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Attn: Legal Office
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Building 172
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5006
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Notes: Report appears to be undated, but several internal references refer to the year 2004. There are no internal references to the year 2005.

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NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
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IN REPLY REFER TO:
5720/09-002
Ser 00K/ 1261
30 Oct 08

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of September 23, 2008. Your request sought three documents:

- 1) A copy of the Naval Inspector General Special Focus Study-Interrogation Special Focus Team-GITMO-OEF-OIG.
- 2) A copy of the Special Focus Study on Utilities Privatization.
- 3) A copy of the Special Focus Study-Sexual Assault Study (SAVI).

A copy of the later two studies is enclosed. The first study requested, the ISFT report, is a Department of Defense (DOD) report, which DOD has posted on its website at:

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/other_related.html

If you have any questions about what was released or withheld from that report you should contact the DOD FOIA Office at:

Office of Freedom of Information
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155.

5720/09-002
Ser OOK/1261
30 Oct 08

You may contact Ms. Pat Chase, at (202) 433-2222, or Mark O'Brien, at 202-433-2224, in our legal department if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul D. Garst". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

PAUL D. GARST
Captain, USN
By direction

Enclosures: (1) Copy of Utilities Privatization Study
(2) Copy of SAVI Study

Naval Inspector General Report to VCNO



Sexual Assault Study

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	i-ix
Part One	
Systems Review of the Navy’s Sexual Assault Process.....	1-11
Part Two	
Effectiveness of the SAVI Program.....	12-16
Part Three	
Reliability, Consistency and Accuracy of reporting Incident data.....	17-23
Part Four	
Controllable Factors and Situations that Incur Higher Risks of Sexual Assault.....	24-32
Part Five	
Command Responsiveness and Accountability Issues.....	33-36
Part Six	
Navy Command Leadership Views.....	37-42
Part Seven	
Fleet Perceptions of Sexual Assault.....	43
Part Eight	
Comparison of NAVINGEN SAS Report Findings with DoD Task Force Report.....	44-47
List of Appendices	
Appendix A	
VCNO Tasking Memo.....	A-1
Appendix B	
Survey Analysis.....	B-1 thru B-21
Appendix C	
Bibliography.....	C-1 thru C-5
Appendix D	
Glossary.....	D-1 thru D-6

Naval Inspector General Report on Sexual Assault in the U.S.

Navy

Executive Summary

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct an in-depth review of the Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program and the risks associated with the occurrence of sexual assault (SA).

An eight-member team conducted a six-month study that included an internet-based survey (over 38,000 responses, approximately 10% of active duty Navy), document reviews, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) SA incident data analysis, SAVI program reviews at 70 commands worldwide, conducted 160 focus groups sessions that included 3,200 participants, and interviewed command leadership, first-responders and legal authorities throughout the Navy.

The Sexual Assault Study (SAS) Team concluded the effectiveness to manage at the program level had eroded over a 10-year period due to lack of budgetary growth with associated staffing cuts, impacting prevention education and quality victim care. Moreover, the SAVI instruction, which is the guidebook for managing SA incidences does not provide all the elements currently required from program management resulting in misinterpretations by users, as evidenced by the wide disparity in SA incident data maintained at the Echelon II level, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Navy data collection agent (PERS-661).

The SAS Team concluded, although the SAVI program, as designed, is capable of meeting the goals as established by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, marginal program management, poor command level execution and lack of accountability have diminished its effectiveness.

The SAS team discovered many areas of concern to Navy leadership; including personnel risk, process execution, program management, and program accountability. These areas of risk/concern are highlighted below:

Personnel Risk Areas:

- Junior Sailors (18-25)
- Remote/Isolated Locations
- Mixed Gender Billeting
- Psychological Screening
- Training Commands
- Alcohol/Drug Misuse
- Newly Reported Personnel

Process Issues:

- Declining Budget (in real terms)
- Inadequate/Incomplete Databases
- Non-Cohesive SAVI Network
- Victim Apprehensiveness to Report Incidents due to Collateral UCMJ Violations
- Unclear Incident Reporting Requirements
- Inconsistent Engagement of Law Enforcement

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Training Challenges:

- Minimal SA Awareness Training at Accession Points
- Minimal SA Program Management Training at Leadership Schools

- No Command Leadership Involvement at SA Awareness GMT
- No Standard Curriculum for SAVI Program Personnel

Program Improvements:

- Draft a User-friendly SAVI Instruction
- Improve Local Program Oversight (Region, ISIC)
- Improve Overseas/Remote SAVI Support
- Develop a Standard Training Curriculum for Personnel working within the SAVI Program

- Review SAVI Program Funding/Budget
- Incorporate SAVI Program into Command Cyclic Assessment Process
- Include SA Awareness/Management Training at Leadership Schools

Personnel Risk Areas

Junior Sailors

- The first step to improving gender relationships in the Navy is recruit screening intended to eliminate candidates with psychological impairment, personality disorders, or criminal tendencies that make them unfit for active-duty service. OPNAVINST 1100.6, The Psychological Screening of Recruits, outlines the above agreement; however, the SAS team found that it has not been in place since January, 2000 at the Recruit Training Command; although, there is no record of a request to cancel the policy.

Recommendation

- *NETC, in cooperation with BUMED, commission a panel of subject matter experts to review the feasibility of reinstating psychological screening of new recruits to avoid increased risk of first term enlistment attrition due to dysfunctional behavior and prevent potential perpetrators from entering the Navy.*
- Young Sailors, after matriculating from basic Navy training and intense “Sailorization” processes (i.e., development of an identity as a Sailor as well as learning job tasks), experience a new degree of freedom. This degree of freedom, in some cases, leads to high-risk behaviors among this age group (18-25 years). Specifically, reckless behavior encouraged by peer pressure and excessive alcohol misuse are precursors to SA incidents. NCIS’s SA database and interview data (including command leadership) supports this finding.

Recommendation

- *Commanders/Commanding Officers should ban certain social events or locations, restrict personnel to installations when necessary (in accordance with OPNAVINST 1620.2A) and develop and promote positive social programs/events that provide avenues*

for relaxation and maintenance of Navy Core values. CNI should provide the resources to MWR for these positive social programs.

- Ninety-seven percent of SAS survey respondents acknowledged alcohol misuse was a contributing factor to sexual assault.

Recommendation

- *Commanders/Commanding Officers carefully select the individuals assigned as the Drug and Alcohol Program Advisors (DAPAs). As the command's primary contact for the Navy Alcohol and Drug Safety Program (NADSAP), the DAPA should also be trained in the SAVI program in order to provide educational awareness of the link between alcohol misuse and SA occurrence to known problem drinkers.*

Recommend Commanders/Commanding Officers educate their members regularly with all NADSAP programs (Right Spirit, Alcohol Aware, Alcohol Impact) to promote responsible use of alcohol.

- Mixed gender living arrangements with a lack of supervision is an especially high risk for junior Sailors.

Recommendation

- *Recommend staffing barracks with responsible petty officer's that are charged with the specific responsibility to provide mature leadership to young Sailors in an effort to curb negative behaviors associated with incidents of SA.*
- Victims are reluctant to report due to "collateral" UCMJ violations. It is not uncommon for the victim of SA to admit to violating the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (e.g., underage drinking, fraternization, adultery, etc.). This often results in disciplinary action against the victim. In some cases, the victim is held accountable for her/his behavior, while the alleged SA offender is not held accountable because the dynamics of the case do not support an allegation. This finding contributes to the reluctance of victims to report incidents of SA.

Recommendation

- *Commanders/Commanding Officers avoid re-victimization in accordance with OPNAVINST 1752.1A.*

Remote/Isolated locations

- A relaxed command climate (that is, a prevalence of behavior contrary to good order and discipline) enabled commands to ignore fraternization and sexual promiscuity leading to the potential for SA occurrences. Particularly, such permissive climates tend to exist at remote installations/detachments as reported anecdotally in focus groups and interviews.

Recommendation

- *Commanders/Commanding Officers, while conducting periodic command climate assessments, should include questions regarding the command's involvement in preventing SA incidents, and those behaviors associated with other forms of misconduct.*

Those individuals demonstrating behavior contrary to good order and discipline should be held accountable.

Program/Process Issues

Program budget and staffing

- Since 1995, the SAVI Program budget, executed at Commander Naval Personnel (CNP) (and since transferred to Commander Naval Installations (CNI) in 2004) has remained relatively flat from the original \$1.5 million requested in the first year of the program without significant progressive adjustments made to cover increasing labor costs and inflation. Consequently, in an effort to remain within budgetary controls, paid Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) SAVI Program Coordinators (SPCs) has decreased from 28 in 1995 to 23 SPCs in 2004; more staff has been targeted for reduction-in-force, despite the real need to have these professionals in place.

Recommendation

- *CNI establish a zero-based approach to develop a clearly focused funding profile consistent with the goals and objectives of the SAVI program. The information gained from this review will strengthen the SAVI program's ability to defend budgetary resources and present more cogent arguments for supporting, where warranted, unfunded or under-funded initiatives.*

Unclear reporting

- SAVI volunteers indicated that the current SAVI directive (OPNAVINST 1752.1A) is not a user-friendly "operator's manual," causing some of the data collection inconsistencies.
- Due to changes in SAVI program requirements and the need for more comprehensive reporting, PERS-661 has combined elements of three different directives to formulate one naval message for SA incident reporting purposes. This process often causes confusion resulting in information omission, improper message addresses, and/or non-reporting.

Recommendation

- *Commander Naval Personnel (CNP) re-write the SAVI program instruction into a user-friendly tool that includes first-responder and command protocol checklists, message reporting templates, and specific requirements (training) for individuals executing the SAVI program.*
- Few Data Collection Coordinators (DCC) could provide statistical data (Incident frequency, demographics, personnel risks, etc.) on SA cases within their commands. Additionally, most commands did not clearly identify a DCC or articulate that individual's responsibility. Echelon II and III commands with large populations need to be able to track, analyze, and report incidences under their purview.

Recommendation

- *DCCs at all levels of command maintain statistical data for trend analysis and provide cognizant commanders with data regarding systemic issues within their organizations.*
- The SAS Team analysis of Echelon II and III commands found that although most commands had assigned a SAVI Point of Contact (POC), few POCs understood the scope of their involvement in the SAVI Program, particularly, incident report Quality Assurance (QA), and process oversight.
- The SAS Team found that most commands that initially file SITREPS/OPREPS only report final dispositions of SA cases but do not submit required interim reports.

Recommendation

- *CNP train and require the Navy to report all SA incidents to appropriate command levels. Specifically, commands identify staff responsible for submitting Incident Reports and train them in the process (e.g., including all data elements, using proper addresses of Immediate Superior in Chain of Command (ISIC) and other agencies, making follow-up reports, etc.). Additionally, as part of organization oversight, recommend all major claimants and ISICs provide QA of SA incidents occurring within their purview. This includes reviewing Incident Reports for accuracy and ensuring proper administration of victim services.*
- Many SPCs were unclear of their area of responsibility for SAVI program management. In order for SPCs to ensure complete SAVI program coordination, they must fully understand the breadth of their geographic responsibility.
- There is no provision in OPNAVINST 1752.1A for commands to contact the SAVI Program Coordinator (SPC) in the event of a sexual assault or to involve the SPC in the SA incident report data collection processes. This omission hinders the local or regional commander's ability to accurately assess the scope of SA within their area of responsibility.

Recommendation

- *CNP clearly define SPCs geographic area of responsibility and articulate the administrative relationship of the SPC with Navy organizations in that geographic area.*

SAVI network/efficient (command & victim) support structure

- There is a significant disparity between commands in the level of their implementation of the SAVI program, ranging from no compliance, to nominal compliance characterized by "just-in-time" appointments, to optimal and fully committed program compliance. This disparity, coupled with some command's leadership misunderstanding of program reporting requirements, further exacerbates the underreporting of SA cases.
- All-male crews indicated that the additional training requirements of the SAVI program are burdensome and not a priority in high operational tempo environments.

Recommendation

- *CNP include in the SAVI instruction language that describes different levels of accountability for execution of all aspects of the SAVI program, and include this program as an inspectable item.*
- *Command leaderships' perception of their responsibilities concerning sexual assault varied across commands. Interview data indicated nearly all command leadership acknowledged their responsibility to help prevent SA incidents; however, not all commands are proactive in implementing preventive measures. The SAS Team was presented with many SA cases that demonstrated leadership's apparent inability or unwillingness to take appropriate action in accordance with established Navy policy.*

Recommendation

- *CO accountability should be a "Check and Balance" system with the chain of command to ensure SA victims are afforded the utmost support. Commands that experience SA incidents and lack proper implementation of policy should be held accountable.*

Victim confidentiality

- *From the SAS survey, 34% of the 2756 respondents who self-disclosed they had been victimized, did not report their incidents for fear of ostracism by peers, fear of public disclosure, felt shame/embarrassment/disbelief, or feared negative impact to Navy career.*
- *SA victims fear retaliation, compromising their careers, and being portrayed as disloyal or "not team players." Those who reported incidents believed that they were often punished, intimidated, or ostracized or that they were stigmatized by referrals to psychiatric services or other "visible" services. Potentially, some SA victims may suffer more from embarrassment and humiliation after-the-fact than from the assault itself.*
- *If both the victim and alleged perpetrator belong to the same command, the SAVI instruction directs commanders to consider temporary reassignment of the victim or accused until such time as the case reaches final disposition. Focus group discussions and individual victim interviews indicated that some Commanders do not follow this guideline for separating the involved parties.*

Recommendation

- *For those victims who feel they are unable to report SA victimization through normal organizational channels, CNI/CNP consider developing a toll-free SA hotline. This will ensure all DON members and their families have a confidential method to report these cases for immediate SAVI support and further tasking to Echelon II Inspectors General to investigate process breakdowns.*
- *Discuss SAVI program and SAS Team findings at Prospective Executive Officer, Prospective Commanding Officer, and Command Master Chief training in order to firmly establish the importance of the program and a Commander's responsibility to respond to SA victims, to assure their safety and privacy, and to keep them informed throughout the disposition process.*

Training Challenges

Accession training

- The SAS Team attended recruit SA awareness training, and concluded the information provided does not adequately address the subject. The briefing summarizes the penalties for perpetration of SA, while providing an overview of sexually transmitted infections. Recruits don't gain the full benefit of understanding how to avoid SA situations or recognize the risky behaviors that could lead to commission of SA. Also, this delivery method does not accommodate the transition of individuals to advanced training environments and is not conducive to educating personnel who are unfamiliar with Navy culture (e.g., Navy hierarchy, acronyms, protocols, etc.).

Recommendation

- *Recruit Training Command (RTC) provide SA awareness training to new recruits in a clear and deliberate manner, comprehensible at their level of indoctrination. Avoid excessive use of acronyms and Navy jargon and reduce speed of delivery to ensure each recruit understands the material.*

Annual (GMT) training

- There is significant confusion between the terms sexual harassment (SH) and sexual assault. It is vital for Sailors to understand the definitions of these terms and how they are considered under the UCMJ, as well as by local and international jurisdictions. It is equally vital for Sailors to know the consequences of such offenses and their impact on the missions of individual commands and the Navy.

Recommendation

- *The Navy's Equal Opportunity Office (Pers-00H) and the Navy's SAVI Program Office (Pers-661) should develop and implement guidelines to educate and train the Fleet to understand the distinction between sexual assault and sexual harassment.*

Programmatic training

- Since the inception of the SAVI program in 1995 a standard orientation or training program for FFSC SPCs has never been developed. In addition, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) has been responsible for sponsoring biennial training for all SAVI Coordinators and related staff. The SAS Team study found that required training for SAVI Coordinators and support staff lacks uniformity and is not provided on a consistent basis.

Recommendation

- *CNI in conjunction with Naval Education and Training (NETC) develop a standard SPC training curriculum that all SPCs, including collateral, part-time, and FTE, attend as soon as feasible. In view of scheduling conflicts and excessive time between scheduled SPC courses, newly hired SPCs should receive on-the-job training from an accredited SPC.*

- SAVI Advocates had not completed initial required training, and in some instances in which the advocate required additional or follow-up training, there was no documentation to validate certification. Also, there are no viable mechanisms at the command or SPC level to monitor or track the requirement to provide annual follow-on training.

Recommendation

- *SPCs and local commanders should be required to establish a mechanism to track Volunteer Advocate certification and subsequent required refresher training.*
- The SAS Team did not find a requirement to provide formal training for the SAVI POC, SAVI Rep, or SAVI DCC, although these individuals provide the majority of local program management and victim support.

Recommendation

- *CNP establish a requirement in the SAVI instruction, and requisite curriculum, for all personnel assigned or participating as volunteers within the SAVI program to receive training in order to effectively perform their duties.*

Leadership pipeline training

- The SAS Team noted that leadership schools and officer accession points (e.g., CO/XO, Senior Enlisted Academy, Navy Leadership School, Officer Candidate School, etc.) provide only limited or no SA/SAVI Program management training and do not adequately prepare students for their management and supervisory roles in executing the SAVI program, and mechanisms available to assess command climate.
- A significant number of Sailors, both officer and enlisted, do not possess a requisite level of knowledge and understanding of SA, including: what constitutes SA; its controllable and contributing factors; those situations and behaviors that incur higher risks; appropriate preventative measures; and the programs designated to assist SA victims. In addition, many Sailors are not aware of the options available for reporting the occurrence of an SA incident. Many focus group participants suggested that dramatized story videos based on actual cases would be an effective training format.

Recommendation

- *NETC, in conjunction with CNI, develop targeted training curricula for various levels of command responsibility that prepares students to assume duties commensurate with their levels of responsibility. For example, tailored curricula should be developed for Leading Petty Officers (LPOs), Chief Petty Officers (CPOs), Junior Officers, and Senior Officers that gives these individuals the requisite tools to manage and/or respond to SA cases. These curricula are not a replacement for all hands General Military Training (GMT) that is designed to heighten awareness regarding SA.*
- *As prospective command leadership prepares to assume commands, recommend these individual's receive briefs at the region/ISIC level on SA incident management within their new organizations to bridge the gap between leadership pipeline SA incident management training and regional/ISIC SAVI program policies.*

Reporting

- There is a wide disparity between CNP's database and NCIS's database regarding the number of cases being reported/tracked. NCIS SA incident numbers are based on cases reported to and/or investigated by NCIS. Each case is catalogued and a report of investigation is forwarded to the responsible commander. This data is also compiled at NCIS headquarters. Since commanders are required to report all allegations of SA, and NCIS forwards all cases of adult SA that it investigates to the respective commander, then the number of SA cases reported to PERS-661/83 should, at a minimum, match or exceed those compiled by NCIS. Unfortunately, this is not the case. On average, NCIS investigated 72% more cases of SA than were reported to PERS-661/83 for calendar years 1996 through 2003.
- Although required by SECNAV directive, CNP has not submitted an annual SA incident report since 2001.

