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Description of document: Interviews with Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) personnel by 9/11 Commission Staff and related records from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) 2002-2006

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September 30, 2021

RE: FOIA Request, Control No.: FI-2021-0047

This letter is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated March 12, 2021, sent to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Office of the Inspector General (OIG). You requested the following records:

“[A] copy of all documents concerning any and all investigation(s) conducted by the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General concerning the actions of the FAA on September 11, 2001, relating to interactions between FAA and the entities known as NEADS and/or NORAD.”

Some of the records, 255 pages, originated with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); and is therefore referred to the FAA. The appropriate personnel from the FAA will review the documents for FOIA and respond directly to you.

Attached are 4,376 pages of documents responsive to your request. Please be aware that all 9/11 Commission hearing transcripts are released in full, without redactions. For other records, some information was redacted or withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (6), (7)(C) and (7)(E)).¹

¹ Exemption 5 protects documents that are pre-decisional and a direct part of the deliberative process. Exemption 6 protects names and any data identifying individuals if public disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

Exemption 7(C) protects personal information in law enforcement records. It prevents the disclosure of law enforcement information which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

For any further assistance, you may contact Attorney-Advisor/FOIA Officer Barbara Hines at (202) 680-3084, Barbara.Hines@oig.dot.gov. You may also contact our FOIA Public Liaison, Marie Miller at (202) 366-1959, Marie.Miller@oig.dot.gov.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

If you are not satisfied with the DOT OIG's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Chief Counsel for the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, 7th Floor West (JL), 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, DC 20590. Appeals to the Chief Counsel should be prominently marked as a "FOIA Appeal." If you prefer, your appeal may be sent via electronic mail to FOIAAPPEALS@oig.dot.gov. An appeal must be received within 90 days of the date of this letter and should contain any information and arguments you wish to rely on. The Chief Counsel's determination will be administratively final.

You also have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the FOIA Public Liaison (contact information shown above) or the Office of Government Information Services (<https://ogis.archives.gov>) via phone—202-741-5770 / toll free—1-877-684-6448; fax—202-741-5769; or email—ogis@nara.gov.

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Until further notice, we recommend (when possible) that FOIA requests be submitted using our online portal at <https://www.oig.dot.gov/FOIA> or the National FOIA portal

Exemption (7)(E) protects law enforcement techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions that could risk circumvention of the law if released.

at <https://www.foia.gov/>. We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause. Thank you for your patience.

Sincerely,

Siera Griffin

Government Information Specialist

Enclosures

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

TONY MELLO

BY

JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 Commission

MILES KARA, 9/11 Commission

JEFF BROWN, 9/11 Commission

DAVID WIEGAND, FAA Counsel's Office

Friday, March 26, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's March 26, we're at FAA headquarters in Washington, about to begin an interview with Tony Mello. I'm John Azzarello with Team 8, 9/11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9/11 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9/11 Commission.

MS. WOODS: David WIEGAND, FAA Counsel.

MR. MELLO: Tony Mello, FAA, Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mr. Mello, can you start, generally, by giving us a brief overview of the various positions you've held with the FAA since you started your career with the FAA leading up to September 11 and then tell us, in a little bit more detail about the position you held on that day and the duties and responsibilities that went with that position?

MR. MELLO: Sure, I was hired by the FAA after serving in the military from '77 to '81. Hired at LaGuardia Tower in New York after the strike in '81. Spent three years as an Air Traffic Controller in New York.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Eighty-one to '84, you were at LaGuardia?

MR. MELLO: Eighty-one to '84, correct. I then transferred to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and did a three-year contract down there, from '84 to '87.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were a controller there, too?

MR. MELLO: Yes and that was both in the approach and in the center environment non-radar environment down there in the ocean. Came back in '87, was an employee of the Eastern Region, so I came back to Baltimore tower and Baltimore radar, which is an up/down facility. Spent about three years there, to '91. And I got hired by Dave Cannoles in the Investigation side of QA here at headquarters. Spent about four years with Dave and I transferred out to Washington Center as a supervisor.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me stop you for a second, '91 to '95, you're in the QA Division?

MR. MELLO: Yes, I was in Air Traffic Investigations.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Air Traffic Investigations Division?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And there you were part of a team that investigated accidents?

MR. MELLO: A staff worker on a team that would look at accident incidents and that type of air traffic incidents.

MR. AZZARELLO: Incidents including, like, separation errors?

MR. MELLO: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then from there after '95?

MR. MELLO: I think it was, yeah, late '95, early '96, I transferred out to Washington Center in Leesburg as a supervisor, a traffic control supervisor. I spent about 2 and a half years there; came back, basically the same outfit, due to organizational changes, I think the name changed probably, but the same function, job function, still under Dave Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was around '99?

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MR. MELLO: Yes, late '98.

MR. AZZARELLO: Late '98.

MR. MELLO: November '98. Back to a staff position with Dave and about six to eight months later, I get promotion as an Acting Assistant Division Manager with Dave and three or four months after that was made permanent as a Systems Division Manager, AAT-201 is the identifier.

MR. AZZARELLO: AAT-20 what?

MR. MELLO: One, and I've been doing that up till now.

MR. KARA: What was the final position?

MR. MELLO: Assistant Division Manager.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave was he AAT-200, then?

MR. MELLO: At the time he was AAT-20 in charge of 100, which is Evaluations and 200 which is the Investigations side.

MR. AZZARELLO: And he was your direct report?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And tell us what, prior to 9/11, what would be a typical day of your duties

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and responsibilities prior to 9/11 in your role as AAT-201, Assistant Division Manager.

MR. MELLO: Well, I shared the duties of on-call which is 24/7, basically, after-hours type person to be on-call for incidents and accidents in the system. On a daily basis, we would compile whatever happened in the system the day before from, you know separation, any near mid-air collisions, accidents, any type of quality assurance problems in the system. And we'd compile a daily report on that and we'd brief that up. Back then, it was AAT one, which was Ron Morgan [ph], Bill Peacock, that type of position, we would brief that up daily. And the day more or less focused around following up on what happened the day before and trying to do some proactive stuff for quality assurance in the field to prevent reoccurrences.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you were monitoring all accidents, incidents, and investigating them trying to find causes of the incidents or accidents?

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MR. MELLO: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then, hopefully, I guess to learn lessons from what caused them and then if changes could be made to prevent it, going forward you would discuss those things?

MR. MELLO: Yes, and as a manager, I would be sending teams out to accident sites, if needed, to facilities that had a high level of operational errors, separation problems. And also we had a two-person group that supported the litigation side when accidents resulted in litigation against the FAA, we would provide Air Traffic Control Specialists to assist the attorneys in preparing for the case.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you had a litigation-support role, too?

MR. MELLO: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: For any FAA litigation?

MR. MELLO: Air traffic litigation.

MR. AZZARELLO: For any air traffic litigation?

MR. MELLO: That's where our expertise is,

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yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about prior to 9/11, if there was a hijack report--a report of a hijack in the system that was still airborne, would that trigger any duties and responsibilities for you and the office that you were in?

MR. MELLO: Prior to 9/11 if one was reported or occurred, the function of my office, at that time, would be in data collection to support making tapes, getting radar, it would be a post-type of investigation and ongoing as you speak, other than getting the data from the facilities.

MR. AZZARELLO: It would not involve the responsibility of coordinating, say, an FBI law enforcement or military response to the hijacking, that's ongoing?

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. KARA: During the first time you worked for Dave Cannoles in '91 to '95, do you recall working the hijack that occurred in early 1993 where a Lufthansa plane came across the

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Atlantic and landed at New York City?

MR. MELLO: No, I did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, about pre-9/11 general hijack protocol, if you know, was it your responsibility as you've said, or your office's or division's to respond in terms of getting to coordination with the military or with any element of the Department of Defense or law-enforcement. But do you know who would--where would that responsibility fall to, if you knew what the protocol was pre-9/11?

MR. MELLO: My understanding it would be the first persons in the FAA that had knowledge of it happening, being an Air Traffic Control facility or if that was elevated to the headquarters for dissemination, but I guess those are the first people who have knowledge of it and have access to the military. If it's a small facility, naturally, they would call their parent facility that oversees them on tower to center, and then the center has lines to the military to give notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where, this is not a test

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or anything, I don't want you to feel that way. And we've seen some documents and it seems that there are different understandings, I guess, as we've gone out in the field and in the facilities. I understand that at a controller level as to what happened above them once they reported to their supervisors and once they've done that, then they're back at their scope watching planes, it is off their plate in a real way and they might not have been intimately familiar, then, with what happens after they report that.

But there are some protocols and I think the way we read them and understood them is that there's a hijack coordinator designated here at headquarters. And that once the information flows from the field facility--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --of a hijack that it sort of goes up the chain of command, I guess that--certainly that part is in the controller guidelines, I guess, the FAA orders that provide the guidelines for controller conduct and duties.

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It says you notify your supervisor immediately, if you know of a hijack, and they use the example typical of squawking hijack code 7500?

MR. MELLO: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then, in terms of the paperwork, it tells you that you tell your supervisor and then the next piece of relevant paper on hijacking that we see appears at a headquarters level and it talks about escort procedures and an FAA order around is, like 7610--7610, you guys have that?

MR. KARA: I've got it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Here it is escort of hijacked aircraft. And this is the document that says that there's a hijack coordinator, either the Director or his designee of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security; that that person on duty at Headquarters at the time--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --was the person that's supposed to request the military to provide an escort for a--excuse me, for a confirmed hijack and

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then it tells, you know, what the purposes are to secure a positive flight following and a report of unusual observances and aid--is that--did that comport with your pre-9/11 understanding or was it that it didn't formally have to go up to the headquarters that it could go--was it a dual track that the center could report it right to let's say a military entity, if they knew about NEADS or SEADS that the center could call right to that military sector?

MR. MELLO: Well, having both worked at--in San Juan in international waters and the Washington center, I'm familiar with what centers have. Centers have direct lines; they have a military office right there. You know, with a lot of the warning areas had direct contact with the military. So, my understanding is we would go direct to the military or talk to the MOS at the facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, just go right to the military ops specialist?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, anything out of the

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ordinary we'd do that, you know, especially when you have the--be outside of the country, where you would have [unintell.] violations and stuff like that, which, you know, could just be for not squawking the right squawk coming in.

MR. AZZARELLO: And in addition to that, though, it was your understanding that you would also notify your supervisor at the center?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I was the supe, my it would be to my second-line and from there it disseminated to regional centers, the WOC and--

MR. AZZARELLO: And when you were a supervisor, at, say, ZDC--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --were you--what was your official title? Were you controller in charge or--

MR. MELLO: Supervisor Air Traffic Control Specialist, in charge of the controllers on my team.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who--would you report to OMIC or the Air Traffic Manager?

MR. MELLO: The Ops Manager--

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MR. AZZARELLO: The Ops manager.

MR. MELLO: --the called them Area Managers back then, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that the same as an OMIC?

MR. MELLO: Yes, an Area Manager is the same as an Ops Manager today.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, hypothetically, in 1998, you're at ZDC, you have a controller, you're a supervisor, he tells you, I think I got a hijack here--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --7500 squawk, you would tell the Area Supervisor?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what was your understanding as to the Area Supervisor what he or she would have done with that information?

MR. MELLO: Take it to the Watch Desk to the OMIC.

MR. AZZARELLO: The TMU guys?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And where would they, did you have an understanding as to where they--

MR. MELLO: Well, Washington Center, the military specialist was right there, so, they would be getting notification at that point. And anything--any calls to the military would be made to our MOS, Military Operation Specialist at the Watch Desk, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: I would go right to the MOS?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about reporting in the chain of command within the FAA?

MR. MELLO: The Ops Manager would be calling the Region Operations Center, ROC, and, in turn get patched into the WOC.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the ROC would go right to the WOC here?

MR. MELLO: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I guess, is that when the FAA hijack coordinator at headquarters would sort of be brought into the loop?

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MR. MELLO: Yes, to be honest, I didn't know it was the Aviation Security person back then, I just thought it was the FAA headquarters and they disseminated it, I didn't know how--

MR. AZZARELLO: Somebody would take control of the situation from the headquarters perspective--

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --from a management perspective?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, take us to-- do you have any other background stuff?

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take us to the day of 9/11 and tell us how your morning started and then take us to when you first realized that there was a report of a hijack in the system, the first report--came to your attention, anyway, there being a hijack in the system?

MR. MELLO: Day starts pretty normal, about 5:30 get to work. We start building the

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packages and briefing notes for the previous day to brief, you know, the Director of Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you do that daily?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Whether there's significant incidents--

MR. MELLO: Anything--

MR. AZZARELLO: --or any incidents at all?

MR. MELLO: Yes. People and faces have changed you know, positions, but, basically, we still brief people. We brief the COO now, instead of the Air Traffic Director. But everything pretty much normal, we do a 7:00 o'clock and a 7:30 briefing. Takes us to right around 8:00 o'clock, by that time, you know, get with my people downstairs on the fourth floor--still on the fourth floor. And just kind of discuss what we were going to do for that day.

Usually, we've got a roundtable down there and just--

MR. AZZARELLO: On the fourth floor?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, we call it the POD, it's

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just a bay with a desk. And the exact timing, I don't know, but somewhere in the 8:15, 8:20, you know, Dave Cannoles walks by, which Dave Cannoles was a pretty hands-on boss, so he would come out to the group a lot just to say how's it going. But he came back and he said, come with me.

And as I caught up to him, because he never stopped, he said a plane just hit the World Trade Center. And he said something about a possible hijacking. And so, I asked Dan Diggins who was one of my specialists to join me and we came up to the tenth floor to AAT-1's office to the conference room.

MR. AZZARELLO: You grabbed, Dan Diggins was one of your assistants?

MR. MELLO: One of my employee specialist, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you, Dan Diggins and Jeff Griffith go up to the--

MR. MELLO: Dave Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: --Dave Cannoles, I'm sorry, go up to the tenth floor?

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MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we have a schematic here that we made--

MR. MELLO: Okay, sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take a look at that and see if you--I guess at that--I guess--it's fair and accurate depiction of what the floor looked like--

MR. MELLO: Oh, okay, here we go--

MR. AZZARELLO: --on the 11?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. KARA: Is it normal to come up to the tenth floor as opposed to configuring yourselves down on the fourth floor?

MR. MELLO: For that, when my boss said come, yeah. Normally, any, if we had a major accident a TWA, American 587, we'll come right up and do a face-to-face briefing with what we have and I considered this, at that time, definitely at that level.

MR. AZZARELLO: What did you know about the accident, did you just--did you know anything outside of Dave telling you we've had an accident?

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MR. MELLO: We had someone hit the World--and aircraft hit the World Trade Center is how he said it. And, no, I didn't, we didn't have a TV down there, it wasn't till I come upstairs, you know, I could see it on a TV.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you said if there was a major accident, you'd come to the tenth floor to brief the, what, the Administrator and Deputy Administrator?

MR. MELLO: Director of Air Traffic, not the Administrator, my bosses would probably brief the Administrator, Dave Cannoles probably would do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, the Director of Air Traffic at that time would have been Bill Peacock?

MR. MELLO: At the time of 9/11, yes, Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did, when you saw--did you see when you came up to the tenth floor, did you see the results of the first crash that was on the TV?

MR. MELLO: Yes, but the TV was actually

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in Bill's office and we were next door in a conference room, divided by a wall. So, I happen to look in there--Bill wasn't in that day, Jeff Griffith was out in the entrance to the office, I remember passing him. And Dave says, you know, let's get going in here and we got set up and first thing Dave asked for was we need to get a telecon going.

The fortunate thing about what we do is we have access to that telecon without going through the normal procedures.

MR. AZZARELLO: Without going through the WOC?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, they sterilize a code for us 24/7, so we can just dial into it. Where you would have to call in and be placed into, they'll get a code. They just always give us one, in case we want to bring three or four facilities up to talk about an accident or something.

MR. AZZARELLO: And everybody--the facility know to call that number--

MR. MELLO: No, we tell them to come up,

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it's ours we don't share it unless we want them.

MR. KARA: So, it's an invitation only?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: Ah.

MR. MELLO: By us.

MR. AZZARELLO: And when you make that invitation, I mean, they know what number to call, they have a pre-assigned number--

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and there's a code actually to make it on?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, we did it, we took our manual which is 7110.65 and so the pass code was 7110, 7-1-1-0, easy to remember, QA-type thing. So, we, instead of wasting time getting the WOC and then having to do whatever configuration back then, because it's all new equipment now, back then to put a telecon together, we just dial into the 7110--

MR. BROWN: It's an Air Traffic Bridge, is that right or not?

MR. MELLO: No, it's a WOC bridge, but we

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had direct access to it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there a name, the bridge as you set that Dave Cannoles said let's set up once there was an accident?

MR. MELLO: Well, it was the normal number you call in to get any bridge, but it allowed you to put your own pass code in without them assigning it, because it was permanently done.

So, once we did that, the first thing, and I forget the order of it, but he wanted New York Center, Boston Center, he started telling us people to contact.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me see if I can put it in a time frame when it--when you're on your way up here to the tenth floor, you know of one crash at the Trade Center right?

MR. KARA: Not the second one?

MR. MELLO: No, not the second one.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Dave Cannoles tells you there's a possible hijack in the system. Did you equate those two at the time based on what Dave told you that the reported hijack might be one and

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the same as the crash?

MR. MELLO: No--

MR. AZZARELLO: At that time, you thought--

MR. MELLO: --actually just the idea that a plane hit the building was scary in itself. So, I was in kind of awe from that, and then, you know, a hijacking, I didn't relate them at the time, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, at the time based on what Dave said to you, you thought they might have been two separate events?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, did you have any idea, based on what Dave said to you, whether you thought it was a commercial aircraft that was--that hit the Trade Center or was it--

MR. MELLO: I don't know if it was Dave that told me, but early on, someone said something about a small airplane. I don't know if it was the TV when I got upstairs or someone said a light aircraft or a small aircraft. And I just remembered the first time I looked at the TV, I

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said, yeah, a small aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Based on your experience, you didn't--

MR. MELLO: Just based on the amount of damage that was done, but, still in my head I didn't think it was an airliner.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me when you learned of the second hi-jacking event?

MR. MELLO: Well, sometime in that very first 10 minutes, 15 minutes or so upstairs while we were trying to establish this telecon and get people on, I heard someone say another one hit. And, again, they're in the next room, there are several people in there. And they had the TV on and I remember just--I didn't go in there immediately, but a minute or two later went in there and they did a replay of it--

MR. AZZARELLO: Where's that, where are you now when you--

MR. MELLO: This is, we're talking over here okay? The door is here--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who's office is that the

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Air Traffic Director's Office?

MR. MELLO: Yeah--

MR. AZZARELLO: Bill Peacock's office?

MR. MELLO: --his office is actually, right here, there's a conference room here and then there's a few more offices down here, AAT-1 was here and this is the conference room, this is really where we were. But they had the TV in here.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, you were in the conference room, though? Off of the Air Traffic, AAT-1--

MR. MELLO: Correct, door here, yeah, like that, door here, separated by one of these two walls they have.

MR. AZZARELLO: And where is the TV in that room?

MR. MELLO: It was, he had it on a desk, like, right here, he had it, believe it or not facing out, so, I don't know if someone turned it, but that's where I--we could see it from there.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were in the conference room when you hear someone say another

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one hit over here?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, in there I was doing something and I couldn't get right out of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And do you have, is your telecon up yet or are you in the process of getting it going?

MR. MELLO: The telecon was up immediately but there was no one on it immediately, except us. So we were in the process of bringing people up. Get New York Center on and it was, I just remembered tough to start getting ahold of people, you know, you'd call the WOC, the line was busy--

MR. KARA: When you called to the ZBW or ZMI, who, specifically would you be inviting onto the Net, what entity within the centers?

MR. MELLO: Well, we would normally be given, like, at an Ops Manager level.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. MELLO: Or manager, in fact, New York Center it was the Manager we were talking to, Mike McCormick.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is--let's see if we can

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put this in a time context and I know it's hard, you don't have the benefit of, I guess, all the other pieces that we have from talking to other people--

MR. MELLO: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: --I think Mike McCormick told us and his recollection might not, you know, be accurate--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --so don't accept it as gospel if I say what he told you--you have a different recollection then by all means, tell us if you do.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because, obviously, that's normal on a day like that when things are happening fast, minute-by-minute everybody has a little bit of a different recollection of the timing of things. Mike seemed to think that he might have been the first guy on your telecon, he referred to it as the Cannoles telecon.

MR. MELLO: I would say, I remember the

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first facility Dave asked us to get was New York. And we were looking at New York City, New York Center, you're just thinking New York, New York, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: And do you remember if he said get both the TRACON and the en-route or just the NY first?

MR. MELLO: It was New York Center first and I think through New York Center, if I remember, we asked the TRACON to come up a short time later. Don't forget New York Center's in immediate contact with the TRACON through their own lines. So, anything we needed we could get through them, but they actually come up on the DEN in a short time, not the DEN the telecon.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, then, at the moment when you would hear somebody say there's been another one or another one went in--another one hit, you were in the process of getting the telecon up, but it is your recollection at that time at the time of the second hit, that there was no one on yet?

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MR. MELLO: No, I would say that New York Center was on at that time, at least.

MR. AZZARELLO: You think they might have been on then.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it possible they got on shortly after that, too?

MR. MELLO: Oh, sure, yeah.

MR. KARA: And then Boston, or who was next after that?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, Boston, Command Center somewhere in there, we asked them to come up. And I know Jacksonville Center, Cleveland Center, we had started expanding and so, I think almost everything was--

MR. KARA: When do you recall or do you recall the ZBC being--

MR. MELLO: Fourth, fifth person, I think in-between the Command Center and it was probably the third or fourth.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, ZBW and ZBC, at some point are on--

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MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then the Command Center?

MR. KARA: And [unintell.] situations are, [unintell.] Indianapolis and Cleveland on--

MR. MELLO: At that time, no, we were growing with the incident--

MR. KARA: With the incident?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. KARA: As it emerged.

MR. MELLO: We're taking places where things were happening and bringing them up.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who would have been the Command Center point of contact, was there a particular position there that would have called into the bridge or--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I imagine their Watch Desk is what, you know--

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that GNOM [ph] position or--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, GNOM. That's their equivalent to an OM out there.

MR. KARA: Was it on a speaker phone in

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your conference room?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: So, nobody was manning it per se you could all hear it whoever came up on it?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: And anyone could speak--

MR. MELLO: Just like this?

MR. KARA: Just like this?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you can help us out because we're trying to find this--trying to see if we have it from the Command Center, I can see we don't, and we know it wasn't taped on your end here at headquarters right?

MR. MELLO: If it was, in WOC, I didn't think they recorded that thing to be honest with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's what I recall, I think they did, so we were trying to see if we could find the conversation from the other end from the Command Center, which we know recorded, certainly all the lines out on the floor in the

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[unintell.]. Jeff, did you bring any of those with you?

MR. BROWN: Yeah, I did.

MR. KARA: See the Command Center's spin on it.

MR. BROWN: The overall.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you have the schematic of that, I have that.

MR. KARA: I have a couple of the lines.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's one line--I don't know, there's a line that people are referring to, they're calling it the Tactical Net at various points of the conversation. I think it comes in through position, like, 14 or 15, so it's coming in either through ZNY position at the Command Center or through 15, which then is ZBW's console at the Command Center. And someone appears to be, like a moderator on the line, saying this is FAA Tactical Net, the Eastern Region, you know, go ahead. Or FAA Tactical Net, New York TRACON wants to give a report.

MR. MELLO: Oh, okay, I never heard that.

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MR. AZZARELLO: You never heard that, okay.

MR. MELLO: I didn't hear it on our line that day, either.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be a different line, I guess, some tactical net--are you familiar with the Tactical Net?

MR. MELLO: Now, I wasn't back then, I learned a whole lot in the last two years. Just from, I work up here a lot now.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, from what you've learned, I'm going to ask you now, to sort of jumble it all together, what you knew pre-9/11--

MR. MELLO: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: --then all of what you learned afterwards, just for the purposes of this question, we're, as we understand from the documents, there's a Tactical Net that is generally stood up in the event of a hijack that's internal, it's just FAA only, and it's a way for the FAA and the people running the FAA Tactical Net, which would be, okay, it says it would be, who would be

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running the tactical net?

The Net is established to transmit restricted communications and information pertaining to taskings between the FAA Security offices and it's not appropriate to discuss it on the Primary Net and it's authorized for CAS employees. Okay, so I guess it's the Primary Net has outsiders, so this is a way for the FAA in a more secure way to keep some confidential information within the cone of just the FAA.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's stood up in the event of a hijacking, according to the protocol and it's called the Tactical Net.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where we've encountered some confusion is, some people suggested that maybe there's also such a thing as a Tactical Net that the Regions can establish. So, therefore, I don't know that when we hear somebody on this tape from Command Center say Tactical Net, I don't know if the Command Center is monitoring a headquarters

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Tactical Net or a regional Tactical Net. Can you shed any light on that from what you learned?

MR. MELLO: No, none at all, never worked at the Command Center, been out there for tours and all my knowledge of any net now has been within the last couple of years. Don't know if it was up or what was available back then.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is a Command Center schematic that Shirley gave us.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I'm going to ask you, you see, like, the Watch Desk area or the Watch Area of the Command Center which would be the likely place where someone would have gotten on?

MR. MELLO: That's the Command Center.

MR. KARA: You've been out to the Command Center, multiple times?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: From what we understand, that's the NOM position on 9/11.

MR. MELLO: Okay, screens are up here, right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Yep, screens are up here, the is severe weather positions are up here, I think SMOR 7 8 or severe weather, that's New York Center's console--

MR. MELLO: Okay, I just know East and West, though.

MR. AZZARELLO: All right New York Center's here, Cleveland, Indie and D.C. are behind them and then Boston and Cleveland to the right of ZNY as you're facing it. Then MTO East.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, I guess they divide in an East and West management of the country. This is the traffic manager and officer for the Eastern part of the country. And then there's an MTO West on this side. Are you referring to this position National Operations Manager's position?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, where I would assume the call was up.

MR. KARA: What line's that, then?

MR. AZZARELLO: There's four lines there, two operations lines, 5134 and 5149.

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MR. KARA: Do you recall any specific individuals that you talked to that day or that were up on that Net?

MR. MELLO: Um--

MR. KARA: --at the Command Center?

MR. MELLO: I don't know if he was at the Command Center but I thought he was, was Doug Davis?

MR. KARA: Doug actually was here.

MR. MELLO: Was he?

MR. KARA: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug was actually here.

MR. MELLO: I kept hearing him over here and it sounded like--

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug was in the Crisis Center.

MR. KARA: He was right in here. He was on your line.

MR. MELLO: Yes, he was probably dialing--

MR. AZZARELLO: He was speaking to John White for a good part of that morning--

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --who was--and John was one of the NOMs.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, remember John on there several times.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you have any of the NOM lines there?

MR. BROWN: I don't have, but I have--

MR. AZZARELLO: 4525, is that the one that Doug was on with John?

MR. BROWN: I have positions 14, 18, 15, I have 4525 if you want that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, could you pop 4525?

MR. BROWN: What about [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Start with the 4525 NOM position and see if--

MR. BROWN: It'll take me two or three minutes to pop it up.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, we'll go on and we'll come back when you find it.

MR. KARA: Let me back up one second. And the one entity we didn't ask about here was Eastern Region on your Net?

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MR. MELLO: The actual Region?

MR. KARA: Yes.

MR. MELLO: Frank Hatfield.

MR. KARA: Hatfield was on.

MR. MELLO: Don't know if he was physically at the Region, I just know I heard his voice.

MR. KARA: But he could have dialed in from anywhere?

MR. MELLO: Sure.

MR. KARA: All he needed was the pass code and he was in?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. KARA: Do you recall anybody else from the Region, Rejarm [ph] or Marcus Serillio [ph] or--

MR. MELLO: No, I mean, a lot of people, but specific ones, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, when you get, so when Mike McCormick gets on the bridge, do you have any recollection of what information was discussed with Mike McCormick in terms of situational awareness

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that you were trying to gain from what was going on in New York?

