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Note:	This is one of a series of self-study guides for a country or area, prepared for the use of USAID staff assigned to temporary duty in those countries. The guides are designed to allow individuals to familiarize themselves with the country or area in which they will be posted.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMEX	Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
FSA	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

Ukraine:
A Self-Study Guide

United States Department of State
Foreign Service Institute
George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center
Washington, D.C. 20522-4201

The Self-Study Guide: Ukraine is intended to provide U.S.government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important Ukrainian issues related to history, culture, politics, economics, and international relations. This guide is meant to serve as an introduction and self-study resource. It replaces the self-study guide of 2005 largely because political and economic events over the past year have changed sufficiently to warrant a new assessment. In particular, the leadership of the Orange Revolution – the spectacular popular upsurge of 2004 that swept away one regime and brought to power another – has morphed yet again into a largely new political configuration. At the same time, Ukraine's energy dependency on Russia, at a time of heightened aggressiveness on Moscow's part towards its neighbors because of Rusia's energy superpower status, requires fresh analysis and discussion.

The reader or user of this guide are also encouraged to supplement his/her reading by referring to the books, articles, periodicals and web sites listed in the appropriate sections. A relatively up to date bibliography of books and materials can be found in the Area Studies Office along with this guide.

Final preparation of this guide was facilitated and enhanced by two individuals at the Foreign Service Institute. Colleen O'Shea, an intern in the summer of 2006, conducted research on a number of articles and helped write several key essays, including 'Ukrainian Folk Traditions,' 'The Jewish Question,' 'Corruption,' and 'Energy Issues.' Her scholarly interest in Ukraine and in the countries of the former Soviet Union proved to be of inestimable value. In addition, Nesreen Matarneh, an Administrative Support Assistant at the FSI, added greatly to the overall quality of the guide by finding suitable pictures, art embellishments, and maps. Both Colleen and Nesreen are to be commended for their service.

In the end, however, responsibility for the overall guide are fell to Dr. William Gleason, Chair for Ukrainian and Eurasian Area Studies at the FSI. The views expressed in this guide those of the authors or of attributed sources and do not necessarily reflect official policy or the position of the U.S. Department of State or the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. This publication is for official educational and non-profit use only.

November 2006

TABLE CONTENTS

The Land: Geography, Climate and Environment in Ukraine

Ninety-five percent of Ukraine is comprised of flat plain or steppe, a characteristic that provoked the early geographer Rudnytskyj to suspect that "nine-tenths of Ukrainians have certainly never seen a mountain and do not know what one looks like." Ukraine is comparable to the American Midwest, similar not only in landscape and foliage, but in rich soil as well, making Ukraine a breadbasket similar to Kansas or Nebraska. These two characteristics—flat plains and rich soil—have played an almost deterministic role in Ukrainian history, establishing agriculture as a profitable occupation while allowing easy access to numerous invaders.

Source: CIA Factbook

Ukraine is a country of 603,700 square kilometers, approximately 1300 kilometers from east to west and 900 kilometers from north to south. The country is bounded by the Black Sea on the south, Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland on the West, Belarus on the North, and Russia on the East—borders carved out after centuries of expansion, contraction, and occupation. Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, is located in central northern Ukraine on the Dnieper River. The Dnieper is the largest river in Ukraine, snaking through the center of the country and flowing, like most rivers in the country, from northwest to southeast before emptying into the Black Sea. The Dniester River, which flows in Western Ukraine before cutting into Moldova, is the second largest river in the country. The average elevation in Ukraine is 574 feet and only 5% of the country—primarily near the borders—is mountainous. The highest point is Hora Hoverla at 2,061 m, part of the Carpathian Mountains.

Ukraine's soil is its most defining geographical characteristic. A substantial portion of the country is endowed with *chornozem*, a rich, black fertile soil that prompted Europe's first agricultural endeavors in Ukraine. In contrast to Russia, agriculture has consistently proved successful in Ukraine, and Russia's group farming techniques never became as prevalent in Ukraine. The very north of Ukraine contains a sandy soil with fewer nutrients than the rich chornozem, and salty chestnut soil is found near the Black Sea, but these soils cover a very small portion of the land. One-eighth of the country is forested, with most of these forests covering the northeast. Approximately one-third of Ukraine's land has been cleared for cultivation.

The climate of Ukraine is mostly mild, tempered by ocean air from the Atlantic and nearby seas. Although winters are more harsh in the East and summers more hot in the West, neither area generally experiences temperatures greater than 75° or less than 18° F. Crimea has a Mediterranean climate. Precipitation is largely unpredictable, with the only clear pattern being that much more rain falls—two to three times more—during the warmer seasons.

The Ukrainian government has long considered natural preservation a high priority, beginning with the creation of the Askania-Nova national wildlife refuge in 1875. Currently, the country protects thirty-nine national parks and reserves, some of the most prominent being the F.E. Falz-Fein Biosphere Reserve, Black Sea Nature Reserve, Danube Water Meadows, and Ukrainian Steppe Reserves. Despite these preservation efforts, the Soviet period seriously degraded Ukraine's environmental conditions, and some of the most polluted areas in the world are now found in Ukraine. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1989 caused serious contamination, birth defects, and cancer in Ukrainian citizens living near the site, and the surrounding area will continue to be contaminated for thousands of years. In addition, coal burning in Eastern Ukraine produces heavy air pollution and water pollution has contaminated some coastal areas of the Black Sea and Sea of Azoz.

Figure 31. Radiation Hotspots Resulting From the Chornobyl' Nuclear Power Plant Accident



Source: University of Texas Libraries

Aside from environmental factors caused largely by Soviet domination and modernization, many of the tragedies—and fortunes—of Ukraine have been shaped by the lay and substance of the land. While the rich black plains and steppes of Ukraine have embraced and fed her people, this land has failed miserably in averting foreign invasions, repeatedly allowing tragedies wherein Ukrainian soil soaks up the blood of those it once fed.

As later sections on history will illustrate, Ukraine's endowment from nature has proven both a blessing and a curse.

Questions for Study

- What nations and bodies of water bound Ukraine?
- What is the largest river in Ukraine?
- How much of Ukrainian land is mountainous and how much is forested?
- What kind of soil covers most of Ukraine and why is this important?
- What is the climate in Ukraine?
- What events have greatly affected Ukraine's environmental conditions?

Sources for Further Study

Subtelny, Orest. 2000. Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
A comprehensive history of Ukraine with a short section on Ukrainian geography.

Encyclopedia Britannica, latest edition. *Ukraine.*
An extensive analysis of Ukrainian geography, climate, and environment.

The World Almanac and Book of Facts, latest edition. *Ukraine.*
Basic facts and statistics concerning Ukrainian geography.

Magocsi, Paul R. 1985. Ukraine: A Historical Atlas.
Contains useful historic and geographical maps of Ukraine.

The People

Population

Ukraine is a large country, larger than any European country except Russia, or about the same size as Texas in the United States. As of 2006, Ukraine's estimated population stands at almost 47 million. During the Soviet period, a policy of Russian in-migration and Ukrainian out-migration prevailed, and the ethnic Ukrainian share of the overall population declined from 77 percent in 1950 to 73 percent in 1991. The final Soviet census (1991) revealed Russians to be largest minority, at 22 percent. Ten years later the 2001 census showed the same figure, with the remaining minorities constituting about 5 percent of the nation. This includes (in descending numerical order) Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, and Jews.

Aside from specific numbers, the most salient feature of Ukraine's demographic history since 1991 is the precipitous drop off in the overall population, from a high of 52 million. The decline of 4 million over a 12 year period reflects the sharp deterioration of economic and social conditions as well as an emigration of large numbers, in particular to Israel, Canada, and the United States. Declining standards in healthcare and daily nutrition have yielded a lowering of fertility and life expectancy rates. Average life expectancy in Ukraine in 2000 was 68 years and in 2002 mortality rates exceeded birthrates by a ratio of

2:1. Male life expectancy is now about 65 years, mirroring widespread alcoholism and drug abuse. More tragically, by 2004, as in neighboring Russia, HIV/AIDS in Ukraine had reached pandemic proportions with no end in sight.

Ethnic Relations and Languages

Before 1991, Russian was the required language of governmental administration and public life. Kiev, for example, was a Russian-speaking city along with the major urban centers of the eastern and southern region of Ukraine. That same year, immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian became the official language although in the Crimea, home to a large Russian-speaking majority, Russian remained. Similarly, despite the new policy, Russian was the preferred spoken language as well as the language of instruction in the Donets Basin and along the Dnipro river bend of south central Ukraine. And in 2004, in the midst of the hotly contested presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych, the Prime Minister and a leading presidential candidate, promised if elected to restore Russian to official status alongside Ukrainian.

Ukrainian and Russian, the two dominant languages throughout Ukraine, both belong to the East Slavic language family that also includes Belarussian. For native speakers, Ukrainian and Russian are mutually intelligible and millions of Ukrainians speak both languages freely. In addition, significant minorities in the Western regions of Ukraine speak Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian or Hungarian.

Ethnic Composition of Ukraine

	2001	% of total	1989 % of total
Ukrainians	37,542	77.8	72.7
Russians	8,334	17.3	22.1
Belarusians	276	0.6	0.9
Moldovans	259	0.5	0.6
Crimean Tatars	248	0.5	0
Bulgarians	205	0.4	0.5
Hungarians	157	0.3	0.4
Romanians	151	0.3	0.3
Poles	144	0.3	0.4
Jews	104	0.2	0.9

Source: Ukrainian National Census, 2001

Since 1991 – and in contrast to fears of many observers at the time of the implosion of the Soviet Union – ethnic relations between Ukrainians and Russians have been good. This success to date derives from several key factors, including a shared cultural history, a common faith (Eastern Orthodoxy) for most people, generations of intermarriage, and the government's sensitivity to this issue. The 1996 Constitution enshrined both religious and ethnic rights and freedoms, rights that have been respected by virtually everyone across the various regions of Ukraine. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the treatment of ethnic minorities in several of the other former Soviet republics, Ukraine immediately bestowed full citizenship

on all non-Ukrainians. As a result, the largest ethnic Russian community in Ukraine – the largest numerically of any non-Russian republic of the former Soviet Union – accepted their new status and produced no nationalist parties or leaders. This fact was especially significant in Crimea, where a Russian naval fleet remained anchored at Sevastopol, a testimony to pre-1991 Soviet power and ambition.

