Included Records

Full copy redacted report:

- A History of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), October 2001

First two pages of:

- 160th SOAR Annual Historical Review, January 91 - December 91
- 160th SOAR Annual Historical Review, calendar year 1991
- 160th SOAR Annual Historical Review, calendar year 1992
- 160th SOAR Annual Historical Report for calendar Year 1993
- 160th SOAR Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1994
- Headquarters and Headquarters Battery Division Artillery, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1996 Annual Historical Review, 1 January 1996 – 31 December 1996
- 160th Special Operations Aviation (Airborne) Annual Historical Review CY97
- 160th SOAR(A) Annual Historical Review - CY98
- 160th SOAR(A) Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year (Cy) 2001
- Historical Report 160th SOAR (A), January 2001 to December 2001
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Case #09-76. Your request consisted of two separate requests combined into one, Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 requests a copy of internal written history of the 160th SOAR covering the 1980s. Part 2 requests a copy of the title page and coversheet for each history of the 160th SOAR.

The U.S. Army 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center School conducted a thorough search for records responsive to your request. Documents (72 pages) were located. A redacted copy of the documents is enclosed. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has designated Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, its components’ headquarters, and theater Special Operations Commands as “sensitive units” as defined by 10 USC 130b. The code (10 USC 130b) precludes release of personally identifying information in units that are sensitive, routinely deployable, or overseas. Information is being withheld pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA (E.O, Order 12958 (b)(1)), because the information pertains to military weapons systems. Personally identifying information regarding any person’s name, rank, duty address, official title, official email address, and phone numbers contained in the requested documents is being withheld under Exemption 3 of the FOIA (5 USC 552(b)(3)) and Exemption 6 of the FOIA (5 USC 552(b)(6)). Information is also being withheld pursuant to Exemption 6 of the FOIA, because disclosure of this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion into the individual’s privacy interests.
While you agreed to accept a "releasable" copy of the information, you retain the right to request the records in their entirety. At that time you will be given a formal denial, and you will be advised of your right to appeal.

This is only a preliminary decision. We are referring your request to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Attention: DAJA-AL, 1777 N. Kent Street, 10th Floor, Rosslyn, VA 22209, for a final determination and direct reply to you.

There is no charge for processing your request, as the fees fell below our $15.00 threshold.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please call Ms. Mary Bowling, FOIA Officer, at (910) 432-9233, email: bowlingm@soc.mil; or Mr. Chris Nesbitt, FOIA Analyst, at (910) 432-9107, email: nesbittc@soc.mil).

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Campbell P. Cantelou
Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief Information Officer/G-6

Enclosures
A History of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

Under an Interagency Agreement with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

October 2001
Preface

This report traces the history of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) (Airborne) from its inception in October 1981 to the present. Based on information from unclassified files of the 160th SOAR (A) and interviews with many of the participants, the report describes some of the major operations in which the unit has been involved, as well as the reorganizations that the unit has undergone in the past twenty years. When available, photographs from the actual operations have been included.
A History of the

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
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Introduction

It is fitting that on the 20th anniversary of the founding of what we now know as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) "Night Stalkers" we honor the many brave soldiers who have served in this unit. They have frequently been asked to put their lives on the line, and some have made the ultimate sacrifice in order that the 160th could accomplish its special mission. The men of the 160th and their aircraft often have displayed their unique qualifications for clandestinely infiltrating, supporting, and exfiltrating special operations forces and rescuing downed personnel in hostile environments throughout the world, as well as for carrying out routine combat patrols and escort duties. Whatever the mission, the Night Stalkers of the 160th have always remained true to their motto, "Night Stalkers Don't Quit!"

The Creation of Task Force 160

Following the April 1980 failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the attempted U.S. hostage rescue in Iran, President Carter appointed Admiral James L. Holloway, III, the former Chief of Naval Operations, to head a commission to study the deficiencies revealed by the operation. Among the findings was the fact that the military lacked aircraft and crews who were trained and prepared to perform these types of missions. The services would later formally address the findings of the commission, but, in the short term, the focus was on recovering the hostages. To accomplish this task, the Army turned to the 101st Aviation Group of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The division possessed the greatest number and variety of helicopters of any unit within the Army, and thus showed the greatest potential for the rapid development of a rotary wing special operations capability.
The special project known as Honey Badger would center around the Aviation Battalion. Companies of the battalion had acquired the Army's new UH-60 assault helicopter and would serve as the primary assault force for the project. The UH-60A Blackhawk was an easily deployable and highly capable assault helicopter and with its great power was able to carry large payloads at high speeds. The Attack Helicopter Battalion would initially provide pilots for the light assault helicopters. They would later man the light attack component as well. OH-6A scout helicopters (Little Birds) were chosen for the light assault role because of their small size and ease of transport. The Little Birds could carry only three soldiers and a single pilot, but they could land in the most restrictive locations. Personnel at Fort Rucker, Alabama developed armed Little Birds as a separate part of the project. Selected personnel would team with the Fort Rucker element toward the end of the initial project as Company Attack Helicopter Battalion became the Little Bird organization of the Task Force.

Company Assault Support Helicopter Battalion would provide the heavy lift element of the new organization. CH-47C Chinooks, although not as easily deployable as the other aircraft, were capable of moving large numbers of personnel and heavier payloads. The Chinooks would prove most effective in the project by establishing forward area refuel/rearm points (FARPs) for long-range operations. Together, these men and aircraft formed Task Force.

The 160th SOAR (A) still uses the same basic models of aircraft that were used in the initial project; however, they have undergone significant modifications to enhance mission performance. The current inventory includes the following aircraft.

1 [www.nightstalkers.com/history/origin.html](http://www.nightstalkers.com/history/origin.html)
The project began as separate training deployments. The Blackhawks were moved to Norton Air Force Base (AFB) in San Bernardino, California, on Air Force C-5 transport aircraft, while the Chinooks self-deployed. At Norton AFB, the Blackhawk aircraft were modified to accommodate night vision goggles (NVG), and no one was qualified for NVG flight in the UH-60. In fact, the aircraft instruments and lighting were not NVG compatible, and modifications had to be made before training could begin. Once the aviators completed a 10-hour NVG syllabus, they...
progressed to long-range navigation training. Training flights consisted of up to seven and one-half hours of night flying with AN/PVS-5 night vision goggles (NVG). Pilots who completed the designated route, qualified. The Chinooks stopped at Reese AFB in Lubbock, Texas, and Luke AFB in Phoenix, Arizona, for refueling and crew rest, and then joined the Blackhawks at Norton AFB. Pilots selected for the Little Bird helicopters were sent to the Mississippi Army National Guard Aviation Support Facility at Gulfport, Mississippi, for two weeks of training on the OH-6A helicopters. Following aircraft qualification, the Little Bird aircraft and crews were loaded on Air Force C-141 aircraft and moved to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for two weeks of mission training.2 Armed OH-6 aircraft would join the training program later in the fall of 1980. Ultimately, aircrews would perform missions over routes as long as nautical miles. Little Birds would load on C130 transports and move to appropriately located forward staging areas to train for their role in the mission.

All of the units continued extensive training throughout the summer and fall of 1980 in desert environmental skills and long-range, close-formation precision navigation with NVGs in preparation for the unspecified mission. Late in the fall, the aircrews were asked if they wished to volunteer to continue with the project. As expected, most volunteered to remain. At this time, the volunteers were given their first formal briefing on Operation Honey Badger, which was to be the air component of a second attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages from Iran.