MR. MELLO: There was a lot of activity starting to happen. Someone not responding to a call; someone wanted to divert; this was early on, too, and this could have been normal business, but at that point we started suspecting everything, you know, everything seemed--everything was starting to happen. So, I know Mike was giving some updates on different things. Asking for some, I remember some guidance, do we want to do this? Do we want ground stop? It was that type of questioning and stuff going over there, specifically, each and every question, just dialogue about what was going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the state of your situational awareness as to what caused the first two crashes at that point or the two crashes in the Trade Center? Were they equated with commercial aircraft that were reported hijacked at that point?

MR. MELLO: After the second one someone did see an airliner on the second one.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Commercial aircraft?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you--but were you and the people with you, Dave Cannoles and company, were you trying to learn which aircraft it was that went into the first two crashes?

MR. MELLO: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: What do you remember about that? What did you learn in the early stages about which aircraft they might have been?

MR. MELLO: There was some talk early on about a jet going down the Hudson River. Didn't know, I don't really remember it being an airliner, but just a jet going down the Hudson River. It kind of faded off and then, you know, a short time later, we heard the, you know, the second one had it. At that time, I didn't relate one to the other, either. Being up in that area, there's a lot of jets up and down the river. You know, normal traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, were you having discussions about, okay, what--do we figure out

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which aircraft hit the tower and when we learned that there was something wrong with it, was it off course, what were the characteristics? Like what warning signals did we get, if any, before it went into the tower? Were you trying, as an accident investigator and given your background, are those the types of things that you and Dave Cannoles were trying to find out in the early stages? Like, what was going on with these planes, then before they hit?

Were you thinking--at what point were you thinking this isn't an accident, this is, this purposeful, it's intentional and it's probably the act or terrorists?

MR. MELLO: Still didn't think it was terrorists. We didn't know what it was still, personally I didn't know what it was--

MR. AZZARELLO: After the second crash, did--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, after the second one, something's terribly wrong, but I really didn't fathom, really, what it was, but I knew something

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was wrong. And, again, didn't see the second one, heard it, went in and I did see it later, whether it was a reply by the news or something, but it was--

MR. AZZARELLO: You weren't thinking intentional or terrorism or?

MR. MELLO: Not, terrorism.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you thinking intentional?

MR. MELLO: I can't say I was at that second. Thinking back now, yeah, I probably should have but--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what did you learn when New York got on the bridge, did they tell you what they knew about the aircraft?

MR. MELLO: There was some dialogue going on about aircraft. I was in-between that room, the corner room--I was in-between, back here--I was in-between conference room and back in here and going down to the WOC down here a couple of times.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where was Dave Cannoles?

MR. MELLO: As far as I remember him, he

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was pretty much glued to the conference room.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, to the conference room?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, he might have popped in, but again, I was, I know I went out to the--I went back down to the fourth floor--

MR. AZZARELLO: And he was sort of moderating and running and overseeing this conference call, this bridge?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: From that conference room?

MR. KARA: You were one of the out-and-about guys a little bit, then.

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: And how about people from the WOC coming down to your area?

MR. MELLO: No, I don't remember any WOC people coming down.

MR. KARA: Well, let me--not just the WOC, but the people that were in the ACC itself, I'm sorry, I didn't mean May Barry [ph] and company, I meant Jeff Griffith, not Jeff, Doug Davis--

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MR. MELLO: Doug Davis

MR. KARA: Doug Davis or somebody.

MR. MELLO: No, it's funny, I talked to him on the phone, again, I thought he was out there. But didn't see him and I remember a couple of military people, Cheryl Atkins, Colonel Atkins and a couple of her people were up there. Jeff, Rick Hosteddlar [ph], couple of people but--

MR. AZZARELLO: Hosteddlar was here?

MR. MELLO: I'm pretty sure he was, pretty sure he was.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about Mike Scirillo, did you see him?

MR. MELLO: Yes. And they were working--they were working down in these two rooms. This would be where Linda Schuessler sits now, which is AAT-2 and that would have been Jeff Griffith's office at the time. And this is, Jerry Levy [ph] sits back there, I think. But they were using this room for conversations at a higher level than my clearance at that time, I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did any of the information

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that New York and Boston have filter down to you in the early morning hours when that telecon started going and then some of that information was that Boston was tracking the first aircraft that hit the Trade Center, when it shut the transponder off, basically, at first, they lost radio communications and then the transponder was shut off and then there was some transmissions that were overheard in the cockpit about threats and about having more--about having some planes and everybody stay in your seat--was any of that, did any of that filter down to you in the early stages that morning?

MR. MELLO: No, in fact, I happen to be, you know one of the people that probably heard that for the first time from [unintell.] from the tapes, because we got the tapes pretty quick and I got to hear that, but I don't recall any of that coming, you know, coming over that. Again, I was in and out a few times. Then, again, I don't know. I don't know if it came over that or not. But I don't recall that early on, no.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And do you recall any information that you got early on, before you looked at any tapes or anything from New York about the second aircraft, about it switching the transponder code a couple times?

MR. MELLO: No, the only think I--as best as I can remember back then, I remember something about a plane on the Hudson, fast-moving, that's what I remember. I'm pretty sure it came over our telecon, but transponders on and off, primary down-river, then you'd have to say transponder off to me so I know it's either off or inoperative, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: After the second--after the first two planes hit and before the Pentagon was hit, just to put it in sort of a time frame for you--

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --then the second plane hits around 9:02 at the Trade Center and the Pentagon around 9:37.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: There's about 35 minutes in-between there.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: At some point in-between there a report surfaces that the first plane that they thought was the first strike at the Trade Center, American 11, which we now know was American 11--

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --may still have been airborne headed towards Washington and it might not have been the plane that crashed into the Trade Center, in fact, we talked to Doug Davis and he says he got that information from someone up on the tenth floor and then repeated it in the Crisis Center--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that American 11 is still out there and somebody had seen it. What do you--do you recall hearing any of that?

MR. MELLO: It was, you know, there was some confusion on, you know, who and what plane hit

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it, what type plane hit it. And it was, you know, you could hear it coming over, the telecon from a 75 and a 76, I remember there was, either Mike McCormick or someone from up in Eastern Region talking about a route of flight of an American--someone departed Boston, just some dialogue about planes. I do recall something like that.

MR. AZZARELLO: But nothing specific--this is sort of rather specific, it's like first there was a strong belief within the FAA system that American 11 caused the first crash. It was a belief, for example, strongly held at Boston because they were tracking it.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: I imagine some of this stuff, you probably know from looking at or your staff would from reviewing all the tapes.

MR. MELLO: I'm trying to separate that from upstairs because that's, you know, I've got everything in my head, but a lot of it's from reconstructing it all you know.

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MR. AZZARELLO: At the time of--through reconstruction, it was apparent that in the early minutes after the first crash, that Boston felt pretty sure that there was their plane that they lost that went into the Trade Center, that they thought was hijacked, okay. And that--

MR. MELLO: Is that a fact you're telling me?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, I'm telling you that you could see Terry Biggeo [ph] was on the Command Center at, like, 8:55, which is like three minutes after it's hit the media and nine minutes after the crash saying I feel pretty confident that, yeah, I mean, they're asking him, was that, do you think that's the hijacked one? And he pretty much says, hey, as far as from where we stand here?

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: We're pretty certain it looks like the one that we lost before that was hijacked [unintell.].

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that, sort of carries

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for the next, you know, 15 minutes or so and it carries even after the second crash. The second one goes in and New York Center and New York TRACON as, at least early on, some people there have a fair idea that that's 175 because it never shut off it's beacon code, you know, I assume you learned that at some point--

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --afterwards, in the investigation that it didn't shut off the beacon code, it changed it--

MR. MELLO: Changed it.

MR. AZZARELLO: --but there weren't a whole heck of a lot of planes in that area of that controller's scope, so he was able to equate the coast path had with the coast with the original--with the primary.

MR. MELLO: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, at that point, there was some firm situational awareness by New York and Boston that those are the two planes that hit, 11 and 175. But then, shortly thereafter, Boston

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reports that they heard from Washington from a telecon in Washington that American 11 is still airborne and is headed to D.C. And what, if at all, did you find in going back in after the fact and trying to, you know, do the time lines and the accident investigations and the reconstruction and all those efforts?

MR. MELLO: Best as I can remember is there was a confusion factor on one or more, who it was and when it was, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: But we're talking about a plane that, initially, is thought buried in a building, that people in the system are confident about going from that to being, no, you know what, now we're sounding like we're pretty confident that that did not go in and it's still airborne headed South. And none of that--do you recall uncovering any of that and trying to figure out how that happened? Like, all right how did we go from out of the system collectively, go from the situational awareness of, yeah, 11 hit, to it didn't hit, it was a different plane and now it's still airborne

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and it's a threat, now headed toward D.C.?

MR. MELLO: No, I, no, I don't--I know it did happen like that where, you know, there was some dialogue about 11 coming back again, meaning, you know--I don't recall early on, them saying 11 hit the building.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. MELLO: Okay? I remember--

MR. AZZARELLO: It might not have reached you. I mean, it reached other people, but it might not have gotten to your ears.

MR. MELLO: --yeah, but I remember there was some confusion about--if it was 11 or 175, I don't know--but they thought one crashed, no that was the one out West. I don't know, I'd be guessing right now.

MR. KARA: Yeah, but speaking of the one out West. Thinking about 11, when did you first become aware that after the first two towers are--or the World Trade Center towers are hit that there are more problems out there in the national airspace system?

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MR. MELLO: Something came over the telecon and, don't know if it was a military, but heard something to the effect of fast-moving aircraft heading towards Washington. And I could actually hear people calling out miles, 60 miles, 30 miles.

MR. KARA: Do you recall who was calling them out?

MR. MELLO: It sounded like a military person to me, don't know who it was, though.

MR. KARA: It was on your?

MR. MELLO: Yes, but it didn't sound like it was our group, it probably someone who was on our part of some other group, that's what it sounded like to me. Didn't recognize the voice or facility like that.

MR. KARA: Was Colonel Atkins there at the time?

MR. MELLO: She was in and out so much--

MR. KARA: I see.

MR. MELLO: It was a man's voice, not a woman's voice.

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MR. KARA: Well, I was curious as to whether she had any insight as to who it might have been.

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell us what you remember of that, someone was reporting a fast-moving aircraft?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, 60, Northwest,--

MR. AZZARELLO: You remember 60 Northwest?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, 30--30 miles--

MR. AZZARELLO: Thirty miles from where, D.C.?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: What was the universe of possibilities of people that could have been on your Net? We've talked about the centers and we've talked about the TRACONS and we've talked about the Command Center; we've mentioned Eastern Region. Who else would have had the pass code to dial in and be on your Net?

MR. MELLO: All the other centers, Indie--I don't know who else I gave the code to.

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Now, I know that if, I mean, the WOC could have put anyone in. Even though, they can access anyone they want, so did they--

MR. KARA: Oh, so somebody calls into the WOC and says we need to be on the Cannoles Net, they can just add it to them without them dialing in the pass code?

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. KARA: How about the towers and the TRACONS, other than New York?

MR. MELLO: I don't recall any. Some reason Dulles sticks in my head for a minute, but that could have been after the fact, but I thought I heard a conversation with Dulles Tower.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now you said you thought it was a military person who reported it, what makes you think that, what about that?

MR. MELLO: Just the voice sounded like military, like a tactical-type of 30 miles, it sounded, you know, military.

MR. AZZARELLO: You mean because it was with precision, I'm trying to get at what--

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MR. MELLO: Yeah, I mean, the phraseology sounded to be that of a military person more than a controller. You know, like a, you know, a controller doesn't usually talk like that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did any other--recall anybody saying asking who has a bead on that? Who's--

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --where's that coming from, who's giving this report?

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Have you found that, well, in going back and doing a recreation after the fact, I'm trying to get, you know, get down accurately, what happened for an after-action-type summary like this, I assume, did you work on this, like, for Dave?

MR. MELLO: Oh, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. MELLO: Oh, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I know a lot of work.

MR. KARA: You recognize the work.,

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MR. AZZARELLO: I know a lot of work into this, because you're quoting transcripts from facilities and even the threats, you know, as you say that came over the frequency in American 11 that they heard up in DBW. Obviously a lot of work went into this. Did you and your hunt through the tapes, did you find the Dave Cannoles telecon somewhere on the recording?

MR. MELLO: No, because, believe it or not, we never worked on tapes from the Command Center and that's the only place they would have been or that would have been recorded, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, I have a question for you on that. And I'm trying to figure that out. The regions. I know to the extent the regions were on them, that the regions didn't record the times that were involved, the Eastern Region and New England Region.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so that makes sense. The Great Lakes, too, is that correct? The Great Lakes did not.

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MR. MELLO: Did not, I don't think anyone did, regions, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: But there are people, according to, I think the recollection of a lot of people, including what's in about ground stop, you have facilities that people interviewed say that you know, that various entities were on, including FAA Centers and what comes to mind for us right away is, well, the centers usually do record, so wouldn't it be odd that--we haven't found it and we're trying to say, tell us, if you were us, where would you look, then to find a recording of the Cannoles telecon that day, the morning of? Shouldn't it be on, if the centers were on, wouldn't they ordinarily be recording it? New York Center or Boston Center?

MR. MELLO: Well, depends where they dialed in from, I guess.

MR. KARA: If they dialed in from the TMU on an unrecorded line, that would be one possibility.

MR. MELLO: Or the Watch Desk if it's

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unrecorded.

MR. KARA: The Watch-and your experience at ZBC was where the Watch Desk lines were--

MR. MELLO: Half and half, well, there's always a line that you can have a private conversation on, you know, if a wife calling or something like that at mostly all facilities. There was one at the Watch Desk at Washington Center when I was there, you know, that was a few years before this happened, you know, a couple years anyway.

If anyone dialed in on an unrecorded line, yeah at that point, but if anyone called in on a recorded line, it should be somewhere, but--

MR. KARA: On the recorded lines, people dial in and, again, let's use your experience in the ZBC, would it be possible that they dialed in on a push-to-talk to phone?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. KARA: Well, no, that's not a good analogy, because push-to-talk you could hear it if it picked up.

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MR. MELLO: Most of the stuff at the--

MR. KARA: But you guys aren't on push-to-talk at all because you're just simply talking into--

MR. MELLO: Correct, we were muting now and then, just because it was getting loud in our room in the conference room. But we heard--

MR. AZZARELLO: Was anybody in your room, down at--was anyone down in there trying to get a bead on and a handle on how many other aircraft now are out there in the system that might be in the process of being hijacked or are already are hijacked now headed for a building or headed for a target?

MR. MELLO: Actually what was going on in the system from my perspective there, was that was the Command Center side of it, I mean, they could see the system.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you say the Command Center side of it, you're talking about Herndon?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so you're thinking,

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from your perspective, Herndon was the eyes and ears to try and figure out what else is out there?

MR. MELLO: Well, they can see all the planes; they're talking to every center; they're on our line. Now there was talk--like I said, a lot of these anomalies started coming up, U.S. Air wanted to go someplace, like in Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, I forget. Just a lot of things started happening, and all of a sudden, everything you think that could happen is starting to happen. Meanwhile this 60-mile call; 30-mile call's coming. You know, this is all going on, from what I remember at this time. And now, we're saying--we're starting to look out the windows.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. MELLO: And that's, I remember my buddy was over here in this room, you know--

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that Jeff--was that Jeff Logue?

MR. MELLO: Jeff Logue.

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff Logue?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, yeah.

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MR. KARA: What entity in the FAA headquarters complex, and that's an arbitrary word to describe the Command Center, the WOC, with the ACC next to it and the air traffic situation room where you guys work. Of those three entities, which would have the best, most current of accurate information at any one time?

MR. MELLO: Other than individual facilities actually?

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. MELLO: Taping a plane.

MR. KARA: Yes, the guy on the scope's going to have the best, but in terms of that information merging up to these three entities within FAA headquarters, which one at any one point in time would have, included--

MR. MELLO: My opinion would be, at that time, the Command Center because it's not actual radar but they're getting a picture of all the planes, plus they're hearing everything we hear. We can hear it, we can't see nothing.

MR. KARA: They can hear and see, you can

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just hear.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I mean, they can look at a sector, they can look at a state.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know the plane that you heard was bearing down towards Washington, is that the one that actually you say started out at 60-Northwest, 30-miles?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, now, I don't know if we're talking 93 or 11 now--

MR. AZZARELLO: Ninety-three or 77.

MR. MELLO: Excuse me, 93 or 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me ask you about that by trying to put it in a sequence of events.

MR. MELLO: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the two crashes in New York and before the Pentagon crash. In-between those two such events, what was the--did you hear, is that when you heard about the aircraft being 60-miles out, was it before the Pentagon was hit and after New York?

MR. MELLO: Say that one more time.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the two attacks in

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New York--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and you're starting to get the telecon up, Dave Cannoles starting to get the telecon rolling and before the Pentagon was hit.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: What, if anything, did you hear about aircraft approaching Washington?

MR. MELLO: Well, what happened in-between those two, the Pentagon and the two World Trade--

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. MELLO: --was an aircraft we thought crashed out near Kentucky.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about that.

MR. MELLO: They lost radio and radar with an aircraft, which was simultaneous loss of radio and radar, is two things: one, is the airplane falls out of the sky; or, two, you have an electrical failure on the aircraft and you lose everything, can't talk to us, transponder and all type of communications are out. So, there was a

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lot of dialogue going on about American 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: That they thought it crashed?

MR. MELLO: Thought it crashed. And it was--we found out later, but a miscommunication with some local authorities about they were saying there's an accident and we thought they were reporting an accident; and a local sheriff was out there looking for an accident; I don't know how they got word of it, but, so we actually thought this plane was down on the border of Kentucky and Indiana.

MR. KARA: I'm sorry, John. And that was by name, that was by reference to American 77?

MR. MELLO: I think Indie said that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we see on some of the Command Center tapes, and I don't know whether or not this was communications that you could were monitoring from Dave Cannoles telecon, I don't know whether you were linked in, but there are some Command Center conversations between say the 9:20 and the 9:30 range, where they're looking for 77,

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too. Where there's a thought that it might have crashed, but it's not accepted yet as ground truth and there's efforts, obviously, to find out if it is still out there and they're asking all the centers to look for it.

MR. MELLO: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember hearing that from the Cannoles end of things or his telecon?

MR. MELLO: From the telecon side of it, yeah, I remember it being is he down or isn't he down, well, where is he, type questions coming out. Because someone else reported that no, his tag is 40 miles West of something; and, no, no, no, a few minutes later someone says, that's just a tag that froze on the scope, you know, when his transponder went off, the computer froze it or projected he was going to go that way and painted it for a while. So, you know, we're saying where is this guy? Normally, you would think a plane that big fell out of the sky, you'd get immediate reports of it crashing, you know. We didn't get those.

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MR. AZZARELLO: We didn't get those?

MR. MELLO: No, but this sheriff from a little hick town probably, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, give us the sort of, what is it, bring us back to that day in the room and the atmosphere in that room and the dynamics of what was the thoughts in there. Was it that the general thought was that they doubted that it had crashed because you weren't getting that confirmation, that slew of reports coming in that something big fell out of the sky, there's a big crater in Kentucky or the Kentucky/Indiana border? What was the mind set in that room? Was it generally that a belief that it did crash or that it didn't or was it completely unsure if you could let us know.

MR. MELLO: It was like you were going up and down; yes, it crashed; no, it didn't crash, the tag's 40 West. And then the report from the sheriff; no, it crashed. We got a plane, now we got a major accident, so we're thinking a major accident, but yet we had two planes at the

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building--to us there was still an accident out there in the Midwest so we're going to have to launch on and do our normal stuff, you know. And then, somewhere right in that time is something heading towards Washington; something came out about something heading towards Washington, I remember, because that's when we got the angst for we're sitting here at the top of a building in Washington.

MR. AZZARELLO: When did you or anyone else up here in your end of the tenth floor conclude that it was it didn't crash? At what point in the day did you say nothing--77 did not crash, it didn't go down? Or it didn't go down on the ground in Indie?

MR. MELLO: I'll tell you what, I'm talking after all four planes were down, there was still some discussion about where's 77?

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Still not knowing whether or not after all four whether there could have been five total, four that crashed into buildings and then one--

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MR. MELLO: We--we, you know, somewhere down towards the end of the four planes, okay, we're trying to reconstruct this and we're saying 93 did this, 77 did that and we still had a hole with 77 from what I remember, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, were there any thoughts, then, as to what might have hit the Pentagon?

MR. MELLO: Pulse sign [ph], no. A jet, Boeing jet, yes, because it was kind of media plus, you know, my buddy Jeff, he saw it, you know, he saw the circle, he didn't see the impact because it was below building level.

MR. AZZARELLO: He knew it was a commercial jet?

MR. MELLO: Oh, yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: He didn't know what company it was and what airline--

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --but so to the extent that you thought 77 might have crashed somewhere even after the fourth crash, even after the 93 went

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down in Somerset--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --Pennsylvania, to the extent that you were still trying to figure out what happened to 77, the thought was that 77 didn't hit the Pentagon it was another commercial jet we just had to figure out what call sign and what company it was--

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that type of thing. What about another thing and I'm saying, I'm looking back now and putting together the after-action works. You talked a few moments ago about the aircraft that somebody reported over the Cannoles telecon you know, 60-Northwest, 30-miles out and thinking that it was military person who might have been reporting that. Did you--well, let me ask you this, did you, ultimately, when you went back and listened to the tapes and everything and reviewed everything, did you equate that with the plane that actually went into the Pentagon, then, that information that was coming over?

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MR. MELLO: Haven't been involved in a while, but, no, I can't say it was either 93 or 77 because they were both in that not exact time frame but I relate both of them to coming towards Washington.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let's see if we can compare that report to what Jeff Logue did, when he looked out the window and saw a low-flying commercial jet that then disappears over the horizon and next thing you know you hear the report that the Pentagon's been hit. Were those, on that, before we get to what went on after--now, let's try and separate on that day, as you lived it and you remember your friend going next door to look out a window and then coming back with his report. Did you equate those two on that time that the report of, hey, 60-miles Northwest, 30-miles and then, at some point--

MR. MELLO: Personally, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --yeah, did you equate those two events--

MR. MELLO: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --at that time, in your mind were you saying, oh, that must be the plane that Jeff just now saw out the window, which we now hear moments later that there's a crash at the Pentagon, it's probably the one that we just heard somebody reporting 60-Northwest, 30-miles out, you equated them on that day?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then when you went back--now, you're going back after the fact--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --looking at tapes and radar, you know, [unintell.] and radar reductions and everything, did that confirm your thought that they were one and the same when you listened to the various facility tapes and looked at the radar data?

MR. MELLO: Well, we didn't have a time line for that, rather than what we reconstructed.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't have a time line for?

MR. MELLO: For the telecon.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. MELLO: We didn't have a time channel to say, this happened at 30.42 seconds, you know, which is a calculation of, you know, whoever happened to be jotting something down on the white-board at the time or taking typing it in looking at a watch or a clock.

MR. KARA: We think this chronology came from--

MR. AZZARELLO: We showed this to Dave Cannoles yesterday, and he said he thinks this looks like probably a chronology that his people--some of his staff put together and he commented that he thought that it wasn't necessarily accurate either; there were a lot of things that, you know, just because of the nature of the confusion that day and the various reports that were coming in that these times might not be very accurate. So, if we show you this, don't take this as being accurate.

MR. MELLO: I understand.

MR. AZZARELLO: It says at 10:14 a.m.

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here, fast-moving aircraft, 60-Northwest, DC, Southeast-bound, headed towards D.C. Now, we don't know because we can't verify the accuracy of the time. We don't know whether or not this happened at or around 10:14 or that it happened before the Pentagon was hit, which was at 9:37 and somebody didn't log it until 10:14 that they had heard a report earlier, that there was a fast-moving aircraft.

And I don't know if looking at the other events, as they're logged here, and where in comparison to where the fast-moving aircraft was logged, whether that would jar your memory as to whether or not they would have been one and the same as the plane that hit the Pentagon or was it a separate event--would that have been a different aircraft after the Pentagon was hit that would be recorded.

MR. MELLO: Yes, I mean, at the time, the mileage that I heard being counted out over the telecon, I related that to 77--

MR. AZZARELLO: You related that to the

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Pentagon?

MR. MELLO: This I related to 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: This entry, you do?

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know if I follow you on that.

MR. KARA: Let me--let me further muddy the waters a bit. At some point, ZOB, Cleveland Center is on a call with the Command Center. And I believe ZDC is on that Chicago is on it, Great Lakes is on it.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: It starts because the Attorney General is in Milwaukee and wants to come back, so they get together to decide how they're going to bring November 4 back in, which is the Attorney General. In the course of that four-way or five-way conversation, Cleveland starts counting down 93. They don't count it down in terms of distance so much

MS. SULLIVAN: they count it down in terms of, he's turning left, he's turning right,

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but he's definitely coming southeasterly.

MR. MELLO: Right.

MR. KARA: Do you recall being on that or that being part of your Net concerning A) the attorney general, and B) Cleveland Center providing a real-time countdown on 93?

MR. MELLO: I remember 93 came over--discussion about 93 coming over the telecon. I remember November--I don't know if it was four, I thought it was one or two, but those discussions. I thought it was a little later with the November, though, after--

MR. KARA: There were--that saga continued on--

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: --it just simply started with him in Milwaukee and trying to get him back. It dominates the airways for a couple of hours on where's he going to land, what are they going to do.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. KARA: But the genesis of it was he's

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in Milwaukee, he's got to come back. And the interest to us is that it's concurrent with Cleveland having a primary coverage on 93--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. KARA: --after it passes Pittsburgh tower.

MR. MELLO: Yeah. I remember the Pittsburgh thing coming over.

MR. AZZARELLO: Actually, I just noticed some things I think we could acknowledge now, looking back in hindsight.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And probably what Dave said we didn't have a lot of confidence in these times here being very accurate. If you look up here, it's got 10:07, second impact World Trade Center. And we now know that occurred around 9:02 and some seconds, so that's an entry, that's an hour and five minutes delay. Do you agree on that?

MR. MELLO: This one here?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, 10:07. Just before the 10:07, it says lost radar with United 93 south

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of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. I don't expect you to remember this off the top of your head, but in putting this together, that was one of the things your people did was look at when the transponder was lost on 93. That says, what, 10:07?

MR. MELLO: Yep.

MR. AZZARELLO: And here it says 9:41 the transponder signal was lost. So, again, there's a significant, there with about a 26-minute lag off an entry--I just want to finish with this and bring it down to here. This 60-miles fast-moving aircraft now at 10:14, 60-Northwest of D.C. The very next minute, 10:15, it says UA 93 is down, confirmed already by C130 on the site, so it would seem, wouldn't it seem a little bit unlikely that those two entries are related to the same plane?

MR. MELLO: Well--

MR. BROWN: Given where the United crashed?

MR. AZZARELLO: Given where it crashed, yeah.

MR. KARA: Let me interject something else

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off the Cleveland count-down; in addition to the transponder on 93, going off at what was it, 9:40?

MR. AZZARELLO: Nine-forty-one.

MR. KARA: One, it comes back on at about 10:03, so they picked up the transponder, again on 93; so there's two different--and so they lose it again, so--that, I just wanted to put that in there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. MELLO: I related--I always related the 60-Northwest, southeast-bound to United--

MR. AZZARELLO: To United-- you always did?

MR. MELLO: I always did. Because we had a report somewhere, you know, to me 60 Northwest is a little further southeast than Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 60-Northwest is about Camp David. Camp David, we thought if we had a plane crash in Camp David. So, that always to me, was 93. My recollection was from the West, East and coming in from the Southeast was American to the Pentagon.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Let me ask you

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this: In the aftermath of 9/11, when you were putting together the accident investigation, well, it was also actually accident packages, right, for each of the four aircraft?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is just a summary of all four events.

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just from the amount we've learned in the short time in our Commission work in the meeting with FAA personnel, it's a very meticulous and sort of exact type of work even when there's--not only when there's an accident, but even when there's an incident.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And there's a loss of separation in aircraft. There is a certain amount of precision involved in pulling end caps and controller tapes and trying to say where did that error occur and let's see if that error will not occur again.

