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Titles of documents: See following page

Source of document: FOIA Officer
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Washington, D.C. 20472
Acting FOIA Officer/Requester Service Center Contact
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INCLUDED AFTER ACTION REPORTS

- (Space Shuttle) Columbia Recovery Operation Informal After-Action Report Executive Summary (undated)


Re: FEMA 06-581

This is the final response to your September 7, 2006, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This office received your request on September 15, 2006. You requested the following:


We conducted a comprehensive search of files within Region II Operations, Region III Operations, Region IV Operations, and the Region VI Operations for records that would be responsive to your request. This search produced 38 pages responsive to Items 3, 4, and 5.

We are granting your request under the FOIA, Title 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and DHS implementing regulations, 6 C.F.R. Chapter I and Part 5. After carefully reviewing the responsive documents, it is determined that the documents are appropriate for full release. The documents are enclosed in their entirety; no deletions or exemptions have been claimed.

Unfortunately, we were unable to locate or identify any responsive records for Items 1 and 2 of your request.

While an adequate search was conducted, you have the right to appeal this determination that no records exist within FEMA that would be responsive to your request. Should you wish to do so, you must send your appeal and a copy of this letter, within 60 days of the date of this letter, to: Associate General Counsel (General Law), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. 20528, following the procedures outlined in the DHS FOIA regulations at 6 C.F.R. § 5.9.
Your envelope and letter should be marked “FOIA Appeal.” Copies of the FOIA and DHS regulations are available at www.dhs.gov/foia.

Provisions of the FOIA allow us to recover part of the cost of complying with your request. In this instance, because the cost is below the $14 minimum, there is no charge.

If you need to contact our office about this matter, please refer to FEMA 06-581. This office can be reached at (202) 646-3323 or by e-mail at FEMA-FOIA@dhs.gov.

Sincerely,

Maile Arthur
Acting Disclosure Branch Chief
Mission Support Bureau
Office of the Chief Administrative Officer
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Enclosure(s): Responsive documents, 38 pages
COLUMBIA RECOVERY OPERATION
INFORMAL AFTER-ACTION REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This was a one-of-a-kind operation in many ways. First, it was a mission no one had expected or prepared for so the response team literally had to “make it up as we went”. It also brought together hundreds of agencies, including thousands of volunteers, most of whom had never worked together. Finally, it was also very large in scope from at least 3 perspectives: (1) it was a long response operation lasting over 90 days; (2) it was manpower intensive with a peak strength of 6,000 personnel and over 25,000 personnel rotating through from the various agencies; (3) and it covered a large area with search operations of various magnitudes taking place in several states from the California coastline to the Gulf of Mississippi. Additionally, this operation took place as our nation was ramping up for war with Iraq and continued through the end of the war. This posed many challenges with regards to resources being diverted to support the war effort.

This was also the first response operation under the Department of Homeland Security. Since this was both a long and large “no-notice” response operation and occurred in a resource-constrained environment, this may serve as a good case study for the development of the National Response Plan and the organizational structures associated with it.

There are 6 major issues that came out of this operation:

- RESPONSE OPERATIONS BEGIN AND END AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
- MULTIPLE GPS STANDARDS USED
- USE OF VOLUNTEERS
- A VIABLE DATABASE MUST BE READILY AVAILABLE
- BASE 8 OR STRAIGHT TIME REIMBURSEMENT POSED PROBLEMS
- EXCELLENT INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AT ALL LEVELS

RESPONSE OPERATIONS BEGIN AND END AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.
The response at the local level in the immediate aftermath of the Columbia tragedy set the foundation for a successful operation. There were dozens of communities affected and the local law enforcement and emergency managers were well organized and able to effectively use the thousands of volunteers that showed up to help. State emergency management personnel from both Texas and Louisiana came on the scene and quickly integrated state assets into integrated state response structures.