Settlement Patterns

Well over 50 percent of the Ukrainian population lives in the urban areas, a striking reflection of decades of Soviet industrialization and urbanization. Southeastern and south central Ukraine are home to the highest population densities, with large concentrations in the coal mining centers of the Donets Basin (Donetsk) and the Dniper Bend (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk). Cities with population over one million in Ukraine are Kiev, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk. The next largest cities are Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Kryvyi Rih, and Mykolaiv.

Although a majority of Ukrainians live in cities, a significant minority – approximately 30 percent – remain in the countryside. Of this number, most live in large villages, sometimes numbering up to 5,000 people, a reflection in part of the survival of the huge Soviet collective farms. Central Ukraine, with its fertile soil (the so-called 'black earth' or chornozem) and temperate climate conditions, accounts for the greatest number of rural inhabitants.

An old Ukrainian couple in the Carpathian Mountains. Photography by Jeremy Little.

Questions for Study

- How big is Ukraine, compared to other European countries?
- Why has Ukraine's population declined since the end of the Soviet Union?
- What are the dominant spoken languages of Ukraine?
- Why have ethnic relations between Russians and Ukrainians been good since 1991?

History and Its Legacies

800	Ukrainian princedoms united by Vikings
980-1015	Volodymyr 'the great'
1019-1054	Yaroslav 'the wise'
1240	Mongols obliterate Kiev
1349	Polish occupation of Galicia
1596	Union of Brest; creation of the Greek Catholic Church
1632-1647	Petro Mohyla and educational modernization
1648	Cossack revolt under Bohdan Khmelnytsky; rise of the Hetmante
1654	Treaty of Perislav between Khmelnytsky and Moscow
1657	Khmelnytsky dies
1685-1686	Kiev Church dissolved into Moscow Church
1785	Abolishment of Cossak Hetmante
1880s	Ukrainian culture and history taught in Lembourg University during the reign of the Hapsburg Empire
Early 1900s	Ukrainians are elected to central Hapsburg Diet in Vienna
1914	Outbreak of WWI
1917	Bolshevik revolution
1918-1921	Ukraine tries and fails at independence, becomes part of the USSR in 1921
1932-1933	The great famine
1944	Western Ukraine becomes part of the USSR
1991	Ukrainian independence created through referendum on Dec.1; Kravchuk becomes president
1994	Kuchma defeats Kravchuk in the presidential election
1996	Ukraine adopts a new, internationally lauded constitution
1996	Introduction of the *hryvnia*, Ukraine's currency
1999	Kuchma is reelected and Yushchenko becomes Prime Minister
2000	Disappearance and murder of Gongadze; Kuchma is accused as a participant in the affair
2001	Yushchenko is dismissed
2002	Parliamentary elections; *Our Ukraine* wins a plurality of seats
2004	Presidential elections and the Orange Revolution
2005	President Yushchenko takes Power
2006	Parliamentary Election in March; Party of Region
2006	Yushchenko (Party of Regions) appointed new prime Minister

Introduction

The peculiarities of Ukrainian history are twofold: first, the fact that until 1991 Ukraine never existed as a true, independent state, and secondly, until that same date most of what we knew about Ukraine came from Russian secondary sources. The first point is explained by the fact that for over 850 years – from the destruction of Kiev and Kievan Rus by the Mongols in 1240 – Ukraine was a frontier region split between neighboring empires and states. Indeed, the Ukrainian word for Ukraine – Ukraïna – means 'borderland,' a word that perfectly expresses the central geographic determinant of a people whose identity had to be marshaled within other states, until 1991.

The second characteristic of Ukraine's historic narrative comes from Russia's long domination of most of Ukraine, a record stretching back to the mid 17th century when Ukrainians, under their Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky, called upon Moscow to aid them in the struggle for freedom from Polish overlordship to the West. Within decades Moscow had taken control of two thirds of modern day Ukraine and reduced Ukrainians to the status of "Little Russians," the less than endearing term for their subjects for the next three centuries. As a result, after the mid 1600s, Russian writers and historians placed Ukraine within Russian history, and Ukraine was labeled either *Little Russia* or *South Russia* or *New Russia.* Whatever the name, except for a slice of Western Ukraine under the Habsburg Empire in the 1800s, Ukrainians lost their place as a distinctive culture and peoples until their sudden emergence in the aftermath of the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991.

Early History – Kievan Russia

Ukraine's earliest history is inseparable from that of other Slavic peoples whose original homeland in Eastern Europe stretched between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Over time, as a consequence of successive migrations and invasions by peoples of both Asian and European origins, the Slavic agricultural tribes dispersed into the Western Slavs , (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians), and the East Slavs (Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians). Under nearly constant threat from nomadic horsemen from inner Asia, the East Slavs successfully established a loose collection of princedoms. By the 9th century these princedoms had been united by Scandanavian Vikings (known as Varangians or Norsemen), the center of which was Kiev.

From the 9th to 13th centuries Kievan Rus, as it was known, was the dominant power in Eastern Europe, trading with Byzantium and in regular contact with the feudal states of Central and Western Europe. Within a few decades following its emergence, the Viking ruling elite was Slavicized and during the reign of Prince Volodymyr, Christianized in 988d within the Eastern orthodox faith. For over two centuries the Rus witnessed a literary flowering, architectural marvels, and the codification of a uniform system of customary law. The code – known as the 'Law of Rus' – was extremely progressive for its time, with fines more typical than corporal punishment or property seizure, and with equitable property (inheritance) and family rights for women.

At the same time, Kievan Rus was not a modern nation or state. As time passed the princes quarreled amongst themselves, a development that exposed everyone to a terrifying

reality – the appearance of the Mongolians, a massive nomadic army from the Asiatic steppes. The result was the violent obliteration of Kiev in 1240 by Batu, grandson of the legendary Mongolian unifier Genghis Khan. Kiev's destruction was the first instance of the subjugation of the local population and the resultant scattering of the surviving Slavic population across a huge area from the open prairie lands of southern Ukraine to the thickly forested lands to the northeast. Thus, in Ukrainian history, 1240 is viewed as a symbolic date: the end of a once-united Eastern Slavic state and the gradual emergence of Ukrainians as a separate people, with distinct mentalities, institutions, and values.

Polish-Ukrainian Commonwealth (In Dark) and Cossack Empire (Thin Stripes)



The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Origins of Ukrainian Identity

Within 200 years of the Mongolian onslaught, Ukrainian territories were mostly under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. While direct Polish rule in Ukraine initially was limited to Galicia, an area of Western Ukraine, which changed suddenly in 1385 when Lithuania was drawn into the Polish realm following the dynastic linkage of the two states and the baptism of the Lithuanians into the Latin (Roman Catholic) church. The rapid diffusion of Catholicism among the Lithuanians and the equally significant diffusion of Polish language, culture, and ideas of political order – an elective monarchy for one thing – characterized the entire area. From 1350 to 1600 virtually all ethnically Ukrainian lands experienced the overwhelming impact of Polish cultural

predominance. By 1600, for example, Kiev was a Polish-speaking city with Catholic schools and a militant, proselytizing Jesuit faith. And it was exactly that development – the existence of militant Catholicism – that gave rise to the first offshoots of Ukrainian self-awareness.

The religious roots of Ukrainian identity assumed two forms, both growing out of the need of the Orthodox Church and faith to defend themselves. The first reaction was compromise with the Catholic hierarchy, an approach that led many Ukrainians to seek the protection of the Pope, but within an Orthodox context. The result was the Union of Brest in 1596, which placed the adherents under the authority of the Pope while allowing them to retain the traditional rite and church service. In time this movement came to be known as the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church.

The second reaction was reform from within, best illustrated by Petro Mohyla, the Kievan Metropolitanate from 1632 to 1647. Mohyla founded the academy that bears his name to this day (and is now the main independent University in Ukraine). Mohyla's principal objective was to modernize the education of the Orthodox clergy in order to make them competitive and attractive to the people, principally to the Ukrainian aristocracy who had converted en masse to Catholicism for a half century. He updated the liturgy, revolutionized the program of religious education (introducing Greek and Latin over the ancient Church Slavonic), and insisted that the clergy engage in pastoral care across the greater community. By the end of the 17th century, the Mohyla Academy was the leading educational institution in Eastern Europe and a magnet for scholars and scientists from many countries, including Russia.

If religion was the primary badge of incipient Ukrainian identity, the other shaping force across the same period was the Cossacks. To modern Ukrainian historians, the Cossack tradition – best encapsulated in the Cossack revolt of 1648 that led, momentarily, to a Cossack state – sets Ukraine apart from Russia politically. The Cossacks were free men fleeing the tyranny of encroaching serfdom in both Poland and Russia to establish farming and fortress communities across the wild, open steppes of southern Ukraine. The Orthodox faith unified the Cossacks and often came together to fight their great enemies to the south – the Crimean Tatars and Ottoman Turks. It was under the Cossacks that the term 'Ukraine' became widespread to describe the lands around the Cossack kingdom or 'Hetmanate.' Equally important, the idea of Cossack liberty and freedom as a distinguishing Ukrainian trait mushroomed in the mid 1600s, in contrast both to the Polish aristocracy to the northwest and Muscovite (Russian) autocracy to the northeast.

The Cossack era in Ukrainian history – and all it promised for an early modern Ukrainian state – came to an end in 1654 when the Cossack leader Khmelnytsky forged ties with Russia to achieve his goal of defeating the Poles. The Treaty of Pereiaslav between Khmelnytsky and Moscow brought Ukrainian lands east of the Dnipro river under Russian control. Over the next century, gradually and in defiance of Pereiaslav in which Moscow pledged to honor Cossack autonomy, the remaining remnants of Ukrainian freedom were lost to the Russian tsars. In 1785 the Hetmante, the last symbol of Cossack independence, was abolished and absorbed into the tsarist regime. At the same time, the collapse of the Polish Commonwealth and its subsequent dismemberment by Austria, Prussia and Russia, gave western Ukraine to the Austrian (Habsburg) Empire in 1795. The long period of Polish sway over Ukraine was over.


