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Description of document: **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) File Number
HQ 157-10909: Possible Leak of Information, San Diego
Office, 1968-1973**

Released date: 27-July-2010

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Source of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attn: FOI/PA Request
Record/Information Dissemination Section
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

July 27, 2010

Subject: FBI FILE NUMBER HQ 157-10909
FOIPA No. 1145451- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

- ☐ (b)(1)
- ☒ (b)(2)
- ☐ (b)(3) _____
- _____
- _____
- ☐ (b)(4)
- ☐ (b)(5)
- ☒ (b)(6)

Section 552a

- ☐ (b)(7)(A)
- ☐ (b)(7)(B)
- ☒ (b)(7)(C)
- ☒ (b)(7)(D)
- ☐ (b)(7)(E)
- ☐ (b)(7)(F)
- ☐ (b)(8)
- ☐ (b)(9)
- ☐ (d)(5)
- ☐ (j)(2)
- ☐ (k)(1)
- ☐ (k)(2)
- ☐ (k)(3)
- ☐ (k)(4)
- ☐ (k)(5)
- ☐ (k)(6)
- ☐ (k)(7)

30 page(s) were reviewed and 30 page(s) are being released.

☐ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☐ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted to the Records Management Division at Winchester, Virginia, enclosed is a processed copy of the FBI Headquarters file HQ 157-10909.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Marshall

FROM : [Redacted]

DATE: JUN 29 1973

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

BUFILE: 157-10909-~~18~~9

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Section, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1116 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

JEB:ncf
(2)

It is no longer necessary to maintain this file in the Special File Room, unless the employees in question have been reassigned to FBI HQ. CAM 7-3-73 GCM/SGP

*See serial 3 -
monitored since
attest assigned
San Diego
7/5/73*

844-159 1973

*Removed from Special
File Room 7-9-73
(Notation on 157-10909-9)*

FILE REVIEWED
DATE 5/3/83
INITIALS SJK

157-10909
NOT RECORDED
JUL 9 1973

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10-11-68

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-3360)

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Re my telephone call 10-10-68.

On 10-9-68 [redacted] advised that on [redacted] names unknown but speaking acquaintances, [redacted] that a female Negro employee of the FBI in San Diego who, they stated, is known to source, has furnished information from FBI files to US members.

US is a militant Black Nationalist organization in San Diego.

This employee is alleged to have told US members that [redacted] have been furnished to the FBI by [redacted] San Diego, California, and [redacted] functions of the US group. [redacted] are regularly furnished to the San Diego Office of the FBI and have been for a long period of time.)

Source, recontacted on [redacted] advised that, in addition, he recalled that [redacted] that the female employee allegedly had told [redacted] that the FBI had been furnished [redacted] him by [redacted]

[redacted] subject of Bufile [redacted] has been active in Black Nationalist activities and has been placed on both the Security Index and the Agitator Index.

Source advised that he expects [redacted] and may, at that time, obtain further information.

Photographs of the two female Negro employees in the San Diego Division and that of the [redacted] of one of them, [redacted] are being shown to [redacted] among other similar photographs, in an attempt to ascertain which [redacted]

- ② - Bureau - AM; REGISTERED
1 - San Diego

RWE:jeb

(3) 1968

6 OCT 17 1968

REC 107

RACIAL MATTERS SECT.
157-10909

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SD 67-3360

of the two employees is known to him. Source, on the occasion of both contacts, advised that he is not aware that he knows any Negro female employee of the FBI.

It appears that the Negro female employee, if the allegation is true, has had the opportunity to obtain and pass on information for a considerable period of time. Because of this it is felt that any immediate aggressive action taken at this time could very easily compromise [redacted]

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For the Bureau's consideration, the following suggestions are submitted for Bureau approval. It is believed that these actions will assist in establishing the identity and guilt of this employee.