Recommendation

- *To validate the reporting accuracy of SA incidents, recommend NCIS and the SAVI program database manager compare data and determine reporting shortfalls on a quarterly basis. When necessary, the SAVI program manager can communicate with major claimants to determine where the shortfalls lie. Additionally, as outlined in SECNAVINST 1752.4, recommend CNP resume submitting an annual report of SA incidents to SECNAV.*

Summary

This report gives the Navy a status check on the strengths and weaknesses of the SAVI program, nearly 10 years after its initial implementation. Overall, the program provides a broad array of response services and a number of avenues for reporting incidents. However, if the Navy is to provide an effective "responsive system" (cf., DoD Task Force Report, 2004) to address SA, Commanders and Commanding Officers must be actively engaged in the training, reporting, and adjudicating processes. Furthermore, this is a "top-down" (cf., DoD Task Force Report, 2004) program that requires the highest levels of command to ensure that policy is clear and concise, resources are available, data is accurate, accreditations and training are in place, and accountability is required and enforced at all levels. Moreover, regular review and quality improvement is necessary "to ensure this program is the very best to support the Navy operating around the world, [and] around the clock" (ADM Mullen, Senate Armed Services Committee address, 25 February 2004).

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Part 1

Systems Review of the Navy's Current Sexual Assault Policies and Processes

Overview. The three-component system that is the Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program is a comprehensive model that has a specific goal of eliminating sexual assault in the Department of the Navy (DON). Its component parts, working in concert, also provide a mechanism for victims of sexual assault to receive the immediate care and assistance they need. These components are:

SA awareness and prevention education. The SAVI program focuses on aggressive awareness and prevention education and includes information on actions that can minimize the risk of becoming a victim. The program also includes procedures for commands to optimally respond to SA incidents. This awareness training is reinforced through annual mandatory General Military Training (GMT), as well as targeted training at key career progression points (officer and enlisted) that provides information commensurate with the individual's level of responsibility and accountability.

Victim advocacy and intervention services. The victim advocacy component of the program focuses on developing a highly-responsive volunteer victim advocate support system that provides immediate emotional support to SA victims and helps to avoid re-victimization. The SAVI Program is based on coordinating military and local civilian resources to provide multi-disciplinary counseling services to victims.

Reliable data collection on SA cases. The third component of the SAVI program is a data collection system for reporting and collecting accurate data on SA incidents in the Navy. Data is used for case management and trend analysis to bring attention to this menacing crime. A complete and comprehensive database affords Navy leaders the opportunity to address this issue.

Goal. Eliminate SA incidents that impact DON personnel and family members or are perpetrated by DON personnel through implementation of a comprehensive program that encompasses sexual assault awareness and prevention education, victim advocacy, and data collection.

Policy. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established the policy that there is no place in the Navy for the egregious misconduct involved in sexual assault. Commands are expected to adopt a "zero tolerance" policy for Sailors who perpetrate this violence and for command environments that condone it.

Program. The Navy uses the Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) program and the SAVI program to address and maintain healthy command climates, as well as manage incidences of sexual assault. These programs, working in concert, serve to monitor the command climate for social abnormalities and provide victim sensitive services in the event of SA occurrence.

Applicability. All active-duty members and members of the Reserve force while on active-duty. Specifically:


- Male and female victims who are 18 years old or older
 - Active-duty Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members and their legal family members

- Members of the Reserve components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard while on active duty and their legal family members
- On a space-available basis, retired members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard and their legal family members
- Civilians assaulted by:
 - Active-duty Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard members and their legal family members
 - Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Retirees and their legal family members
 - Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Reservists and their legal family members
 - Civilians on naval installations
- Referrals may be made to other military or civilian resources, as appropriate
- Other victims may be eligible for services from the Navy's Family Advocacy Program (FAP) and/or Victims Witness Assistance Program.

Strategic importance. The policy creates an environment that is consistent with and promotes the Navy's core values of "***Honor, Courage and Commitment***" and will have a positive impact on mission readiness. It facilitates a culture of inclusion and openness and fosters positive changes in personal culture and behavioral norms, as expressed in OPNAVINST 1752.1. Specifically, commanders must create a command climate in which victims feel comfortable reporting acts of sexual assault, one of the most underreported crimes.

System/Process review. Figure 1.1 illustrates the program process when allegations of sexual assault are brought forward to a Navy official. For a detailed overview of roles and responsibilities within the SAVI program refer to OPNAVINST 1752.1A.

**Figure 1.1
SAVI Procedural Flow Chart**



Estimated costs of victimization. National Statistics estimate that it costs \$110,000 to deal with a single SA victim, broken down as follows:

- \$500 immediate medical care
- \$2,400 mental health services
- \$2,200 + for lost productivity
- \$104,900 + for pain and suffering

According to the *Task Force Report on Care for Victims of SA* (2004), the calculated prevalence (potential) rate per 100,000 active-duty service members was 69.1 in 2002 and 70.0 in 2003. As of September 2004, the Navy's end-strength was 385,771 active-duty Navy personnel. Applying the most recent prevalence rate (70/100,000) to our current end-strength indicates there are an estimated 270 potential SA victims annually. Further, applying the above national statistics cost per victim to this estimate indicates a potential annual cost to the Navy for SA of \$29,704,367. This significant cost does not reflect the loss of working hours after the incident, trial costs, sacrificed training costs (if the victim separates), or the dampening affect on command morale, command climate, and mission readiness. These estimates also do not account for the cost of personnel assigned to each case and its aftermath. In conclusion, the estimated costs are decidedly conservative; given NCIS data that accounts for 358 reported SA cases in CY 2003.

In addition, the above cost estimates do not take into consideration non-disclosure cases, in which victims suffer in silence (particularly male victims) or contemplate detaching from the Navy, resulting in further loss in technical expertise and personnel resources. While this prevalence rate encompasses reported and unreported cases, there is no accurate way to reasonably estimate total costs related to those victims who do not disclose or who leave the Navy within their first or second terms.

Program oversight review. Local SAVI programs are reviewed on a triennial basis by a team from the Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM; PERS-661) through the FFSC Accreditation process, which assesses the FFSC's ability to meet minimum services and support standards for various programs within its domain.

The SAVI Program is a *command responsibility* that is not necessarily under the purview of the FFSC. However, when under the cognizance of the FFSC (as most are), commanders are required to designate a SAVI Program Coordinator (SPC), in writing, to provide overall management of the program. When the SAVI program falls under the responsibility of the FFSC, compliance is determined by a review of the following:

The installation/regional SAVI instruction, which outlines responsibilities and should address the following requirements:

- Coordinate/conduct SA awareness and prevention education and victim advocate training
- Coordinate/maintain a cadre of trained victim advocates, a watch bill, and recall system for victim advocacy services if community advocacy services are not used

- Ensure SAVI program victim advocate volunteers receive a minimum of 20 hours of initial training and at least 10 hours of refresher training annually (not required if using community advocacy resources)
- Ensure SAVI services and resources are made available to all eligible personnel and commands
- Provide referrals for victim support services with local service providers via an installation/regional Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) where appropriate support services are available
- Maintain responsibility for incident reporting requirements
- Maintain responsibility related to the SAVI Program Coordination Committee
- Maintain responsibility for installation incident reporting requirements, only when the SPC is designated as the command Data Collection Coordinator
- Ensure command access to SAVI training materials including Instructor/Student Guides and videos provided by NAVPERSCOM (PERS-661)

Written materials required to be maintained by SAVI staff are:

- Training schedules and training materials
- Volunteer rosters, if community advocacy services are not used
- Watch bills, if community advocacy services are not used
- MOU, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) or Letter of Agreement with other community agencies if applicable
- SAVI program coordinator position description, if full-time
- Letter of designation if collateral duty
- Letters or e-mails that demonstrate communication with commands and command points of contact (POC)

A review of the SAVI Program Coordinating Committee membership and minutes indicated that the committees:

- Oversee the implementation of program elements and requirements
- Convene, at minimum, quarterly
- Are chaired by the SAVI Program Coordinator
- Are composed of representatives from medical, Trial Service Offices (TSO), base security, NCIS, chaplains, and FFSC
- Review compliance with awareness and prevention requirements

- Evaluate effectiveness of the SAVI Victim Advocacy Services
- Review compliance with the local reporting requirements
- Ensure, via the SAVI Program Coordinator, training is available and a system is operating to document victim advocate training (advocate training records, class rosters, logs)
- Are knowledgeable of their responsibilities and comply with the installation/regional instruction

When SAVI program coordination does not fall under the responsibility of the FFSC, compliance will be determined by the following:

- An accurate listing of military and civilian resources pertinent to SA is available
- Current SAVI training materials, including Instructor/Student Guides and videos provided by NAVPERSCOM (PERS-661), are maintained and provided to command SAVI POCs upon request
- Compliance with Standard 2.1, of the Fleet and Family Support Program Accreditation Handbook (NAVPERS 175400A) relevant to SA crisis intervention

SAVI program budget.

Overview. Commander, Navy Personnel Command (COMNAVPERSCOM) had been the designated entity within DON to plan for and distribute fiscal, personnel, and SAVI program resources in coordination with major claimants, although this function has been transferred to Commander, Navy Installations (CNI) effective 1 Oct 2004. In FY04, COMNAVPERSCOM utilized \$500,000 from CNO Contingency funds in an effort to bring the SAVI program up to required standards. The funds were expended for:

- Hiring one year contract Data Analyst at PERS 661
- Purchase/distribution of updated training materials (i.e., videotapes) to disseminate to field commands
- Biennial SAVI Conference
- \$100,000 obligated toward integrating SAVI Incident Report process into DON Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (CLEOC) (target operation date, 2nd qtr FY05)
- \$70,000 obligated to Navy Personnel Research Studies & Technology (NPRST) for follow-up SAVI survey in FY05

Findings

1.1. Lack of SAVI program funding. Since 1995, the SAVI program budget, executed at CNP and since transferred to CNI in 2004 has remained relatively flat from the original \$1.5 million requested in the first year of the program without significant progressive adjustments made to cover increasing labor costs and inflation. Figure 1.2 illustrates the budget from fiscal year (FY) 1999 to 2004 calculated in FY 99 constant dollars. The year-to-year real program budgetary changes in these fiscal years are illustrated in Figure 1.3. The latter figure clearly shows the “flatness” in the budget over the recent five-year period with the exception in FY 04 when additional funds became

available which were used to significantly boost training and headquarter support. In an effort to remain within budgetary controls since 1995, conversion of full-time equivalents (FTE) from GS to contract labor, reduction in training and reductions in both headquarter and field support were required and were justified through a combination of Commercial Activities (CA) and Functional Assessment (FA) studies. As a result of these efforts, paid FTE SPCs have decreased from 28 in 1995 to 23 in 2004, and more SPCs have been targeted for reduction-in-force (RIF). Labor costs absorb 90% of the SAVI program funding, while the remainder is used for SAVI program support.

FY-99 Constant Dollars




Figure 1.2

Real Program Change




Figure 1.3

The Sexual Assault Study (SAS) Team found that the lack of additional manpower funding resulted in the loss of efficiency in the management of the SAVI program, especially in Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) locations. Plans to have FTE Regional SAVI Coordinators provide overall program coordination throughout large geographical areas, while assigning only part-time SAVI Coordinators at local FFSCs, hinders the effectiveness and efficiency of the SAVI program and compromises

professional quality training for Sailors and SAVI program volunteers. OCONUS sites will be significantly impacted, because SA victims exclusively rely on base support systems when no comparable support services exist in the civilian community.

1.2. Inconsistent program oversight and management. Navy policy requires that all Commanders and Commanding Officers designate a SAVI Program point of contact (POC) for their respective organizations. For Echelon II, this responsibility not only covers staff/personnel but also includes program management and oversight for the entire organization. The SAS Team analysis of Echelon II and III commands found that although most commands had assigned a SAVI POC, few understood the scope of their involvement in the SAVI Program.

1.3. Inconsistent and non-standard training of SAVI Program Coordinators. Since the inception of the SAVI program in 1995 a standard orientation or training program for FFSC SPCs has never been developed. In addition, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) is responsible for sponsoring biennial training for all SAVI Coordinators and related staff. The SAS Team study found that required training for SAVI Coordinators and support staff lacks uniformity and is not provided on a consistent basis, having last been conducted in 1999. CNP SAVI staff attributed this delay in conducting formalized training to the lack of funding and manpower. However, CNP has made an effort to provide on-the-job training opportunities and certification for newly assigned SAVI Program Coordinators. Unfortunately, many SAVI Program Coordinators have yet to receive the required initial training.

1.4. Certified SAVI Advocates have not completed required training. The SAS Team review identified individuals who had volunteered or been designated to represent their commands as SAVI Advocates, but had not completed the initial required training. In some instances, where the advocates required additional or follow-up training, there was no documentation to validate certifications, nor were there viable mechanisms at the command or SPC level to monitor or track the requirement to provide annual follow-on training. It is noted that some SPCs understood this deficiency and provided training individuals during SAVI Advocacy training.

1.5. No formal training curriculum for members of the SAVI Program. Formal training is provided for Victim Advocates, however, the SAS Team did not find a requirement to provide formal training for the SAVI POC, SAVI Rep, or SAVI Data Collection Coordinator. It is noted that some SPCs understood this deficiency and provided training for these individuals during SAVI Advocacy training.

1.6. SAVI Program Data Collection Coordinators (DCCs) do not maintain statistical data on SA cases within their organizations. The SAS Team review found very few DCCs who could provide statistical data (incident frequency, demographics, personnel risks, etc.) on SA cases within their command. Additionally, most commands did not clearly identify a DCC and failed to articulate the responsibility of that individual. The inability to provide accurate data prevents the local Commander from being able to make appropriate policy decisions with regard to SA incidents.

1.7. SAVI Program Coordinator contract positions specify more requirements than their General Schedule (GS) counterparts. The SAS Team program review found that SPC contract positions required higher levels of education

(e.g., Bachelors Degree, Masters Degree, etc.) and requisite clinical licensing. Employees with these qualifications/certifications become prime candidates to inherit additional duties requiring clinical background, which makes it difficult to efficiently manage the SAVI Program. Also, because these contractors have clinical backgrounds, they tend to focus more on the clinical aspects of victimization rather than overall program management. Consequently, SAVI Coordinators with clinical backgrounds may feel professionally unfulfilled when they are required to concentrate on SAVI Program management instead of exercising clinical/counseling skills. Additionally, as Figure 1.2 illustrates, with the increased reliance on contract SPCs, this requirement becomes even more relevant.

1.8. No required command interface with the SAVI Program Coordinator.

There is no provision in OPNAVINST 1752.1A for commands to contact the SPC in the event of a sexual assault or to involve them in the SA incident data collection process. This deficiency makes it impossible for an SPC to effectively manage an area SAVI program. One SPC passionately commented, *“Contacting the SPC...can help commands avoid innumerable headaches (e.g., congressional inquiries) as they receive guidance from him/her vice acting in unilateral ignorance.”*

1.9. FFSC Directors have nominal input on programming of contracted SPCs. The FFSC does not manage contractors and may have little or no input for personnel initiatives, such as Performance Evaluations, making a final decision in the hiring or firing process, or training outside the scope of the contract.

1.10. Some FFSC SAVI Programs failed to fully comply with FFSC Program Accreditation Handbook (NAVPERS 175400A) standards regarding the SAVI Program. While reviewing SAVI Programs at Navy installations throughout the world, the SAS Team used the FFSC Program Accreditation Handbook (NAVPERS 175400A) as a standard for program requirements. These standards are derived from the applicable OPNAV instruction. The standards were updated and published in 2003, but FFSC SAVI Programs only began to be accredited utilizing these standards in 2004. While many SAVI programs were not in full compliance with the standards, most disturbingly, we found two programs non-compliant that had been accredited just weeks prior to our visit. The coordinators at these sites could not provide us with some of the documents required for accreditation, including letters of appointment, job descriptions, and SAVI Program Coordinating Committee minutes. At one site, the SPC had not chaired the committee, and the committee did not include all of the required participants. At another location, local victim advocates reported they had received only four hours of initial SAVI training, rather than the required 20 hours, and that no provision had been made for the 10 hours of required annual refresher training.

At other sites not recently accredited, we found a range of compliance discrepancies, including: unavailability of required documents, no documentation of committee meetings for greater than a year, no documentation of advocate training or follow on training, no awareness of the identities of an installation’s SAVI advocates, and no awareness of the identities of assigned Data Collection Coordinators. Such discrepancies made it particularly difficult for the SAS team to assess the completeness of Incident Reports of SA cases we knew NCIS was investigating or had investigated.

It was difficult to recover required data at locations where SPC duties and responsibilities were being performed on a part-time basis by Family Advocate Representatives (FARs) or FFSC directors. Generally programs were deficient where they were managed on a part-time basis. Reduced FFSC staffing caused by Commercial

Activities Studies and Most Efficient Organization initiatives resulted in these part-time assignments, and it was apparent that these programs were more deficient than those managed by full-time SPC. The SAS team learned that SAVI programs might be further compromised by additional losses of local full-time SPC in favor of implementing Regional SPC.

1.11. OPNAVINST 1752.1 series is not user friendly. SAVI volunteers reported difficulty working with the current SAVI directive, which is not a user friendly “operator’s manual” and causes some data inconsistencies.

Recommendations

1.1. Fund SAVI program appropriately. CNP establish a zero-based approach to develop a clearly focused profile consistent with the goals and objectives of the SAVI program. The information gained from this review will strengthen the SAVI program’s ability to defend budgetary resources and present more cogent arguments for supporting, where warranted, unfunded or under-funded initiatives.

1.2. Provide consistent program oversight and management. CNP establish in the SAVI instruction that SAVI POCs must provide oversight of their respective organizations, regardless of the level of command, as a mechanism to continually inform Commanders of possible systemic issues regarding SA. This involves monitoring all aspects of SAVI program execution, including incident report Quality Assurance (QA), and incident data trend analysis.

1.3. Provide standard training of SAVI Program Coordinators. CNP in conjunction with Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) develop a standard SPC training curriculum that all SPCs, including collateral, part-time, and FTE, attend as soon as feasible. In view of scheduling conflicts and excessive time between scheduled SPC courses, newly hired SPCs should receive on-the-job training from an accredited SPC.