Unless otherwise specified, conducted all subsequently cited interviews.
On 20 January 1981, the hostages were released, and Operation Honey Badger was cancelled. The men of Task Force expected to disband and return to their former units; however, Army leadership determined that the unit was needed to meet future contingencies. The new unit, soon to become the 160th Aviation Battalion, consisted of a Headquarters and Service Company (HSC), a Light Assault Company (M-6-H-6s), and a Light Attack Company (AH-6s). With the addition of two Blackhawk companies and a company of Chinooks, Task Force 160 was formed. Sometime later, a maintenance company was developed from the maintenance platoon of HSC and added to the task force. The task force continued to train and develop specialized skills while operating from diverse locations on Fort Campbell to minimize the appearance of a non-standard unit. The 160th Aviation Battalion was formally activated at an open ceremony on the Fort Campbell Division Parade Field on 16 October 1981 immediately following the change of command ceremony for the Aviation Battalion. Outgoing commander of the became the first commander of Task Force 160. A few months later, on 1 April 1982, the 160th Aviation Battalion was officially added to the Army s rolls. The new battalion s stated mission would be to provide additional flexibility to the commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) while experimenting with new and improved air assault tactics, techniques and procedures. In reality, the Army s special operations aviation unit had been quietly but openly activated. While the 160th has grown and evolved over the past 20 years, many still refer to the organization as Task Force 160.

The following chart depicts the task force as it appeared in approximately November of 1982, was formed from the Headquarters and service company about this time. was redesignated in about November of 82.
Early training took its toll on the task force and threatened its future existence. From March to October 1983, four aircraft and sixteen personnel were lost. Because of these accidents, the Army convened a Blue Ribbon Panel at Fort Campbell, Kentucky in October of 1983. The panel recommended the creation of a dedicated training program, which quickly became known as Green Platoon. The program would later evolve into the dedicated Special Operations Aviation Training Company. The Systems Integration and Management Office was also created in order to organize and manage the many aircraft programs that were required to support special missions. The training company centralized and standardized the fragmented training of the unit, and enabled the highly skilled volunteer pilots recruited by the unit to become properly qualified as special operations pilots. After four months of rigorous training supervised by an experienced special operations pilot, the pilots were certified as Basic Mission Qualified (BMQ) and could serve as co-pilots on missions. After 12 to 18 months of training and experience in an operational company, pilots were certified as Fully Mission Qualified (FMQ) and could serve as command pilots and planners on special operations missions. A further 36 to 48 months of sustained high performance qualified selected pilots to be designated
as Flight Lead Qualified and plan and lead special operations aviation missions. Implementation of recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Panel drastically reduced task force training accidents and prevented the dissolution of the unit. 4

**Missions**

**Operation URGENT FURY (October 1983)**

In October 1983, the task force engaged in its first combat mission. On 19 October 1983, Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and a number of his top aides were executed by the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), on orders from a radical new political group known as the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). Intending to replace Bishop's Marxist government with an even more virulent Marxist regime, General Hudson Austin and his sixteen-member RMC quickly moved to assume control of the island-nation. The United States had intelligence that Cuban troops were stationed in Grenada and that Cuban workers were assisting in the construction of a 10,000-foot runway capable of handling large military transports. This intelligence, coupled with concern for the safety of U.S. citizens studying at the medical school in Grenada, caused President Reagan to authorize military action to direct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and the restoration of a more mainstream government in Grenada.

On 21 October 1983, the 160th received notice to go to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to prepare for Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. The call came on a weekend, forcing those members of the task force who were unable to get back to Fort Campbell in time to leave with the unit to rent a car and drive to Fort Bragg. An operation plan was hastily drawn up at Fort Bragg, and task force aircraft were loaded on Air Force C-130 and C-5 aircraft for transport to the forward staging airbase in Barbados. Those conducting the mission were provided with

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4 "The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)," Working Draft by.
operations orders, maps (photocopies of tourist maps), and an execution checklist. The task force received an intelligence briefing stating that the operation would be a “walk in the park,” that there were approximately six hostile Cuban nationals on the island, and that they could even expect the locals to “wave at them” as they flew onto shore.\textsuperscript{5} Based on this briefing, the crews were armed only with 38-caliber pistols with six rounds of ammunition and their privately owned weapons. While there was talk of leaving the gunships at home, they deployed with the rest of the force. There efforts and the firepower of the Blackhawks’ door gun proved to be of great value as the enemy proved to be more determined than briefed.

Equipped with MH-60 Blackhawks, CH-47 Chinooks, MH-6 and AH-6 Little Birds, the 160th had been formed to provide the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) community with a dedicated helicopter capability. One primary mission of the 160th was the clandestine infiltration and exfiltration of SOF personnel into hostile locations. This would be their task in Grenada. The three primary objectives for the 160th in Operation URGENT FURY were the Richmond Hill prison, the Governor’s mansion, and the radio/TV station. Intelligence reported that the prison housed the core of senior advisors to General Austin, who were collectively known as the Revolutionary Military Council and scores of civil servants and other citizens arrested by the RMC regime.\textsuperscript{6}

The Richmond Hill prison was built on the site of an old fort, overlooking the town of St. George’s. The prison, in turn, was overlooked by Fort Frederick, at the time a fully manned garrison outpost used by the People’s Revolutionary Army. Between the two locations was a small valley, and it was through this valley that the assault team would have to fly. Upon arrival at the prison, six helicopters would move to their pre-designated location around the facility and
slow quickly to a hover, allowing the teams immediately to fastrope to the ground and execute their assault. 7

Ideally, Operation URGENT FURY should have been carried out at night. The original plan called for a flight of nine MH-60 Blackhawks to depart Barbados at approximately 0100 hours, ferrying Special Forces soldiers. Because of chaotic planning, last-minute inter-service bickering at senior levels, and Air Force delays, however, the helicopters did not leave until 0630, over five hours behind schedule. This delay meant that instead of the helicopters racing into the objective unseen, under cover of darkness, the airmobile assault would take place in the stark light of the rising sun. Enemy defenders (already alerted because the conventional invasion had begun hours earlier) would have the advantage in defense. Still, had the pre-assault intelligence that reported only lightly armed prison guards at the objective been correct, the situation might not have been as disastrous as it proved to be. 8

When the Blackhawks raced toward the prison, it was clear that intelligence had failed them. Pilots, tuning into the local radio station en route from Barbados to Grenada, were shocked when they heard the announcer urging all listeners to grab their weapons and shoot down the American aircraft as they came to shore. Although ordered at an earlier briefing not to test fire any of their weapons, the aircraft crews immediately test fired all of their M60 machine guns upon hearing this radio transmission. As soon as the nine Blackhawks rounded a hill south of the prison, they were immediately the targets of massive ground anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Upon arrival at the prison, they attempted to insert the special forces troops, however the gunfire was so intense that doing so was not possible. 9

6 www.nightstalkers.com/history/baptism.html
7 www.nightstalkers.com/urgent_fury/default.html
9
The Blackhawks left the prison area, regrouped, and made a second attempt. This time, the first six Blackhawks headed for the prison, chalks 7 and 8 went to the Governor's Mansion, and chalk 9 went to the radio station. Again, chalks 1-6 were bombarded by enemy fire as they approached the prison. With the aircraft torn apart and the crew chiefs and ground troops severely injured, the Blackhawks aborted the mission and flew towards the ocean. Luckily, they saw an American warship offshore, approximately 10 miles away. They had no radio to contact the ship, and as the first Blackhawk approached the ship, the ship's crew tried to wave them off, not knowing that the helicopters had just come under hostile fire and had wounded soldiers on board. As the first helicopter landed, the ship's operations officer approached and was extremely angry, but before he could say anything, he noticed the bullet-ridden damage and saw the injured personnel. One by one, each Blackhawk landed and unloaded its injured. Manned by minimal personnel, the helicopters then flew to Salinas airfield, leaving both company commanders wounded on the deck.10

One Blackhawk, piloted by b3/6 b3/6, was shot down as it raced along the coast. It crashed east of Salinas Airfield before it approached the ship. b3/6 became the 160th's only fatality in Operation URGENT FURY. Because there was no close air support, elimination of the defenses was impossible despite valiant attempts at providing suppressive fire by 160th Blackhawk pilots and crewmen. The two attempts to land on the prison resulted in extensive damage to all six MH-60s.11 Chalks 7 and 8 received heavy fire from the city and the prison after missing the release point on their first attempt to drop off passengers at the Governor's mansion. They regrouped and made another approach. This time

chalk 7 was able to drop off all of its passengers and circle out to sea. Meanwhile, the occupants of the mansion went out the back door and blasted chalk 8, which was able to drop off its passengers, but took heavy fire. The helicopter moved its wounded crew and passengers to the USS Guam, but was shut down only when water from a fire hose was shot into the engine. At the TV/radio station, however, the situation was much different. Arriving by 160th helicopters, troops assaulted the complex without sustaining casualties.