After a primary suspect is developed, the following action will be taken with Bureau authority;

1. Suspect will be allowed to overhear loose talk within the office to the effect that the FBI has penetrated the Black Panther Party of San Diego on a high level.
2. A dummy file will be opened reflecting that [redacted] for San Diego of the Black Panther Party, has agreed to cooperate with the FBI.
3. A letter [redacted] but not mailed, requesting that the Bureau authorize payment of a large sum of money to [redacted] on a specific date after he has furnished complete information regarding all Black Nationalist activities and plans in San Diego. For information of the Bureau, the Negro female employees of the San Diego Office are [redacted]

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It is anticipated that this information will be of sufficient importance and interest to immediately be relayed to Black Nationalist friends of the employee. It is anticipated that due to the magnitude of such information, other sources should soon hear of it and report back to the FBI concerning this matter. In addition to confirming the guilt of the suspect, this should be an excellent counterintelligence move to neutralize a dangerous

SD 67-3360

Black Panther Party leader in San Diego.

It is possible that information could have been released by an employee through an act of indiscretion rather than a deliberate release of information. It is hoped that the counter-intelligence moves described above will help to verify the actual situation.

Close liaison will be maintained with [] and all pertinent information received will be promptly furnished to the Bureau. In the event that source is not able to identify photographs of the two employees, then consideration will be given to using two dummy files concerning separate individuals. [] concerning these files will be furnished to [] employees to see if information concerning one of the subjects is subsequently disclosed. Consideration will then be given to interviewing [] of the employees.

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San Diego is requesting authority to interview [] by separate teletype. He will be interviewed in an attempt to actually convert him to an informant status before this plan is placed in effect. Should he show any indication of cooperation, another subject would be chosen for the counter-intelligence move. This alternate subject would be [] mentioned above. Therefore, immediate approval is requested to institute counterintelligence approach as set forth above.

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F B I

Date: 10-14-68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-NEW)

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b7C

RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Possible Leak of Information

Remytelcal this date and San Diego let to Bureau
10-11-68

OFFICE

Pursuant to referenced letter, counterintelligence plans have been instituted. On this date [redacted] was interviewed and furnished no information concerning the BLACK PANTHER PARTY in San Diego. Interviewing Agents believe that [redacted] should not be considered as good informant potential at this time, and therefore counterintelligence efforts are being directed against him. It should be noted that [redacted] is a [redacted] to whom the alleged employee has furnished information from FBI files, according to [redacted]

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A dummy 170 file has been established concerning [redacted] and a teletype has been [redacted] on that file, requesting immediate Bureau authority to pay him \$500 for information which [redacted] has agreed to furnish the FBI concerning the US organization in San Diego and [redacted]. It is anticipated that this information, if disclosed by [redacted] will come to the attention of appropriate informants covering the activities of those organizations, thus confirming her guilt and, in addition, serving as an excellent counterintelligence move.

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It is to be noted, however, if the original disclosures resulted from indiscretion while at a social function.

3 - Bureau - AM
1 - SD

ELM:jeb
(4)

OCT-21 157-

10909-2

REC 107

6 OCT 17 1968

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

PERS. REC. UNIT

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-NEW

it is not expected that an immediate disclosure will be made at this time concerning the information in the teletype of 10-14-68, which will not be actually sent to the Bureau.

On this date, files of San Diego Sheriff's Office, San Diego Police Department, and Merchants Credit Association, San Diego, California, were re-checked, with negative results concerning [redacted] and [redacted]. Files of Traffic Court, San Diego, California, revealed no information other than a previously admitted arrest by [redacted] for speeding on [redacted] in San Diego.

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This date, [redacted] was shown photographs of [redacted] and [redacted] along with a number of similar photographs. Source could not identify or furnish any information concerning [redacted]. However, [redacted] stated he was positive he had observed [redacted] at US Group meetings. Source could not identify [redacted] by name and did not know her as an FBI employee.

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Close liaison is being maintained with all racial informants, and immediate steps are being taken to insure prompt conclusion of this matter.

- 2 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS/ape*

FROM : Mr. G. C. Moore *GC*

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

DATE: 10/14/68

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

This is to advise you of steps San Diego Office is taking in order to resolve possible leak of information on the part of either one or both of two Negro clerical employees, details of which were set out in memorandum N. P. Callahan to Mr. Mohr, 10/10/68, attached.

San Diego, based upon allegation that a female Negro employee of its Office was furnishing information from FBI files to members of US, black extremist organization, has checked knowledgeable informants and advised there appears to be substance to the allegation. One informant identified [redacted] as person he has seen in [redacted] said that she has seen [redacted] Another informant who is a [redacted] was shown photographs of [redacted] employees said that he had seen [redacted] at US group meetings. It is noted that the allegation here is that an FBI [redacted] employee had access to files of US members and knew FBI source who photographed members.

