




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Description of document:	Final Reports of sixteen (16) Closed Government Accountability Office (GAO) Inspector General (OIG) Investigations, 2018-2019
Requested date:	01-March-2020
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O I G

Office of Inspector General

United States Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room 1808
Washington, DC 20548

March 16, 2020

This letter is in response to your March 1, 2020, public access request for materials from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) files. Your request seeks: closing report, memo or letter for sixteen OIG investigations closed in 2018 and 2019.

We have processed your request under procedures set forth in GAO's public access request regulation, found at 4 C.F.R Part 81. The documents specified in your request are enclosed. We have redacted material that is protected from disclosure under GAO regulation 4 C.F.R. §81.6.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "APR", with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Counsel to the Inspector General



O I G

Office of Inspector General

Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (f)

United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-17-0023-HL-O


[OIG-16-11-0005]

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**RESTRICTED
INFORMATION
GAO OIG**

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Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (f)

Prepared by: [REDACTED]

Approved by: [REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-17-0023-HL-O	DATE OF REPORT: July 19, 2018
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED] [OIG-16-11-0005]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: November 10, 2016 TO September 21, 2017	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]	
DISTRIBUTION: GIMS / HARD COPY FILE	

SUMMARY

On November 7, 2016, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an allegation from an anonymous source to the OIG Hotline that [REDACTED] a Senior Special Agent assigned to the Forensic Audit and Investigative Services (FAIS) mission team, is committing time and attendance fraud. [REDACTED] station is the GAO headquarters building located at 441 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20548.

The OIG's investigation identified that [REDACTED] fraudulently claimed "Work Time," as recorded in WebTA, for the period January 23, 2017, through March 31, 2017. Routinely throughout the period of investigation, [REDACTED] falsified his WebTA reports to claim a greater number of hours of "Work Time" than he actually worked. Based on available data, the investigation identified that [REDACTED] claimed at least 35 hours of "Work Time" for which no work was performed. These false claims resulted in a loss of at least \$2,715 (\$161,900*/2087 hours*35 hours) to GAO.

On June 20, 2017, [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, District of Columbia, declined to accept this matter for prosecution and authorized the Reporting Agent to administer [REDACTED] administrative Kalkines Warnings.

On July 5, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed and asserted he always worked an eight hour day as reflected in his WebTA. While he acknowledged he arrived at the office between 9-10am and departed the office around 4pm, and said he was always working another two hours on FAIS business outside the office, [REDACTED] couldn't provide definitive answers describing the work he accomplished after 4pm.

On October 27, 2017, the investigative findings were referred to GAO management for administrative action, as appropriate.

On April 25, 2018, [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits, returned the Disposition Action Report dated April 25, 2018. Attached was a Notice of Suspension (EXHIBIT 1) dated April 23, 2018, from [REDACTED] FAIS, addressed to [REDACTED] advising he was being given a "...7-day suspension to promote the efficiency of GAO".

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DETAILS

On July 16, 2000, [REDACTED] joined GAO as a Senior Criminal Investigator, PE-1811, Band II. The GAO Criminal Investigator Position Description identifies, among other things, the "Major Duties and Responsibilities" and states in part, "...execution of extremely complex and sensitive investigations of alleged or suspected violations of federal regulations and criminal laws, with particular emphasis on white collar crime that involves potential fraud, waste, abuse, and government corruption."

During the period of investigation, [REDACTED] was assigned to FAIS, located in Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] total salary, including premium pay from Law Enforcement Availability Pay (LEAP), is \$161,900¹ per year.

For the period January 23, 2017, through March 31, 2017, we obtained (b) (5) DPP 1) GAO access badge records; 2) WebTA time and attendance summaries; and 3) (b) (5) DPP Data. Additionally, we obtained available GAO parking garage surveillance camera images.

Pursuant to GAO Directive 0910.1-04, GAO access badges are issued to GAO employees who are assigned to, and work 3 or more days a week, in the GAO headquarters building. The primary purpose of the GAO access badge is to permit access to the GAO headquarters building. Control of access to the GAO headquarters building is managed through a [REDACTED]

On May 20, 2013, GAO Office of Security issued [REDACTED] access badge card # [REDACTED]

GAO granted [REDACTED] parking privileges pursuant to GAO Order 0681.1, GAO Vehicle Parking Program. [REDACTED] drives a Black, with beige colored interior, [REDACTED] with a Maryland registration. On November 19, 2012, [REDACTED] submitted an Application for GAO Building Parking Permit (GAO Form 194). [REDACTED] requested "Time Zone" parking and indicated a departure time of 4:00 pm. Additionally, [REDACTED] provided Maryland tag, [REDACTED] as identification for the vehicle he would be parking at GAO. On January 10, 2013, [REDACTED] application was approved and he received GAO Vehicle Parking Permit [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was authorized to use his permit to park in the 4:00 pm time zone.

GAO employees are issued notebook computers. When GAO employees power on their notebook computer, they are required to log in [REDACTED]

GAO employees are issued a unique

¹ Rate limited to the rate for level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5304(g)(1)).

GAO's information technology (IT) infrastructure logs information related to each employee's

When employees power on their GAO-issued notebook in a GAO facility and enter their credentials,

Employees can connect their GAO notebook to a wired or wireless network (such as a home network) to gain Internet access. Employees can also

"WebTA" is GAO's time and attendance recording application. GAO staff use WebTA to record their hours on their timesheet, as well as validate and affirm the accuracy of their time and attendance. Falsification of time and attendance may lead to disciplinary action and/or criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.C. 1001.

Employees must schedule their basic work requirement between 6:00 am and 7:00 pm, Monday through Friday.² LEAP is a type of premium pay that is paid to criminal investigators required to perform, or be available to perform, investigative activities outside of normal business hours based on the needs of the agency. The LEAP Act of 1994, as amended, authorized 25 percent premium pay to criminal investigators as compensation for performing unscheduled duty in excess of a 40-hour work week.³ submitted his Maxiflex Work Schedule (GAO Form 461A) request to FAIS, and on January 13, 2016, she approved it. This approved request documents basic work requirement beginning at 10:00 am and ending at 6:45 pm, totaling 8 hours per day, Monday through Friday.

On January 20, 2016, submitted "Episodic Telework Arrangement" and "Continuing Telework Arrangement". The applications were approved on January 21, 2016, and January 26, 2016, respectively. The Continuing Telework Arrangement permitted to work 32 hours of telework a pay period (8 hours each Monday and Friday). On February 24, 2017, submitted "Episodic Telework Application" and "Continuing Telework Arrangement". On March 14, 2017, the applications were. The Continuing Telework Arrangement permits to work 38 hours of telework a pay period (8 hours each Monday and Friday and 3 hours each Thursday).

The RA compiled a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet based upon available data. The RA reviewed time and attendance records to identify holidays, leave, and "work time" claimed. This information was then input into the spreadsheet for further analysis. daily arrival was documented for a particular day. On days that did not obtain a the RA concluded did not enter the GAO headquarters building that day.

² GAO Order 2620.1, Ch. 3, Sec. 2(c).

³ 5 U.S.C. § 5545a(b), (h).

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GAO requires each employee who works 8 hours or more in a day to take a 45-minute unpaid lunch break that cannot be scheduled as the last 45 minutes of their workday.⁴ For the dates [REDACTED] claimed 8 hours of "Work Time," in the office, the RA subtracted 45 minutes from the documented departure time to obtain an "Adjusted Departure Time." This time was then paired with [REDACTED] badge-in time to calculate "Work Time" for that day.

On July 5, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed pursuant to this investigation. The interview was conducted utilizing data that was available as of that date. Regarding the work hours he claimed on his T&A, [REDACTED] said his Maxiflex scheduled hours were 10 am to 6:45 pm. When [REDACTED] was asked whether he spent eight hours in the office as he claims on his WebTAs, he appeared caught off guard and asserted he had outside activities that on occasion required him to leave early. When [REDACTED] was shown an analysis for the period of January 23, 2017 to April 3, 2017, of the hours he claimed on his WebTAs and his actual departure times he acknowledged he generally arrives between 9 am-10 am and leaves around 4 pm. [REDACTED] could only speculate why he left early: to attend meetings associated with his Defense Capabilities Management (DCM) engagement assignment; to travel to Baltimore for his DCM assignment; and to check the FAIS [REDACTED]. While [REDACTED] was adamant he was doing work-related activities after 4 pm, he could not provide a definitive explanation for claims on his WebTA reflecting a greater number of hours than he actually worked. [REDACTED] agreed to use the pertinent dates and departure times provided to him to identify his activities when he left early during the period in question.

On July 7, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed. [REDACTED] said he didn't know of any meetings with the DCM engagement or other outside agencies, that he did not attend with [REDACTED] and/or would have caused [REDACTED] to depart work early. [REDACTED] also stated [REDACTED] was not tasked with checking the FAIS [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] leaves the light on in his office so that it appears that he is in when he may not be. [REDACTED] finished the interview by saying [REDACTED] should not be leaving early every day, he did not know why [REDACTED] would leave early, and he never authorized [REDACTED] to leave early on days when he should to be in the office.

