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Commander, INSCOM
ATTN: IAMG-C-FOI
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This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 12, 2010 to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requesting file FBI HQ 105-19581 and supplements our letter of July 13, 2012.

As noted, coordination with another element this command has been completed and the referred records have been returned to this office for final disposition and direct reply to you.

We have conducted a mandatory declassification review of the responsive records in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized from the records as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). The record is partially releasable and is enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

Information has been sanitized from the record as the release of such information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(6).

In addition, information which would reveal sensitive investigative methods and techniques has been sanitized from the record. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon
protection of sensitive intelligence methodologies. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA.

This withholding of information described above constitutes a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Christopher S. Ballard, Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority in this matter under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal at this time, your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90 day period the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis for your disagreement with the response and you should provide justification for an additional administrative search to be conducted or reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel:

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Forty-eight pages have been withheld in their entirety as it is not possible to reasonably segregate the withheld information. Deleted page sheets have been provided to explain the reason for the withholdings and to identify the withheld pages.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for the processing of this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, contact this office at 1-866-548-5651 or email the INS_COM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-gpmbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #3487F-12. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency website: https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FP-12-029672. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INS_COM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear, at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,

Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure
(U) FOREWORD (U)

(U) This pamphlet, published by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, is the third in a series to support a program to inform the Army about current developments and trends in the techniques of espionage and subversion which are employed by the Sino-Soviet bloc to attain its Cold War objectives, and which have a direct or indirect impact upon the security of the U.S. Army.

(U) The pamphlet contains information designed for use in implementing AR 381-12, "Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (Short Title: SAEDA (U))," 8 September 1961, which establishes a requirement to insure that all military personnel and civilian employees of the Army are given orientation on methods used by foreign intelligence services to gather information pertaining to U.S. Army installations, activities, and personnel. Within the limits of security classifications set forth in the articles, material herein may be used in the preparation of indoctrination lectures. In addition, the contents of this pamphlet may be used as background material in the preparation of troop training programs concerning Communist subversion and espionage.

(U) Articles appearing herein are geared to the exposition of current intelligence activities of the Sino-Soviet Empire as they occur around the world. It is intended that the pamphlet be given the widest possible distribution consistent with its security classification in order that Army personnel may be conversant with Communism in all its forms and thus be better prepared to cope with the security hazards which the Army faces in the conduct of its primary mission.

(U) Revisions of this pamphlet will be published from time to time in order that its contents may keep pace with worldwide developments in the counterintelligence field. Readers are encouraged to comment on its content and to submit suggestions, either with respect to its improvement, or the inclusion of special articles in future editions.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (U)

Table of Contents

ESPIONAGE (U)

The Hand That Reached Around the World (U) ..................................................... 2
Chinese Communist Intelligence Agents (U) .......................................................... 12
The North Korean Agent (U) ................................................................................. 16
The Suicidal Escort Agent (U) .............................................................................. 23
Czech Espionage in Switzerland (U) ................................................................. 27
Use of Cover Names by Red China (U) .............................................................. 28

ESPIONAGE RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES (U)

The Friendly Doctor (U) ...................................................................................... 30
Sexual Entrapment (U) ........................................................................................ 31

SUBVERSION

American Reds Fight American Law (U) ............................................................ 36
Cuban-Communist Indoctrination of Latin American Youth (U) ......................... 41

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

They Put Ears in the Walls (U) ............................................................................ 44

SABOTAGE

Sabotage in Iran (U) .............................................................................................. 56

PROPAGANDA (U)

Chinese Communist Publications (U) ............................................................... 58
Communist Propaganda Exploitation of Captive US Army Personnel (U) .......... 61

SECURITY (U)

Security Responsibilities (U) ............................................................................... 63
Security Violations are Bad Habits (U) ............................................................... 67
Security Measures of the Communist Party, USA (U) ........................................ 72

ESPIONAGE BRIEFS (U)

Items of Interest Around the World (U) ............................................................. 76

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
ESPIONAGE

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
(U) It was cold and damp on 7 January 1961 when greying, 65 year old Harry Houghton and Miss Ethel Elizabeth Gee, plump and mid-fortyish, boarded the Salisbury train for London. They didn't know it, but Chief Inspector Ferguson Smith of Scotland Yard boarded the same train.

(U) In London, the two aging lovers walked closely together, toward the Old Vic Theatre near Waterloo Bridge. They didn't notice, but Inspector Smith was also on his way to the Old Vic.

(U) Near the theatre a younger man, heavy but with bouncing step, approached the couple from behind. He placed friendly hands on their shoulders and they walked on a bit, chatting amicably. The younger man reached over and took a shopping bag from Miss Gee.

(U) At that moment Inspector Smith briskly stepped in front of the group. "You are under arrest," he said. "I am a police officer."

(U) The three friends looked around anxiously and saw a swarm of British counterintelligence agents materialize from nowhere. They peacefully submitted to arrest. Six months of close around-the-clock surveillance had come to an end. Other arrests were quick to follow.

(U) In Miss Gee's shopping bag, the British agents found four pamphlets and a tin can sealed with adhesive tape. The pamphlets were SECRET information on British underwater weapons. Inside the can was a roll of undeveloped film—microfilm photographs of 212 pages of the SECRET British Royal Navy document entitled "Particulars of War Vessels." All the material was the property of the British Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment in Portland, England, the site where England was building her first nuclear submarine, the Dreadnought, powered with a US-built nuclear engine.

(U) This was the end of a successful Soviet espionage operation that had begun ten years earlier in cities half a world apart—New York and Warsaw.

(U) Morris Cohen was an interesting man. He was born in the Bronx about 1910 and was graduated from James Monroe High in 1928. Two years later he enrolled at the University of Alabama on an athletic scholarship, but he transferred to Mississippi State in 1931 and was graduated from that school with a BA degree in 1934. Then he spent six months in graduate studies at the University of Illinois and began to study the works of Karl Marx.
(U) Cohen married Lona Teresa Peitka in July 1941 in Norwich, Connecticut. Lona, born in 1913 of Polish parents in Adams, Massachusetts, was a dominating woman who had already dedicated her life to the Communist cause.

(U) Cohen served as a cook in the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps during World War II, with duty in Alaska and France. During the war, Lona worked in a munitions plant. Both were fingerprinted in 1942. After the war, Cohen returned to New York City, took a 2-year course at Teachers College, Columbia University, and in 1947 he began teaching school.

(U) But Cohen, between 1950 and 1954, could hardly have accumulated a "life's savings" sufficient to purchase the 5,000 rare and ancient volumes he had at the time of his arrest; nor did he have "considerable experience" as an antiquary when he left the United States. His customers were university and public libraries, professors, dealers, and private individuals throughout the world, he told the court. But he didn't say that many of his customers were Soviet espionage agents, and that some of the rare and ancient volumes that left his shop contained messages in the most modern micro-dot photography.

(U) Although money was of no object to the Cohens, they played their part well. Upon arrival in London, Morris Cohen rented a back room over a tobacco shop for nine pounds a week and complained bitterly about the cost. They rented a house for 5 guineas a week, and finally bought a home in Ruislip for 4,200 pounds ($11,760). Mrs. "Kroger" handled all the money. The British press later said the rent on the home and the price of the house had been paid by a Swiss bank, but this was not mentioned in the trial.
After the Cohens' arrest, Canadian passports were found in their Ruislip home. The passports were in the names of Thomas James Wilson and Mary Jane Smith, both native-born Canadians, and contained photographs of the Cohens. Canadian authorities examined the passports and said they were complete forgeries. Information in the passports indicated they had been issued by the Department of External Affairs at Ottawa on 15 June 1956, so they could not have been used during the period of 1960 to 1964.

(U) Meddy was the heavy man with the bouncing step arrested with the Cohens as he attempted to take a handbag from Lona. At their trial, the Cohens admitted to having met with...
Molody, known to them as Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, in France in 1955. This may explain the Travelers Cheque that was cashed in Paris that spring. Cohen, at his trial said: “Attracted by his effervescent personality and stimulating comments on literature, I invited (Lonsdale) to my home. Our relationship developed into a warm friendship which was marked by his generous nature. He would drop into our home during the week and on odd weekends.”

(U) Molody was more than an intelligence operative. He was an astonishing, absorbing man who immersed himself completely in his job—yet he wrote soulful micro-dot letters to his wife in Russia, whom he hadn’t seen for years. He was fluent in numerous languages, including English; in spare moments he dabbled in the London stock market, and made several thousand dollars. He once took a tourist bus tour of Europe and became a friend of a U.S. Army officer, but he apparently never used the friendship to gain military information. This was the man who had kept the USSR abreast of the Western world’s underwater weapons developments.

(U) He was born Konon Molody on 17 January 1922 in Moscow, the only son of Trofim Molody, a Soviet scientist, and Evdokiya Konstantinovna. His father died on 14 October 1929, but his mother is believed to be living in Moscow. (In December 1960, Molody’s wife wrote from Moscow: “I am writing to tell you the truth so that you should know that you must somehow make haste to come home. One has only one mother in this world.”)

(U) Molody had his cover story down pat— with documents to prove it. But the Canadian doctor’s record of delivery that Olga had to use to backup the birth certificate has some small print: it indicated that the real Gordon had been circumsised at birth. Molody had all the documentation, but he was at a loss to explain his physical condition. Even the best agents make mistakes.

(U) The Lonsdale passport showed that Molody left Canada on 22 February 1955 by way of Niagara Falls, New York. He sailed from New
York City on the SS America, arriving in Southampton, England, on 3 March 1955. Well financed (8,000 pounds), he took up residence at the White House Apartments near Regents Park. He immediately went to France to meet with the Cohens. (U) In October 1955, Molody enrolled as a student at the London University School of Oriental Languages and African Studies, and for 18 months regularly attended the Chinese language course. He was a master of languages, fluent in English, French, Serbo-Croatian, and Chinese. He was also successful in the financial world. He operated businesses and dabbled in the stock market, on one occasion making a large profit on a flyer dealing with a quick turnover in aircraft shares.

(U) As a cover, he went into legitimate business and made money at it. He first bought used juke boxes and rented them out; later he added bubble-gum vending machines. Finally he went into partnership with two Britishers, Peter Ayers and Michael Bowers, in a company known as Automatic Merchandising Company. Molody handled the Continental accounts, traveling to Italy, France and Switzerland. When the business faltered, Molody got out with 30,000 British pounds and joined the board of directors of two other firms, Master Switch Company of Coplestone Road, Peckham SE, and a subsidiary firm, Allo Security Products, Ltd., 19 Wardour Street, W1, both concerned with selling patented safety locking devices.

(U) He lived well, dressed well, and drove a new Studebaker. Though he was a devoted family man, he was lonely and had romances with women—Yugoslav, Belgian, Italian, Canadian—that he met at the Overseas Club in St. James. He was never short of money. Besides the 8,000 pounds that he had parlayed into 30,000, he had a second income—it came from Moscow via the United States and Switzerland. In addition to accounts with the Midland Bank in London, Molody had an touchable account with the Credit Suisse in Geneva.

(U) Rudolf Ivanovitch Abel never talked. He was silent at his trial, he was pleasant but silent through 5 years at the Federal prison in Atlanta, and he was still silent when he crossed the ancient, windswept bridge in southwest Berlin on 10 February 1962, in exchange for American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.
in 1951. Henry Frederick Houghton, the Security Officer at the British Embassy in Warsaw, was blackmailed by Polish Military Intelligence and agreed to give them classified information.

(U) Houghton met and became intimate with a young blonde Polish girl named Christina. Christina was a “frightened” temptress. She insisted that their meetings be “secret” and would come to his room at night only after an all-clear signal was given by a lamp at the window. Houghton, during 15 months in Warsaw, made approximately 4,000 pounds in black-market operations selling coffee and drugs. Because of his growing drinking habits, his black-market activities, and his family problems—he was a married man—Houghton was sent home in October 1952. But the Z-II, the Polish military intelligence service, already knew of his activities and acted more quickly than the British. By the time he left Warsaw, Houghton had been blackmailed into the service of Polish intelligence.

(U) When he returned to England, Houghton was posted to the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment, one of Britain’s most secret experimental bases. Houghton presumably passed information to Soviet intelligence while working here, and twice he seemed to slip up. In 1954 and 1956 he was under investigation for allegedly taking secret documents home from the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment. But the charges were never proven, and Houghton continued to be a trusted Admiralty employee. The final investigation began because of Houghton’s living suspiciously in excess of his income.

(U) Houghton tells another story. He said he was not blackmailed by the Poles in Warsaw, and that his first approach by Soviet intelligence agents was in England in January 1957. He received a telephone call from a unidentified person who insisted on meeting him concerning Christina.

He met a man whom he later knew only as “Nikki,” a Pole, outside the Pulwich Art Gallery in London. Nikki led Houghton to believe that he was trying to help Christina out of Poland. After establishing rapport of a sort, Nikki then asked Houghton to get for him some “snippets” of naval information. Houghton claims that he refused to cooperate but then he was forced to because “the man said things would go hard for me, and perhaps Christina.” Then began a series of clandestine meetings with Nikki and another agent named John to whom Houghton fed the “snippets” of naval information. Houghton said that twice, when he attempted to pass worthless information, he was severely beaten and threatened with death.

(U) Houghton said he met Conan Molody, known to him as Alexander Johnson, in June 1950. Molody, posing as a U.S. Navy commander assigned to the U.S. Attache office in London, told Houghton he had been asked to look him up by a friend of Houghton in Warsaw. “Johnson” said the United States was giving England valuable classified material and wanted to know if it were properly used. He requested Houghton and Houghton’s friend, Ethel Elizabeth Gee—to obtain British secrets so he could check on the matter because, after all, “we are all working toward a common goal.” Houghton then supplied him with fleet orders, communications secrets and data concerning underwater weapons.

(U) Neither British or American intelligence is inclined to believe Houghton’s story of naive cooperation.

