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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) memos or Description of document: emails sent or issued during calendar 2013 mentioning the reopening of the investigation into the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 (TWA 800) near East Moriches, New York, July 17, 1996 Requested date: 2015 Released date: 20-September-2018 Posted date: 12-November-2018 Source of document: National Transportation Safety Board Attention: FOIA Requester Service Center, CIO-40 490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW Washington, DC 20594-2000 Fax: (240) 752-6257 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Public Access Link

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September 20, 2018

Re: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) No. FOIA-2015-00435 July 17, 1996, East Moriches, New York (DCA96MA070)

This letter responds to your FOIA request for all memos or emails mentioning the reopening of the above investigation sent or issued during calendar 2013. Enclosed is the information you requested on CD-ROM, totaling 103 pages of records.

We partially withheld personal information, notably direct business telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, personal telephone numbers and addresses, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), which exempts from disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." We redacted 35 pages with this information.

The NTSB has concluded processing your FOIA. No fees are being charged for processing the request. You may contact Tamara Crawford, the analyst who processed your request, as well as our FOIA Public Liaison at 202-314-6540 for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: OGIS, NARA, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at <u>ogis@nara.gov;</u> telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the NTSB, Attn: Mr. Dennis Jones, Managing Director, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, D.C. 20594. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request.

Sincerely, reft

Melba D. Moye FOIA Officer

Enclosure

From:	Mayer David
Sent:	17 Sep 2013 09:44:41 -0400
То:	Moye Melba
Subject:	FW: TWA 800 movie
Attachments:	Petition for Reconsideration, The TWA 800 Project, 6-19-2013.pdf

Another email

From: Tochen David Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 11:42 AM To: Mayer David Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

From: Mayer David Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 11:07 AM To: Tochen David Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

Thanks!

From: Tochen David Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 11:05 AM To: Mayer David Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

I'll have Avis scan it and sent it to you and Shalonda.

From: Mayer David Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 10:57 AM To: Tochen David Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

Delightful. I would like to get a copy scanned and entered into CNS for assignment. May I ask Shalonda to borrow it from you for scanning?

From: Tochen David
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 10:54 AM
To: Nantel, Kelly; Hersman Debbie
Cc: DeLisi John; Kolly Joseph; Schulze Dana; Ritter James; Zoeller Thomas; Gormley Erin; Mayer David; Gawalt Ann; Jane Terry; Sledzik Paul; Bryson Sharon; Klejst Stephen; PA
Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

A process server just served GC with The TWA 800 Project's "Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800," dated today.

The transmittal letter addressed to me is signed by Henry F. Hughes, Senior NTSB Investigator, retired, and Mr. Hughes and Thomas Stalcup are listed on the cover page of the petition as the points of contact.

The petition indicates the Petitioners "include investigators for the original [NTSB] investigation, family members of crash victims, former airline crash investigators, and concerned scientists."

The petition also states it "is based upon new and material evidence and analyses that refute the NTSB's original findings and is submitted in accordance with NTSB Reg. §845.41(a)."

The petition is 24 pages in length and includes 70+ pages in exhibits (mostly FBI summaries of interviews it conducted in the summer of 1996 and signed forms identifying the various petitioners).

David Tochen General Counsel National Transportation Safety Board (b)(6) (direct) 202-314-6090 (fax) (b)(6)

From: Nantel, Kelly
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 10:12 AM
To: Hersman Debbie
Cc: DeLisi John; Kolly Joseph; Schulze Dana; Ritter James; Zoeller Thomas; Gormley Erin; Mayer David; Tochen David; Gawalt Ann; Jane Terry; Sledzik Paul; Bryson Sharon; Klejst Stephen; PA
Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

All - FYI, both ABC and NBC are here on The Hill and looking to talk about TWA 800. As a result, the Chairman will quickly address them after the hearing is over.

-----Original Message----From: Nantel, Kelly
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 08:58 AM Eastern Standard Time
To: Hersman Debbie
Cc: DeLisi John; Kolly Joseph; Schulze Dana; Ritter James; Zoeller Thomas; Gormley Erin;
Mayer David; Tochen David; Gawalt Ann; Jane Terry; Sledzik Paul; Bryson Sharon; Klejst
Stephen; PA
Subject: RE: TWA 800 movie

Chairman - this morning CNN pushed a story on the movie, followed by a story on GMA and an AP article. I've talked to all the major outlets and while none are terribly thrilled about it - like a game of dominos, they are now compelled to follow suit and do a story. Tom Costello asked for you to do an on camera - I declined the offer. They

understood. We'll continue to manage it by sharing the facts and giving some context to the movie.

Eric will be listening in on the press briefing and will report back to me when it's over.

You should be prepared to address any questions that may come up today, while on the Hill.

Thanks.

----Original Message----From: Nantel, Kelly
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 8:26 PM
To: Hersman Debbie
Ce: DeLisi John; Kolly Joseph; Schulze Dana; Ritter James; Zoeller Thomas; Gormley Erin; Mayer David; Tochen David; Gawalt Ann; Jane Terry; Sledzik Paul; Bryson Sharon; Klejst Stephen; PA
Subject: TWA 800 movie

Chairman - as you may be aware, tomorrow the producers who created the soon-to-be-released movie on the TWA 800 accident investigation are holding a telephone briefing with reporters. The movie is timed to be released on the anniversary of the accident in July and they are purportedly submitting a petition for reconsideration.

Today, after working with David Mayer, David Tochen, John Delisi and Tom Zoeller, PA crafted the below set of talking points to use in response to media inquiries.

So far tonight, I've talked to Matt Wald, Lisa Stark, Jay Blackmon, Alan Levin and Mike Ahlers about the release of the movie. All five reporters covered the investigation at the time and none seem terribly inclined to do a story. Each has said that the movie doesn't seem to raise any new information - though all they all were 'intrigued' by the former NTSB investigator's involvement in the project.

I suspect we'll receive a number of calls on this tomorrow and am prepared to handle them as they come but wanted you to be aware of the situation. Please let me know if you have any concerns. Thank you!

TALKING POINTS:

The NTSB is aware of the movie and the producers' intent to file a petition for reconsideration. As required by NTSB regulation, a petition for reconsideration of Board findings or a probable cause determination must be based on the discovery of NEW evidence or on a showing that the Board's findings are erroneous. At this point, the NTSB has not received a petition, however, we stand ready to review one, should it be filed.

As a matter of course, all petitions for reconsideration are thoroughly reviewed and a determination is usually made within about 60 days. If the request requires more than 60 days for review, the NTSB informs the petitioner that more time is required, indicating the reason why and an estimated decision date.

While the NTSB rarely re-investigates issues that have already been examined, our investigations are never closed and we can review any new information not previously considered by the Board.

As you know, the NTSB conducts very thorough and methodical investigations. The TWA Flight 800 investigation lasted four years and remains one of the NTSB's most detailed investigations. Investigators took great care reviewing, documenting and analyzing facts and data and held a five-day hearing to gather additional facts before determining the probable cause of the accident during a two-day Board meeting.

The NTSB's final report of this investigation includes more than 400 pages of detailed information, and it can be accessed here. The NTSB's docket of which has been available to the public since the late-1990s contains more than 17,000 pages of supporting material. Requests for material from the docket may be made using our online contact form, or by calling 800-877-6799.

June 19, 2013

David Tochen, Esquire General Counsel National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza Washington, DC 20594

Dear Mr. Tochen:

Enclosed with this letter is a Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800.

We look forward to your consideration of its contents and to your response. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerel

Henry F. Hughes Senior NTSB Investigator, Retired The TWA 800 Project Tel: (b)(6)

Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project 6/19/2013

Contact:

Henry F. Hughes Senior NTSB Investigator, Retired Tel: (7(b)(6) Email:

Thomas F. Stalcup, Ph.D.

(b)(6)

Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project 6/19/2013

The Petitioners, which include investigators from the original National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation, family members of crash victims, former airline crash investigators, and concerned scientists, hereby request Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800. This petition is based upon new and material evidence and analyses that refute the NTSB's original findings and is submitted in accordance with NTSB Reg. §845.41(a).

NTSB Reg. §845.41(a) states:

Petitions for reconsideration or modification of the Board's findings and determination of probable cause . . . will be entertained only if based on the discovery of new evidence or on a showing that the Board's findings are erroneous.

The Petitioners have reviewed the FAA radar evidence along with new evidence not available to the NTSB during the official investigation and contend that the NTSB's probable cause determination is erroneous and should be reconsidered and modified accordingly.

New evidence includes:

- 1. Two new analyses of FAA radar data,
- 2. Twenty FBI eyewitness interview summaries apparently not previously available to the NTSB.
- 3. Analysis of "spike-tooth" fractures found in multiple locations.
- 4. Evidence of explosive residue detected in multiple locations other than the forward cargo hold and floor boards.

Furthermore, based on a critical analysis of the new evidence, NTSB finding #8, which states "that witness observations of a streak of light...was burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight..." will be shown to be erroneous.

New Evidence and Analyses

Two new analyses of the FAA radar evidence demonstrate that the explosion that caused the crash did not result from a low-velocity fuel-air explosion as the NTSB has determined. Rather, it was caused by a detonation or high-velocity explosion.

On page 260 of the NTSB Final Report the fuel-air explosion that caused the crash is described as an "overpressure event," which caused a forward wall of the tank to fracture "at its upper end and...rotate forward about its lower end." After this wall and other adjacent nearby fuel tank walls were recovered in large sections and analyzed, NTSB investigators working with scientists contracted by the NTSB concluded that the explosion was a low-velocity event or deflagration. Had the tank detonated, the NTSB investigators and outside experts surmised, the recovered center tank wreckage would have been significantly more fragmented.

The official probable cause for the crash therefore rests on the determination of a lowvelocity overpressure event that resulted in failure of the center fuel tank at the forward aspect and that because of the location of the failure, forces would be directed longitudinally forward with respect to the airplane.

The radar evidence however, shows that a far more powerful and sideways projected explosion occurred simultaneously with the loss of the aircraft's electrical power, which sent debris perpendicular to the accident aircraft's flight path, traveling approximately 1/2 mile due south.

We have found no NTSB analysis of or accounting for this high-speed debris in the NTSB public docket or the final report.

Additional new material evidence includes a collection of twenty FBI eyewitness interview summary documents. Many of the witness statements summarized in this collection describe a firework or streak of light that ascended to where TWA Flight 800 exploded.

During the course of the initial investigation, the NTSB investigators as well as parties to the investigation were denied the opportunity to interview eyewitnesses or to review FBI form 302 eyewitness summary documents. At this crucial time, within two weeks of the crash and after interviewing hundreds of eyewitnesses, FBI investigators were finalizing a report that concluded there was a "high probability" that a missile caused the crash.¹

An internal CIA memo dated July 30, 1996 and attached to this petition discusses an FBI report being finalized at the time with the conclusion that there is "high probability that the incident was caused by a MANPAD [shoulder launched missile]". One of the FBI agents involved in the witness interviews and a co-author of this FBI report was described in the CIA memo as a former military pilot with radar and avionics experience.

The failure of the NTSB to provide investigators access to all of this data in the critical early stages of the investigation was unprecedented in that it violated well established NTSB policy and customs regarding data availability. Such a denial of data has never occurred prior to or since the TWA Flight 800 investigation.

We are attaching FBI form 302 witness summaries to this petition. These new witness summaries contain descriptions of rising streaks of light and other observations that do not corroborate the official crash sequence determined by the NTSB. Observations in the attached witness documents, combined with the observations of an important grouping of witnesses among the 670 summaries that the FBI ultimately provided to the NTSB during the investigation should be reviewed and collated to determine if the eighth finding in the NTSB report is, as we believe, erroneous and does not fairly summarize witness observations.

More than 100 spike tooth fractures were found on various aluminum wreckage items from areas throughout the aircraft. According to the NTSB Structures Group Factual Report (Exhibit 7A), "spike tooth characteristic[s] are indicative of a very rapid strain rate produced by a high energy event." We have found no NTSB report or analysis describing an event in the official crash sequence that could have caused these fractures.

We determined that the NTSB has not adequately investigated or accounted for the spike tooth fractures. Our analysis highlights a grouping of these fractures that remain unaccounted for in the official scenario. This grouping of fractures was found on wreckage items that landed in the earliest debris field and hit the water at relatively low velocities. These fractures most likely occurred while the aircraft was in the air. In the officially proposed crash sequence, there is no mention of any high energy event.

We urge the NTSB to conduct and publish the necessary analysis to determine the minimum energy and velocities required to generate representative spike tooth fractures on aircraft components landing in all three debris fields and to show which segment of the official crash sequence contained sufficiently high energy to create these fractures throughout the jetliner.

A large number of aircraft wreckage items tested positive for explosives. PETN, for example, was reportedly detected on the aircraft's right wing and on at least one floorboard. According to investigators who worked inside the reconstruction hangar, RDX was detected on a canvas cargo bay curtain. The NTSB final report only mentions three items testing positive for explosives--a "piece of canvas-like material and two pieces of floor panel"--and suggests they were deposited during a "dog-training explosive detection exercise"² that allegedly took place inside the passenger cabin of the accident aircraft six weeks before the crash. However, during such an exercise, explosives would not have been deposited on a curtain in the cargo bay, on the right

² NTSB Final Report on the crash of TWA Flight 800, pg. 118, 2000

wing, or on other wreckage items outside the passenger cabin.

Our investigation has determined that there were approximately 100 or more explosives detections. The NTSB should immediately request all evidence and information from the FBI regarding these detections, treat each detection as new evidence, and then thoroughly study and document them. A comprehensive report should then be published that explains the origin of each detection inside and outside of the passenger cabin. The NTSB should also carefully review all documents pertaining to the "dog-sniffing" exercise to verify how conclusively they prove that the exercise was, in fact, conducted on the jetliner that became TWA Flight 800. Our investigation has determined that the exercise did not, in fact, occur on that aircraft.