On July 10, 2017, FAIS [REDACTED] was interviewed. [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] direct supervisor but she explained she was an auditor and while she was responsible for [REDACTED] administratively, [REDACTED] actually supervised [REDACTED] investigative activities. Regarding [REDACTED] schedule, [REDACTED] did not know what it was but knew he generally arrived to work around 10 am. She wasn't sure when [REDACTED] departs but noted when she occasionally walks past his office before she departs at 4:45 pm [REDACTED] lights and computer are on so she assumes he's still in the office. [REDACTED] was surprised when told that from January 23, 2017, to April 3, 2017, our investigation revealed [REDACTED] departed the office, on average, two hours early every day. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] should not be leaving early every day, admitted she did not know why [REDACTED] was consistently leaving early and that [REDACTED] did not have her permission to leave work early when he should be in the office.

On September 1, 2017, [REDACTED] provided information to explain his T&A discrepancies. On September 7, 2017, upon review of [REDACTED] response, [REDACTED] emailed him requesting documentation be provided by September 21, 2017, to support his statements. In the event there are no records available for a specific request, [REDACTED] was instructed to indicate as much for that request. [REDACTED] did not respond.

⁴ GAO Order 2620.1, Ch. 3, Sec. 2(f).

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] – Special Agent - FAIS

JUDICIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

On June 20, 2017, [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, District of Columbia, declined to accept this matter for prosecution and authorized the RA to administer the subject administrative Kalkines Warnings.

On October 27, 2017, the investigative findings were referred to GAO management for administrative action, as appropriate.

On April 25, 2018, [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits, returned the Disposition Action Report. [REDACTED] FAIS, addressed to [REDACTED] advising he was being given a "...7-day suspension to promote the efficiency of GAO".

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

The OIG did not obtain any original evidence in this investigation.

STATUS

This investigation will be placed in a pending status due to the subject's filing of an appeal with the Personnel Appeals Board. Once the appeal is complete, this file will be updated, as necessary, and closed.

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EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	Disposition Action Report dated April 25, 2018, with attached Notice of Suspension from [REDACTED] dated April 23, 2018

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Office of Inspector General

Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (f)

United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-17-0221-O




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Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (c)

Prepared by:	[REDACTED]
Approved by:	[REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-17-0221-O	DATE OF REPORT: May 14, 2019
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: July 1, 2012 TO August 1, 2015	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]	
DISTRIBUTION: GIMS	

SUMMARY

On July 14, 2017, [REDACTED] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received an allegation via email from [REDACTED] Employee Relations & Benefits, Human Capital Office (HCO), GAO. The allegation included information that [REDACTED] Senior Auditor (PE-22), Financial Management and Assurance (FMA), [REDACTED] GAO, verified employment of [REDACTED] applied for a loan through CRM Lending and listed GAO as her current employer. [REDACTED] represented that [REDACTED] could verify her employment with GAO. Additionally, [REDACTED] provided tax records and paystubs indicating she was employed by GAO, to support her loan application. CRM Lending employees contacted [REDACTED] to verify [REDACTED] employment. [REDACTED] confirmed [REDACTED] was a GAO employee. Further, CRM Lending received an email from [REDACTED] supporting [REDACTED] employment status. However, HCO confirmed there isn't any record of [REDACTED] having ever been employed by GAO.

On July 20, 2018, U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson, in Washington, DC, approved a federal search warrant related to email communications of subject [REDACTED] (Exhibit 1). Responsive email records were returned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

On November 9, 2018, the RA and FBI [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] (Exhibit 2).

Based upon our investigation, on January 2, 2019, GAO management proposed removal of [REDACTED] (Exhibit 3). On January 5, 2019, [REDACTED] retired (Exhibit 4).

On February 6, 2019, as a result of our investigation, [REDACTED] was charged with one count of False Statement in Loan and Credit Application, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 (Exhibit 5). [REDACTED] conspired with [REDACTED] the loan applicant. The conspiracy involved [REDACTED] representing to a mortgage loan lender that [REDACTED] was an employee of [REDACTED] in an attempt to secure a mortgage in the amount of \$332,500, when in fact they both knew [REDACTED] was never employed by [REDACTED]

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On February 22, 2019, [REDACTED] plead guilty to one count of False Statement in Loan and Credit Application (**Exhibit 6**). On June 4, 2019, [REDACTED] was sentenced by United States District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, in Washington, DC. Judge Kollar-Kotelly sentenced [REDACTED] to two (2) years of supervised release, 100 hours of community service, a fine of \$1,000 and special assessment in the amount of \$100.

DETAILS

Up until January 2019, Defendant [REDACTED] was a United States Citizen residing in Georgia, and employed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"). [REDACTED] was also the owner of [REDACTED] an accounting firm that [REDACTED] ran as a side business.

Fidelity Direct Mortgage, LLC ("Fidelity") was a licensed mortgage loan correspondent that is in the mortgage lending business and makes in whole or in part, federally related mortgage loans as defined in section 3 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1975.

The Fraudulent Loan

On or about July 10, 2017, [REDACTED] submitted a "Uniform Residential Loan Application" (the "Application") to Fidelity for a loan in the amount \$332,500.00, to support the purchase of a residence located at [REDACTED] (the "Property").

[REDACTED] assisted [REDACTED] with the Application by providing materially false information and fraudulent documents to Fidelity in order to influence Fidelity to issue the loan to [REDACTED]

In particular, [REDACTED] created at least four fraudulent paystubs for [REDACTED] to submit to Fidelity which reflected that [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] making a bi-weekly salary of \$3,000.00. These fraudulent paystubs were for the period May 15, 2017 to July 7, 2017. [REDACTED] also created a fraudulent IRS Form W-2 reflecting that [REDACTED] earned a salary of \$78,000 working for [REDACTED] in 2016. The W-2 listed the address for [REDACTED]. In truth and in fact, although [REDACTED] performed some limited part-time work for [REDACTED] she did not work the hours reflected in the paystubs that [REDACTED] provided to Fidelity, nor did she earn the salary reflected in the paystubs that [REDACTED] provided to Fidelity. [REDACTED] created the pay stubs and IRS Form W-2 for [REDACTED] in order to fraudulently induce Fidelity into approving and issuing a mortgage loan to [REDACTED] for the Property.

On or about July 31, 2017, [REDACTED] was contacted by a senior loan processor at Fidelity and orally verified that [REDACTED] was employed by [REDACTED] as the Office Manager, and had been so employed since March 15, 2015, even though [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] was not employed by [REDACTED] as the Office Manager and the oral verification was false.

On or about August 4, 2017, Fidelity approved and issued a loan to [REDACTED] in the amount of \$315,000 for the purchase of the Property. Fidelity relied upon the materially false information and fraudulent documents submitted to Fidelity by [REDACTED] as part of its decision to approve and issue the loan. Thereafter, Fidelity transferred loan proceeds in the amount of \$315,000 to Advantage Title Company which conducted the closing for the purchase of the Property. After the closing, [REDACTED] took title to the Property.

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SUBJECTS

[REDACTED]

JUDICIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

On January 2, 2019, based upon our investigation, GAO proposed removal of [REDACTED] (Exhibit 3).
On January 5, 2019, [REDACTED] retired (Exhibit 4).

On February 6, 2019, [REDACTED] was formally charged with one count of False Statement in Loan and Credit Application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The criminal information was filed in federal district court in the District of Columbia (Exhibit 5).

On February 22, 2019, [REDACTED] plead guilty to one count of False Statement in Loan and Credit Application (Exhibit 6).

On June 4, 2019, [REDACTED] was sentenced by United States District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, in Washington, DC. Judge Kollar-Kotelly sentenced [REDACTED] to two (2) years of probation, 100 hours of community service, a fine of \$1,000 and special assessment in the amount of \$100.

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

There was no original evidence obtained during the course of the investigation. On June 11, 2019, all grand jury material in the possession of GAO OIG was returned to AUSA [REDACTED]

STATUS

With no pending criminal/civil/administrative matters, this case is closed.

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EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	Federal Search Warrant for Email [REDACTED]
2	Interview of [REDACTED]
3	GAO Management Proposed Removal of [REDACTED] January 2, 2019
4	[REDACTED] Retirement January 5, 2019
5	Criminal Information filed February 6, 2019
6	Guilty Plea filed February 22, 2019

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
APPROVED BY: ADAM TRZECIAK

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0021-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: MARCH 28, 2018	

SUMMARY

GAO has established a zero tolerance policy towards sexual harassment and other forms of unprofessional conduct of a sexual nature. Employees who engage in these activities undermine GAO's ability to complete its mission. The Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness (O&I) helps promote and maintain a work environment that is fair, unbiased and inclusive. O&I fulfills its mission by, among other ways, implementing GAO's sexual harassment policy and investigating allegations of sexual harassment.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has completed an informal preliminary review in response to a complaint alleging that O&I did not follow established policies and procedures related to a sexual harassment complaint. The OIG's preliminary review found O&I did not follow established policies and procedures when notified in July, 2017 of an employee's intent to report sexual harassment. Based on this review, OIG has broader concerns regarding O&I's handling of reports of sexual harassment and misconduct. Due to our review being very narrow in scope, and a lack of resources to complete a more thorough inspection/evaluation, we recommend the GAO OIG consider conducting a performance audit of GAO's handling of sexual harassment complaints.

RESULTS

Although OIG only reviewed one instance of reported sexual harassment, we identified significant weakness in O&I's receipt, processing, investigating and resolving this particular complaint.

GAO maintains an intranet page that provides employees with a brief overview of the "Sexual Harassment Policy" including: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GAO's intranet page also provides a link to GAO Order 2713.2, *Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process* for staff to reference. GAO Order 2713.1, *Opportunity and Inclusiveness in the Government Accountability Office (GAO)*, also [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Our review focused on the process for filing a complaint and therefore the "Reporting"

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G-18-0021-HL-P

MARCH 28, 2018

and "Investigation and Correction" sections, as well as GAO Orders 2713.1 & 2713.2 were referenced for compliance.

