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February 25, 2010

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request 2010-02-008

This responds to your letter dated January 21, 2010, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA), the closing memos and first 30 pages of exhibits of a list of closed investigations conducted by the Treasury Office of Inspector General (OIG). In our telephone discussion, you amended your request to just the actual closing memos.

I have am enclosing copies of the requested memos. The names and other identifying information of subjects, witnesses, employees and other persons identified in the memos have been redacted, consistent with Exemption 7C of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).

Exemption 7C shields from public dissemination “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [if disclosure] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The OIG invokes Exemption 7C relative to the identities of complainants, interviewees, witnesses, and OIG investigators and clerical personnel, and any information that could reasonably be expected to identify such individuals.


As we discussed, after reviewing the enclosed memos, you may request some or all of the exhibits to these memos. Please call me on 202-927-3973 to discuss.. You also have the right to appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) for full disclosure of the contents of the closing memos. Pursuant to the Department’s FOIA appeal process set forth in 31 C.F.R. § 1.5(i), an appeal must be submitted within 35 days from the date of this response to your request, signed by you and addressed to: Freedom of Information Act Appeal, DO, Disclosure Services, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20020. The appeal should reasonably describe the records to which access has been denied.
and should specify the date of the initial request and the date of this determination. Please enclose copies of your initial request and this letter.

Sincerely,

R.K. Delmar
Counsel to the Inspector General

Enclosures
### SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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Field Chief, TR-0083-14, US Mint
Field Chief, TR-0083-14, US Mint |
| PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES) | 18 U.S.C. § 641, Public Money, Property or Records
18 U.S.C. § 1341, Mail fraud |

### SYNOPSIS

On February 19, 2004, this office received anonymous correspondence alleging that the US Mint had several problems that needed to be investigated. These alleged problems included that [redacted] Management Analyst, and [redacted] the American Federation of Government Employees (Local 3653), was stealing from the union. Another issue was that a [redacted] Inspector, US Mint Philadelphia, PA, was placed on temporary duty for three years from Philadelphia, PA to US Mint Headquarters in Washington, D.C., at a cost of $250,000.00. The complainant also alleged that US Mint Police Officers were required to drive him to and from the train station and the US Mint.
The other allegations were not investigated because of their vague nature were:

1. "Cheating on time cards by telecommuting employees and never coming to work"
2. "Special favors and positions given to a officer who is dating the field chief"
3. "Opening of a job announcement to bring that officer from Kentucky to Washington because he had moved in with that Field Chief."
4. "Police officers denied Sergeant promotions by HR."
5. "Training Officer denying training to blacks."
6. "Relocation of Ft. Knox chief to DC for dating an officer, and it was discovered she was giving him special favors."
7. "Chief of Police covering for other chiefs."
8. "Creating positions for people."
9. "Giving out collateral duties to intel, police staff to chief and id section, and not advertising to everyone."
10. "Use of NCIC to look up girls covered up by training officer." (Exhibit 1)

Garner:

The matter of [Redacted] stealing from the union was investigated by this office, and on June 26, 2006, [Redacted] pleaded guilty to one count of 18 USC §1341, Frauds and swindles, by criminal information by Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C. On September 26, 2006, Garner was sentenced to 60 months supervised probation, 180 days of confinement under home detention, and 360 hours of community service. (Exhibit 2)

[Redacted]

The matter of [Redacted] Inspector, US Mint, Philadelphia, PA, being placed on temporary detail to Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for three years was also investigated by this office. The investigation substantiated that [Redacted] as well as, [Redacted] and [Redacted], Field Chiefs, US Mint, had all been on temporary detail assignments to US Mint Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for weeks to months at a time at the direction of [Redacted] Chief of Police (former), US Mint. These temporary detail assignments were from 1998 to
September 2007, and cost the US Mint a total of $787,598.63. The temporary detail assignments ended when [redacted] retired and [redacted] became the new US Mint chief of police.

The matter of [redacted] receiving rides from US Mint Police to and from the US Mint and train stations was also investigated. [redacted] admitted that he did receive rides in government owned vehicles (GOV) from the US Mint Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to the train station (Union Station). US Mint police management was interviewed and stated that it was a common and accepted practice to drive field chiefs, inspectors, and other US Mint management from the US Mint to the train station in Washington, D.C. This practice was approved because the employees were on official travel, and it was less expensive for the government to transport them in GOVs than in taxis. The US Mint also has a kiosk in Union Station that US Mint police would inspect regularly. US Mint Police management were not aware if US Mint police were being driven to and from field offices and train stations. However, it would be an acceptable practice if it was a cost savings for the US Mint. As such, this investigation was unsubstantiated.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On May 6, 2008, [redacted] Chief of Police, US Mint, was interviewed. He stated that he became the Chief of Police in August 2007. He learned that [redacted] Field Chief, US Mint, Philadelphia, PA; [redacted] and [redacted], Field Chiefs, US Mint, Denver, CO; and [redacted] Field Chief, Fort Knox, KY, had been on temporary detail assignments to US Mint Headquarters for months at a time. He said immediately informed the field chiefs that the temporary detail assignments would terminate, and he sent all of them back to their respective field offices. (Exhibit 3)

On May 6, 2008, [redacted] Deputy Chief of Police, was interviewed. He stated that he served under [redacted] from 1980 to December 2006. He said that after [redacted] retired, from January 2007 to August 2007, he served as the acting chief of police. In August 2007, [redacted] became the new chief of police. He stated that [redacted] and [redacted] were temporarily detailed for weeks and months at a time from their field offices to US Mint Headquarters. This was under the direction of [redacted] because [redacted] felt he needed their expertise in headquarters. [redacted] said he that once he became acting chief, and at the advice of [redacted]
of Deputy Director (former), US Mint, he kept the temporarily detailed employees at US Mint Headquarters because he was short staffed, and he was not allowed to hire new employees. (Exhibit 4)

On May 20, 2008, Deputy Commissioner, Financial Management Service, was interviewed. He said he was employed with the US Mint from October 2002 to December 2007, serving as the deputy director of the US Mint. While in his position as the deputy director, he met with the various US Mint business units twice a week. The US Mint Police was a business unit, so he met with the US Mint Police. He recalled that and were on temporary detail assignment at US Mint Headquarters at different times. In January 2007, retired and the deputy chief, became the acting chief of police. told to keep the temporarily detailed employees at US Mint Headquarters while was acting chief of police. felt these employees were needed during the transition before the US Mint hired a new chief of police. felt uncomfortable keeping the temporarily detailed employees in Washington, D.C. for long periods of time because of the costs. However, he believed the temporarily detailed employees were needed because was overseeing 40 police officers at US Mint Headquarters, in addition to the field chiefs, inspectors and police officers at the other Mint locations and needed the temporarily detailed employees’ expertise. In August 2007, hired and gave him a clear mandate to cut costs, and, as soon as he was able to, send the temporarily detailed employees home. Shortly thereafter, hired a staff for US Mint Headquarters and sent the temporarily detailed employees back to their respective field offices. (Exhibit 5)

On May 12, 2008, Field Chief, US Mint, Philadelphia, PA, was interviewed. said since 2004, he had been employed in his current position with the US Mint. He said that from 1985 to 2004, he had worked as an inspector for the US Mint Police in Philadelphia, PA. During most of that time period, was the chief of the US Mint Police. said that while was the chief, he had all field chiefs (six US Mint field offices) and inspectors temporarily detailed to US Mint Headquarters for two weeks at a time. Additionally, the field chiefs were detailed to US Mint Headquarters for weeks at a time. The field chiefs who were temporarily detailed were: and said he was also temporarily detailed to US Mint Headquarters several times for periods of two weeks at a time. said he never asked the reason why the inspectors and field chiefs had to work in
the headquarters office instead of the field offices. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] was the supervisor and you did not question his reason. He said that while they were detailed to US Mint Headquarters, the temporarily detailed employees stayed in hotels in Washington, D.C., and were allowed to travel home on weekends.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] retired in 2007, and the [REDACTED] served as the chief of police for several months. He said that [REDACTED] kept the temporarily detailed employees in Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] was not certain of the reason for keeping the employees temporarily detailed to US Mint Headquarters, but he believed that [REDACTED] needed assistance with various functions that the temporarily detailed employees handled. In August 2007, [REDACTED] became the chief of police and sent all of the temporarily detailed employees home to their respective field offices. Since that date when [REDACTED] became chief, the field chiefs have been to US Mint Headquarters occasionally, but for only short periods, such as a week. (Exhibit 6)

On May 13, 2008, [REDACTED] Inspector, US Mint, was interviewed. He was advised of his rights, via Treasury OIG OI-Form 27, Advice of Rights (Beckwith / Garrity). [REDACTED] stated that from sometime in 2001 to September 2007, for weeks at a time he was temporarily detailed to the US Mint Headquarters for weeks at a time. He stated that he also traveled to the other field offices and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, GA, to fulfill his training duties as the field chief of training. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was the chief of police and his direct supervisor. He said that all of this travel was at the request and authorization of [REDACTED] (Exhibit 7)

[REDACTED] said that when he was in Washington, D.C., he stayed at the Renaissance Hotel. He also said that he traveled home on most weekends to Philadelphia, PA. He said he would either drive or take an Amtrak train. He added that on several occasions, US Mint police officers would drive him to the train station in Philadelphia, PA, which is only three miles from the Philadelphia Mint. [REDACTED] said that he did not believe that the police officers driving him to the train station was an issue because a Mint kiosk is located at the Amtrak station. Additionally, he said that the kiosk at the Amtrak station had been robbed in the past, so the police officers would drive him to the train station and inspect the kiosk.
believed after he became a field chief approximately 80 percent of his business days were on travel. He said that the other US Mint field chiefs who were also temporarily assigned to Washington, D.C. for weeks at a time were retired and his deputy became the acting chief of the US Mint Police. He said he kept the temporarily detailed employees at US Mint Headquarters because he had no one in Washington, D.C. to handle the responsibilities of the detailed field chiefs. In September 2007, became the US Mint Chief of Police. informed him that field chiefs should be at their respective field offices, and returned all of the temporarily detailed employees to their field offices. (Exhibit 7)

provided a sworn statement. He also provided the vacancy announcement #00-COA-248 for the position of inspector, dated December 20, 2000, which reflected the selected employee could choose Washington, D.C. or the duty station of his or her choice. He also provided the vacancy announcement #HQ-PR-2004-70 for the position of Training Coordinator dated October 7, 2004, that reflected the vacancy was in “any United States Mint Facility.” (Exhibit 7)

In a subsequent interview dated June 12, 2008, was re-contacted to clarify the matter regarding the rides he received from US Mint Police. stated that he did not get rides to or from the train station in Philadelphia, PA. He said he only got rides from the US Mint Police Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to the train station (Union Station) which is only blocks away. Union Station also has a Mint kiosk that is inspected regularly by US Mint Police. (Exhibit 8)

On June 12, 2008, was re-contacted to clarify information previously discussed in a May 12, 2008 interview. was aware that US Mint Police occasionally drove US Mint field chiefs and inspectors from the US Mint Headquarters to the train station (Union Station) in Washington, D.C. He believed US Mint Police management in Washington, D.C. allowed this practice because it is less expensive to drive the US Mint employees in government owned vehicles than to get a taxi. He added that Union Station has a Mint kiosk that the US Mint police inspect regularly. He did not believe the US Mint Police in Philadelphia, PA drove employees to the train station which is approximately three mile from the US Mint. (Exhibit 9)
On June 12, 2008, [Redacted] was re-contacted to clarify information discussed during a May 6, 2008 interview. [Redacted] is aware that US Mint Police occasionally drive US Mint field chiefs, inspectors, and other US Mint management from the US Mint Headquarters to the train station (Union Station) in Washington, D.C. He was not aware of an official policy regarding this matter, but allows this practice because it is less expensive to drive the US Mint employees in government owned vehicles (GOV) than to get a taxi. He added that the employees being driven are on official travel so the use of a GOV is justified. Finally, Union Station has a Mint kiosk that the US Mint police inspect regularly. He was not aware if US Mint Police in field offices follow this practice, but believes that it would be allowed if it saved the government money and did not take police off of posts. (Exhibit 10)

On May 19, 2008, [Redacted] Field Chief of Operations and Training, US Mint, Fort Knox, KY, was interviewed. From approximately 1988, when she became an inspector until 2003, she came to the US Mint Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for two week periods to work on specific projects several times per year. In 2003, [Redacted] said she transferred to Washington, D.C. and resided in Virginia. In May 2007, she returned to Fort Knox, KY, for personal reasons. Since that date, she has occasionally returned to US Mint Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for meetings and projects. (Exhibit 11)

On May 20, 2008, [Redacted] Field Chief of Inspections, US Mint, was telephonically interviewed. From 2003 to September 2007, he spent approximately 50 percent of his time at the US Mint Headquarters. [Redacted] said that at other times, he was in Denver, CO, or inspecting one of the other Mint facilities. [Redacted] said when he was in Washington, D.C., he stayed at the Renaissance Hotel and he would travel home on weekends by airplane. He said he would occasionally remain in Washington D.C. for the weekend.