Less obvious, but just as important, are all the state and federal agencies that were imbedded in the communities in the affected area. For, example, the US Forestry Service (USFS) provided the first helicopters in the area. The Texas Forest Service, USFS and the FBI had local offices and were on the scene immediately.
Integration of state/local response organizations with their federal counterparts was greatly facilitated by having already established professional relationships as a consequence of being geographically collocated. The USFS, FBI, along with FEMA and EPA regional offices in the area had developed habitual relations with state and local officials which went a long way toward a smooth transition from state/local response to federal response operations.

**MULTIPLE GPS STANDARDS USED. (See issue#6)**
More than one GPS standard was used for this incident, resulting in a significant amount of confusion on the specific locations of debris.

**USE OF VOLUNTEERS. (See issues 18 & 25)**
FEMA did not have a good system to manage the thousands of volunteers that came to assist. State and local entities assumed management for most of the volunteers. We need a system that can quickly evaluate and screen those volunteers that can be of assistance. We also need to have the capability to provide food and incidentals to volunteers. And we need to have contracts that convey the government’s responsibilities and the volunteers’ authority to act on behalf of the government.

**A VIABLE DATABASE MUST BE READILY AVAILABLE PRIOR TO A RESPONSE OPERATION. (See issue #4)**
We tried to build a new database for this operation and while it eventually worked out, it created many problems and unnecessary duplication of work throughout the entire operation. At the onset of the incident several agencies logged (county judges, sheriffs, EPA, Texas Forest Service, NASA, etc) in calls and set up databases on shuttle debris. Within the first few days we tried to merge the various databases into a single, unified database that would support all the state and federal agencies in the Disaster Field Office. We learned that you can’t develop a database while concurrently operating it.

Recommend a national database and 800 phone number be established and “on the shelf” to BE immediately available at the onset of an incident. It should be sufficiently generic in nature to collect data that would apply to any situation. It would, in effect, be a dirty database that collects the initial input form the field at the onset. This would allow time to establish a specific database for the incident while concurrently capturing information from the field.

**STRAIGHT TIME REIMBURSEMENT POSED PROBLEMS. (See issue#22)**
Full-time employees of FEMA’s federal partner agencies were not reimbursed for their straight time when deployed to this incident. This is problematic in two ways. First, their home organizations are more than reluctant to release their employees as they have to continue to pay them out of their budgets, while at the same time, have someone else do their work back at home station. Clearly, it would have been easier to get full-time personnel if straight time pay was provided.

A second issue of concern is a perceived inequity among agencies. Specifically, the Urban Search and Rescue personnel deployed to this incident had their straight pay
reimbursed as well as payment for their replacement back at home stations. Additionally, some of the Urban Search and Rescue teams get portal to portal pay. These folks were working side by side with the Forest Service community under different pay rules, resulting in more than a little resentment.

EXCELLENT INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AT ALL LEVELS.
(See issues: 1, 2, 8, 10, 15, 17, 21, 23)
A common refrain--from the people that worked in the Disaster Field Office as well as the many visitors--was that this was an excellent example of interagency cooperation. Local, state, and federal agencies worked as a very tight-knit team and this environment made up for the shortcomings resulting from an organizational structure that was put together “on the fly” and resulted in an hybrid of the Federal Response Plan and the Forest Service ICS architectures.

We recognize a better organizational structure is needed for future response operations where there is a large interagency effort and organizations are working together for the first time. For example, our Logistics and Administration functions were not interagency-staffed and should have been. The Information/Planning function was partially integrated but needed more interagency participation. We did have a fully integrated, multi-agency Operations function that worked extremely well--particularly considering that these agencies never worked together before and were literally “making it up as they went” since this was an unprecedented and unprepared-for incident.

The organizational structure we had worked well, but it was more because of personalities involved than anything else. We basically used a Unified Command Structure but had more than a few holes in it. That being said, the structure used for this operation would be a decent starting point for developing an architecture that could be used for all-hazards incidents.

