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Description of document:	Annual Historical Review, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), FY 1980
Requested date:	10-June-2008
Release date:	24-October-2018
Posted date:	03-December-2018
Source of document:	Freedom Of Information Act Request Commander, INSCOM ATTN: IAMG-C-FOI 2600 Ernie Pyle St. Fort Meade, MD 20755-5995

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

OCT 24 2018

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for the INSCOM Annual History FY 1981 and supplements our letter of March 11, 2015.
1980

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized as it is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

In addition, information has been withheld pursuant to Title 5 U. S. Code 552(b)(3) of the FOIA. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information that is exempt by statute. The applicable statute is 50 U. S. Code 3024i which protects intelligence sources and methods.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Gary W. Johnston, the Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (APPEAL)
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA), that their information, contained in the records has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4 of Executive Order (EO) 13526, as amended. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) of EO 13526.

5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:
50 U.S.C. Code 3605 (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)
50 U.S.C. 3024(i)

The withholding of the information by the NSA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal/Privacy Act Authority. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe release of the information is required. Please cite FOIA Case #67170 assigned to the case so that it could be easily identified.

Coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been completed and we have been informed by the CIA that their information is partially releasable pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2016-00162 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA and Executive Order 13526 §§ 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). The applicable Statute is 10 U.S.C. §424 .

Their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424 (b)(3), which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A (FOIA), Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA MDR-0174-2012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #595F-08. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: <https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx>. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FA-08-2823. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,



Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FISCAL YEAR 1980

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

(RCS CSHIS-6(R3))

September 1980

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The Appended Documents

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Sensitive Sources and
Methods Involved.

WARNING

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
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PREFACE

(U) The Annual Historical Review was prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies and Procedures. The purpose of the report is to provide a reference and research base as well as a summary of the significant activities, events, and accomplishments of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) during FY 1980. Particular attention was paid to the preparation of the FY 1980 Review to insure that the truly significant events and developments which had a major impact on the policy, organization, and functions of the command were documented. Principal source materials used in compilation included the annual historical reports, briefings, INSCOM Quarterly Program Reviews, interviews, and miscellaneous documents and reports.

(U) The FY 1980 Annual Historical Review was the first summary in twenty-four years not edited by Miss Virginia A. Ferrell, who retired from Federal Service in January 1981 after having served as Editor-Writer for the INSCOM History Office since 1956. Professionally, Miss Ferrell was recognized by her associates for her ability to express herself clearly and concisely in her writings, her editorial skills, and her knowledge of the command's organization and mission. Miss Ferrell was solely responsible for the establishment of probably the most valuable and frequently used of the History Office's reference documents--the historical data cards. Through her initiative, she created a format and maintained detail and accurate records pertaining to changes in the status of units worldwide. Besides her lasting contributions to the documentation of the history of Military Intelligence, Miss Ferrell will be remembered for the spirit of teamwork which she fostered within the History Office.

(U) This summary was prepared by Mr. James L. Gilbert with review and editing being accomplished by Ms. Diane L. Hamm, who joined the History Office as Editor-Writer on 12 April 1981.



JAMES L. GILBERT
Command Historian

September 1981

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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CHAPTER I

FY 1980 OVERVIEW

(u)
(S//NOFORN) Over the past four years, decisions emerging from the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) have resulted in fundamental changes in the philosophy and structure of Military Intelligence. FY 1980 symbolically drew to a close the formative years of INSCOM during which the command expended much effort to define its role and to gain acceptance within the Army. Actions taken to develop Echelons Above Corps (EAC) intelligence structures in Pacific, Europe, and CONUS were representative of the many transitional changes occurring during FY 1980. IOSS which led to the establishment of INSCOM, first recognized the need for a peacetime Pacific Army Component Headquarters staff to facilitate transition to war and to provide peacetime intelligence and security support. HQ INSCOM addressed the problem in INSCOM OPLAN 1-79, resulting in the organization of an INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center (Provisional) (ITIC) at Fort Shafter, Hawaii on 1 October 1979. Command and control of ITIC-PAC remains with INSCOM until PACOM DEFCON 3, when OPCON passes to the US Army Western Command as it transitions to the US Army, Pacific. The Center's mission includes complete integration of enemy, weather and terrain intelligence support to WESTCOM and other Pacific Command Army elements. Among its first year achievements, ITIC-PAC participated with the 372d ASA Company in a detailed analysis of the tactics, doctrine and organization of North Korean artillery elements of regimental echelon and below and also played a crucial role in the timely exploitation of a Soviet data collection device recovered at sea near the main island of Hawaii.

(S//NOFORN) In January 1980, the organizational and operational concepts for EAC intelligence structures in Europe and CONUS were developed to support the total Army Analysis (TAA) 86, which reprogrammed approximately 1,200 and 600 TOE spaces (exclusive of INSCOM TDA resources) for EAC support in Europe and CONUS, respectively. As a result of the concepts' approval by HQDA and the reprogramming actions, several significant organizational changes were undertaken: USAREUR would transfer the 502d ASA Group to the 66th MI Group on 1 October 1980; an INSCOM LNO to CINCUSAREUR would be established; HQ 66th MI Group reorganized; and provision made for activation of the USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC) during exercises. In March 1980, the 66th MI Group participated in Exercise CARAVAN WEST II and for the first time tested the formation of the Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) under the command of the DCSI, USAREUR. In the process, the Group provided one-third of the staffing for the USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center and gave extensive multi-discipline intelligence and security support to participating units during CRESTED EAGLE 80.

(S//NOFORN) In addition to the previously mentioned organizational changes, the organizational and operational concepts for Europe and CONUS provided for the FY 83 activation of the 513th MI Group in CONUS. During transition to war, the unit's personnel will deploy to Europe, but during peacetime contingencies, the Group will provide general support to FORSCOM and its elements of the

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Rapid Deployment Force or other Joint Task Forces. While EAC intelligence support requirements for contingencies have not yet been fully defined, the multidiscipline nature of the CONUS structure furnishes the potential for its deployment as an entity or in tailored packages to satisfy requirements as they are articulated. An ancillary benefit of the 513th Group's activation is that a mechanism will be provided to facilitate readiness development of EAC active and reserve intelligence organizations to meet war and contingency requirements.

Multidiscipline Operations. (U) Cdr. INSCOM initiated a review of the historical development of the HQ INSCOM organization with the view of improving the structure and concluded that the HQDA guidance as found in IOSS and succeeding instructions had not been completely fulfilled. As a result of the study's findings, on 1 May 1980, the counterintelligence and production functions from other staff elements were joined with those of collection already within ODCSOPS, forming a multidiscipline organization at the HQ INSCOM staff level. The same study also resulted in the establishment of the Marketing Group within ODCSOPS. The ultimate purpose of the Group is to serve as INSCOM's sensing arm for identification of user intelligence requirements against the full spectrum of INSCOM operations and to assist INSCOM customers in articulation and prioritization of those intelligence needs. In summary, the purpose of the Marketing Group is to improve the way INSCOM conducts business for its customers.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ During FY 1980, HQ INSCOM took significant steps to effect a multidiscipline approach among its units worldwide drafting the Mission Reference Guidance and the Operational Data Exchange Regulation. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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~~(S/NOFORN)~~

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) IMINT. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ During 1980, HQ INSCOM developed a program to station INSCOM Collection, Processing, Analysis and Reporting (CPAR) Element analysis cells at the Naval Security Group's CLASSIC WIZZARD operational ELINT sites. Known as TRUE BLUE, the program is part of the Department of the Army Tactical Exploitation of National Space Capabilities (TENCAP) Master Plan, and the CPAR teams are to satisfy Army tactical commanders requirements. The initial two-man team was established in November 1979 at NSG Activity, Edzell, Scotland.

(U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The past year witnessed INSCOM's exercising operational control for collection and exploitation requirements levied against national satellite imagery assets by Army units outside of the Unified and Specified Commands. HQ INSCOM had assumed responsibility for the Army Element at the Community Support Center on 1 October 1979.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(1) Per NSA

(S/NOFORN)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(S/CCO) The plan to establish a Tri-Service Remote Operations Facility at Kunia, Hawaii, responsible for collection, first-echelon processing, and timely reporting [redacted] on schedule. During the 3d Quarter FY 1980, an NSACSS/INSCOM implementation Plan for the Quick Reaction Capability Phase of the Kunia Project was approved and published, and by exercising an intensive management effort, HQ INSCOM met all suspenses. On 1 October 1980 US Army Field Station Kunia was organized at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii with approximately 400 personnel assigned and became operational on 15 December when the first Remote Operations Facility (ROF), [redacted] was installed.

(C/CCO) Wobeck, West Germany, [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] Over the past several years, various tactical organizations manned the Wobeck site from out-of-hide resources. Whereas the situation was sufficient on a short term basis, INSCOM believed a more permanent solution was demanded and took the initiative to assume responsibility of the site as an EAC asset. Although the personnel and logistical problems were not completely solved, INSCOM had personnel on station for initial operational capability by the close of FY 1980.

(U) The 146th Army Security Agency Aviation Company (Forward) conspicuously distinguished itself as the foremost aviation unit in the United States Army by receiving both the Army Aviation Association of America and The Association of Old Crows Outstanding Aviation Unit Awards in 1980. The unit is unique in that it is the first company-size unit to combine all US Army fixed wing intelligence collection capabilities within a single organization. Although

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the unit was constantly undergoing changes in location, organization, and systems while experiencing critical equipment and personnel shortages, an overall 93 percent mission accomplishment rate was achieved.

(U) For the first time, INSCOM began to exercise its role in a viable manner as the Army's strategic SIGINT acquisition and developer coordinator. DA required a focal point to transition systems developed by NSACSS for the Army's operational use and in December 1979 formally recognized INSCOM as such. The command made significant progress in fulfilling its responsibilities by publication and distribution of INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25, the System Development Model, which would be available to all DA organizations to monitor and coordinate Army participation in development, support planning, field, and transition of strategic systems. The model provides an automated life cycle management which gives the status of the equipment at any time during its development cycle including funding and indicates the impact of the equipment on all organizations down to depots and direct support units in the theater of operations.

Production. (~~S/NOFORN~~) During FY 1980, the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center disseminated all-source, integrated intelligence products, threat analysis, and imagery exploitation for Department of the Army and major commands. Perhaps the most significant of the products was ITAC's expanded coverage to include detailed OB information and details of

(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i) Other representative studies included an ITAC-managed (b)(3);50 USC 3024(i) which resulted in significant updating of organization/disposition of the troops and ITAC's direct support imagery interpretation reports on (b)(3);50 USC 3024(i) which assisted the Navy and Air Force in their development of contingency plans for (b)(3);50 USC 3024.

(b)(1);(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i)

(U) In support of the RDJTF requirements, the Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) program was initiated. The purpose of the AIS is to provide detailed intelligence information on countries, thoroughly researched and validated, in order to aid and support tactical commanders and/or contingency planners in responding to crises and international situations requiring US involvement. Coverage of each country is divided into such categories as overview, geography, capabilities of ground forces, extent of counterintelligence medical/health environment, and potential for psychological operations. There exists the ongoing need to assure that prioritization of AIS is validated with Army component commanders of operational forces as well as the continual requirement to legitimize the AIS and other projects in support of the Joint Operations Planning System and contingency planning.

OPSEC/CI. (U) During FY 1980, the 902d MI Group provided CI and SIGSEC support to Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified command staffs, and major Army command staffs during three command post exercises and five field exercises. These included JCS-directed exercises PRIZE GAUNTLET 80, POSITIVE LEAP 80 and PROUD SPIRIT; similar support was provided during JCS coordinated exercises BRAVE SHIELD 80 and GALLANT KNIGHT 80, both sponsored by US Readiness Command. In addi-

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tion, for the first time, CI and SIGSEC resources were used to evaluate the operations security (OPSEC) posture of large numbers of contingency forces operating in a tactical mode. On three separate occasions, JCS requested that OPSEC support be provided at several locations throughout the continental United States to assess how well the units involved practiced OPSEC. As a result of lessons learned concerning tactical forces' OPSEC posture and INSCOM's capacity to support these types of operations, in the future INSCOM will be better prepared to expand the scope and nature of support to the Army's OPSEC program.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In late June, DCSOPS, DA, tasked INSCOM to perform an Operations Security Evaluation (OSE) of a Joint Training Exercise by operating covertly as a hostile intelligence source might do. The objective was to determine what an outside agency/force could learn about a highly sensitive and classified training exercise. Although given little information and utilizing only a small number of CI/SIGSEC personnel, INSCOM was able to determine the purpose of the exercise, the units involved, their role, and the EEI sought. Two months later, INSCOM was again tasked to perform an OSE of a similar joint training exercise. However, this time the exercise planners supplied additional information to INSCOM and authorized the CI/SIGSEC operators to communicate directly with the units involved so that on-the-spot corrections could be made.

(U) In mid-July 1980, an Operations Security (OPSEC) Evaluation Group, under the auspices of the ODCSOPS, HQDA, met for three days and recommended actions to tighten security and improve OPSEC in the Army at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. This declared "War on OPSEC" is a significant step forward in INSCOM's efforts to sell OPSEC. The VCSA recommendations were of two types: those actions which can be accomplished immediately and others which must be implemented as resources become available. Generally, actions requiring immediate action involved improving command emphasis on OPSEC, establishing procedures for incorporating OPSEC considerations in combat development/material acquisition processes, improving OPSEC training throughout the Army, activating an OPSEC program at DOD level, and developing an OPSEC threat data base.

(U) IOSS RELOOK. ~~(S)~~ On 21 July 1980, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army approved a number of recommendations resulting from IOSS Relook; one of these recommendations tasked INSCOM and OACSI to jointly develop a plan to resolve the division of responsibilities between INSCOM and OACSI concerning the administration of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) security programs within the Army. In an effort to centralize SCI operations, the responsibility for administering the Army's SCI program was placed with the principal security operator, INSCOM. On 1 October 1980, the USA Special Security Group and its functions were to be assigned to HQ INSCOM, allowing for increased control and expansion of INSCOM's support to ground force commanders.

(U) REDTRAIN. ~~(S)~~ HQDA designated Cdr, INSCOM as the Army Executive Agent for the US Army Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) program to assess the technical readiness of tactical SIGINT/EW personnel and units and their ability to perform the technical tasks required to effectively execute SIGINT

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and EW operations in peace and war. The first Technical Evaluation of Army Tactical (TEATAC) SIGINT/EW team deployed to Europe in January 1980 and was later followed by similar teams which visited FORSCOM and Pacific tactical units. The teams' findings concluded that tactical SIGINT/EW is suffering from a lack of personnel, operational equipment and technical training and documented the critical need for SIGINT REDTRAIN. These conclusions were presented in a briefing to the VCSA.

(U) The past year was one of expansion for the REDTRAIN program. For the first time both Reserve Component and National Guard units participated in REDTRAIN. In January, the 641st MI Detachment and the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center began to identify live environmental training (LET) opportunities appropriate for the 142d MI Company (Linguist) of the Utah National Guard. A major step was also made in June to fully integrate the Reserve Component into the program. The 314th MI Battalion (USAR) received personnel and training aid support from INSCOM REDTRAIN during the Battalion's Annual Training period. The effort was well received and serves as a basic design for future support to other RC units.

(U) During FY 1980, an increasing amount of INSCOM's REDTRAIN program was devoted to non-SIGINT training. The 641st MI Detachment developed the HUMINT REDTRAIN program/schedule to accommodate FORSCOM, WESTCOM and USAREUR personnel/units participating in Specialized Operational Training (SOT) and LET. The Detachment established over 110 LET/SOT opportunities worldwide and coordinated nearly 60 LET/SOT were interrogators. As manager of the IMINT REDTRAIN program, the US Army ITAC coordinated SOT for 49 active duty personnel, provided LET for 14 active and 80 Reserve personnel, and supported 16 Reserve units during their annual training. All in all, these actions represented an encouraging beginning for the non-SIGINT side of the REDTRAIN program.

Language Office. (U) Concern with the overall posture of recruitment, training, utilization, and retention of INSCOM linguists led to HQ INSCOM's establishment of the Language Office on 4 February 1980. As principal advisor on all matters concerning INSCOM linguists, the Language Office began to review linguistic readiness to develop proposals resolving problem areas. An integral part of this task was to provide input to a 23 October briefing for the Vice Chief of Staff, Army outlining the linguistic problems and recommending solutions.

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CHAPTER II

MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

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Mission and Functions. ~~(C)~~ The mission for the Commanding General, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (CG INSCOM), as set forth in AR 10-53, effective 15 June 1978, was to-

1. Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and electronic warfare (EW) operations in support of the Army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC).
2. Conduct Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) operations as a member of the United States SIGINT System (USSS).
3. Command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and serve as Chief of the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA).
4. Conduct Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.
5. Conduct CI investigations and operations, collection, production, and related CI support activities.
6. Provide Army-wide all-source multidisciplined Operational Security (OPSEC) support.
7. Conduct Army-wide signal security (SIGSEC) support operations.
8. Analyze, produce and disseminate all-source counterintelligence and general intelligence (less medical) and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army, as authorized by pertinent statutory and regulatory authorities.
9. Provide technical advice and operational assistance to other functional and operating Major Army Commands (MACOM's) in the discharge of their intelligence, EW and security responsibilities.
10. Act as the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Executive Agent for the management of the Military Intelligence Peacetime Utilization Program, Active and Reserve.
11. Provide advice, assistance and technical/operational support to insure maximum exploitation of national intelligence assets in improving ground processing and dissemination for tactical support from Special Activities Office (SAO) systems.
12. Act as the Initial Denial Authority (IDA) and Access Amendment Refusal (AAR) authority for all requests involving US Army intelligence investigative files.

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13. Act as the HQDA Executive Agent for target exploitation (TAREX), a cryptologic directed activity dealing with the collection and exploitation of cryptologic associated information, equipment, and documents.

14. Conduct, or participate in, photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.1

Location. (U) Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was located at Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22212. Until a final stationing decision is effected, certain staff functions will continue to be located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II. MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 1-2.

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CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

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Command and Staff Relationships. (C) AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, effective 15 June 1978, established the basic command and staff relationships for INSCOM. The regulation outlined the following relationships:

1. The CG, INSCOM, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Directives, authorities, policy, planning and programming guidance, approval programs, and resource allocations, and other methods of command direction are issued to CG, INSCOM, by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

2. The CG, INSCOM--

a. Commands the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and is subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS) for the conduct of SIGINT operations.

b. Manages SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS.

c. Provides specified military personnel and administrative, logistics, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS as authorized by HQDA.

d.

(b)(1) Per DIA

3. INSCOM and other MACOM's are coordinate elements of DA. The CG, INSCOM, is authorized to communicate directly with other major Army commands or with heads of Army Staff agencies on matters of mutual concern.

Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Developments. (U) The Department of Army recognized the need to constitute an Army organizational/force structure above corps. Initiating action to eliminate this shortfall, the Chief of Staff directed CDR, TRADOC in late 1979 to conduct a study to determine the doctrine and organizational structure for EAC. The study was to define the missions and interrelationships among divisions, corps, and supporting EAC organizations in the primary context of NATO (Armed Forces, Central Europe). The study would also describe conceptually the proper structure for EAC 86 in coalition warfare. TRADOC organized the EAC study group with representation from MACOM's, the TRADOC community, and NSACSS; the Commander, Combined Arms Center was designated as study director. TRADOC's EAC study effort was structured as a two-phase study with Phase I being completed in July 1980 and Phase II in progress. Phase I developed the basic broad organizational and operational (O&O) concept and identifying general doctrine.

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The intelligence portion of the TRADOC EAC study was identified as Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ISTA). Phase II of the study will develop more detailed and specific doctrine and force structures.

(U) INSCOM assumed the lead for intelligence matters. Because of the political environment with HQ TRADOC, the study progressed slowly. There was difficulty in obtaining approval of the CG TRADOC for Phase I, but it was anticipated it would be finally forthcoming in October 1980. Within the HQ INSCOM staff, there were initial concerns expressed as to the direction of Phase I of the study, because it was felt that intelligence had taken a step backward from the O&O concept developed by USAREUR and INSCOM during late 1979 and early 1980. However, through the active participation of ODCSFM, INSCOM's concerns were made known, resulting in the development of an acceptable multidisciplined intelligence structure for EAC.²

Combat Development/Materiel Acquisition Role. (U) Based on the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, INSCOM's predecessor, the US Army Security Agency, was diverted of its combat developments and materiel acquisition functions. To date, the Major Commands charged with development and acquisition of strategic SIGINT systems have not completely filled the void. In addition, there exists the need for a translator to help bridge the DA system with the NSACSS. In recognition of these requirements, on 19 December 1979, HQDA established INSCOM, the Army's Service Cryptologic Element, as the single contact point to coordinate the Army's support planning and other efforts related to strategic SIGINT systems developed by NSACSS.

(U) In this role, INSCOM will assure appropriate distribution of information (NSACSS plans, system coordinating papers, etc.) involving Army commands and activities; consolidate MACOM positions and develop consolidated Army response to NSACSS; coordinate logistics assignments proposed by NSACSS with appropriate Army activities; assume the overall responsibility for overall coordination of Army training requirements for an NSACSS developed system; evaluate on-site user tests of NSACSS fielded materiel; and chair the development acceptance in-process review during the materiel development stages of the life cycle.

(U) Besides the establishment of INSCOM as the point of contact for the Army's strategic SIGINT systems, there was also the publication of the System Development Model (INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25) in July 1979 and the Systems Status Handbook in February 1979. The model which would be available to all DA organizations would give the status of the strategic equipment at any time during its development cycle including funding and impact of the equipment on all organizations. The handbook provided a base upon which future INSCOM/DA resource requirements could be identified and appropriate programming action initiated. Finally, on 1 May 1980, INSCOM created a DCS, Force Modernization to insure that SIGINT systems, which are developed by NSACSS for use in field stations, are in fact transferred to the Army's system so that once a system is delivered the resources required to maintain and support it will also be in place. The DCSFM parallels the establishment of Force Modernization at HQDA for the purpose of tracking all systems which are introduced into the Army's inventory over the next five year period.³

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Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) Reread. (C) In early December 1979, the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army directed that his Management Directorate (DACS-DMA) lead an examination of IOSS, not for the purpose of initiating major changes in the direction of the original study but rather to validate IOSS findings in light of current reality. The VCSA tasked selected members of the Army Staff and Major Commands to report on the status of IOSS actions and issues remaining to be addressed. As a result of input received, a conference was held in January 1980, and recommendations formulated. These findings were coordinated among the MACOM's and Army Staff prior to being presented to the VCSA during a July decision briefing. The final recommendations were less supportive of INSCOM than those which initially emerged from the January 1980 working conference. However, as a whole, they appear to represent a substantial step forward in achieving IOSS objectives.

- (U) ~~(C)~~ There were two important decisions which resulted from the July briefing to the VCSA. The VCSA directed the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to lead an ad hoc study group with representatives from INSCOM, DARCOM, TRADOC, The Surgeon General (TSG), and Health Services Command (HSC) for the purpose of conducting a detailed examination of the Army's entire threat and analysis production effort. In early October 1980, representatives from OACSI presented a decision briefing to the VCSA. To achieve the most effective and efficient manner of providing threat and analysis production support, the study group recommended two alternatives. The first was to retain the current organizational structure with the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) subordinate to DARCOM and the Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (MIIA) subordinate to TSG. The second alternative was to reassign FSTC, MIA, and MIIA to INSCOM. Based on the October briefing, the VCSA chose the first alternative but emphasized the responsibilities which INSCOM, TSG, and DARCOM had toward each other in the area of the Army's Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) production activities.

- (U) ~~(C)~~ Another recommendation approved in July by the VCSA was the tasking of INSCOM and OACSI to jointly develop a plan to resolve their divided administration of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) security programs within the Army. In an effort to centralize SCI operations, MG Rolya, CDR INSCOM, and MG Thompson, ACSI, approved a plan dated 28 August which placed the administrative responsibility with INSCOM, the principal security operator. As a result, the US Army Special Security Group was to be transferred to HQ INSCOM effective 1 October 1980. The plan also called for an INSCOM concept for SSO support to the Army to include provisions for possible future decentralization of SSO operations to regional Intelligence Commands (MI Groups).⁴

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INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center, Pacific. ~~(C)~~ The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study recognized the need for a peacetime Pacific Army component headquarters staffed to facilitate transition to war and to provide peacetime intelligence and security support. In the draft of FM 100-16 dated November 1977, INSCOM postulated the creation of a Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC). Exercise NIFTY NUGGET reinforced the need for TAIC.

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In November 1978, CG, US Army CINCPAC Support Group requested INSCOM to establish a TAIC in the Pacific Command. This request was part of the overall planning effort associated with the establishment in Hawaii of an Army MACOM and Army component command of the Pacific Command. In April 1979, the US Army Western Command (WESTCOM) was established as the Army component command of PACOM vice USARPAC. WESTCOM has DA MACOM responsibilities for matters in the Pacific less USARJ and EUSA. There was acknowledged intelligence support deficiencies which would jeopardize the ability of a ground force commander deployed outside Korea to accomplish any but the most routine of short-duration missions. Correction of this deficiency required the existence in the PACOM of an Army oriented intelligence focal point. This could bring together all relevant enemy, weather, and terrain data the ground commander requires for predeployment planning and post-deployment operations.

(U) INSCOM and WESTCOM jointly contributed to INSCOM OPLAN 1-79 which established an INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center, Pacific (Provisional) at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, on 1 October 1979. The Center will provide required peacetime intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISE) to include integration of enemy, weather and terrain intelligence support to WESTCOM, INSCOM units within PACOM, and other PACOM Army elements. It will also provide an organizational base for wartime expansion into a Theater Army Intelligence Command. INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii served as the organizational base for the ITIC-PAC(P) cadre with WESTCOM echelon above Corps intelligence assets (652d Engineer Battalion and imagery spaces) being placed under the OPCON of the Center on 1 October 1980. Operational control of the 652d Battalion placed enemy, weather, and terrain intelligence responsibilities and management of Pacific mapping, charting, and geodesy functions under the ITIC-PAC(P). It further supports implementation of new topo-doctrine that stresses direct support to operations and intelligence terrain data needs. No new spaces were planned for the establishment of ITIC-PAC(P), but extensive use of Reserve Components is planned for augmentation in crisis or wartime. It was envisioned that the complete development of the Center would take place over a five-year phase. The unit would leave its provisional status in early 1981. ⁵

Organizational and Operational Concepts for EAC in Europe and CONUS. ~~(C)~~ (U) Transition to War Planning received considerable attention by HQ INSCOM during FY 1979. Success was achieved in the Pacific Theater with the production of INSCOM OPLAN 1-79 establishing the INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center, Pacific (Provisional), but similar efforts directed to the European Area had only negative results despite the large amounts of time and effort expended. In October 1979, there was a significant breakthrough with the creation of a HQ INSCOM work group to write a revision of the INSCOM/ODCSI USAREUR MOU and to develop a concept of a wartime Echelon Above Corps (EAC) intelligence structure for Europe. The group went to Europe in November to negotiate the issues with HQ USAREUR and the 66th MI Group; at the time there were favorable indications from ODCSI that progress would be made.

(U) ~~(C)~~ As a result of the meeting, organizational and operational concepts for EAC intelligence structures in Europe and CONUS received the full endorse-

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ment of CINCUSAREUR and CDR INSCOM for meeting minimum intelligence and security requirements as constrained by the resource allocations of Total Army Analysis (TAA) 86. As a result of the TAA-86 reprogramming of resources to provide needed assets for Corps CEWI Groups, 1,188 and 846 TOE spaces have been identified for EAC support in Europe and CONUS, respectively. These spaces did not include those already allocated to INSCOM TDA units. Both the European and CONUS concepts were designed to support CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102. The CONUS structure provided assets which could also be used to support CONUS EAC forces under conditions short of general war. The proposed European and CONUS structure were briefed by INSCOM and USAREUR at FORSCOM in early January 1980. While fully supporting the OPLAN 4102 aspects of the concept, ODCSI FORSCOM withheld final endorsement of the secondary mission of EAC support to contingencies in as much as this concept is evolutionary and support requirements have yet to be formally established. On 17 January 1980, the ACSI and his staff concurred in the interim intelligence structures. On 29 January, DA DCSOPS approved the joint USAREUR INSCOM interim concept for the allocation of EAC intelligence resources. There could be no final approval until the TRADOC study on EAC was completed.

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~~(S)~~ The first changes in the European EAC intelligence assets called for within the concept was to be the 1 October 1980 transfer of the 502d ASA Battalion from USAREUR to INSCOM. The 409th ASA Company, Operations (subordinate to the 502d Group) will be reorganized to include the operation of the Wobek, Federal Republic of Germany site to monitor Soviet-Warsaw Pact operations in the Letzinger Heide Training Area. Detachment E will transfer from the US Army Operational Group to the 430th MI Battalion (HUMINT); however, the Group will retain operational control of the Detachment's mission. Other future changes included establishment of an INSCOM Liaison Office to CINCUSAREUR, reorganization of the 66th MI Group headquarters and provision for activation of the USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC) during exercises. During 4-12 March 1980, the 66th MI Group participated in CRESTED EAGLE 80, and for the first time tested the establishment of the Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) under the command of the DCSI, USAREUR as well as provided extensive support to the USAREUR UTIC. Upon declaration of a simple alert command of EAC assets will transfer to USAREUR's control.

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~~(S)~~ During FY 1983, the European concept transferred the 165th and 511th CI Battalions (currently INSCOM assets) to the Corps Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Groups. Originally, a new CI Battalion was to be formed from the Special Operations Detachment (66th MI Group), the 201st ASA Company, and the Land Liaison Offices (66th MI Group). This was changed to the 201st ASA Company being subordinated to the 527th MI Battalion to supplement its resources. Plans also called for a new Electromagnetic Intelligence Battalion (EMI) to be formed from the 502d ASA Battalion resources; this Battalion will include an Imagery Interpretation Company, formerly a part of the 2d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation). Consolidation of these units would provide space savings by minimizing overhead to insure maximum availability of operators. If the subordination of the 652d Engineer Battalion (topographic) to the EAC intelligence organization in the Pacific (INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center, Pacific) proved successful, the subordination

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of the European topographic battalion would be subordinated to the 66th MI Group.

(U) ~~(S/CCO)~~ Although progress was made in the area of the organizational and operational concepts for Europe, there was still the resolved issue of disposition of sigint fixed site resources during periods of contingency. The results of the NSA Sizing Study, released in February 1980, identified SIGINT Shortfalls in support of OPLAN 4102 which will aid in establishing the type and quantity of hardware required to provide support for the AFCENT, CENTAG and NORTHAG echelons. One company will be CONUS based and deployed to Europe to support the AFCENT echelon. The other two companies are to be formed from reallocated field station assets and prepositioned equipment prior to the initiation of hostilities in Europe. The issue which remained unresolved was the identification of the requirements for transfer of resources to other fixed sites in the event of hostilities.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Within CONUS, a Group along with subordinate units are to be created out of approximately 600 spaces allocated EAC intelligence in CONUS under TAA-86, effective FY 1982 later slipped by DA to FY 1983. The units to be created and stationed at Fort Monmouth are shown below with their authorized strengths:

(Military authorized strengths: Officer/WO/ENL/(Total))

513th AS HHC Gp	11/0/78 (89)
201st MI Bn (P&C)	23/5/112 (140)
568th MI Det (II)	3/2/33 (38)
164th MI Co (OPSEC)	4/3/78 (85)
166th MI Co EWOP (Rear)	3/1/106 (110)
219th MI Co (INTER)	4/3/51 (58)
MI Det (Foreign Lang Expl)	1/5/118 (124)
(Totals)	49/19/576 (644)

In addition to the new units to be activated, the 641st MI Detachment at Fort George G. Meade and the 11th MI Company at Aberdeen Proving Grounds were to be reassigned to the Group but would remain at their present locations. Their reassignment would put the total strength of the Group over 800 spaces. The Group's peacetime mission will consist of supporting CDR FORSCOM with full range of intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISE) services and will provide resources for exercise support in accordance with established contingency requirements. The Group will also support CINCUSAREUR by reinforcing the 66th MI Group, providing additional ISE capability as required. During peacetime, the Group will also serve as a training base for Reserve Component EAC intelligence units designated

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for support of USAREUR intelligence requirements. During periods of contingency, the Group will support CDR FORSCOM by servicing deployed/deploying forces. In war, the Group will augment the TAIC Europe, providing ISE services as established in CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102.

- (U) ~~(S)~~ Although EAC intelligence and security doctrine was still evolving, the proposed Organizational and Operational Concepts for EAC in Europe and CONUS conformed with planning guidance established by FM 100-16. The concepts insured the availability of resources at all echelons for application to implement a generic intelligence and security concept when it is developed. In the interim the European concept has been designed to meet that theater's unique wartime intelligence requirements to insure US fighting forces' interests are served. In that the European concept is resource constrained, the CONUS EAC organization is designed to enhance support in accordance with increased theater wartime requirements. The two concepts thus jointly assure the continuation of EAC intelligence support to the European Theater while providing a nucleus for improved intelligence support to the operational US and allied commanders who will control US forces in war. While EAC intelligence support requirements for contingencies have not yet been fully defined, the multidisciplinary nature of the CONUS structure provides the potential for its deployment as an entity or in tailored packages to satisfy requirements as they are articulated. An ancillary benefit to be realized by the CONUS MI Group will be that a mechanism is provided to facilitate readiness development of EAC reserve intelligence organizations to meet war and contingency requirements.⁶

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Border Resident Offices. ~~(U)~~ During the Spring of 1979, a representative of ODCSI, USAREUR, along with a representative from the 66th MI Group conducted an evaluation of the ten Border Resident Offices (BRO) managed by the 66th MI Group in order to determine their contribution to the overall USAREUR mission. The Corps and Divisions MI Detachments and Companies had expressed their desire to retain all or some of their organic interrogators attached to the BRO's in order to have the capability to plan and evaluate prisoner of war play Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), field training exercises, and maneuvers. From its evaluation, ODCSI determined that the authorized BRO's spaces be reduced from 55 to 43. The return of these 12 interrogators was to be accomplished by attrition and by mid-1980 each Corps MI Detachment and Division MI Company would have its authorized complement. However, by the close of FY 1980, the total stood at 45, two above the mandatory staffing. Regarding the future BRO alignment, ODCSI proposed several options. Of the choices, INSCOM indicated their preference of closing four BRO's and returning four personnel. In response to ODCSI's solicitation of other alternatives, the 66th MI Group responded by recommending the closure of the BRO's and transferring the reporting function to the Land Liaison Office Hesse and Land Liaison Office Bavarian Border Affairs. At the close of FY 1980, the DCSI had made no final decision.⁷

- (U) Community Support Center. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ On 1 October 1979, the IMINT Office, HQ INSCOM assumed full responsibility for the Army Element at the Community Support Center (CSC). INSCOM took operational control for all collection and exploitation requirements levied against national satellite imagery by

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CONUS Army units. The move followed a three month shake-down and completed the transition of control from OACSI(DA) to INSCOM. As evidenced by the high collection success against the T-80 Soviet tank problem, INSCOM continued to provide the same excellent support to Army units as OACSI personnel had done previously.⁸

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, INSCOM, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 5-6.
2. FY 1980 DCSFM AHR (TS/CCO), Chap. 3, p. 2: *INSCOM Staff Assoc 12 Dec 80 (U); D. In DCSFM*
3. FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), pp. 12, 110-1; FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), *Review of PACOL EAC 1001 (18 Jul 80)* p. 198; Interview, Mr. Art Carter (C, Requirements Validation, ODCSFM) with Mr. James Gilbert (History Office) (18 Mar 81) (U). *19 Dec 80*
4. FY 1980 MAO AHR (S/CCO), Chap. 2, pp. 1-2, Appendix C & H; Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study Relook Report (Final Draft), Management Directorate, Chief of Staff, US Army (2 Jun 80) (C); Ltr, CofS, INSCOM, subj: IOSS Relook (27 Dec 79) (C).
5. Information Paper, IAOPS-PTR-P, subj: INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific (ITIC) (29 Jan 80) (U); Ltr, IACG, subj: Concept for Army Intelligence support to USAWESTCOM (18 Sep 79) (C); DF, DCSOPS, subj: Assignment of 652d Engr Bn (Topo) (9 Jul 79) (U).
6. Interim EAC Intelligence Concept Read-Ahead Package Executive Summary (S); DCSLOG FY 1980 AHR (S/CCO), p. 16; Msg, INSCOM, subj: O&O Concept - CONUS (Dec 79) (S); DF, Cmt 2, DCSOPS, subj: NSA SIGINT Sizing Study (17 Mar 80) (S/CCO); DF, Cmt 2, C, PTR, subj: Operational Readiness Report (1 Nov 79) (U); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: Wartime Reallocation of Field Station Personnel (31 Jan 80) (S/CCO); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: Reallocation of Field Station Personnel (221800Z Aug 80) (TS/CCO); Briefing, subj: Reallocation of Field Station Resources (Undtd) (TS/CCO).
7. 66th MI Gp FY 1980 AHR (S), p. 28; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-M, subj: Border Resident Offices (11 Jul 79) (C).
8. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 134-35; FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), p. 14.