ACTION:

SAC Evans was telephonically authorized today to have [redacted] concerning a dummy file furnished to the suspected employee in order to see if such data is subsequently disclosed. Following this, Evans says consideration will be given to interviewing [redacted]

SAC Evans has been instructed that this matter must be afforded the closest personal attention on his part in order to resolve it in the shortest time possible.

This matter is being vigorously pursued and you will be kept advised. Arrangements have been made to control access to Bureau information. XEROX [redacted]

Enclosure
GCM/JGD:fmh chs (6)

OCT 17 1968

OCT 17 1968

ENCLOSURE

51 NOV 1 1968

PERS. DIV. UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

DATE: 10-10-68

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT:

SAN DIEGO OFFICE

SAN DIEGO OFFICE

RACIAL MATTER -
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION.
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

Special Agent in Charge Evans, San Diego Office telephoned. He stated that their top racial informant had advised of a situation which occurred in the informant's [redacted] leading to the conclusion that there was possibly a leak of racial intelligence information from the San Diego Office. The informant overheard two Negroes in conversation. [redacted]

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ENCLOSURE

SAC Evans stated that the San Diego Office has two Negro employees, namely, [redacted]

[redacted] SAC Evans is inclined to feel that [redacted] would be more susceptible to this type of thing than would [redacted]. He also stated that [redacted]

[redacted] and assigned at San Diego. [redacted]

- EWV:mah (6)
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Sent direct)
1 - Mr. Callahan (Sent direct)
1 - Personnel file, [redacted]
1 - Personnel file, [redacted]

Negro militant group

XEROX
REC 107
OCT 17 1968

757-10909-25
(OVER)
OCT 17 1968
PERS. REC. UNIT

b6
b7C

Memo. Callahan to Mohr

re: [redacted]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC Evans advised that the informant who furnished the above information is an extremely valuable and critically placed informant whose identity cannot be compromised in any way. He stated an interview now with either one of the employees would blow the informant out of the water. SAC Evans plans to show photographs of the above-mentioned employees along with several other photographs to the informant to see whether he can identify either one as the girl referred to as being known to him. He plans to maintain as tight a security over the files as possible, bearing in mind that [redacted] do have access to the files in connection with [redacted] that is assigned to them. He will have the girls discreetly watched during the time they are in the office. He stated that physical surveillance of the girls would not be practical at this time since each, of course, resides in a Negro neighborhood in the San Diego area. b6 b7C

Based on the additional contact they plan to have with the informant this evening, SAC Evans will come in with full details together with his recommendations as to such further action as may be warranted.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. The foregoing is a preliminary report and as soon as full details have been submitted by SAC, San Diego, appropriate recommendations will be made.

[Handwritten mark]

[Handwritten signature]

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[Handwritten initials]

expedite

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 10/15/68

FROM : G. C. Moore

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

This is to apprise you of status of efforts on the part of the San Diego Office to resolve allegation that [redacted] has been furnishing FBI information to members of US, black extremist organization.

SAC Evans of San Diego advised this afternoon that yesterday disinformation concerning US organization was prepared [redacted] to serve as bait in order to ascertain if any playback is received through our sources showing [redacted] disclosed such information. She was closely observed [redacted] and no significant facial expressions noted indicating information was of unusual interest to her. Agent purposely left desk [redacted] during which time it was discreetly observed that [redacted] made no attempt to observe loose papers on his desk. Check of her [redacted] indicated that nothing had been removed. Evans also stated that another racial informant acquainted with [redacted] has been contacted and advised [redacted] not known to informant to be involved in black nationalist activities but known as a [redacted]

Evans stated he fully realizes that he must resolve this matter at the earliest possible time and is making every effort to do so. He said this could be a situation where the employee has been indiscreet with either [redacted] rather than a case of deliberately passing out Bureau information. Whatever the case, it must be resolved. Consideration has been given to an interview with [redacted] however, Evans feels that we would be in much better position if employee is fed additional bait material and if a few days are allowed to see what she does with this information. This is especially so as any social gathering which she might attend will take place over the coming weekend. If we receive no playback at that time, then, of course, she will have to be interviewed. During the interim, employee is not being given access to sensitive material.