The OIG review found the complainant and management were unclear about what constitutes a formal complaint. The "Reporting" section of the intranet page [REDACTED] While O&I staff understand what constitutes a formal complaint, the process can seem ambiguous to employees and management. GAO is undertaking efforts to increase staff knowledge [REDACTED]

Additionally, GAO requires agency employees [REDACTED] As the subject matter experts, O&I should ensure full and open communication in order to guarantee the complainant and management, as appropriate, have all necessary guidance.

The "Investigation and Correction" section of the intranet page states in part, [REDACTED] The OIG review identified that no investigation was conducted by either the MD O&I or unit head. [REDACTED] contributed to confusion among staff as it was interpreted to apply to all reports of sexual harassment or unprofessional conduct of a sexual nature. Also, material information of the subject's previous relevant conduct (i.e. similar complaints, prior inappropriate communications, undisclosed complaints, etc.) was not obtained due to the lack of investigation. O&I did not provide the unit head with appropriate guidance detailing the need for an investigation.

Third, we found that the MD, in consultation with MD O&I, imposed discipline on the subject. Our review did not determine whether the discipline was appropriate as we only reviewed one complaint. However, without any investigation, management is not equipped to identify adequate discipline. Also, after counseling the subject, the MD shared with the complainant that the subject had been counseled. Without the subject's consent, this poses a possible violation of the subject's privacy rights.

Finally, subsequent to management counseling the subject, the subject was nominated and approved to receive a [REDACTED] Award. Our review identified that GAO has minimal procedures for vetting nominees prior to making an award. This resulted in additional distress to the complainant, as well as embarrassment to the subject. Both the unit head and MD O&I reviewed the list of awardees and failed to recall the subject's substantiated inappropriate conduct.

GAO OIG met with GAO's Deputy Chief Administrative Officer to share the results of our limited review. We also met with GAO's Office of General Counsel to provide our results in order to assist them with their ongoing efforts to reform GAO's process for handling sexual harassment complaints.

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United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-18-0069-HL-O



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Prepared by: [REDACTED]

Approved by: [REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-18-0069-HL-P	DATE OF REPORT: November 25, 2019
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: January 4, 2018 TO March 28, 2019	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]	
DISTRIBUTION: IT/HCO/GIMS/HARD COPY FILE	

SUMMARY

Between January 4, 2018, and March 28, 2019, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] the Reporting Agent (RA), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation. The subject of this investigation is GAO Information Technology (IT) Analyst [REDACTED] also known as [REDACTED] started her employment at GAO on April 12, 2009, and has a [REDACTED]. The investigation was initiated after a Hotline allegation (**Exhibit 1**) dated January 3, 2018, was received that claimed [REDACTED] filed bankruptcy in 2012 and 2017 without reporting them to GAO; failed to accurately report her financial status on her GAO Financial Disclosure Report; and fraudulently received Social Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits while employed at GAO.

The investigation substantiated the accusations that while employed by GAO [REDACTED] fraudulently received SSA benefit payments in 2009, 2010, and 2011; [REDACTED] acknowledged she received an "overpayment" of approximately \$35,125.00 from SSA; [REDACTED] failed to notify GAO of her bankruptcies in 2012 and 2017; and [REDACTED] didn't accurately report the amount of debt she owed in her Financial Disclosure submissions in at least seven of the nine years she's been employed at GAO.

Using documentation obtained in this investigation, as of June 2018, it is calculated [REDACTED] owes approximately \$93,834 to her creditors.

On September 30, 2019, HCO provided the OIG with [REDACTED] ROI Disposition Action Form (**Exhibit 1**). The ROI Disposition Action form advised the OIG ROI had been reviewed and evaluated, and as a result, [REDACTED] would be issued a Proposed Removal Memorandum on October 4, 2019 (**Exhibit 2**).

BACKGROUND

The Social Security Administration's Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") Program, Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(d), pays monthly benefits to the elderly, blind and to people with disabilities. Also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1588 states that a Social Security disability benefit recipient must promptly inform the Agency if the individual's condition improves; or returns to work; or increases the amount of their work; or their earnings increase.

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The **Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C app 4 §107** authorizes collection of government employees' information regarding potential conflicts of interest between public responsibilities and private interests. Yearly, all GAO employees in the analyst and analyst related pay bands are required to complete GAO's **Financial Disclosure Report Form 310**; "Once the report is submitted a GAO reviewer, who is sufficiently knowledgeable of the employee's work and interests listed on the report, must make an informed judgement about the employee's potential conflicts of interest and impairments to independence."

One of the factors an employee must make available to the GAO reviewer is captured in **GAO Form 310, Part III: Liabilities**, which instructs employees to report for "...you, your spouse or dependent children all personal liabilities aggregating over \$10,000 owed to one creditor at any time during the reporting period..."

DETAILS

The investigation confirmed [REDACTED] sought bankruptcy in 2012 (**Exhibit 2**) and again in 2017 (**Exhibit 3**). On November 9, 2018, the RA received from Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [REDACTED] a copy of a "Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt", dated January 15, 2013 (**Exhibit 2**). This document was filed by AUSA [REDACTED] Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, on behalf of the government challenging [REDACTED] 2012 Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing which was an effort by [REDACTED] to relieve of her obligation to repay the money owed to SSA. In the document the government contends:

- That on [REDACTED] applied for Social Security Disability Title II benefits ("DIB") alleging that she became unable to work on March 11, 1993. [REDACTED] signed the standard disability benefits application and in it stated that she "became unable to work because of my disabling condition on March 11, 1993" and "[was] still disabled." [REDACTED] also agreed "to notify the Social Security Administration of all events as explained to me" and acknowledged that her "reporting responsibilities have been explained to me." [REDACTED] further acknowledged:
 1. I agree to notify the Social Security Administration:
 - a) If my medical condition improves so that I would be able to work, even though I have not yet returned to work; and
 - b) If I go to work whether as an employee or a self-employed person.
- That following initiation of benefits SSA periodically sent [REDACTED] letters informing her when it was reviewing her disability case to determine whether she was still disabled. These letters informed [REDACTED] of her obligation to provide SSA with information if she returned to work. [REDACTED] was also routinely required to complete Work-Activity Reports indicating whether she had returned to work and, if so, the details of the work.
- That in October 2011 SSA was advised by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that [REDACTED] earned \$44,389.42 in 2009 and \$9,606.32 in the first quarter of 2010.
- That on January 26, 2011, SSA advised [REDACTED] that it had information concerning her work and earnings. [REDACTED] was informed by SSA that it would decide that she was not eligible to payments beginning April 2009 based on this information and requested she respond to SSA if she had information she

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- wanted SSA to consider in connection with its decision to stop paying her benefits. [REDACTED] never responded to SSA.
- That as a result of [REDACTED] failure to report her work activity in accordance with her reporting obligations, SSA paid [REDACTED] benefits totaling approximately \$35,125.00, to which she was not entitled.
 - That [REDACTED] failure to report the commencement of substantially gainful activity violated her reporting obligation to the SSA. The continued disbursement of monthly DIB payments to [REDACTED] by the SSA was in direct reliance upon the [REDACTED]'s willful omission to report his gainful activity. Therefore, [REDACTED] receipts of the funds represented by the Overpayments were obtained by false pretenses.

Before a judgement was rendered on its "Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt", the Government entered into an agreement ("Consent Order" **Exhibit 4**) with [REDACTED]. The "Consent Order", was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria District, and was placed on the docket on May 15, 2013, before the Honorable Brian Kenney, United States Bankruptcy Judge. Judge Kenney ordered, in part, that the "Motion for Approval of Settlement" was approved. The "Consent Order" stated that [REDACTED] liability to SSA is non-dischargeable in the amount of \$25,000.00; that [REDACTED] shall pay at least \$100.00 per month to SSA until the debt is repaid in full; and that if [REDACTED] defaults on any of her monthly obligations, SSA has the right to pursue all available legal means to collect the outstanding debt.

On January 8, 2018, SSA issued a "Certificate of Indebtedness" (**Exhibit 5**) that states as of April 18, 2013, SSA has "...not received a monthly payment towards the amount of \$25,000.00."

On March 26, 2019, SSA Operations Supervisor [REDACTED] provided the RA an explanation of the SSA history of DIB payments [REDACTED] received. The documents provided confirm [REDACTED] received SSA payments while working at GAO. The records provided show [REDACTED] received SSA payments after she started her employment with GAO (**Exhibit 6**).

The individual who made the Hotline allegation also provided canceled checks (**Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20**) which show from February 19, 2013, to April 24, 2014, [REDACTED] received approximately \$34,775.00 in the form of a personal loan from the GAO employee which [REDACTED] has not repaid. On June 14, 2016, the GAO employee submitted an "Order for Default Judgement" in the Circuit Court of Prince William County, Virginia, seeking repayment. On October 21, 2016, the Circuit Court of Prince William County awarded the GAO employee a default judgement which ordered [REDACTED] to pay back \$34,775.00, plus pre-judgement interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum through June 13, 2016, in the amount of \$6,015.87 plus interest thereafter at the legal rate until the date of judgement (**Exhibit 21**). The GAO employee states in the Hotline allegation that she had not been repaid by [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy to avoid repaying her.