Concerns and Recommendations

During this review, we urge the NTSB to isolate and study all of the witness accounts that include descriptions of an ascending streak of light. These are very critical eyewitness accounts, since the NTSB previously determined that they included observations of the earliest moments of the crash. Unlike the majority of witnesses who only saw events near the end of the crash sequence, many witnesses in this early grouping described the trajectory of the ascending light and the characteristics of the explosion that apparently initiated TWA 800's demise.

Since the NTSB announced at its final hearing on the crash in August 2000 and stated in its eighth finding in the final report that the ascending light that eyewitnesses saw was TWA Flight 800 in crippled flight, it is important to compare these eyewitness accounts with what can be deduced about Flight 800's final moments.

In addition to an analysis of eyewitness evidence presented in this petition, and in a further effort to establish whether or not Finding 8 is accurate, we request that the NTSB conduct a detailed review of the Witness Group Chairman's August 2000 Sunshine hearing presentation. We believe that an objective review of the transcript will show that the Witness Group Chairman misrepresented the observations of important eyewitnesses, omitted important details from the accounts of airborne military witnesses, and significantly understated the number of witness accounts that conflicted with the official crash sequence.

Since the language in Finding 8 was provided by the Witness Group Chairman, we believe that his performance at the Sunshine hearing should be taken into account when considering whether or not that finding is accurate.

We also have serious concerns regarding the validity of the debris field database. The NTSB originally contracted Oceaneering to create and maintain the wreckage recovery location database, and then later assigned two NTSB employees as "project coordinators" for this effort. One of the two NTSB project coordinators was observed changing wreckage recovery location data for various wreckage items without informing or consulting the NTSB Group Chairman responsible for that wreckage.

That Group Chairman and several group members complained to NTSB management and a meeting was ultimately held to rectify the situation. According to the Group Chairman and the group members who attended this meeting, none of the location changes were satisfactorily justified. To this day, those location changes remain unchanged in the database. We request that this issue be revisited and that the database be revalidated.

We are concerned that the NTSB did not require certain investigative groups to provide analyses of their findings, which are required per the NTSB's own investigative protocols and which have been provided in all previous NTSB investigations. The NTSB should immediately order that these necessary analysis reports be produced.

Finally, we are deeply concerned that the NTSB has never met with the medical examiner to discuss the NTSB's findings or probable cause determination, as is customary to facilitate the official manner of death determination for the death certificates of the TWA 800 victims. Because of this lapse, the manner of death for all 230 victims is still pending. We urge the NTSB to meet with the Suffolk County Medical Examiner so that these death certificates can be finalized.

Should you have any questions regarding this petition or any of the information contained herein, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.

Sincerely,

VEN

Henry F. Hughes Senior NISB Investigator, Ret. The TWA 800 Project

New Analysis: Radar Tracking of High Velocity Debris

Within 8.5 seconds of TWA Flight 800 losing electrical power, a heavy concentration of light debris began appearing on the FAA radar between 1/3 and 1/2 mile due south of and almost perpendicular to TWA Flight 800's flight path. The majority of this debris stopped most of its horizontal motion and began falling to the ocean 1/2 mile south of where TWA Flight 800 lost electrical power. As it fell to the ocean, the wind carried this debris toward the SE for more than ten minutes. The Islip, White Plains, and JFK radar sites recorded the debris as it fell. When plotted over time, the radar returns from this debris appear as a distinctive, diagonal band, as shown on the NTSB radar plot below.



Figure 1: NTSB radar plot from page 44 of the Airplane Performance Study (Exhibit 13A). The band of debris in question has been circled by the petitioners with a thick black line.

At the 1997 NTSB hearing in Baltimore, NTSB investigator John Clark testified that the above-mentioned plume of radar returns (circled with a thick black line above) was "consistent with the explosion" that caused the crash. However, Mr. Clark did not provide a scientific basis for that conclusion nor did he attempt to further characterize that explosion by presenting an analysis of the subject radar returns. Our analysis of the speed and direction of the circled radar returns presented below demonstrates that the explosion responsible for the propagation of these returns was, in fact, a high velocity explosion--a detonation. The official NTSB theory for the crash is based on the assumption that the explosion in question was a low-velocity explosion or deflagration of fuel-air vapors and therefore cannot account for this radar-recorded detonation.

Ground Speed Calculation

To calculate the ground speed of the radar-recorded debris, Flight 800's position at the time of the explosion must be determined, as well as the time and position of the debris. All of this information can be obtained either directly or extrapolated from the raw radar data.

TWA Flight 800 exploded within approximately one second of the Islip radar site receiving its last secondary return (secondary returns indicate an aircraft has electrical power). Based on a linear extrapolation of the Islip radar returns from the last secondary return, TWA Flight 800 was 8.66 nautical miles south of the Islip radar antenna at the time. Approximately 8.5 seconds later, the Islip antenna recorded a radar return 9.12 nautical miles south of Islip antenna and due south of Flight 800's position when it lost electrical power. This was the first of a cluster of returns essentially perpendicular to TWA 800's track recorded by both the Islip and White Plains radar facilities.

If as stated by the NTSB this cluster of radar returns represents debris leaving the airframe during or after the initial explosion, its average ground speed was approximately (9.12 - 8.66)/8.5 nautical miles per second or 195 knots (100.3 m/s).

Error Analysis

To determine the uncertainties associated with the velocity of this debris as determined by radar, we calculated the upper and lower limits of the debris speed, based on the accuracy of FAA radar sites published by the NTSB in the "Addendum I to Main Wreckage Flight Path Study".

That Addendum lists the azimuth and range accuracies for the Islip, White Plains, and JFK radar sites as +/-1/2 the azimuth change pulse (or ACP which is 0.04 degrees) and 1/16 nautical mile respectively. For brevity, we will focus on the Islip radar site; however, a similar analysis can be conducted with data recorded by the White Plains

site.

Since the returns in question appear nearly due south of where TWA Flight 800 lost electrical power, only an analysis of the north-south displacement is necessary. Therefore the accuracy of each radar hit in the north-south direction must be determined.

TWA Flight 800 was approximately 9 miles south and 20 miles east of the Islip radar antenna. The north-south portion of the range accuracy is $+/-(1/16 \text{ nautical miles})^*$ sin (theta), where theta is tan⁻¹ (9/20) = 24.23⁰. Therefore, the north-south accuracy based on the range accuracy is +/-0.026 nautical miles.

Since TWA Flight 800 was approximately 22 nautical miles away from the Islip antenna, the maximum azimuth accuracy is $\pm/-22 \sin(ACP) = \pm/-22 \sin(0.04) = \pm/-0.0154$ nautical miles. And the north-south portion of the azimuth accuracy is $\pm/-0.0154$ * cos (24.23) = $\pm/-0.014$ nautical miles.

Combining the two sources of error results in a total north-south accuracy of Islip radar returns in the vicinity of the crash of TWA Flight 800 of +/- (0.026 + 0.014) nautical miles = +/- 0.04 nautical miles.

When considering this source of error, the minimum ground speed of the debris is (9.08 - 8.7)/8.5 nm/second or 161 knots and the maximum is (9.16 - 8.62)/8.5 nm/second or 211 knots. Therefore, the Islip radar site recorded debris exiting the area of the aircraft, traveling approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of a nautical mile at an average ground speed of between 161 (82.8m/s) and 211 knots (108.5m/s).

Vector Analysis: Determining the Debris' Speed Relative to TWA Flight 800

To determine the average speed of this debris relative to the accident aircraft over the 8.5-second period, vector analysis is necessary. Before the explosion, any material on the aircraft that could become debris travels at the same velocity as the aircraft since it is still part of the aircraft. Therefore the aircraft velocity must be considered when calculating the speed of the debris within the aircraft's reference frame.

Since Flight 800 was traveling ENE (approximately 71 degrees from true north) at 385 knots (198 m/s), its northern speed component was $385*\cos(71) = 125$ knots (64.3 m/s) and it is labeled 'i' in Figure 2 below. Since the debris was moving due south, its velocity (161 to 211 knots) must be added to the accident aircraft's northern velocity component (125 knots), yielding a minimum speed of 286 knots (147 m/s) and a maximum speed of 336 knots (172.9 m/s) in the south direction relative to the aircraft.

The eastern speed component of Flight 800 can be calculated in a manner similar to the northern speed component using $385^* \sin(71) = 364$ knots. It is labeled 'j' in Figure 2

below.

Using the Pythagorean Theorem, the average speed of the debris relative to the accident aircraft was between 463 and 495 knots or between 238 and 255 m/s.





It is important to realize that the velocities discussed above are averages over 8.5 seconds. Because of the extreme forces of air resistance at those speeds and because the debris was likely very light since it can be seen drifting with the wind for more than ten minutes, its initial exit velocity was most likely considerably greater than its average speed over the 8.5 second interval. In fact, we show below that the exit velocity of the debris was far greater than the speed of sound (supersonic). Consequently, the explosion that ejected this debris was a detonation, not a fuel-air deflagration.

Even in the physically unlikely case that the average speed of the debris over eight and a half seconds represented the initial exit velocity of this debris, its velocity would have been more than twice that of the pressure wave created by a fuel-air deflagration. This is known because Dr. Melvin Baer of Sandia Laboratory, on behalf of the NTSB, calculated that the fuel-air deflagration resulted in a pressure wave traveling approximately 100 m/s.³

Furthermore, the NTSB proposed fuel-air deflagration caused the front wall of the center wing tank to rotate forward and downward, thus projecting any debris in a forward direction relative to the airplane. There is no sideways displacement of any aircraft wreckage from the alleged fuel-air explosion cited in the NTSB Sequencing Study or any other NTSB report.

Comparison with Official Scenario

As described above, the officially proposed fuel-air explosion was a low-velocity event or deflagration. This finding was reached by all the relevant experts who analyzed the wreckage, as well as by scientists who conducted real-world and simulated explosion tests. Their finding was based on the fact that most of the fuel tank structures⁴ were recovered in large sections. Had the proposed explosion been high-velocity or a detonation, the fuel tank's structures would have been significantly more fragmented.

Dr. Melvin Baer of Sandia Laboratory was contracted by the NTSB to generate computer simulations of the proposed explosion, and in 1998 he issued the report "A Combustion Model for the TWA 800 Center-Wing Fuel Tank Explosion". As noted above, based on his computer modeling and a review of the aircraft wreckage, Dr. Baer determined that the velocity of the officially proposed fuel-air explosion would have been just 100 m/s.

Dr. Baer added that it was unlikely the explosion would accelerate any wreckage items to that speed because of inertia and other physical effects. Nevertheless, in an attempt

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Private email communication between Dr. Melvin Baer and independent investigator Dr. Tom Stalcup. Dr. Baer provided a flame speed of 100 m/s for the deflagration, but said that it would be unlikely that any debris reached this velocity from the deflagration alone.

The exception was the left wall of the center wing fuel tank, called the left side of body rib (LSOB). This wall was severely fragmented, but pieces were curled inward, into the center wing tank, a finding that is inconsistent with this damage resulting from an internal explosion of the center-wing fuel tank.

to provide the NSTB's official scenario the best possible chance of matching the radar evidence, we will present a graphical simulation (Figure 3 below) which allows wreckage to reach this speed during the fuel-air deflagration and provides other exceptions.

1) Instead of the officially proposed explosion being forward moving as determined by the NTSB, we will assume its direction was rearward and to the right (see the red arrows in Figure 3).

2) We will prescribe an exit velocity equal to the explosion velocity: 100 m/s.



3) We will ignore the effects of air resistance outside the aircraft.

Figure 3: Maximum deflagration wave expansion at three points in time in TWA Flight 800's reference frame. Air resistance is neglected outside the aircraft to provide a best-case scenario for the NTSB's crash sequence. The red arrows point to hypothetical debris ejected by the deflagration. The 747 icons are not to scale.

In Figure 3, the circles represent the maximum expansion of the officially proposed fuel-air deflagration. The red dotted lines represent the maximum horizontal distance any piece of debris could have traveled in the first moments after the explosion. The hypothetical wreckage item colored red at the lower left edge of each circle represents the most dense and streamlined wreckage fragment, since the effects of air resistance would be lowest for such fragments. But as can be seen, even a fragment with those properties would still be more than one kilometer away from where radar sites recorded the debris plume at 8.5 seconds.

Since TWA Flight 800 was traveling about two times faster than the wave propagation speed of the proposed fuel-air deflagration, nothing from that deflagration could have reached the position where radar sites recorded the debris in question, which is represented by a large irregular shape on the left axis of Figure 3, about 800 meters south of the position of the initiation of the explosion. As discussed above in the *Error Analysis* section, the actual position of the debris detected on radar at 8.5 seconds could have been anywhere between approximately 1/3 and 1/2 of a nautical mile due south of the explosion, or between 700 and 1000 meters south of the explosion.

Ballistics Analysis

Since the aircraft began breaking up at 13,800 feet in altitude, air resistance at that altitude must be considered when studying any debris ejected from the airframe by the initial explosion. Formulas based on well understood aerodynamic principles can be used to estimate a range of possible exit velocities for the debris detected by radar. Using a computer program like the one described by Marion and Thornton's text⁵ on classical dynamics, we generated theoretical ballistics curves with data points spaced at five millisecond intervals.



Figure 4: Three ballistics curves fit to north-south position vs. time from the Islip and White Plains radar sites. This plot only shows the north-south distances and speeds. Flight 800 was heading ENE at 385 knots. The small blue squares are a composite of Islip and White Plains FAA radar returns.