Khmelnytsky

Ukraine Under Imperial Rule: Russia and Austria

It is safe to say that the embryonic Ukrainian culture of the 17th century was almost completely destroyed by the Russian empire. Because Ukrainian identity revolved around local concepts of Orthodoxy and the Cossack tradition, the disappearance of these realities rendered Ukraine hostage to subsequent Russification. By 1800, Cossack autonomy was long gone. As for orthodoxy, while remaining in principle, in reality much was lost when the Kievan Church was swallowed up by the Moscow Church in 1685-86 and Tsar Peter the Great subordinated church to state by abolishing the patriarchate altogether in 1721. From the early 1700s onward, Russia's strategy of integrating Ukrainian leaders into a multi-ethnic state bureaucracy – in essence a dynastic empire in which all could serve but on the tsar's terms – meant that Ukrainian cultural revival remained the preserve of a tiny, culturally isolated intelligentsia and publicists.

In truth, were it not for the existence of another Ukraine under the Habsburgs, it is at least debatable whether Ukrainian identity would have survived at all, even in a cultural sense. As with their ethnic counterparts under Russian rule, Ukrainians under Austrian control were members of a multi-ethnic empire, subject to the seductions of an imperial state. However, in sharp contrast to Russia, the Habsburgs favored local rights and responsibilities. As early as 1781, elementary education became compulsory, mostly in the local language, and by the 1880s Ukrainian history and language were being taught at Lemberg University (now Lviv University) by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Dean of Ukrainian historians. By the early 1900s Ukrainians were being elected to the central Diet in Vienna and had created a whole network of peasant cooperatives, land banks, reading rooms, and political parties across Galicia. In a word, the Galicians, in almost total contrast to their eastern counterparts under tsarist rule, had grown quite used to governing themselves. World War I would bring them their first opportunity.

The Hapsburg Empire (In Dark)

Questions and Issues:

- What are the peculiarities of understanding Ukrainian history?
- How did religion shape the formation of Ukrainian identity?
- How did the Habsburg experience contribute to the evolution of Ukrainian
- consciousness?

Suggested Reading: Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 2nd ed., 2002.

The Twentieth Century: Ukraine under Soviet rule

World War I (1914-1918) brought a violent end to the age of empires. Within months the tsarist and Hapsburg dynasties disappeared, the former to a popular revolution from below, the latter to the war itself and allied treaties ending the conflict. In Russia, Ukrainians jumped at the chance to rule themselves, but the effort failed after four years (1917-1921) due to internecine strife between the competing factions and the destruction of independent regimes by the victorious Bolsheviks (Communists) in Moscow. By 1921, two thirds of Ukraine was again under Russian rule.

In western Ukraine, despite the hopes of local nationalists that the victorious Allies would recognize their claims for an independent state, the hopes were ignored and the people divided during the interwar period (1919-1939) between a reconstituted Poland, a newly created Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Notwithstanding their failed hopes, Western

Ukraine did not come under Moscow's control until 1944, when the Red Army seized this area from Nazi occupiers. For Western Ukrainians, memories of freedom and autonomy dating back to the pre World War I period remained embedded during the Soviet period.

From 1921 to 1991 the huge majority of Ukrainians lived under Soviet rule. During these seven decades Ukraine was subject to many wrenching changes: the transformation of the economy and society due to Soviet sponsored industrialization and collectivization of farming, and the imposition of Soviet marxism that promoted the notion of a superior Soviet system in the global competition with capitalism. During the 1930s one of the worst tragedies of modern times visited Ukraine when Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, imposed a famine on Ukraine to eradicate the local peasantry (free farmers) and vestiges of cultural nationalism. According to official estimates (only revealed by the 1990s after the end of the Soviet era), at least 7 million died in the Great Famine of 1932-33.

To describe the Soviet impact on Ukraine in institutional and ideological terms alone, however, is insufficient. While millions died in the Great Famine, and Ukrainian nationalists were violently repressed, other millions from the village and urban working poor benefited from the Soviet state. These people – upwardly mobile men and women – staffed the Soviet bureaucracy with managers, technocrats, teachers, and engineers. They also provided a base of social stability for the ruling elite, a base that held for more than half a century.

By the 1960s and 1970s, as one author noted, a "real fear" existed among Ukrainian nationalists and dissidents that Ukraine would never attain sovereignty or self-rule. Soviet-Russian culture and ideology had sunk deep roots across the Ukrainian countryside and in the cities. Real hope of independence existed largely in the diaspora in Canada and the United States, along with a handful of dissidents in Ukraine, most of who were in jail or under close watch by the Soviet KGB.

How, then, did 1991 – complete independence and self-rule – happen? Three answers suggest themselves. First, the wholly unexpected emergence of a new, dynamic leader, Mykhail Gorbachev, who decided to engage the Soviet people nationwide in a dialogue in order to reform the increasingly moribund Soviet economy. By 1989 that dialogue meant that many local elements in Ukraine and elsewhere were being consulted broadly, a process that increasingly yielded uncontrollable results as people voiced their complaints and concerns.

Secondly, the world's worst nuclear accident in history at Chornobyl, north of Kiev, where an explosion on the morning of April 16, 1986 killed several dozen workers, spread radiation across a wide area (most of today's Belarus, and north-central Ukraine), and left millions susceptible to long term disease and illness. The impact on public opinion in Ukraine was devastating, made worse by the silence of the Soviet leadership for days after the explosion. That silence disillusioned millions of otherwise loyal citizens and left them open to suggestions for radical change and reform.

Third, the breakdown of communist party unity in Moscow as Gorbachev's reforms accelerated and exposed the underlying fissures in society, a breakdown that by 1990-91 emboldened elements in Ukraine, both within the local party leadership and the general population, to push for independence. By the summer of 1991 two factors, the spread of the popular movement Rukh (centered largely in western Ukraine and Kiev), and the decision of the Ukrainian Communist Party under Leonid Kravchuk to break with Moscow, took Ukraine to the edge of independence. Still, it was not until the so-called 'August coup' by Moscow conservatives against Gorbachev – a coup that was forcibly put down due to the emergence of the new Russian leader Boris Yeltsin – that Ukrainian leaders were emboldened to act. On August 24, three days after the suppression of the coup, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence by a vote of 346 to one. Three months later, on December 1, a national referendum secured a huge majority in favor of the newborn state.

Ukraine was born.

Questions and Issues

- How did the Soviet Union affect Ukraine and the lives of ordinary Ukrainians during the 1930s and beyond?

- What was the status of Western Ukraine during the 1920s and 1930s?
- What factors contributed to the emergence of independent Ukraine in 1991?

Suggested Reading

Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow (1986). The definitive examination of the Great Famine by a noted scholar. Includes a searing indictment of Western indifference to Ukraine in the 1930s.

On the period leading up to independence, there is Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (1994)

Politics in Ukraine

What a difference two years can make. In December 2004 – for 17 days before a transfixed, worldwide television audience -- the Ukrainian people literally stood up in Kyiv and other major cities to demand an end to corruption and bad governance, helping to initiate a wild series of events that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. To everyone's amazement, including experts on Ukraine, almost none of whom foresaw the political zigs and zags, the people succeeded: by 2005 the old regime was gone, a new pro-western government was in power, and Ukraine seemed set to join humanity at the dawn of the 21st century, a time of global promise and integration.

Fast forward to late 2006. The Orange Coalition – the alliance of parties and political factions in support of the Orange Revolution – has collapsed. Viktor Yanukovych, the defeated presidential candidate in 2004, has miraculously re-emerged to become the new Prime Minister under President Yushchenko. Furthermore, Yanukovych's comeback has the blessings of the people,

as his party (the Party of the Regions) received a plurality of votes in the March 2006 parliamentary elections, deemed to be the freest and fairest in Ukrainian history. And, to add insult to injury (at least from the perspective of 2004 and the Orange Revolution), the Communist Party now controls several key ministries in the Yanukovych government.

Two questions must be asked: What happened to change the political landscape so radically from 2004-2006, and where is Ukraine in all likelihood headed now?

The first question – what happened? – is easier to answer if for no other reason than hindsights offers the analyst a clear advantage. Many points surface, but three stand out:

- The ideopogical fallout between the leaders of the Orange Revolution in the first year of the Yushchenko Presidency;
- Yushchenko's personal shortcomings as a leader;
- The regional divide from East to West, a divide that reasserted itself in 2006 and became the dominant motif in the parliamentary elections.

The fallout within the upper eshelons of the Orange Coalition should have been apparent almost from the beginning. In truth the Orange Coalition was a tactical alliance between key groups across the ideological spectrum, united mainly if not exclusively by a hatred of corruption and former President Leonid Kuchma. Once Kuchma was gone, the underlying differences between Yushchenko – an economist who favored free market solutions – and his Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko – a populist with socialist leanings – became clear. As a result, within a year Tymoshenko was fired and the anchor of the Orange Coalition – the crowd pleasing appeal of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko in December 2004 – imploded. In effect, then, the top leadership canabalized itself.

In addition to the leadership fallout, President Yushchenko himself failed to govern effectively. Presented with a golden opportunity in early 2005 to steer Ukraine in a different direction, Yushchenko hesitated, preferring throughout much of the year to travel to the West to receive acclaim and recognition. Within Yushchenko's governing circle friction emerged between key advisors, with further delays in enacting the President's program. And, finally, Yushchenko often appeared disconnected from public affairs, seemingly content to dabble in hobbies and personal pursuits.

Personality differences and leadership foibles, however, do not sum up the declining fortunes of the Orange Coalition. Although Yanukovych lost the final presidential election of 2004, the margin of Yushchenko's victory was relatively small – about 51 to 48%. That in turn reflected the cohesiveness of the Yanukovych's political base in eastern and southern Ukraine, home to Ukraine's largest cities (except for Kyiv itself) and home to a large Russian minority with close ties to its easterly neighbor. Quarrels within Yushchenko's entourage as well as the President's inconsistent leadership presented Yanukovych and his followers with a golden comeback opportunity.

