



# governmentattic.org

*"Rummaging in the government's attic"*

Description of document: **Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, March 11, 2009**

Requested date: 06-August-2009

Released date: 19-May-2010 / 11-June-2010

Posted date: 21-June-2010

Source of document: Department of Homeland Security  
United States Secret Service  
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch  
Communication Center  
245 Murray Lane, S.W.  
Building T-5  
Washington, D.C. 20223

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**  
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch  
Communications Center  
245 Murray Lane, S.W.  
Building T-5  
Washington, D.C. 20223

MAY 19 2010

File Number: 20090586-20090588

Dear Requester:

Reference is made to your Freedom of Information and/or Privacy Acts request originally received by the United States Secret Service on August 6, 2009, for information pertaining to the following:

File no. 20090586: The report entitled: Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, dated March 20, 2009. (not just the executive summary, the remainder of the report);

File no. 20090587: The letter from the Joint Congressional Committee requesting the report;

File no. 20090588: A copy of any FOIA requests for this report, along with the response provided and a copy of the administrative processing file for these reports.

Enclosed are copies of documents from Secret Service records. The referenced material was considered under both the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 and/or the Privacy Act, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a. Pursuant to the Acts, exemptions have been applied where deemed appropriate. The exemptions cited are marked below.

In addition, approximately 2 page(s) were withheld in their entirety. An enclosure to this letter explains the exemptions in more detail.

☐ If this box is checked, deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below.

***Section 552 (FOIA)***

<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (3) Statute:		
<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (5)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (6)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (B)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (D)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (7) (F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b) (8)

**Section 552a (Privacy Act)**

☐ (d) (5) ☐ (j) (2) ☐ (k) (1) ☐ (k) (2) ☐ (k) (3) ☐ (k) (5) ☐ (k) (6)

The following checked item(s) also apply to your request:

☐ Some documents originated with another government agency(s). These documents were referred to that agency(s) for review and direct response to you.

☐ page(s) of documents in our files contain information furnished to the Secret Service by another government agency(s). You will be advised directly by the Secret Service regarding the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(s).


☐ Other:

☐ Fees:

If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U.S. Secret Service, Communications Center, 245 Murray Lane, S.W., Building T-5, Washington, DC 20223. If you do decide to file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your appeal.

Please use the file number indicated above in all future correspondence with the Secret Service.

Sincerely,

  
Craig W. Ulmer  
Special Agent In Charge  
Freedom of Information &  
Privacy Acts Officer

Enclosure: FOIA and Privacy Act Exemption List

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT  
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552**

**Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act do not apply to matter that are:**

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices any agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the information: (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for regulation or supervision of financial institutions;
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

**PRIVACY ACT  
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

**The provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply to:**

- (d) (5) material compiled in reasonable anticipation of civil action or proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) material is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (k) (2) material compiled during investigations for law enforcement purposes;
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of Title 18;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or for access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or prior to the September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process;



**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**  
**UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223**

Freedom of Information Act & Privacy Acts Branch  
Communications Center  
245 Murray Lane, S.W., Building T-5  
Washington, D.C. 20223


File Number: 20090586

Reference is made to your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Acts (FOIA/PA) request originally received by the United States Secret Service (USSS) on August 6, 2009, for information pertaining to the report entitled: Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration, dated March 20, 2009 (not just the executive summary, the remainder of the report).

Additionally, reference is made to the letter dated May 19, 2010, from the USSS, FOIA/PA Branch releasing to you copies of documents responsive to this FOIA request.

Upon further review of your file, we have determined that we may appropriately reduce the scope of our redactions. Accordingly, enclosed is a copy of the documents responsive to your request, with additional information being released to you. We continue, however, to withhold certain information pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) and (b)(7)(E), as information related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the USSS, and the information which could disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. In addition, information continues to be withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), as the disclosure of that information could result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

Sincerely,

  
Craig W. Ulmer  
Special Agent In Charge  
Freedom of Information Act &  
Privacy Acts Officer

# **Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration**

**March 11, 2009**

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS *FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)*. IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO *FOUO* INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
Inaugural Review Team	5
PLANNING	7
National Special Security Event Designation	7
Event Overview	7
2009 Inauguration Executive Steering Committee	7
Subcommittees	8
U.S. Capitol Subcommittee	8
Challenges	9
Transportation System	10
Tickets	10
Pertinent Aspects of Selected Elements of the Security Plans For the 56 <sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration	11
Agency Assignments	11
Crowd Management	14
Entry Points	15
Third Street Tunnel	17
Third Street Crossover	17
Medial Support	17
Site Security	17
ISSUES WHICH DEVELOPED DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN	19
Tickets	19
Recommendations	19
Crowd Management	19
Recommendations	20

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS *FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)*. IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*217*

## Table of Contents (Continued)

Entry Points	21
Pre-Screening	21
Recommendations	23
Blue and Purple Screening Checkpoints	24
Concerns Unique to the Purple Screening Checkpoint	25
Recommendations	26
Orange and Yellow Ticket Screening Checkpoints	26
Recommendations	26
Silver Ticket Screening Checkpoint	26
Recommendations	27
Magnetometer Screening	27
Recommendations	27
Site Security	27
b2 b7e Fencing	27
Recommendations	28
Third Street Tunnel	28
Recommendations	29
Third Street Crossover	30
Recommendations	30
OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE IRT	32
Executive Steering Committee	32
Recommendations	32
MACC	33
Recommendations	33
Emergency Medical Support	34
Recommendations	34
SUMMARY	35
CERTIFICATION	36

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*218*



## Table of Contents (Continued)

APPENDIX I – Abbreviations and Acronyms

APPENDIX II – 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration Executive Steering Committee Organizational Chart

APPENDIX III – Aerial Photograph of U.S. Capitol and Nation Mall, January 20, 2009

APPENDIX IV – 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration NSSE – Security Map, U.S. Capitol and National Mall

APPENDIX V – U.S. Capitol Subcommittee – Security Map, U.S. Capitol

APPENDIX VI – Report Distribution

IF RELEASED, L.E.S. INFO SHOULD  
BE DELETED FROM APPENDIX

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS *FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)*. IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO *FOUO* INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

2if

# Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration

## INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2009, according to media reports, an estimated 1.8 million people converged on Washington, D.C., the United States (U.S.) Capitol grounds and the National Mall to witness the Inauguration of President Barack Obama. An enormous amount of preparation and planning went into this historic event. It was one of the greatest logistical challenges ever faced by law enforcement planners. Area law enforcement agencies worked very hard to develop and implement a security plan that would ensure the orderly transfer of power without disruption and keep the nation's capital safe during the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration. In this regard, the plan was successful.

However, thousands of people holding blue, purple and silver tickets to the swearing-in ceremony were not processed through the various checkpoints in time to view the Inauguration ceremonies, with many spending an extended period of time waiting in the northbound tube of the Third Street tunnel.

The following report addresses the inability of ticketholders to view the Inauguration of the President and other issues identified by Senator Dianne Feinstein, Senator Robert Bennett, the Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC) and other members of Congress. As directed by Senator Feinstein, this report seeks to critically analyze the planning and execution of the security plan for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration, identify any deficiencies with regard to crowd management and make specific recommendations to ensure that identified deficiencies are properly addressed in plans for future Inaugural ceremonies.

## Inaugural Review Team

As requested by Senator Feinstein, Director Mark Sullivan, U.S. Secret Service (USSS), convened an Inaugural Review Team (IRT) to examine the planning and execution of the 2009 Inaugural security plan and report the findings. A representative was selected from each of the law enforcement agencies involved in the planning of the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration. These representatives were not directly involved in the planning of the Inauguration and were better disposed to offer a fair and balanced analysis of the event planning and execution. The IRT members are listed as follows:

- Inspector **B7C B6**, Inspection Division, USSS - Chair
- Assistant Inspector **B7C B6** Inspection Division, USSS - Co-Chair
- Inspector **B7C B6** Executive Office of the Chief of Police, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
- Captain **B7C B6** Commander, East District, U.S. Park Police (USPP)
- Captain **B7C B6** Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Capitol Police (USCP)

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

- Lieutenant *BIC B6* Executive Office of the Chief of Police,  
MPD
- Robert R. Howe, Senior Advisor to the House Sergeant at Arms
- Joseph C. Haughey, General Counsel for the Senate Sergeant at Arms

The IRT conducted an in-depth review of the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration security plan to include: ticketing, pedestrian crowd management, entry points, level of magnetometer screening, flow rates, b2, b7 fencing, signage, mass transportation and volunteer staffing issues.

The IRT members interviewed command officers and members from their respective agencies who were either:

- Participants on the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee;
- Responsible for the formulation and implementation of the security plan;
- Assigned to the Multi-Agency Communications Center (MACC), USCP Command Center, MPD Joint Operations Center (JOC), and MPD/USCP security rooms;
- Assigned to the blue, purple or silver entry gates;
- Assigned to the Third Street tunnel;
- Dispatched to provide law enforcement assistance at various incidents; or
- Witnesses to noteworthy events as they occurred.

Also, IRT members conducted interviews of persons assigned to the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCCIC) and the PIC, as well as civilian volunteers.

In addition to the many interviews conducted, IRT members reviewed numerous photographs and video footage from security/surveillance cameras around the U.S. Capitol, USPP aerial, still and infrared photographs of the National Mall, content on Facebook and YouTube, newspaper articles, as well as related photographs and letters submitted to members of Congress.

This report focuses mainly on those issues affecting the U.S. Capitol sites, but also incorporates the events on the National Mall and the parade route. This report provides a foundation of lessons learned for future Presidential Inaugural security planners.

# PLANNING

## National Special Security Event Designation

On October 20, 2008, Secretary Michael B. Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), designated the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). Although security planning had already been underway for some time, once this event was designated an NSSE, the USSS assumed its mandated role as the lead federal agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan.

Historically, the USSS has relied on existing partnerships with federal, state and local law enforcement, and public safety officials to achieve the goal of providing a safe and secure environment for the event and those in attendance. Preparations for an NSSE of the magnitude of the 2009 Presidential Inauguration are always a cooperative effort. No single law enforcement entity can implement necessary security measures on its own. The many areas for which the security plan for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration was successful are a direct reflection of the high degree of cooperation and professionalism shared among the participating agencies.

## Event Overview

The 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration NSSE encompassed three days beginning on January 18, 2009, and included events in Wilmington, Delaware; Baltimore, Maryland; and Washington, D.C.

On January 20, 2009, the NSSE consisted of the swearing-in ceremonies at the U.S. Capitol; the Inaugural parade route; the White House reviewing stand; the Inaugural balls and various other events and venues throughout Washington, D.C.

## 2009 Inauguration Executive Steering Committee

The USSS Washington Field Office began its initial planning for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration in May 2008. The USSS relied heavily on its established partnerships with law enforcement and public safety officials at the local, state and federal levels to provide a safe and secure environment for USSS protectees, dignitaries, event participants and the general public. For the purpose of preparation, planning and implementation of this NSSE, an Executive Steering Committee was established.

The below listed agencies made up the Executive Steering Committee and provided the critical leadership to plan and implement the operational security measures for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration:

- United States Secret Service
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- United States Capitol Police
- Metropolitan Police Department
- District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Department of Defense
- United States Park Police
- District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Management Services (EMS) Department
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID NEED-TO-KNOW WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

- United States Supreme Court Police
- United States Coast Guard
- Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Police (WMATA)
- United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia

The Executive Steering Committee also partnered with the PIC, JCCIC, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal and local partners to plan and ensure the success of the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration.

The Executive Steering Committee began meeting in July 2008, with representatives from the aforementioned agencies. The Executive Steering Committee had joint decision making authority and de-conflicted issues identified by the subcommittees. The Executive Steering Committee also conducted several tabletop exercises in the months leading up to the Inauguration to ensure success of the security plan.