Multiple curves fit the data because objects of various shapes and sizes were likely

Classical Dynamics of Particles and Systems, Third Edition, Jerry B. Marion and Stephen T. Thornton, Harcourt Braces Jovanovich, Inc, 1988, page 65.

ejected from the initial explosion and each would have different inertial and aerodynamic properties. Three ballistics curves fit the data well, each with exit velocities greater than Mach 4 (four times the speed of sound). Curves with exit velocities below Mach 4 and with low drag forces relative to their mass would not decelerate fast enough to fit the data. Curves with high drag forces relative to their mass and with exit velocities less than Mach 4 would not reach the earliest and southern-most debris recorded by radar.

Implications of the New Radar Analysis

We analyzed a dense cluster of radar returns that the NTSB confirmed was created by the explosion that caused the crash.

Two separate analyses show that debris tracked by multiple FAA radar sites moved too far, too fast, and in the wrong direction to have resulted from the officially proposed fuel-air deflagration. A vector analysis shows that even when air resistance is neglected, nothing in the official crash scenario can account for this radar evidence. An analysis that considers air resistance indicates that the debris left the area of the aircraft at a speed greater than Mach 4 (four times the speed of sound). Nothing in the official crash scenario can account for this very high velocity.

Erroneous Finding in NTSB Final Report: Finding 8

Finding 8 states that the "streak of light reported by most of [the streak of light] witnesses was burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight during some portion of the postexplosion preimpact breakup sequence..."

We conducted a detailed review of the eyewitness evidence and determined that this finding is incorrect. A far greater number of witnesses who reported a streak of light gave testimony consistent with the streak originating at the surface or horizon rather than where the accident aircraft lost electrical power. Many reported that after rising off the surface, the streak of light climbed sharply and fast, exploding at its apex. The accident airclane did not rise sharply or fast off of the surface, and the NTSB final report mentions no explosion during crippled flight except for the eruption of fuel as TWA 800 descended to the ocean.

In an apparent attempt to match the official crash sequence to eyewitness observations, the NTSB generated simulations of the aircraft climbing in crippled flight. However, these simulations diverge from the radar data precisely when the climb begins, indicating that no such climb occurred.⁶ There are also unexplained control surface

⁶ See the Figure 28d on page 99 of the NTSB Final Report on TWA Flight 800 and similar plots from NTSB Exhibit 22C and its Addendum. The simulation data in all of these plots diverges from

manipulations that appear to be more an effort to make the accident aircraft climb than to factually establish the aircraft's post-explosion flight path. A case in point is the official NTSB animation based on one of these simulations. It correctly shows the aircraft banking left after losing electrical power, but then—without explanation shows the aircraft turning back to the right in order to perform a climb.

Such a climb in the simulated aircraft resulted in a commensurate decrease in ground speed of the airplane. This decrease in ground speed caused the simulated aircraft to fall far behind where FAA radar sites actually recorded the accident aircraft position supporting a conclusion that the aircraft did not climb at this point.

A few pilots in the air and some witnesses on the ground were watching TWA 800 before it exploded, and none reported seeing it climb sharply as depicted in the simulation. The NTSB Witness Group interviewed one such eyewitness at length. Captain David McClaine was asked if he saw any part of the accident aircraft climb, and he answered no.⁷

To determine whether or not the motion of the streak of light was consistent with the path of the accident aircraft, the streak must be compared to a valid simulation of the accident aircraft's post-explosion motion. FAA radar sites tracked the aircraft heading ENE and turning left just after losing electrical power. Since there was no loss of ground speed early in the crash sequence to account for any significant climb, the aircraft then likely rolled over and headed downward.

Since a majority of the streak of light eyewitnesses said that the streak rose upward (many saying that it rose off the surface of the water), it is clear from a thorough review of the FAA radar tracking of the accident aircraft and the eyewitness evidence, including the new witness documents provided with this petition, that the observed streak of light could not have been burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight.

An Accurate Accounting of the Streak of Light

Two separate NTSB reports found a significant percentage of witnesses who said the

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Witnesses Group Chairman Factual Report, Appendix Z, Interview transcript Capt. David McClaine, March 25, 1999. During his NTSB interview, McClaine estimated that TWA Flight 800 exploded at an altitude of between 13 and 15 thousand feet. Its flight data recorder failed at the moment of the first explosion, just after recording an altitude of 13,800 feet. McClaine was asked if "any structure or anything else of this thing zoom[ed] up 1,000, 1,500, 3,000 feet at that time." McClaine answered "No."

the radar data points during the simulated climbs.

streak of light rose off the surface or horizon⁸ moments before Flight 800 exploded and fell to the ocean in flames. Therefore, it is important to both consider the possibility that a light did rise off the surface of the water near the flight path of Flight 800 just before it exploded and to determine what the entire event would look like to witnesses in the vicinity of Flight 800 watching from vantage points in the air, on the water, or on land.

In such a scenario, witnesses observing the entire sequence would see a light appear on the horizon and rise upward in the vicinity of Flight 800. Then the aircraft would explode, continue its momentum to the east and begin a descent to the ocean. At some point during the descent, as was determined by the NTSB and seen by eyewitnesses, the wings of the aircraft would break away releasing fuel that would ignite into one or more fireballs.

Nearly all of the 670 eyewitness accounts reviewed by the NTSB match the crash scenario described above. According to the NTSB Witness Group Study, 599 (89%) saw the large fireball or fireballs at the end of the sequence. Two hundred fifty-eight (39%) saw a streak of light and a large majority said the light ascended. Between 25 and 96 of the 258 said the streak of light originated at the surface or horizon.⁷

Most of the witnesses observed the fireball because it was the brightest event and occurred at the end of the sequence. Witnesses compared it to the setting sun or described it as a waterfall of flames. Many witnesses who saw earlier events continued watching until the fireball(s) disappeared in the distance. Entire groups of people reported seeing the fireball(s) after one member of their group pointed to the sky.

According to witnesses, and as determined by the NTSB, the rising light was one of the earliest events in the sequence. Many described it as a point of light. For anyone to see such a streak originate on the surface, they had to just happen to be looking directly toward the streak's point of origin as it started climbing. There would have been no other visual clues to look in that direction, as this was determined to be the first visual event.

A majority of people in groups with one person directing attention to it could have missed seeing it rise off the surface, because by the time their attention was directed toward it and they saw it, the streak may have already been in mid-flight and far above the surface. Therefore, the NTSB's statistic of between four and fourteen percent of the

According to the original NTSB Witness Group Factual Report released in December of 1997, "102 [witnesses] gave information about the origin of the streak...96 [or 94%] said that it originated from the surface." According to the NTSB Witness Group Study released in February 2000 which relied on a more strict interpretation of the eyewitness accounts, out of 27 witnesses who gave information about the origin of a streak of light and who had unobstructed views to the surface or horizon, 25 (93%) said rose off either the surface or horizon.

total number of eyewitnesses seeing the streak's point of origin appears to be a reasonable estimate.

At the final Sunshine Hearing on the crash in August 2000, NTSB Witness Group Chairman Dr. David Mayer mentioned 56 eyewitness accounts that "didn't seem to fit"⁹ the NTSB's scenario. These same eyewitness accounts, however, fit well into the scenario described above. In fact, nearly all of the witnesses who observed a streak of light described a scenario that essentially matched the above scenario.

New Eyewitness Evidence

We have obtained twenty FBI eyewitness interview summary documents (FBI form #302s) from the crash of TWA Flight 800 that we could not locate in the NTSB's public docket. We are therefore providing them to the NTSB as an attachment to this petition. To avoid confusion and any conflicts with existing NTSB witness documents that are numbered 1 to 755, we have numbered these documents 800 to 819.

In eight of the twenty FBI 302 summaries that we are submitting with this petition, eyewitnesses describe a rising streak of light before seeing the fireball(s).

New Photographic Evidence

One FBI interview summary provided with this petition mentions that an eyewitness provided the FBI with several photographs of a light or lights in the sky when TWA Flight 800 exploded. We urge the NTSB to request from the FBI this and any other photographic and video evidence the FBI received during its investigation into the crash of TWA Flight 800. All witness, photographic, video, or other evidence of lights or rising streaks off the East Coast of the United States before, during, and after the crash of TWA Flight 800 are relevant, and a thorough investigation into each event could lead to determining the actual cause of the crash.

NTSB Witness Group Sunshine Hearing Presentation

On August 23, 2000 at the NTSB Sunshine hearing in Washington, D.C. on the crash of TWA Flight 800, Witness Group Chairman Dr. David Mayer inaccurately described the observations of important eyewitnesses and omitted crucial details from the accounts of military eyewitnesses who were airborne at the time of the explosion. His conclusions

⁹

Witness Group Presentation by Dr. David Mayer, NTSB Sunshine Hearing, August 23rd, 2000

should be completely disregarded and a new, unbiased and accurate analysis of the witness testimony must be made and evaluated alongside the new and material evidence we are providing to this case.

We have listed some significant problems with the Witness Group Chairman's Sunshine hearing presentation below, and we urge the NTSB to conduct a detailed review of that presentation to identify and correct all of the problems.

Errors and Inaccuracies

Witness 649's FBI file includes four sketches and several FBI witness summaries. It is one of the most thorough and comprehensive set of eyewitness documents in the NTSB docket. The sketches and summaries describe an object ascending and traveling westward, spanning over ten degrees horizontally before approaching a second object that was at a position and altitude consistent with where Flight 800 lost electrical power. An explosion occurred where the two objects apparently met.

At the sunshine hearing, the Witness Group Chairman testified that Witness 649's observations "certainly do sound like a missile attacking the airplane." However, the Witness Group Chairman then discounted this witness evidence by incorrectly stating that witness 649's horizontal view of the accident was limited to just a few degrees--between "two flagpoles". The Witness Group Chairman used this incorrect information to conclude that the witness could not have seen the initiating event because it did not occur between these flagpoles. The word "flagpole" does not exist in witness 649's NTSB or FBI file, nor did this witness indicate to investigators that his observations were ever restricted to a degree that would render him unable to observe the initiating event. Based on the same incorrect information, the Chairman further concluded that witness 649 did not see a missile.

Although Witness 649 did reference a *telephone* pole in the description of where the rising projectile originated, Witness 649 never cited an adjacent telephone pole as a limit of his observations nor did he describe any significant visual obstructions. In fact, Witness 649 indicated that the projectile rose over and beyond other telephone poles, apparently colliding with TWA Flight 800 above structures in the distance, which were well to the right of where the projectile originated, and well below the line of site to the airborne collision. Critically, from Witness 649's perspective, the structures were on a line of site between 196° and 209° magnetic. Clearly, the Witness Group Chairman misspoke and/or misconstrued the evidence, and Witness 649's FBI file should not have been excluded from consideration.

Neither the Witness Group Chairman nor anyone from the NTSB ever interviewed Witness 649. When Dr. Mayer was Chairman of the NTSB Eyewitness Group, only one out of 670 eyewitness was interviewed by the NTSB. NTSB personnel never returned to Witness 649's location or to any other eyewitness locations to obtain bearing lines to events in the sky based on the landmarks given.

The Witness Group Chairman provided blatantly inaccurate testimony about the observations of Witness 649 and erroneously discounted some of the most compelling and potentially reliable eyewitness evidence surrounding this tragic incident.

Airborne Military Eyewitness

The Witness Group Chairman's Sunshine hearing testimony should also be questioned and re-examined because he omitted important details provided by an experienced airborne military eyewitness who was in close proximity to the crash and who provided very compelling evidence of a missile strike.

On January 11, 1997, the original NTSB Eyewitness Group interviewed Major Frederick Meyer of the New York Air National Guard. According to the NTSB transcripts from this interview, Major Meyer was in a Black Hawk helicopter, descending into Gabreski Airport, when he saw a streak of light heading toward the area where TWA 800 crashed. At the end of a trajectory consistent with the streak of light, Major Meyer reported he observed explosions that he described to the original eyewitness group as:

"...hard explosions. This looked like flak¹⁰. It's a hard explosion. It's like an HPX explosion, as opposed to soft explosion like gasoline..."

Major Meyer testified during his NTSB interview that while in Vietnam, he "flew a UH-2 Kaman Seasprite rescue helicopter". And during his tour, he had seen "three different types of missiles...SAM-1s, SAM-2s, and SAM-3s". He also testified that he could distinguish between different types of explosions, saying that some things "resemble anti-aircraft fire and other things are soft explosions; like if you saw somebody hit a fuel storage depot".

Even though Major Meyer was uniquely qualified to identify the type of explosion(s) that caused the crash, the Witness Group Chairman never mentioned these crucial details during the Sunshine Hearing Witness Group presentation.

Instead the Witness Group Chairman simply said Major Meyer "saw an explosion and a second explosion, and a large fireball".

10

Flak is the explosion and ejection of shrapnel by a military explosive within an antiaircraft shell. Later during the hearing, NTSB Chairman Jim Hall mentioned a letter that Major Meyer sent to the NTSB stating that he felt the NTSB "ignored the eyewitness information". When Chairman Hall asked if this was true, the Witness Group Chairman answered "Absolutely not." Then a short time later, Chairman Hall asked the Witness Group Chairman "what did the helicopter pilot tell?" The Witness Group Chairman responded saying "He observed a streak in flight for one or two seconds and then he saw the enormous fireball develop."

Once again, the Witness Group Chairman failed to inform the NTSB board members of Major Meyer's expert testimony, in which he compared the explosion(s) that caused the crash to military ordnance. Given his years of combat experience and his vantage point, Major Meyer's testimony should have been seriously considered and discussed with the Board at great length, but it was not.