OTHER ISSUES.
While the 6 issues noted above are the most significant, there are several other noteworthy issues that came out of our review. Following are 28 issues that fall into one of two categories: “Issue Statement” for issues that need some type of corrective action; and “Best Practice Statement” for practices we consider were instrumental in achieving our objectives. Of these, Issue #5 probably had the most negative impact.
AFTER ACTION REPORT
FEMA-1292-DR-NC
March 10, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lacy E. Suiter
Executive Associate Director
Response and Recovery Directorate
Attention: Richard Roback

FROM: Carlos Mitchell
Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA-1292-DR-NC

SUBJECT: After Action Report
Severe Storms, Hurricanes, and Flooding
Declared September 16, 1999

The attached After Action Report is provided in compliance with FEMA Instruction 8610.2.

This report contains after action issues that were submitted by the Emergency Response Team staff and identifies critical issues with the potential of having an important bearing on future operations if not resolved.

In addition to the attachments, another critical issue identified during this recovery effort as having an important bearing on future operations concerned the National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS). The system was taken off line for maintenance on February 25, 2000, during a critical phase of the recovery operation. Although the system came back on line on February 29, persistent problems were experienced with the reliability of fiscal and statistical data for another week, causing a backlog in reporting and the resultant potential for an adverse impact on the decision-making process.

It is strongly recommended that, given the history of potential adverse impact on field operations, future decisions to perform maintenance on NEMIS be coordinated with Headquarters, Regional, and field management.

cc: Regional Director, FEMA Region IV
DISASTER OPERATIONS

AFTER ACTION REPORT

The Report of the Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA-1292-DR-NC
Declared: September 16, 1999

Federal Emergency Management Agency
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I. DESCRIPTION OF NORTH CAROLINA STORMS AND HURRICANES EVENT

The Federal Regional Center (FRC), Response Operations (OPS) Cell, Thomasville, Georgia opened at 0700, September 13, with the staff monitoring Hurricane Floyd. Operations transitioned from the FRC OPS Cell, Thomasville, Georgia, to the Regional Operations Center (ROC), Atlanta, Georgia at 1200 September 13, 1999. The ROC opened operations at Level Two. The ROC transitioned to Level One operation on September 14, 1999.

Hurricane Floyd’s approach prompted the largest evacuation in US history as 3.5 million coastal residents and vacationers rushed inland. Floyd made landfall at approximately 0230, the morning of September 16, near Cape Fear, North Carolina. At that time, Floyd was a strong Category II hurricane with sustained winds around 110 miles per hour (mph). The National Hurricane Center downgraded Hurricane Floyd to a tropical storm as of 1700 September 16 after sustained winds dropped to 65 mph.

The amount of rain from Floyd combined with rains previously received from Hurricane Dennis caused record flooding along most rivers and streams in central and eastern North Carolina. This event exceeds the previously worst North Carolina flood disaster, which occurred November 4-6, 1977.

The devastating consequences of this system impacted 66 North Carolina counties and included: 1) inundating and isolating numerous communities; 2) hundreds of residents stranded in trees and on rooftops; 3) 51 dead and five (5) missing and presumed dead; 4) over one million people without power; 5) contaminated municipal water systems and wells leaving whole communities without drinking water; 6) interrupted phone services; 7) closed airports and roads stranding travelers; 8) closed schools; 9) enormous incident debris; and 10) severe impacts on the public infrastructure. Search and rescue operations were a major part of initial response activity. Operations headed by the US Coast Guard saved an estimated 370 lives and more than 1,000 swift water evacuations were effected.

As a result of effects from Hurricane Floyd, the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) sprayed over one (1) million acres for mosquitoes, an ESF-10 Environmental Protection Agency field team recovered and disposed of 2,070 containers, and the Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) of ESF-8 recovered and reburied 225 remains.

The American Red Cross (ARC) opened 235 shelters, sheltered 48,022 persons and served over 1.5 million meals to persons affected by the storms and tornadoes. Four (4) ARC fixed feeding stations, 116 mobile feeding sites, and nine (9) Service Centers were in service in the State of North Carolina. The Salvation Army also established mobile and fixed feeding sites.