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CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION

INSCOM Organization. (U) At the close of FY 1980, there was a total of 54 units (17 TOE and 37 TDA) in the INSCOM organizational structure. The TDA figure does not include Augmentation, Augmentation (Carrier), or Provisional units. However, these units along with the remainder TDA and TOE units are listed, as of 30 September 1980, in appendix A, a worldwide organization and deployment table. For lists of TOE, TDA, and Provisional units at the close of the report period, see appendixes respectively. Changes in the status of TOE, TDA, and Provisional units occurring during the fiscal year are depicted in appendix C, E, and G, respectively.

(U) Major General William I. Rolya commanded the US Army Intelligence and Security Command throughout the year. Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn continued to serve in the position of Deputy Commander, Intelligence. However, on 8 August 1980, the position title of Brigadier General John A. Smith, Jr. was changed from Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production to Deputy Commanding General, Support. Also on 8 August 1980, new Letters of Instructions were promulgated for both of the Deputy Commanding Generals. The new division of responsibilities was the result of a reorganizational change occurring in May 1980 in which counterintelligence and production activities were merged with the intelligence collection activities to form a multidiscipline DCSOPS. The DCG-I would be responsible for the three disciplines, and the DCG-S for personnel, material, and information systems.

(U) At the end of FY 1980, Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, General Staff, and Personal Staff as shown below:

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). (U) The CG, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army, for accomplishment of the missions and functions prescribed by AR 10-53 and was concurrently responsible to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all SIGINT activities for which National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS) was responsible.

Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence (DCG-I). (U) The Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence assisted the CG in the management of all intelligence operations of INSCOM in accordance with Executive Orders, National, Departmental, and Command policies and taskings. As a result of a HQ INSCOM reorganization which placed production, counterintelligence, and collection disciplines into a multidiscipline DCSOPS, the DCG-I was made responsible for the three disciplines by an 8 August 1980 Letters of Instructions.

Deputy Commanding General, Support (DCG-S). (U) The Deputy Commanding General, Support assisted the CG in the management of all support operations of INSCOM in accordance with Executive Orders, National, Departmental, and Command policies

and taskings. As a result of a HQ INSCOM reorganization which led to a new division of responsibilities among the Deputy Commanding Generals, the Deputy Commanding General, Security and Production was redesignated as the DCG, Support and was made responsible for personnel, material, and information systems. These were defined in an 8 August 1980 Letter of Instructions. (H. v. f. a. t. e. s.)

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). (U) The CSM served as a personal advisor and principal enlisted assistant to the CG on those matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel including, but not limited to, morale, welfare, customs and courtesies of the service; enlistment and reenlistment, discipline, and promotion policies.

Chief of Staff (CofS). (U) The CofS acted as the principal coordinating agent of, and advisor to, the CG and DCG's on those matters pertaining to INSCOM; directed and coordinated the staff to achieve efficiency and unity of action; and assisted the CG and DCG's in the supervision of the execution of orders. Directly subordinate to the CofS were the Liaison Officers, the Mission Analysis Office, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS). (U) The DCS acted for the Chief of Staff during his absence and assisted to coordinate all actions of the HQ INSCOM staff; and supervised the activities of the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the General Staff, the Office of Public Affairs, Equal Employment Opportunity Office, and INSCOM Liaison Officers. The DCS was created on 24 July 1980 with the filling of the position. The driving force behind its creation was the HQ INSCOM reorganization study of 5 October 1979 which called for additional spaces to be assigned in the Office of the Chief of Staff for operational continuity and for assistance.

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS). (U) The ACofS acted for the CofS and DCS in their absence and performed other duties as assigned by the DCS. Assigned actions to HQ INSCOM based on guidance from CofS and reviewed staff actions for compliance with established policies and administrative procedures.

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). (U) The SGS acted as executive officer for the CofS and as office manager for the offices of the CG, DCG's, and CofS.

Chief, Mission Analysis Office (CMAO). (U) The Chief, MAO provided advice and assistance to the CG in formulating future goals for the command and the broad strategies to achieve them.

Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (EEEO). (U) The EEEO provided staff leadership and guidance to the EEO Program, the Federal Women's Program, and the Spanish-Speaking Program.

Liaison Officers. (U) The Liaison Officers provided liaison representation to DARCOM, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other commands as required. The liaison officer's primary duty was to maintain continuity in the exchange of information and to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact between representatives of HQ INSCOM and those of the host headquarters.

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General Staff:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). (U) The DCSPER served as the principal staff officer for the administration of military and civilian personnel. He acted for the CG in the direction, supervision, and coordination of plans, policies, and procedures for personnel administration, distribution, and management; maintenance of order and discipline; safety; welfare; morale; organizational effectiveness; human affairs; and nonappropriated fund activities. Exercised staff supervision over the INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity which was organized on 30 November 1978. The ODCSPER continued to divide into a Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Officer; Plans, Policy and Management Division; Military Personnel Division; and Civilian Personnel Division.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). ~~(S)~~ The DCSOPS formulated and implemented INSCOM policy on multidiscipline collection, production, electronic warfare and operational security activities; coordinated and supervised and conduct of INSCOM operations involving signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), electronic warfare (EW), operational security (OPSEC) and production (PROD) resources; supervised the command aviation standardization, aviation safety and flying hour programs; provided organizational analysis and evaluations; provided advice and assistance on intelligence collection, exploitation, operational security, production and electronic warfare matters to major Army commands and activities; developed, coordinated and promulgated operational directives for the conduct of specified operations; managed multidiscipline intelligence collection requirements; maintained appropriate liaison and interface with the Department of the Army, USACSS, Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, joint/combined commands, other MACOM's and governmental agencies; supervised the command's historical program; developed, coordinated and promulgated appropriate planning incident to collection, operational security and production strategies; served as the USAINSCOM Staff Program Director for General Purpose Forces (P2), Cryptologic Activities (P3), HUMINT (P3), Technical Sensor Intelligence (P3), Communications Counterintelligence (P3), Training (P8), and Special Activities Office (SAO) appropriations; served as the primary INSCOM representative on the US Army Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Board Working Committee (AEWIBC).

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(U) As so often over the last decade, ODCSOPS underwent a major reorganization, one which was as important and with as far reaching implications as any in the past. The major changes included the following. On 1 March 1980, six spaces from the discontinued Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat Analysis were transferred to ODCSOPS and formed the newly established Production Office. On 13 March 1980, a Marketing Group was established within ODCSOPS for the purpose of providing INSCOM with a client-oriented, sensing arm for identification of user intelligence requirements and assisting clients in the articulation and prioritization of those intelligence needs. On 1 May, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence was merged with ODCSOPS, and its functions formed the basis for the ADCSOPS OPSEC. Also on 1 May, the Reserve Affairs and Plans functions and spaces were reassigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Modernization. At the close of the FY 1980, the ODCSOPS consisted of the following: ADCSOPS, SIGINT/EW/IMINT; Training Division; Intelligence Coordination Division; ADCSOPS, HUMINT;

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ADCSOPS, OPSEC; Marketing Office; Production Office; Policy and Management; History Office; and Administrative Office.

(U) The results of the reorganization which occurred in the Spring of 1980 were that ODCSOPS for the first time was truly multidiscipline with the consolidation of production, collection, and security functions. The transfer of Plans and Reserve Affairs functions and resources to ODCSFM would limit the focus of ODCSOPS to the immediate although the DCSOPS still hoped to be able to drive future requirements.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). (U) The DCSLOG served as the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to logistics to include exercising general staff supervision over logistic activities of the Command; serving as Program Director for Military Construction Army (MCA) Program and is responsible for developing and monitoring the logistic portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Program; maintaining liaison with other agencies and services for the purpose of coordinating logistic activities; formulating, reviewing, and evaluating policies, plans, programs, and concepts incident to the conduct of logistics operations; maintaining awareness of trends in the various military and industrial fields related to logistics and evaluating for impact on INSCOM; directing the acquisition of equipment, facilities, and services which are unique to the mission requirements of the Command; acting as representative of the Commanding General on all procurement actions; and in coordination with DCSPER, monitoring the selection of personnel assigned key logistic assignments within the Command.

(U) During FY 1980, the organization of ODCSLOG remained the same. It consisted of Assistant DCSLOG at Arlington Hall Station, Assistant DCSLOG at Fort George G. Meade, the Supply and Services Division (portions of the division were located at both AHS and FGGM), Maintenance Division, Installation Division, Fixed Station Engineering Division, Management Office, and Administrative Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization (DCSFM). (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to planning, development and acquisition of the INSCOM's total force materiel requirements, conceptual force planning, and life cycle management in support of fixed plant and intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) and counterintelligence/OPSEC support units at Theater/EAC. The DCSFM is responsible for the concept and development of futuristic electro-optics systems and their incorporation into the Army Force Structure; is responsible for coordination with other planners, combat developers and materiel developers to insure the DA/NSACSS/INSCOM responsibilities are considered during the conceptual phase of planning, concept formulation, and systems development; and is responsible for the planning, concept, and development of organization and materiel needs in support of the requirements to conduct the functions of an all-source multi-discipline Military Intelligence organization at Theater/EAC. The DCSFM develops and coordinates the INSCOM position on materiel research, development and acquisition projects which have application at the Echelon Above Corps; within INSCOM, coordinates intelligence concepts, systems requirements, procurement plans, and related actions to include organizational and operational concepts, doctrine, user tests and other plans relating to total force requirements; and provides technical advice and assistance concerning intelligence, EW, counterintelligence and OPSEC support

materiel requirements, concepts and deployment in response to requests by other commanders/MACOMs. The DCSFM is the designated Army materiel developer for NSA/CSS developed systems to be operated by INSCOM and serves as the INSCOM point-of-contact with NSACSS on all matters relating to SIGINT systems planning, development and acquisition.

(U) On 1 May 1981, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems was redesignated to Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization as part of a major HQ INSCOM. At the same time, the DCSFM was given the full responsibility for systems development and received from DCSOPS the functions relating to Plans and Reserve Affairs along with accompanying resources. Internally, the ODCSFM retained the Systems Division but split the Concepts and Requirements Division into Force Modernization Division and the Requirements Validation Division. The Programs Office was also created to handle the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), etc.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management is the principal staff assistant to the Commanding General, INSCOM, in matters pertaining to programming, budget, manpower authorization, control and utilization, management analysis, cost and economic analysts, finance and accounting, accounting policy, control of funds, and internal review. Exercises staff supervision over the INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity and assists and advises commanders in all matters relating to resource management throughout the Command. At the close of FY 1980, ODCSRM consisted of the Program and Budget Division, Management and Analysis Division, Finance and Accounting Division, Manpower Division, Internal Review Division, and Administrative Office. During the year, the Cost and Economic Analysis Division was placed under the Program and Budget Division for purpose of more efficient management because of the Cost and Economic Analysis Division's size. The Quality Assurance Division was no longer reflected in the organizational structure due to uncertainty as to its relationship within ODCSRM.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Automation (DCSAUT). (U) The mission of the DCSAUT is to advise and assist on all matters pertaining to ADP; establish INSCOM ADP policy; develop comprehensive, integrated automation plans; exercise resource management for INSCOM ADP activities, worldwide; evaluate execution of INSCOM plans and programs which employ ADP technology; operate the command-level data processing installation; and to interact with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Per DIA, National Security Agency (NSA), Department of Army (DA), Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communications (OACSAC), Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), and supported data processing activities (DPAs) to insure that a focal point for each automation function or category is designated and provided with sufficient authority to carry out assigned responsibilities. The DCSA also served as commander of the INSCOM Automated Systems Activity.

(U) On 1 October 1979, the Automation Management Office was redesignated as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Automation. The change in title reflected a transfer of functions and personnel from the Automated Systems Activity. Under the new organization, the DCSA consisted of a Technical Advisor, Life Cycle Management Division, and the Plans, Policies, Programs and Requirements Division.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (ACSTEL). (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications was the principal staff assistant for all matters pertaining to telecommunications. Responsibilities include development, coordination and staff supervision of all functions related to telecommunications within the Command. Served as Program Area Director for command programs, budgets and the Army Management System as they relate to telecommunications. Discharged primary staff responsibilities for engineering, installation and maintenance of INSCOM telecommunication systems. Exercised staff supervision over operation of the Defense Special Security Communication System (DCSSCS), CRITICOMM and other telecommunications activities of the Command. Directed development of tactical communication objectives, concepts and requirements within INSCOM areas of interest. And exercised operational control over the US Army Communications Command Communications Center supporting INSCOM at Arlington Hall Station. As in FY 1979, OACSTEL continued to be organized into the following: Plans, Operations and Resources Division; Communications Electronics Division (Ft Meade); Communications Electronics Division (Arlington Hall Station); Engineering and Installation Division; and Administration Office.

Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). (U) The IG, as a member of the personal staff, inquired into and reported upon, matters affecting the performance of mission and state of economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of every phase of activity which was within the sphere of responsibility of the CG and as prescribed by law. Throughout the report period, the IG Office continued to be comprised of an Assistance and Investigations Division and Inspections Division.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (U) The SJA served as legal advisor to the CG, DCG's CofS, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM and, as necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

Advisor for Scientific and Cryptologic Affairs. (U) The Advisor served as the principal advisor to the CG on scientific and cryptologic matters.

Command Chaplain. (U) The Command Chaplain served as the Chaplain of the USAINSCOM, and was responsible for all chaplain related activities within the command; provided advice and assistance to the CG and his staff on religious, moral, moral leadership, and human self development matters.

Special Disbursing Officer (SDO). (U) The SDO served as the Special Disbursing Officer for the USAINSCOM, advising the CG and DCG's on all aspects of the control, administration, supervision, and utilization of intelligence contingency funds (ICF).

Command Psychologist (CP). (U) The CP advised the CG on matters pertaining to the mental health, other medical support, and provided guidance on psychological factors pertaining to intelligence operations.

Reorganization of HQ INSCOM and CONUS Elements. (U) There was a general perception among the INSCOM Commander, subordinate commanders, and staff officers at all levels that HQ INSCOM was not functioning as expected. These perceptions were recorded in statements from the staff, Organizational Effectiveness (OE) seminars and the INSCOM Commanders Conference, and showed a high degree of uniformity of view. There was a preponderance of opinion that first, command goals and objectives were not effectively communicated to the staff; second, that even if effectively communicated these goals and objectives were often not accepted by the staff; and third, that even when understood and accepted, staff performance was not totally effective in achieving goals and objectives. Besides these perceptions, there existed the need to attempt to utilize manpower resources as efficiently as possible. Only through maximum utilization of its personnel would INSCOM be able to gather out-of-hide the manpower spaces to accomplish essential functions which here-to-fore had been neglected. The widely held belief that HQ INSCOM was not organized properly to reflect its mission and the pressing manpower constraints prompted COL Allan R. Stern, the Chief, Mission Analysis Office, to propose to MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, that a reorganization study be conducted.

(U) Subsequently, on 10 August 1979, MG Rolya tasked MAO to conduct a concept study to determine strategies to improve the organization of HQ INSCOM. To complete the study COL Stern and MAO action officers formed a research team. In addition, the study team used input from the HQ INSCOM staff from past OE sessions and coordinated each phase of the study with the staff. The first step of the study included a historical look at how HQ INSCOM came to be organized in its present form. Several milestones stood out.

(U) The INSCOM Concept Plan, dated 13 August 1976, was an attempt as a result of IOSS to organize HQ INSCOM to centralized functional authority and responsibility in four areas: Finished Intelligence and Threat Analysis (production); Intelligence Operations (collection); Counterintelligence (counter collection); and Resource Management and Support (men, money, and materiel to carry forth missions in the three operational areas). As shown in Tab A, the Commander, the functional directors for each of the four areas, and the Director of the HQ staff were the chief executives of INSCOM. The breadth and complexity of operations within INSCOM would warrant flag officer grades in the Commander, Deputy Commander for Operations, and Deputy Commander for Resource Management and Support positions. The Deputy Commander for Counterintelligence Operations and for Intelligence Threat Analysis, and the Director of the HQ INSCOM staff were perceived of as O6 positions.

(U) The coordination of the 13 August 1976 Concept Plan within the Army altered the focus of HQ, INSCOM organization. Included among the guidance provided by a 29 December 1976 ACSI Directive were the following:

(3) Organizational structure must be revised along staff/command lines and simplified. [i.e., the idea of centralizing command authority and staff responsibilities along DCDR lines is rejected.]

(4) Integration of intelligence disciplines should be maximized throughout the INSCOM structure.

(U) On 30 December 1976, one day after the promulgation of DA guidance which significantly altered (reduced) the perceived scope of INSCOM's missions and authority to come (thus the conceptual organization), DA GO 25 was published redesignating HQ USASA as HQ INSCOM. Six months before there was an approved concept, an organization was created. USAINTA was assigned as a subordinate unit (an organizational alternative that was rejected before the 13 August 1976 Concept Plan was submitted). Operational, functional and management responsibilities for Production were assigned without conceptual foundation (or resources). INSCOM was tasked to meet all operational tasks of the residual ASA and newly affiliated (OACSI and USAINTA) organizations in accordance with Army regulations, or to get the regulations changed (29 December 1976 OACSI letter).

(U) In response to DA's guidance, HQ INSCOM submitted a revised Concept Plan on 11 March 1977, which attempted to accommodate the 29 December 1976 guidance.

(1) There are more multidisciplined units. (But CONUS units are still single disciplined.)

(2) The overall structure is "Staff/Command line" oriented.

(3) Although discipline integration is manifested for OCONUS units, the operations staffs are still Collection, CI, and Production oriented. An Operations Center under the Chief of Staff and a Systems and Requirements element in the DIROPS were to be the genesis of multidisciplined management of concepts, doctrine and operations: "The Headquarters staff organization was designed to meet the various operational necessities of INSCOM as well as conforming with proven Army management principles.

(a) The design assumed a single station location for Headquarters, INSCOM.

(b) The design evidenced a mix of directors and deputy chiefs of staff allowing differentiation between the collection (DIROPS), intelligence and threat analysis (DIRITA), and countercollection (DIRCI) elements and the other functional staff elements. These three directors will be constituted with the specific authority to direct the operations of INSCOM in the name of the Commander, yet are a part of synthesized coordinating staff all responsive to one Chief of Staff.

(c) Every effort has been made to remove operating functions from the INSCOM staff and to implace all proper headquarters staff functions on the staff. This will result in a bi-directional migration of functions and resources, from HQ USASA and USAINTA to operating levels and vice-versa. In both cases, it has been determined that HQ staff functions have, in the past, been assigned to operating units, e.g., US Army Operations Group and the USASA SIGSEC Activity. Further, it has been determined that support functions have been performed by resources allocated to the staffs, e.g., graphics, printing, etc."

(U) On 2 May 1977, the VCSA approved the revised concept subject to modifications: HQ support elements being supervised by staff proponents; creation of an ODCSOPS, i.e., integration of CI, Collection and Production staffs at the earliest feasible date; and placement of DCDR's in the chain of command. The resultant and final conceptual organization which was identical in purpose to the 11 March 1977 version is shown at Tab C and was promulgated in the 14 June 1977 Change 1 to the 11 March 1977 INSCOM Concept Plan. HQ INSCOM TDA, dated effective 1 June 1979 still reflected several areas inconsistent with DA's planning guidance. (See Tab D). The INSCOM had yet to create at the "earliest feasible date" an integrated ODCSOPS consisting of collection, production, and CI integration. In addition, the DCDR's should be in the chain of command. Finally, the VCSA had also directed on 2 May 1977 that INSCOM future planning objectives include the organizational integration of CONUS single discipline groups.

(U) There was a multitude of causes for this failure to complete the organization. There real-time problems on-going while the concept and organization was being formulated. The pulling of a production staff "out-of-hide" and comingling HUMINT, CI, and SIGINT staff actions. The concept was based on a single station location while reality had HQ INSCOM at two primary locations plus a small element at a third. The Deputy Commanders, though functionally assigned tended to be physically oriented, one toward Arlington Hall Station elements and one toward Fort Meade elements. In addition, the personal and special staffs were located at one or both of the locations with functional responsibilities to the entire staff. During the period of organization, there was internal negotiation of pre-integration relationships and a focus on assurance that HQ operations staff elements at Fort Meade and Arlington Hall Station were neither subordinate nor superior, but co-equal.

(U) A recapitulation of the organizational development steps discussed in time sequence illustrates the haphazard Army management control of the organization of this MACOM:

a. On 15 May 1976 HQ USASA was tasked to develop the INSCOM concept in concert with USAINTA and OACSI.

b. On 30 December 1976, INSCOM was formed, nine months prior to the approved implementation date of the concept, 18 months prior to the publication of AR 10-53 and 30 months before the effective date of the HQ TDA.

c. On 2 May 1977, the Concept was approved for implementation on 1 Oct 77 (INSCOM anniversary).

d. On 15 June 1978, the OM&F Regulation (AR 10-53) was published, 18 months after the organization was formed, and 12 months prior to the effective date of the TDA.

e. On 18 August 1978, the HQ TDA was submitted to DA and was approved with an effective date of 1 June 1979, 30 months after the organization was formed.

(U) When event sequencing is coupled with conceptual planning guidance that forced a HQ designed for single station location, the full reasons for the "way HQ INSCOM is organized today" became apparent:

a. HQ INSCOM organized itself to accomplish existing missions of USAINTA, OACSI FOAs and the residual ASA, prior to INSCOM concept approval, OM&F Reg publication, or HQ TDA submission.

b. HQ INSCOM organizational elements were formed in operationally and physically separate modes 18 months prior to the articulation of the INSCOM mission.

c. Requirements to stay within end strengths, inability to transfer spaces/faces between locations, necessary preservation of all associated civilian jobs and the existing physical separation of key elements of the operational staffs along USAINTA and residual USASA mission lines perpetuated the operational character of the 20 month old Headquarters during the formulation and submission of the first HQ TDA.

d. The HQ INSCOM organization did not reflect the spirit and intent of the IOSS as modified or amplified by succeeding HQ DA guidance. This was especially true in the continued separation of CI, Collection and Production staffs and in the continued direct management of CONUS single discipline units.

(U) Given the conditions which led to the current HQ INSCOM organization, the MAO study team rejected an organizational approach to the problem. This is what had largely been tried in the past. Instead, the team took the various HQ INSCOM functions as contained in the current M&F manual and grouped like functions with one another. Afterwards, the planners determined the final organization by simply drawing logically organizational boxes about the functions.

(U) The study by MAO arrived at several findings. INSCOM had a collection goal and a production goal which as organized were essentially independent. As long as these remained separate and not placed under a single manager the goals of IOSS would not be accomplished. If INSCOM was to fulfill both the intent of IOSS and the mission given it by the Army, the level collection of support given to Army producers would be required to increase. This would have the effect of coupling the collection and production goals. As this coupling increases, the potential for conflict and the necessity for coordination between collection and production would increase.

(U) The analysis of the INSCOM security goal indicated a disconnect in the current staff structure in this area. Components of the goal of providing security support to the Army and selected DOD activities included the collection of information/intelligence concerning the activities of hostile collectors, the production of intelligence concerning hostile collection activities, the analysis of the security vulnerabilities of friendly organization with reference to both the actual and potential collection threat, and the initiation of measures to counter this threat. Each of the components were dependent on the outputs from the other elements. The potential for conflict and lack of coordination were large, suggesting the requirement for a single manager. In actual fact

several managers were involved--both DCSOPS and DCSCI for collection, DCSITA for production, and DCSCI for the rest.

(U) The mission/goal analysis also revealed a functional inconsistency in the manner the Deputy Commanding Generals were focused. One DCG was functionally focused on intelligence collection (DCG-I) while the other (DCG-S&P) was focused on production and security. An additional complication was introduced by the physical focus of the DCG's which placed the DCG-I at Arlington Hall Station where the production and collection managers were located while the DCG-S&P was at Fort Meade where the security manager was located. The mission/goal analysis clearly revealed that the intelligence collection and production efforts were more strongly linked than the security and production (less CI production) efforts. The orientation of the DCG's probably contributed to the lack of coordination of collection and production.

(U) The fragmented structure of the operations staff results in an unusually complex set of coordination requirements to effectively execute the four implied support missions/goals--concepts/doctrine, people, material, and money. Requirements for resources were originated by the operational managers as they assessed tasking from external and internal sources and generated plans for intelligence, security, and electronic warfare support. These operational plans in turn precipitated a whole series of requirements and plans for acquiring and sustaining resources. The job of managing these resources was the job resource managers (i.e., DCSPER, DCSLOG, DCSRM, and DCSS). The analysis of the INSCOM staff structure for accomplishing concept/doctrine and equipment support revealed a disconnect. INSCOM's materiel goal consisted of acquisition and maintenance components. The maintenance component was dependent upon the acquisition component to accomplish the materiel goal. In fact, three staff managers (DCSS, DCSLOG, and AMO) were involved in the management of materiel (including software) acquisition while two staff managers were involved in the management of materiel maintenance. The potential for both lack of coordination and conflict were large, suggesting the necessity for a single manager.

(U) In the current HQ INSCOM organization DCS Systems was responsible for concept and doctrine. DCSOPS was in charge of plans. However, the MAO Study Team felt that all three functions should be combined. In this manner the one who conceives of doctrines and concepts should also be the one who formulates the plan. At present the originator is often unaware of the problems in implementing a particular doctrine.

(U) Concept and doctrine development played a role in both operations and systems acquisition. In the operational area, concept and doctrine were both driven by operational planning. In the systems acquisition area, concept and doctrine should drive the acquisition of materiel and the systems development process. Although previous discussions were concentrated on the reduction of conflict, there was a positive value if it was carefully managed. The systems acquisition process was where conflict can be of positive value. Those who write concept and doctrine levy requirements on the systems development process. If the same set of people do both, conflict was minimized but total system effectiveness may be diminished because the user can be left out of the process. Systems developers tend to let technology drive need and consumers will either

end up with systems for which there would be no need or systems which would not satisfy needs. It was for this reason that TRADOC (the requirement developer) and DARCOM (the system developer) were not united under one MACOM in the Army. The MAO study team believed that the driver of both the staff element responsible for concepts, doctrines, and plans and the staff element in charge of systems development should be the DCSOPS. The DCSOPS would state the basic requirements. In this manner, there would be an honest broken relationship.

(U) HQ INSCOM was in the position of providing command, control, and staff support for 26 subordinate units. Of these 26 units, 18 had operational missions. While the span of control was not unusual for a MACOM, the differing scope of subordinate activities was unique, e.g., this MACOM directly commanded within OCONUS everything from single discipline field stations to four variations of multidiscipline to a geographically dispersed production unit. The demands on the worker and manager components of the staff were different for each different type unit that HQ commanded. This was considered a complexity multiplier that could not be ignored when considering the HQ structure. It specified that, e.g., the DCSPER was not only a MACOM DCSPER but for some units, (especially in CONUS) the acting S-1. The condition focused the full time attention of the operations and resource management staffs on not only the MACOM planning functions but on day-to-day unit operations problems. This bi-focal modus operandi was seen as deleterious to the planning functions simply from the aspect that day-to-day problems always demanded priority.

(U) The condition mandated amalgamation of all the operational staff and support staff activities dealing with day-to-day operations whenever possible. The MAO study believed a part of the answer lay in the establishment of a CONUS TAIC. Such action would have a significant and positive impact on the worker and management focus of the HQ Staff, and on the entire command and MACOM management system. It would replace seven CONUS units from reporting to the Command Group to only one unit. The establishment of the CONUS TAIC would also permit a partial solution of the split headquarters dilemma. The shifting of resources between Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade would mean that the CONUS TAIC resources plus those responsible for materiel development would be at FGGM and the staff elements consolidated at AHS. Therefore, this study proceeded by assuming that INSCOM would best be served by the establishment of a CONUS TAIC because of:

(1) the command goal to create a viable MACOM.

(2) consistent Army guidance to create a multidisciplined MI group in CONUS.

(3) The critical need to limit the central focus of the HQ staff on planning, versus day-to-day operations.

(U) The MAO study team arrived at the conclusion that there was no one optimum alignment of functions and that alternatives were viable. Each would be as efficient as the others given proper cooperating among the command group and staff. The study group proposed two different approaches, but designated one as its preferred choice.

(U) The study group recommended the following organizational changes:

a. Activation of a CONUS TAIC HQ at FGGM.

b. Streamlining of the headquarters staff to include establishment of a:

(1) Multidiscipline DCSOPS at AHS.

(2) Multidiscipline DCSPLANS at AHS.

(3) Integrated Materiel Systems Development and Logistics Staff (expanded DCSLOG) at AHS.

(4) Integrated ADP and Telecommunications Staff (consolidated ACSTEL and part of AMO/ASA) at AHS.

(5) FOA to perform systems development and acquisition functions (Systems Development Agency for all systems) at FGGM.

c. Moving the Command Security Office from DCSCI to the Special Staff.

d. Revised DCG responsibilities.

e. Strengthening of the Office of the CofS.

(U) As a result of these changes, numerous improvements are realized to include:

a. The ability to consolidate HQ INSCOM at a single location (AHS) now.

b. Significant resource savings.

c. More efficient operations at multiple echelons.

d. A significant decrease in the span of control problem for the CG and CofS.

e. Increased compliance with the provisions of the IOSS.

f. Reduction of the restationing requirements to one element--the ITAC.

(U) The personnel turbulence resulting from implementation of the study was believed to be minimal and inconsequential compared to the turbulence INSCOM had always been ready to accept as a result of a restationing decision. Consequently, MAO concluded that there were no major disadvantages to implementing the study.

(U) From 22 to 24 October 1979, the Command Group and principle staff held an executive session at Camp Peary. At this time, MG Rolya enthusiastically endorsed the study and its basic conclusions. The remainder of the Command Group appeared more neutral, and the reception of staff was mixed as could be expected. Those elements which would gain resources were supportive; those which would lose

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were not. An exception was the DCSOPS, who although standing to lose spaces, was very positive.

(U)

~~(C)~~ Specifically, MG Rolya approved the following at the October Executive Session: First, there would be established an 139 personnel operational CONUS Command at FGGM tentatively called the 1st Intelligence and Security Brigade instead of TAIC. Spaces would be drawn from HQ INSCOM as a result of savings from eliminating non-staff functions. In April 1980, the CDR INSCOM issued the guidance that the Central Security Facility, the 902d MI Group, the CONUS MI Group and the USA Operations Group would be directly subordinated to the I&S Brigade. Field Stations Homestead and San Antonio will be subordinated to the CONUS MI Group and the 641st MI Detachment assigned to the USA Operational Group. It was also decided that the USA ITAC would remain directly subordinate to HQ INSCOM and the 11th MI Battalion (Provisional) assigned to the Center. Plans called for the future activation of a MI Group which would be subordinate to the Brigade and would have assigned upon activation the 641st Detachment and the 11th MI Company. The spaces (67 from HQ INSCOM, 27 from HQ Support Detachment, and 15 from the INSCOM Audiovisual/Admin Spt Activity) for the Brigade were identified, and on 1 May 1980, Field Station Homestead and Field Station San Antonio were reassigned from HQ INSCOM to the INSCOM CONUS MI Group (Provisional) on 1 May 1980. Plans called for the CONUS MI Group to augment the field stations during crisis or contingency situations. Although the package for the Brigade was completed, the CDR INSCOM directed in June 1980 that it be held until the time was appropriate for submission to DA. There was the belief that the final stationing decision would soon be announced. There was also a fear that if HQ INSCOM went on record showing that 109 spaces were available, HQDA would approve the consolidation of headquarters at one location but would request the 109 spaces be given up while denying the activation of a Brigade.

(U) Secondly, the Command Security Office (CSO) would be reassigned from the DCSCI to the Chief of Staff as a separate staff element. This was accomplished on 12 November 1979. Thirdly, two additional spaces for operational continuity would be established in the office of the Chief of Staff. The incumbent Chief of Staff felt no immediate need for the increase so it was not until 24 July 1980 that the position of Deputy Chief of Staff was created and filled. Fourth, although mentioned by the MAO Study, there was no mention by CDR INSCOM of the revision of the DCG's responsibilities. However, this occurred on 8 August 1980 when new letters of instruction were issued largely based upon the establishment of the multidiscipline ODCSOPS, which consolidated collection, production and counterintelligence staff functions. The Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence was made responsible for all three functions; the Deputy Commanding General, Security and Production was redesignated as the DCG, Support and was made responsible for personnel, material, and information systems.