**Blackhawk being hosed down on the deck of the USS Guam**

At Salinas airfield, the remaining seven aircraft, armed with minimal ammunition, were immediately attacked by enemy fire. Fortunately, minutes after their arrival, C141s dropped a Ranger force onto the airfield. However, the rangers were dropped onto the hard surface of the runway, and the flight crews had to drag injured Rangers to safety. Once the Rangers had secured the airfield, the aircrews began assessing their damaged Blackhaws and dispatched two helicopters to retrieve the equipment of the aircraft downed near the airfield. (The passengers had already been removed by a Navy H-3.)

MH-60s were then allocated to an operation to secure Sir Paul Scoon, the governor general, at his residence. As the helicopters approached the residence, Grenadian soldiers took them under fire. The helicopters evaded the fire and flew over St. George’s harbor to the USS Guam. In a second attempt, Special Operations forces reached the Governor’s residence and protected the governor general. When three Special Operations personnel were unaccounted for, the commander asked for volunteers to fly back into the city to find them. Four pilots volunteered. As the pilots were flying into the city, they received word that the missing

[URL: www.nighthawks.com/urgent_fury/default.html]
personnel were in the ocean, attempting to swim out as far as they could go. The pilots continued their search and rescued two of the three personnel. The third swam seven miles, injured, until he reached a Navy ship and pounded on the side until they rescued him.  

All the remaining aircraft at Salinas airfield were told that they had to leave the following night in complete darkness, even though their aircraft were badly damaged and low on fuel. On the quiet flight to Barbados, the crews made plans to ditch the aircraft in the water if they ran out of fuel. With their fuel almost gone, they saw land and let out a sigh of relief as they touched ground. Despite hasty planning and inadequate and misleading intelligence, the 160th successfully completed its mission in the face of a heavily armed Cuban and Grenadian force, and earned the motto "Night Stalkers Don’t Quit."  

**Restructuring**  

From 1983 to 1986, 160th members continued to hone their skills through numerous classified exercises and operations. One of the force’s main efforts was development and documentation of unit force structure and command and control requirements necessary to execute the precision operations tasked. Beginning as an "ad hoc" organization without a defined force structure, the 160th implemented changes to keep pace with operational requirements. Although conventional models were applied to the structure, they did not meet the needs of this one-of-a-kind unit. In addition, initially the unit’s operational requirements grew faster than the system’s ability to capture and respond. Consequently, force structures of the 160th were often incompatible with the prevailing and combat-proven special operations doctrine.

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"Urgent Fury Remembered."

The proven value of the 160th Aviation Battalion in the early to mid-1980s led the military to provide the Army special operations community with additional aviation resources. On 1 October 1986, to help meet the increasing demands for support, the 160th Aviation Battalion was activated at Hunter Army Airfield (AAF), Georgia, and was placed under the command and control of the 160th. Out of the 15 MH-60s at Howard AFB, Panama. The 160th had five of the 15 MH-60s assigned to the 160th. Additionally, the 160th Aviation Battalion was reorganized and redesignated as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG) Airborne (A). This action also marked the designation of the 160th as an airborne unit and authorized personnel to wear the maroon beret. The unit initially had worn the airborne flash and background trimming of 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Later, however, the unit designed its own flash and background trimming, combining both aviation and 1st SOCOM colors. On 26 March 1987, the Institute of Heraldry, U.S. Army, approved the distinctive flash and background trimming for the 160th.

The formation of the 160th SOAG (A) in October 1986 was an interim step in the creation of one special operations aviation unit to serve as a unifying headquarters for all Army special operations aviation. Plans were underway to create a SOF aviation brigade at Hunter AAF by 1987. In addition, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was tasked to submit a layout of the design concept plan for the 160th Aviation Group.

In August 1987, the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, proposed that the 160th SOAG be regimentally designated as separate companies and one Battalion of the 7th
Aviation Regiment because of the long history of the 7th versus the relative newness of the 160th. In October and November 1987, however, the 160th and 1st SOCOM requested that the 160th SOAG (A) be redesignated as the 160th Aviation Regiment, instead of the 7th Aviation Regiment. Although the 160th was a relatively new unit, it had been combat tested, had earned two unit citations, and had a special operations affiliation. Activation of the 160th Aviation Regiment under the U.S. Army Regimental System was approved. 19

Operations EARNEST WILL and PRIME CHANCE (July 1987-August 1989)

Near the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) when Iran began using naval mines and Silkworm missiles to endanger oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the United States offered to do what it could to keep the oil moving. In December 1986, concerned that it could not protect its ships, the government of Kuwait approached the United States about registering 11 of the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company's oil and gas tankers under the American flag. In March 1987, the U.S. government agreed to this transfer, and in July 1987 initiated Operation EARNEST WILL to provide a naval escort to tankers passing through those dangerous waters. 20

On 24 July, when the Bridgeton, the first oil tanker escorted by US Navy ships, struck a mine near the end of its return through the Persian Gulf, it was apparent that the mere presence of U.S. Navy ships would not be enough to safeguard the tankers. It would be necessary to call on SOF boat units, helicopters, and Navy SEALs to provide surveillance and patrols. Within two
weeks, MH/AH-6 helicopters from the 160th were on station, along with patrol craft and SEAL platoons from the Naval Special Warfare Command.\textsuperscript{21} 

Initial 160th assets, designated Detachment 160 Aviation Group (DET 160 AVGP) for Operation EARNEST WILL, consisted of two MH-6s, four AH-6s, and personnel, including pilots, crews, and maintenance personnel.\textsuperscript{22} The MH/AH-6 helicopters had many characteristics that made them remarkably suited to the operation. Small helicopters that could fly at 120 knots with a radius of nautical miles, they were difficult to detect on radar and relatively quiet running. In addition, the two pilots assigned to each aircraft were proficient at flying with night vision goggles. The MH-6 was equipped with forward looking... with a

The AH-6 gunships also were armed with... and...

On 5 August 1987, the unit reported to the command ship USS La Salle (AFG-3) on station and, on 8 August, the unit accompanied the USS La Salle on an escort mission. For the operation, DET 160 AVGP was divided into two self-sustaining teams. Each team used the call sign SEABAT and consisted of one MH-6, two AH-6s, crew, and maintenance personnel. Later that day, the first SEABAT team was transferred to the USS Klakring (FFG-42) and ordered to protect minesweeping tugboats operating west of Farsi Island where the channel narrows. It remained on station until the convoy passed through the area on its return south from Kuwait. On 9 August, the second SEABAT team transferred to the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) to accompany the convoy on the return to the Gulf of Oman.\textsuperscript{24}
Initial tactics called for the MH/AH-6s to fly nightly patrol missions over the gulf in tight formations waiting for U.S. Navy Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) helicopters to vector them to contacts. It was soon determined that in order to preserve the crews and equipment, the MH/AH-6s should remain on the ship’s deck until a LAMPS requested verification of a contact.25