## **Subcommittees**

The Executive Steering Committee appointed 23 subcommittees that focused on specific considerations for the NSSE. These subcommittees are listed as follows:

- |                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| • U.S. Capitol                       | • Consequence Management                        |
| • Parade Route                       | • Maritime Security                             |
| • Crisis Management                  | • Andrews Air Force Base                        |
| • Transportation/Traffic             | • Airspace Security                             |
| • Civil Disturbance                  | • Interagency Communication/Joint Field Office  |
| • Public Affairs                     | • Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) |
| • Venues                             | • Credentialing                                 |
| • Legal                              | • Health and Medical                            |
| • Critical Infrastructure            | • Explosive Device Response                     |
| • Training                           | • Intelligence                                  |
| • Tactical/Counter Surveillance Unit |   |
| • VIP/Dignitary Protection           |   |
| • Reviewing Stand                    |   |

## **U.S. Capitol Subcommittee**

The U.S. Capitol Subcommittee began meeting on a regular basis in July 2008. A heightened security posture was established surrounding the U.S. Capitol due to the NSSE designation and the fact that U.S. civilian and military leadership would be in attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies. Attendees included former presidents, justices of the Supreme Court, the entire Congressional leadership, as well as members of Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, numerous state governors and other high level dignitaries.

The U.S. Capitol Subcommittee was chaired by the USCP and co-chaired by the USSS. The following agencies were represented on the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee:

- United States Capitol Police
- United States Secret Service
- Metropolitan Police Department

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

*Dif*

- United States Park Police
- District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Management Services Department
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Department of Defense
- Architect of the Capitol
- Transportation Security Administration
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Metro Transit Police
- District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency
- United States Supreme Court (USSC) Police
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- United States Coast Guard

The U.S. Capitol Subcommittee was tasked with developing the operational security plan for the Capitol Hill portion of the NSSE. Because of jurisdictional control, the USCP primarily developed the security and logistical plan with regards to the Congressional Inaugural Ceremonies that took place on the U.S. Capitol grounds. The USCP appointed officials and civilians to an Inaugural Task Force. This USCP Inaugural Task Force worked with the JCCIC and USSS to prepare the security plan for events on the U.S. Capitol grounds. The U.S. Capitol Subcommittee presented all of their plans to the Executive Steering Committee.

With respect to the ceremonies at the U.S. Capitol, JCCIC was responsible for planning and executing all Inaugural activities, including the Inaugural swearing-in ceremonies, printing and distribution of tickets for the swearing-in ceremonies, and signage. The JCCIC made all decisions concerning the Inaugural activities, but deferred to USCP and the Executive Steering Committee concerning law enforcement issues such as screening and crowd management.

## Challenges

It was anticipated that an unprecedented number of people, estimated by the media at two to four million, would converge on the city, U.S. Capitol grounds and the National Mall for the Inaugural swearing-in ceremonies. During the planning process, the decision was made to open the entire National Mall so that all of these people could view this historic event. As such, the Executive Steering Committee, JCCIC, PIC, as well as D.C., Virginia and Maryland government agencies, and news media prepared for this eventuality.

Planning for and accommodating such a crowd, while maintaining the integrity of the security plan, became the central challenge faced by all the subcommittees. Many subcommittees, to include the Transportation/Traffic, the Fire/Life Safety/HAZMAT, and the Health and Medical Subcommittees took on much larger roles than in past Inaugurations. These subcommittees had to examine issues that had not been historically problematic, i.e., mass transportation, medical care, portable restroom facilities, warming stations and the parade staging area.

As these subcommittees engaged in the planning process, two relevant challenges began to emerge:

- First, there was growing concern that the transportation system (Metro, buses, etc.) and access routes would not be able to handle the task of moving two to four million people in the National Mall area, especially in areas around the U.S. Capitol grounds.
- Second, the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee was concerned that the number of tickets

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS *FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)*. IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO *FOUO* INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*Rif*

being issued would exceed the maximum capacity of the allotted space in the respective viewing areas.

## **Transportation System**

### *Metro, Access Routes and Road Closures*

Recognizing that two to four million people may be converging on Washington, D.C., the transportation plan was critical. Beginning in December 2008, the Executive Steering Committee was briefed by JCCIC and USCP on these challenges. Throughout December 2008 and January 2009, the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee, JCCIC and PIC discussed which color tickets would be directed to which Metro stations. The Executive Steering Committee convened meetings which included the governors of Maryland and Virginia, the mayor of D.C., representatives from WMATA and each respective Department of Transportation, among others. The details of the Metro station assignments are referenced below under the Tickets section of this report.

Overall, it was recognized that overcrowding could occur at Metro stations and access routes to the screening areas. To plan for overcrowding and provide access to screening gates, the USCP and JCCIC developed signage plans (15 two-sided banners and 15 variable message boards) to assist with crowd management. The USCP utilized "way finder" volunteers to assist with crowd management.

The JCCIC also recognized the need to work with the Office of Congressional Accessibility Services in order to accommodate people with disabilities. This plan called for two drop-off points at South Capitol and E Streets, SE and North Capitol and E Streets, NE, as well as transportation to the screening checkpoints for these individuals. The plan also addressed persons with wheelchairs, sign language interpreters for the hearing impaired and reserved areas for people with visual impairment (audio descriptions for non-speaking portions). The plan attempted to make the event accessible for persons with disabilities, but recognized that getting to the U.S. Capitol grounds would be difficult due to large crowds.

The USSS issued a press release on January 7, 2009. Among other things, the press release included information on downtown area road closures and parade route entry points. It also identified intersections to be utilized as parade route crossover points.

### *Buses*

The Executive Steering Committee recognized that many people would be arriving in buses. The committee planned for accommodating thousands of buses arriving from all over the country. Bus drop-off points were designated outside of the security perimeter and throughout the downtown area.

### **Tickets**

The Executive Steering Committee expressed concern about the number of tickets being issued by JCCIC for the swearing-in ceremonies. Planners knew that in previous Inaugurations, a percentage of ticketholders did not attend; however, they knew that most of the ticketholders would likely attend this historical event. The Executive Steering Committee also realized that this would likely cause overcrowding in the viewing areas, particularly in the blue and purple areas.

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

In lieu of reducing the number of tickets, JCCIC requested that site surveys first be conducted to determine if additional space could accommodate the number of people that had been historically invited to the swearing-in ceremonies. The USCP worked with the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and succeeded in configuring expansion/overflow areas that met the space requirements for 241,000 guests. The number of issued tickets was ultimately not reduced.

Tickets for the orange, yellow, blue, purple and silver viewing areas were distributed as follows:

Orange	17,469
Yellow	19,269
Blue	52,500
Purple	52,500
Silver	100,000

Ticketholders were provided with an accompanying map identifying the location of the respective color-coded screening checkpoints. Based upon the color of ticket, the map instructed ticketholders to utilize the following Metro stations:

<u>Ticket Color</u>	<u>Metro Station</u>
Orange	Capitol South
Yellow	Union Station
Blue	Federal Center
Purple	Judiciary Square
Silver	Federal Center SW

Additional instructions on the map advised all ticketholders that they would be required to pass through security screening.

The JCCIC issued a news release on January 11, 2009, concerning map and ticket information for the Inaugural swearing-in ceremonies. This news release provided specific information to ticketholders regarding how to access their designated entry points and provided information to persons utilizing Metro trains.

## **Pertinent Aspects of Selected Elements of the Security Plans for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration**

### **Agency Assignments**

Through the subcommittee process, major areas of responsibility were delineated as follows:

**USCP** - secure the U.S. Capitol and all Congressional Office Buildings; building access control; emergency responders; garage security; subway security; secure Capitol Square; secure Marine One; secure Inaugural Platform; provide protective details for Congressional Leadership; provide escorts for dignitaries; execute traffic control throughout U.S. Capitol grounds; secure parade

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

Rif



route (within U.S. Capitol perimeter); provide motorcade escorts; carry out protective intelligence; provide counter surveillance teams; provide emergency response teams; provide counter sniper and assault teams; provide canine patrols; provide hazardous devices search and response teams; execute security equipment maintenance and repair; carry out technical countermeasures operations; provide Joint Hazard Assessment teams; provide decontamination teams; conduct vehicle maintenance and recovery operations; provide law enforcement support on U.S. Capitol grounds and the National Mall panels as defined in the Interagency Agreement between USCP and USPP; direct pedestrians outside selected Metro stations; direct pedestrians along routes to screening areas; pre-screen ticketed guests; carry out Command Center Operations; conduct liaison (communication centers); conduct lost and found/missing persons operations; provide pedestrian direction and information; provide routine patrol and law enforcement support.

**USSS** - plan, set up and screen (magnetometer and waistband search) all ticketholders entering the site; plan for and set up security along parade route; post all vehicle access points to the U.S. Capitol; provide *b2 b7e* *b2, b7c* to the USCP Command Center; provide a *b2, b7e* to the USCP Security room located in room *b2, b7e* provide manpower utilized for screeners (magnetometer and waistband searches) and supervisors at five primary ticket screening locations; post and secure a middle perimeter inside the U.S. Capitol Building; post and secure an inner perimeter inside the U.S. Capitol building; post all designated hold rooms; post the West Front of the U.S. Capitol; post the Inaugural Platform; provide appropriate personnel and material for installation of *b2, b7e* for the platform; provide the appropriate personnel and material for the installation of *b2, b7e* on the platform; provide counter surveillance personnel; provide wireless tracking personnel; provide countersnipers; provide countersniper response SAs; provide Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division personnel; provide dedicated personnel for the airspace security over the U.S. Capitol; provide canine teams; coordinate sweeps by military Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams; provide *B2 b7e* Team personnel.

**USPP** - responsible for public safety and security on all National Park Service (NPS) lands and roadways impacted by the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration; most significant of which were those areas on the National Mall from Fourth Street to the Lincoln Memorial, Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Site, which includes the north and south sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue between Third and 15<sup>th</sup> Streets along the parade route, the Ellipse, Lafayette Park, and the White House sidewalk. By virtue of the proximity to the swearing-in ceremonies, the parade route, and the presidential reviewing stand, these NPS lands saw the highest concentration of visitors witnessing these historic events. The USPP employed the following assets to ensure the safety and security of the event, the public, and numerous protectees: a full Force commitment of sworn and civilian staff, to include sworn personnel from its New York and San Francisco Field Offices, as well as several officials from NPS regions across the country; NPS and Department of Interior (DOI) law enforcement personnel; numerous state and local law enforcement personnel; National Guard personnel; Aviation assets that provided aerial support and monitoring for presidential escorts, crowd management, and medevac capabilities; canine teams; Horse Mounted Patrol Units; SWAT Teams for tactical response; Reactionary Teams for civil disturbance; Intelligence Teams; bike and scooter squads; escort rifers for numerous protectee and ceremonial escorts; liaison officers for several command and coordination centers, to include the MACC, Joint Information Center (JIC), MPD JOC, DC Emergency Operations Center (EOC), USCP Command Center, Transportation Security Operations Center, Joint Forces Headquarters, and representation on a Joint Hazard Assessment Team; and several elevated observation platforms along the National Mall to monitor the crowds.

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

**MPD** - monitor all pedestrian thoroughfares outside the U.S. Capitol grounds; provide main cordon duties for the entire Inaugural parade route; provide response to all suspicious packages and bomb threats outside the U.S. Capitol grounds; escort all VIPs to swearing-in ceremonies and Inaugural events; provide security and traffic control at all Inaugural ball sites and unofficial venues; staff multiple command centers, including the MACC, JIC, USCP Command Center, D.C. EOC, as well as fully staff MPD JOC; provide Joint Hazard Assessment teams; secure entire outer perimeter and execute a tiered crowd management system for all areas under MPD responsibility; execute and staff prisoner processing sites; handle all missing persons outside the U.S. Capitol grounds with stationary and mobile units; execute traffic closures and monitor traffic flow throughout the entire city; execute all towing and recovery efforts; establish and carry out a commissary detail for the over b2,b7c officers assigned to the events; provide emergency response teams; provide canine patrol; execute logistical matters, such as equipment and vehicle maintenance and repair; support and execute crowd metering functions around USPP territory; support and execute crowd metering functions around Metro stations; provide pedestrian direction and information; conduct intelligence surveys; monitor protest groups and areas; provide crowd management and metering at all parade access points; provide air support; provide dedicated personnel for the egress of all persons leaving the events; monitor and secure all avenues of departure for the Inaugural attendees; provide patrol functions for entire city; maintain police presence at extended hour bars and restaurants.