ACTION:

This matter is being vigorously followed and you will be kept advised.

6 OCT 17 1968

OCT 17 1968

OCT 17 1968

EX-100
UNIT

F B I

Date: 10-15-68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-)OfficeRACIAL MATTERS;
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Pursuant to telcals today and SD airtel 10-14-68.

Concerning the information previously received indicating a possible leak of information from files of the SD Office, it is to be noted the following possibilities exist, all of which are being taken into consideration in efforts to resolve the situation:

1. No leak actually exists, and the information received by [] was an effort on the part of the two unidentified to "bait" []
2. No leak actually exists, and the two unidentified individuals were bragging as to their ability to obtain information from FBI files. In this regard, they might logically expect that [] since he is []
3. [] at a party and under the influence of alcohol in a moment of relaxation bragged and used indiscretion.
4. [] used indiscretion and advised [] of information in our files and he, in turn, made it known to outsiders.
5. [] has provided limited information to outsiders concerning them and who are friends of hers.

③ - Bureau - AM; REGISTERED

1 - SD

ELM:jeb

5 (4) NOV-1 1968

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

PERS. REG. UNIT

RACIAL INT. SECT.

1 OCT 18 1968

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REC 107

157-10909-5

3-061

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

6. [] is actively providing information to Black Nationalist Groups.

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In regard to Items 1 and 2, if either of these is true, the matter may never be resolved since any open inquiries such as identifying the two unidentified individuals and/or interviewing them could easily compromise []. If [] is compromised it would also compromise [] and [] all of whom are extremely valuable informants with even greater potentiality. If, however, items 3 through 6 are eliminated it could logically be assumed that either item 1 or 2 is correct.

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If Item 3 or 4 is the case, it is believed [] would admit this in an interview. However, it is believed an interview is premature at this time as once an interview is conducted it would preclude resolving whether Items 5 or 6 are true.

If Item 5 is the case it is believed that additional information will, in time, come through informants, particularly after the weekend when more opportunity arises for her.

If Item 6 is true, it is believed that we should definitely receive a "play-back" from our counter-intelligence program as outlined in referenced telephone call.

For the Bureau's information, the following steps have been taken and the following additional information has been received.

An airtel was dictated to [] stating that [] was recontacted this date and furnished information concerning [] organization at Los Angeles, California, and his romantic involvement with the wife of San Diego []

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C-11F

- 2 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

In addition, the airtel contained UACB reference reflecting [redacted] would be paid \$100 on 10-18-68 as first installment on the \$500 agreement. The airtel contained information that [redacted] is appropriating funds from US, INC., for his personal use.

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[redacted] who is under development as a Racial Informant, and who has attended and participated in numerous US and BLACK PANTHER meetings and activities, was contacted early on the morning of [redacted] is intimately acquainted with the Black Nationalist element in San Diego. In the course of being shown photos, [redacted] immediately identified a photo of a person he knows as [redacted] very emphatically stated that [redacted] has no contact or affiliation with any of the Black Nationalist groups, and he described her as a [redacted] He stated that he knows this girl's family and has known her to be a girl who attends Christian church regularly. He stated that she would never have any part of Black Nationalist activity. [redacted] In the course of viewing photos, did not identify [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] did not identify [redacted]

[redacted] who is also intimately acquainted with and has attended both US and BLACK PANTHER activities and meetings in San Diego, was also contacted early on the morning of [redacted] during the course of being shown photos of persons engaging in and being suspected of engaging in Black Nationalist activities, failed to make any identification of [redacted]

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The Bureau will be kept advised of all developments.

- 3 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 10-16-68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO OFFICERACIAL MATTERS;
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Remyairtel 10-15-68.

Close contact has been maintained with all informants familiar with racial matters and particularly with the US group. To date no "playback" has been received from the counterintelligence activity of the San Diego Office. This activity is continuing and, pursuant to telephone call 10-15-68, a dummy letter was dictated today to the San Diego Office of Army Intelligence, indicating positive results from recent releases from military services and thanking them for their cooperation.

It is to be noted that of the three informants who recognized [redacted] photograph, none was aware of the fact that she is employed by the FBI.