By 2006, with little to show for his Presidency, Yushchenko was in trouble, which surfaced in the form of a bitter defeat for his party in the parliamentary elections. Unwilling to reconcile with Tymoshenko, his original ally from the Orange Revolution,

Yushchenko offered the Prime Ministry to Yanukovych, to the disgust of many stalwart supporters of the beleaguered President but a short time earlier. By fall 2006, the improbable combination of Yushchenko and Yanukovych – bitter enemies during the Orange Revolution – was a fact.

Where does this leave Ukraine now and what are its prospects? First of all, it must be admitted that Yanukovych's victory suggests that Ukraine isn't so orange after all. It is at least arguable that the West, which bet heavily on Yushchenko, misread the nature of the Orange Revolution. For while 2004 did indeed mobilize millions with hopes for a new Ukraine, it was not, as often said, only a democratic awakening. Rather, it could be portrayed as the latest chapter in a contest for power within an elite circle that has misgoverned Ukraine since independence in 1991.

That explanation may account for the deep disillusionment of many Ukrainians for the inability of Yushchenko to root out corruption which pervades the government at all levels. Recall that one of the main reasons for the Orange Revolution was popular disgust with a political system that was wide open to bribery along with personal abuse and misuse of power.

Even if this interpretation is wrong – if, for example, Yushchenko sincerely wished to change the underlying ethos of government, but failed for personal reasons – other facts remain, with potentially serious policy implications for Ukraine and the West. First, Yushchenko's power has been diminished by constitutional reforms enacted in January 2006 that augmented the powers of the prime minister. In effect Ukraine is now a presidential-parliamentary system, with considerable leverage in the hands of the legislature and the ministers, many of whom answer directly to the legislature.

Secondly, the collapse of the Orange coalition along with the appointment of Yanukovych as Prime Minister means that Ukraine's westward movement will be slowed, if not arrested altogether. It means that neighboring states, such as Georgia and Moldova, could find it harder to continue their westward courses since Ukraine – a big state that straddles a large geographical expanse – may not be able to offer much meaningful support. It means that Poland, which championed Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and played a key role in the Orange Revolution, is unsure of its eastern neighbor and hesitant to offer advice.

Finally, it means that Russia will be encouraged to step up its pressure on Ukraine, whether it be in Crimea, with a Russian majority and the Black Sea fleet, or with energy supplies, for which Ukraine is completely vulnerable. Some of this has already happened, as in January 2006 when Russia momentarily shut off gas supplies to Ukraine while claiming that Kyiv was siphoning gas transit deliveries to Europe. And although Russia soon backed down in the face of western outrage over what was perceived as political blackmail by Moscow, the point is clear: Putin is using, and will continue to use, energy exports to enhance Russia's international clout. The fact that Ukraine, with its many ties to Russia, ties that include language, religion, culture, and ethnic identities, currently is led by a Prime Minister with pro-Russian sympathies, disturbs many people both in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe and beyond.

The unraveling of the Orange Revolution against a backdrop of rising Russian assertiveness pose deep challenges for the West, and especially for the United States. In 2004, America championed the Orange Revolution, so much so that Moscow, angered by the turn of events in Kyiv, portrayed the Revolution as an "American plot" to weaken Russian influence across the East European expanse. By 2006 the momentum for Ukraine's integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO and the EU, has slowed substantially, in part because of fatigue within Europe over the breath-taking expansion of the EU in recent years. In the end, three related questions remain whose answers could go a long way in determining the strength and stability of Europe and the West:

1. Can Ukraine resurrect a coherent agenda of political and military reform or is the Yanukovych government destined to be but the harbinger of deeper splits and fissures within the country, with potentially disastrous consequences for the people?
2. Assuming a resumption of reform, can Ukraine convince an otherwise skeptical West to take it seriously, or are major western countries (i.e., France, Germany) so transfixed by their own energy security needs that they no longer care about Ukraine (or other former republics within the Soviet Union for that matter)?
3. Can the United States somehow convince European skeptics that Ukraine's integration within the Euro-Atlantic institutions is important enough to be kept on the agenda, while telling Kyiv that it must continue to move forward or risk all?

<u>Questions and Issues</u>

- Why did the Orange Revolution go astray within two years?
- What are the principal consequences of the unraveling of the Orange Revolution?
- What challenges does this story present for Washington and for American policymakers?

America and Ukraine

Delivering remarks with Bennett Middle School Students President Leonid Kuchma, on signing a Ukraine-United States Joint Statement in Kiev, Ukraine June 5, 2000

Ukraine's importance for the United States derives from multiple factors: its size (the largest European country, excluding Russia); its strategic location, between a rapidly expanding European Union to the West and an increasingly authoritarian Russia to the East; its natural resources and function as a supplier of energy to countries of the EU; and the impact of Ukraine's domestic development on Russia's stability and democratic future.

Despite the evident importance of Ukraine for the United States, Washington was slow to react to Ukraine's independence in 1991 and thereafter. Only in 1994, with the signing of Trilateral Agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States – an agreement in which Ukraine gave up all its nuclear weapons in return for assistance on cleaning up Chornobyl – did things change for the better. The amount of US assistance to Ukraine since Ukraine's independence now totals above $3 billion.

From 1994-2000, American-Ukrainian relations improved dramatically and decisively. Bilateral cooperation ranged over a number of areas, including agriculture, defense conversion, energy, culture, science, and technology. Particularly impressive was the exchange of scientists and scholars in numerous fields as well as the opportunity for hundreds of Ukrainian students and teachers at all levels to travel to the United States and learn of American life and institutions face to face.

This pleasant interlude ended abruptly in 2000 when Heorhiy Gongadze, an independent, internet journalist, was murdered, allegedly on orders from top government officials, including President Kuchma. By 2001, the Kuchma regime, in its second term in office following re-election in 1999, had become an international pariah. Significantly, that development coincided with 9/11 and the warming of relations between Washington and Moscow, as Russian President Vladimir Putin rushed to offer assistance in the American-led war on Islamic extremism in the aftermath of the devastation of the Twin Towers in New York. For the next three years, from 2000-2003, relations between Kyiv and Washington froze, with little contact between high-ranking officials, although non-governmental assistance continued during this period.

Only in 2003, with the American attack on Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the offer by Kuchma of military and logistical assistance for that attack, did relations improve somewhat. President Bush was duly appreciative of Kyiv's support although, as 2004 dawned, words of praise from Washington were coupled with admonitions to Ukraine to assure free and fair elections for Kuchma's successor. In other words, the entire American-Ukrainian relationship was increasingly enclosed in a complex web of domestic and international events that made any simple characterization difficult if not impossible. On the one hand, clearly Washington's interest lay in Ukraine's emergence as a democratic state through a transparent presidential election, interest expressed by a steady stream of official visitors from America to Kyiv as 2004 unfolded. On the other hand, while welcomed, Kuchma's involvement in Iraq was perceived by many in the West and in Washington as an effort to buy time for his regime and to downplay criticism of possible fraud as the elections approached.

Whatever problems existed across 2004 evaporated in the drama of the presidential election at the end of the year. By the end of 2004, what had seemed unthinkable only weeks before – a post-Kuchma era dominated by democrats and leaders of progressive society – had transpired, due to the incredible surge of popular support for Yushchenko along with the outpouring of international acclaim for the new regime. The American role in that fast-paced drama was symbolized by Colin Powell, the outgoing American Secretary of State during the first Bush Administration, who roundly condemned the fraudulent results of the November 21 vote in which Yanukovych, the pro-Kuchma successor, won. His condemnation, along with the refusal of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in central Kyiv to end their protests, helped set the stage for the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court to overturn the November 21 vote and to call for a revote on December 26 that led directly to Yushchenko's election as President.

After the Orange Revolution, the US turned to Ukraine with praise and support. During President Bush's second inaugural speech in January 2005, Bush specifically praised Yushchenko for his victory in late December, coupling that praise with a commitment to freedom and democracy everywhere as the best guarantee of American security and stability. Scarcely a month later those words were given concrete meaning by a request from the Bush administration to the American Congress for a $60 million dollar supplement for Ukraine to assist in the development of civil society and a free market. By the end of February, Bush and Yushchenko had met during the visit of the American President to Europe and the White House had extended an invitation to Yushchenko to come to Washington in April for talks on how to broaden the new dialogue and exchange.

The US believes that Ukraine's independence is still threatened by Russia, as evidenced by Russia shutting off gas to Ukraine in early January 2006. America thus would like to help Ukraine in its aspirations to become a NATO member, and later, and EU member. To help with such goals, the Millennium Challenge Corporation pledged $45 million in June 2006 to help fight corruption (problems with combating public corruption disqualify Ukraine from receiving even more aid from the MCC). Additionally, US AID recently signed agreements working to support the rule of law in Ukraine through reforms and increasing transparency in the government. The US and Ukrainian governments have also signed agreements in the business and energy sectors, pledging reforms and improvements.

In the months since the elections, the country's dreams of continuing the Orange Revolution legacy have faded considerably. Supporters of the Revolution were disappointed by the appointment of business tycoons to Yushchenko's administration, despite his promises to separate business from politics. In the March 2006 parliamentary elections, no party won an overall majority, but the opposition Party of the Regions won a majority of seats. Following this turmoil, the Socialist party broke from its membership of the Orange Coalition, and formed a coalition with the Party of the Regions. The new coalition demands Yanukovych as prime minister, which would severely limit Yushchenko's power as president. Meanwhile, Yulia Tymoshenko calls for dissolving the parliament and holding new elections.

The current political situation in Ukraine is extremely fluid, with protesters again gathering on the Maidan, this time not to protest elections, but to protest the seeming dissolution of the government. With such an unstable government, at times it seems as though "Ukrainian fatigue" is setting in, as hopes for an effective democratic regime slip away. The political turmoil in Ukraine greatly affects the positive relationship that was growing between the US and Ukraine, and it is difficult to predict what will happen next.

Questions:

- Why is Ukraine important to the US?
- What was the importance of the 2004 elections to the US?

Ukraine and the EU

With the election of Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine has embarked on a new period in its history, one fraught with promise and peril. The promise is to build a stronger country through political, economic and social reform and to draw Ukraine into a closer relationship with Europe and the West. The peril is to squander the support of the population through half-hearted or mismanaged reform and continued corruption, thus aborting Ukraine's brightest moment since independence in 1991.