On October 16-17, the State braced once again for a hurricane, but Hurricane Irene never made landfall. The heavy winds and rain associated with Hurricane Irene stayed off shore for the most part. The three to six inches of rain in eastern and central North Carolina did cause a revised prediction of river flooding, delaying the reduction of river levels along the Tar, Neuse, NE Cape Fear, Cape Fear and Lumber Rivers and exacerbating flood/damage...
conditions in many communities. Some of the revised river crest levels approached the records set by Hurricane Floyd.

Preliminary Damage Assessments of primary residences indicate more than 20,000 impacted: 4,046 structures destroyed, 4,838 with major damage, and 9,091 with minor damage. Housing Damages are estimated to be nearly $100 million.

The State reports 44 American Red Cross shelters were open October 16-17 with a population of 865 people seeking refuge from Hurricane Irene.

Emergency Declaration FEMA-3146-EM authorizing Emergency Protective measures (Category A and B) for 66 North Carolina counties was signed by the President, September 15, 1999.

On September 16, the President signed Disaster Declaration FEMA-1292-DR-NC authorizing Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA) for 66 counties in the State of North Carolina.

The FEMA-State Agreement was signed September 22, 1999.

The Incident Period for 3146-EM-NC and 1292-DR-NC began September 15 and closed October 4, 1999.

As a result of continued flooding caused by Hurricanes Floyd and Irene, Amendment Number 3 to FEMA-1292-DR-NC re-opened the Incident Period, effective October 21, 1999.

Amendment Number 4 to FEMA-1292-DR-NC closed the Incident Period for this disaster, effective November 2, 1999. The Incident Period is September 15, 1999 to November 2, 1999.

The State requested and was granted an extension of the deadline for applicants to submit a Request for Public Assistance until Tuesday, December 14, 1999.

The State also requested and extension of the application period for Individual Assistance. The application period was extended until Tuesday, December 14, 1999, at which time the State requested an additional extension. On December 14, the application deadline for IA was extended until January 18, 2000.

Amendment Number 5 to FEMA-1292-DR-NC appointed Carlos Mitchell as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared disaster, effective January 17, 2000.

The State requested a third extension of the application period for Individual Assistance. On January 18, the application period was extended until February 17, 2000. Then a fourth extension was granted to February 29.
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<td>5) Incident Period:</td>
<td>September 15 to midnight November 2, 1999</td>
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| 6) Name & Service Dates of FCO: | Glenn C. Woodard  
September 16, 1999 to January 16, 2000  
Carlos Mitchell  
January 17 to March 10, 2000 |
| 7) Number of IA Counties Declared: | 66 |
| 8) Number of PA Counties Declared: | 66 |
| 9) Number of MT Counties Declared: | All |
| 10) Other Declarations: | Small Business Administration |
| 11) HS Obligation: | $214.2 million |
| 12) Infrastructure Obligation: | $212,563,645 (eligible) |
| 13) MT Obligation: | $50,095,769 |
| 14) Total IA Registration: | 87,526 |
| 15) Type of ERT Activated: | Full Region IV ERT & ERT-A Supported by ERT-N |
| 16) Number of DRCs Activated: | 22 (19 fixed; 3 mobile) |
| 17) Number of RPAs: | 530 |
COMMUNITY RELATIONS

1. Complaints Regarding Inspectors/Inspections
Issue #1

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Community Relations

Issue Code:
ISNP

Brief Issue Statement:
Complaints Regarding Inspectors/Inspections

Brief Discussion of Issue:
Continued efforts by FEMA to improve efficiency and FEMA’s public image were tarnished by inspectors’ performances and actions during Hurricane Floyd in North Carolina. A significant number of inspections showed evidence of unprofessional performance and contained many errors. Applicants complained that they had to wait an exorbitant amount of time for inspectors’ visits (three weeks to never in some cases), inspectors gave erroneous information, and some inspectors were rude and displayed a lack of sensitivity to persons impacted by the hurricane. Applicants also complained about the amount of grant/money deemed necessary to make the damaged dwelling habitable.