It was later decided that mobile sea bases (MSB) would be more suitable for special operations forces. As a result, two oil servicing barges were leased from a civilian firm: the Hercules, a derrick barge used for constructing oil platforms, 400 feet long and 150 feet wide with a draft of 15 feet; and the Wimbrown VII, a jack-up barge, 250 feet long and 80 feet wide with a draft of 13 feet. The Hercules also had an elevated 65-foot by 75-foot helicopter landing pad and could accommodate \( \text{\textsuperscript{62}} \) men. Although the Wimbrown VII had an elevated 50-foot by 50-foot helicopter landing pad, it was smaller and could not fit the SEABAT team and all the patrol and minesweeping craft on board. It could, however, accommodate \( \text{\textsuperscript{62}} \) men. The president of Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, encouraged by the Kuwaiti oil minister, agreed to lease the barges, and on 5 September 1987, contracts were issued to modify the barges and provide them for special operations use along the convoy route in the vicinity of Farsi Island.26

On 21 September 1987, the Iran AJR, an Iranian Navy roll-on roll-off cargo ship modified for mine laying, sailed from Bandar Abbas intent on mining the convoy route off the northern coast of Qatar. At 2200 hours, the of the USS Jarrett, alerted to possible mining activity, launched his SEABAT team (an MH-6 and two AH-6s) to search for the Iran AJR. It
was an excellent night for helicopter surveillance. There was a 5,000-foot ceiling with scattered clouds, visibility of one to two nautical miles, and zero percent moon illumination. Within 40 minutes, the SEABAT team had spotted the *Iran AJR*. After the MH-6 had moved to within 200 meters without being observed by the ship, the SEABAT team was ordered to pull back and observe the ship from afar. The helicopter stayed within one nautical mile of the ship. At 2250 hours, the *Iran AJR* extinguished its lights and reversed course. The MH-6 moved in and observed six crew members remove the tarpaulin on center of the deck, revealing cylindrical-shaped objects with flat bottoms and rounded tops. When the MH-6 radioed the *Jarrett* that he had observed three crewmembers push one of these "mine-like" objects over the side, the SEABAT team was ordered to take the ship under fire.\(^{27}\)

The MH-6 moved away and the first AH-6 moved in. At 600 to 700 meters, it strafed the deck of the *Iran AJR* with the minigun to clear personnel away from the mines and machine guns, and at 200 meters it fired two 2.75-inch high-explosive rockets into the stern of the ship. Then the first AH-6 broke off, and the second AH-6 raked the deck and bridge with minigun fire and shot two rockets at the stern, causing a secondary explosion in a paint locker. When this AH-6 broke off, the first AH-6 came back around and launched its last 2.75-inch high-explosive rocket, striking the pilothouse with two flechette rockets. Before the other AH-6 could make another pass, the SEABAT team was ordered to cease-fire.\(^{28}\)

While the first AH-6 returned to the *Jarrett* for refueling, the MH-6 remained to observe, covered by the other AH-6. On the *Jarrett* the first AH-6 was serviced, and a back-up pilot replaced the pilot for the return to the *Iran AJR*. The MH-6 observed 10 to 15 Iranians standing near the bow of the ship and 16 mines arranged in three rows on the main deck. When the
SEABAT team reported that personnel were moving from the bow of the ship back to the suspected mines, the AH-6 on station was given permission to use whatever means necessary to prevent further mining. It fired a rocket at the stern, sprayed the deck with minigun fire, and expended its remaining flechette on the deck. Out of ammunition, it returned to the Jarrett and was replaced by the other AH-6 inbound from the Jarrett. This AH-6 engaged the ship with 500 to 800 rounds of minigun fire and fired two rockets into the bridge before it was ordered to cease-fire. Although the Iran AJR had not issued a distress signal nor responded to calls on the maritime radio, the SEABAT team could see that the ship was damaged and dead in the water. Most of the crew had abandoned ship, but two crewmembers remained near the ship’s bow. The MH-6 returned to the Jarrett for servicing and the two AH-6s remained on station. The SEABAT team remained on station until U.S. Marine helicopters relieved them shortly before dawn. Then they returned to the Jarrett to wash and stow their helicopters. The maintenance crew on the Jarrett had worked through the night without relief, rearming and refueling the SEABAT helicopters.

Another incident occurred on the evening of 8 October 1987, when LAMPS flying in the vicinity of Middle Shoals Buoy detected a target and directed the SEABAT team to investigate. At first the target appeared to be friendly patrol boats known to be operating in the area, but the image in the FLIR box revealed a Revolutionary Guard Corps Boghammar and two Boston whaler boats. The MH-6 went in to investigate, and as it made its turn received machinegun fire from the Boghammar. The first AH-6 moved in to engage, firing flechette rockets to suppress the personnel on the boats’ decks followed by high-explosive rocket and minigun fire. This attack broke one of the Boston whaler boats in half and started fires on both of the whaler boats.
To cover the first AH-6 on its outbound leg, the second AH-6 engaged the Boghammar and the remaining Boston whaler with a minigun. One of the rockets hit the whaler boat, causing a second fire. When the first AH-6 finished its attack run, the second attacked the Boghammar with its minigun and a high-explosive rocket. On this pass the Boghammar launched two rockets, later revealed to be STINGER missiles, in the direction of the AH-6. The Boghammar maneuvered, using the smoke from the burning whaler boats to shield it. In response, the AH-6s changed their tactics. The first helicopter remained on one side of the fire while the other AH-6 went around to the other side to meet the Boghammar when it came around. After the first AH-6 had expended its ammunition, the MH-6 made a run, firing its recently acquired minigun at the Boghammar. The second AH-6, which had left, was directed by the other AH-6 to get closer to the Boghammar and to fire its last The rocket sank the Boghammar.

AH-6 firing at a Boghammar

In November 1987, two 160th Blackhawk helicopters with four pilots, two crew chiefs, and six maintenance personnel were deployed to the Persian Gulf to enhance combat search and rescue (CSAR) capabilities. The Blackhawks, equipped and armed with miniguns, required only minor modifications and gray paint to match Navy colors, thus being dubbed as “Grayhawks.” The Blackhawks were first assigned to the Hercules. (They were not able to land on the Wimbrown VII, until the landing pad was expanded and strengthened in March 1988.) Mission commanders originally

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Interview with 68-71.

7 July 2001.
intended that the Blackhawks would go out with each of the SEABAT patrols, but this schedule put too many flying hours on the Blackhawks. Therefore, they remained on the barge on five-minute alert during SEABAT patrols. In addition, the Blackhawks were made available for an increasing number of administrative support missions. These assignments taxed the equipment and the morale of the crews.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{“Grayhawk” on the lower deck of the Hercules}

In addition to CSAR and logistics flights, the Blackhawks also provided nighttime casualty evacuations. This service was critical on December 1987, when an accident aboard the \textit{Wimbrown VII} seriously injured a 160th maintenance sergeant. As walked under the rotor blades of an AH-6 after picking up individual weapons from the pilots, a gust of wind caught the blade pushing it down far enough to strike him in the head, breaking his neck and splitting his head open. SEABAT and SEAL personnel stabilized his injury and put him on a Blackhawk for medical evacuation to Bahrain and further evacuation to the United States. The rapid evacuation by the Blackhawk helicopter very likely saved his life.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{Grayhawk} suffered its only helicopter loss near the end of its Persian Gulf assignment. On 24 June 1988, as a flight of one MH-6 and two AH-6s was patrolling the northern Persian Gulf, one of the AH-6s experienced engine failure. Unable to make it to the nearest land, a Saudi Arabian island manned by coast guard personnel 12 to 13 nautical miles away, the helicopter plunged into the water. The crew was able to swim clear of the helicopter

\textsuperscript{91-92, 94-95; interview with 17 July 2001.}
before it sank, and the other AH-6 threw them a ladder and flew them to the Saudi Arabian island on the ladder. A Blackhawk was immediately scrambled from the Hercules to pick up the two crewmembers from the island. While the Blackhawk was en route, Iranian forces on the island were searching for the two crewmembers. The Blackhawk landed quickly and picked up the crewmembers before Iranian forces could get to them. (The AH-6 was recovered from the water five days later.)