The Bureau's attention is directed to another possibility concerning the original information received. It is to be noted that numerous letterhead memoranda and reports are disseminated concerning racial matters. Some of these memoranda or reports may have made reference to the receipt [redacted] from an unidentified informant as far as they are concerned. Thus, a colored employee of the receiving agency familiar with US meetings and knowing that [redacted] [redacted] could have made the statement that FBI files contain [redacted] received from the informant. In making this statement, other individuals could assume she was an FBI employee. In an effort to eliminate this remote possibility

③ - Bureau - REGISTERED

1 - SD

ELM:jeb

(4)

REC 107 157-10909-6
OCT 18 1968Approved: 1 1968

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per

RACIAL INT. SECT.
PERS. REC. UNITb6
b7Cb2
b7D

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

US dissemination material is being reviewed.

San Diego will continue at least daily contact with informants in an effort to resolve this matter. Employee being discreetly observed during regular working hours.

During the so-called "waiting period" for a possible play-back and prior to possible future interview of employee, consideration should be given for appropriate telephone coverage which could be handled here with maximum security. This technique would assist in further evaluation of this matter.

It should be noted that [] has been continuously trying to identify the two unknown individuals who first brought this matter to our attention; however, has not seen either one since the original contact on []. He has been able to determine the location of one's residence; however, does not know his name. He has been counseled to handle this matter very delicately so that he does not jeopardize his position.

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Bureau will be kept advised of pertinent developments.

- 2 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F.B.I

Date: 10-17-68

Transmit the following in _____

A I R T E L

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 157-10909

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-)

OFFICE

RACIAL MATTERS;
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Remyairtel 10-16-68 and telcals today.

Additional discreet inquiries, observations, and contacts with informants have failed to provide any additional indications that a San Diego employee has provided information to an unauthorized source. There has been no "play-back" from our counter-intelligence operation.

Pursuant to telcal 10-15-68, an airtel attributed to a phony informant on a dictabelt has been given to [redacted]

[redacted] in a counter-intelligence operation and in an effort to get a "play-back" from this [redacted]

This operation involves setting up another dummy file with information completely independent of that previously given [redacted] so that any "play-back" could be definitely attributed to one or the other.

For the Bureau's information, a contact with [redacted] has disclosed that she was present during parts of the conversation between the two unidentified individuals and [redacted] It was her impression that the alleged FBI employee was [redacted]

[redacted] In light of this new information it appears that the leak may have been [redacted]

3 - Bureau - REGISTERED
1 - San Diego
ELM:jeb
(4)

REC 107

157-10909 3-261
157-10909-17

54 NOV - 6 1968

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

6 OCT 22 1968
M Per _____RACIAL INT. SECT.
REC-INT. SECT.b6
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F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

play detective and is difficult to handle at the best.

[redacted] was shown photographs in an effort to identify US members. Some of [redacted]

[redacted] at US meetings and at Teen Post #1. [redacted]

is a member of US and [redacted]

She easily could have guessed that some of the [redacted]

[redacted] It is very feasible that she could have not heeded [redacted]

[redacted] In this regard, it was with great difficulty that she was persuaded not to come to the FBI Office in person. [redacted] seems to most closely fit the information as provided by [redacted] and this would account for the limited information being given when much more valuable information would have been available to an FBI employee.

Photographs of [redacted] will be shown among a group of photos to [redacted] as well as racial in formants.

Continuous efforts are being made to identify the two unknown individuals. This is being handled in a discreet manner so as not to compromise the informant.

For the Bureau's information. [redacted]

[redacted] was cautioned concerning her but told she did provide valuable information.

The Bureau will be kept advised.

ASAC CLARK
Chicago
NOTE to direct - UNIT 6
FURTHER
NOTICE
11:05 AM
10/21/66

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 10-18-68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 157-10909

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-)

OfficeRACIAL MATTERS;
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Remyairtel 10-17-68.

On 10-18-68 [redacted] Calif. [redacted] and [redacted] were shown the photograph of [redacted] and failed to identify it among other similar photographs displayed. It is noted that the only available photograph of [redacted] at this time was not a particularly good likeness of her. Attempts are being made to obtain better photos for display to sources.