(U) At the Camp Peary Meeting, the CDR INSCOM decided the present ODCSLOG would remain vice creation of a ODCSMAT as recommended by the MAO study. At the same time, he approved the development of a provisional DCS Automation and Communications in the place of the current ACSTEL and DCSA subject to the review and approval of the CDR US Army Communications Command and HQDA. The proposal failed to develop as the USACC was opposed. In October, the CDR INSCOM also

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approved the development of a DCS Force Modernization vice DCSPLANS. Force Modernization was announced as the INSCOM planner for war plans, all architectural planning, Reserve Components/National Guard planning, language monitoring, etc. DCSFM would be the primary staff element with interest in systems development, and as such, it would be given a Field Operating Agency (FOA) at FGGM which would provide the project managers who would receive validated requirements for new systems/equipment, plan the development, and bring to Type A Classification those new items. Some changes were made prior to the actual establishment of the DCSFM. In February 1980, the Language Office was established within the ODCSOPS instead of ODCSFM. Because the I&S Brigade was not established at Fort George G. Meade, the FAO was not organized. However, the FAO functions were made a part of DCSFM itself. On 1 April 1980, spaces and functions dealing with Reserve Affairs and Plans within ODCSOPS were transferred to DCS Systems, which on 1 May was redesignated as DCS Force Modernization with 62 spaces.

(U) Undoubtedly, the most significant of all the changes was probably the establishment of a multidisciplined ODCSOPS which consolidated collection, production, and security functions at the staff level for the first time. The DCSITA was discontinued on 1 November 1979 but the final disposition of its personnel was held in question until there was resolution of where the production functions would rest. The DCSITA also served as the CDR, ITAC and because of this division had come to the conclusion that the ODCSITA should be abolished to promote greater efficiency. The question which remained was to whom should the functions and personnel be transferred. In early 1980, negotiations between the CDR, ITAC and the DCSOPS led to the transfer of the mission for general intelligence production policy to ODCSOPS with six personnel. Threat policy and dissemination along with the remainder of the DCSITA personnel would go to ITAC. On 1 March 1980, the six persons were assigned to ODCSOPS to form the Production Office. On 1 May 1980, the DCSCI was merged with DCSOPS to form the ADCSOPS, OPSEC. Although the creation of the multidisciplined ODCSOPS had a far reaching effect and fulfilled the spirit of IOSS which MAO had originally addressed in its study, there were still serious organizational flaws that remained. Within the ODCSOPS, for example, ADCSOPS HUMINT was isolated in both distance and secure communications from the remainder of ODCSOPS, and there was not immediate solution as long as personnel could not be moved between headquarters. The same was true for elements of ADCSOPS, OPSEC which were found at FGGM, Vint Hill Farms, and AHS. In the end, the MAO Study and its implementation effected significant changes but had not solved all the problems which it had addressed.³

INSCOM Science and Technology Board. (U) On 26 October 1979, the newly created INSCOM Science and Technology Board met for the first time. The purpose of this board is to insure that INSCOM exploits science and technology to the maximum in order to accomplish its mission as effectively as possible. Mr. E.A. Speakman, Staff Advisor for Science and Crypto Affairs served as chairman.⁴

501st MI Group Reorganization. (S) Over the years the intelligence structure in Korea evolved over time as information gaps, intelligence shortfalls, and requirements were balanced against manpower decrements. As a result, FY 1980 found a patchwork organization, built to support peacetime requirements. Intelli-

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

gence analysis and reporting resources were overtaxed due to the emphasis placed on early detection of the imminence of hostilities. There were no resources available to meet contingency intelligence collection and analysis requirements. Unprogrammed requirements placed additional stress on already scarced assets and had to be delayed or cancelled if they could not work around the Indications and Warning (I&W) mission. HUMINT collection was spread among three subordinate elements with no central middle manager; CI units were conducting HUMINT activities; and the group staff was performing operational functions normally done by subordinate units (source, management, collection management, intelligence-related preparation and distribution). The 501st MI Group's tactical ground-based (332d ASA Company, Operations) and airborne [redacted] assets were totally tied to and dependent upon a fixed, IDA garrison facility. While this dependency had distinct [redacted] operational advantage during peace, operations would be initially inhibited and resources made more vulnerable in crisis or war.

~~(C)~~ On 15 December 1979, the 501st MI Group was reorganized to consist of three provisional battalions in addition to Field Station Korea and the 332d ASA Company, Operations. The battalions were the 146th MI Battalion (Prov), the 209th MI Battalion (Prov), and 524th MI Battalion (Prov). The purpose was to better consolidate and centralize collection activities. Operationally, the 524th was assigned HUMINT responsibilities; the 209th, counterintelligence; [redacted]

support. During FY 1980, HQ INSCOM staff worked with the 501st MI Group in formulating a new operational and organizational concept which would be sent to DA for approval in FY 1981.5 (U)

Establishment of Field Station Kunia. ~~(S)~~ The new Remote Operations Facility (ROF) at Kunia, Hawaii is to be manned and operated by personnel from the three Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE). INSCOM is the base and cryptologic host responsible for overall facility management (less operational missions of the other SCE's in addition to its assigned mission of collection, analysis, and timely reporting on assigned targets). INSCOM is also responsible for providing systems maintenance less those systems identified as service-unique.

(U) ~~(C)~~ During 1979, INSCOM had attempted to gain USAFSS and NSG support for a Joint Kunia Operational Organization but was not successful. The other two Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA) did not accept the approach that a joint service controlled organization would insure meaningful service participation. They believed that such an arrangement would establish an excessive NSACSS role early on, and the better approach would be to have three separately identified SCA's with which NSA must deal. Secondly, the other services did not feel comfortable with a joint organization. They questioned, based on Kunia unknowns at the time, that it could be made to work. Instead, they view the Tri-Service, Misawa, organization as known and workable. Although INSCOM did not abandon its desires for joint organization, the issue was for all intents and purposes dead.

(U) ~~(S/CEO)~~ The basic "mover and shaker" for the Kunia project was NSACSS. INSCOM's role was primarily to establish arrangements for base operations support and other support relationships with WESTCOM, the Army installation host. NSACSS

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continued to handle such large projects as the rehabilitation of Bldg 102 as a BEQ; NSACSS was also the director of the rehab of the 3rd floor of the Kunia facility as a site for QRC operations. This was accomplished by the Electronic Security Command, utilizing a series of AF Civil Engineer Reserve units on two weeks active duty each, and was completed in September 1980. At that point, the INSCOM installation teams took over and began to install the operational equipment.

~~(TS/CCO)~~ Kunia's principal mission is the collection, processing, and timely

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(S/CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(S/CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

approach permits centralized control and allocation of resources in support of objectives-oriented collection, analysis, and reporting. It provides an interfunctional level of skills, concentration of computer and communications support, improved collection operator support, enhanced data base access and opportunities for collection and processing which can be recognized and exploited in near real-time.

~~(S/CCO)~~ The first requirement to surface for the Kunia Tri-Service Station was indicated in the HF Modernization Study, issued on 5 June 1978 by NSACSS. This resulted in the promulgation of Annex E to the HF Modernization Study,

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

dated 9 August 1978. This annex outlined a plan to establish a Tri-Service Remote Operations Facility at Kunia, Hawaii, responsible for collection, first-echelon processing, and timely reporting of [redacted] This annex was responsible for the subsequent issuance of an NSACSS System Coordinating Paper I (SCP-I), dated 8 January 1980. During the 2d Qtr FY 1980, Public Law 96-154 was announced as the Defense Appropriations Bill for Project Kunia. Also, during this period a final copy of the Kunia Concept of Operations was published. During 3d Qtr FY 1980 an NSACSS and INSCOM Implementation Plan (25 June 1980) for the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) Phase were approved and published. US Army Field Station, Kunia would be organized on 1 October 1980.

~~(S/CCO)~~ Initially, under the QRC Phase, the INDRA Remote Collection Facility

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(S/CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

However, the AGAS being sent to Kunia is considered to be inadequate by those personnel associated with its operation. Some of these inadequacies are lack of documentation of software by Saunders Corporation and a lack of replacement parts. The system is about 15 years old and should be upgraded or replaced by a similar, more efficient system. With an efficient AGAS type system at Kunia, the processing of conventional wideband collection can be done two-and-a-half times faster than by manual means. If the system doesn't operate efficiently, it backs up all processing and consequently would adversely effect the reporting posture of Field Station Kunia. Unfortunately, due to budget constraints, this system has very little chance of being upgraded.

~~(S/CCO)~~ ^(U) During Phase I, a DF-6/RTSS/Net Control capability will also be provided, possibly in August 1981. A Mission Control System (MCS), possibly an IBM 43xx Series, will be procured and installed also sometime in August 1981. The operational date for Phase I is planned for April 1982. There is 257 personnel planned to be assigned during the phase. Phase II will consist of the procurement of equipment for a new RCF at the field station. This final phase is scheduled for sometime in the FY 1984/85 time frame. There would be 231 personnel required for Phase II.⁶

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Transfer of TAREX Detachment Europe's Operational Control (OPCON). ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

In October 1979, the Commander, 66th MI Group, proposed the transfer of OPSCON of the TAREX element at Munich (TAREX Det-E) to the 18th MI Battalion. The intent of the proposal by Commander, 66th MI Group was to place the TAREX Detachment into the wartime configuration of the 66th at a position in the overall structure which would be most advantageous for NSACSS, US Intelligence (USI), and TAREX during time of conflict. However, TAREX Management Division (TMD), HQ INSCOM took exception to this proposal, feeling that TAREX Europe would suffer from increased subordination, loss of lateral and vertical access, loss of status, layering, and employment of TAREX personnel in non-TAREX duties. In addition, TMD cited the TAREX experience in Vietnam and explained how and why TAREX functioned so well in that environment. Both lateral and vertical access within the Intelligence community during time of conflict were found to be essential. NSACSS, as the Office of Primary Interest (OPI) and proponent agency of the TAREX Program through Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) Funds, also expressed concern that TAREX functions and reporting should not be inhibited. Subsequently, 66th MI Group replied to TMD and NSACSS through the DCG(I), INSCOM on 4 January 1980, outlining the proposal, presenting its justification, and assuring that TAREX functions and reporting would not be degraded as a result of such transfer. At the request of the DCG(I), TMD drafted a letter responding to NSACSS's concern, using the 66th MI Group Cdr's letter as a model. Although this request put TMD in the awkward position of writing a letter in support of a proposal it disagreed with, the task was completed. The final draft of the letter to Mr. Zaslow was ready for the DCG(I)'s signature on 3 March 1980. Despite the opposition, in June, the DCG(I) informed TMD that the decision was to approve the transfer, and on or about 1 August 1980, OPCON of the TAREX Detachment was transferred to the 18th MI Battalion.

(U)

Reorganization of the 500th MI Group. ~~(S)~~ In March 1979, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, expressed his interest in a possible realignment of INSCOM assets in Japan and tasked the CDR 500th MI Group to perform a study and prepare a reorganization plan. The thrust of the reorganization was to establish a single multidiscipline collection organization by placing HUMINT/CI and SIGINT missions conducted in mainland Japan under a single command. Other objectives included providing additional military intelligence Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) career progression positions for field grade MI officers and establishing an Asian Studies Detachment (ASD), which provides for expansion of Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment (STRATMID) program and extension of Asian language training program by drawing on the linguistic capability and foreign document availability in the US Army Document Center (Pacific) (UDC).

(U)

~~(S)~~ In June 1979, the CDR 500th MI Group presented HQ INSCOM with a comprehensive reorganization plan, utilizing the Group's current authorized manpower. Under the plan, the Group would be configured into a Group Headquarters to consist of a Deputy for Operations and a Deputy for Support. Subordinate to the Group Headquarters and the Deputy for Operations would be a civilian assistant and a Multidiscipline Coordination Center (MCC) which would act as the focal point for discipline fusion and overall policy guidance/direction. The Deputy for Support would direct the Group's support functions. The four operating elements would consist of Field Station Misawa, an MI Battalion, an Asian Studies Detachment (ASD) and a Counterintelligence Detachment (CID).

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(U) ~~(C)~~ On 18 July 1979, the CofS, HQ INSCOM sent a message to the CDR 500th MI Group expressing the concurrence of CG INSCOM with the principles of the 500th's plan. Although approved, the HQ INSCOM staff raised questions involving different aspects of the plan. Key staff elements opposed the subordination of the Field Station Misawa to the Group. The distance between the 500th MI Group and FS Misawa was believed to be a detriment; another was that resubordination would not really change anything as the operational control would remain with NSACSS. In the end, however, the belief that placing Field Station Misawa under the 500th MI Group would be done for structure sake prevailed. Next HQ INSCOM set about to secure NSACSS's concurrence. This was done by emphasizing that the field station's operational control would remain with NSACSS and that the field station would not engage in nor provide Program III (CCP) resources for multidiscipline activities. On 1 October 1979, Field Station Misawa was reassigned from HQ INSCOM to the 500th MI Group.

(U) ~~(C)~~ There were doubts whether DA would approve a 45 military personnel authorized battalion with an additional 32 hire civilians augmentation. There were also doubts whether an additional OPMS 05 commander space could be sold to HQDA. The mission of the battalion would be to command and control four assigned detachments, conduct overt HUMINT and counterintelligence collection activities, conduct both unilateral and bilateral (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) for the Japan base; conduct operational liaison with Japanese Government agencies, and conduct TAREX collection activities. On 1 December 1979, the INSCOM MI Battalion (Collection)(Provisional) was organized at Camp Zama, Japan.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The UDC would be reorganized into an Asian Studies Detachment designed to improve translation and linguistic support and to manage linguistic and STRATMID training programs/projects. Besides the spaces already existing, six additional space requirements were identified. These six spaces were meant to satisfy the Commander INSCOM's desire to provide a viable Asian language maintenance training program, translation and linguistic support, and effective management of STRATMID support to the 500th Group. To insure that the Asian Studies Detachment would be saleable to HQDA, ODCSRM HQ INSCOM instructed that the six spaces should be taken from the reorganized 500th Group Headquarters.

(U) ~~(c)~~ The fourth element to be organized was a Counterintelligence Detachment which would direct and coordinate CI and security activities in the 500th MI Group. The detachment would act for the Commander, 500th MI Group, in the direction, control, monitorship, and coordination of CI operations, liaison programs, operations security support, and other security services. The total military spaces amounted to 24. On 1 December 1979, the INSCOM MI Detachment (Counterintelligence)(Provisional) was organized.

(U) In April 1980, the concept plan was forwarded to HQDA for approval. On 2 September 1980, the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans approved the reorganization with a few exceptions. One of the major changes was the changing of the proposed battalion to a detachment because its size and structure was inconsistent with that of a standard Army battalion. The approved 500th MI Group organization included the four major subordinate elements: Field Station Misawa, the US Army Asian Studies Detachment (authorized strength of 1 Officers, 8 Enlisted, 9 DAC, and 74 Foreign Nationals); 149th MI Detachment

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(authorized 8 Officers, 5 Warrant Officers, 29 Enlisted, and an augmentation of 13 DAC and 17 Foreign Nationals); and the 181st MI Detachment (1 Officer, 5 Warrant Officers, 13 Enlisted, and an augmentation of 2 DAC and 4 Foreign Nationals). The Asian Studies Detachment, 149th MI Detachment, and 181st MI Detachment was organized and activated on 1 October 1980 at Camp Zama.⁸

HQ INSCOM Restationing. (U) To implement the stationing aspects of the Intelligence Operations and Stationing Study (IOSS), INSCOM has been involved since 1977 to establish a consolidated headquarters for the command. In December 1978, HQ INSCOM submitted a Case Study and Justification Folder (CSJF) for consolidation at Vint Hill Farms Station only to have DOD select Fort George G. Meade as the preferred alternative. As a result, HQ INSCOM had to prepare a new CSJF for submission; this was completed and forwarded to HQDA on 27 November 1979. To assure DARCOM of adequate support of its elements at Vint Hill Farms if INSCOM would no longer be the proponent, in the future HQDA indicated that DARCOM would be provided an estimated \$4.1 million dollars per year and the required personnel resources through FY 1985. HQDA also indicated that it would support requirements should any increase in DARCOM's strength within the National Capital Region be required.

(U) On 3 January 1980, during the visit of a congressional staff/DOD/DA party to FGGM, the Director of Facilities Engineering (DFAE) FGGM remarked to representative of the Military Construction Subcommittee staff that space utilization studies subsequent to the CSJF indicated construction projected at FGGM was "not required." This statement, which contradicted information previously provided by DFAE on 9 May 1979 that no permanent facilities were available, necessitated clarification prior to further action. The "new data" was a proposal to renovate and utilize four permanent buildings (Bldgs 39, 40, 41 and 43 in the FGGM commissary complex), to be released upon completion of a new commissary to accommodate the move of US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) (MILPERCEN) and Central Security Facility (CSF) (INSCOM) files from Bldg 4552, and the Post printing plant from Bldg 4553. Temporary buildings in good condition and air conditioned (T2508/2509, T4454/4474 or T4700) were to be used as new sites for Intelligence Materiel Development and Support Office (IMDSO) (moved from Bldg 4554) and Readiness Group FGGM (moved from Bldg 4553). An addition to Bldg 4550 (HQ First Army) was to be constructed to accommodate move of First Army elements from Bldg 4553. Following departure of present tenants, Bldgs 4552, 4553 and 4554 were to be rehabilitated (porches enclosed, attic converted) for consolidation of all HQ INSCOM elements.

(U) MG William I. Rolya's reaction to this proposal was that for the long occupancy anticipated, substandard and make do conditions were not acceptable. There was also a negative reaction by subordinate elements of First Army to a move to temporary type facilities. The FGGM proposal also began to break down when the US Army Troop Support Agency advised the projected new commissary, although approved February 1980 for FGGM, would not be funded until April 1983. This would mean that the new store which would permit release of buildings 39, 40, 41 and 43 would not be opened prior to approximately October 1984, too late to fit into FGGM's schedule.

(U) A coordinated position was established which eliminated plans to utilize

temporary structures, as well as the permanent buildings in the commissary area (with exception of Bldg 39, still to be rehabbed for the Post Print Plant). Substituted for these proposals were additions to Bldg 4550 and 4554, and a new building not previously considered for the Readiness Region. Plans included in the 30 November 1979 CSJF for construction of a Tempest Facility and to rehab buildings 4552, 4553 and 4554 were continued. Primary facilities to be constructed were reduced to an estimated \$6,507,000 (vice \$8,534,000 in 30 November 1979 document). Supporting facilities totalled \$1,243,000 (vice \$1,074,000). Total estimated project cost was thus reduced from \$9,608,000 to \$7,750,000 in the revision of Section III, CSJF submitted to DA on 14 March 1980.

(U) The CSJF (as revised) made its way through the Army Staff to the Secretary of the Army who forwarded it on 13 June 1980 to the Office Security of Defense. For the remainder of FY 1980, it was held at that point. The protracted delay created considerable difficulties, some of which were addressed by the Vice Chief of Staff, in a memo to the Secretary of the Army on 21 April 1980. VHFS, attempting to implement the Commercial Industrial Type Activities (CITA) Program, experienced difficulties in obtaining bidders on the contract due to the uncertainty of VHFS future status. By a message dated July 1980, DA attempted to alleviate this problem by assuring all concerned that construction-dependent relocations/closure of VHFS could not take place for approximately five years at earliest from time of decision.⁹

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATION

1. Ltr, MG William I. Rolya, subj: Letter of Instructions (8 Aug 80) (U).
2. Interview, LTC R.W. O'Shea, (ADCSRM, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM) with Mr. James Gilbert (History Office), 24 Jun 81 (U).
3. FY 1979 MAO AHR (S/NOFORN), Appendix A and F; FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 2-11; Interview (taped), LTC Patrick J. Murphy (C, Production Office, ODCSOPS) with Mr. James L. Gilbert (History Office) (21 May 81) (C); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: Implementation of Camp Peary Recommendations - Command Security Office (071900Z Nov 79) (U); DF, CofS, subj: Reorganization HQ INSCOM and CONUS Elements (1 May 80) (U); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: Camp Peary Executive Session (261534Z Oct 79) (U); DF, CofS, subj: Reorganization of HQ INSCOM and CONUS Elements (9 Jul 80) (U); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: INSCOM CONUS Reorganization (241430Z Apr 80) (C); Interview, LTC R.S. Cannard (C, Mgt & Anal Div, ODCSRM) with Mr. James L. Gilbert (History Office) (1 Jul 81) (U).
4. Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: INSCOM Science and Technology Board (061300Z Oct 79) (U).
5. FY 1980 501st MI Group AHR (S), Chap. IV; Paper, IAOPS-PTR-P, subj: Reorganization 501st MI Group (Korea) (25 Feb 80) (C).
6. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S), Chap. III, pp. 3-6, 19-20; DF, DCSOPS, subj: Kunia Joint Operations Proposal (9 Mar 79) (U); Ltr, IACG, subj: INSCOM Comments on NSA Draft CONOP for Kunia (23 Jan 79) (C/CCO).
7. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 117-118.
8. Paper, subj: Issues Involved in 500th MI Gp Reorganization (Undtd) (U); Ltr, DAMO-FDP (HQDA), subj: Reorganization of 500th MI Group (2 Sep 80) (U); Staff Note, IAOPS-PTR-P, subj: 500th MI Group Reorganization (19 Jun 79) (C); Ltr, IARM-SA (HQ INSCOM), subj: Reorganization of 500th MI Group (7 Apr 80) (U); Msg, CDR 500th MI Gp, subj: 500th MIGP Reorgn Planning (060006Z Jun 79) (C); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: 500th MIGP Reorganization Plan (241815Z Sep 79) (C); DF, CofS (HQ INSCOM), subj: Subordination of FS Misawa to the 500th MIGP (29 Mar 80) (S/CCO).
9. FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), pp. 24-26; FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S), Chap III, pp. 11-14.

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CHAPTER V
RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. (U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's OMA funding program at the close of FY 1980 consisted of \$94,585,000 in Direct Funds and \$28,000 in Automatic Reimbursements for a total of \$94,613,000. The table below shows a breakout of end FY 1980 direct funding by subprogram.

Table 1. - Direct Funding By Subprogram
(As of 30 Sep 80)

<u>Subprogram</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>
P2 (General Purpose Forces)	\$ 5,058,000
P31 (Intelligence Activities)	68,074,000
P3C (COMSEC)	1,996,000
P30 (Other)	18,667,000
P7 (Troop Issue)	31,000
P8T (Training)	523,000
P80 (Education Services)	231,000
	<u>\$94,580,000</u>

(U) Following is an audit trail from the DA dollar guidance for preparation of the FY 1980 Command Operating Budget (COB) to final FY 1980 Approved Funding Program (AFP):

Program 2

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	\$ 4,008,000
Flying Hour Program	- 575,000
Foreign Area Officer Russian	- 643,000
SIGINT/EW Unit Operations	- 138,000
FY 1979 Class. Pay Increase	- 60,000
FY 1978 DHFN Pay Increase	- 6,000
Opposing Force Program	- 11,000
JCS Exercise Program	- 26,000
FY 1979 Non Pol Stk Fnd Price Increase	- 54,000
Align to COB	- 175,000
Training Schools and Facilities	+ 681,000
Unit Mission Activity	+ 952,000
Miscellaneous	+ 12,000
<u>FY 1980 Initial AFP</u>	3,965,000
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 279,000
FY 1980 Non POL Stk Fnd Price Increase	+ 58,000

Disab. Retirement and Sick Leave	\$ 3,000
Parking, Unleaded Gas, Recap Tires Red	- 18,000
Service Spt Contracts	- 6,000
FY 1980 Pvt Sector Price Increase	+ 48,000
EW Center Support Red	- 200,000
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 446,000
JCS Exercise Program	+ 19,000
FY 1980 Pay Supplemental	+ 24,000
TENCAP/BETA	+ 456,000
FY 1980 IHFN Pay Raise	+ 4,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	- 20,000

<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 5,058,000</u>
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Program 3I

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	<u>\$ 61,882,000</u>
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Humint Collection	- 354,000
FY 1979 Class Pay Increase	- 823,000
CCP - Mgt HQs	- 653,000
CCP - Logistics Support	- 61,000
CCP - Gen Purpose	+ 128,000
Intel Analysis Gp	+ 644,000
Imagery Intel Gp	+ 91,000
Intel ADP	+ 783,000
Imint HQ	+ 132,000
INTA HQ	+ 307,000
Tech. Recon. & Surv.	+ 2,000

<u>FY 1980 Initial AFP</u>	<u>\$ 62,078,000</u>
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 346,000
Det 4 Base Maint Contract	+ 8,445,000
Project SEEK	- 400,000
IHFN Separation Allow.	- 407,000
CRYPTO Activities	+ 39,000
Private Sector Price Increase	+ 390,000
FY 1980 Pay Supplemental	+ 1,534,000
Det 4 Base Maint Contract Conversion Red	- 5,390,000
Fuel Cost Adj.	+ 956,000
Project Kunia	+ 131,000
E/O Equip. Mod.	+ 50,000
AHS Barracks Rehab.	+ 250,000
Det 4 Base Maint Contract	- 689,000
Intel Activities	+ 87,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	- 160,000

<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 68,074,000</u>
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Program 3C

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	<u>\$ 1,953,000</u>
HAC Reduction	- 22,000
FY 1980 Initial AFP	1,931,000
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 7,000
FY 1980 Pay Supplemental	+ 83,000
Excess CI Activity	- 25,000
<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 1,996,000</u>

Program 30

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	<u>\$ 17,817,000</u>
HAC Reduction	- 1,078,000
FY 1979 Class Pay Increase	- 171,000
CI Purification	+ 260,000
CI OPS SPT	+ 6,000
FY 1980 Initial AFP	16,834,000
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 38,000
FY 1980 Overtime Increase	+ 17,000
Disab. Retirement and Sick Leave	+ 51,000
Payroll Allot	+ 12,000
FY 1980 Stock Fund Supply Increase	+ 13,000
FY 1980 IHFN Pay Increase	+ 67,000
FY 1980 IHFN Separation Allow.	+ 34,000
Other Purchase Serv.	+ 21,000
Mgmt. HQ Red	- 492,000
Parking Red	- 144,000
Unleaded Gas Red	- 11,000
FY 1980 Private Section Price Increase	+ 58,000
CI OPS Increase	+ 1,000
Mgmt HQ Increase	+ 1,292,000
FY 1980 RPMA Increase	- 100,000
FY 1980 Parking, Unleaded Gas	+ 111,000
FY 1980 POL Price Increase	+ 96,000
FY 1980 Pay Supplemental	+ 792,000
FY 1980 Pay Supplemental	+ 9,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	- 62,000
<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 18,667,000</u>

Program 7S

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	\$ 0
Troop Issue OPS	+ 31,000
<u>FY 1980 Initial AFP</u>	31,000
No Changes	0
<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 31,000</u>

Program 8T

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	\$ 503,000
No Change	0
<u>FY 1980 Initial AFP</u>	503,000
<u>FY 1980 Private Section Price Increase</u>	+ 20,000
<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 523,000</u>

Program 80

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1980 COB</u>	\$ 161,000
Army H. School Compl. Program	- 7,000
Tuition Assistance	- 14,000
FY 1979 Class Pay Increase	- 6,000
Exec. Development	- 4,000
Educ. Center OPS	+ 29,000
Civ. Per ES Increase	+ 2,000
<u>FY 1980 Initial AFP</u>	161,000
Aces Workload Ads	+ 19,000
<u>FY 1980 Private Section Price Increase</u>	+ 47,000
<u>FY 1980 Pay Supplemental</u>	+ 4,000
<u>Final FY 1980 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 231,000</u>

(U) The table below reflects direct obligations by element of expense for FY 1980 (\$ in Thousands). Obligation of \$93,686,000 and Annual Funding Program of \$94,580,000 resulted in an obligation rate of 99.1 percent.

<u>ELEMENT OF EXPENSE</u>	<u>P2</u>	<u>P30</u>	<u>P3I</u>	<u>P3C</u>	<u>P7</u>	<u>P8T</u>	<u>P80</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent of Grand Total</u>
Civ Pay & Benefits	532	14,397	28,957	1,031	30	-	60	45,007	48

ELEMENT OF EXPENSE	P2	P30	P31	P3C	P7	P8T	P80	Total	Percent of Grand Total
Travel & Trans	523	1,710	2,683	390	-	503	27	5,836	6
Rents/Comm/ Util	40	1,038	2,445	94	-	-	-	3,617	4
Contr Svc	1,330	380	22,270	298	-	-	57	24,335	26
Supplies & Equip	2,574	1,039	11,041	161	1	-	75	14,891	16
Total	<u>4,999</u>	<u>18,564</u>	<u>67,396</u>	<u>1,974</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>503</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>93,686</u>	<u>100</u>

Military Construction, Army. (U) The INSCOM FY 1983-87 Military Construction Army (MCA) program was submitted to HQDA on 30 September 1980 with the approval of the Commanding General. The total value of the construction requested for FY 1983 is \$5,825,000.

(U) In Korea, there were several projects undertaken to support both the operational needs and troop welfare. Operationally, the conversion of Building 1237 to a communications center had progressed to an active stage. An additional hanger for Camp Humphreys was programmed for FY 1982. On the troop support side, the project to modernize the dining facility had reached the construction stage with an award expected soon. Due to programming changes at HQDA, the modernization of the existing barracks was postponed until FY 1983, a delay of four years. In Turkey, political maneuvering by the Turks and the seasonal scarce water supply finally led to the decision to build a desalinization plant. The Corps of Engineers placed the European Division Engineer in charge. It was anticipated that 30 percent design would be completed by the time the project is presented to Congress in January 1981. Although the land surveys for plant site and pipeline right-of-way and the subsequent acquisition of the land itself are not moving as fast as EUD had hoped, EUD is continuing to press TUSLOG for the necessary permits. The final say-so must come from the Turks themselves.

(U) Other projects include air conditioning upgrade and power upgrade. Major air conditioning upgrades were in progress at Field Stations Okinawa, Augsburg, and Berlin. Okinawa is about 80 percent finished, and the other two are in the latter stages of design. In addition, there was an upgrade plan for Field Station Sinop for FY 1983. These upgrades will permit uncleared foreign nationals to perform the work more efficiently by arranging the systems to be put mostly outside SI-secured areas. In the past, air conditioning needs were tailored to specific thermal loads required by a certain type of equipment. However, often the equipment was reconfigured. The remedy is to rebuild the system to the variable-air-volume concept which supplies cool air in quantities matched to the need of each area without over or under cooling. Finally, older systems often used conflicting systems to achieve the desire results; by simplifying the design and eliminating the competitive use of heat and cooling,

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the energy efficiency is improved. With new systems, advantage can be taken of the available cool outside air.

(U) During FY 1980, power upgrades were completed at Field Stations Korea and Okinawa (both FY 1975 MCA projects) and at Field Station Berlin (a FY 1977 project). Each installation included several important features to help attain a 99.99 percent reliability standard: duplication of all major circuit elements; improved auxiliary generators with automatic starting; uninterruptible power supply to power critical circuits such as computers and communications equipment; and improved arrangement to place most of the systems outside SI-secure space to enable uncleared electricians to perform the maintenance.²

Family Housing Units. (U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command operated and maintained family housing units at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. Funds were also received from DA for leased housing. The Annual Funding Program for these units for FY 1980 was \$700,000 of which \$699,000 was obligated (99.9 percent).³

INSCOM Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1980 (Authorized Strength). (C) Based on DA Program and Budget Guidance, May 1980, the manpower data shown in the following table represents the authorized strength for end of FY 1980.

Table 2. - INSCOM Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1980

Authorized Strength							
<u>Program</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>US CIV</u>	<u>FN CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P2 Gen Purpose Forces	89	59	962	1,110	11	13	1,134
P3 Intel & Comm	891	373	6,293	7,557	1,583	426	9,566
P8 & 10 Tng & Mil Sales	3	2	10	15	8	-	23
P3 Joint Acty (NSA)	<u>112</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>532</u>	<u>675</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>675</u>
TOTAL	1,095	465	7,797	9,357	1,602	439	11,398

(U) Of the 66 space net loss in FY 1980 end authorized strength, 59 spaces were decrements by HQDA in selected functional areas of Base Operations at Vint Hill Farms Station (Program 3 - Other) which were scheduled for review for possible contracting out under the Commercial/Industrial Type Activities (CITA) Program. These space reductions will be offset either by contracting out the function if found to be more cost-effective or by partial reinstatement of the spaces with US Direct Hire Civilian spaces.

(U) The 328 spaces authorized in Program 3 - Other for Base Operations at Vint Hill Farms Station were transferred to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (P3-I) by HQDA during implementation of OSD Program Change Decision (PCD) X-0-001, dated 5 February 1980. PCD X-0-001 required the separation of Real Property Maintenance (RPMA) from Base Operations (BOS) and a restructuring

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of appropriate program elements to provide increased standardization among the Services and DOD elements. One of the major changes in Army manpower accountability required by the PCD was the requirement to establish separate BOS and RPMA Program Elements for the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP). However, it did not require that all intelligence activity BOS/RPMA be consolidated into a single Intelligence Program. The Director, NSACSS, nonconcurred in the DA action on the premise that the majority of the operational activities at Vint Hill Farms Station were in support of Army tactical Programs, rather than Consolidated Cryptologic Program activities. Final resolution of this action is pending.

(U) A separate program for Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Activities (PE 315127) was implemented with the transfer of 367 spaces from the Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities (CI&IA) Program (PE 315128). The FCI Program was concurrently incorporated into the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The new FCI Program Element will simplify the identification and management of manpower resources allocated to the two separate functional activities.

(U) An Army Management Headquarters Account (AMHA) for CI&IA (PE 315298) was established with the transfer of 123 spaces from the CI&IA Operational Activities Account (PE 315128). The new AMHA account will facilitate ease in distinguishing the manpower resources engaged in the Operational Control and Management of the CI&IA Program from those engaged in CI&IA field operations.³

Military Strength by Program. (C) The table below reflects authorized and assigned military strength by program. Program 2 (General Purpose Forces) was 16 percent short. The shortage was generally spread across the board, heaviest in the 641st MI Detachment and 11th MI Company in CONUS and the 501st MI Group in Korea. The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) portion of Program 3 was two percent over. But the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) portion was 14 percent under, the Counterintelligence and Other portion were one percent under, and COMSEC was 22 percent under. Within the GDIP, the intelligence Data Handling Systems (INSCOM Automated Systems Activity) was at 61 percent fill. In the area of Counterintelligence and Other, the excess Support to NSA subcategory overshadowed shortfalls in other areas. Shortages within COMSEC was mostly at the 902d MI Group. Overall, the shortage for all programs combined amounted to three percent, an improvement over the previous fiscal year.⁴

Table 3. - Military Strength by Program

<u>Program</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Plus/Minus</u>
2 Gen Purpose Forces	1,109	932	(-177)
3 Cryptologic Activity (CCP)	4,834	4,844	(+ 10)
AMHA (CCP)	187	195	(+ 8)
Base Opns/RPMA (CCP)	311	376	(+ 65)
HUMINT (GDIP)	574	526	(- 48)
Imagery (GDIP)	59	48	(- 11)
Production (GDIP)	145	116	(- 29)

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<u>Program</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Plus/Minus</u>
Intel Data Handling Sys (GDIP)	49	30	(- 19)
AMHA Gen Defense Intel Prog (GDIP)	72	51	(- 21)
AMHA (CI & Other)	61	21	(- 40)
Foreign CI (CI & Other)	204	177	(- 27)
Scty and Invest Actv	831	766	(- 65)
Support to NSA (CI & Other)	675	179	(+111)
COMSEC	230	179	(- 51)
8 Training	12	11	(- 1)
Family Housing	3	2	(- 1)
 TOTAL	<u>9,357</u>	<u>9,060</u>	<u>-296</u>

Command Personnel Situation. (C) Authorized and actual total command strength for FY 1979 and FY 1980 are shown below.⁵

	<u>30 September 1979</u>					
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV**</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Authorized*	1,078	474	7,851	9,403	1,638	11,041
Actual	952	425	7,377	8,754	1,634	10,288

	<u>30 September 1980</u>					
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV**</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Authorized*	1,092	464	7,773	9,329	1,597	10,026
Actual	1,023	466	7,621	9,110	1,588	10,698

*The FY 1979 authorized is Permanent Orders Authorized and the FY 1980 authorized is Command Program Authorized.