(U) Houghton first met “Bunty” Gee in 1954. She was a lonely old maid who worked in the Secrets File room at the British Establishment. Her salary was only $30 a week, but she had a position of some responsibility—making file checks and issuing classified documents to officials requesting research information.

(U) Miss Gee employed at the Underwater Weapons Establishment since 1950, lived in Portland with her 80-year-old mother, a 79-year-old uncle and an octogenarian aunt who had been bedridden for 22 years. It was a lonely and hard existence. Then she met wonderful, light-hearted Harry Houghton. There was nothing romantic looking about Harry. He was, in fact, mean.
Figure 4 (UNCLASSIFIED). Henry Frederick “Harry” Houghton (U).

looking, long nosed, cleft-chinned, and whisky flushed. But to a woman like “Bunty”—long unloved and unwanted—he must have seemed her dream man.

(U) The friendship developed into something more, and she began meeting “socially” with Harry when he bought a house trailer in 1958 and set up bachelor quarters in Portland. When he later moved into a cottage in town, they decorated it together. At her trial she admitted to the role of mistress for a period of some years.

(U) Bunty, too, says they never met Molody until June of 1960. She said she took him to be an American because of his accent, and because he chewed gum, wore a flashy ring, and had a watch that told the date. But British and American intelligence do not believe her story, either.

(U) The story of the British surveillance of the couple, as told in Old Bailey Court, began on 9 July 1960. That summer afternoon, Harry met Miss Gee in the lobby of the Cumberland Hotel in London. Under the skillful, unobtrusive watch of MI-5, the couple went to the Old Vic Theatre. As they walked, Molody joined them and gave Houghton a small envelope. While Molody and Miss Gee sat chatting in a small park, Harry went away and returned carrying a light blue-grey carrier bag which he gave to Molody. Molody left them and, following a circuitous route, walked to his car and drove away. The first observed exchange had been made.

(U) A month later, on 6 August 1960, Houghton met Molody near the Old Vic. They walked to a small coffee house called Steve’s Cafe near Waterloo Station. Over a cup of coffee, they discussed a newspaper clipping concerning the defection of Martin and Mitchell to Russia.

(U) Three weeks later, agents watched Molody enter a London bank and put a large leather case in a deposit vault. The next day he left England and traveled extensively on the Continent. MI-5 obtained a search warrant and opened the case. It contained the tools of a spy—camera, tube-type microscope for reading micro-dot messages, and a Ronson table-type cigarette lighter with a secret compartment in its base. The hidden cavity contained coding and decoding instructions for radio transmitted messages. The items were returned to the vault. A month later Molody returned to England, retrieved the leather case, and took it to his office in downtown London. The equipment was next seen in the home of Morris Cohen.

(U) After leaving his office, Molody took the subway to Ruislip. He strolled leisurely along the residential streets, then came to a private road joined by a footpath. The path led to a peaceful country road called Cranleigh Drive. When he entered No. 45, a simple stucco and brick house,

Figure 5 (UNCLASSIFIED). Ethel “Bunty” Gee (U).

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
Molody had led MI-5 to the long-missing Cohen—Peter John Kroger, the antique book dealer.

(U) Following the arrest of Houghton, Ethel Gee and Molody near Waterloo Bridge on 7 January, agents raided the Ruislip house and took "Peter John Kroger" and his wife into custody. A check of their fingerprints with the 1942 prints of Morris and Lona Cohen, sent to Scotland Yard by the FBI in 1951, confirmed the Cohen's identity.

(U) But Cohen didn't confess. He said he had bought the Ruislip home in 1958, transferring his place of business from London to save money and avoid the daily trip into the city.

(U) "Professors and customers from the United States, Canada, Great Britain and the Continent visited me and stayed at my home," Cohen said, adding, "I am a member of the Antiquarian Booksellers Association and the National Book League."

(U) To the casual burglar, the house at 45 Cranleigh Drive would have been quite a shock. The front door had a Yale lock, a mortise lock, and a securing chain and bolts, top and bottom. The rear door had two mortise locks and bolts, top and bottom. Four bolts and two patented locking devices secured each of the windows, in addition to their ordinary catches. "After all," Cohen explained, "I have 5,000 valuable books in the house." There were other items of value to Cohen and his employers.

(U) Among the items found hidden in the house were micro-dot microscopes (smaller than a cigarette), slides, microfilm-reading equipment, dummy flashlight batteries (for hiding messages), a 150-watt, 15-pound portable radio transmitter-receiver which could be set up for immediate operation in about three minutes, a 50-foot cable antenna capable of receiving and sending messages to Moscow, the copying camera Molody had stored at the bank—a $200 Praktina, also the Ronson lighter with the secret compartment and pads of special message paper that would dissolve as soon as it was placed near heat. Also found were a list of code numbers used in encoding messages, an automatic keying device enabling Morse code to be transmitted at up to 200 words a minute—a speed which lessens the chance of the signal being detected, or if detected, of pinpointing its origin. A total of $59,171 in American and English currency, travelers checks, British savings bonds and stocks were also cached in the house.

(U) In Miss Gee's home, agents found an English translation of a Russian 12-part questionnaire concerning the British nuclear submarine; and they found $11,300 in savings bonds—a sizeable nestegg for a woman earning less than $150 a month and supporting three other adults. The British court confiscated all the monies, declaring "these are Russian monies," and charged the amount against court costs.

(U) Only Houghton and Gee elected to testify in their own behalf—telling the fantasy of the American Naval Attaché.

(U) Molody did make a strange sworn closing statement—strange because he attempted to exonerate completely the Cohens and accept full responsibility himself. He alone, he said, and without their knowledge, transformed the Ruislip home into a powerful radio transmitting station. He told a fantastic story of night and weekend labor at the home of his hosts—of which they were never aware. During the weekend absences of the Cohens, he said, he managed to secrete such tools of the espionage trade as radio direction finders, forged passports, false-bottomed bookends and talcum powder cans, and a small fortune in American and British currency.

(U) "At one time while the Krogers were away," Molody said, "I constructed the hiding place found in the foundation of the house and deposited there for long-term storage the radio transmitter and other articles. I took great care that no traces of its existence were left. I knew if the contents of the hiding place were discovered, it would land Mr. and Mrs. Kroger in very serious trouble. I decided to obtain false passports which could be used by the Krogers if such an event took place." On innocent pretext, he said, he took some photographs of the Krogers, inserted them into the passports, concealed them in a leather writing pad and hid them in the home along with about $4,000 in getaway funds. (None of this, of course, would have been necessary had the Cohens been innocent.)

(U) Molody's London days included an interesting side trip to the Continent that may have started simply as a relaxing vacation.
This case shows the care taken in developing sources: The sexual and black-market entrapment of Houghton in Warsaw and the blackmail control placed over him in England; the studied approach to Miss Gee using the one thing she wanted most—love—as a device for entrapment.

Throughout the case, we see almost unbelievable examples of the tenacious devotion to duty shown by Soviet intelligence agents, yet they remain poignantly human. During this case, both the mother and father of Morris Cohen died, but he attended neither funeral. Molody, a devoted family man, suffered almost constantly from separation from his wife and family—and his wife longed for him, too.

Molody wrote regularly to his wife and family. He reduced the letters to micro-dots and the Cohens sent them to Moscow in their books. When Lona Cohen was arrested, micro-dot letters were found in her purse—one from Molody's wife and the other, Molody's reply. The letter from Moscow, dated 9 December 1960, read, "Hello my Darling: I congratulate you on the past forty-third anniversary of the October Revolution. . . . We were all deeply sorry you were not with us and so was I especially. . . . How unjust is life. I fully understand you are working, and this is your duty and you love your work and try to do all this very conscientiously. Nevertheless, my reasoning is, somehow, narrow-minded, in the female fashion, and I suffer dreadfully."

Molody responded with a six-page reply which said, in part: "My beloved Galyusha. Just received your mail. I am very happy to have three letters from you in one lot. . . ."

"I hope you don't think I am an entirely hard-hearted man who gives no thought to anybody. All I am going to say is, I myself have only one life, a not entirely easy one at that. I want to spend my life so that later on there is no shame to look back on, if possible."
"I do know what loneliness is. From the age of ten, during the past 29 years, I have spent only ten years with my own people. I did not wish it and I did not seek it, but so it turned out to be. It did not depend on me. I have thought very much about it. . . .

"I understand you quite well. You wrote that seven October anniversaries were celebrated without me. That is so, of course. But I have celebrated them without you and without the children and without my people. . . . I am not complaining, but even you cannot imagine how sad I feel in general and especially at this moment. . . .

This is the eighth year I have celebrated without you. Such is life. Many kisses to my beloved wife and children.

(signed) K.

"P.S. I will be thirty-nine shortly. Is there much left?"

"(U) Material presented in this article may be used in the preparation of lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 381-12. If presentation is to be unclassified, those paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET must be deleted or replaced by fictitious material."
A considerable number of persons of Chinese origin live in the United States, as in nearly every country of the world. The current total is estimated at 287,000. Altogether, over 11 million Chinese live outside the borders of Communist China, not including those on Taiwan and in Hong Kong and Macao, with roughly 10 million of them living in southeast Asia. This leaves about 2 million Chinese residing in the Western World, a sizeable pool for potential recruitment. There are currently 15,000 Chinese in Mexico, 45,000 in Canada, and 26,000 in Cuba.
The flow of Chinese into the United States is both legal and illegal. By air and sea during the year ending 30 June 1960, 8,828 aliens from Hong Kong, 59,920 aliens from Japan, 1,241 aliens from Korea, and 1,654 aliens from the Ryukyu Islands, arrived in the United States—all legally, but among them could have been numerous Communist agents. The number entering illegally is difficult to determine since only those caught can be counted. During 1960 a total of 2,105 Chinese were apprehended in the United States as deportable aliens. Many of the Chinese (approximately 80 percent) in the United States are not citizens and do not intend to—or cannot—become American citizens. Each January all alien residents in the United States must register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, giving their name, address, and occupation. The last registration revealed that there are 47,895 noncitizen Chinese residents in the United States.

![Figure 6](UNCLASSIFIED). Citizens and aliens admitted at US ports of entry 1 July 1959—30 June 1960 (U).
The Chinese are prominent members of Mexican border communities. The city of Mexicali actually was founded by Chinese who were working for a U.S. development company in Mexico. From about 1920, the Chinese owned approximately 80 percent of the farms and cotton plantations and 90 percent of the retail stores in the Mexicali area. The Mexican anti-Chinese movement in 1933 caused many of the Chinese to flee or relinquish their economic holdings. World War II reversed this economic trend for the small number of Chinese who remained in the area. As of August 1960, the Chinese community in Mexicali totaled about 1,000 and most of the large retail stores were again in Chinese possession. Many new Chinese are arriving in the border areas and consist of two classes: Those with Republic of China (Taiwan) passports and those admitted as Mexican citizens. Many of those in the first category have Republic of China passports issued at Macao, the Portuguese exclave on the Chinese mainland. Chinese officials state that these passport-holders are screened carefully, but the system is not foolproof. As for those in the second category who are admitted as Mexican citizens, it is known that citizenship papers can be purchased through irregular channels for prices from $2,000 to $4,000 in U.S. currency. Processing of the applications and negotiations for citizenship papers are usually conducted in Mexico City; however, such documentation can also be obtained in Hong Kong or Japan. Upon receipt of instructions from the Mexican Department of Interior, the appropriate Mexican Consulate in the Far East, usually Tokyo, issues the necessary papers. Chinese residents in Mexico stated that a number of the new, young Chinese arrivals are unusually well versed in Spanish.
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Page(s) 17-24

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
THE SUICIDAL ESCORT AGENT (U)

(U) This special article is a contribution to Counterintelligence Trends and Developments by the 508d Military Intelligence Battalion, Eighth United States Army, located at Yongsan, Seoul, Korea.

Indoctrination

Training—"One if by land, two if by sea"

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Downgraded at 12-Year Intervals.
Not Automatically Declassified
DOD Dir. 5200.10

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on
11 April 2012
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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USIA

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Page(s) 26-28
The trial of three Czech agents arrested by Switzerland a year ago ended late this spring with the conviction of all three for terms from 5 to 12 years. A fourth member of the spy ring, Bohuslav PAVLIK, died during the trial.

The Swiss Government revealed few details of the case, but from various sources the following synopsis has been pieced together.

Otto SCHWARZENBERGER and his wife Eva came to Switzerland in 1959 on excellently forged documents. Eva worked with Otto, and though she too was a trained agent, Otto did most of the collecting. The couple had been trained in Prague and had passed their "exam" in the form of a 2-month practical exercise in East Germany. Their training included the usual techniques—geography, language, shortwave operation, microfilming, invisible writing.

When they arrived in Switzerland, the "destitute" couple was given help by the city of Brutton. But they weren't really destitute; in her clothing, Eva had sewn 10,000 Swiss francs given her by the Czech Government.

They moved to Zurich and immediately began working. Otto was hired by the Oerlikon Machine Works as plant bookkeeper. This permitted him to report to Prague on materials furnished the Swiss Army and to collect secret production figures on strategic items. He microfilmed reports on his observations and delivered them to the Czech legation in Bern in a cigarette package.

Otto also transmitted information about politicians, emigrants, NATO officials, and other prominent persons. In all, the Schwarzenbergers are known to have sent 64 messages to Prague, seven of them with a shortwave transmitter given to them by Pavlik. It was this radio that eventually provided the incriminating evidence.

The Schwarzenbergers were well financed by the Czech Government. During the 2 years besides the 10,000 Swiss francs ($2,600) they began with, they received 27,000 Swiss francs ($6,020) and 27,000 kronen ($1,850) was added to a special account in their name in Prague. Part of their pay came directly from the Czech Legation in Bern.