On this date [redacted] was thoroughly reinterviewed concerning her knowledge of this matter and stated that she recalled a previously forgotten conversation which she had with a Negro male in [redacted]. This individual, one of the two men present [redacted] advised her at that time

that the man told her that [redacted]. The man stated that he knew this to be true because a girl who worked there said so and said that the girl got so angry upon learning that [redacted] further recalled that this man was a friend of [redacted] and [redacted] was allegedly told by the employee that [redacted]

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③ - Bureau - REGISTERED

1 - SD

ELM:jeb

(4)

REC 107

157-10909 - 8 3

OCT 22 1968

5 1 NOV 1 1968

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M Per _____

RACIAL MAT. SEC.
PERS. REC. UNIT

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

[REDACTED]

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Photos of [REDACTED] are being shown among other similar photos to [REDACTED] since information from [REDACTED] indicates the alleged employee became angry because of him, and it is possible she expressed this to [REDACTED] or there has been friction between them.

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^{Calif.} It is considered that the remote possibility exists that [REDACTED] is a personal friend of [REDACTED] and that she was actually working for him as a double agent. In that event, [REDACTED] could have furnished information to [REDACTED] for submission to gain FBI confidence. It is noted that [REDACTED] appeared to have the desire to work 24 hours a day with no concern for her personal safety, which is considered highly unusual for a typical informant of this type.

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Therefore, consideration is being given to direct counterintelligence efforts against [REDACTED]

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The following counterintelligence situation is being submitted to the Bureau as a suggestion:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in San Diego, described above. [REDACTED] should be advised that information has

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

been received that a plan made back in August, 1968, includes the assassination of [] by one of [] "triggermen" with the blame to be placed on the American Nazi Party. This move would, of course, not be made without further discussion with the Bureau.

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Since [] has been in []

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[] should check toll calls made to date by her. If the above counterintelligence program is subsequently further considered, then toll calls would be checked consistent with this operation.

[] has not as yet been recontacted by the two Negro men, and their identity and whereabouts are unknown. He hopes to see these men this coming weekend in [] and will discreetly attempt to obtain additional information.

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b7D

Bureau will be kept advised.

For the Bureau's information, the exact quote, to the best of her recollection, of the conversation on [] and the unknown Negro male is set forth as follows:

b7D

Unidentified individual advised [] that [] had furnished photographs to the FBI.

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b7D

- 3 -


Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

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- 4 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *very*

DATE: 10/18/68 *Brady*

FROM : G. C. Moore *GCM*

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

for *for* SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

This is to recommend that all serials concerning captioned matter be kept in the Special File Room of the Records Branch of the Files and Communications Division.

Captioned matter deals with an allegation concerning the possible leak of racial information by an employee of the San Diego Office. This is a sensitive matter and access to this file should be limited to a need-to-know basis.

ACTION:

If you agree, this memorandum should be referred to Records Branch for appropriate attention. *R*

157-10909

JGD:fhd (7) *JGD*

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Tavel
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

*Handled
Spec. File Rm
11-12-68
EK*

EX 106

REC-64 157-10909-9

6 OCT 24 1968

*Removed from the Special
File Room 7-9-73 GYM
Authorization Memo 6-20-73
from*

RACE INT. SECT.

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b7c

OCT 24 1968

98 NOV 14 1968

66-17404-
REC COPY FILED IN

10/23/68

Airtel

1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

b7D

To: SACs, [redacted]
San Diego

From: Director, FBI

RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION
Bufile: 157-10909

Bufile: [redacted]
San Diego File: [redacted]

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b7D

This will confirm the instructions furnished to the
[redacted] on 10/21/68 concerning contact of [redacted]

As previously instructed, the [redacted] should not
direct the activities of [redacted] nor should it initiate
any contact with this individual until so advised by the Bureau.
In the event the above individual contacts a representative of
the [redacted] information volunteered should be accepted
but no payments should be made to her nor should any direction
be given to her.

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b7D

JGD:rmm (10)

EX-102 REC-78

157-10909-10

19 OCT 24 1968

NOTE: The above pertains to a possible leak of information
from the San Diego Office. There is a possibility the above
named informant may be involved in this security breach; therefore,
the above instructions are being sent.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

F B I

Date: 10-22-68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (67-)

OFFICERACIAL MATTERS;
POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION

Remyairtel 10-18-68.