#### **Staffing**

To accomplish the security mission at the U.S. Capitol, personnel were assigned from the following agencies:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number of personnel assigned</u>
USSS - SAs (Poststanders)	
USSS - Uniformed Division (UD) officers	
TSA	B7c
USCP	
USCP Civilians	
Library of Congress (LOC)	
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	B2
U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO)	
USSC Police	
AMTRAK Police (Vapor Wake K9 teams)	

The USSS also provided personnel support from Technical Security Division b7c b7d Information and Resources Management Division b7c Washington Field Office b7c B2 Counter Assault Team b7c b7d and the Office of Government and Public Affairs b7c b7d

#### **USPP Staffing and Deployment**

In all, the USPP utilized over b7c b7d personnel. The USPP provided escorts and traffic control for all b7c b7d Armed Forces Inaugural Committee (AFIC) buses, which carried the ceremonial elements of the Inaugural parade from the Pentagon to the Ellipse exclusively utilizing NPS roadways; developed and executed a crowd management/overcrowding mitigation plan for the National Mall; coordinated similar plans for the parade route with the USSS and MPD; ensured all First

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

Amendment Demonstrations occurred without disruption and within legal parameters along the parade route, within Lafayette Park, and an impromptu demonstration near the Ellipse; facilitated the safe and effective transit of numerous EMS vehicles transporting patients to local hospitals; ensured the safe egress of visitors from NPS lands upon the conclusion of the events; and successfully reunited all missing persons, some of which were identified as critical missing.

#### **MPD Staffing and Deployment**

Overall ~~B2, B7C~~ MPD members were engaged in Inaugural events along with ~~B2, B7C~~ outside agency members for a total of ~~B2, B7C~~ law enforcement members staffing these events. The MPD established its presence in the area from 23<sup>rd</sup> Street, NW to Third Street, NW and from K Street, NW to the SE/SW Freeway.

- MPD had ~~B2, B7C~~ platoons assigned to the Inaugural events (~~B2, B7C~~ members)
- ~~B2, B7C~~ total members were assigned to the Inaugural events
  - ~~B2, B7C~~ members provided traffic control, parade cordon and escort duties
  - ~~B2, B7C~~ members handled events such as Inaugural balls and traffic control
- ~~B2, B7C~~ outside agency members assigned and deployed under MPD's control

~~B2, B7C~~ officers were assigned to work throughout the remainder of the city. These officers handled calls for service, staff entertainment areas with unofficial Inaugural events and extended operating hours for Alcoholic Beverage Control establishments.

#### **Crowd Management**

##### **USCP**

USCP had ~~B2, B7C~~ sworn officers and ~~B2, B7C~~ civilian employees, augmented by ~~B2, B7C~~ CBP officers, assigned to Capitol Hill Metro stations, critical intersections, checkpoints and sidewalks to direct pedestrians along routes to screening areas and to provide general information to ticketed pedestrians. USCP also developed signage to direct ticketed guests to their respective viewing areas.

##### **MPD**

MPD established three tiers to control and inform crowds attempting to enter the parade route area.

- Tier 1: two blocks out - Public information, monitoring and coordination.
- Tier 2: Crowd Monitoring and Flow Control - Metering points, ½ to 1 block from entry points to allow no more than 50 to 100 through to the gates at one time, and use of megaphone to control crowds from the rear.
- Tier 3: Security Checkpoint Access Control - USSS/National Guard to use counters to determine when each area was filled to capacity.

A total of ~~B2, B7C~~ reserve officers, civilian volunteers and Serve DC volunteers were deployed to manage Tier 1 areas and distribute information. Tier 2 members also provided information.

A total of ~~B2, B7C~~ Civil Disturbance Units (CDU) platoons (~~B2, B7C~~ members) were deployed to Tier 2 and Tier 3 areas.

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

Crowd monitoring and metering points were also established for the following Metro stations and the Third Street tunnel:

- Gallery Place Metro station
- Judiciary Square Metro station
- Federal Center SW Metro station
- Federal Triangle Metro station
- Foggy Bottom Metro station
- Union Station Metro station
- North Entry to the southbound lanes of the Third Street tunnel *B7c B2*
- Exit from the Third Street tunnel (south side) *B7c B2*

CDU platoons were ultimately used at these locations. In addition, *B7c B2* National Guard troops were deployed to Metro stations to meter and control the exiting crowds

### Entry Points

#### Flow Rate

In general, the flow rate is established with reference to the number of ticketholders anticipated at an entry point in relation to the amount of time allocated for screening. The number of pre-screeners and magnetometer screening modules allocated to each ticketed entry point is determined in order to meet the flow rate. Planners relied on consultant studies in establishing applicable matrix to each entry point which are set forth below.

<u>Ticket Entry Points</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Tickets Anticipated</u>	<u>Pre-screeners Assigned</u>	<u>Magnetometers and Screeners</u>
Orange	Lot 4	17,469	<i>B7c B2</i>	
Yellow	Upper Senate Park	19,269		
Blue	Washington Avenue	52,500		
Purple	Louisiana Avenue	52,500		
Silver	Jefferson Drive	100,000		

For additional information on the silver ticket "lanes," please see the Magnetometer Screening section below.

In order to accommodate anticipated ticketholders, the flow rates at the entry points were established by the planners as follows:

Orange	350/hour
Yellow	350/hour
Blue	700/hour
Purple	700/hour
Silver	750/hour per lane

The flow rate per hour through screening checkpoints varied in accordance with NSSE required

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

safety and security standards based on distances of the viewing areas from the Inaugural platform.

#### *Pre-Screening*

The USCP pre-screeners were assigned to monitor the crowd lines, verify authenticity and check for appropriate color-coded tickets, maintain order, facilitate ingress through the entry points and provide assistance to disabled and elderly guests. Accepted protective methodology calls for pre-screening for threats at points farthest from the entry gates.

The personnel assigned to crowd management activities received extensive training prior to the event. Agencies conducted both individual and joint civil disturbance training, high-volume arrest training and crowd management training. Additionally, on January 11, 2009, MPD hosted a training seminar on crowd dynamics and psychology.

All screening checkpoints were directed to open at 8 a.m., or immediately upon the completion of the USCP security sweep – whichever came first. All screening checkpoints were to be closed at 12 p.m.

#### *Magnetometer Screening*

Magnetometer screening was employed to detect weapons, explosives and other prohibited items. Magnetometer screening assets were deployed at entry points as follows:

<u>Site</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Number of Magnetometers</u>	<u>Number of Personnel Assigned USSS/TSA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Orange	Walk-through	B7c B2		
Yellow	Walk-through			
Blue	Walk-through			
Purple	Walk-through			
Silver	Waistband			

The level of security screening at the U.S. Capitol was discussed at length among the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee, JCCIC and the Executive Steering Committee. There are different protocols employed by agencies depending upon factors such as proximity to protectees, whether an event is designated a NSSE, etc. It was a concern that any significant threat (i.e., shooting, suicide bomber, improvised explosive device, etc.) had the potential to impair the constitutional process of the swearing-in of the President. It was also realized that this entire event, and particularly the U.S. Capitol, could be a potential target for terrorists.

Utilization of magnetometers is the current method employed to mitigate the threat of weapons, such as handguns, long guns and knives. As such, guests were required to pass through magnetometers at the orange, blue, purple and yellow screening gates. At the silver ticket screening checkpoint, waistband searches were conducted. A waistband search

B7c B2

It was also pre-determined by operational planners that if the anticipated flow rates were not being achieved at the blue and purple screening checkpoints, a decision would be made to utilize

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

waistband searches <sup>876. 82</sup> This waistband search was intended to further increase the flow rate without severely jeopardizing security. For the blue and purple screening areas, the level of screening was modified as described above. This modification decreased screening times, while at the same time ensured the safety of the event.

### **Third Street Tunnel**

The planners mutually decided to close the Third Street tunnel to normal vehicular traffic. The southbound tube was to be used exclusively for north and southbound pedestrian traffic under the National Mall. The northbound tube was reserved for emergency vehicles only.

The MPD had operational responsibility for securing the Third Street tunnel. b2, b7E MPD motorcycle and bicycle officers were assigned to the southbound tube of the tunnel to monitor pedestrian flow through the tunnel. No MPD officers were assigned to the northbound tube of the tunnel because it was not designated for pedestrian use.

### **Third Street Crossover**

There were conflicting plans regarding the use of the Third Street crossover. The NSSE map conflicted with the site specific map utilized by the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee. The NSSE map indicated that Third Street would be utilized as a pedestrian crossover and parade route access point, while the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee map indicated it would be closed.

In addition, the USSS press release of January 7, 2009, identified that Third Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW, would be one of the crossover points for the general public attending the Inaugural parade. The JCCIC news release of January 11, 2009, did not address parade route crossovers. This news release only addressed the Third Street tunnel, Second Street, NE and roads further east of the U.S. Capitol as options for pedestrians to travel from the north to the south side of the U.S. Capitol.

These issues and their effect on overcrowding will be addressed in more detail in the Third Street crossover section in this report.

### **Medical Support**

The Office of Attending Physician (OAP) was staffed to provide medical assistance within the U.S. Capitol grounds. Medical assistance carried out on January 20, 2009, was wide-ranging and included minor injuries (cuts) as well as more serious incidents (hypothermia, cardiac emergencies). The USCP assisted the OAP with all calls which required a police response.

### **Site Security**

The USCP, in concert with its law enforcement partners, developed the security plan for the swearing-in ceremonies. The security plan and processes were designed to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities identified in the comprehensive joint threat assessment developed by the Intelligence Subcommittee. The security plan used a systems approach in the utilization of physical security barriers, people and processes. This plan also incorporated emergency evacuation plans.

The physical security plan employed aspects of crime prevention through environmental design

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

and the theory of concentric rings of security around the U.S. Capitol. The outer vehicle barrier was comprised of jersey barriers, Nasatka barriers, and large buses and trucks used as blocking vehicles. The middle pedestrian perimeter was comprised of <sup>b7c b2</sup> fencing (b7c b2 fencing) that tied into the House and Senate office buildings to minimize the fencing requirements. The pedestrian barriers were supplemented with bike rack and snow fencing that served as pedestrian controls, aiding law enforcement personnel in their task of coordinating and controlling crowd movements throughout the area. Security cameras and light towers augmented the physical security barriers by increasing observation and enhancing the ability to detect and deter malicious, criminal or terrorist activities.

As with any security plan, the people assigned to the perimeter, access points, screening areas, and crowd management functions were the critical component. More than <sup>b7c b2</sup> USCP officers, supplemented by the USSC Police, LOC Police, GPO Police, CBP officers, MPD officers, TSA screeners, USSS UD officers and USSS SAs, provided law enforcement, security, screening and crowd management functions.

The processes developed as part of the overall security plan included security sweeps, access controls, vehicle and pedestrian screening procedures, emergency medical response plans, crowd management, and control and arrest processing procedures. These processes were complemented by a comprehensive and detailed Crisis Management Plan (CMP) designed to protect the crowds and government leaders in case of any environmental, criminal or terrorist event. The CMP incorporated detailed incident response plans for

in

d.....

<sup>b7c b2</sup>

Specific response plans developed as part of the CMP were thoroughly discussed and vetted at multiple interagency table-top exercises.

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

## ISSUES WHICH DEVELOPED DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

### Tickets

For the orange, yellow, blue, purple and silver areas, 241,738 tickets were printed for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration. The number of invited guests remained consistent with those of prior Presidential Inaugurations.

As was noted in the planning section above, the Executive Steering Committee recognized that a higher percentage of ticketholders would actually attend this historic event. To accommodate the number of ticketed guests, the AOC followed the USCP Crowd Capacity Matrix based upon the standard of three square feet per person in the viewing and overflow areas. As anticipated, a never-before-seen number of ticketholders did converge on the various ticket screening checkpoints.

In order to accommodate the GPO scheduled workload, ticket printing had to be accomplished by July 2008. As noted earlier, these tickets were color-coded to correspond to the respective viewing areas. Since the tickets were printed early, they contained incorrect information concerning the opening time and locations of the checkpoints.