Tell me, if I'm wrong, but I would imagine

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that one of the things--not you, personally--but you the FAA would want to do after 9/11 was to say, well, now let's go back and see what's the earliest that A) somebody could have picked up American Airlines 77 that hit the Pentagon; and now, let's look at, listen to tapes from all the controlling agencies through whose airspace it traveled and let's see who, indeed, pick it up at the earliest; and then let's find out whether or not they reported it to the system at the earliest possible time that they picked it up. Was that done, am I accurate in thinking that something like that was done along the way, either here or somewhere outside of this summary work?

MR. MELLO: If anyone did it, we didn't do it in my shop. We didn't. We reconstructed the flight paths, the communications and that kind of stuff to present a pictorial for, maybe more law-enforcement, you know, for the FBI, for the antiterrorism. You know, we were providing them all the information. I mean, that's not a book we would have done under any other circumstances.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, how about the accident packages--

MR. MELLO: The packages we do. The packages we do for litigation. That's why we make an accident package.

MR. AZZARELLO: And in that incident, would that be one of the things you'd look at in terms of 77 and 90--or all of them, let's stay with 77--

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: --let's talk about, for that matter, accident packages for litigation. To the extent that litigation would result even from the events of 9/11 by either someone on-board 77's aircraft or someone at the Pentagon who was killed--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --wouldn't one of the things that one might think about as an issue not just for litigation purposes, but for lessons learned and how can we improve going forward, if somebody else wants to, you know, in September of

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2002, hijack a plane, shut off the transponder and try to fake us out so that we can't follow it easily--let's find out when our system did pick it up; what was the earliest it was picked up that it could have been even reported? Was that done on 77?

MR. MELLO: After the fact?

MR. AZZARELLO: After the fact, yeah.

MR. MELLO: After the fact we found that people who were not probably aware of the situation, different sectors at Indie, or, as a matter of fact, I think it was another center who had overlapping coverage.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: Where the controller sitting at the scope that was working 77, lost the tag--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: --and lost the primary that someone else, if they were working the guy or had the responsibility to work him, they could see him, but they, you know, it was someone that wasn't in their airspace, wasn't under their control, so with

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a primary going across, it happens all the time, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yet it could have been put up, you're saying--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I mean, you know, I mean we found out that different systems were recording it, we gave you a picture of what the flight looked like.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. MELLO: That's based on us reconstructing that somewhere, somehow, it was recorded somewhere. But the person working the scope at Indianapolis, that lost radar and radio communications with American didn't see what you're seeing there, they saw a blank scope with a guy going due West-bound and projected he was continuing West and off, went straight down.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, then, now, let's go back to your memory of the day when Jeff Logue goes to look at the window at the aircraft bearing down on D.C. What's the furthest out you recall that plane being reported to you through the Canoles

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telecon before it crashed at the Pentagon? Do you recall that--what do you recall it, how close to D.C. do you recall it being recorded?

MR. MELLO: I remember, 30 West, I remember a call at 30 West. And, again, Dulles tower plays in here somehow, but I don't know if it was them reporting it or someone else. Someone said something about a aircraft 30 West.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you equate that with 77, though later--or wait till it gets to the Pentagon?

MR. MELLO: No, after the crash --

MR. AZZARELLO: After?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And not just a aircraft--

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that might have just zipped by and was landing?

MR. MELLO: No, and when I say after, after we reconstructed it. Not after--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MR. MELLO: --not after the crash itself,

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Impression talking that night, maybe or the next day when we could see the actual track. Not that far. I mean, when we got reports that it probably was an American plane that hit the Pentagon, you know, then we put two and two together that it was American 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: If I were to say, and just tell me if I'm [unintell.] little confused now, but if I were to say your real-time recollection the day of, when the Pentagon was hit, not what you learned even later that night--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --but when it was hit that there was some countdown and then it was, Jeff looks out the window and it had hit, it was reported that the Pentagon was hit, was your recollection at the moment, oh, that must be the plane that they reported being about 30 miles out a little while ago?

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, okay.

MR. MELLO: No.

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MR. AZZARELLO: So, do you remember--the countdown that you were hearing, was there more than one countdown or was it just one countdown?

MR. MELLO: No, there were several countdowns, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there a countdown associated with, in your mind at the time it happened associated with the crash at the Pentagon?

MR. MELLO: No, there was different calls; we have aircraft 60-West; we have an aircraft 30-West; not a countdown.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. MELLO: I do remember more of a countdown associated with 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean, we have, is it a Dulles tape or where is that, there's a Dulles TRACON or, where's the tape with them saying 6 fast-moving aircraft; 6--5-miles out, at Dulles or Reagan tower?

MR. KARA: But I don't recall any of the FAA tapes going 6, 5, 4, 3, or anything like that. We've got the fast-moving aircraft 6-miles from the

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White House.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, that's reported not by Scott even up in Boston.

MR. KARA: Yeah, and that's reported initially by Dulles TRACON, or at Dulles, I'm not saying TRA--tower.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dulles tower's saying it's--well, the one the woman picked it up on the Dulles--Dan--Daniele O'Brian.

MR. KARA: Daniele O'Brian, picked it up.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know if that's something that you learned from your investigation afterwards? That you knew that Daniele O'Brian picked it up on her scope? And it was reported--

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --over some open line. Six miles, I think was the furthest was the point it was out at that point.

MR. KARA: I'd have to go back and look to be sure. [off microphone]

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you go back in the after review and determine from listening to any

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tapes what was the earliest that anybody picked up 77 and reported it? Was it Daniele O'Brian, was she the first one, as far as you recall that was able to pick it up? Bad question, not was able to pick it up on a scope, but, in fact, did?

MR. MELLO: Probably the first person to say something about it, but, again, people just based on what the radar recorded, both primary and secondary, you know, other positions or centers were recording it--did someone see it? Yep, did the note? No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, that's what I'm saying, did anybody see, I mean, I know that, yeah, you hear Command Center and they're telling people at the centers, put your primaries on, you know, keep your antennas up, beware of anything unusual; loss of coms, communications or transponder signals and be alert. When you went back and did your review in your investigation for the investigation packages and everything, did you--were you able to determine that somebody did pick it up before Daniele and it was a little bit further out and

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reported, hey, I have a primary here, I don't know what it is, and it's headed toward D.C.

MR. MELLO: We didn't find that, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Didn't find that?

MR. MELLO: No. Again, it was recorded and we could reconstruct it, but did someone see and say something, we didn't find that. And, again, not to put words in her mouth, I don't know if she knew what it was either. She just knew it was an aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right she wasn't reporting it as American 11, when was saying--

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm. So, I guess, just to recap on 77, do you remember, you say, you do or you don't remember any countdown at all being associated with it, no countdown, but a--

MR. MELLO: Not a countdown, but I remember some mileage calls. I remember 60, I remember about 30. Those two ring in my head.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sixty and 30?

MR. MELLO: Yes, 60 out and then 30-West,

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I remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the same aircraft or are they two different aircraft, the 60 and the 30, if you know.

MR. MELLO: I recall it as being the same.

MR. AZZARELLO: One and the same at 60 and 30, and do you--what aircraft did you acquaint that with? You don't know?

MR. MELLO: The 60 and the 30, I equated that with now, I know American, I equated it with the Pentagon, not knowing it was American.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, okay, you equated it with the Pentagon, okay.

MR. KARA: Was the--

MR. MELLO: We even said something to the, let's look at the window, Jeff or something like that.

MR. KARA: Earlier in the sequence on 93, this is off of the TNC radar associate position at Washington tower, we've got Beckey and I'm not sure who Beckey is, talking about United 93, said southeast of Pittsburgh, heading back towards D.C.,

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primary only headed our way; 20 Southeast of Pittsburgh coming down 518. Do you remember that kind of specificity on any of the tapes you listened to?

MR. MELLO: [off microphone] [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: What do you remember about, on the day of, not after, on the day of, 93, do you remember that any reports coming in on United 93 before it crashed?

MR. MELLO: I remember, initially, something from Cleveland was headed on 93. Who they were on, now and again, on the telecon side. I do remember a, he's turning, something to the effect that he's turning back now.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know where it was coming from?

MR. MELLO: No, it was coming over the air, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: You said, Cleveland, did you know whether it was coming from Cleveland Center or--

MR. MELLO: Yes, Cleveland Center. And I

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remember a call about Pittsburgh. Heading towards Pittsburgh, someone said heading towards Pittsburgh and then, I don't know two or three minutes later, we heard someone says, Pittsburgh tower evacuating. And we all kind of chuckled on it.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this is coming over the Cannoles telecon?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: What were the reports, the specific reports about 93, what were they saying about 93 from Cleveland, what was the situational awareness?

MR. MELLO: I remember the transponder went off; there was a turn made; and I think we were--there was other aircraft in the area and I think they were trying get altitude reports from other, hey, where is this guy now; and I remember someone said he's--I remember the last one, the 8,000 feet or something like that. But I thought there was a report of an altitude before that one.

MR. KARA: That's what you just said is

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off of that conversation I described between Cleveland Command Center in the Great Lakes.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: Passably ZDC was on it. Sounds like you might have picked up part of that here.

MR. AZZARELLO: Like some Command Center position between--

MR. KARA: Yeah, that's one of those tapes we just got, back on original code, it's an 8200P, just when the transponder came back on, the 8,000 foot, the specificity of that comment is in that transcript.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did anyone sort of talk about the reports of bomb on-board, do you remember if that came over the--

MR. MELLO: I didn't hear that or any conversations about anything that was overheard until I started listening to the tapes. Not to say it wasn't said, I just didn't hear it.

MR. AZZARELLO: That day, you didn't hear it. Do you remember if anybody from Cleveland Center was reporting where it was headed, what

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direction 93 was?

MR. MELLO: Southeast-bound, I remember at the time, they said it was Southeast-bound.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if that information--or was any of that information taken out of that room out of the Cannoles telecon room and brought down to the WOC or do you know if the information was independently going down to the WOC in the crisis center?

MR. MELLO: I don't know. I know people were going back and forth, so I would--I don't want to assume, but that's probably what they were taking the information like that back and forth, but.

MR. AZZARELLO: How would you describe your role that morning, let's say after 9:00 o'clock, after the second crash, between then--let's take the time frame between--after the second crash in New York and when the National Airspace System was clear, no aircraft [unintell.] we're talking about roughly a two-hour period. If you were sitting at, you know, whatever you were

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sitting at the bar with your buddies and you said this is what I did that morning, this was my duties, how would you characterize it?

MR. MELLO: Fireman at headquarters, not to fight the fire, but trying to handle a crisis. In other words, someone needed a drink of water or call the Command Center and get me this person, I was doing all that. I was trying to keep up with what was on the board. I didn't write on the board anything. I was kinda like support for Dave. You know, he would give me something to do and I'd do it, you know. And that's usually my role with him anyway.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were support?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, talked to Dave but it felt like it was, you know, we were fire fighters that day, we were just reacting to something we never did before, I never did before or, you know fathom.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was any part of your assignment that day, your role, to bring and courier information from the Cannoles telecon room

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down to the WOC or to the Crisis Center?

MR. MELLO: No, I never went to either one that day.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. You never went to either the ROC or the Crisis Center that day, that morning, let's say between 9:00 and 12:00?

MR. MELLO: No, no, uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you, for the majority of the time, stay back in that area?

MR. MELLO: Other than I went, I remember I went to the bathroom one time, down to the fourth floor, because what I had my folks do down there was dial in from down there so there wouldn't be more people upstairs, but yet they could have the benefit of what's going on because you know, we needed to know what to ask for and start putting this thing together. Doug Gould was one of the person downstairs I had monitoring the telecon.

MR. KARA: Doug stayed downstairs?

MR. MELLO: Ninety-five percent of the time, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: What telecon was he

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monitoring?

MR. MELLO: Same one, just a different location.

MR. KARA: He was monitoring that from downstairs?

MR. MELLO: Fourth floor, yeah. I can't help it but it's laughable, the telecon was monitored from a thousand locations, [unintell.] we forgot a copy of the tape. Pretty amazing isn't it?

MR. KARA: Were you involved at all in the study we just learned about yesterday for MITRE Corporation to put together a very detailed analysis of what they called the Air Traffic Situation Room, which is another room for the Cannoles telephone?

MR. MELLO: No, I knew MITRE, I mean, they have a lot of contracts with us.

MR. KARA: But you don't recall any--

MR. MELLO: Specifically, no, uh-huh.

MR. KARA: Do you recall anyone in Mr. Cannoles' shop asking MITRE to do a review of the

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events of 9/11?

MR. MELLO: No, I do recall, I remember Nancy Kolonowski was working with MITRE had something to do with 9/11, but didn't know what the--

MR. KARA: And Nancy is head of [unintell.]?

MR. MELLO: No, she works, at that time she worked for ATA Sabre [ph], she worked for Sabre, she was her deputy. ATA-2, I think her designator was.

MR. KARA: She was the deputy to who?

MR. MELLO: Sabre Kalahia.

MR. KARA: How do you spell her last name?

MR. MELLO: Last, K-a-l-a-h-i, Kalahia, something like that, i-a.

MR. KARA: And Sabre is?

MR. MELLO: S-a-b-r-e?

MR. AZZARELLO: On that telecon that day, the Cannoles telecon, SIMULTANEOUS CONVERSATION: [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: The Cannoles telecon, it's

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referred to as the Air Traffic Telecon, the Cannoles Telecon, well, because we have the Primary Net and the Tactical Nets and they had names, but Dave started one that day it seemed sort of ad hock, it became the Cannoles Traffic Telecon. On that telecon, were you able to tell from anything you were hearing on it that morning, other than, you know, you were already saying you think a military-type person was reporting 60-miles Northwest, did you hear any other activity that period to be clearly activity of a military entity trying to coordinate with the FAA to locate either 77 or 93, so that they can go and try to track it down?

MR. MELLO: On the telecon, no, I was hearing some stuff from the military people outside.

MR. AZZARELLO: Outside your room here?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, just outside the actual room we were in, you know, there's basically where the secretary sat out there, there's a lot of room out there. But the military people in and out;

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they'd come in and out, but there was talk about fighters being up and stuff like that, I but specific--

MR. AZZARELLO: General fighters being up?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Nothing specific?

MR. MELLO: Uh-uh.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about your role in the Summary of Air Traffic Events [unintell.] what was your role in helping to put this together?

MR. MELLO: Well, let's see, I was, well, as a manager, I kind of assigned tasks for that, myself and Tony Ferrante. I was, again, I was assistant division, Tony was Division, so he was my immediate boss, Cannoles is our second-line, you know, boss's boss. Ferrante wasn't here the day of 9/11, he was in Chicago.

MR. KARA: Chicago, yeah.

MR. MELLO: So, the initial and we didn't know what the product was going to look like or what we were going to do with this, initially, because, again, we normally do accident packages.

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But we started putting together something, you know. It started getting into each flight. But I was just, you know, you do the transcript, you take care of the tape, let's make re-recordings and, I mean, things were coming in, like--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was sort of managing the whole project, who was overseeing it?

MR. MELLO: Dave was down there, I was there, and the following day Tony came in. So, it was, you know, who's in charge? Dave. And then me and Tony, you know, took, Dave's lead and worked the issues.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if you had to say who was overseeing it it would be Dave Cannoles was overseeing it?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And if you had to describe your role--what was your role putting it together?

MR. MELLO: I did everything from fill the paper in the printers, get coffee, to help type up the transcripts. Yeah, review the data.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you gather the--who

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gathered the end caps and the radar reduction data?

MR. MELLO: Well, the regions did. I mean, they came from facilities.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who received them?

MR. MELLO: I did, Dan Diggins did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Diggins help out on this, too?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, right. Gould.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug Gould?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. KARA: How is it that Doug keeps getting sent to Iraq and you don't get sent there?

MR. MELLO: Doug's living out something he probably couldn't live out when he was in the military. That's my figuring.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the people that worked on under Dave Cannoles direction were yourself, Dan Diggins, Doug Gould, Tony Ferrante.

MR. MELLO: Yes, Jeff Meyers [ph], and Captain Meyers was in the WOC.

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff and Catherine Meyers?

MR. MELLO: Yeah. Molly Boyan [ph] did

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some administrative stuff on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you split up the responsibility of reviewing the tapes or was there a tape person, you know, was there a tape man and a radar person or was it all?

MR. MELLO: We all helped do everything.

MR. AZZARELLO: Everybody pitched in with everything?

MR. MELLO: Whatever was the hot thing to do at that minute, we were doing it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Something we actually talked about yesterday with Dave Cannoles was the first two aircraft, 11 and 175, had references to notifications to the military as reflected in the military logs, NEADS, the references in the NEADS logs.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: They show the notification times for 11 and 175 for the military, but there's no notification times indicated for United 93 and American 77. And what do you know about that?

MR. MELLO: We couldn't physically fine a

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time associated to someone's log or anything that was recorded, other than the military being on here with us during the situation, the last two. And then being at the Command Center, and the military people right behind us, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the conclusion, then, collectively, yourself and the group? Let's start with, say, 93, was your conclusion that you couldn't pin a time on the notification of 93 and so, it was left out or that there was no notification of 93, which was it? Or that there was, you thought there was, but you couldn't pin a time?

MR. MELLO: If we pinned something down, we wanted to show you a document that it was written on or a tape it was recorded on. That's kind of how we did it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you review--you reviewed the Cleveland Center tapes, though, right?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And somebody did, I don't mean you, personally, a person did, just take a

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look at the first couple of pages--I think you have controller conversations, right?

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just sort of read through that to the next page.

[Pause.]

MR. MELLO: Okay, next page?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Most of those entries--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --aside from particular time are pretty much linked to specific datapoint, an FAA datapoint, for example the tapes. The transponder gone off is linked to the radar, right?

MR. MELLO: Radar returns, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Radar returns. Then you've got, like, when the report went from Cleveland Center to Great Lakes Regional Operations Center, is that something, doesn't indicate whether it's tape or not, but I guess that would either be a tape or interviewing people?

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MR. MELLO: My recollection there is that it was a notification sheet from Cleveland Center to the ILC with a time written down.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sort of a checklist?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, a checklist, yeah. Either that or from their Operations Log.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you've got, say, 10:00 o'clock, here an entry that says the time is approximate based on personnel statements [unintell.] so I guess would you have the opportunity to review them or did they interview the controllers?

MR. MELLO: After the fact, the statements came here, so we reviewed all those.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were reviewing the written statements, they weren't actual interviews then, that your people conducted?

MR. MELLO: No, we, my shop, didn't go out and do interviews. The FBI went out and did interviews.

MR. AZZARELLO: This last entry here at 10:41, it says a note, Although this is the

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officially documented notification time, FAA officials were aware of the accident--talking about United 93--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --as these events were reported as they occurred on a Critical Event Teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters Building. What's that Critical Event Teleconference?

MR. MELLO: That's the Cannoles, that's what I assume it is. Critical Events.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know why you assume because you helped put this together and I assume that there's some--

MR. MELLO: That's what I believe it is.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, help us out here, there's a couple of things going on that and from what we can tell there are two main notes, whatever so to speak, of communication. One was going on in the Crisis Center.

MR. MELLO: Uh-huh.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Aviation Crisis Center

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on this end of the tenth floor.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: There was a secure video teleconference with the highest level of executive level of the FAA, White House and others here. And then you had, down on your end of the floor which is the Cannoles, the Air Traffic end.

MR. KARA: Actually there's two nets in here, there's Primary Net going up and the Tactical Net within FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: We don't know if the Tac Net was run out of here, yet.

MR. MELLO: At that time, I didn't have the clearance to be in any of that, so I didn't--

MR. AZZARELLO: In any of that.

MR. KARA: So we're not sure where the Tactical Net was being run.

MR. MELLO: Well, when you say telecon to me that's what telecon, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, you're referring to a Critical Event Teleconference, you were, your opinion is or you're saying the Cannoles

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Teleconference.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I don't know whoever put that in there, again, I was involved in writing most of this, but to me that is that, that is [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand you're not speaking for everyone of those in the division, but your personal understanding is you would think this Critical Event Teleconference would be the one that Dave Cannoles was moderating--

MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --himself?

MR. KARA: Within the MITRE package that we just got yesterday, there's an appendix that is a Critical Incident List. CI-1, CI-2, up to about, there are as many 20 critical events. Was someone within this entity down here maintaining a critical incident or a critical events list, linearly as they occurred?

MR. MELLO: The closest thing I would say is our reconstructed log, it would be logged-

MR. KARA: the one we just looked at?

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MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. KARA: What I was trying to do the terminology, John just gave you there, equates to the terminology that's written--

MR. MELLO: Sounds like it's their terminology, it's not something that we--

MR. KARA: It's not yours?

MR. MELLO: No.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about, sticking with Cleveland Center and 93, did you look at the TMU tapes, did you have those available to you, too?

MR. MELLO: After?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MR. MELLO: No, we didn't. We had SATORI, which is a, basically, have you ever seen the SATORI.

MR. KARA: Yes, we've seen the SATORI.

MR. MELLO: To a controller a SATORI's better than the TSD which you see [unintell.] we see with the controller more or less, not identical, but close to it.

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MR. AZZARELLO: So, you saw what the controller--

MR. MELLO: A replay of the radar cap.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you're also looking at what the controller's saying and communicating?

MR. MELLO: Listening.

MR. AZZARELLO: Listening to and communicating. And beyond those tapes, the controller tapes, did you ask for any other tapes, did you ask for any other tapes in the Centers. Did you ask them for the Watch Desk tapes to see what they were doing on their end?

MR. MELLO: No. We asked for ATC tapes and we asked for all logs of the facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you ask for all ATC tapes or just the ATC tapes of the controllers that handled any part of the subject--

MR. MELLO: Well, we held everything from the day and then we took what we needed to reconstruct that, you know. We went through this sector we got that frequency, that position.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to the extent that for

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each of these four flights it talks about the center notifying their chain of command either the Region or the Washington Operations Center that would have been sourced not from tapes, to the best of your recollection, but from logs or checklists?

MR. MELLO: Either at the facility level or at the regional ops center or the WOC level, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Here, I'll give you an idea, here's one on American 11. New England Regional Ops Center advised Washington Operations Center, the WOC, of suspected hijacking of American 11, would that have been based--what would that have been sourced on, if you know?

MR. MELLO: By your New England ROC log, WOC log. Because, the only reason I'm saying that is we didn't listen to tapes from either of those.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, the only thing is--is it your understanding that the only tapes that were listened to were the controller tapes for those that handled the four planes?

MR. MELLO: Controller tapes or there was

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a couple of coordination lines, but ATC stuff.

MR. AZZARELLO: How did you and the other people in your group that was putting this together pin down notification times to the military, because that was one of the things that we talked with Dave Cannoles about yesterday that it was important from a lot of different perspectives to just try to figure out when did the FAA tell the military about each of the four planes?

MR. MELLO: From the center logs, I thought we got one or two off there. I know we had a couple of logs from the military--

MR. AZZARELLO: A NEADS log, from [unintell.] that's referenced.

MR. MELLO: Did you have, or, like, I remember, like with Cape, I think we actually heard the controller call to the unit out there, Otis or whatever's out there on the Cape, so we assumed that, I mean, we took that as a call to the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: You reference Boston Center, yeah calling the Cape TRACON and asking

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them to notify--Boston Center's asking Cape TRACON to go let Otis know that they're co-located, go ask the military--tell the military we need some help.

That, by the way, I think was, was that a TMU tape CBW, call into the TRACON?

MR. KARA: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was actually, I mean, I just happened to remember that one because it's the one that sticks out in your mind, that was Dan Bueno [ph], from Boston Center, he was at a TMU desk, he was a supervisor--an area supervisor. Went to the TMU and called the Cape TRACON. So I assume then, for that, that you did have a TMU tape for that and I guess it--

MR. MELLO: A TMU tape or a statement that says I did that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know which it is it's either a tape. It's a tape with Dan Bueno's great recollection. All right so, there are, for the first two flights, as I said, there are specific military notifications. Not for the second two. Did that come to the attention of your

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group as you were putting this together that there appeared to be no specific notification times that were in here on the last two flights, notification to the military?

MR. MELLO: It came to us that we didn't have a figure we could go to because anything we did--we knew that the military rep Command Center we didn't want to go with the time that they were there, because they were there the whole time. Did someone out there actually tell them, I think one of our statements from the Command Center or one of their logs is that they reached over and we mentioned something about I don't know which aircraft it is now, but, you know, they mentioned something to their liaison, military liaison. To them that's military notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was this that was doing that?

MR. MELLO: Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Command Center you're talking about the CARF [ph]?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember what, reading that in the transcript somewhere or somebody saying that they think they'd been notified by the--

MR. MELLO: Might have been in our log, [unintell.] log.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think we're done. We can actually pretty much wrap up here. I just wanted to know if, Jeff, if you were able to find that tape?

MR. BROWN: Yeah, well, I've got the--

MR. AZZARELLO: You have it loaded.

MR. BROWN: I have the 4525 one. Is that the one you'd like?

MR. AZZARELLO: Where does it start at?

MR. BROWN: It starts at 8:34.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah that would have been too early for you are up after the first crash, right?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you started getting the telecon rolling after the second crash?

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MR. MELLO: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, start it after 9:05, you know after the second crash.

AUDIO TAPE PLAYED [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: So would that indicate then that they're probably not yet [unintell.] on that?

MR. MELLO: I remember we had to call a couple times-- [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: What does that say 8:30?

MR. BROWN: 8:32.

MR. AZZARELLO: 8:32, so that's near 9:08/9:07, it's still pretty early, I mean because the second aircraft crashed at 9:02 almost 9:03, I mean, you're talking a matter of 4 minutes, trying to get them up, you know, trying to get the Command Center on the telephone.

MR. BROWN: Further?

MR. AZZARELLO: So, Karen Montgomery [ph], is Jeff Griffiths

AUDIO TAPE PLAYED [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know who that is

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talking?

[END SEGMENT 1]

MR. AZZARELLO: We made some efforts when we were off the tape trying to locate, off the record here in the interview just trying to locate a tape to see if you can tell us [unintell.] part of a telecon that Dave Cannoles was running that day and we have Command Center tapes here and then we were unable to find the one that was linked into the--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I recognized nothing on there that I heard on the telecon that day.

MR. AZZARELLO: Miles do you have any other questions?

MR. KARA: No, appreciate very much your time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thanks for your time.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DARLENE FREEMAN

BY

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN AZZARELLO

SPECIAL AGENT JEFF BROWN

SPECIAL AGENT MILES KARA

BROOKE LEWIS, FAA

Tuesday, April 8, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's April 8, and we're at FAA headquarters in Washington about to begin an interview with Darlene Freeman. I'm John Azzarello, Team 8, 9-11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9-11 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9-11 Commission.

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis, Chief Counsel of Federal Aviation Administration's Office.

MS. FREEMAN: I'm Darlene Freeman. I'm now director of Corporate Learning and Development in Human Resources Office.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a long title. Director of Corporate Learning--

MS. FREEMAN: Corporate Learning and Development.

MR. KARA: You're in the Human Resources Office?

MS. FREEMAN: In Human Resources Management.

MR. KARA: You know my good friend Cary Lang?

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MS. FREEMAN: Oh, yeah.

MR. KARA: I used to car pool with her.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could you start off perhaps by giving us a little overview of your career at the FAA in terms of when you started and the various positions you held, briefly describing those leading up to 9-11 and the position you held on that day.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay. I started with the FAA in 1977 with the Staff Attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel. I then went here in Washington. I then went to Eastern Region as regional counsel for the FAA up there. I came back here, and I don't know if I should go through all of the positions I've held.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe just briefly. You don't have to give a description but if we have any questions about what the roles are in those positions, we'll ask you.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay. I came back here and I worked briefly on a special project for the Administrator's office which is called Impact '88,

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1988. From there I became deputy director for Civil Aviation Security. And from there, I became deputy associate administrator for Aviation Standards. After that, I was associate administrator for Aviation Safety. I then became associate administrator for Aviation Standards. And after that, I became deputy associate administrator for Air Traffic Services. I then took three years leave without pay to accompany my spouse to Brussels. He was transferred there. When I returned, I became--that would have been in the year 2000. I was director of Safety and Special Studies in the deputy administrator's office. That was the position I held on 9-11.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was Safety and Studies?