The original information received in this matter from [] was that two individuals known to him by sight, but not by name, had told him that [] employed by the FBI, had told [] and other Black Nationalists that [] had provided the FBI with [] them and that this girl had seen the []

There are two colored girls employed in the FBI Office, San Diego. []

The allegation, however, did not ring true as to why an FBI employee, if, in fact, was providing information, provided only this information when much more important data would be available to an employee. Steps were taken, as follows:

(1) Photographs of the two employees, along with photographs of other colored girls, were displayed to all racial informants to ascertain if they had been observed at any Black Nationalist meetings or functions.

(2) As a counterintelligence operation, false information was deliberately made available to these two employees

③ - Bureau - REGISTERED

SD
RWE:feb

NOV 7 1968

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Per _____

3-DIV
PERS. REC. UNIT

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b7C
b7D

ENCLOSURE FILED IN 170-3386

Memo B.C. Brown to L.C. Sullivan
JG D:RMH 10-25-68

ICC detached
10/24/68
REC-40

157-10909-11
18 NOV 1 1968

EX-101

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

to disrupt the movement and to see if any "play-back" was received from informants.

In regard to Item No. 1, these were all negative except for [redacted] who at first identified employee [redacted] as having been in attendance at US meetings.

On 10-22-68, [redacted] again viewed photographs and advised he had been mistaken in identifying [redacted] photograph. He advised that due to the similarity in the facial features of [redacted] and a photograph of [redacted] and the poor lighting conditions on initial contact he had thought he was identifying [redacted] who is, according to [redacted] a [redacted] girl who had attended a number of functions. On this second contact [redacted] specifically advised that he has never seen [redacted] and does not know her.

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There was no play-back from Item No. 2, and no apparent disruption in the Black Nationalist movement.

On 10-18-68 additional information was received from [redacted] who had overheard the conversation and, in addition, had talked to these individuals on a prior occasion concerning this "FBI employee". This information was that the "FBI employee" [redacted]

[redacted] and the two individuals even discussed the fact that it would have been better had [redacted] and could have continued to provide the Black Nationalists with information. With this new information, no FBI employee, [redacted] in the San Diego Office fits the criteria. No colored employees have been terminated.

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Since the allegation concerning an employee having provided information from our files and the allegation that an FBI employee attended US meetings have been resolved as being

- 2 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

SD 67-

completely false, neither of the two colored female employees is being interviewed, UACB. No basis for an interview exists.

Even though the allegations concerning irregularities on the part of an FBI employee have been proven false, the fact still remains that someone provided information of significance concerning FBI operations. In analyzing the data available, it became apparent that [redacted] was responsible for the "alleged leak". [redacted]

[redacted] who attended numerous meetings of US and other Black Nationalist groups. In attempting to identify Black Nationalists, she was shown numerous [redacted] and could easily have guessed [redacted]

[redacted] having been present herself. This would also account for the fact that more important information was not provided since it would not have been available to her. She was extremely difficult to handle, had no apparent concern for her personal safety as other informants do, and on one prior occasion broke her confidential agreement, in spite of much counseling against this, by revealing her relationship with the FBI. [redacted]

[redacted] file is being closed, and no request is being made to have the [redacted] interview her. [redacted]

[redacted] consideration will be given to utilizing her in a counterintelligence operation by feeding her misinformation. No steps in this regard, however, will be taken without prior Bureau authorization.

I have in the past stressed to both clerical and agent personnel the fact that information in our files is confidential and will continue to stress this in future clerical and agent conferences. Per Bureau regulations, informant and other highly confidential files are being kept under lock and key and are available to employees only on a "need-to-know" basis. No additional action is deemed necessary at this time.

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- 3 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

for **Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**

TO : Mr. Sullivan *HLS*

DATE: 10/25/68

FROM : G. C. Moore *hcn*

SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS:

To advise investigation conducted concerning allegation that an FBI employee in the San Diego Office was furnishing information to members of US, a black extremist organization, showed it to be false.