Finally, the GAO employee who submitted the Hotline allegation also provided a copy of a document from [REDACTED] Chapter 13 filing. On August 13, 2017, [REDACTED] submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a "Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy". In this document [REDACTED] acknowledges a debt of \$41,157.00 to the GAO employee; another \$21,774.00 education loan with Navient; and \$5,905.00 to several other creditors for a total debt of \$68,836.00 (**Exhibit 3**).

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When [REDACTED] debt of \$25,000.00 to SSA, which she presumably still owes from 2013, is added to the \$68,836.00 she owed in August of 2017; as of June 2018, [REDACTED] owed approximately \$93,836.00 to her creditors.

A review of [REDACTED] Financial Disclosure Forms from 2012 to 2018 show she has never listed a liability of over \$10,000.00 (Exhibits 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28).

On June 1, 2018, the RA and SA [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] (Exhibit 29) at an offsite location (Starbucks, 10683 Sudley Manor Drive, Manassas, VA 20109) to discuss the allegations. The interview was conducted offsite because of an injury [REDACTED] sustained which precluded her from participating in the interview at GAO headquarters.

When asked about her general financial situation [REDACTED] said she was currently in the process of filing for bankruptcy in order to consolidate medical bills she and her husband had incurred (There were no medical bills listed for discharge in the 2017 bankruptcy submission). She said there was a lot of debt but didn't know how much because she was confused about the process. [REDACTED] explained the amount gets adjusted and therefore she didn't know how much she owed. [REDACTED] also said she owed additional money to a former friend. [REDACTED] friend loaned her money but she could not remember how much but said that the money she owed was included in the bankruptcy filing. [REDACTED] said she could not pinpoint the amount she owed her friend because there was a dispute about what [REDACTED] should pay back. When asked about a Circuit Court of Prince William County ruling on October 21, 2016, (Exhibit 20) [REDACTED] acknowledged there was a ruling but she didn't remember how the attorneys settled the matter. When asked if the court ordered her to pay back \$34,775.00 with \$6,015.87 of interest [REDACTED] replied, "Probably."

[REDACTED] stated she had accumulated additional debt over the years that included a student loan for her master's degree. She couldn't remember exactly how much she owed on the student loan but estimated it was \$12,000.00 to \$15,000.00. [REDACTED] said she also had a car loan but did not mention any other debt. When a debt to SSA was mentioned she acknowledged she did owe money to them for an "overpayment". When asked about a previous bankruptcy, she acknowledged she had filed for bankruptcy before to consolidate debt that included approximately \$35,125.00 she owed SSA. [REDACTED] could not remember when she filed for the first bankruptcy or the amount of debt she asked the court to discharge. [REDACTED] readily acknowledged there was an agreement with the government from her first bankruptcy that she was to pay \$100.00 per month to SSA. [REDACTED] stated she didn't know the total amount of the overpayment and couldn't remember if the agreement discharged some of what she owed SSA. [REDACTED] admitted she was sometimes not meeting her obligation to reimburse SSA the \$100.00 a month as agreed.

When it was pointed out she owed a total of \$93,834 (\$68,834.00 in debt by her own calculations (Exhibit 3 [Part 4, Page 5]) and another \$25,000.00 obligation to SSA (Exhibit 4), [REDACTED] said she didn't understand her obligation to list liabilities on GAO's Financial Disclosure Form 310. [REDACTED] stated she thought liabilities referred to credit card debt; "...didn't understand to include that"; and didn't know where to put her non-credit card debt on the form.

Finally, [REDACTED] said as soon as possible she was going to re-submit her 2018 Financial Disclosure Form to reflect her actual liabilities.

On March 27, 2019, [REDACTED] Ethics Office, Office of General Counsel, advised [REDACTED] had not submitted a revised 2018 Financial Disclosure Form.

SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

On September 30, 2019, HCO provided the OIG with [REDACTED] ROI Disposition Action Form (Exhibit 1). The ROI Disposition Action form advised the OIG ROI had been reviewed and evaluated, and as a result, [REDACTED] would be issued a Proposed Removal Memorandum. The Proposed Removal Memorandum was issued on October 4, 2019 (Exhibit 2).

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

The OIG did not obtain any original evidence in this investigation.

STATUS

This investigation is closed with the submission of this report.

EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	[REDACTED] ROI Disposition Action Form dated 9/30/19
2	[REDACTED] Information Technology Management Issues, Proposal to Remove Memorandum dated 10/4/19

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0114-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: JANUARY 17, 2019	

On February 16, 2018, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a hotline allegation regarding GAO employee [REDACTED]. The allegation expressed concern that [REDACTED] falsified information in US immigration paperwork and lied on her security clearance paperwork. Thereafter, the GAO OIG obtained copies of [REDACTED] security clearance paperwork and learned that [REDACTED] security clearance was in the process of being renewed.

On June 5, 2018, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED] an investigator with Omnisec International Investigations, Inc. [REDACTED] is in the process of conducting a re-investigation of [REDACTED] security clearance so the OIG provided [REDACTED] with a copy of the allegation in this case. [REDACTED] indicated that an interviewee was told by another party that [REDACTED] had disclosed that she had falsified her mother's [REDACTED] date of birth on [REDACTED] immigration paperwork. The assumption is that [REDACTED] inflated her mother's age so that her mother would receive social security benefits sooner.

On July 10, 2018, the OIG made a referral to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding the allegation in this case. On December 12, 2018, the OIG received information from DHS OIG that it referred the complaint to ICE and it appears that ICE decided not to open an investigation regarding the allegation.

On July 24, 2018, the OIG made a referral to the Social Security Administration (SSA) regarding the allegation in this case. Thereafter, the OIG obtained information from SSA that [REDACTED] had submitted a change in her date of birth, making her three months older. Other than the receipt of about \$1800 in additional social security and medicare benefits (\$600 per month for 3 months), the SSA could find no other benefit that [REDACTED] would receive as a result of the change.

As a result of the responses received from DHS and SSA in response to the OIG's referral, there are no further issues pending, and this preliminary investigation is closed.

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United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-18-0136-HL-O



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Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (f)

Prepared by: [REDACTED]
Approved by: [REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-18-0136-HL-O	DATE OF REPORT: March 26, 2019
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: March 13, 2018 TO August 3, 2018	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	

SUMMARY

On March 13, 2018, the GAO OIG received a hotline complaint alleging that [REDACTED] had falsified the IT employment experience and credentials/certifications that he claimed on his resume. The complaint also alleged that [REDACTED] was planning to "steal government data" and divulge GAO information security to government adversaries.

The OIG investigation corroborated the allegation that [REDACTED] falsified his employment experience and credentials/certifications on his resume and his security clearance paperwork.

DETAILS

On March 13, 2018, the GAO OIG received a hotline complaint alleging that [REDACTED] had falsified the IT employment experience and credentials/certifications that he claimed on his resume. The complaint also alleged that [REDACTED] was planning to "steal government data" and divulge GAO information security to government adversaries.

GAO OIG initiated an investigation pursuant to the complaint. The investigation focused on whether [REDACTED] in fact, falsified his employment experience and credentials/certifications to obtain employment as a GAO contractor.

The OIG determined that [REDACTED] was hired by Softworld, the subcontractor on GAO's CSRA contract, in January 2018. When it hired [REDACTED] SoftWorld conducted a "background" on [REDACTED] but it included a criminal history and credit check only. The OIG obtained [REDACTED] security clearance paperwork from 2011 and the resume that he submitted to Softworld. The OIG then issued subpoenas to [REDACTED] claimed employers and credentialing companies to verify the claims he made on his security clearance paperwork and resume.

On [REDACTED] resume, he claimed that he had a "Security+" certification. However, CompTIA notified the OIG that they have no record of [REDACTED] receiving a "Security+" certification. Further, CompTIA added that they are not aware of any other organization that issues "Security+" certifications.

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██████ also included a bullet point on his resume: "SANS Intrusion Detection In-Depth (GCIA)". The OIG contacted SANS regarding this claim. SANS responded that they have no record of ██████ taking courses from SANS or earning the GIAC Certification. ██████ indicated that he has an MBA from Keller School of Management. The OIG was able to verify that this information was accurate.

On ██████ resume, he indicated that he had worked for ██████ from April 2016 until the time that Softworld employed him. However, web searches for ██████ showed that it is a small business operated out of a townhome in Woodbridge, Virginia. According to business websites such as Manta, Buzzfile, and All Biz, ██████ has only one employee and annual revenue of \$45,000 to \$75,000. When ██████ interviewed ██████ about an allegation similar to the one that the OIG received, ██████ described ██████ as similar to a call center handling security for government and private sector customers. He indicated there were about 60-70 employees at ██████

The next (and last) employment entry on ██████ resume is Security Analyst/Incident Response SOC Analyst for "Client: USPTO Alexandria VA" for September 2011 to April 2016. On ██████ security clearance paperwork, he lists General Dynamics as his employer from August 2011 to present (with present being the date of the security clearance paperwork submission which is October 14, 2011). He lists his position as "Service Desk Agent", and the address and phone number are that of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. The OIG contacted General Dynamics and requested ██████ employment history. However, General Dynamics has no record of ██████ being employed by them directly. General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) recently purchased ██████ so they do have a record of ██████ employment with SoftWorld as of January 2018.

On his security clearance paperwork, ██████ indicated that he was employed as an IT Auditor by Protiviti Government Services, Inc. from April 2011 to present. Protiviti told OIG that ██████ had applied for a job, but was never employed by Protiviti.