1.4. Ensure SAVI Advocates complete required training. SPCs and local commanders be required to establish a mechanism to track Volunteer Advocate certification and subsequent required refresher training.

1.5. Establish a formal training curriculum for members of the SAVI Program (DCC, SAVI POC, SAVI Reps). CNP establish a requirement in the SAVI instruction, and requisite curriculum, for all personnel participating as volunteers within the SAVI program to receive training in order to effectively perform their duties.

1.6. Ensure SAVI program Data Collection Coordinators (DCCs) maintain statistical data on SA cases within their organizations. DCCs at all levels of command should maintain statistical data for trend analysis and provide cognizant commanders with reports regarding systemic issues within their organizations.

1.7a. Establish standard position descriptions for all SAVI Program Coordinator positions. CNI ensure contract SPC position descriptions include language that specifies the requirement to be able to execute all aspects of SPC responsibility as outlined in the applicable SAVI program instruction.

1.7b. Ensure FFSC Directors have input on programming of contracted SPC positions. Contracts being prepared for specific geographical areas should include generic specifications for the educational and experience levels of SPCs. Additionally,

since these contract employees are under the administrative management of the FFSC Director or comparable authority, they should have administrative authority regarding personnel actions.

1.8. Institute a requirement for mandatory command interface with the SAVI Program Coordinator in the event of SA occurring in SPCs area of responsibility. CNP establish a requirement in the SAVI instruction for tenant commands to contact the command/area SPC for all incidents of SA within the SPC's area of responsibility. This requirement should include forwarding all incident reports from initial allegation to SA case final disposition. Additionally, CNP should clearly define the SPC's geographic area of responsibility and articulate the administrative relationship of the SPC with the operational forces in that geographic area.

1.9. Reconsider current staffing model of SAVI Program Coordinators. The single most important asset to the SAVI program is a fully trained and engaged SPC that has the required tools to effectively execute their responsibilities. CNP ensure all SPC staff are able to execute all areas of responsibility, whether General Schedule or Contract employee.

1.10. Ensure FFSCs follow program accreditation standards for the SAVI program. FFSC SAVI Programs adhere to the handbook's accreditation standards, which are not arbitrary recommendations, but derived from OPNAVINST 1754.1A, the SAVI Program's guiding directive.

1.11. Re-write the SAVI program instruction OPNAVINST 1752.1. CNP re-write the SAVI program instruction with the specific goal of eliminating redundancy and providing a user-friendly "Operator's Manual" that includes incident action protocols and message templates.

Part 2

To determine effectiveness of the Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program (i.e., program, training, awareness, etc.)

Overview. In 1990, the Navy Women's Study group (NWSG) identified deficiencies with existing individual education and victim assistance policies. As a result of these findings, they made recommendations to address sexual assault awareness, prevention education, victim intervention, and data collection. In 1995, DON established the SAVI program with dedicated funding, staffing, and resources.

Findings

2.1. Lack of general understanding of the SAVI Program. A significant number of Sailors, both officer and enlisted, do not possess a requisite level of knowledge and understanding of SA, including: what constitutes SA; its controllable and contributing factors; those situations and behaviors that incur higher risks; appropriate preventive measures; and the programs designated to assist SA victims. In addition, many Sailors are not aware of the options available for reporting the occurrence of an SA incident. Many believed the chain of command was the only option to report an SA incident. Without an awareness of all SAVI program elements, young Sailors are at high-risk for SA victimization or perpetration, particularly in training commands. Even after SAVI and SA prevention training, young Sailors remain in a high-risk status.

This lack of general awareness has marked disparity along gender and grade lines. Although some focus group participants were familiar with the SAVI program, many had not heard of it until the SAS Team study (E1-E4 participants in particular). This is troubling information, given that the "at-risk" age group is predominately within these pay grades. Overall, female participants appeared to have a better understanding of the program, while males tended to be far less knowledgeable. Our survey results confirmed these findings. (See Appendix B.) In our focus groups, the E5-E6 and O1E-O3E groups appeared to have the most knowledge of the program. Conversely, O1-O3 junior officers who were not prior enlisted generally stated that they had not received or could not recall receiving SA Awareness training (i.e., orientation, GMT, etc.). The written comments below provide further insight:

-I don't work with enlisted people, so there's no need for me to know that kind of information." (male O-3 Aviation training command)

-Since I am at a "School" command, I feel and believe the staff takes all allegations of SA very seriously. Unfortunately, the students fail to understand their role in prevention of SAs. From the first day of reporting aboard as a student, the students are told the horror stories of the "hotel parties," where classmates, believing that they will watch out for each other, head off for a weekend of "chilling" at one of the local hotel/motels where they can kick back, watch television and drink. The female to male ratio is usually 1 female to 5 male classmates. After consuming alcohol, the inhibitions go away and group sex ensues. Unfortunately, when everyone sobers up, the female realizes she has made a mistake and/or the males start telling everyone who will listen that they "pulled a train." This results in allegations and an ensuing investigation. I wish I had the answer on how to convince our students that we are not fabricating these stories and are

telling them the truth, but so far, they continue not to listen. (male enlisted training staff)

2.2. Significant confusion exists between the terms sexual harassment (SH) and sexual assault. To determine current awareness of the SAVI Program and its relevant definitions, the SAS Team addressed the definition of “*Sexual Assault*” at the beginning of each focus group. We found that participants intermingled their definitions with that of Sexual Harassment (SH), and even when provided a textbook definition of SA, they were unaware that their discussions continually shifted between SA and SH. This was consistent with both male and female participants.

The SAS Team found focus group participants well trained in sexual harassment concepts, but noted that while the SH curriculum includes information about the basic elements of SA, it often omits the requisite protocols for responding to SA incidents. Many participants thought the Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Program Manager was the command’s appropriate responding agent for SA incidents. It is apparent that Sailors who are trained improperly or not at all do not know the critical differences between the two terms. Overall, we found confusion between the two terms was consistent across all pay grades.

The DOD *Task Force Report on Care of Victims of Sexual Assault* (2004) also noted that focus group participants confused the two terms. These two independent findings strongly indicate that the military in general, and the Navy in particular, are struggling to understand the key definitions of SA and SH. This uncertainty may compromise the integrity of reporting and tracking procedures, training, and program implementation.

In the SAS survey of 30,000 Sailors, 85% indicated that they had heard about the SAVI program, but only 60% indicated general knowledge of the program, such as an awareness of services offered or their command’s point of contact. (See Appendix B.)

2.3. Current GMT format fails to adequately illuminate the seriousness of SA issues. The majority of focus group participants indicated that while the content of GMT training sufficiently addresses SA issues, the medium and delivery fail to grasp their attention or capture the seriousness of SA. For example, one respondent was critical of a computer based GMT format.

-GMT has become a computer-based function and is completed quickly and without much thought about the topic area other than to complete a particular section. I made this comment to note that GMT is perceived as just a check in the box rather than meaningful training designed to emphasize the importance of certain topic areas to the troops. (Male officer)

-Training is sometimes conducted with little thought or preparation: the slides or videos are shown, but with little discussion or strong statement from someone in authority. (Male officer)

Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and Navy instructors often provide training in a one-way, non-interactive lecture format. Reviews of instructional material indicated that the body of their lectures was devoted to the definition of SA and recounting Sailors’ misbehavior, especially their lack of self-control and their poor choices. Both in form and content, the program assails the audience, possibly impressing those young Sailors whose self-management and self-image are already tenuous. One enlisted member remarked about a

lecture containing a Power Point presentation, “...*PowerPoint presentations kill the [SAVI] program.*”

The GMT format problem is compounded by the lack of senior command leadership involvement in stressing the importance of the training. As confirmed by a review of GMT rosters, senior command leadership was noticeably absent when the GMT audience was Sailors. Focus group participants remarked that this gives the perception that SA is not an important issue.

2.4. Deployment SA Awareness and Prevention training. Deploying units do not receive SA Awareness and Prevention training before, during, or after deployment. Anecdotal data from SMEs indicate that without SA Awareness and Prevention training crewmembers are not aware of the dynamics associated with overseas deployments and associated risks.

2.5. SA awareness among all-male units. Survey and interview data indicated that all-male crews are inclined to believe that a SAVI program and representative are not necessary, because “*things like that do not happen in an all-male crew.*” Training of these crews is critical for several reasons: (1) they need to be aware of the fact that, although rarely reported, male-on-male assaults do occur in the Navy; (2) they need to be aware of their personal responsibilities for being involved in an SA incident; and (3) they need to be aware of their responsibilities concerning personal knowledge of SA incidents involving others.

2.6. SA Awareness and Prevention training presentations have significant variance at training commands. During the study, we obtained and reviewed SA Awareness and Prevention training curricula and schedules from training commands and found them to be inconsistent. SAVI presentations/briefs at various leadership and indoctrination schools ranged from being non-existent (e.g., *Enlisted/ Officer Recruiting Orientation*) to being read-ahead material of 15 minutes to two-hours duration (e.g., *Legalman Accession and Basic Lawyer Course*).

2.7. Recruit training does not adequately indoctrinate recruits on SA awareness. The SAS Team found that recruits receive SA awareness training, but that the information provided does not adequately address the subject. The briefing summarizes the penalties for perpetration of SA, while providing an overview of sexually transmitted infections. Recruits don’t gain the full benefit of understanding how to avoid SA situations or recognizing the risky behaviors that could lead to commission of SA. Also, this delivery method does not accommodate the transition of individuals to advanced training environments and is not conducive to educating personnel who are unfamiliar with Navy culture (e.g., Navy hierarchy, acronyms, protocols, etc.)

2.8. Limited SA Awareness and Prevention training at leadership schools and officer accession points. We noted that leadership schools and officer accession points (e.g., CO/XO/SEA/NAVLEAD/OCS, etc.) provided only limited training on SA awareness and prevention and SAVI Program management. A review of training materials and curricula schedules indicated that the SAVI Program is not afforded adequate instructional time as compared to other Navy awareness and prevention programs, despite the requirement of OPNAVINST 1752.1A

2.9. SAVI Program is not prioritized in the training schedule. All-male crews indicated that the additional training requirements of the SAVI program are burdensome and not a priority in high operational tempo environments. Data from focus groups involving senior enlisted members and junior officers indicated that it is not considered

critical training at their commands. They expressed a sense of frustration at “doing more with less time.” As one Petty Officer in an aviation squadron said, “*Our job is putting planes in the air, if there is any time left, we train!*”

2.10. SA Awareness and Prevention training in joint environments presents unique challenges for all military services. Interviews with Navy personnel assigned to Joint Commands revealed that there is no standard for addressing the needs of SA victims in the joint environment (e.g., White House Communications Agency, U.S. Forces Korea, Defense Intelligence Agency, etc). It is vitally important to provide consistent SA prevention and awareness training in the joint environment to maintain a climate of camaraderie and cooperation, as well as an environment free of suspicion and mistrust.

2.11. Ineffective SAVI Program Coordinating Committee meetings. The SAS Team found that most SAVI Program Coordination Committees complied with Navy policy. However, while most held meetings, they were not always within the spirit of the intended goal. Typical discrepancies noted included: (1) someone other than the SPC chaired meetings; (2) local SMEs were not part of the committee (e.g., NCIS, Chaplain, etc. In some locations, activities had not held SAVI Coordination meetings within the past 12 months.

Recommendations

2.1, 2.3, 2.6. CNP in conjunction with NETC create SAVI Program related video “Docudramas” to ensure male and female Sailors understand the issue from all perspectives, including those of the victim, perpetrator and shipmate. A significant number of Sailors, both officer and enlisted, do not possess a requisite level of knowledge and understanding of SA, including: what constitutes SA, its controllable and contributing factors, those situations and behaviors that incur higher risks, appropriate preventive measures, and the programs designated to assist SA victims. In addition, many Sailors are not aware of the options available for reporting the occurrence of an SA incident. Many focus group participants suggested that dramatized story videos based on actual cases would be an effective training format. “Docudramas,” in trade jargon, are the most striking new format to be introduced in compliance training in recent years and have the potential to make people listen, learn, and think ethically and defensively about what they are doing. This approach ensures the material covered becomes relevant to each Sailor no matter what the circumstances.

2.2. Clearly define the term “Sexual Assault” and its requisite reporting requirements and distinguish the differences with other types of sexual misconduct. Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOA)s and CMEOs in the military EO community are experienced in educating and training the Navy; therefore, the Navy’s Equal Opportunity Office (PERS-00H) and the Navy’s SAVI Program Office (PERS-661) should develop and implement guidelines to educate and train the Navy to understand the distinction between sexual assault and sexual harassment.

2.4. Establish guidelines for deployment SA Awareness and Prevention training. SA Awareness and prevention training should continue to be part of the normal annual GMT and command indoctrination process; those units in a deployed status should continually update their personnel on SA awareness and prevention as part of pre-liberty briefs to heighten awareness of associated risks when in a deployed status. Additionally, those volunteers providing services in the SAVI program should make themselves aware of any challenges to provide these services while deployed in overseas or isolated locations.

2.5, 2.9. Increase SA awareness and SAVI protocols among all-male units.

The SAS team acknowledges that commands are subjected to ever increasing program requirements and competing priorities. However, full compliance with applicable doctrine only requires commands to conduct SA awareness training on an annual basis and to be able to provide SAVI support to all members of the command, regardless of type of command organization. Execution of this requirement requires minimal time, but deliberate focus.

2.7. Retool the SA awareness indoctrination process for recruit trainees.

RTC retool SA awareness indoctrination to provide SA awareness training to new recruits in a clear and deliberate manner, comprehensible at their level of indoctrination. Avoid excessive use of acronyms and Navy jargon and reduce speed of delivery to ensure each recruit understands the material.

2.8 Incorporate SA Awareness and Prevention training at leadership schools and officer accession. NETC, in conjunction with CNP, develop targeted training curricula for various levels of command responsibility that prepares students to assume duties commensurate with their levels of responsibility. For example, tailored curricula should be developed for Leading Petty Officers (LPOs), Chief Petty Officers (CPOs), Junior Officers, and Senior Officers that gives these individuals the requisite tools to manage and/or respond to SA cases. These curricula are not a replacement for all hands GMT that is designed to heighten awareness regarding SA

2.10. Establish standard SA Awareness and Prevention training and SA incident protocols in joint military environments. All Navy commands are required to be able to provide advocacy services, as well as ensure all Sailors receive annual SA awareness training, no matter where they are located. Include in the SAVI instruction a requirement that all Navy elements within a joint or combined environment establish a program to ensure the objectives of the SAVI program are met.

2.11. Conduct effective SAVI Program Coordinating Committee meetings.

The single most effective method to deliver coordinated program services is for all SAVI responders to collectively engage the issue. SAVI Coordination Committee meetings, chaired by SPCs, must be held to achieve this objective. Commanding Officers with SPCs should ensure these meetings are conducted on a quarterly basis and forward corresponding minutes to their respective Regional Commanders.

Part 3

To determine reliability, consistency (between different sources) and accuracy of reporting data for Navy from all sources

Overview. A major SAVI program component is accurate data collection of SA incidents. Collection of inaccurate and unreliable data compromises the program and causes victims to lose faith in the reporting process as a mechanism for change. Inaccurate incident data may also jeopardize the significance of the program to the extent that its budget and client services may not receive the same level of support as other FFSC programs. The number of reported SA cases significantly impacts the program, yet it is widely believed that reports are submitted for only a fraction of the actual number of cases within DON. The team identified various discrepancies in SA data collection and reporting and found that SA victims experienced barriers to reporting incidents, all of which impacts the accuracy of data. These findings are discussed further in this section.

Command Reporting

3.1 Lack of understanding of SA incident reporting requirements. Due to changes in SAVI program requirements and the need for more comprehensive reporting, PERS-661 has combined elements of three different incident reporting instructions (SAVI, the Navy's Operational Report (OPREP)/Situational Report (SITREP) reporting system as outlined in OPNAVINST 3100.6G, and SECNAVINST 1752.4) to formulate a hybrid system. Currently 33 data elements are synthesized to formulate one naval message for SA incident reporting. Figure 3.1 illustrates the process. Since elements of the message are drawn from three different sources, commands become confused as to the actual type of message required to be forwarded to higher authority.

Many personnel interviewed indicated they were unaware of a requirement to formally report incidents, and some commanders believed they had discretion with regard to forwarding reports. The SAS Team routinely heard comments such as, "*We resolved it at the lowest level.*" When asked what constituted the lowest level, some focus group respondents indicated, "*The Chief or Division Officer took care of it!*" SA reporting is quite different from SH reporting. SH can be handled at a lower level, while SA incidents must be formally reported. However, some Commanders did not understand or realize the difference. The SAS Team noted many styles of SITREP formats failed to comply with OPNAVINST 1752.1A and OPNAVINST 3100.6G guidelines. Even more disconcerting was that several reports inappropriately identified the victim and alleged perpetrator, violating SAVI reporting requirements and the confidentiality and privacy of the victim.

Focus group data and candid interviews with senior leadership, including enlisted members and officers, indicated commands were reluctant to report SA cases for fear of "*Putting themselves on report.*" Of course, this reluctance is accompanied by a lack of support for victims, since command leadership has no desire to allow the issue outside the chain of command. Also, there is a misunderstanding of the amount of discretion commanders have with respect to whether or not a report is required, even though the current policy states, "*Commanding Officers will ensure a SITREP (conflicts with requirements of OPNAVINST 3100.6G) is sent..., within 24 hours of the report of all allegations of sexual assault...*" In some cases, commanders opted to wait for a response from an NCIS or CID investigation to determine whether a report was appropriate. In some instances, when NCIS declined to pursue a case, commanders believed a report to higher authority was not required. However, discussions with the SAVI Program Manager and selected SAVI Coordinators indicated that all "allegations"

of sexual assault must be reported, regardless of whether or not NCIS accepts or declines investigation. The full range of reporting data allows higher authority to monitor the number of cases that may not meet the SA threshold or that may involve false allegations.

Sexual Assault Command Reporting Requirements




Figure 3.1

3.2. Sexual assault report analysis. The SAS team sampled 35 incident reports from various Navy units, including some working in a joint environment, and assessed three areas of incident reporting:

- 1 Message address integrity
- 2 Message formatting
- 3 Data content (i.e., the representative sample comprised DoN organizations from all communities including joint working environments)

SA incident reporting is critical, because it stimulates leaders to act. Consequently, errors in the process significantly impact the SAVI Program and the potential for leaders to act effectively. For example, when commands improperly address

incident reports intended for Echelon II commands, those commanders are unable to obtain a comprehensive understanding of SA incidents within their respective organizations. For lack of insight, they miss an opportunity to properly address systemic issues. Projecting this example on a Navy-wide scale illustrates its impact and potential for far reaching consequences on mission readiness.