MS. FREEMAN: I worked for Safety and Special Studies.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: Special Studies, and that was for you said the deputy?

MS. FREEMAN: For the deputy

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administrator. And then after that, I took the position that I'm now in.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were with the Region 2 in the Counsel's Office--

MS. FREEMAN: Eastern Region of the Regional Counsel.

MR. AZZARELLO: When was that?

MS. FREEMAN: That was from 1985 to 1987.

MR. AZZARELLO: Eastern Region Counsel's Office?

MS. FREEMAN: Regional Counsel, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you the counsel for the region?

MS. FREEMAN: Regional counsel, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how about your--you said deputy director of Civil Aviation Security? What year was that?

MS. FREEMAN: That was 1988 to about 1990 I believe.

MR. AZZARELLO: This Civil Aviation Security at that time, was it broken down? Under

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the umbrella of ACS, was there a civil aviation--in Operations or was it structured differently?

MS. FREEMAN: It was structured differently. Back then, Civil Aviation Security was--the organization was an office, and under it, there were divisions. There was an-- Division. There was also, as I recall, there was a division for domestic security and a division for foreign security. It was a different organization.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it was headed by the director position and you were right underneath the director as deputy director?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was the director then?

MS. FREEMAN: His name was Ray Salazar.

MR. AZZARELLO: Ray Salazar?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And your next position after that?

MR. KARA: Can I go back to that position for a moment? At the time you were within that umbrella of activity or line of business, was the

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role of hijacking coordinator part and parcel of the deputy director's duties?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes. I mean it was part of--not part of my role, my job specifically, but we did have an operations group and they would handle hijackings.

MR. KARA: You recall who had that role? I know we're going back a little bit.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, and my recollection is that his name was Donnie Blazer. He's now deceased, but my recollection is that he was the one who had that role.

MR. AZZARELLO: You had an Operation division then you said?

MS. FREEMAN: My recollection is that the way it was structured back then it was domestic operations and foreign operations, but there was a reorganization during the time that I was there, so I may not have that quite accurately. But there was definitely domestic operations group, and Donnie Blazer was the division manager, and he handled the hijacking crisis center.

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MR. KARA: Let me share this with you. This is the line and block chart that we understand was as of 9-11. So this would be maybe a couple of reorganizations removed, but the job sounds similar. The blocks have changed a little bit. This is Civil Aviation Security and this is ACO. This is ACI working for Claudia--today and this is where Lee-- was on 9-11 and Lee--we understand was the hijacking coordinator on 9-11. So given the fact that you had been in this organization, we were just probing you a little bit on that. But this sounds like the area where the hijacking coordinator--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, it was. The organization evolved into that.

MR. KARA: Into this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if at that time in '88 to '90, was it pursuant to any written policy of protocol that the Operations Division of Security was the hijack coordinator, or was that just sort of--that it evolved as a practice as sort of a defacto?

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MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember if there was anything in writing about that. I know, you know, it was the case, but I don't remember if it was an agency order.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have an understanding on 9-11, giving any familiarity you may have had with the FAA policy and protocol as to what office or position the hijack coordinator would fall under on 9-11? Is that defined in any written policy or protocol?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know if it was at the time of 9-11. You know, I was no longer in the business of security, so I don't know what the current orders were.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's when you were the director of Safety and Special Studies, right?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me see if I have it with me.

MR. KARA: I've got it, John. This one--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, the other one.

MR. KARA: The other one?

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MR. AZZARELLO: Crisis management handbook?

MR. KARA: 4?

MR. AZZARELLO: You handed this one out the other day. Yeah, 4. Chapter 4. I have that in the box actually.

MR. KARA: This one, John?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes, we'll have to dig it out.

MR. KARA: We weren't quite going to go down this path, but since you have some experience there, we decided--

MR. AZZARELLO: We apologize it wasn't the first thing asked at the top. This is one of the documents that we were given by the FAA in connection for our request for any written policy and protocol. We believe this could be the one even in effect on 9-11 and they're checking on that for us now. And Miles, if you can give me the chart you had before, the organizational chart.

It says that the FAA hijack coordinator parenthetically the director or his designate for

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this FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security on duty at headquarters may define if there's any certain responsibilities as hijack coordinator requesting escort aircraft for a confirmed hijack.

Just tell us based on your career in the FAA and based on reading that document, what office here in the chart of administration positions that would fall to, the hijack coordinator.

MS. FREEMAN: Well, as I read this, I would say that it was in the Office of the Associate Administrative Facilities Management Security. More specifically I would say it was in the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and that's just where I was sort of having difficulty meaning how do we get to Operations just from here. Can you tell me? As I read it, I thought it fell right here because the ACS1 position--

MS. FREEMAN: It's very possible that it did and, you know, I may be speaking of more in terms of practice. I know that for the associate director or his designate, and my understanding is

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that whoever was in charge of Operations would be the one who would be running the hijack crisis command center whenever there was a hijacking.

However, I have to say also that when I was in Security, often it was the director of Civil Aviation Security himself, and that's Ray Salazar, he did run some of those hijacking crisis centers when a hijacking occurred. He was not there, you know, or sometimes he would delegate it to this gentleman I mentioned, Donnie Blazer, who was then the head of Domestic Operations.

MR. AZZARELLO: The terminology director, the director of FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security, is that synonymous or not with--I don't want to make the wrong conclusion here--is that synonymous with the associate administrator for Civil Aviation Security, or is it a different term?

MS. FREEMAN: My assumption is that, if I have to guess, I would guess that this is a throwback to the old Civil Aviation Security organization. Before it became an associate administrator, it was called director. So it used

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to be an office of Civil Aviation Security and this box here was a director. At some point, it got elevated to an associate administrator. If I have to guess, my guess is that the change was never made.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. All right. I'm with you now. So if this is a 9-11 document, Chapter 4, hijacked aircraft, which talks about the hijack coordinator role, if that was current on 9-11, then it just lagged, for definitional purposes, it lagged in the not catching up with the reorganization?

MS. FREEMAN: That would be my guess.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. What was in your role on 9-11 as the director of Safety and Special Studies? Can you give us a little bit more information or description? Sort of what was your sort of day-to-day duties consist of in that position?

MS. FREEMAN: Leading up to 9-11, I was working on a special project developing a proposal for how the FAA might provide safety oversight over

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the new Air Traffic organization that was about to be created.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what was the name--

MS. FREEMAN: The new ATO, the new Air Traffic organization that is now headed up by the chief operating officer--

MR. AZZARELLO: What in particular may have prompted that change in the organization?

MS. FREEMAN: It was a statutory requirement for the FAA to have a chief operating officer for a performance based Air Traffic organization. And as a result of that legislation, the deputy administrator asked me to put together a proposal for how the FAA might provide some safety oversight over the new Air Traffic organization.

MR. KARA: And who did you report to on 9-11?

MS. FREEMAN: The deputy administrator.

MS. KARA: Monty Belcher?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Anybody have any other background questions--

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MR. KARA: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I guess I myself will step back a second. In your role as counsel in the Eastern region, what was your role in that position with regard to litigation that would result from any aircraft accidents or incidents?

MR. FREEMAN: The litigation was handled out of Washington, out of the Chief Counsel's office in Washington. What we did at the regional level was mostly enforcement cases, cases against pilots for violation of federal aviation regulations. We handled other legal matters, labor law, Freedom of Information Act issues, environmental law.

MR. AZZARELLO: In the position you held on 9-11, did you have an occasion to have any interaction, or what was the AT20 group, the role of Dave Kenols in this group?

MS. FREEMAN: When I was working on the safety oversights proposal, I had a team that was assisting me, and Dave Kenols was on that team. To be honest with you, I don't remember whether at

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that point he was still on the team, but at some point during my work on this proposal, I believe he was still on the team. I was going to say at some point, Tony Ferranci from that organization took over for him on my team. I just don't remember what point that was.

MR. AZZARELLO: In terms of your chain of command, you reported directly to Deputy Administrator Belcher?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess other than the people that would support you on the special project you were working on, was there anyone that would report directly to you?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: If we could sort of shift gears to 9-11, and if you can just tell us where you were when your day started, and when you first came to learn there was a problem with the aviation system that day.

MS. FREEMAN: I was in my office which was in the Deputy Administrator's suite, and at some

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point, I walked out, or I found myself in the outer area of the suite where there is a television, and the deputy administrator's secretary had the television on, and she was--the news, it was breaking news about that one aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. And so that's how I learned about it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you recall your first knowledge that anything was wrong, that it was pretty much what was seen on the news that there was a report of an aircraft that hit the Trade Center? Do you remember whether or not they specified whether it was a commercial aircraft or GA?

MS. FREEMAN: No. At that time, they did not yet.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you see the damage. I guess you see the fire at the World Trade Center?

MS. FREEMAN: It was the first one.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you learn any time after that news report that that was a commercial aircraft that hit that north tower?

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MS. FREEMAN: I did. I don't remember at what point I did.

MR. AZZARELLO: But at some point you did? Do you remember how you learned of the second aircraft incident?

MS. FREEMAN: I was standing there. I may have walked away. I did not see it live, but I heard I believe it was Cecilia who was the deputy administrator's secretary saying something like oh, my God, a second airplane just hit the World Trade Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if at that time while these events are transpiring when you learn of the first and second aircraft incidents where the deputy administrator is at that time?

MS. FREEMAN: He was either in his office or he was with the administrator in her office, or in the conference room between the two because I remember seeing both of them run out of his office and run across the hall into the Operations Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: --center?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did you see then the replay of the second aircraft hit after you heard--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, I did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Had you heard anything yet at all about reports of hijacks in the system at that point in time when you see the second aircraft?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't believe I heard anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: When the deputy administrator--I guess you said you think the deputy administrator at that point came out perhaps with the administrator to go across the Operations Center, did you have any exchange at all about--?

MS. FREEMAN: I really don't remember. I have a recollection. Whether it was an exchange or whether I heard Monty Belger ask Cecilia to put in a phone call, I can't tell you exactly, but I have a recollection of Monty Belger getting on the telephone with American Airlines, with somebody from American Airlines. So I can't remember if he said something that I overheard or how I came to

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know that.

MR. AZZARELLO: But no one asked you at this point to take any action or assist them in any way with the events that were developing?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So where at this point now--where do you go after you see the replay of the second crash in the Trade Center?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I went back to my office, and I turned my television on.

MR. AZZARELLO: So in terms of any activity that was going on here at headquarters at that time in trying to get a crisis center set up or anything of that nature to respond to the events, you didn't have any role in that?

MS. FREEMAN: I had no role in that. It was not expected. It was just not my position.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand that's not your position. No one asked you to give anything outside of the confines of your defined position in an effort to respond to the events.

MS. FREEMAN: No. Not on that day, no.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Did that hold true pretty much for the remainder of the day?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have an occasion to spend any--center that day?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I did not. In fact, I did not spend a whole day here. I left at some point. I wanted to leave and go get my daughter in school because I was concerned about what might happen.

MR. AZZARELLO: She was in school in the D.C. area?

MS. FREEMAN: In Virginia.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if you left before or after the Pentagon attack?

MS. FREEMAN: It was after the Pentagon attack.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the Pentagon was hit? Do you remember if it was before or after the fourth aircraft crash in Pennsylvania?

MS. FREEMAN: I believe it was before. I don't remember.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember how you learned about the Pentagon crash?

MS. FREEMAN: Again, I had the television on in my office and I learned about it on the news.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you didn't hear any reports or rumors or anything of that nature before the Pentagon crash from your vantage point about a potential aircraft that may have been approaching the D.C. area?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I was by myself basically in my office.

MR. AZZARELLO: So pretty much we can conclude as of that day you weren't asked to perform any roles respondent to the events as they unfolded?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about--

MR. KARA: Did you conduct that day at all any--

MS. FREEMAN: No, I did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was a Tuesday. Did you come in on the following day, on a Wednesday,

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on the 12th?

MS. FREEMAN: To be honest with you, I don't remember whether I came in the next day or if it was the day after. I'm sure it had to with whether my daughter had school or not. I'm a single mother, so depending on what was happening with that, you know, that would've dictated whether I came in.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think that it may be two days after do you think that by then you were back?

MS. FREEMAN: I did come back, yes. If not the next day, the day after.

MR. KARA: And when you came back, what task were you given to do?

MS. FREEMAN: When I came back, at some point, and I apologize for not recalling exactly at what point, but when I came back, I did go to Monty Belger and I offered my assistance in any way that I could. And at some point, he and the administrator, Jane Garvey, asked me to put together a briefing book for the administrator for

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an upcoming Congressional hearing which took place on September 21st, to put together a briefing book.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that was a briefing for the administrative for September 24th Congressional hearing?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what subjects were you given with respect to the substance of the briefing book?

MS. FREEMAN: I believe that--I'm trying to remember exactly how it was that we decided what to cover in the briefing book, but I believe that where I got the guidance was from the legislative group in the Chief Counsel's office. They had some ideas about what some of the subject matters were that we should cover in the book. It's possible that I also got some guidance from Monty Belger or Jane Garvey, but I just don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember any of the people in the legislative board of the Chief Counsel's office in this regard?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, I believe it was Mary

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Walsh.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mary Walsh?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what was her position?

MS. FREEMAN: I think she was the assistant chief counsel for Legislation, but I'm not sure if that was her position at the time.

MR. KARA: Do you recall what the major topics were or the major subdivisions of the briefing was?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm sorry?

MR. KARA: The major subdivisions of the briefing or the major topics to be covered.

MS. FREEMAN: It was one topic. It was like--about, you know, things that could be reasonably expected to be asked of the administrator at the Congressional hearing. What I did is I put a team of people together from the different organizations in the FAA that had something to do with these issues, and as a team, we added more things to the list.

MR. KARA: Who was on your team?

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MS. FREEMAN: I'm sure I won't be able to remember everybody who was on my team, but we had somebody from Aircraft Certification, somebody from Flight Standards. We had at least two people from Civil Aviation Security, had at least two people from Air Traffic.

MR. KARA: These are the people who are specifically interested in who was from Air Traffic.

MS. FREEMAN: From Air Traffic, I believe Dave Kenols was there at the beginning of our meeting as a team, but I don't believe that he stayed for the whole time. We worked through the weekend.

MR. KARA: Right.

MS. FREEMAN: Jim Slate from National Airport was a more consistent member of this team from Air Traffic. I think that was it from Air Traffic.

MR. KARA: Tony Ferroti or Doug Gould involved at all?

MS. FREEMAN: No, not on my team. They

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were all working the issues. There was a lot of back and forth. It ended up, you know, with Jim Slate sort of being the representative, and I would ask him to find something out, you know, get a paper to include in the book, and he would go back. And I knew that he was working with that group, Dave Kenols, Tony Ferroti.

MR. KARA: Where's Jim today?

MS. FREEMAN: He's still at National Airport I believe.

MR. KARA: He's at national?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So was it your impression that Dave Kenols and Jim Slate had people under them assisting them in this project, that might have been reporting to you or taking part in the meetings at your level, but--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember did Dan Diggins ever take part in any of the meetings?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember, no.

MR. KARA: And before we focus more on AT,

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who were the two people from CAS, from Civil Aviation Security?

MS. FREEMAN: David Tiedge.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tieg?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes. T-i-e-d-g-e.

MR. AZZARELLO: T-i-e-d-g-e.

MS. FREEMAN: Mike Morse, M-o-r-s-e, and I believe Terri Kraus. K-r-a-u-s. I believe that she was also with Security. I know that she was on the team and I believe that she was on the Security team.

MR. KARA: Terri Kraus? Do we know a Kraus? Mary Ellen?

MS. FREEMAN: Different from Mary Ellen.

MR. AZZARELLO: Different--

MS. KARA: Different from Mary Ellen, okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that everyone from Civil Aviation Security?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, that's my recollection, yes, and then eventually Leo Boivin was also on the team.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Was he Civil Aviation Security?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Leo?

MS. FREEMAN: Boivin. B-o-i-v-i-n. He has since retired.

MR. KARA: And how about from the WOC and the Aviation Crisis Center?

MS. FREEMAN: My recollection, and it's not a very good recollection, my recollection is that it was Dan Noell, but I believe that May Avery also came to some of the meetings. You have to remember we were, you know, the FAA was--there was a lot going on, and so people would come to meetings, or people would come to the gathering place and sometimes we got different people because somebody would get pulled off--

MR. KARA: Sure.

MS. FREEMAN: --to work on the real stuff that needed to be done as opposed to putting a briefing book together.

MR. KARA: Sure. How about the Command

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Center?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't believe that we had anybody specifically from the Command Center. I believe again that Jim Slate from Air Traffic sort of--he was gathering whatever information needed to be gathered from the different parts of Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't remember--participating in this effort, like John Wiedle, Linda Schuessler, Jeff Keys or anyone?

MS. FREEMAN: No, not directly.

MR. KARA: How about the senior officials in Air Traffic, like Chellen or Brown or Jeff Griffith?

MS. FREEMAN: They were not specifically on this team. The administrator, when she asked me to do this tasking, she announced it at a staff meeting of which all of the senior officials were at, and she asked them to support me in any way that they could. So she basically said, you know, whatever Darlene Freeman requests in terms of people to be on the team or anything like that, I

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expect you to support it. I did not request for the senior level officials to be on the team, but I did request for them to give me representatives.

MR. KARA: When she announced that and probably gave some general statements about your purpose and direction and the assistance that the--business heads could provide you, what was her guidance about reconstructing the events of the day or developing a time line?

MS. FREEMAN: It was not part of that announcement, but again, I don't remember exactly where the direction came from, but one of the things that we were asked to include in the book was a chronology of the notification sequence.

MR. KARA: And when you say notification sequence, notification--

MS. FREEMAN: Notification of the military.

MR. KARA: To the military?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if Fred Davis was involved in any of these efforts?

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MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't. I don't remember that he was.

MR. KARA: What points of contact did you develop within the Pentagon or within NORAD to assist you?

MS. FREEMAN: I did not directly. I did all of that through Air Traffic, so I relied on--for the chronology, the notification issues, I relied on Air Traffic, basically relied on the AT20 group, Dave Kenols and the people who work for him.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you relied on them for any contacts with NORAD or the military in trying to come up with a chronology?

MS. FREEMAN: And I again I can't say that they did contact the military. You're going to have to ask them, but I know that I dealt through them, so in coming up with a chronology, I basically asked Air Traffic to come up with it.

MR. KARA: At a senior level, though, with you as the project director, did you talk at all with General Arnold at Konar?

MS. FREEMAN: I did not.

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MR. KARA: Or with Colonel Scott?

MS. FREEMAN: I did not talk to anybody, but I do believe that--oh, gosh, what was Jeff's last name? He was the deputy director of Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff Griffith?

MR. KARA: Griffith.

MS. FREEMAN: Jeff Griffith. I know that Jeff Griffith was in touch with some other military people.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was it your understanding that the chronology that was part of this briefing would include not just a chronology of notification for the military, but in a broader sense, the chronology of significant events as they evolved that day with respect to each aircraft that were hijacked?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, from an air traffic perspective.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right. From the air traffic perspective anywhere from takeoff to impact for each one?

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MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So anything in between there that would be deemed a relevant reportable event.

MS. FREEMAN: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which would encompass obviously notification to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it your position with regard to that project any part of that pulling together the chronology from takeoff to crash for each of the four aircraft that was something that was headed by Dave Kenols, head of AT20?

MS. FREEMAN: I believe it was, but I also believe that Jeff Griffith who was over him had something to do with it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Some oversight perhaps, or some--

MS. FREEMAN: Perhaps some oversight, and I specifically recall some contacts with the military, with I believe with NORAD.

MR. AZZARELLO: In terms of what the

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ground level work of pulling the information, like I'm sure you are well aware of because of the positions you held, for the kind of work-- Is it fair for me to assume that?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm sorry--

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair for me to assume that you have a good understanding of sort of the kind of ground level work that would be entailed in pulling together chronologies for the four flights?

MS. FREEMAN: I was aware of what they were doing, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So were you aware--were you reviewing for example tape recordings from various FAA facilities who controlled the aircraft company?

MS. FREEMAN: I can't say that I was aware that they were reviewing tape recordings, but I'm aware that they were reviewing radar--

MR. AZZARELLO: Radar data?

MS. FREEMAN: --data, and I have to assume that they were also reviewing recordings.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Anything that basically they could use as a source--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --from that perspective perhaps.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I would assume from my questions that I guess like anywhere else when the boss speaks, when the administrator says encourages the staff to support a particular project, the expectation would be that if there was a resource there and someone to help pull it together, the message is clear to pitch in and try to help out to put the resources together for this project?

MS. FREEMAN: Definitely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if any particular issues arose that were of a nature that--as the chronology was being put together for the four aircrafts that was discussed with you along the way as the chronology part of the briefing work was being compiled, or either Jeff Griffith, anyone like at Jeff's level, or any level

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for that matter, I guess, you know, talk to you formally or informally?

MS. FREEMAN: No, the only thing I remember was somebody coming in and saying that NORAD had a time line. NORAD had developed a time line, and somebody had a piece of paper with the times, notification times NORAD had.

MR. AZZARELLO: They had a sheet of paper with NORAD times?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if it was--what the format of it was, like was it a--did it look like an official NORAD document? Did it look like a press release, a log, chrono log?

MS. FREEMAN: I think I remember a piece of paper that did not look very official at all, and then I remember seeing either a press release or a copy of a newspaper article that had some of the same time lines in it.

(Intervening matter.)

MR. AZZARELLO: I apologize for that interruption. They know we're in the middle of an

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interview. Okay, so you're not sure whether it looked like--didn't look official, that was your recollection? Let me see if we can get that--do you have the press release?

MR. BROWN: Yeah, I think we do. I'm looking for it, and I can't find it.

MR. KARA: You're looking for that one-pager--

MR. AZZARELLO: Either the press release or--let me see what you have. Do you have the tech log?

MR. KARA: I gave you the tech log.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Does this look familiar, the time line or--

MS. FREEMAN: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: That doesn't look familiar?

MS. FREEMAN: Not at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did--okay so--

MS. FREEMAN: No, what I remember it was typed, and it was typed and it was short--

MR. KARA: We got one page, notifications

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to the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, okay.

MR. KARA: And I can't find my copy of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it like a press
release?

MS. FREEMAN: It could have been that. It
could have been the press release. I just don't
remember.

MR. KARA: That was the short two-pager.
The press release was a two-pager.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes, there was a page,
notifications to the military, but my understanding
was that that was a document that was produced by
the FAA. Is that your understanding too, Miles?

MR. KARA: No, the 20th of September one
pager we had we got from FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's what I'm saying.
It was an FAA document, not a military--

MR. KARA: That's correct, yeah. I'm
sorry. It was FAA, and then we had the 18
September, 2001 NORAD press release which was a
military document.

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MS. FREEMAN: But it could have been the press release. I'd have to see it to recognize it.

MR. KARA: What was the issue with the paper coming to you with the notifications?

MS. FREEMAN: I just remember somebody bringing it to my attention. I just remember seeing it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you call Kevin and tell him to get the NORAD press release and the one page notification to the military and bring them over or send them over?

MR. KARA: I've got the FAA press release.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Let me show you this document actually.

MR. KARA: Yeah, why don't you go with that one.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was the summary of--it's an FAA summary of air traffic hijack events on the day, September 11th, in terms of when it was produced and put together, September 17th is the date on that one page, and I guess we were told by some other witnesses that that was the day--

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sort of finalize it on September 17th which would have been the following Monday. I remember you said earlier you worked through the weekend with a group of people on the briefing book. Is that correct?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that part of the project for the briefing book as you look at it now, the summary of events? It's a chronology for each of the four flights treated separately and then pulled together at the end.

MS. FREEMAN: We did view some--I remember that they put this together, and we did use the chronologies for the book. They look like the chronologies that ended up in the book, but I do remember that they put together a more complete book like this with, you know, with the radar tracks.

MR. AZZARELLO: There were some--I think there are some radar data there, one page, chrono radar data.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

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MR. KARA: Probably the only thing I need is the press release.

MR. AZZARELLO: All we need is the press release.

MR. LEWIS: And it's not in the box?

MR. AZZARELLO: If you have a Neads book in there, it'd be in there. I don't think the Neads book is in there. So was that part of a larger briefing book that was put together for the administrator, that document?

MS. FREEMAN: My recollection is that when that--at the same time that we were asking for Air Traffic to put together a chronology for the briefing book, my recollection is that they put this together, which was certainly more than we needed for the briefing book. But my recollection is that they put this together, you know, and gave it at least to the deputy administrator. I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: And did you say you don't know if they used that whole report? It might have been excerpts that made it's way to the briefing

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book?

MS. FREEMAN: I know that that's a fact, that we did not include, for example, the radar, the maps, we did not include those in the briefing book.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if that part, the written chronology was just sort of in paragraph form that sort of described the--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would have--you're fairly certain that would have made its way into the briefing?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, that would. Yes, that did make it into the briefing book. Yes, it did. What I don't know is whether--you know, this is dated September 17th. You know, I don't know whether this was the one that ended up--

MS. KARA: You don't know whether that was the final version.

MS. FREEMAN: The final--thank you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. How about this document here? This has a got a date--on September

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20th, '01, and it's titled "Notifications to the Military."

MS. FREEMAN: It looks somewhat familiar. I just don't remember this document specifically.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it have been something that you think you would have been involved in putting together or pulling together that information?

MS. FREEMAN: It could have been. Yes, it could have been, or it could have been somebody in Air Traffic putting it together, you know, at our request. I just don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: The reason why I specifically wanted to ask you about that document to see--to understand the context of it from our perspective. We've interviewed some people from AT20 who are familiar with the summary, this sort of booklet underneath, and specifically with regard to the issue of notifications to the military from the FAA. We asked them about it and showed them that, and there was at least one witness who we recall when that person saw the notifications to

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the military thought that--frankly he said two things. One, that they thought that that particular issue of the FAA as an agency trying to determine when the FAA notified the military with regard to each of the four hijacked aircrafts, they thought it was a particular issue that you were working on, that the administrator had assigned you to take a look at or asked you to take a look at. And then number two, that they thought you might have been the person who either helped pull that together or directed the sort of creation of that document.

MS. FREEMAN: It's possible. It's like I said it does look familiar. My recollection is that, you know, initially when we were trying to put together the information about specifically notifications to the military, I have a recollection that something like this was put together. Who exactly put it together, I can't say, and then, you know, as we--it's dated September 20th--I was going to say that, you know, as we worked on the briefing book, we had the more

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detailed chronology in the briefing book, you know, more detailed than this, but this does look familiar.

MR. AZZARELLO: That I guess treats it as a separate issue. In other words, pulls out obviously--within a chronology of events for each of the four hijacked aircraft, there's a number of different issues that arise. For example, you know, when the controller, controlling the aircraft, first recognized that the plane might have been in distress or maybe even possibly hijacked. And among those issues obviously you can pull out the one issue of notifications to the military--at least treated separately on one document.

With regard to notifications to the military, there have been a few folks in the group that you've described to us as the group pulling together the briefing book. There have been at least a few folks within that group who recall notifications to the military being a topic of hot debate between the FAA and the military as to who,

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what, when and how much time did the military have to react to each of the four hijacked aircrafts. And it was spirited is my word, but hotly contested debate that I believe were the words used by some of the officers and individuals that we talked about who were working with you and the group that, you know, who was asked to assist you in pulling together the briefing book. I want to ask you about your recollection of that issue and the debates or debate between the military and the FAA as to who, what, when.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I can't say that I--again I was not involved in any discussions with the military, so I can't say that I was aware of debates with the military. I do remember that the issue was one that was of interest to particularly the deputy administrator, you know. It was one of the issues that he wanted us to, you know, to capture exactly when was the military notified, and I just--again that's why I remember Jeff Griffith being--I thought he was in touch with the military, but I just remember an effort to take what we

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had--what we, the FAA--had from an air traffic perspective and then, you know, and then see what the military had, you know. Again just trying to piece together the story, piece together the chronology.