As a corrective measure, a joint decision was made to publish an addendum showing the location of gates and guest sections for ticket-holders and providing guidelines and directions according to specific ticket colors. This addendum was not identified on its face as a replacement for the previously issued inaccurate directions; it did not instruct silver ticketholders to disregard the previously issued directions, and it did not indicate that there was any change. The addendum did identify a sole access point and give specific instructions on means of access. However, because the silver ticketholders were never instructed to disregard previously issued instructions, the two documents were contradictory and therefore confusing.

### Recommendations

1. *The capacity of the viewing areas should be based on the FEMA crowd management standard of five square feet per person.*
2. *Tickets should be printed later in the planning process and only after being properly vetted through the appropriate subcommittees, once the security plan is approved. This will ensure that printed tickets contain correct information that is consistent with the finalized security plan that is shared with the public.*
3. *A dedicated website and toll free telephone number should be listed on the ticket, ensuring that ticketholders have access to up-to-date information concerning screening checkpoints, reporting directions, etc.*

### Crowd Management

Entry point information and directions (i.e., which Metro stations to utilize) were included on the reverse side of the tickets, and in the case of silver tickets, on addendums. Investigation

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

217



revealed that for various reasons (i.e., Metro transferring not possible, visitors unfamiliar with the Metro system, visitors not reading or misreading the directions), a great number of guests exited at the wrong Metro stations and then tried to navigate through the crowds to their respective entry points.

Crowds began arriving at the Metro stations and the U.S. Capitol very early on Inauguration Day. The intent of planners was to begin separating the ticketed and non-ticketed guests as far away from the checkpoints as possible. USCP had 47 sworn officers and 342 civilian employees, augmented by 16 CBP officers, assigned to Capitol Hill Metro stations, critical intersections, checkpoints and sidewalks to direct pedestrians along routes to screening areas and to provide general information to ticketed pedestrians. Included above were 62 NE of CDUs (Bilge officers) dedicated to provide crowd management and direction on U.S. Capitol grounds. As mentioned in previous sections, USPP, MPD and National Guard were posted for crowd management purposes in this area.

While the crowds remained orderly with no disruptions to the events and no arrests made by assigned officers, the crowd management control component covering blue, purple and silver access areas was adversely impacted by the earlier than anticipated arrival of such large numbers of both ticketed and non-ticketed guests. As such, the crowd management component was not able to fully establish control of the queuing at these entry points.

The police officers and "way finders" were augmented by 15 banner-bridge signs and 15 variable message boards. While the signage plan was more comprehensive than in previous Inaugurations, it is clear that the signage was insufficient to accommodate the crowds already amassed on Inauguration Day.

These signs and variable message boards provided directions for ticketed guests. However, little or no direction was provided on these signs to direct non-ticketed guests. Although there were 15 banner-bridge signs and 15 variable message boards deployed around the U.S. Capitol grounds to guide ticketholders, the size and density of the crowd limited the ability of those within the crowd to read the signage. As a result, non-ticketed guests attempted to gain entry at the ticket screening gates by co-mingling with ticketed guests.

By the time the full contingent of law enforcement officers arrived on post between 4 a.m. and 4:30 a.m., hundreds of people were already congregated at each of these screening entry gates. The crowds, consisting of ticketed and non-ticketed guests, continued to grow throughout the morning. Many of the guests left the National Mall and parade routes in order to gain a closer view of the swearing-in ceremonies. These non-ticketed guests also co-mingled with the ticketed guests and converged on the blue, purple and silver ticket screening checkpoints in an attempt to gain access.

All screening areas had bike rack fencing available to queue the lines. Because enormous crowds of ticketed and non-ticketed guests funneled to the blue, purple and silver ticket prescreening gates respectively, the density of the crowd essentially rendered the established queuing lines ineffective.

#### **Recommendations**

1. *All Presidential Inauguration guests, both ticketed and non-ticketed, should be provided with accurate information and directions to route them to their designated Metro station*

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*and entry point via a more extensive use of media outlets to include print, radio, television and the Internet.*

- 2. A Crowd Management Subcommittee should be established for future Inaugurations. This subcommittee would be tasked with establishing and de-conflicting issues such as pedestrian routes, entry gate queuing and comprehensive signage for the entire city. The MPD, USCP and USPP should be included on this subcommittee to ensure that adequate law enforcement personnel are assigned to direct crowds from the ingress points to other viewing areas. This subcommittee should study how an extended U.S. Capitol security perimeter would impact crowd management.*
- 3. The signage should not only provide adequate directions to ticketed viewing areas for the swearing-in ceremonies at the U.S. Capitol and reviewing stands, but also provide direction to non-ticketed guests to public viewing points along the parade route and National Mall.*
- 4. This signage, to include banner-bridge and variable message boards, should contain precise instructions for ticketed and non-ticketed guests.*
- 5. This signage should be placed at major visitor arrival sites such as Metro stations, Union Station and bus drop-off locations, both inside the stations as well as at their exits.*
- 6. These visual cues should be placed high enough so that they are visible above a crowd and at as many points as practicable throughout the National Mall and around the U.S. Capitol.*
- 7. Queuing should take into consideration both vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow.*
- 8. Additional reporting directions should be accomplished by utilizing personnel to include "way finders," volunteer staff and law enforcement officials equipped with loud speaker capability at established informational kiosks. These informational kiosks should be identified with appropriate signage that is posted at least 10 feet above the kiosks and situated at key visitor arrival sites such as Metro stops, Union Station and bus drop-off points.*

## **Entry Points**

### **Pre-Screening**

Historically, security planners have been able to rely on the fact that total ticketed guest turnout at Presidential Inauguration ceremonies was typically smaller than total tickets distributed. Similarly, the number of non-ticketed guests attempting to enter at screening checkpoints traditionally has been relatively small in comparison to the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration. Because of this, ticketed guests for previous events could typically move in a direct manner from Metro stations to their respective screening points. Large numbers of non-ticketed guests attempting to pass through or gain access to ticketed viewing areas was simply not a factor in the formulation of past security plans.

Although the exact numbers that would attend the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration could not be known, the Executive Steering Committee anticipated a much higher invited guest turnout as

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

compared with years past. This committee planned for much larger crowds in general and specifically for larger numbers of ticketed guests. Based on these assumptions, the committee felt that the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration security plan was sufficient to screen every one of the invited guests if they all decided to attend. This committee also felt there was sufficient personnel and equipment at each checkpoint to allow all the ticketed guests to be properly screened within the allotted time period.

To prepare for these larger crowds, the security plan at all screening areas called for bike rack fencing to be used as a tool to queue lines, separate ticketed from non-ticketed guests and prevent people from cutting into the queues. Additionally, USCP officers were assigned to every intersection on the U.S. Capitol grounds to provide directions, security and crowd management. At each gate, pre-screeners were assigned to check tickets and maintain order. Finally, *Ble 82* 82 of CDUs *ble 82* were dedicated to provide crowd management and direction on the U.S. Capitol grounds. The 16 foot-wide gates through which all pre-screened guests passed were of a sufficient size to provide passage for all invited guests. However, as noted below, crowd density prevented ticketholders from reaching these gates.

Despite these preparations, the number of non-ticketed guests who migrated from Metro stations, bus drop-off points and the National Mall into the security screening checkpoints was drastically underestimated by planners. These crowds included non-ticketed guests, guests with commemorative PIC invitations, guests with wrong-colored tickets and guests attempting to enter with their Metro fare cards. So many people attempted to access the entry gates that they severely clogged queuing lines. At one point, crowds became so dense that police officers at the purple gate had to briefly restrict the flow of ticketholders in order to move the bike rack fencing that had been pushed in front of the entry gate, effectively closing off the entrance temporarily. In effect, overcrowding caused pre-screeners to sort through thousands of non-ticketed guests, which severely hindered the screening process, caused unforeseen delays and ultimately prevented many congressional guests from being screened in time to see the swearing-in ceremonies.

It should be noted that there were no issues at the yellow and orange pre-screening areas or magnetometer checkpoints. This was due in part to the fact that the number of these ticketholders passing through screening was smaller than at the purple and blue areas. Additionally, these ticketholders came from the Metro Stations and points further east so they did not come in line with the crowds at the blue and purple staging areas. For these reasons, overcrowding was not an issue at the orange and yellow pre-screening areas or the magnetometer checkpoints, and all of the ticketed guests were screened at both of these areas. All of the ticketed guests who arrived at the orange and yellow screening checkpoints prior to the planned gate closure time, entered their respective viewing area in time to witness the swearing-in ceremonies.

It should also be noted that despite reports to the contrary, none of the screening gates were closed due to the lack of space for ticketed guests. Gates were closed temporarily, five to ten minutes total, to address crowd safety issues and to accommodate a presidential motorcade.

At 10:45 a.m., when it became apparent that not all of the blue and purple ticketholders would gain entry into the event, USCP officials decided to allow these ticketholders to be screened at any gate. This resulted in thousands of additional guests being admitted to the swearing-in ceremonies. Additionally, in order to relieve crowd congestion at the silver gate, some non-ticketholders were also admitted.

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

The decision by planners to close the National Mall crossover at Fourth Street NW was made in order to provide a secure area for staging parade participants and floats. This decision is consistent with the previous Inauguration. The opening of the National Mall for viewing the Inaugural ceremonies resulted in utilizing a new parade route different from previous Inaugurations. This route inhibited a crossover in the Seventh Street area and also inhibited pedestrian egress at the conclusion of the swearing-in ceremonies.

When the non-ticketed viewing areas of the National Mall were secured due to reaching safe capacity at 6:30 a.m., visitors were directed to the west towards the 12th Street entrance of the National Mall. This was accomplished through variable message boards, signage and USPP officers assigned to the National Mall. However, visitors continued to migrate towards the U.S. Capitol on their own accord in an attempt to gain a closer view of the swearing-in ceremonies. The USPP and MPD were responsible for managing the crowd on the National Mall and surrounding streets, and should remain so for future events.

### **Recommendations**

1. *The number of non-ticketed and ticketed guests co-mingled in the screening areas must be minimized. Access to the queuing lines must be strictly limited to guests holding the appropriate color-coded tickets. Pre-screeners should query guests upon entering the queuing lines and randomly along the queuing lines to ensure they possess the appropriate color-coded ticket.*
2. *To avoid excessive congestion at the screening checkpoints, the number of lanes making up a queuing line should correlate to the number of guests that can be prescreened simultaneously at an access gate. Queued guests not possessing the correct color-coded tickets should be diverted away from the checkpoints through egress paths separated by suitable fencing. Persons not in line should not be allowed to congregate at the checkpoints and should be directed to the appropriate locations based upon their ticketing status.*
3. *Flexibility at each screening checkpoint, whereby multiple/alternate entry gates are incorporated into the security fencing, should be considered to accommodate larger than expected crowds, etc.*
4. *Ticket checking in the future should be the function of the host committee, not a function of law enforcement officials. This would allow law enforcement officials to perform security and crowd management duties.*
5. *Once inside the security screening buffer zone, the host committee should provide staff to direct ticketed guests to utilize each of the magnetometers.*
6. *The IRT suggests an in-depth study be conducted to determine the feasibility of combining magnetometer checkpoints on the north and south sides of the U.S. Capitol. There could be one bank of magnetometers on the north side of the U.S. Capitol for yellow and purple ticketholders, and one bank of magnetometers on the south side of the U.S. Capitol for orange and blue ticketholders. Ticketholders would then be segregated and directed to their respective viewing areas once inside the magnetometer checkpoint.*

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*214*

7. *The issue of the silver ticket screening checkpoint should be addressed independently by future planners.*
8. *The host committee should have the flexibility to direct guests from one viewing area to another, i.e., orange to yellow, if one side appears to be more full than the other. The same consideration should be given to the purple and blue viewing areas.*
9. *Future security planners should examine the possibility of opening the screening gates at an earlier hour in order to allow for more screening time. It should be noted, however, that doing so is not without costs. Earlier opening times will require the entire security perimeter, both the U.S. Capitol and the parade route, to be swept and secured earlier. In addition opening earlier would pose concerns regarding having restroom facilities and medical support for guests available at an earlier hour.*
10. *Fencing all screening gates is vital. It provides stand-off distance for the security screening process, prevents the magnetometers from being overrun and allows law enforcement officials to more effectively pre-screen for threats.*
11. *A public address system should be installed outside of the entry gates. Although police officers had megaphones available, they proved insufficient for the task at hand. A robust public address system at the gates would allow police officers to provide directions to the crowds and aid in separating non-ticketed and ticketed guests.*
12. *Although additional bike rack fencing is an option, it is not recommended. Studies on crowd management do not currently recommend the use of bike rack fencing for queuing lines, as they can create crushing hazards. The use of well-staffed rope lines should be explored as an option to create queuing.*
13. *A review of the National Mall Fourth Street crossover and its impact on the Seventh Street crossover should be conducted by future planners.*

#### **Blue and Purple Screening Checkpoints**

Not all of the blue or purple ticketholders were processed in the allotted timeframe; therefore, many did not enter their respective viewing areas in time to observe the swearing-in ceremonies.