From August 2008 to July 2009, ██████ indicated that he was employed as an Internal Audit/Compliance Analyst by United Launch Alliance (ULA). ULA has a record that he worked for Kforce, a ULA subcontractor from September 2008 to March 2009. His position was a "ULA Test Analyst". ██████ listed employment as a Sap Security Tester with Nestle Waters from January 2007 to December 2007. Nestle Waters indicated that they have no record of his employment with them as either an employee or a contractor.

On July 27, 2018, at 9:21am, the OIG contacted ██████ at his GAO email to request an interview. Having received no reply, the OIG attempted to contact ██████ via phone (using the number on his security clearance paperwork), but was unsuccessful. The OIG then contacted GDIT to obtain a more current phone number and learned that ██████ resigned from Softworld as of July 27, 2018, the same day that the OIG requested an interview.

As described above, ██████ made a number of claims on his resume and security clearance paperwork that were not accurate (e.g., employment with General Dynamics, Protiviti, and Nestle Waters, "Security+" certification, and "SANS Intrusion Detection In-Depth (GCIA)"). Thus, the complainant was correct that ██████ did not have the credentials and experience that he asserted on his resume to become a contractor at GAO. This raises concerns that the

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complainant may also be correct that [REDACTED] "goal is to steal government data and [divulge the] government's information security to adversaries and attackers". The OIG is providing you with this information so that you can conduct an assessment of [REDACTED] activities involving GAO's IT infrastructure to ascertain whether [REDACTED] did anything to harm GAO's IT security or removed GAO information when he left Softworld's employ.

SUBJECTS

[REDACTED] Softworld Contractor

JUDICIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

December 11, 2018: Referred to GAO management for appropriate action.

February 7, 2019: Email including disposition and memo received from [REDACTED] (Exhibit 1).

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

NA

STATUS

On February 7, 2019, [REDACTED] forwarded the disposition which stated that ISTS took its routine steps for removing access and collecting issued equipment when [REDACTED] left. After receiving the ROI from the OIG, ISTS determined that [REDACTED] did not have global administrative access, he did not access documents outside of his responsibilities, he did not send emails with sensitive information to external destinations, he did not have a request to download data from the network, and no specific concerns were raised by GAO's Data Loss Prevention Tool.

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EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	Email including disposition and memo received from [REDACTED]

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY:	[REDACTED]
APPROVED BY:	[REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0160-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: AUGUST 23, 2018	

On April 10, 2018, this office received an anonymous hotline allegation (**Attachment 1**) regarding Assistant Director [REDACTED] Atlanta Field Office, claiming she is falsifying her Time and Attendance (T&A) reports. The allegation highlighted several instances of [REDACTED] listing personal appointments on her Government Accountability Office (GAO) calendar during the week of April 16, 2018; the examples given appeared to be personal appointments during her Maxiflex scheduled hours with no reference to submitting annual leave. The author of the complaint says that [REDACTED] repeatedly takes lengthy personal appointments in the middle of the day that she does not hide on her calendar. Further, the anonymous caller alleges [REDACTED] has often bragged about her actions, quoting [REDACTED] as saying, "oh, nobody takes leave for things like that," and "that's why we work for the federal government, silly."

A six month review of [REDACTED] T&As, Outlook calendar, Outlook account images (emails) and records of [REDACTED] accessing the Atlanta Field Office failed to substantiate the allegations in the hotline complaint.

Regarding the allegations of [REDACTED] attendance during the week of April 16, 2018, the RA can report that on Monday April 16 [REDACTED] accessed the office at 7:49am and again at 1:32pm (the allegation states per her calendar [REDACTED] had an appointment at a spa from 12:30pm to 2:30pm), and on the April 17 [REDACTED] claimed seven hours of telework and was receiving emails until 6:14pm (the allegation states per [REDACTED] calendar she had a 10:30am to 1pm hair appointment).

The RA examined the records mentioned above and over the six month review of [REDACTED] data she was not consistent listing on her calendar when she was taking leave or teleworking. And, the vast majority of appointments that might be personal were accompanied by some hours of leave or telework, making it difficult to identify whether she actually used government time to attend personal appointments

The RA's investigation is closed with the submission of this Memorandum.

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0230-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: February 26, 2019	

On June 21, 2018, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a hotline complaint regarding an alleged abuse of telework by [REDACTED].

The OIG obtained [REDACTED] telework agreements, badge records, timecards, and [REDACTED] login records. The OIG compared these records to the requirements for the telework program. One requirement for the regular telework program (as opposed to the expanded telework program) is that an employee may not telework half a pay period or more. While [REDACTED] was on a regular telework schedule, [REDACTED] violated this requirement during pay period 6 of CY2018. Another requirement is that GAO employees appropriately account for their telework time on their timecard by indicating that they are on "Continuing" or "Episodic" telework. For Monday, June 4, 2018, [REDACTED] inappropriately allocated her time to "Continuing" telework rather than "Episodic" telework. This was the only occasion that the OIG identified a discrepancy in [REDACTED] reporting of time on her timecards.

The OIG also reviewed [REDACTED] to determine whether she was [REDACTED] when she was supposed to be teleworking. There is no requirement that employees [REDACTED] on telework days, but being [REDACTED] On March 13, 2018, [REDACTED] reported teleworking for 8 hours, but did not [REDACTED]. On all other occasions, [REDACTED] logged in with her [REDACTED] on her telework days.

The OIG also noted that for several pay periods [REDACTED] took leave on days when she was supposed to be in the office, but teleworked for the remaining days of the week. However, there is no prohibition against doing this. During these weeks, the OIG found that [REDACTED] on her telework days.

The three potential issues identified (exceeding the maximum telework in one pay period, incorrectly recording episodic telework hours as "Continuing" for one day, and [REDACTED] one telework day) [REDACTED] referral for administrative action. For this reason, this preliminary investigation is closed.

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0242-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: MARCH 26, 2019	

On June 3, 2018, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a hotline complaint regarding an alleged abuse of time by [REDACTED]. Specifically, the complaint alleges that [REDACTED] arrives late to work, but claims the hours as worked. In addition, the complaint alleges that [REDACTED] could not produce records for April 2, 2018, to April 16, 2018, when she claimed she was on "Active Duty Reserve".

The OIG obtained [REDACTED] badge records, metro records from WMATA, and timecards. The OIG compiled these records and determined that [REDACTED] had not worked the time she claimed on 105 days from October 4, 2017, to July 19, 2018. The total amount of time claimed and not worked is 5,643 minutes, or about 94 hours. [REDACTED] worked a total of 635 extra minutes on 26 days, mostly from May 30, 2018, to July 19, 2018.

With regard to [REDACTED] military service, the OIG obtained records from the 11th Wing. These records show that [REDACTED] was on "Inactive Duty Training" from April 2, 2018, to April 16, 2018.

In GAO's Management News for October 1-19, 2018, it was announced that [REDACTED] had left GAO. As a result, the OIG has decided not to pursue this case further. For this reason, this preliminary investigation is closed.

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY:	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-18-0292-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: SEPTEMBER 20, 2018	

On August 23, 2018, this office received an anonymous hotline allegation (**Attachment 1**) questioning whether Forensic Audits and Investigative Service (FAIS) [REDACTED] disclosed a 2008 bankruptcy on his SF86 paperwork. The allegation indicated [REDACTED] security clearance.

On September 7, 2018, the Reporting Agent (RA) requested [REDACTED] to conduct a search for [REDACTED] 2008 bankruptcy. [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] and his wife had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on July 10, 2008, [REDACTED] (**Attachment 2**) in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Maryland.

On September 17, 2018, [REDACTED] GAO Security Officer, provided the RA a copy of [REDACTED] SF86 dated January 24, 2012 (**Attachment 3**). A review of this document identified that [REDACTED] disclosed his 2008 bankruptcy on pp. 37-43.

The results of this investigation disprove the hotline allegation. This investigation is closed with no further action by our office.

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment #	Description
1	Anonymous hotline complaint dated August 23, 2018.
2	U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Maryland Case [REDACTED] dated July 10, 2008.
3	[REDACTED] SF-86 dated January 24, 2012.

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Office of Inspector General

Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6 (f)

United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-18-0317-HL-O



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Prepared by:	[REDACTED]
Approved by:	[REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-18-0317-HL-O	DATE OF REPORT: February 22, 2019
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: June 11, 2017 TO September 25, 2018	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]	
DISTRIBUTION: GIMS	

SUMMARY

On September 19, 2018, and September 20, 2018, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) received multiple hotline allegations that [REDACTED] Professional Development Program (PDP) Analyst, Defense Capabilities and Management (DCM), was filmed discussing engaging in outside activities while on official time. The OIG review of a video produced by Project Veritas, a political activist group, confirmed [REDACTED] had been surreptitiously recorded asserting he performed Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) functions during work hours.

GAO OIG initiated our investigation to determine: 1) whether [REDACTED] accessed classified information; 2) the extent of possible time and attendance fraud; and 3) whether other agency staff were involved in this misconduct. Aside from [REDACTED] statements in the video, the investigation did not identify any information to substantiate the allegations.

DETAILS

On September 19, 2018, and September 20, 2018, GAO OIG received multiple hotline allegations that [REDACTED] Professional Development Program (PDP) Analyst, Defense Capabilities and Management (DCM), was filmed discussing engaging in outside activities while on official time. The OIG review of a video produced by Project Veritas, a political activist group, confirmed [REDACTED] had been surreptitiously recorded asserting he performed Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) functions during work hours. The recording was subsequently posted to the Internet.