While he worked at Oerlikon, Schwarzenberger was reminded by Swiss authorities that he hadn't performed his "obligatory" military duties. So he entered the army and eventually was assigned to an office of the general staff. There, two auxiliary soldiers became suspicious of Schwarzenberger because of "certain behavior" that was never elaborated on. Schwarzenberger was put under surveillance by Swiss intelligence, but the incriminating evidence against him was discovered by chance.

A bricklayer, digging in a yard in a suburb of Zurich, found the shortwave transmitter that Schwarzenberger had buried on orders from Prague when he went into the army.

Interestingly, when the Swiss arrested the Schwarzenbergers, they also arrested Pavlik and Vlastimil GLASER, their handlers, although both were Czech nationals bearing diplomatic passports. The Swiss pointed out that since the two men were not credited either to the Swiss Government or to any international organization located in Switzerland, they were not involved in a legitimate diplomatic mission in Switzerland, they were subject to Swiss control and possible arrest for illegal activities.

The fact that the Czech Government chooses to issue diplomatic passports to members of its espionage service, the Swiss said, was indicative of the attitude taken by the Czech Government toward the traditionally accepted roles of persons having diplomatic status.

Note. Material in this article may be used in the preparation of lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 361-12.
(U) The letterhead on the request gave the address as Headquarters, Combined Armed Forces, PO Box 14940, Hong Kong, and the letter was signed by Ed Stanford.

(U) A semiannual OACSI publication entitled Solicitation of Post, Camp, Station and Unit Newspapers and Other Military Publications furnishes Continental Army Commanders with a listing of members and employees of Soviet and Soviet Bloc diplomatic missions in the United States. It also provides identification of individuals and agencies involved in the collection of unclassified publications from the U.S. Army agencies and installations. In order to achieve maximum circulation of the publication, the list is unclassified; this prohibits inclusion of the following information.

(U) Any solicitation for information received from any of the above named persons or organizations should not be honored if the information is unclassified, and such solicitation addressed to U.S. Army Commands should immediately be reported to this headquarters through organizational intelligence channels.

SECRET

Excluded from Automatic Regrading:
DOD Dir. 5200.10 Does Not Apply
(U) A long-range, well-executed entrapment by Communist agents was explained recently by the victim—an American Government employee. 

(U) The employee, in January 1962, voluntarily told his agency that he had been compromised and placed under control by Communist intelligence. He had been the victim of a plot that allowed the Communists to blackmail him for a weakness he didn't have.

(U) This case illustrates the extremes to which Communist intelligence services are willing to go to entrap and compromise potential sources of information and their ability to quickly exploit the unwary for their purposes.

Note. Material presented in this article may be used in the preparation of lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 331-12.
SEXUAL ENTRAPMENT—HOW THE COMMUNIST USE IT FOR ESPIONAGE (U)

(U) "I realized that as a soldier my first duty was to my country. But I loved this girl so much that it prevented me from doing what I knew was right. I told her I would give her whatever information I could obtain." An Army enlisted man, no longer passionately in love with a German girl, explained at his court-martial why he had given her an Army CBR manual and drawings of Army installations. With the detachment common to a cooled romance, the soldier explained that love had simply outweighed patriotism. He had never thought he would do such a thing, and he wanted to think he would never do it again.

(U) Love and sex have dulled men's consciences throughout history. Although professional female spies are rare—their nature does not seem to permit the necessary long-term emotional detachment—women's natural allure is frequently used by opposing intelligence services to entrap an unwary target. OACSI files record many cases of successful Soviet bloc intelligence operations involving the use of women to obtain information from military personnel. In all too many instances they have resulted in the compromise of military information and disgrace to those involved.

(U) Hostile intelligence services sometimes thoroughly prepare a woman for an espionage mission, and then send her out to accomplish it; but more often they are merely opportunists. They happen upon a romance already in progress and exert pressure on a susceptible woman to recruit her for their purpose. Then they simply let her cajole military information in exchange for her affections.

(U) Fraulein Zettl was a camp follower of middle-class origins who was dating an American enlisted man we will call Howard. Zettl had no particular contact with East German officials until a day when she illegally entered the Soviet Zone of Germany in the company of a friend. She was arrested and searched. When police found a photograph of Howard in her purse, she was interrogated by Soviet agents and told she must work for them. "We want you to get documents and information from your boyfriend," they said. "And if you can, get him to come into East Berlin with you."

(U) Zettl told Howard what had happened. She said she was in trouble and needed military information to protect herself. Since Howard loved her—it was from his court-martial we quoted, he helped her. Even after his wife arrived in Germany and Howard's love for Zettl cooled, the girl continued to demand his cooperation by threatening to expose him to military authorities.
(U) In 1961, newspapers gave prominent coverage to a classic case of exploitation of illicit romance by a hostile intelligence service, the Irvin Scarbeck and Urszula Discher case. Scarbeck was a U.S. Foreign Service career officer stationed with the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. Urszula was not much to look at, emaciated, with sunken cheeks and hollow eyes, but possessed of a seductive voice.

(U) Urszula's approach to Scarbeck was startlingly simple. She called the Embassy late one night when Scarbeck was on duty. She talked about an application she had made for a job. The more they talked, Scarbeck related at his trial, the more he became intrigued by her voice. Though he did not know her, he arranged to meet her later that night. They met, but only for a few minutes. Scarbeck's first thought was that Urszula was an agent for the Polish secret police, the Urzaiz Bezpieczenstwa--UB, but he wanted to see her again.
(U) But it is not only men who are the target of sexual entrapment. There have been a number of cases in which unwary women have also fallen into a romantic snare carefully prepared by hostile intelligence. Here are two examples.

(U) At the beautiful American Embassy club on the Rhein River in Bad Godesberg, Germany, lonely Eleanor, an American secretary, met Paul, who claimed to be a naturalized American. The two began dating, and Eleanor fell in love with Paul. When Paul moved to West Berlin, they kept in touch by mail and telephone.

(U) One day, Eleanor received a telephone call. Paul had been seriously hurt, the caller said, and was hospitalized in East Berlin. At the first opportunity, Eleanor visited Paul in the hospital and as she left he gave her a package containing a roll of film, asking that she give it to his landlord in West Berlin. Outside the hospital, Eleanor was arrested by Communist police. They searched her, found the film, and developed it. It showed photographs of East German military equipment. Eleanor was detained, but she was allowed a moment with Paul. He told her that he was working for Western intelligence, and was in trouble because the film had been found.

(U) Eleanor was taken to a Soviet officer who said he was taking over her case; he said he would release her and her fiancé if she would agree to steal coded telegrams concerning U.S. policy toward Berlin and the USSR from her office. Eleanor agreed and was released. Back in Bonn, she reported the whole affair to her superiors. U.S. investigators soon found that Paul was not an American citizen, but a Soviet agent. The Soviet officer who had made the deal with Eleanor was identified as a former Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington who had been unofficially asked to leave the United States in 1959.

(U) In the second instance, loyalty to her country prompted the wife of a western diplomat to make what must have been an agonizing decision against being blackmailed by a Communist intelligence service.

(U) The woman fortunately had the courage to tell the entire story to her husband and to her country's Chief of Mission as soon as she was able. She was immediately sent home and her husband was reassigned out of the country a few days later.

(U) The instances related in this article occurred during the past few years. They are but a sampling of the methods of sexual entrapment employed by Soviet bloc intelligence services against the United States. Many of them were at least partially successful and the methods are more than likely to continue. Comrades are therefore urged to cite them in connection with security indoctrination lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 381-12. If unclassified lectures are to be presented, classified paragraphs must be first sanitized to omit dates and the identities of persons, places, and installations.
Figure 11 (UNCLASSIFIED). This electrically charged seductress' picture appeared in a Hungarian magazine to warn Hungarian officials against "America's latest spy techniques." This evening dress, the magazine reports, "is exceptionally suitable for embassy or legation receptions." It includes microphones (Nos. 1, 3, and 4), a tape recorder (6), and an antenna (6). The magazine observes that Hungary "must keep in step with the advancing techniques of cocktail party" (U).
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SUBVERSION

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10S-HQ-1958/
(S) AMERICAN REDS FIGHT AMERICAN LAW (U)

(U) A legal net has been tightened around the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) since the June 1961 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld a previous ruling on the McCarran Act of 1950. The McCarran Act ordered all Communist-action organizations to register with the Attorney General. The Supreme Court decision, that the McCarran Act was legal, meant the CPUSA would have to register its organization and its officers.

(U) In April 1968, the Subversive Activities Control Board, after lengthy hearings, determined that the CPUSA is a Communist-action organization and ordered it to register with the Attorney General. Court battles, including three appearances before the Court of Appeals and two before the Supreme Court, resulted in two remands to the Board for reconsideration. But the June 1961 decision of the Supreme Court was final, the Subversive Activities Control Board was finished with the case, and it became the function of the Attorney General to enforce the order.

(U) Since that day, several moves and counter-moves have been made by the Justice Department and the CPUSA.

(U) The Justice Department, immediately after the Supreme Court's action, issued a request for compliance by the CPUSA. There was no answer. Then the Justice Department set specific dates for registration: National office by 20 November 1961; if the national office did not comply, then all local or national districts should register by 20 December 1961; if they did not comply, all individual CP members were to register.

(U) The CPUSA has not registered and has indicated it has no intention of registering.

(U) The Justice Department, with no further warning, served Gus Hall, general secretary of the CPUSA, with a summons to appear before a Federal justice in Washington, D.C., on 8 December 1961 and show cause why the CPUSA should not be held in contempt. Hall answered the summons and pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for a later date.

(U) The first Party official to be jailed was Philip Bart, a longtime member and now organizational secretary of the CPUSA. Bart appeared before a Grand Jury investigating the CPUSA's failure to register and refused to answer 47 questions about the officials and organization of the CPUSA and actions it had taken to thwart the registration ruling. The Court of Appeals ordered Bart to jail on 6 March 1962. The Grand Jury indicted the Party itself and ordered it to trial.
James Jackson, editor of The Worker, the Communist Party newspaper in the United States, faced a Grand Jury on 9 March 1962 and also was jailed for refusing to answer questions.

The main blow against CPUSA was a government civil suit filed 19 March 1962. The Government, contending that the Communist Control Act of 1954 took the Communist Party out of the political party tax exemption class, sued to collect more than $500,000 in income taxes and interest for the year 1951. (It may be coincidental, but the real assets of CPUSA at the end of 1961 were valued at $500,000.) The CPUSA leaders named in the suit were Gus Hall, general secretary; Benjamin Davis, national secretary; Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, national chairman; and Philip Bart, organizational chairman.

Organizational changes have been made at all levels of the CPUSA. Except for the top national officers, nearly all official positions have been stricken from the books to limit the number of persons who may be required to register as officers. The rank and file members are getting nervous; this has been reflected in a rash of factional disputes and internal bickering by several clubs. Some clubs and individuals have been expelled from the Party. New organizations have been formed by dissidents.

In an effort to obscure the real issues and CP aims and to attract as many persons as possible to the Party's cause, Communists were instructed to "participate to the fullest extent in the battle for peace, for equality for Negroes, and for the everyday crucial issues of the people." They were specifically instructed to support civil liberties bodies and to work for repeal of the Internal Security Act.

The current project of CPUSA is to make secure its own organization. All national offices were abolished in December 1961, and the affairs of the Party are now conducted by a three-member executive committee consisting of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Gus Hall, and Benjamin Davis. Party leaders plan to streamline all operations, but to maintain the clubs, particularly in heavily populated centers. The leaders have declared that the CP must remain intact and must plan for future rapid growth, although they expect to be somewhat restricted in open operations. Some CP clubs have begun recording dues payments in code so that members cannot be identified from dues records. Clubs have been told that most of their activity will have to be private; they must refrain from meeting publicly.

At the moment the Party does not seem to speak with one voice. The national headquarters...
has issued a policy statement on its failure to register, but the various state groups have given it different interpretations. Each district seems to be formulating its own defense against any Justice Department action. One suggestion is that CP members depend on help from the larger front organizations, on the theory that the front organizations should realize they will be the next target of the Justice Department.

(U) Because the Justice Department has been silent on its plans, the reactions of OP members have been confused. They don't know what to expect, because the Justice Department has preceded talk with action. This has had the effect of making the members and leaders apprehensive and the differing opinions and solutions have compounded the confusion. It cannot yet be called chaos, but the disagreements have caused serious internal strife and lack of discipline within the Party.

(U) A New Jersey CP group expelled from the Party in 1961 for factionalism and open opposition to national policy; they immediately set up the beginning of what they called a “new CP in USA.” In October several members of the CP “Railroad Industry” trade union were expelled from the Party; they planned to set up another CP group, taking the leftist, anti-imperialist position as opposed to the “rightist” pacifist group that is represented by the National CP leaders. Another group of insurgent members were expelled in the Southern California CP District and reportedly formed a new group that they hope will eventually be the nucleus of a new CPUSA.

In a stinging attack on recently expelled “factionsists and disrupters,” the national office of the Party reaffirmed its adherence to the Khrushchev line in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it expects the membership to follow suit.

(U) A number of changes have been made in the operation of the Southern California CP District. All local Party officials were told to resign their positions as section and club officers. All section committees have been dissolved and CP clubs will meet only once each month. Each club will receive directions from a designated member of the previous district board. Members are having savings accounts made joint accounts with non-Party persons, to protect their personal savings should an attempt be made to confiscate the funds under provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1960. No CP literature or Party material is to be sent through the mail. Party clubs will meet as peace groups, forums, or readers' groups with not more than 15 members at any meeting.

(U) The organizations that are high priority CP targets are: trade unions (especially the Teamsters); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; all youth and student movements; Negro American Labor Council; and peace movements.