**The FY 1979 civilian strength does not include 440 authorized foreign nationals and 394 actual foreign nationals; FY 1980 figures do not include 439 authorized and 383 actual.

(U) For FY 1980 command personnel strength by unit, see Appendix F.

DA Scrub Team. (U) In accordance with a HQDA Directive dated 5 May 1980, a DA Scrub Team reviewed all INSCOM TDA's, including both HQ INSCOM and subordinate TDA units. The purpose of the action was to reduce officer and NCO authorized positions in numbers and grades so that all active Army positions could be better supported by FY 1982. Although primary attention was directed toward the military, the scrub team also recommended the elimination of several civilian positions. HQ INSCOM reviewed the DA Scrub Team recommendations to reclaim any potential DA decrements and to develop trade-offs within the Command for fulfilling total reductions. By the close of FY 1980, the team had assessed INSCOM about 100 eliminations and some 850 downgrade/upgrade actions.⁶ But the review was still in progress, and no final decisions had taken place.

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INSCOM Key Personnel. (U) Appendix H contains a listing of personnel occupying key positions within the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, as of 30 September 1980.

Reenlistment Rates. (U) INSCOM continued to have reenlistment problems but showed improvements among careerists during FY 1980. The table below shows the command's FY 1980 reenlistment rate by unit.⁷

Table 4. - Unit Reenlistments, FY 1980

Units	First Termers			Careerists		
	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
<u>Group I</u>						
USAFS Augsburg	182.12	104	57.09	108.57	90	82.90
CONUS MI Gp	61.71	63	102.09	168.81	100	59.24
501st MI Gp	39.61	48	121.18	85.06	75	87.17
USAFS Berlin	78.47	28	35.68	52.58	48	91.29
USAFS Okinawa	35.79	40	111.76	42.00	47	112.00
66th MI Gp	17.01	23	135.21	74.90	85	113.48
<u>Group II</u>						
USAFS San Antonio	37.88	47	124.08	27.59	35	126.86
USAG AHS	23.21	13	56.01	80.24	42	52.34
902d MI Gp	13.81	10	72.41	61.28	39	63.64
USAG VHFS	10.30	12	116.50	27.84	26	93.39
USAFS Misawa	10.03	9	89.73	14.90	15	100.67
USAITAC	11.41	17	148.99	50.33	28	55.63
500th MI Gp	----	--	-----	3.12	4	128.21
470th MI Gp	2.90	1	34.48	5.33	6	112.57
TUSLOG Det 4	9.44	6	63.56	14.51	6	41.35
<u>Group III</u>						
ITIC-PAC	.88	--	-----	3.27	1	30.58
USAFS Homestead	---	1	100.00	----	--	-----
Central Scty Fac	---	--	-----	.52	--	-----
Sp Ops Det	---	--	-----	4.01	2	49.88
Admin Survey Det	.53	2	377.36	1.72	6	61.73
Ft Meade Hq Sp Det	.60	--	-----	3.54	2	56.50
Opnl Gp	.24	--	-----	4.06	1	24.63
Crypto Spt Gp	---	--	-----	----	1	100.00
Command TOTAL	<u>535.94</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>79.11</u>	<u>842.18</u>	<u>659</u>	<u>78.25</u>

Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1980. (U) The table below depicts INSCOM's critical MOS recruitment posture for FY 1980.⁸

Table 5. - Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1980

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Enlistments</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>
05D	228	186	82
05G	246	240	98
05H	585	388	66
05K	379	305	80
33S	316	286	90
96B	715	650	91
96C	308	113	37
97B	341	253	74
98C	889	625	70

(U) The table below reflects the 98G recruitment by language skill.

Table 6. - Recruitment by Language (MOS 98G)

<u>Language</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Enlistments</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>
Arabic-Egyptian	22	10	45.45
Arabic-Syrian	19	19	100.00
Chinese-Mandarin	93	91	97.85
Czech	86	75	87.21
French	9	9	100.00
German	215	210	97.67
Korean	157	135	85.99
Polish	34	19	55.88
Russian	481	481	100.00
Spanish-American	46	29	63.04
Vietnamese	12	4	33.33
TOTAL	<u>1,174</u>	<u>1,082</u>	<u>92.16</u>

Critical MOS Fill. (U) A comparison of the enlisted personnel posture by critical and critical support MOS's in FY's 1979 and 1980 is shown in the table below.⁹

Table 7. - Enlisted Personnel Posture by Critical MOS
FY's 1979-1980

<u>MOS</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>			<u>FY 1980</u>		
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>
05D	161	185	115	177	188	106
05G	77	75	97	101	102	101
05K	635	582	92	652	650	100

MOS	FY 1979			FY 1980		
	Auth	Act	Percent of Fill	Auth	Act	Percent of Fill
05H	1,079	1,120	104	1,201	1,160	97
33S	425	367	86	449	398	89
96B	106	75	71	112	122	109
96C	120	121	101	117	134	115
96D	58	32	55	57	56	98
97B	456	326	71	455	348	76
97C	123	54	44	132	53	40
98C	920	827	90	969	861	89
98G	715	749	105	744	774	104
98J	150	158	105	153	143	93
98Z	105	63	60	100	87	87

(U) The posture of MOS 33S fluctuated throughout the fiscal year. The shortages were caused primarily by Additional Skill Indicators and special training requirements.

(U)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Analysis of the MOS 97B posture during the FY indicated that the percentage of fill remained steady. A breakdown by unit showed the 66th MI Group moving from 78 to 86 percent; 500th MI Group from 65 to 91 percent; 470th MI Group from 133 to 43 percent; 902d MI Group from 62 to 69 percent; and 501st MI Group from 89 to 74 percent.

(U) In MOS 97C, there was a critical shortage Army-wide (41 percent), and the fill was expected to decrease even further. By unit, the 66th MI Group decreased from 95 to 86 percent; 500th MI Group from 60 to 42 percent; 470th MI Group from 140 to 33 percent; Operational Group 56 to 50 percent; and the 501st MI Group remained at 36 percent. In coordination with MILPERCEN, INSCOM developed a fill plan in April 1980 to assist in a balanced fill of available manpower.

Enlistment and Reenlistment Incentives. (U) At the close of FY 1980, the tables below depict the enlistment and reenlistment monetary incentives that were in effect.¹⁰

Table 8. - Enlistment Incentives

MOS	Title/Language	Amount
05D	EW/SIGINT Identification Locator	\$3,000
05G	Signal Security Spec	\$2,500
05H	EW/SIGINT Interceptor	\$3,000

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Title/Language</u>	<u>Amount</u>
05K	EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor	\$3,000
96C	Interrogator	\$2,500
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor by Language	\$3,000
	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	\$3,000
		\$2,500
		\$2,500
		\$2,500
		\$2,500
		\$2,500

Table 9. - Reenlistment Incentives

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Title/Language</u>	<u>*Bonus</u>
05D	EW/SIGINT Identification Locator	4A 1B
05G	SIGSEC Specialist	2A 4B
05H	EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor	4A 1B
05K	EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor	4A 1B
33S	EW/Intercept Systems Repair	2A 2B
96C	Interrogator	2A
96D	Image Interpreter	3A
97B	Counterintelligence Agent	4A
97C	Area Intelligence Specialist	2B
98C	EW/SIGINT Specialist	2A 1B
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor	4A 4B
	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	
98G		5A 4B
98G	All other languages	2A 1B
98G	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	4A 2B
98J	EW/SIGINT Non-Collection	2A 1B

*Zone A applied to 1st Termers (6 or less years active service at ETS). Zone B applied to Career soldiers (6-10 years active service at ETS). Maximum bonus allowable for either Zone A or B is \$12,000 before taxes.

Additional Skill Identifiers. (U) Two INSCOM proponent Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) were approved during FY 1980. The ASI T2 (Model 40 Teletypewriter Maintenance) was approved effective 1 June 1980 for MOS 31J. Effective 1 September 1980, ASI M7 for MOS 05K became effective; this replaced ASI's H2 and J4 which were dropped at the same time.

Establishment of USARI Committee of Visitors. (U) The United States Army Russian Institute (USARI) Committee of Visitors is an interagency committee responsible for providing expert assistance to the Commander, INSCOM, and Commandant, USARI, on a wide range of problems, concerns and challenges relating to USARI. In order to establish a Committee of Visitors for USARI, it was

first necessary to produce an appropriate regulation in accordance with AR 15-1. To this end, the INSCOM Language Office prepared and staffed USAINSCOM Regulation 15-2, which was yet to be published at the close of FY 1980. A HQ INSCOM Committee Management Officer has been designated with the remaining members of the committee to be identified by 1 December 1980. It is anticipated that the first meeting of the committee will be held by 3rd Qtr FY 1981. The USARI Committee of Visitors will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating USARI policies, procedures, and programs as they relate to administration and management, staff, faculty, students, equipment and facilities, curriculum, methodology and evaluation strategies. For this reason it is absolutely essential that members of the committee be highly knowledgeable with comprehensive backgrounds in education and training evaluation.¹²

Establishment of Language Office. (U) Due to the Commander's concern with the overall posture of linguistic readiness and the "Language Problem" within INSCOM, the Language Office was established on 4 February 1980. During the executive session held on 22 to 24 October 1979, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, had indicated that since no one else was orchestrating the establishment of a language center within the Army, INSCOM should take the lead and become the Executive Agent for Intelligence Language Training. The INSCOM Language Office, an element of DCSOPS, Training Division, provides staff supervision and centralized coordination for INSCOM language programs and is the principal staff advisor on all matters dealing with the recruitment, training, utilization and retention of INSCOM linguists. The Language Office is also responsible for reviewing and coordinating dissemination of foreign language dictionaries, glossaries and training aids in support of US Army language programs.

(U) The Language Office was specifically tasked to review the existing posture of INSCOM linguists and propose solutions for any problem areas encountered. An integral part of this task was to prepare a briefing for the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army outlining the "Linguist Problem" and presenting INSCOM's recommended solutions. This briefing for which overall responsibility was later assumed by DA staff (with input supplied by the INSCOM Language Office) was to be presented in October 1980.

(U) The major problem encountered by the Language Office is the rapid identification of qualified linguist personnel to support short-fuse contingency operations. This problem is especially critical in those third-world language for which no, or inadequate, Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPT) exist. To address the problem, the Language Office requested authority to access MILPERCEN's computer-stored linguist personnel listings and also requested that the DLPT be prepared to realistically evaluate major Arabic dialects. The Language Office also recommended the establishment of a foreign language exploitation unit to support contingency operations. This unit would be primarily composed of linguists proficient in third-world languages.¹³

Far East In-Country Language Training Program. (U) The Far East In-Country Language Training Program was to give both INSCOM and tactical support linguists refresher maintenance training and/or intermediate level training at civilian institutes in the country in which the linguist was stationed. Initially, it was limited to the European theater languages but was scheduled for expansion

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to countries in the Far East during FY 1980. Plans called for three personnel to begin school in Korea during the 1st Quarter. However, this did not occur, and the Far East portion of the program was put on hold. A major consideration was the Defense Language Institute's doubt as to the applicability of the training being offered to mission related language requirements.¹⁴

New Equipment Training (NET). (U) After implementation of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study 1976 and 1977, there was no longer a single Army coordinator (previously the US Army Security Agency) for training support for strategic signals intelligence systems developed by NSACSS. Army training responsibilities were fragmented between elements of the USA Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the USA Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), and INSCOM. It gradually became evident that a single contact point was required for coordination of Army support for new equipment systems. In December 1979, DA ACSI assigned INSCOM the responsibility for coordination of Army support planning, programming, and other efforts related to strategic signal intelligence systems developed by NSACSS, including responsibility for overall coordination of Army training requirements.¹⁵

(u)
(c) Civilian Strength by Program. (c) The table below reflects authorized and assigned civilian strength by program. It includes foreign nationals, temporaries, and permanent over-hires. As with the military personnel, the greatest shortfall was in Program 3 (both General Defense Intelligence Program and COMSEC portions). However, the real shortages were not as extensive as the percentages appear (11.3 and 25.5 percent under fill respectively). Many of the temporary and permanent over-hires being accounted for under the Consolidated Cryptologic Program portion of Program 3 (6.6 percent over fill) were actually utilized in GDIP and COMSEC.¹⁶

Table 10. - Civilian Strength by Program

	<u>Program</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Plus/Minus</u>
2	Gen Purpose Forces	24	27	(+ 3)
3	Base Opns/RPMA (CCP)	299	304	(+ 5)
	AMHA (CCP)	211	242	(+31)
	Cryptologic Actv (CCP)	247	261	(+14)
	HUMINT (GDIP)	442	412	(-30)
	Imagery (GDIP)	71	55	(-16)
	Production (GDIP)	110	88	(-11.3)
	Intel Data Handling Sys (GDIP)	34	22	(-12)
	AMHA Gen Defense Intel Prog (GDIP)	32	34	(+ 2)
	Base Opns (CI and Other)	1	0	(- 1)
	Scty and Invest Actv (CI & Other)	279	254	(-25)
	Foreign CI (CI and Other)	163	157	(- 6)
	AMHA CI (CI and Other)	69	66	(- 3)
	AMHA Other (CI and Other)	4	4	(0)
	COMSEC	47	35	(-12)
8	Training	3	2	(- 1)
	Family Housing	4	4	(0)
10	Sales	1	0	(- 0)
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2,041</u>	<u>1,967</u>	

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INSCOM Senior Level Positions. (U) During FY 1980, INSCOM received an additional 15 high grade positions (GS-13/14/15), raising its DA Senior Level Position Allocation from 197 to 212. The DA based its increase upon INSCOM's request for 41 additional high grade allocations to aid the command in providing the necessary expertise required to accomplish the mission. When the Army Security Agency (ASA) became INSCOM, the high grades were transferred with the functions but no provision was made to provide a "corporate headquarters" to manage the new multidiscipline intelligence mission. In addition, the ceilings by grade had been removed. The DA authorized high grade allocations may increase INSCOM's Average Grade which was 9.0544 at the end of FY 1980. However, the prevailing guidance was to be at or lower than end FY 1979 average which was 9.1238. With good position management, INSCOM should remain below the established Average Grade Ceiling.¹⁷

Merit Pay System. (U) The Civil Service Reform Act required employees GS-13 through GS-15 in policy making positions be included in the Merit Pay System to be effected for pay purposes on 1 October 1981. Out of 213 positions above GS-13, 205 were identified for Merit Pay.¹⁸

Presidential Hiring Limitation for Civilian Employment. (U) Effective 29 February 1980 the Civilian Personnel Hiring Limitation was imposed by President Carter. Based on this, a civilian who left the command for a position in any other DOD organization, INSCOM could hire another DOD employee to fill, i.e., one for one. However, if the loss was to a non-DOD source, then INSCOM would have to draw upon non-DOD sources to enable the command to hire one fill from outside DOD. At the end of FY 1980, INSCOM had lost 103 spaces to non-DOD sources and hired 53 from non-DOD sources. This placed INSCOM three filled spaces above their ceiling at the end of the fiscal year.¹⁹

Reduction of Hire Lag. (U) Beginning in January 1979, an intensive management effort was undertaken to reduce hire lag within the entire command. On 31 January 1979, 13.3 percent of all civilian positions were unfilled. It was determined that by 31 December 1979, the lag would be reduced to only five percent, a 95 percent fill rate. Supervisors were directed to submit an SF-52, Request for Personnel Action, against each existing vacancy and to submit crediting plans for all positions (non career field) regardless of whether or not a vacancy existed, and all activities were required to submit a monthly SF-52 report. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management distributed 85 Permanent Overhire spaces against the hire lag.

(U) As a result of these actions, INSCOM had an end-of-quarter fill rate as follows: 92.4 percent for 3d Qtr FY 1979; 92.3 percent for 4th Qtr FY 1979; 94.3 percent for 1st Qtr FY 1980; 94.4 percent for 2d Qtr FY 1980. Therefore, the 95 percent fill target was reached; however, the actual fill rate by the end of the 2d Qtr was 101.3 percent due to the cancellation of Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) spaces for FY 1980.²⁰

DA, OMB, OPM Part-Time Civilian Employment Program. (U) The Federal Employees Part-Time Employment Act effective in FY 1980 is intended to give managers increased flexibility in obtaining skilled manpower and distributing work. Up to now, almost all part-time employees were hired temporarily and counted

under manpower ceilings as full civilian spaces. Consequently, part-time employees within INSCOM were hired for supplementary clerical support, only. Commencing FY 1980, the permanent appointment of part-time civilians for all types of positions is permitted and encouraged.²²

Upward Mobility. (U) A DCSPER, HQDA survey in August 1978 was critical of the progress in implementing an Upward Mobility Program at Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS). Progress was slow in correcting the problem. By the close of FY 1979, two positions had been identified, but neither of the spaces filled. During FY 1980, three spaces were actually filled.²²

Civilian Intern Program. (U) Begun in FY 1979, INSCOM had a total of 27 civilian interns assigned to two programs by the close of FY 1980. Three interns were assigned from the Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and Development (SAMOD) Program in which the DA provided the spaces and the interns would complete their training within INSCOM. In addition, INSCOM's own intern program had a total of 24 personnel assigned. Interns from both programs were assigned to nine different career programs. During FY 1980, the DA queried INSCOM as to whether or not the command desired to participate in the DA Intern Program. INSCOM replied in the affirmative and requested 25 spaces by career program. Although DA had not officially approved the request by the close of the fiscal year, they had informally indicated that INSCOM would receive 15 spaces including the three assigned as part of the Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and Development (SAMOD) Program.²³

CONUS Rotation Exception at the US Army Russian Institute. (U) US Army Russian Institute (USARI), Garmisch, Germany, conducted a Foreign Area Officer Program in a two-year curriculum of advanced language training and research in Soviet Area studies. In addition to Army officers, the student body consisted of military and civilian personnel of DOD elements, the US State Department, and other government agencies.

(U) The authorized civilian instructor strength was nine US in the 1710 series and ten local nationals. At present, the nine competitive service US positions were filled by two US citizens, three third country nationals, and four local nationals. The US positions were filled by non-US personnel primarily because of the inability to recruit Soviet Union area instructors from universities in CONUS. A primary cause of the inability to recruit lay in the fact that the Russian Institute could not offer the equivalency of "tenure," a form of job continuity granted by American universities. Quality Russian area university instructors were highly reluctant to leave positions in which they either have tenure or can be granted tenure in CONUS. Civilian instructors in US Army CONUS schools had "tenure," in effect, under normal competitive service status. However, competitive status did not afford the psychological equivalency of tenure to Russian Institute instructors because of the five year rotation policy. Extension to eight years did little to alleviate the situation because of the brevity and tentativeness of the one-year increments.

(U) INSCOM contended to DA that the Soviet studies instructors should be exempted from rotation under AR 690-301, V-3c, Employees in Oversea-Unique Positions, which permitted exception from rotation to CONUS if the position required frequent

contact with host nation officials and detailed current knowledge of host nation culture, mores, law, customs, and government processes of the host nation. The justification was based on the fact that, if possible, the Institute would be located within the Soviet Union; instead, it was as close as geographically feasible to the Soviet Union. The intent of the Institute was to instill total immersion in the Soviet culture. Russian fluency was required of all students; all classroom instructions were in Russian; Russian was the only acceptable language in all non-academic activities, e.g., all signs were in Russian and Russian was spoken at coffee breaks and meals.

(U) Other Foreign Area Officer Programs afforded on-the-job, on-site training in the particular foreign area. Since accessibility to the Soviet Union was severely restricted, the Russian Institute must substitute for the on-the-job, on-site training. The total environment of the Institute was structured and functioning as if it were actually in the Soviet Union. Although Germany was technically "the host nation" to the Russian Institute under AR 690-301.V-3C, INSCOM contended that the instructors should be exempted under V-3c since, by construction and in practice, the Soviet Union was "the host nation." DA concurred on 13 May 1980. As a result, INSCOM began to approve three year extensions in perpetuity. This permitted sufficient job continuity and served as a recruitment incentive within the academic community.²⁴

INSCOM Exclusion from Unionization. (U) Executive Order 12171 specifically excluding INSCOM from the Federal Labor Relations Program was signed 19 November 1980. The issuance of the Executive Order was necessitated by the Civil Service Reform Act. The exclusion grants the same status to INSCOM as has been held by CIA, FBI, NSA, and DIA. Up to now, the INSCOM exclusion was authorized only by DA Civilian Personnel Regulation, subject to a variety of DA interpretations and open to union challenges, requiring affirmation of the exclusion by the Secretary of the Army. As a result of the Executive Order 12171, the INSCOM exclusion was beyond questioning.

(U) The exclusion meant that INSCOM activities could not be unionized for the formal negotiation of civilian personnel policy, regulations, working conditions, etc. INSCOM employees continue to retain the right to join unions and/or have unions represent them in grievances and appeals. Management officials must continue to maintain strict neutrality as to civilians joining unions.

(U) Although the General Intelligence Production Detachment, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis as an intelligence activity under US Continental Army Command (CONARC) and FORSCOM, DA permitted it to be unionized along with all other activities at Fort Bragg. Executive Order 12171 rectified the problem. The Fort Bragg Civilian Personnel Office submitted a clarification of Unit Petition to the Federal Labor Relations Authority. The extrication of General Intelligence Production Detachment from the total Fort Bragg unit was not seriously challenged by the American Federation of Government Employees.²⁵

Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program (FEORP). (U) As part of the INSCOM FEORP plan, the Director of Civilian Personnel visited Hampton Institute, Virginia State University and Norfolk State University as a preliminary step toward establishing relationships with these three Historically Black Colleges

(HBC). During the visits the Director met the Presidents, Vice Presidents for Academic Affairs, Cooperative Education Administrators, and deans of various colleges. Based upon the input from the HBC officials, the Director briefed the CDR INSCOM on the HBC program and recommended possible areas for further exploration. As a result of the recommendations the CDR INSCOM approved the following six initiatives:

- a. Cooperative Education
- b. College Faculty Augmentation
- c. Summer Employment
- d. Temporary Appointment of Faculty
- e. Use of College Faculty/Facilities
- f. Recruitment of College Seniors for INSCOM Intern Program

(U) Since becoming INSCOM, the command had not had a college recruitment program because a sufficient number of applications were received without college campus recruiting. At the three HBC's mentioned above, the Director of Civilian Personnel established two recruitment dates at each in 1980 and 1981, a guest lecturer bureau, and a management institute (to teach HBC faculty and staff oral communication, effective listening, organization effectiveness, systems analysis, etc.). As part of INSCOM's commitment to the FEORP program, the command designated two full-time spaces for the administration of the FEORP and Severely Handicapped Recruitment Program (SHARP).²⁶

Equal Employment Opportunity Program. (U) FY 1980 was the first year that HQ INSCOM had an informal complaint of discrimination become formal. A female employee felt she had not been selected for a job because the selecting official had wanted a male. The complaint could not be resolved at the informal stage, so the complainant filed a formal charge. The US Army Complaint Appellate Review Office (USACARO) investigated but found no discrimination. Still, the complainant was not satisfied and requested a hearing. A hearing was scheduled but cancelled when the complainant decided to drop the complaint.

(U) Recognition of EEO as a primary responsibility of the command was evidence in the publication of INSCOM Regulation 5-5, INSCOM Management by Objectives (MBO) Program, 1 August 1980. The command acknowledged three basic goals: Human, Mission, and Management. In both the areas of the Human and Management, EEO Objectives were listed.

(U) During FY 1980, HQ INSCOM EEO staff and USAG Arlington Hall Station EEO representatives sponsored several weeks and events of special emphasis. These included Women's Week, Martin Luther King's Birthday, Black History Month, Asian Pacific American Heritage Week, and Hispanic Heritage Week.²⁷

INSCOM Federal Women's Program. (U) The USAG Arlington Hall Station Women's Week held from 22 to 27 October 1979 was termed as the best yet by the HQ INSCOM

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Equal Employment Opportunity Office. The five day emphasis included the presentation of awards for outstanding contributors to the program, a musical play by a touring high school group, workshops and seminars for employees and supervisors, and an all day executive session held at Fort Belvoir for staff heads, their respective FWP Committee Representative and a senior woman employee for each staff element.

(U) An analysis was performed of women in mid-level positions at HQ INSCOM from January 1978 to January 1980. Following is a breakdown by year:

Table 11. - HQ INSCOM Mid-level Women Employees by Year

	<u>GS-09</u>	<u>GS-10</u>	<u>GS-11</u>	<u>GS-12</u>	<u>GS-13</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1978	7	1	4	2	0	14
1979	5	1	7	5	0	18
1980	15	1	10	15	1	42

Kudos were sent to all staff heads/commanders commending their progress and asking for continuing support.²⁸

Management by Objectives (MBO) Program. (FOUO) The command group approved the staff proposed objectives in support of the new command goals and directed the replacement Circular 5-1 with INSCOM Regulation, INSCOM Management by Objectives (MBO) Program, dated 1 August 1980. The following command goals were set forth by the regulation:²⁹

HUMAN:

- a. Get and keep the best people, train them and give them meaningful, satisfying jobs.
- b. Upgrade the quality of life in all INSCOM units.
- c. Provide every opportunity for advancement and growth, reward individual achievement, and recognize responsibility and creativity.

MISSION:

- a. Expand intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations, production/threat analysis, and intelligence security to improve multidiscipline support to the Army and the national intelligence effort.
- b. Improve our ability to rapidly respond to crisis and changing situations.
- c. Set a standard of excellence for the Army.

MANAGEMENT:

- a. Refine and improve our planning and our organization.
- b. Improve the management of our people, money, material, and time.
- c. Take full advantage of the tools of our profession.

Baseline Planning. (U) In a memo dated 30 June 1980, DIRNSA established the Baseline Planning Concept, a planning and reviewing process designed to better direct program priorities and permit improved resource trade-off positions

within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. Previously, what little planning which occurred on a timely basis within INSCOM was largely hit and miss and varied from system to system and organization to organization. Baseline Planning attempted to address the need for establishing planning as a cornerstone and framework within which specified program proposals could be evaluated, approved/rejected, and implemented. In the future, baseline planning would be used as the basis for program development; it should be a very rare instance when program/budget proposals would not have already been substantiated in an approved plan. Baseline planning would cover three time periods: Current plan (through budget year), midrange plan (program years, 3-7 years) and long range plan (ten years beyond program years).³⁰

Organization Effectiveness (OE). (U) Shortages of personnel in a critical operational MOS (97B Counterintelligence Agent) were negatively impacting on the ability of INSCOM and other commands with military intelligence personnel to perform their missions. During FY 1980, a four hour problem solving conference was conducted to address the problem. Representatives from DOD, DA, MILPERCEN, TRADOC, and INSCOM attended. Four months later, the conferees met again to evaluate the results of actions taken. The evaluation revealed that the average processing time of applicants had been shorted by almost four months, mainly by eliminating certain outdated procedures, and a successful promotion effort had been conducted to interest more soldiers in applying for the MOS. Both of these actions led to an increase at TRADOC schools and possibly a 20 percent per year increase in the number of school trained soldiers holding the MOS.

(U) A problem solving/action planning session emerged from the annual INSCOM wide Reenlistment Conference. As a result of actions generated from the session, INSCOM achieved 100 percent of its monthly retention goal in January 1980, believed to be a first since becoming INSCOM. Retention of first term soldiers was up three percent in FY 1980 despite a sizeable increase in the retention goals set by DA, and the retention of career soldiers was up by nine percent for the same time period.

(U) To reduce the internal and external turbulence inherent in the establishment of a new organization, HQ INSCOM Organizational Effectiveness Office worked with the Deputy Commander, INSCOM, CDR USA Field Station Kunia, and CSM of the field station to design a two-year multi-phase operation. The design addressed both internal issues and external interface with other MACOM's, DA, and DOD agencies which have an impact upon the ability of the Field Station to become fully operational and perform its mission. By the close of FY 1980, the commander's goals had been clearly communicated within the organization, and the duties and roles of key staff members had been clearly delineated.

(U) The major emphasis of the OE Program within INSCOM was to establish a control group committed to long range strategy of utilizing OE within an organization. Many times after an OE intervenes, the energy level for change will drop. An internal committed group will continue the OE process without the direct facilitation of OE personnel.³¹

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Executive Sessions. (U) In FY 1980, HQ INSCOM continued the practice begun the previous year in the assembling of the Command Group and heads of staff elements on an aperiodic basis to assess the mission, functions and operational direction of the Command. Three such meetings took place: 22 to 24 October 1979 at Camp Peary, 2 June 1980 at Vint Hill Farms Station, and 18-19 August 1980 at the Warrenton Training Center. Since the executive sessions first began in February 1979, topics of discussions have become progressively more specific in nature.

(U) The October session was one of the more important of the executive meetings held over the past two years. In his opening remarks, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, stated that "it is time for a significant breakthrough the full-fledged establishment of INSCOM." In keeping with this theme, MG Rolya approved with certain modifications the implementation of the conclusions of an organizational study which would reorganize the headquarters along more functional lines, permit a greater degree of multidiscipline operations, and provide for an immediate solution to the split headquarters situation.

(U) At both the June and August meetings, items were discussed and actions reviewed which stemmed from the previous executive session. In June, a great deal of time was spent focusing on INSCOM's wartime planning and INSCOM's support role to the Rapid Deployment Force during periods of contingency. One or two subjects did not dominate the August discussions as had taken place in June, rather numerous operational and planning activities were reviewed. In some instances, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, furnished guidance; on other occasions, he tasked the responsible staff element with prioritizing the needed resources and requirements.³²

1979 INSCOM Commanders' Conference. (U) The 1979 INSCOM Commanders' Conference was held at Arlington Hall Station during 3-7 December 1979. The theme was INSCOM in the 1980's. After the conference, an Executive Session was held at Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia, from 10-11 December for selected commanders and staff chiefs. See Appendix K for photograph of INSCOM Commanders attending the 1979 Commanders' Conference.³³

(U) Command Exercise Support. ~~(C)~~ HQ INSCOM entered FY 1980 with unresolved issues involving its exercise within the framework of echelon above corps (EAC) concepts outlined in draft FM 100-16. FORSCOM/ARRED/ARLANT had not recognized INSCOM as an active player at the EAC level, but mainly saw INSCOM in the role of providing advice and assistance below corps. However, INSCOM had resolved not to participate at or below corps level. In addition, HQ INSCOM exercise support continued to be constrained during FY 1980 by personnel shortages. An officer billet was identified for the function but was filled on a part time basis only; the NCO (E-9) billet remained vacant throughout the period. HQ INSCOM only monitored traffic during the JCS sponsored command post exercise (CPX) PRIZE GAUNTLET (24-28 March 1980) and POSITIVE LEAP (2-6 June 1980). Although unable to realize any progress, INSCOM made initial plans for the creation of a Intelligence Staff Support Element (ISSE) to support Joint Task Force (JTF) Rapid Deployment Force deployment exercises. The ISSE would provide the same services as the Staff Support Cells described in FM 100-16. Employed at EAC level, ISSE conceptually provides an 18-20 person cell with expertise in each of the various

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disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT) to perform a variety of intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and security missions. The ISSE would provide such support as the following: advice and assistance to J-2 staff for intelligence tasking and mission management of EAC systems and other organic intelligence resources; liaison between assigned/attached intelligence units (CEWI/EAC) and National level systems/organizations; advice and assistance on CI/OPSEC support to JTF; assistance in deception planning, as appropriate; and J-2 staff augmentation as required.³⁴

Exercise CRESTED EAGLE 80/CARAVAN WEST II. (C) Between 4-12 March 1980, the 66th MI Group responded to the tasking of USAREUR by providing the best multi-discipline intelligence and security support ever to CRESTED EAGLE 80 participants. This support involved a major undertaking within the 66th MI Group, which took the initiative for: a full deployment of the Group (FTX CARAVAN WEST II) concurrently with CRESTED EAGLE 80; a practice of the Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) play by Group dependents; the first test of establishing the Headquarters, Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) under the command of the DCSI, USAREUR; the provision of extensive support to the USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC); and the simulated passing of command of two counterintelligence battalions to corps in accordance with USAREUR OPLAN 4102. The exercise included the utilization of HUMINT, SIGINT, CI, SIGSEC, and OPSEC.

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

OPSEC/CI Support to Exercises. (U) During 1980, the 902d MI Group provided CI and SIGSEC support to Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified command staffs, and major Army command staffs during three command post exercises and five field exercises. These included JCS-directed exercises PRIZE GAUNTLET 80, POSITIVE LEAP 80 and PROUD SPIRIT; similar support was provided during JCS coordinated exercises BRAVE SHIELD 80 and GALLANT KNIGHT 80, both sponsored by the US Readiness Command. In addition, for the first time, CI and SIGSEC resources were used to evaluate the operations security (OPSEC) posture of large numbers of contingency forces operating in a tactical mode. On three separate occasions, JCS requested that OPSEC support be provided at several locations throughout the continental United States to assess how well the units involved practiced OPSEC. As a result of lessons learned concerning tactical forces' OPSEC posture and INSCOM's capacity to support these types of operations, in the future INSCOM will be better prepared to expand the scope and nature of support to the Army's OPSEC program.