In early 1988, it was decided that Army OH-58D (AHIP) helicopters from the would be phased in to replace the SEABAT teams. On 24 February 1988, AHIP helicopters reported to the Wimbrown VII, and the SEABAT team stationed on the barge returned to the United States. For the next few months, the AHIP helicopters on the Wimbrown VII shared patrol duties with the SEABAT team on the Hercules. Coordination was difficult, but despite frequent requests from TF-160, the SEABAT team on the Hercules was not replaced by an AHIP detachment until June 1988. The Blackhaws remained in the gulf until transportation was available to return them to the United States in July and August 1989.

**Little Bird landing on a barge**

160th helicopters performed very well in the Persian Gulf. Neither the MH/AH-6s nor the Blackhawks had major maintenance problems, although the Blackhawks did suffer. At the time that the AHIPs replaced the SEABAT teams, the MH-6s and AH-6s had logged 1,300 and 2,100 flight hours respectively, and, through 15 January 1989, the Blackhawks had flown 2,306 hours. Nevertheless, the availability rate of the MH/AH-6s was 97 percent and
that of the Blackhawks was 94 percent. The presence of DET 160 AVGP deterred numerous attacks on international shipping and slowed the mine-laying process. Once again the 160th proved to be a decisive weapon, one that had international implications.

**Operation MOUNT HOPE III (June 1988)**

During this same time period (June 1988), the 160th SOAG and other US special operations forces received a short-notice directive to recover a Russian-made Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter from a remote location in Africa. In 1960 Chad had gained its independence from France. Its neighbor, Libya, recognizing the unrest in the new country, took advantage of the situation to occupy a 114,000 square mile uranium- and oil-rich area of northern Chad known as the Aouzou Strip. In 1987, after 15 years of fighting, the Libyans were ousted from the area and a cease-fire agreement was reached. Among the equipment abandoned by the Libyans in the desert of northern Chad near the Libyan border was a Russian-made MI-24 Hind helicopter of great intelligence value to the U.S. military. The Government of Chad agreed to let the U.S. have the helicopter, if they could get it out of the desert. After other U.S. government organizations had been unsuccessful in recovering the aircraft, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG) was called upon to perform the mission.

In April 1988, CH-47 Chinooks were loaded on an Air Force C-5 Galaxy and flown to White Sands AFB, New Mexico, along with maintenance personnel and crews to rehearse the mission. From White Sands AFB, the Chinooks flew to Biggs AAF in El Paso, Texas, the same distance that would be required for the mission. At Biggs, chalk one, the first Chinook picked up six blivets (500-gallon fuel tanks) full of water, simulating the weight of the
Hind, and, with the Chinook as back up, the Chinooks returned to the simulated Forward Support Base, successfully completing the training mission.40

When the execution order was issued on 21 May 1988, an advance team led by went to the European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and on to N'djamena, Chad, to await their aircraft. Nearly two weeks later, the Chinooks and 76 crewmembers and maintenance personnel arrived by Air Force C-5 Galaxy. In N'djamena the six pilots and four crewmembers stayed in the home of a U.S. Embassy employee, and the maintenance personnel stayed at the U.S. Marine Corps barracks attached to the embassy.41

At midnight on 11 June 1988, the MH-47s lifted off on Operation MOUNT HOPE III and flew miles at night without outside navigational aids to the target location, the Ouadi Doum airfield in northern Chad, arriving at approximately 5:00 a.m. The first Chinook landed close to the Hind and configured it, while the second Chinook hovered over the Hind and sling loaded it for the return to N'djamena. There were refueling stops at Faya Laargeau and Mousorro, Chad.42

Because of a lack of adequate weather reporting, approximately 45 minutes from N'djamena, the flight encountered a surprise sandstorm, with sand rising as high as 3,000 feet. The Chinooks separated by approximately one mile and slowed to 40 knots until the sandstorm cleared enough for them to set the Hind down and land at N'djamena. After they landed, the sandstorm came around again, and they were unable to exit the aircraft for more than twenty minutes. As soon as the storm passed, the ground crew immediately began loading the Hind and the Chinooks aboard the C-5 for return to the United States. It had been just 67 hours since the

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first arrival of the C-5 in Chad.\textsuperscript{43} This mission once again demonstrated the ability of the 160th to strike deep and accomplish the mission despite the most demanding flight conditions.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{MI-24 Hind at Quadi Doum}

\textbf{MH-47 with Hind in sling}

\textbf{Sandstorm on the airfield}

\textbf{Night Stalker crew}

\textbf{Operation JUST CAUSE (December 1989-January 1990)}

In December 1989, the 160th SOAG (Airborne) was called upon to spearhead Operation JUST CAUSE, to remove Panamanian General Manuel Noriega from power. The mission had been anticipated for some time. Elements had trained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for “Operation Blue Spoon” for over a year, and units had made sorties to Panama to conduct “proof of concept” exercises. A replica of Modelo Prison had even been constructed at Hurlburt AFB, Florida.\textsuperscript{45} Finally, on 17 December 1989, the soldiers of the 160th departed Fort Campbell in preparation for Operation JUST CAUSE. The weather was bitterly cold, 20°F with blowing snow, as four MH-47 Chinooks and their crews left for Hurlburt AFB, Florida. From there, the Chinooks accompanied by MH-53Js from the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) deployed non-stop from Hurlburt Field to Howard AFB in Panama, a 12-hour trip requiring
aerial refuelings.\textsuperscript{46} The other aircraft of the 160th were transported by Air Force C-5 transports. Altogether the 160th deployed approximately \[b_2^2\] personnel along with \[b_2^2\] AH-6G/Js, \[b_2^2\] UH/MH-60As, and \[b_2^2\] MH-47Ds. The force arrived at Howard AFB on Monday, 18 December, and gathered all the aircraft and the personnel in Hangar 3. The heat was sweltering.\textsuperscript{47}

After dark on Tuesday, 19 December, the aircraft were rolled out of the hangar in preparation for the mission. Night Stalkers participated in the successful pre-H-hour airborne and air assaults. Missions in Panama City included the pre-H-hour insertion of a beacon and combat controllers by two MH-6s supported by two AH-6s at Torrijos-Tocumen Airport.\textsuperscript{47} AH-6s also conducted pre-assault attacks on the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) Headquarters in the Comandancia. One of the AH-6s was shot down and crashed into the Comandancia. The pilots \[b_3^6\] survived the crash and were pinned down by enemy small arms fire for two hours, after which they evaded capture, took a PDF soldier prisoner, and linked up with friendly forces. In addition, \[b_2^2\] AH-6s with \[b_2^2\] FARPs provided fire support for the airborne assault at Rio Hato. Two \[b_2^2\] teams from the 160th participated in the airborne assaults of Torrijos-Tocumen Airfield and Rio Hato Airfield, and were dropped from Air Force C-141s to set up FARPs. The FARPs consisted of 12-foot platforms with HE-rocket and minigun ammunition, parts and replacements for the miniguns, and fuel and refueling pumps, hoses, etc. The FARP dropped at Rio Hato landed in a marsh and was not able to be used. As a result, for the rest of the operation, the team had to "wet wing" refuel directly from the C-141 on the ground.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, \[b_2^2\] AH-6s with \[b_2^2\] FARPs provided fire support for the airborne assault at Rio Hato. The Rio Hato mission originally included nine other MH-
60s and four MH6s, which were to raid a key PDF stronghold. Several hours prior to H-hour, PDF leaders were believed to be in the vicinity of Colon. The MH-60s and MH-6s conducted an air assault raid on a beach house on the coast of Colon at H-hour. Another force of MH-60s and MH-6s were on strip alert to conduct raids should the need arise during the H-hour operations. During this mission the 160th received its only fatalities in an AH-6 supporting the operation were shot down.