Recommendation:
1. Hire sufficient numbers of qualified (appropriate training and skill level) inspectors in accordance with the magnitude of the disaster to ensure more timely inspections.
2. Instruct inspectors on exactly what program matters they may discuss with clients and what not to discuss in order to eliminate giving out wrong information.
3. Hire more bilingual inspectors if needed.
4. Ensure that all applicants receive consistent/fair/just inspections by demanding that all inspectors follow the same, exact inspection criteria/guidelines/rules.
5. Provide more training for inspectors and include sensitivity training.
6. Review amount of money deemed necessary to make damaged dwellings habitable according to today’s labor/materials market and make adjustments to grants/allocations as necessary.

Responding Office:
RR-HS

FEMA-1292-DR-NC
Information & Planning
Region IV

After Action Report
1. Standardization of Course Names/Descriptions/Numbers in the ADD System
Issue #1

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Disaster Field Training Office (DFTO)

Issue Code:
Training

Brief Issue Statement:
As job-specific training certification takes on more importance for all FEMA employees, the requirement for the standardization of course names/descriptions/numbers in the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) system becomes imperative. Standardization of course information throughout FEMA will eliminate confusion among employees as they take classes to meet certification requirements.

Brief Discussion of Issue:
Currently, FEMA program areas have a listing of credentialing courses that are required for their employees. Often the title of a course on their list does not match the title as recognized in the ADD system. Titles/descriptions and associated numbers in the ADD system for all FEMA classes need to be standardized for use throughout the organization.

Recommendation:
FEMA Headquarters should standardize all course titles and associated descriptions and numbers in the ADD system to coincide with credentialing courses required by all elements within FEMA.

Responding Office:
PT
HUMAN SERVICES

1. Need for Restructuring Processing at the National Processing Service Centers (NPSCs)

2. Inadequate Search Capability in the National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS)

3. Assignment of NPSC Liaison to the Disaster Field Office (DFO)
Issue #1

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Human services/Applicant Assistance

Issue Code:
NPSC

Brief Issue Statement:
Restructure “virtual environment” processing at all three national Processing Service Centers (NPSCs).

Brief Discussion of Issue:
There has been more delay in the processing of cases during 1292-DR-NC than at any other disaster in recent memory. Countless cases have been worked at the Disaster Field Office (DFO), forwarded on to the NPSC, and then have languished in Disaster Housing (DH) Manual or Supervisor Review for weeks at a time. They seem to remain undiscovered in this state until a call or e-mail from the DFO brings attention to the problem.

Generally, when a case is worked in the Disaster Recovery Center (DRC), reviewed at the DFO, and then forwarded to the NPSC, the processing of the case will be completed with no further action required. Not so at this disaster. Even some congressional level inquiries have not been processed within a reasonable timeframe.

Recommendation:
Restructure “virtual environment” processing.

Develop measurable methods to determine responsibility and accountability for the processing of a disaster, especially if it is spread among the three NPSCs.

Create Aging Reports to record the length of time cases remain in a queue. Set achievable standards for the length of time it should take to process those cases.

Responding Office:
RR-HS
Issue # 2

Program Office Reporting the Issue:

Human Services/Applicant Assistance

Issue Code:

NEMIS

Brief Issue Statement:

The Search Capability within NEMIS has been inadequate at 1292-DR-NC.

Brief Discussion of Issue:

Frequently there is a need to complete a search within NEMIS for a specific applicant or a list of applicants by name, street or area.

Currently, when such a search is initiated, only the first 100 names are viewable. This provides only partial data, not access to the entire universe.

It is my understanding that the decision whether or not to provide access to the entire database is determined at the front-end of a disaster.

Recommendation:

Provide full access to the applicant database within NEMIS so that a complete search can be accomplished.