[Redacted] said he never questioned the reason for the numerous and lengthy temporary detail assignments. He stated that “it was obvious,” that [Redacted] did not have the assistance he needed at US Mint Headquarters. In January 2007, [Redacted] retired and [Redacted] became the acting chief. [Redacted] said that he kept the temporarily detailed employees in Washington, D.C., because he also needed assistance. In September 2007, [Redacted] became the chief of police. [Redacted] said that he informed the detailed employees that: “headquarters employees need to be at headquarters and field employees need to be in their field offices.” He added that
telephoned him, when he was on vacation, and informed him that he should not return to Washington, D.C., but remain in Denver, CO. He said that subsequently hired new employees to assist him at US Mint Headquarters. Since that date, said that on occasion, he has traveled to Washington, D.C., but no longer than a week at a time. (Exhibit 12)

On May 21, 2008, Chief of Investigations and Inspections, US Mint, was interviewed. said that from approximately 1999 to September 2006, he traveled to all of the US Mint facilities and US Mint Headquarters several times per year. Each of these visits was for one to two weeks at a time. He added that since these trips were all at the request and direction of described as a very intelligent and ethical man, but he was a "disciplinarian and a dictator." said expected his people to do as they were told and no one questioned him.

stated that he was only sent to US Mint Headquarters three to four times a year, but other chiefs, such as and were detailed to US Mint Headquarters for several weeks at a time. said to retired in January 2007, and Deputy Chief, became the acting chief. He said that the temporary detail assignments continued under In August 2007, became the police chief.recalled calling him and telling him that the temporary detail assignments were over and he was not to return to Washington, D.C. said he later met with and told him that US Mint Headquarters employees should be at US Mint Headquarters. said he agreed with 's decision. He wanted to continue as a US Mint Headquarters employee in his capacity as chief of investigations and inspections in March 2008, he moved to Washington, D.C. (Exhibit 13)

On May 29, 2008, provided documentation for travel costs for , and 's travel to Washington, D.C. and other locations such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. A subsequent review reflected that the US Mint spent a total of $787,598.04 for travel and temporary detail assignments for the four aforementioned employees from 1998 through 2007. (Exhibit 14)
### EXHIBITS

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<td>2.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity, Court Documents of Judgment of Mary Garner in case number CR06-0091-01, dated October 10, 2006</td>
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DISTRIBUTION

Edmund Moy, Director, US Mint, Washington, D.C.
SYNOPSIS

On February 25, 2005, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received United States Police Incident Report #05-HQ-014. This report indicates that [redacted] of Midwest Coins, Kansas City, Missouri, was buying Mint 50 state quarters and new release nickels through Loomis-Fargo & Company (Loomis) without paying the Mint a licensing fee or royalties.

This office conducted a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and interviewed the subject and relevant witnesses. Subpoenas were issued to acquire bank and other records.
On July 1, 2005, the matter was presented and accepted for prosecution by the United States Attorneys Office for the Western District of Missouri. However, on February 20, 2008, Assistant United States Attorney, Roseann Ketchmark then declined criminal prosecution against [redacted] based on a lack of sufficient admissible evidence.

When interviewed, [redacted] agreed to contact the Mint and make arrangements to purchase commemorative coins in bulk directly from them.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

Based on the fact that prosecution was declined and there are no apparent violations of Treasury Policies, it is recommended that absent further information, no further investigative actions be conducted into this matter at this time and, with the approval of this memorandum, this investigation is concluded.

**DISTRIBUTION**

Edmund C. Moy, Director, United States Mint
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: Sean Hubbard
Special Agent

SUBJECTS: OIG File Number 2006-0061

PREDICATION: On November 18, 2005, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received a Hotline e-mail regarding an allegation that the Bureau of Public Debt (BPD), Department of the Treasury, was abusing the time and attendance system. (Exhibit 1)

ALLEGATION(S): The complainant alleged that was working on a personal business venture during government his duty hours and not properly taking annual leave.

VIOLATION(S):
- 18 U.S.C. § 1001 - False Statements
- 18 U.S.C. § 641 - Theft
- 31 C.F.R. Part 0.208 - Falsification of Official Records
- 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705 - Use of Official Time
- 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (b) (5) – Basic Obligation of Public Service

SYNOPSIS of OI ACTIVITY:
During an interview, Deputy Chief Information Officer, Departmental Offices, Department of the Treasury, stated Assistant Commissioner, Office of Management Services, BPD, initially referred to the HR Connect office to serve on a reimbursable detail. had been on a reimbursable detail to HR Connect from BPD since August 2005. 's duties at HR Connect did not require travel, nor had traveled on behalf
of HR Connect since he had been detailed there. made his leave requests through
Acting Associate Chief Information Officer, HR Connect Program Office, Departmental Offices, Department of Treasury.
was aware of a few days when had asked to telecommute. (Exhibit 2)

During an interview, Acting Associate Chief Information Officer, HR Connect Program Office, stated that since August 2005, had been on a reimbursable detail from the BPD to the HR Connect Program Office. had e-mailed her to take sick leave in the past, and also e-mailed her with any leave requests. had emailed stating that he would be gone for a week on travel for BPD in late October 2005, to early November 2005. advised the HR Connect Program Office does not manage Time and Attendance records, those records were still maintained by BPD. was not authorized to telecommute while on his detail to HR Connect. (Exhibit 3)

During an interview, Office Manager, Investor Education Office, BPD, stated that she was responsible for recording any leave taken by stated that would either e-mail or tell her in person when he took annual leave or sick leave, and she would record it on his Time and Attendance record. stated that had not requested any annual leave or sick leave when he was detailed to the Treasury Department HR Connect office. provided copies of 's time sheets for the period between August 21, 2005, and December 10, 2005. (Exhibits 4, 5, and 6)

During an interview, Administrative Assistant, Investor Education Office, BPD, stated that she shared timekeeper responsibilities with stated that between the period August 22, 2005, and January 7, 2006, never advised her that he took annual leave or sick leave. (Exhibit 7)

During an interview, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Management Services, BPD, stated that it was legitimate for "secretaries" of senior BPD employees to validate the senior official’s time and attendance records. However, stated that another individual must certify the validation. stated 's deputy, was authorized to certify ‘s time and attendance. provided BPD time and attendance definitions of the responsibilities and duties of the "certifying official," "timekeeper," and "employee." (Exhibits 8 and 9)

During an interview, Former Deputy Commissioner, BPD, stated that until September 30, 2005, she was 's supervisor. assumed that was advising his timekeeper, Hieb, when he was requesting leave. When Vogelzang was detailed to the HRConnect office, assumed that continued to advise his timekeeper at BPD of his requested leave because he was still administratively under BPD. stated during her
supervision of she personally entered and validated her own leave on the webTA program. was unaware if entered his leave himself or if his assistant entered his leave for him. stated that she had approved to work from home on “a few occasions.” expected to advise her of any time he intended to work from home. said there was no formal documentation of this policy. (Exhibit 10)

During an interview, Acting Executive Director, Investor Education Office, BPD, stated since July 2003 he worked for in the Investor Education Office. stated that there are approximately 12 people working in the Investor Education Office, and he maintained a general awareness of his daily activities. advised that would generally arrive at the office prior to him, and’s normal arrival time at the office was 6:30 a.m. stated that would telecommute approximately one time per pay period. stated that, office manager, entered leave into WebTA for which would approve. said he had not approved a leave request for since August 22, 2005, when left for his detail to the HR Connect office. understood that during the detail, would be responsible for e-mailing any leave requests he had while he was detailed to HR Connect. stated that BPD still maintained Vogelzang’s pay and tracking while he was on the temporary detail. had not had much contact with since he left for the detail. said he also authorized travel requests for . said he did not receive a travel request from to attend a podcasting conference in California in November 2005. sent an email to requesting information on getting the travel authorized for the California trip on November 30, 2005. left a voicemail for after the November 2005 podcasting conference advising that he could not authorize travel after the travel occurred. (Exhibit 11)

A review of e-mail account, government cell phone account, government travel card account, and HR Connect office access records show that was absent from work without authorized leave or travel on the following days: September 23, 2005; September 26, 2005; September 30, 2005; October 3, 2005; October 4, 2005; October 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; October 14, 2005; October 21, 2005; October 28, 2005; November 7, 2005; November 8, 2005; November 9, 2005; November 10, 2005, November 23, 2005; November 25, 2005; December 2, 2005; December 6, 2005; December 9, 2005; December 13, 2005; December 14, 2005; December 15, 2005; December 16, 2005; December 22, 2005; December 23, 2005; December 30, 2005; and January 6, 2006. (Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17)

During an interview, Former Investor Education, BPD, stated that was his office manager while he was the for the Investor Education Office, and that was the
office assistant. Advised that prior to his leaving on a temporary detail to the HRConnect office on August 22, 2005, the practice he used to account for his leave was emailing his supervisor, and also alerting or of days that he would take annual leave or sick leave. Stated that he had limited interaction with the web based system WebTA for tracking his leave, and relied on or to properly record his leave. Advised that he would either call or email or when he planned on using leave, and that they would ensure that it was charged properly. Advised that if he had annual leave available, he would regularly use it.

Initially advised that he did not remember taking any sick leave or annual leave while he was on detail to the HRConnect office between August 22, 2005, and January 7, 2006. When asked about specific dates, provided the following information about these specific dates:

- **Friday, September 30, 2005**
  Stated that he stayed at home because his son was sick, and did not recall if he had or but that he let his supervisor at the HRConnect office know that he would be taking that day off.

- **Wednesday, October 12, 2005**
  Stated that he did take the day as sick leave.

- **Friday, October 14, 2005**
  Advised that he did take leave to attend a wedding, and that he believed he phoned from his office phone at the HRConnect office.

- **Friday, October 28, 2005**
  Stated that he took the day as sick leave.

- **Monday, November 7, 2005 through Thursday, November 10, 2005**
  Stated that he was on BPD travel in November, but that he paid for the trip himself. Advised that he stayed at a Marriott Hotel in Ontario, California during the conference called the Portable Media Expo. Initially advised that he worked at the HRConnect office on Monday, believed he traveled to California on Tuesday, spoke at the conference on Thursday, and returned to Virginia on Friday. When shown the schedule for the Portable Media Expo, showing that it was on Friday and Saturday, November 11-12, 2005, and copies of his government cell phone records showing that he was in California from Sunday, November 6 through Saturday November 12, 2005, restated that he left for California on Sunday, November 6, 2005 and returned on Saturday, November 12, 2005. Said that his wife, also went to California and they had gone to Disneyland. Revised his prior statement,
and advised that he thought he had informed his supervisor that he was taking annual leave for the week of November 7, 2005, through November 10, 2005.

- **Wednesday, November 23, 2005**
  [Redacted] said he took a half day of leave.

- **Friday, November 25, 2005**
  [Redacted] said he did not go to work because he thought it was a holiday.

- **Friday, December 2, 2005**
  [Redacted] advised that he took this day as sick leave, and he called [Redacted] or [Redacted] advising them of his sick leave for that day; however, later during the interview, [Redacted] advised that he doubted that he called [Redacted] or [Redacted].

- **Friday, December 9, 2005**
  [Redacted] advised that he did not go to work on this day because of snow, and referred to the time as “liberal leave.”

- **Tuesday, December 13, 2005**
  [Redacted] stated that he did not go to work this day because his wife needed to go to the chiropractor.

- **Friday, December 16, 2005**
  [Redacted] said that he was at a doctors appointment all day, and he believed that he had called [Redacted] or [Redacted] to let them know he planned to take leave.

- **Thursday, December 22, 2005**
  [Redacted] advised that he took this day as annual leave, and believed that he called [Redacted].

- **Friday, December 23, 2005**
  [Redacted] advised that he took this day as annual leave, and believed that he called [Redacted].

- **Friday, December 30, 2005**
  [Redacted] stated that he took this day off to attend a conference, and [Redacted] believed that he notified [Redacted] through email or telephone.

- **Friday, January 6, 2006**
  [Redacted] advised that he did not go to work on this day due to plumbing problems, and he thought he called [Redacted] or [Redacted] advising them.
said that he needed people to explain how time was supposed to be accounted for so that he could conduct himself accordingly. said that he usually telephoned or e-mailed and when he was taking leave. estimated that 75%-80% of the time he took annual leave or sick leave during his detail to the HRConnect office he notified or . stated that he knew that he was on a temporary detail to HRConnect and that the BPD was still tracking his time and attendance. stated that or validated his leave while he was on the detail, and that he loosely ensured that his time and attendance was being accurately recorded and certified. stated while he was on the temporary detail to HRConnect, replaced as his permanent supervisor at the BPD. advised that his method of tracking annual leave and sick leave when was his supervisor was by notifying and when he would be taking leave. stated that when he returned from the temporary detail, told him to use WebTA to request and track his leave. said that he occasionally certified his leave on WebTA prior to him leaving for the temporary detail, and that WebTA was not foreign to him. stated that and would usually enter his time into WebTA for him. referred to his time being "fluid," but that he did communicate adequately regarding his leave. stated that his error was in not keeping track of his annual leave, and that it wasn’t tracked as closely as it should have been. stated that he always tried to notify people of his leave, but that at times he did not. said that there were dates when he did take annual leave and sick leave that weren’t recorded properly. said that he was not as precise as he wanted to be, but that he should have been more precise. said that he thought the either the HRConnect office or BPD was recording his time, and that he thought as long as he notified someone it would be tracked. said that he tracked his leave by periodically requesting what his leave balance was from .

Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia declined to pursue prosecution of in lieu of administrative action. (Exhibit 19)

signed from BPD effective February 19, 2006. (Exhibit 20)

FINDINGS: The allegation that committed time and attendance fraud was substantiated. The investigation found that was compensated for 224 hours of government time he fraudulently claimed.

RECOMMENDATION/DISPOSITION: The allegation that committed time and attendance fraud was substantiated. resigned from BPD on February 19, 2006. It is recommended that absent further information, no further
investigative actions are conducted into this matter at this time and, with the approval of this memorandum, this investigation is concluded.

EXHIBITS

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Hotline complaint e-mail, dated November 18, 2005.</td>
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</table>

15. Memorandum of Activity, review of [redacted] e-mail, dated December 27, 2005.


Approved: [Signature]  

Special Agent in Charge: [Signature]  

10/19/2007
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT: DECEMBER 02, 2008
REPORT STATUS: FINAL
CASE NUMBER: 2006-0087
CASE TITLE: National Bank Examiner, OCC

PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)
31 C.F.R. § 0.213; General conduct prejudicial to the government
5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (a) and (b); Standard of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Basic obligation of public service

SYNOPSIS
This case was initiated on December 15, 2005, upon receipt of correspondence from President, Admiral Family Banks. The correspondence contained documents which related to allegations that National Bank Examiner, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), was prejudice in his review of the National Family Bank in Munden, Kansas. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations were unfounded based upon a review by the Office of Audit.

Case Agent: Special Agent
Supervisory Approval: Special Agent In Charge

Page 1 of 3
DETAILS

A. Allegation: The OCC, was prejudice in his review of the National Family Bank in Munden, Kansas. He did not communicate with the appropriate individual at the National Family Bank. He applied inappropriate pressure to force the complainant to sell the National Family Bank.

B. Context/Background

On March 15, 2000, the Munden State Bank, a state-chartered bank, became National Family Bank, a nationally chartered bank, and changed its primary regulatory agency from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to OCC.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

A review of a Treasury OIG, Office of Audit, final audit report titled: OIG-06-045, OCC: Allegations Regarding Supervision of National Family Bank, relative to allegations that the OCC acted in a prejudicial manner during their supervision of the National Family Bank, found that the allegations were without merit. (Exhibit 2)

FINDINGS

The investigation determined that the allegations were unfounded based upon a review by the Office of Audit. The Office of Audit found that the OCC Examiner adhered to its policies and procedures for communicating with bank management. The Office of Audit found that the OCC Examiner also did not place undue pressure on the bank’s management to sell the bank. The Office of Audit also found that the OCC followed its policies and procedures while it conducted its enforcement actions. (Exhibit 2)

REFERRALS

A. Criminal

Not applicable

B. Civil

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Not applicable.

C. Administrative

Not Applicable.

**RECOMMENDATIONS/DISTRIBUTION**

Not Applicable.

**EXHIBITS**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Initial allegation, dated November 2, 2005.</td>
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MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: Assistant Special Agent in Charge (Acting)

SUBJECT: “Operation Subway”

OIG File Number: 2006-0126

On January 18, 2006, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) OIG received correspondence from the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of South Carolina, requesting this office assist in an investigation initiated by the Social Security Administration, Office of Inspector General (SSA-OIG) pertaining to allegations of bank fraud and money laundering at Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) regulated banks.

A Joint Task Force (Operation Subway) was established to investigate alleged money laundering through the bank accounts of several suspects with connections to Subway franchise restaurants located in South Carolina and Kentucky. The task force was comprised of the following agencies: TOIG, SSA-OIG, Federal Reserve Board, Office of Inspector General (FRB-OIG), the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), the United States Secret Service (USSS), the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), the Department of State Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) and the United States Marshal Service (USMS).

In July 2008, the USAO, District of South Carolina, advised the United States Attorney and the Assistant United States Attorney handling this case resigned from their respective positions to obtain other employment, thus placing the case on hold.

In August 2008, another AUSA was assigned to the case; however no new developments have occurred to date. This case continues awaiting indictment by the USAO, District of South Carolina.
As the result of changes in the Treasury Department's Office of Inspector General's priorities and objectives this investigation is being concluded. The SSA-OIG who has investigative authority in this matter will conclude this investigation. In the event additional information is developed in this matter, this case maybe re-examined to determine if further investigative activity by the Treasury OIG is warranted. Therefore, it is recommended that no further investigation be conducted by the Treasury OIG and with the approval of this memorandum, this investigation is closed.
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:
Special Agent

SUBJECT:
Liberty Dollars
OIG File Number 2006-0225

PREDICATION: The Treasury Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an inquiry on April 7, 2006, based upon receipt of correspondence from Deputy Sherriff , Polk County Sherriff’s Office, alleging is selling Liberty Dollars. (Exhibit 1)

ALLEGATION(S): is selling Liberty Dollars in Polk County, Florida, under the alleged approval of the Department of the Treasury.

VIOLATIONS(S):

- 18 USC 486, Uttering Coins of Gold, Silver or Other Metal.

SYNOPSIS of OIG ACTIVITY: The OIG interviewed Special Agent, United States Secret Service (USSS), Tampa, Florida. explained that her office never opened a case on the Liberty Dollar because the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) in Tampa, Florida, will not prosecute. (Exhibit 1)

The OIG then spoke with Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) USAO, Tampa, Florida. declined prosecution citing a lack of size and scope of the fraud. (Exhibit 2)

FINDINGS: The USSS, Tampa Office, did not open a case on this matter because it lacks prosecutorial merit. Additionally, the USAO has declined prosecution in the Middle District of Florida, citing a lack of size and scope of fraud.

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RECOMMENDATION/DISPOSITION: With the approval of this memorandum, this inquiry has been concluded.

EXHIBITS

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Approved:

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT

REPORT STATUS

FINAL

CASE NUMBER

2006-0255

CASE TITLE

Pertinent Statute(s), Regulation(s), and/or Policy(ies)

18 U.S.C. § 207; Restrictions on former officers, employees and elected officials of the executive and legislative branches

18 U.S.C. § 208; Acts affecting a personal financial interest

SYNOPSIS

This case was initiated on April 20, 2006, upon receipt of correspondence from Senate Banking Committee Correspondent. Forwarded a complaint regarding a possible conflict of interest involving a former employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The complainant alleged that the OCC is responsible for the oversight and examination of Key Bank, which was involved in the civil suit of his clients' Executive Vice President, Key Bank, was a former bank regulator and deputy comptroller of OCC. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations were unfounded.

Case Agent:

Special Agent

Supervisory Approval:

David S. Smith, Special Agent in Charge

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Office of the Inspector General - Investigations
Department of the Treasury
DETAILS

A. Allegation: Executive Vice President, Key Bank, had a conflict of interest because of his former employment with the OCC, which is responsible for the oversight and examination of Key Bank.

B. Context/Background

From the OCC as a deputy comptroller on September 27, 1990. Upon separation, joined Ameritrust Corporation as a senior vice president in 1990. In 1994, Key Corporation took over Ameritrust Corporation, and became chief risk officer. (Exhibit 2)

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

Senior Advisor / OIG Liaison, OCC, provided documents related to the OCC’s response to the complainant’s allegation. Also provided OCC documentation reflecting that left the OCC in 1990. Provided an e-mail thread which included an assessment by Chief Counsel, OCC, that the allegation of conflict of interest is “spurious.” (Exhibit 2)

During an interview, Examiner in Charge, OCC, stated he was the Examiner in Charge of Key Bank in Cleveland, Ohio, between 2003 and the fall of 2007. Explained that his duties included overseeing a team of examiners who examined the books and records of Key Bank. Stated that was a key point of contact during examination because he acted as the Chief Risk Officer before becoming the General Auditor. Stated he knew that had left the OCC in the early 1990’s, and that was “long removed from OCC.” Stated the “cooling off period” did not apply at the time was at Key Bank. Stated there was “unequivocally no interference” or attempt to manipulate OCC’s responsibility for oversight and examination by stated he was not aware of Key Bank’s business with TAB Express International as it related to student loans for flight training, but stated that would not have been the point of contact at Key Bank for that matter, but instead it would be the lending unit itself. Stated the OCC examination teams relationship was no different with than with an official at any other bank under examination. Stated the OCC did not conduct any “special or unique investigation” of Key Bank. Stated OCC’s involvement with Key...
Bank was related to the routine bank examination process. stated OCC had ongoing routine supervision activities related to Key Bank with OCC’s assigned resident staff. (Exhibits 3 and 4)

During an interview, Senior Counsel/Ethics Officer, OCC, stated after reviewing the complaint against that based upon her review of the complaint, there was no conflict of interest between the OCC and stated that had been gone “many years,” and that there was no current relationship between and OCC. stated that the complaints allegations regarding a conflict based upon giving congressional testimony were not pertinent because many OCC employees often provide congressional testimony as part of their official duties. (Exhibit 5)

FINDINGS

The investigation determined that the allegations were unfounded.

REFERRALS

A. Criminal
Not applicable

B. Civil
Not applicable.

C. Administrative
Not Applicable.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISTRIBUTION

Senate Banking Committee Correspondent, United States Senate.
### EXHIBITS

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<td>Initial allegation, dated April 13, 2006.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [redacted], dated October 24, 2008.</td>
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## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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<th>DATE OF REPORT</th>
<th>APR 21 2009</th>
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<td>REPORT STATUS</td>
<td>FINAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASE NUMBER</td>
<td>2006-0497</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASE TITLE</td>
<td>Project Manager (Former) Paradigm Solutions Corporations President and Chief Executive Officer Reid’s and Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)</td>
<td>Title 18 U.S.C. § 201—Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses. 5 C.F.R. 2635.101—Basic obligation of public service states.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## SYNOPSIS

This inquiry was initiated on September 28, 2006, based on information received from an anonymous complainant who alleged an unethical relationship between an Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) contractor and subcontractor at the OCC Data Center in Landover, MD. It was alleged that Project Manager (Former), Paradigm Solutions Corporations (Paradigm) accepted bribes and/or kickbacks from President and Chief Executive Officer, Reid’s and Associates, in exchange for business opportunities with Paradigm.
The information gathered during the course of this inquiry determined that purchased an airline ticket for to visit the Dominican Republic in or around July 2006. This investigation revealed that did not have hiring or termination authority, nor did she have the authority to approve or disprove project funding on the behalf of Paradigm. However, since is not a Treasury employee and had no influence or ability to influence a Treasury contract, it is recommended that this investigative matter be concluded.

DETAILS

A. Allegation – Inappropriate Conduct by OCC contractors.

B. Context – Background

It was alleged that accepted bribes and/or kickbacks from an exchange for business.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

Interview of Eric Reid

stated during the interview that he worked at the OCC Data Center as a 1099 independent contractor since 1998. stated that in 2003, OCC announced a solicitation for a contractor to consolidate the separate projects at the Data Center. After Paradigm won the bid (contract), stated that was assigned to OCC by Paradigm as the Project Manager during the middle of his negotiations with Paradigm. stated that did not assist him in obtaining a sub-contract with Paradigm. did, however, state that he developed a friendship with during the time she was assigned to the OCC Data Center. stated that he would socialize with and her family outside of the OCC. also stated that he paid for ’s vacation to the Dominican Republic, in July 2006, to visit his family farm. stated that he did not purchase ’s airline ticket in an effort to bribe her for more business or a sub-contract with Paradigm.

stated that asked him if he paid for ’s vacation to the Dominican Republic. stated that he initially denied paying for ’s vacation or airline ticket to protect from being terminated. stated
that he did not want to get into any trouble, so he decided to lie to (Exhibit 2)

Interview of

On February 26, 2009, Special Agent (SA) Treasury-OIG, contacted via telephone. SA informed that the interview was voluntary and she could terminate the interview at any time. agreed to meet Treasury-OIG agents the following afternoon, but later cancelled. did, however, provide SA with unsolicited information regarding the allegation and inappropriate business practices between Paradigm and OCC over the telephone.

stated that she was not in a position to award any subcontractor with work or positions on a contract at OCC. She did, however, state that the first time she went to the Dominican Republic, she went with some co-workers and friends (including stated that she did not do anything unethical, but she did observe some unethical practices between OCC officials and contractors. stated that she developed a friendship with and his family, while she was assigned to the OCC, but she did not assist in obtaining a subcontract agreement with Paradigm. also stated that went behind her back and met with senior level management at Paradigm to acquire a subcontract agreement. went on to state that she is no longer friends with because of his business practices. (Exhibit 3)

Interview of and

stated that there was a rumor that President of & Associates and & Associates Project Manager went to the Dominican Republic together. However, stated that he did not think it was an issue. stated that he did not think it was an issue because was not in a position to influence a sub-contract agreement between Paradigm and & Associates. stated that did not have the authority to approve or disapprove any Paradigm contracts. stated that he believed that had a sub-contract agreement with & Associates, prior to being assigned to the OCC Data Center. stated that should have informed Paradigm that she had a personal relationship with and recused herself from Reid & Associates.
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Vice President of Human Resources & Compliance confirmed the information provided by the Ethics Official for Paradigm, stated was not in position to influence an OCC or Paradigm contract. In addition, agreed to provide OIG with a copy of the Paradigm Authority Matrix and Program Manager job description at a later date. (Exhibit 4)

Document Receipt / Review

On March 23, 2009, forward a copy of the Program Manager Position description and authority matrix for Paradigm via email to Treasury-OIG. Based on the Program Manager Position description and the authority matrix for Paradigm, former Program Manager, Paradigm did not have the authority to approve a sub-contract agreement. Additionally, did not have the authority to approve or recommend more funding for Paradigm projects or contracts. (Exhibit 5)

EXHIBITS

1. Original allegation, Correspondence, dated September 28, 2006.


SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT
REPORT STATUS Final = FEB 18 2009
CASE NUMBER 2007-0123
CASE TITLE Supervisory Police Officer, TR-0083-12, U.S. Mint, Denver, CO
Supervisory Police Officer, TR-0083-10 U.S. Mint, Denver, CO
Other Unidentified Employees U.S. Mint, Denver, CO
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES) 5 C.F.R. § 735.201 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Restrictions on Gambling.