Four or five hours before H-hour, members of the 160th loaded up a two and one-half ton truck with ammunition and weapons and set up a FARP at Albrook AAF. Fifteen minutes before H-hour, someone pulled up on the road, began shooting, and drove off. About five minutes later, another group from the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) came by and fired at the FARP. For the rest of the night, no aircraft could land because of heavy fire. By 2:00 a.m. the FARP had been shut down and the personnel took cover in a sewerage ditch. The next morning a Chinook picked up the FARP and took it back to Howard AFB.

**Modelo Prison**

A key mission during JUST CAUSE was a rescue operation at Modelo Prison adjacent to the Comandancia.) MH-6s from the 160th, escorted by AH-6s also from the 160th, were called upon to perform the rooftop assault on the prison. As they approached the prison, the aircraft received sniper fire from the windows and roof of a nearby apartment house. Despite heavy fire, the Little Birds were able to land on the roof of the prison, drop off the rescue team, and lift off. As the helicopters returned to pick up the successful rescuers, heavy smoke enveloped the area and they had difficulty locating the roof of the prison. The aircraft also were receiving heavy fire.

*Interview with 18 July 2001.*
from a cellblock about 50 to 60 feet from the landing site. Co-pilot, who was at the controls of one of the Little Birds, was struck in the elbow by a bullet. His pilot reached over and locked his shoulder harness, then immediately took over the controls, landed the aircraft, picked up the personnel, and flew directly back to Howard AFB. Another heavily loaded MH-6 in the flight lost power as it departed the roof of the prison. It crashed in the street with minor injuries to passengers. Infantry soldiers securing the perimeter assisted the aircrew and passengers in moving from the crash site.

After these initial missions, the 160th continued to provide support as special operations forces attempted to secure outlying areas, recover weapons caches, and “hunt for Elvis,” the phrase the men of the 160th used to refer to the search for General Noriega. A small force of MH-60s, MH-6s, AH-6s, and MH-47s was moved to Ft. Sherman in the north to stage for operations in and around Colon. The 160th conducted numerous air assaults over the next two weeks.

On 3 January 1990, the majority of the force redeployed, but a small element remained behind. During the evening of 3 January, two MH-60s from the 160th transported General Noriega from the Papal Nuncio to Howard AFB for transload to a waiting MC-130 and transport to the United States. Most of the force redeployed two weeks later, but two MH-47s remained in Panama for the next few months to support Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. Operation JUST CAUSE proved the 160th’s ability to conduct complicated night and sustained combat operations as a unit against a determined enemy.

On the airfield at Howard AFB, Panama
Reorganization

In his 27 June 1988 outgoing report, the CG, 1st SOCOM cited the dangers of the over commitment and inadequate force structure of special operations aviation resources. In September 1988, 1st SOCOM prepared a concept brief on the formation of a Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and briefed the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command.51

After receiving Army and TRADOC concurrence, the 160th SOAG (A) was redesignated as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) with an effective date of 16 May 1990. A regimental activation ceremony was held on 28 June 1990.
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DEsert STORM (August 1990-April 1991)

On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded and occupied Kuwait. In response, the United States initiated Operation DESERT SHIELD. Initial plans called for the deployment of 475 MH-47s from 3/6. This battalion was able to provide only 12 aircraft, a deployment that would prevent them from providing any aircraft in the continental United States for other missions. Therefore, their commitment was reduced to eight. 3/6 was tasked to
provide MH-47s and MH-60s, which brought the total to MH-47 equivalents.

After finding out that they were going to get MH-60s, SOCCENT modified the requirement to MH-47s and MH-60s. The headquarters, MH-47s and MH-60s from 160, comprising Task Force 160. Deployment began on 3 September 1990. The unit was based at King Khalid International Airport, also known as King Khalid Military City (KKMC). In December 1990 and January 1991, the equipment on the aircraft was upgraded with.

When the air war began on 17 January 1991, Task Force 160 had two missions. The first mission was to provide MH-47s to support the pre-H-hour attack of Iraqi air defense ground control intercept sites. The task force also provided fuel bladder aircraft to refuel AH-64 attack helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The operation was successful. The second mission was to forward deploy to Rafha and to conduct CSAR missions into Iraq to pick up downed allied pilots. Task Force 160 retained the CSAR mission throughout the war, but moved from Rafha back to KKMC when commanders realized that the potential for allied shootdowns was slight.

The only CSAR mission that Task Force 160 was called upon to perform occurred on 17 February 1991, after F-16 pilot was shot down 60 miles north of the Iraq-Saudi border. His wingman saw his parachute and established voice communications with him. No Iraqi forces were in the immediate area. A CSAR was ordered from Task Force 160 at KKMC, and the crew plotted a zigzag course through Iraqi radar to

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52 http://www.nighthawks.com/history/desert.html
Before they could take off, however, their helicopter developed mechanical problems. Immediately assembled his crew (co-pilot, crew chiefs, medic, and Special Forces security team members) to take the mission. As soon as he was airborne, contacted the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft for the area and made his presence known.

Flying the zigzag course established by the other team, passed directly over the pilot, but even with his night vision goggles, was not able to see him in the extreme darkness. Realizing the problem, turned on and spotted the and flew directly toward the downed pilot at 140 knots at an elevation of 20 feet, hopping sand dunes. At the same time, became aware that he had been illuminated by Iraqi radar. Dipping behind a hill, he broke the Iraqi missile lock and landed. Aware that Iraqi forces were only 30 minutes away and quickly brought aboard and headed back for Saudi Arabia flying 140 knots at an elevation of 20 feet. The return flight seemed uneventful until spotted a missile in the air turning toward them and accelerating. Fortunately, the missile lost power and fell short. Back at the 160 hangar at KKMC had an emotional reunion with his wing man and nothing but praise for the outstanding training and skills of the 60 crew.

In addition to executing its CSAR mission, the 60th also infiltrated and exfiltrated special forces terrain reconnaissance teams and "hide-site" teams sent deep into Iraq to obtain intelligence prior to the launching of Operation DESERT STORM. One of the most daring of these missions began on 23 February 1991, the day before Operation DESERT STORM was launched. Local villagers discovered a Special Forces (SF) reconnaissance team inserted
approximately 185 miles behind Iraqi lines shortly after daybreak and for the next several hours the team had to fight off increasing numbers of armed villagers and militia. The team required emergency extraction. Normally a pair of Blackhaws conduct such operations. However, when the other Blackhawk was not able to get up and his crew had to go it alone. Flying at 5 to 15 feet off the deck, they raced to the rescue, arriving shortly after 2:00 p.m. When the Blackhawk crew first spotted the SF team, it was on the other side of a 120-foot power line. was able to jump the power line and land next to the team, as the Blackhawk crew used the newly installed miniguns to suppress the heavy fire that they were receiving from the encircling Iraqi militia. The reconnaissance team scurried aboard the helicopter under the minigun fire. remained on the ground long enough to confirm that he had everyone aboard the aircraft. (He had been told to expect six and there were only three.) The Blackhawk took at least six direct hits from Iraqi ground fire, but kept flying at full speed until it was able to land safely at Rafha. On the ground it was discovered that the MH-60 was badly damaged, but maintenance crews worked diligently to return the aircraft to flying status a week later.54

Tent city in DESERT STORM

Going to aircraft in DESERT STORM
After the war, the 160th remained on station performing reconnaissance missions on Iraqi missile and communications sites, and inserting ground forces to destroy them.55 The 160 returned to Fort Campbell in March and April 1991.56
Blackhawk pilot in DESERT STORM

also deployed to the desert in October 1990 to conduct Special Operations Aviation missions against the Iraqi regime. During their 61-day deployment, they executed hundreds of missions deep into enemy airspace against targets that remain classified. During one such operation on 21 February 1991, an MH-60L Blackhawk, flown by

and

responded to a request for an urgent medical evacuation deep in enemy territory under zero illumination. They flew their aircraft at an extremely low altitude to evade the air defense artillery threat. In spite of dense fog, which they could not increase altitude to avoid, and against which their night vision equipment was useless, they continued their mission by relying on their experience using navigational instruments and extracted a badly wounded soldier. While returning to the medical facility, they encountered a fierce sandstorm and lost visual reference with the ground, causing them to crash, killing both of the pilots and two crew chiefs. Unit personnel were awarded four Silver Stars and numerous other awards for their valorous performance of duty in other cross border missions. The success of their many operations in the harsh desert environment again proved that the Night Stalkers were the world’s premiere night-fighting aviation unit.