Responding Office:

RR-HS
Issue # 3

Program Office Reporting the Issue: Lead
Human Services/ Applicant Assistance

Issue Code:
NPSC

Brief Issue Statement:
NPSC Liaisons at the DFO/DFO Liaison at the NPSC

Brief Discussion of Issue:
Assigning National Processing Service Center (NPSC) liaison staff to the DFO has been an excellent idea. I have worked directly with them and have found them professional and competent. We have learned a great deal about NEMIS from them and have gained a better understanding about the entire processing system. They, in turn, have learned a lot about the real life disaster environment in the field.

In the past, we have had a DFO liaison at the NPSC. This position was eliminated at this disaster.

Recommendation:
Continue to assign NPSC staff to future DFO operations.

Re-institute a DFO liaison at the NPSC. Current information about the processing flow from the NPSC is important to the DFO operation. At previous disasters, the DFO Liaison provided a continuous flow of information about any processing issues, Helpline concerns, etc.

Responding Office:
RR-HS
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**Total** 60  60  60
Summary of Impacts Map (revised October 27, 1999)

Based on the ESF 5 Planning Branch Analysis
Analysis based on preliminary data.
Emergency Response Team
FEMA-1292-DR-NC

Federal Coordinating Officer
Glenn C. Woodard
Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer
Tommy Moore

Deputy FCO for Mitigation
Todd Davison

Information & Planning Section
Deder Lane

Operations Section
Ginger Edwards

Operations Support Branch
Fred Rees

Human Services Branch
Paul Fay

Infrastructure Support Branch
Les Smith

Emergency Services Branch
Ginger Edwards

Situation Status Branch
Henry Thomas

Planning Support Branch
Paul Aadnesen

Documentation Branch
Sally Bishop

Technical Services Branch
Ron Langhelm

Coordination and Planning Branch
Kathryn Smith

Resource Management Branch
Tim Towers

Supply Branch
Mike Lee

Support Services Branch
Bobby Price

Information Services Branch
Steve Duke

Information & Planning - Last Update: 10/09/99
Emergency Response Team
FEMA-1292-DR-NC

Information & Planning updated 12-01-99
AFTER ACTION REPORT
FEMA-3168-EM-VA/1392-DR-VA

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
FEMA-3168-EM-VA DECLARED SEPTEMBER 12, 2001
FEMA-1392-DR-VA DECLARED SEPTEMBER 21, 2001

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICER
Federal Emergency Management Agency

After Action Statement of Purpose:

The After Action Report for the Commonwealth of Virginia disaster recovery operation identifies and analyzes critical, national operational issues from the current disaster that, if left unresolved, may impede future operations. This report highlights ideas and approaches that merit national consideration. This After Action Report is designed to contribute to the future success of the Federal Government’s disaster operations. This report provides analysis rather than documentation.

After Action Statement of Scope:

This After Action Report is an analytical report, dealing only with those national issues that have an important bearing on future operations. It complements other reports, such as Situation Reports, Action Plans, Regional reports, and detailed chronologies that were issued during this disaster operation. Contributions were solicited and considered from organizations directly involved in the Fires and Explosions Disaster Operation, including FEMA elements inside and outside the Disaster Field Office. The final decision on the selection of key issues for this report was made by the Federal Coordinating Officer.

Thomas P. Davies
Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA-3168-EM-VA/FEMA-1392-DR-VA
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V. MAPS

VI. ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
I. DESCRIPTION OF VIRGINIA FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS EVENT

On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks struck three (3) areas of the United States. Two (2) hijacked airplanes crashed into New York’s World Trade Center approximately 20 minutes apart, collapsing both towers. A short time later, another aircraft crashed into the Army wing of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and a fourth hijacked plane crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. Both towers of the New York World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon collapsed. The terrorist attacks caused numerous casualties at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, significant physical damage, and the loss of all plane passengers. Approximately 189 persons were killed or are missing from the Pentagon attack. The Pentagon, White House, State Department, Justice Department, Capitol, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and all other government buildings in Washington, DC evacuated. All commercial flights in the United States were suspended.