The USCP had primary responsibility for the areas immediately in front of the entry gates. GPO, CBP, LOC and USSC officers augmented USCP personnel and were assigned to various intersections and routes leading to the purple and blue gates. In addition, USCP officers were assigned to crowd management duties and were among the queuing lines leading to the entry gates. The USPP and MPD CDUs were available for additional support if requested.

Coordination of these resources was communicated primarily through the MACC to the various interagency command and coordination centers such as the USCP Command Center and the MPD JOC.

The crowds began to gather at the blue and purple entry gates long before they were scheduled to open, even before law enforcement officers had a significant presence and before the security perimeter was established. The blue gate did not open until 8:10 a.m. due to electrical power issues caused by faulty generators that were rented by USSS to power the magnetometers. This

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

brief delay in opening the blue gate did not have a significant impact on the screening process.

The earlier than anticipated arrival of such a large number of ticketed and non-ticketed guests seeking entry at both of these gates severely clogged the access areas. This crowd activity made it especially difficult for law enforcement officers to establish proper queuing lines and maintain an acceptable rate of flow through pre-screening. Complaints that uniformed police personnel could not be located for assistance can, in many cases, be attributed to the officers' lack of visibility amongst the dense and massive crowds of visitors.

The issues identified in the Crowd Management section of this report also had a negative impact at the blue and purple entry areas. Thousands of non-ticketed guests migrated to the blue and purple screening checkpoints and co-mingled with ticketed guests. Among the non-ticketed guests were persons seeking access with commemorative PIC invitations, special event Metro fare cards and incorrect color-coded tickets. Pre-screeners had to segregate non-ticketed guests from ticketed guests among the massive and congested crowds.

Banner-bridge signs and variable message boards were deployed along access routes to guide ticketholders. However, because of the signage deficiencies mentioned previously in the Crowd Management section of this report, these assets were of little assistance in resolving the crowd congestion problems at the blue and purple access areas. Despite the signage, thousands of guests migrated en masse toward the U.S. Capitol from the Metro stations, Union Station, bus drop-off points and the National Mall.

Alternative reporting information was sent to silver ticketholders in the form of an addendum which may not have been the most effective means to ensure that each ticketholder was aware of reporting changes. As a result, thousands of silver ticketholders made their way into the blue and purple ticket screening checkpoints and co-mingled with crowds, ticketed and non-ticketed, in those areas. However, notwithstanding corrective measures taken, interviews of police officers in the crowd and anecdotal information revealed that numerous silver ticketholders utilized already overcrowded northerly access routes. Silver ticketholders contributed to the massive congestion at the purple screening checkpoint. Their use of the southbound Third Street tunnel lanes resulted in congestion at the north entry at Third and D Streets, NW (purple ticket staging area). Upon their exit from the Third Street tunnel on the south, silver ticketholders intermingled and joined the lines for the blue screening checkpoint. This added to the overcrowding in the blue staging area.

#### **Concerns Unique to the Purple Screening Checkpoint**

The purple access area was located in the triangle consisting of First Street, NW to Louisiana Avenue to Constitution Avenue, NW. This area became very crowded early in the morning due to the convergence of persons from the Judiciary Square Metro station, Union Station Metro station, Union Station commuter trains and other modes of transportation terminating north of the U.S. Capitol.

Crowd density in that limited area was expected to consist mainly of purple and yellow ticketholders. However, it was exacerbated by the arrival of parade route observers waiting to be screened at the entrance site between Second and Third Streets at C Street, NW; the backup of persons seeking access to the southbound Third Street tunnel at D Street, NW, in order to access the blue, silver and National Mall viewing areas; the closure of the Third Street crossover; the line of persons in the northbound Third Street tunnel seeking to merge with other queued purple

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

ticketholders; and many other non-ticketed guests.

At one point, crowd density at the purple gate increased to the degree that USCP officers had to briefly halt screening of ticketholders in order to move bike rack fencing that had been pushed in front of the entry gate. This action effectively closed off the entrance temporarily.

For security reasons, the purple gate was again closed for approximately five minutes due to the passage of the presidential motorcade on Constitution Avenue. Pedestrian flow was momentarily restricted on three occasions: once when the President was moving on stage and twice to restore order in the queuing lines.

The only gates that were closed for any extended period of time were gates intended for emergency vehicles. These vehicle gates, which remained closed throughout the event, were in close proximity to the entry gates.

#### **Recommendations**

1. *See Crowd Management section above.*
2. *The parade entry checkpoints should be moved further west, so that these crowds do not impact the purple ticket screening checkpoint.*
3. *Consider impact on security interests of moving the east U.S. Capitol grounds perimeter in from Second Street to First Street to provide a more convenient easterly route for blue, silver and orange ticketholders and National Mall visitors traversing from Union Station to those entry points.*

#### **Orange and Yellow Ticket Screening Checkpoints**

As noted above, the number of orange and yellow ticketholders passing through screening was smaller than at blue and purple checkpoints, and these ticketholders came from Metro stations and points further east. Therefore, overcrowding was not an issue in the queuing lines and at these screening checkpoints. All of the ticketed guests were screened at both of these areas. Ticketed guests were processed in a much more orderly and timely fashion. All the ticketed guests who arrived at the orange and yellow screening checkpoints entered their respective viewing areas in time to witness the swearing-in ceremonies.

#### **Recommendations**

1. *See Crowd Management section above.*

#### **Silver Ticket Screening Checkpoint**

As noted in the Tickets section of this report, the number of access points to the silver viewing area had been reduced from six to one at Third Street and Jefferson Drive, SW. This reduction was vetted and decided upon jointly by the USCP and USSS based on a number of factors which are described below:

- Planners believed that sharing a ticketed screening checkpoint with a screening checkpoint for non-ticketed guests would pose significant challenges, especially once

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

- the parade route closed.
- Congestion at Third Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, was anticipated. The area on Jefferson Drive, which is south of the National Mall, provided a large screening/staging area. Having all guests enter from the south ensured that the exits from the screening areas would not be congested or blocked.
- It was desired by the planners that all the silver ticketholders arrive from the south to equalize the demands on the infrastructure, Metro stations, streets, sidewalks, etc.

The silver ticketed guests trampled the snow fence and accessed the area around the Grant Statue. This caused the USCP to divert their civil disturbance platoons to the area to prevent a breach of the hard security perimeter. MPD CDU responded to assist as well. This incident prevented the use of the Pennsylvania and Maryland Avenue overflow areas.

Despite anecdotal reports, no silver ticketed guests accessed the purple ticket viewing area.

### Recommendations

1. *Aerial photographs of the silver area show the mass of individuals screened and admitted to the area are concentrated in the vicinity of the screening site rather than distributed across the area. Better placement of television viewing screens would prevent the congestion of spectators in close proximity to the screening area and limit impact on the screening flow rate.*
2. *See also Crowd Management section above.*

### Magnetometer Screening

As referenced in the Entry Points section of this report, a joint decision was made by USCP and USSS to utilize waistband searches at the purple and blue gates. *B1c B2*  
*B1c B2* This waistband search further increased the flow rate through these magnetometer checkpoints.

It is the opinion of the IRT that the number of magnetometers and USSS/TSA personnel at the orange and yellow checkpoints was more than required. There were *8* and *9* magnetometers at the orange and yellow checkpoints respectively. USSS officers and TSA screeners had no difficulty keeping pace with the pre-screeners, and personnel at these checkpoints were often waiting for guests to be screened.

### Recommendations

1. *The IRT makes no recommendation concerning the appropriate level of magnetometer screening for future events, as that decision should be predicated on the existing threat at that time.*

### Site Security

#### *B2 B7c* Fencing

The fencing plan was developed with the concept of concentric rings of security. *B2 B7c*  
*B2 B7c* served as the primary pedestrian barrier between

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.



secure and unsecure areas and was never breached. Bike rack fencing and snow fencing served as pedestrian controls to guide pedestrians inside and outside of the perimeter. The snow fencing was trampled in the silver viewing areas and the bike rack fencing was easily moved by the large crowds.

### **Recommendations**

1. *Fencing plans should be reviewed and de-conflicted by the Crowd Management Subcommittee.*
2. *The IRT makes no recommendation concerning the appropriate level of fencing for future events. This decision should be predicated on the existing threat level at that time.*

### **Third Street Tunnel**

The southbound tube of the Third Street tunnel was open to north and southbound pedestrian traffic. The northbound tube of the Third Street tunnel was reserved for emergency vehicles only. Although it was reserved for emergency vehicles, pedestrians unexpectedly utilized the northbound tube of the Third Street tunnel as a queuing area. Crowds formed a line in the tunnel believing they could access the purple entry gate through Exit 9, the First and C Streets spur. The people who entered this line were in the tunnel for several hours in a line that did not progress. The following were contributing factors:

- Extreme overcrowding in the purple staging area that forced crowds west onto D Street, NW.
- No signs or barricades prohibiting pedestrians from utilizing the northbound tube of the tunnel entrance at Second and D Streets, NW.
- A limited law enforcement presence in the northbound tunnel.

As a result, the Third Street tunnel became a relief valve for the crowd and people filed into the tunnel of their own accord to queue in line in anticipation of entering the purple staging area.

The MPD utilized blocking vehicles to block the south end of the northbound Third Street tunnel at D Street, SE, and at the north ends at New York Avenue, NW and E Street, NW, to vehicular traffic. The plan also called for the District Department of Transportation (DDOT) to supply barrels and barricades to block off the south end of the tunnel. Due to vandalism to their vehicles (slashing of tires), DDOT arrived at the tunnel after 8 a.m. and people had already accessed the tunnel.

No other precautions were taken at the U.S. Capitol northbound exit ramps since pedestrians were not authorized to utilize the tunnel. Signage was posted at the south entrance of the northbound tube which read, "Emergency Vehicles Only." Signage prohibiting pedestrians from entering this tube of the tunnel was not posted.

For the reasons set forth in the Concerns Unique to the Purple Screening Checkpoint section of this report, some guests elected on their own to establish a separate queue going into the northbound tunnel spur that exited at First and C Streets, NW. While no one was directed to utilize this spur, the road sign inside the tunnel clearly indicates that the spur goes to the U.S. Capitol. These guests had hopes of merging with the existing purple access line upon exit from

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*RT*

the spur.

At approximately 5:30 a.m., MPD arrived for duty to monitor the Third Street tunnel. The MPD encountered the mass of people at both Third and D Streets, NW and Second and D Streets, NW waiting to enter the purple ticket area at First Street and Louisiana Avenue, NW. People had already formed a line in the northbound tube of the tunnel facing northbound and then turning east on D Street.

The MPD deployed ~~the~~ CDU team to the tunnel. Upon the CDU team's arrival, the tunnel was already full but orderly. People were entering the tube from the north end of the tunnel at D Street, NW and queuing at the back of the purple line which was inside of the tunnel. The CDU team attempted to re-direct people away from the tunnel, but their attempts proved ineffective because people had already established themselves in the ad hoc queue. The crowds were orderly, so the CDU team departed the northbound tube of the tunnel and established crowd management posts along the D Street corridor. Later in the morning, these CDU members directed people into the northbound tube of the tunnel to ease a dangerous overcrowding situation between First and Second and D Streets, NW.