I don't remember a debate. The only thing I remember was some--perhaps some reaction to--it seemed that NORAD put a press release out about the notification issue that I believe caught the FAA by surprise. So I remember some--I just remember that, and again, you know, the issue as I recall it was simply to try to--it was one of those things that we knew. We knew that the press would ask the questions. We knew at that the Congressional hearings this would probably be covered and, you know, it was just an issue of trying to make sure that what we got was accurate, what we had was accurate.

MR. KARA: Let me ask you this in the terms of--there's a lot of staff action work going on obviously. Jeff's doing contact with the military, and you're getting information that comes

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in, and then you probably had a couple of desk sides with the deputy in terms of where you were and what the final product. Do you recall anything he said at those desk sides or more guidance that you got?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember other than, you know, let's nail down exactly when, you know, when was the military notified.

(Intervening matter.)

MR. KARA: In your discussions with the administrator and the deputy administrator, and with Jeff and Dave Kenols and everybody else, was there a discussion about what constituted notification to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't remember that discussion in particular, no.

MR. KARA: Were the roles of either Colonel Cheryl Atkins or the Air Traffic Services cell at the Command Center part of the discussion of what might have been notification to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: If so, I wasn't involved in

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that.

MR. KARA: Your personal position, you were a senior staff person here and you were tasked directly with the responsibility by the administrator to prepare her for Congressional testimony. Did you think in that direction? Did it pop into your mind that notification to Cheryl Atkins might have constituted notification to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I remember being made aware that we had some military liaison or whatever. I'm not sure exactly what the position is, but we had some military people at the Command Center. I remember being made aware of that when we were meeting together--

MR. KARA: There's not a military cell at the Command Centers. There's an Air Traffic Services cell, and that Colonel Zirvanik and Lieutenant Colonel Cherry. In addition to that, then you have the military cell here which is Colonel Atkins, and I think each of the four services is represented.

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And we really asked you to search a little bit with us on this because we had been told by some people we've talked to that they thought notification to the internal military structure within FAA was sufficient to be determined as military notification. We're just trying to flush that out a little bit with you.

MS. FREEMAN: I mean all I can say is that what we focused on was--when I was piecing this together, we focused on notification to NORAD.

MR. KARA: To NORAD.

MS. FREEMAN: So I mean I don't recall capturing--

MR. KARA: Hence therefore, if I could just follow that line of thought, hence Jeff's discussions with the military of which you were aware, and hence FAA's corporate surprise at the NORAD time line when it was published on 18 September, 2001.

MS. FREEMAN: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there a discussion, sort of going over the issue of--let me step back

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from that for a minute. There was the Congressional hearing in October that the administrator needed to be prepared for. Were there any events prior to the Congressional hearing? For example, any meetings with the White House administration that the FAA would have to attend and explain the same type of issues to the administration in terms of what the FAA knew, when and when they told the military on 9-11?

MS. FREEMAN: I was not involved in that, so I just don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think there was--I've seen reference to a meeting I think on--perhaps even on the 17th of September I think, a White House briefing, and in fact, we were told by I think at least one witness that that might have been the summary that we showed you that might have been also the document used in the briefing of the White House. Are you aware of that?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm not. I just don't know. I wasn't there.

MR. AZZARELLO: So to the extent that

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there was a White House briefing the week after 9-11, it would not have been one you attended?

MS. FREEMAN: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: If it involved what the FAA knew when and when they told the military about it with regard to the hijacked aircraft, would you expect that you would have been told about that meeting if the administrator or the deputy administrator had briefed the White House on this?

MS. FREEMAN: No, not really, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: You wouldn't even know that was one of the projects of the briefing book in preparing for the Congressional testimony?

MS. FREEMAN: I mean I would not have necessarily known about a meeting with the White House. I was focused on putting together a Congressional briefing book, and to the extent that there were other meetings, other briefings going on--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, but my specific question is to the extent that this subject matter of your briefing book was going to be addressed at

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a White House meeting prior to the Congressional hearing, would you expect that you might be consulted on that or asked to provide the administrator or the deputy what you had on that issue in your briefing book?

MS. FREEMAN: If it had been my briefing book, but again this was not my briefing book. This is not the briefing book we put together for the Congressional hearing.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, put that aside. One of the issues that I think--of interest to the deputy administrator, military notifications. You don't know if they notified with--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you indicated that yourself earlier, and would you agree that that issue probably would also be one of interest in the Congressional hearings that the administrator went to?

MS. FREEMAN: I would assume so, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And in fact, would you agree though that issue also was one of the issues

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that you were asked to address it, oversee addressing it as part of the briefing book that was being put together?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So if that issue came up prior to the need for the briefing book for Congressional hearing, if the issue of military notification came up, then that was an area you were asked to look at if it came up, and prior to the Congressional hearings and the White House meeting. I mean maybe my assumption is that they would come to you and ask you for what you have on that because it was an issue you were looking at for the Congressional hearing.

MS. FREEMAN: Again, you know, I don't know. I mean not necessarily. There were a lot of people working on a lot of things, and I was getting--I was sort of the intermediary. I was getting all the information from Air Traffic, so, you know, I would have assumed that they would've included people from Air Traffic, you know. I was just pulling the stuff together, but I would not

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have expected that I would have been there.

MR. AZZARELLO: You wouldn't have--

MS. FREEMAN: Or known about it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or known even about it.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, would it--

MS. FREEMAN: And I'm not saying I did or I didn't. To be honest with you, I really don't remember that there was a meeting with the White House, but I just don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, wouldn't that have been sort of an event that might have stuck out in your mind if there was a White House meeting suddenly if you were asked to prepare the administrator or the deputy administrator for?

MS. FREEMAN: If I had been asked to prepare them for that meeting, yes, I would have remembered it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it's fair for us to conclude then that you don't believe that you were asked at all to prepare either one of the--either the administrator or the deputy administrator for a

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White House briefing?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember that. I don't remember it, so I think that would be fair.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. You said earlier I think that you remember seeing that piece of paper. Maybe it was a press release from NORAD. And there was something on it, I think you said that something that came as a surprise to the FAA people or officials because of what NORAD had on there. Something that caught your attention--

MS. FREEMAN: No, no. The only thing that I think caught people by surprise was that NORAD put the press release out.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, the fact that they put it out, not anything in it substantively?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why did that catch FAA by surprise if they put it out?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know. I don't know. It just seems--I have a recollection that it seemed like it was early. You know, we were still trying to piece together who said what to whom when, and,

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you know, when we learned that NORAD had put out a press release.

MR. AZZARELLO: So what was the nature of the surprise? Was it that you didn't--

MS. FREEMAN: The timing.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean you were still putting together--you, the FAA--were still trying to piece together what happened.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So was the surprise that the NORAD press release was out time-wise meaning that you're surprised that they thought they had had a definitive--

MS. FREEMAN: So soon.

MR. AZZARELLO: So soon. A time line to issue, and I would imagine that when they did, that one of the things that--not you personally--the people working on the issue of military notification might want to take a look at what they said that you told, you the FAA, told them, right?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And so this is the press

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release we just got, if that looks familiar. That came out on September 18th, so a week after the attacks? Does that look like the document that somebody might have shown you?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, it looks somewhat familiar, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, could it have been one of the direct forms of that? Could it have been a draft form of that, even maybe over that weekend? The weekend after the attacks?

MS. FREEMAN: You know, it could have been. I'm sorry. I just don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I only asked you that question with a particular interest because you said it didn't have--the paper you saw didn't look very official at all.

MS. FREEMAN: No, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I guess it would be opinions on whether that was official or not.

MS. FREEMAN: This looks official to me.

MR. KARA: Yeah, but it didn't say this piece of paper.

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MS. FREEMAN: No, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the document you believe you saw you think looked less official than this?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, I believe that that's the case.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: Did the NORAD position in addition to the timing of it, they issued it so soon, did the position they took on any of the four aircrafts cause concern or catch you by surprise here?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I mean I seem to recall somewhere--in fact, in that chronology you just showed me. I seem to recall that we had something about 8:38 notifying, calling NORAD and they had 8:40. So I remember that was the only one I remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: If I could refer you back to the notifications to the military, which is the FAA document that they gave us, dated September 20th? Do you see 8:40 where it says Needs log

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indicates Boston Center notified regarding American 11?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is one of the logs from Neads that I showed you earlier that you don't believe you saw, but I just wanted to note something for you here. At 12:40, they have Zulu times, so that would be 8:40 Eastern time, possible hijack of American Airlines Flight 11. We believe that whether it was the FAA who drafted this notification to the military list was looking at, was referring to when you look at this Neads log here because it is in fact the Neads log from the Operations floor, and in fact the times match exactly. But to the extent that somebody had the Neads logs available to the review here at the FAA, it wasn't you directly but it might have been someone beneath you. Is that correct?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember seeing something that looked like this. I do remember seeing something that looked like this, and it's possible that the reference to Neads logs refers

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to, you know, something more official like this than this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Than this.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: 8:40 is the NORAD press release list as the FAA notification to Needs?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: If you drop down to United 175, they put 8:43 as the notification time to Needs. Do you see that?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's the September 18th release by NORAD. If you look at the log from Needs, there's no 8:43 a.m. entry at all there. And this is the notification to the military drafted by the FAA on September 20th, 8:43 a.m., and you see the FAA perspective on that is that the New York Center asked the military liaison specialist at New York Center to get military assistance. Then it says paren's "we believe this is still related to American 11, but it may be the source of the NORAD press release showing 8:43

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notification regarding United Flight 175."

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It says New York Center was working UAL 175 at that time, but everything was still normal. In fact, that's something that would be borne out by the review of the controller tapes and the radar data that we think in terms of the transponder being on and communications--and not being able--no indication of a hijack at that point.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. KARA: Let me interject this at this point now. The press release says 18 September, so clearly you had this almost in realtime, or at least FAA did--in realtime. This informal document that we've been looking at, and we now have two copies of it in front of you, is two days later on the 20th of September. Do you recall the administrator, the deputy administrator or yourself, asking somebody to sort this out? Can somebody please take a look at this and tell us why this is so? And this might lead to the kind of

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language that John just read to you here as--

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, it's possible, and I have to tell you the more I look at this, the more this sounds like my language.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you mean that you might have drafted it yourself?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I might have. You know, now as I look at it, I just--

MR. KARA: This is how you would've explained a different set of rows and you were asked to take a look at it by the deputy administrator or the administrator.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean I don't know who, you know, people that we were interviewing at the FAA were making suggestions as to who they think had a role, and they felt some part that you drafted there, the notifications to the military, but certainly in a general sense, you're stepping back and who drafted that document. For a minute it would certainly strike us and seem to us that if the administrator is going to go on the Hill under

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oath and tell Congress and perhaps maybe the rest of the world what the FAA's position is, when they notified the military of each of the four hijacked aircraft. And before that happens, the military comes out and says well, this is when we say the FAA told us that the aircraft were hijacked.

It would certainly appear to be a great--an issue of great interest and concern for the FAA administrator to want somebody to look at those times and say well, are they accurate, do we think they're accurate because there's only--you know, the possibilities are if you don't agree with NORAD, well, then those two entities are going to be saying something different to Congress and then there's a debate on who's right or who's wrong, or is there a, you know, a right time or a wrong time, or if there's an agreement on it, and there's not an issue. And certainly to the extent that there is not an agreement, and there are times where there's not agreements, we would expect that to have generated some discussion or a debate within the FAA, and we wanted to know your recollection of

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that as it pertained to the hijacked aircraft.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, again I don't remember the issue of a debate, but I do remember as you accurately pointed out that when NORAD came up with its times, that, you know, I remember I believe the deputy administrator saying let's look at our times, which we were already looking at. Let's look at our times and let's compare them to the times that NORAD had. Let's see if there are any inconsistencies and, you know, try to--I do remember looking at that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I want to see another entry on the second flight, by the 175. This is taken from the FAA summary of hijacked events dated September 17th. It says 6:30 a.m.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: AAT20. I'm at 175. It says "9:05, Northeast Air Defense Sector Needs log indicates they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning 175." Again going to the Needs track log at 9:13:05 Zulu, which is 9:05, "United 175 possible hijack." Again this appears to

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be--this Neads log appears the one that's being referenced in the FAA summary on the time of notification of United 175 just as it appears to be on the American 11 at 8:40.

Did it come to your attention then in conjunction with putting together a briefing book as it related to the issue of military notification that here you have a document dated September 17th, which is the day before the NORAD press release where the FAA takes the position that NORAD was notified by the FAA, or Neads was, at 9:05, and then a day later, NORAD's press release comes out and it says 8:43 the FAA told NORAD or Neads about the second hijack.

MS. FREEMAN: I believe--my recollection--I believe that's why I started to remember that as I said it sounds like my language. I believe that's why I included this statement in here. In other words, 8:43 is what they had in their press release, and when we looked back at the whole air traffic chronology, you know, it appeared that 8:43--the only thing we could find was that

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the New York Center had asked the military liaison specialist in New York Center to get military assistance. But frankly my recollection, at least from my point of view, I couldn't figure out where they, NORAD, had gotten 8:43.

MR. KARA: Where they got 8:43.

MR. AZZARELLO: On that issue, on 8:43, would you have--because we've listened, you know, to all the tapes in New York. We've looked at records. We can't seem to pin that to a data point. Would you have had some backup documentation, direct papers, or logs from the New York Center or something that you would've--led you to believe that that's what's generated?

MS. FREEMAN: Oh, I'm sure, yes. I'm sure that there was something from the New York Center.

MR. KARA: Do you still have your backup materials for this?

MS. FREEMAN: No, but--no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you turn them over to somebody?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I mean--and I hate to

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draw yet another--but I would say you might get that from Jim Slate. I think again Jim Slate was the one who was bringing me all the--

MR. KARA: And he commuted up and down from the tower. Did he camp out here permanently for the next few days?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I think he camped out here.

MR. KARA: Let me ask you this on this very point, and you sort of confessed to being the author here so let me--

MS. FREEMAN: I believe, you know, now that I look at it.

MR. KARA: There's two ways you can go, and I'm doing this hypothetically here. As FAA and speaking for the administrator here, you could try to assist NORAD in understanding why they've made this error, or you could simply have said we can't support this. Did you think about taking that point of view as opposed to--

MS. FREEMAN: It wasn't my position to do that. And again, there were discussions that were

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taking place between the deputy administrator and Jeff Griffith and Air Traffic that I was not privy to a lot of discussions about this issue.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can we take a look at the next one then? Do you have anything else on--

MR. KARA: No, because you're going to segway right into another one of these.

MR. AZZARELLO: American 77, they have 9:24. Do you see the FAA notification dates?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's in the NORAD press release and the FAA summary that's dated the day before that press release. On American 77 at 9:24, it says the Great Lakes Regional Operations notified the Washington Operations Center of the simultaneous loss of radio and radar. It doesn't say anything about notifying Neads or NORAD or any component of NORAD.

I don't want you to have to take my word for it, but if you page through these two or three pages and I think what you're going to see when you're done is that there is no time listed under

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American 77 at all for notification from the FAA to the military, which seemed to me like that might be a significant issue that you might recall something about in terms of, you know, preparing your administrator to go and appear and testify before Congress if there was no notification at all or if there was--whether it means that there was none, or that there wasn't an ability to determine it. But it seems like it would be an issue that might have been discussed beforehand.

MS. FREEMAN: No, I mean again we tried to capture what we had in these chronologies, and where we had nothing other than the Neads logs--we, I'm saying we, FAA--Air Traffic, you know, for the most part they indicated it. Why they didn't indicate it for American 77, I don't know, but I mean other chronologies say the Neads logs indicate such and such. I don't know why this one did not include that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is there anything on that last one?

MS. FREEMAN: The 9:24 is the Great

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Lakes--the Regional Operations Center notifying Washington Operations Center. So I don't know why they didn't include that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then in the log which it appears was available to somebody, to the FAA, at 9:34, it says "American 77 flight to LA lost, unable to locate." So in terms of some data pointing available in the Neads logs which were referenced earlier on 11 and 175, but in the FAA in its very own brief does not reference the entry of 9:34 of FAA telling Neads that 77 was lost. They were unable to locate it. Do you remember any discussion about that?

MS. FREEMAN: I do not recall. I don't remember any discussion.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then I guess lastly is United 93. This is United 93. There's no notification time listed in here by the FAA and its summary of events. If you look at the Neads log, the first time that the call sign--there is a United tail number that appears at 9:16 here, but this is a tail number of 175. And the only

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reference to United 93 is 10:07, bomb on board UAL 93 over Pittsburgh, and there's a note 3 listed. 10:07. Do you have any insight on why that wouldn't have been included in the--

MS. FREEMAN: In the chronology?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, in the FAA one?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't know why it wouldn't have been. I mean it's like look at the NORAD press release, you know, look at their footnote here, you know. The FAA needs to establish a line of open communication discussion both American 77 and United 93. So I do recall--the only thing I do remember is that the Washington Operation Center had, when they set up the net, you know, I know that NMCC was on the net, so I mean at some point the information was flowing--

MR. KARA: And this should come back to the notes you've written here on the 9:26 time of a possible explanation?

MS. FREEMAN: That would have been it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that look like

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something in your language there?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, that looks like something I would've said. Again, you know, I must have been trying to explain where the 9:24 came from, and--

MR. KARA: It's the evidence you had--

MS. FREEMAN: At 9:26, our net log showed--

MR. KARA: Yeah, but let me ask you this. This piece of paper we have stops at 9:26. Is it possible that there was a second sheet of paper and we only got one piece where you also talked about 93 later on at the 10:07 time and then we just didn't get it?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember.

MR. KARA: Any recollection at all that it was continued?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't recall that.

MR. AZZARELLO: If that's the FAA position that there may have been an open line established to discuss 77 and 93 that was going on at 9:24, then do you have any explanation for why it

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wouldn't be here in the summary of hijacked events?

MS. FREEMAN: The only explanation would be that this was prepared by Air Traffic, and the net logs were logs that belonged to the Washington Operation Center, so, you know, the only explanation I could offer is that perhaps the Air Traffic people who put this together were focused on air traffic communications.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be an issue you'd want to bring to the attention then of the people who put this together to tell them to update it if you found information to indicate that there was an earlier notification?

MS. FREEMAN: Not necessarily. I mean I--there were, you know, different sources of information and this was Air Traffic's chronology that they put together. I certainly didn't want to feed them or put words in their mouth. I mean this was what it was that they put together, and, you know, this was something that if I put it together, which I believe I did, was something where I tried to pull all these pieces together from different

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organizations, with different organizations.

MR. AZZARELLO: But then it's not a great concern that this document might be different--this being the September 17th one--but I'm having a difficult time understanding what it was you were comparing the NORAD press release to that prompted you to grab two days later the list of notifications to the military. I mean you couldn't have been looking at just in a vacuum the NORAD response times, which noted FAA notification to the military. You must have had some document next to that where the FAA took a written position or formal or informal and draft or not, you know, final that said this here, this is what the FAA says--

MS. FREEMAN: Well, it was several documents, so I mean some of it was the Washington Op Center net logs. Some of it was information from Air Traffic, such as the information from the New York Center.

MR. KARA: Do you remember this document, the chronology of events on 9-11 and the note at

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the top is Tracy, and we understand that's Tracy Pettcrom from ARC, and then simply you come down here to pick up the--you're looking at your 9:26, you could come down here to pick up the Secret Service and MCC times. You can pick up 9:24, A77 disappeared from radar, and look at it. This sort of mirrors the language you had here, and I thought this might have been something that your referred to or was prepared for you.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, possibly.

MR. KARA: Who's Tracy?

MS. FREEMAN: Tracy represents the regional organization, so here in Washington--or she did--she represented the Regional Operations Centers, and she was on my team.

MR. KARA: She was on your team.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. KARA: And when you'd show all of the ROCs and the information they had, as you're preparing the testimony information about the ROCs where they--Tracy and then come into you because she was a member of your team.

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MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, that 9:24 entry that when Tracy logged, it just says the WOC received report from the Great Lakes Region regarding 77 disappearing from air. It didn't say anything about sharing it with the military or any open line.

MS. FREEMAN: No, you're right.

MR. KARA: Except that, John, just for the record, if you look at the entry above--

MR. AZZARELLO: It says 9:20, Washington--FAA Washington Op Center sets up primary net including NMCC. It says 9:20. DOJ 9:23, Secret Service, 9:22, and there are other times for CIA, FBI, DIA, DOS and the White House, 9:29. But it doesn't indicate what if anything was communicated. Said setting up program. It doesn't indicate what if anything was communicated on that line. Is that fair to say?

MS. FREEMAN: That's fair, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're not quite sure what you were comparing those NORAD press releases

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to in terms of notification times, but you don't think it was the summary? At least part of the summary that Air Traffic put together with chronology the day before?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm sure it brought it from--it was summary from Air Traffic. The summary, you know, it was net logs from the Washington Op Center, and, you know, it--

MR. KARA: Let me come back to this issue a second because embedded in here are entries such as Neads logs shows. Could this be an indicator that it was Tracy that was looking at the Neads log to make these entries? Do you recall?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know.

MR. KARA: Okay, and if you go to the second page, she also has Neads log shows FAA reporting American Air 77, 9:24 here.

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know which came first. Maybe this one came first. I just don't know.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: I just don't know where she

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got that from.

MR. AZZARELLO: In order to come to a conclusion in the September 20th draft that you put together, would you have wanted to see some documentation that substantiated it, and particularly if there was a difference between what was in the NORAD press release and what the Air Traffic people were saying? Like how would you resolve that? What--

MS. FREEMAN: Well, yes, how I would've resolved it was just to report the facts based on data that I had. So as you can see, you know, where the source was, the Needs or NORAD press release, you know, then I said Needs logs show FAA notifying them regarding American 77. I did not say FAA notified them regarding American 77 because I didn't have any documentation to go by.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm trying to figure this out. On 9-26, your one-page note, you say FAA net logs. I guess the FAA--you say net logs. Are you referring to primary net?

MS. FREEMAN: Must have been I think.

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Washington Op Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: They show a discussion of two airplanes hitting the World Trade Center, both possibly American flights, one out of Boston and one out of Dulles.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then--I don't know if you knew it on the 20th, but--at this point--they weren't both American. One was a United out of Boston and out of Dulles.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it says "this may be the source of the 9:24 Needs entry." And that says "NMC and Secret Service on the net, 9:26." Do you know what data plan you used--did you confirm that they actually were on the net, and if so, how'd you do that?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know if--

MR. AZZARELLO: Tracy. Here's the Tracy one. Tracy's log or chronology. She's got two entries logged into NMCC. One is at 9:20. It says "the Op Center sets up primary net including NMCC,

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9:20." 9:24, nothing there on NMCC. Nothing at 9:26.

MS. FREEMAN: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean just to put it bluntly, you know, we're not trying to play any games or anything. We certainly don't see any evidence that the NMCC was on any primary net or any communications with the FAA at that time.

MS. FREEMAN: Should be if there are logs or the Washington Ops Center. That should be in the log.

MR. AZZARELLO: Should be in their logs--

MS. FREEMAN: I mean if you have it here, Washington Op Center sets up primary net including NMCC at 9:20.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now that's separate. When you say Washington Ops log, that would be separate from the chronology that the WOC put together, wouldn't it, or not--

MS. FREEMAN: I would think so. I would think this was probably done after the fact.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if anybody

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checked to see if the NMCC was actually on any primary net, or in any communication with FAA regarding--or at that time without getting into what was said? Did anybody even try to confirm where they are, or would they just try to call them then and there was no--we couldn't get through?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know the answer to that whether somebody confirmed that, you know, it was--that's what the Washington Op Center logs showed is that they were on there, but I don't know if anybody called back to confirm that they in fact had been on there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. It's a difficult area to explore then if you don't know what source was relied upon, but if the administrator was going to appear before Congress and say, for example, take a position specifically on when the FAA notified the military about a particular flight, like 77 or 93, and she was relying on some entry in her log that it was an open net, an open primary net, and the NMC was believed to be on it, is that the kind of documentation that in your view would

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be sufficient to put in the briefing book and tell the administrator that she could feel comfortable that to know if they were notified, or would you want to actually have somebody listen and make sure that a, the NMCC was on the net, and that b, they were asked information about those flights, that they were notified that they were hijacked, those particular flights?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I mean the statement is they were on the net, and if the net logs showed that they were on there, I would've felt that that was sufficient.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just that the NMCC was on the net, and the log showed they were on the net?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You think that would be sufficient. You wouldn't--necessarily to see if somebody listened to it to see if actually that information was passed regarding those flights?

MS. FREEMAN: I personally would have trusted the logs.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I'm drawing a

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distinction though between the log entry that says FAA, you know, notified AA 77 hijacked, or FAA notified UA 93, bomb on board on primary net at NMCC on. That's one scenario, okay, and I would tend to agree with you there that if you saw that in the log entry, you know, maybe you could take that at face value and expect that that was done.

But if that's not what you see in a log entry, I'm drawing a distinction, if what you see is a primary net activated, NMCC, 9:20. And then a subsequent entry that just says, you know, American Airlines--for example, Op Center received information from the region regarding 77. Disappeared from radar. Use that as an example. Now that doesn't tell me that the NMCC--at least me on its face--that the NMCC was told that over the primary net. It tells me that the WOC received that from the region, okay.

And another example is you might see something come in from the field facility level to the region or to the ROC about them reporting it, you know, hijacked flight, but that doesn't tell

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you that it was then relayed to the NMCC. And that's what I'm getting at. Like what level of log entries would you deem, you know, sufficient to rely on to then say, okay, notification was given on United 93? Let's use that as an example. Would you expect to see in the log entry that NMCC notified a primary net or words to that effect that the notification went to the NMCC about that particular flight being hijacked?

MS. FREEMAN: I think I would expect to see that.

MS. KARA: John, let me--as of this afternoon, we've got another version of this log. Actually not of that log, of the WOC log. Yeah, that one, and this one, which says a note at the top, an Excel crisis log, 9-16-01, which would be five days after. This would be the version five days later. We have an earlier version which has a couple of 9-20 entries. The 9-20 entry says primary net requested and activated by ACO, and above that, NMCC notified and in parentheses Major Chambers, and then these are handwritten notes that

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explain these two entries. And I'm enlisting your help here. I'm taking from this that this, which is the same version John just went over with you, it's a polished version of this. Does that make sense, or am I taking a leap in logic?

MS. FREEMAN: I believe that--you say--

MR. KARA: Well, I haven't gone line for line, but it appears to be.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay. I believe this is the Op Center, Washington Op Center log for lack of a better term.

MR. KARA: Right.

MS. FREEMAN: And I believe that this was an attempt to put together what the Regional Op Centers logs said and the Washington Op Center.

MR. KARA: So this chronology itself is not the log. This is the underlying log of all of the notification times.

MS. FREEMAN: I'm not sure. You'd have to ask--

MR. KARA: Right. But to conclude our conversation, this is the day of log or the

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Center--

MS. FREEMAN: The Washington Op Center.

MR. KARA: And this is the chronology later on perhaps the 16th derived from that log.

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I think this is just Washington Op's Center--

MR. KARA: Right, and this is multiple sources in chronology.

MS. FREEMAN: This is the--Regional Ops Center.

MR. KARA: Good, because you mentioned the region, and that brings in Terry Pettcrom word or Tracy Pettcrom's word.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I have to apologize, but--

MR. KARA: You got to go someplace?

MS. FREEMAN: I have to go pick up my daughter at school before it closes, and I'm already running late. If there's something--

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe if we could come back next week for some other interviews. I don't know if you're available for a half hour say, we

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can pick up whatever times to interview. We'll be here next Tuesday and Wednesday. So maybe if we can steal a half hour from one of those days.

MR. BROWN: I thought some of those are going to be--

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, that's right--

MR. KARA: Well, we'll just start early. We'll come in early. Whatever we have to do because there are a couple of critical things that flow into 2002, 2003 that we need to talk you about.

MR. BROWN: We might be out here Thursday because we have some people coming for other things--so maybe Thursday even, if next Thursday would be good for you for a half hour or something.