For Yushchenko, the most important long-term international goal is EU membership that will facilitate and strengthen Ukrainian democracy, civil society and a market economy. There are signs in early 2005 that this goal may take fruit, although historically the EU has shown scant interest in Ukraine. Indeed, under Kuchma, Ukraine regularly petitioned the EU to recognize it as a potential candidate for membership, only to be told that the petition was unacceptable. In part the traditional EU attitude reflected the difficulty facing the EU in digesting ten new Central and East European countries as well as in trying to decide what to do with Turkey's appeal for membership. In part, however, EU reluctance also drew on the belief of several key countries that Ukraine was in Russia's sphere of influence, and should remain so, rather than facing the formidable prospect of integrating a large, poor, and badly governed country.

That attitude began to shift in December 2004, when the EU sent Javier Solana, its foreign minister designate, to mediate the political crisis in Kyiv in the midst of the popular uprising. Other prominent EU figures were drawn in when Solana was accompanied by the

Polish President, Alexander Kwasniewski, and his Lithuanian counterpart, Valdas Adamkus. At the same time Lech Walesa, the hero of Polish Solidarity in the 1980s, traveled to Kyiv to speak on Independence Square, center of the Orange Revolution. And, following the vote on December 26 that brought Yushchenko to power, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly for a resolution that asked Ukraine to be granted a "clear European perspective, possible leading to EU membership." And although the resolution was nonbonding, it was, in the words of the prestigious Financial Times the best indication to date that "the EU's door is open."

By the end of January other developments were in the works. The EU was moving forward with a comprehensive package of measure to add substance to the stated desire for cooperation – the so-called EU-Ukraine Action Plan. This plan, as Solana noted in an article in the Weekly Mirror, foreshadows a "qualitatively new phase in our relationship." It holds out the prospect for Ukraine of complete access to EU's single market – the world's largest of prosperous economies and affluent consumers. In addition to Solana, a key EU official, Ukraine retains the active support of Poland and Lithuania in its bid to join the EU and NATO. Thus, in April of this year, the Polish president promised to back Yushchenko's efforts to have the EU soften its visa rules for Ukrainian scientists, medical personnel, and students.

In the end, and despite these hopeful beginnings, it will not be easy and the best that can be said about EU integration is that it is a long term objective. Ukraine is a large country with huge pockets of poverty and low wages, characteristics that make entry into the common market problematical. Poland's Kwasniewski, Yushchenko's most outspoken supporter, thinks that within 15 years Ukraine will be part of the EU. Pessimists and skeptics may feel vindicated, but if Yushchenko's energy and determination are any indication, history may yet prove them wrong, as it did in 2004, when against all odds and predictions, the Ukrainian people stood up and voted for democracy and for the right to reclaim their European heritage.

Energy Issues

When Russia shut off its gas supply to Ukraine in early January 2006, in the midst of a harsh winter, the world held its breath. Was Russia asserting its power, threatening Ukraine and the rest of Western Europe with discontinuing its gas supplies?

Russia was indeed trying to show its force and status on the world stage, although it denies such allegations. However, this was not the first time Russia has played the "petro-politics" game: it enforced similar tactics in the 1990s with the Baltic States, reduced gas

supplies to Ukraine in 1993 and 1994, in 2004 in Belarus, and stopped the flow of crude oil to Lithuania nine times between 1998 and 2000. Russian-owned Gazprom is known for its monopoly of Central Asian gas, creating major profits for Russia, and causing European consumers to worry about the dependability and security of their energy imports. When questioned about the incident during an online chat on the BBC's website, Russian president Putin denied any political motives. He stated that Russia will no longer give away its resources for peanuts, claiming that for fifteen years Russia sold gas under market prices and helped out its neighbors, but that now Russia must move to market principles.

Others suggest that one of Russia's motives was to express its unhappiness with President Yushchenko. In the 2004 elections, Russia supported Yanukovich, the losing candidate, and distrusts Yushchenko's policies of moving toward the West. Russia demanded a rewriting of the 2004 gas agreements, which are widely thought to have been written to aid Yanukovich's presidential hopes.

The demand for Ukraine to pay "world market prices" was settled in a manner no more transparent than in the past. Instead of submitting the case to international arbitration, the two countries settled it themselves. Five to six agreements signed in January 2006 by Russia and Ukraine remain private, and all Russian gas sent through Ukraine is contracted by RosUkrEnergo, widely considered to be a nontransparent company.

Ukraine's consumption of natural gas has increased since 1992, and it now accounts for over half of the total energy usage in Ukraine. There have been efforts to reform this sector, including a bill passed in 2001 encouraging alternative energy sector development through tax rebates, and the country is a member of the Methane to Markets Initiative, which pledges to reduce methane emissions. In July 2006, US AID launched a $1 million campaign called US AID Ukraine Energy Efficiency Initiative Program, aimed at saving amounts of natural gas and to serve as a model for other businesses to emulate. As the December gas shut-off incident showed, there is still a lot of work to be done in this sector.

Ukraine is also the nexus of oil transit networks in the region: in 2005, Ukraine fed 67 percent of oil from Russia into the European oil market. However, the oil sector in Ukraine still reeks of corruption. Corrupt oligarchs still control gas deliveries from Russia and even domestic fields. Two-thirds of Ukraine's refineries were owned by Russian companies when Yushchenko came to power, and close to one hundred percent of the refined product that Ukraine exports is produced in Russian-owned companies. Russia completed a pipeline in 2001 that allows the oil to bypass Ukraine, effectively decreasing Ukraine's handling of its oil by 30 percent. Yushchenko has not made much progress in developing a system of fair investment, especially toward inviting Western investment, which means that the country remains dependent on Russia.

The *Oil and Gas Journal* reports that Ukraine has 395 million barrels of proven oil reserves, but Ukraine's refineries are working well below capacity, and thus the country is highly dependent on imported oil, primarily from Russia, secondarily from Kazakhstan. Ukraine would like to be a transit center for Central Asian oil by means of the Odessa-Brody pipeline and feasibility reports are being conducted currently.

Ukraine also remains dependent on coal, albeit less so than in 1992, as shown in the graph. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2003 Ukraine produced 63.5 million short tons of coal, but consumed 67 million short tons, making the country a net coal importer, despite their vast coal reserves. The coal industry continues to face woes: until the end of 2002, the coal industry was heavily subsidized, and over half of the mines were operating at a loss. Privatization efforts have been proceeding since 2003 at a slow rate. Additionally, 4,300 deaths since 1991 have been reported in the mines, making Ukraine's mines among the most dangerous worldwide. Since 1997, the World Bank has given over 300 million to help with restructuring Ukraine's coal sector.

Fig. 5: Components of Energy Consumption in Ukraine



In terms of electricity, the EIA reports that Ukraine's power sector is the twelfth-largest in the world in terms of installed capacity, which is at 54 gigawatts. Generation and consumption fell steadily after 1991, but have been trending upward since 2000. Ukraine could produce more than twice its energy needs, but problems with infrastructure and maintenance prevent it from doing so. The country has begun improvements through privatization efforts, the completion of two new nuclear plants, and more efficient usage procedures at other plants. In 2004, Ukraine exported 5.14 billion kilowatts to other countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Ukraine is set to have its entire electricity grid integrated into the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Energy (UCTE) by 2008.

After the gas shut-off crisis in January 2006, the world realized just how important Ukraine's role in providing and processing energy is. Because the energy sector in Ukraine is unstable and in need of much improvement, the world will continue to watch and assist the situation there.

Sources for further study:
US Energy Information Administration website on Ukraine: contains information about all energy sectors and is updated often.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Ukraine/Background.html

The Economy

A visit to Kyiv in 2006 is mind-boggling for anyone who has not seen Ukraine for the past decade. Even four years ago, for example, building cranes were conspicuous by the absence on the Kyiv skyline – today they dot the horizon and the air is heavy with the whirl of lifting gears and shouts from workers high overhead. Kyiv is in the midst of a building boom than shows no signs of slowing, let alone aborting. And not only in the city center – where retail shops and new businesses sprout almost daily – but along the periphery as well, where new homes arise like magic, testimony to the emergence of a new middle class, eager to buy and own property.

Now in its fifth year, the building boom is not the only sign that Ukraine's economy is taking off. Far from it. New cars flood the streets – expensive new SUVS and foreign imports – and drivers search endlessly for parking places, finally giving up and pulling onto the sidewalks already overflowing with impatient and well dressed consumers. Along the city's main boulevards, shoppers crowd into new department stores and retail shops, determined to spend their salaries and wages which have risen significantly since 2000. Indeed, aside from industrial manufacturing, it is consumer spending that is powering the economic surge, with consumer credit up by 75 per cent to date in 2006 alone.

All of this traces back to 2000, when President Yushchenko, then the Prime Minister under former President Kuchma, reformed the state finances and increased pension payments, helping to jumpstart an economy that until that point had been dead in the

water since Ukraine's independence in 1991. Those reforms generally are credited with providing the initial impetus for Ukraine's expansion AND for Yushchenko's political popularity that fueled his drive for the Presidency and victory during the Orange Revolution of 2004.

From 2000 the Ukrainian economy has grown at impressive rates and shows little sign of stopping. Kyiv is not the only recipient of the advance, although by far the most impressive to date. Other cities – Khar'kiv, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, L'viv, to mention four – also have benefitted. As a result, for the first time since 1991, international investors are beginning to take note: foreign direct investment has skyrocketed since 2004 to $10 billion in 2005-2006, a figure equal in value to the cumulative total for the 14 prior years. True enough, as some might hasten to point out, Ukraine still lags woefully behind Poland and other East European countries when it comes to foreign direct investment, but the upward movement in remarkable, given the rate of increase and the potential for continuing investment targets.

Another sign of economic dynamism lies with the banking sector. This sector has seen a flurry of activity over the past eighteen months, as European banks have rushed in to acquire some of Ukraine's largest financial assets. Granted, the risks remain due to the absence of a credit control and accounting system on a level with the West. But the explosion of mergers and acquisitions is likely to continue as many European banks see Ukraine as a major source of growth. As a result, many key bankers predict that half of Ukraine's banks could come under control of European partners and holders by 2008, scarcely thirteen months away as of this writing.