(S) In late June, DCSOPS, DA, tasked INSCOM to perform an Operations Security Evaluation (OSE) of a Joint Training Exercise by operating covertly as a hostile

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intelligence source might do. The objective was to determine what an outside agency/force could learn about a highly sensitive and classified training exercise. Although given little information and utilizing only a small number of CI/SIGSEC personnel, INSCOM was able to determine the purpose of the exercise the units involved, their role, and the EEI sought. Two months later, INSCOM was again tasked to perform an OSE of a similar joint training exercise. However, this time the exercise planners supplied additional information to INSCOM and authorized the CI/SIGSEC operators to communicate directly with the units involved so that on-the-spot corrections could be made.³⁶

(U)

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INSCOM Operational Readiness Report. (U) The INSCOM Operational Readiness Report (ORR) was established in November 1978 by MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, as an initiative to gain more visibility for INSCOM organizations in the unit readiness status reporting arena at DA level. Following a pilot report prepared in November 1978, quarterly unit reports were submitted in March 1979. Unit reports have been staffed at HQ INSCOM in each quarterly cycle. The process has provided staff feedback to the reporting organizations, a written command summary for DA DCSOPS, DCSLOG, DCSPER, and ACSI, and a quarterly DCSOPS briefing for CDR INSCOM and the staff. In March 1980, however, office personnel losses made the compilation and staffing of the ORR difficult to maintain. As the ORR was not achieving the results for which it was instituted, a recommendation was submitted to and approved by the Command Group to discontinue the report indefinitely. The recommendation was based on the fact that readiness deficiencies noted in the report were due primarily to DOD budget limitations and personnel recruitment shortfalls well known to DA force managers, who were unable to take any action that would directly assist INSCOM's readiness posture. The ORR was discontinued as of the end of March 1980.³⁸

INSCOM Field Visitation Program (FVP). (U) An HQ INSCOM Ad Hoc work group met in October 1979, consisting of representatives from ODCSOPS, ODCSITA, ODCSI, ODCSPER, to discuss and assess the INSCOM Field Visitation Program (FVP) under the provisions of INSCOM Regulation 5-1. The work group unanimously felt that the FVP should be discontinued. It was merely an additional headquarters visit

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and was duplicative of many other visits such as normal staff visits, IG, Manpower Survey, etc. Consequently, FVP has not eliminated other visits despite the fact that it was a stated aim of FVP. The topics covered by FVP team are often not time or project sensitive. This is because of the lack of knowledgeable team members to handle all technical or specialized topics. In the final analysis, the cost and manhours expended could not be justified. There was a minority opinion among the Ad Hoc Work Group which believed that the field would support the FVP idea of "consolidating routine advice/assistance/orientation visits of the HQ staff and to staff FVP with personnel with in-depth experience to address/solve problems and provide needed technical guidance."

(U) Although the FVP was discontinued and the associated INSCOM Regulation 5-1 rescinded, the NSACSS FVP for field stations was continued under provisions of US SIGINT Directive 520. In addition, it was anticipated that with the establishment of a multidiscipline ODCSOPS in May 1980, there would be opportunities to schedule on a time available basis multidiscipline operational advice and assistance staff visits to subordinate INSCOM field elements.³⁹

INSCOM Mobilization Operation Plan. (U) The purpose of the INSCOM Mobilization Operation Plan I-80 was to provide guidance for the effective accomplishment of INSCOM's intelligence, security, and electronic warfare mission in support of the CONUS base during phased mobilization and to ensure that the plan is integrated into the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System. The CofS, HQ INSCOM promulgated the MOB OPLAN I-80 on 23 July 1980. In turn, subordinate elements of INSCOM began development of their supporting mobilization plans.⁴⁰

The Army Capstone Program (CAPSTONE). (U) HQDA charged FORSCOM with the responsibility of implementing CAPSTONE in coordination with the other Major Army Commands and the National Guard Bureau. The purpose of CAPSTONE was to improve mobilization and wartime planning throughout the force, training and deployability, and management of the force. These objectives would be accomplished through planning and training associations between units which will be assigned to the same wartime command (either an overseas headquarters or a CONUS MACOM) and are located in the same geographical region during peacetime. Planning and training associations are intended to provide for interaction of units from the Active and Reserve Components to conduct post-mobilization mission planning in peacetime; and to train together as appropriate, during inactive duty training and annual training, in order to improve overall readiness. The planning and training associations were to be developed from existing command relationships or local arrangements (i.e. MOU's) made by commanders of Active Component (AC) installations and Army National Guard and US Army Reserve major headquarters.

(U) On 22 July 1980, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between CDR FORSCOM and CDR INSCOM outlining their respective roles in CAPSTONE. In fulfillment of its role to conduct intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISE) in support of EAC, INSCOM, or its overseas groups, become the gaining command for certain FORSCOM AC and Reserve Component ISE units upon mobilization and deployment. Units were identified to perform periodic training together in order to become familiar with operating procedures and techniques to be employed in wartime.⁴¹

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Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) to MTOE Units. (U) DA changed AR 140-145 (MOBDES Program) to permit commanders to requisition members of the Ready Reserve to be assigned as MOBDES against unit ALO-1 requirements not authorized at peacetime level of organization. All officers, warrant officers, and enlisted grades E-4 through E-9 would be considered under the program. The 641st MI Detachment became the first US Army MTOE unit to have MOBDES when two O3's (MOS 36B) were assigned.⁴² (U)

Reserve Unit at 66th MI Group. ~~(S)~~ As a result of an OACSI survey of December 1979 to February 1980 in which the ability of the 66th MI Group to fulfill its wartime mission was questioned, a proposal was made for a paid multi-disciplined MI Reserve unit located in Europe. The unit would consist of US civilian employees in overseas areas eligible to serve in the Reserves. The 66th MI Group responded to the proposal by requesting a survey be completed prior to initiation of any such unit at its headquarters. The survey was completed on 15 October 1980 and reached approximately 150 Reserve personnel throughout Europe. Informally, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) enthusiastically endorsed the idea for a MI Reserve unit in Europe. However, HQ USAREUR voiced immense interest in the unit being used to augment the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Talks between OCAR and HQ USAREUR were being conducted at the close of FY 1980, and it was undercertain whether the Reserve unit would be located with the 66th MI Group or at HQ USAREUR.⁴³

Security of HQ INSCOM at Fort George G. Meade. (U) On 13 February 1980, Building 4554, HQ INSCOM elements at Fort George G. Meade was made a restricted area. This action restricts access to Building 4554 to persons who have not been properly cleared by the Command Security Office and Special Security Office. The exchanged badge system placed into effect was compatible with INSCOM elements at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. Besides providing for increased security, the new system facilitated day-to-day working contacts between the headquarters elements.⁴⁴

Implementation of Interim SCI Access Program. (U) The pilot program for interim sensitive compartmented intelligence (SCI) access was implemented within the Command, and a message giving guidance was dispatched on 6 February 1979. Under this program, certain individuals who met the requirements listed in the message would be eligible for the interim access. This allowed personnel to be granted SCI access on an interim basis prior to the completion of a Special Background Investigation. Due to the success of the pilot, the program became permanent in July 1980.⁴⁵

Investigative Records Repository (IRR). (U) The most significant accomplishment during FY 1980 was the reduction of the files from 3,655,069 to 3,587,660. The reduction was due primarily to the efforts of the File Maintenance Review Division personnel. Total files reviewed were 200,886; deleted 84,752; and retained 116,134. All of the files retained were identified in the Defense Central Index of Investigations with the year indexed, type of file, and retention period.

(U) In August 1979, the IRR initiated the purge/review of the records with a view toward the categorization, sanitization, separation of material and the

disposition to the appropriate agencies of the records in accordance with the contents of the file. During a 19 October 1979 briefing, BG John A. Smith, DCG-S&P, INSCOM, reemphasized the disposition of the files in the same manner. Initially, it was determined that Personnel Security Files would be transferred to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS); Adjudicative Files to the Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility; Industrial Security Review Office Files (ISCRO) to DOD, possibly DIS; and Prisoner of War Files to DCSPER, DA. The Files Maintenance Review Division, IRR (Purge/Review Division) operated under this concept with three exceptions. The first exception was to maintain both personnel security investigative and adjudicative material in the same file (effective May 1980). Each of these files was identified in the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) by the letter "S" immediately following the dossier number. The second exception was to maintain each Prisoner of War file intact for continuity of the investigation. The third exception was the elimination of the downgrade/declassification review action. This action met the parameters set forth in DOD Regulation 5200.1-R for storage of material. When requested, the classified material contained in these files was reviewed prior to transfer/loan to any agency.

(U) INSCOM proposed that the personnel security investigative (PSI) files be transferred to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and that OACSI take appropriate action to effect this transfer. The matter was referred on the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review), who approved the transfer of files in principle provided resource implications were worked out between INSCOM and DIS. As a result of numerous meetings and discussions between INSCOM, DIS, and OACSI representatives from September to December 1979 various options and impacts for transfer of the PSI files to DIS were explored. After having reviewed these alternative courses of action, it was decided that the most efficient and least disruptive, in terms of resource allocations, was to retain the files in IRR and allow them to obsolesce in place. This is notwithstanding OSD investigative policy decisions in 1972 and 1977 directing that the PSI mission would henceforth be the responsibility of DIS. This action did not alter the disposition of existing PSI's conducted previously by the services. Since the majority of the PSI files will age out by 1987 or be routinely transferred to DIS in conjunction with ongoing PSI's, retention of these files in IRR will preclude the possibility of a transfer of much needed spaces to DIS and attendant disruption usually accompanying such a move. At the same time, it was decided that effort would continue to be made in exploring the ultimate transfer of adjudicative files to the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF). In January 1980, OACSI accepted the action of resolving the issue of transferring adjudicative files to CCF.

(U) During a May 1980 meeting between representatives of the Central Security Facility and the Industrial Security Review Office Files (ISCRO), CSF requested that the retention criteria for ISCRO files be reviewed in order to reduce the number of files IRR must retain. ISCRO personnel felt that there may be a need to retain the files more than the 25 years in the best interest of the Government in cases of reinvestigation. Further coordination was necessary before a final decision could be reached.⁴⁶

Military Justice. (U) The number of non-judicial punishments imposed under Article 15 in FY 1980 was 397, a significant increase from 298 in FY 1979. There was no one cause for the rise but a series of seemingly isolated and non-related incidents. Despite the increase, INSCOM still remained below the Army in general. Courtmartial in FY 1980 totaled six Summary, 14 Special, eight General; in FY 1979, there were four Summary, four Special, and one General.

Table 12. - Serious Crime Offenses

<u>Crimes of Violence</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>
Rape	0	1
Robbery	1	1
Aggravated Assault	2	0
Assault	12	19
Assault/Battery	3	2
<u>Crimes Against Property</u>		
Larceny	21	13
Burglary	2	1
Auto Theft	1	0
Destruction of Property	17	12
<u>Drug Offenses</u>		
Use/Possession of Marihuana	53	48
Narcotics	1	5
Sale/Trafficking	0	2

(U) Personnel were administratively discharged for the reasons, shown in the table below, during FY 1980.

Table 13. - FY 1980 Administrative Eliminations

<u>Authority</u>	<u>Hon</u>	<u>Gen</u>	<u>Less Than Hon</u>
Chap 5, AR 635-200	16	9	1
Chap 9, AR 635-200	9	1	0
Chap 10, AR 635-200	1	0	6
Chap 13, AR 635-200			
Unsuitability	6	0	0
Chap 14, AR 635-200	3	1	0
All Others	5	0	0

(U) Units were required to indicate number and method of disposition of certain offenses as shown in following table.⁴⁷

Table 14. - Disposition of Other Offenses, FY 1980

<u>Disposition/Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Art 86 (Absences Without Leave)	26
Art 86 (Failure to Repair)	113
Art 89/90 (Disrespect/Disobeying Commissioned Officer)	19
Art 91 (Disrespect/Disobeying Order of WO or NCO)	17
Art 92 (Failure to Obey Order/Dereliction of Duty)	70
Art 111/112/134 (Offenses regarding intoxication)	44
All Others	16

Berlin Democratic Club v. Brown Litigation. (U) After six years in litigation, the Berlin Democratic Club case was settled 4 April 1980. The settlement provided that plaintiffs be provided one copy of relevant portions of documents within the sealed and segregated files subject to deletions under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiffs agreed not to challenge deletions made because of the G-10 law or involving sensitive sources and methods of electronic surveillance in West Berlin. Preliminary DA review and sorting of documents to meet settlement terms began in February 1980. A joint OACSI/OTJAG team reviewed all relevant documents in the sealed and segregated files and identified those items that were responsive to terms of the settlement agreement. Approximately 30,000 such documents (90-100,000 pages) was segregated for a Freedom of Information/Privacy Act type review prior to release to the plaintiffs. A tentative suspense for completion of all screening and release was 31 March 1981. Although the civil litigation was not brought against INSCOM, the command was requested to furnish 26 personnel in support of HQDA. The personnel were attached to the US Army Central Security Facility.⁴⁸

Congressional Inquiries/Requests for Assistance. (U) Responses to Congressional Inquiries during FY 1980 totaled 53 and represented a slight decrease from the 57 accomplished in FY 1979. Contrary to FY 1979, grievances in no single category accounted for more than ten percent of the total actions processed. As has been the case historically, only a comparatively small percentage (17 percent) was found to be substantiated. The figures reflect only Congressional Inquiries processed by the Inspector General system; occasionally replies are accomplished in command channels.

(U) Responses to Inspector General Action Requests (IGAR) received by HQ INSCOM detailed Inspectors General during FY 1980 reflected a substantial increase over the previous year, 211 compared to 153. Much of the increase was directly attributable to a greater awareness of and access to a detailed INSCOM IG among European-based personnel. The desired shift in IGAR workload toward Acting Inspectors General (AIG) at major subordinate units--successfully accomplished in FY 1978 and FY 1979--suffered an inexplicable setback in FY 1980 when AIG's accomplished less than a majority (45 percent) of cases processed. An unofficial objective of the INSCOM OIG remains a 70 percent AIG completion rate, an objective in consonance with problem-solving at the lowest possible level.

(U) In FY 1979, the only category of IGAR accounting for over ten percent of the total actions processed remained Administration. The striking aspect of IGAR within INSCOM continued to be that a majority were found to be substantiated.

Such a high substantiation rate is believed to reflect that most IGAR continue to concern matters which are irresolvable in normal command/administrative channels.⁴⁹

TRILOGY FARE. (U) ODCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, has long recognized the need for a systematic means of relating supply, maintenance, and configuration management of hardware and facilities used by INSCOM. A comprehensive study was conducted of the HQ logistics information needs, as well as those of field station managers, in order to establish such a system. It was believed that any responsive system should incorporate the following features: First, there was no logistics data required by the ODCSLOG of HQ INSCOM which was not also required by managers in the field to properly perform their functions. Thus, if the data requirements of field managers in the field, greater data accuracy would be assured. Thirdly, the data collection should occur in the normal course of activities of the functional user; it should not require separate, redundant recording or transcribing. Finally, the system must not become a "reporting" system but rather should replace and eliminate current periodic and, insofar as possible, one-time reports. The ODCSLOG must be able to function utilizing raw data parasited from that collected and used by field elements.

(U) The study resulted in the creation of a functional system entitled TRILOGY FARE, which was briefed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation and Logistics (HQDA), and subsequently approved for development in June 1980. While awaiting DA approval, coordination was initiated with the General Services Administration to solicit their assistance in developing the TRILOGY FARE System Specifications. GSA agreed to accept the task and placed the order for the service with their supporting contractor, the Computer Science Corporation (CSC). In September 1980, two CSC personnel along with HQ INSCOM representatives from DCSLOG and DCS Automation conducted a one-week field visit to Field Station Augsburg to better orient themselves and gather additional information to assist in their system specifications development effort. The first draft of the specifications is expected to be submitted to this HQ for review and approval during the 1st Qtr FY 1981. The follow-on effort will include development of the system documentation, testing, and installation at the field sites. The first operational system is expected to be installed at Field Station Korea in early 1982 with installation at the remaining field stations after verification that the system functions as intended. All systems are expected to be installed by mid FY 1983.⁵⁰

Opposing Forces Program. (U) The Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Program is a DA Program designed to train US soldiers in an environment which simulates as closely as possible that which would be encountered in wartime with potential adversaries. A key element in the program is the use of materiel and weapons currently in use by potential US adversaries. Logistics support of this equipment is difficult since few if any US sources of replacement parts have been located. Support is further complicated due to lack of operator, maintenance and repair parts manuals, drawings and specifications, as well as a system of cataloging components and repair parts. INSCOM became deeply involved in the OPFOR Program as a result of Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study which transferred

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the only Army Technical Intelligence Unit (the 11th MI Company - formerly Co D, 319th MI Battalion) to INSCOM. AR 350-2 which describes the program also placed the majority of the logistics support responsibilities on the 11th MI Company. A review of these responsibilities and the functions required to accomplish these operations were made by the INSCOM Command Logistics Review Team. Expanded (with DA representatives) (CLRT-X) in February 1979 which concluded that the unit was not equipped or staffed to perform the required functions; many of which were depot level such as major overhaul, principle and secondary item management. In February 1980, the INSCOM CLRT-X reached the conclusion that a major revamping of the logistics support of the OPFOR program was required if the program was to continue on a long-term basis. As a result, DA requested INSCOM develop a new draft of AR 350-2 revising the regulation as necessary to support the program. Supply and Services Division, ODCSLOG, undertook this task, developing missions and responsibilities in such a manner that the support would be provided by agencies and activities which normally provide such support to similar US equipment. The OACSI, DA, has accepted the draft and forwarded it to all interested and effected major commands for comment.⁵¹

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Base Operations Support for Torii Station. (U) Base operations support for USAFS Okinawa peculiar to the Army continued to be provided by US Army Garrison, Okinawa (USAGO) during FY 1980 with one exception. FS Okinawa by a message dated 12 March 1980 advised that USAGO had been directed by US Army, Japan (USARJ) to develop a plan in Coordination with the Field Station to transfer administration and management of the KP contract and accountability for dining facility equipment (that part not yet on FS Okinawa's property books) related to the Field Station Enlisted Mess from USAGO to the field station. Hq INSCOM concurred in this action. A USARJ message on 29 July 1980 to USAGO later indicated that the earliest date funds related to this action could be transferred in FY 1983. In the interim, USAGO is to continue funding until INSCOM is prepared to accept the responsibilities.

(U) On 25 April 1980, at direction of this headquarters, FS Okinawa provided a study concerning support responsibilities of USAGO. This excited CDRUSARJ to advise CDRINSCOM by a 9 May 1980 message that he emphatically opposed any suggestion that any of USARJ/USAGO Base Operations support responsibilities be transferred to INSCOM. In reply, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, assured the CDRUSARJ that he had no intention of infringing on USARJ's mission. This confirmed prior policy guidance. The transfer to INSCOM of certain functions related to the dining facility is the exception rather than the rule.53

Housing for Command-Sponsored INSCOM Positions in Korea. (U) On 12 July 1979, CDR US Forces Korea disapproved a 501st MI Group request for a share (50 sets) of 200 family quarters planned for Osan Air Base, stating "Osan has been designated as unrestricted area only for Air Force personnel." The 13 month tour creates excessive personnel turnover, lack of continuity and operational inefficiency, but family housing is normally necessary to establish command sponsored (two-year tour) positions. Despite the turndown by USFK, CDR INSCOM directed a letter to the Chief of Staff, US Army, GEN John W. Vessey on 24 March 1980. The letter, asking for CSA support to obtain reconsideration of the relative priority of USAFS Korea and a "reasonable share" of related Osan housing, concluded that the request was supported by MG Thompson (ACSI), ADM Inman (DIRNSA) and GEN Wickham, the new CDR USFK.

(U) GEN Vessey, who had served as CDR USFK at the time of the original turn-down of the 501st Group's request, declined to forward a letter asking USAF for reconsideration until assured of GEN Wickham's full support. (A back channel from GEN Wickham had indicated the Air Force still has priority for existing Osan housing.) By message dated 14 May 1980, ACSI tasked INSCOM to review all official actions taken in theater to establish and validate requirements for

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theater designations of key billets, command sponsorship for such billets, and the results of coordination with Osan Air Base and Eighth US Army to secure allocation of air base billets.

(U) GEN Wickham sympathized with the requirement and had, in fact, authorized a limited number of command sponsored key positions for SIGINT specialists at Camp Humphries (Pyong Taek) to have commissary and exchange privileges but neither government housing, nor DOD school support. He supported plans by the Korean National Housing Corporation (non Military Construction, Army) for construction of a minimum of 300 family housing units for the Army in the Osan AB/ Camp Humphries vicinity. Three sets of quarters at Osan were made available for the commanders of Field Station Korea, the 146th MI Battalion (Provisional) and the US Naval Security Detachment, Pyong Taek. No further, action was being planned by INSCOM.⁵⁴

Search for Stationing for New CONUS Group. (U) In January 1980, DCSLOG was tasked to determine stationing alternatives for six new CONUS Military Intelligence Units. These units were to be organized during FY 1982 from 603 spaces to be transferred to INSCOM from FORSCOM for that purpose. These units would constitute a new MI Group in support of the DA approved Echelons Above Corps (EAC) concept and would parallel in CONUS actions taking place in Europe to refine the FY 1983 EAC structure based upon the 66th MI Group. The 641st MI Detachment and the 11th MI Battalion (Provisional) were to be assigned to the new group upon activation but would remain at the present stations (Ft George G. Meade and Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, respectively).

(U) DARCOM and TRADOC provided no recommendations to INSCOM as to the stationing of the new group. FORSCOM recommended stationing of the group headquarters and MI Battalion (Production and Collection) at Ft McPherson; the CI Battalion at Ft Lewis, WA; MI Company (Imagery Interpretation) at McPherson with Detachments at Ft Bragg, Bergstrom AFB and at Shaw AFB; MI Company (SIGINT) at Ft Hood; and MI Company (Interrogation) at Ft Devens. MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, did not receive the recommendations favorably. He considered stationing at McPherson would not lend itself to test of a viable EAC operational concept and would be an invitation to continued subordination to FORSCOM although support to that command was for peacetime utilization only. DCSLOG was tasked to continue a search for more acceptable alternatives.

(U) The DCSLOG and his representative made trips to Fort Dix, Fort Monmouth, and Fort Devens. All installation commanders welcomed the possibility of new tenant unit, as all three installations were presently underutilized and could improve cost effectiveness by adding to the military population served. MG Rolya, together with the principal staff, was briefed on the DCSLOG's observations on 28 July 1980. The CG approved the DCSLOG recommendation to seek stationing at Ft Monmouth, based on the following factors:

(1) Permanent type facilities (vacant since relocation of the Signal School to Ft Gordon, GA) are available for BEQ, administrative and operational requirements to permit the collocation of all elements of the group, facilitating mission accomplishment in peace and in war.

(2) Post facilities at Ft Monmouth are excellent and would enhance the Quality of Life for assigned personnel.

(3) Rapid deployment of the group in support of CINCUSAREUR or the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for contingency operations would be facilitated by proximity to McGuire AFB and Port of Bayonne, NJ.

(4) Ft Monmouth warmly supported the proposal, welcoming the backfill.

(U) On 2 October 1980 in a letter to DA, MG Rolya recommended that the Department of Army initiate action to approve stationing of the new USAINSCOM at Ft Monmouth. In the interval since original tasking, DA had "slipped" the projected activation from FY 1982 to FY 1983. Organizational carrier units were to be established in 3rd Qtr FY 1982.⁵⁵

Paid Parking at Arlington Hall Station. (U) As part of the implementation of the Federal Paid Parking Program, a monthly parking fee was collected for use of Arlington Hall Station parking spaces beginning in November 1979. The charge was determined by Government Services Administration on an annual basis and was to be equivalent to the fair monthly rental value for the use of comparable commercial facilities in the area. For the period from November 1979 to September 1980, the charge was assessed at one-half the established GSA rate; thereafter, the full rate was to go into effect. The initial charge on 1 November 1979 was \$12.50 per month and was assessed for use of parking spaces during normal duty days between the hours of 0700-1615. Certain exemptions were allowed and monetary savings were to encourage car pools.

(U) During FY 1980, the pay parking office sold 12,204 monthly permits, and 5,520 daily permits. In addition, it issued 351 TDY permits and granted 987 parking exemptions. Income from permit sales totaled more than \$156,700 of which \$34,861.89 was spent in support of parking related activities; the balance was turned over to the US Treasury Department.⁵⁶

Status of Aircraft Resources. (U) One change within INSCOM's aviation resources during the year was the addition of a second C-12 aircraft to Field Station, Sinop. The C-12 replaced the U-21A, utility aircraft, which was traded on a one for one basis with USAREUR at the direction of the Department of the Army. The second C-12 was justified by mission and safety considerations as well as substantial savings in funding and manpower requirements. The C-12 aircraft represented the newest of the Army's models and provides pressurized, all-weather passenger and cargo service at altitudes up to 25,000 feet. INSCOM aircraft on hand at the end of FY 1980 are shown below:⁵⁷

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>30 SEP 80</u>
146th AEB (Prov)	RU-21H	6
	U-21A	1
	OV-1D	6
	RV-1D	6
USAFS Korea	UH-1H	3
USAFS Sinop	C-12	2
USAFS Augsburg	UH-1H	2
66th MI Group	UH-1H	1
Total INSCOM Aircraft		<u>27</u>

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)
(1) Per NSA

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Communications Programs and Resources. (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (ACSTEL) was the Program Manager within INSCOM for Program Element (PE) 381055A, Cryptologic Communications, Army. This program was divided into two subelements (SE). The first subelement SE49 (Cryptologic Communications, non-Defense Communications System (DCS)) included all telecommunication resources (except cryptographic equipment) required to provide, operate, and maintain US Army Communications Command fixed station Special Intelligence communications. The SE54 (Cryptologic Communications, DCS) involved funds necessary to support leased or government-owned communication circuits which include AUTODIN subscriber tails and other circuits in support of the cryptologic effort. It did not, however, include AUTODIN "backbone" costs.

(U) Department of the Army worldwide Consolidated Cryptologic Program manpower levels in PE 381055A increased from the 511 spaces allocated in FY 1979 to a total of 547 spaces in FY 1980. This increase resulted from the opening of Field Station Kunia.

(U) During FY 1980, all PE 381055A funds were apportioned to NSACSS for budgetary management. Major expenditure of these funds were limited to procurement of Model 40 teletypewriters. The total FY 1980-85 Other Procurement, Army funding program for PE 381055A, as of 30 September 1980, is depicted in the table below (thousands (K)).⁵⁹

Table 15. - OPA Funding - PE 381055A

	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>
Test Equipment	0	31K	146K	158K	169K	180K
Equipment Replacement	125K	(S) 136K	436K	471K	505K	536K

Communications Facility, AN/MGC-38. (U) The AN/MGC-38 was a transportable communications facility capable of terminating either five or six full duplex low speed teletype circuits. In 1975, HQ US Army Security Agency (predecessor to INSCOM) established a requirement for four of the AN/MGC-38 facilities in order to support the future mission requirements of [] GUARDRAIL. INSCOM provide project funds; Tobyhanna Army Depot assumed engineering, overhaul, and fabrication tasks; and US Army Communications and Electronic Readiness Materiel Command (CERCOM) provided configuration management, documentation and follow-on support. In November 1979, representatives from HQ INSCOM participated in the operational test and acceptance of the AN/MGC-38 at Tobyhanna Army Depot in Pennsylvania. In September 1980, the last of the four AN/MGC-38 units were delivered; this one to Fort Bliss, Texas for use in GUARDRAIL. The previous three had gone to [] to 145th ASA Company in July 1978 for Project GUARDRAIL; and to 300th ASA Company in November 1978 for Project GUARDRAIL.⁶⁰

Communications Facility, AN/MS-67. (U) The AN/MS-67, Communications Facility (COMFAC), was an automated, transportable communications facility specifically tailored to support the Army Corps tactical electronics warfare and intelligence operations. COMFAC was to provide highly unique automated communication capabilities controlled by an AN/UYK-19 computer system for handling both formal and informal or OPSCOMM traffic. The COMFAC contract was awarded to ECI Division/E-Systems, Incorporated, on 8 September 1977, but due to expensive overruns and mismanagement of the project by ECI Division, the Government decided to terminate the contract with ECI and complete the project in-house under the auspices of the Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (CEEIA) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The transfer of the project and equipment began in November 1979.

(U) Termination funds were used to place the system in an operational configuration at Fort Huachuca for the purpose of providing OJT instruction in operational and trouble-shooting procedures and software training to CEEIA personnel. In March 1980, the funds were exhausted, and by June, the Chief of Staff, US Army had called a halt due to lack of funds. The following month, HQ DA requested TRADOC to revalidate the AN/MS-67 requirement. The US Army Intelligence Training Center and School held the responsibility to responding to the request, but HQ INSCOM reinforced the school's position by detailing existing needs in the field and the capabilities of the AN/MS-67 to meet these needs. As a result, DA revalidated the AN/MS-67 project on 2 September 1980 and tasked DARCOM to provide OPA/OMA funds to complete the development effort.⁶¹

Automated Data Processing (ADP) Activities. (U) During FY 1980, the INSCOM Automated Systems Activity assumed responsibility for five new projects: INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific (ITIC-PAC) Automation Support (Pacific Command Data Services Center (PDSC); 66th MI Group Automation Support (Primary Control and Analysis Center (PCAC)); TRAILMARK, a feasibility study addressing the development of an automated name-tracing system; upgrade of the KALA system at Field Station Augsburg; and upgrade of the automated data processing equipment from the terminated TRACER ROUND Project for use in support of Project TRILOGY FARE, a management information system at field stations. In addition to the five new projects undertaken, there were nine on-going: TRIPLE SCOOP, TRIPLE SPACE, ASSIST Accreditation, DESKTOP Computers, TOPSAIL GAFF, TREBLE CLEF, TRIPLE SWEEP, TRILOGY FARE, and CHUBBUCK II.

(U) In an effort to acquire the resources and ADP hardware needed to establish the ITIC-PAC as a full Army mode of the PDSC computer network system, INSCOM forwarded the Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) to OACSI where it was validated and sent to the DIA Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Program Manager for approval. DIA withheld approval of the MENS until they had received the full and unqualified concurrence of the Commander in Chief, Pacific. Initially, it appeared that a single AN/GYQ-21(V) computer (also known as PDP 11/70) would suffice for the ITIC-PAC requirements, but later in the year it became apparent that the PDSC system had outgrown the capability of a single computer and that a second one would be needed. In June 1980, INSCOM learned that excess AN/GYQ-21(V) were available. After substantial documentation was provided, HQDA approved the requirement for a second computer at ITIC-PAC. Next, DIA validated the MENS and gave a qualified approval to acquire the computer subject to the development

of additional documentation to be provided them in early FY 1981.

(U) In February 1980, INSCOM submitted a MENS documenting automation requirements at the 66th MI Group. Both HQDA and DIA approved. In June 1980, INSCOM prepared additional documentation to acquire one of the excess AN/GYQ-21(V)'s for the 66th MI Group. This effort was a successful subject to the same additional documentation requirements specified for procuring the AN/GYQ-21(V) for ITIC-PAC. However, the 66th MI Group did not have a suitable computer facility since the system was not intended to be acquired until about FY 1983. The early delivery forced the selection of an alternate site at Field Station Augsburg, approximately 50 miles from the group headquarters. Since the computer was scheduled for installation in December 1980, programmed resources were not available, and the operational costs had to be absorbed for a couple of years. HQDA (ACSI) planned to assist with financial resources, and the INSCOM Automated System Activity will designate two military spaces with duty station at Augsburg, Germany to alleviate the staffing shortage until the 66th MI Group get personnel authorized.

(U) In the area of ADP, personnel turnover continued to be the most significant problem. Among civilians, five supervisors left the Automated Support Activity as well as several nonsupervisory types. An aggressive civilian recruitment effort supplemented by participation in the ADP intern program helped to alleviate the problem. On the military side, the officer situation went from bad to worse. At the beginning of the year, there was only a 50 percent fill; by the end of the year, the Activity had lost seven more officers. Enlisted fill was a blurred picture. At the start of the year, a shortage existed in MOS 74F (programmers) but a maximum fill of computer operators (74D); at the close of the year, just the opposite was the case. However, the bulk of newly arriving enlisted personnel from ADP MOS courses at Fort Benjamin Harrison were considered to be outstanding.

(U) Funding level restrictions imposed at higher levels constrained INSCOM's ADP efforts in the area of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). INSCOM units funded by the Consolidated Cryptologic Program had a relatively high degree of automation. However, INSCOM units funded through GDIP were less fortunate with a few exceptions, notably elements of the Automated System Activity located at Pentagon and Fort Bragg. The curtailment of new programs had the potential of seriously effecting field units, but the approval to reutilize the two excess AN/GYQ-21(V) computers somewhat reduced the impact of the GDIP funding restraints. In addition, OACSI and DIA appeared ready to support a computer system for the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. 62

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office. (U) During FY 1980, the Freedom of Information/Privacy Office (FOI/PO) received and processed 724 FOI requests and 1,845 Privacy Act (PA) requests for a total of 2,569 requests. This represented a one and a half percent increase over the total of 2,532 (752 FOI and 1,780 PA) in FY 1979. The table below shows a breakdown of both FOI and PA requests in FY 1980 by month.

Table 16. - FOI and PA Requests During FY 1980

<u>Month</u>	<u>FOI</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Oct 79	53	190	243
Nov 79	56	200	256
Dec 79	48	144	192
Jan 80	59	136	195
Feb 80	57	152	209
Mar 80	54	177	231
Apr 80	56	150	206
May 80	74	161	235
Jun 80	65	113	178
Jul 80	68	147	215
Aug 80	58	139	197
Sep 80	<u>76</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>212</u>
	724	1845	2569

(U) On 12 August 1980, the FOI/PO was tasked to assist HQDA in the screening of approximately 30 thousand documents (90-100,000 pages) for release under the terms of the litigation settlement, Berlin Democratic Club vs Brown Project.⁶³

Public Affairs Activities, (U) The following is a list of INSCOM publications as of 30 September 1980:⁶⁴

<u>Publication</u>	<u>Unit Publisher</u>
<u>The Journal</u>	HQ INSCOM
<u>Augsburg Profile</u>	USA Field Station, Augsburg
* <u>Berlin Bee</u>	USA Field Station, Berlin
<u>Alamo Wrangler</u>	USA Field Station, San Antonio
<u>Torii Typhoon</u>	USA Field Station, Okinawa
<u>66th MI Scrambler</u>	66th MI Group
** <u>Zephyr</u>	USA Field Station, Korea
<u>Write On</u>	INSCOM CONUS MI Group (SIGINT/EW)
<u>The Vint Hill Vanguard</u>	USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station
*** <u>Misawa Sentinel</u>	USA Field Station, Misawa

*The Berlin Bee ceased publication in November 1979.

**The Zephyr suspended publication in October 1979 due to lack of qualified Personnel.

***The Misawa Sentinel suspended publication in September 1979 due to lack of qualified personnel.

Travis Trophy Award. (U) By the close of FY 1980, the Travis Trophy Award Ceremony for CY 1979 winner had not taken place. See Appendix J for a complete list of previous years' winners.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
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Director's Trophy. (U) During FY 1980, Vice Admiral B.R. Inman, DIRNSA, established a new award which will recognize the mobile SIGINT element which makes the most significant contribution to the cryptologic community during the calendar year. The Travis Trophy will continue to be awarded for the most outstanding performance by a fixed field station while the Director's Trophy will serve as equal recognition of performance by a mobile station. INSCOM nominated the 146th ASA Company (Avn) for 1979, but ACSI, DA selected the 193d MI Company in Panama as the Army's nominee. The selection of the winner from among the three Service nominees will not take place until FY 1981.⁶⁵

The BG Bernard Ardisana Award. (U) The BG Bernard Ardisana Award, a National Security Agency (NSACSS) award, was presented annually by the Director under the sponsorship of the NSA Collection Association. This award was to be given to the intercept operator who, through sustained and exceptional performance, was judged to be the Collector of the Year. The aim of the award was to promote and recognize excellence in the field of collection. All INSCOM Field Stations, the 470th MI Group, the 146th ASA Company (Avn) (Fwd), and the 332d ASA Company, Operations (Fwd) were eligible to nominate an individual for this award.