Significant Understatement of Witness Accounts that Conflict with the Official Crash Sequence

The Witness Group Chairman testified that there were fifty-six (56) witness accounts "that didn't seem to fit" into the official crash sequence. These 56 witnesses said they saw a streak of light rise off the surface and/or climb straight up or nearly so. However, this number significantly under counts the number of witness accounts that directly conflict with the official crash sequence. In his count, the Witness Group Chairman failed to include a significant number of eyewitnesses who described a streak of light heading in a direction that conflicted with the accident aircraft's flight path.¹¹

Table 1 below provides raw NTSB statistics of the trajectories of the streak of light described in twenty-five eyewitness accounts that do not match the crippled flight path of the accident aircraft. These additional witness accounts brings the total to eighty-one (81) eyewitnesses providing observations that conflict with the official crash sequence. Further, if the work of the original NTSB Witness Group Chairman Norman Wiemeyer were considered, there would very likely be more than one hundred (100) eyewitness accounts that conflict with the official crash sequence.

Witness 386 is a good example of an eyewitness who reported a streak of light trajectory that conflicted with the official crash sequence, but was not included among the fifty-six witnesses the NTSB said conflicted with the official crash sequence. The

These witness accounts do not have the Eastern component ascribed to TWA Flight 800 as it allegedly climbed in the official crash sequence. As the streak rose upward, many eyewitnesses said it moved westward, and many others said it moved to the south: two directions the officially climbing aircraft never traveled.

following is excerpted from this eyewitness' NTSB file:

"It seemed like it came off the horizon and rose slowly, weaving as it continued upward. At first they thought it might have been a flare, but realized that it was too huge. It traveled diagonally at an approximate 70 degree angle going in a westerly direction...

The object rose in the sky for approximately six (6) seconds, leaving a white smoke trail in its wake. It then disappeared from sight for approximately 1/2 second. After that time, without a sound of an explosion, a large oval ball of fire appeared just above the area where the object was last seen. ...[Witness 386] thought that the ball of fire came down traveling in an easterly direction. The ball broke into two separate balls of fire before it hit the water."

Witness 386 said the streak weaved as it climbed westerly (just as Witness 649 had reported and sketched). Flight 800 in crippled flight never traveled in that direction. Official crash sequence animations show TWA Flight 800 traveling in a slowly developing curve as it traveled east-northeast.

Witness 386's account and many others like it that clearly do not fit into the official crash sequence were not included in the 56 witness accounts that the Witness Group Chairman said did not fit.

Witness Number	Trajectory
319	as if further south"
523	"north"
232	"north"
524	"north"
49 9	"north"
226	"northwest"
345	"northwest"
637	"south"
715	"south"
276	"south"
492	"south"
467	"west"
179	"west"
385	"west"
540	"west"
135	"west"
88	"west"
648	"west"
90	"west"
506	"west"
658	"west"
521	"west"
535	"west"
386	"west"
127	"west"

 Table 1: Twenty-five additional witnesses who reported a trajectory for the streak of light that is inconsistent with the trajectory of TWA Flight 800 in crippled flight. Taken from the NTSB Witness Group's raw eyewitness statistics.

Witness Group Analysis not Dependent on Climbing Aircraft

The Witness Group Chairman concluded that the ascending streak was TWA Flight 800 as it "maneuvered in crippled flight". However the NTSB could not simulate the aircraft performing a steep climb while matching FAA radar tracking.¹² In essence, the

See the Figure 28d on page 99 of the NTSB Final Report on TWA Flight 800 and similar plots from NTSB Exhibit 22C and its Addendum. The simulation data in all of these plots diverges from the East-West vs. Time radar data points during the simulated climbs.

radar evidence showed that the accident aircraft did not climb appreciably or at all after losing electrical power.

NTSB Chairman Jim Hall asked the Witness Group Chairman: "if you could show that the airplane did not climb after the nose departed, will that change your analysis?"

The Witness Group Chairman responded "No sir..."

This meant that without the airplane climbing to explain the ascending streak of light, the Witness Group Chairman would not change his analysis. Therefore he would have to either conclude that most of those who reported an ascending streak of light did not actually see it ascend or that the observed *rising* streak was the horizontally and downward moving aircraft.

The Witness Group Chairman's willingness to overlook such a significant number of eyewitness observations that clearly contradict an officially proposed scenario, to present grossly inaccurate accounts of what other eyewitnesses saw, and to omit crucial details from the observations of an expert military eyewitness when directly questioned about this witness' observations from the NTSB Chairman is troubling.

Findings

1. The explosion that caused the crash was external to the aircraft.

2. FAA radar sites recorded fast-moving debris that traveled perpendicular to the flight path, just after Flight 800 lost electrical power. A ballistics analysis of this debris plume shows that the explosion that accelerated this debris was high-velocity, a detonation. No mechanism or event in the official low-velocity fuel-air explosion theory can account for this radar evidence.

3. A significant number of credible eyewitness accounts are consistent with an external event.

4. The CIA produced an inaccurate crash animation, without consulting with Boeing, the aircraft manufacturer. The group at the CIA who produced the animation were not qualified to simulate aircraft flight paths.

5. Both the CIA and NTSB crash sequence simulations are inaccurate since they diverge from the radar tracked flight path and deviate from the tolerances imposed by the FAA radar tracking. The simulations do not match the observations of the witnesses with descriptions of the early crash sequence.

6. There remain significant anomalies in the way this investigation was conducted. There were numerous violations of customary and normal investigative protocol, which are contrary to the provisions set forth in title 49 CFR 830 and NTSB Board orders.

7. Contrary to legal directives set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, the NTSB allowed their investigation to be superseded by the FBI's investigation.

8. The NTSB's probable cause determination for the crash of TWA Flight 800 is not supported by the physical evidence, the witness statements, or other facts.

Summary

A preponderance of hard evidence, including radar and forensic evidence, combined with dozens of corroborating eyewitness accounts, refute the NTSB's probable cause determination for the crash of TWA Flight 800. The NTSB concluded that an electrical short circuit initiated TWA 800's demise. The source of that short circuit was never found and no hard evidence supporting the official probable cause has ever been presented. The available hard evidence, which is corroborated by eyewitness accounts, indicates that at least one detonation outside the aircraft initiated its destruction.

Two new analyses of the radar evidence presented in this petition clearly show proof of this high velocity explosion or detonation. We have found no analysis of this radar evidence in the NTSB's final report or any other NTSB report or study.

We have also determined that the eyewitness evidence was misrepresented, resulting in inaccurate conclusions being drawn and conveyed by both the CIA and the NTSB. It should first be noted here that contrary to established NTSB policies and procedures, eyewitness evidence was not made available to NTSB investigators and other parties during the critical early stages of the investigation. The Witness Group Chairman assigned to present the NTSB's final conclusions based upon eyewitness evidence interviewed only one out of 670 eyewitnesses. At the Sunshine Hearing, the Witness Group Chairman misrepresented eyewitness observations and presented inaccurate conclusions based on those misrepresentations.

The new evidence and analyses presented in this petition show that the NTSB probable cause determination and findings are erroneous. Therefore, according to NTSB policy and legal directives, the NTSB must reconsider its probable cause determination of the crash of TWA Flight 800.

PD-302 (Rev. 3-10-82) - 1 -FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 6d **b**7С Date of transcription 7/20/96 DOB Long Beach Long Island was interviewed at the New York City Police Department, Sixth Precinct, 233 West 10th Street, New York. New York. /by Detective and of the Federal Bureau of Special Agent was advised of the identities of the Investigation. interviewing agents and provided the following information: 2996 at approximately 8 p.m. On Wednesday, July 17, and his female friend Long Island, Montauk walked his landlord's dog 1051 Ocean Front, Long to the beach by chauncy's Restaurant. Beach, Long Island. sat near the lifequard stand approximately 80 feet from Chauncy's Restaurant and were watching the ocean and airplanes. was facing the ocean and was facing inland when object fly overhead. noticed a glowing stated that the object was flying lower than the airplanes and went from an inland location traveling out to the ocean. ladded that it swerved a couple of times then disappeared. stated that he could not hear anything only the loud roar of the waves. said that he was encouraged by his friends to contact the authorities when reports of a possible missile strike were reported by the stated that he has had some military experience media. in Great Britain. Route to Entered by de Investigation on _7/20/96 New York, New York File # 265A-NY-259028 Det SA Date dictated Ъy This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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	On July 20, 1996, SA telephonically terviewed was contacted regarding information he provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 19, 1996, egarding the explosion of TWA Flight 800. provided the provided the
	was sitting on his deck by the bay with his wife the the airplanes fly-out. He described the evening as having a clear sky. It was twilight, the sun had just set to the gree the land was dark. There was ground haze/ground fog esent near the horizon. As looked out into the darkness suddenly saw an incendiary flash, a brilliant white flash blowed by a stream of color come down. He described the still flash as if a flare had ignited leaving a trail of red do orange color. As the flare descended, approximately two- nirds down, there was a second eruption of two umbrella-like to use of fire, red and orange in color which fell to the estimates the event lasted approximately ten econds and occurred at about 8:40 PM.
	did not see the airplane. He just saw a flare in he air, it exploded and then traveled down.
	After seeing the explosion he went upstairs in his home see where it landed, but he couldn't see anything. What he d notice were headlights heading west in the opposite direction the crash on the William Flyod Estate. The William Flyod state is a federal park adjacent to his property. Stated here is a check point at the gate entrance to the Estate and hly four wheel, all terrain vehicles are allowed on the coperty. It is a place frequented by fishermen.
	stated his home is approximately one mile to a le-and-a-half away from the barrier. The plane may have been out ten miles away, putting him possibly 10-12 miles away from he crash.
[nvest	tion on 07/20/1996 at New York, New York (telephonically)
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Upon reflection of the events he had just witnessed, stated that the flare could not have been a distress signal, as he momentarily thought, as it was too great in magnitude. He witnessed an explosion in the sky. He came to the conclusion that the flaming flare was the plane descending engulfed in fire. The plane fell straight down, out of control.

the space that the plane had occupied. The smoke lingered in the air.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

7/26/1996

white male, date of birth: residing at Westbrook, Connecticut, telephone Mailing address P.O. Box Westbrook, Connecticut 06498 provided the following information concerning his activities and observations on the evening of July 17, 1996.

stated that at approximately 8 PM on July 17,, 1996 he was watching television and taping a National Geographic show, Heart of Africa which was scheduled to be a one hour television show. _____ home is directly on the shoreline of Long Island Sound in Westbrook, Connecticut and after he watched the National Geographic show for about twenty or twenty-five minutes he walked down to the shoreline to talk to his brother, _____ and a friend of ______ both of whom were seated on the seawall adjacent to the beach.

saying hello to he caught sight of something out of the right corner of his eye over Long Island. Stated that he first thought that it was fireworks and then he thought it might be a boat flare but immediately realized that it did not have the same pattern as fireworks when it exploded and did not look like a boat flare floating down after it exploded. stated that what he observed travelled in an upward arc from Long Island into the sky leaving a trail while it was happening. Stated that his impression was that the arc originated at ground level at some point beyond Long Island which appeared over the horizon and that the arc continued to travel in an upward direction.

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bluish sky. _________stated at the time of the observation it was still light out.

definitely upward.

that the pattern of the explosion he observed in the sky did not make any sense and would not have indicated a firework display.

stated that the shoreline of Long Island normally appears as a little blue strip or line on the horizon which is higher to the East at a point around Plum Island and appears to diminish in height and gradually disappear as one stated looks towards the Western end of Long Island. at the time of his observation and at the point where he observed the arc rising from Long Island all he could see was the horizon line and as the shoreline of Long Island began to fade out to the West is the location where he observed the arc originally come was furnished with two previously prepared maps from. of the Connecticut shoreline and one previously prepared map of the Connecticut shoreline in relation to Long Island. On the first map which represents a detailed area of Westbrook, placed an X Connecticut to include Magna Lane, indicating his approximate location at the time of the above described observations. On the second map which contains further details of islands located in Long Island Sound to include <u>Menunketesuck Island, a prominent point of reference for</u> placed an X and drew an arrow observation, indicating direction of his observation on the evening of July also drew an arrow with the 17, 1996. On the third map direction of observation indicating his position on the Connecticut Shore Line at a point where the map indicates Magna In addition to the maps, provided two pen and Lane.

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ink drawings on white paper. The first drawing indicates a view from Magna Lane in Westbrook, Connecticut looking South to Long Island with the arc and explosion depicted with Menunketesuck Island as a point of reference. The second pen and ink drawing detailed the arc as recalled by ______ and specifically the pattern he recalled which he indicated was a fork shape image or V shape image which ______ stated stuck in his mind after the explosion. _______ described the color of the arc and image as reddish-orange and not unlike the bright embers in a fireplace. _______ stated that after the explosion debris was falling from the sky and was filtering down glowing in the same color.

Again emphasized that the trajectory of the arc was in an upward direction.

stated that at the time the upward arc caught his attention out of the corner of his eye he immediately pointed it out to his brother friend

the arc of light he had been looking out towards Long Island from Connecticut and that were sitting on the seawall facing each other and he pointed the arc of light out to them.

stated that he further recalls a sound that was contemporaneous with his observation however he stated he could not definitely remember or place the sound before or after his observation. ______ stated that he definitely did hear a boom which he said almost seemed like two sounds very close together. ______ stated it was very similar to a sonic boom and was about the same intensity of that type sound.

stated that he discussed his observation with his brother friend and that he thought his observations were odd and wondered what happened and whether someone was in trouble. stated that it was not until the following morning, July 18, 1996, when a friend of his picked him up in his van and asked if he had heard about the TWA flight that blew up over Long Island that he made a connection between his observations and the news of TWA 800. stated that his response to words were that he got goose bumps and said "I think I saw it". FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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In addition to the above maps and documents ________ indicated that he was an artist and subsequent to the interview prepared a 5" X 7" colored pencil drawing to indicate the color of the evening sky and water on the evening of July 17, 1996 and the reddish-orange contrast of the arc that he had observed on that evening.