SYNOPSIS

In December 2006, the Treasury Office of Inspector General (TOIG) received an anonymous allegation concerning gambling by U.S. Mint Police Officers at the U.S. Mint facility in Denver, CO. The anonymous complainant specifically identified Inspector as a participant in the gambling pools. The investigation substantiated that gambling pools have been operating at the U.S. Mint in Denver, CO for a number of years. Our investigation did not identify that was involved

Case Agent: Special Agent
(Signature)

Supervisory Approval: David S. Smith Special Agent In Charge
(Signature)

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in any of the gambling pools. The anonymous complainant also alleged that Lt. was unprofessional in his actions during roll call. As there was insufficient information contained in the anonymous complaint to substantiate the need for an investigation into this issue, it was not addressed by this investigation. (Exhibit 1)

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

As a result of our investigation into this issue, it was determined that there have been a variety of gambling pools at the U.S. Mint for several years. The three varieties of gambling pools identified were, Baby Pools, Football (college and National Football League) Pools and Fantasy Football Pools. In each of these pools, it appeared that some part of the gambling activity took place on U.S. Government property at the U.S. Mint in Denver, CO. The investigation did not identify any information that indicated that was involved in the gambling activity. (Exhibit 2)

DISTRIBUTION

Edmund C. Moy, Director, United States Mint
## EXHIBITS

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MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: [Redacted]
Assistant Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: OIG File Number 2007-0230

This investigation was initiated to assist the Social Security Administration (SSA) - Office of Inspector General (OIG) in recovering SSA benefit funds inappropriately paid to the identified subject(s). This office is no longer participating in the recovery efforts of inappropriately paid SSA benefit funds and as such, this investigation is being administratively closed with the submission of this Memorandum to File.

Upon the receipt of any additional information received from SSA - OIG as to the final disposition of their investigation into this matter, a supplemental Memorandum of Activity will be included in the Treasury Office of Inspector General case file.
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT

REPORT STATUS Final

CASE NUMBER 2007-0328

CASE TITLE Black Patriots Memorial Foundation and of the

PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)

Title 18 USC § 641 – Public money, property or records

Title 18 USC 1001 – False Statements


SYNOPSIS

This case was initiated upon the receipt of correspondence from the General Counsel's Office, United States Mint (USM), regarding possible misuse of USM funds from the Coin Surcharge Program by a group named Black Patriots Memorial Foundation (BPMF). The USM advised that the organization received approximately $902,000.00 in USM funds from the sale of commemorative coins, as authorized by Congress, and disbanded without providing the requisite annual “Audited Financial Opinion.” (Exhibits 1, 2)

The resulting United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI) investigation revealed that no members of the Black Patriots Memorial Foundation (BPMF) profited from any of the $902,000.00 of USM funds. However, the investigation did reveal that some of the USM funds were not used in accordance with Public Law 108-15—APR 23,
2003, which required the funds from the proceeds of the USM Coin Surcharge Program be used solely for the purpose of the construction of the Black Patriots Memorial on the National Mall.

DETAILS

I. Allegation: Members of the BPMF utilized funds from the USM for purposes other than allowed on USM funds raised by the Coin Surcharge Program noted in Public Law 108-15—APR 23, 2003.

II. Context/Background: On April 9, 2007, the OIG/CI interviewed USM, said that the BPMF lobbied congress to authorize the creation of a commemorative coin for the group to assist with fund raising efforts to build a memorial to The Black Revolutionary War Patriots on the National Mall. After securing Congressional approval, the USM struck the coin in which 112,280 coins were sold and netted approximately $902,758.00. said that on August 14, 2003, the USM made a payment of $902,758.00 to the BPMF. said that after the USM made the initial and only payment, the organization failed to file the requisite annual “Audited Financial Opinion” statement. Further research indicated that the organization appears to have disbanded. (Exhibit 2)

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

The investigation was worked jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). During the course of this investigation, and at the direction of the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), numerous interviews were conducted with ex-members and officials of the BPMF. Additional interviews were conducted with accountants and government officials. In addition, Grand Jury records have been requested and received regarding the BPMF, and several accounting firms. As a result of these interviews and Grand jury records, was identified in this investigation. (Exhibits 3,4,5,6,7)

Interview

On April 9, 2007, the OIG/CI interviewed USM, Coin Surcharge Program. said that the BPMF lobbied congress to authorize the creation of a commemorative coin for the group to assist with fund raising efforts
to build a memorial to The Black Revolutionary War Patriots on the National Mall. The organization won Congressional approval, and the USM struck a coin which raised approximately $902,000.00 that was subsequently paid to the organization. However, said the organization failed to file the requisite annual “Audited Financial Opinion” statements with the USM. said his research indicates that the organization appears to have disbanded. also indicated that appeared to be involved in the organizations passage of the coin program. also said that appeared to have re-established efforts to build a memorial to the Black Patriots of the Revolutionary War. said the new name of the group is called the National Mall Liberty Fund DC. (Exhibit 1)

Interview

On April 20, 2007, the OIG/OI interviewed , National Park Service. said that beginning in 1986, the BPMF lobbied congress to authorize the creation of a memorial to the Black Revolutionary War Patriots on the National Mall. The organization won Congressional approval, and a final design was authorized and land was set aside by the National Park Service to build the memorial. said the organization failed to file the 2003, requisite annual “Audited Financial Opinion” statements with the USM. said the organization appeared to be in arrears on every financial report. said the site design, and the approval, for the memorial was valid for seven years, with a two year extension, during the period of October 27, 1996 thru October 27, 2005. said that the organization failed to raise the required matching funds during the nine year approval time frame. (Exhibit 4)

provided the names of two of the previous board members of the organization. According to was the and was a contentious board member that was unhappy with the leadership of the organization at that time. said that in 2003, a public law was passed that made the land previously set aside to build the Black Revolutionary War Patriots Memorial; part of a restricted area of the National Mall called the “Reserve.” said the Black Revolutionary War Patriots organization appeared to have disbanded in 2003. said that has re-organized the effort to build a memorial for the Black Revolutionary War Patriots at the same site on the National Mall. said the new organization is named the National Mall Liberty Fund DC. said the National Park Service is opposed to building
the memorial because the previously approved area is now part of the National Mall "Reserve." also said the National Park Service was also opposed because the National Mall Liberty Fund, DC President, was affiliated with the Black Revolutionary War Patriots Memorial organization which, had a long history of not being able to raise matching funds to build the memorial.

Interview

On July 24, 2007, the OIG/OI interviewed , the former of the BPMF, said that he left the organization in 2002, after his wife became seriously ill and passed away in 2003. After his wife passed, he lost interest and contact with the organization which made him unaware of the daily activities of the organization. never received a salary or any money from the BPMF during his tenure. However, claimed he contributed approximately $25,000.00 to $35,000.00 of personal funds to the organization and their mission. As part of his responsibilities as a board member, solicited funds from large corporations and prominent individuals to help fund the project. recalled one occasion where he solicited and received a contribution in the form of a check in the amount of $700,000.00 from , the of General Motors (GM) on behalf of GM. said these contributions were used to pay the day to day operating expenses of the organization including the salary of several staff members. (Exhibit 5)

said the purpose of the non-profit organization was to construct a memorial on the National Mall to recognize the 5,000 black slaves that fought during the Revolutionary War. The organization won Congressional approval, and the USM struck a coin for the organization and raised approximately $902,000.00 which was paid to the BPMF used to construct a smaller model of the memorial and the actual memorial on the National Mall. stated he was no longer a member when the BPMF received the $902,000.00 from the Mint. said that during the time he was a member, the group always appeared to be "strapped for cash." was aware that the money raised by the USM from the sale of the commemorative coins was to be used in a restrictive manner.

identified , as the person who controlled the money for the organization during the time period in question and stated that should be contacted for any questions concerning the organization’s financial transactions.
Additionally, [redacted] said he was personally unaware of any illegal or fraudulent activities associated with the organization.

**Interview**

On November 14, 2007, the OIG/OI interviewed [redacted] at his residence in [redacted], NC. [redacted] said he was the former [redacted] of the BPMF. [redacted] said that while he was [redacted] of the BPMF, he was not aware of any disbursement of any funds associated with USM funds. [redacted] said he volunteered all of his services to the BPMF. [redacted] said he never received any money from the BPMF. [redacted] said that he was not aware of any restrictions on the uses of the USM funds. [redacted] said that [redacted] controlled all of the money that was spent by the BPMF, and that [redacted] should have been aware of restrictions on the USM money because she is an attorney. [redacted] said he was aware that [redacted] approved the purchase of a miniature version of the memorial. [redacted] said the miniature version of the memorial was produced by a sculptor named [redacted] for a purchase price of $125,000.00. (Exhibit 6)

**Interview**

[redacted] ([redacted]), H. B. Lazar Business Service, advised that her firm conducted the payroll services for the BPMF. [redacted] said that when she started doing the book keeping for the BPMF in 2002, the records provided to her were “in shambles”. [redacted] said she used past bank account statements of the BPMF to create a meaningful ledger. [redacted] said most of her dealings with the BPMF were with a [redacted] named [redacted] who said that [redacted] was on a salary from the BPMF and she was the authorizing official on an American Express credit card. [redacted] said that [redacted] used the American Express card to pay for numerous airline tickets and “shopping type items” on those trips. [redacted] also said that [redacted] would authorize large sums of money to pay for numerous consultants. [redacted] said that the BPMF stopped paying her for her book keeping services in 2005. [redacted] said the BPMF still owes her firm approximately $700.00. [redacted] said she made numerous attempts to contact [redacted] and other members of the BPMF to have them pick up their records. [redacted] said that when she could not get a forwarding address to mail the records, that she shredded all the BPMF records. [redacted] said she had to shred the records because of storage problems. [redacted] said that her firm currently does not have any of the BPMF records. [redacted] did mention that the BPMF did have sizeable cache of gold coins stored in an unknown vault. [redacted] said she was aware of the gold coins because she had heard different
members of the BPMF talking about the gold coins. She said she also heard some BPMF members talking about some of the coins were missing after an inventory. (Exhibit 7)

Interview

[Redacted] said she started as a consultant with the BPMF as a consultant during November of 2002. [Redacted] later became the President of the BPMF, after the previous President passed away. She was paid from June 2003, thru October 31, 2005. was paid $75,000.00 to $85,000.00 per year to serve as President of the BPMF. was paid by a book keeping firm named ADP Services via electronic deposit. was later paid in the form of paper checks when the bookkeeping firm changed. affirmed that she was President of the BPMF when the 902,758.00 arrived from the USM. was unaware that the money from the USM came with any restrictions. said the USM money was co-mingled with other funds solicited from private firms and individuals. The money was used to promote the BPMF, raise additional funds, and to pay the daily operational expenses of the BPMF. said a friend mentioned that the Mint money might have some restrictions. called a CPA, from the accounting firm Regardie Brooks and Lewis to ask about restrictions on the Mint money. said called the USM Legal Counsel, and was advised that the USM money did not have any restrictions. When asked, could not provide a date, time or who talked to at the USM. said $125,000.00 of the USM money was paid to a sculptor named to build a scale model of the memorial. The scale model of the memorial was built and delivered to the BPMF sometime in 2004. later described the relationship between sculptor and the BPMF becoming tenuous. (Exhibit 8)

In May of 2005, she was telephonically contacted by an individual who said his name was [Redacted], who claimed to be a Revenue Agent with the Internal Revenue Service. wanted to verify the tax exempt status of the BPMF. faxed her forms that had Internal Revenue Service letterhead requesting financial information. said she complied, and faxed back the BPMF financial information which was readily available. When she could not find all of the information requested, she contacted the BPMF bookkeeping firm of H B Lazar Business Services. She was advised by the owner, [Redacted], that the BPMF records had been shredded because of non payment from the BPMF.
said the BPMF was constantly looking for sources of donations to help pay the operating cost of the BPMF. She was contacted by an individual named who claimed to be an off-shore investor that specialized in helping groups like the BPMF in soliciting funds. claimed to have helped the Seventh Day Adventist Church raise millions of dollars.