A review of photographs of the crowd reveals that the only relief valve for those waiting in the crowds was to seek refuge in the tunnel. Because of the structures within the area, the fact that Second Street, NW ends one block north of D Street, NW and the continual depositing of people into the area from the Judiciary Square Metro station, the natural formation of the line in the tunnel was inevitable.

Based on interviews with law enforcement officials assigned to the MACC, USCP Command Centers, etc., personnel at those locations received several telephone calls from frustrated ticketholders concerning the Third Street tunnel. However, these callers never articulated that they were "stuck" in the northbound tunnel. So when the calls were relayed to command center officials, they determined that the tunnel was still open and crowds were flowing, albeit slow. No one considered that the calls were referencing the northbound tunnel since it was supposed to be closed to pedestrians.

The MPD has listened to dispatch recordings from the morning of Inauguration Day. Other than the dispatch referenced above, MPD did not find any evidence that motorcades, emergency vehicles or other law enforcement officials reported that pedestrians were utilizing the northbound tube.

Relative to the crowd flow, both sides of the Third Street tunnel were empty by 11 a.m. At 10:46 a.m., guests suddenly exited the tunnel. This exodus continued until 11 a.m., when the northbound tube was almost completely emptied. The exiting of the tunnel occurred mostly in the left two lanes as the pedestrians exited onto Second and D Streets, NW. The emptying of this tube coincided with the USCP and USSS acknowledgement that they allowed the purple ticketholders to move east and use the yellow entrance checkpoint.

It should be noted that pedestrians continued to flow through the southbound tunnel all morning and although crowded, this southbound tube remained open.

## **Recommendations**

1. *Future planners should consider allowing for pedestrian use of both Third Street tunnel*

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*tubes for ease of pedestrian north-south movement and as an overflow for crowd management. This could be accomplished with proper signage, police presence in both tubes, real time surveillance camera coverage and definitive separators (bike rack fencing, cones, barrels, barriers, etc.) for authorized vehicle and pedestrian movements.*

2. *Coordination between all agencies must be developed with respect to major thoroughfares, such as the Third Street tunnel and their impact on crowd management and traffic flow.*
3. *Consideration should also be given to the use of one tube of the tunnel to stage the parade participants and associated floats, horse trailers, vehicles, etc. This will remove them from surface streets where they impact pedestrian and traffic flow to major points of egress. It will also remove the participants from the elements and remove the need for them to stage at the Ellipse, which meant that the parade crossed over itself. Use of the tunnel would make it easier to bring the buses from the Pentagon over the SE/SW Freeway and into the tunnel for disembarking.*

### **Third Street Crossover**

As noted previously, there were conflicting plans regarding the use of the Third Street crossover. The NSSE map conflicted with the site specific map utilized by the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee. The NSSE map indicated that Third Street would be utilized as a pedestrian crossover and parade route access point, while the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee map indicated it would be closed.

When representatives of the USCP and USSS recognized this discrepancy on January 19, 2009, the USCP and the USSS agreed that the gate should remain closed. The primary concern was the inability to separate silver ticketholders from those who only wanted to view the parade. Unfortunately, the decision to keep the gate closed was not communicated to partner agencies.

Although the U.S. Capitol Subcommittee never intended for this gate to be an access point for silver ticketholders, a joint decision was made on the morning of January 20, 2009, that an accommodation could be made for designated groups of silver ticketholders if they were escorted. Upon request from the MPD to relieve congestion, initial steps were taken to escort a large group of silver ticketholders from Third and C Streets, NW to their viewing area, however, a miscommunication prevented this from occurring.

The crowd that amassed at Third and C Streets, NW, was a combination of silver ticketholders who were not informed of the change of the entry site location, and people who expected to cross Third Street to view the parade. Ultimately, this crowd had to be redirected into the southbound tube of the Third Street tunnel. This caused additional pedestrians into the already crowded D Street corridor and silver ticketholders presenting themselves at the purple and blue gates.

### **Recommendations**

1. *Future planners should examine other options to facilitate crowd management to include the use of walkways, portable bridges and tunnels.*

**WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.**

2. *Law enforcement stakeholders must improve planning, situational awareness, communication and execution in order to maximize crowd flow.*

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS *FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)*. IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO *FOUO* INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

217

## OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE IRT

### Executive Steering Committee

As the lead federal agency, the USSS worked collaboratively with all of its partners for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration NSSE. On January 20, 2009, events included the parade route, reviewing stand, U.S. Capitol ceremonies and Inaugural balls. Especially critical were the events at the U.S. Capitol. The USSS was respectful of the jurisdiction of the USCP inside the curtilage of the U.S. Capitol, as well as of the role of JCCIC, PIC and all partner agencies. In addition, the USCP recognized the importance of the USSS in spearheading this NSSE.

The IRT noted areas of concern that may not have been de-conflicted effectively or fully at the subcommittee level or more importantly at the Executive Steering Committee level. Security plans, crowd management plans, maps and signage were produced by the respective subcommittees; however, the subcommittees were not required to submit a final plan for approval by the Executive Steering Committee.

### Recommendations

- 1. It is the opinion of the IRT that each subcommittee should present a formal plan or a final presentation to the Executive Steering Committee. It should be the responsibility of the Executive Steering Committee to review each plan and de-conflict any issues which might affect the plans of other subcommittees. The Executive Steering Committee should approve any plans or maps to be used by any law enforcement agency to eliminate conflicting information.*
- 2. To accomplish this, the Executive Steering Committee must be staffed with executives from each represented agency at a level commensurate with this decision making authority. Any conflicts that cannot be resolved should be brought to the attention of the head of the lead federal agency for discussion with other involved agency leaders.*
- 3. During the planning process, there were situations where JCCIC communicated to the various planners through the USCP. The IRT recommends that there be direct communication between the governing bodies (JCCIC, PIC and the AFIC) and the Executive Steering Committee.*
- 4. As recommended earlier in this report under the Tickets section, the IRT suggests that, for future Presidential Inaugurations, the Executive Steering Committee authorize the creation and management of an Internet-based Inaugural website. While designed to provide the most accurate and updated event information possible, the purpose of this interactive website should be two-fold. First, it can be utilized by the security planners to disseminate information to the public, both in advance of and during the Inauguration. Second, it can provide the general public with a means of posting any issue relevant to the event and reporting any security-related concerns, such as crowd build-ups and suspicious activity. This website should be in addition to any websites being utilized to announce road closures, parade entry points, or ticket information, etc.*

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

## MACC

The USSS has developed the MACC structure over the course of 10 years of experience successfully overseeing NSSEs. The purpose of a MACC is to receive, process and disseminate all communications pertaining to operational security concerns for the entire NSSE. The MACC ensures that real-time information sharing is achieved for all participating public safety agencies and organizations.

Because the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration NSSE supported multiple events and venues on January 18, 19 and 20, 2009, the MACC became operational on a 24-hour basis beginning on January 18, 2009. The MACC was located at the *Age 82* On January 20, 2009, the MACC supported the U.S. Capitol swearing-in ceremonies, parade route, reviewing stand, National Mall and the Inaugural balls. The MACC officially closed on January 21, 2009, after the Inaugural balls officially concluded.

The NSSE command and control structure is centralized, with each agency retaining its statutorily mandated authority. To coordinate communication, all participating agencies are represented by key command personnel in the MACC. These representatives are instructed to monitor developments within their jurisdictional control or agency and document any event that may impact the Inauguration events. Furthermore, these representatives are instructed to forward this information to the USSS MACC supervisors via incident reporting sheets. Additional coordination occurs at the various interagency command and coordination centers to include the USCP Command Center and MPD JOC.

When the MACC receives accurate and timely information, the MACC structure operates effectively. Individual agency representatives assigned to the MACC were able to coordinate and communicate with other law enforcement agencies and quickly resolve issues brought to their attention.

With respect to issues raised about the Third Street tunnel, several telephone calls from frustrated ticketholders were received in the MACC. However, these callers never articulated that they were "stuck" in the northbound tube of the tunnel. When the calls were relayed to command center officials, they determined that the tunnel (southbound) was still open and crowds were flowing. Because the information was not specific, agency representatives considered that the calls were referencing the southbound tube of the tunnel since it was intended for pedestrian use.

### Recommendations

1. *A review should be conducted by the USSS to ensure that the flow of information is timely and accurate. The USSS should ensure that the Incident Reporting Format is adequate to ensure that all incidents are documented, tracked and brought to a satisfactory conclusion.*
2. *During the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration, the MACC was not situated in the immediate vicinity of the event, nor should it be in the future. Future planners should continue to locate the MACC outside of the immediate area so as not to be adversely affected in the event an emergency situation occurs.*
3. *The IRT noted that on Inauguration Day, many people posted observations and concerns on the Internet in real time. It is recommended that for future Presidential Inaugurations,*

**WARNING:** THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

*the JIC further monitor Internet-based websites such as Twitter and Facebook, in order to track potential problems as they develop. Subsequently, the JIC can forward relevant information to the MACC for multi-agency distribution.*

## **Emergency Medical Support**

The 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration included a robust medical support plan. Within the perimeter and on U.S. Capitol grounds, the OAP retained control and coordination of the medical response. Throughout the city, D.C. Fire and EMS provided primary medical support, which was coordinated through the MACC to the MPD JOC. Primary medical support for the U.S. Capitol grounds was coordinated through the USCP Command Center. The planning included designated routes that were to remain clear to ensure access by emergency response vehicles. If emergency response vehicles deviated from these designated routes, law enforcement personnel would intervene by clearing crowds to facilitate the movement of emergency medical teams.

## **Recommendations**

1. *This plan seemed to have worked well and does not warrant plan revision.*

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

RIF

## SUMMARY

On January 20, 2009, an estimated 1.8 million people converged on Washington, D.C., the U.S. Capitol grounds and the National Mall to witness the Inauguration of President Barack Obama. Despite these unprecedented numbers, there was not one major arrest, injury, or incident reported. In the months and weeks leading up to this event, all participating law enforcement and public safety agencies worked tirelessly to keep the nation's capital safe. In this regard, the plan was successful and they should all be extremely proud of their efforts.

Given the roles mandated by the NSSE format, the IRT recognizes the importance of strong collaboration among all federal and local law enforcement partners. As the lead agency, fostering these essential professional relationships must continue to be a cornerstone of the USSS philosophy as it is tasked with NSSEs in the future. It should be noted that all NSSE partners must continue to work together with representatives of JCCIC, PIC and AFIC in order to ensure the highest possible level of success at all future Presidential Inaugurations.

The USSS and the IRT realize how important attending the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration was to so many people, and recognize the various difficulties many endured in an effort to witness the historic event. This committee regrets that all who traveled to the nation's capital were not able to view the swearing-in ceremonies.

The IRT has attempted to analyze the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration security plan, identify the deficiencies that caused so many to be denied access and make recommendations for the future. It is the hope that all future security planners will benefit from this report and will be better equipped to handle the many challenges, old and new, that will emerge during the next Presidential Inauguration in 2013.

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). IT CONTAINS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE INFORMATION (LES) THAT MAY BE EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552). IT IS TO BE CONTROLLED, STORED, HANDLED, TRANSMITTED, DISTRIBUTED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. SECRET SERVICE/DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY RELATING TO FOUO INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT HAVE A VALID "NEED-TO-KNOW" WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN AUTHORIZED U.S. SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.



# CERTIFICATION

The IRT certifies that the information contained in this report is an accurate representation of the 2009 Inaugural security plan and its deficiencies with regard to crowd management. The recommendations have been agreed to by all committee members so that identified deficiencies are not repeated in future Inaugural ceremonies.