Each map and drawing provided by was signed and dated by him. The original maps and drawings will be maintained in an exhibit envelope and copies are attached hereto.

Subsequent to interview, advised that he would prepare a larger detailed color sketch representing his observations with regard to the above described incident and provide that to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.





LEGEND

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State Route	Major Street/Road
 Geo Feature 	State Route
o Town, Small City	interstate Highway
∆ Hill	👝 US Highway
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ີ່ US Highway	
Street Boord	land Mass

Scale 1:31,250 (at center) - 2000 Feet

1000 Meters

Mag 14.0 Thu Jul 25 12:49:16 1996

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302 (Rev. 3-10-82)	ALL INFORMATION C HEREIN IS UNCLASS DATE 06-13-2011 B	OFTAINED IFIED Y UC60322LP/PLJ/CC	80.	3
	FEDERAL BURN	- 1 - CAU OF INVESTIGATION	ī	
		Date of	transcription <u>8/6/1996</u>	
On Develo Burbank, Cal identity of following in	August 2, 1996, pment Assistant W ifornia, the interviewing a formation:	da arner Bros., 4000 was advise gent and thereaft	te of birth Warner Boulevard, as to the er provided the]
employer. DIXONS were residence ap were looking area was. A light rush u was going to pieces of fi firework tha what she was believed it out to be. Guards) imme she thought this occurre closer and t location. approximatel bf TW and re the evening.	was vacation: Tonnecticut when and his Connect sitting on a deck proximately four f around the beach t that moment, p into the sky. be a fireworks di re fell. At that t failed to functi- seeing was on a m was closer in prox recalls som diately responding it to be and then d because the boat hen the boats prob drove y one hour later. A Flight 800 explo alized what they a	ng at her parents she went to visi brother, icut. After dinn in the yard of th eet above the bea area commenting of recalls seein first thous splay. The flare time beli on. now u uch Smaller scale imity to Connecti e "clipper" boats to the area of t quickly disperse. s also thought th ably responded to home to parents a ding. It was at ctually had witne	a home in t a former her and the her and the her and the her and the her and the her and there her a flare-like ght was that there her a built up and then eved it was a moderstands that her because she cut than it turned (possibly Coast the explosion where She believes he incident was her the correct parents house and this time, essed earlier in	
<u> </u>		4	Lini 10843,302-	_
Investigation on 08/02	/1996 at Los Ange	les, CA		-
File # 265A-NY-2590	28 - 307 - 804			-

	<u></u>	ALL INFORMA	TION CONTAINED	7		804	
" FD-302 (Rev	-10-82)	HEREIN IS UN DATE 06-13-	NCLASSIFIED 2011 BY UC603221P	/PLJ/CC			
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		FEDERAL	BUREAU OF INVE	STIGATION			
				Date of trai	escription _	07/24/96	
							
	On Sc	July 20, 1996, Cial Security A		Dat (SSAN)	te of Bi		
L_	terviewed	Manorville,	New York (NY] and). IOL CHE	receral	, was Bureau	Ь€ Ъ7С
0	E Investiga	tion (FBI). On	July 26, 19	अह ¹ , <u> </u>		contacted	
r P	or a routin olice Depar	tment Detective	erview by add		land r lpr	rovided	
t	ie followin	g information:			_		
		works as	a full time ;	Pararescue	$ \frac{FMT-I}{FMT-I} $	for the	
n T	ech Sergean	t, 106th Squadr	on based in '	Westhampto	DD, NY.	On July	
I	7, 1996, he	was involved i	n routine tra	aining at chute ium	the bas o from a	e. At <u>HC-130</u>	
a	ircraft and	landed at a dr	op zone nort.	h of the l	base. <u>A</u>	n HH60	
h. A	<u>licopter</u> w approxima	as scheduled to tely 8:35PM to	8:40PM he wa	s facing s	south to	wards the	
0	cean, when	he saw an orang	e/red object	descendin descendin	ng rapid	lly out of de in an	
t e	astbound di	rection, away f	rom	He turne	ad to		
W	no was stan ee that?"	ding on the dro The object appe	p zone with a same the same the same the same the same term of t	him and as perfect c:	sked,⊐" ircle wł	hich did	
— n	at change i	ts shape or siz		advised th	ne objec	t moved	
L t	ike a meteo housand fee	r, falling from t (8,000'-9,000	(a ne <u>rone or</u>	described	d it as	screaming	
0	ut of the s	ky. He watched	l it f or live to a massive	"to six (! fireball :	5-6) sec in the s	conds at sidewavs	
đ	irection.	At that point h	e realized i	t was an a	airplane	e. The	
o te	bject never hen fell ou	: changed shape it of his view a	or speed unt and he observ	ed black :	smoke r:	ising. He	
đ	id not hear	any sound wher	n the plane e	xploded.			
	тŀ	ne helicopter th	nat was to pi	ck up	and	1	
h b	eaded dired our later t	tly towards the the the helicopter p	e explosion. returned and	_ <u>Approx</u> im a	ate <u>iv</u> o nđ	entered	
i	t and heade	ed out to the ca	rash site. A	pproximat	el ý for 1 bodie:	cy (40) s which	
n r	ad drifted	in a southwest	erly direction	n from th	e area	they were	
i	nitially lo	ocated. A fishi	ing trawler c	ould be s	een pic.	king up	_
Investiga	tion on <u>07/2</u>	0/96 at We:	sthampton, Ne	w York		······································	-
File #	265A-NY-25	9028				<u> </u>	_
hv s		TKBH:am	0)	Date dictated	07/20/	96	— A
···	-↓	h			in Logmand in success		1 1
This doc it and its	unent contains neither contents are not to be (recommendations nor conclusion distributed outside your agency.	sof the FBI. It is the prop	eny or me the and	IS ROMING TO YOU	· ····································	•
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Page 44 of 103

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FD-302a (Rev. 11-15-83)	•	• ·
*		
265A-NY-259028		
Continuation of FD-302 of		, On 07/20/96 , Page 2
bodies at this poi operations were un	nt. As no survivors dertaken.	were observed, no rescue
•		

T. 546		ALL INFORMATION HEREIN IS UNCLAS DATE 06-14-2011	CONTAINED SSIFIED BY UC60322LP/PL	a / cc	
D-302 (Rev. 3	-10-82)			,	
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		EFDEDAL RU	- D7411 of D3/06	TIC A TICNI	
		FEDERAL DO	NERO OF HVES	LIGALIQN	
				Date of transcription	7/29/96
_	<u>On</u>	July 22, 1996,		Date of Rirth	J]
		Work Walenhond		the Home Telep	ione number
va I	/ Special Ag	ent	Aft	er being advis	ied of the
id	lentity of t	he interviewing	Agent and th	at the nature	of the
17	lcerview was 1, 1996	provided the	following in	of TWA Flight 8	00 on July
of	Commerce,	he was attending	as president a club func	tion at the Belipo	llport
Ya	cht Club, B	el <u>lport La</u> ne, Be	llport, New	York, the even	ing of
Ju be	ly 17, 1996	. advise	d that at 8:	31PM, on July	17, 1996,
lo	oking at th	e sky in a south	easterly dir	ection facing	the bay
wh	en he obser	ved what appeared	d to be a br	ight headlight	of a
pi di	ane. He sta rection and	that it looked	ignt light w similar to a	as lacing a we sparkler with	sterly
wh	itish-silve	ry glow.	now believe	s that the lig	iht was
me	tal which wa	as burning.	•		
		stated that	he observed	the light expl	ode into a
fi 	reball of so	olid mass the signal the signal the signal of the second sec	ze of a bask	etball which h	egan to
fl	ame dripping	g from the sky".	adv	ised that the	right mass
wa	s larger the	at the left mass	and that th	rough the left	fireball,
ne	saw-what a	ppeared to be a .	Targe sectro	n or the prane	•
		stated that 1	he did not s	ee any smoke t	hroughout
hì	s observance	e nor did he hear	r or feel an	yrning unusual	- 1
		advised that	at the time	he believed t	he
in ro	cident had o	occurred over the	e Smith Poin between two	nt Park and the	t it was
te	lephoned Su	ffolk County Pol	ice at 911 w	ithin two minu	tes of the
cr	ash to noti:	fy them of same.			
-,, · · -· -					<u> </u>
Investigatio	mon <u>7/22/9</u>	6 at Long	Island, New	York	
File # 2	65A-NY-2590	28			
hr SA	\	(KCM:me)	a) (KCM)	Date dictated 7/23/9	96
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D-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)	HEREIN IS DATE 06-27	MATION CONTAINED UNCLASSIFIED 7-2011 EV UC50322LP/	PLJ/CC	806
		• 1 •		
	FEDERAL	BUREAU OF INVEST	IGATION	
			Data of moundary	B (1 /0C
			Date of transcription	8/1/96
contacted at a of the intervi- provided the fo	is residence. ewing agents ollowing info	Ham After being a and the nature rmation:	oton Bays, New advised of the of the interv	b6 b7 <u>v York, was</u> identity riew,
Shinnecock Inle approximately slightly south the frame of h stated he belie the end of the pictures.	advised he et Beach down 8:40 P.M. while fac west. is camera as eves he took roll which m described	had been at the from his home was taking p ing the direct stated he notic he snapped the approximately f ay have the ball the ball of lig	e north end of on July 17, pictures of hi ion to the occ ced a ball of picture. Four to six pi ll of light in ght as a yello	f 1996. At is friend, ean, light in lalso ictures at the ow flame.
Later 800 plane crash Investigation filmi wa had taken processing cent release the fil reasons. A rec	r in the even h. had (FBI) because as interested h the roll of ter for devel- lm to intervi- ceipt was give	ing learn not contacted he was not sun in selling the black and whit oping. agents for ewing agents for	the Federal H re what to do pictures to the film to a p agreed to obtain the film.	A Flight Bureau of with the the media. whoto win and evidentiary
number is	Long T	sland <u>City. New</u> in Southa	York.	advised telephone
7/21/06	Ham	pton Bays, New	York	
investigation on 1/31/90	1			
File # 265A-NY-259021	B)		······	

0-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)	HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 06-27-2011 BY UC50322LP/PLJ/CC	
	- 1 -	
	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
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	Date of transcription7/26/	/96
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<u>^</u>		_
Birth	of Date of New York.	E I
home Lelepho	me , work terephone Socia	al
Adent (SA)	<u>ount Number</u> I was interviewed by Special was first advised of the	1
identity of	the interviewing agent and that the nature of the	-
intervi <u>ew wa</u> crash.	is regarding the July 17, 1996 TWA flight 800 airpl: provided the following information:	ane
8:30 PM, ne	was working at Gabreski Airport, Westhampton Beach	Y ,
New York, as	a member of the Air National Guard - New York Stat	že –
Fireman 105C	n Civil Engineering Squad - Fire Department.	
	advised that at approximately 8:30 PM, July 1	7,
finger past	the T-hanger facing south on the southern portion (of
the airfield		
	advised that upon looking at the sky, he	
observed wha	t appeared to be a red flare similar to a roman	<u>Fha</u>
flare had a	consistent brightness and left no trail of smoke.	He
stated that	the flare appeared for a period of at least 15 to 2 wibly as long as 20 seconds, and at a latter part	20
appeared alm	ost stationary in movement. Upon seeing the flare.	,
he exited hi	s truck to continue watching it.	
	stated that he then observed the flare become	'a
ball of fire	which separated into two equally sized balls	ive
balls were i	In his vision from five to ten seconds.	270
Investigation on7/22/	96 at Hampton Bays, New York	
File# 265A-NY-259	2028	<u> </u>
by SA	mam (Kcm Date distant 7/22/96	
This document contains petther p	recommendations not conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency:	