None of the above suggests that Ukraine is home free when it comes to the economy. Big problems remain, foremost among them Ukraine's energy dependency on Russia (see above for additional analysis of Ukraine's energy problem). Agriculture lags, principally because many politicians refuse to sanction full property ownership in the countryside, a searing tribute to the Soviet legacy and to distrust of potential foreign ownership of Ukraine's fertile farmland.

Corruption also remains, with a handful of incredibly rich men who lined their pockets at everyone else's expense – and it is no accident that Ukraine has been dubbed an "oligarchical" economy par excellence. If outside investment is to continue, Ukraine must restructure its business system to reduce corruption and promote transparent business practices. There is no middle way now.

The latter point – the persistence of the oligarchs and their control of a corrupt economy – raises the final consideration here. Not long ago Ukraine's richest man, Rinat Akhmetov of Donetsk, said that Ukraine's economic future lay with the West, with European and North American markets and investors. Akhmetov is not alone in this sentiment, and the logic of this belief is that reform must come – big reform of Ukraine's convoluted business structures and underlying corruption – if he and others are serious. In other words, if Ukraine's oligarchs wish to continue their success, they are going to have to clean up their act, to put it simply. Otherwise they will be turned back and defeated by a lack of investment and of markets. They will have to retreat to the East, to Russia where

similar traditions of corruption and non-transparency exist, and where the future is also highly problematical. Do they fully realize this?

Thus, by the deepest of ironies, it may very well be that Ukraine's economic reforms and its economic future now rest in this hands of the very group that to date has stolen the lion's share of the national treasure. Can a generation of Ukrainian Rockefellers, Carnegies, and Kennedys be in the wings? Can Akhmetov rise above his natural instinct to make money through cronies and by underhanded means? These are questions worth pondering.

Ukrainian Reform Agenda

Arguably, legal reform is the most pressing challenge facing Ukraine today. Without a just legal system, capitalism gives way to black markets and bribes, and attempts to gain justice get stymied by vacant courts and political agendas. From 2001 to 2002, small legal reforms took place on an incremental basis, but there were still not many programs in place. In the 2004 elections, the Yushchenko team placed reform high on its campaign platform. This created a wave of excitement in Ukraine because it meant that a politician finally had the political will to undertake the reforms so necessary toward inviting further foreign investment and moving toward entry to NATO and the European Union. After Yushchenko's victory, the country assumed reforms would be rolling along at a rapid pace. Unfortunately this has largely not been the case, leaving many feeling disappointed in the administration's progress. Some claim that the failure of the Yushchenko government has been its unfulfilled promises. Changes are finally on the government's agenda, although they have been slowed by the continuing political tumult.

The most notable push for reforms is taking place in the judicial realm, because ensuring justice is seen as critical in a civil society. At present, the public holds the judiciary in low regard, deigning the sector corrupt and disputing their judgments. In 2005, the American Bar Association together with Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) conducted a comprehensive judicial reform survey. The ABA CEELI Judicial Reform Index for Ukraine shows Ukraine scoring positively on just four out of thirty categories relating to judicial reform. Some of the group's biggest concerns were in relation to judicial independence: improper influence on decisions by outside sources, lack of respect for judiciary decisions, lack of timely and proper enforcement of judgments, and opportunities for judges to be corrupted throughout their terms. The Criminal Code was established in 1960 and has just been amended since then, providing for a very unbalanced code. The Index found that the courts have overwhelming caseloads, but lack sufficient amount of judges to handle them.

Clearly, there is a lot of work to be done. The Yushchenko government recognizes this, and in May 2005, President Yushchenko established a Commission for Judicial Reform,

charged with developing reform proposals by the end of 2005. Curiously, this commission did not include any active judges, and only 4 out of the 40 participants were retired judges. To some, this meant that the people who knew best about what to reform were excluded from the process, as well as their opinions. The Commission developed a Concept plan outlining various judicial reforms. Critics denigrate the Concept as being very broad and theoretical; active judges complain that its ideas lack feasibility.

In May 2006, the President signed the Plan of Action established by the Commission for Judicial Reform. The Plan of Action covers a variety of reforms in addition to judicial reforms, but the courts were similarly not consulted concerning the Plan of Action. The Plan of Action calls for improving the judiciary system so that its procedure is on par of that of the European courts, which means that it needs to undertake a variety of measures, such as improving staff by creating a transparent selection process and requiring continuing education-type of courses judges, increase salaries and space, ensure adherence to the judicial oath, and keeping a register of all cases that is accessible to the public. There are many other measures outlined in the Plan of Action, including creating higher courts of civil and general jurisdiction and improving case distribution and workload, and all of these ideas require funding and commitment. Getting things moving beyond the paper is another task altogether, one which has been stunted by the lack of a Supreme Court Chairman, and because the Constitutional Court has not operated since October 2005 due to political reasons, leaving outside groups to claim that justice is being held hostage to political interests.

Outside of legal reform, other reforms such as tax, land, and religious reforms have also moved slowly. In 2001, Ukraine instituted changes to its tax code that lower corporate tax rates, decrease exemptions, and consolidate five income tax brackets into two. The new First Deputy Premier Mykola Azarov has recently stated that his goal is to start tax reform in 2007, and that taxes will soon be cut and import tariffs restored. Land reform has further privatized Ukrainian lands and provided for market-based agricultural financing. Reform of religious legislation has been instituted to guarantee the wide freedoms granted under the 1996 constitution and has proven successful.

Outside agencies have been helping to spur reform ever since Ukraine's independence. Most recently, US AID and the Ministry of Justice created a program to Combat Corruption and Strengthen the Rule of Law in June 2006, which means that both governments will be actively involved in planning and implementing activities to combat problems in Ukraine. Additionally instrumental in aiding reform has been the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which approved a $45 million initiative to reduce corruption, strengthen the judiciary system, and improve governmental and administrative standards and regulations in Ukraine. The Corporation considers Ukraine a threshold country, which means that if Ukraine decreases the amount of corruption in the country, it may be eligible for more aid from the MCC. The US government also awarded a contract to Chemonics International in June 2006 to promote a rule-of-law program.

Despite this assistance, legal reform must ultimately be achieved by the Ukrainians themselves. Outside assistance can suggest language or specific reforms, but adopting—and, more importantly, implementing these reforms is a challenge unto itself. Legislators and legal enforcers need more than new laws alone: they need to understand

how these new laws work and the *ethics* that lies behind effective legal administration. The foundations for legal reform have been spelled out in the Concept and Plan of Action, and the next step is to establish a clear way to fulfill these goals and bypass the corruption that so often impedes change.

Corruption

Ukraine's pervasive corruption is a disease with the potential to destroy business, political, and educational interests and values. As of October 2005, Transparency International has placed the country 107th out of 159 countries—last place being the most corrupt—with a corruption score of 2.6 on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning completely corrupt. Bribes and payoffs plague the government, business sectors, and higher education, while arbitrary rules, censorship, and even murder restrict Ukrainian media. In a country struggling to assert itself into the international sphere, corruption often holds Ukraine back.

Transparency International's Corruption Percentage Index

Year	CPI	Ranking
2005	2.6	107/158
2004	2.2	122/145
2003	2.3	106/133
2002	2.4	85/102
2001	2.1	83/91
2000	1.5	87/90

The roots of corruption in Ukraine extend beyond the Soviet Era. Under the Russian empire corrupt practices became widespread, and the Soviet experience—typified by shortages, oligarchs, and few rubles to go around—only increased and solidified these practices. Over time, corruption became ingrained into local culture until bribery and dishonesty became taken for granted and viewed as the best and most efficient way to get things done. Indeed, in a system rampant with corruption, honesty and transparency often are i prompting one to wonder whether Ukraine's culture of corruption can ever be overcome. Current economic hardships and a lingering Soviet-instituted oligarchy have, if anything, made the problem worse today, paving the way for corruption in business, politics, media, and education.

Complicated and contradictory rules are the highest hurdle for businesses in Ukraine, difficulties that encourage payoffs to obtain business permits and evade taxes. Organized criminal groups often buy assistance from Ukrainian law-enforcement officials and bribe members of parliament to avoid financial disclosure. These circumstances lead to a widespread lack of transparency and disincentives for international investment.

Corruption in the political sphere is not limited to law-enforcement officers and members of parliament accepting bribes. Ukraine's legal system lacks a reliable and adhered to judicial code of ethics, creating a system with a suspiciously high conviction rate where prosecutors have more influence than defense attorneys. Corruption also plagues elections: questionable media tactics skewed the 2002 parliamentary elections and critics charge both media and poisoning as rendering the 2004 presidential elections undemocratic. The new Plan of Action and its goal of reforming the judiciary is heartening, but only if the promised reforms take place.

Government regulations heavily constrain Ukrainian media. Most news and media sources adhere to these regulations, as deviance is heavily punished. The most brutal example of such punishment was the 2000 murder and beheading of Heorhiy Gongadze, a

journalist outspokenly critical of government corruption. Although Ukrainian President Kuchma denied any affiliation with the affair, subsequent evidence pointed directly back to him. In this way, the government controls much of the media, all but eliminating any reports of corruption and preventing media coverage advantageous to opposition groups.

The most discouraging sector for corruption, however, is Ukraine's universities, where the next generation is forming habits that will mold the future of the country. Corruption is rampant in institutions of higher learning, where students bribe entrance officials and professors on a regular basis, and Ukrainian students have the legal right to re-take any test, leading to widespread cheating. Although corruption varies among universities in Ukraine, the standards of integrity many graduates will meet if seeking further study or employment in the West are not only missing, but misunderstood.

Some argue that the culture of corruption plaguing Ukraine is unshakable while others contend that changes to exact improvement can be made. Through straightforward, enforced legislation, serious consequences for corrupt government officials, reduction of media regulations, and higher, strongly enforced standards in schools, Ukraine can make a turnaround. Yet with decades of corruption, little help for media, and a culture of corruption characteristic even in the young, the country's prospects for breaking free look grim. To break free from corruption, some Ukrainians and international investors are opting to break free from Ukraine.