Interview

On March 25, 2009 the OIG/Or interviewed Senior Accountant, Regardie Brooks and Lewis, indicated that he prepared the 2003 tax return for the BPMF. said he remembered the BPMF did not provide him with the documents he needed to prepare the 2003 tax return until December of 2004. said he has had numerous conversations with said that he never advised on how to spend the proceeds USM. said he could not remember making the phone call to the USM Legal Counsel. also provided a copy of the 2003 tax return for the BPMF. (Exhibit 9)

On July 23, 2008, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). declined criminal prosecution due to the "lack of criminal intent" and the impending expiration of the Statute of Limitations which was set to occur on August 14, 2008. It should be noted, that the facts of this investigation were not provided to the OIG/Or until April 4, 2007, approximately three (3) years and seven (7) months after the USM failed to receive the requisite annual "Audited Financial Opinion" from the Black Patriots Memorial Foundation. (Exhibits 10, 11)

FINDINGS

The resulting investigation could not substantiate allegations against any member of the BPMF for knowingly misusing the USM funds. However, the investigation did reveal that some of the USM funds were not used in accordance with Public Law 108-15—APR 23, 2003, which required the funds from the proceeds of the Coin Surcharge Program to be used solely for the purpose of the construction of the memorial.
REFERRALS

I. Criminal

This case was referred and accepted by the USAO for the District of Columbia. However, on July 23, 2008, the case was declined for prosecution because of the lack of evidence proving criminal intent and the impending statute of limitations.

On July 22, 2008, this matter was referred to the [redacted] for potential criminal violations against [redacted].

DISTRIBUTION

Director, United States Mint
Director of Security, United States Mint
### EXHIBITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT: MAR 16 2009
REPORT STATUS: Final
CASE NUMBER: 2007-0378
CASE TITLE: Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Washington, DC Possession of Partially Shredded $20 FRN

SYNOPSIS

On May 10, 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (TOIG) initiated a case based on an electronic mail correspondence received from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) regarding a partially shredded $20 Federal Reserve Note listed for auction by Heritage Auction Galleries, Dallas, Texas.

In response to IG subpoena #322 issued in November 2007, records identified Austin, Texas as the consigner of the subject partially shredded note. (Exhibit 1)

Anthony J. Scott, Special Agent

David Smith, Special Agent In Charge

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Investigation revealed no record of being ever worked for the BEP (Exhibit 2).

In May 2008, [redacted] was contacted via telephone by TOIG and requested to release the subject item to TOIG. [redacted] refused to comply.

In July 2008, [redacted] was contacted via registered mail by TOIG and advised conveyance of the subject item by auction or other means may constitute a violation of Federal law. [redacted] was again asked to release the subject item to TOIG. [redacted] never responded. (Exhibit 3)

In February 2009, [redacted] Investigator, BEP, informed the TOIG via memorandum that the BEP would not pursue further action for the return of the subject item and was closing its case. (Exhibit 4)

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

Investigation has determined that it is not possible to determine how or when the subject partially shredded $20 FRN was removed from the BEP. Furthermore, it could not be determined if the note was removed by illegal means or passed through a shredder without being fully mutilated. It is recommended that upon approval of this report, this case be closed.

EXHIBITS

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>MOA of SA</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Letter addressed to Mr.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Memorandum from BEP</td>
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[Redacted information]

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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT
REPORT STATUS Final
CASE NUMBER 2007-0379
CASE TITLE Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Washington, DC
Possession of "Foreign Currency: Philippines 20 Pesos Philippine National Bank Circulating Note Face Proof 1919"
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES) Title 18 USC § 641 – Theft of public money, property or records

SYNOPSIS

On May 7, 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (TOIG) initiated a case based on an electronic mail correspondence received from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) regarding a "Foreign Currency: Philippines 20 Pesos Philippine National Bank Circulating Note Face Proof 1919" listed for auction by Heritage Auction Galleries, Dallas, Texas.

In response to IG subpoena #332 issued in November 2007, records identified Jubilee Coins, Moline, Illinois as the consigner of the subject proof. (Exhibit 1)

Case Agent: [Signature]
Special Agent

Supervisory Approval: [Signature]
David Smith
Special Agent in Charge

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Office of the Inspector General - Investigations
Department of the Treasury
Investigation revealed no record of [redacted] having ever worked for the BEP (Exhibit 2).

In July 2008, [redacted] was contacted via registered mail by TOIG and advised conveyance of the subject item by auction or other means may constitute a violation of Federal law. [redacted] was requested to release the subject item to TOIG. (Exhibit 3)

In August 2008, [redacted] authorized Heritage Auctions, Inc. Dallas, Texas, to release the subject 20 Peso Pilipino Proof to the TOIG for examination. On August 15, 2008, the TOIG received possession of the subject proof via FedEx. The 20 Peso Pilipino Proof was subsequently turned over to the BEP to determine its authenticity. (Exhibit 4)

In December 2008, [redacted] Investigator, BEP, informed the TOIG via memorandum that the subject proof is "property that is exclusive to the United States government and was removed by illegal or unauthorized means from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing's Washington, D.C. facility." (Exhibit 5)

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

The investigation has determined that it is not possible to determine how or when the subject "Foreign Currency: Philippines 20 Pesos Philippine National Bank Circulating Note Face Proof 1919" was removed from the BEP. However, the investigation was able to secure and return the item to the rightful owner, the BEP. It is recommended that upon approval of this report, this case be closed.

EXHIBITS

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<td>2.</td>
<td>MOA of SA, Treasury OIG, dated November 28, 2007</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Letter addressed to Mr. [redacted], Moline, Illinois, dated July 31, 2008</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Letter from Mr. [redacted], Moline, Illinois, dated August 5, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Memorandum from BEP, dated November 13, 2009</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT:  MAR 3  2006
REPORT STATUS:  Final
CASE NUMBER:  2007-0468
CASE TITLE:  GS - 13, Supervisory Computer Specialist, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Western Currency Facility, Forth Worth, TX
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES):  Title 18 USC § 113 - Assaults within maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
5 C.F.R. 735.203, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government
31 C.F.R. 0.210, Conduct while on official duty or on Government property

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated on July 30, 2007, based on information received from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) alleging that GS - 13, Supervisory Computer Specialist, BEP, Western Currency Facility (WCF), assaulted Equal Employee Opportunity Assistant, BEP, by pulling her hair on July 5, 2007, and sometime in April 2007. (Exhibit 1, 2)

The investigation determined that _____ and _____ were conversing in the main entrance hallway at the BEP, Western Currency Facility on July 5, 2007, and video surveillance revealed that during their interaction, _____ grabbed by her hair and pulled her head down towards the floor. Also, _____ admitted in a written sworn affidavit that he “flicked” _____ hairs during their interaction on

Case Agent:  
__________________________
( Signature )

Supervisory Approval:  
__________________________
( Signature )

Office of the Inspector General - Investigations
Department of the Treasury
that date; however, denied pulling her hair. Therefore, the allegation of improper conduct is sustained against ___.

The investigation did not reveal any evidence that ___ assaulted ___ in April 2007. (Exhibits 2, 5, 6, 7)

DETAILS

I. Allegation – Improper conduct by a BEP employee.

A. Context - Background

On July 27, 2007, ___ Supervisory Investigator, Special Projects and Investigation Section, Office of Security, BEP, reported that he received information from the BEP, Western Currency Facility, regarding an alleged assault of ___ on July 5, 2007. He also reported that ___ alleged she had been previously assaulted by ___ in April 2007.

On July 24, 2007, the BEP initiated an investigation into ___ accusations; however, suspended their investigation due to the Treasury OIG assumption of jurisdiction. On August 16, 2007, the BEP provided the Treasury OIG with a copy of their final report in which substantiated that ___ assaulted ___ on July 5, 2007. However, we did not find evidence to substantiate the allegation that he assaulted ___ in April 2007. (Exhibit 1, 2)

B. Investigative Activity

Interview of Paula Rathers

During an interview, ___ stated that on July 5, 2007, she decided to go to the canteen to get something to drink. According to ___ as she walked toward the canteen via the main entrance hallway, she noticed ___ walking towards her from the opposite direction. ___ said that she and ___ exchanged pleasantries, and then ___ stated that he was on his way to get a turkey sandwich from another staff member and did not want to be late.
said that she told that he needed to be careful because of his position at the BEP. According to commented in a playful manner, "You are jealous because there is nothing a black woman can do for me." said that at that time, looked over her shoulders and said, "The only thing a black woman can do is put that 'horse shit' in their hair." said that grabbed a handful of her hair and pulled her head almost to his waist. said that she told to stop and he released her hair.

reported that after pulled her hair she noticed that Human Resources Specialist, BEP, was in the hallway and witnessed pulling her hair. further reported that pulled her hair in April 2007, while she stood in the hallway by post 15 conversing with Systems Accountant, BEP. (Exhibit 3)

**Interview of**

During an interview reported that she witnessed pulling's hair near the BEP seal located in the WCF atrium on July 5, 2007. reported that placed her hand over ' hand in an effort to stop him from pulling her hair. According to , she considered the interaction between and as mutually playful. said that did not appear to be in distress or she would have intervened. reported that she had witnessed playful hitting (banter) between and in the past and considered their interaction as normal. (Exhibit 3)

**Interview of**

During an interview reported that she recalled conversing with in the hallway near BEP WCF Police Post 15 in April 2007. also said that she recalled interjecting into their conversation. According to , she did not recall pulling's hair or any other physical contact during their conversation. (Exhibit 4)

**Video Analysis**

Video surveillance obtained from the BEP, WCF, captured and conversing in the main entrance hallway on July 5, 2007. Video surveillance revealed that during their interaction, grabbed by her hair and
pulled her head down towards the floor. Video surveillance recordings for the months of April 2007, and May 2007, did not reveal an assault on [redacted] by [redacted]. (Exhibits 2, 5, 6)

Interview of [redacted]

During an interview, [redacted] reported that during his employment with the BEP he and [redacted] had established a jovial relationship. According to [redacted], in July 2007, he met [redacted] in the main entrance hallway and engaged in "trash talk" with her. [redacted] said during their conversation he informed [redacted] that if she did not leave him alone, he would snatch the fake ponytail off of her head. [redacted] said that as he and [redacted] continued to talk he reached up and flicked [redacted] ponytail.

[redacted] said that after he flicked [redacted] ponytail they proceeded to walk towards the atrium, and once in the atrium area [redacted] again started the "trash talk." [redacted] said that he again flicked [redacted] ponytail. According to [redacted] he witnessed the incident and laughed. (Exhibit 7)

C. FINDING: Based on the evidence and information gathered during this investigation it was determined that on July 5, 2007 [redacted] assaulted [redacted] by pulling her hair. The investigation did not reveal evidence that [redacted] assaulted [redacted] in April 2007.

D. RECOMMENDATION/DISPOSITION: The allegation is determined to be substantiated. It is recommended that, absent any further information, no further investigative action is conducted and with the approval of this Report of Investigation, this investigation is concluded.

REFERRALS

I. Criminal:

Based on the aforementioned information, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted], United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Texas, declined to prosecute [redacted] due to lack of criminal intent, and returned the case to the Department of the Treasury for any administrative action deemed appropriate. (Exhibit 8)
II. Administrative

The Report of Investigation will be forwarded to BEP for its review.
**EXHIBITS**

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<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity regarding receipt of DVD with CCTV recordings from April 26, until May 2, 2007.</td>
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</table>

**DISTRIBUTION**

Scott Wilson, Associate Director, BEP
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: [Redacted]
Special Agent

SUBJECT: [Redacted]
Police Officer
United States Mint

Case Number: 2007-0504

On August 30, 2007, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a complaint alleging that [Redacted], Police Sergeant, United States Mint (USM), possessed and showed a co-worker topless photographs of her 14 year old daughter.

On August 30, 2007, Special Agent [Redacted], Treasury OIG, telephonically interviewed [Redacted], Chief of Police, USM - West Point. [Redacted] advised that he received an allegation that [Redacted] was showing topless photographs of her 14 year old daughter to [Redacted], Detective, USM Police.

On August 30, 2007, [Redacted] prepared a written statement outlining the facts of the incident. [Redacted] reported that [Redacted] was showing her pictures from a recent vacation she took in the Dominican Republic. [Redacted] indicated that some of the photographs were of [Redacted]'s daughter, who appeared to be wearing a bathing suit. However, after further viewing, [Redacted] realized that [Redacted]'s daughter was topless and her hair was covering her breasts. [Redacted] questioned [Redacted] about the pictures and [Redacted] explained that the photographs were taken by a professional photographer at the hotel. [Redacted] notified Chief [Redacted] of the incident. [Redacted] advised [Redacted] to tell [Redacted] the photographs were inappropriate for the workplace and should be removed. [Redacted] agreed and
never saw the photographs again, nor was she aware of any further incident(s) involving them.

In accordance with the investigative discretion of this office, it is recommended that absent additional information concerning the alleged conduct, no further investigation be conducted and this inquiry be concluded.