Shortly after viewing the video of [REDACTED] discussing engaging in outside activities while on official time, the OIG took possession of [REDACTED] government-issued computer to determine whether it contained any information pertinent to the investigation. We coordinated with information technology specialists from GAO's Information Systems and Technology Services (ISTS) to image the computer. ISTS provided the OIG with all folders/files recovered and a copy of [REDACTED] Microsoft Outlook email account. The OIG's search of this information did not identify any records to support the alleged activity or indicate added risk to agency operations.

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The OIG coordinated with Department of Defense (DOD) OIG during its forensic review of computers used by [REDACTED] from April 2018 to August 2018 during a GAO audit of the DOD OIG Hotline. DOD OIG also conducted a review of the Defense Case Activity Tracking System (DCATS), a system of records used by the DOD Hotline for case management, case tracking, information storage, responses to requests for information, and to fulfill mandatory reporting requirements. DOD OIG reported to GAO OIG that its forensic review of the DOD laptop computers and the access records did not indicate a loss to the DOD or adversely affect DOD operational capabilities (Exhibit 1).

[REDACTED] was removed from his position with GAO on September 25, 2018. Our comprehensive review of available information did not identify any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of information by [REDACTED]

SUBJECT(S)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

JUDICIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

On September 25, 2018, [REDACTED] was terminated (Exhibit 2).

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE (Exhibit 3)

9/20/18: RA took possession of [REDACTED] GAO-issued laptop.
9/21/18: RA transferred custody of the laptop to [REDACTED] ISTS, for imaging.
10/15/18: [REDACTED] returned the laptop to the RA for safekeeping.
3/22/19: RA transferred the laptop to [REDACTED] ISTS, as the final disposition.

STATUS

With no pending criminal/civil/administrative matters, this case is closed.

No redactions

EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	DOD OIG Report of Investigation dated January 6, 2019.
2	Termination Letter dated September 25, 2018.
3	GAO Form 78, Personal Custody Receipt and Property Action Documents (9/20/18, 9/21/18, 10/15/18, and 3/22/19).

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United States Government Accountability Office

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

G-19-0019-O



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Prepared by:	[REDACTED]
Approved by:	[REDACTED]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE#: G-19-0019-O	DATE OF REPORT: June 14, 2019
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: October 22, 2018 TO March 22, 2019	
CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]	
DISTRIBUTION: GIMS/HARD FILE	

SUMMARY

This investigation originated on October 22, 2018, as a referral from GAO management. Between October 22, 2018, and March 22, 2019, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] the Reporting Agent (RA), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), conducted an investigation into the unauthorized use of a GAO Lexis-Nexis (L-N) account. Our investigation substantiated the unauthorized use of a GAO-authorized L-N account between 2009 and 2018.

On October 3, 2018, [REDACTED] GAO Acquisitions Librarian, was notified by [REDACTED] L-N Information Assurance and Data Protection Group, [REDACTED] that L-N identified six questionable searches conducted under L-N Login ID [REDACTED]. L-N requested GAO to determine if each search was conducted, A) during the regular course of business, and B) for a regulatory permissible purpose. The investigation confirmed Login ID [REDACTED] was assigned to GAO employee [REDACTED] Physical Infrastructure (PI), when these searches were conducted. All of [REDACTED] activity within the L-N database was unauthorized by GAO. [REDACTED] unauthorized access of data resulted in the enhanced risk of loss of Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

On March 25, 2019, OIG referred this matter to Physical Infrastructure [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits Center, for consideration of administrative action.

On March 29, 2019, GAO's Inspector General Adam Trzeciak, forwarded a "Management Alert: Privacy Incident Due to Unauthorized Activity of GAO Employee" (Exhibit 1) to GAO's Chief Administrative Officer, Karl Maschino.

On May 28, 2019, GAO's Chief Agency Privacy Officer, Terrell Dorn, responded (Exhibit 2) to Inspector General Trzeciak's "Management Alert".

On May 28, 2019, [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits Center, forwarded to this office the Report of Investigation Disposition Action form (Exhibit 3).

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BACKGROUND

LexisNexis Group (L-N) provides legal and business research products to its customers. GAO staff can access public, personal, and non-public information records via the L-N platform while conducting official business of the GAO. L-N grants customers a restricted license to use its services solely for the customer's "own internal business purposes." Every customer certifies that "their use of the L-N database shall be for only legitimate business purposes." Every customer certifies it will use the information, "...in accordance with the permissible uses selected... and shall not use the LN Services for personal (non-business) purposes." Some of the information contained in the L-N database is "personal information" the use of which is regulated by federal statutes, specifically the Drivers Privacy Protection Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

The "Drivers Privacy Protection Act" or "DPPA" (18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.), requires the protection of personal information contained in an individual's motor vehicle record. It is unlawful under the Act to obtain or disclose personal information for unauthorized purposes or for any person to make false representations to obtain any personal information from an individual's motor vehicle record. A person who acts in violation of the DPPA may be subject to a criminal penalty and a civil action brought by the individual to whom the released information pertains.

The "Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" or "GLBA" (15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.), requires financial institutions to protect the security and confidentiality of their customers' nonpublic personal information. Under GLBA, it is prohibited for a nonaffiliated third party that receives nonpublic personal information from a financial institution to disclose that information to any other third party, unless the disclosure would be authorized if made by the financial institution. The GLBA further prohibits the use of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or documents to get customer information from a financial institution or directly from a customer of a financial institution and imposes criminal penalties and fines and imprisonment for up to 5 years for violations.

GAO Order 0645.1, *Limited Personal Use of Government Provided Office and IT Equipment, Including Internet*, [REDACTED]

GAO Order 0645.1, 6(b)(2) and 6(b)(8) [REDACTED]

GAO Order 0450.1, *GAO Privacy Program*, [REDACTED]

PII is any personal information about an individual, including: information that can be used on its own or with other information to identify, contact, or locate a single person, or to identify an individual in context. Some examples of PII are:

- Full name (if not common)
- Home address
- Social Security number
- Date of Birth

- Birthplace
- Vehicle registration plate number
- Driver's license number
- Telephone number
- Credit card numbers
- Email address
- Phone numbers

DETAILS

On October 3, 2018, [REDACTED] RELX Group, contacted [REDACTED] via email (Exhibit 1) to advise that on August 13, August 27, and August 29, 2018, the GAO L-N account [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED] Physical Infrastructure (PI), was used to conduct questionable searches. [REDACTED] requested GAO review the search activity identified and determine whether the searches were conducted during the regular course of GAO business and for a regulatory permissible use.¹

On November 13, 2018, the RA interviewed [REDACTED] (Exhibit 2). Prior to the interview, [REDACTED] was provided with the Warnings and Assurances to Employees Required to Provide Information (Kalkines Warning). The RA read the Kalkines Warning to [REDACTED] stated she understood the warning, read the acknowledgment, and then signed the form. The interview was audio recorded.

[REDACTED] said she knew what the interview was about before being told and was forthcoming regarding her use of L-N. She readily admitted she used the database to locate friends and family for herself, mother, aunt, and ex-sister-in-law. She wasn't certain how long she had access to the L-N database but thought it was about eight or nine years. In its referral, L-N included the six searches [REDACTED] made in August of 2018. [REDACTED] acknowledged she conducted the searches and identified the individuals as either family or friends of family.

[REDACTED] explained that one of the searches she made in August of 2018 was at the request of her aunt, [REDACTED] said she volunteered to try and locate her aunt's husband, [REDACTED] who lived in South Carolina. Her aunt and [REDACTED] were married but not together and her aunt wanted to know his location and whether [REDACTED] refinanced some property. [REDACTED] ex-husband's deceased uncle. [REDACTED] said she voluntarily initiated the L-N search to determine his financial situation after a conversation with her ex-sister-in-law, [REDACTED] who wondered if [REDACTED] owned property. [REDACTED] with whom she wanted to re-connect. The fifth search for [REDACTED] was an attempt to locate [REDACTED] The last search was for [REDACTED] cousin. This search was conducted because [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] wanted to know whether [REDACTED] sold her residence.

[REDACTED] said she used L-N over the last eight or nine years on an average of once a month but there were some months she may have accessed the database two or three times (Note: One use resulted in multiple searches: see table on page 5). [REDACTED] stated she never used

¹ A "Regulatory Permissible Use" is a search conducted in compliance with applicable state or federal laws governing the permissible use of the information being accessed.

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L-N for official business and therefore was always careful to login to the database claiming her searches were "No Permissible Use" searches.²

██████████ said it was her understanding she could conduct these searches at work as long as it did not "consume your day" and the searches were done on personal time. ██████████ said she was careful about when, and the amount of time, she spent running searches; not because she knew it was wrong, but because she knew she wasn't supposed to conduct personal business during work hours. ██████████ stated she honestly didn't know she was not supposed to conduct L-N searches for non-business purposes. ██████████ said she thought it was "OK" to use L-N as long as she logged into L-N and identified the search as a non-permissible purpose.³

██████████ denied ever being paid to share the information she obtained. ██████████ never allowed anyone to see the search material she printed before she shred it and stated that she never used the information to harm anyone. Finally, ██████████ admitted she didn't have a reason to retain her L-N account because she's never had an official need to search the database.