In cases of rape and aggravated sexual assault, the Unit SITREP format fails to provide adequate notification of these serious SA incidents. As one commander explained, *“Unit SITREPS just don’t receive the same level of attention as an OPREP III Navy Blue. If a subordinate needs to get my attention, they need to frame the concern in an appropriate manner!”* Many reports included only sketchy comments that didn’t provide the responsible commander with a full understanding of the nature of the incident. For example, a command reported an SA incident via Unit SITREP, indicating only that it had occurred in a local park. However, a local news source reported the same incident as an aggravated rape at gunpoint by two assailants. Such detailed information is useful to regional commanders and assists them in developing strategies to enhance safety within their organizations.

Discrepancies noted in the sample of 35 incident reports are as follows:

- 62% did not include PERS-661/83, the Navy data collection agent as a message addressee.
- 20% did not include the address of the regional commander.
- 16% did not include the address of the Echelon II command.
- 53% reported cases of rape or aggravated sexual assault via the Unit SITREP, despite the requirement to report these types of incidents via OPREP III Navy Blue.
- 25% did indicate the type of sexual assault and left commanders to speculate about the nature of the incident.
- 28% included vague remarks or no remarks, which made it difficult to assess the scope of the sexual assault.

3.3. Database disparity. The Secretary of the Navy requires that CNO maintain an integrated database (IDB) to track reported SA incidents against persons over 18 years old and not married to their alleged perpetrators. CNP (PERS-661) has been directed to maintain a central data repository and collect data from SA incident reports filed by commands throughout the Navy. As part of this process, CNP is also responsible for submitting an annual SA Incident Report to SECNAV. NCIS maintains a similar database, but there is a wide disparity between CNP’s database and NCIS’s database regarding the number of cases being tracked.

NCIS SA incident numbers are based on cases reported to and/or investigated by NCIS. Each case is catalogued and a report of investigation is forwarded to the responsible commander. This data is also compiled at NCIS headquarters. Since commanders are required to report all allegations of SA, and NCIS forwards all cases of adult SA that it investigates to the respective commander, then the number of SA cases reported to PERS-661/83 should, at a minimum, match or exceed those compiled by NCIS. Unfortunately, this is not the case. On average, NCIS investigated 72% more cases of SA than were reported to PERS-661/83 for calendar years 1996 through 2003

(see Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also lists the number of SA incidents being tracked by Echelon II claimants (seven major claimants reporting), which are far more than PERS-661, but still less than NCIS. These data further illustrate the breakdown in command reporting to the Navy’s central repository. The lack of an integrated system for tracking SA reports and final case dispositions limited the SAS Team’s assessment. Our review identified inconsistent databases, a lack of efficient database structure, comparative gaps, and definitional confusion. This finding is consistent with the DOD Care for Victims of SA Task Force Report (2004).

SA Incident Database Comparison




Figure 3.2

3.4. Lack of data collection standardization. Overall, Echelons II and III data collection and quality assurance is not sufficiently standardized to ensure that all relevant/qualifying SA cases are reported to higher authority. This results in an inaccurate and unreliable database and prevents meaningful trend analysis that would facilitate corrective action at the major claimant or command level.

3.5. Tracking of Interim Reports. The governing SAVI instruction assumes that SAVI Coordinators, POCs, Advocates, and data collectors will monitor and analyze SA case data. However, we found that most commands do not follow-up or submit interim reports. After the initial SA incident report, the next report is usually the final disposition of the case.

3.6. Poor quality Incident Reports is a direct reflection of inadequate SAVI program volunteer training. Commands with proactive SAVI volunteers understood the necessity to comply with SAVI program requirements. However, other less-involved commands were more likely to submit untimely, incomplete, or erroneous Incident Reports (e.g., submitting late or not at all or submitting incorrectly to ISICs and/or Echelon II or III commands).

3.7. There is no directive requirement for a command to advise the SPC that an Incident Report has been forwarded to its Echelon II or III command. For example, NCIS investigated 358 SA incidents in FY03, but only 115 initial Incident Reports were forwarded to PERS-661. Therefore, PERS-661/83 did not have an accurate account of what happened to 243 SA victims.

Victim Barriers to Reporting

3.8. Fear of disbelief, invasion of victim's privacy, and negative impact on career. Young SA victims often fear they will not be taken seriously or will be ignored or blamed for their own victimization. Moreover, their concerns about personal autonomy and freedom make them reluctant to involve authorities in their personal affairs, particularly if they think it will lead to a curtailment of career opportunities and liberties. For example, several females in training commands indicated that they knew of other females who were sexually assaulted but did not come forward, because they thought it would set them back in their training schedules or delay them from reporting to their next duty stations. Similarly, females in shore commands revealed that they suspected that females they had interacted with had been sexually assaulted but chose not to report the incidents, because they were concerned that protracted legal proceedings would delay or compromise their careers. SAS survey data indicated 57% of the victims who were sexually assaulted at some point in their Navy career did not report their incidents (See Figure 3.3). This percentage is comparable to national statistics (61%).

SA Victims and Non-Reporting




Figure 3.3

3.9. The male ego. Many focus group participants expressed the belief that it is extremely difficult for men to report being sexually assaulted. Reasons for this reluctance may be rooted in the socialization of males, which educates them both directly and vicariously to be strong and capable of protecting themselves and others (cf., Stander, Olson & Merrill, 2004; Gilmore, 1990). Males who express vulnerability are often perceived as being less than a "real man," and may feel a need to prove they are not vulnerable or weak. Moreover, admitting weakness, particularly in a "male environment," compromises the male victim's reputation and his status within the command.

3.10. Some commands fail to provide victims the safest environment after an SA incident. If both the victim and alleged perpetrator belong to the same command, the SAVI instruction directs commanders to consider temporary reassignment of the victim

or accused until such time as the case reaches final disposition. Focus group discussions and individual victim interviews indicated that some Commanders do not follow this guideline for separating the involved parties.

3.11. Fear of retaliation or intimidation by perpetrators and/or chain of command. SA victims fear retaliation, compromising their careers, and being portrayed as disloyal or "not team players." Those who reported incidents believed that they were often punished, intimidated, or ostracized or that they were stigmatized by referrals to psychiatric services or other "visible" services. Potentially, some SA victims may suffer more from embarrassment and humiliation after-the-fact than from the assault itself. The experience is stressful and psychologically detrimental with long-lasting effects. Many victims reported receiving long-term counseling or psychotherapy to come to grips with their ordeals and their relationships with family, friends, and peers. Focus group participants described the psychological status of victims as day-to-day challenges and used the term "walking wounded" in their descriptions. Victims also fear retaliation or intimidation by perpetrators. According to many focus group and survey participants, when SA perpetrators work within the same confines as their victims, post-attack stress on the victims is even greater. More importantly, it is generally believed that a victim who reports an SA incident will be chastised by peers and ridiculed by the chain of command. Such fears are believed to be widespread and greatly impacting SA incident reporting by victims.

3.12. Victims' perceptions of the chain of command. We found that SA victims feared how they would be treated in their interactions with the chain of command, security, CDO, or police handling SA incidents. The less sensitivity these individuals appear to exercise towards the victim, the less likely the victim will be to pursue the issue.

3.13. Lack of confidentiality in SA cases. If both the victim and alleged perpetrator belong to the same command, the SAVI instruction directs commanders to consider temporary reassignment of the victim or accused until such time as the case reaches final disposition. Focus group discussions and individual victim interviews indicated that some Commanders do not follow this guideline for separating the involved parties. This compromises the safety and confidentiality of the survivor and further contributes to fostering a hostile work environment. As word spreads about SA incidents, individuals newly victimized may feel hesitant to approach the chain of command, because they believe that the command failed to provide a safe haven for previous SA victims.

Recommendations

3.1. Lack of understanding of SA incident reporting requirements. CNP develop message-reporting templates within OPNAVINST 1752 series to minimize confusion and improve the integrity of SA incident reporting data, recommend that the CNP design standard naval messages in accordance with the Special Incident Reporting Manual OPNAVINST 3100.6G. Incidents of rape and aggravated SA should be reported via Operational Report (OPREP) 3 Navy Blue, while incidents that would be characterized as indecent assault, should be reported using the Unit Situation Report (SITREP). Include a sample message shell within the SAVI program instruction, so all messages will conform to one standard and only include those data elements necessary for accurate data analysis.

3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7. Consistent training regarding the reporting of SA incidents. CNP train and require the Navy to report all SA incidents to appropriate

command levels. Specifically, commands identify staff responsible for submitting Incident Reports and train them in the process (e.g., including all data elements, using proper addresses of Immediate Superior in Chain of Command (ISIC) and other agencies, making follow-up reports, etc.). Additionally, as part of organization oversight, recommend all major claimants and ISICs provide QA of SA incidents occurring within their purview. This includes reviewing Incident Reports for accuracy and ensuring proper administration of victim services.

3.3. Database disparity. NCIS and the SAVI program manager should compare data and determine reporting shortfalls on a quarterly basis. When necessary, the SAVI program manager should communicate with major claimants to determine where the shortfalls lie. Additionally, as outlined in SECNAVINST 1752.4, recommend CNP resume submitting an annual report of SA incidents to SECNAV.

3.8, 3.10, 3.13. Leadership training. Discuss SAVI program and SAS Team findings at Prospective Executive Officer (PXO)/Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO)/Command Master Chief (CMC) training in order to firmly establish the importance of the program and a Commander's responsibility to respond to SA victims, to assure their safety and privacy, and to keep them informed throughout the disposition process.

For those victims who feel they are unable to report SA victimization through normal organizational channels, CNP should develop a toll-free SA hotline. This will ensure all DON members and their families have a confidential method to report these cases for immediate SAVI support and further tasking to Echelon II Inspectors General to investigate process breakdowns.

Part 4

To determine controllable factors, situations and behaviors that may incur higher risks of SA

Overview. The rate of occurrence of SA incidents could be reduced by a number of controllable factors under command leadership's purview. These factors are noted in Table 4.1 and several notable factors discussed below in more detail.

The SAS Team found that risky behaviors, such as alcohol misuse by Sailors in their off-duty hours, require proactive command involvement to mitigate related problems. For the Navy, alcohol consumption is recognized as one of the leading risk factors for SA incidents. NCIS agents estimate that approximately 95% of alleged rape cases they investigate involve alcohol use by either the victim or the perpetrator. National statistics conservatively estimate that 25% of women experience SA (including rape) and that alcohol use by both victim and perpetrator is a factor in 50% of the related incidents. Under age drinking by victims exacerbates the situation, as it tends to cause them to avoid reporting SA or not to fully disclose the circumstances of an incident. NCIS statistics indicate that Navy personnel between the ages of 18 and 20 comprise 22% of DON rape victims and 37% of indecent assault victims.

In 1994, Dr. Lex Merrill and his colleagues from the Naval Health Research Center, San Diego began assessing Navy recruits to determine underlying factors common to those who were perpetrators of sexual assault and those who were childhood victims. Merrill found that approximately 11% of male Navy recruits (850 of 7,800) admitted anonymously that they had committed pre-military rape (Merrill et al., 2001). Factors common to this group were: a history of childhood abuse (physical or sexual), a history of alcohol problems, and a history of multiple sexual partners. Merrill also found that 24% of female Navy recruits (1,267 of 5,473) reported being victims of childhood sexual abuse. The research further determined that a history of childhood abuse and multiple sexual partners correlated with dysfunctional sexual behavior and a potential for being re-victimized later in life (Merrill, Thomsen, & Milner, 2003). These results strongly suggest that psychological screening of recruits is an important gate-keeping factor preventing undesirable SA perpetrators from entering the Navy and protecting and providing support for childhood victims entering Navy service. This is discussed later in this section.

Controllable Factors

**Table 4.1
Summary List of Factors Leading to High-or Low-Risk SA Environments**

High-Risk Factors	Low-Risk Factors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nominal or no SAVI staff • Minimal or lack of training and accountability • High frequency of alcohol misuse • High ratio DUIs within command • Minimal alcohol use training • Infrequent command climate assessments and feedback • Poor/fair/relaxed command climate • No or nominal command assessment • Training School environments in CONUS • High turnover of SAVI staff • Gapped SAVI volunteer billets • Lack of policy enforcement by chain of command • Prior offenses committed by perpetrators • Low average age of junior personnel; social immaturity • Remote location/forward deployed unit • No established command SOPs • No updated SOPs • Co-ed/mixed-gender barracks • Initial training environments (“A” and “C” Schools) • Lack of MOUs or MOAs with civilian agencies within AOR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High visibility of command leadership and involvement in SAVI programming • Frequent and command tailored training schedule • Command leadership is engaged and alerted to SA severity • SAVI Coordinator, POC or Representative direct line to CO/XO/OIC/CMC • SAVI Committee/SAVI Working Group established and periodic meetings • Public awareness events (held in April, SA Awareness Month) • High visibility SAVI staff • High command <i>esprit de corps</i> and morale • Ensuring command climate comfort for victims to disclose SA incident(s) • Communication plan to disseminate SAVI information to command i.e., POW/POD notes, newspapers, <i>Navy Times</i>, posters, CTV, etc. • American Forces Network information announcements • Updated and signed policy statement • Off-limits orders -- bars, nightclubs, hotels, etc. • Active and diverse MWR program • Relatively high percentage of female staff and female leadership • Frequent contact and training with civilian agencies • Use of the Ombudsman program as a source of information and support • Psychological screening at Recruit Training Command

Findings

4.1. Poor/fair/relaxed command climate contributes to a high-risk SA environment. Focus group participants expressed a belief that command climate and SA occurrence are linked. Many indicated that a relaxed command climate, which may overlook or ignore fraternization and sexual promiscuity, contributes to the frequency of SA occurrences (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). One officer described social events where

male and female members of various ranks intermingled and openly groped each other. Another participant remarked that some officers openly bragged about their consensual sexual liaisons with enlisted females. Another noted that some enlisted females were also known to brag about their sexual liaisons with officers.

NCIS data noted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicated that working relationships are one of the dominant situations in which perpetrators and victims first encounter one another prior to the assault. A relaxed command climate can only exacerbate the situation.




Figure 4.1






Figure 4.2

4.2. Remote locations present higher risk for SA. Focus groups, interviews, and anecdotal data from Navy members also indicated a prevalence of behavior contrary to good order and discipline at remote locations. Anecdotal evidence suggested a more permissive attitude toward sexual promiscuity exists at some installations/detachments, in part, because they were remotely located. Many Sailors remarked, “What goes on deployment, stays on deployment.”

4.3. Navy training commands are high-risk SA locations. Focus group data suggested that training commands carry a higher risk of SA than other types of commands. NCIS’s SA database also indicated that training command environments are conducive to SA incidents. Interview data, including command leadership, further supported this finding. Young Sailors (18-25 years old), leaving basic training after having been subjected to intense “*Sailorization*” processes experience a new degree of freedom that makes them susceptible to high-risk behaviors. Such reckless behaviors, encouraged by peer pressure and fueled by alcohol abuse, are precursors to SA incidents.

4.4. Mixed gender living and working environments are at high-risk for SA. Focus group data indicated that women who lived in mixed-gender barracks and experienced unwanted sexual advances (i.e., sexual harassment) were almost seven times more likely to be physically assaulted. At one overseas location, NCIS reported that SA incidents occurred four to five times per month in the E-4 and below barracks. NCIS identified alcohol use and lack of intrusive adult supervision in the barracks as contributing factors in these assaults. Conversely, there were mixed-gender barracks with proactive command involvement and minimal sexually harassing behavior that were not at high-risk for physical assaults. Figure 4.3 illustrates locations of rape amongst active duty personnel and Figure 4.4 location of indecent assaults. Note in both figures, the barracks have one of the largest number of incidents.



Mixed-gender training/work environments are a double-edged sword. On the one hand they provide the opportunity for team work and professional acknowledgement, while on the other they have proven to be conducive to sexual misconduct.

Research has demonstrated that women in traditionally male-dominated careers experience more sexual harassment and assault than women in other work settings. It is argued that men in traditionally male-dominated careers (like the military), who have minimal experience in working with women, may rely on inappropriate gender-based expectations to guide their interactions with women. This potentially leads to inappropriate and hostile behavior.

4.5. OCONUS Ports/Stations/Installations present victim support challenges. Forward deployed locations such as Guam, Diego Garcia, Japan, etc., have limited outside resources in the areas of psychological, legal, counseling, and medical assistance. Without SAVI program or chain of command support, victims are left to their own, often inadequate, resources and support circles to deal with sexual assault's traumatic aftermath. Therefore, it is imperative for local Navy leadership to have viable SA victim services in these locations. As one overseas SAVI Coordinator said, *"Most of our SA victims have been aboard for less than 90 days when an incident occurs."*

4.6. The number of senior women in a command has a modulating effect of SA incidents. Studies show that the number of women assigned to a unit appears to be a safety or modulating factor in the rate of SA incidents (cf., Dansby & Lanis, 1995). Interview data also suggested this was the case and that greater numbers of senior women who serve as role models has a moderating effect on the number of "poor choices" by both female and male members leading to SA and SH incidents.

4.7. Prior SA Experience influences the reoccurrence of SA. Counselors with the Counseling and Advocacy in a Recruit Environment (CARE) and training staff assigned to Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, reported that a significant number of recruits seek counseling to relieve past memories of SA or abuse, usually during the third week of Boot Camp when they experience increased anxiety and difficulty coping with the rigors of training. Unfortunately, unless a Sailor makes a special effort to continue receiving counseling, it stops upon leaving Boot Camp. Research by Merrill, Thomsen, and Milner (2003) indicated 24% of surveyed female recruits (1,267 of 5,473) reported having been victims of childhood SA or abuse. Merrill (2001) also found that approximately 11% of male recruits (850 of 7,800) acknowledged having committed a rape after age 14, and nearly 4% more indicated they had attempted rape. Rape perpetrators often used physical threats or force and also attempted to get victims drunk. According to some reports, the percentage of Navy recruits who had either been female rape victims or male rape perpetrators exceeds rates among college students, working women, and community samples in the United States and Canada (Bower, 1997).

4.8. Psychological screening of Navy recruits. The first step to improving gender relationships in the Navy is recruit screening intended to eliminate candidates with psychological impairment, personality disorders, or criminal tendencies that make them unfit for active-duty service.