(U) To capitalize on American interest in the Soviet Union, Communist speakers—American and foreign—have been busily touring the United States, addressing any group that will listen to them. CPUSA leaders have delighted in this renewed interest and in the free publicity given by press coverage of the speeches. At a recent meeting of Communist leaders on the west coast, Gus Hall said that a survey has shown that there are millions of Americans who are tired of hearing about Communists and who want the right to hear from Communists, even if they disagree with them. Hall said the “uncertainties of the future of the United States and its policies” open up tremendous possibilities for the Communist Party to explain its position. He said the possibilities of the new generation are “explosive.”

(U) One result of the current CP emphasis on youth work was the response Gus Hall received from University of California students in recent appearance in Berkeley. Hall was elated over the reception he received and he said it proved his belief that the main Party effort should be directed toward youth. People's World, a west coast Communist publication, described the student reaction to Hall as “warm and friendly” and noted that one of his speeches was interrupted a number of times by applause. The paper estimated attendance for Hall's first speech at 175 and the second at 300.

(U) Student organizations all over the nation are scheduling or attempting to schedule speeches by representatives of the CPUSA. The argument of some student bodies is that no restrictions should be placed on the free expression of ideas inside or outside the classroom. The eleventh report of the 1961 California Legislature's Senate Fact Find-
The Subcommittee on Un-American Activities says: "We know from an intensive survey that Communist propaganda has been alarmingly effective among our students during the past two years."

(U) CP leadership found it hard to explain Russia's resumption of nuclear testing and for a while they considered criticizing Russia through People's World. This, they thought, would win more public sentiment to their side because it would be taken as an indication that there is no connection between the CPUSA and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

(U) The CPUSA leadership has also been put in an embarrassing position by a message from Peiping. On 15 January 1962, the CPUSA received a cablegram from the Communist Party of China encouraging the CPUSA and condemning the United States for its persecution through the McCarran and Smith Acts. Since the CPUSA has unequivocally supported the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute, officials in the CPUSA haven't decided how to respond to this message.

(U) Article VIII of the CPUSA constitution, adopted in 1957, provides for the assessment of dues, initiation fees, and special collection. The article says initiation fees and dues will be paid according to rates set by the National Convention; that income from dues and initiation fees will be apportioned among the subdivisions of the party; and that special assessments may be levied by the National Convention or by a two-thirds vote of the National Committee. (The National Convention is the highest authority of the CPUSA; when this body is not convening, the National Committee is the highest authority.)

(U) New Organizations

(U) Several new organizations were begun by American Communists during the past 18 months. Among them were:

(U) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (NADR). It was organized after a CP meeting in June 1961. The assembly was held 23-24 September 1961 in New York City.
York City. It reportedly had an average daily attendance of 8,000, of which 2,000 were registered delegates. Many different organizations throughout the United States were represented, including the Nation of Islam, an organization which before that time had not participated in any CP activities. The assembly's concern was the "repressive measures against citizens by government branches," and it sought means of combatting these "illegal, un-American and undemocratic tactics." Although the assembly was not intended to be permanent, its New York office is still in operation.

Material presented in this article may be used, within the limits of security classifications set forth, in the preparation of lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 381-12. If the presentations are to be unclassified, the material concerning CPUSA finances and new organizations must be excluded.

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Page(s) 43

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set forth, in the preparation of lectures required by paragraph 7, AR 381-12. If the lectures are to be presented as unclassified, the material must first be sanitized to omit dates and the identities of persons and places. The photographs of enemy clandestine listening devices cannot be declassified.
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Page(s) 49-55
SABOTAGE

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Page(s) 57

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1 Sep 93
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INDEC
USA Doc 3 7.5

105-HQ-1958
Sec 10
The importance which Peiping attaches to the export of books, magazines, and other printed matter in foreign languages is vividly manifested by the fact that, despite the chronic and frequently severe shortage of paper stock on the China mainland, the outflow of foreign-language magazines and books has remained at a high level. Equally significant, particularly in recent years, are the impressive advances which Peiping’s Foreign Language Press has achieved in the visual and technical aspects of its operation. Despite some heavy-handed propaganda themes, the foreign-language publications reflect an expertise in foreign language exposition, effective organization and pleasing arrangements of graphic and photographic materials.

During 1961, Peiping capitalized upon Sino-Cuban amity by introducing Spanish-language books and magazines into Cuba in quantity. During the first nine months of 1961 over 250,000 copies of Mao Tse-tung’s works were sold there as well as 180,000 copies of various books on China. The word “sold” is used advisedly, since Havana is known to serve as a distribution center of Communist publications for the rest of Latin America. An estimated 145,000 copies of three books by Mao, Anna Louise Strong (elderly China apologist residing in Peiping), and the late Chinese writer, Lu Hsun, were released in October 1961. There is also evidence that during 1961 Peiping took the lead in publication of Communist propaganda in Esperanto language, distributed principally in Europe and Latin America. Chinese Communist presses were kept busy during the year rolling off an Esperanto version of a 102-page booklet presenting Peiping’s version of Lenin’s teachings entitled “Long Live Leninism.” The compilation which was first issued in the aftermath of the 1960 Moscow meeting, is understandably top heavy with tracts stressing the inevitability of warfare between the capitalist and Communist camps and the “anomalies” of Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful co-existence. Other works published in Esperanto during the year included a 412-page Chinese anthology—a first volume—and Mao’s “On Practice” and “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship.”

Among the 45-odd titles published in English by Peiping’s English Language Press in 1961, two publications received particularly heavy publicity in Chinese Communist foreign language magazines and journals. Foremost was the English-language version of volume IV of Chairman Mao’s selected works, covering the decisive period of the Chinese Communist revolution following Japan’s surrender. This work had been issued with great fanfare in late 1960 in time for the October 1 “National Day” commemoration. Peiping’s determination to insure its heavy sale abroad was apparent by the full-page advertisement of the book in the widely distributed Peking Review for 7 consecutive weeks, beginning in April.

Running a close second was a volume entitled “Stories About Not Being Afraid of Ghosts” which brings together a collection of ancient Chinese tales. A pointed introduction calls attention to the fact that while there are no demons today like those described in the tales, “there are many things which resemble them—imperialism, reactionaries, difficulties and obstacles in work, etc.” Throughout the preface, the author, Ho Chi-fang, reiterates that the ghost stories are propagated as current ideological parables. As a promotional stunt, the editors of Peking Review offered overseas subscribers a copy of “Ghosts” for every subscription or renewal to the Review.

With respect to works published in foreign languages other than English, Mao’s writings...
in various foreign languages in book and booklet form were released in great number: There was a Portuguese translation of his first volume. A contract was let to publish a Japanese version of his volume IV. Late in the year, a People's Daily advertisement stated that a number of articles from volume IV were being issued in 11 separate pamphlets—translated into one or more of eight different languages. The choice of languages indicated that the targets for these publications are the non-Bloc countries.

(U) For the first time since 1959, several major mainland newspapers became available outside China. In 1960, People's Daily was the only Communist Chinese newspaper obtainable through subscription. In 1961 this subscription list was expanded to include newspapers as Ta Kung Pao, Kwang Ming Pao, Worker's Daily and Youth News. The biweekly party theoretical journal Red Flag was also returned to the foreign export list. A year-end advertisement, also posted in People's Daily, announced that 29 Chinese-language scientific and technical periodicals published by the Science Press—most of which had been deleted from export in 1959—would be available for subscriptions in 1962.

(U): People's China, China Pictorial, Chinese Literature, Peiping Review, and China Reconstructs continued to represent Peiping's five most prominent foreign-language periodicals. Although circulation figures are unavailable for these publications, China Pictorial, an illustrated monthly magazine designed for popular consumption and prepared in 18 foreign languages, including English, enjoys by far the widest circulation among the group, estimated to be in the neighborhood of 1 million copies per month.

(U) A promotional device worthy in all respects of Madison Avenue was introduced by the editors of China Reconstructs. In an attempt to boost overseas circulation, new subscribers or old subscribers renewing were offered a dozen sheets of stationary decorated with colorful Chinese prints in the traditional style (fig. 22).

(U): Chinese Communist publications have reflected a growing understanding of effective advertising techniques, but this was the first evidence of the use of the "giveaway" promotional device.

(U) Peiping's international propaganda offensive in 1962 shows no signs of slackening, despite economic disasters and retribution on the China mainland. Chinese Communist propagandists continue to give particular emphasis to the "correctness" of Peiping's foreign policy—especially as it pertains to differences with the Soviet Union—and to the drive to solidify relations with both its Communist and non-Communist neighbors. As in previous years, support for national revolution coupled with repeated warnings of the dangers of "colonialism" to world peace provides the major ingredients of Peiping's propaganda message to the underdeveloped areas. As sustained and especially vituperative personal attack on President Kennedy and his administration and a carefully executed drive to line up support for U.N. membership continues to high light Chinese Communist propaganda presentation.

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION OF CAPTIVE U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL (U)

(U) Communist propaganda exploitation of captured U.S. soldiers and defectors from U.S. Forces continues today, in a vein similar to that observed during the Korean War. Recent incidents in South Vietnam and Korea are pertinent examples.

(U) In South Vietnam, two U.S. Sergeants, both members of the 1st Battle Group (Special Forces) who were captured by the Viet Cong, were said by the clandestine Communist Vietnamish "Liberation Radio" on 1 May 1962 to have been released because of their "repentance for barbarous aggressive activities." Subsequently TASS the official Soviet news agency, amplified the propaganda in broadcasts on 8 and 10 May.

(U) A clerk-typist assigned to MAAG, Vietnam, was kidnapped on 24 December 1961 by the Vietnamese Communists and released 6 months later on 24 June 1962. While a prisoner, he was reported by the "Liberation Radio" to have written two letters criticizing the U.S. Forces in South Vietnam and U.S. policies in that country; on 9 and 11 June 1962, the North Vietnamese radio broadcast the texts, supposedly "at his request."

(U) In Korea, the defection to North Korea on 28 May 1962 of a U.S. Army private has given the Communists a potent propaganda tool. The soldier, who has a record of dereliction of duty and misconduct, walked across into North Korea while on duty with U.S. Forces at the demilitarized zone. He has been quoted by North Korean radio in a long statement praising the North Korean people and condemning the "aggressive policies" of the U.S. in South Korea. First announcement of his defection was broadcast in Korean to South Korea, and in English to Asia, as well as the domestic North Korean audience, on 12 June 1962. On the same day, a report of the defection was included in a frontline, loudspeaker broadcast directed at the 28th ROK Division. Both announcements were embroidered with the usual Communist propaganda against the U.S. Army and U.S. policies.

(U) On 15 June 1962, a North Korean frontline, loudspeaker broadcast aimed at the 8th ROK Division reported in English and in Korean that North Korea had another U.S. Army "defector" who was identified as "John Nixon, a member of the 1st Cavalry Division."

(U) During the Korean War, such announcements were frequently repeated and widely disseminated, as is true of this latest propaganda. The occasional nature of recent Communist opportunities for such propaganda has not changed the method of its presentation or its purpose: to create confusion, frustration, and mistrust in U.S. ranks and among U.S. allies. Such incidents serve to re-emphasize that Communist propagandists everywhere will continue to exploit by duress, distortion, and outright prevarication both U.S. military captives and deserters to Communist control.
(U) On 20 April 1962, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army, and the Provost Marshal General (PMG) concluded an agreement which delineates their respective roles in the field of security. This agreement, prepared jointly by representatives of OACSI, PMG, and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAINTC) in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding with Addendum, is reproduced here (figs. 23 and 24) for general information.

(U) The agreement was considered necessary to clarify often conflicting definitions and interpretations of the term "physical security" which are found in current Department of the Army publications and to assist commanders in eliminating duplication of effort in accomplishing security surveys, a duplication which results in waste in terms of time, money, and personnel.

(U) It is believed that the agreement and its addendum are self-explanatory. One point, however, may well be emphasized. A counterintelligence survey is conducted as a service to assist commanders to determine the security measures required to protect key installations from possible sabotage, espionage, subversion, and unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The security activities of the Military Police Corps, Provost Marshals, and other staff officers or agencies supplement rather than duplicate the functions of Army Intelligence Corps units. A coordinated effort with all investigative elements using their particular capabilities is seen as the best approach to the overall security problem in a command.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
SECURITY

1. The purpose of this Memorandum and Addendum is to define the areas of primary interest to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Provost Marshal General in the field of security and to issue a spirit of clear coordination on all matters of mutual interest in support of security within the Department of the Army. Both action is considered necessary in view of the conflicting definitions and interpretations of physical security which are to be found in current Department of the Army publications. Army Intelligence and Provost Marshal field operations will conform to this Memorandum.

2. The AGSI, under supervision of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, has the General Staff responsibility for plans, policies and procedures concerning with counterintelligence. These aspects of security in which the AGSI has primary staff interest include counterintelligence investigations, counterespionage and counterintelligence operations, and other counterintelligence activities, including counterintelligence surveys and inspections and the protection of classified defense information, in any form.

3. The Provost Marshal General, under the direct supervision and control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, formulates, coordinates, and supervises the execution of plans, policies and procedures pertaining to the criminal investigation, law enforcement and crime prevention aspects of security. His role in security is related to prevention of unauthorized entry, the control of traffic, circulation and use of unauthorized personnel and vehicles, and the enforcement of laws and regulations by means of Military Police and civilian guard services, perimeter security and approach areas, and protective lighting and alarm systems, pass and badge systems, and the conduct of Military Police activities in law enforcement and the prevention and detection of crime. He has staff responsibility for the physical aspects of security which involve criminal investigation operations, crime prevention surveys, Military Police operations and the conduct of surveys to establish the need for, or to determine the effectiveness of, those physical measures identified above.

4. Close cooperation between AGSI and TPMU activities at all echelons is a uniquely recognized necessity. Those aspects which are of mutual interest will be coordinated at the Department of the Army level between the AGSI and TPMU, laterally between respective units, Intelligence Officers and Provost Marshalls, boards, schools or centers, or within command channels, as appropriate. Close coordination will be achieved within the AGSI Intelligence Board which establishes requirements and evaluates alarm systems, locking devices and other anti-theft devices in comparison with the safeguards of classified information and the TPMU Military Police Board which establishes requirements and evaluates similar devices for the purpose of deterring illegal entry and protecting them.