On November 14, 2018, the RA contacted ██████████ and requested documentation of ██████████ L-N activity. This request was made to follow up on information ██████████ provided that she had conducted searches in L-N for eight or nine years. On the same date, the RA spoke telephonically with ██████████ to inform her that ██████████ confessed to conducting the six searches on August 13, August 27 and August 29, 2018. ██████████ further admitted these six searches were for personal reasons and not for official government business.

On November 15, 2018, the RA received a spreadsheet (**Exhibit 3**) from L-N that contained the history of ██████████ L-N usage from March 3, 2009, to September 25, 2018. ██████████ conducted 4,656 searches⁴ relating to information on 295 individuals/entities (**Exhibit 4**). All searches were made for personal, i.e. non-business reasons.

Below is a summary of ██████████ activity.

Year	Searches	# Days
2018	235	12
2017	138	10
2016	285	12
2015	757	22
2014	457	17
2013	728	24
2012	1048	32

² One of the available selections to search the L-N database is "No Permissible Use." Though according to L-N documentation no account holder should ever search the L-N database for any reason other than official business, the "No Permissible Use" selection offers the user limited information and would be the best choice to indicate the search was for reasons other than a regulatory permissible use.

³ L-N Investigator ██████████ advised there should never be a non-business use, i.e. a non-permissible use, of L-N and it was GAO's responsibility to ensure agency account holders are aware of this.

⁴ For this report, we define a search as user-provided criteria, in any combination, to obtain data from the database. Numerous searches may be performed in order to obtain data related to one individual/entity (i.e. last name only, first initial/last name, first name/last name, last name/city, state, etc.).

2011	542	24
2010	380	25
2009	<u>86</u>	<u>9</u>
	4656	187

Person Related Searches	2107	45.25%
Real Property Related Searches	1695	36.41%
Other Searches	<u>854</u>	<u>18.34%</u>
	4656	100.00%

The RA contacted L-N Investigator [REDACTED] RELX Group, [REDACTED] to better understand the search categories and database content. According to Investigator Campbell, after he saw that [REDACTED] accessed DPPA and GLBA protected data without authorization, and the "File Search" commands she used, he observed the risk of loss of PII is substantial.⁵

On March 7, 2019, the RA interviewed [REDACTED] again (Exhibit 5). Prior to the interview, [REDACTED] was provided with the Warnings and Assurances to Employees Required to Provide Information (Kalkines Warning). The RA read the Kalkines Warning to [REDACTED] stated she understood the warning, read the acknowledgment, and then signed the form. The interview was audio recorded.

During this interview, [REDACTED] changed or contradicted statements she made during her November 13, 2018, interview or could not explain earlier statements when confronted with her data usage.

She amended her previous statements that she never searched for anyone who was not a family member or friend and that she did not share the information with anyone. [REDACTED] said she lives at [REDACTED]. The RA explained that additional L-N data identified that she conducted 54 searches in West Virginia and 44 of those searches were for addresses associated with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said she forgot that she conducted these searches and acknowledged she searched people associated with [REDACTED]. She explained that she served as the secretary for the [REDACTED] Homeowners Association (HOA) for three years and the searches were for [REDACTED].

⁵ Due to the fluid nature of the sources L-N relies on for information, the OIG would not be able to recreate with certainty the results [REDACTED] received from the unauthorized searches she conducted.

⁶ The 54 searches in West Virginia and 44 of those for addresses associated with [REDACTED] communicated in the interview were based on preliminary analysis, and in some cases contain duplicate searches. Final analysis based on unique individual addresses indicates that [REDACTED] was attempting to search 43 locations in West Virginia and 26 associated with [REDACTED].

the names, locations of residents, and tenants of the HOA.⁷ [REDACTED] stated the primary purpose for identifying owners and tenants was so the HOA could send out dues' notices. She said she typed letters with the information she obtained and shared the information with the president of the HOA but no one else. [REDACTED] said the remaining searches in West Virginia were for family members who lived in Martinsburg or the surrounding area.

[REDACTED] initially stated that she logged on to L-N and selected the "No Permissible Use" search option. This option limits the data that will be available to the user for review or download. Based on our review of her usage of the L-N database, we noted only 19 searches (out of a total of 4,656) when "No Permissible Use" was selected. We indicated to [REDACTED] that over 2200 searches she conducted were the result of access to L-N where she selected "Agency" as the "Regulatory Permissible Use" option. Notwithstanding, [REDACTED] continued to insist she never accessed the database representing the search as a Regulatory Permissible Use.

[REDACTED] stated that she did not know she was "...crossing any line..." because the information she searched was all "public" information. She said every time she went into L-N she was looking at prices of property that had been bought or sold or trying to locate people. [REDACTED] said she never used social security numbers⁸ or vehicle searches⁹ to locate individuals; instead, she used name and address searches to locate people. [REDACTED] said she thought what she was doing with L-N was innocent because all the information she found was "public" and she didn't realize what she was doing was so serious.

[REDACTED] stated that most of the searches she performed were for her own personal interests. However, she admitted to conducting L-N searches and sharing resultant information with third parties including her mother, aunt, daughter-in-law, ex-sister-in-law, and the president of the [REDACTED] HOA. [REDACTED] also said she only printed information from the database twice and both times she shredded the documents prior to leaving the office.

[REDACTED] also stated she didn't think she was properly instructed when she received her initial L-N training and the only thing she remembers distinctly is the instructor saying no one should ever use L-N to "...go spying on your co-workers."

Finally, [REDACTED] was adamant she never sold information, or harassed anyone, or allowed individuals to review printed copies of the information she printed, or used L-N information for fraudulent purposes. [REDACTED] said she now realizes what she did was wrong but thought she was accessing public information and never considered the consequences of unlawfully obtaining and sharing PII. [REDACTED] was apologetic and said she used L-N because she was "nosy" but had no intention of harming anyone or abusing a GAO resource.

⁷ [REDACTED] conducted searches for addresses and people associated with [REDACTED] in years 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2018.

⁸ L-N records indicate [REDACTED] used Social Security Numbers as a search term five times.

⁹ L-N records identified over 200 vehicle related searches including five searches using drivers' license numbers.

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] Physical Infrastructure

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

On March 25, 2019, OIG referred this matter to Physical Infrastructure [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits Center, for consideration of administrative action.

On March 29, 2019, GAO Inspector General Adam Trzeciak, forwarded an OIG "Management Alert: Privacy Incident Due to Unauthorized Activity of GAO Employee" (**Exhibit 1**) to GAO's Chief Administrative Officer, Karl Maschino. The OIG "Management Alert" documented the circumstances surrounding [REDACTED] unauthorized use of L-N and identified two vulnerabilities as a result of the investigation:

- [REDACTED]
The subject of the investigation told the OIG that she did not have a need to access LexisNexis for GAO official business since given access. Further, the OIG did not see evidence that GAO [REDACTED] LexisNexis on system use.
- [REDACTED]
The OIG believes that additional guidance is needed for individuals who work with, and/or oversee, sensitive information.

Further, the OIG "Management Alert" provided three matters for GAO management's consideration:

- (1) Consider whether the unauthorized access to PII through LexisNexis occurring between 2009 and 2018 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GAO Directive 0910.1-8, *Notice of Sensitive Information Security Incidents*.
- (2) Develop, document and implement [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which may provide PII.
- (3) Develop, document and implement [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which may contain PII.

On May 28, 2019, GAO's Chief Agency Privacy Officer, Terrell Dorn, provided GAO's "Management Response" (**Exhibit 2**). In the "Management Response" Dorn addresses each of the OIG's three "Matters for Consideration." Dorn's response advises GAO management has completed a review of the issues and corrective action for each of the three "Matters for Consideration" has been completed.

On May 28, 2019, [REDACTED] Employee Relations and Benefits Center, forwarded to this office the Report of Investigation Disposition Action form (**Exhibit 3**). The document states that after review and evaluation of the OIG's ROI, the decision was made to propose a three day suspension for [REDACTED]

No redactions

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

No original evidence was obtained in the course of this investigation.

STATUS

This investigation is closed with the submission of this report.

EXHIBITS

Exhibit #	Description
1	OIG "Management Alert: Privacy Incident Due to Unauthorized Activity of GAO Employee" dated March 29, 2019, to Chief Administrative Officer, Karl Maschino
2	GAO Management's response to the OIG's "Management Alert", authored by Terrell Dorn, GAO's Chief Agency Privacy Officer, dated May 28, 2019.
3	Report of Investigation Disposition Action form dated May 28, 2019

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-19-0036-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: MARCH 27, 2019	

On December 4, 2018, this office received a referral from HCO regarding ISTS [REDACTED]. It was alleged [REDACTED] forged a doctor's note to extend short term telework based on a Special Accommodation. [REDACTED] doctor's note (Attachment 1) was faxed to HCO-Special Accommodations on October 16, 2018, 11:45am, stating her condition was expected to continue until January 1, 2019. [REDACTED] told HCO she needed additional short term telework and that her doctor made a mistake when he said she only needed short-term telework until January 1, 2019. HCO directed her to obtain another doctor's note with the correct time she needed to have her Special Accommodation.

On Monday October 19, 2018, at 16:06, HCO received another fax from [REDACTED] doctor (Attachment 2) stating her condition was expected to continue until May 31, 2019. HCO noticed the doctor's note appeared to be the same note as before and the new date was forged (the 1/1/19 was changed to 5/31/19 by making the one a five and adding a 3 before the 1).