(U) During FY 1980, INSCOM nominated three individuals: SSG Garry W. Evans (FS San Antonio), SSG Paul L. Durnwald (FS Augsburg), and SGT Mark Codd (FS Berlin). Although none were selected, SGT Codd was chosen as runner-up in the May competition.⁶⁶

Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement. (C/CCO) The Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement is presented annually to the nonsupervisory service member who made the single greatest contribution to the operational effectiveness of INSCOM during the preceding calendar year. On 14 July 1980, a HQ INSCOM panel selected SGT Zachary J. Shultz to be the CY 1979 recipient. The selection was based upon SGT Shultz's outstanding accomplishments in the coordination, development, and analysis of the [redacted] [redacted]

The Army Aviation Unit of the Year Award. (U) The Army Aviation Association of America selected the 146th ASA Company (Aviation) as the Army Aviation Unit of the Year for 1979. The annual award recognized the unit for its outstanding contributions to Army aviation and the US Army. The unit is unique in that it is the first company size unit to combine all US Army fixed wing intelligence collection capabilities within a single organization. Although the unit was constantly undergoing changes in location, organization, and systems while experiencing critical equipment and personnel shortages, an overall 93 percent mission accomplishment rate was achieved.⁶⁸

Association of Old Crows Outstanding Unit Medal. (U) The Association of Old Crows (AOC) announced that the 146th ASA Company (Aviation) was selected to receive the 1980 Outstanding Unit Medal. The ceremony will be held on 28 October 1980 at El Toro Marine Base, California, and the medal will be presented during the opening ceremonies of the 1980 Technical Symposium.⁶⁹

INSCOM Team Day Awards. (U) Since 1976, INSCOM attempted to foster the military/civilian team concept as well as to recognize outstanding contributions made by civilian employees through the annual celebration of the INSCOM Military Civilian Team Day. INSCOM Team Day Awards for FY 1980 were presented as follows:

Award

Receipient

The Albert W. Small Award

Mr. Richard P. Swisher,
ODCSRM, HQ INSCOM

The Action Officer of the Year Award

Mr. James R. Morris,
CI and SIGSEC Spt Bn, Ft
Sam Houston

The Virginia McDill Award for Outstanding
Secretarial Ability

Mrs. Barbara A. Bacot,
470th MI Group

The Equal Employment Opportunity Award

COL John M. Carr,
Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM

The Wage Grader of the Year Award

Mr. Lawrence E. Ward,
USAG, AHS

The Non-Appropriated Fund Employee of
the Year Award

Mrs. Barbara F. Nielson,
USAG, VHFS

The Military-Civilian Team Improvement
Award
Military

SFC Rodney F. VanGuilder,
902d MI Group

Civilian

Mr. Avedis D. Donabedian,
Auto Sys Actv

(U) The Military Civilian Team Day was held on 25 April 1980. Activities began with the awards luncheon at Arlington Hall Station which was attended by 225 people. Guest speakers included Dr. Sue Dueitt, Deputy for Human Systems and Resources, Office of Assistant Security of the Army and BG Joseph C. Lutz, Director of Human Resource Development, DA. Later in the day, an INSCOMFEST was held, featuring music and refreshment. 70

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

1. FY 1980 DCSRM AHR (C), pp. 11-17.
2. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S), Chap. VI.
3. DCSRM FY 1980 AHR (C), pp. 33-35, 37.
4. 4th Qtr FY 1980 QPR (C), p. 4.
5. FY 1979 Ann Hist Rev (TSCW), p. 40.; Manpower Command Strength, DCSPER HQ INSCOM (5 Nov 80) (C).
6. FY 1980 DCSRM AHR (C), pp. 25-36; Memo, IARM-SU, subj: Visit to TDA Scrub Team (10 Jul 80) (U); Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: TDA Scrub Results, Phase I (061830Z Aug 80) (U).
7. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 25-26.
8. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), p. 21; Interview, SFC B.H. Hein, Reenl NCO, ODCSPER, HQ INSCOM (May 81) (U).
9. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 17-18.
10. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 22-24.
11. Army Regulation 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties, C13 (1 Mar 80) and C14 (1 Jun 80) (U).
12. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 211.
13. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 207-08; FY 1979 MAO AHR (S/NOFORN), Appendix A.
14. Interview, MAJ Palmer M. Esau (Training Div, ODCSOPS) with Mr. James L. Gilbert (History Office) (21 Jul 81) (U).
15. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 199.
16. 4th Qtr FY 1980 QPR (C), p. 18. (p. 18 p. 18 p. 18 p. 18)
17. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 31-32.
18. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 38-39.
19. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), p. 32; DF, CofS, subj: Civilian Hire Limitations (22 Jul 80) (U).
20. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 31.
21. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pg. 34.
22. FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), p. 82; Interview, Ms Anderson (CPO, USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station) with Mr. James Gilbert (History Office) (22 Jul 81) (U).
23. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), p. 35.
24. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 27-38.
25. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), p. 36.
26. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 33-34; Ltr, IACG, subj: Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program (25 Sep 80) (U).
27. FY 1980 EEO Off AHR (U), pp. 9-14.
28. FY 1980 EEO Off AHR (U), pp. 9-10, 14.
29. INSCOM Regulation 5-5, INSCOM Management by Objectives (MBO) Program, 1 Aug 1980 (FOUO).
30. FY 1980 DCSRM AHR (C), p. 20; Interview, Mr. James Lynn, OADCSOPS, SIGINT/EW (11 May 81) (U).
31. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), Chap 2, pp. 1, 3-6, 14; Interview, MAJ James E. Tate, Jr., Sr OE Officer, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM (1 May 81) (U); Ltr, IACG, subj: Transmittal of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command Organizational Effectiveness (OE) 3-10 Year Plan (26 Feb 80) (U).
32. MAO FY 1980 AHR (C), Chap 2, p. 1; Appendix A; MAO FY 1979 AHR (S/NOFORN), Appendix A.
33. Minutes, Executive Session Vint Hill Farms Station, 10-11 December 1979 (U).

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT (Continued)

34. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 213; FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), pp. 57-58; FY 1978 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), p. 17; Msg, CDRINSCOM to HQDA, subj: Army Aims and Objectives for JCS Exercise POSITIVE LEAP (29 Jan 80) (C); Interview, CPT Thomas P. Reidy (ICD, ODCSOPS, HQ INSCOM) with Mr. James L. Gilbert (History Office) (11 Jun 81) (U); FY 1979 MAO AHR (S/NOFORN), Appendix A; Paper, Policy and Program Management ODCSOPS, subj: Exercise Support (2 May 80) (C).
35. FY 1980 66th MI Group AHR (S), p. 52; CRESTED EAGLE 80/CARAVAN WEST II After Action Report 66th MI Group (24 Apr 80) (S); Msg, fm INSCOM to USAREUR, subj: Observations of UTIC During Exercise CRESTED EAGLE (18 Apr 80) (S).
36. Paper by MAJ Charles E. Kelly (ODCSOPS-OPSEC, HQ INSCOM), subj: USAINSCOM Support to Major Exercises (U); Paper, subj: INSCOM Accomplishments in 1980 (TSCW).
37. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 134.
38. DCSOPS FY 1980 AHR (TSCW), p. 213; DF, DCSOPS (IAOPS-PPR-R), subj: Review of INSCOM Operational Readiness Report (ORR) (29 Feb 80) (U).
39. Staff Note, IAOPS-PPR, subj: INSCOM Field Visitation Program (FVP) (12 Feb 80) (U); DF, DCSOPS, subj: INSCOM Reg 5-1 (20 Mar 80) (U); DF, DCSOPS, subj: Multidiscipline Field Visitation Program (25 Feb 80) (U).
40. FY 1980 DCSFM AHR (TS/CCO), Chap. 3, p. 5; DF, IAOPS-MP, subj: INSCOM Mobilization Planning (21 Apr 80) (U).
41. DF, DCSFM, subj: The Army CAPSTONE Program (CAPSTONE) (25 Aug 80) (C).
42. Staff Note, IAOPS-PTR-P, subj: MOBDES to MTOE Units (8 Jul 80) (U).
43. FY 1980 DCSFM AHR (TS/CCO), Chap. 3, p. 9.
44. FY 1980 CSO AHR (U), p. 10.
45. FY 1980 CSO AHR (U), p. 9; FY 1979 Ann Hist Rev (TSCW), p. 64.
46. FY 1980 CSF AHR (FOUO), Appendix B.
47. FY 1980 SJA AHR (U), pp. 5-6.
48. FY 1980 USA Ctr Scty Facility AHR, Appendix A, Tab B (FOUO).
49. FY 1980 IG AHR (U), pp. 6-7.
50. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S), Chap. IV, pp. 4-6.
51. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S/CCO), Chap. IV, pp. 6-7.
52. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S/CCO), Chap. III, pp. 6-8; FY 1979 Ann Hist Rev (TSCW), pp. 72-73.
53. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S), Chap III, pp. 2-3; FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), pp. 69-70.
54. FY 1980 DCSLOG AHR (S/CCO), Chap. III, pp. 17-18.
55. FY 1980 DCSLOG (S/CCO), Chap. III, pp. 14-16.
56. Ltr, IAG-DPCA, subj: Assessment of Parking Fees (24 Oct 79) (U); FY 1980 USAG AHR (U), "Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities."
57. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 191.
58. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 195.
59. FY 1980 ACSTEL AHR (C), pp. 13-14, 17.
60. FY 1980 ACSTEL AHR (C), pp. 28-29.
61. FY 1980 ACSTEL AHR (C), pp. 27-28; FY 1979 Ann Hist Review (TSCW), pp. 125-126.
62. FY 1980 Auto Sys Actv (U), Chap. II, pp. 4-5, 9.
63. FY 1980 CSF AHR, Appendix A, p. 2.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT (Continued)

- 64. FY 1980 OPA AHR (U), pp. 7-8.
- 65. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 195.
- 66. BG Bernard Ardisana Award File, History Office, HQ INSCOM.
- 67. Ltr, IAEA-OP-O (FS Augsburg), subj: Letter of Recommendation for Commander's Plaque (6 Feb 1980) (TSCW).
- 68. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 194.
- 69. FY 1980 146th ASA Co AHR (S), Tab E.
- 70. FY 1980 DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 40-41.

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CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

INSCOM Wartime Missions. (S) There did not exist a comprehensive set of plans describing Army activities in wartime, and the wartime plans which did exist gave only cursory treatment to intelligence, security, and electronic warfare. In December 1979, the CDR INSCOM directed Chief, Mission Analysis Office to undertake a study to define the wartime mission of HQ INSCOM and units remaining subordinate to the headquarters during time of war. In its study, MAO began with a set of wartime scenarios which laid out a total range of conditions under which INSCOM would possibly have to function. Using the scenarios as a springboard, the authors of the study analyzed the responsibilities of INSCOM under each of the wartime situations and estimated the possible resource and organization implications of INSCOM's wartime missions. In May 1980, MAO completed the first draft with the intention of updating the study as events and premises change. The document would serve as a foundation for additional planning.¹

(S/NOFORN//NWINTTEL/LIMDIS)

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(U) The table below lists significant products produced by ITAC.

Table 17. - Products Produced by ITAC

Title

Base Development Survey (BDS)

Matanzas, CU
Guantanamo, CU
Iraq (Country Resume)
Tobruk, LY
Azores
Barbados

Drop Zone Survey (DZS)

San Isidro, Dominican Republic

Emergency Evacuation Survey (EES)

Lebanon

Ground Forces Order of Battle Book (GFOB)

Algeria
Jordan
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Syria
Tunisia

Handbook of Military Forces (HMF)

Cuba

Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis (TACCTA)

(U) In support of the RDJTF requirements, the Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) program was initiated. The purpose of the AIS is to provide detailed intelligence information on countries, thoroughly researched and validated, in order to aid crises and international situations requiring US involvement. Coverage of each country is divided into such categories as overview, geography, capabilities of ground forces, extent of counterintelligence, medical/health environment, and potential for psychological operations. There exist the ongoing need to assure that prioritization of AIS is validated with Army component commanders of operational forces as well as the continual requirement to legitimize the AIS and other products in support of the Joint Operations Planning System and contingency planning.

(U) Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the Chief of Staff, US Army requested that Black Book coverage of the USSR/Afghanistan situation be expanded. A special crisis team was formed within

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the Current Intelligence Division, ITAC, to work around the clock, five days a week. The team functioned in this manner for approximately five months until the CSA modified his guidance to be notified only of significant developments.³

Regional Appraisal Program. (U) INSCOM's Regional Appraisal Program (RAP) was based upon concept that required INSCOM to examine its intelligence collection and production effort in support of consumer needs. As originally envisioned, a regulation was to have been published to guide the effort. However, the lack of decision making due to proposed reorganizations delayed and finally killed the action in FY 1980. Although not in the form of a program, the function of evaluating intelligence collection and production against consumer needs was very alive. Within the ODCSOPS, the Marketing Group was established on 13 March 1980 as INSCOM's client-oriented, sensing arm to identify user intelligence requirements against the full spectrum of INSCOM operations and to assist INSCOM clients in articulation and prioritization of those intelligence needs.⁴

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(u) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The effective definition and all-source analysis of the North Korean grid system was used in tactical maps. As a result of Project POLONAISE, the North Korean system of map usage can be exploited much more readily, particularly in the key 2d and 5th Corps areas.⁵

CLUSTER THIMBLE. (u) During January 1980, INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific (Provisional) played a crucial role in the timely and effective exploitation of a Soviet data collection device recovered at sea near the main island of Hawaii. As a result of the effort of the Commander, USAITIC-PAC (P), the device (designated CLUSTER THIMBLE) was flown by Army aircraft to Oahu and from there to USAITIC-PAC (P). After evaluation of the device, an

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Intelligence Information Report was issued giving full details of the device which appeared to be a submersible conobuoy with passive data collection and recording instruments as well as an electronic beaconing system for retrieval purposes. After initial exploitation, the device was turned over to the US Navy elements on 17 January 1980 for shipment to Command Task Group 168, Washington, D.C., and Naval Intelligence and Security Command Detachment, Chesapeake Beach, Maryland.⁶

(S/NOFORN)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

US Army Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN). (U) The past year was one of expansion for the US Army Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) program. For the first time both Reserve Component and National Guard units participated in REDTRAIN. In January, the 641st MI Detachment and the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center began to identify live environmental training (LET) opportunities appropriate for the 142d MI Company (Linguist) of the Utah National Guard. A major step was also made in June to fully integrate the Reserve Component into the program. The 314th MI Battalion (USAR) received personnel and training aid support from INSCOM REDTRAIN during the Battalion's Annual Training period. The effort was well received and serves as a basic design for future support to other RC units.

(U) During 1980, an increasing amount of INSCOM's REDTRAIN program was devoted to non-SIGINT training. The 641st MI Detachment developed the HUMINT REDTRAIN program/schedule to accommodate both FORSCOM/WESTCOM/USAREUR and INSCOM personnel/units participating in Specialized Operational Training (SOT) and LET. The Detachment established over 110 LET/SOT opportunities worldwide and coordinated nearly 60 LET/SOT for attendance; approximately 18 percent of all personnel participating in INSCOM's SOT were interrogators. As manager of the IMINT REDTRAIN program, the INSCOM Threat and Analysis Center coordinated SOT for 49 active duty personnel and provided LET for 14 active and 80 Reserve personnel and support to 16 Reserve units during their annual training. All in all, these actions represented an encouraging beginning for the non-SIGINT side of the REDTRAIN program.

(U) (e) The Department of the Army designated CDR INSCOM, the Army Executive, agent for the REDTRAIN program, to assess the technical readiness of tactical

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SIGINT/EW personnel and units and their ability to perform the technical tasks required to effectively execute SIGINT and EW operations in peace and war. The first Technical Evaluation of Army Tactical (TEATAC) SIGINT/EW team deployed to Europe in January 1980 and was later followed by similar teams which visited FORSCOM and Pacific tactical units. The teams' findings concluded that tactical SIGINT/EW is suffering from a lack of personnel, operational, equipment, and technical training and that there existed a critical need for an increased emphasis on SIGINT REDTRAIN. These conclusions were to be presented in a briefing to the VCSA in early FY 1981.

(U) ~~(C)~~ As a result of TEATAC, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Reporting (CPAR) Element, INSCOM CONUS MI Group began to organize and deploy Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to assist tactical sigint/EW units in their REDTRAIN efforts. CPAR deployed its initial MTT to the 853d ASA Company in July 1980. The MTT hold intensive two-week training programs which focus on MOS skill training keyed to target areas. The Mobile Training Teams are designed to train the unit trainers, improve individual and team proficiency (98CMF), prepare the unit for in-house missions, and complement the Army Training and Evaluation Program and the skill qualification test. Training packets are designed to familiarize personnel in MOS 98G and 98C with specific features of the communications structures associated with their respective target areas. The MMT training packets are developed especially for each unit and are left for use by the unit upon the team's departure.

(C) ~~(U)~~ There were various other milestones which occurred within the REDTRAIN program. In early 1980, the REDTRAIN program in Europe was implemented with the assignment of personnel to USAREUR and the 66th MI Group and the establishment of the CPAR Detachment, Europe [redacted]. The purpose of Detachment Europe is to assist the 66th MI Group and [redacted] units in the implementation of REDTRAIN program and to coordinate SOT, [redacted] opportunities for FORSCOM and USAREUR units alike. Another milestone was establishment of two reports in December 1979 to facilitate the management and evaluation of the program. These two reports are the quarterly REDTRAIN report and the semiannual MACOM report. In May 1980, the REDTRAIN Office assumed full responsibility for the management of REDTRAIN. Originally, the Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM had given the responsibility to various staff elements DCSOPS (SIGINT/EW), DCSCI (CI/SIGSEC/OPSEC), and DCSITA (IMINT). In turn, the staff elements were dependent upon operational elements (CONUS MI Group, 902d MI Group, and USA Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, respectively) for day-to-day management of their discipline's program. However, serious lack of development in the CI/SIGSEC/OPSEC due to communications failure led to the transfer of all program responsibilities to the REDTRAIN Office.

(U) The REDTRAIN program faced continued funding programs, and FY 1981 appears to hold more of the same. During FY 1980, DA reduced the travel funds which led to a drastic decline in SOT/LET after mid-year. III Corps actually froze all REDTRAIN travel funds for approximately three months.⁸

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- (u) (e) With regard to the problem of dropping accountability of the intelligence property on long term loan to the Special Military Intelligence Office (SMIO) and the Special Intelligence Detachment (SID), OACSI (DA) advised on 7 February 1980 that the long awaited International Security Assistant Act of 1979 was finally enacted into Public Law 96-92 on 29 October 1979. Under the provisions of Section 23b of this law, the President of the US is authorized to transfer to Taiwan US property which was located on Taiwan on 1 January 1979. However, OACSI determined that this method of transfer would become complex and would involve several agencies which did not have a "need to know." Consequently, OACSI authorized the 500th MI Group to obtain relief by completing and submitting the Government Property Lost or Damaged Report (DA Form 4696 - Test) under the provisions of Chapter 2, AR 735-11, 15 October 1978. Relief under this AR could be claimed when no apparent negligence was involved. On 24 March 1980, the Intelligence Property Book Officer and Accountable Officer of the 500th MI Group submitted the completed DA Form 4696 (Test), which was approved by the Commander, 500th MI Group on 26 March 1980, terminating accountability for the intelligence property placed on long term loan to SMIO and SID.
- (u) (S) There remained the problem of officially terminating the Army's intelligence formal relationships with SMIO and SID. It was still intended to provide termination notices to these agencies as part of the US review of all agreements in order to mask military intelligence relationships with them. In an attempt to hasten a decision, the Commander, 500th MI Group sent out feelers on a proposed visit by him to meet with the heads of SMIO and SID organizations in Taiwan. OACSI's guidance was that the Commander, 500th MI Group was only

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authorized to state that "the official U.S. position on further intelligence relationships is still being studied and will be provided to you soon." In view of this restriction, the Commander, 500th MI Group did not further pursue his proposal to visit Taiwan.

(u)
~~(S/NOFORN)~~ AARCS is the unclassified acronym for Automatic Agent Radio Communications System (S/NOFORN). Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (OACSI), Department of the Army is the sponsoring and funding agency for development of the AARCS. The Intelligence Material Development & Support Office (IMDSO) is the project manager for AARCS, interfacing directly with the development contractor (Rockwell International) and the Contract Administration Office (Harry Diamond Laboratories). Ongoing coordination is maintained with the National Security Agency (NSA), who monitors and advises on design aspects associated with communications security. The ADCSOPS-HUMINT, HQ INSCOM, coordinates directly with IMDSO to provide input regarding user requirements and to assist with field tests and analyses.

(u)
~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The development of AARCS is seen as going through four "generations," AARCS I through IV. AARCS I was completed in 1976 and was a feasibility prototype produced by a small firm that was unable to undertake the larger contracts for the production models. AARCS II was tested by IMDSO and ADCSOPS-HUMINT during the fall of 1977. In March 1978, IMDSO invited NSACSS to study the AARCS' vulnerability in a hostile environment (Eastern Europe). As a result of the field tests and NSA's analyses, extensive modifications were made to the AARCS II system.

(u)
~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The prototype AARCS III was delivered to IMDSO in December 1979, and extensive field testing of the system was conducted during the period January - March 1980. The tests were based in Fort Riley, Kansas, and several military installations south of Fort Riley. Transmissions were made between the agent radio sets and the base station and from the base station to the agent radio set, using several different antenna configurations and transmission modes. The test team included technical personnel from IMDSO and HUMINT personnel from the 66th, 470th, 500th and 501st MI Groups and the US Army Operational Group. SIGINT representatives from San Antonio Field Station also participated. Operational capabilities of the system were tested at various ranges up to 1,000 kilometers (600 miles). Equipment improvements based upon findings from this series of tests will be incorporated into AARCS IV, which was anticipated to be delivered in the summer of 1981. Acceptance tests at that time will consist of both CONUS-based and Europe-based tests, and field deployment of the system will follow soon after acceptance.

Latin American Emigre Exploitation Program (LEEP). ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ LEEP is an

[redacted]
[redacted] from a permanent base of operations at
Begun in October 1979, the program

(b)(1)

focuses upon former political prisoners, normal emigres, and US citizens who remained in Cuba after revolution. Continual pre-contact coordination is maintained with the [redacted] Prior to mid-April 1980 when the first of a surge of nonpolitical refugees began entering the US through Key West, LEEP identified over 300 potentially know-

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ledgeable personnel. After April the number of Cubans entering CONUS increased dramatically and the operation was revamped to meet this unprecedented collection opportunity. In an attempt to exploit the intelligence data possessed by these emigres, some of whom had only recently left military service in Cuba, USAOG augmented its original two-man team with eight other people and in turn with 70 additional personnel from FORSCOM, DARCOM, INSCOM MI Groups, as well as contingents from the US Marine Corps and the Utah National Guard, and formed teams at the five CONUS refugee processing centers. Working around the clock, these personnel screened more than 27,000 refugees and collected data for approximately 800 Intelligence Information Reports. In the analysts's feedback, the LEEP reporting of 1980 was judged to represent the most significant breakthrough in HUMINT reporting for Cuba since the early 1960's.

Prisoner Release Claims. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) With the release of massive numbers of Cuban emigres in the "Freedom Flotilla" in mid-April 1980, OACSI in July 1980 requested HQ INSCOM to review Army records and determine the probable number of potentially legitimate financial claims from former Cuban sources which could foreseeably be brought against the US Army for settlement. A review of approximately 700 Army dossiers (identified with 1,371 former Cuban sources and leads) disclosed/positively identified 55 former Army sources as potentially eligible to apply for legitimate claim settlement resulting from arrest, incarceration, and/or death as a result of intelligence activities in Cuba. Furthermore, an additional 24 former Army sources were identified as questionably legitimate claimants; however, attempts to positively identify these individual's eligibility to apply for settlement were hampered by the condition of the former US Army Field Activities Command (USAFAC) dossiers. Future funding requirements may be substantial if the identified claims are brought against the US Army for settlement. It was anticipated by the OACSI action officer that a figure of 60 or 70 multiplied by the average CIA settlement which had been about \$65,000 plus medical expenses would be used in approaching OSD.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1) 1.4a; 1.4c Per DIA

(U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(U)

Project SEEK. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Under the auspices of the Interagency Defector Committee and chaired by CIA/DCD (Domestic Collection Division) of the JWG (Joint Working Group), Project SEEK was a positive intelligence collection program of interviews and debriefings of Jewish and other emigres from the USSR. Immigration and Naturalization Service records (INS) and other official assessment forms were used to identify and screen knowledgeable Sources who were contacted and debriefed by contact specialists (C/S) linguists throughout CONUS. Exceptionally knowledgeable Sources were brought to the Washington, D.C. area for community debriefings, seminars, and symposiums attended by analysts from numerous agencies of the Intelligence community.

(U) ~~(C)~~ During FY 1980, Detachment L, US Army Operational Group accomplished the following:

Table 18. - Project SEEK FY 1980 Production

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

While the results obtained in FY 1980 were more than satisfying, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as exemplified by a 30 June 1980 letter from LTG ~~(b)(1)-(b)(6)~~ Per DIA, wherein Detachment L was identified as the best collection agency of defector/emigre information in both CONUS and overseas. It was anticipated that the output would even improve in the near future with the assignment of additional personnel and improved administration which would permit more effective selection and screening of sources to better satisfy the requirements levied on the SEEK Program.

(U) China. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The "Opening" of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to Western trade and technology served as a catalyst to review ongoing and proposed operations to insure that clandestine resources were being applied against target which could not be reduced by other means. The 500th MI Group operations were focused on science and technology (S&T) subjects, Chinese logistic capabilities, and the reinforcement of enemy warnings/indicators of hostilities (EW/IOH) reporting capabilities. The latter were developed through the combined reporting from Japanese businessmen visiting the PRC for both brief and extended stays. In FY 1980, Group sources spent in excess of 1,000 days in the PRC. Their travels were performed at varied times so that the cumulative effort afforded EW/IOH reporting on a constant basis by Japanese visitors who have traveled in and out of Eastern China for several years. The majority of these Sources were fluent Chinese linguists, have resided in China for extended periods, and were well qualified to detect small or subtle indicators of change which might present hostilities for mobilization. Other collection highlights included operations to report on Chinese armor developments, a capability for future reporting in Xizang and Xinjiang, and extensive reporting on current and future PRC logistics capabilities. Four new operations were approved during the year and three are awaiting approval at the end of FY 1980.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(S)

(U) Project [] was the name assigned to the 1974 action which was intended to provide Program II European personnel/billets at [] to fill Program III spaces transferred to the consolidated wideband retrieval center at San Antonio. Almost from its inception Project [] had difficulty providing the required personnel to the Field Station. The situation further deteriorated during the early post Viet Nam period when cryptologic personnel became more and more scarce. The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) further compounded administrative/support problems associated with [] to the point where during a September 1979 visit to DCSI (USAREUR), the S3 [] proposed an immediate termination of [] versus the planned FY 1981 termination date. By Mid-June 1980 final arrangements and details of the demise of [] had been finalized, and the project was formally terminated.²⁶

Technical Evaluation of Army Tactical (TEATAC) SIGINT. ^(u) Since the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, there has been no mechanism to evaluate the technical health of the Army's tactical SIGINT units, but reports had been received at HQDA which indicated the inability of tactical SIGINT forces to perform their mission. The ACSI took the initiative and tasked INSCOM in November 1979 to perform a worldwide technical evaluation to determine the technical readiness of Army tactical SIGINT/EW personnel and units; to recommend corrective action to improve technical proficiency when required; and to provide technical advice and assistance and take corrective action, where practical, during the conduct of the evaluation. The evaluation within Europe, Pacific, and CONUS was conducted from January to April 1980 by INSCOM led teams with a representative from NSACSS and HQDA. The teams produced the first objective look at the Army's tactical SIGINT units in at least, five years. The results of this evaluation indicated that the Army does not have the capability to provide SIGINT support during either peacetime or wartime. This conclusion was based on evaluations of the individual (primarily the 98G linguist and the 98C traffic analyst), unit, and the system. Recommendations of the team were to increase emphasis on training for MOS maintenance including linguists and making full use of Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) program.²⁷

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Issuance of USSID In Microfiche. (U) The operational directives office in NSACSS queried HQ INSCOM to determine US Army interest in microfiche dissemination of US SIGINT Directive (USSID). The primary advantages of microfiche USSID were described as ease of storage and capability for rapid destruction. An earlier investigation into microfiche USSID was conducted in 1973. At that time, the microfiche documents were believed to have been discontinued for the following reasons: (1) Microfiche dissemination is inherently slower than electrical amendments as it is routed via courier. (2) The small size of the library contributed to a greater chance of theft/compromise. (3) Changes to microfiche USSID were slow to be produced by NSACSS as each amended page required a new fiche to be produced and internal backlogs quickly developed causing slow distribution to consumers.

(U) (C) HQ INSCOM again surfaced these problem areas with the NSACSS Operational Directives Office but was assured that NSACSS had weighed the security considerations and that technological improvements in microfiche production would enable NSACSS to meet the expected demands. HQ INSCOM staffed the NSACSS proposal with ACSI DA, Major Army Commands with SIGINT missions, INSCOM field sites, and internal HQ elements.

(U) On 5 March 1980, this HQ passed the Army position to NSACSS. INSCOM activities (essentially, INSCOM fixed sites) believed the disadvantages of microfiche USSID outweighed the advantages. Nearly all sites stated microfiche distribution was inconvenient and that electrical USSID changes would still be necessary pending arrival of updated fiche. The single exception to the above was received from [] (Consolidated Security Operations Center) who firmly supported USSID in microfiche. However, among Army tactical SIGINT units, HQ INSCOM received indicating microfiche libraries provided advantages when working conditions were suitable (for example, Division/Brigade Support companies while in Garrison and at Operations Rear and Aviation companies). On the other hand, all comments concerning use of USSID in extreme tactical conditions ruled out microfiche documents.

(C) In light of its findings, HQ INSCOM did not concur in unrestricted distribution of USSID in microfiche. Where microfiche were supplied, electrical changes were to be retained on distribution. In the instance of INSCOM manned fixed sites, microfiche USSID was considered most effective where rapid destruction is essential (for example, [] operations) or when large manuals/catalogs (which are slow to change and/or infrequently referred to) are reduced to fiche. Specific recommendations for each SIGINT Activity Designator (SIGAD) were offered to NSA for selective distribution. For Army tactical SIGINT activities, only hard copy USSID were proposed for field use by Division/Brigade Support companies. Microfiche dissemination to Aviation, Operations rear and Control and Processing was to be addressed in a unit-by-unit recommendation as required.

(U) At the close of FY 1980, no change had been made to the NSACSS microfiche USSID distribution policies.²⁸

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USSID 1600. ~~(C)~~ US SIGINT Directive USSID 1600 (SIGINT Tasking for US Army Tactical SIGINT Units (U)) was published by NSACSS on 17 October 1979. USSID 1600 outlines the SIGINT mission, operational relationships, and tasks performed by US Army tactical SIGINT units worldwide.

- (U) ~~(C)~~ The issuance of USSID 1600 represented over two years of coordination effort among NSACSS elements, supported Army Major Commands (MACOMS), ACSI DA, and HQ INSCOM. USSID 1600 superseded existent USSID 2606(P) (SIGINT Tasking for USAREUR Tactical SIGINT Units (U) and USSID 1630(P) SIGINT Tasking for 329th ASA Company (U)).²⁹

USSID 1600R. (U) An 11 April 1980 meeting with NSACSS, FORSCOM, and INSCOM representatives resolved existent concerns and cleared the way for printing and formal coordination of NSACSS Draft US SIGINT Directive USSID 1600R (SIGINT Tasking for US Army Tactical SIGINT Reserve Units (U)). Draft USSID 1600R represented a first time effort to document the role of US Army Reserves (USAR) tactical SIGINT units as members of the US SIGINT System (USSS).

(U) USSID 1600R will document the SIGINT mission, operational relationships, and tasks performed by USAR tactical SIGINT units, under the SIGINT operational control of DIRNSA/CHCSS (as exercised through the USSID system).

(U) Draft USSID 1600R was reviewed by ACSI DA, CDRFORSCOM, the Collection, Processing, Analysis and Reporting (CPAR) Element (INSCOM CONUS MI Group), the Major US Army Reserve Commands, and HQ INSCOM. HQ INSCOM provided an Army response to NSACSS on 15 July 1980 which stipulated several mild concerns but essentially concurred in promulgation of formal USSID 1600R.³⁰

Coordination of Draft US SIGINT Directive (USSID) 505. (U) NSACSS forwarded to this HQ a newly developed Draft USSID 505 (basic document entitled "Directory of SIGINT Organizations (U)"). The draft was reviewed in ODCSOPS, who is the HQ INSCOM office of primacy. When promulgated the new draft would replace extant USSID 505 dated 16 July 1973. The substantive differences between the previous USSID and its replacement were as follows:

- (U) ~~(C)~~ The draft USSID's criteria for assignment of a SIGINT Activity Designator ("SIGAD" - for Army activities a "USM-" number) is now precisely defined. Specifically, SIGADs are to designate activities which perform: (1) intercept, (2) processing, (3) reporting, or (4) radio direction finding. Also, SIGADs are to be assigned to activities which are listed in the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), listed in the Tactical Cryptologic Program, or other SIGINT resources under the operational or technical control of DIRNSA/CHCSS.
- (U) ~~(S/CCO)~~ The draft USSID contained the current/more stringent NSACSS SIGAD classification criteria and was the first USSID (or USSID draft) to do so. This criteria classifies the association of even one SIGAD with its true unit identify/location (formerly a single SIGAD association was unclassified). Similar protection is afforded mere listings of US and Second Party SIGADs (even without the true unit identities/locations).

~~(C)~~ A new "anonymity program" was established in the draft whereby NSACSS

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cryptologic activities were assigned a Roman numeral between I and IV. The numerals indicate the "class" of sensitivity of the activities' cryptologic operations. Class I - the least restrictive level - was assigned to NSACSS activities whose operations require no anonymity arrangements. Class IV required the use of cover designators/addresses and precluded all visible association with the individuals involved in the cryptologic activity and NSACSS. The classes were derived from requirements levied by foreign governments pursuant to concluded agreements. As stated in the draft, only NSA activities were affected, (b)(1) (C) qualified for anonymity arrangements as well.