5. It is agreed that action will be taken by the agencies concerned to incorporate in pertinent publications, provisions reflecting the content and spirit of this Memorandum. Such action will be taken at the time of normal review and revision of such regulations and publications.

6. Attached Addendum is made a part of this Memorandum.

[Signatures]

I. Addendum to Memorandum of Understanding, Security

Figure 88 (UNCLASSIFIED). Memorandum of understanding of security, 20 April 1963 (U).

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

USA  DOC 3
Physical security is understood to be a distinct type of security as differentiated from document and information security and from personnel security as discussed in paragraphs 199 through 202, FM 30-17.

The use of the substituted terminology, "criminal investigation, law enforcement and crime prevention aspects of security", in lieu of the term "physical security" in describing the interests and responsibilities of TPM is not to be construed, as changing or modifying, or as constituting a basis for future change or modification of his responsibilities for physical security as stated in paragraph 40, AR 10-5.

The primary staff interest of ACSI in counterintelligence surveys, which may assess counterintelligence effectiveness of physical security plans and procedures, is not understood to include primary staff interest in physical security surveys as described and defined in FM 19-20 and FM 19-30. Termination, "surveys to establish the need for, or to determine the effectiveness of those physical measures identified above", is understood to describe and refer to physical security surveys as discussed in detail in FM 19-20 and FM 19-30.

Alva R. Pitch
Major General, GS
ACofS for Intelligence

R.G. Butcher
Major General, USA
The Provost Marshal General
SECURITY VIOLATIONS ARE BAD HABITS (U)

(U) One must remember that the only known enemy espionage is that which has failed.
Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

  (b)(1)

  It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

- Other:

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 71

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
Bad security habits make their job easier.
Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)
It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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☐ Other:

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 73-74

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
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11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
(U) On 14 June 1962, it was announced that a naturalized Argentine citizen born in Aussig, Czechoslovakia, and a naturalized Argentine citizen born in Berlin, Germany, had been arrested by Argentine security authorities for espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Bloc. The former head of a pro-Communist organization devoted to the expansion of Argentine trade with the Communist Bloc were associated with other former German nationals now residing in Brazil and Cuba who are allegedly engaged in intelligence activities. According to Argentine intelligence, radio transmitters, cipher materials, photographic and microfilming equipment, and other apparatus were seized in the homes of the two men.
(U) In May 1962, Iceland expelled Czechoslovak trade envoy, Vlascimil V. Stochl, charging that he had attempted to persuade an Icelandic civilian pilot to collect information concerning U.S. military aircraft based at Keflavik, Iceland. The Icelandic Justice Ministry stated that the civilian pilot, Sigurdur Olafsson, employed at the U.S. base, had complained to the Czechoslovak Embassy about faults in a twin-engine aircraft he had purchased from Czechoslovakia in 1954. The Ministry said Olafsson quoted Stochl as saying that Czechoslovakia would give him a new plane in exchange for information about the American planes at Keflavik.

SECRET

U Iceland (U)

SECRET

U Mexico (U)

INDEX C

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SECRET

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

EARLE G. WHEELER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:
Active Army:
- USofA (1)
- ASA (M&P&RF) (1)
- ASA (I&L) (1)
- ASA (RD) (1)
- USASA (5)
- AFRD (1)
- GLL (1)
- CARBON (1)
- COA (1)
- TTAG (1)
- CPE (1)
- CMH (1)
- TAG (1)
- TSG (1)
- TPMG (1)
- CFT (1)
- TIG (1)
- DOSPER (3)
- AGSY (145)
- DGSETS (2)
- DGSLSD (8)
- AMO (8)
- AMO Det No. 1 (Ord) (6)
- USCARB (5)
- OS Maj. Comd. (10) except
- USARJ (1)
- USARCARIB (15)
- USAEUR (94)
- USARYS (20)
- ARADCOM (3)
- ARADCOM Rgn (3)
- LOGCOMD (1)
- US Army (50) except
- Second USA (70)
- Third USA (35)
- Fourth USA (40)
- Sixth USA (85)
- EUSA (3)
- MDW (5)
- XVIII Abn Corps (3)
- 101st Abn Div (2)
- USA Cbt Dev Exper Cen (1)
- USA Aggressor Cen (1)
- USACollege (2) except
- USAOOG (1)

Br Svc Sch (1)
NWO (1)
ICAF (1)
USMA (2)
USA Cold War & Mt Sch (1)
USA Maj Comd (1)
USA Arm Cen (1)
US Army (1)
Engr Cen (1)
QM Intel Agcy (1)
Ord Intel Agcy (1)
Med Info & Intel Agcy (1)
Sig Intel Agcy (1)
Oml Intel Agcy (1)
Trans Intel Agcy (1)
AMS (1)
USAEUR Intel Sch (3)
US Forces Japan (10)
Iceland Def Force (1)
Mil Man (1)
MAAG (1)
ARMA (1)

NG: None.
USAR: None.
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

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Auth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5200-01-V1
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: James

FROM:

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

DATE: 25 JUN 1963

The attached U.S. Army booklet has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enclosure

105-19581
NOT RECORDED
5 JUN 25 1963

INFO ONLY
TO ENDE C DCE 4 160 79 Sect 16
SECRET

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE
US ARMY (U)

15 MARCH 1963

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the
United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,
Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to any person
is an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
(U) The United States Army, as a consequence of its world-wide mission and disposition in defense of the nation and of our allies, has been and is a main target of espionage and subversive operations directed by the Intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare services of the Sino-Soviet bloc countries. Instances in which these hostile services have sought to subvert Army personnel or enmesh them in espionage are numerous and frequent. There are no indications that these hostile operations against the Army will decrease; to the contrary, they may become more frequent. To defend against them, it is of urgent importance that all Army personnel, military and civilian alike, be aware of the nature and techniques of hostile espionage and subversion. It is the purpose of this booklet to contribute to such an awareness by presenting a review of Communist directed espionage and subversion against the United States Army in recent years.

(U) The review is in three parts. Part I illustrates the emphasis bloc intelligence services place on the detection of character weaknesses, indiscretions, and evidences of emotional instability on the part of Army personnel, all of which may be used to involve them in espionage operations. It also shows the manner in which these hostile services exploit blood-ties between residents of Communist countries and members of the Army, its civilian employees, and its local foreign employees in overseas commands. Summaries of actual cases are presented to clearly show the manner in which our enemies bait their snare with money, alcohol, and sex, or resort to the use of threats and other forms of mental duress to bend their victims to their will. 

(U) Part II discusses the use of technical equipment by hostile intelligence services. In recent years their technicians developed a formidable array of tools to aid them in the clandestine collection of information and to entrap the unwary. The modern Communist espionage agent has at his disposal and is trained to use a variety of devices which enable him to covertly monitor telephone conversations and to listen in on private conversations in closed rooms, restaurants, hotels, and offices. He is also able to take surreptitious photographs of persons, places, and things. The security problems posed by these devices have increased greatly since the development of miniaturized electronic and mechanical components; they may now be carried inconspicuously on the person or easily concealed in or outside of rooms and buildings in such a fashion as to defy detection.

(U) Part III reviews the use of propaganda by hostile intelligence and psychological warfare agencies to undermine the morale and loyalty of American servicemen, to estrange United States Forces from their allies, and to incite the populace of friendly foreign nations against the presence of American soldiers. Examples of propaganda to achieve each of these Communist aims are cited in order that similar propaganda of this nature, wherever it may appear, may be readily recognized for what it is by Army personnel. 

(U) It is intended that this booklet be given the widest possible distribution consistent with its security classification in order that it may achieve its purpose. Much of the information contained herein has been prepared for use in implementing those provisions of AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (Short title: SAEDA), dated 8 September 1961, which require that all
military personnel and civilian employees of the Army be given an orientation on methods used by foreign intelligence services to gather information pertaining to US Army Installations, activities, and personnel. Where security classification precludes direct use of some portions of the material in the preparation of indoctrination lectures, such material may be used as background information for instructors possessing adequate security clearance.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

CHARLES J. DENHOLM
Brigadier General, USA
# HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE US ARMY (U)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I: (S) Soviet Bloc Espionage Techniques (U)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Easy Money&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Hostages&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;False Colors&quot;</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Decoy&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Asking for Trouble&quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A Loaded Handbag&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Mr. Mata Hari&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The 'Doctored' Photograph&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART II: (S) Clandestine Listening and Photographic Devices (U)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. General</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telescopic Photography</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Basic Counter-Measures Against Audio-Visual Surveillance Devices</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Examples of Audio Surveillance by Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III: (S) Subversive Activities Directed Against US Army (U)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instances of Subversion and Propaganda</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
(U) The Soviet espionage network, augmented by those of the Satellite countries, is by far the largest in the world. Its operational bases are located in virtually every country on the globe. Thousands of Communist bloc agents in the guise of diplomatic personnel, military attaches, commercial representatives, artists, technicians, tourists, emigres, etcetera, carry on clandestine intelligence operations from these bases. Some are located in Soviet/Satellite embassies, consulates, or the residences associated with these diplomatic installations; others operate under the cloak of press and travel agencies or trade delegations; still others illegally infiltrate non-Communist countries to pose as loyal citizens while covertly engaged in espionage.

(U) The United States Army, which together with its sister services represents the military power of Communism's principle Free World antagonist, is a prime target of this Soviet bloc espionage network. Its operatives seek information concerning the Army's strength, disposition, training, equipment, communications, plans, research and development, weapons, anything which might aid Communist forces in the event of hostilities.

(U) Never before in its peacetime history has the United States had occasion to deploy so many troops in so many foreign lands as it has in the post World War II period. To the Communist bloc intelligence services, these hundreds of thousands of American servicemen and their dependents stationed throughout the world represent an inexhaustible number of potential sources for the information they seek. Fully appreciative of this vast potential, the Sino-Soviet bloc countries are conducting an unceasing clandestine effort to subvert and recruit US Army personnel in order to exploit them for intelligence collection purposes.

(U) The methods employed are diverse and ingenious, and more frequently than not of a sordid nature. In attempting to recruit their "targets", Communist agents will not hesitate at the vilest of means to achieve their purpose. They are fully aware that any instances of immoral, illegal, or indiscreet conduct of US personnel assigned abroad are a valuable lever in their hands. Personal habits, traits of character, mannerisms, and associations are scrutinized to determine any irregularities of conduct. Information is sought regarding personal interests, associates, and relatives residing in countries under Communist control; particular attention is given to any evidence of black market or other illegal transactions, indebtedness or other financial difficulties, illicit or abnormal sexual activities, and excessive drinking.

(U) In determining how best to effect recruitment of his target, the foreign intelligence agent considers no piece of information insignificant or irrelevant. Any evidence of misconduct is exploited to the utmost. And if there is no evidence, it may be contrived. Entrapment is a common technique. Hostile intelligence services will frequently arrange situations which invite illicit relations between US personnel and foreign nationals of the opposite sex who are their readily available tools. Claims of pregnancy or alleged abortions which may arise from such situations are used to further entangle the entrapped individual. (See Fig. 1)
Figure 1. (UNCLASSIFIED—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Confessed informants of hostile intelligence services who were companions of U.S. military personnel (U).
(U) Americans stationed in Iron Curtain countries are even more exposed to hostile Intelligence operations; each individual and his activities, both during and after duty hours, is subject from the moment of his arrival to a constant scrutiny and surveillance by police and security agencies aided by an army of informants. Moreover, complete control of public communications services, construction work, and installation of utilities in their own countries assures the Communist Intelligence services ample opportunity to install covert listening and recording devices which invade the privacy of offices and homes.

(U) As a consequence of the unceasing effort, the number of Soviet/Satellite attempts to recruit profitable sources of information from within US military forces, wherever they may be stationed, is on the increase. Unfortunately, a rash of recent cases—both publicized and unpublicized—in which classified military information was furnished to Soviet bloc agents by US military personnel and civilian employees testifies to the success and effectiveness of hostile Intelligence methods.

(U) Military and civilian personnel often fail to recognize foreign Intelligence activities directed against them because they: (1) minimize the importance of their own rank or duties to foreign Intelligence services; (2) fail to appreciate the ease with which any bad personal habits, traits of character, and associations can be used against them for purposes of blackmail, intimidation, and embarrassment; and (3) fail to recognize or suspect questions posed by foreign nationals in the course of otherwise innocent conversation as deliberate attempts by hostile Intelligence to obtain valuable information.

(U) It is, therefore, believed that US Army commanders and their staffs will find the following summaries of actual case histories useful, not only in alerting personnel of their commands to the gravity of the security threat posed by hostile Intelligence but also to acquaint them with the means by which they can avoid or negate attempts by hostile Intelligence operatives to recruit or subvert them. Each of the following instances illustrates a different approach or combination of approaches by bloc Intelligence services to achieve their common goal.

"EASY MONEY"

(U-FOUO) Excessive indebtedness is always a source of pressure on the debtor. Communist Intelligence officers know this well and are ever alert to manipulate this pressure on potential sources of information who are in financial difficulty. There are known instances where they have even infiltrated agents into banking and lending institutions in order to obtain the names of borrowers. In the following case, they obtained their information by other means and quickly put it to successful use. A US Army soldier stationed abroad (whom we shall call Sergeant Brown) was their target.

(U-FOUO) Brown's difficulties began when he tried to support both his family, which he had left in the United States, and a mistress with whom he cohabited at his duty station. Agnella had been a barmaid, but the American soldier's dollars made it unnecessary for her to continue working. Brown's pay, however, was insufficient to cover the added expenses of this affair and he began to borrow money from other soldiers in his unit. When he was unable to promptly repay these loans, he soon found

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it impossible to borrow additional money except at exorbitant interest rates.