Fr 302	(Rev.	3-10-82)
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<pre>#Rev.3(p42) PEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Due of transmission Social Security Number Social Security Number Teclenhouse At approximately 8:20 or B:20 EW, was on his deck which faces the south shore. Was having across the sky and brought this to his attention. Jadvised that the white ball travelled on an arc fram right to left (approximately west to east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nice from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately an ine (9) or clock position the brought this to his attention in the shore ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake type rumbings were felt and heard. divised that the fireball and arc were east of the adoutent sits. Additionality. Is advised the above information. wide organized the time and arc were east of the adoutent sits. Additionality. Is advised the above information. wingenees advised the a "skinny" white trail. Expression of the adoutent sits. Additionality. Is advised the above information. wingenees advised that a the fireball and arc were east of the adoutent sits. Additionality. Is advised the above information. wingenees advised that the fireball and arc were east of the adoutent sits. Additionality. Is advised the above information.</pre>	TRM-31463				. 808
12 12 12 DESCRIPTION DEVICES	-1 21 21 DEDEAL DUE AU OF INVESTIGATION	02 (Rev. 3-10-82)		-	-
Description 07/24/96 Social Security Number another residence in provided the following talendoe Information: another residence in birship At approximately 8:20 or 8:30 PM was on his deck which faces the south shore. Information: advised that it looked Drought this to his attention. advised that it looked Divide the south shore. was anatind dinner with the ball shorting across the sky and birship attention. Divide that to a large white ball shorting across the sky and birship across the sky and birship and the white ball sighting, advised that the looked like a shorting star. Divide the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake ball sighting, advised that the fireball and arc were east of the accordent availed upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake that the fireball and arc were east of the accordent the time incident occurred in the (in) seconds or less. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared te occurrent incident occurred the above information.	Image: Provided into a large while half the shore of		- <u>1</u> -		ь6 b7C
<pre></pre>	vertices 07/29/2 Social Security Number Date of Birch (DOB) information: information: At approximately 8:20 or 8:30 EM was havind dinner with his wife information: information: information: another residence in lines information: another resolution from its initial sighting. information: another resolution from its initial sighting. information: another resolution from its initial sighting. information:	FEDERAL BUR	EAU OF INVESTIGATIO	ON	
Social Security Number relemona information: At approximately 8:20 or 8:20 FM, was on his deck which faces the south shore. Muse having dinner with his wife brought this to his attention. Idvised that it looked it a shooting star. It advised that the white hall brought differ the south shore. Muse having dinner with his wife brought this to his attention. Idvised that it looked it a shooting star. It advised that the white hall travelled on an arc frameriked on a decline from its initial sighting. It hould be a store travelled on a decline from their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball eft at "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/redish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake type runblings were felt and hear. store incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and is were east of the accurent site. Additionally, he advised that it appeared to eccur ever the bay. corroborated the above information.	Social Security Number		Date	of transcription	07/24/96
Social Security Number	Social Security Number anorher residence in in telember anorher residence in provided the following ht approximately 8:20 or 8:30 PM, was on his deck which faces the south shore was baried dinner with his wife advised that the white ball shooting across the sky and brought this to his attention advised that the vest to lock a shooting star advised that the white ball sighting. Travelled on a arc free right white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) of clock position the ball eff a "skinny" white travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heard advised that the forement of the accurate in cident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less corroborated the above information.	₹.			,
Social Security Number Information: At approximately 8:20 or 8:30 PM was havind dinner with his wife orresponse was baby of this to his altention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. advised that it looked like a shooting star. brought this to his altention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. brought this to his altention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. brought this to his altention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. brought this to his altention. coking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball eft at alking trapported to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame travelit and heard. advised	Social Security Number information: At approximately 8:20 or 8:30 PM, was on his deck which faces the south shore. was havind dinner. brought this to his attention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. advised that the white ball brought this to his attention. advised that it looked like a shooting star. advised that the white ball travelled on a arc from right to left (approximately west to east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/redish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heard. advised that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. site. Additionally. he advised that it appeared to eccur over. the bay.	Dat	e of Birth (DOR)		
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westignede on <u>07/19/96</u> a <u>MARS:hrg</u> <u>Dec direct</u> <u>07/19/96</u>	<pre>vestigation on 07/19/96 # vestigation 07/19/96 # vestigation 07/19/96 # vestigation 07/19/96 # vestigation on 07/19/96 # vestigation ve</pre>	At approximately 8:20 deck which faces the south sho: his wife,	0 or 8:30 PM,	was o	n his mer with
<pre>like a shooting star advised that the white ball travelled on an arc from right to left (approximately west to east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/reddish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared, two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heardadvised that the entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. Additionally, he advised that it appeared to accur over the bay corroborated the above information.</pre>	<pre>like a shooting star advised that the white ball travelled on an arc from right to left (approximately west to east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball exploded into a large whitish grave ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/reddish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heardadvised that the entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. Additionally. he advised that it appeared to occur over the bay corroborated the above information.</pre>	brought this to his attention.	ball shooting a advised	cross the that it 1	sky and ooked
<pre>east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/reddish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heard advised that the entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accure over. the bay corroborated the above information.</pre>	<pre>east). The arc travelled on a decline from its initial sighting. the ball left a "skinny" white trail. From their position, looking south, at approximately a nine (9) o'clock position the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/reddish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. Additionally. he advised that it appeared to occur ever. the bay. corroborated the above information.</pre>	like a shooting star.	advised that the	white bal	l est to
Next point for the state of the same of the second of the second	<pre>Note that the state of the second state of the fell position, the ball exploded into a large whitish grey ball of smoke. Then a wide orange/reddish flame travelled upward to the smoke ball. Shortly after the wide flame disappeared, two strong earthquake type rumblings were felt and heard</pre>	east). The arc travelled on a the ball left a "chinned white	decline from it	s initial	sighting.
<pre>vestigation on</pre>	<pre>vestigation on 07/19/96 at</pre>	looking south, at approximately	y a nine (9) o'c	lock posit	ion the
Shortly after the wide flame disappeared. two strong earthquake advised that the entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. Additionally, he advised that it appeared to occur over the bay. corroborated the above information.	Shortly after the wide flame disappeared, two strong earthquake entire incident occurred in ten (10) seconds or less. commented that the fireball and arc were east of the accident site. Additionally, he advised that it appeared to occur over the bay. corroborated the above information.	wide orange/reddish flame trave	elled upward to	the smoke.	Then a ball.
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vestigation on <u>07/19/96</u> at	vestigation on <u>07/19/96</u> at <u>07/19/96</u> at <u>104</u> <u>265A-NY-259028</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u> <u>SA</u>	entire incident occurred in ter	n (10) seconds o	or less.	Jant
the bay	vestigation on 07/19/96 at	site. Additionally, he advised	that it appear	ed to occu	# OVET
westigation on $07/19/96$ at the 4 265A-NY-259028 The 4 265A-NY-259028 The 4 265A-NY-259028	Ivestigation on 07/19/96 21 Ile # 265A-NY-259028 S2 MAB: hrg) Date dictated 07/19/96 is document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; Image: Conclusion of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;	the bay.	rated the above	intormatic	n.
Avestigation on $07/19/96$ at 10^{10} 10	ivestigation on <u>07/19/96</u> at <u>265A-NY-259028</u> <u>Standard B: hrg</u>) Date distant <u>07/19/96</u> (1) is document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBL. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;				
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Fe	- <u>1 -</u> DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA	ATION	b6 b7C
On July 21,	1996	Date of transcription	07/26/96
te <u>lephone</u> interviewing agents ar furnished the followin	was advised of the state of the second secon	e identities interview.	of the then
On July 17, LILLY'S FISHING STATION York, and parked in the this time, was find the water. At appropriate appeared to be a red for the formal state of the formal state of the formal state of was straight up for any rate of speed and term undetermined altitude explosion description description description from the point of explosion from the said that from the said that from the said that in the water and that distance halfway to the the FLO was red in contrail.	1996, at 8:00 PM DN, Adelaide Avenue, Ea he parking lot to wait facing south watching for the water of the post fare-like object (FLO f seven-eight (7-8) mile proximately three (3) minated in a bright which and followed by a boom ribed a sheet of flames and followed by a boom ribed a sheet of flames to thick black smoke losion and to his left the flames below the hom to his south although 7-8 milessta) and jet ski's were in t there was nothing un he did not see a poin it appeared to have o he point of explosion. lor but he was unable	drove to ast Moriches for a frien the boats an observed above the h int of explo) was due so les. The FI seconds and ite explosion m. After th s that fell that also d (easterly). rizon, he he flames land his estimat ted that sev n the water usual or peo t of origin riginated at to describe	the SILLY s, New nd. During nd jet skis h what horizon beion). buth from so's path h at a high on ât an ne towards lescended After eard four he f its veral small to his ruliar. of the FLO t a ted that any smoke
Investigation on 07/21/96 at	East Moriches, New	York	
File X 265A-NY-259028	Date	dictated <u>07/21</u> ,	/96
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcriptio	territe second second second
On July 24, 1996.	date of	birth
telephone number was	s interviewed tele	phonically.
He was advised of the identity of the	he interviewing ag	ent and the
information:	LOATGER THE TOILOW	
On July 17, 1996, at about was surfing with his brother friend at Smith's Point, and was pad stated that he saw a "flare" in the "Holy shit, what is that? Is that a consistent color of red, about three star, went "more straight up" for ab distance about half of a finger leng and a half inches. The "flare" then approximately three inches at an arr observed a flame off the back of the times the size of the "flare". It t the time first saw the "tail". The "tail" turned into a smo into a burst a little less than the arm's length) The burst broke into	t 8:30 p.m. local r, dling South. sky to the South a i flare?". The "fil e to four times th out one second, ar gth at arm's length dropped straight m's length and e flare - a "tail" ook two to three s e "flare" until he okey, fiery trail a size of a guarter o two pieces - a b	and a and said are was a e size of a id covered a h, about one down about three seconds from noticed the and exploded (at an ig fiery
piece and a smaller piece. The big the moon and looked like it was spi was about ten percent the size of t still connected to the bigger piece bigger piece was "fiery", flame oran and trailing a long "tube of fire". seven seconds for this large sectio Approximately twenty seconds later, rumbling sound for three to four se	piece was almost nning, while the s he big piece and but a separate se age and yellow at t It took approxima n to fall to the h heat conds.	the size of maller piece all fire - ection. The the bottom ately six to horizon. ard a deep
piece and a smaller piece. The big the moon and looked like it was spi was about ten percent the size of t still connected to the bigger piece bigger piece was "fiery", flame oran and trailing a long "tube of fire". seven seconds for this large sectio Approximately twenty seconds later, rumbling sound for three to four se	piece was almost nning, while the s he big piece and " but a separate se age and yellow at f It took approxima n to fall to the h heat conds.	the size of maller piece all fire" - action. The the bottom ately six to horizon. ard a deep
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Investigation on <u>7/24/1996</u> at New York, New File 265A-NY-259028 - 302 - 163/8	piece was almost nning, while the s he big piece and " but a separate se age and yellow at f It took approxima in to fall to the h conds. y York (te Dato dictated 7/3	the size of maller piece all fire" - ection. The the bottom ately six to horizon. ard a deep lephonically) 0/1996
<pre>Investigation on <u>7/24/1996</u> at New York, New File 265A-NY-259028 - 302 - 16818</pre>	piece was almost nning, while the s he big piece and " but a separate se age and yellow at " It took approxima <u>n to fall to the h</u> conds. <u>v York (te</u> <u>Dato dictated 7/3</u>	the size of maller piece all fire" - ection. The the bottom ately six to horizon. ard a deep lephonically) 0/1996

FD-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)* - 1 -FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date of transcription 8/26/96 date of birth: home Ьб home telephone: address: **b7C** truck ship cellular telephone number contact number cellular telephone number was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents advised as follows: and of the nature of the interview. He has been the fishing boat CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH for the past two months. The CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH is of Montauk, New York, where it is registered and has its home port. It is operated, however, out of Point Judith, Galilee, Rhode Island. It is a fishing vessel that trawls for squid, butterfish and fluke. During the summer months, it spends a considerable amount of time off the coast of Long Island, New York. At approximately 8:20 p.m. the evening of July 16, 1996, the CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH left Point Judith and proceeded to Fire Island, Long Island, arriving at 7:00 p.m., July 17, 1996. The crew fished the waters in that area until 5:00 p.m. when they realized there was not enough fish left to make remaining profitable, so they departed, heading east, planning to return to Point Judith to change nets. At approximately 8:20 p.m., came up the bridge and asked if had seen two flares in the sky. The Captain he responded in the negative. who arrived on the bridge a few moments after question said that what they and had heard had seen could not be flares because they were (he and too big. went on to report to the Captain that they had observed two (2) large, separate and distinct fireballs in the sky a few degrees off the starboard stern of the They also said that at the time they saw the fireballs in ship. the sky, the ship was approximately six (6) miles east of Shinnicock Inlet, Hamptons, Long Island. 2468 - NY - 269028 -7/22/96 GALILEE, RHODE ISLAND 902 - IN44 Investigation on 265A-NY-259028 Fale # **N**SA 7/22/96 SA Date dictated bγ This document sontains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; 71cin 03.303 it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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The crew wound the net up onto the ship, turned the ship around and headed west in the direction of the fireballs. At that time the fireballs were not visible.

After turning the ship, ______ called the Shinnicock, Long Island. Coast Guard station and reported the sightings, since _______ had estimated the fireballs to be approximately five (5) miles behind the ship when they were observed, this placed the fireballs in the general vicinity of that Coast Guard station. Shinnicock Coast Guard advised that they had no knowledge of the incident but requested the Captain report any subsequent findings ______ hoted that the boat radio traffic indicated other boats reporting similar sightings. He believes that these reports were coming in from pleasure craft.

As they proceeded west, they heard reports of "fire on the water" over the boat radio which was set on Channel 16, VHF. also heard several people contact the Coast Guard station at Moriches, Long Island, to report that whatever was in the water was still burning. At some point during their approach they heard that the Coast Guard cutter, ADAK, was dispatched to an area approximately eight or nine miles southeast of Moriches Inlet.

At approximately 9:00 p.m., Moriches Coast Guard station called a Coast Guard cutter and advised that the object in the water was a 747 and then designated Channel 6, VHF, as the working frequency.

At approximately 9:20 p.m., about five (5) miles from the airplane, ________ noticed that his shipboard radar, which registered objects up to six (6) miles in every direction indicated that other boas were converging on the area. The ship's radar did not show any vessels moving away from the area. At the time of the original sighting of the fireball by his crewmen, the radar did not show any other boats or ships in the area that the CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH was located in.

From five (5) miles off, from the burning airplane looked like a large orange search light. The wind was blowing in a southeasterly direction and the crew could smell the smoke as they approached the area.

Upon arriving in the vicinity of the airplane, at approximately 9:55 p.m., there were six to seven boats in the area including two (2) 41' Coast Guard cutters. Two (2)

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helicopters were hovering so low over the water that the ship radar was reading them as boats. Flames as high as eighteen (18) feet were shooting into the sky and debris was floating from the wreckage. ______ called the Coast Guard who advised him to search the southeast section of the debris line for survivors. Later, the Coast Guard called to advise that they should search for bodies because there would not be any survivors.

The CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH spotted a body approximately two hours after arriving in the area. Due to the size of the ship (approximately 100 feet) they could not easily get the body aboard so they hailed a small fiberglass pleasure boat in the area which took the body aboard. They later found a male body which they did take aboard and subsequently turned over to a SUFFOLK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT vessel nicknamed the "VESSEL KILO". They spotted a third body which another pleasure boat picked up.

They searched for another three and a half hours but due to the number of boats in the area, the Captain felt they could no longer safely operate so they broke off at approximately 3:45 a.m., July 18, 1996, and proceeded towards Point Judith, Rhode Island.

One mile off Point Judith they were called by their home telephone: who told them that whiting fish were being caught fifty miles east of Point Judith. They were also told that CHANNEL 6 NEWS was waiting on the dock to interview them. took his vessel out of the recommended fishing area without docking at Point Judith and remained there until returning to Point Judith at approximately 8:30 p.m., July 20, 1996.

did not notice any unusual vessels from July 16 through July 18, 1996, and had not heard of nor seen any stolen or abandoned vessels. He has been

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On October 21 DOB POB Austria Palm springs, California 92263, telephone was contacted telephonically at the advised of the identity of the was above address. interviewing agent, SA and advised that the interview was in reference co <u>upe trans World Airlines</u> (TWA) Flight 800 crash on 07/17/96. voluntarily provided the following information: advised that he holds Ph. D's. and and teaches at the California on a part-time basis. further advised that he is currently in the process of writing a book. stated that he was out for an On 07/17/96, evening walk while visiting friends, somewhere in the vicinity of East Moriches, New York, when he noticed a flash of light ascending from the ocean which was followed by a small explosion and then a larger explosion. However, advised that he further advised was unable to hear either explosion. that the sky was overcast and visibility was approximately ten would not provide miles at the time of the explosions. the address of the individuals that he was visiting on Long Island, nor could he remember the exact location of the township advised that he was visiting his where they reside. (LNU), address unknown, who lives in the New York daughter City area. stated that TWA flight 800 was shot down by a U.S. Navy Aegis missile which was launched from a guided missile ship which was located in area "W-105" approximately thirty miles advised that area from where TWA flight 800 exploded. "W-105" is a warning area off the southeast coast of Long Island, and is utilized for military operations, including missile further advised that he attained this firing. [(LEU), who manages the Welwood Murray information from Memorial Library, Palm Springs, California, telephone (619) 323-8296. He believes that _____(LEU) retrieved this information This information was mailed to TWA by from the Internet. along with a letter describing what he observed on 07/17/96. TWA then mailed this data to the New York office of Investigation on _ 10/21/96 at PALM SPRINGS, CA (telephonically) File # 265A-NY-259028 Date dictated _10/22/96 by SA

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7/31/96

On 7/21/96, called the 800 number and reported that on 7/17/96, he saw what appeared to be a Roman candle go up and burst into balls of flame. was on a sailboat at the time. (control no. 1779)

On 7/31/96, Easton, MD, was interviewed telephonically by SA New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his observation on 7/17/96. furnished the following information.

During 7/14/96-7/28/96, were on a boating trip. On 7/14/96, they left Annapolis sailing on "TARKA" (WCEB011). By Wednesday evening on 7/17/96, they were about 22 miles off o<u>f SHINNECOCK.</u> was on the companion way about 8:30-8:45 p.m. He was looking toward the land when he saw what appeared to be a Roman candle or a flare come up from the horizon in an angle leaving a streak of The flare went off leaving a trail of red glow behind it light. and burst into red flame about a size of a beach ball. A second or two later, he saw another flare. It was lower than the the first flare. Then streaks of light fell into water dispersing black, heavy smoke.

whether the flare came up from land or water. He further stated that as he faced the land the first flare ascended from his left to his right and a second flare went in the same direction.

initially thought this occurrence was only about 2-3 miles away from where he was given the size of the flare. He could not each the Coast Guard on Channel 22 because of another communication being transmitted at the time.

location at the time was latitude: 40-28-62, longitude: 72-22-79. He calculated that he was approximately 16 miles from the occurence of the flare. He also heard a radio messad Ptoppelicopter belonging to the National Air Guard who WITH/TEXT

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/28/96

On July 21, 1996,, also known as (aka)
Social Coourity Number residing at
number was interviewed at her residence was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, which was to ascertain her knowledge and observations regarding an explosion which occurred on July 17, 1996, at approximately 8:30 PM. Thereafter, provided the following information:
On July 17, 1996, was watering plants in the front yard of her residence which is located on the northern shore of Shinecock Bay. At approximately 8:30 PM, observed a bright, hot orange elongated ball of fire falling toward the horizon south, southwest of her location. The fireball was quite elongated and was visible to for approximately five (5) seconds until it disappeared into the horizon.
estimated that the elongated fireball was approximately two (2) miles away. This estimate was based on the large size and clarity of the elongated fireball. advised that the actual explosion occurred approximately ten (10) miles from her location. heard no noise associated with the elongated fireball.
her husband, Who was inside the residence at the time Was present during the interview and concurred with the observations made by
described the fireball as cyndrical in size, red/orange in color and descending downward, curving east prior to disappearing into the horizon. No noise was heard by regarding the fireball.
estimated the fireball to be approximately two (2) miles away at the time of the occurrence. estimates the actual explosion occurred approximately fifteen (15) miles away.
favestigation on 07/21/96 at Hampton Bays, New York
File # 265A-NY-259048
by <u>SA</u> Date distated <u>07/24/96</u>
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informati they reca explosion	ion regardin all any othe a to reconta	co g the explosio r information/ ct the Federal	uld not provi n. They were observations Bureau of In	de any additiona advised that if related to the vestigation (FBI	ы).
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-1-FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date of transcription 8/8/96 bб b7C 1996 <u>On July</u> 28 Date of Birth Mastic Beach. New York (NY) 11951, Social Security telephone number Account Number _____ an electrician for the Long Island Railroad, Hillside Avenue, NY telephone number 1 800-728-3922, was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview.] provided the following information: On July 17. 1996. was on a boat fishin and brother-in-law <u>father</u>-in-law,L , on the southern tip of the east jetty (Moniches). approximately 8:30 pm observed a small red dot then a flash/ball of fire followed by flames. This ball of fire sizzled out/and fell vertically when another flash/ball of/flames appeared. This second ball of flames went out and fell vertically toward the water. The two flashes/balls of flames lasted only approximately ten seconds in the sky. was The approximately six to seven miles away from the flames. flames were in a southeastern direction from and were at approximately a 70 degree to 80 degree angle upward in the sky. did not see the point of origin of the flames but informed the Agents that he thought the flames were from a flare gun at first. did not hear an explosion nor did he observe the object which was on fire. At approximately 7:45 pm observed a 25-foot (approximate) inboard high speed boat go out of the Moriches inlet, direction unknown, prior to the balls of flames in the did not remember seeing the boat after the flames sky. [but recalled a White male and White female being on board the speed boat (no further descriptions given). 265A-NY-259028-SUB 362 SEARCHED _____UNDEXED ______UNDEXED ______ NOV 121996 FBI-NEW YORK Investigation on 7/28/96 Mastic Beach, New York (telephonically) at File # 265A-NY-259028 LLLL. Date dietated 7/28/96 by'

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agents	s and the purp	pose of the	interview.	then f	urnished
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to two	on July : miles east	17, 1996, of <u>Smith</u> foi	was sur .nt Park wit	ting approxim h	ately one Between
8:30 <u>p</u> a flar	m and 8:45 pr ce-like object	m, was	looking so describ	utheast when ed the FIO as	ne observed reddish-
white	in color asc	ending in a	straight li	ne at a one o	<u>'clock</u>
angle ímmedj	(from perpend ately faced !	dicular) fro back towards	m his vanta the shore	ge point.	At that
time,[direct	ted aaaaa	ttention ba	ck to/the sou	theast
thouse	and feet which	h he describ	ed as two h	mately one to ouse-sizes in	two diameter.
senara	advised that	as the expl	osion quick	ly descended,	it timued to
observ	re <u>the two</u> se	ctions until	he lost si	ght of them i	n the
ocean. light	up the sky a	sed that the od the ocean	explosion Approxim	was bright en atelv one min	ough to ute after
	lost sight of	f the explos	ion, he hea	rd a thunder-	like noise
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On July 26. 1996. Date of Birt	h. wag
advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and purpose of the interviewthen furnished the foll information:	d the lowing
On July 17, 1996, was on a boat located Gun Dock, Morriches, New York. Also on the boat was	<u>at G</u> reat
At approximately 8:45 pm 10	oked
rocket ascending straight up. The rocket was silver in with sparks coming out of the endestimated the to the rocket location was 3-4 milesobserved the ascending for a lengthy period of time and then develop whitish glow. The glow then turned into a massive burst reddish flames which descended towards the ocean.	color distance he rocket into a t of
At no time did see a smoke trail from the ascending rocket and theorized that a small aircraft was involved.	he s
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Investigation on 7/26/96 at Southampton, New York	·
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Date of Contacte Agents a	On July Birth ed.	22, 1996, Home Teler Was informed ed the followi	Home address hone number of the idention ng information	wh ty of in	<u>iterne Male</u> , was terviewing
number 9 after 6 a flash time thi there wa	5 on July 1 00PM. out of the is occurred as still li	had gone <u>down</u> 7, 1996 said that corner of his , the sun had ght in the sky	to Robert Mose arrived at at approximat eye. gone down beyo	s Beach, the bea ely 8:30 said th nd the h	Field ch a little PM, he saw at at the orizon but
saw the camera 1	flash. He flash going said that	was looking di initially the off or a ligh the flash came	rectly out to ought that it o ntning bolt in from southeas	the wate ould hav the dist t of his	r when he e been a ance. position.
the flas line smo the edge initial horizon were are observed the whit followed	sh, he saw oke trail. es. by thought thy thought ching in a d the star te star poi d it.	said that when a small white The smoke tra was unsure of that it had of said that the north easterly point, it was nt was brighte	he looked in star point foluin may have be of the distance courred on his star point and direction. We on a downward er than the smooth	the dire lowed by en sligh of this side of the smo Men arch oke trail	ction of a fine- tly wavy at object but the <u>ke trail</u> said which
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Investigation on	7/22/96	at			
File # 265A-N	Y-259028	H:meg)			
bw SA		111	Date dict	$t = \frac{1}{23}$	/96

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•	Continuation of FD-302 of, On, On
	said that earlier in the evening, he had observed an unusual boat operating about 200 yards off-shore. described the boat as an "old ugly iron-hulled trawler" about hundred feet in length. said that he noted the boat because it appeared unusual. It was a trawler but had no outriggers and the railing and cabin appeared rusty and decrepit. The hull of the boat was white and the bow was very round.
	not see any person on the boat.
	provided two diagrams which he had made representing the events he observed the night of July 17.
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<page-header> Preduce Preduce</page-header>)-392 (Rey. 3-10-82)	
DECREPTION DEPENDENCIPATION Image: Decreption of the second state of the second state of the interview of the i	- 1 -	ь6 Ь7С
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Image: A state of the state of the shooting stars cane down one after another approximately is to 20 seconds. Durther state of the state of t		
home residence of ratenomic New York 1972, telephone (home) work! Social Security Account Number (SSAN) way interviewed at his place of employment and was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, which was to ascertain his knowledge and observations of the evening of July 17, 1996. Thereafter, provides the following information: Image: the sky from behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be five or six shooting stars, while in color, with 20 to 30 feet white tails trailing behind. image: the sky from behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be five or six shooting stars, while in color, with 20 to 30 feet white tails trailing behind. image: training behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be five or six shooting stars, which fall together; however, all were white in color. in difference Between the approximately two seconds apart. advised that the shooting stars fell one after another except for two which fall together; however, all were white in color. of the stars in his sight before they were out of sight was approximately 15 to 20 seconds. form this location. gatted that he saw no smoke and heard no noise, as the shooting stars travelled southwest over the roof at his house and over the ording stars moved quickly across the sky, each one in sight for only a second. YEAANY-259028-SUB York WINVICY: YALYOF	Date of Birth (DOB)	
Patchnomic New York 172, telephone (Long) work! Socnal Security Account Number (SAN) advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, which was to ascertain his knowledge and observations of the evening of July 17, 1996. Thereafter, on July 17, 1996, he was sitting on his pool diving boat looking at the sky from behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be five or six shooting stars, which has hooter approximately two seconds apart advised that the shooting stars fell one after another except for two which fell together; however, all wree white in color further stated that the shooting stars seemed to travel from the northeast to the southeast at an 80 degree angle (approximately), three miles away from his location stated that he saw no smoke and heard no noise, as the shooting stars travelled southwest over the roof at his house and over the moof at his house and over the developments disappearing from sight for only a second. UPLOADED	home residence of	
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advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, which was to ascertain his knowledge and observations of the evening of July 17, 1996. Thereafter, provides the following information: on July 17, 1996, he was sitting on his pool diving board looking at the sky from behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be five or six shooting stars, while in color, with 20 to 30 feet white tails trailing behind further stated that the shooting stars came down one after another approximately two seconds apart advised that the shooting stars fell one after another sight before they were out of sight was approximately 15 to 20 seconds further stated that the shooting stars in his sight before they were out of sight was approximately 15 to 20 seconds further stated that the shooting stars are and over the from the northeast to the southeast at an 80 degree angle (approximately), three miles away from his location stated that he saw no smoke and heard no noise, as the shooting stars moved quickly across the sky, each one in sight for only a second	Twork) Social Security Account Numb	er (SSAN)
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PETITION

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project , June 9, 2013

NameJohn Desmond	Signature	<u>A.P.l</u>
date:		V

Address:	(b)(6)	<u></u>
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The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Name VERNION L. GROESignature Tenow	
date: 8 JANI (3 (Titles qualifications): NTSB MEMBER, 1983-84	
Address: (b)(6)	
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Email address:	(b)(6)
ctuan audress.	