(U) An INSCOM concurrence of Draft USSID 505 with comments was passed to NSACSS on 14 May 1980. A new USSID 505 was released by NSACSS on 29 May 1980 which included all of the draft's requirements/criteria.31

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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for the relocation of the three units and the rehabilitation of a former Navy fleet sonar school building for operations. On 26 June 1980, approval was received on the System Concept Paper III; the military contract for rehabilitation of the building was awarded in September; and actual construction was scheduled to begin in October 1980 and be completed in July 1981. The total cost for the rehabilitation of facilities, relocation of the units, and installation of updated mission and communications equipment would amount to approximately \$2.7 million.

(u)
(S/CCO) FS Homestead's mission had been limited to processing Cuban HF manual Morse, but with the move, the unit would man two collection positions (one Cuban and one Russian) and two voice transcription positions. Both collection positions would have a 20 to 450 MHz range in either single or multichannel modes. Initially, the Cuban position would be tasked for 16 DHOC, seven days a week; the Russian position would be tasked for eight DHOC, five days a week. In the past, these targets were intercepted on a time available basis by Navy and Air Force positions; this move would enable the Army to perform its mission on the same priority basis as the Navy and Air Force.

(u)
(S/CCO) The entire 20 personnel strength has been increased by one. The unit's MOS structure has also been revised to provide the needed collection and processing capabilities. The realignment will include 14 collection/voice processor spaces targeted against the Cuban ground forces and three collection/voice processor spaces targeted against the Soviet brigade in Cuba.33

WOBECK. (U) The U.S. Army [redacted] (b)(1) station located at Wobek, West Germany, has been managed by various tactical organizations over the past several years from out-of-hide resources. Whereas the situation was sufficient on a short term basis, it has become increasingly evident that a more permanent solution is demanded. In an effort to formalize Wobek's status as a [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)(1) Per NSA OACSI directed INSCOM to assume responsibility for the station as an echelon above corps (EAC) asset.

(U) On 29 November 1979, an in-process review (IPR) was held at HQ INSCOM and in December 1979, action was initiated to draft up an implementation plan which describes various tasks and objectives necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of providing a viable training platform and collection effort at Wobek effective 1 October 1980. The Program Decision Issue Paper (PDIP) submission for Wobek, legitimizing its existence, was sent to the Department of the Army in December 1980. Submission was for 54 persons. In January 1980, HQ INSCOM sent a planning message relative to EAC objectives to USAREUR and 66th MI Group outlining their main roles. Also during the month a more detailed message was sent to 66th MI Group, expounding upon their role specifically as it pertains to the Wobek effort. After much intensive work, a draft plan was sent on 27 May to ACSI (DA), USAREUR, 502d ASA Battalion and the 66th MI Group for staffing.

(U) Logistically, adequate equipment is now being purchased to operate the site. However, it appears that acquisition of proper personnel fill through normal pipeline procedures will not provide people in time. Efforts are under-

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(3):50
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way to man the site with volunteers, both from CONUS and overseas to temporarily solve the problem. The present operations building is inadequate for human habitation. Funds have been acquired to rehabilitate the structure so as to increase the level of working conditions. No formal training program currently exists at Woback for Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources (REDTRAIN). This problem is currently being overcome by publishing a REDTRAIN plan specifically designed for that site along the same lines of FS Augsburg's plan. Funding for the FY 1981 time frame is only partially solved and a continuing effort to acquire adequate O&MA money for operating funds will have to be effectuated by INSCOM. Unfunded requirements money will have to be used to fill this void.³⁴

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Field Station Homestead. ~~(SCW)~~ Perhaps the most significant operational problem continued to be the inability to influence and provide timely and

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] Modernization Project at Homestead. ~~107~~ The modernization of the Homestead joint service cryptologic facility's morse collection and processing efforts were nearly complete at the end of the fiscal year. The purpose of the entire [redacted] system was to enhance collection and analysis capabilities through the immediate accessing of analysts to the intercept

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
NSA

being copied at any one time and to a computer data bank of technical and order of battle. The system is characterized by a Sylvania designed system of high frequency collection and analysis hardware positions, consisting of a modern design morse keyboard and video display readout for the morse operators and an analytical typewriter keyboard and data/message display scope for the analysts.

(C) Training on the operation of the MAROON SAIL computer, conducted by the Navy between 22 August and 14 September, consisted of a 56 hour block of instruction. The Field Station Commander, six analysts, and three transcribers attended and successfully completed the block of instruction. In preparation for the Operational Readiness Demonstration (ORD), limited access to the system was permitted commencing 24 September. ORD was scheduled for mid-October 1980 with full system implementation programmed after successful completion of ORD.38

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(C) [redacted] was a real-time data forwarding and collection steorage system which provided the capability to intercept, forward, and process critical, time-sensitive communications from the European forward [redacted] area to NSA. [redacted] would maximize mission effectiveness by rapidly communicating the target environment to collection managers at NSA. The [redacted] system would provide a forwarding and recording capability for 24 audio channels from Terminal A [redacted] to Terminal B at NSA. Twenty-three of the channels would be used for transferring collected audio information and the 24th would be used for digital data to provide communications for end to end coordination and NSA access to [redacted] information. The design for Project [redacted] was based upon that of Project [redacted] located at [redacted]. The on-site user test plan for [redacted] was published, and test run during the 3d Qtr FY 1980. However, the actual results had not been issued by the close of the fiscal year.40

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
NSA

switch, LO (local oscillator) synthesizer and VFT demodulator control unit. [] would provide 72 Bullet VFT demodulators for this purpose. The project would interface directly with Subsystems J and K in order to rectify problems which affected the collection and processing capabilities of Subsystems J and K since the [] Operational Test and Evaluation was conducted in 1972. During FY 1980, Field Station [] published a [] on-site user test (OSUT) plan, but it was found to be unacceptable. The OSUT was rescheduled for February 1981. The system was installed in April 1980, and part of it became operational in September. The remainder would not be operational until Subsystem J was reinstalled and Subsystem K moved in January 1981.⁴²

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(c) The funding initially programmed for [] was \$4 million dollars (\$3 million by the Army and \$1 million by the Air Force). By the time of actual acquisition, the cost had risen to \$7 million. After negotiation with ESL and discussions between NSACSS and Army, the contract was let for \$5.2 million. NSACSS made up the shortage of funds.⁴³

(c) All collection receivers at Field Station [] will be replaced with new, digitally controlled receivers that are more accurate, stable and more reliable than existing receivers. The [] concept is found in three new capabilities to be provided to the collection operators. The first is convenient, automated setup and tuning of collection equipment from a centralized position CRT/keyboard. Tasking, signal environment and resource files (largely developed through automatic data entry and accessible from the position CRT/keyboard) constitute the second major system capability. The third capability involves the introduction of a built-in-test capability to allow for the testing of equipment state and health to be routinely analyzed. The installation date is scheduled for July 1981.⁴⁴

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
NSA

[] (S) A sub-task under [] is a selective collection and pre-processing system to monitor dialing, detect signal activity, and perform limited mode analysis on signals contained in frequency, division multiplex (FDM) multi-channel networks. The results of dial recognition, director look-up and activity detection are used to automatically select and prioritize traffic for future processing. During FY 1980, [] experienced continuous slippage and was not expected to be deployed until early 1981. There were problems within the training area. One maintenance training contract expired at the same time [] was to be fielded, precluding the training of two engineers. Another contract would not be let in time to permit their people to be trained on the system prior to deployment. The remaining problem in the area of training was that no formalized package had been devised by NSACSS. More importantly, the software problems delayed the development.⁴⁵

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Direction Finding Nets. (S/ECU) At the close of FY 1980, INSCOM direction finding (DF) net configurations were as follows:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

to US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) for shipment to HONEYWELL for rehabilitation. The first of these rehabed equipments is expected to be returned to the field on or about the first of September.⁴⁷

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] was finalized in June with the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) representatives holding meetings with both the HQ INSCOM office of interest and the Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) contract holder. Purpose of these meetings was to finalize and clarify requirements for the SSL upgrade and provide final guidance to SWRI as to operational requirements for the system. The upgrade actually consists of two contracts, one to test a remote sounder concept at SWRI facilities in Texas and one to change operational aspects of the system in [redacted]. The remote sounder test in Texas will determine if the remote sounder is taken to [redacted] and installed as part of the overall upgrade. The end of the year saw SWRI involved in getting the sounder from US Army Electronics Command (ECOM) in shape to begin testing the remote sounder concept in 1981.

(b)(3):P.L.
86-36;(b)
(1) Per
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(S/CCO) During FY 1980 SSL was plagued by maintenance problems, problems which could be attributed to the contract for system maintenance being taken away from Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) and placed under the [redacted] station contract. [redacted] maintenance personnel were not familiar with the system and had insufficient documentation to allow them to adequately support the system. On 28 September 1979 a contract was awarded to SWRI to allow them to provide assistance to the on-station [redacted] personnel in getting the system back into service. The initial concept of support was a seven- to ten-day research effort at the SWRI plant to isolate problems, than an on-site effort by SWRI to repair the system and train maintenance personnel. After much effort, the SSL was finally returned to full time on-line service on 3 December.⁴⁸

[redacted] (S/CCO) At the start of the fiscal year [redacted] was out of service due to work being completed on the [redacted] operations building and to an extremely complex hardware problem caused by what looked like power imbalance. On 15 October 1979 HQ INSCOM was informed that the 96 megabytes (MB) disk drive unit was also deadlined and that repairs were beyond on-station maintenance expertise to repair. By 27 February, [redacted] system was reported as up and fully operational by [redacted] after replacement parts were received for the 96 MB disk unit. [redacted] continued to operate with many software crashes until 21 April when it was shut down due to the uninterrupted power supply of [redacted] being taken down for repair; this outage was originally planned to be for a short time but the on-station engineers found that the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) was unrepairable and that the station would have to operate off island power until the new UPS was operational. At that time, the planned operational date for the new UPS was the first week in July. Further slippage of the UPS installation date finally forced a decision that the [redacted] system would be operated on island power, and on 3 June the [redacted] system was brought back up. The system continued to experience

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

numerous software crashes and after numerous short outages [redacted] Emitter
Location and Identification Officer decided to take the system off line on
10 July until software problems could be identified and corrected.49

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Project [redacted] (~~C/CCO~~) In 1977 the Emitter Location and Identification
(ELI) Office, ODCSOPS, wrote and submitted an RCP (Resource Change Proposal)
for replacements of the RO-361 equipment (Advanced Identification Technique
(AIT)). This RCP spelled out a requirement FY 1980 other procurement, Army
(OPA) dollars of \$1,325,500 to purchase four modified Special Signal Analysis
Systems (SSAS). The SSAS had been tested and that test culminated in an
engineering model that underwent extensive feasibility testing and a six-
month operational test against a live SIGINT mission.

(~~C/CCO~~) When INSCOM came under the System Concept Paper (SCP) program all
outstanding RCPs were rewritten as SCP-1s. INSCOM submitted an SCP-1 (a
rewrite of the RCP), again calling for \$1,325,500 FY 1981 procurement dollars
to purchase four SSAS systems. NSACSS sent this SCP-1 back to INSCOM for a
rewrite. NSACSS (W3) did not like the SSAS system and wanted references to
a specific system taken out of the SCP-1, with just the requirement being
delineated. The rewritten SCP-1 dated 10 January 1980, was submitted to
NSACSS with an additional 40 thousand O&MA dollars per year for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). RDT&E funds requested were \$518K
in FY 1982, \$876K in FY 1983, \$460K in FY 1984, \$485K in FY 1985, and \$512K
in FY 1980.

(~~C/CCO~~) While the SCP-1 was being rewritten, NSACSS provided the guidance
on 7 December 1979 that SCP-1s do not require formal review as stipulated in
NSA Circular 25-5. On 15 January 1980, a letter and a copy of the [redacted]
SCP-1 was sent to US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) from DCS Systems,
HQ INSCOM stating that NSACSS had approved of the subject requirement and
exempted Project [redacted] from additional NSACSS Circular 25-5 process, and

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that it was not necessary for the SCP-1 to go through the SCP-III and SCP-IV stages with corresponding reviews. However, NSACSS was upset about the difference in cost of the SCP-1 for an AIT replacement which they exempted from the SCP process and the SCP-1 for [] dated 10 January 1980. The AIT replacement called for \$1,325,500 in 1982 dollars; the [] SCP-1 calls for a total of \$2,851,000 in 1982-86 dollars.

(C/CCO) On 21 May 1980, a DF was sent from DCSOPS to DCSFM requesting they take action to write an SCP-1 for a replacement AIT system that would replace the present system but not have any additional capabilities and not require a large expenditure of RDT&E dollars.⁵¹

[] is an ELINT identification and location system consisting of an airborne platform, a ground processing facility (GPF), an operations central, and associated maintenance and ground support equipment. The system operates over a range of .5 to 18 GHz against non-communications emitters (radars). Two antennas located on the outer wing stores of the RV-1D collect the radar signals and transmit the signals to processing units inside the aircraft for initial analysis. The signals are then downlinked to the IPF for more extensive analysis and reporting. The

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

solution was determined to be software related and was subsequently corrected. The second problem was a lack of [] training for operators and supervisors. When confronted with inadequacies of the proposed training program, the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca initiated corrective action.⁵²

OLYMPIC TORCH. (C/CCO) Early in 1979, US European Command (USEUCOM) offered US Army, Europe (USAREUR) the opportunity to man collection positions in the highly productive OLYMPIC TORCH system. USAREUR's initial response was to inform USEUCOM that it would be unable to provide any SIGINT operational personnel due to shortages within its units. However, USAREUR did submit a Program Decision Issue Paper (PDIP) for a ten person unit to support OLYMPIC [] However, HQDA did not approve the PDIP. At this point, HQ INSCOM offered to support the project if provided the personnel to man the Army's portion of the operations. In August 1980, NSACSS authorized the transfer of 11 enlisted spaces from San Antonio to Field Station [] for the OLYMPIC TORCH Detachment.⁵³

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[] (S/CCO) As a result of a visit to Field Station [] in November 1979, representatives from the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory and HQ INSCOM determined the requirements to perform a basic upgrade of the [] remote collection system. Besides replacement of the receivers, there existed the need for digital controlled demodulators, new receiver control panels, complete Trick Chief position equipment, [] interface with [] intercom upgrade, time code signal from local GSQ-53 to operator positions, and new RF spectrum displays. The entire package was given the project name [] and was scheduled to be completed in FY 1982.⁵⁴

AN/TSQ-112, TACELIS. (S) The Tactical Automated Communications Emitter Location and Identification System (TACELIS), AN/TSQ-112, was a ground based communications intercept and direction finding system which was composed of a Control and Processing Center, two Remote Master Stations (RMS), and four Remote Slave Stations (RSS). The two RMS's had the capability to interface with up to eight RSS's, and each RMS had 16 AN/ULR-17 intercept receivers. In June 1980, the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory notified HQ INSCOM that TACELIS would not be procured. However, ODCSFM, HQ INSCOM initiated an investigation into possible deployment of the TACELIS prototype into an operational theater. Although no decision had been made by the close of FY 1980, it appeared highly unlikely that a favorable decision would be made. Units in the field were interested in acquiring the equipment but not without personnel resources to man them, and no such resources were available to be given.⁵⁵

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[] The system utilized a differential time of arrival (DTOA) and direction of arrival to compute fix locations for intercepted radars. The DTOA technique allowed for fix computations of less than 50 meters circular error probable of a target one-half distance from the total length of the baseline. The fix accuracy was totally dependent on baseline ratios. Highly accurate fix computations could be accomplished with baselines exceeding 100km, for example along the []

(U) In June 1980, the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory decided not to procure the [] as a result of an operational test. However, after examination of the system, ODCSFM, HQ INSCOM recommended deployment of the prototype to an operational theater. At the close of FY 1980, the questions of whether to deploy the system and, if so, where had it not been resolved, but it was highly unlikely that the equipment would be deployed. Commands in the field were interested in the equipment but only if the personnel to man the systems were included. The resources were simply unavailable.⁵⁶

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AR 381-14, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM). (U) The revision of AR 381-14, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), was undertaken to clarify the policies and objectives of the TSCM program, and to redefine its relationship to the overall OPSEC support mission of INSCOM. The guiding principle behind this revision was to clearly define sensitive facilities requiring support by limited TSCM resources. An initial revision of AR 381-14 was completed and submitted to ACSI, DA, on 17 September 1979. After subsequent coordination, a final draft of AR 381-14 was provided to ACSI, DA, on 14 July 1980. Final publication of the AR is expected by the second quarter of FY 1981.

(u)
(e) The initial revision (17 September 1979) of AR 381-14 sought to identify and establish several changes. On 18 June 1980, an agreement was reached with OACSI DA on the final draft. The final revision "echoed" the changes that were first sought under the initial draft. The sensitive Army activities which require mandatory TSCM support were defined. These activities include: Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) (C); Secure Communication Facilities (SCF) (C); Data Processing Activities (DPA) (C); and Restricted Areas (RA) (C).

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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~~(S)~~ A more definitive personnel selection was established along with new training standards. A service obligation, for example, was established as one of the requirements for TSCM agents. Furthermore, the physical and technical security standards for sensitive areas were updated, and reporting procedures were streamlined and modified. Finally, AR 381-41 designated the CG INSCOM as the executive agent for the Army, for the selection of TSCM special agents, and for the training and the certification of the agents.⁶⁸

TB 380-9, SIGSEC Survey Guide. (U) Publication of Technical Bulletin (TB) 380-9, SIGSEC Survey Guide, accomplished the fielding of guidance to all Army Signal Security (SIGSEC) support elements, activities, and personnel on the conduct of SIGSEC Surveys. This was the first fielding of definitive guidance on this primary SIGSEC support function. This task was initiated during FY 1978 within the then Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence (ODCSCI) as a result of perceived need for this guidance and under the provisions of AR 530-2, COMSEC, which assigns responsibility to Cdr INSCOM to provide advice and assistance to Army commanders at all levels.

(U) The INSCOM SIGSEC Operations Manual remains a primary reference within the Army for the conduct of SIGSEC support activities. Among its stated support functions, the conduct of SIGSEC Surveys is a primary activity of SIGSEC specialists. However, the manual is inadequate on how such Surveys should be organized and conducted. Cognizant of a NATO COMSEC document detailing COMSEC Surveys, a copy was obtained and reviewed for application in this area. It was found that much of the information had direct application and an effort was initiated to develop a similar document using the COMSEC Survey guide as a basic starting point, but expanding the scope to encompass the full range of SIGSEC topics. It was felt that the classification of such a document must be held to a minimum to ensure the widest possible dissemination. Careful attention was paid to the classification and to the elimination of direct NATO applications so as to preclude a NATO caveat. The goal was to obtain an unclassified document. Upon the completion of an early draft in FY 1979, the Guide was provided informally to interested staff elements at the National Security Agency (NSA). While no changes in the context of the document were suggested, NSACSS strongly felt a minimum classification of CONFIDENTIAL was necessary due to the quantity and the comprehensive nature of the information involved. As the draft of the TB evolved, this opinion was considered and evaluated. The result was a final draft covering all appropriate aspects of COMSEC and ELSEC, rendering it a complete SIGSEC document, and offering comprehensive guidance on the conduct of a SIGSEC Survey. Though the document bears a CONFIDENTIAL classification based on the collection of information, the procedural aspects are unclassified and can be extracted for easier application. The printed document entered distribution channels in May of 1980.⁶⁹

Revision of AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA). (U) During February 1980, a series of conferences between representatives of OACSI (DA), US Army Special Operations Detachment (INSCOM), and OADCSOPS OPSEC (INSCOM) were held to revise AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA). The original OACSI draft was deemed unsatisfactory to INSCOM representatives resulting in a number of

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recommended changes to the proposed revision. On 4 March 1980, a final conference between OACSI and INSCOM representatives was held. Highlights of changes in the proposed AR 381-12 are: terrorism and deliberate compromise of classified information were added to the regulation; INSCOM is charged with maintaining the SAEDA data base; INSCOM will be responsible for preparing and presenting SAEDA briefings to units above Corps and to units without CI resources; and SAEDA briefings must be multidiscipline, must include the nature of the terrorist threat, vulnerabilities of DA personnel and their dependents to terrorist acts, and defensive measures which can be employed to thwart such acts. OACSI plans to rewrite AR 381-12 and have it published by January 1981.

(U) If AR 381-12 is published as revised, two problem areas are expected. A data base will have to be prepared, staffed, approved, and maintained within INSCOM and the myriad of required SAEDA lectures will require extensive man hour expenditure which will lessen the time available for other tasks within INSCOM field elements. 70

Personnel Security Screening Interview Program. (U) Initiated 23 August 1978 in accordance with OACSI, DA tasking, the Personnel Security Screening Interview Program (PSSIP) consists of the conduct of Personnel Security Screening Interviews (PSSI) by designated INSCOM personnel in support of the US Army Military Personnel Center's (MILPERCEN) Personnel Security Screening Program (PSSP), directed by HQDA and implemented under the provisions of MOU between the Cdr, US Army MILPERCEN and the Cdr, USAINSCOM. The PSSP is a MILPERCEN-administered program at specified Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Training Centers to screen first term and prior service enlistees tentatively selected for assignment to sensitive duties, including special agent duties, and/or duties involving access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The PSSP is a four-phase program beginning with Armed Forces Entry and Examination Station (AFEES) pre-enlistment selection and screening by MILPERCEN Security Interviewers, and ending with final adjudication and granting or denial of security clearances and access by the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF). The PSSI is administered during Phase II by INSCOM Special Agents trained and certified for the program.

(U) In November 1979, approximately one year subsequent to the initiation of the PSSIP, INSCOM initiated an examination/assessment of the program. Two representatives of the ODCSCI, INSCOM (Messrs Daughters and Blotzer) visited each of the five principle locations where PSSI are conducted; namely, Fort Dix, NJ; Fort McClellan, AL; Fort Gordon, GA; Fort Jackson, SC; and Fort Leonard Wood, MO. During these visits, suggestions for the improvement of the PSSIP were solicited. PSSIP interviews were monitored, and personnel from both the PSSD and PSSID were queried as to problem areas. After visiting the PSSIP units, MILPERCEN, OACSI, and CCF were contacted to secure their assessment concerning the viability of the PSSIP. Feedback from these agencies revealed all were highly pleased with the efficiency of the PSSIP. Information received from CCF revealed that based on the 2,665 PSSI conducted in the first half of FY 1980, approximately 15 percent resulted in the individual being denied his/her enlistment option; thus resulting in substantial financial and manpower savings thru negating the necessity for DIS investigations and advanced training. A further benefit derived was enhanced security.

(U) An assessment of the PSSIP surfaced two major problems. The first problem was the lack of a current INSCOM regulation which outlined policy and procedural guidance for the conduct of the PSSIP. This problem was solved by the 1 July 1980 publication of USAINSCOM Regulation 380-1, Personnel Security Screening Interview (PSSI) Program. The second problem concerned the methodology for passing on knowledge of criminal activity obtained thru the conduct of PSSI. On 19 May 1980, a meeting was held at OACSI, DA with representatives of OACSI and Law Enforcement Division, ODCSPER, DA. Based on this meeting, a formal letter was dispatched thru OACSI, DA to ODCSPER, DA requesting guidance. By indorsement 25 June 1980, INSCOM was notified that criminal information obtained should be passed to the local Personnel Security Screening Detachment for transmission to the Provost Marshal.⁷¹

Expansion of INSCOM ADP Security Mission. (U) In March 1980, the Cdr, INSCOM received a message from BG(P) Williams, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. This document tasked INSCOM to provide input concerning the proposed expansion of mission in the area of computer security. The ADCSOPS, OPSEC ADP Program Manager coordinated with Systems Security Division (SSD), 902nd MI Group to investigate the feasibility for and development of a positive concept for expanding the present INSCOM ADP mission to incorporate trusted software and security test and evaluation. On 4 April 1980, BG Smith, DCG for Security and Production, INSCOM sent a letter to BG(P) Williams outlining INSCOM's approach and identifying additional assets needed to perform the newly proposed ADP security services.

(U) Recruitment/training of qualified technical personnel with the expertise and education to perform the requirements for implementation of trusted software on sensitive Army systems and provide technical assistance in the selection of appropriate Army software systems poses a major problem. Operation Maintenance Army (OMA) funding for computer equipment and the personnel for this expansion of mission would require over \$300,000 of additional government funding. The request for these funds were included in the FY 1982 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) but were turned down.⁷²

Polygraph Activities. (U) Production figures for the worldwide INSCOM polygraph program for FY 1980 are shown in the table below.⁷³

Table 20. - Polygraph Activities, FY 1980

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total</u>
Technical Review of Polygraph Examinations: (Field Examinations only)	233
Review of Permanent Polygraph Files:	2,952
Examiner Certification Actions:	5
Polygraph Examinations Conducted:	
ADCSOPS OPSEC/902d MI Gp (Field Examinations)	55
902d MI Gp for NSA	264
66th MI Gp (Field Examinations)	135
501st MI Gp (Field Examinations)	33
(Total)	<u>(487)</u>

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<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total</u>
Seminars:	1
Examiner Refresher Training:	8
Pre Polygraph Dossier Reviews:	97

Consolidation of Polygraph Activities at 66th MI Group. (U) MI polygraph examiners within the 66th MI Group had been in a decentralized mode for several years, with individual examiners assigned Munich, Frankfurt and West Berlin. This separation of examiners did not provide adequate opportunity for them to communicate effectively regarding individual polygraph cases and general polygraph matters. This resulted in individual examiners attempting unorthodox methods in the conduct of examinations.

(U) In November 1979, the Polygraph Program Manager, HQ INSCOM, met with individual examiners and their supervisors at the 66th MI Group to discuss various polygraph problems, and recommended that the Commander, 66th MI Group announced his decision to centralize his polygraph activities in Munich.

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Quick Reaction Team (QRT). (U) In December 1979, the need was identified by the CG, INSCOM for a TSCM quick reaction capability which would be equipped and manned appropriately to respond worldwide to TSCM incidents and major unprogrammed TSCM support. On 25 February 1980, the QRT Chief, Mr. David D. Groff, was officially hired by INSCOM. By the close of FY 1980, the team had one GS-12 Team Chief (certified TSCM Special Agent - TSA), three WO 971A91 certified TSAs, and one GS-11 TEMPEST Technician on the way. The INSCOM TSCM Program Manager selects and approves team members and directs all operational activities. Equipment procurement, development and unique fabrications are under the cognizance of the Team Chief. The preliminary mission of the QRT is in support of special projects, the first occurring in February 1980.⁷⁵

DAIG TEMPEST Finding. (U) The DAIG TEMPEST Finding was initiated by the CDR INSCOM and published in November 1979. It found major deficiencies in the management of TEMPEST and determined that the performance of TEMPEST tests were inadequate. The primary factor affecting TEMPEST was found to be insufficient resources, both authorized and assigned. This lack of sufficient resources was heavily underscored by two predominant facts: (1) that positions authorized to perform TEMPEST inspections and tests had been below a 65 percent fill rate for the past year; and (2) there was not TEMPEST career field for either warrant officers or enlisted personnel. In addition to personnel shortfalls, an intolerably high rate of equipment failure was noted; equipment used for performing TEMPEST testing had not been usable for about 20 percent of the available time during the past year. Consequently, personnel shortfalls, resource problems, and equipment failures contributed to the incompleteness of an estimated 75 percent of known TEMPEST testing requirements over the past two years. This fact is coupled with the determination that new and reconfigured installations requiring TEMPEST testing had taken place,

but at no level within INSCOM could these new facilities be identified with certainty. It was also shown that these problems were compounded by ineffective management practices. Personnel engaged in the management of TEMPEST at group level and below did not maintain essential statistics to track the progress of SIGSEC evaluations. Also, TEMPEST managers at HQ INSCOM by-passed subordinate commands in coordinating schedules, and scarce TEMPEST resources were diverted to fulfill unprogrammed requirements. Finally, it was determined that within HQ INSCOM, TEMPEST management responsibilities and resources were geographically fragmented, and that supported commands were not fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities regarding TEMPEST.

(U) The DAIG TEMPEST Finding stated that increased command attention, improved management practices, and resource augmentation and realignment would improve INSCOM's capability to fulfill TEMPEST responsibilities. The response given to this finding by ADCSOPS OPSEC, INSCOM was one of concurrence, and stated additionally that several actions had been planned and taken to correct the noted deficiencies, but that in the short-term the issues remained unresolved.⁷⁶

Military Intelligence Polygraph Seminar. (U) The first annual Military Intelligence Polygraph Seminar was held on 14-15 October 1979 at Fort Meade, Maryland. It was attended by all MI examiners assigned in CONUS and USAREUR. It is anticipated that this seminar will become a permanent training vehicle in future years. The MI Polygraph Seminar was in accordance with AR 195-6 and scheduled to occur immediately following the annual Federal Interagency Polygraph Seminar (8-13 October 1979) held at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

(U) The MI Polygraph Seminar offered an excellent opportunity for an open and candid discussion of MI polygraph matters and for attacking common problem areas as a group. Due to individual attempts to solve problems, various examiners assigned to USAREUR developed idiosyncratic approaches to conducting polygraph examinations. USAREUR examiners are assigned in three different locations (Munich, Frankfurt and West Berlin) and, consequently, had limited opportunity for personal contact to discuss specific polygraph cases. The decentralization of examiners encouraged an individual to drift from principles taught at the Polygraph Course, US Army Military Policy School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, and as espoused by the Office of the Polygraph Program Manager. Quality control reviews of individual polygraph examinations were helpful in retarding examiner drift from principles, but it was recognized that isolated examiners had to be drawn back in the direction of "school solutions" when they were preferable to field expediency. The first annual MI Polygraph Seminar was a first step in that direction.⁷⁷

INSCOM Role In War On OPSEC. (U) In mid-July 1980, an Operations Security (OPSEC) Evaluation Group, under the auspices of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, met for three days and recommended actions to tighten security and to improve OPSEC in the Army at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army. This declared War on OPSEC is a significant step forward in INSCOM's efforts to sell OPSEC. The VCSA recommendations were of two types, those actions which can be accomplished immediately and others which must be implemented as available

resources were received. Generally, matters requiring immediate actions involve improving command emphasis on OPSEC, establishing procedures for incorporating OPSEC considerations in combat development/materiel acquisition processes, improving OPSEC training throughout the Army, activating an OPSEC program at DOD level, and developing an OPSEC threat data base.

(U) Major Army Commands (MACOM) were specifically tasked to accomplish designated actions by certain dates. Of the 54 taskings approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) has primary responsibility for four actions. These actions involve improving OPSEC training, improving OPSEC awareness, creating a threat data base, and formalizing OPSEC arrangements with other MACOMs, if necessary. To date, action has been completed on three of our four taskings and is 50 percent completed on one other. USAINSCOM continues to provide extensive support to other MACOMs and the Army staff to assist them in completing seven other taskings which they have proponentcy.⁷⁸

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. FY 1980 MAO AHR (S/CCO), Chap. 2, p. 2, Appendix D.
2. FY 1980 470th MI Gp AHR (TSCW), pp. 4-5; Ltr, fm BG Thomas J. Flynn (DCI, HQ INSCOM), subj: USAOG Operational Success (June 80); Msg, CDRINSCOM, subj: Coverage of Shah of Iran (S/CCO/NOFORN) (26 Mar 80) (S/CCO/NOFORN); FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 218.
3. FY 1980 ITAC AHR (C), Tab 14, pp. 5-6, Annex B, Tab 15; ITAC Intelligence Production Task Data Sheet (Jan 81) (U); ITAC Accomplishments (1980) (S).
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Continued)

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32. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 140-141.
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56. FY 1980 DCSFM AHR (TS/CCO), Chap. 3, p. 7.
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60. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 174.
61. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 181.
62. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 172.
63. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 179.
64. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 176.
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66. FY 1980 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 138-139.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Continued)

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70. Paper prepared by Mr. John W. Blotzer, Counter-HUMINT Div, 11 July 1980, Updated 5 November 1980.
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APPENDIX A

USA INSCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE*
(As of 30 September 1980)

<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
WO0YAA	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
WO00AA	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station	Arlington, Virginia
WO01AA	USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
	USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
	1st Battalion (Support) (Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
	2d Battalion (Operations) (Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1KAA	US Army Field Station, Homestead	Homestead Air Force Base, Homestead, Florida
W31UAA	US Army Field Station, San Antonio	San Antonio, Texas
WO02AA	US Army Element, National Security Agency	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1HAA	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station	Harrenton, Virginia
WO2BAA	US Army Field Station, Okinawa	Sobe, Okinawa, Japan
WO2RAA	US Army Field Station, Berlin	Berlin, Germany
WODRAA	US Army Field Station, Sinop	Sinop, Turkey
WOKLAA	Classified Unit	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W1U3AA	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W372AA	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W2JBAA	US Army Russian Institute	Garmisch, Germany
H3AGAA	US Army Field Station, Augsburg	Augsburg, Germany
W3CCAA	USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3NSAA	USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii	Fort Shafter, Hawaii
	USA INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific (Provisional)	Fort Shafter, Hawaii

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<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W3QNAA	US Army Cryptologic Support Group	Heidelberg, Germany
W3YDAA	US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
WH60AA	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
WH6099	Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
	11th Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence) (Provisional)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
	US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Provisional)	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W32BAA	US Army Central Security Facility	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W35GAA	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W36SAA	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W39CAA	US Army Special Operations Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W318AA	USA INSCOM Fort Meade Headquarters Support Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W319AA	US Army Operational Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DFAA	US Army Systems Exploitation Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DKAA	USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
WBU6AA	902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W005AA	USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
W009AA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Houston	Fort Sam Houston, Texas
W01AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	Presidio of San Francisco, California
W01BAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	Alexandria, Virginia
W3S2AA	USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
	USA INSCOM Security Support Battalion (Provisional)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

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<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
	902d Military Intelligence Group	
W32AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU7AA	66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WGNTAA	18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WGNT99	Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
HBVNAA	5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBNVAA	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	
WBNVAA	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nuernberg Fuerth, Germany
WBNVAA	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nuernberg Fuerth, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBNKAA	430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBNK99	Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBNVAA	766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
	66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional)	Berlin, Germany
	430th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	Munich, Germany
WBU8AA	470th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Clayton, Panama
		Fort Clayton, Panama

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<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
WBU9AA	500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
W3BRAA	US Army Field Station, Misawa	Misawa, Japan
	US INSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection) (Provisional)	Camp Zama, Japan
	US INSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment (Counterintelligence) (Provisional)	Camp Zama, Japan
WH6AAA	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Camp Coiner (Yongsan Military Reservation) Seoul, Korea
WH6A99	Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Camp Coiner, Seoul, Korea
WBWFAA	209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Coiner, Seoul, Korea
WBWF99	Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Coiner, Seoul, Korea
W33YAA	US Army Security Detachment, Korea	Camp Hovey, Uijongbu, Korea
	209th Military Intelligence Battalion (Counter-intelligence) (Provisional)	Camp Coiner, Seoul, Korea
W3F1AA	US Army Field Station, Korea	Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea
WDLPA A	146th ASA Company (Aviation) (Forward)	Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea
WEDVAA	332d ASA Company, Operations (Forward)	Camp Page, Chunchon, Korea
	146th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) (Provisional)	Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea
	524th Military Intelligence Battalion (HUMINT) (Prov)	Camp Coiner, Seoul, Korea
W4ASAA	US Army Combined Research Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
WGTXAA	641st Military Intelligence Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

*In previous Annual Historical Reviews, provisional units were not listed, but subsequently, they have increased significantly in numbers and have taken on a role of permanency.