(U-FOUO) Brown was soon deep in financial trouble. His mistress was pregnant and in the process of being evicted from her apartment for failure to pay the rent. In a note to Agnella, Brown wrote his worries were compounded by the possibility of his being separated from the Army as an undesirable because of continued excessive debts. To improve the financial situation, Agnella looked for work.

(U-FOUO) She first tried to get a job at the bar where she had last worked. There she spoke to an old customer, known only as "Egon", who frequented the place. She told him she was badly in need of money; he appeared sympathetic and soon assisted her to a new job. Later, in thankful conversation, she confided in Egon about her condition, her Army friend, his debts, and their need for money.

(U-FOUO) Agnella never saw Egon again, but shortly thereafter two men unknown to her visited the bar where she was working, introduced themselves as friends of Egon, and invited her to their table. During the ensuing conversation, Agnella discussed her financial problems and one of the men suggested the possibility of a well-paid clerical job with his "firm." Arrangements were thereupon made for a further meeting to discuss this possibility.

(U-FOUO) At this meeting, the man suggested that they go elsewhere for the discussion, his chauffeur-driven car was just outside. They drove to another restaurant where the man introduced himself as Mr. Peters. He then told Agnella outright that he represented a certain intelligence agency and that her job as a barmaid would give her an excellent opportunity to observe people and pick up interesting information; would she be willing to become an informant? Agnella accepted.

(U-FOUO) Peters said he was primarily interested in obtaining information about people who drank excessively or engaged in illicit sexual affairs. Brown's name was hardly mentioned, although Agnella did explain that she and Brown had pressing debts amounting to $500. Peters asked for an itemized account, stating that this indebtedness could be settled; it would be "easy" to obtain the money if the couple could furnish information about US Army installations, equipment, and personnel. Peters ended the discussion by giving Agnella a telephone number and instructions for their next meeting.

(U-FOUO) Agnella quickly informed Brown of these events and persuaded him to accept Peter's proposition. Brown immediately set down and turned over to Agnella some notes on order of battle information on US units in the area. At their next meeting, Agnella gave Brown's notes to Peters. He appeared satisfied with them and paid her $75, stipulating, however, that this money was to be used to buy civilian clothing for Brown and that the Sergeant was to accompany Agnella to the next rendezvous. When Agnella disclosed that Brown had recently attended a demolition training school, Peters promptly requested that Brown also obtain samples of explosives used at the school as well as all available field manuals dealing with US Army weaponry.

(U-FOUO) Brown's complicity in this espionage operation was exposed a few days later by mere chance. When he had been placed under restriction for being AWOL,
Brown prepared several reports for Peters which he placed in a bundle of laundry and gave to another soldier to deliver to Agnella. This soldier, whose suspicions had been aroused by some of Brown's recent activities, opened the bundle and discovered the reports. Brown and his mistress were quickly arrested and soon tried and convicted of espionage.

(U-FOUO) Investigation found no evidence of Communist orientation or associates in Brown's past. Nor did it uncover any evidence which might have raised doubts about his prior loyalty to the United States. This soldier probably had never had the remotest idea that one day he might betray his country. What then is the lesson to be drawn from Brown's disgrace? It is that irresponsible conduct of one's personal and financial affairs can lead to situations which may impair judgment, integrity, and loyalty, situations only too quickly exploited by hostile intelligence agents who seek them out.

(U-FOUO) What primary espionage technique appears in this case? It is the use of a "spotter." In intelligence jargon, a spotter is an intelligence operative whose principal function is to determine the identity and circumstances of persons who for one or more reasons may be considered susceptible recruitment targets. Spotters are often recruited from among those occupations which have frequent opportunity to learn some details of an individual's personal affairs and conduct; barkeeps, barmalts, waitresses, prostitutes, barfilles, and taxi drivers have been often used for this purpose.

(U-FOUO) Upon learning information about a person which may indicate his susceptibility, the spotter transmits it by various means to an intelligence headquarters where a dossier is opened on the potential target. There, experienced intelligence officers review all known factors bearing on the target in order to determine the possibility and best avenue of approach. When it appears that there is some possibility of success, an agent is ordered to make the approach.

(U-FOUO) In Brown's case, Egon was the spotter; the circumstances which he reported were the Sergeant's extra-marital affair with Agnella, the resulting pregnancy, and their desperate need for money. This was enough to give the "green light" to agent Peters who had no difficulty convincing Agnella, and she, in turn, Brown, that his proposal was a way out of their difficulties. But in cases where the target individual is not under immediate mental duress and the prospects for success are not immediate, his dossier will be maintained in the files of the hostile intelligence service in view of the possibility that additional information may permit an approach at a later date.

THE HOSTAGES

(U-FOUO) There are thousands of persons associated with the Army who have close relatives or friends residing in countries under Communist control. They include the alien enlistees, many of them refugees from Communism who have since acquired citizenship, foreign born scientists and technicians employed in research and development for government agencies or military contractors, immigrant civilian employees of the Army in the United States, local foreign employees of overseas commands on the periphery of the Communist empire, and foreign born dependents of servicemen. These people have chosen...
freedom and, with rare exception, have shown their loyalty to their adopted country. Nevertheless, they are often the targets of Communist espionage operations which seek to use their relatives and friends who are still subject to Communist controls as hostages to obtain their ends.

(U-FOUO) A soldier assigned to the 16th Field Hospital in West Germany became involved in such an operation when he visited his grandparents in Poland. He had scarcely arrived when he was summoned to the local city hall, ostensibly for the purpose of validating his travel documents. There he was taken to a private room where he was questioned by two men who did not identify themselves. After a few preliminary remarks with regard to his military assignment, the men discussed the strained relationship between the United States and Poland, which they attributed to American support of West Germany. The soldier was then asked about USAREUR military units and West German missile sites. He was also asked if he would be willing to "work for Poland" upon his return to West Germany; this, it was implied, would be to the benefit of his grandparents who might otherwise suffer for his lack of cooperation. When the soldier declined the offer, he was admonished not to reveal the approach if he wanted to avoid endless interrogations by American security authorities.

(U-FOUO) Another case involved Carlotta, an erstwhile Rumanian national who had married a member of the US Army also stationed in Germany. Not long after her marriage, she received her husband's permission to visit her mother in Rumania. She made application for the necessary visa and was directed to the Rumanian Consulate in London. There, she was cordially received by a consular official and, after furnishing the necessary data, issued the required papers. Before her departure, however, one of the officials who had been exceptionally courteous to her indicated that he too contemplated traveling to Rumania soon and would be interested in meeting her again.

(U-FOUO) Shortly thereafter, Carlotta traveled to Bucharest. She had barely arrived at her mother's home when she was visited by the same Rumanian official who had been so courteous to her in London. He pretended a friendly interest in her and persuaded her to accept several dinner engagements. During these meetings, Carlotta soon perceived that the Rumanian’s interest was other than friendship. He spoke at length about the loyalty she owed her native land and how much it would serve the interests of her family in Bucharest if she would perform certain "harmless" favors for the Rumanian Government upon her return to Germany. Although Carlotta politely declined, she did accept an address to which she should write if she happened to change her mind.

(U-FOUO) Carlotta left Bucharest in a troubled state. Despite the suave and courteous treatment accorded her by the official, she feared for the safety of her family in Bucharest should she refuse to cooperate with the Rumanian Government. Upon arriving home, she immediately told her husband about the entire matter. He, in turn, reported the circumstances to Army Intelligence.

(U-FOUO) Army Intelligence officers requested and obtained the cooperation of Carlotta and her husband in an effort to determine the true nature of the Rumanian’s interest. Carlotta dispatched a letter to the Bucharest address, indicating her readi-
ness to cooperate. She soon received instructions to meet another Rumanian representative at a given restaurant in Germany at a specified time.

(U-FOUO) This representative turned out to be a member of an official Rumanian delegation in West Germany. He quickly took Carlotta into his confidence and explained that, through her husband, she could obtain certain US military information that the Rumanian Government needed in order to "protect itself against its enemies." It was now clear that Army Intelligence had to deal with a bona fide Rumanian intelligence operation. The man was arrested and soon admitted that he was in reality a Rumanian Intelligence agent. He also confirmed that Carlotta had immediately become the target of this espionage operation when she first applied for her visa at the Rumanian Consulate in London.

(U-FOUO) It is not only overseas that such cases arise. In June 1961, the United States demanded the recall of Miroslav Nacvalac, a Czechoslovak delegate to the United Nations. He was charged with seeking information about the US Army Language School in Monterey, California, from an instructor at the school who cooperated with United States authorities in their investigation of the case.

(U-FOUO) In a series of meetings with the instructor in California, Nacvalac sought to obtain information about the staff of the language school, the identities of students, and their assignments after completion of their language training. His lever was the fact that the instructor's fiancée was still a resident of Czechoslovakia. Nacvalac implied that in exchange for the information he desired he could be helpful in arranging an exit visa for her.

(U-FOUO) In response to the US charges, Nacvalac claimed that he had never been in California and had never met the instructor. The State Department thereupon released photographs of Nacvalac together with the instructor at a meeting which took place between the two men in San Francisco on 14 November 1959. Nacvalac subsequently left the United States.

(U-FOUO) These are but three of many similar cases. In each, the basic techniques are similar. In the case of travel to Communist countries, the intelligence services learn of the scheduled arrival of their target from their consulates or other diplomatic installations which issue visas and entry permits and from their border control units. In other instances, surveillance of postal communications gives them leads to ties between their nationals and relatives and friends in the West. And when the target has been identified, he or she is contacted either directly or by mail and an effort is made to solicit cooperation by threatening the well-being of relatives or friends living under Communist control. Although there is little or no evidence that these threats are ever carried out, the mere fact that they are made by representatives of a society in which such things are possible is enough to lend them plausibility and give concern to those to whom they are made. In these cases, as in other hostile intelligence approaches, the best solution for all concerned is to report the approach as quickly as possible to the appropriate US agency.

FALSE COLORS

(U-FOUO) Another variation in the techniques used by Communist intelligence services to recruit sources of information is the so-called "false-flag" approach. The agent employing this approach mis-
represents himself and his motives to his target. A case involving this approach was terminated in March 1961 with the arrest of Harold Borger, an American businessman, in Nuernberg, West Germany, on charges of espionage against the US Army.

(U-FOUO) Borger, who lived in Nuernberg and dealt in the import/export trade, came to our attention when it became known that he had visited East Germany and the Soviet Union and, upon his return, had coupled open criticism of American foreign policy with praise for the USSR. But his approach to an Army enlisted man was not on that basis. Instead, taking advantage of the fact that both he and the soldier were of Jewish descent, Borger discussed Israel and the merits of Zionism. When he felt that rapport had been established, Borger said that "Israel" needed military information and asked the soldier to furnish him with the details of USAREUR maneuvers, alert plans, and missile sites, as well as Army technical manuals and equipment. He said that he would deliver the information to a "Zionist" contact in Switzerland and that it might be worth $600; he would also furnish the soldier with a camera and a false bottom briefcase to facilitate acquisition of the material.

(U-FOUO) After his arrest, Borger denied any intent of espionage or any contact with a foreign intelligence service. He at first maintained that he had sought military information and material only for the purpose of aiding him in making arrangements for the production of equipment for sale to the Army. It was, however, determined that he had been working for a Communist intelligence service. He was convicted by a West German court on espionage charges and sentenced to two and one-half years imprisonment at hard labor.

THE DECOY

(U-FOUO) A derivative definition of decoy describes a person employed to inveigle another into a position where he may be trapped, robbed, or the like. Decoys in one form or another are often used by hostile intelligence agencies. The following case history illustrates but one use of this technique. It involves a serviceman, referred to as Sergeant Smith in this account, who was assigned to a sensitive position with the Army in West Berlin. He was a conscientious worker of more than average intelligence who was trapped by a Communist decoy.

(U-FOUO) One evening, Smith and a companion visited a West Berlin bar that catered chiefly to US military personnel. He had previously visited the bar a number of times and was well known to both the bar personnel and clientele. During this visit, Smith met an attractive German girl named Elsa, whose smile invited his attention. Elsa claimed to be a ballet dancer who lived in West Berlin; she looked the part and this intrigued Smith. In an effort to impress her, Smith told her where he worked. They danced several times and Smith then drove her to a subway station where they parted after arrangements had been made for a date several days later. She obligingly furnished Smith her home telephone number.

(U-FOUO) The date took place as scheduled, with Smith picking the girl up at the same subway station at which he had previously left her. The two had drinks at a local bar, attended a Post movie, and then returned to the same bar for more

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drinks. At this point, Elsa proposed that they attend the East Berlin opera on their next date. Smith agreed and a date was set. He then drove Elsa to her subway station where they parted.

(U-FOOU) The next day Smith made arrangements for a pass to East Berlin, and the following evening he drove to the opera house where he was to meet Elsa. Contrary to USAREUR regulations, he wore civilian clothes. When Elsa did not appear Smith called her at the telephone number previously furnished. She answered, saying that she had been delayed but would be there soon. Shortly thereafter, she arrived and said that her tickets for the State Opera did not entitle them to good seats; consequently, she planned to obtain tickets at another theater. They drove to the other theater where Elsa absented herself for approximately 15 minutes, allegedly to exchange the tickets. She returned and sat on their seats. During the performance, Elsa left twice for short periods, allegedly to check her coat and to go to a nearby restaurant to make reservations. Afterwards, Elsa and Smith went to the restaurant where they ate dinner and drank champagne and cognac. During this time, Elsa again briefly absented herself on two occasions. They left the restaurant at midnight.