Approved:

[Signature]

Special Agent in Charge (Acting)
Washington, DC
## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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<tr>
<th>DATE OF REPORT</th>
<th>FEB 04 2009</th>
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<td>FINAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASE NUMBER</td>
<td>2008-0012</td>
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| CASE TITLE    | (Retired) United States Mint Police Officer  
United States Mint, Denver, Colorado |
| PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES) | 18 USC § 641 Theft of Government Property.  
31 C.F.R. 0.208 Falsification of Official Records. |

### SYNOPSIS

This case was initiated on January 30, 2008, based upon information provided by Ombudsperson, United States Mint (USM), USM Headquarters, stating several anonymous sources had complained that a former USM Police Officer, and Local Union and National Mint Council President, improperly claimed night differential, overtime, and premium pay on time and attendance records he submitted during his tenure as a USM union official from 1997, until his retirement from the USM on September 30, 2007. (Exhibit 1)

This investigation was unable to substantiate any criminal liability pertaining to Wikberg.

---

*Case Agent:*

[Signature]

*Supervisory Approval:*

[Signature]

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INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On March 14, 2008, Senior Legal Advisor, USM Headquarters, was interviewed and provided several documents pertinent to this investigation. Records provided indicate was authorized to submit time and attendance records reflecting his initial shift as a USM Police Officer, while working a regular shift as Mint Council provided a copy of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed December 5, 1995, between the USM and AFGE Local 695 stating employees regularly assigned to a night shift shall continue to receive his/her regular night shift differential during a "temporary" assignment to a shift with a lower differential, when such an assignment is made for the convenience of management. The MOU states this intent is to provide appropriate arrangements for employees who are adversely affected by Management’s exercise of its authority. Furthermore, in paragraph (3) the MOU states, "...will be assigned to the current day shift with no loss in his normal schedule night differential and/or Sunday Premium Pay.” also provided a memorandum dated March 18, 2008, documenting the history of events from 1999 to 2005, involving USM management’s decision on allowing to claim his night differential and pre/post shift overtime. (Exhibit 9)

position as the AFGE was considered “temporary” in nature, due to his re-election to this position every three years.

On March 14, 2008, Personal Security Specialist, USM Police, Denver, Colorado, provided a faxed copy of a memorandum provided to her office for concerning pay issues regarding while acting in his role as US Mint Councilman (Exhibit 10)

On March 18, 2008, provided several emails from USM Headquarters documenting that effective October 2005; all time and attendance records pertaining to will be verified and signed by USM Headquarters. (Exhibit 12)

On March 19, 2008, (Retired), USM Police, Denver, Colorado, was interviewed and provided a signed sworn statement. stated he was ‘s supervisor during his entire tenure as union stated he was unable to verify the hours actually worked by due to union offices located at a different facility within the Denver metro area.

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confirmed USM Headquarters would certify [REDACTED]'s time and attendance records as of October 2005. (Exhibit 15)

On March 20, 2008, [REDACTED] was interviewed and provided a signed sworn statement relevant to this investigation. [REDACTED] stated as a USM Police Officer he served as the Local Union [REDACTED] and subsequently, the National Mint Council [REDACTED] from 1996 until his retirement in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that USM Legal issued an opinion stating that for the purpose of him acting as Council [REDACTED] and working with USM Management in Washington DC, he was to work a day shift schedule, while submitting time and attendance sheets reflecting his normal second shift schedule originally assigned to him. [REDACTED] stated each time he was re-elected to that position every three years he would initially report back to the second shift, but was instructed by USM Headquarters to continue working the regular shift and authorized to claim his second shift assignment. (Exhibit 16)

On April 9, 2008, [REDACTED], Attorney, Denver, Colorado, stated he is representing [REDACTED] in response with this matter, and provided several documents relevant to this investigation. [REDACTED] provided a copy of a settlement agreement DE-CA-30493, which recognizes [REDACTED] as the current [REDACTED] of the AFGE Local 695. Adding, as long as [REDACTED] chooses to exercise his seniority rights under Article 10-2 of the Fourth National Agreement, he will continue to be assigned to the second shift. An addendum to the settlement was signed on November 8, 1998, extending this agreement to cover the entire period [REDACTED] serves as the National Mint Council [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 17)

### EXHIBITS

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7. Memorandum of Activity, Human Resources Specialist, BPD, dated March 6, 2008.


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18. Memorandum of Activity, Associate Director, Workforce Solutions, USM, dated April 25, 2008.
SYNOPSIS

On November 14, 2007, Chief Information Officer, Community Development Financial Institution Fund, contacted the Office of Audits (OA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Treasury (Treasury). On November 15, 2007, OA provided the information to the Office of Investigations, OIG, Treasury. Alleged that Program Advisor and Acting Compliance Manager, CDFI, denied CDFI employees access to the Reports Monitoring System (RMS). The RMS allows employees to view grant awardees’ history and compliance on CDFI grants. It was also alleged that the denial of RMS to some

Case Agent: 
Karen Cottrell
Special Agent

Supervisory Approval: 
Karen Cottrell
Special Agent In Charge (Acting)

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CDFI employees was retaliatory because CDFI employees provided KPMG and OA information in the past. (Exhibit 1)

The allegation that inappropriately denied CDFI employees access to the RMS, and did so for retaliatory reasons was unsubstantiated. had the authority to limit the use of this system in his role as the acting Compliance Manager. This action was performed to protect information released from the CDFI and there was no evidence to prove it was a retaliatory act.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On November 15, 2007, Program Advisor and Acting Compliance Manager, CMEU, CDFI, was interviewed. He stated that he is responsible for monitoring the compliance of CDFI grant award recipients. This compliance information is maintained in the RMS database. In the past, CDFI employees outside the CMEU have misinterpreted information in the RMS and disseminated the incorrect information. He recalled that CDFI employees provided incorrect information to KPMG and the Treasury OIG. On other occasions, CDFI grant award recipients were informed by CDFI employees that they were not in compliance, but were actually in compliance. He informed former CDFI Director, in early November 2007 that he planned on restricting the data, and she voiced no concerns. On November 14, 2007, he limited access to the RMS to only CMEU employees. He stated that other CDFI employees can obtain information from the RMS by requesting the information through the CMEU. He adamantly stated that limiting the RMS to CMEU employees was not retaliatory against other CDFI employees. (Exhibit 2)

On November 16, 2007, provided the OI with an office memorandum he sent to Acting Director, CDFI, regarding his decision to limit the RMS access to employees in the CMEU. (Exhibit 3)

On July 30, 2008, Legal Counsel, CDFI, was interviewed. stated that in approximately November 2007, limited access to the RMS to only those employees within the CMEU, CDFI. In the past, all CDFI employees had "read only" access status to the data in the RMS. However, there had been issues with CDFI employees outside the CMEU incorrectly reading the data and providing erroneous information to other CDFI employees and grant holders. In
January 2008, [redacted] Director, CDFI, issued a memorandum to all CDFI fund managers on the process of obtaining compliance information from the CMEU. [redacted] stated that limiting access to the RMS was a "wise management decision" because employees outside the CMEU did not know how to correctly analyze the data in the RMS. He also stated that did not violate any law or administrative regulations by limiting access to the RMS. (Exhibit 4)

### EXHIBITS

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity, E-mail from [redacted] to OA, OIG, Treasury, dated November 14, 2007.</td>
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT: JUL 23 2008
REPORT STATUS: FINAL
CASE NUMBER: 2008-0040
CASE TITLE: Former Engraver, United States Mint
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES): Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 - Public money, property or records.

SYNOPSIS

On January 4, 2008, the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a complaint from the United States Mint (Mint) alleging that a former employee was attempting to sell government property through a third party auction. It is alleged that former Engraver, Mint, was attempting to sell a production plaster for the 1982 George Washington Half Dollar, and three design sketches for proposed medals through Heritage Auction Galleries. (Exhibit 1)

The resulting investigation substantiated that attempted to sell a production plaster for the 1982 George Washington Half Dollar, and three design sketches for proposed medals through Heritage Auction Galleries.

Case Agent: [Signature]
Supervisory Approval: William Sterling, Special Agent In Charge (Acting) [Signature]

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DETAILS


B. Context – Background

It is alleged that [redacted] former Engraver, Mint, was attempting to sell a production plaster for the 1982 George Washington Half Dollar, and three design sketches for proposed medals through Heritage Auction Galleries.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On January 9, 2008, the Treasury-OIG received correspondence and supporting documentation of the government ownership of the items, via email, from [redacted] Senior Legal Counsel, Mint. Subsequently, a review of the listed correspondence and documentation was conducted.

A review of the documents revealed that the production plaster for the 1982 George Washington Half Dollar and the three design sketches for proposed medals are government property, and should be stored within a government facility. The review also revealed that [redacted] did not have the authorization or authority to remove the items from the Mint. According to the Treasury directive 25-02, “Records Disposition Management”, and the National Archives and Records Administration’s Pamphlet, “For the Record: Guidelines for Federal Records and Personal Papers”, “No material, even though judged to be nonrecord, should be withdrawn if this will create such a gap in the files as to impair the completeness of the essential documentation. Indexes or other finding aids necessary to the use of the official file may not be removed.” (Exhibit 2)

On January 24, 2008, the case facts were presented to [redacted] Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for potential criminal prosecution of [redacted] for violation of Title 18 United States Code § 641 – Public money, property, or records. AUSA [redacted] declined criminal prosecution due to the lack of prosecutorial merit. However, AUSA [redacted] referred the matter to AUSA [redacted] of the United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Division. (Exhibit 3)
AUSA suggested and recommended that the Treasury-OIG attempt to obtain the items by having surrender them. AUSA stated her office was willing to pursue the matter further if refused to cooperate with the OIG. (Exhibit 4)

On January 28, 2008, attorney, SchiffHardin, LLP was contacted regarding the potential surrender of the government property was attempting to auction. requested to review supporting documentation on the rightful ownership of the items, and then make a determination.

Subsequently, informed this office was willing to surrender the items. appointment letter was not surrendered because it was deemed to be personal property. (Exhibit 5)

From January 25, 2008, through February 7, 2008, Treasury-OIG corresponded (via email and telephone) with regarding the allegation and the surrender of the items. During this timeframe, and agreed to coordinate with Heritage Auctions Galleries Inc. in the surrender the items to the Treasury-OIG. (Exhibit 6)

On February 19, 2008, the Treasury-OIG received (via FedEx), from Heritage Auctions Galleries Inc.; a plaster cast of 1982 George Washington Half Dollar, and sketches of James A. Baker III, Harry Truman, and Aaron Copland. The items were inventoried and held in evidence. (Exhibit 7)

On February 19, 2008, AUSA was informed of compliance with the investigation and surrendering the items. Subsequently, AUSA declined civil prosecution of due to the lack of prosecutorial merit. (Exhibit 8)

On July 15, 2008, the plaster cast of 1982 George Washington Half Dollar, and sketches of James A. Baker III, Harry Truman, and Aaron Copland were released to General Counsel, Mint. (Exhibit 9)

**FINDINGS**

The information gathered during the course of this investigation substantiated the allegations. As such, on February 19, 2008, Treasury OIG received (via FedEx),

REFERRALS

A. Criminal

Prosecution of this case was referred to and declined by Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Criminal Division. (Exhibit 6)

B. Civil

Prosecution of this case was referred to and declined by Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Division. (Exhibit 8)

C. Administrative

The recovered items were returned to Mint for final retention and appropriate archiving. (Exhibit 9)

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISTRIBUTION

Edmund Moy, Director, Mint

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EXHIBITS

1. Original allegation, Correspondence, dated from January 4, 2008.


MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: [Redacted]
Assistant Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: OIG File Number 2008-0085

This investigation was initiated based upon information received from a source that had been inappropriately giving government property in the form of used plate printers' tool boxes to retiring plate printers from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Western Currency Facility (WCF). Our investigation substantiated the allegation against [Redacted] On January 14, 2009, this office received a declination of prosecution relating to this investigation from the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Texas. Subsequent to receiving the declination, it was learned from Chief Counsel, BEP, WCF that [Redacted] had been admonished by his supervisor, Chief, Currency Manufacturing, WCF for his actions.

As there is no criminal action to be pursued, and [Redacted] has been administratively admonished for his actions, no further action need be taken by this office. With the approval of this Memorandum to File, this investigation is concluded.
SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT
REPORT STATUS
CASE NUMBER
CASE TITLE
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)

2008-0097
CDFI - Improper Bonuses
5 CFR 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

SYNOPSIS

On July 10, 2008, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audit (OIG/OA) received an allegation from the Senior Advisor to the Director of Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI) regarding bonuses paid to CDFI employees from 2004 through 2007. It was noted that the bonuses were exorbitant in light of the fact that the viability of the Fund is a current concern. Many bonuses for FY 2007 were for $10,000, which is the largest amount that could be approved internally without additional Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approval. (Exhibit 1)

The OIG/OI determined there were three (3) bonuses paid during fiscal years that required additional inquiry. These included one (1) payment to (Former) Treasury, CDFI, in the amount of $15,000.00 on September 4, 2005 and two (2) payments to (Former) Treasury, CDFI, in the amount of $10,000.00 on November 9, 2006 and $10,000.00 on December 12, 2006.

Through interviews of several CDFI employees the OIG/OI was able to receive legitimate explanations for the above listed payments.