Ukraine's Cultural Rebirth:
The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

No institution symbolizes Ukraine's culture renaissance more vividly than the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Founded in 1632 by the reform-minded orthodox clergyman of Kyiv, Petro Mohyla, the Academy quickly became a leading educational center throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for scholars and churchmen from across Eastern Europe. Unfortunately that happy state of affairs did not last because by the early nineteenth century, Mohyla's doors were closed forcibly because of Russia's concern that culturally conscious Ukrainians might destabilize the tsarist empire.

Mohyla's doors remained shut under tsar and commissar – from 1817 to 1992 – when, like Ukraine itself, that is rather unexpectedly, the doors reopened and a new Academy emerged. One dedicated to the aims of its founder 360 years earlier: progressive education for Ukrainian young people, but this time with a secular twist.

The founder of the new Academy – and over a decade later its President – was a leader of Rukh, the coalition of democratically minded Ukrainian nationalists formed in 1989 to oppose communist rule. Vyacheslav Brioukhovetsky, and colleagues around him, saw the reestablishment of the once famous academy as their contribution to Ukraine's rebirth. From its reincarnation the school – renamed the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy – was determined to uproot the system of nepotism and corruption that has plagued Ukraine in general and education in particular. The cutting edge of this broadside attack is the entrance exam that is graded anonymously at Mohyla. Today, Mohyla takes justifiable pride in being recognized across Ukraine as one of the very few educational institutions where admissions standards are based solely on a student's ability, rather than on cash or connections.

A second distinguishing feature of the Academy is its relationship to what might be termed the "outside world." At Mohyla, the doors are wide open to Western educators. More Fulbright lecturers by far have taught at Mohyla than at any other Ukrainian university. One reason that Western educators (and not only Fulbright professors) are welcomed is that by official policy all students at Mohyla are proficient in English, one of two instructional languages, the other being Ukrainian. However, in addition, the faculty and students eagerly seek out western opportunities and contacts. And they are encouraged to do so by the administration and their peers. Mohyla's faculty regularly pull down Fulbright grants for research and/or teaching in the United States. Others journey to Germany or England under the auspices of similar programs for the same purpose.

Mohyla's existence throws into sharp relief several aspects of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian higher education. To begin with the most general, it reflects the proliferation of new schools at all levels and the diversification of higher education since the Soviet Union. By 2000, private universities and institutes comprised twenty percent of the student population. In one sense, the diversification of higher education reflects the realization of many parents and students that the old curriculum imparts skills and attitudes inherited from a highly centralized planning system ill adapted to the new economy and to conditions in the global age.

Diversification also mirrors a critical and often overlooked aspect of Ukraine's transformation during the first post-communist years: the emergence of an entrepreneurial mentality, and not only in business, that is risk prone in support of an idea or vision, in this instance in education. Dozens, perhaps hundreds of men and women across the education spectrum, from the ground floor up, have cast their fate and reputations with creation of bold, new educational ventures and enterprises. To that extent one can speak of the existence of an entrepreneurial drive that has gone unmeasured in the literature on educational reform and merits a fuller study.

Mohyla's success in promoting a progressive curriculum and in attracting western assistance also underscores the necessary ingredients of a reform agenda, whether in higher

education or beyond. To put it simply, reform lasted and deepened at Mohyla because it was there to begin with, in the stated mission of the University and the philosophy of its founding president. Reform will outlast Briukhovetsky because it is bigger than any single individual or, in this instance, any group of individuals. It IS the University. Seen from this perspective, western assistance to Mohyla works because it facilitates local actors.

At the same time, the key question for Mohyla – and for other reform minded ventures and initiatives (whether in education or public policy or business) – is sustainability. Kyiv-Mohyla is not a rich institution, although compared to many Ukrainian universities, it is relatively well off. Certain departments, such as the graduate level economics program, are generously endowed from without (Eurasia Foundation). But what happens when the Foundation pulls out? When the spigot is turned off? This is the challenge facing entrepreneurs and reformers across the spectrum in Ukraine.

Finally, Mohyla's success story – including the challenge of sustaining the progressive momentum embodied in the University – points to an overwhelming need if schools at every level are to go forward in Ukraine. And that is the imperative of carrying institutional change into the heart of Ukrainian education, which is the pedagogical university where a new generation of teachers is being trained. The battle for the future of Ukrainian learning and culture is being fought and will be won or lost in the main pedagogical universities. That is where thousands of new teachers are being trained, teachers who will fan out across a vast land to classrooms in the 20,000 plus schools. For Ukraine to prosper in the 21st century, these universities will have to follow Mohyla's example and encourage active learning, creative thinking, and a new curricula. It can be done, as Mohyla and Ukraine's cultural history strongly suggests.

Religion in Ukraine

Stories of religion in Ukraine are stories of solidarity and rivalry, characteristics of a state struggling with identity and religious freedom. Although some Ukrainians see a national religion as central to national identity, current constitutional standards prohibit state acknowledgement of any national religion—and rightly so. While Ukraine's constitution grants commendable rights for religious freedom, the struggle between this freedom and religion-based national identity has put the state in a relative quandary, a quandary exhibited in part by clashes between adherents of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In July of 1995, a controversy arose over the burial place of Patriarch Volodymyr, a Patriarch under the Kiev branch of the Church. His followers felt he should be buried in St. Sophia's

Cathedral, but adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate forbade such a burial for an apostate priest and called out the Kievan police for support. The clash left Patriarch Volodymyr's coffin buried under the sidewalk just outside the cathedral and members of both Patriarchates unsatisfied with the outcome. *(Photograph: St. Michael's Church in Kiev by Jeremy Little)*

Quandaries such as this will be overcome only through time, as the interplay between national identity and religion matures. Indeed, the state has only recently re-entered the religious sphere after the long draught caused by Communism: in 1990, only 15% of Ukrainians considered themselves religious, while that number has risen to 70% today. In addition, 14% of people in Ukraine attend church weekly, contrasted with 3.6% in Russia. This increased religiosity resurrected the impact of religious history and demographics on Ukraine and brought to the forefront issues of national/religious identity and separation of church and state.

The overwhelming dominance of Orthodox religions in Ukraine can be traced back to Prince Vladimir's acceptance of Byzantine Christianity in 988 AD. This Orthodoxy survived despite invasion by the Mongols in the 13th century and a four-century occupation by Poland (although Poland's Roman Catholicism left a definite legacy). In 1596, the Union of Brest waged solidarity between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine and paved the way for establishing a Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church came into being in the 1820's and 30's, created in an effort to form a specifically Ukrainian church. In the mid 1900s many churches came under persecution, but none faced persecution as strong as that waged against the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which was eliminated by the tsars and heavily punished under Stalin. The fall of Communism brought religious revival and rivalry, reflected by acceptance of new Western religions such as Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses and deeper splits in existing Ukrainian churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which had traditionally looked toward the Moscow Patriarchate as its head, split to form the UOC Kiev Patriarchate, a separation influenced by nationalistic ideas and newfound independence.

The Geography of Religion in Ukraine

The current demographics of Ukrainian religion reflect much of this religious history. Ninety-seven percent of churches in Ukraine are Christian, and half of all Christians belong to one of three main Orthodox churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), or Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The UOC-MP and UOC-KP are primarily found in central and southeastern Ukraine while the

Autocephalous Church is primarily found in Western Ukraine. Although official records show that the UOC-MP has substantially more communities than the UOC-KP, some surveys have shown that the Kiev Patriarchate has greater membership than the Moscow Patriarchate (10.7% of the population compared to 17.8%, respectively), illustrating the questions of property and ownership created when churches break apart, as buildings are required to create communities. Major Catholic churches in Ukraine include the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church, mostly in Western Ukraine, and the Roman Catholic Church, which is primarily in Central Ukraine. The UOC–MP, UOC–KP, Autocephalous Church and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church are the four major churches in Ukraine. In addition, there are a number of protestant churches, the largest being the Baptist church, which is found throughout the country. The Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Sub-Carpathian Reformed and Lutheran Churches are also well established in Ukraine. Jews and Muslims—the latter located primarily in the Crimea—make up small but important religious groups in Ukraine, while non-traditional groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses have also taken root.

Religious Communities in Ukraine



The history and demographics of Ukrainian religion prompts some Ukrainians—primarily in Eastern Ukraine—to consider the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as "the Ukrainian Church," and membership in this church is associated with a certain degree of

Ukrainian-ness. Some are even so bold as to suggest state-building through the church and support state favoritism toward "Ukrainian" churches to reinforce a Ukrainian state. In addition, it is the view of many that Orthodoxy is genetic, yet a nationally-oriented Ukrainian will not belong to the UOC-MP. At the same time, Western Ukrainians are receptive to new religions from the West (and more receptive to religion in general) and harbor the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which stands as a reminder of persecution in the past. In these respects, religion reflects the demographic and political differences between East and West and is a critical factor in the creation of a Ukrainian national identity.

Although some Ukrainians have pushed for state favoritism of particular churches, Article 35 of the Ukrainian Constitution declares "the Church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separated from the state, and the school—from the Church. No religion shall be recognized by the state as mandatory." In addition, the constitution provides everyone with "the right to freedom of personal philosophy or religion." Ukraine has effectively upheld these standards, exhibited by the State Department's Human Rights Report, which notes only the difficulties of some groups in gaining land to build religious structures—difficulties all groups experienced proportionately. Despite those pushing for a national church that will define what it means to be Ukrainian, it should be noted that no one church commands a majority of the population; religion in Ukraine is quite diverse, especially when compared to other European nations.

National/religious identity and religious freedom are two great forces at work in Ukraine. Although recent events have suggested a conflict between the two, many Ukrainian leaders—and even the Pope, during his seminal visit in 2001—see solidarity between the two notions. Ukraine and her people are still trying to find themselves, a search that often involves religion. Only as Ukrainian identity becomes more tangible and defined can religion can grow stronger in its separation from the state, a separation mandated by law, by international standards, and by the human spirit.

Questions for Study

- What are the four primary religions in Ukraine?
- What are the roots of Ukrainian Orthodoxy?
- Into which two patriarchates is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church separated, and why is this significant?
- What percent of Ukrainians consider themselves religious?