---

**B7C B6**  
Inspector  
USSS

---

**B7C B6**  
Assistant Inspector  
USSS

---

Inspector  
MPD

---

**B7C B6**  
Captain  
USPP

---

Captain  
USCP

---

Lieutenant  
MPD

---

**Robert R. Howe**  
Senior Advisor to the House Sergeant at Arms

---

**Joseph C. Haughey**  
Senior Advisor to the Senate Sergeant at Arms

Approved:

---

George P. Luczko  
Assistant Director  
Office of Professional Responsibility  
USSS

---

Mark Sullivan  
Director  
USSS

## Appendix I Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFIC	Armed Forces Inaugural Committee
AOC	Architect of the Capitol
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CDU	Civil Disturbance Unit
CMIP	Crisis Management Plan
CPTEd	Crime prevention through environmental design
DC	District of Columbia
DDOT	District Department of Transportation
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EMS	Emergency Management Services
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
ft	Feet
GPO	U.S. Government Printing Office
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
IED	Improvised explosive devices
IRT	Inaugural Review Team
JCCIC	Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies
JIC	Joint Information Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
LOC	Library of Congress
MACC	Multi-Agency Communications Center
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department
NPS	National Park Service
NSSE	National Special Security Event
OAP	Office of Attending Physician
PIC	Presidential Inaugural Committee
SA	Special Agent
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UD	U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division
US	United States
USCP	U.S. Capitol Police
USPP	U.S. Park Police
USS	U.S. Secret Service
USC	U.S. Supreme Court
VBIED	Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

**Appendix I E**  
**50<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inaugural**  
**Executive Steering Committee**  
**Organizational Chart**

SEE ATTACHED ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Rif

7  
2

**STEERING COMMITTEE**  
 USSS / FBI / FEMA / DHS / USCP / USPP / DOD / MPD  
 U.S. SUPREME COURT PD / DC HSEMA / USCG / DCFD  
 EMS / METRO TRANSIT PD / U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

## SUBCOMMITTEES

**REVIEWING STAND**  
 USSS / USPP / MPD / USCP / DCFD EMS /  
 DC HS EMA / METRO TRANSIT PD

**MARITIME SECURITY**  
 USSS / USCG / USPP / MPD / FBI / DOD /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / PG COUNTY PD /  
 MNRP

**LEGAL**  
 USSS / U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE / FBI /  
 USPP / USCP / MPD / HOUSE SSA /  
 DOD / DC ATTORNEY GENERAL /

**HEALTH & MEDICAL**  
 USSS / HHS / DC HEALTH DEPT. / DOD /  
 DCFD EMS / FBI / FEMA / DC HS EMA /  
 EPA / DHS / USCP / USPP / MPD /  
 DC NATIONAL GUARD / OFFICE OF  
 CAPITOL ATTENDING PHYSICIAN

**INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION / JFO**  
 USSS / USCP / DHS / USPP / MPD  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / USCG / FBI  
 NORTHCOM / DC HS EMA / DCFD EMS  
 DC DOT / HHS / FEMA / DOD / WHMO  
 FPS / ICE / U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE  
 TSA / DSS / USMS / FAMS / NPS /  
 DC NATIONAL GUARD / ALEXANDRIA PD

**U.S. CAPITOL**  
 USSS / USCP / FBI / DCFD EMS / TSA /  
 ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL / FEMA /  
 MPD / USPP / DOD / DC HS EMA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD /  
 U.S. SUPREME COURT PD

**AIRSPACE SECURITY**  
 USSS / FAA / NORAD / USPP / FBI / MPD  
 USCP / DSA / DOD / WHMO /  
 DC NATIONAL GUARD

**CREDENTIALING**  
 USSS / USCP / USPP / MPD / FBI / USMS /  
 DC HSEMA / TSA / ICE / DOS / DOD /  
 HHS / FEMA / WHCA / MEMA

**EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE**  
 USSS / FBI / ATF / MPD / USCP / DOD /  
 DCFD EMS / DC HS EMA / USPP / TSA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / USCG

**FIRE / LIFE SAFETY / HAZMAT**  
 USSS / FBI / DCFD EMS / FEMA / DTRA /  
 DC HS EMA / DHS / USCP / MPD / DOD /  
 DC DEPT. OF HEALTH / NMRT / IMAAC /  
 MD NATIONAL GUARD / DOE / EPA / FPS

**CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT**  
 USSS / FEMA / DC HS EMA / USCP /  
 RED CROSS / FBI / HHS / MPD / USPP /  
 TSA / DCFD EMS / DOD / FPS / USCG /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE**  
 USSS / MPD / USPP / USCP / DCFD EMS /  
 USMS / DOD / DC NATIONAL GUARD /  
 U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

**ANDREWS AFB**  
 USSS / DOD / DSS

**TRAINING**  
 USSS / USCP / USPP / MPD / FBI / DHS /  
 USCG / DCFD EMS / DC HS EMA / FEMA /  
 ICE / FPS / METRO TRANSIT PD / DOD

**INTELLIGENCE**  
 USSS / FBI / MPD / USPP / USCP / USCG /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / ICE / NORTHCOM /  
 JTTF / FEMA / TSA / FAMS / FPS / DOD /  
 AMTRAK PD / PG COUNTY PD

**CRISIS MANAGEMENT**  
 USSS / FBI / DOD / USCP / MPD / USPP /  
 DCFD EMS / DC HS EMA / USCG / FEMA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / TSA /  
 DC NATIONAL GUARD

**VENUES**  
 USSS / MPD / FBI / DOD / DC DOT / DHS /  
 DCFD EMS / FPS / USCP / USPP / TSA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / DC HS EMA /  
 FEMA / DC DCR & A

**CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**  
 USSS / USCP / FBI / DC DOT / PEPCO /  
 DC OFFICE OF CHIEF TECH / USPP /  
 DOD / DOE / DHS / MPD / DC HS EMA /  
 VERIZON / HHS / CARNEGIE MELLON

**TACTICAL / CSU**  
 USSS / FBI / MPD / USPP / USCP / TSA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD

**TRANSPORTATION / TRAFFIC**  
 USSS / MPD / USPP / USCP / DC DOT /  
 TSA / FAMS / DC HS EMA / MDOT / DOD /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / U.S. DOT / USCG /  
 VDOT / DC NATIONAL GUARD

**PUBLIC AFFAIRS**  
 USSS / USCP / USPP / MPD / DHS / FAA /  
 DC HS EMA / DC DPW / DC DOT / TSA /  
 DC MAYOR'S OFFICE / FBI / DOD / ATF /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / JCCIC / USCG /  
 FEMA / U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE /  
 HHS / FAIRFAX COUNTY GOVERNMENT

**PARADE ROUTE**  
 USSS / MPD / USPP / USCP / NPS / TSA /  
 DCFD EMS / FPS / DC DOT / DC HS EMA /  
 METRO TRANSIT PD / DOD / CRP /  
 DC NATL GUARD / WHCA / USMS / ICE

**VIP / DIGNITARY PROTECTION**  
 USSS / USCP / MPD / DSS / DOS / USMS /  
 DOD / USPP / U.S. SUPREME COURT PD

**Appendix III**  
**Aerial Photograph of U.S. Capitol and National Mall**  
**January 20, 2009**

SEE ATTACHED AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH

RIT



P. 18

Appendix IV  
56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration  
NSSE - Security Map  
U.S. Capitol and National Mall

SEE ATTACHED MAP

Rif

Appendix V  
U.S. Capitol Subcommittee - Security Map  
U.S. Capitol

THE ATTACHED MAP

RIF



## Appendix VI Report Distribution

1. Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman
2. Hon. Robert Bennett
3. Hon. Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader
4. Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House
5. Hon. Steny Hoyer, House Majority Leader
6. Hon. John Boehner, House Minority Leader
7. Phillip D. Morse, Sr., Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police
8. Terrance W. Gainer, Senate Sergeant at Arms
9. Wilson B. Livingood, House Sergeant at Arms
10. Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.
11. Salvatore R. Lauro, Chief of Police, U.S. Park Police
12. Mark Sullivan, Director, U.S. Secret Service

Rif

February 11, 2009

Mr. Mark Sullivan  
Director  
United States Secret Service  
Washington, DC 20223

Dear Director Sullivan:

Thank you for following up on my request to review the problems that developed at several of the screening gates during the Inauguration of President Barack Obama as part of an after-action review of the Inaugural events.

The Members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies realize the importance of this day for so many people who braved the cold and waited in long lines for hours. We deeply regret that these guests were unable to witness this historic event. And we believe it is crucial that we understand the factors and deficiencies so we can work to ensure that these problems do not occur again in the future.

Our Committee received a number of letters from other Members of Congress. I am forwarding these letters to you so their questions and areas of concern will be reviewed and addressed in the report.

An unprecedented number of people, estimated at nearly two million, converged on the National Mall area for the Inauguration, and there was not one major arrest or serious injury at the event. All law enforcement agencies worked very hard to keep the nation's capital safe during this historic event, and they deserve our thanks.

But we need to know more about the delayed or limited screening and entry to purple, blue and silver standing areas; and why thousands of people – many with tickets – were stuck for several hours in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Street Tunnel, apparently without the presence of any law enforcement personnel.

In your letter of January 26, 2009, , you mentioned that the Office of Professional Responsibility would conduct this review in conjunction with the Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate the Washington Metropolitan Police, and the National Park Service Police, and that the review will be completed within 45 to 60 days of that date.

105

I understand that the team has already put nearly three weeks of work into this project. I appreciate all these efforts and the commitment to do a thorough job in a timely manner and look forward to your analysis and recommendations

In the interim, I believe it would be helpful to me and the members of the JCCIC if your office provided an outline of the areas that are being examined by February 23, a draft report by March 11.

A number of questions that I believe need to be addressed are listed below. While this is not an exhaustive list, it does include specific issues that have either been mentioned by my colleagues or in the feedback we received via e-mail or letter. There may be a number of other areas that your team is already exploring, and I value their input in those matters. Some issues were already brought up during our previous discussions and at the meeting of JCCIC and Secret Service staff last week. However, I believe it may be useful for all of us to have the following questions presented in writing:

**1) Was the checkpoint/screening plan sufficient for the crowd?**

- Were there enough screening areas and were they large enough?
- Security officials estimated that there were adequate magnetometers to ensure the ticketed guests could get through screening. What was the projected flow rate – and how was it determined?
- How many screeners and how many magnetometers were there at each of the gates?
- For the blue and purple zones – should the screening be less intensive, perhaps without magnetometers in order to expedite passage, or will this unacceptably increase the security risk?
- Were any of these gates closed for extended periods of time for motorcade passage or because of other problems?
- Can and should the screening gates be opened at an earlier time in the morning? One reason for not doing it earlier was that the Capitol Police needed to complete the sweep of the West Lawn – should this be done earlier in the future? What impact would that have on the sweeps?
- What kinds of barriers were set up to separate the queues to keep ticketed people away from the unticketed or those with other color tickets? Could you provide details on this plan and describe the joint law enforcement plan for staffing it?

**2) Was there sufficient signage guiding the crowds to the checkpoints?**

- While the signage plan was even more comprehensive than in previous inaugurations, it is clear there was some confusion by some.
- And for both the purple and blue zones – in previous inaugurations, because there were not the unprecedented numbers of unticketed guests, passage to the screening areas was much more direct from metro station to each area, and did not involve such large numbers of other people passing through and alternative routes by attendees.

- How could this be improved – and since this also involves the Presidential Inaugural Committee and its guests for the Mall and the Inaugural Parade – who should be in charge of the overall signage plan?

**3) Were there sufficient law enforcement and crowd management personnel to properly line up ticketed guests awaiting entry to the checkpoints and were those on hand properly trained in their job?**

- Especially at the purple gate, most anecdotal reports complain about a lack of police personnel to ensure those who arrived earliest were allowed in and to maintain proper lines. What was the staffing plan? And how was coordination supposed to be established between the different agencies and jurisdictions?
- What should be the role of Washington, DC police? As the crowd got further away from the actual checkpoints, who should be responsible? And should there be joint command guidance to help ensure against conflicting police queuing directions?
- What kinds of measures were in the plan to prevent large number of people from cutting into queues? Were there street barriers in place or law enforcement personnel assigned to this duty?
- Should there be a more centralized command structure in place?
- With the large crowds massed at the gates, what kind of provisions were in place for emergency medical response, and how were these implemented? What assistance was provided to help ambulances pass through the crowded areas? How can this be improved in the future?