Somalia/Operation GOTHIC SERPENT (August-October 1993)

In December 1992, President Bush ordered United States troops to join United Nations peacekeeping forces in an attempt to restore order in Somalia, a country wracked by civil war and famine. Over the next several months, the situation deteriorated badly. In May 1993, all the
parties involved in the civil war agreed to a disarmament conference proposed by Mohammed Farah Aideed, the leading Somali warlord. Any hope of a peaceful resolution of the conflict quickly vanished on 5 June, however, when 24 Pakistani troops in the UN force were killed in an ambush in an area of Mogadishu, Somalia, controlled by Aideed. The next day, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 837 calling for the arrest and trial of those responsible for the ambush, and U.S. warplanes and UN troops began a concentrated attack on Aideed’s stronghold. Aideed remained defiant, and the violence between Somalis and UN troops escalated.57

On 22 August, Task Force Ranger, consisting of one company of Rangers from 3rd Special Forces Group, a special forces unit, and a deployment package of the 160th SOAR (A), was ordered to deploy to Mogadishu, Somalia. They departed on 26 August. The mission of the 160th SOAR (A) as defined by the task force commander was, when directed, [to] deploy to Mogadishu, Somalia; [to] conduct operations to capture General Aideed and/or designated others. The aviation task force must be prepared to conduct two primary courses of action: moving convoy and strong point assault. . . . Success is defined as the live capture of General Aideed and designated individuals and recovery to the designated transload point; safely and without fratricide.58

In Mogadishu the task force occupied an old hangar and old construction trailers under primitive conditions. The force even lacked potable water and was subject to frequent mortar attacks.

and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire. During the month of September, the force conducted several successful missions to arrest Aideed sympathizers and to confiscate arms caches. The aircraft also made frequent flights over the city to desensitize the public to the presence of military aircraft and to familiarize themselves with the narrow streets and alleys of the city.\footnote{Interview with \textit{\ldots} 19 July 2001.}

On the afternoon of 3 October 1993, informed that two leaders of Aideed's clan were at a residence in central Mogadishu, the task force sent 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 men to arrest them. During the mission, one of the rangers fast-roping from an MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, missed the rope and fell 70 feet to the street below, badly injuring himself. The two leaders were quickly arrested, and the prisoners and the injured Ranger were loaded on a convoy of ground vehicles. Armed Somalis were converging on the target area from all over the city. In the meantime, another MH-60, call sign and piloted by and \footnote{\ldots} was flying low over the street a few blocks from the target area, and was struck from behind by an rocket propelled grenade (RPG). The MH-60 crashed to the street below.

The convoy and the Somali crowds immediately headed for the crash site. An MH-6 Little Bird, call sign piloted by landed in the street next to the downed MH-60 and attempted to evacuate the casualties. Both and \footnote{\ldots} had been killed in the crash. went to assist survivors, successfully pulling two soldiers into the Little Bird, while \footnote{\ldots} laid down suppressive fire from the cockpit with his individual weapon.

Under intense ground fire, the MH-6 departed with its crew and survivors. In the meantime, Blackhawk with pilot copilot and crewmembers moved in to take place in the formation. As circled over the target area, an RPG suddenly struck it. The Blackhawk's tail rotor was severely damaged, and the air mission commander ordered it back to
the airfield. En route to the airfield, the tail rotor and much of the rear assembly fell off, and the helicopter pitched forward and crashed.\textsuperscript{60}

Meanwhile the ground convoy had lost its way, and rescue forces were already overtaxed at the site of the first Blackhawk crash. As armed Somalis rushed toward the crash site, the crew's only hope came from aboard the covering Blackhawk who volunteered to jump in and protect the crew of the downed helicopter. They would ultimately sacrifice their lives for their downed comrades, and had both suffered broken legs in the crash, and both of the crew chiefs were severely wounded. A large crowd of Somalis, organized by the local militia, surrounded the crew and their rescuers and engaged in a fierce firefight, killing all but Then, they rushed the downed pilot, severely beating him and taking him prisoner.\textsuperscript{61}

Meanwhile another Blackhawk carrying a rescue team arrived over the crash site of and the 15-man team fast-roped to the ground. They found both already dead, but crew chiefs and were still alive in the wreckage. It took hours to pry body from the wreckage. In the meantime, the soldiers set up a perimeter to protect against attack from Somali militia and armed civilians and awaited the arrival of a convoy from the 10th Mountain Division to rescue them.\textsuperscript{62}

The militia had taken captive, planning to trade him for Somali prisoners. But before they could get him back to their village, they were intercepted by local bandits, who took intending to use him for ransom. He was taken back to a house where he was held, interrogated, and videotaped. Later, after Aideed paid his ransom was moved to the

apartment of Aideed's propaganda minister. After five days, he was visited by a representative of the International Red Cross and interviewed by British and French journalists. Finally, after ten days, with the intervention of former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley, he was released and flew home to a hero's welcome. The mission was over. The 160th SOAR (A) had been involved in the fiercest battle since the Vietnam War. It had lost two MH-60 aircraft with two more severely damaged, suffered eight wounded and five killed in action, and had had one of its pilots taken captive. Despite the public perception that this was a failed mission, Task Force Ranger did take into custody and delivered the two leaders from Aideed's clan, resulting in mission accomplishment, with the force members remained true to their motto, "Night Stalkers Don't Quit."  

Blackhawk over Mogadishu

The battle

Super 64 crash site

In memory of fallen comrades

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (September 1994)

On 30 September 1991, less than a year after his election, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. In September 1994, when coup leader General Raoul Cedras backed down on his promise to allow President Aristide and his government to return, President Clinton authorized Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The
of the 160th were called up and self deployed to Savannah, Georgia, where they went aboard the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, USS America, en route to Port au Prince, Haiti. Their mission was to insert assault forces to secure key government sites. Fortunately, just before H-hour, a delegation consisting of Former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell convinced General Cédras to step aside and seek asylum in Panama. The two battalions of the 160th remained aboard the USS America in very cramped quarters for another six weeks, carrying out their missions in a permissive environment. During this deployment, the 160th accomplished another first. It conducted its Regimental Change of Command on the flight deck of the USS America.65

passes the Regiment colors to as assumes regimental command of the 160th aboard the USS America

USS America

Other Operations

From December 1995 to April 1996, the Regiment deployed the 160th to support Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. In April 1996, four MH-47D Chinooks also participated in Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia, assisting other United States forces as they safeguarded American citizens and diplomats from the ravages of civil war. During the 10-day period, United States forces evacuated 2,100 people, including 437 U.S. citizens from Monrovia, Liberia to Freetown, Sierra Leone.66

The 160th arrives in Freetown, Sierra Leone

In January 1998, Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime began harassing United Nations inspectors in their hunt for weapons of mass destruction and other weapons prohibited by the UN accords. At the same time, United States forces participating in the coalition force in Operation Southern Watch also encountered Iraqi hostility. This led to Operation DESERT THUNDER, which involved increased air strikes and a greater likelihood that aircraft could be shot down.