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APPENDIX B

TOE UNITS

(As of 30 September 1980)

WBU7	66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU8	470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU9	500th Military Intelligence Group
WH6A	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WBU6	902d Military Intelligence Group
WGNT	18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVH	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN	5th Military Intelligence Company
WH60	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)
WDLP	146th Army Security Agency Company (Aviation)(Forward)
WEDV	332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Forward)
WBWF	209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK	430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGTX	641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection)
WBVW	766th Military Intelligence Detachment

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APPENDIX C

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS

RELOCATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
470th Military Intelligence Group From: Fort Amador, Canal Zone TO: Fort Clayton, Panama	1 Oct 79	FY 80 470th MI Gp AHR, p.1.
332d ASA Company, Operations (Forward) From: Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea To: Camp Page, Chunchon, Korea	15 Aug 80	FY 80 332d ASA Co AHR, p.I-1

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APPENDIX D

TDA UNITS

(As of 30 September 1980)

W00Y	Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
W000	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station
W001	USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EH)
W002	US Army Element, National Security Agency
W005	USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force
W009	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Houston
W01A	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco
W01B	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency
W01H	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station
W01K	US Army Field Station, Homestead
W02B	US Army Field Station, Okinawa
W02R	US Army Field Station, Berlin
W0DR	US Army Field Station, Sinop
W0KL	Classified Unit
W1U3	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
W2JB	US Army Russian Institute
W31U	US Army Field Station, San Antonio
W32A	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Meade
W32B	US Army Central Security Facility
W33Y	US Army Security Detachment, Korea
W35G	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity
W36S	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity
W39C	US Army Special Operations Detachment
W318	USA INSCOM Fort Meade Headquarters Support Detachment
W319	US Army Operational Group
W372	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment
W3AG	US Army Field Station, Augsburg
W3BR	US Army Field Station, Misawa
W3CC	USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity
W3F1	US Army Field Station, Korea
W3NS	USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii
W3QN	US Army Cryptologic Support Group
W3S2	USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Fort Meade
W3YD	US Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center
W4AS	US Army Combined Research Detachment
W4DF	US Army Systems Exploitation Detachment
W4DK	USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group

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APPENDIX D

WBVH99 Augmentation, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK99 Augmentation, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL99 Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN99 Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company
WBWF99 Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK99 Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWV99 Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGNT99 Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WH6A99 Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WH6O99 Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company

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APPENDIX E
CHANGES IN STATUS OF TDA UNITS
REASSIGNED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority*</u>
US Army Field Station, Misawa From: HQ INSCOM To: 500th Military Intelligence Group	1 Oct 79	PO 61-1, 25 Sep 79
US Army Field Station, Homestead From: HQ INSCOM To: USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Prov)	1 May 80	PO 23-1, 21 Apr 80
US Army Field Station, San Antonio From: HQ INSCOM To: USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Prov)	1 May 80	PO 23-1, 21 Apr 80

* All Permanent Orders are from HQ INSCOM unless stated otherwise.

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APPENDIX F

USA INSCOM PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNIT*
(As of 30 September 1980)

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
HQ, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	172	137	17	21	102	94	291	252	292	313
USAG, Arlington Hall Station	17	18	2	2	141	197	160	217	154	157
USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	124	141	37	33	957	963	1118	1137	4	4
USA Element, National Security Agency	17	11	0	0	0	0	17	11	0	0
USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station	16	16	2	1	137	146	155	163	150	153
USA Field Station, Homestead	1	1	0	0	18	13	19	14	0	0
Classified Unit (WOKL)	1	1	0	0	5	6	6	7	14	14
USA Administrative Survey Detachment	51	44	37	37	51	48	139	129	268	251
USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity	16	7	2	2	99	91	117	100	62	59
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	79	79	25	21	113	97	217	197	184	146
11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	24	14	8	7	139	105	171	126	0	0
USA Field Station, San Antonio	11	11	5	4	341	328	357	343	5	5
USA Central Security Facility	5	5	0	0	9	5	14	10	93	79
USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	1	1	0	0	15	14	16	15	19	20
USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	2	1	1	2	66	41	69	44	10	8
USA Special Operations Detachment	8	7	7	5	28	12	43	24	6	6
USA INSCOM Ft Meade Headquarters Support Detachment	1	1	1	2	10	8	12	11	14	14
USA Operational Group	44	40	14	13	26	23	84	76	11	13

*For the first time in the Annual Historical Review coverage of personnel strength by unit, the Command Program Authorized is being used in place of the Permanent Orders Authorized. Table taken from DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, Manpower Command Strength (5 Nov 80).

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		HQ		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Systems Exploitation Detachment	12	8	0	0	4	6	16	14	1	1
USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	2	0	0	1	28	29	30	30	38	43
641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection)	19	8	15	18	39	5	73	31	0	0
902d Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	14	15	3	3	20	15	37	33	16	14
USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	10	9	15	11	39	29	64	49	0	2
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Houston	22	17	16	15	58	49	96	81	2	3
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	20	19	21	21	39	30	80	70	2	2
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Meade	32	31	29	29	96	75	157	135	6	2
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	3	3	5	5	7	4	15	12	2	2
USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	21	17	17	12	53	49	91	78	4	18
SUBTOTAL CONUS	745	662	279	265	2,640	2,482	3,664	3,409	1,377	1,329
470th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	13	13	1	2	99	97	113	112	4	9
SUBTOTAL CARIBBEAN	13	13	1	2	99	97	113	112	4	9

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Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii	7	7	3	3	37	29	47	39	3	2
USA Field Station, Okinawa	25	24	5	6	652	715	682	745	0	2
USA Field Station, Misawa	3	3	1	1	130	142	134	146	0	0
500th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	18	19	14	18	79	60	111	97	54	53
501st Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	24	30	4	5	153	159	181	194	1	2
209th Military Intelligence Detachment	7	9	6	5	102	76	115	90	0	0
USA Combined Research Detachment	3	3	1	1	15	14	19	18	0	0
USA Field Station, Korea	13	11	6	9	270	281	289	301	1	0
USA Security Detachment, Korea	1	0	0	0	8	7	9	7	0	0
146th Army Security Agency Company (Avn)(Fwd)	8	11	24	23	249	215	281	249	0	0
332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Fwd)	7	5	3	2	241	198	251	205	0	0
SUBTOTAL PACIFIC	116	122	67	73	1,936	1,896	2,119	2,091	59	59

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Cryptologic Support Group	2	2	4	4	11	11	17	17	0	0
USA Field Station, Berlin	30	32	16	20	714	719	760	771	4	1
USA Field Station, Augsburg	73	73	29	36	1,607	1,669	1,709	1,778	12	40
66th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	23	26	10	10	111	131	144	167	130	144
5th Military Intelligence Company	4	3	3	3	43	54	50	60	0	0
18th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	9	10	12	103	111	123	132	0	0
165th Military Intelligence Battalion	8	10	7	3	78	57	93	70	0	0
511th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	13	9	8	79	64	98	85	0	0
430th Military Intelligence Detachment	13	12	13	16	28	17	54	45	0	0
527th Military Intelligence Battalion	13	13	7	4	99	77	119	94	0	0
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	5	7	2	3	17	21	24	31	0	0
USA Field Station, Sinop	24	22	7	7	203	209	234	238	0	0
US Army Russian Institute	3	4	0	0	5	6	8	10	11	6
SUBTOTAL EUROPE	218	226	117	126	3,098	3,146	3,433	3,498	157	191
GRAND TOTAL	1,092	1,023	464	466	7,773	7,621	9,329	9,110	1,597	1,588

TOTAL direct and indirect hire Foreign Nationals worldwide (439 authorized and 383 assigned)

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APPENDIX G

PROVISIONAL UNITS
(As of 30 September 1980)

1st Battalion (Support)(Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)
2d Battalion (Operations)(Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)
11th Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)(Provisional)
66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional)
146th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)(Provisional)
209th Military Intelligence Battalion (Counterintelligence)(Provisional)
430th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)
524th Military Intelligence Battalion (HUMINT)(Provisional)
USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)
USA INSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection)(Provisional)
USA INSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment (Counterintelligence)(Provisional)
USA INSCOM Security Support Battalion (Provisional)
USA INSCOM Threat Intelligence Center-Pacific (Provisional)
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Provisional)

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APPENDIX H

USA INSCOM KEY PERSONNEL*

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
COMMANDING GENERAL MG William I. Rolya	1 Sep 75 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BG Thomas J. Flynn	31 Jul 79 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, SUPPORT BG John A. Smith, Jr.	15 May 78 - Present
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR CSM Douglas B. Elam	1 Oct 79 - Present
CHIEF OF STAFF COL John M. Carr	1 Aug 77 - 30 Sep 80
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LTC John R. Yates	24 Jul 80 - Present
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF MAJ John H. Prokopowicz LTC Donald York	24 Jul 80 - Present 21 Aug 78 - 24 Jul 80
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF 1LT Dorsey Jackson MAJ John H. Prokopowicz	24 Jul 80 - Present 7 Jul 78 - 24 Jul 80
USA INSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, FORSCOM LTC Jimmy S. Hammett COL Horace S. Kelley, Jr.	8 Sep 80 - Present 25 Feb 78 - 8 Sep 80
USA INSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, DARCOM LTC Henry W. Areheart	8 Aug 78 - Present
USA INSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, TRADOC MAJ Walter G. B. Wright MAJ James O. Campbell	23 Sep 80 - Present 17 Oct 77 - 11 Jul 80
INSPECTOR GENERAL COL Jack E. Baker LTC Joaquim D. Martins COL Robert A. Hyatt	1 Sep 80 - Present 7 Jul 80 - 31 Aug 80 1 Sep 77 - 31 May 80

*Commanders of Provisional units are listed by titles of TOE/TDA parent organizations.

APPENDIX H

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE LTC Joseph S. Kieffer, III LTC Raymond K. Wicker	14 Jan 80 - Present 1 Sep 75 - 14 Jan 80
STAFF ADVISOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND CRYPTO AFFAIRS Mr. Edwin A. Speakman	12 Aug 68 - Present
CHIEF, MISSION ANALYSIS OFFICE COL Charles C. Partridge LTC Robert P. Ridpath COL Allan R. Stern	4 Aug 80 - Present 5 Feb 80 - 4 Aug 80 10 Jul 78 - 5 Feb 80
CHIEF, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Mrs. Roberta J. Herman (Acting) LTC Robert W. Loomis	3 Aug 80 - Present 24 Aug 77 - 2 Aug 80
COMMAND CHAPLAIN COL John J. Cunniffie COL Richard W. Mansur	14 Mar 80 - Present 1 Apr 78 - 14 Mar 80
CHIEF, OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Mr. Carl P. Thorpe	5 Feb 79 - Present
SPECIAL DISPURRING OFFICER Mr. Autmer Ackley	10 Jul 78 - Present
COMMAND PSYCHOLOGIST LTC Richard E. Hartzell	17 Sep 79 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL COL Richard J. Powers, Jr. COL Richard E. Jewett	5 May 80 - Present 12 Jul 77 - 5 May 80
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COL Francis X. Toomey	15 Sep 79 - 31 Apr 80
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS COL Charles F. Scanlon COL Allan R. Stern COL Richard W. Wilmot	29 Sep 79 - Present 5 Feb 80 - 29 Sep 80 1 Oct 79 - 4 Feb 80
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS COL Harold D. Yawberg	14 Jul 78 - Present

APPENDIX H

Position/Name

Dates Served

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
COL Lawrence H. Whitt

1 Feb 78 - Present

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, FORCE MODERNIZATION
Mr. George A. Harvey, Jr. (Acting)

3 Jan 78 - Present

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT
ANALYSIS
COL Albert F. P. Jones

3 Oct 77 - 1 Nov 79

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AUTOMATION
COL Joseph J. Megna

29 Sep 79 - Present

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COL Clarence A. Trowbridge

28 Jun 77 - Present

CHIEF, COMMAND SECURITY OFFICE
Mr. Lloyd A. Martin

7 Nov 79 - Present

Unit/Commander

66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COL Dudley J. Gordon
COL Charles F. Scanlon

15 Jul 80 - Present
2 Aug 78 - 15 Jul 80

470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
LTC Jack L. Brunson

29 Jun 79 - Present

500TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COL Stanley H. Hyman
COL Roy M. Strom

16 Jul 80 - Present
24 Jul 78 - 16 Jul 80

HHC, 501ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COL William D. Fritts

20 Jul 79 - Present

902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COL Robert B. McCue
COL Arion N. Pattakos

9 Jul 80 - Present
17 Jan 79 - 9 Jul 80

USA INSCOM CONUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(SIGINT/EW)
COL Richard W. Mock

10 Jul 79 - Present

APPENDIX H

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP	
LTC John L. Greife	12 Jun 80 - Present
LTC Harry S. Houllis	15 Apr 80 - 12 Jun 80
LTC Monte Bullard	1 Aug 79 - 14 Apr 80
US ARMY CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP	
LTC James T. Reilly	8 Aug 79 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG	
COL Seab W. McKinney	11 Jul 80 - Present
COL James W. Hunt	23 Jun 78 - 11 Jul 80
US ARMY FIELD STATION, BERLIN	
COL Louis D. Kirk	7 Jul 80 - Present
COL Charles B. Eichelberger	6 Jun 78 - 7 Jul 80
US ARMY FIELD STATION, HOMESTEAD	
CPT Wayne F. Petersen	20 Dec 79 - Present
CPT Bruce Jackson	1 Jul 75 - 20 Dec 79
US ARMY FIELD STATION, KOREA	
LTC William H. Campbell	18 Jun 80 - Present
LTC Frank Zachar	22 Jun 79 - 18 Jun 80
US ARMY FIELD STATION, MISAHA	
LTC Ralph P. Stevens	29 Nov 78 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, OKINAWA	
COL Ira C. Owens	5 Aug 80 - Present
LTC John M. Bennis	29 May 80 - 4 Aug 80
COL Seth W. Burkett	25 Jun 79 - 28 May 80
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SAN ANTONIO	
LTC Russell E. Miller	15 Aug 79 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SINOP	
COL Franklin S. Parker, Jr.	2 Sep 80 - Present
COL James W. Shufelt	24 Aug 79 - 2 Sep 80
18TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Wade J. Williams	8 Jul 80 - Present
LTC Arnom H. Harris, Jr.	31 Mar 80 - 8 Jul 80
LTC Roy J. Davis	2 Aug 78 - 31 Mar 80

APPENDIX H

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
HHC, 165TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Arleigh D. Waterman	11 Dec 78 - Present
HHC, 511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Paul R. Zingle LTC Arthur L. Henderson	25 Jun 80 - Present 13 Jul 78 - 25 Jun 80
HHC, 527TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Frances P. Keough LTC Nicholas F. Quintarelli	9 Jul 80 - Present 28 Jun 78 - 9 Jul 80
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, FORT MEADE LTC Robert M. Bowe LTC William J. Foley	17 Mar 80 - Present 18 Sep 78 - 17 Mar 80
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, FORT SAM HOUSTON LTC William P. Johnson, Jr. LTC John E. Riddle, Jr.	12 Aug 80 - Present 5 Feb 79 - 12 Aug 80
USAINSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO LTC Dennis S. Langley	 22 Jun 79 - Present
5TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY MAJ Marilyn E. Klubek MAJ Victor W. Gundersen, Jr.	28 Mar 80 - Present 15 Jun 79 - 28 Mar 80
11TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE) LTC James A. Bartlett LTC Dwight W. Galda	 Feb 80 - Present Jun 80 - Feb 80
146TH ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY (AVN) (FWD) MAJ Thomas Kells, Jr. MAJ Kenneth G. Loudermilk	8 Oct 79 - Present 17 Dec 78 - 8 Oct 79
332D ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY, OPERATIONS (FWD) CPT Thomas G. Corcoran CPT Michael J. Baier	Feb 80 - Present 16 Feb 79 - Feb 80

APPENDIX H

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
209TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Jimmy Paul Ashworth LTC Bishop L. Lane LTC Howard W. Moore, Jr.	Jul 80 - Present Oct 79 - Jul 80 May 78 - Oct 79
430TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Charles J. Little LTC(P) Robert G. Lunt	24 Apr 80 - Present 24 Jun 77 - 24 Apr 80
641ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT (COLL) LTC Laszlo P. Boesze	16 Sep 79 - Present
766TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Raymond S. Olson LTC James L. Ford	19 Jun 79 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 19 Jun 79
US ARMY COMBINED RESEARCH DETACHMENT MAJ Gary A. Stein LTC Gerald R. Lewis	10 Sep 80 - Present 17 Jun 79 - 10 Sep 80
USA INSCOM CI DETACHMENT, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY LTC John L. Bohach, Jr.	7 Aug 78 - Present
US ARMY SYSTEMS EXPLOITATION DETACHMENT MAJ J. Douglas Mistler	1 Oct 78 - Present
USA INSCOM DETACHMENT, HAWAII LTC Robert C. Rhoads	1 Aug 77 - Present
USA INSCOM SECURITY SUPPORT DETACHMENT, FORT MEADE LTC James R. Linnen LTC Robert E. Keenan	May 80 - Present 12 Jul 78 - May 80
US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENT COL Robert G. Lunt COL Donald B. Grimes	2 Jun 80 - Present Apr 75 - 2 Jun 80
US ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY DETACHMENT COL Richard F. Judge	25 Apr 77 - Present
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER COL Arion N. Pattakos COL James D. Powers (Acting) COL Albert F. P. Jones	28 Jul 80 - Present 3 Jul 80 - 28 Jul 80 3 Oct 77 - 3 Jul 80

APPENDIX H

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

USA INSCOM PENTAGON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE
LTC Morton S. Cohen
LTC Joaquim D. Martins

27 Jun 80 - Present
16 Aug 78 - 27 Jun 80

USA INSCOM ADMINISTRATIVE/AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT
ACTIVITY
Mr. David Stein

30 Nov 78 - Present

USA INSCOM AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACTIVITY
COL Joseph J. Megna

29 Sep 79 - Present

US ARMY CENTRAL SECURITY FACILITY
COL Ernest H. Fountain, Jr.

12 Sep 79 - Present

US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
LTC John G. Canyock

Jun 79 - Present

US ARMY GARRISON, ARLINGTON HALL STATION
LTC Joseph C. Liberti
COL Joseph D. Howard

1 Aug 80 - Present
9 Jul 79 - 1 Aug 80

US ARMY GARRISON, VINT HILL FARMS STATION
COL John P. Brown

12 May 78 - Present

USA INSCOM FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY
MAJ William E. Daniels

13 Aug 79 - Present

USA INSCOM ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE
ACTIVITY
COL Harold D. Yawberg

8 Mar 79 - Present

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APPENDIX I

CHANGES IN STATUS OF PROVISIONAL UNITS

ORGANIZED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
1st Battalion (Support)(Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	1 Mar 80	PO 12-1, 13 Mar 80
2d Battalion (Operations)(Provisional), USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	1 Mar 80	PO 14-1, 19 Mar 80
11th Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)(Provisional)	29 Feb 80	PO 9-1, 29 Feb 80
146th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)(Provisional)	15 Dec 79	PO 31-2, 27 May 80
209th Military Intelligence Battalion (Counter- intelligence)(Provisional)	15 Dec 79	PO 31-2, 27 May 80
430th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	1 Dec 78	PO 31-4, 66th MI Gp, I&S (Prov), 1 Dec 78
524th Military Intelligence Battalion (HUMINT) (Provisional)	15 Dec 79	PO 31-2, 27 May 80
Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Pro- visional), Germany	1 Jul 77	PO 38-2, 8 Jun 77
USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	1 Mar 80	PO 14-2, 19 Mar 80
USA INSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection)(Provisional)	1 Dec 79	PO 73-2, 29 Nov 79
USA INSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment (Counterintelligence)(Provisional)	1 Dec 79	PO 73-1, 29 Nov 79
USA INSCOM Security Support Battalion (Provisional)	7 Apr 80	PO 31-2, 27 May 80
USA INSCOM Threat Intelligence Center-Pacific (Provisional)	1 Oct 79	PO 60-1, 20 Sep 79
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Provisional)	1 Mar 80	PO 8-3, 25 Feb 80

REDESIGNATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
Old: Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Provisional), Germany	1 Aug 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
New: 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional)		

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APPENDIX J

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winner</u>
1964	6988th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command]
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (C) [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School]
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe]
1969	6994th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 330th ASA Company]
1970	USASA Field Station, Udorn
1971	US Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms]
1972	6916th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn]
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	US Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg]
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d US Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe
1977	470th Military Intelligence Group
1978	6903d US Air Force Security Squadron, Osan Air Base, Korea [USAINSCOM NOMINEE: US Army Field Station, Augsburg]

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GLOSSARY

AAH	advanced attack helicopter
AAR	access amendment refusal
AARCS	Automated Agent Radio Communications System
AB	air base
AC	active component
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ACSTEL	Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
act	actual
actv	activity
ADCSLOG	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ADCSOPS	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
adj	adjustment
admin	administration
ADP	automatic data processing
AEWIBWC	Army Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Board Working Committee
AFCENT	Allied Forces, Central Europe
AFEES	Armed Forces Entry and Examination Station
AFP	approved funding program
AGAS	Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System
AGI	annual general inspection
AGTELIS	Automatic Ground Transportable Emitter Location and Identification System
AHR	annual historical report; annual historical review
AHS	Arlington Hall Station
AICP	alternate intercept coverage plan
AIG	acting inspector(s) general
AIS	Army Intelligence Survey
AIT	advanced individual training; American Institute on Taiwan
allow	allowance
AMHA	Army Management, Headquarters Activity
AMO	Automation Management Office
AR	Army regulation
art	article
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASA	Army Security Agency; Automated Systems Activity
ASD	(US Army) Administrative Survey Detachment; Asian Studies Detachment
ASD (MRA&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
ASI	additional skill identifier
auth	authorized
auto	automated; automobile
AUTODIN	automatic digital network
avn	aviation

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S&P/OPS/OPS/OPS

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BFF	Bendestelle Fur Fermildsteatistik
BG	brigadier general
blgd	building
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems
bn	battalion
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
BOS	base operations support
BRO	Border Resident Office
CCF	US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility
CCM	counter-countermeasures
CCO	controlled/clandestine collection objective
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CDAA	circular disposed antenna array
CDIP	Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
cdr	commander
CEEIA	Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency
CENTAG	Central Army Group Central Europe
CERCOM	US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command
CETA	Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
CEWI	combat electronic warfare intelligence
CG	commanding general
CGG	Combined Group Germany
chap	chapter
CHCSS	Chief, Central Security Service
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Counterintelligence Detachment
CI/IA	counterintelligence and investigative activities
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
CITA	Commercial Industrial Type Activities
CIVPER	civilian personnel
class	classified/classification
CM	countermeasures
CMA	Collection Management Authority
CMAO	Chief, Mission Analysis Office
COB	command operating budget
COF	central operating facility
CofS	Chief of Staff
COL	colonel
COMFAC	communications facility
compl	complete/completion
comm	communication(s)
COMSEC	communications security
CONARC	US Continental Army Command
contr	contract

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CONUS Continental United States
COPES Collection by Objective Priority Evaluation System
CP command psychologist
CPAR collection, processing, analysis and reporting
CPX command post exercise
CRITICOMM critical intelligence communications
CRT combat readiness training
C/S contract specialist
CSA Chief of Staff, US Army
CSC Community Support Center
CSF (US Army) Central Security Facility
CSG cryptologic support group
CSJF case study and justification folder
CSM command sergeant major
CSO Command Security Office
CSS Central Security Service

DA Department of the Army
DACS Department of the Army, Chief of Staff
CDC domestic collection division
DARCOM US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DCG deputy commanding general
DCG-I Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence
DCG-S Deputy Commanding General, Support
DCG-SP Deputy Commanding General, Security and Production
DCII Defense Central Index of Investigations
DCS Deputy Chief of Staff; Defense Communications System
DCSAUT Deputy Chief of Staff, Automation
DCSCI Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
DCSFM Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization
DCSI Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (US Army, Europe)
DCSITA Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DCSPLANS Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans
DCSR&D Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development
DCSRM Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management
DCSS Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
DCSSCS Defense Special Security Communication System
DEFCON defense readiness condition
det detachment
DFAE Director of Facilities Engineering
DHFN direct hire foreign nationals

b3 10 USC 424 Per DIA

DIRCI Director, Counterintelligence
DIRITA Director, Intelligence & Threat Analysis
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency

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DIROPS	Director, Operations
DIS	Defense Investigative Service
disab.	disability
DLPT	Defense Language Proficiency Tests
DMA	Directorate Management Analyst
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOA	direction-of-arrival
DOD	Department of Defense
DPA	Data Processing Activities
DSA	Defense Security Agency (Korean)
DTOA	differential time of arrival
EAC	echelon above corps
ECI	ECI Division/E Systems Incorporated
ECOM	US Army Electronics Command
ECON	emergency condition
educ	education
EEI	essential elements of information
EEO	equal employment opportunity
EEOO	equal employment opportunity officer
e.g.	for example
ELI	emitter location and identification
ELINT	electronic intelligence
ELSEC	electronic security
EMI	electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic intelligence
EO	Executive Order; equal opportunity
ES	end strength
ESL	Electronic Systems Laboratory
etc.	et cetera
ETEC-E	Electronics and Telecommunications Evaluation Center, Europe
EUSA	Eighth US Army
EW	electronic warfare
exec	executive
fac	facility
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCI	Foreign Counterintelligence
FDM	frequency division multiplex
FEORP	Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program
FGGM	Fort George G. Meade
FGH	Research Institute for High Voltage and High Current Techniques
FGR	Federal Republic of Germany
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared
FMOD	Federal Ministry of Defense (German)
fnd	fund
FOA	Field Operating Agency

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FOCP Foreign Officer Combat Program
FOIP Foreign Officer Information Program
FORMICA foreign military intelligence collection activities
FORSCOM US Army Forces Command
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FS field station
FSTC Foreign Science and Technology Center
Ft fort
FVP Field Visitation Program
FY fiscal year

GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program
gen general
GHz gigahertz
GO general officer; general order
gp group
GPF ground processing facility
GS General Schedule-Civilian Employees

HAC Health Appropriation Committee
HBC Historically Black Colleges
HF high frequency
HFDF high frequency direction finding
Hon honorable
Hq/HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HSC Health Services Command
HUMINT human intelligence

ICR intelligence collection requirement
IDA initial denial authority
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IDHS Intelligence Data Handling System
i.e. that is
IG inspector general
IGAR inspector general action requests
IHFN indirect hire foreign nationals
IMDSO Intelligence Material Development & Support Office
IMINT imagery intelligence
INTA intelligence activity
inc increase
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
INSCOM (US Army) Intelligence and Security Command
intel intelligence
IOC initial operational capability
IOH imminence of hostilities
IOSP INSCOM OPSEC Support Procedures Manual

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IOSS Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
IPF initial production facilities
IR instrument reading/infra-red
I&S Intelligence & Security
ISCRO Industrial Security Review Office
ISE intelligence, security, and electronic warfare
ISSE Intelligence Staff Support Element
ISTA Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition
ITDB Intercept Tasking Data Base
ITEP Interim Tactical ELINT Processor
ITIC INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center
ITIC-PAC(P) INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center, Pacific (Provisional)
inves investigate/investigative
I&W indications and warning

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSIS Joint Service Intelligence Staff
JTF Joint Task Force

km kilometer(s)

LEEP Latin Emigre Exploitation Program
LET live environment training
LFV LAFAIRE VITE
LHTA Letzlinger-Heide Training Area
LIDS laser identification and detection system
LIMDIS limited distribution
LITES laser intercept and technical exploitation system
LLLTV low light level television
LNO Liaison Officer
LO local oscillator
Ltd limited

MACOM major Army command
MAJ major
maint maintenance
MAO Mission Analysis Office
MB megabytes
MBO Management by Objectives
MCA Military Construction, Army
MCC Multidiscipline Coordination Center
MCS Mission Control System
MENS mission element need statement
M&F Missions & Functions
MG major general
mgt management

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MHZ megahertz
MI military intelligence
MIA missing in action
MIIA Medical Intelligence and Information Agency
MILPERCEN US Army Military Personnel Center
MMW millimeter wave
MOB mobilization
MOBDES mobilization designee
MOBTDA mobilization tables of distribution and allowances
MOD moderate/modify/modulator
MOS military occupational specialty
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MTT Mobile Training Teams

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCEUR NSACSS Representative, Europe
NCO noncommissioned officer
Nd neodymium
NEO noncombatant evacuation order
NET New Equipment Training
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program
NOFORN not releasable to foreign nationals
NORTHAG Northern Army Group, Northern Europe
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA National Security Agency
NSACSS National Security Agency/Central Security Agency
NSG US Naval Security Group
NSGA Naval Security Group Activity
NSGAH Naval Security Group Activity Homestead
NV&EOL Night Vision and Electro-Optics Laboratory
NVL Night Vision Laboratory

OACSI Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
OADCSOPS Office, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
OCA Office of Controlled Activity
OCAR Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
ODCSCI Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
ODCSFM Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization
ODCSI Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
ODCSITA Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat
Analysis
ODCSLOG Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ODCSMAT Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel
ODCSOPS Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ODCSRM Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management
ODCSS Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
OE organizational effectiveness

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OES Operational Evaluation System
OIG Office of Inspector General
OMA Operation and Maintenance, Army
OM&F Operations, Missions, and Functions
O&O organizational and operational
OPA other procurement, Army
OPCON operational control
OPFOR Army Opposing Force
OPI office of primary interest
OPLAN operation plan
OPMS Office Personnel Management System
opnl operational
opns operations
ops operations
OPSCOMM operations communication
OPSEC operations security
ORD Operational Readiness Demonstration
ORR Operational Readiness Report
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSE operations security evaluation
OSUT on-site user test
OTD Office of Test Directorate

PA Privacy Act
PAC Pacific
PACOM Pacific Command
PAO Public Affairs Office
PCAC Primary Control and Analysis Center
PCD Program Change Decision
PCS permanent change of station
PDIP Program Decision Issue Paper
PDSC Pacific Command Data Services Center
PE program element
pers personnel
PHOTINT photographic intelligence
PI Philippine Islands
PO Privacy Office; permanent orders
POL petroleum, oils and lubricants
POW prisoner of war
PRC People's Republic of China
prod production
prog program(med)
PSI personnel security investigative
PSSI Personnel Security Screening Interviews
PSSIP Personnel Security Screening Interview Program
PSSP Personnel Security Screening Program
pvt private

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QRC quick reaction capability
QRT Quick Reaction Team
qtr/qtrly quarter(ly)

RA regional appraisal
RAF Royal Air Force
RAP Regional Appraisal Program
RC Reserve Component
RCF remote collection facility
RCP Resource Change Proposal
R&D research and development
RDF Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF Rapid Development Joint Task Force
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
red reduction/reduce
REDTRAIN Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources
recon reconnaissance
rehab rehabilitation
rept report
RF radio frequency
RFI radio frequency interference
RJE Remote Job Entry
RMS Remote Master Stations
RO resident office(s)
ROC Republic of China
ROK Republic of Korea
RPMA Real Property Manning Account/Real Property Maintenance
Activity
RSS Remote Slave Stations
RWE Rheinisch Westfaelische Elektrizitetswerke

SAEDA Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army
SAMOD Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and
Development (Program)
SAO Special Activities Office
SAVE sensitive activity vulnerability estimate
SCA Service Cryptologic Agency
SCE Service Cryptologic Element
SCF Secure Communication Facilities
SCI sensitive compartmented intelligence
SCIF secure compartmented information facility
SCIPMIS Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information
System
SCP system concept paper
scty security
SDO Special Disbursing Officer
SE subelement
SEIT Specific Emitter Identification Techniques

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SESO	Sensitive Source
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SHARP	Severly Handicapped Recruitment Program
SID	special intelligence detachment
SIGAD	SIGINT Activity Designator
SIGINT	signal intelligence
SIGSEC	signal security
SIS	Showa Information Service (Japan)
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SMIO	Special Military Intelligence Office
SNUTR	SIGINT Numerical Tasking Register
SOD	Special Operations Division
SOT	specialized operational training
sp	special
spec	specialist
SPESM	Special Purpose Electronic Warfare Support Measures
spt	support
SSAS	Special Signal Analysis Systems
SSG	staff sergeant
SSO	Special Security Office/Officer
S&T	science and technology
STARS	staring TV atmospheric recording sensor
S&TI	Scientific and Technical Intelligence
stk	stock
STRATMID	strategic military intelligence detachment
subj	subject
surv	surveillance
SVA	security vulnerability analysis
svcs	services
SWL	US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory
SWRI	Southwest Research Institute
sys	system
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TACCTA	Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis
TACELIS	Tactical Automated Communications Emitter Location and Identification System
TAIC	Theater Army Intelligence Command
TAREX	target exploitation
TB	technical bulletin
TDA	tables of distribution and allowances
TEATAC	Technical Evaluation of Army Tactical
tech	technical
TENCAP	tactical exploitation of national capabilities
TMD	TAREX Management Division
TOE	table(s) of organization and equipment
TR	TAREX Representatives
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
trans	transportation

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TR&PD Technical Requirements and Purchasing Division
TSA TSCM Special Agent
TSCM Technical Surveillance Countermeasure
TSG The Surgeon General

UDC US Army Document Center (Pacific)
UFD unintentional frequency deviation
UHF ultra high frequency
UK United Kingdom
undtd undated
UPS uninterruptible power supply
US United States
USA United States Army; United States Air (Force)
USACARO US Army Complaint Appellate Review Office
USACC US Army Communications Command
USAFAC US Army Field Activities Command
USAFS US Army Field Station
USAG US Army Garrison
USAGO US Army Garrison, Okinawa
USAINTA US Army Intelligence Agency
USAINSCOM US Army Intelligence and Security Command
USAITAC US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
USAOG US Army Operational Group
USAR US Army Reserve
USAREUR US Army, Europe
USARI US Army Russian Institute
USARJ US Army, Japan
USARPAC US Army, Pacific
USASA US Army Security Agency
USATSA US Army Technical Support Activity

b3 10 USC 424 Per DIA

USEUCOM US European Command
USFK US Forces, Korea
USI US Intelligence
USM United States Military
USN United States Navy
USSID United States Signal Intelligence Directive
USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic
USSS United States SIGINT System
UTIC USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center
util utilities

VCSA Vice Chief of Staff, US Army
VFT voice frequency telegraph
VHF very high frequency
VHFS Vint Hill Farms Station

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