MR. AZZARELLO: One quick question I want to ask you. Did you have any involvement in preparing any administrative--for the testimony before our commission, the 9-11 Commission in May, 2003?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't brief her or

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prepare her in any way for that?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I'm sorry. When was that?

MR. AZZARELLO: May of 2003.

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. KARA: And just one follow-on question for the record. Did they enlist your support because she had mis-spoken on notification times? Did you get involved in correcting the record on that?

MS. FREEMAN: In May--

MR. KARA: In May of 2003.

MS. FREEMAN: No, no. I was on--the reason I ask you the date, I was on detail at that time to the Department of Homeland Security. So I wasn't here.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. We have a little bit more. Hopefully we can get together for maybe a half an hour maybe. Thanks.

MR. KARA: We're concluding the interview to be continued with Darlene--

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[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DARLENE FREEMAN

BY

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN AZZARELLO

SPECIAL AGENT JEFF BROWN

SPECIAL AGENT MILES KARA

BROOKE LEWIS, FAA

Tuesday, April 20, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's Tuesday, April 20th. I'm losing track of days. Tuesday, April 20th. We're at FAA headquarters. We're about to begin an interview with Darlene Freeman of the FAA. This is actually our second interview with Darlene. Our last one was abbreviated before we concluded. It's John Azzarello, 9-11 Commission, Team 8.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9-11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9-11 Commission.

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis, Chief Counsel's office, FAA.

MS. FREEMAN: I'm Darlene Freeman.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thanks for taking the time to meet with us again. Just a question that I had before we start actually I guess on preparation that you might have had before today's meeting. My colleague, Miles Karas, said that when he had stepped out before moments ago, he saw Monty Belger on the 10th floor hallway. We're right now on this floor and we have just interviewed right before you today. And you know Monty's no longer an FAA

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employee. We were curious if you met with Mr. Belger prior to coming to this meeting today.

MS. FREEMAN: I happened to see him in Shirley Miller's office five minutes before coming here, but it was just a social--said hello to him.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't have any discussions with Mr. Belger regarding the content of the interview he had with us?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. I want to see if we can sort of focus in on a particular issue that I think we were talking about last time, that obviously we had spoken to Mr. Belger about because he was involved in it, an assignment that you had, or task you were given by Mr. Belger, I believe, to compare information that you were able to gather with the assistance of others obviously, what the FAA knew and when they knew it regarding each of the four hijacked aircrafts on September 11th. Is that correct?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: One of the things you were

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asked to look at--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, I mean I would actually say that what he asked me to focus on was, you know, was the issue of when the military was notified more specifically.

MR. AZZARELLO: The issue of when the FAA notified the military after each of the four hijacked aircrafts?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Did he give any further I guess guidance or instructions as to what he wanted you to look at?

MS. FREEMAN: Not really, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did he also want you to look at what the military said they were told by the FAA and when to the extent that documentation existed?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about that.

MS. FREEMAN: I seem to recall that at some point the military put out a press release. It was either a press release or it was a newspaper

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article. I can't remember which I saw first, and so one of the things--we were already looking at the issue of when did the FAA notify the military. So one of the things that he asked me to do was to look at--now that we had the times the military were saying they were notified--to look at those and see, you know, how they compared to the times that we were showing in our records that we notified them.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so there was a military release regarding notifications, and he wanted you to compare that against FAA's universe of information on notifications and see if there were any discrepancies in comparison?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that a fair characterization?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, that is.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know if we showed you this last time. I think we did. This is a copy. We have a photocopy of a NORAD press release dated 18 September, 2001, and as far as we know,

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it's the only--certainly the first and earliest and we think only press release by NORAD regarding the notifications of the four hijacked aircraft on September 11th. Does that look like it's the document that you were--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, it does.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I think last time we were also looking at this FAA document called "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," and prepared under the direction of AAT20, and I think we established last time that was Dave Kenols' group.

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I think we looked at a separate chronology that they have in here in the FAA summary for each of the four hijacked aircrafts, correct?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And some of these do include a reference to a time for military notification. Is that correct?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: I want to just take out two other documents that I think we will be referring to. One is a Neads log and then a one-page document. This one I'm pretty sure--yeah, we looked at this last time. If you recall it's notifications to the military. Just for the record, it was provided to us by the FAA in response to our request for documents. It's dated September 20th, 2001, and I guess just to sort of put it in time sequence for you, and I'm not suggesting that you saw them in this order, but I want to give you the sequence of the documents as we know them, at least on the face of the document to the time of them.

The FAA summary appears to have been--well, it's dated September 17th, 2001, 6:30 a.m., AAT20. Chronologically the next dated document we have is the NORAD press release the following day, September 18th, which would have been the following Tuesday after the attacks. The FAA-- certainly it would have been the Monday after the attacks. And then September 20th would be the

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one-page document notifications to the military. I think, and I don't want to inaccurately summarize this or paraphrase it, so you tell me if I remember this accurately. I think last time we were here, you looked at in particular on the September 20th notifications to the military, which is an FAA document, I think you looked at the 8:43 entry and thought that you might have drafted that because the language looked like language you may have used. Could you tell me if that's still your recollection and then maybe amplify that?

MS. FREEMAN: It's still my belief that I put this document together.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, the entire document. Was it only one page?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and I appreciate that clarification. I didn't know last time if we had gotten to the whole document, or if it was just that one part that you thought you drafted. And then the last thing I wanted to show you is the NCC. This is a log we did not get from the FAA.

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This we got in response to the request for information from the military, from the Department of Defense. I'll represent to you that it was told to us that this was the log from the Northeast Air Defense Sector. It's called the MCC, mission crew commander log, tech log, which is supposed to be a representation of some of the events that were occurring on the floor of Needs Operations on the day of September 11th, 2001. Had you ever seen this--did you see this Needs log from September 11th in connection with your work of comparing notifications to the military by the FAA on what the military had?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't ever recall seeing this document except when you brought it to my attention at the last interview.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Didn't look like you thought you had ever seen it before the interview?

MS. FREEMAN: Did not look familiar to me at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. One of the things

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that I guess we know understanding that you did not--well, let's clarify. You did not prepare this summary of Air Traffic hijack events, correct?

MS. FREEMAN: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: No part of it. Is that correct?

MS. FREEMAN: No. That's right, although I did review it. It was prepared for the deputy administrator's office, I mean, you know, I did--

MR. AZZARELLO: For your review, okay. Let's review it now and look at each flight and what it may or may not reflect on the military notifications. And this is obviously from the FAA dated September 17th, and I'm looking at FAA--I mean--I'm sorry, Flight AA 11, the first flight that we now know the first flight that crashed that day. There's an entry at 8:40 on the second page says, "Northeast Air Defense Sector logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning American 11."

Understanding you didn't see the MCC log,

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I just wanted to point out so that you're aware of what we're looking at and what we think was referenced by somebody in the FAA. This is a Neads log, and as you can see at 12:40 Zulu, which corresponds to 8:40 a.m., the log states "Possible hijack AA 11 flight."

If you go to the second aircraft that is a chronology for that day, which is United 175, which was the second crash up in New York. At 9:05, there's an entry on the third page of the chronology again referencing Neads logs, and it says that "the logs indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning 175." Now again if you could turn to the Neads log, it says "13:05 Zulu time," which is 9:05 a.m. It corresponds perfectly with the time "United 175, possible hijack, Boston to Los Angeles."

And so it would appear to us that somebody, whoever worked on putting this FAA summary together on September 17th either had access to the log itself or was given the information specifically from the Neads log on

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American 11 and United 175. Would you agree that it appears that way?

MS. FREEMAN: It would appear certainly.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any reason why it just--I just thought that one of the things you were looking at is, or one of the things you attest with examining is notifications to the military, and this is the realtime log from the military of when they received notifications. Any thoughts you might have on why you--was there any discussion about this document, this Needs log being in existence, of why you wouldn't have been privy to it?

MS. FREEMAN: No, no. I mean I recall tasking Air Traffic, specifically the AT20 organization, with developing the chronology and getting the information, and so it does not surprise me that I wouldn't have seen it directly.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you tasked the folks at AAT20 to get whatever documentation they needed to get to find out the universe of information on notifications, including whatever they needed to

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get from the military?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if anyone came back to you and said that there was any problem getting any documents from the military because of the classification issue?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember.

MR. KARA: Do you hold a secret clearance--from at least a secret clearance? So the fact that the document in its original form was secret would not have kept it from you?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know if--did Dave Kenols and the folks at AAT20--did Dave Kenols have secret clearance if you know?

MS. FREEMAN: Oh, I'm sure they did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff Griffith recalled that the FAA did get this from Neads log. Did you ever discuss with him the fact that he knew it was a military log which indicated notifications?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember

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specifically discussing it with him, but I do know that he was the person in Air Traffic--he was the person that Monty Belger or Jane Garvey tasked with getting in touch with the military, talking to them about, you know, about--whether it was about the logs or about the notification times, but Jeff Griffith was the primary who was sort of a liaison to the military. You know, he served in that capacity for the purposes of this tasking.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess along the lines of that statement about Jeff being I guess the point of contact for the military, in his interview with us said that--in fact I think someone from AAT20 did too. I can't recall whether it was Mr. Kenols or Mr. Diggins--but there were at least two or perhaps more people who recalled that in the immediate days following 9-11 as the FAA was endeavoring to reconstruct the chronology of events on the four hijacks, and while the military they assume was doing the same, then why was this communication.

Now it was an item that was--I'm

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paraphrasing, but clearly calling hotly disputed or hotly debated in the days that followed 9-11 that the issue that was hotly debated is who knew what when, vis-a-vis, the military and the FAA. And that the military was not on the same page with the FAA on when they were given information about the hijacked aircraft, with a particular focus on the last one, United 93. Were you privy to that or a part of any of these discussions or heated debates, or heated discussions and spirited debates?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I was not. I don't remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if there was any one issue regarding notifications to the military that there was an agreement on between both sides?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, the only one that I remember, you know, was the 8:38 versus 8:40.

MR. KARA: And I think we talked about that the last time.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah.

MR. KARA: And I would just pose the

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question on that one. Simply that it is defensible that the time was 8:38 and could have been defended from either side, either the NORAD paper that we looked at or your paper. And I'm just curious as to why ultimately when FAA's own time line came out later on that FAA adopted the NORAD position as opposed to simply establishing its own position on that.

MS. FREEMAN: On 8:38 versus 8:40?

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. FREEMAN: It just--I think that given that some of our information was based on personnel interviews at the Centers, and I don't remember if this was one of them, but some of them were based on somebody at a particular air traffic center saying that they had done something. It just appeared to us that, you know, that the military--that perhaps the military had more official records of notification, and so if they said 8:40, some air traffic controller remembered calling them at 8:38. We sort of gave the military

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the benefit of the doubt. We assumed that perhaps their records were more exact and we thought, you know, well, maybe we should go with theirs, particularly since, you know, if anything it worked against us or--

MR. KARA: And for whoever was helping you in their own log here, they had put 8:40 as the notification time.

MS. FREEMAN: And perhaps that was it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, I guess what Miles is referring to is actually that is the--and you might not have known it, or maybe you didn't know it now or you didn't know it then, but there really was a call at 8:38, not just on the personnel statement. And we have both the Neads end of that call, a tape, as well as the FAA one. In fact, the FAA produced it to us in the aftermath of our document production.

And we do understand too that it was some of the things that the Air Traffic folks were pulling together in an effort to compile the summary, tapes of notifications and calls. So the

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call starts at 8:38 from the TMU desk where they call Needs. Now it might not have reached the log until two minutes later, but, you know, that's understandable at that time from the start of a call, process the information, and get it down on the log as near time possible--as near realtime as possible.

But I guess when you look at American 11, and you think about the question is there an issue regarding a discrepancy on notification, it certainly doesn't appear to be any--if there is an issue, it's a two-minute issue. And if you look at the military's saying well, our logs show us that the FAA told us about it at 8:40, and the FAA documentation or information shows that they believe they told the military 8:38. And the reality of it is that's when the call started. So it doesn't certainly appear to be an issue on American 11. Let's go to the second one that day, United 175.

And before we even look at anything here, I want to ask you independently, do you recollect

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there being any issue on the second aircraft, on United 175? In terms of discrepancy, beyond two minutes, something that's a significant discrepancy, and I'll describe it as being beyond 10 minutes.

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't remember any. I do know that in the chronology that Air Traffic put together, they had an indication I believe it's at 8:55 that somebody--I think somebody overheard somebody at the New York Center. The controller in charge--

MR. AZZARELLO: Advised the Operations manager that she thought--

MS. FREEMAN: The CICD turned to the OM position and heard a request for military aircraft to scramble. That was at 8:55. I don't know what that means. I don't know whether that was specific to United 175.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or American 11.

MS. FREEMAN: Or American 11.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, it's ambiguous from the 8:55 entry I guess, and as you said, it's a

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personnel statement, and we don't know if the controller in charge is hearing--if he or she is apparently hearing a request for military, but it's not there whether it's in response or with respect to American 11 or 175.

And what we have here is--they say 9:05 is--the military says is when they were notified of United 175 according to their logs, and again, you look at the log entry that coincides. 9:05 is 175. What do you have on your sheet that you prepared for notification to the military on 175? Do you have anything specific?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I have the indication that the Needs logs show FAA notifying them at 9:05 regarding United 175, and then there's also this 8:43 entry, which again there was some confusion as to whether that was related to American 11 or United 175.

MR. AZZARELLO: How does that 8:43 entry--how is that affected if at all by the FAA summary that predates this September 20th one? The September 17th summary, it says that at 8:46 and 48

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seconds that United 175's transponder code was changed, changed twice actually. And that the Air Traffic computers don't correlate either of those codes with obviously the call sign because that was an answered sign, beacon code. And then it also says--I'm reading ahead--the controller, it says, "Note, the controller communicating with 175 was also monitoring the flight track of American 11. Based on coordination received from Boston Center indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention was focused on American 11."

And in fact, there's a five minute gap between I guess when the transponder code changes and when the next entry on the summary is, and that entry is that the New York Center controller transmitted to 175 quote--so this is from a transcript that appears from the New York Center. In fact, we've seen the transcript and the tape, so we can confirm that it is the New York Center controller who is controlling the aircraft. In fact, he's watching both aircrafts earlier, watching 11 and having 175 in the screen. He says,

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"Recycled transponder. Squawk code 1470. No response was received." And then the controller made these several attempts repeatedly to try and contact the aircraft over the next four minutes which would've taken him up to around 8:55, which is what--before impact anyway. "And that during that time the aircraft was observed making a left turn and descending."

So it appears from the face of this summary, and tell me if you agree or disagree, and if so why, it appears from the FAA internal summary that the first sign of something, we'll call it something unusual with regard to either communication or the tracking of 175, occurred at 8:46 and 48 seconds when they changed the transponder code.

MS. FREEMAN: May I look at this?

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure.

MS. FREEMAN: I would agree with that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that because of the attention of the controller being focused on what he knew at that time to be a reported hijack, i.e.,

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American 11, that it appears he might not have even noticed the transponder code change until 8:51 and 43 seconds.

MS. FREEMAN: That I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's an inference I'm making without, you know, looking at what happened between 8:46 and 8:51. We looked at the controller transcripts, and I represent to you I don't recall him, you know, making any other attempt to contact United 175, but when he saw that the code was changed, it appeared that he immediately called him at 8:51 and asked him to recycle his transponder.

And other than that, it doesn't appear to have any indication on the FAA summary of the 17th that would purport to be an FAA notification to the military. Do you see anything else that would purport to be a notification?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't. No, it's not in this summary.

MR. AZZARELLO: So now let's go to the 20th, your one-page summary. Did you put down a position on behalf of the FAA of when the FAA

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believes it notified the military on United 175?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, again I guess by inference I did reflect the 9:05 entry--9:05, the Needs logs show FAA notifying them regarding United 175, and then I did note the 8:43 a.m., New York Center asked the military liaison specialist at New York Center to get military assistance, and the statement, we believe this is still related to American 11, but it may be the source of NORAD press release showing 8:43 notification regarding United 175. And then I pointed out as you just did that New York Center was working United 175 at that time, but everything was still normal. So that was sort of my interpretation or my opinion that 8:43 notification time probably did not relate to United 175.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, it looked to be a NORAD mis-interpretation of notification on 175. Is that what you're saying potentially?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, potentially. I mean I don't know what it's like there at NORAD. I don't know and I wasn't there and I don't know what the

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environment was like, so I don't know if they were--I don't know exactly how that works. It was New York Center, and New York Center was handling United 175, so, you know, I just don't know whether there was confusion at the time the notification was made, or confusion about the two airplanes because they were happening within a close period of time. I just don't know what it was that caused the military to say 8:43 was the time that they were notified on--

MR. AZZARELLO: Putting the military aside, from your perspective in terms of the FAA notifying, you did not believe that 8:43 was an FAA notification to the military on 175, to the extent that there was any communication. Is that accurate?

MS. FREEMAN: It did not appear to me to be logical, given the fact that the transcripts did not indicate a problem with 175 until after 8:43. So as to why New York Center asked the military liaison specialist to get military assistance, I don't know. I have to assume that that was related

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to American 11 because of the time frame and given the fact that the indications that problems with 175 occurred at 8:46.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the only other notification time on your one-page September 20th paper relative to notification on 175 is the 9:05 time but that cites to the Neads log, right?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: As the military indicated.

MS. FREEMAN: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is the inference in that that the FAA would agree or disagree that that looks like, given the information available of when approximately, you know, give or take a minute, when the notification was made by the FAA to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: The only--I would agree, except for this entry and "8:49 to 9:05 a.m., New York Center military liaison specialist contacts Huntress military facility." Frankly, I don't remember what the source of this was, but I do seem to recall that somebody had some New York Center

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logs and there must have been an entry in there about that. What that notification was about, I just don't know, and I think if I had known that it related to a specific flight, I feel certain that I would have entered it in that entry.

MR. AZZARELLO: At 8:49 and 9:05--

MS. FREEMAN: 8:49 to 9:05.

MR. KARA: John, I think that's after the call to the New York MOS. That would be a different call.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, it might be. Did anybody say they interviewed the MOS? I mean wouldn't that have been a good source to find out if he or she remembers making notifications to the military on either aircraft, the 11 or 175?

MS. FREEMAN: I just don't remember. I don't remember who would have done that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know, based on your experience, did you know that each center has a military or most of them have a military liaison specialist at MOS position?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And what their function was?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I'm not intimately familiar with what their function is.

MR. AZZARELLO: But that they exist. Did you--

MS. FREEMAN: But that they exist.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you think that was from a log of that reference there in your document?

MS. FREEMAN: That's my recollection, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't remember off the top of my head what they said. We did interview an MOS gentleman, Robert Felzer. I don't know if that name rings a bell, and I'm just remembering, so I don't know if it's entirely accurate. But I recall him saying that he thinks he made a few calls to Huntress, one, regarding 11, one on 175, and then one later on confirming Air 175 had gone in. We do have the Neads end of that where there are calls in, and we can see some of those that have been repeated in the background or the original call into him where he gives, you know, confirms that

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175 was in. So that's my recollection of sort of contacts of the military liaison specialist.

We don't recall seeing anything--Miles, correct me if I'm wrong, and Jeff--we don't recall seeing anything earlier than 9:05, being a notification from the military specialist at GNY to Neads about 175.

MR. BROWN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now taking you to American Airlines 77, is there any indication on this sheet of the representation of the FAA position on when they believe they notified the military about American Airlines 77?

MS. FREEMAN: There's the entry that the Neads log shows FAA notifying them regarding American 77 at 9:24.

MR. AZZARELLO: But that's a military document, right, the Neads log?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's not an FAA--

MS. FREEMAN: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So I read that citation to

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a military document and that to their position on what their logs show that that's when the FAA notified them. So that's when they're saying that their logs show they were informed. Is there any entry on that sheet that takes the position of when the FAA thinks they told?

MS. FREEMAN: No, not on this sheet, and I'd have to look at the chronology to refresh my memory.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure. I think this is 77. I think it's the last one. There it is. It starts at takeoff. Is this what you relied on to see if the FAA had something different on notification?

MS. FREEMAN: To some extent, yes. My recollection at the point that I put this together, I was relying on--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes, so the FAA source of information on notification. Then this was the NORAD sequence.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Add to my highlight--9:24. Not coincidentally because that's

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the time that the FAA logs show that the FAA notified them, so I was looking to see what the FAA said happened at 9:24. That entry on the FAA shows that the Great Lakes Regional Operations notified the Washington Operations Center of this simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification of 77. It doesn't say anything about the implication of that loss, whether that means hijack crash or anything else.

MS. FREEMAN: Right. Yeah, I don't see anything in that--

MR. AZZARELLO: There's one more page. I don't think there's anything back there.

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, tell me what does that mean then that if you looked at this and all you put down was what the military log said. Does that mean that--well, you tell me. I don't want to put--I mean--why we would conclude that there is nothing on that one page representing when the FAA thought they called.

MS. FREEMAN: Right. I mean my conclusion

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at the time was that we didn't have any information indicating-- independent of what we got from the military indicating when we had notified them. However, I do know that a net had been set up, and so when we tried to piece together the whole issue of when the military was notified, it was difficult to piece it together because at some point a hijacking net had been set up which would have included the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: It had or it did?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, it would have included them, and I guess my belief is that it did include them. I think there was something somewhere that indicated an MCC was notified or NMCC was--out or something like that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be something that you would want to then cite to show that--in other words you're saying that they--lead you to believe that the FAA made the notification?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I guess what I'm trying to say is that it seemed to me that with the first airplane, American 11, we had, you know,

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pretty specific evidence about notification, and it seemed like as you got later and later time with these airplanes that the information got more and more general. And given that, you know, given that there was some scrambling done by the military, you know, I think it was--you know, one of the things that we wondered about or assumed when they pieced this together was that the military was on the net and so as this day, this morning was unfolding, you know, I was assuming that they were talking on the net about these airplanes as these events were unfolding, as they were happening.

MR. AZZARELLO: They were talking--

MS. FREEMAN: On the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: An FAA representative?

MS. FREEMAN: Right. The FAA people who were on the net and the military people who were on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess what we're understanding though is a little bit of difference between let's say if a net is up, and someone says oh, there's another aircraft we think is hijacked,

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United 93, that gives a call sign. And if someone's listening, that someone's on that line and listening, well, now they've just learned that there's an aircraft, United 93 call center they think might be a hijack. That doesn't necessarily tell the person listening are you tracking it. If so, who is. What FAA entity. Where is it, and that kind of stuff, to coordinate the military response, if that's what was going on.

MS. FREEMAN: I mean I wasn't there. I don't know what was talked about on the net. I mean when they manage--you know, when there's a hijacking net--you know, whenever there's a hijacking, the reason you set up a net involving the various agencies is to coordinate actions. But I don't know what happened on this one.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, before we get to that, I just want to show the military log, the Needs log, that you, not you, but somebody obviously was privy to because they were citing it in the FAA summary. With regard to that, the American 77 flight, it starts at 8:40 in the

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morning with a report of 11, and if you go down all the entries, you'll see the next entry regarding American Airlines is at 9:24, but it just gives a tail number, and that's the tail number 211. And that the first mention of 77 is a call sign is at 9:34 a.m. "American 77 flight to L.A. lost, unable to locate." Obviously this is military Needs receiving this information from the FAA that the FAA can't locate 77 and it's lost and it was going to L.A., from I.D. Dulles.

Is this the type of information on entry that you would've thought was reflective of a notification on 77 to the military of it being lost, neither being hijacked, but exactly what it says, lost, unable to locate? That if you knew about would you have--that would have been the type of information you would have reflected in your notifications to the military on 77?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, it depends. I think I would've had I had--I would've focused on the first notification. So, you know, the continuing--with what I assume was happening on the net was

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continuing discussion about things as they were happening and they were being reported. But what I would have focused on would've been the first notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which is--their logs say, or your papers says their logs--and when you look at 9:24 on their log, it doesn't show--it says American Airlines--I'm quoting--"American Airlines N334 AA hijacked," and that's the tail number for American 11 not 77.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay. I hear what you're saying. I didn't have the benefit of this. I had the benefit of the news release which said that at 9:24 they were notified on American 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand you didn't have it, but somebody in Air Traffic did. You say that you believe the point of contact for the military was Jeff Griffith. Jeff Griffith said he recalls getting a log, a Needs log, thinks this was it. And he did not directly represent that you had it in your possession but thought that this was circulated. It wasn't just kept by hand by people

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who were working on the issue of notifications issues, of military notification were aware of its existence. I'm not saying that you were, but that people that were working on this project knew it was here to refer to it, when obviously somebody did because it's in the FAA summary.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah. Again, I just don't remember ever seeing that before.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the Air Traffic folks that indicate that they have training which would obviously indicate to them seeing the tail number doesn't tell you which aircraft it is, but that you can then find out which American Airline that day, knowing that two were hijacked, you know, which one is this tail number go with. And we find out it was American 11 and parenthetically this information did come from Boston Center, from their military guy who gave the information to Needs.

MS. FREEMAN: You're asking me--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, I'm telling you.

MS. FREEMAN: Oh, okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because we have the Needs

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tape and it comes in near realtime, like 9:23 or whenever the call starts, and they're giving the tail number of American 11. So it was clear to the FAA folks who gave this information in Boston that they're referring to American 11 and anybody who checked the tail number would know it's 11 not 175, which I would think would cause maybe somebody some cause for concern as to why someone would want to rely on that log entry as a notification regarding 77. Had you known that, would that have caused you concern about whether or not this was 77 or 11 that--

MS. FREEMAN: Had I known that, that there was a different tail number, yeah, I would have asked them to look further, you know. Yes, I would've, and again, I don't know if that's what Jeff Griffith was doing.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then I guess there would be certainly some discrepancy or ambiguity if one thought that the Needs log at 9:24, the tail number, that they thought that was 77 and it was hijacked, and then 10 minutes later at 13:34,

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American 77 flight goes to L.A. lost, unable to locate, which is a little bit different than and potentially inconsistent with hijack as lost and we can't find it. So none of this information was even brought to your attention outside of the document itself? No one said, hey, you know, there's some inconsistent entries in this log?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: John, I want to for a moment approach this in a slightly different direction, the construct of this and the ultimate construct of the FAA press release in 2002. First of all we got hijack procedures that were in place which nobody followed that day, so you can pretty much set that aside. And that is focused on headquarters and what headquarters interacts with the military with. The fact of the matter that day, and we'll start with American 11, the notification to the military on 11 went from an in-route center to the Northeast Air Defense Sector. That establishes the paradigm for the day. This is the construct for how

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notifications--one construct. I'm not saying it's the only one, but it's certainly one that could be used to establish notifications. So, yeah, Boston notifying Northeast Air Defense Sector and in-route center on 11. You have either Boston or New York notifying on 175. On 77, it's actually part of a different conversation having to do with American 11. Washington Center makes the notification to the Northeast Air Defense Sector, and then finally on 9--

MR. AZZARELLO: --and I can't find it.

MR. KARA: Right. Then that line--but that is the notification that we're carrying forward. And then finally on 93 the notification is made after two other conversations that Northeast Air Defense Sector, Cleveland notifies zero, when he notifies Northeast Air Defense Sector. So just to summarize this as I'm saying this to you, we have times of notification and the constant on the other side or in-route centers setting aside what was supposed to happen that day. Did you or anyone in your group try to approach it

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that way in terms of the notice that had been established at the very beginning by Boston Center?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I mean the only--what we did do is we just tried to gather data from all the sources we could think of.

MR. KARA: Whether it was an in-route center or headquarters or wherever you could get it from.

MS. FREEMAN: Exactly.

MR. KARA: And then as you look at the military--the military's a rather large place. The pointing end of the sphere, and I apologize for the use of the language, is the Northeast Air Defense Sector. Nothing is going to happen in an Air Defense response until they are notified. So to say notified the National Military Command Center or notify the Air Traffic Services cell or to notify Colonel Cheryl Atkins here could constitute notification to a military person. But operationally to get things to happen, the notification has to end up at the Northeast Air Defense Sector, and that's why I came back to this

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construct. Does that construct make sense the way I just gave it to you?