Under a Memorandum of Understanding, Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland AFB, San Antonio, TX, agreed to manage the Navy-Air Force Medical Evaluation Test (N-AFMET), a three-phase psychological assessment program, including maintaining the database and training Navy personnel.

OPNAVINST 1100.6, The Psychological Screening of Recruits, outlines the above agreement; however, the SAS team found that it has not been in place since January, 2000 at the Recruit Training Command; although, there is no record of a request to cancel the policy.

4.9. Age factor: Young Sailors are more susceptible to SA Incidents.

Teenagers are less likely than other age groups to report crimes against them. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that people ages 12 to 19 report only 36% of crimes against them, as compared to 54% reporting by the 20 to 34 and 35 to 49 age groups. Teenagers in particular are unlikely to report date related violence. In one major study, the majority of teenagers experiencing dating violence told no one about their victimization. Only 22% told someone – always a peer – and less than 5% told a parent (Koss, 1992). This research finding has direct implications for the Navy, since the profile of SA victims is within the same age cohort. NCIS data in Figures 4.5 – 4.8 indicate the 18 – 25 year olds (E-1 through E-3) are most vulnerable in both rape and indecent assault cases.




Figure 4.5




Figure 4.6




Figure 4.7






Figure 4.8

An alarming number of command leaders have failed to gain the trust of junior Sailors who are within the demographic profile that is at higher risk of SA (ages 18-20 years). To quote one enlisted Sailor:

There is a major problem at my command with sexual harassment. Incidents have been reported and the aftermath actions are uncalled for and completely unjust. A junior Sailor of mine reported a problem and the command basically overlooked it and faulted her entirely. The first class [that] the charges were brought against is still a first class and remained working in the same work center as the junior Sailor.

4.10. Leadership’s frustration with “zero tolerance” for reporting SA. In focus groups, leaders at all levels of the chain of command expressed frustration with what they characterize as a “zero tolerance” mentality for commands reporting SA, because they perceive that any reported misconduct reflects negatively on command leadership (i.e., too many SA cases would be analogous to running a ship aground, causing the ultimate relief of the Commanding Officer). Many focus group participants indicated that the perception of this “zero tolerance” mentality for reporting SA potentially determines if a senior leader will confront an incident professionally, or take a course of action that will make the command look good to the ISIC. A collateral effect of this perception is the conscious containment of bad news, including SA incidents, at lower command levels. In an effort to prevent senior leaders from recognizing that a subordinate has a problem or has failed, junior leaders avoid reporting bad news to their superiors.



4.11. Real and perceived: High positive correlation between alcohol misuse and SA. NCIS data indicated a high percentage of SA cases involved alcohol misuse, which coincided with research that generally concluded that alcohol misuse is a major

contributor to a variety of forms of violence. Figure 4.9 and 4.10 indicate victims are under the influence of alcohol at the time of the criminal act compared to the perpetrators.

One study of men incarcerated for a violent offense found that chronic alcohol patterns had little predictive value, but that acute episodes of drinking immediately before the offense appeared as a significant predictor. This research may help to explain the rate of incidents among young Sailors engaged in weekend binge drinking. Focus group and survey data support this finding.

4.12. Illegal drug use and SA. The SAS Team review found that recreational pharmaceuticals/drug use was much less of a contributor to SA incidents than alcohol use. This would indicate that the Navy’s “zero tolerance” policy for illegal drug use and associated training are having a desirable effect. However, in San Diego, a clinical social work researcher noted that the use of illegal date rape drugs or drug-facilitated date rape drugs (i.e., GHB [gamma hydroxybutyric acid], Rohypnol [flunitrazepam], and ketamine [ketamine hydrochloride]) has increased over the past three years. One of the factors associated with this phenomenon was Sailors’ access to those illegal drugs in nearby Mexico.

Recommendations

4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.9. Implement policies to effect safety of environment.

Commanders/Commanding Officers, while conducting periodic command climate assessments, should include questions regarding the command’s involvement in preventing SA incidents, and those behaviors associated with other forms of misconduct. Additionally, Commanders/Commanding Officers should ban certain social events or locations, restrict personnel to installations when necessary (in accordance with OPNAVINST 1620.2A) and develop and promote positive social programs/events that provide avenues for relaxation and maintenance of Navy Core values. CNI should provide the resources to MWR for these positive social programs.

4.4, 4.6. Implement policies to incorporate Senior Enlisted leadership within mixed gender living and working environments. Recommend as a Navy policy, that at least one Senior Enlisted (E6+) of each gender living in the barracks be charged with the specific responsibility to provide mature leadership to young Sailors in an effort to curb negative behaviors associated with incidents of SA. The Navy should consider conducting a study to determine if there is a correlation between the number of senior females assigned to a unit and the number of incidents (SA, SH unwanted pregnancy, etc.) occurring in that command.

4.5. OCONUS Ports/Stations/Installations present victim support challenges.

CNI should focus manpower and fiscal resources in developing effective overseas SAVI programs.

4.7, 4.8, 4.12. Recommend reviewing the reinstatement of psychological screening of recruits (the N-AFMET program as prescribed by OPNAVINST 1100.6). NETC, in cooperation with BUMED, commission a panel of subject matter experts to review the feasibility of reinstating psychological screening of new recruits to avoid increased risk of first term enlistment attrition due to dysfunctional behavior and prevent potential perpetrators from entering the Navy. Although there may be some problems with the program, a longitudinal analysis, including continual evaluation and validation of the psychological tools, should be conducted regularly. (Note: The Air Force is still conducting its psychological screening program, assessing factors identified

in the Merrill reports in the screening process to identify past SA victims and providing them with additional psychological counseling and SA awareness training, if necessary.)

4.10. Leadership frustration with “zero tolerance” mentality. Leaders should apply a number of the actions listed in the right-hand column of Figure 4.1.

4.11. Real and perceived: High positive correlation between alcohol misuse and SA. Commanders/Commanding Officers carefully select the individuals assigned as the Drug and Alcohol Program Advisors (DAPAs). As the command’s primary contact for the Navy Alcohol and Drug Safety Program (NADSAP), the DAPA should also be trained in the SAVI program in order to provide educational awareness of the link between alcohol misuse and SA occurrence to known problem drinkers.

Recommend Commanders/Commanding Officers educate their members regularly with all NADSAP programs (Right Spirit, Alcohol Aware, Alcohol Impact) to promote responsible use of alcohol.

Part 5

To determine command responsiveness and accountability issues

Overview. Responsiveness and cooperation between SAVI staffs and the victims' commands varied from command to command and region to region. Many SPCs described experiences of passive and aggressive resistance from commands, who are required to provide support and comfort to SA victims. SPCs said this resistance centered on their efforts to support victims, their inquiries about required initial incident reports and updates their requests for NCIS intervention and investigation, and their requests for information about alleged perpetrators.

To remain viable and effective, Navy prevention programs such as SAVI, rely on command accountability, support, and personal responsibility. Command accountability is vested in the CO by the CNO's top-down leadership charter, which places responsibility squarely on the chain of command to establish and maintain an environment free from SH and SA. COs must intelligently assess the specific context and climate of their commands and then move toward creating optimal workplace environments.

Findings

5.1. Lack of CO accountability. There is no mechanism in place to hold a CO accountable for failing to comply with established policy regarding SA incidents. Although accountability should, at minimum, be maintained through normal Chain of Command (COC) oversight processes, the SAS Team did not find the level of accountability and oversight to be consistent with such a sensitive issue.

5.2. Accuracy and timeliness of SA reporting varies across commands. There remains some misunderstanding among command leadership with regard to reporting requirements as outlined in the SAVI program instruction. Available data indicated minimal delay in victims reporting alleged SA incidents; however, command reporting is deficient for several reasons, including: (a) holding reports in abeyance, pending NCIS investigation, (b) improperly adjudicating criminal matters at the command level, (c) diminishing the seriousness of SA allegations, and (d) improperly addressing SA reports. Erroneous and vague data also negatively impact SA incident reporting. (See Part 2.)

5.3. Lack of consistent SAVI program application across Navy commands. There is a significant disparity between commands in the level of their implementation of the SAVI program, ranging from no compliance to nominal compliance, characterized by "just-in-time" appointments, to optimal and fully committed program compliance. This disparity, coupled with some command leadership's misunderstanding of program reporting requirements, further exacerbates the underreporting of SA cases.

Focus group discussions suggested that many volunteer SAVI staff were appointed within days of the SAS Team visit. These individuals suspected that their involuntary assignments resulted from command leadership's belief that the SAS Team visit constituted a NAVINGEN inspection and that without SAVI "volunteers" in place, the command might be placed on report and subject to ISIC guidance.

5.4. Perception that command leadership concealed SA incidents. Survey results and focus group discussions suggested a number of reasons for non-disclosure, including: (a) protection of alleged perpetrators, who are viewed as valued command members, (b) protection and preservation of command image, (c) lack of understanding

of SA case management protocol, and (d) fear of retaliation or intimidation by the chain of command, perpetrators, or other shipmates. Many focus group participants expressed frustration at their command's apparent lack of sensitivity to the need to assure a victim's rights to privacy and/or confidentiality. According to enlisted personnel, senior officers who conducted inquiries were more concerned about safeguarding the Navy's reputation and protecting personnel than naming alleged perpetrators or seeking justice. One enlisted Sailor commented in the survey:

Command climate toward SAs and sexual batteries is better than it used to be, but still suffers from a "good ol' boy" attitude. Command leadership, primarily in the Chief's community, shy away from taking immediate and appropriate action in SA and sexual battery cases, especially when it's within their own ranks. Upper level command leadership appears to be more concerned about how the community views the command and their leadership than they are about the victims. SAs and sexual batteries go unreported daily because the victims don't have faith in the command response.

There appears to be a type of "loyalty code" system operating within commands, whereby it is tacitly understood that members owe their loyalty to the Navy, the command, and to their superiors. "Whistle blowing," or reporting unethical and/or criminal acts, effectively labels that person as an outsider, who is not part of the team and cannot be privy to insider information. Repercussions for the whistle blower are not unexpected.

According to this code, it is permissible for males to commit criminal acts against females, as the "loyalty code" will protect them and the command image. Research literature seems to confirm this mode of behavior. Studies indicate that repeated violations occur because men see other men getting away with SA, leading to development of a predatory climate. This type of climate was apparent at a number of commands visited by the SAS Team.

5.5. Command leadership responsiveness to SA incidents and SA Awareness and Prevention training. Focus group discussions suggested that command leadership is too absorbed in their careers and adopts a "not on my watch" attitude regarding SA cases. This apparent attitude conveys the message that the mission is more important than the people executing and accomplishing it. Moreover, focus group data indicated that command leadership is the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and enforcing an environment of respect and dignity in the Navy, particularly for "people support programs," such as the SAVI Program.

Junior officers and senior enlisted focus groups indicated that increases in Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), inspection cycles, and other training requirements have made their schedules extremely demanding, and allotting time to SA Awareness and Prevention training would be another demand that is not directed to operational readiness. Several senior member focus groups indicated that lack of program compliance related to their emotional/professional resentment of the program's perceived time and personnel requirements. Others thought SA Awareness and Prevention training should be incorporated or integrated into the existing training (e.g., EO, Navy Rights & Responsibility, SH, DAPA), rather than assigned as a separate requirement.

5.6. Lack of confidence in command leadership in SA cases. Focus group participants lacked confidence that their command's leadership would respond appropriately to SA cases. Data indicated that members have experienced, heard of, or

observed incidents in which their chain of command was hesitant, not committed, or lackadaisical in responding to SA reports. Without the benefit of being privy to the details and final disposition of the SA case, these members were apt to critically judge their command leadership's response. This finding corroborates the DOD Task Force Report (2004) findings.

The selected survey comments below are relevant to this portion of the report:

A system to help those that have been assaulted, without fears as I checked, does not exist – not in the Navy. If a person assaults another, with no witnesses, and no physical evidence, or in my case I even had physical evidence (punch marks/bruises) it is not worth the repercussions and stigma of our current legal systems to even try to obtain justice. It is better to tell no one and try to forget it. (male officer)

I was sexually assaulted, reported the incident to my chain of command and I was the one that was put on restriction. I find that unfair and unjust for the actions brought forth against me. I believe that the program is a good program but the people that run it are not following the right steps. (male enlisted)

I believed in my chain of command, but because of pay grade status and the man who attacked me out ranked me, my chain of command – my CO especially – talked me out of pursuing further action. I wanted at least a captain's mast, and my CO said if I pursued it that I would be discharged. I love the Navy with all my heart and have risen in ranks. I didn't feel like my chain of command supported me at all and I decided to keep it quiet so I can continue to serve. If it happens to anyone in my command, I know I will provide the right leadership to ensure there are no more victims. I was victimized once and then I feel like my CO victimized me again. (female officer)

When I was at my last command my roommate and I were both assaulted and when we reported it to our Chain of Command we were told that they weren't going to do anything because " We didn't have the best reputations". We also got page 13's for not going directly to our Chain of Command. We went to the Legal Officer instead who was a Lieutenant we trusted. The SAVI representative was a female Lieutenant that neither one of us trusted because it was well know[n] to both of us she wasn't trust worthy. She was the one who told us they weren't going to pursue anything [because] of our reputations. We were in our own house drinking with some of our friends as well as friends of friends. We did nothing wrong. Before this happened I was planning on making the Navy my career. Now, after the way we were treated, I'm getting out when my enlistment is up. (female enlisted)

I was drugged and raped by two members at my command and sodomized by another. I had three meetings with my Commanding Officer, all three of which he said he viewed this as an alcohol incident and not rape or sexual assault. He advised me not to drink so much next time. Two other members of my chain of command, a Chief and a LTJG, advised me not to press charges because this would follow me anywhere I went in the Navy. I have learned many things from this incident the main being the system of the [Navy] is a wonderful thing [for] the people in it however mostly are not

deserving of the positions they hold. I feel sorry for anyone who has to live with the embarrassment I went through with my chain of command I wish I would have never said anything. I would have been better off that way.
(female enlisted)

5.8. Victim’s not informed of disposition of their case. SA victims believed their needs were not met when they were not allowed to review information on the status of their cases during the investigative process. Being out of the command or legal information loop exacerbated their feelings of neglect, anxiousness, loneliness, unworthiness, or even paranoia.

5.9. Late identification of alleged and repeat perpetrators. According to SME interviews in both CONUS and OCONUS locations, Navy officials may not identify some SA perpetrators until after they have committed the same crime/offense and are apprehended, detained, and prosecuted by authorities at another command. Research (Muren et al., 2002) indicates that rapists and perpetrators of SA will continue this behavior until apprehended.

5.10. Many victims were unaware of SA support services. Many self-identified victims were unaware of support services and were left vulnerable to pressure and intimidation from command leadership and command members. There were indications that some commands are only marginally competent in processing SA cases. In addition, victims were inclined not to request assistance from outside their command (e.g., SAVI volunteer staff, healthcare providers, FFSC, and other agencies; See Part 7). Contacting outside assistance would be perceived as “*making the chain of command look inadequate.*”

Recommendations

5.1 – 5.10. CNP revise OPNAVINST 1752.1A to include CO accountability for failure to establish and monitor an effective command SAVI program, including ensuring timely reporting, appropriate training, adequate services, effective adjudication, proper treatment of victims, and timely notification of case dispositions. CO accountability should be a “Check and Balance” system with the chain of command to ensure SA victims are afforded the utmost support. Commands that experience SA incidents and lack proper implementation of policy should be held accountable.

As prospective command leadership prepares to assume commands, recommend these individual’s receive briefs at the region/ISIC level on SA incident management within their new organizations to bridge the gap between leadership pipeline SA incident management training and regional/ISIC SAVI program policies.

Upon assuming command, Commanders/Commanding Officers should conduct a review of their SA prevention and awareness, victim support, and SA reporting processes to determine if they meet program standards.

Part 6

Examine how Navy command leadership views and exercises the responsibility to prevent sexual assault, specifically addressing behaviors that fail to acknowledge the dignity and respect to which every Sailor is entitled

Overview. The commissioning of this study reflects executive Navy leadership's concern for the seriousness of the crime of SA and its effect on our ranks. The SAVI Program's governing directive requires that Commanding Officers and SA support services provide a supportive and confidential setting for SA victims. Essentially, an effective program starts and stops with command leadership.

According to a number of interviewees, command leadership has marginalized and under-resourced the SAVI program, rather than view it as a force multiplier. That the program has worked as well as it has is a tribute to dedicated SAVI personnel working diligently to ensure that Sailors' needs are effectively addressed. In addition, the program has worked well due to those Commanders who, as exceptions to the rule, have proactively supported the SAVI program as a force readiness multiplier. General findings of command leadership are presented below, along with a theoretical construct that may explain why some senior leaders are not in tune with the SAVI Program.

Findings

6.1. Not all commands are implementing measures to prevent SA.

Leaderships' perception of their responsibilities concerning sexual assault varied across commands. Interview data indicated nearly all command leadership acknowledged their responsibility to prevent SA incidents; however, not all commands are proactive in implementing preventive measures. Lack of knowledge and expertise to implement such measures is particularly telling for all-male crews.

Comments from enlisted members reflected the absolute need for Navy leaders to understand and implement preventive measures:

I believe that ISICs and seniors in the chain of command need to hold their subordinates accountable for repeated actions that occur at the subordinates command. Complacency regarding sexual assault is the same as tolerating or condoning those actions. When an incident occurs the actions by the chain of command need to make a forceful statement, because they certainly set a precedent.

Senior leadership must address sexual assault if people are going to take it seriously. I say this because sexual assault is happening in the Navy. After the offense happens, it's too late.

Rather than focusing on the responsibility of upper-level leadership, the lower end of the leadership chain (E3+) needs to be brought into the loop and taught how to foster a protective environment amongst Sailors in each work center, division, command, and in general. If personnel treated other Sailors as they would a member of their own family, there would be a trend of Sailors assisting each other and helping them to avoid high-risk activities and situations.