On September 11, the Governor of Virginia declared a state of emergency and requested a Major Presidential Disaster Declaration. On September 12, the President signed FEMA-3168-EM-VA designating Emergency Assistance for Arlington County, Virginia.

A temporary Disaster Field Office (DFO) opened at the Arlington County Emergency Operations Center on September 12, 2001. On September 15, operations transitioned to the DFO established at 2200 Clarendon Boulevard, 9th Floor, Arlington, Virginia.

On September 21, the President signed FEMA-1392-DR-VA designating Arlington County in the Commonwealth of Virginia for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance, Categories A and B, 100 percent Federal funding. All counties in the Commonwealth of Virginia are eligible to apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. Operations for FEMA-3168-EM-VA were folded into FEMA-1392-DR-VA.

The FEMA-Commonwealth Agreement for FEMA-1392-DR-VA was signed on September 29, 2001.

The Disaster Field Office closed October 24 and operations transitioned to the Region III office.
II. AFTER ACTION REPORT FACT SHEET

1. FEMA Disaster number: FEMA-1392-DR-VA

2. Disaster-affected State/Territory: Arlington, Virginia

3. Disaster Type: Fires and Explosions

4. Declaration Date: Emergency, September 12, 2001

5. Incident Period: September 11, 2001

6. Names and Service Dates of FCOs: Thomas P. Davies
September 12, 2001 (FEMA-3168-EM-VA)
September 21, 2001 to October 24, 2001 (FEMA-
1392-DR-VA)

7. DFO Location: Disaster Field Office
2200 Clarendon Boulevard, 9th Floor
Arlington, Virginia 22201
Telephone: 703-875-7800
FAX: 703-875-7920

8. Number of Jurisdictions Designated: IA: 1 PA: 1 HM: 1

9. Other Declarations: Small Business Administration

10. HS Obligation: $1,752,500 as of October 16, 2001

11. Infrastructure Obligation: $190,284 as of October 16, 2001

12. Hazard Mitigation Obligation: NA

13. Total IA Registration: 95 as of October 16, 2001

14. Type of ERT Activated: Region III ERT

15. Number of DRCs: 0

16. Number of RPAs: 50 as of October 16, 2001
III. UNRESOLVED CRITICAL ISSUES

1. TIMELY ARRIVAL OF EQUIPMENT
2. TELeregistration VIA INTERNET
3. MP3 TECHNOLOGY
4. DEPLOYMENT OF ANNUITANT DAEs
5. NEMIS INTER-AGENCY/PROGRAM INTEGRATION
6. T-1 TELECOMMUNICATION LINES FOR STATES
7. MUTUAL AID POLICY 2523.6
8. CREATION OF EMERGENCY DECLARATION SITUATION REPORT TEMPLATE
Issue #1

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
All Programs

Issue Code:
LOGIS/MERS/TLC

Brief Issue Statement:
Timely Arrival of Territorial Logistics Center (TLC) Equipment

Brief Discussion of Issue:
TLC equipment trucks were approximately 12 hours late arriving at the Pentagon-disaster DFO site. The late arrival of equipment delayed the startup of a working DFO.

Recommendation:

1. Use Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) personnel with Commercial Driver License (CDL) credentials rather than utilizing contract drivers.

2. Cross train personnel to ensure an adequate number of CDL qualified drivers for perceived emergency deployment.

Responding Office:
HR/RR-MO
Issue #2

Program Office Reporting the Issue:

Human Services

Issue Code:

NTC

Brief Issue Statement:

Human Services Teleregistration Process

Brief Discussion of Issue:

The Teleregistration process, as currently setup, provides expeditious/efficient service. However, applying for assistance via an Internet applications document may provide an easier and more convenient method for some clients.

Recommendation:

Any development in this area should be encouraged and accelerated. In the absence of development, resources should be dedicated.