MS. FREEMAN: Sure.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So I guess to summarize what Miles is saying is there was an outside the box notification that was going on on 9-11, meaning outside the protocol, and that happened when Boston Center made an immediate contact to Northeast Air Defense Sector. But they also followed their protocol by telling their superiors. What was supposed to happen then, as we understand and tell us if you have the same understanding--is when Boston tells the region, the region tells the Washington Operations Center here where we are on the 10th floor, and then they go get a hijack coordinator or summon that person, and that person then calls the NMCC so that you don't have a disconnect. You have the Ops folks--down here at the lower level, but you have the decision-makers and the management at headquarters locked up with the NMCC who then bring in decision-makers. Did

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you and your folks try to confirm whether or not the upper level contact was ever occurring between the NMCC and FAA headquarters?

MS. FREEMAN: No. The only thing I remember was, you know, asking for the logs or, you know, asking the Washington Ops Center to check their logs and--

MR. AZZARELLO: Which logs for what?

MS. FREEMAN: For the net. You know, when was the net--

MR. AZZARELLO: That's what I need to know from you. What net because there's been references to more than one net and frankly without trying to confuse you people that interchangeably use terminology, two different terminologies to explain the same net, or they refer to two different nets but the same terminology. Either way you want to approach it.

So if I'm you, and I'm Darlene Freeman and I'm in your shoes on let's say September 12th, and Monty Belger tells me, okay, Darlene, go find out whether or not our management level, the folks who

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were supposed to be according to our protocol talking to the folks at the NMCC, could you do me a favor and go please check whatever records or tapes or logs and find out if that happened. Where would you go, what would you look for, what specific documents or tapes or whatever? What in addition would you look for?

MS. FREEMAN: I would go to the Washington Ops Center and ask them for, you know, ask them to check their logs to see when was the net activated and who was on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which net?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, initially when we asked the question, you know, they said the net was activated at whatever time they said it was activated. You know, after asking a few questions, we ascertained that that net that they initially set up was internal to FAA, and it was some time later they activated the net that included the military and I think CIA and others. I can't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the first net set up

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you found out from the WOC was the one internal to the FAA?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's the tactical net you found out.

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: First net set up on 9-11 was the tactical net and it was internal to FAA. That's what we understand. Did you know that before you went in there and asked the folks in the WOC, or did you have a pre-existing understanding?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I did not have a pre-existing understanding of two different nets.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. And I'll give you--that purports with our understanding given what we've read. There's a crisis management handbook, and do you have a copy of that, Miles? I'm sorry. There's a crisis management handbook and in Chapter 4 of it, it talks about--there's a tab for primary net and the tactical, and the tactical net says it's generally internal. You can pull that outside parties according to the crisis

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management handbook at the discretion of those running it, the Security folks running the tactical net, if you think somebody belongs in it from the outside. But it's primarily internal to figure out what's going on. And then you would set up, as we understand it from the document I'm speaking of some folks in Security, if it warranted, the event warranted it, then you would after the tact net, establish a primary net and bring in the outside folks when you need it to go outside the FAA. Is that how you came to understand it after 9-11?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. So which net then of those--do you know if the second one was called the primary net?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, primary net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Which one would you expect then to find the military under? The primary or the tactical?

MS. FREEMAN: The primary.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that's where you would look after 9-11 to see if the military element of

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the NMCC was on.

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you'd look there for FAA communication with the NMCC.

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. We have a transcript from Command Center that we went over with Mr. Belger and other people. It's referred to as the tactical net, not the primary net, and there's a gentleman named Pete Falcone on it that was calling it a tactical net. Did you know who Pete was in the aftermath of 9-11 if not before?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I mean that name rings a bell, but are you talking about the Air Traffic Command Center in Herndon?

MR. AZZARELLO: No. Well, that's where we get the tape from, and they are on it with other entities, other FAA entities among other parties. FBI's on it too. And what you see when you read the transcript and listen to the tape is at some point after 9 o'clock, you hear a new party come in, this is almost as a moderator, this is FAA

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tactical net to Eastern Region net. This is FAA tactical net to Command Center. What was that last report on Flight X or give us the update. Okay, that appears to be the tactical net because somebody's calling it that in FAA headquarters, Pete Falcone.

They asked repeatedly on the tact net where's the NMCC. Is NMCC on here yet, after 10 o'clock somebody asks. No NMCC on here yet. About a half hour or so later, it's almost 11 o'clock. Somebody wanting the tact net who we understand was running that tact net, Pete Falcone, is ACS Security. So he's in this building, I would assume, and so maybe even available--not for you, but for the folks running down the real sort of ground level facts what went on that day. He's at headquarters and he's one of the tact net in that aviation crisis center we think if that's where he's running it from, that's where people saw him. And he's there on that tact net as people were saying where's that NMCC.

We're getting the distinct impression that

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maybe someone thought that that was supposed to be the primary net and that they should have been on there and that they weren't. And what we're seeing from all our findings is we're getting a distinct impression that notwithstanding what the FAA folks here at headquarters might have thought should have been going on with the NMCC, that they might not have been on a primary net before all of the events concluded, before the four crashes concluded that day on September 11th.

And I'm just applying some logic. If the primary net is supposed to go on in the same room, in the same crisis center as the tactical net, it would strike me that the gentleman moderating it from headquarters on the tact net would be saying, sitting there silent, you know, when people are saying well, where's that NMCC, are they on the net. It would strike me that he might say yeah, they're on the net, but this is the tact net, and as I said before, this is FAA tact net, but you folks that are asking for them, they're on the primary net, and that ain't here, folks, because

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this is the tact net. That's my colleague over here, three chairs over, in the crisis center who was on the primary net. And we don't hear that, and--issue for you, and what we're hearing that the military was saying to Jeff Griffith after 9-11. In particular, a representative from Konar, perhaps even General Arnold himself, was saying hey, we didn't know about 93, United 93, the last one before it crashed. We didn't get any heads-up on that from you folks at the FAA.

And to the extent that the FAA folks that we're interviewing, and there's numerous ones at headquarters, they seem to be relying on the fact that they can't point to--Mr. Belger just met with us, and he said I can't, you know, they, meaning the FAA, can't point to--look at my notes instead of trying to guess--there's no record they, the FAA, can point to that the FAA asked the NMCC or any military component for assistance on United 93, or that they pointed out United 93 as a hijack to the NMCC. But yet there remained this consistent inference that well, we can't show you, but we

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think it happened because we're assuming that what was supposed to happen, given our protocol, we're assuming that it did happen, i.e, that there was a primary net set up and that the NMCC was on it.

MR. LEWIS: John, who were you just quoting?

MR. AZZARELLO: Belger. We're assuming that it happened.

MR. LEWIS: Your contact was not quite right.

MR. BROWN: Would it be helpful if I just read the whole paragraph I have?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, read the whole paragraph then.

MR. BROWN: "Belger did not receive information that the NMCC was on the net when the information was communicated regarding UAL 93. Belger did not believe there was any information that the FAA asked the military to "do anything regarding UAL 93." Belger commented that there was not record "to point that UAL 93 was discussed with the military. He holds the position that the NMCC

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was on the primary net and not notified "of UAL 93" if UAL 93 was discussed on the net."

MR. AZZARELLO: Unless I'm missing something, and we should talk about this later because there's been a position taken by your folks and with an agreement with OJ that counsel present to monitor these meetings will not interfere with the questioning unless--

MR. LEWIS: I did not interfere. I was just--

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't think I'm going to defend myself here with all due respect, Mr. Lewis, and tell you that I think I said to Ms. Freeman that Mr. Belger said that, but there have been repeated representations that notwithstanding the fact that there's nothing to point to, that there's a belief that it did occur, that the military knew about it because they think protocol was followed. And with all due respect, I think that put it in context and did not mislead--

MR. LEWIS: (Inaudible).

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask the witness.

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Do you feel that I misled you in any way in the way I approached that to you?

MS. FREEMAN: I mean my understanding is, again, not being privy to exactly what was discussed on the net, but this is what my understanding was when I tried to piece all of this together. My understanding was that first the tactical net was set up that was internal. When the primary net was set up and NMCC was part of it, that's what I understood, okay. The NMCC was part of it.

I would agree with the quote that you read from Mr. Belger. We could not find anything specific to show FAA notifying the military about United 93, but we knew--again, I hear what you're saying about talking to people, but this is what I believed is that NMCC was on the net at the time that 93 was taking place, and so that much we knew. We knew that the military was on the net--

MR. AZZARELLO: You believed--I'm sorry but I got to get a distinction between belief and knowledge.

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MS. FREEMAN: We believe that the military was on the net at the time that United 93 was occurring.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: So we, you know, we believe that they knew about it because it must have been discussed on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have any hard knowledge that they were on the net beyond a belief? Tell me what was that belief based on that they were actually on the net?

MS. FREEMAN: I have a recollection of either somebody from the Washington Ops Center or--I have a recollection of NMCC, you know, seeing something that showed the NMCC came up on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, that they came up. Now I want to take it a step further. Let's assume--did you ever hear a tape of the primary net?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you ever speak to any individual who identified himself or herself as a

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participant in the net from the FAA? Did somebody say hi, Darlene, this is, you know, Pete Falcone. I was on the primary net that day?

MS. FREEMAN: I think I did talk to somebody in Security, but I don't remember who it was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what do you remember that person telling you? Did you talk to them about the primary net?

MS. FREEMAN: What I remember discussing with them was what was the difference between the two nets and, you know, what was their role, vis-a-vis the role of the Washington Ops Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: The difference between the two nets and the role of the nets--

MS. FREEMAN: The role of Security versus the role of the Washington Ops Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Security, okay, versus the role of the Ops Center.

MS. FREEMAN: In other words, I was more interested in, you know, how do you get from a tactical net to a primary net, who set that up.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. KARA: That's the question we have too.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now let's take it a step further. Now did you see anything beyond a log or a document which indicated that a primary net was activated and the NMCC was on it?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe I'm oversimplifying it, but I would think that maybe one of the avenues that could be pursued to try to verify that such a primary net existed separate and apart from the tactical net would be just to do a query. I don't know whether it's an e-mail or a memo or call all the folks together who worked that day and say does anybody here remember being on the primary net with NMCC while United 93 was going on. Was anything like that done? I mean even that's sort of a pretty straightforward way to try and find out who was on it?

MS. FREEMAN: I have no reason to question the information that was given to us.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so the log--I just want to understand, and I'm not suggesting that you should have questioned it. I'm just trying to gain an understanding of the universe of your--basis of your belief that there was a primary net, and that the NMCC was on it while United 93's transpiring. And so can I take away from this meeting that the universe of that belief was based on a piece of paper that the FAA possessed that said that the primary net was activated?

MS. FREEMAN: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that the NMCC was on it?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could that be--was it one piece of paper or more than one piece?

MS. FREEMAN: I honestly don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me show you one piece of paper that doesn't appear to be too official. It says Tracy with an extension in the upper--chronology of events on 9-11. It doesn't say who's chronology, whether it's the center or

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headquarters or Tracon or--it says "at 9:20, FAA Washington Ops Center sets up primary net including NMCC" and it has the time, 9:20. DOJ, 9:23, Secret Service--you see all that?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that look like the document you might have looked at?

MS. FREEMAN: That might have been the document, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now I want to draw a distinction that I think it's a very important distinction, and I want to be clear about it, and if I'm not clear, let me know if I haven't been clear. I think there's a distinction between what you said before which is there was a belief based on maybe this, maybe it was this very document I showed you that Tracy directed, but there's a difference between--Situation A is we believe that there was a primary net open at 9:20. We believe based on the document we see that the NMCC--that it included the NMCC at 9:20, and we know that United 93, the events surrounding its hijacking started

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after 9:20. That's a certain set of facts.

But from those set of facts that doesn't answer the question of was the NMCC still on the line when the events surrounding United 93 evolved. If they were, was an FAA representative on the line with a primary net at the same time the military was. Was that FAA representative on the line, a person who was given--who had knowledge of what was transpiring with United 93, that it was reported to have been potentially hijacked with a bomb threat on board? And then B, did he or she communicate that information to the NMCC person who they believe was standing there listening?

Now all of those things occurred that I just went through in Scenario B. I would think that you or the FAA collectively would have a pretty solid basis to believe that there was a notification from the FAA to the NMCC which would have been--just happened to be in the protocol. I'm not understanding not all things went according to protocol that day. But we don't see any outside the box notifications by the centers until after

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the crash is on. Cleveland calls at 10:07, and we have the live date from both ends, from Cleveland Center and from Neads at 10:07 saying 93, bomb on board, hijack. In fact, Cleveland Center doesn't even know it went down yet four minutes ago when they're notifying Neads.

So that only leaves us with looking at did the primary net get it. We haven't even found any--that the primary net existed other than this one piece of paper that we just looked at and showed you, the one that Tracy had, and this one which is a ROC chronology which appears to be more of a formal document because it says terrorist attacks with the date, 9-11, and it says chronology for the AVA Authority, which is the manager of a ROC. And all that has is 9:20 primary net activated. It doesn't even tell you who's on it, if anybody's on it. Doesn't say who. So it gives us no indication on here that the NMCC was even on it.

MS. FREEMAN: Right, but there is a protocol. I mean there is some, you know, there's

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a--I don't know if it's an order or what it is, but it's a protocol for--

MR. KARA: Well, I'll show you what John was--

MS. FREEMAN: --for the Ops Center to follow when they activate the primary net and who they--

MR. AZZARELLO: Here's a--this is the protocol of--"it's established immediately upon activation of the crisis center. It remains operational till it's disestablished by the manager. The actual participants are dependent on the situation. Normally it will consist of the following participants, who are automatically included during the establishment of the net." And it has NMCC.

But I'm going to--and I don't mean to facetious, but I want to throw it back at you in the spirit of a debate here. I'm afraid that I've heard a little too often from the FAA when I talk about normal and what's supposed to occur and what's protocol. If I had a nickel for every time

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I heard from an FAA rep that come on, John, normal, there's nothing normal about 9-11. Throw protocols out the window. There was all kinds of non-protocol stuff going on. It was all kinds of actions outside the protocol. And that would beg me to ask the very agency that's telling me that don't rely on protocols for answers on 9-11, then I got to throw that back at the FAA and say why would they just rely on a protocol that a document existed that's supposed to happen without trying to check did it happen because a lot of things that was supposed to happen evidently according to the FAA show didn't happen on 9-11.

MS. FREEMAN: Well, I mean I can tell you from my point of view when I see a log that has specific times for specific agencies being brought up, generally that's something I would not look past. I would've, you know--it just seems to me that somebody entered that in a log so therefore it must have happened. I did not see any reason to question.

MR. KARA: Let me just pursue that point

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one step further. The WOC is set up to--it runs the place. The crisis center is activated, the WOC turns the lights on, turns air conditioning on, makes sure that this place is a right, and activates the nets. That's their job--they call organization X, let's call it the NMCC, and they talk to a similar type person over there who has exactly the same responsibilities, turns the lights on, the computers go on, they activate the net, and they say we're on at their technician level. Then once that net is activated, principles or representatives of principles get on it and keep it active. For example, the tactical net would have Peter Falcone from here, Marcus Royal from New England, and we would hear those voices back and forth.

We have an open window into the Aviation Crisis Center because the severe weather position at the Command Center left its mike open to hear. So we're hearing, and I must confess early on, we thought the voices we were hearing were the Command Center and here they were not. What we were

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hearing was here talking to New England Region. So we have a window. We have an audio window into the Aviation Crisis Center as John has said several times. We hear nothing about that line of communication talking to the primary net, or do we hear voices in the background that even lead us to believe that the primary net--once activated, we're not calling it if it was activated. We believe it as activated, but we don't hear it being used operationally.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not going to--

MR. KARA: Well, what I meant by that--

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not going to concede that we believe it was activated a, at all, or b, if it was activated that it was activated at 9:20.

MR. KARA: Yeah, I said that from--

MR. AZZARELLO: I do hold the belief that it maybe that the folks thought that the primary net was activated when it was--it wasn't activated until much after 9:20, and that someone maybe mistaken. Maybe. Or maybe it was. We haven't concluded one way or the other on this yet,

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although there appears to certainly be a disconnect because the military is saying--and they're saying clearly now, notwithstanding what they put out there at NORAD having gone over their tapes and having walked through everything now themselves, they're saying that it looks like they didn't hear about anything until 10:07.

MR. KARA: And Mike Morris, when we talked to him, it was his--he was a little late getting there that day, but he operated up--nine or 12 positions. He thought the two nets, if they were established, would have an operator--an operational operator, not the May Averys, but here and here with recorders behind them. And that's why John and I are looking for any evidence--let's call it the primary net--we just have no evidence whatsoever that there's anything happening.

MS. FREEMAN: Well, but you do have--

MR. KARA: Other than this. Other than that, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And let me expand on this, though. This doesn't say that the NMCC was on it

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when United 93 was evolving, the events which are later than 9:20. And my other point is that somebody in the FAA was on it who was getting that--in situational awareness on 93 and passing it on, which would constitute in someone's estimation, maybe not just mine, maybe your's, would you agree that that would be some indication of notification at NMCC? If somebody at FAA said, hey, United 93 is hijacked over--

MR. KARA: (Inaudible).

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So are you saying then that no one--that the assumption was made upon seeing a document like this that the NMCC--a, that they stayed on past 9:20, b, that they were on during the evolution of events regarding United 93, c, that someone from the FAA was on it with knowledge of 93, and d, that they communicated it? All that was assumed from this that they were notified on 93?

MS. FREEMAN: I mean yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, I mean if that's

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what it was, then that's what the assumption was based on. Then my question to you is this that United 93, and you can see from the time line here, it was a period of time where the controllers were aware that something was amiss when they hear some sounds about get out of here, get out of here. And it proceeds from 9:28 phone. And I can tell you at 9:34, headquarters knows about it because John White from Command Center is talking to headquarters, and he's giving the update to Jeff Griffith and Doug Davis on 93.

But now that leaves a whole window--let's say for the sake of argument that 9:34 is where we've seen the earliest time that headquarters and Command Center are both aware that United 93 looks like a hijack with a reported bomb on board. That's 29 minutes before it crashes. Understanding as I would have to say that if not you personally, people at the FAA and the military were sensitive to--okay, that's 29 minutes. Minutes count in the notification game--aircraft and get them to tail that aircraft, or be in a position to do something

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should a higher authority like a commander-in-chief or the President of the United States give us an order to take it out. That's 29 minutes.

I would be surprised if somebody then at the FAA, and I'm asking you did they, did they go then and say when within that 29 minute frame did we notify the military about it. Just because we think that we had a primary net going, and just because we think the NMCC was on it because this document says so doesn't add to the \$64,000 question well, when did somebody--when did our rep on that net say hey, folks, heads up at NMCC, we got another one coming in, United 93, transponder off, turn--headed for D.C., i.e., Alway. Did anybody even make an effort to find out when that occurred, the time of the notification, because wasn't that part of your assignment? Part of your task was what was the specific notification that we gave to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember if I asked the question whether, you know, there were any tapes. My recollection is that of the net. My

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recollection is that what we had were these logs from the Washington Operations Center, and that's what we had.

MR. AZZARELLO: But that doesn't answer the question, right?

MS. FREEMAN: No, it does not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think that somebody--did you take it further or ask somebody, well, hey, this doesn't answer the mail, and I don't mean that in a derogatory fashion, but you know what I'm saying. This doesn't put me, Darlene Freeman, in position to tell Mr. Belger and Administrator Garvey when we think--the time, give them a time--when we think we notified on United 93.

MS. FREEMAN: I have to believe, just looking at what I put together, I have to believe that I must not have been able to ascertain that, otherwise I would have included it. So I did not make any statements in here--

MR. KARA: Then there is no second page?

MS. FREEMAN: No.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Was that--

MR. KARA: It just stops at 9:29. There is no entry that goes further than this.

MS. FREEMAN: I don't see it here, you know, and I don't have this document anymore.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what about from your--because it's important obviously if there was a second page. Are your practices--if you did have one, if you had more than the one page document, would it be your practice to in any way denote that by putting one of two or two of two?

MS. FREEMAN: It would not have been, but I have to tell you--I mean, we have what we had, which was, you know, NA for notification on 93. I don't believe there was a second page.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your statement that you think--you're believing or inferring from that you didn't have a specific notification. Is that right? I don't want to put words in.

MS. FREEMAN: That's right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that have been something you would've raised with Deputy

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Administrator Belger like--when did we know what and when did we tell the military. Wouldn't you have gone to him and said Mr. Belger, on 93, I can't give you a time. I can't find a specific notification time. All I can tell you is that we think NMCC was on the line and that they--

MS. FREEMAN: It's possible that I did or somebody did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall a discussion of ever hearing it?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember specifically discussing it, but I remember being aware of the fact that the 93 we didn't have the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't remember not being able to pin a time to it.

MS. FREEMAN: Right.

MR. KARA: Out of time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thank you. Thanks for your time.

MS. FREEMAN: Thank you.

MR. AZZARELLO: I appreciate your coming

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back a second time.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JANE GARVEY

BY

SAM BRINKLEY, 9/11 Commission

JOHN RAIDT, 9/11 Commission

BILL JOHNSTONE, 9/11 Commission

LISA SULLIVAN, 9/11 Commission

Tuesday, October 21, 2003

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. BRINKLEY: I'm Sam Brinkley, we've already met before. And thank you for being here with us, Ms. Garvey, and this is Team 7, which is the Aviation and Transportation Security Team for the Commission. There's a few formalities here, I have to sort of give us some preface to the--because we are recording it.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. BRINKLEY: So that--it's not going to be transcribed, we use the recording to--really to re-enforce our notes and to make sure we got it right. And, if at any time in the future that you want to go back and listen to it or see if it came away the way you want it to, we'll be glad to let you hear the recording--

MS. GARVEY: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: --and make any corrections.

It is, I guess, the 21st of October and it's 10:00 o'clock and we are in the GSA Building in Washington, D.C.

And we're here to interview Ms. Jane

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Garvey, former Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

I'd like to have everyone identify themselves, please.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Bill Johnstone, with the 9/11 Commission staff.

MR. RAIDT: John Raidt, with the 9/11 Commission Staff.

MS. SULLIVAN: Lisa Sullivan, also with the Commission.

MR. BRINKLEY: We have the ability to go to the Secret Clearance at this level. Do you still have the clearances?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I don't know. That's a very good question. I'm not sure, they were never officially revoked. I would assume I do.

MR. BRINKLEY: I would presume you do, too, at this point in time. And just by your own recollection, there may be some information that if you know that it was classified, when you received it, if you could let us know that so we can--that,

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Kate, there, the recording is classified Secret, it does get locked up. It will also help us to identify our notes to make sure that they are classified properly and that we don't by mistake do something improper with something that would be secret at least.

If, later we thought we needed to go to the TS or SCI level, we would have to go to the other facility. But I don't anticipate that we'll do that, today.

You're fully aware of the Commission and its background and its charter. If you have any questions on that we can go over those again. But the way we're going to try to structure today is really talk to you about pre-9/11; the environment that led up to 9/11. The events of 9/11, itself; and the immediate aftermath of 9/11; and, finally, because the Commission has the charter to make recommendations, we really would like to talk to you about your recommendations and how you see things now and we would appreciate your providing that to us.

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If I could ask you to state your name, full name with the spelling of your last name and your former title, if you could, please.

MS. GARVEY: Certainly, Jane Garvey, G-a-r-v-e-y, former Administrator for the Federal Aviation Administration from 1997 to 2002.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you very much.

MR. GIBSON You're welcome.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's all the bureaucratic piece. I'd like to start.

MR. : Sam, you might want to just add that in addition to reviewing the tape, if you have--and this record, really, is open, until the final report is done. So, if you have--after the interview, if you have anything you want to add or modify, just get in touch with us.

MS. GARVEY: Good, thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: I really want to start out by sort of asking you some questions concerning the overall time that you were with FAA, from when you first got there as Administrator to the time you left.

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And it really deals with your view and how you viewed security in the overall roles and missions of FAA and how you were organized to look at security issues as the Administrator.

MS. GARVEY: Well, I'll go back to the 1997, which seems like very distant history at this point. But certainly coming in and I would say throughout the five years and looking at some of my early testimony, you may have seen that certainly the three goals that we focused on at the FAA were Safety, Security and System Efficiency.

And most of the strategic plan, for example, really was focused on those three areas. We had, in a sense, a Board of Directors or Management Board, made up of Associated Administrators. And, certainly, key among that or on that Board was Admiral Flynn, who headed the Security operation when I arrived at the FAA.

There was a colleague of his that headed Safety, at the time it was Guy Gardner. Today, it is Nick Sabatini and was when I left.

Air Traffic Control are Steve Brown, also

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was someone that I had brought in as the Associate Administrator. So we had, in a sense a management board and a board of directors made up of very senior people.

Some changes I made when I came in, but in terms of Security, Irish Flynn, Admiral Flynn, was in that role. He came and, certainly, I'd heard about Admiral Flynn, and had met him before I came to the FAA. I had been part of DOT since 1993 on the surface side. And I had certainly met Irish Flynn at briefings that the Secretary might have. Did not know him well, but knew of him.

And, certainly, he had a very fine reputation within the Security ranks, both within the agency, but, also, outside the agency. He had a good relationship with Dick Clark and the folks who were associated with national Security. He had an excellent reputation overseas. And so he came with a strong reputation.

And while I wanted to make some changes in some of the other areas, Security was an area that I felt we needed to change the leadership at the

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top. He had a good reputation.

Certainly coming again, but going back to that period, the agency had just come of a couple of very difficult years. Value Jet, TWA-800, even PanAm, was not so much of a distant memory, although, clearly, it had been a long time since PanAm. But the agency had come off a very difficult period.

Safety was a very large focus, clearly post-Value Jet, post-TWA-800. The White House Commission that was established, the Bore Commission, in a sense, I think, gave the agency, gave me, if you will, a blueprint, a series of recommendations that we needed to focus on. And so, the focus clearly from a Security perspective were those recommendations that gave us, in a sense, a blueprint.

Coming in in '97, Y-2-K which, again, seems like a very distant memory and a more pleasant one than it seemed at the time, was something that was looming very much in our arena. We had had a number of, frankly, very negative

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reports out of Congress about how well the agency was prepared for Y-2-K. I think one of the first hearings that I had when I arrived at the agency was a Y-2-K hearing.

So, the agency faced a number of challenges. There were the Safety issues, certainly, always associated with an agency like the FAA. And, clearly, pretty paramount post-Value Jet and TWA-800. There were the Y-d-K issues. There was a general sense that the agency had not done well on modernization.

And then, of course, we had the Gore Commission recommendation.

From a management point of view, I met with my managers twice a week, every Monday and Friday, for the most part. I mean, there were occasional times when I'd be traveling and that wouldn't occur. But that was really, my Board of Directors meeting.

Each one of the Associate Administrators had a series of actions that they were responsible for, related to the mission Safety, Security, and

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System Efficiency.

And, again, to go back to Irish and to the Security Arena, the Gore Commission was the blueprint and he received, I think, a fair amount of cooperation from the rest of the Associates who had a role to play. Like most recommendations, it never one element of the agency that has to deal with it, but it involved the Counsel's Office, it involved Policy Office. So, he was calling on other members--or we were all calling on other members of the organization to pull their load.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, I know, then, in FAA Security every day they had a daily intel summary. Did that, did you see that daily? Or how did you get--keep--besides, I know that you met with Irish, say, on Mondays and Fridays, but how did you keep a pulse on Security?

MS. GARVEY: Irish had a pretty direct line, both to myself and to Monte Belger who eventually became the Associate--or the Deputy, rather. At that point, he was--when I first came in, Monte was associated with Air Traffic but

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someone I was relying on a great deal and saw a great deal and he eventually--he eventually became, as you know, the Acting Deputy. And really shared in that position for most of the five years.

So, Irish had a pretty direct line, either to Monte or myself. If there were any Security issues that he felt needed our attention, he got our attention. We never did it on the phone. We always did it in person. He would come up to the office. It was not unusual for him to call and say I just need to see the Administrator or the Deputy before the end of the day or in the next hour. And that would occur.