**4) What led to such a large number of people being forced to wait in line for hours in the Third Street tunnel?**

- Was there ever a plan to utilize the Third Street Tunnel as a queuing area for the Purple ticket gate? If so, who authorized it? If not, how and why were people directed into the tunnel?
- Anecdotal evidence suggests that the queuing occurred in the Northbound tunnel lanes, which was supposed to have been reserved for emergency vehicle use. Is this accurate?
- Other anecdotal evidence suggests that the Southbound tunnel lanes, which were being used for pedestrian traffic, continued to flow and did not have the same problems as they were not utilized as a queue. Is this accurate?
- When transportation and security planners decided to use the Southbound tunnel lanes for pedestrian traffic, what kind of security plan was put in place to ensure against serious problems?
- Were there any law enforcement or security personnel assigned to either the Southbound or Northbound lanes?
- When did the MACC, or other police command posts learn of the problems in the tunnel and what did they do?
- Did any of the emergency vehicles or other law enforcement passing by the queue in the Tunnel report this to the Supervising agencies. What action was taken?

**5) What was the impact of the decision to open up the entire Mall for people to view the event and to close the Parade route early to cross traffic?**

- How seriously did this impact the flow of people to and through the checkpoints?
- What was the impact of not having cross Mall traffic in the ticketed area except for 2<sup>nd</sup> Street to the East of the Capitol and the Third Street Tunnel to the West?
- How was the decision reached to close the Mall and Fourth Street to cross Mall pedestrian traffic? In the future, should there be more pedestrian crossings?
- How was the decision reached to have only one silver gate – instead of the multiple gates originally planned?
- Once some of the unticketed mall areas were closed off, were there large numbers of unticketed guests in the crowds trying to get through the ticketed checkpoints? If so, how could these people be better guided? -- and whose responsibility should this be?

**6) Should the number of tickets be reduced or should new ticketed areas be set up further away in the future?**

- The distribution was based on historic numbers that go back over 20 years, but after concerns were raised that a greater percentage of those receiving tickets might actually attend the event, a backup plan was developed with the approval of security officials to provide overflow sites all along the perimeters of the purple and blue ticketed areas consistent with National Park Service standards for major events
- Based on an after-action analysis, were all the backup areas utilized by those with tickets for the areas?
- Did other people – with no tickets or tickets to other areas, crowd into the areas through breaks in the fencing?
- Anecdotal reports suggests a number of breaks that allowed silver ticketed guests to get into the purple areas. Is this accurate? Are there any estimates on how many?
- How can fencing plans be improved to prevent such breaks?
- Anecdotal reports also indicate that some screeners at times did not reject people who had the wrong color tickets or no tickets. Is this accurate?
- Did any of the screening gates need to be closed because there was no more room for the ticketed guests? If so, which ones and when?


**7) What other factors might have contributed to the problems?**

- Where was the parade security entrance in comparison to the purple gate? Was there crossover queuing from both gates?
- According to anecdotal reports, a large number of guests arrived in the Purple ticket gate area with preprinted "invitations" to the Inaugural, but no tickets. Is this accurate? How did that impact the area?
- Was there some confusion for guests who received their tickets from the PIC via Ticketmaster believing they had assigned seats?
- Was there confusion from guests who received tickets with ticket numbers on them from Congressional offices and believed these were assigned seats?

- Did closures of any of the Metro stations because of overcrowding cause any anticipated problems with regard to access to the ticketed or nonticketed areas?
- Should the Multi-Agency Command Center be located at the Capitol and under more centralized control?
  - Was the command post too far away to be able to respond in a timely manner to the actual problems that developed?
  - Should one person be in charge of the assignment of all law enforcement, across all jurisdictions to specific locations.

Once again, thank you for undertaking this effort. It is crucial that we understand what went right and what went wrong, so we ensure that similar problems do not occur at future Inaugurations.

Sincerely,

  
Dianne Feinstein  
Chairman

Enclosures

cc: Hon. Robert Bennett  
Hon. Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader  
Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House  
Hon. Steny Hoyer, House Majority Leader  
Hon. John Boehner, House Minority Leader  
Phillip D. Morse, Chief of Capitol Police w/encls.  
Terrance W. Gainer, Senate Sergeant at Arms w/encls.  
Wilson B. Livingood, House Sergeant at Arms w/encls.



**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**  
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch  
Communications Center  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Building T-5  
Washington, D.C. 20223

MAY - 1 2009

File Number: 20090212 and 20090213

Dear Requester:

Reference is made to your Freedom of Information and/or Privacy Act request which was originally submitted to the United States Secret Service on April 10, 2009, and all of our previous correspondence regarding your request.

A review of the Secret Service's systems of records indicated that there are no records or documents pertaining to the "2009 Inauguration Review" in Secret Service files. Please refer to the Inaugural Senate's website at <https://inaugural.senate.gov/documents/doc-032309-multiagencyreport.pdf> for responsive documents relating to the "2009 Inauguration Review".

Document(s) responsive to your request relating to the "Multiagency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on "Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration" have been located and forwarded to this office for review. They will be processed in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, and/or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and mailed to you upon completion.


Due to the increasing number of Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts requests received by this office, we may encounter some delay in processing your request. However, we will process your request as expeditiously as possible. Requests are processed in chronological order based on the date we were in receipt of a perfected request.

Please note that file number 20090212 is obsolete please use file number 20090213 in all future correspondence with this office.

If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U. S. Secret Service, Communications Center, 245 Murray Lane, SW, Building T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you choose to file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your appeal and reference the case number listed above.

choose to file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your appeal and reference the case number listed above.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Craig W. Ulmer", written in a cursive style.

Craig W. Ulmer  
Special Agent In Charge  
Freedom of Information &  
Privacy Acts Officer

BCC: Chron. File  
Subject File  
CWUlmer/lrs 4/30/2009

**SUBJECT**





DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Branch  
Communications Center  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Building T-5  
Washington, D.C. 20223

[REDACTED]

b47-

APR 24

File Number: 20090212 and 20090213

Dear Requester:


This letter is intended to acknowledge the receipt of your recent Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts request received by the United States Secret Service on April 10, 2009, for information pertaining to the report dated March 20, 2009, titled "2009 Inauguration Review" or "Multiagency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration."

A search for files responsive to your request is being conducted. When the results of the search are known, you will be notified.

Please use the file number indicated above in all future correspondence with this office.

We solicit your cooperation and assure you that the search will be conducted as expeditiously as possible.

Sincerely,

*for*   
Craig W. Ulmer  
Special Agent In Charge  
Freedom of Information &  
Privacy Acts Officer

BCC: Chron. File  
Subject File ✓, N-2  
CWUlmer/asb/4/15/09

March 27, 2009

United States Secret Service  
Communications Center (FOI/PA)  
Building T-5  
245 Murray Lane  
Washington DC 20223

**Re: Freedom of Information Act Request**

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), please send me a copy of the report dated March 20, 2009, titled "2009 Inauguration Review" or "Multiagency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration."

In evaluating my request, please consider President Obama's January 21, 2009, memorandum to heads of executive departments and agencies. President Obama declared, "A democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency." The president added:

The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense of those they are supposed to serve. In responding to requests under the FOIA, executive branch agencies \* \* \* should act promptly and in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants of the public.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), I expect to receive "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record \* \* \* after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection."

Please provide an electronic version of the report if and only if provision of an electronic version would cause a lesser amount of fees to be charged to me than if I received a paper copy of the report.

At this time, I am not willing to pay any fees for the provision of this record. According to FOIA, fees shall not be charged for the first 100 pages of duplication

and the first two hours of search time. If fees will need to be charged, please notify me in advance.

I look forward to receiving the record that I have requested within 20 working days of the date on which you receive this request, as FOIA requires.

Please contact me if you need to clarify any part of my request.

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,



LIAISON DIVISION

FOIA/PA & BRANCH

*ACTION SHEET*



DATE: 4/10/09

TO: LRS

FROM: b6/b7c

SUBJECT: MULTI AGENCY RESPONSE TO CONCERNS RAISED BY JCCIC FOR 56<sup>TH</sup> PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION

FILE:

**Case Actions:**

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Open a FOIA Case | <input type="checkbox"/> Open a PA Case | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Open a FOIA/PA Case |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Close This Case  | <input type="checkbox"/> Other          | <input type="checkbox"/> File                           |

**Administrative Actions / Needs:**

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Acknowledge | <input type="checkbox"/> Glomar Ltr.             | <input type="checkbox"/> Original Signature           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Appl1                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Granted Ltr.            | <input type="checkbox"/> Proof of Death               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Appl2                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Identifiers Needed      | <input type="checkbox"/> Special Ltr. (Comments)      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fees Comm.             | <input type="checkbox"/> Imperfect FOIA          | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Search (Comments) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fees FOIA              | <input type="checkbox"/> Imperfect PA            | <input type="checkbox"/> Third Party / Release Needed |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fees PA                | <input type="checkbox"/> Notary Needed           | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Comments)             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Expedite Ltr.          | <input type="checkbox"/> Open Invest. / B7a Ltr. |   |

Comments: SS: OPO, MNO, GPA

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 4/15/09

FILE #: 20090213

NAME: INAUGURATION

OPEN FILE:   x  

FILE ALREADY OPEN:           

SEARCH SHEET(S):           

2<sup>ND</sup> TIME SEARCH SHEET(S):           

TWX:            PLEASE KEEP TWX WITH THE LETTERS TO BE SIGNED. THANKS!

LETTER(S):   x   ACK

**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

REFERRAL STACK:

MCI CHECK HIT: YES        POSSIBLE        NO   x  

NAMES SEARCHED:

INAUGURATION

FOI CHECK HIT: YES        POSSIBLE        NO   x  

NAMES SEARCHED:

INAUGURATION

NOTES:

REFERRAL STACK:           

THANK YOU!

LIAISON DIVISION  
FOIA/PA OFFICE  
NAME SEARCH REQUEST

4/15/2009

**A. IDENTIFICATION DATA**

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

**Please read the attached request and conduct the following name check**

Request No.: 20090213 Request Date: 4/10/2009 Due Date: 4/16/2009

Subject: MULTI AGENCY CONCERNS BY JCCIC

Aliases:

DOB:

SSN:

POB:

Cross References:

Records Checks: OPO, MNO & GPA

Notes:

Please Fill out the information in Section B  
and Return to Liaison Division

**B. RESULT OF NAME SEARCH**

After conducting your search, please indicate your findings in the Comments Section. If no records are found, please indicate by checking the "None" box. Also, make a brief statement in the comment section stating a search was conducted and no records were found.

Date Checked: \_\_/\_\_/\_\_

Checked By: \_\_\_\_\_

The following is provided:

( ) None

Comments:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Grade Level of Employee conducting Search: \_\_\_\_\_

Search time expended: \_\_\_\_\_ hour(s) \_\_\_\_\_ minutes

**RETURN THIS FORM UPON COMPLETION TO:**

U. S. SECRET SERVICE  
LIAISON DIVISION, SUITE 3000  
245 MURRAY DRIVE, BLDG 410  
WASHINGTON , D.C. 20223  
(202) 406-6370

COMMON INDEX (CI)                      NAME SEARCH RESPONSE                      LAST  
 NAME: INAUGURATION  
 SEX:       RACE:       DOB: MMDDYY    SSN:                      CFO:

SYSTEM	CASE NUMBER	NAME	S/D	SRT	DOB	SSN	CF
. PI	127CO20075500	INAUGURATION		UUT			11
. PI	1276710011800	INAUGURATION		U T			11
. PI	1276710017436	INAUGURATION		U T			11
. PI	1276710001800	INAUGURATION		U T			11
. PI	127CO20083500	INAUGURATION		UUT			11
. PI	1276710001800	INAUGURATION EIGHTY FIVE		U A			11
. PI	1276710011800	INAUGURATION EIGHTY NINE		U A			11
. PN	127I730000052	INAUGURATION 1973		UUT			11
. NO	1276780000014	INAUGURATION 2001		U T			12

SELECT       F1=HELP       F2=RFRSH                      F10=AP MENU  
              F3=SUBJECT   F4=ADDRESS   F5=PHONE   F6=VEHICLE       F9=OTHER