6.2. Command Leadership is struggling to enforce the "zero tolerance" policy. Although commanders are aware that Sexual Assault Prevention is a major Navy

objective, enlisted focus group data suggests that command leadership is only nominally aware of the details behind implementing the program. “Zero Tolerance” is a term that is described in the CNO’s direction to his subordinate commanders, but in general, at the command level, there is a perception that leaders only loosely adhere to or enforce the policy, as indicated from the following comments:

My command does not appear to believe that sexual assault is an issue by its members or directed towards our female junior service members. The command does not require or provide adequate training or reinforcement of policies with regard to sexual assault or inappropriate conduct. The subject of sexual assault or harassment is taken lightly and is a frequent butt of jokes by department heads, the officer in charge, and other members of the command. (enlisted male)

I am currently deployed and I feel that my command has let down a few Sailors. I reported a sexual assault to my command last year. That was the worst thing I could have done. This command is not good at keeping the "victim" apart from the "Accused". The[y] let their personal "feelings" about the accused get in the way of any kind of proper justice. This kind of thing should not happen in a command. To this day I am still looking for answers on why this command has let me down. (enlisted female)

Individual command leadership (khakis) say that they support the Navy's Zero Tolerance policy on Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault, but it is still leadership by "do as I say, not as I do." I have seen perpetrators of SH/SA at this command get off with little or no punishment. (enlisted female)

I just think that the program is not taken seriously and that the command does not stand behind the program. I have been here for 2 1/2 years and they have yet to offer sexual assault training. (enlisted female)

This perception may stem from the lack of transparency in the administrative and judicial processes of an SA case required to protect individual’s privacy. This lack of transparency may be misconstrued as inaction or lack of action on a command’s part. The only way to change this perception is to articulate to the crew the issues dealing with confidentiality that contribute to this perception.

6.3. Command leadership behaviors that fail to acknowledge the dignity and respect of sexually assaulted Sailors. The SAS Team was presented with many SA cases that demonstrated leadership’s apparent inability or unwillingness to take appropriate action in accordance with established Navy policy. According to survey and focus group data, Sailors identified leadership behaviors that failed to ensure the dignity and respect of all Sailors as:

- 1 Lack of leaderships’ participation in annual SAVI awareness and prevention training.
- 2 Chain of command failed to ensure privacy and the right to confidentiality for the victim.
- 3 CO delayed talking to the victim or refused to talk to the victim and referred the case to a lower level in the chain of command.

- 4 CO failed to ensure that the victim was fully informed of SA complaint processes and the chain of command intentionally ignored the victim's requests for information about case proceedings and status.
- 5 CO abused his or her authority, failed to ensure a safe and equitable command environment, or interfered with the complaint and investigative process.
- 6 Chain of command actively pursued separation of victim from the Navy, vice exercising other available options, such as a permanent change of station. When the chain of command is perceived as pursuing this option, rather than finding ways to retain the victim on active duty, the crew is alerted to how leadership manages and regards SA cases.
- 7 Leaders, in some cases, fail to understand the psychological implications of sexual assault. They do not understand that a victim usually needs short-term and long-term medical care and counseling. There is a tendency for leaders to deal with symptoms (e.g., increased alcohol abuse, unauthorized absence, decreased work productivity, etc.) by administrative consequences rather than identify SA as the root cause of changed behavior. Consequently, leaders are less likely to accommodate SA victims, which may compromise a victim's right to care.
- 8 Chain of command described as "bean counters," who treated victims like objects and not Sailors in desperate need of assistance.

6.4. Violations of UCMJ while reporting. In the process of reporting sexual assault, it is not uncommon for the victim to admit to violating the UCMJ (e.g., underage drinking, fraternization, adultery, etc.). This often results in disciplinary action against the victim. In some cases, the victim is held accountable for her/his behavior, while the alleged offender is not held accountable because the dynamics of the case do not support an allegation of SA. This situation leaves victims feeling re-victimized by the system. One Sailor wrote:

I was sexually assaulted and I reported it on my ship to my chain of command and was told that if I wouldn't flirt so openly with other men like that one who assaulted me [they] wouldn't feel like they had the right to do that to me. Then when I got raped I chose not to report it so I wouldn't have to go through the same situation.

6.5. Marketing the SAVI Program. SAVI intervention services can be useful only if the intended recipients are aware of them. The SAS Team noted that the SAVI program is not marketed like other command programs, such as DAPA, EO, and Physical Readiness.

6.6. Command leaderships' holistic approach to eliminating SA and other forms of inappropriate behavior. Table 6.1 lists a number of best practices (left column) that commanders can implement to improve their SAVI program and provide a safe, confidential environment in which victims are willing to report SA incidents and seek treatment. Commanders need to review their entire process of preventive training and awareness, victim support, and SA incident reporting. They must be alert to risky behavior, such as frequent alcohol abuse by members, and deglamorize it through

programs like the *Right Spirit Campaign*. This approach is a holistic, systems review of organizational structure and functional processes to implement a proactive SAVI program. Commands with the most effective SAVI programs stress leadership, accountability, and responsibility at all levels of the chain of command, emphasizing acceptable standards of behavior that uphold Navy Core Values. Commands that fail to adopt such best practices (right column) provide an environment in which victims either fail to report their SA experience or are re-victimized by the system.

**Table 6.1.
Summary of Favorable and Unfavorable SAVI
Program Responses to SA Incidents**

Favorable Responses (Best Practices)	Unfavorable Responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command leadership alerted to seriousness of SA incidents • Adopting a holistic approach to eliminate SA and related behaviors • Ensuring SPC, Advocate, POC or Representative are in the information loop with CO/XO/OIC and civilian resources • SAVI CDO Procedures accessible and posted throughout the command or AOR • Local SAVI instruction posted command wide • Compliance with instruction relative to privacy and confidentiality • Chaplain Corps involvement or support, if requested • Follow-up of victims, e.g., victims are accompanied by SAVI advocate and other supportive members days/weeks after the incident, if requested • Ensuring all principals are informed (within information loop) during and after the SA investigation • Requesting SME assistance to prepare SITREP, if necessary • Alerting and mobilizing civilian resource networks and services, if necessary • Processing “lessons learned” from command responses to SA incidents • Advocates trained by medical officers in the “proper etiquette” to assist victims in a medical context • Advocates trained by legal or TSO staff • Advocates monitor all advocacy services (with a SAVI Advocate Tracking Sheet) • Dispatching two Advocates to assist a victim, if and when possible • Communicate SAVI information by updated policy statements, newsletters, meetings, speeches, training programs, Websites, and Intranet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command interpretation of SAVI instruction • Lack of understanding policy and protocol by chain of command • Attempts to resolve SA incidents at the department/division level • No established written command SOPs or CDO procedures • Failing to inform victims of their rights and options • Prejudging or blaming victims by command, legal, security, and/or NCIS staff • Chain of command decision making without victim input or victim notification • Discounting or dismissing victim(s) input (due to age, rank, status, gender) • Disparate treatment across gender • Failing to follow-up (i.e., counseling, legal assistance, etc.) victims • Command history of unresolved SA cases • Lack of short-term follow-up and support • Lack of understanding of long term effects of SA to mental health

Recommendations

6.1, 6.2, 6.3. Review command SAVI Programs. Commanders/Commanding Officers conduct a review of their SA prevention and awareness, victim support, and SA reporting processes to determine if they meet program standards. A number of best practices are listed in Table 6.1.

6.4. Violations of UCMJ while reporting. Commanders/Commanding Officers avoid re-victimization in accordance with OPNAVINST 1752.1A.

6.5. Marketing the SAVI Program. Commanders/Commanding Officers should elevate recognition of this program to the level given the DAPA, EO and Physical Readiness programs. Provide appropriate resources in the same manner as these other programs. Develop SAVI bulletin boards, include the SAVI Representative as part of the check-in process, and include the SAVI program in command orientation presentations.

6.6. Command leaderships' holistic approach to eliminating SA and other forms of inappropriate behavior. See right-hand column of Figure 6.1.

Part 7

SAS Survey Results Navy Perceptions of SAVI Program and Sexual Assault Scope and Methodology

Overview. As part of the methodology to capture the Navy's perspective on SA, the SAS Team developed an online survey and posted it to the NAVINGEN website. It was announced Navy wide to active-duty personnel from 1 June to 1 September 2004. To ensure only those authorized members could access the survey, a password was employed. The survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete and included questions designed to obtain information on demographics; SAVI program training; SA reporting, including organizational responsibilities; perceptions of commands' involvement in preventing, reporting, and adjudicating SA; and overall impressions of the Navy's ability to manage SA cases. There were 38,519 respondents, representing approximately 10% of the active-duty population. These members of the Navy service were solicited to participate in the survey on a volunteer basis via naval message and naval letter. Although the survey instrument did not employ random sampling, we are confident that the quality of the information collected accurately reflects the thoughts and perceptions on this issue as evidenced by the full range of responses to the survey.

Survey results indicated that women recognize the possibility of being victims more than men and are, therefore, better informed about the SAVI program. Men perceive that the SAVI program is working, but women do not. Female victims rely on the reporting organizational structure, but men do not. Of the men and women who decided not to report SA incidents, 76% felt they could deal with the incident alone. Nearly all (97%) respondents agreed that alcohol is a key contributing factor to SA incidents. Additional findings are presented and summarized in Appendix B.

In examining survey data across four main categories of duty type (Shore, Afloat, Aviation, and Education and Training), the Afloat community was in greater agreement than other communities that perpetrators got away with SA at their commands. This finding represented approximately 1,500 of the 7,700 respondents from the Afloat community who responded to the issue and was statistically significant, exceeding other duty types by approximately 7% (see Appendix B).

Part 8

Comparison of NAVINGEN SAS Report Findings with DOD Task Force Report Findings of April 2004

As a result of reports that nearly 112 SA incidents had occurred against servicewomen in the Gulf War zone by their male comrades-in-arms, SECDEF directed a 90-day review of all sexual assault policies and programs among the military services within DoD. The reviewers were requested to recommend changes necessary to increase prevention, promote reporting, enhance the quality and support provided to victims, especially within combat theaters, and improve accountability for offender actions.

The eight-member OSD Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults Task Force was established in February 2004 and conducted visits to 21 military locations in the Continental United States, Pacific Command, and Central Command. The Task Force completed its report late in April 2004.

8.1. OSD Task Force Report validation. The sequence of events producing the OSD Task Force Report on SA prompted the VCNO to request a Navy-wide review of the DON SAVI Program. In May 2004, CNO directed NAVINGEN to verify the effectiveness and functionality of the Navy's SAVI program. The current SAS report validates nearly all of the OSD findings, with the exception of those specific to the combat theater, which the SAS team was unable to visit. Below are the 35 OSD findings annotated by check marks to the right indicating the SAS Team study validated these findings. Thus, the Military Services have a number of programmatic, educational, and philosophical gaps/issues impeding effective services-wide implementation of SA programs.

Recommendation. A number of OSD's recommendations reflect the organizational development of a new DoD-wide SAVI program. Since this report looks at the Navy's program 10 years after inception, recommend that it be shared with the OSD committee as a "lessons learned," while corrective actions continue with the current Navy program.

OSD Task Force Report

NAVINGEN SAS Report

1) Data systems and records of SA are incomplete and not integrated	√
2) The rates of reported alleged SA cases were 69.1 and 70.0 per 100,000 uniformed service members for 2002 & 2003, respectively	√
3) Differences in definition create significant challenges for DOD in evaluating SA trends and program execution	√
4) SA risk factors in the military are not significantly different from those reported in the civilian literature	√

5) Existing policies and programs aimed at preventing SA are inconsistent and incomplete	√
6) At some locations, commanders have developed local SA awareness training	√
7) SA awareness training in the joint operational environment presents serious challenges due to operations tempo	√
8) American service personnel are not well prepared to deal with inappropriate behavior by foreign nationals	
9) Training and education designed to prevent SA is limited and varies from location to location	√
10) Junior enlisted prefer training conducted by those with first hand experience	√
11) Focus groups identified gaps in physical safety measures, which increased risk of SA on service members	√
12) There are barriers to reporting incidents of SA. Some are consistent with those in the civilian community while others are unique in a military setting	√
13) Generally, individuals are not aware of the full range of reporting options available to them	√
14) Victim's privacy needs must be positively assured	√
15) Balancing the issue of confidentiality for SA victims with the commander's responsibility to ensure community safety and due process of law is very complicated, but must be addressed	√
16) DOD guidelines are needed to ensure victim safety and protection	√
17) Actions to segregate alleged victim and alleged offender are not always timely	√

18) Assuring victim safety is a challenge when offenders are from coalition forces or foreign nations	√
19) Commanders have variable responses in support of victims	√
20) DOD has not mandated requirements to provide advocacy for SA victims	√
21) There is a perception that some victims are not consistently informed on the status of their cases	√
22) There are multiple factors causing delays in immediate response to victims	√
23) A system to coordinate and track victim support services for effective case management does not exist at all installations	√
24) Resource to deliver integrated case management support for victims in a combat theater is currently not a part of force planning	√
25) Department-wide uniform training of providers and standards of care for victims of SA do not exist	√
26) There is a backlog of DNA evidence waiting for processing at the United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory and this can significantly delay investigations and prosecutions	√
27) The environment in the combat theater can have a severe and detrimental impact on the ability to timely and effectively investigate and prosecute cases	
28) Investigations run by the command, both formal and informal, without involvement of investigative agencies may compromise cases of SA	√

29) Addressing victim misconduct is a significant challenge for commanders	√
30) Understanding the dynamics of false allegations of SA may help the Department minimize victimization of actual victims	√
31) The investigative and legal communities are not currently resourced to provide investigators and prosecutors at each location with specialized training in handling sexual assault cases	√
32) Due to a lack of system transparency, there is a perception that commanders do not always take appropriate action and/or alleged offenders are not always held accountable	√
33) Sexual assault cases are often very difficult to investigate and to successfully prosecute, but available data shows commanders are taking action	√
34) No overarching policies, programs, and procedures exist within DOD to ensure all functional areas responsible for dealing with victims of SA provide an integrated response to reported cases of SA	
35) Accountability for resolving SA problems is diffused	√

Appendix A



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
27 MAY 04

MEMORANDUM FOR NAVY INSPECTOR GENERAL

Subj: IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE FOR STATEMENT OF WORK ON SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN THE NAVY

Encl: (1) Statement of Work on Sexual Assaults in the Navy
(2) SECDEF memo to Combatant Commanders on 30 Apr 04
(3) OSD Task Force Report on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault
(4) CNO (N00J) Point Paper with a Synopsis of Findings and Recommendations of 19 May 04

1. Enclosure (1) is detailed statement of work on Sexual Assaults. Enclosures (2) through (4) are forwarded for your information and use in your study of sexual assault issues within the Department of the Navy.

2. As part of your data collection and analysis efforts, you are directed to address the Program Elements, Findings and Recommendations of the OSD Task Force on Sexual Assaults in your final report. These items are summarized in enclosure (3).

3. Provide regular updates with the first required one month from the date of this memorandum. Completion time is six months.

4. My point of contact for this matter is CDR Kirk Foster, JAGC, USN, (703) 695-3480.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. G. Mullen", followed by a horizontal line.

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

~~For Official Use Only~~

Appendix B

Survey Analysis

Survey Demographics. The SAS Team personally contacted over 200 active-duty Navy members and DoN civilians including SAVI, FFSC, NCIS, security, and healthcare staff on a variety of CONUS and OCONUS naval installations. Their input is discussed throughout the report. But, the major perceptual data input came from 38,519 respondents. These members of the Navy were solicited to participate in the survey on a volunteer basis via naval message and naval letter. Although the survey instrument did not employ random sampling, we are confident that the quality of the information accurately reflects the thoughts and perceptions on this issue as evidenced by the full range of responses to the survey.

Overall sample survey demographics included:

- 86% enlisted and 14% officers
- Significant senior officer participation including flag officers (1,296 senior officer (O5-O6); 20 Flag (O7+) respondents)
- 29% in senior positions (E7/O4 and above)
- 80% male and 20% female
- 59% shore; 21% afloat (shipboard, subsurface); 13% aviation; and 7% Education & Training

NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study

Table B.1 displays and compares SAS survey sample demographics with the Navy active-duty population who participated in completing the survey. Table B.2 identifies the gender distribution in the SAS survey sample. Other graphic displays of SAS survey results are below.

Table B.1. Survey Sample Demographics Compared to Active-Duty Navy Population¹

Paygrade	Number of Survey Respondents	% of Survey	Status of Active-Duty Navy, July 2004	% Active duty Navy Represented in Survey
E1	434	1	9,820	4
E2	797	2	20,643	4
E3	3,013	8	57,139	5
E4	5,368	14	65,881	8
E5	9,095	24	78,813	12
E6	8,622	22	60,714	14
E7	3,663	10	25,190	15
E8	1,219	3	6,847	18
E9	733	2	3,343	22
CWO2-5	171	<1	1,646	10
O1	325	1	6,743	5
O2	624	2	7,752	8
O3	1,725	4	18,613	9
O4	1,414	4	11,300	13
O5	910	2	7,478	12
O6	386	1	3,629	11
O7+	20	<1	220	9
Total (as of 1 September 04)	38,519	100	385,771	100

¹ Source: Navy-wide Demographics Data Report for Q3 FY04 (2004, July 30). Navy Equal Opportunity Office (Pers-670), Navy Personnel Command, Millington, TN.

Table B.2. Male vs. Female Survey Sample Demographics Compared to Active-Duty Navy Population¹

Paygrade	Number of Male Survey Respondents	Male Active Duty Navy, July 2004	% Male Active Duty Navy in Survey	Number of Female Survey Respondents	Female Active Duty Navy, July 2004	% Female Active Duty Navy Represented in Survey
E1	347	8,425	4	87	1,395	6
E2	635	17,760	4	162	2,883	6
E3	2,253	46,760	5	760	10,379	7
E4	3,928	53,717	7	1,440	12,164	12
E5	6,968	66,111	11	2,127	12,702	17
E6	7,284	54,459	13	1,338	6,255	21
E7	3,199	23,120	14	464	2,070	22
E8	1,083	6,388	17	136	459	30
E9	663	3,167	21	70	176	40
CWO2-5	159	1,560	10	12	86	14
O1	257	5,627	5	68	1,116	6
O2	480	6,394	8	144	1,358	11
O3	1,406	15,642	9	319	2,971	11
O4	1,193	9,649	12	221	1,651	13
O5	751	6,539	11	159	939	17
O6	317	3,236	10	69	393	18
O7+	15	208	7	5	12	42
Total	30,938	328,762	9	7,581	57,009	13

Summary of Overall SAS Survey findings across gender:²

² **Keys to Interpretation.** All SAS survey items were measured on either a five-point Likert-type scale (i.e., “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know”), or a three-point scale (i.e., “yes”, “no”, “not sure or don’t know” or “not at all”, “somewhat”, “met all my needs”), a dichotomous scale format (i.e., “yes” or “no”) or multiple-choice format including “select all that apply” items. Response frequency and percentages to each survey item are presented here.