Sources for Further Study

Tataryn, Myroslaw. 2001. Christian Churches in the New Ukraine. Saskachewan: Heritage Press.

RISU (Religious Information Services of Ukraine). www.risu.org
An excellent resource for statistics on Religion and up-to-date bulletins.

The Jewish Question:
An Answer or a Tragedy?

Above: Jewish Cemetery inBerezhany. Photo taken by me in January 2001.

What should be done about the Jews? This question has lingered in Ukraine for as long as the Jews have lingered, shouting for attention when 15th Century Polish occupation brought a wash of Jews to Ukraine and becoming less pertinent only as Jews emigrated from Ukraine by the thousands in the twentieth century. Indeed, the demographic trends of Jews in Ukraine have largely determined the magnitude and response to the Jewish question, turning a deep historical concern into a relatively peripheral issue.

During the 15th Century Polish occupation, Poles used Jews as middlemen in trade with Ukrainians, a situation that made Ukrainians feel robbed and cheated; they perceived the Jews as making a large profit at Ukrainian expense. From these days prevailed a widely held perspective of Jewish affluence bought by treachery, a socioeconomic perspective that in reality never did exist. Although Ukrainian Jews have historically lived in urban areas and held professional positions, they are not generally wealthier than the average Ukrainian, nor do they obtain wealth at Ukrainian expense.

Three main waves of Jewish emigration from Ukraine coupled with the Holocaust have significantly altered the demographics of Ukrainian Jews. The first wave of emigration came with the 1917 revolution and radical alteration of the economic and political system. Jews, many of whom created a comfortable living through study and work, disagreed with the new system and its mandates of state property. A large number of Jews opted to leave

the country instead of facing persecution for refusing to support the new system. Two decades later, the remaining Jews had to confront the horrors of WWII. The Holocaust in Ukraine killed more than 1 million Jews—but many Ukrainian citizens were killed as well, making an emphasis on Ukrainian Jews during the Holocaust a controversial matter. Although both the Holocaust and Soviet system systematically oppressed Jews, emigration was extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible. In the 1970's the United States made deals with the USSR to allow Soviet emigration in return for political favors in Europe, bringing on a second wave of Jewish emigration from Ukraine, where many Jews fled to Israel, Canada, the United States, and Germany. The fall of the USSR marked the third wave of immigration, a process that continues today.

In many ways, the Holocaust and waves of immigration have essentially 'answered' the Jewish question for Ukraine: in cities where 5,000 Jews were found thirty years ago, there are only 1,000 present today; in place of questioning where Jews fit in society, there is questioning of where Ukrainian identity is found. In addition, serious economic concerns that affect all Ukrainian citizens have pushed ethnic tensions to the background. Although perspectives of Jewish-Ukrainian relations differ, the Jewish question has largely been answered by emigration—emigration initiated by the tragedies of historical perspectives, the Holocaust, and Soviet oppression. These tragedies, however, have largely faded into the past as oppression on the government level has evolved into to little more than discussions on the kitchen table level. Thus, while the question "What should be done about the Jews?" has historically troubled Ukrainians, today it lingers as a waft of the past, a once-unanswered question of tragedy that has all but been transformed to an unspoken—yet implied—answer of "nothing; many of them are gone."

Questions for further study:

- What Jewish organizations exist in Ukraine?
- How has Jewish emigration affected foreign relations between Ukraine and Israel, Canada, the United States, and Germany?
- What age groups of Ukrainian Jews are left in Ukraine? How does this affect their quality of life?
- How do anti-Semitic attitudes in Ukraine function within the larger context of Europe?

For further reading:

Aster, Howard, and Peter J. Potichnyj. 1990. Ukrainian-Jewish relations in historical perspective. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Aster, Howard, and Peter J. Potichnyj. 1983. Jewish-Ukrainian relations: Two solitudes. New York: Mosaic Press.

Friedman, Philip. 1980. Roads to extinction: Essays on the Holocaust. New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies: Jewish Publication Society of America.

Hesli, Vicki L., Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger and Kevin L. Morgan. 1994. Social distance from Jews in Russia and Ukraine. *Slavic Review* 53(3): 807.

Ukrainian Folk Traditions

Ukraine has a rich history of folk customs, stories, and art. Although Russian and Ukrainian traditions are similar and sometimes viewed as one and the same, Ukrainian folk culture is distinct and in many ways embodies what it means to be Ukrainian. The two most important types of Ukrainian folk art are *pysanky*, elaborately decorated Easter eggs, and *rushnyky*, embroidered hand towels. Both contain designs symbolizing family, marriage, life and death. *Rushnyky* are often used in Ukrainian weddings, which themselves are filled with traditions, including wedding marches, somber ceremonies, and riotous celebration afterwards. Fairy tales, folk tales, and suspicion of witchcraft are also distinguishing Ukrainian traditions, and many stories put an intriguingly strong emphasis on women.

Ukrainian folk traditions are observed most prominently in village life, and the onset of urban migration has diluted the influence and pervasiveness of folk traditions. At the same time, many urban Ukrainians have connections to the villages and old traditions and periodically go back to visit their homeland and observe village customs. One French professor at Mohyla University in Kiev—a very well educated professor who had studied in France for many years—once told her friend she was going to "my village" for the weekend, illustrating how even the most educated and urbanized of Ukrainians have ties to village life and customs. These traditions are at the heart of Ukrainian history, and even as the country transitions to a modern economy and migration movements redefine the importance of folk traditions, Ukrainians look upon these customs as part of themselves—as part of their identity.

Questions for Study

- What are four aspects or attributes of Ukrainian folk traditions?
- Where are folk traditions most commonly observed?

Sources for Further Study

Brahma: Gateway Ukraine. Ukrainian Holidays, Traditions, and Folklore. Online at http://www.brama.com/art/traditions.html.

Bloch, Marie H. and J. Hnizdovsky. 1999. Ukrainian Folk Tales. Hippocrene Books.

Women in Ukraine

A top official of Ukrainian President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party (left) and former prime minister Yulia V. Tymoshenko exchange folders with signed documents — an agreement to reunite the estranged allies of the Orange Revolution in a coalition following parliamentary elections. (Photo: Sergei Supinsky / AFP-Getty Images)

Much has changed since the Soviet Union's fall, and Ukrainian women are among those who are learning to adapt to the new world. Those intrepid enough to plunge into the employment pool face discrimination and earnings well below male counterparts, or have to resort to "entertainment" careers to survive. In desperation, others leave as "Ukrainian brides" for affluent Western men. While women can still obtain good education, it does not make their futures any easier.

During the Soviet era, women were supposed to be liberated by having outside employment, but most were overwhelmed by the double hardship of having a job and having taking care of a family. For some women, the new era means that they have a right to not work and a right to resume their traditional place in the home. Other women have continued to work, despite the setbacks women face in the Ukrainian workforce, such as unequal wages and positions as compared to men with equivalent qualifications. The average yearly earned income for men in 2002 was $6,493, while the average earned income for women was $3,429. According to the Human Rights Watch in 2003, the Ukraine Ministry of Labor's responses to gender discrimination in the workplace were subjective and unmethodical. Most women interviewed in the report were unaware that they could report unfair labor practices. The Human Rights Watch also reported in 2005 that women make up 80 percent of the unemployed in Ukraine.

Against these incredible odds, there are some success stories, such as Prime Min ister Yulia Tymoshenko, ranked the world's third most powerful woman by *Forbes Magazine* in 2005. Ukrainian women athletes have shown that they can compete at the highest levels: swimmer Yana Klockhova won two Olympic gold medals in the 2004 Games and the women's gymnastics team placed fourth.

Some headway toward helping women in the job market has been aided by the Women's Economic Empowerment project, sponsored by the US Agency for International Development and various Ukrainian NGOs. Since the project's inception, almost 13,000 Ukrainian women have received business training, and more than 1,000 of these women have started or expanded their own businesses. Non-governmental agencies such as Women's Information Consultative Center (WICC), which was founded in 1995, are also hard at work educating and informing women in Ukraine.

Another serious problem facing Ukrainian women is the massive human trafficking industry, be it in the realm of sexual exploitation or forced labor. Eastern Europe is a bastion for trafficking: people are sent from there to the rest of Europe, the Middle East, or Russia. Many women from rural areas in Ukraine unwittingly become victims of trafficking when they try to get jobs in the cities, while others simply submit to prostitution and claim that such a choice was unavoidable if they wanted to advance in the world.

The US State Department's Trafficking in Humans Report of June 2006 states that the Ukrainian government is not doing enough to combat the problem, although they are taking significant steps, such as establishing an anti-trafficking department in 2005 and cooperating with NGOs and international organizations to help victims.

Ukrainian women face other problems common to women in countries of the former Soviet Union: outnumbering and outliving men. As a consequence of these factors, there are many single mothers in Ukraine, as well as a low birth rate. The divorce rate in Ukraine is high, varying from 40 to 64 percent, depending on the source, and highest in urban centers. No system of child support payments exists, making life even more difficult for single mothers and creating a new backlash against having children.

Ukrainian women will continue to face challenges in the coming years, but they will undoubtedly meet these challenges with the same strength that has served them for centuries. After surviving communism, World War II, and a complete overhaul to democracy, Ukrainian women shall prevail against the odds.

<u>Questions for further study:</u>

- What are some of the most significant problems facing Ukrainian women today?
- What are some things that have been done to empower women?

<u>Sources for further study:</u>

- Kuehnast, Kathleen, ed. *Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation Building, Economic Survivial, and Civic Activism.* Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004.

- Bohachevksy-Chomiak, Martha. 1988. *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884-1939.* Canadian Institution of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1988.

Resources

1.Readers Guide for Ukraine is available at the School of Professional and Area Studies/FSI.

2.Suggested Periodicals:

- Current History
- East European Constitutional Review
- Foreign Affairs
- Foreign Policy
- Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs
- Post-Soviet Affairs
- Post-Soviet Geography
- Problems of Post-Communism
- Russian Review
- Russian Social Science Review
- Slavic Review

3.Web Resources

Particularly useful is the Art Ukraine, a daily website at www.artukraine.com. This website provides a compendium of reports, including speeches by leading Ukrainian officials, on current events.