On December 12, 2018, [REDACTED] was interviewed. Prior to the interview, [REDACTED] was provided with the Warnings and Assurances to Employees Required to Provide Information (Kalkines Warning) (Attachment 3). The RA read the Kalkines Warning to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated she understood the warning, read the acknowledgment, and then signed the form. The interview was audio recorded (Attachment 4).

[REDACTED] explained she spoke with her doctor's office and explained she needed a doctor's note to remain on short term telework as a Special Accommodation. The doctor filled out a form provided by GAO and made a mistake about the length of time she needed for recovery. When she told HCO the doctor made a mistake she was instructed to have the doctor send another note with the correct information. She notified her doctor's office of their mistake and asked for that they forward HCO a corrected document. When the RA showed [REDACTED] the second doctor's note she said she understood it looked like someone had taken the original note and adjusted the dates by making the one a five and adding a 3 before the 1, but claimed she did not forge it. Before the interview was concluded [REDACTED] provided contact information for her doctor's office and gave permission for the RA to contact her doctor.

**RESTRICTED
INFORMATION
GAO OIG**

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MARCH 27, 2019

On December 13, 2018, the RA contacted [REDACTED] doctor's office and spoke to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was familiar with [REDACTED] situation and confirmed to the RA that [REDACTED] physician, [REDACTED] made the change to the form in question. She explained she was familiar with the circumstances because she was the one who gave [REDACTED] the form to correct the date. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not take the time to fill out a new form, but in front of her, made the one a five and added a 3 before the 1 to read 5/31/19. [REDACTED] said she took the form from the doctor and faxed it to HCO personally.

On December 13, 2018, the RA spoke to HCO Disability Program Manager and Reasonable Accommodation Coordinator [REDACTED] and advised her that [REDACTED] doctor's office confirmed the doctor had made the change to the form extending the request for a Special Accommodation from January 1, 2019, to May 31, 2019.

This investigation is closed with the submission of this report.

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENTS	Description
1	[REDACTED] doctor's note dated October 16, 2018
2	[REDACTED] doctor's note dated October 19, 2018
3	Kalkines Warning dated December 12, 2018
4	Audio Recording of [REDACTED] interview dated December 12, 2018

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

PREPARED BY:	[REDACTED]
APPROVED BY:	[REDACTED]

PRELIMINARY CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE#: G-19-0160-HL-P	CASE AGENT: [REDACTED]
CASE TITLE: [REDACTED]	
DATE: SEPTEMBER 17, 2019	


On May 20, 2019, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint regarding [REDACTED] time and attendance, conduct, and potential substance abuse. On May 20, 2019, and June 3, 2019, an additional complaint was submitted which involved alleged inappropriate behavior by [REDACTED].

Due to the press of other cases, this case was not actively investigated, other than to request documents that would prove or disprove some of the allegations. Subsequently, GAO's Management News for September 2-13, 2019, announced that [REDACTED] had left GAO. As a result of [REDACTED] departure from GAO, GAO cannot take any administrative action involving her. Thus, an investigation into the administrative issues presented is unnecessary. Since this case does not involve issues that rise to the level of criminal activity required by DOJ, this preliminary investigation is closed.

RESTRICTED INFORMATION GAO OIG	<p style="text-align: center;">FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY</p> <p>This Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, and any/all attachments, is intended solely for the official use of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), component thereof, or other government agency, receiving a copy directly from the OIG. No secondary distribution of this report, in whole or in part, may be made outside GAO without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined under Title 4, CFR, Part 81.</p>
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From: Trzeciak, Adam
Subject: FW: EMCOR / Honeywell Complaint
Date: Friday, June 21, 2019 3:31:21 PM
Attachments: Adam Trzeciak2.vcf

FYI



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From: Anderson, William L
Sent: Friday, June 21, 2019 3:29 PM
To: Trzeciak, Adam
Cc: Maschino, Karl J; White, William J; [REDACTED] Dorn, Terrell G
Subject: RE: EMCOR / Honeywell Complaint


Adam, thank you for the prompt response. The matter has been referred to HCO. Bill

From: Trzeciak, Adam
Sent: Friday, June 21, 2019 3:22 PM
To: Anderson, William L
Subject: EMCOR / Honeywell Complaint

Bill,

I reviewed the information you provided re: IO employee [REDACTED] and the complaints against him by EMCOR and Honeywell staff. There appears to be a pattern here that is well documented, although I did not observe evidence of a violation of law or policy within OIG's jurisdiction. Consequently, I feel this is best handled as a performance matter by GAO management. I will not be opening an OIG investigation. If during management's review it discovers possible criminal acts or GAO order violations, please contact me to discuss.

Thank you
Adam



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CASE DETAILS Redactions pursuant to 4 C.F.R. Section 81.6(f)
OIG-19-08-0001

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

Report Initiated	2019-08-02 10:46 ET	Primary Priority	B
Scheduled Follow-up	2019-08-16		
Source	Web Submission	Current Status	Closed
Awareness Resource	Other	Case Opened	2019-11-22
Language	English	Case Closed	2019-11-22
Documented by	WEBALLEGATIONSUBMIT	Days Open	0 days

Allegation	Class	Priority	Primary
Substance Abuse	Environmental, Health and Safety	B	Yes

Location	Location Geography	Location Function
GAO - HQ GAO - Headquarters 441 G Street NW Washington, District of Columbia 20548 United States		

Parties Involved	Party Type	Job Title	Description
Anonymous Caller	Caller		

Issue Summary

Alcohol use by MDs and CG while at work in office building

Issue Details

It is widely known that multiple high level GAO officials have alcohol in their offices and consume alcohol on a regular basis while working in the GAO building. There was a well known incident last fall where a high ranking GAO official spilled a coffee mug full of alcohol in the hallway and when employees went to help the manager up, they smelled alcohol and reported it. This also led rumors to begin swirling around the building, especially amongst this MD's mission team, that GAO does not care if management drinks at work because the head of the agency also drinks at work. If this ever got out to the public, the notoriety of this offense would prove detrimental to the reputation of the agency, so I highly recommend that this matter be looked into.

Additional Questions	Answers
What type of substance was in use?	Alcohol
What is your involvement in the issue?	I overheard it
Did the substance use affect job performance?	I do not know
Is this an ongoing issue?	Yes
Was law enforcement notified of the issue?	I do not know

What is the date of the most recent occurrence?	2019-08-02
Have you reported this issue to anyone within the organization?	No
Do you believe that anyone has taken steps to hide this issue?	Yes
Where did the issue occur?	At a location of The Government Accountability Office
What is your relationship to The Government Accountability Office?	Employee

Communication with Reporter

Type	Date Entered	Entered By	Reply Given to Reporter	Language
Reply	2019-11-22 11:27 ET	[REDACTED]	No	English
Initial				
G-19-0210-HL				

Thank you for your correspondence to our office. We fully appreciate the concerns you have raised. However, our office requested additional information be provided, and as a result of receiving no response, this report is now closed.

Reply	2019-11-22 11:14 ET		No	English
Initial				
G-19-0210-HL				

GAO's Office of Inspector General OIG has received your report to our hotline. GAO OIG independently conducts audits and other reviews of GAO's programs and internal operations. GAO OIG also investigates allegations of potential fraud, waste, mismanagement, and violations of rules and laws related to GAO programs and operations.

GAO OIG is reviewing this matter and will take such action as is deemed appropriate.

Reply	2019-08-02 16:14 ET	[REDACTED]	No	English
Additional Information Requested				

Thank you for your complaint. We require additional information to be able to proceed with a review of this matter. Please see questions below.

Reply	2019-08-02 16:12 ET		No	English
Additional Information Requested				

For each instance of persons consuming alcohol in the GAO building, please provide as much of the following information as possible:

When did the drinking take place (date/time if possible)?

Where did the drinking take place? Please be as specific as possible – e.g., room number, whose office, etc.

Who was drinking alcohol? Please provide names if possible.

Who witnessed the drinking? Please include as many names as possible.

Was there a particular occasion for the drinking?

If known, what type of alcohol were the people drinking?

In addition, who did you overhear speaking about this issue? Who else might have overheard this conversation?

Assignee	Assignment Type	Complete/Removed	Date Assigned	Assigner
No Assignment found for this call report.				

Assignment Notes	Date Entered	Entered By
No Case Assignment Notes found for this call report.		

Investigation Notes

Date Entered	Entered By
2019-08-02 16:12 ET	[REDACTED]
Responded to Reporter:	

For each instance of persons consuming alcohol in the GAO building, please provide as much of the following information as possible:

When did the drinking take place (date/time if possible)?

Where did the drinking take place? Please be as specific as possible -- e.g., room number, whose office, etc.

Who was drinking alcohol? Please provide names if possible.

Who witnessed the drinking? Please include as many names as possible.

Was there a particular occasion for the drinking?

If known, what type of alcohol were the people drinking?

In addition, who did you overhear speaking about this issue? Who else might have overheard this conversation?

Resolution Details

No Resolution found for this call report.

Attachments

File Name	Date Added	Uploaded By
No Case Upload Files found for this call report.		

Distribution

Name	Job Title
[REDACTED]	Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
[REDACTED]	Executive Assistant

*Client agrees and understands that NAVEX Global neither warrants, vouches for, nor authenticates the reliability of the allegations provided in this report. Client agrees that it shall have the sole responsibility for investigating or otherwise evaluating these allegations and other information provided and to comply with all local, state and federal laws pertaining to the investigation and protection of such information, as well as the protection of all rights of any person or persons accused of any wrongdoing.