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Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Name CHARLES V. WETLI MD	Signature	- (2007)	······································
date: 01-17-13			
(Titles, qualifications): <u>Forwaric</u>	PATTOLOGIST		
Address:			
Email address: _(b)(6)			

FINDINGS

1. The explosion that caused the crash was external to the aircraft.

2. FAA radar sites recorded fast-moving debris that traveled perpendicular to the flight path, just after Flight 800 lost electrical power. A ballistics analysis of this debris plume shows that the explosion that accelerated this debris was high-velocity, a detonation. No mechanism or event in the official low-velocity fuel-air explosion theory can account for this radar evidence.

3. A significant number of credible eyewitness accounts are consistent with an external event.

4. The CIA produced an inaccurate crash animation, without consulting with Boeing, the aircraft manufacturer. The group at the CIA who produced the animation were not qualified to simulate aircraft flight paths.

5. Both the CIA and NTSB crash sequence simulations are inaccurate since they diverge from the radar tracked flight path and deviate from the tolerances imposed by the FAA radar tracking. The simulations do not match the observations of the witnesses with descriptions of the early crash sequence.

6. There remain significant anomalies in the way this investigation was conducted. There were numerous violations of customary and normal investigative protocol, which are contrary to the provisions set forth in title 49 CFR 830 and NTSB Board orders.

7. Contrary to legal directives set forth in the code of federal regulations, the NTSB allowed their investigation to be superseded by the FBI's investigation.

8. The NTSB's probable cause determination for the crash of TWA Flight 800 is not supported by the physical evidence, the witness statements, or other facts.

Henry F. Hughes NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired) Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator Lisa Michecson 7-15 Sorensen 7-15-DRER LEMMER 7-15-12 garet Giustiano 1-15 orunic Kanton TORIE KRUKAR MAR 7-15-13-

Page 69 of 103
PETITION

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800. Please add my name and petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's. Finding and determination of the probable cause of TWA Flight 800.

The TW	A 800 Project
Name:	SANARA-JACO AS Prisignature The Ang fille period
Address	(b)(6)
Date:	9/2/32/3

hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the	e accident investigation of TWA 800.			
Please add my name as petitioner to the	Petition for the Reconsideration and Mod	lification of the National T	ransportation	
Safety Board's Finding and Determinatio	n of the Probable Cause for the Crash TW/	A Flight 800		
Name	Adress	Phone #	Signature	Date
Norma Westall	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Horma Westall	9-4-12
JOANN BARTER	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	John Bonton	9,4.12
CARLA GOWDY	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	A A A Z	Stat- 5,2012
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Henry F. Hughes NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)

Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup	
Physicist and Independent Investigator	
KENNETH MICORE	(b)(6)
TXCTCCC Man Mar 1991	
JACKOLYN B. STADTA	1AN
guilding Stattman	■(b)(6)
PAULINE BRECHINRIDGE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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	(b)(6)

PETITION

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The TW.	A 800 Project	,
Name: /	MADOWN AGBI MUNTI Signature Munthing	Auginary
Address:	(b)(6) Phone Number:	(b)(6)
Date:	9-2-12	

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the	accident investigation of TWA 800 .			
Please add my name as petitioner to the	Petition for the Reconsideration and Mo	dification of the National	Transportation	
Safety Board's Finding and Determination	n of the Probable Cause for the Crash TW	A Flight 800		
Name	Adress	Phone #	Signature	Date
ALAIN DUGUAY	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	-t-t	- 09/09/12
SUSAN VENTRELLA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Ston ball	09/15/12
Tony Ventulla	LX	(I	For Vorticla	09-1572
William E Halderman	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Win his S flot am	09-18-12
Susan D. Haldorna	\ <i>\</i>	۱)	Summer & all down	- 09 - 18 - 1.
Rosielversen	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Prois neron	4-20-12
STEVE HARDER	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Shaff	9/20/12
Paul Skellet	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Pare 8 Recent	9/20/12
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Please add my name as petitioner to the	Petition for the Reconsideration and Modifi	cation of the National 1	Transportation	
Safety Board's Finding and Determination	on of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA F	light 800		
Name	Adress	Phone #	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>
JAMESRHOHMANN	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Jan R. H.	SEPt 15 2012
Paul Robinson	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Adam	15 2012
JOHN KROWSK:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	- Juli	9/15/2012
Lavid Uldnick	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Det Hay	9/20/12

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accid	lent investigation of TWA 800 .		······································	
Please add my name as petitioner to the Petit	ion for the Reconsideration and Modil	fication of the National Tr	ansportation	·····
Safety Board's Finding and Determination of t	ne Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Adress	Flight 800 Phone #	Signature	Date
GREEG TOSEILO	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	for a struct	8/30/ 2012
Laure Ritkovio	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Jana Attoric	9-2-12
Nes/Silth	(b)(6)	(b)(6)] dow forth	9 2/12
ind cenerizo	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Alexand	9-2-2
MARY ANN Wilson	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	malla	9/3/12
Juan Harris	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Our that	9/3/12
BARBARA SAHAR	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	And the second	9/13/12
Dunna Shevitz	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Jeily .	9/1/12
Nowcy McLean	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Ma Mr Ha) 9/9/12
Susan Limares	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	a Contraction	9/20/12

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I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accide	ent investigation of TWA 800 .			
Please add my name as petitioner to the Petitio	on for the Reconsideration and Mod	ification of the National	Transportation	
Safety Board's Finding and Determination of th Name	e Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Adress	A Flight 800 Phone #	Signature	Date
MARY NORERA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Margin from	9/3/12
Hidul Themas	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	1 1 Kita	9/4/12_
Dave Carnaghi	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Da-	9/6/12
HADRIS	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		9/14/201
iamela Fisher	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		9/15/2012
Janis R Williams	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	PR Williams	9/15/12
LisaLorusso	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Anuso-	9/15/1-
Allan Bigs / and	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	<u>A hoje</u>	9/15/1.
Torya Schwartz	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		91.71.2
Lucille Uldnok	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Junice rolding	1/20/12

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On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Rick Carlton wrote:

Hi friends -

I have received an alternate form and method for submitting the TWA-800 petition.

This subject is very Important to many of us in aviation, and there are many mysteries surrounding this "crash" and investigation. I am urging you to take this small step to insure that justice has been served. Ours is in the mail.

Many thanks,

Rick Carlton

METHOD 1:

Copy, print, fill out this short form, add address, phone #, e-mail, etc., and snail mail to Bill Smith.

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800. Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project

Name James A. Barber	Signature	Burba
date: 8/24/12		

Address:	A	
		 ممد جيمين من ال

United Airlines Captain (retired), etc.

You are welcome to add any other title or degree like former Navy or Air Force Pilot, Flight Surgeon, Scientific titles or degrees, etc. anything that would indicate that you are knowledgeable and experienced in aeronautics and the associated fields, which would indicate that you understand the subject and disagree with the findings. It would not be helpful to make political comments on this form, so resist the urge.

Page 78 of 103

Add your address and phone number or email address.

METHOD 2:

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012 auria Name Signature FREDERICK H. MEYER 23 2012 8 date: United Airlines Captain (retired) (b)(6)

PETITION

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The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Name DEWS J. CMALLEY Signature -i> date: Aule. 21, 2012

United Airlines Captain (retired)

(b)(6)

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Name Harold C. Lloyd, Jr. Signature date <u>August 25, 2012</u> 1 140 -United Airlines Captain (retired) USAF Flight Examiner Pilot Colonel (retired)

(b)(6)			
(b)(6)	Cell	(b)(6)	
(b)(6)			

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Henry F. Hughes NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)

Robert A. Young

Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator

KWURNWORMER SILVER O.)	(b)(6)
CAPTRET MAL 24 Au62012	
Roberta S. Ven Wormer that Statione	(b)(6)
Deborah S. VanWormer -	(b)(6)

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Safety Board's Finding and Determination (Name	of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Fli Adress	ght 800 Phone #	Signature	Date
Upsula Junith	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	advance mint	7/26/12
Willion F. Ch Jai	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	<u>Land</u>	8/2/2
Wigma R Widd	(b)(6)	(b)(6)] Lignice Relation	8 /26 /12
Stere Cighour	(b)(6)	(b)(6)] <u>St-Caller</u>	8/26/12
Jally Kegs	(b)(6)	(b)(6)		- 8-26-12
ROBERT SMith	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	RANA-	8-28-12
JAIVETA VANPELL	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Sauch 1 the Piet	8/29/12
MARY K BIMBA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Finance K. Kimba	8/29/12
Judy SMITH-RENNEDY	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	- Anti Kana	3/29/12
Marica Vaunders	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	Maria Abarnelos	5 8/39/12
	j / · · · ·	7		

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The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012

(b)(6) George Name____ Signature date:<u>8/2</u>

George E. Nolly, Captain, UAL, Retired Doctor of Business Administration I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

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Aug 23, 2012	
Name: David E. Ott_	· / · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Signature	×
date: 8/23/2012	
United Airlínes [/] Captain (r	etired)
(b)(6)	

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Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator



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8/6/2012



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Captain James Speer Pilot and former Airline Pilots Association Aircraft Crash Investigator

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Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project

Name:	Carl A Hankwitz
Signature:	Carl Corputing
Date:	August 29, 2012
Address:	(b)(6)
Email:	(b)(6)

Certifications:

Retired FAA Aircrew Program Designee: B-747, B-737

Retired Standards Captain, United Airlines: B-747, B-737

Prior Lt., United States Coast Guard – Rescue Acft. Cmdr.

The TWA 800 Project

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Name	George W. Howell, Jr.	
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Signatu	re <u>processes to to</u>	
Date:	August 26, 2012	.
Address	(b)(6) s:	
Title: (Captain, United Airlines (retired)	

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Henry F. Hughes NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)

Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator	Que la se
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Omes Stava	(b)(6)
-TACOUELINE STUBBS	(b)(6)
DAVID STUBBS	(b)(6)

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Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator	
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KAYE JUHL	(b)(6)
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Robert A. Young

Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

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With Hilling St. Hotelling	(b)(6)	
Marci D. Prinkiek	(b)(6)	
Latrica Retainer	(b)(6)	

PETITION

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I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project , June 9, 2013

Name DENN	<u>IS F. SHANAHAN</u> Signat	ature <u>Comments Manufac</u>
date: Juniz	F 2013	
(Titles, qualifica	ations): M.D. M.P.H.	
Address:	(b)(6)	
	(b)(6)	
Email address:	(b)(6)	

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te: 19 Scort 2012	
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The TWA 800 Project

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Name TOM ERICKSON S date: 9-4-12	ignature
Add (b)(6)]
Title, Degrees, Certifications <u>BA</u> <u>U. OFMINNESOTA</u> , <u>PILOT</u> <u>U</u> <u>727</u> , 707, OC-10, B.747, B-747-40	SAF/ANG RETIKED PILOT NW AIRLINES DO INSTRUCTOR PILOT

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The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012	
Name ALAN L. BLACK	_ Signature
date: AUGUST 24,2012	
United Airlines Captain (retired)	
(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
Ine IWA SUU Project July 15, 2012	
Name_Richard L. Carlton	
Signature	
date:_August	
23,2012	······
Nome 111 A Controp	
Name_JIII A. Cariton	<u> </u>
Signature <u>fix a Castlor</u> date:_August 23.2012	
United Airlines Flight Attendant (retired)	
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Capt. HKay Jam

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The TWA 800 Project

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Name H. PAYLAHR Signature Khay	(b)(6)	
date: Aug 24, 2012 - (b)(6)		
Address: (b)(6)		
United Alir		

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You are welcome to add any other title or degree like former Navy or Air Force Pilot, Flight Surgeon, Scientific titles or degrees, etc. anything that would indicate that you are knowledgeable and experienced in aeronautics and the associated fields, which would indicate that you understand the subject and disagree with the findings. It would not be helpful to make political comments on this form, so resist the urge.

Add your address and phone number or email address.

From:	Mayer David
Sent:	17 Sep 2013 09:45:36 -0400
То:	Moye Melba
Subject:	FW: TWA 800 movie
Attachments:	Petition for Reconsideration, The TWA 800 Project, 6-19-2013.pdf

Last one...

From: Mayer David Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 12:22 PM To: Chappell Sheryl; Bing Candi Subject: FW: TWA 800 movie

Please enter this into CNS as a PFR. Thanks.

From:	Sind-Prunier Paula
Sent:	16 May 2013 20:25:59 -0400
То:	Mayer David;Bishop Jennifer;DeLisi John;Chappell Sheryl
Cc:	Klejst Stephen;Bury Karen
Subject:	RE: TWA flight 800 Petition for Reconsideration

I had checked, and we had no record of it. However, not knowing who they addressed it to, we can't know for sure. Even more so than any other mode, aviation petitions seem to come in addressed to OAS or the IIC directly. If AS hasn't seen anything, then we probably didn't receive it.

Sent with Good (www.good.com)

-----Original Message----From: Mayer David
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2013 05:36 PM Eastern Standard Time
To: Bishop Jennifer; DeLisi John; Sind-Prunier Paula; Chappell Sheryl
Cc: Klejst Stephen; Bury Karen
Subject: TWA flight 800 Petition for Reconsideration

Tom Stalcup's group is expected to announce this summer that they have filed a PFR with us for TWA flight 800. Of course we processed a petition from them about ten years ago. But they have a new petition that has been widely available on the internet for about 6 months or longer. I do not believe that we have ever received a copy of that new Petition. Can you verify for me that this we have not received a Petition pertaining to TWA 800 in recent months? Thanks.

David