Based on the evidence and information gathered during this investigation it was determined that the allegation of improper bonuses could not be substantiated.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On June 25, 2009, the OIG/OI entered all CDFI employees and their bonuses in a separate spreadsheet for fiscal years (FY) 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. It was determined that there were no unusual bonuses paid out in FY 2004 and 2006. In FY 2005, it was discovered that received a cash award for $15,000.00. In FY 2007, it was discovered that received a cash award for $10,000.00 in November of 2006 and received a cash award of $10,000.00 in December of 2006. (Exhibit 2)

On July 22, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed CDFI, Administrative Manager, regarding the entry and approval of the bonuses. advised that she was responsible for entering the awards into the HR Connect system when instructed by (former) Director of CDFI, and occasionally by (former) CDFI. confirmed that she, and had “Director’s Proxy” in the system given by “Director’s Proxy” is the ability to approve awards in the system without the direct approval of the Director.

stated that would not approve bonuses and awards himself; he would rely on or the other proxy holders to approve the awards. Although she believes that was aware of all of the awards that were approved. (Exhibit 3)
On August 10, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed (former) CDFI. admitted to receiving "back to back" awards of $10,000.00 in 2006. He stated that the first award was based on his annual performance evaluation in which he received a rating of outstanding. The second award was given to him based on the assistance he provided to the OIG/OI during their 2006 investigation of as well as handling the extra duties of the Chief Financial Officer following the resignation of. stated that both of these awards were approved by (Exhibit 4).

On August 18, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed (former) CDFI. stated that during the fiscal year 2005 a retention bonus plan had been approved by Treasury. and had proposed this plan to and individuals at Treasury in order to maintain employees. In fiscal year 2005 the Administration was considering an initiative called the Strengthening America’s Communities Initiative (SACI), had this initiative been passed, CDFI would have been consolidated with another Federal Program and the employees were not guaranteed their jobs. felt the critical employees at the CDFI would begin seeking other employment. This retention bonus plan would allow the CDFI to keep critical employees through that fiscal year. (Exhibit 5)

On September 28, 2009, the OIG/OI telephonically interviewed Housing Program U.S. Department of Agriculture, in reference to the September 2005, cash award of $15,000.00 awarded to was the of CDFI during this period. stated that he did not approve this award, nor would he approve any award over the $10,000.00 OPM limit. provided an email to OIG/OI reiterating his statements. (Exhibit 6)

On November 18, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed (former) CDFI. admitted to receiving a bonus of $15,000.00 in September of 2005. stated that this bonus was part of a retention plan that was approved through OPM and Treasury. explained that the retention bonus plan was initiated by and himself after learning that OPM and the Administration were considering merging CDFI with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). The rumor was that CDFI employees would not be transferred if this merger were to take place; therefore and felt it necessary to put forth a plan to keep the CDFI critical employees in place. stated that the retention plan would

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allow for 10% of an employee's pay to be given as a bonus if that employee remained at CDFI through the end of fiscal year 2005. (Exhibit 7)

On November 25, 2009, the OIG/OL, telephonically re-interviewed Housing Program U.S. Department of Agriculture, in reference to the retention bonus plan initiated in fiscal year 2005 by the CDFI. He stated that he recalled this initiative; however he was unable to remember the parameters set forth by OPM or Treasury. Provided an email to the OIG/OL reiterating his statements. (Exhibit 8)

On December 3, 2009, Treasury, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources forwarded to the OIG/OL the approval document allowing CDFI to issue a retention bonus of up to 10% of an employee's salary for CDFI employees who stayed through September 30, 2005. This document confirms statement. (Exhibit 9)

**EXHIBITS**

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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT
REPORT STATUS  Final

CASE NUMBER  2009-0013

CASE TITLE  GS-0301-15, Director, Office of Debt Management, Departmental Offices, Washington, DC

PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)  5 C.F.R. § 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

SYNOPSIS

On October 23, 2008, the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (TOIG) was contacted by [Redacted], Deputy Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Office of General Counsel, regarding a matter involving [Redacted], Office of Debt Management, Departmental Offices (DO), and [Redacted], Government Bond Trader, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS). [Redacted] provided TOIG with a statement written by [Redacted] summarizing the events as follows; a third party notified [Redacted] that it was rumored [Redacted] and/or GS profited by more than $100 million dollars after speaking with [Redacted] about the reopening of four Treasury securities on October 8, 2008. (Exhibit 1)

On October 24, 2008, an investigation into this matter was initiated by TOIG, during which TOIG interviewed Treasury Department employees and several Treasury market securities traders, to include [Redacted]. The investigation did not
substantiate the allegation that [redacted] made any improper disclosures concerning the re-issuance of Treasury securities to [redacted] during a telephone conversation on October 8, 2008.

The results of this investigation were not referred outside of TOIG.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

When interviewed, [redacted] General Counsel, DO, stated that on or about October 10, 2008, he was contacted by [redacted] concerning a rumor in “the market” regarding GS and the re-opening of four Treasury notes on October 8 and 9, 2008. [redacted] told [redacted] that there was a rumor that GS may have illegally profited relative to the re-opening of the four Treasury notes in question. Furthermore, [redacted] reported that he had a conversation with a GS trader prior to the official announcement of the re-opening of the four Treasury notes which may have facilitated the rumors of GS making these profits. (Exhibit 2)

When interviewed, [redacted] stated that on October 8, 2008, the Treasury Department publicly announced at 10:30 A.M., the re-issuance of four Treasury securities (also referred to as notes). On this same date, at approximately 8:30 A.M., [redacted] contacted [redacted] to discuss conditions in the Treasury securities markets. During this conversation, [redacted] inquired what [redacted] thought about the securities markets, which Treasury notes he thought were most affected, or had “failed”, and what notes, if reissued, would significantly help the securities markets.

[redacted] stated that on October 9, 2008, he received a call from [redacted] Investment Officer, Soros Fund Management, LLC and [redacted] of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee. [redacted] stated that [redacted] told him that there was a rumor in the market that GS made over $100 million dollars after speaking with Treasury prior to the announcement on October 8, 2008, of the re-opening of the four Treasury notes in question. [redacted] stated that [redacted] told him “[redacted] [redacted] sold several billion dollars worth of “Treasuries” in several of the specific maturities which Treasury had reopened.

[redacted] stated that he is certain he did not disclose to [redacted] any specific information during this conversation that the four specific notes selected by
SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Treasury, were to be reissued later that morning. In addition, [REDACTED] does not believe he “inferred any information to [REDACTED]” (Exhibits 3, 4).

When interviewed, [REDACTED] confirmed that he contacted [REDACTED] on or about October 9, 2008, and related to him that [REDACTED] had been told that GS and specifically [REDACTED] had been told that GS and specifically [REDACTED] upon receiving information from the Treasury Department on the re-issuance of Treasury notes, “profited by 50 or 100 million dollars.” [REDACTED] stated that he was told this by [REDACTED], Graham Capital Management (GCM). (Exhibit 5)

On November 10, 2008, the reporting Special Agent (SA) contacted [REDACTED] Branch Chief, Enforcement Division, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), NY. [REDACTED] was contacted regarding the SEC’s jurisdiction and interest in possible illegal “insider” trading of Treasury notes by [REDACTED] and/or GS. [REDACTED] was briefed on the specifics of the investigation and was advised that at least two interviews were planned of witnesses in TOIG’s investigation. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that if it was determined that [REDACTED] or GS received confidential information, and traded on that information prior to the public announcement by Treasury, it would be of interest to the SEC. (Exhibit 6)

When interviewed, [REDACTED] stated that he received a call from [REDACTED] on October 8, 2008, at approximately 8:00 A.M. [REDACTED] stated that he contacted him concerning “the re-opening of certain issues,” but did not at anytime during the call tell him, or “indicate” which specific “issues or notes” would be re-opened by Treasury. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was seeking his opinion on market conditions; which “issues” he ([REDACTED]) thought should be re-opened, and what Treasury could do to free up money in “the market.” [REDACTED] stated that he suggested four of the “most chronic issues” which he ([REDACTED]) believed had significant “failures” and if re-issued would add significant “liquidity back into the market.” [REDACTED] stated that he did suggest four issues, two of which, unknown to him at the time, were on Treasury’s list to be re-opened later that day.

[REDACTED] stated that after his conversation with [REDACTED], trading from his desk on Government issued securities stopped in all but a list of six to eight securities. Furthermore, trading was halted on 50 specific securities, because [REDACTED] believed any number of these could have been the subject of the conversation and could potentially be re-issued that day by Treasury. [REDACTED] stated that neither he, nor
anyone at GS traded in any of the notes re-issued by the Treasury until after the public announcement by Treasury at 10:30 A.M. on October 8, 2008. (Exhibit 7)

(Agent’s Note: When interviewed, through GS Legal Counsel provided documentation in support of his statement that trading from his desk on Government issued securities stopped in all but a list of six to eight securities. Furthermore, that no trades took place in the four securities listed by Treasury on October 8, 2008, prior to the public announcement by Treasury. These documents are attached to exhibit #7.)

When interviewed, confirmed that he contacted and reported what he heard about GS “making money” off of the re-issuance of four Treasury notes on October 8 and 9, 2008, and that it was possible may have “traded” on information he received from an employee at Treasury. recalled that he told that GS and specifically may have made over 100 million in profits. stated that he heard this information from the portfolio manager on [his] trading desk, Portfoliomanager, GCM, stated that during “the trading day” he and are co-located in GCM’s trading desk area and it is possible that passed this information to him while the two of them were at their trading desks. (Exhibit 8)

When interviewed, stated that on the morning of October 8, 2008, when the Treasury Department made the public announcement concerning the re-opening of four Treasury notes, had a telephone conversation with the “believed” was sometime between 7:00 A.M., and 10:00 A.M. recalled that he contacted from his trading desk, discussed market conditions and the “rumors that had been swirling around about several failures in the Treasuries market.” is sure that this conversation took place prior to the public announcement by Treasury, because the announcement was a “big deal in the market.” does not recall the specifics of the conversation, which lasted only minutes, but believes must have stated something relevant to the rumor, or belief, that Treasury would re-open several securities with high failure rates. does not recall if told him that he had spoken to anyone at the Treasury Department that day (October 8, 2008), but opined that it was possible.

who sits at a trading desk directly in front of recalled that after the conversation with he stated to something to the effect: “Jesus,
of money on this one." stated that he was referring to "positions" held by GS in the Treasury securities market and that this was directly related to his conversation that morning with . However, opined that GS could not have made any money on the four re-issued notes in the morning of October 8, 2008, or until the public announcement by Treasury, because "no one in the market was buying or selling those securities."

stated that he had another conversation with on the evening of October 22, 2008, concerning GS' position in at least one of the re-opened Treasury notes from October 8 and 9, 2008. stated that during the conversation, he recalled that made specific reference to one of the re-opened notes with a maturity date of May 15, 2115. recalled saying that GS "bought the tail and we made lots of money" and "we covered the short." thought that put a dollar amount of $100 million on what GS made on these transactions. As a result, had another conversation with on October 23, 2008, concerning and GS possible "improper trading on the notes reissued on October 8, or 9."

stated that he has no proof or independent verification that or GS did anything illegal or improper related to the Treasury notes in question, "just a suspicion." (Exhibit 9)

DISTRIBUTION
Not Applicable

EXHIBITS

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<td>Memorandum of Activity, Investigative Contact of dated</td>
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November 10, 2008.


SYNOPSIS

The OIG/OI received an anonymous complaint in August 2009, alleging that the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Chief Counsel had sent employees to New Orleans, LA to attend Excel spreadsheet training. The complainant had sent a written statement alleging fraud, waste and abuse of Federal funds of expenses related to travel, per diem, and lodging costs for sending BEP employees to New Orleans when the training could have been conducted locally in Washington, DC. (Exhibit 1)

The Chief Counsel of the BEP was interviewed, who advised the OI that the Office of Chief Counsel did send three of its staff attorneys to an “EXCEL” conference in New Orleans, in July 2009. He further described the EXCEL training as an acronym for an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) accredited training course entitled “Examining Conflicts in Employment Law.”
Investigation is closed without any referrals for any prosecutorial decisions, judicial findings, and/or administrative actions.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

The OI interviewed [redacted] Chief Counsel, BEP, on September 30, 2009. [redacted] advised the OI that the Office of Chief Counsel did send three of its staff attorneys to an “EXCEL” conference in New Orleans, July 27-30, 2009. [redacted] further described the EXCEL training as an acronym for an EEOC accredited training course entitled “Examining Conflicts in Employment Law.” [redacted] Chief Counsel described the training as relevant and significant, and that the training was widely recognized throughout the country and Federal government as the foremost informative and relevant equal employment opportunity training available. (Exhibit 2)

[redacted] Deputy Counsel, had recommended that the attorneys attend the training. The BEP legal staff had been unable to send its staff attorneys to attend EEO training in several years due to budget restrictions. In FY 2009, [redacted] reported that his office’s training budget was $24,000 for 17 personnel. In previous years, the Chief Counsel’s training budget was approximately $10,000 per year. The BEP Office of Chief Counsel has 28 EEO cases open at present and [redacted] believed obtaining this training for the staff was a high priority.