The 160th SOAR (A) was assigned the mission of providing personnel recovery aircraft for any downed air crews in high threat areas. Later, the 160th SOAR (A) also was assigned the mission of planning for special reconnaissance.67

The MH-47E Chinooks of the 160th SOAR (A) arrived in February 1998 and were split into two teams and placed on a weekly cycle. This cycle continued for approximately two months. During this time, no aircraft were shot down and hence the 160th did not have to execute any personnel recovery missions. At the end of the period, the 160th returned to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.68

In November 1998, as a result of renewed hostility from Iraq, the 160th again was placed on a short-notice recall status and ordered to prepare to return. An advance party was sent to Kuwait in December, only to return to the U.S. a few weeks later.

Finally, on 27 January 1999, only a day after a tornado had ravaged the unit's local community, the 160th deployed on a mission for which it had prepared months earlier and began the training/alert cycle once more.69

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67 Interview with
68 Interview with
69 Interview with
While they remained ready to perform this mission, the soldiers of the 160th also had to be prepared for other missions, such as the recovery of equipment. An Air Force Predator Unmanned Area Vehicle (UAV) had crashed two miles away from the Iraqi border on its return flight to the U.S. base. A Kuwaiti lieutenant had seen the crash and called in the coordinates. The 160th, along with Air Force Security Police, was sent to recover the UAV. They easily found the wreckage of the UAV, filled with classified materials. After sitting on the ground for two hours assessing the situation, the crew chiefs decided that they could fit the UAV into the MH-47E. They loaded the wreckage on top of vehicles and moved it inside the Chinook and returned to base. This turned out to be the only mission conducted by the 160th during Operation Desert Fox, because, fortunately, no coalition aircraft were shot down.70

Conclusion

The 160th, which has been labeled as the world's premier aviation night fighting force, is the Army's only special operations aviation force. Throughout its 20-year history, the 160th has pioneered night flight techniques, shared in the development of new equipment, and met the call to duty wherever it sounded. Despite all challenges and adversities, the Regiment has always upheld its motto, "Night Stalkers Don't Quit." Today, as in the past, the 160th stands ready to support actions to prevent aggressive and provocative threats, from any nation or group, against American citizens and the freedoms and values that our country holds sacred.71

Photo by 06 b5 2001
160th SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

"NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT"

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 91 - DECEMBER 91
160th SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

NIGHT STALKERS
"NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT"

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 91 - DECEMBER 91
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Annual Historical Review, Calendar Year 1991


2. The Calendar Year 1991 Annual Historical Review for this command is attached.

3. This review includes the subordinate elements of and Battalions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
Commander, B/6 Battalions, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, ATTN: A0AV-P/B3/6 Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223
Commander, B/6 Battalions, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, ATTN: A0AV-S/B3/6 Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223
Commander, B/6 Battalions, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, ATTN: A0AV-T/B3/6 Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223
Commander, Special Operations Aviation Detachment, ATTN: A0AV-P/B3/6 APO Miami 34006
160th SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

"NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT"

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 91 - DECEMBER 91
160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

PERIOD: 1 JAN 91 - 31 DEC 91

COMPLETED: 12 AUG 92

BY: [Signature]
160th SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION
REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

"NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT"

ANNUAL HISTORICAL
REVIEW

JANUARY 91 - DECEMBER 91
160TH SOAR(A)

ANNUAL HISTORIC REVIEW

CALENDAR YEAR 1992

CLASSIFIED DUEL REMOVED FEB 94
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report

1. References:
   a. AR 870-5, Annual Historical Reports.
   b. USASOC Policy Number 9-92, dated 15 Oct 92, Annual Historical Reports and Request for Historical Support (Enclosure 1).

2. The annual historical report is an initiative by USASOC to preserve the historical assets of the NSCs at the MACOM Headquarters. The goal is to include copies of documents which are already in existence and place them in order by staff function/element and provide an executive summary/cover letter.

3. Enclosure 2 provides the recommended outline for compiling the report. Classified material will be handled according to classification. is capable of storing up to SPECAT.

4. POC this headquarters is the undersigned at FOR THE COMMANDER:

   2 Encls
   1. Historical Report
   2. Outline

   DISTRIBUTION:
   Cdr., 160th
   Cdr., 160th
   Cdr., 160th
   Cdr., 160th
   Cdr., 160th
MEMORANDUM FOR 160th SOAR Attn:

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report

1. Enclosed is all information available from 160th SOAR (A) for FY 93.

2. POC for this action is

"NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT!"
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1993

1. Each unit listed in distribution will assemble the documents listed in enclosure 2 and forward them to Regiment ATTN: BLT 15 November 1994.

2. The original suspense was changed three times because of Regiment deployment and recovery operations. USASOC must receive Regiment input BLT 18 Nov 94.

3. POC is FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encls
ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1994

160 SOAR FACILITIES
HAAF, GA

27 APR 95

Commander, 160 SOAR

NIGHT STALKERS DON'T QUIT!
MEMORANDUM FOR USASOC, ATTN: Port Bragg, North Carolina 28510

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1994

1. Enclosed is the Annual Historical Report for calendar year 1994.

2. The Historical Summary (ANNEX A) outlines 60th SOAR (A)'s significant events and accomplishments during 1994.

3. POC is DSM, b3/6...
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
DIVISION ARTILLERY
101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

1996 ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

1 JANUARY 1996 - 31 DECEMBER 1996

COMPLETED
21 July 1997
BY

b3/6
b3/6
166th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

Annual

Historical Review
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 160TH Special Operations Aviation (Airborne) Annual Historical Review - CY 97

1. Mission. Equip, train, validate, employ and flight Special Operations Aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency missions, the Joint Task Force Commander and war fighting CINCs.

2. Organization. 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) is assigned to United States Special Operations Command. The unit consists of Regiment Headquarters and four Battalions placed strategically throughout the continent for rapid deployments.

3. Key Personnel (as of December 1997)

Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander

4. POC is

b/6
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 160TH SOAR(A) Annual Historical Review - CY98

1. Mission. Equip, train, validate, employ and flight Special Operations Aviation Forces worldwide in support of contingency missions, the Joint Task Force Commander and war fighting CINCs.

2. Organization. 160th SOAR(A) is assigned to USASOC. The unit consists of Regiment headquarters and four Battalions placed strategically throughout the continent for rapid deployments.


   - Regiment Commander
   - Regiment Deputy Commander
   - Regiment Executive Officer
   - Command Sergeant Major
   - Adjutant

4. POC is
160th SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

2001
MEMORANDUM FOR 60th SOAR(A), Ft. Campbell, KY 42223

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year (CY) 2001

1. The enclosed appendices comprise the 60th Battalion Historical Report for CY 01.

2. The point of contact for this product is

Enclosure
Appendix 1: Overview
Appendix 2: Personnel
Appendix 3: Training and Operations
Appendix 4: Support & Logistics

[24] Battalion Historical Files
HISTORICAL SUMMARY

Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
January through December 2001
MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: Historical Report - Battalion, 160th SOAR (A), January 2001 to December 2001

1. The enclosed data represents the 160th SOAR (A) 2001 contribution to the Annual Historical Report.

2. Enclosures:
   
   TAB A: Historical Summary
   
   TAB B: Mission: Latest copy of Unit Command Brief
   
   
   TAB D: Training: Quarterly Training Briefs
   
   TAB E: Operations: Operations Summary, Photographs, Battalion Newsletters, BN Change-of-Command Program, Annual Formal Program

3. Point of contact is Voice DSN: Fax DSN:

   5 Encls

   Commanding
Annual Historical Report

Calendar Year 2001
MEMORANDUM FOR 160TH SOAR (A), FT. CAMPBELL, KY 42223

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year (CY) 2001

1. The enclosed appendices comprise the Historical Report for CY 01

2. Point of contact regarding this matter is DSN 416/6366

Enclosure
Appendix 1: Overview
Appendix 2: Personnel
Appendix 3: Training & Operations
Appendix 4: Support & Logistics

CC:
Historical Files