(U-FOOU) The two then drove to an apartment in the East Sector near Stalin Allee, where one of Elsa's girl friends allegedly resided and where Elsa said she intended to spend the night. She gave the necessary directions, and they parked approximately one and one-half blocks from the house and walked the remaining distance. The apartment house door was opened by an elderly woman who took the soldier and his date into a living room where a table was set in German fashion with sandwiches, hors d'oeuvres, and bottles of champagne, wine, and cognac. Elsa filled several glasses and offered them to Smith. He admitted drinking at least two glasses of champagne and cognac. Smith made advances to Elsa, who had previously intimated they would be permitted, but she rebuffed him without explanation and suddenly told him to leave. She accompanied him part way to his car and then walked back to the apartment. Not easily put off, Smith returned to the apartment and rang the doorbell, which was answered by the elderly woman; she told him to leave. Smith believed that he heard the telephone during the conversation.

(U-FOOU) He returned to the car and drove to Stalin Allee, intending to return to West Berlin via Brandenburger Gate. Upon entering Stalin Allee he was stopped by two East German policemen and a plain clothesman. The keys were forcibly taken from the automobile and he was accused of drunken driving. Smith reacted correctly to the situation and demanded that he be placed in contact with a Soviet officer. A Soviet Major arrived 20 minutes later and asked to see his identification card. After a cursory check of the papers, the Major, and the plain clothesman escorted Smith to the Soviet Compound in Berlin-Karlshorst. He was taken to a room which appeared to be an office where he was subjected to a series of questions posed by the Major and the civilian. Smith refused to talk to the civilian, stating that he would speak only with Soviet officers. The civilian countered by stating that he was a Soviet officer.

(U-FOOU) The questions covered the usual items of name, rank, service number, unit, age, civilian background, schooling, etc. When Smith refused to talk, stating
that he was required only to give his name, rank, and service number, the civilian suddenly ceased to use the "soft" approach and told Smith that he was "drunk and in trouble." He was further advised that he was in "their" (Soviet) control and it would be to his advantage to cooperate. If he refused to answer their questions, he would be turned over to US authorities who, according to the civilian interrogator, dealt harshly with personnel who were drunk and disorderly and became involved with authorities in East Berlin. At this point the interrogation was taken over by another civilian who used a friendly approach. Smith was asked whether he had enjoyed the theater performance, how long he had been in Berlin, whether he liked the city, and whether he would like a drink.

(U-FOUO) The interrogation was then resumed by the first civilian who used the previous threatening tactics. This procedure was repeated several times during the course of the interrogation, which lasted from 0100 to 0930 hours. Finally, the civilians threatened to take Smith to their superior and told him this would be his last chance to cooperate. This threat was not carried out, but shortly before the interrogation was terminated the first civilian threatened to turn Smith over to the US authorities and charge him with drunken driving and unspecified traffic violations in East Berlin. When this threat failed to elicit the desired response, the civilian then offered Smith payment for his cooperation and stated that the transaction would be kept secret. Smith refused the offer, and the interrogators apparently conceded their chances of making a successful recruitment.

(U-FOUO) US authorities, shortly thereafter, received a telephone call from the Soviet Kommandatura requesting that Smith be picked up in East Berlin. The transfer to US control was made without incident, and Smith was allowed to take his car with him. An interesting sidelight is that the car had been thoroughly searched without any effort made to conceal the fact, although nothing had been removed from the vehicle.

(U-FOUO) Smith's account of the events that transpired during the time he was under Soviet detention was confirmed by investigative means. Except for providing limited personality data on persons employed in his office, Smith conducted himself in an exemplary fashion while being interrogated. The behavior which led to his detention was naive, but he did display good judgement in the sequence of events following his arrest. Subsequent efforts to locate Elsa met with negative results; a check of West Berlin records produced no evidence that she resided in the West Sector as she claimed. The telephone number Elsa furnished Smith was listed in an East Berlin Directory.

(U-FOUO) This case illustrates not only the use of a decoy, Elsa, but also a familiar alternation of intimidation and inducement in an effort to recruit the target. In all likelihood, Smith was first spotted and assessed by a Soviet support agent—a spotter—covering West Berlin bars and looking for exploitable character weaknesses in American soldiers. It was probably reported that Smith had a sensitive assignment and a habit of picking up unknown women in bars. The nature of his assignment was no doubt confirmed by other spotters and a file on Smith established at this step of the operation. The next step was to confirm information about his habits and then assign an attractive girl the job of bringing him to East Berlin. After she had succeeded in making contact with Smith and had per-
suaded him to meet her in the East Sector, the remainder of the operation was strictly routine; it required only coordination with the police, arrangements for the apartment, and the immediate availability of Soviet interrogators to exploit the hapless target.

.asking for trouble

(U-FOU) In the foregoing case history, a decoy was used to contrive a situation in which a soldier's indiscretion led to his being subjected to intimidation and pressure by a foreign intelligence service. But more often, as in the case of Sergeant Brown's financial difficulties, foreign agents attempt to exploit existing situations to their own advantage. In the following case, an American serviceman's misconduct and incredible naivete led ultimately to disloyalty, the compromise of classified information, and his disgrace.

(U-FOU) Carter was assigned to a duty station in an Iron Curtain country. Although living with his family at this station, he entered into an illicit love affair with a local girl employed as a maid at his home. Despite the fact that his wife discovered the affair and discharged the maid, whom we shall call Ilona, Carter continued to maintain the relationship at a downtown apartment.

(U-FOU) It was not long, of course, before the affair came to the attention of the intelligence service of the country. The agents assigned to the case further learned that Ilona had become pregnant and had undergone an illegal abortion. They contacted Ilona and encountered little difficulty in recruiting her for an intelligence operation to be mounted against Carter. The cards were all on their side; her alternative was a prison term for the illegal operation.

(U-FOU) Initially, Ilona's only task was to report on everything she could learn concerning Carter's personal life, activities, job, habits, and associates. At the downtown apartment, the agents installed hidden microphones and a two-way mirror, a glass which appears to be a mirror on the one side but which permits persons on the other to watch and photograph everything going on in the room which it faces.

(U-FOU) At this stage, the case took an unusual twist. Ilona, apparently prompted by remorse or genuine affection for Carter, told him of her recruitment and the hidden microphones and two-way mirror. Carter's reaction was both stubborn and naive. He replied that he would continue seeing her because he still loved her, was concerned for her safety, believed the object of the intelligence operation was merely to keep him under surveillance, and, now that he knew of it, he could outwit the agents. Whatever misgivings Ilona might have entertained were relegated to the back of her mind by her infatuation with Carter and the relationship continued.

(U-FOU) Not long after this episode, Ilona told Carter that she was again pregnant. After some discreet inquiries, a doctor was found who was willing to perform the second abortion. Then, shortly after the operation, Carter arrived at the apartment to find two policemen and an intelligence agent awaiting him. They immediately confronted him with the evidence of his misconduct and violation of the laws of their country; however, they said he could avoid exposure and prosecution by rendering "certain services." After several hours of threats, abuse, and details of their evidence, Carter agreed to cooperate. He
later told US counterintelligence agents that he was so frightened at the time that he would have done or said anything just to get away from his captors.

(U-FOUO) Carter's treasonable relationship with the Iron Curtain country continued throughout the remainder of his tour and came to light only after Ilona had fled to a free country and confessed her intelligence activities to authorities there. In the follow-up, Carter was taken into custody and confessed his complicity. He admitted that following his coerced recruitment he had met 35 times with enemy agents and had furnished them both classified and unclassified information pertaining to US military personnel and activities. He also admitted that he was given generous sums of money for his cooperation and that prior to rotating to the United States he was instructed to apply for duty in another foreign country. Ilona's disclosures, however, put an end to his treasonable activities and to his military career.

(U-FOUO) The sordid tactics used by the Communist agents to entrap Carter and use his own misconduct as a means of blackmailing him into committing treason were not unusual. But another aspect of this case was also of concern to Army security personnel. This was Carter's failure to report to his superiors Ilona's disclosure of the enemy action being conducted against him. Seldom do the targets of a hostile intelligence operation have such an opportunity. Ordinarily, the victim has no inkling of the trap being set for him until it is sprung. Had Carter reported Ilona's disclosures promptly, he might well have spared himself the mental anguish and the serious consequences that followed.
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Page(s) 96

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1 Sep 93
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(U-FOUO) It is not only the male who is the target of hostile intelligence agencies. There have been a number of cases wherein unwary women have also fallen into a snare carefully prepared by hostile agents. The following summary describes one such case.

(U-FOUO) An American secretary, referred to here as Eleanor, was employed in the office of a US Government agency located in West Germany. One day at an American club, Eleanor met an attractive male, Paul N., who claimed to be a naturalized US citizen. For Eleanor, it was a case of love at first sight and she and Paul began dating each other.

(U-FOUO) The romance which appeared harmless enough went along smoothly until one day Paul announced that his work required moving to West Berlin. Nevertheless, the two lovers agreed to remain in close touch with one another by mail and telephone. The relationship continued in this fashion for some time until Eleanor received a telephone call from West Berlin from an individual claiming to be a friend of Paul's. The caller advised Eleanor that Paul had been seriously injured and was hospitalized in East Berlin. Eleanor was thoroughly shaken by this news and decided to go to East Berlin to see Paul at once.

(U-FOUO) At the hospital in East Berlin, Eleanor was ushered to Paul's room where she found him lying bandaged in bed. At the end of the visit, Paul handed Eleanor a package with a roll of film which he asked her to deliver to the landlord of his West Berlin apartment. Eleanor took the film when she left. But immediately upon leaving the hospital, she was accosted by East German Police, who confiscated the package. Before taking her to headquarters, they permitted Eleanor to see Paul again for a moment. When she told him what had happened, Paul appeared to be greatly perturbed and stated that the incident would cause him a great deal of trouble because he was working for a Western intelligence agency.

(U-FOUO) Eleanor was then taken to an East Berlin police station and shortly thereafter turned over to a Soviet official. The latter explained to her that she and Paul were in great trouble because the film found on her person contained pictures of various items of East German military equipment. Turning a deaf ear to Eleanor's protestations of innocence, the Soviet
pointed out the severe penalties that could be applied to both of them as a consequence of this matter. When it appeared that Eleanor was sufficiently shaken by this information, the Soviet dropped his harsh attitude and adopted a softer tone. He told Eleanor that he would be willing to arrange for her and Paul's release if she would agree to obtain for him copies of coded US cables between her office in West Germany and the United States. Eleanor agreed. Before leaving, however, she was reminded that Paul would suffer if she failed to keep her part of the bargain.

(U-FOUO) Fortunately for herself as well as her country, Eleanor suppressed her feelings for Paul, went straight to her superiors, and reported the entire affair. Shortly thereafter, she learned from US investigators that she had been duped. The case investigation disclosed that Paul was in actuality a Soviet agent and the Soviet official who had interrogated her was a known Soviet intelligence officer who only a few years earlier had been expelled from the United States for espionage activities.

THE "DOCTORED" PHOTOGRAPH

(U) The following case illustrates the sordid lengths to which hostile espionage services are prepared to go to entrap their target. It involved an American who was the victim of a plot that allowed Communist agents to blackmail him for a weakness he didn't have.
The first and most significant factor to be considered in this case is the far more favorable climate for Communist espionage operations that exist behind the Iron Curtain. In conducting espionage operations against US personnel stationed within or traveling through their countries, Communists have unlimited facilities and opportunities at their disposal to entice, compromise, or intimidate prospective targets. In the Kelly case, it is apparent that, unknown to himself, his every move was under observation. To accomplish such surveillance, agents are assisted by a horde of domestic and public servants who have been thoroughly indoctrinated to regard every foreigner as a spy and to report all movement of foreigners to the police. The regular police in turn pass the information on to the secret or security police for further exploitation.

Whether the doctor and the girls willingly took part in the Kelly case conspiracy is immaterial. The secret police needed their cooperation; they had no alternative. Enlisting "cooperation" of any citizen in an intelligence operation, however sordid, poses no problem in the Communist countries. Open refusal to cooperate might have very unpleasant consequences for any citizen.
Figure 3. (UNCLASSIFIED—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Confessed Informants of hostile intelligence services who were companions of U.S. military personnel (U).
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Page(s) 101-102
TELESCOPIC PHOTOGRAPHY (U)

(FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Figures 4 through 9 show the capabilities of telescopic cameras to clandestinely photograph documents, material, and personnel with unusual clarity, even at great distances. Figure 4 depicts the general eye-view as seen from a second story window, of a parking area, an adjacent military post, a golf course, and across an estuary, a public park. Using a telescopic lens, a close-up photograph was taken of a 2" x 3¼" parking permit (Figure 5) fastened to the windshield of an automobile (A) 200 feet away. Reproduced at more than actual size, it is easily read. The model identification (Figure 6) on the front fender of an automobile (B) parked 1,500 feet away is easily discernible. An Out of Bounds sign (Figure 7) on the golf course 3,000 feet away stands out clearly. In Figure 8, high magnification shows workmen repairing a street lamp in the public park (D), a mile and a half away. This view is beyond the capability of the human eye. Figure 9 was shot at a distance of 1,500 feet and shows how clearly printed matter can be photographed at long distances.
Figure 5. (UNCLASSIFIED--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) "A"--Parking permit mounted on automobile windshield photographed at 200 feet (U).

Figure 6. (UNCLASSIFIED--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) "B"--Model identification name on fender of automobile photographed at a distance of 1,500 feet (U).
Figure 7. (UNCLASSIFIED--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) "C"—Golf Course sign photographed at 3,000 feet (U).

Figure 8. (UNCLASSIFIED--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) "D"—Maintenance truck photographed at a distance of 1½ miles (U).
camera loaded with infrared film and infrared flash bulbs which he cannot detect. In secure areas where it would be difficult for a photographer to take pictures unobserved, it may be possible to set up camera equipment which can be triggered by infrared. Any movement in the area, therefore would automatically, and unwittingly, photograph itself.

= Telescopic lenses: Cameras equipped with telescopic lenses have produced identifiable pictures of persons two miles distant from the cameras. These same lenses can be used to photograph documents lying unprotected on desk tops by agents situated outside the building in a position permitting line-of-sight observation through a window. (See Figures 4 through 9).