The allegation was that a Negro girl employee was furnishing information to members of US concerning FBI investigation of that group. Two Negro females are employed in San Diego. b6
b7C
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Our investigation included the showing of false information to the employees to determine if we could get a "playback" from informants and the showing of photographs of the employees to informants. There was no "playback." Racial informants stated the employees were not known to them with one exception. One informant when first shown the photographs of employee [redacted] stated he had seen her in attendance at US meetings. When shown this photograph on a subsequent day, he advised that he had been mistaken in identifying [redacted] in that she resembles a woman by the name of [redacted] who frequented the US meetings.

[redacted] is a discontinued racial informant who [redacted] /Additionally, information was received that the FBI employee who was furnishing the information to US [redacted] b6
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In view of the above, the SAC of San Diego recommends that the FBI employees not be interviewed since it is clear no basis for interview exists and that no contact be had with the former informant. However, should the informant [redacted] consideration will be given to utilizing her in a counterintelligence operation by feeding her misinformation. b7D

RECOMMENDATION:

That no further action be taken in this matter unless the former informant returns to San Diego. Then, consideration will be given to feeding her false information as set out above. Separately, we are determining whether informant was mishandled by San Diego.

JGD:fhd/rmm

(6)

DETAILS - OVER

59 NOV 8 - 1968

3-DR
PERS. REC. UNIT

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

DETAILS:

Original Allegation

The SAC of the San Diego Office advised on 10/10/68 that a security informant [] by two individuals known to him by sight but not by name that a [] employed by the FBI had told [] and other black nationalists that [] had provided the FBI with [] of the US group, a militant black nationalist group. [] is presently a racial informant of the San Diego Office. [] and a [] who has furnished the FBI with [] black nationalists. b2 b7D

There are two Negro female employees in the San Diego Office.

[] These employees have been employed since [] respectively. b6 b7C

Investigation Conducted

Investigation in this matter included (1.) showing of photographs of the two employees in question along with photographs of other Negro females to racial informants to ascertain if they had been observed at any black nationalist meetings. (2.) The making available to the employees in question false information for the purpose of disrupting the black nationalist activity and to determine if any "playback" would be received from our informants. In addition, the security informant who furnished the original information and his wife, who is also an informant, were reinterviewed in detail concerning the allegation.

Results of Investigation

The racial informants who were shown photographs of the employees in question also stated that the employees were not known to them with one exception. The exception was [] who first identified employee [] as having been in attendance at US meetings. When recontacted [] again viewed the photographs and advised he had been mistaken in identifying [] photograph. He advises that due to the similarity in the facial features of [] and a photograph of [] he had thought he was identifying [] who according to him, is a [] girl who had attended a number of US meetings. b2 b6 b7C b7D

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

On this second contact [] specifically stated that he has never seen [] and does not know her. In addition, there was no "playback" from the false information that was furnished.

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Additional information was received from the [] who advised that she had overheard the original conversation and [] to these same individuals on a prior occasion concerning the "FBI employee." This information was that the "FBI employee" had []

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OBSERVATIONS:

The SAC of San Diego points out that neither of the Negro girls employed by San Diego are [] and that the original allegation was limited to the fact that the alleged FBI employee furnished information that [] had provided the FBI with [] black nationalists. The observation is made that the allegation did not ring true in that if an FBI employee was furnishing information from our files, why was this employee only furnishing limited information concerning [] when more important data would be available to the employee.

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Concerning [] the discontinued informant, it is noted that while she was being operated as an informant she was shown the [] had provided, therefore, she was in a position to have the information concerning these [] As to the allegation that the FBI employee in question had [] it is also noted that no Negro employees of the San Diego Division have terminated their employment []

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Taking all of the above into consideration, there appears to be no basis of interview of our present employees and in fact it appears that the leak of information can be attributed to [] the discontinued informant.

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Actions to be taken

No contact will be made with discontinued informant [] and in fact the [] which covers her residence at this time, has been so instructed. In the event [] consideration will be given to utilizing her in a counter-intelligence operation by feeding her false information. Separately, we are determining whether informant was mishandled by San Diego.

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Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: RACIAL MATTERS
POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
SAN DIEGO OFFICE

In addition to the above, San Diego advised by airtel of 10/22/68 that the discontinued informant on one prior occasion broke her confidential agreement by revealing her relationship with the FBI. San Diego had not previously advised the Bureau of this fact therefore, the matter must be looked into promptly and a determination made whether there was mishandling and whether administrative action must be taken.

wes