The statistical analysis tested whether the proportion of men and women who answered a survey item was similar or different from one another despite the actual number of responses by each group for that question. The “z-test for proportions” calculates a statistical value to test this issue. If the calculated z value is greater than a recognized critical z value of ± 1.96 then the proportions are considered to be significantly different from one another at a statistical confidence level of 95%.

In a number of the survey items, men and women show only a 1% difference from one another and usually a one percent difference would not be statistically different. However, this survey generated on average about 34,000 data points per survey item. The analogy to best describe this importance is the comparison of “high definition television” versus standard television. The high-resolution images (1080 scan lines) allow much more detail to be shown compared to analog television (500 scan lines). Each survey item had such a high ratio of responses that the z-test for proportions was sensitive to any differences in these ratios.

SAS Survey Item Reliability and Limitations. Reliability refers to a measure’s consistency (i.e., “If I repeatedly measure the same thing, under similar conditions and with no true change in the level of the measured attribute, will I get the same results?”). There are a number of methods for assessing the reliability of a survey instrument. Perhaps the most commonly used is Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficient, a statistic that examines the consistency of scales used in a survey. Alphas are calculated separately for each scale and it may range from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate greater reliability. While there are no independent standards for judging an acceptable level of reliability, many behavioral research scientists use a “rule of thumb” value of .7 as a reasonably acceptable α for

Overall Finding

- Women perceived they are more likely to fall victim to sexual assault.
- Men perceived they would not fall victim to sexual assault.

Item 5-13, 17-18

- Women were well informed about the SAVI program and the services provided.
- Men are trained about the program but because of their belief in not falling victim do not know the specific details about the services or how to receive treatment.

Item 22

- Nearly all (97%) agreed alcohol is a key-contributing factor to SA situations.
- The remaining 3% differed in other contributing factors: men considered the command environment (i.e., mixed gender crews, co-ed barracks, relaxed military protocols) to be the factor; whereas, women considered behavioral/social factors (peer pressure/social situation) and remote location as contributing factors.

Item 25

- More women agreed that SA is a problem in the Navy.
- More men disagreed that SA is a problem in the Navy.

Item 26-28

- More men agreed that Navy/and their command take actions against SA and prevention.
- More women disagreed that Navy/and their command take actions against SA and prevention.

Item 29

- More men agreed that they feel free to report SA.
- More women disagreed that they feel free to report SA.

Item 37

- More men agreed that SA offenders are held accountable.
- More women disagreed that SA offenders are held accountable.

Item 39

- More men agreed that SA is reported to Navy leadership.
- More women disagreed that SA is reported to Navy leadership.

most research efforts. The measure was calculated for each scale. The α coefficient for the SAS survey items covering SAVI program and training = .68; items for awareness of various SA program α = .68; items determining the understanding of SAVI Programming, α = .79; items regarding command response to SA, α = .86; and items regarding investigating agencies meeting the needs of victims, α = .96. Survey items regarding Navy and respondent's command response to SA did not meet nor approach the reliability criteria. The latter might be due to respondents uncomfortable in responding to such a sensitive area.

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Item 40

- More women (23%) have had various SA attempts or actual SA than men (4%) since joining the Navy.

Item 41

- If a victim, more women relied on the Navy organization (chain of command, NCIS, IGs, JAG, SAVI, medical) to handle the case and they are satisfied.
- If a victim, more men did not report it (men = 66%; women = 47%).


Item 49

- If a victim, approximately 65% (both men and women) are not retaliated against by a person in a position of authority.
- If a victim, and a person of authority retaliate, more women victims experienced the retaliation.

Item 50

- Those who did not report their incident, nearly 76% of the men and women gave the reason they felt they could deal with the incident alone
- Those who did not report their incident, some of the other reasons were more women than men feared ostracism by peers, feared public disclosure, felt shame/embarrassment/disbelief or feared negative impact to Navy career


Item 5. **I have heard of the Navy Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program prior to completing this survey.**



	Actual	Responses	Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	24222	6416	87%	92%	*
No	2668	384	10%	6%	*
Not sure	962	150	3%	2%	*
Total	27852	6950	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 6. **SAVI program.**




	Actual	Responses	Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	24204	6413	87%	93%	*
No	3541	515	13%	7%	*
Total	27852	6950	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 7. Victim and Witness Assistance Program.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		*
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	19762	5037	72%	73%	*
No	7771	1840	28%	27%	*
Total	27533	6877	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 8. Civilian Rape Crisis Center.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		*
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	20780	5354	75%	78%	*
No	6767	1527	25%	22%	*
Total	27547	6881	100%	100%	


* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 9. Local civilian medical facilities.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	23376	5768	85%	84%
No	4183	1088	15%	16%
Total	27559	6856	100%	100%

Item 10. Do you know what services the SAVI program offers?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		*
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	16579	4793	60%	69%	*
No	5894	920	21%	13%	*
Not sure	5379	1237	19%	18%	*
Total	27852	6950	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 11. Do you know the SAVI point of contact (POC) at your command?



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	17271	4593	62%	66% *
No	8455	1857	30%	27% *
Not sure	2126	500	8%	7%
Total	27852	6950	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 12. In the past year (12 months) have you attended General Military Training (GMT) on the subject of sexual assault awareness and prevention?



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	23918	5849	86%	85% *
No	2793	837	10%	12% *
Not sure	996	216	4%	3%
Total	27707	6902	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 13. In the past year (12 months) have you attended GMT regarding the SAVI program and services available?



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	17073	4353	61%	63% *
No	7376	1926	27%	28% *
Not sure	3320	648	12%	9% *
Total	27769	6927	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 14. The difference between sexual harassment and sexual assault?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	27168	6798	98%	98%
No	236	42	1%	1% *
Not sure	425	104	1%	1%
Total	27829	6944	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions. Note: Rounding to nearest whole number hid the difference in "no."


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Item 15. **How to avoid situations that might increase the risk of sexual assault.**




	Actual		Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	27048	6767	97%	98%		
No	324	66	1%	1%		
Not sure	417	103	2%	1%		
Total	27789	6936	100%	100%		

Item 16. **How to report sexual assaults.**



	Actual		Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	25695	6410	92%	92%		
No	902	219	3%	3%		
Not sure	1193	305	5%	5%		
Total	27790	6934	100%	100%		


Item 17. **How to obtain medical treatment following sexual assault.**



	Actual		Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	24820	6504	89%	94%		*	
No	1434	197	5%	3%		*	
Not sure	1529	229	6%	3%		*	
Total	27783	6930	100%	100%			

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 18. **How to obtain counseling following sexual assault.**




	Actual		Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Yes	23971	6196	86%	90%		*	
No	1848	348	7%	5%		*	
Not sure	1936	378	7%	5%		*	
Total	27755	6922	100%	100%			

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 19. The services your legal office can provide to a sexual assault victim.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	19032	4697	69%	68%
No	4672	1241	17%	18%
Not sure	4062	977	14%	14%
Total	27766	6915	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 20. The general responsibilities of law enforcement and criminal investigative agencies in response to:



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	21264	5272	77%	76%
No	3219	867	12%	13%
Not sure	3289	788	11%	11%
Total	27772	6927	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 21. The role of the chain of command in handling sexual assault allegations.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	22932	5313	83%	77%
No	2364	820	9%	12%
Not sure	2421	770	8%	11%
Total	27717	6903	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 22. What factors contribute to a sexual assault situation?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
A) Alcohol	26860	6725	97%	97%
B) Lack of military protocol	15107	3236	54%	47%
C) No preventive training	19184	4753	69%	69%
D) Social situations	18451	4859	66%	70%
E) Co-ed barracks	11071	2472	40%	36%
F) Mixed gender crews	10760	2057	39%	30%
G) Relaxed Command climate	12910	2722	47%	39%
H) Peer pressure	15453	4315	56%	62%
I) Remote location	14075	3604	51%	52%
J) Other	1806	462	7%	7%
Total	27747	6912		

- Nearly all (97%) agree (A) alcohol use is a key contributing factor to SA situations.
- However, on other factors, men attribute command environment factors such as (B) lack of military protocol, (E) co-ed barracks, (F) mixed gender crews, (G) relaxed command climate as contributing to SA situations; whereas, women attribute behavioral/social factors such as (D) social situations, (H) peer pressure, and (I) remote location as contributing to SA situations.

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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Item 23. Who trained/briefed you about SAVI?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
A) SAVI Command rep	13383	3516	48%	51% *
B) Training officer	4183	971	15%	14% *
C) GMT instructor	11891	2724	43%	39%
D) NCIS staff	1129	388	41%	56% *
E) EO advisor	3674	871	13%	13%
F) FAP	2904	863	10%	12% *
G) FFSCS	4081	1444	15%	21% *
H) Not sure	3913	781	14%	11% *
I) Not trained	3406	808	12%	12%
Total	27769	6914		

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

- More women (51%) were trained by (A) SAVI Command Representatives compared to men (48%). This is followed by more males (42%) trained by (C) GMT than females (39%).
- Other organizations (D) NCIS, (F) FAP, (G) FFSCS more women are trained by them than men.
- (H) More men unsure they are trained.
- Suggests overall that more women than men get trained in SAVI program.


Item 24. Have you been trained as a volunteer SAVI victim?



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	1281	1046	5%	15% *
No	26348	5842	95%	85% *
Total	27629	6888	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 25. Sexual assault is a problem in the Navy.




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Strongly agree	1903	987	7%	13% *
Agree	9953	3069	36%	44% *
Disagree	9731	1643	35%	24% *
Strongly disagree	1624	156	6%	2% *
Don't Know	4563	1168	16%	17%
Total	27774	6933	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 26. **Actions are being taken in the Navy to prevent sexual assault.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	7598	1482	28%	22%	*
Agree	17289	4291	63%	62%	
Disagree	808	424	3%	6%	*
Strongly disagree	251	107	1%	2%	*
Don't Know	1598	574	5%	8%	*
Total	27544	6878	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 27. **Actions are being taken at this command to prevent sexual assault.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	7618	1575	28%	23%	*
Agree	15899	3729	58%	54%	*
Disagree	1065	448	3%	7%	*
Strongly disagree	286	114	1%	2%	*
Don't Know	2776	1005	10%	14%	*
Total	27644	6871	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 28. **The leadership at my command enforces the Navy's "zero tolerance" policy on sexual assault.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	12683	2593	46%	37%	*
Agree	12145	3132	44%	46%	*
Disagree	701	360	2%	5%	*
Strongly disagree	273	139	1%	2%	*
Don't Know	1948	694	7%	10%	*
Total	27750	6918	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 29. **I feel free to report sexual assault.**




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	12938	2918	47%	42%	*
Agree	12910	3074	47%	45%	*
Disagree	591	414	2%	6%	*
Strongly disagree	292	228	1%	3%	*
Don't Know	988	276	4%	4%	
Total	27719	6910	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 30. Sexual assault training is taken seriously at my command.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	9716	2095	35%	30%	*
Agree	13536	3195	49%	46%	*
Disagree	1523	589	5%	9%	*
Strongly disagree	383	168	1%	2%	*
Don't Know	2572	869	10%	13%	*
Total	27730	6916	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 31. I would know what to do if I were sexually assaulted.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	11876	3526	43%	51%	*
Agree	14191	2990	51%	43%	*
Disagree	657	190	2%	3%	
Strongly disagree	188	52	1%	1%	
Don't Know	882	175	3%	3%	*
Total	27794	6933	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions. Note: Rounding to nearest whole number hid the difference in "don't know."

Item 32. I would know what to do if a friend, at my command, were sexually assaulted.




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	11604	3431	42%	50%	*
Agree	14499	3069	52%	44%	*
Disagree	638	184	2%	3%	
Strongly disagree	141	39	1%	<1%	
Don't Know	870	198	3%	3%	
Total	27752	6921	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

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
Item 33. **Sexual assault is a criminal act punishable under UCMJ.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	17785	4679	64%	68%	*
Agree	9337	2102	34%	30%	*
Disagree	111	22	<1%	<1%	
Strongly disagree	62	18	<1%	<1%	
Don't Know	476	109	2%	2%	
Total	27752	6921	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 34. **Sexual assault is occurring at my command.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	809	284	3%	4%	*
Agree	2481	764	9%	11%	*
Disagree	8349	1824	30%	26%	*
Strongly disagree	7216	1233	26%	18%	*
Don't Know	8834	2803	32%	41%	*
Total	27752	6921	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 35. **People at my command who sexually assault others usually get away with it.**



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	751	204	3%	3%	
Agree	1646	470	6%	7%	*
Disagree	7707	1918	28%	28%	
Strongly disagree	9783	1774	35%	25%	*
Don't Know	7898	2565	28%	37%	*
Total	27785	6931	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

Item 36. **Command leadership is responsive and timely in handling sexual assault allegations.**




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	6393	1192	23%	17%	*
Agree	10717	2327	39%	34%	*
Disagree	754	285	3%	4%	*
Strongly disagree	324	107	1%	2%	*
Don't Know	9535	3003	34%	43%	*
Total	27723	6914	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

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Item 37. All sexual offenders are held accountable.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	7666	1302	28%	19%	*
Agree	10553	2253	38%	33%	*
Disagree	1809	810	6%	11%	*
Strongly disagree	527	280	2%	4%	*
Don't Know	7169	2260	26%	33%	*
Total	27724	6905	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.


Item 38. Sexual assault prevention, response and protection are working well at my command.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	6452	1221	23%	18%	*
Agree	13614	2948	49%	43%	*
Disagree	738	336	3%	5%	*
Strongly disagree	211	97	1%	1%	*
Don't Know	6712	2300	24%	33%	*
Total	27727	6902	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions. Note: Rounding to nearest whole number hid the difference in "strongly disagree" (men-.008; women-.014).


Item 39. All sexual assault cases are reported to Navy leadership.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Strongly agree	3504	635	13%	9%	*
Agree	6893	1282	25%	19%	*
Disagree	5427	1389	20%	20%	
Strongly disagree	2287	944	8%	14%	*
Don't Know	9637	2671	34%	38%	*
Total	27748	6921	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

Item 40. Since you have joined the Navy, had anyone done any of the following actions without your consent and against your will?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
A) Touched privates	1086	1206	4%	17%	*
B) Attempted sex	420	675	2%	10%	*
C) Attempted oral/anal sex	314	168	1%	2%	*
D) Had sex	312	448	1%	6%	*
E) Had oral sex	322	116	1%	2%	*
F) Had anal sex	173	72	1%	1%	*
G) Not experienced	26671	5375	96%	77%	*
Total	27852	6950			

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions

- Across the board, more women have experienced against their will various sexual attempts or actual sexual assaults on them since joining the Navy.
- More men have not experienced any attempts or

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Item 41. To what authorities was this incident reported?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
A) Chain of command	252	533	21%	34%	*
B) FAP	91	203	8%	13%	*
C) Civilian counseling center	58	81	5%	5%	
D) Civilian medical facility	72	128	6%	8%	*
E) On-base medical facility	48	42	4%	3%	*
F) NCIS	65	185	5%	12%	*
G) Military security	84	156	7%	10%	*
H) Civilian law enforcement	54	63	5%	4%	
I) Navy or DoD IG	51	12	4%	1%	*
J) Friend	273	613	23%	39%	*
K) No one, didn't report	786	737	66%	47%	*

- When women assaulted more women inform their chain of command, FAP, civilian medical facility, NCIS, military security, and a friend.
- When men assaulted more men inform Navy/DoD IG or don't tell anyone.

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


Item 42. Investigative agencies.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Not at all	151	184	13%	12%	
Somewhat	89	145	7%	10%	*
Met all my needs	62	128	5%	8%	*
N/A	889	1081	75%	70%	
Total	1191	1538	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

Item 43. Military lawyers handling your case.




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Not at all	147	205	12%	13%	
Somewhat	73	64	6%	4%	*
Met all my needs	56	80	5%	5%	
N/A	915	1189	77%	77%	
Total	1191	1538	100%	100%	

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study


Item 44. SAVI Advocate/Coordinator



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Not at all	145	162	12%	11%
Somewhat	78	97	6%	6%
Met all my needs	69	150	6%	10% *
N/A	900	1127	76%	73%
Total	1192	1536	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.


Item 45. Victim Witness Assistance.



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Not at all	141	188	12%	12%
Somewhat	80	41	7%	3% *
Met all my needs	53	69	4%	4%
N/A	915	1238	77%	81% *
Total	1189	1536	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.


Item 46. Medical personnel



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Not at all	137	147	11%	10%
Somewhat	85	89	7%	5%
Met all my needs	70	149	6%	10% *
N/A	902	1145	76%	75%
Total	1194	1530	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

Item 47. Chain of Command




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Not at all	155	214	13%	14%
Somewhat	110	201	9%	13% *
Met all my needs	108	218	9%	14% *
N/A	823	914	69%	59% *
Total	1196	1547	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study


Item 48. Fleet and Family Support Services



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Not at all	137	159	12%	10%
Somewhat	85	89	7%	6%
Met all my needs	62	131	5%	9% *
N/A	904	1160	76%	75%
Total	1188	1539	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

Item 49. Did anyone in a position of authority retaliate against you for reporting this incident?




	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Yes	125	228	11%	15% *
No	790	952	66%	64%
Don't know	281	317	23%	21%
Total	1196	1497	100%	100%

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions.

- Approx. 65% of men and women did not experience retaliation from anyone in a position of authority.
- In those who had experienced retaliation more women than men experienced it.

Item 50. You decided not to report this incident because –



	Actual Responses		Percent Responses	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
A) Threatened by assailant	129	167	14%	16%
B) Feared ostracism by peers	307	403	33%	39% *
C) Feared public disclosure	225	358	24%	35% *
D) Feared someone close know	170	184	18%	18%
E) Felt shame/embarrassment	273	503	30%	49% *
F) Feared disbelief	230	444	25%	43% *
G) Not aware how to report	121	152	13%	15%
H) Feared impact to Navy career	216	387	23%	38% *
I) Thought I could deal with it	692	793	75%	77%
Total	924	1026		

* Proportions significantly different to $p < .025$ (two-tailed) based on statistical z-test comparison of proportions


- Approx. 76% both men and women felt they could deal with the incident and didn't report it, as their number 1 reason for not reporting.
- Of the other reasons, more women than men didn't report primarily for fear of ostracism by peers, fear of public disclosure of incident, felt shame/embarrassment, feared disbelief, or feared negative impact to Navy career.