[redacted] provided the OI agents with the conference brochure and agenda, as well as the SF-182’s, “Authorization, Agreement and Certification of Training” cost breakdowns for the travels and training. He also provided copies of GovTrip expense detail reports, travels and expenses for each employee. (Exhibit 3)
EXHIBITS

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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 1, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>GovTrip Travel Expense Reports</td>
</tr>
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DISTRIBUTION

Not applicable.
**SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**DATE OF REPORT** | NOV 20 2009
---|---
**REPORT STATUS** | FINAL
---|---
**CASE NUMBER** | 2009-0154
---|---
**CASE TITLE** | [Redacted] Currency Worker, 6941-KG-03, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Washington, DC
---|---
**PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)** | 5 CFR 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.
17 USC 506 - Copyright Infringement
18 USC 2319 - Criminal Infringement of a Copyright
---|---

**SYNOPSIS**

On August 17, 2009, the Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI) received a memorandum from [Redacted] Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security, Assistant Chief, stating that an anonymous telephone complaint was received alleging [Redacted], Treasury, BEP, Currency Worker was selling counterfeit Digital Video Disks (DVDs) while working the midnight shift at BEP. (Exhibit 1)

[Redacted] was interviewed by the OIG/OI in reference to this allegation. She did admit to making copies of counterfeit DVDs on occasion. She denied selling any of

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these DVDs for profit; she was however reimbursed for her purchase of blank DVDs as well as DVD covers.

The OIG/OI contacted Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted] of the District of Maryland in reference to the facts of this case. AUSA Fine stated that if Lawrence was not selling counterfeit DVDs for profit she did not meet the elements of 17 USC 506 or 18 USC 2319, Criminal Infringement of a Copyright.

Based on the evidence and information gathered during this investigation it was determined that the allegation could not be substantiated that [redacted] was selling DVDs while at work or during work hours.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

On September 30, 2009, the OIG/OI received over two months (July 1, 2009, through September 10, 2009) of email traffic from [redacted]’s Government issued email address. Analysis showed no emails in reference to the buying or selling of counterfeit DVDs. (Exhibit 2)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [redacted] in reference to this allegation. [redacted] did admit to making copies of counterfeit DVDs on occasion. She denied selling any of these DVDs for profit; she was however reimbursed by some of her co-workers for her purchase of blank DVDs as well as DVD covers. [redacted] provided written consent to search her BEP locker, personally owned vehicle and her residence. The OIG/OI searched these places with negative results. [redacted] provided three names of co-workers for whom she has copied movies, soccer games, documentaries, etc. to DVDs. (Exhibit 3)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [redacted], Treasury, BEP, Currency Worker. [redacted] stated that he has received approximately five DVDs from [redacted] however he has never paid for any of these DVDs. (Exhibit 4)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [redacted], Treasury, BEP, Note Examiner. [redacted] advised that she received approximately four to five DVDs from [redacted] all in the past year. [redacted] stated that all of the DVDs she has received were from television shows or documentaries. She informed the OIG/OI that she has paid $5.00-$8.00 to [redacted] for these items, but never on work property. (Exhibit 5)
On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed Treasury, BEP, Security Printing. Advised she has exchanged over 100 movies with over the years; however she has never purchased anything from nor has she ever seen sell any DVDs. (Exhibit 6)

On November 13, 2009, the OIG/OI re-interviewed in order to clarify the inconsistency between her statement of not selling DVDs and 's statement that she paid between $5.00 and $8.00 per DVD. Stated that she only took money from for reimbursement. said she purchased materials to make DVD covers for In addition, stated that she did not sell any DVDs on BEP property or during work hours. (Exhibit 7)

**EXHIBITS**

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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT
REPORT STATUS Final
CASE NUMBER DO-09-0143-I
CASE TITLE Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)
5 C.F.R. 2635.101 - Basic obligation of public service
5 C.F.R. 2635.705 - Misuse of Position

SYNOPSIS

On August 13, 2009, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received an anonymous complaint regarding budget, hiring, promotions, and travel within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), and the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC). (Exhibit 1)

The complainant stated that a possible investigation was being conducted on the aforementioned offices by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO was contacted and informed the OIG/OI that a review was conducted only on the TFI. This review did not specifically address the issues mentioned by the complainant.
The OIG/OI decided to review the aforementioned organization's travel records before any additional investigation was conducted. It was found that these organizations did not violate any travel policies. Their employees only traveled nine times in one year using business class, and had the proper justification to fly business class. The OIG/OI discontinued further investigation because the allegations regarding misuse of travel were unfounded and the other allegations made by the complainant were vague.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

On August 13, 2009, the OIG/OI received an anonymous complaint regarding budget, hiring, promotions, and travel within the TFI, OIA, and the TFFC within Treasury. It was determined by the OIG/OI that travel would be reviewed first to ascertain if the complaint had any validity.

On August 24, 2009, the OIG/OI contacted Assistant Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). He stated that his office conducted a "wide, but not deep" review of the TFI in 2009. He added that GAO analyzed and made recommendations on TFI's performance measures and work with outside organizations such as State Department. (Exhibit 2)

On September 1, 2009, the OIG/OI received travel documents from Director of Travel Operations, Treasury, from May 2008 to June 2009, for TFI, TFFC, and OIA. The travel records reflected that employees within these offices only traveled nine times using business class and had no first class travels. (Exhibit 3)
**EXHIBITS**

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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Activity, Contact with the GAO, dated August 24, 2009.</td>
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**DISTRIBUTION**

Not applicable
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT

REPORT STATUS Final

CASE NUMBER USM 09 0050

CASE TITLE

PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES) Title 18 USC § 641 – Public money, property or records

SYNOPSIS

In March 2009, the United States Mint learned that three of the missing prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces ostensibly had been in the possession of [redacted] of [redacted], since sometime in 1974. The United States Mint reported that information to the Treasury Office of Inspector General and an investigation was initiated. The source of the information relating to the three prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces received by the United States Mint was [redacted] of [redacted] (Exhibit 1).

Interviews of [redacted] and all identified parties, provided insufficient evidence to indicate that the surviving children of [redacted] (Date of Death: [redacted]) are currently in possession of, have possessed in the past or have

Case Agent: [redacted]
Senior Special Agent

Supervisory Approval: John L. Phillips
Special Agent In Charge (Acting)

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current knowledge of the whereabouts of the three 1974 prototype aluminum one-cent coins. (Exhibit 2)

DETAILS

I. Allegation

In or about 1974, ____________, while working as a toll booth attendant on the State Highway system was alleged to have received three prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces from an unidentified individual. ____________ was reportedly told by the individual that she should keep the coins as they will be worth something someday. Subsequent to receiving the coins, ____________ reportedly kept and maintained the three prototype coins as personal possessions in her dresser drawer at her home. Sometime between 2006 and 2008, the three coins disappeared from ____________'s dresser, and have not been seen since. Information received from ____________ indicated that one of ____________'s three children may have taken the coins.

II. Context/Background

During the early 1970s, the price of copper rose dramatically. Accordingly, the United States Mint became concerned that, under the then-existing statute that specified the composition of the one-cent coin, continued increases in copper prices could make the cost of producing the one-cent significantly more than its face value. As a result of the increased cost of copper in the one-cent coin, the United States Mint embarked on conducting tests to identify potential alternative metals, including aluminum and bronze-clad steel, to be used in the production of one-cent coins. In 1974, the United States Mint proposed aluminum as a replacement for copper in the one-cent coin, and it struck approximately 1.57 million aluminum pieces, patterned after the 1974 one-cent coin, as prototypes to test both aluminum’s viability as a replacement material and to evaluate the United States Mint’s ability to coin aluminum blanks in high-speed, high-volume production runs. Several of these prototype aluminum pieces were provided to Members of Congress, so they could examine them and ascertain whether they would support legislation to adopt an aluminum one-cent coin. Ultimately, the proposed legislation that would have authorized an aluminum one-cent coin was rejected. All of the prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces remaining in the United States Mint's
possession were subsequently destroyed. However, some of the pieces that the
United States Mint provided to Members of Congress for examination were never
returned. Since that time, the United States Mint has been unable to identify the
specific Members of Congress to whom the prototype pattern pieces were given,
and the United States Mint also has been unable to account for exactly how many
of the prototype aluminum pieces were returned and how many remain at large.

In March 2009, United States Mint provided a
correspondence to the Treasury Office of Inspector General where he identifies that
the 1974 prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces were solely experimental
prototypes, and that the United States Mint never issued these pieces, nor did it
have the lawful authority to issue them. United States Mint also stated that the United
States Mint regards all of these pieces as property belonging to the United States,
and that no one may lawfully circulate, sell, buy, or hold them. United States Mint further
stated that because no one may acquire valid title to these pieces, it is the United
States Mint’s position that these pieces are subject to recovery by the United
States Government.

In March 2009, the United States Mint learned that three of the missing prototype
pattern aluminum one-cent pieces ostensibly had been in the possession of since sometime in 1974. The United
States Mint reported that information to the Treasury Office of Inspector General
and an investigation was initiated. The source of the information relating to the
three prototype pattern aluminum one-cent pieces received by the United States
Mint was

Interviews of and all identified parties, provided insufficient evidence
to indicate that any of the surviving children of (Date of Death: are currently in possession of, have possessed in the past or have
current knowledge of the whereabouts of the three 1974 prototype aluminum one-
cent coins.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

As a result of interviews conducted with the surviving children of and other potential knowledgeable parties, it appears that from
approximately 1974 until the 2006, 2007 timeframe, three of the missing 1974
prototype aluminum one-cent coin pattens were in the possession of [REDACTED]. Subsequent to that time, the items were removed from possession by an unknown individual(s). (Exhibits 2 – 8)

FINDINGS

As a result of the interviews conducted of all parties known to the Government concerning the whereabouts of the three prototype aluminum one-cent coins, it was concluded that there was insufficient evidence identified to pursue any criminal action against any of the surviving children of [REDACTED] or any other person. Additionally, insufficient information was obtained to locate and move forward on a Civil Replevin Action to recover the missing prototype aluminum one-cent coins.

REFERRALS

I. Criminal: N/A

II. Civil: On April 21, 2009 consultations with [REDACTED], Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of [REDACTED] concerning the potential for a civil recover of the property through a Replevin Action by the United States were conducted. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that there was insufficient information available as to the whereabouts of the three prototype aluminum one-cent coins to initiate the Replevin Action, and on May 27, 2009, AUSA [REDACTED] declined any further interest in this issue at this time. (Exhibit 9)

III. Administrative: The U.S. Mint has sent letters to the four surviving children of [REDACTED] requesting that they provide any information they have on the current whereabouts of the three missing aluminum prototype one-cent coins. (Exhibit 10)

DISTRIBUTION

Edmund C. Moy, Director, United States Mint
Daniel P. Shaver, Chief Counsel, United States Mint
## EXHIBITS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>March 25, 2009 correspondence from Dennis P. O’Connor, Chief, United States Mint Police, concerning the whereabouts of three aluminum pennies.</td>
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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT  
AUG 26 2009

REPORT STATUS  
FINAL

CASE NUMBER  
USM-09-0097-P

CASE TITLE  
United States Mint

PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)  
18 U.S.C § 208(a) - Acts affecting a Personal Financial Interest

SYNOPSIS

This case was initiated on June 4, 2009, based upon information received from United States Mint (Mint). Specifically, informed the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), that two anonymous Mint employees informed him that Mint, steered an award of a contract to a vender. (Exhibit 1, 2)

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

During an interview on June 4, 2009, informed Treasury OIG that two anonymous Mint employees informed him that steered a contract related

Case Agent:  

Supervisory Approval:  

[Signatures]

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to the Leadership Development Phase II Training Program to a vendor. The Leadership Development Phase II Training Program was conducted in Shepherdstown, WV, from April 19 - 24, 2009. During that interview, refused to disclose the identities of the anonymous employees.

was re-interviewed on July 17, 2009, and during that interview, disclosed that , Mission and Support, Mint, and Reporting and Audit Branch, Mint, were the two anonymous sources that complained that steered the contract to a vendor. (Exhibit 2, 3)

During an interview with she reported that contacted her via telephone and asked her did she attend the Leadership Development Phase II Training Program from April 19 - 24, 2009, at Shepherdstown, WV. reported that asked her did she hear a class presenter named make the comment, “This is my third agency that I have worked with on this topic, and that is why I am here.”

said that she informed that she heard make the comment and thought the comment was strange. further said that after her conversation with she asked , Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative for the Leadership Development Phase II Training contract about the solicitation. said that told her the procurement was listed as a competitive solicitation and company for Strategic Management) was the only company that responded to the solicitation. also said that she did not have any evidence steered the contract to for Strategic Management. (Exhibit 4)

During an interview, reported that he was present at the Leadership Development Phase II Training Program when commented, “This is my third agency that I have worked with Andy Brunhart on this topic, and that is why I am here.” said that after the training he spoke with about comment because the comment made him believe that may have assisted in acquiring the contract; although, he did not have any direct knowledge of this. (Exhibit 5)

Based on a review of the Leadership Development Phase II Training Program Contract (TM-HQ-09-C-0016), the solicitation was issued to seven companies by
"invitational bid only." Company, for Strategic Management, was the only company that responded to the bid. On December 17, 2009, the contract was awarded to Company for Strategic Management Company through the competitive bidding process. Therefore, Company could not have steered the award of the contract to Company for Strategic Management, and the allegation against Company is unfounded.

DISTRIBUTION

Edmund C. Moy, Director, Mint

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<td>Initial Complaint Information dated June 5, 2009.</td>
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