Responding Office:

RR-HS/NPSC/IT
Issue #3

Program Office Reporting the Issue:

Public Affairs

Issue Code:

MISC/Policy

Brief Issue Statement:

MP3 Broadcasting as a means of disseminating disaster information.

Brief Discussion of Issue:

In many disasters radio broadcasting is the key (possibly the only) means of disseminating disaster information to affected areas/individuals. Reasons include: (1) print is too slow, (2) television sets/antennas may have been lost/damaged in floods/earthquakes/weather events, (3) cable system lines are down or satellite equipment is lost due to storm activity, (4) radio is portable/accessible in cars, the workplace, and at home. The opportunity presently exists to enhance radio communications medium. By using Media Player 3 (MP3) technology (mini-disc audio recorders) quality audio can be transmitted in real time via the Internet. FEMA can assist radio stations in supplying disaster-oriented information. Radio stations (especially in small/medium markets) operate primarily by satellite and computers with minimal local staff.

Recommendation:

1. Add MP3 technology currently used by radio news operations to FEMA operations.

2. Encrypt transmission as necessary.

Responding Office:

ITS/RR
Issue #4

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Human Services

Issue Code:
ADD/Staffing

Brief Issue Statement:
Administrative Control: Early activation

Brief Discussion of Issue:
In some instances, individuals deployed are re-employed annuitant DAEs. These individuals may incur significant expenses, but receive little remuneration. Lack of remuneration may impact activation of annuitant DAEs in early disaster response.

Recommendation:
In disaster situations amend existing rules to suspend re-employed annuitant provisions for PDAs and Emergency Declarations. Consider critical need as justification to deploy the individual.

Responding Office:
FMRR-HS
Issue #5

Program Office Reporting the Issue:

Human Services

Issue Code:

NEMIS/IT

Brief Issue Statement:

Improvements needed in NEMIS

Brief Discussion of Issue:

NEMIS needs to be upgraded. NEMIS needs to integrate information between other agencies/programs such as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). NEMIS needs to recognize independent jurisdictions as well as counties. Recognizing independent jurisdictions is necessary for managing, reporting, and disseminating information.

Recommendation:

Identify utilities and request software change in the operating system.

Responding Office:

NEMIS/IT
Issue #6

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Human Services

Issue Code:
IT

Brief Issue Statement:
Provision of T-1 telecommunication lines for states.

Brief Discussion of Issue:
Currently, unless working at a Disaster Field Office (DFO), State Individual and Family Grant (IFG) staff can only access NEMIS through PCAnywhere and Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACAS) accounts. This is a slow and user-unfriendly process, which results in slow processing of awards for application.

Recommendation:
Provide/identify T-1 lines to state IFG staff for duration of program activities.

Responding Office:
IT/RR-HS
Issue #7

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Office of General Counsel

Issue Code:
Policy

Brief Issue Statement:
Mutual Aid Policy 2523.6

Brief Discussion of Issue:
FEMA policy requires a clear cost reimbursement provision be included in local mutual aid agreements. Few local agreements contain appropriate cost provision. In this terrorist attack, policy became a problem to overcome due to the numerous jurisdictions that responded. In this disaster in Virginia, the policy apparently will be waived and a de facto mutual aid policy among all affected jurisdictions will be assumed. In New York, all responding jurisdictions were declared for emergency protective measures. For a terrorist attack, it would appear that this policy should be changed.

Recommendation:

1. Establish a waiver provision with criteria for jurisdictions with mutual aid agreements.
2. Establish a waiver provision with criteria for catastrophic situations for far-off jurisdictions that do not have a mutual aid agreement with the affected jurisdiction.

Responding Office:
Policy
Issue #8

Program Office Reporting the Issue:
Information and Planning

Issue Code:
I&P

Brief Issue Statement:
Need for Situation Report format/template for an emergency declaration.

Brief Discussion of Issue:
No format/template is included in the July 2000 Information and Planning (I&P) Operations Manual.

Recommendation:
Develop a new format/template for Situation Reports for an emergency declaration and add to the I&P Operations Manual.

Responding Office:
I&P