Summary of SAS survey findings across type of command: Survey items regarding sexual assault at command level were analyzed across command duty types. For the purposes of this survey, there were four main duty type categories (Shore, Afloat, Aviation, and Education and Training). These four categories were included in the


NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study

survey as a demographic question to be addressed by respondents. Data from male respondents were analyzed separate from female respondents. The results of statistical analyses indicated occurrence of SA and duty type were statistically related less than .001 to chance³. The graphs below illustrate items 34, “SA is occurring at my command”, and 35, “People at my command usually get away with it.” In both items 34 and 35, but in particular item 34, a greater percentage (approximately 20% [1,500 respondents out of 7,700]) of Afloat community agreed (strongly agree and agree) of its occurrence by both men and women compared to the other duty types [see the percentages noted for the Afloat community in the graphs below]. The percentage drops to approximately 13% agreement (1,000 respondents) in the Afloat community for item 35. Both results are statistically significant above other duty types by approximately 7%.

Item 34. **Sexual assault is occurring at my command.**



chi square $df(12)=8887$ $p<.001$
contingency coefficient = .493




chi square $df(12)=1628$ $p<.001$
contingency coefficient = .437


³ The contingency coefficient indicated the strength of the relationship with zero representing no relationship and 1.0 representing the strongest relationship in the two variables (occurrence of SA by duty type) evaluated. The contingency coefficient of .40 is a reasonably strong relationship for items 34 & 35.

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Item 35. People at my command who sexually assault others usually get away with it.



chi square $df(12)=8368$ $p<.001$
contingency coefficient = .481



chi square $df(12)=1580$ $p<.001$
contingency coefficient = .431

To look into the opinions underlying items 34 and 35, comments from the Afloat duty type were reviewed. Many were in favor of the SAVI program, the survey, and what commands were trying to do to prevent SAs. However, there were those respondents who commented in a manner that could underlie the statistical results revealed in these two survey items.

Some men were of the opinion that women should not be aboard ship as in the following: (unedited comment)

“Having women in a deploying fleet can hinder operations. They could get pregnant or arouse young men during long deployments, therefore becoming a distraction. For the most part most of the navy personnel do work well together. It is just the long deployments where most of the problems occur.”

Other men regard the occurrence of sexual behavior on ship as a normal occurrence and SAs, a likelihood. (unedited comments)

“Sexual talk, touching, conversation occurs everyday in the navy. Still nothing is done about it. People have sex on the ship while in port or underway. Where I am at it is not allowed and people do get their punishment when caught. But it goes on everyday, everywhere onboard ships or other commands. Still nothing is being done.”

“My last three ships were mixed gender ships and sexual assault has happened, but rarely. I think the largest problem is the victims to speak up and not think it is

their fault (easier said than done). Fleet Landings at foreign ports with large concentrations of mixed gender personnel with alcohol and waiting for liberty boats has proven to be a problem. Strongly recommend video cameras throughout the area prior to an incident happening.”

Still others have extreme negative and disturbing outlook on women, especially aboard ship. (unedited comments)

“I think 90% of the SA cases brought up in the navy are made up by the stupid whores we work with. If they don't get their way or turned down by a guy they scream SA. I worked with a female once who would grope men all the time, but once a man called her a dumb bitch and she said he sexually assaulted her. What the crap is up with that??? I see many cases all the time when women scream that shit just to get even or ahead. If these dumb bitches want to be in the navy so bad put them on the boat by themselves so they don't get in everyone elses way. I feel it is completely unfair that they can flirt with men and get out of almost anything but the second a man flirts with a woman it is SA... Thank you for your time.”

Some women are unhappy in how alleged perpetrators of SA are not removed from the ship immediately while the case is being adjudicated. (unedited comments)

“We had a SA allegation made on several of our sailors onboard Peleliu while deployed westpac 2003-04. Before the hearing while these were just allegations, these people were allowed to walk about our ship as if nothing had happened. There should be protective measures for the people onboard until allegations are proven true/false. If these young men were to want to hurt someone, we were all very much exposed them to. Now maybe because of the circumstances it had to be that way however, how can the people surrounding those alleged rapists be protected until an official court ruling is made. In the civilian world people are held until proven guilty!”

“I know that a female shipmate at my command was sexually assaulted and the assaulters are also attached to this command. After the incident she was sent TAD and her assaulters are still presently at this command now on WestPac.”

Some women continue to accept the negative environment they are in. (unedited comment)

“I am constantly harrassed verbally. I have been asked to have sex with someone and when I turned them down I was then asked, "Well can I jack off in front of you then?" I told a friend, who was also an HM, a female and the CMEO, but was told that basically men are men and it happened to her in her career. I'm approached by higher ranking Enlisted and Officers for dates or sexual encounters. I constantly overhear conversations of peers that are completely inappropriate for the workplace, however nothing is ever done to stop it. Any attempt I have ever made I am later ridiculed and shunned for doing so. I no longer try to make this

Navy a place I can be proud of. A LTJG also told me that I am only one person and I cannot change the Navy...that's been around and been this way forever.”

Some women have given up. (unedited comment)

“I personally do not feel that the navy supports those who have been sexually assaulted as well as they should. When I was sexually assaulted I was afraid and ashamed to tell anyone. However I did tell a friend of mine, she was the one who reported it. Rude chain of commands or higher authorities make it difficult to confide in. Like myself who found myself unable to talk to the MAC at the time. I did lie to her, however when investigated by the NCIS, that was the first thing I notified of. I notified them that I lied to her not being comfortable to talk to her because of fear of her not believing me. Four months later I was sent to captain's mast receiving 45/45 1/2 pay times two and reduction in rank for falsifying on an official statement. This male received the same punishment for reasons unknown. I was not once notified of any actions that were taking place, or told of a way to fight this. I was not offered counseling of any sort. Every so often I break down all over again. I have tried to talk to the chaplain onboard my new ship but he just listens. I still to this day have not been offered any type of counseling. My career was ruined. I should have been a second class about a year and a half ago yet I barley started getting paid for third yesterday, not to mention the fact that I get out of the navy in 2 months. It comes to show huh, navy does take care of their own. "FAVORITES" that is!”

One woman clearly states strong proactive leadership is needed in making the SAVI program successful. (unedited comment)

“We need more leadership involvement in a proactive way in talking about and ensuring Sailors know that SA is taken seriously and will not be tolerated. Also SAVI POCs should be chosen with as much thought and concern as we choose any other important position in a command but that does not always happens which makes a SAVI command program weak, ineffective, and will some times cause Sailors not to report. It should not be viewed as a "good" command collateral duty, but as a duty to our Sailors!!!”

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NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study

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Glossary

Acquaintance rape. Rape committed by someone that the victim knows, such as an acquaintance, friend, co-worker, date or spouse. Acquaintance rape is nonconsensual intercourse between people who know each other. Most rapes are acquaintance rapes and are referred to as non-stranger rape cases. Sexual assault between acquaintances consists of nonconsensual sexual activity that does not include intercourse. Nonconsensual means that there is use of force, intimidation, and manipulation or that one of the parties is unable to give consent (see Date Rape).

Confidentiality. This is a professional act of ethically and legally maintaining a spirit of privacy concerning an issue discussed during, for example, an alleged sexual assault report and subsequent follow-up procedures. While there are some limitations to confidentiality, the ultimate goal of confidentiality is to provide the privilege of protection for personal information that is shared by a client/patient/victim, with the fundamental purpose of using their information to help create a therapeutic process for treatment intervention.

Consent. Sexual activity shall not take place unless consent has been freely given. Freely given consent includes the following conditions: participants are fully conscious, participants are equally free to act, parties have clearly communicated their willingness/permission, parties are positive and sincere in their desires, and parties are free to cease ongoing consensual activity at any time. Consensual participation in a sexual activity shows consent to that specific activity, but does not necessarily show consent to additional activity of a longer or more intense nature of an activity.

Date rape. Rape committed by someone that the victim is dating. Among college students, approximately one-half ($\approx 50\%$) of all rapes are committed by a date (see Acquaintance Rape).

Family Advocacy Program (FAP). This program is designated to address prevention, evaluation, identification, intervention, treatment and reporting of family violence. The FAP involves coordinated effects designed to prevent and intervene in cases to family distress and to promote healthy family life.

Fleet and Family Support Center (FFSC). A multi-service center, located on naval bases, for military personnel and their dependents that request personal assistance. The FFSC provides prevention education, assessment, referrals, treatment and case management in FAP cases. FFSC has counselors and social workers that are trained and qualified to intervene and treat case involving domestic violence.

Forcible Sodomy. An act done by force and without consent whereby one person takes into his/her mouth or anus the sexual organ of another person (of the same or opposite sex) or of an animal; places his/her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of another person or of an animal; places his/her sexual organ in any opening of the body other than the sexual parts of another person; or has penile-vaginal intercourse with an animal; penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.

Fraternization. *Fraternization* is the term traditionally used to identify personal relationships that contravene the customary bounds of acceptable senior-subordinate relationships. Although it has most commonly been applied to officer-enlisted relationships, fraternization also includes improper relationships and social interaction

between officer members as well as between enlisted members. The Navy's policies on fraternization are contained in OPNAV Instruction 5370.2B.

Fraternization is a gender-neutral offense in the Navy. Moreover, personal relationships between officer and enlisted members that are unduly familiar and that do not respect differences in rank and grade are prohibited, and violate long-standing custom and tradition of the naval service. Similar relationships that are unduly familiar between officers or between enlisted members of different rank or grade may also be prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit on the naval service and are prohibited. Commands are expected to take administrative and disciplinary action as necessary to correct such inappropriate behavior. The policies listed here are lawful general orders. Violations of these policies subject the involved members to disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Organizational effectiveness. A general field of research and practice dealing with how to improve the management, communications, job and human resources climates in organizations in order to make them more effective in accomplishing their goals; also use to indicate the degree to which such effectiveness has been obtained.

Perpetrator. A perpetrator is an individual who directly inflicts violence or abuse (Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon & Shelly, 1999); also, one who commits an offense or crime (e.g., sexual assault, rape).

Rape Trauma Syndrome. Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) was recognized (and the term created) in 1974 by Ann Burgess and Lytle Holmstrom. RTS is a system of emotional responses seen in most victims of sexual assault. More specifically, RTS is a response to the profound feat of death that almost all survivors experience during an assault. RTS has two components: acute phase and reorganization phase.

The acute phase may last for a few days to several weeks. A survivor experiences a complete disruption of their life. They may display any of a number of contrasting emotional responses. A survivor may cry, shout, swear, laugh nervously, be silent, or discuss the weather. These reactions are all normal and common for someone who has experienced an acute trauma.

The reorganization phase begins as the victim starts to resolve and integrate the experience. The duration of this phase varies and will depend on factors such as the victim's age, personality style, existing life problems, prior sexual victimization and availability of the support system. It may last anywhere from a couple of months to years.

Sailorization. Upon completion of their initial training at RTC Great Lakes, new Sailors leave with a basic foundation of military knowledge and fundamental skills. Some Sailors will be assigned to "A" school and subsequently to "C" school training, where their military training is further developed. When Sailors report to their first assignment, their military training is incomplete and must continue throughout a full career. The Sailors military training begun in recruit training is a continual development process. Many CPOs and Leading Petty Officers assigned as RDC, RTC or instructor duty are responsible to contribute to this military training, referred to as "Sailorization."

Sexual assault. The term adult sexual assault, as used in this study, applies to all such offenses (sexual assault is a criminal act) against persons who are 18 years of age and

over, and not married to the alleged perpetrator. Sexual assault against children under the age of 18, and those incidents that occur within a marital relationship should be referred to the Family Advocacy Program and should be handled as child sexual abuse or spouse abuse (OPNAVINST 1752.1A and BUMEDINST 6320.7). SECNAVINST 5300.26 deals with sexual harassment. In addition, sexual assault is defined as including offense of rape, forcible sodomy, assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy, indecent assault or attempts to commit any of these offenses.

A criminal act that is incompatible with the DON's core values, high standards of professionalism and personal discipline. Commanders shall take appropriate action under U.S. laws and regulations in all cases of sexual assault. The term sexual assault for the purpose of this assessment includes rape, indecent assault, forcible sodomy assault with intent to commit rape, and assault with intent to commit sodomy.

Sexual assault survivor. A SA survivor is an individual who was a [former] victim of sexual assault who has successfully overcome the emotional and physical trauma of their SA incident. In the present study, the use of the word "survivor" rather than victim is deliberate; the strength, courage and inner resources the females (and males) have drawn upon in overcoming their trauma is truly remarkable. For the dangers inherent in labeling people as victims see Minow, M. (1993). Surviving Victim Talk, *UCLA Law Review*, 40, 1411-1445.

Sexist behaviors. Experiencing sexist behavior included being treated differently because of your gender, having pornography or sexist material displayed, hearing sexist comments, or being put down because of your gender.

Sexual coercion. This category includes behaviors that focused on job benefits or losses conditioned upon sexual cooperation; implied special treatment if you were sexually cooperative. *Quid pro quo*, a Latin phrase meaning, *for this, for that*, is the phrase used by the Navy in training sexual harassment prevention.

Sexual harassment. According to SECNAV Instruction 5300.26C, sexual harassment is a form of discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors (i.e., *quid pro quo*), and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when such conduct directed explicitly or implicitly at an individual, affects future employment decisions, interferes with individual work performance, and creates an intimidating and or hostile offensive working environment.

Spouse Abuse. Includes assault, battery, threat to injure or kill, other act of force or violence, or emotional maltreatment inflicted on a partner in a lawful marriage when one of the partners is a military member or is employed by the Department of Defense and is eligible for treatment in an MTF. A spouse under 18 years of age shall be treated in this category.

Stalking. Actions of a person performed in a repeatedly harassing manner, including but not limited to following another person in a manner to induce, in a reasonable person, fear of sexual battery, injury or death of that person or that person's immediate family.

Stranger rape. Rape committed by someone that the victim does not know. Strangers commit less than 20% of substantiated rapes, although most people believe that stranger rape is the prototypical rape.

Unwanted sexual attention. This category of behaviors includes someone attempting to discuss your sex life, your body or sexual matters with you, being touched in a way that made you feel uncomfortable, receiving unwanted sexual attention, having someone try to establish a romantic sexual relationship with you despite your continued efforts to discourage it, someone making unwanted attempts to fondle you, or someone continually asking you for dates despite your efforts to discourage the person.

Victim. For the purposes of this study, a victim is any person who either reports the act of sexual assault upon him or her is identified, by another person or other information, as a person who has been subjected to a sexual assault [see Sexual Assault Survivor].

Whistle blowing. A command member's decision to disclose unethical or potentially damaging information to an authority figure or group (e.g., supervisor, media, chain of command, legal authorities, or government official).

Zero tolerance. A *zero tolerance* is a policy of having very little tolerance for transgression: any infraction of existing laws and regulations will be punished, no matter how small. The term may be used in general or with reference to a particular category of transgressions, e.g., a zero tolerance policy towards alcohol abuse/misuse or, in the case of the current study, sexual assault. According to the academic references, *zero tolerance* is a strict approach to rule enforcement. It can be use as the basis of formal laws in a country, region or in a smaller environment. As the name suggests, *zero tolerance* policies allow for absolutely no level of tolerance or compromise for violators of the law or regulation. There are no varying levels of punishment under the *zero tolerance*, only the most severe.

Acronyms/Abbreviations

AOR	Area of responsibility
AWOL	Absence without leave
CARE	Counseling and Assistance in a Recruit Environment
CDO	Command Duty Officer
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CMC	Command Master Chief
CMEO	Command Managed Equal Opportunity
CNI	Commander, Naval Installations
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNP	Chief of Naval Personnel
COB	Chief of the Boat
CPO	Chief Petty Officer
COMNAVAIRPAC	Commander, Naval Air Pacific
COMNAVPERSCOM	Commander, Navy Personnel Command
CONUS	Continental United States; 48 contiguous States and District of Columbia
DCC	[SAVI] Data Collection Coordinator
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DUI	Driving under the influence [of alcohol]
EO	Equal Opportunity
EOA	Equal Opportunity Advisor
FAP	Family Advocate Program
FAR	Family Advocacy Representative
FFSC	Fleet and Family Support Center
GMT	General Military Training
HM	Hospital Corpsman
IAFN	International Association of Forensic Nurses
IRS	Informal Resolution System
ISIC	Immediate superior/supervisor in charge
JAGC	Judge Advocate General Corps
LPO	Leading Petty Officer
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCB	Marine Corps Base
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Medical Service Corps
MTF	Medical treatment facility
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NA	[U.S.] Naval Academy
NAPS	Naval Academy Preparatory School
NAS	Naval Air Station
NAVADMIN	Navy Administration message from CNO, VCNO, CNP
NAVINGEN	Naval Inspector General
NAVPERSCOM	Navy Personnel Command
NAVSTA	Naval Station
NETC	Naval Education and Training Command
NC	Nurse Corps
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NDW	Naval District Washington

NAVINGEN Sexual Assault Study

NPC	Naval Personnel Command
NR&R	Navy Rights and Responsibilities
NSA	Naval Support Attachment
NTC	Naval Training Command
NWS	Navy Weapons Station
NWSG	Navy Women's Study Group
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OIC	Officer in Charge
OIS	Officer Indoctrination School
OPNAVINST	Operational Naval Instruction
OPREP	Operational Report
OPTEMPO	Operational tempo (ship away from port)
PERSTEMPO	Personal tempo (time onboard ship, away from port)
P.L.	Public law
POC	Point of Contact
PTSD	Posttraumatic stress disorder
PREVENT	Personal Responsibility & Values: Education Training
QA	Quality assurance
RASAS	Rape and Sexual Assault System [reports]
RDC	Recruit District Command
RTC	Recruit Training Center
RTS	Rape Trauma Syndrome
SA	Sexual Assault
SAFE	Sexual Assault Free Environment
SANE	Sexual Assault Nurse Expert
SART	Sexual Assault Response Team
SAS	Sexual Assault Study
SAVI	Sexual Assault Victim Intervention
SB	Submarine Base
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy Instruction
SH	Sexual Harassment
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SME	Subject matter expert(s)
SOP	Standard operating procedure(s)
SPC	SAVI Program Coordinator
STD	Sexually transmitted disease(s)
UA	Unauthorized leave
UCMJ	Uniform of Military Justice
UNITSITREP	Unit Situation Report
USA	U.S. Army
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USNA	U.S. Naval Academy
VA	Veterans' Affairs/Administration
VCNO	Vice Chief of Naval Operations (SAS sponsor)
VWAP	Victim Witness Assistance Program