= Infrared: Development of film, sensitive to infrared, has enhanced the ability of foreign agents to take pictures surreptitiously. Pictures can be taken at night by illuminating an area with infrared. If the target person is in a room in which there is a two-way mirror, his activities can be photographed through the mirror by using a
who will one day cause a new war and "force American boys to lay down their lives in their interests" and by provocative allusions to alleged German ingratitude, arrogance, and unreliability. Following a lengthy recitation of alleged German failings, the leaflet closed with an appeal to servicemen to write their Congressmen and to the White House to protest West German rearmament. Significantly, with respect to their origin, the leaflets did not protest Soviet arming of Communist East German forces.

(U) But in these publications a different tone is noted. While they too attack "Hitler's Generals" and contain a

Figure 24. (U) Anti-US cartoon in March 1962 issue of "Kaserne" magazine. (U)

... Der Besatzer: "Okay, dieses Problem haben wir auf unsere Art schon längst gelöst."
generous dose of anti-US and anti-NATO propaganda, there is no mention of the German ingratitude, arrogance, and unreliability so prominently alleged in the "Fellow American" leaflets. No indeed, instead, it is the American serviceman who is pictured as unreliable and arrogant and an immoral, roistering bully as well. Figure 24 is a cartoon which appeared in the March 1962 issue of "Kaserne." The cartoon refers to a Soviet program for "Elimination of the Differences in the Living Standards between Cities and Rural Areas" and shows the Communist version of how American servicemen are allegedly themselves implementing such a program in the country town of Baumholder in West Germany. Typically, the servicemen pictured in the cartoon are referred to as "The Occupier," a term itself calculated to arouse German resentment, and pictured as destructive, drunken rowdies who have brought only the most distasteful elements of city life to the country town. The caption reads: "Okay. We've already solved the problem in our own way."

(U) Figure 25 is a reproduction of an article and illustration which appeared in the February 1962 issue of "Soldatenfreund" under the title "GI—Kannst du kämpfen?" or "GI, Can you Fight?" It refers to an American published book pertaining to the behavior of American prisoners in the Korean conflict and by innuendo extends the misconduct of a few to the entire US Army. To further distort the account and stress to the West German soldier the alleged unreliability of his ally, the American soldier, the article concludes with the statement: "A collapse of discipline and morale, cowardice, lack of comradeship, physical softening, and the inability to adapt to battlefield situations and to primitive living conditions—that is the sad balance the American Army leadership was forced to draw from the Korean war."

(U) In Asia, too, Communist propaganda attempts to defame and discredit the American serviceman in the eyes of allied troops. At Figures 26 and 27 are two examples of Asian Communist propaganda. They are North Korean leaflets which were dropped from the air over South Korea in September 1962. Intended for the eyes of the South Korean soldier, they seek to turn him against his American allies by arousing feelings of resentment and hate. Figure 26 pictures a South Korean soldier on sentry duty in foul weather while American officers are shown entertaining themselves safely in their club with an abundance of food, drink,
and feminine companionship. The essence of the caption is "while we work they play."

(U) Figure 27 depicts the "Ugly American" and distorts a series of actual or alleged incidents in which American servicemen have been involved in South Korea. This leaflet is a graphic example of the manner in which the Communists repeatedly dredge up isolated, uncommon instances of misconduct or accidents in which American soldiers have been infrequently involved and serve them up as typical of the behavior of all US service personnel.

(U) Another leaflet in this series is shown at Figure 28. It pictures a group of South Koreans carrying all of their portable possessions and traveling down a Korean road. The text describes them as refugees from the "Yankee invaders" and...
Figure 28. (U) Communist leaflet urging South Koreans to turn their guns on Americans. (U)

as the parents, wives, and children of South Korean soldiers who are urged to turn their guns on the Americans and rescue their suffering families. The Communist origin of this sentiment is evidenced by Figure 29 which appeared in the columns of the newspaper "Pravda," a Moscow published official organ of the USSR. It shows an American soldier on duty with an American Military Assistance Group in an Asian country and suggests that the native soldier whom he is training should turn his weapon on the American.

Figure 29. (U) Cartoon in Soviet newspaper "Pravda" with turn-your-gun-on-the-American theme. (U)
(U) Figure 30 is another example of this theme. It is a reproduction of a propaganda leaflet prepared by the Communist "Viet Cong" Insurgents in Vietnam which was found in the vicinity of an American Air Base in South Vietnam in January 1963. The scene shows marching Vietnamese led by an individual carrying a "Viet Cong" flag who is trampling over a figure clothed as an American officer and representing the American Military Assistance Group in that country.

(U) Another type of Communist hate propaganda is addressed not to allied troops but to the local populace in areas where American units are stationed throughout the world. This propaganda seeks to incite the local populace against the presence of American troops by seizing upon every incident in which an American serviceman is involved and distorting or magnifying the incident to somehow blame all Americans for the incident or picture it as typical of Americans. Every automobile accident, every street incident, every bar brawl, every shooting of an unknown intruder by an American sentry, every unfortunate incident involving an American soldier, no matter where the fault lies, is depicted in Communist and Communist-oriented newspapers and publications throughout the world as the fault of the soldier and the result of his alleged arrogant, callous attitude toward the local populace.

(U) A recent example of this type of Communist propaganda came to light in September 1962 when USAREUR forces were the target of a direct attack mounted by the underground Communist Party in the rural communities surrounding an American training area. In May, a minor water contamination had occurred when USAREUR troops dug latrines in an
area that furnished water to one of the communities. This occurrence became known to the local press and public, but contacts between Army representatives and local authorities alleviated the worst aspects of the public relations problem and measures were initiated to prevent a repetition of the happening. However, when in September another USAREUR unit again inadvertently dug latrines near the public water supply, the Communists promptly produced and distributed a leaflet which attacked the "deliberate" disregard for the rights and interest of the civil population exhibited by the "occupation troops." The leaflet is shown at Figure 31. It pictures an occupied privy labeled "Amito," German slang for Americans, directly connected to a household cookpot. The leaflet is signed KPD, an abbreviation for the illegal German Communist Party.

(U-FOUO) In Italy, when Army authorities introduced use of the polygraph, the "lie detector," in an effort to halt a wave of thievery at Camp Darby, the Communist press vociferously protested the use of this investigative aid on Italian employees at the camp. In a four-column article published in "I'Unita," the leading Communist newspaper, it was charged that use of the machine on Italians was only a smoke screen to draw attention from the fact that the Americans themselves were the "biggest thieves." (See Figure 32).

(U) As we have seen, however, the Communists do not always identify themselves by their signature or by publication in their newspapers and magazines as the source of their own propaganda. Frequently, in order to give their charges more authenticity and to avoid the skepticism if not disbelief which often attaches to pro-

Figure 31. (U) Communist claim of US "deliberate" disregard for interests of the German people. (U)

paganda openly attributed to Communist sources, they indulge in fraud and forgery of documents which purport to be of official western origin.

(U) In November 1962, a series of forged letters were mailed to the mayors of over 20 West German communities in an effort to disrupt German-American relations. The letters, shown at Figure 33 were typed on the stationary of the US Army Headquarters Area Command and signed by Colonel Nathaniel R. Haskett, Commanding. Their text advised the mayors that their communities lay in an area which was soon to be the scene of a major maneuver. In an imperious tone, the letter directed that in the interests of public safety during the supposed maneuver, West German...
I lavoratori italiani di "Camp Darby" sottoposti alla macchina della verità

L'incivile trattamento inflitto dalle autorità U.S.A. — Costretti a firmare una dichiarazione con la quale affermano di essere sottoposti al trattamento volontariamente «perché sospettati di furto»

Figure 32. (U) Communist press attack on US Army use of lie-detector. (U)

civilians were to stay off the streets and to stop all work in fields and forests.

(U-FOUO) Although such a command had at one time existed under Colonel Hoskot's command, it had been eliminated in an April 1958 reorganization and Colonel Hoskot had been long since reassigned. This propaganda plot was therefore quickly countered in a prompt press campaign which warned that other communities might also receive these Communist forgeries. However, had the Communists not chosen a nonexistent headquarters in this instance, the confusion might have been considerable.

(U-FOUO) Another instance of Communist black propaganda, but with an unusual twist, came to light in 1961. It involved a favored Communist cold war pro-
leading Czechoslovak newspaper, "Red Truth (Rude Pravo)" carried a three-column, front page story headlined "Directive for Espionage Activities of Military Attaches of the United States." At first glance this looked like just another of many such articles. But there was a difference. At the heart of the article were two classified OACSI, Department of the Army letters containing guidance to Army Attaches for their relations with Soviet orbit officials. (See Figure 34). Backed by photographs of the compromised SECRET letters, the story enlarged upon their translation with the usual Communist embroidery. "Red Truth" did not reveal how or where it had obtained the letters, except to mention cryptically: "The texts of the secret directives have recently been placed at our disposal."

(U) That morning all major Czechoslovak dailies had front-page stories regarding publication of the documents by "Red Truth." The Czechoslovak news agency, CTK, carried a lengthy dispatch describing the "Red Truth" publication on its English language European wire. The following day, "Red Truth" and "People's Defense (Obhona Lidu)" were the only Czechoslovak newspapers to mention the story, but by this time Warsaw's "People's Tribune (Trybuna Ludu)" and Sofia's "People's Army (Norodna Armia)" had picked up the article.

Figure 33. (U) Forged US documents intended to disrupt community relations. (U)
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Page(s) 137

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
(U) But the documents were not mentioned again in Prague newspapers. Except for the stories mentioned above, other Satellite newspapers made only slight mention of them. Surprisingly, the Russian press ignored it. Most western newspapers, after receiving the CTK release, treated the story as another hoax or dismissed it completely.
(U) A third type of Communist propaganda directed against the Army is sometimes addressed to American servicemen themselves in an effort to subvert their morale and resolve. Since 1961 when the American garrison in West Berlin was reinforced as a result of another crisis in that Cold War hot spot, the East Berlin Communist radio has been broadcasting each night at 2300 hours a special program intended for personnel of the US Berlin Command. Styling itself the real "Voice of Information and Education," the station transmits a program of recorded popular music and features a sultry-voiced female announcer and male commentators who "analyze" the situation in Berlin.

(U) Among frequent references to home, mother, and sweethearts, the program emphasizes the paradox of Americans protecting Berlin when their fathers fought
the Germans on their way to Berlin in 1945. The language is reminiscent of the "Fellow American" leaflet previously shown. A typical commentary which was monitored on 5 December 1961 went as follows:

(U) "There was a day in 1945 when American armor was stabbing up towards Berlin. Behind the armor, the tired foot soldiers of the US Army were catching hell on the main road. One guy, a corporal, let us call him Billy Smathers, ... (words indistinct) ... the pockets of the SS with their burp guns. The damned 88 made the road to Berlin look like a hellish fireworks display.

(U) "The Russian soldiers were catching the same kind of hell moving toward Berlin from the other direction. That was 16 years ago. The Russians made it, the Americans made it, even old Corporal Smathers made it.

(U) "Well, today Corporal Smathers is on that same road, Helmstedt/Berlin, 110 miles. But listen to this: The guys who are commanding Corporal Smathers — incidentally he is a master sergeant now, but his top commanders are the same ... (Indistinct) ... burp guns and 88's that made Smathers think he was living in hell back there in 1945.

(U) "Now, do you think I am out of my mind when I say the same Nazi commanders are commanding Master Sergeant Smathers today? Well, listen to this: US forces in West Germany are part of NATO forces. Among top NATO dogs are Generals Heusinger, he planned all Hitler's invasions; Speidel, he was badly whipped in the Soviet Union but shot a lot of hostages in France; Kammhuber, an old Nazi man from the beginning; Foertsch, Chief of West German forces and a war criminal.

(U) "There are many more of these birds, but they are top NATO men now, and that puts those convoys from here to Helmstedt under their command. They particularly want war. And now they think they can give old Adolf's ghost those old territories he wanted: Poland, Czechoslovakia, the whole of Europe in fact. But this time they will let Master Sergeant Billy Smathers and a few million other Americans do the dirty work for them."

(U) "Another instance of this kind of propaganda is pictured at Figure 35. It is an English language article addressed to the "Boys from USA" which appeared in the 26 August 1961 issue of the East Berlin newspaper, "BZ am Abend." In the insert immediately to the right of the English language text is a German translation of it. But, curiously enough, this specimen confirms the duplicity of Communist propaganda. Whereas the English text is addressed to Americans and defames West Germany, the German language caption immediately below the photograph of the US soldiers and equipment is intended for German readers and slanders United States motives in Berlin. It reads: "On the border at the intersection of Friedrichstrasse and Zimmerstrasse, the Americans graphically demonstrate that they will permit self-determination by the German people only as a farce under USA bayonets. Adenauer and Brandt dispute which of them first called for Yankee tanks, which of them is the most loyal menial of the USA." Reference to the two personalities is to the Chancellor of West Germany and to the mayor of West Berlin, respectively."
Another example of propaganda addressed to American service personnel, and of undoubted Communist origin is pictured at Figure 36. Headed "We Want Out!" and signed "Soldiers on Guard of Truth," this leaflet was an attempt to enlarge upon some scattered instances of discontent evidenced by a few Army reservists during the call-up of reserve units in October 1961. A number of these leaflets were scattered in the vicinity of US military installations and housing areas and mailed to the private quarters of American servicemen in West Germany during the summer of 1962. Still others were mailed from Austria, Belgium, and West Germany to servicemen and some service-connected organizations in the United States.
Not a word of these circumstances in the Communist account. Instead the Sino-Soviet propaganda machines invariably attribute such defections to "disatisfaction with American policies and conduct" on the part of "forward looking" persons who "prefer peaceful Communist objectives" and ask for "asylum" in the "happy" Communist world. As in Abshier's case, as well as with all Communist propaganda, the truth is invariably something else.
### DISTRIBUTION

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