If it was period where it seemed to be problematic, I would receive the daily briefings as they were issues where, let's just keep on top of it. But I can't say that I was reading them every single day during the five years that I was there.

Irish, I never had any reason to believe he wasn't keeping us informed and, in fact, just the opposite. I felt he was very good about that. And if he couldn't reach me, if I was traveling, he

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would always reach Monte. We had a policy that one of us would be in the office and he would reach Monte, and Monte would let me know by phone that he needed to see me as soon as I got back or something to that effect.

MR. BRINKLEY: In your workup or in your initial briefings--I mean, you were at DOT and so, you were obviously fully aware that, I mean, the DOT IG had looked at a number of security issues over some period of time. And when you got that, I would presume that you got some in-briefings on the status, the effectiveness, and efficiency of the security system as a whole.

How did you view that and did you think there were certain specific actions that you wanted to make or take in regard to overall Security and I mean, you are post--I understand you're still post-TWA-800, so that's--how did you think about that?

MS. GARVEY: Although, I have to say when I came in post-800, it was pretty much accepted that it was not a terrorist attack, you know, by the time I got there.

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MR. BRINKLEY: By the time you got there.

MS. GARVEY: By the time I got there, it was it was not viewed as that.

MR. BRINKLEY: You were back at the safety issue.

MS. GARVEY: And I will tell you, I spent a good deal of time with Ken Mead, I valued his judgment. I didn't always agree, as you would expect, but I valued his judgment and, to some degree, his counsel.

I think, one of the first acts that I took as Administrator was a joint review of some safety initiative, post-Value Jet with the IG. I wanted to send the message that I wanted this to be a cooperative, constructive, working relationship.

So, I had many opportunities to talk with Ken about a host of issues facing the FAA and, while I was aware of the report that he had made and, certainly, had been briefed on the actions that the agency had taken, there was nothing in my conversations with Ken or--in what I had heard from staff--that said, you know, he's really on us about

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this and we haven't done enough on that.

He had a number of concerns and he was very, and I mean this constructively, he was very constructive in both raising them with me and suggesting areas that he felt needed improvement.

He did not focus on security, certainly, in the initial months that I met. We both talked about the Gore Commission, we both talked about those issues.

Throughout the five years, particularly around airport access, there were a number of discussions that we had had and our Security people worked with his Security people on a number of initiatives to penetrate airport access.

I understand even before I came--and one of the things I remember being briefed on was an initiative that the agency had taken and had found many vulnerabilities with airport access.

And having been an airport director, I was very well aware of those. And that the agency got, sort of, on the airports, really, sort of got very aggressive and I remember it being described to me

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that the Director of Operations at the time, seemed to spend all his time on airport access and progress was made. But it wasn't sustained.

And I think that was one of the challenges that I found particularly frustrating. I'm sure people in the agency did. I'm sure Ken did and for me it did, and you know, it is sometimes because of the human elements involved, it's difficult to sustain that.

Mid--and please don't hold me to the dates, I will check--but airport access came up again both through efforts with the IG. And that was one where he and I talked quite a bit. You know, what should we do, how do we handle this which was frustrating, we brought the airports in. I asked him to meet with me. We had a number of the airport directors in. Some of the leaders, people that I would consider leaders, like Jim Wilding [ph], from National. Along with the associations to see we really need to, you know, we talked about it in detail. How can we handle this, what steps can we take. [

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We sent out a pretty aggressive letter to all the airports with notifications that we would be following up. Again, I think we made some progress, but a concern is always, how do you sustain that. And I think, to some degree, that may still be a concern for GSA.

MR. BRINKLEY: How, do you recall, did you ever talk and do you recall ever having discussions specific discussions with the Secretary on we've got security problems here and that, along with F60, I mean, how did that relationship work?

MS. GARVEY: You know, F60 was, obviously, the key link with the Secretary. And I certainly did briefings with the Secretary over the Gore Commission and that having served two Secretaries, let me say, both Secretaries were briefed on those issues.

And I don't remember. And I will give it further thought, I don't remember a specific conversation except in more general terms. and knowing that F60 was there. It would not have been quite as likely for me to initiate talking with

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them.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because the other side that's sort of backwards is did the Secretary ever say, hey, Jane, we've got to get a handle on this, this is not going well? I mean, that's the kind of--I'm trying to--

MS. GARVEY: I understand, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, you could go to the Secretary and say, boy, we've got a problem. But at the same time, the Secretary's getting briefed by F60 and, Ken, I presume and saying--

MS. GARVEY: He certainly was, because it would, and I can certainly remember talking to him about, for example, the airport access, raising that. But, again, more in the sense of I would often brief the Secretary on a number of IG reports that we were working on. And, again, I don't want to leave the impression that it was a great deal of huge detail, but, you know, we're working on this we've got some issues and it may. And I believe, you know, even the, bringing in airport directors would have been something for example at a meeting

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with the secretary; either in the intermodal meeting with all the Administrators, were it was very common for me to say, this week, one of our big issues is, you know, we've got the airport directors coming in, we're focused on airport security.

Ken would be at those meetings, it would be very common for Ken to say, this is an issue we're working on together.

But, you know, I want to just--and I don't mean to take issue, but just to step back for a moment. Over all Security, while there were problems, this is a complicated agency with lots of complicated issues going on, which I know you know.

But, on balance, there was--well, there was, generally, I would say a positive feeling about security. We had made some. I mean, it's always an issue. And that's why I'm hesitant, I want to choose my words with precision and carefully.

I think you always worry about it. If you're the Administrator, you know, someone once

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said to you what keeps you up at night? I mean, you have a lot of sleepless nights over whether they are safety issues or the potential of what could happen; what could go wrong. And it's the unknown--it's the uncertainty that, I think, is sometimes is what does keep you up at night.

MR. BRINKLEY: One last question, and then I'll turn it over to my colleagues. And then is--do you recall any briefings, directly on the threat, the domestic threat or any specific briefings from Irish on Red Team results which is internal work?

MS. GARVEY: I remember more discussions on Red Team results with Lynne Osmus. Lynne was my Chief of Staff for, you know, and in some ways, I think I was very fortunate. You know, I had Monte who certainly had his background in security; Lynne whom I have enormous respect for. And who I think has made wonderful contributions in public service.

And I'd certainly gotten some briefings from Lynne. And I also do remember briefings from Irish that were more, not specifically Red Team

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briefings, but more generic briefings; changes that we are making; areas where we need to, you know, improve.

I certainly don't want to leave you with the impression I thought everything was perfect in Security, it certainly wasn't. There were enormous challenges; there were technology challenges that we would get that weren't ready for prime time; there were the human-factors challenges that are always there in aviation, whether you 're talking about Security or Safety. If you look at the record in Safety, you know, really, nearly 80 percent of all accidents are the result of human factors and human failure so there's always the human factors element.

There was the slowness of getting rules out, that was--

MR. RAIDT: We're talking about specifics now, we really, actually want to, we would like to get your opinion on them.

MS. GARVEY: So, there are--certainly there are a number of challenges. But I also, I

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guess want to point out that I think it was a solid organization that had done some good work.

MR. RAIDT: Okay thank you. I think that was a good segue because we want to get into each of the layers of the Aviation Security System and just get your impressions about each layer and how they work together and start that, maybe a general question, talking about the Red Team results, which, you know, and the IG going back many years, many Secretaries and several, you know, FAA Administrators of problems of passing 30, 40 percent, which means it wasn't succeeding 60 percent of the time. And, obviously, that's in the context of a layered system.

So, if you could give us just, kind of your general thoughts about having received the Red Team results from Lynne, knowing that there was such a high failure rate that seeing that in context of other layers, how you viewed the system as a whole and how those layers are supposed to work. What your expectations of the system were?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I mean, I think that if

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you look at aviation just generally, it's a system that its strength is based on its redundancy. Whether you look at Safety, I mean, you look at an accident the way it's always described is you have to have a series of, you know, the holes in Swiss cheese have to line up exactly right. If one falls off, then the accident doesn't occur. So there are systems of redundancies, whether you're looking at Safety or whether you're looking at the efficiency of the system or whether you're looking at Security. So, you know, while, clearly, it's a concern when you're having failures in the system.

There was also the notion that you had a crew that was well-trained; there was the notion that you had extremely trained pilots; there was the notion that there were other ways to determine a security threat or a security risk. And it was, in fact, a system, based on redundancies.

Did it mean that there weren't concerns and that there weren't constant efforts to try and improve? No, of course, not. I mean, you knew that you had to do better. I mean, I think one of

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the great challenges at the EDF and, frankly, one of my frustrations was when a deadline was put in place is that to some degree that technology is not--it is flawed; it does--it is not perfect technology by any stretch of the imagination.

And to see so much effort on that one piece was a concern to me. Intelligence was till, you know, again, part of the redundancy.

MR. RAIDT: Well, that's, again, a good segue. So, let's go down, we want to kind of five. And let me highlight them, and then we'll go back to talk a little bit on intelligence; then get into CAPS pre-screening; about checkpoint screening; a little bit about cargo, mail, checked baggage and then aircraft protection, including the crew training. Talk about, in general that we counted on the strengths and weaknesses and I'll ask you some specifics.

But with respect to intelligence, we've cover a little bit about how you received it. One of the things that we keep hearing from people in the intelligence community was, there was a great

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deal of frustration, the fact that they felt blind domestically. In fact we had one quote that was we need more--the intelligence community, and, therefore, wait until you all received, that we knew more about what was going on on the streets of Beirut than we did in Detroit or Los Angeles.

How did you perceive that domestic blindness? How was that blindness communicated to you from people like Claudio, Monte, Irish Flynn, [unintell.] and then, you know, what steps did you take to say, okay, knowing, if you did know that there was a problem and how did you, either express that to the Secretary or to the intelligence community and say, hey, this is an issue for us?

MS. GARVEY: Well, with the benefit of hindsight, the blindness seems quite obvious. You know, we should have, you know, keep saying, we should have asked more or we should have pushed more, for example, but that's with the benefit of hindsight.

At the time, the way I would describe it is that the great emphasis--and I had some sympathy

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for the person who said we knew more about, what was happening overseas. There was, certainly, a tremendous emphasis on what was happening overseas. And, in particular, the Middle East. To some degree, that may have even been a reflection of my own reading. I think reading The New York Times, you couldn't pick up a New York Times without reading a Tom Friedman editorial about, you know, the Middle East and the uncertainty and the unsettlement of that area.

So, the major focus was there. The way that I would describe the kind of domestic threat was sort of--it was definitely there. There were definitely questions. There were issues, I know that Irish Flynn had raised about concerns that the FBI and intelligence community, had on some Arab-American groups--about some Arab-American groups. Well, again, without much specificity. Were there actions that we could take? There were none.

And I might also add, this was also, you know, I can remember going to Detroit and meeting

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with the Arab-American community because there were lots of concerns raised about that community's view of how we were treating them. So, it's a very difficult line.

I must say that even recently, I had enormous sympathy for Jet Blue and for, you know, to some degree the airlines and TSA. On the one hand, we want it so secure. I think this, still, I think is schizophrenic in the United States on our own views on this.

MR. RAIDT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GARVEY: We want it secure and I don't know whether Jet will follow the right procedures, i don't know enough about it. But on the face of it, they were trying to do the right thing. And, yet, the reaction that they received for doing that was, I think, you an only imagine what the climate might have been at that point.

MR. RAIDT: And that trip to Detroit, was that something that flowed right out of Jet Blue or how do you remember how that--

MS. GARVEY: Well, this was years--this

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was actually years ago. We had received a number of complaints from some members of Congress that Arab Americans were discriminated against through our Security program that, while we were--

MR. RAIDT: This was while ou were Administrator?

MS. GARVEY: While I was Administrator, I'm sorry. So, we went out to try to assure them that this was not out intent. But, again, so there was some--there was definitely questions that had been raised about elements of the community. But it was not specific and there was a sense that there was nothing imminent.

MR. RAIDT: Right.

MS. GARVEY: That we needed to prepare for, we needed to work on it, we needed to continue--

MR. RAIDT: And, I mean, when we talked to Irish and others, they talked about their frustration, you know, in that they would go to the CIA and go to the FBI and say we need more here and we need more there. And that they were told,

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including by John Deutsche [ph] and others that, you know, we've got plenty, don't worry about it. And I think Irish talked about wanting to go up to the Hill to, you know, pound on some desks, and, again, you know, was told by the CIA and others, you know, we're not going to support you on this you've got plenty.

More specifically, were you aware of those frustrations on his part and the idea that, hey, the CIA and the FBI are really blocking our efforts to try to get more?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I was aware to some degree of some frustration that Irish felt, I mean, he would express frustration to me about rulemaking, about a host of things and I'm sure he may have expressed that. I've never asked Monte if he expressed that directly to him. I'm sure he may have expressed it. In hindsight, I wish I had said, hey, you want me to go over and talk to the FBI?

MR. RAIDT: Talk to the Director.

MS. GARVEY: Talk to the Director. I did

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not do that, but I can tell you, I don't think there was a thing Irish asked me to do that I didn't.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, that's--

MS. GARVEY: And I don't want to push this on to him, I--

MR. RAIDT: No, no.

MS. GARVEY: I think he felt he had a good relationship with that he was doing--that he was getting as much as anyone was going to get.

MR. RAIDT: But there wasn't any point where Irish, or anyone else for that matter came to you and said, Jane, you know--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, absolutely not.

MR. RAIDT: --we need this because we're blind and they're not giving us this. And we need to raise this to the highest level?

MS. GARVEY: No, and in fact--in fact, quite the contrary. In the beginning when I was briefed, people made a point of saying post-PanAm. We have had a much better relationship with the FBI than we did previously. So, it may have been

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baseline wasn't the right baseline. But people were more complimentary.

So, as I think back and think about what I knew about the domestic threat, I could certainly say that there was--and, anybody, again, reading the paper, post-World Trade Center would become concerned.

MR. RAIDT: Yes.

MS. GARVEY: That people felt that we had a plan, we were working towards that and the imminent threat was much more overseas, American interests abroad.

MR. RAIDT: And is it fair to say that hijacking versus bombing that was coming from others, like we kind of felt like we'd won the hijacking one, so it was--

MS. GARVEY: Right, we had had a good record with that.

MR. RAIDT: --the primary concern was closest to post-PanAm.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: Let me just mention, three or

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four very specific issues. Again, now, we're talking about a long period of time. So, but a few issues. Were you aware of made aware of, like, the National Intelligence Estimates, such as '95 and '97 more important saying, hey, not just for aviation, but the domestic problem was really heightened across the board? Was that something that, you know, Irish or anybody else had called to your attention, saying, you know, hey, this is NIE says we have a problem domestically, let's take a look at this and identify how this impacts civil aviation or is that--

MS. GARVEY: Not the way you've just described it. Did we talk about a growing concern domestically? Yes, again, post-World Trade, I think even before I arrived there there was a concern about that. Even the re-examination of the baseline in '97, grew out to some degree of that concern about--I can't say that someone said--

MR. RAIDT: Right, and then two others and we'll get out of that--

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask this, but, maybe

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and we'll talk about rulemaking a little bit is that, obviously, if you start down this arduous path of rulemaking, there was intel--

MS. GARVEY: Exactly.

MR. RAIDT: --suggested by that, so, it might be fair to say that if you're looking at the rulemaking and you're trying to justifying it, you're looking at putting in the certification and screening companies and other things, you're--

MS. GARVEY: You're recognized a concern.

MR. RAIDT: --yeah, you've had some recognition of a concern to that process, while you might not specifically have seen in NIE. Would that make sense?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, and I think that, when I felt we had a program underway that we needed to stay the course with that, that was in part a recognition of that.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask two quick ones and then Bill's got some more specifics, on Moussaoui, the Moussaoui case, was that something that you were made aware of at all prior to 9/11? That was

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nothing--

MS. GARVEY: No.

MR. RAIDT: --in on the Phoenix memo of pilot training?

MS. GARVEY: No.

MR. RAIDT: And there was never any instance that you recall where anybody came up to you, Irish, or--said, you know, we've got terrorists training here as pilots, but we think that they're just kind of private pilots, not terrorists?

MS. GARVEY: No, absolutely not.

MR. RAIDT: None of that type of. Okay, Bill's got some and then we'll go to second vector and talk about prescreening and particularly CAPS.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Before we close out intelligence, I did want to show you some documents that we have received and give you a chance to look at them and, also, to find out whether you recall having seen them. The first, and these are both classified at the secret level. The first is from

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the Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence.
It says Threat Assessment from March 1998
entitled--

MS. GARVEY: March, 1998?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry, so
take the time you need, titled Osama bin Laden
World Islamic Front Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation.

MS. GARVEY: I'm sorry, I honestly don't
know if I actually saw it. I'm certainly familiar
with the name bin Laden, but I read it, but I
honestly don't remember.

MR. JOHNSTONE: All right, well, let me,
then pass this one to you, which is from a year
later.

MR. BRINKLEY: Would you routinely get
these kinds of documents?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, but, again, I don't want
to leave you with the impression that every day I
would get them. I would certainly get them if
Admiral Flynn thought there was a concern.

MR. BRINKLEY: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Although, I have to say, it

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was more likely that he would come up and brief in person or bring it and sort of--

MR. BRINKLEY: Talk to you about it.

MS. GARVEY: --talk through it, yeah. I honestly don't remember whether--I can't say with certainty--

MR. JOHNSTONE: This second one is an FAA Intelligence Note from a year later, if you--particular attention to the section starting, marked Hijacking Scenarios and Evaluations and, again, this is an FAA document from 1999.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And that, I think what you're reading now is a part where the FAA Intelligence Division was evaluating various potential scenarios. And if you'll note, at the very bottom of that page, there is consideration of suicide hijacking within the United States.

MS. GARVEY: I don't, I cannot say for certain whether I did--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay. And the last page there's a distribution list and I don't believe it indicates it was routinely routed to your

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department. Do you recall in this time period, because we see other reports, including a presentation that Pat McDonald, this was is SSI, because it went on the road, presenting what airlines and others within the larger civil aviation community--on the McDonald document there is a slide No. 24, which essentially refers to the same material in terms of potential domestic hijacking scenarios. And this went out. This one actually went out into earlier in 2001. And this one, this document was classified SSI; there's a classified version that also went to the carriers, but the information is similar.

Do you recall in this period, form 1999 right through 2001, having discussions about potential hijacking scenarios, whether overseas or in the United States?

MS. GARVEY: Hijacking that would involve suicide?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Or other scenarios?

MS. GARVEY: No, I mean, I knew that Pat did briefings for the airlines and I did hear about

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this one post-9/11, that he had gone out. But, again, it was low-risk not high probability from the perspective of the--or at the time.

MR. RAIDT: Let's go into the CAPS again, with the idea of the layered system with CAPS and this kind of conjoins when you were coming on as Administrator. What was your expectation of what CAPS was designed to do, just in general, what was its purpose?

MS. GARVEY: The purpose of CAPS, certainly from my perspective, was that it was an effective tool to be used, again, as part of a systems approach to security. That it was not going to--it was not going to highlight everyone, but it was a way to sort of narrow the field.

MR. RAIDT: And narrow the field?

MS. GARVEY: In terms of--narrow the field in terms potential threats to aviation.

MR. RAIDT: Across, whether it's bombing, hijacking--

MS. GARVEY: Exactly, it was, although I have that say that my own mind set at the time was

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explosives.

MR. RAIDT: Explosives, okay.

MS. GARVEY: Explosives, and I think that's probably it.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, let me get to a more specific question, because we are aware of kind of the lock out that the original design of CAPS and [unintell.] has to say okay, let's make it people who only check bags. And to be frank, that's been an issue that's been a concern to us. Because it looked like the initial aspects, we already had two fairly aggressive vectors of defense, you know, that CAPS has identified a pool of terrorists and subject them, as we did at one point, to extra personal screening and baggage screening and then EDS.

And families, you know, asked, I think it's a pretty good and tough question that we need to try and answer and any help that you can give us why, at a time when we had a National Intelligence Estimate where the domestic threat is going up, you have conviction of Rassam [ph] and the World Trade

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Center folks or no the African bombing folks in the bank, you got all the State Department and the IG saying, well, something's brewing.

And at the same time, you know, we decided that yes, it was a security directive that was allowed to expire that said, let's just make CAPS only to EDS that we won't require that it be at the selectee gets the extra screening. Can you take us through, do you remember that change in policy, any discussion surrounding that change in policy and maybe some of the influences that caused it?

MS. GARVEY: And I'm telling you, I'm really having a hard time in terms of sequence--

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, I understand.

MS. GARVEY: --of things. I mean, when I came in, I actually think that policy had been, a need to go back and actually double check. What I remember about CAPS--certainly, I remember it being controversial. Again, I think one of the first meetings I had fairly early in my tenure, by the first of the year was bringing the airlines in to say we are going to do CAPS, we've got a deadline.

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We've got an issue here, we're going to do it.

But the decision to go with the checked bags was, again, driven more by that was the notion and that was the view of where the bombs would be. We had people going through metal detectors, so we had, while, imperfect--and are not perfect--it was certainly a way to pick up some potential problems.

Linking it to the checked bag was, again, based on the intelligence that we saw. You know, a sensible approach. I think whenever you're looking at a program, there is always the balance, too, what can we get done? What can we achieve? And there is, and I say this without saying you should use it. This is not a question and I don't mean to suggest that you compromise anything that shouldn't be compromised. But there are also the practical realities of what can we get up and what can we get up quickly. And that may have been part of it.

MR. RAIDT: That's a good point.

MS. GARVEY: I'd like to go back and look. But that fall period for me was a lot of Y-2-K and

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a lot of--

MR. RAIDT: That's a good point and let's talk about it from the airline perspective. And I don't mean this pejoratively in any way, but just from the airline perspective because, we are aware that CAPS was designed with hijack profiles in mind. And, again, the families came up with the question that, well, the thing's built on hijacking profiles, and all of a sudden it went from that to bombs and how did that happen and let me have you comment on this from the air carrier perspective, because we know, how they are through rulemaking; we know how they are with the Hill; and we know how the pressures that are brought on you.

MR. BRINKLEY: I'm glad we settled that.

MR. RAIDT: Do you, just let me state it, that based on opportunity to take two fairly aggressive vectors of defense and, this is not a good word, but I'll use it, is dumb-them-down a little bit. Saying, you know, CAPS is a pain in the ass for us, TBS is a pain in the ass for us; and here's a way to just--to not do away with them

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both, because that's politically untenable for use being air carriers, so let's meld the two into an area where it disrupts it, the system, as little as possible and we're still doing something.

Is that fair; accurate, not fair?

MS. GARVEY: It's always easy to hit the airlines when I'm standing here. You know, look, the airlines were difficult. Not just on security. You know, there tends to be, when you're a regulatory agency, your relationship with the airlines is always going to be somewhat confrontational. Somewhat--you're going to look at things very differently.

You know, having said that, did they use that as an opportunity? They certainly didn't express that to me. They certainly didn't say it in that way. And I think then the question becomes if you make changes are you, in fact, making them at the expense of what we knew about security? And I certainly believe that we were not making any changes based on what, you know, that would compromise the security as we understand it.

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MR. RAIDT: So there was never any point where either internally or from externally with the air carriers where you got the impression that, you know, this was as good way to resolve their--

MS. GARVEY: Not as you've described it, but I can certainly tell you the reason for the meeting in the early part of that year was because Irish was saying we're having problems with the airlines. They're not being quite as cooperative as we--we needed them to really see the urgency. And I can remember talking very directly with Bob Baker about it.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: You knock, who was a very respected member of the aviation community, a wonderful, wonderful man who made enormous contributions. And who was very active in any number of aviation issues, free flight, you know, on the rapid response team for the Secretary, any number of issues.

And I can remember him expressing frustration on his own. Because in his mind, we

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were still--we were putting a lot of resources into something that even with knowing what he knew, didn't seem to be the threat that warranted it.

MR. JOHNSTONE: [unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: Well, just sort of general, yeah, CAPS and EDS, I mean, just sort of a general, sort of, and then, again, I don't want to suggest he was fighting it in that way, but a constant frustration.

I mean, here's a guy who probably is more worried about an uncontrolled engine failure, or who is thinking, do I have everything I need for, you know, in terms of controlled flight into the terrain. I mean, he's thinking safety issues as it relates to the--that's where he saw his biggest threat.

So, here comes the FAA, here comes Congress layering on in his view--layering on certain requirements, which, you know, in his mind didn't quite raise to the same level as some of the safety issues that he saw.

And, again, not to suggest that he wasn't

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trying to be cooperative, it was just, I think, a level of frustration he felt. It was a harder pill for them to swallow than some of the other unpleasant pills we gave them.

MR. RAIDT: [unintell.] kind of the walk out, and we had our document request but we need to--and we asked the families kind of get to the nub of how and why the decision was made to do--to join that. And inasmuch as it was a matter of the security directive being allowed to expire, there's probably not much of a record on, you know, whether you don't--

MS. GARVEY: No, and I honestly don't remember that, but when you say you've requested a roll out or documents, what--

MR. RAIDT: Well, we--I mean, we've asked for the Security Directives that not only were in place, but those that expired, but it's something that we can come back to later--but it

MS. GARVEY: All right and I apologize for that, I'm just not--

MR. RAIDT: Anything on CAPS or

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[unintell.] training?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, first of all, we are aware that the Gore Commission made the linkage, too, between CAPS and baggage.

MS. GARVEY: And that's why I guess I was a little puzzled because I think that had even been determined before I got there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But a question that comes to mind is related to what John was saying, which is that the CAPS and you may or may not have knowledge on this, but CAPS was designed with the hijacking profile in mind, at least to a considerable extent in the weights and factors. And as, per the Gore Commission and then the system, as it came to be deployed, it ends up, as I think you corroborated, it ends up being applied to the bomb threat on-board.

It would seem that if you're looking for a hijacker and you don't think that they're suicidal--if CAPS is looking for hijackers and you don't at this time, really think that suicide is likely. That a focus on the checked baggage of a

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selectee holding a bomb in and that would tend to seem to be outside of the paradigm that the system is focused on.

I mean, it's a question that we would have for the Gore Commission, too. But it would seem--and you spoke about the layering earlier. And this just seems on the surface, I know we've had some comments from family members, just doesn't seem like, like John just referred to, it just doesn't seem to be intellectually rigorous.

MS. GARVEY: That's a fair question.

MR. BRINKLEY: Except for the dupe that I put it in Bill's bag--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --and he probably doesn't know.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: But then, the question is why would then, Bill have the P&R information--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Well, that's right--

MR. BRINKLEY: --to make him the selectee, because I would try to figure out not to have that

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happen, I mean.

MS. GARVEY: Right

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, John can't just
be--the logic of it doesn't quite--

MR. RAIDT: And I would--

MS. GARVEY: I don't know the answer.

MR. BRINKLEY: You think about that.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: You could go a step
further and, you know, with the layers, that is
checkpoint screening was failing at such a high
rate, according to Red Team tests and others that,
and they're getting through and you had mentioned
crew training and that type of thing, in this
vector you know that the idea that you have system
to identify where that pool of terrorists were and
then say, all right, we've decided you're only
going to be a bomber not a hijacker, that doesn't
compute. And it's a good question and one that
we're struggling with.

MS. GARVEY: Have you had a chance to talk
to the people who designed the CAPS? I will tell

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you that I--I was briefed, by choice, only on the highest levels about what CAPS contained.

MR. JOHNSTONE: We're going to go back and talk to them in much more detail because it--

MS. GARVEY: --much more detail, I think that would be--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --anecdotally, we've sort of come to this conclusion--

MS. GARVEY: --yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --and we're going to go back now and say, we're confused.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: I'm confused. I'm not going to speak for my colleagues.

MR. RAIDT: No--

MS. GARVEY: No, I think that's a fair question and I was just going to say, if you're willing to share that, I'd be interested in what--because I do think it's a very fair question.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But we are going to say talk to us about, the pilot program was Northwest.

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MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And how did this come about, how did you create these factors and then, how did we, you know--we are. And I understand the level of briefing you would get would not--might not get into this inconsistency of--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --how they got there. You would be, this is just what we would be doing and why we'd be doing it.

MR. RAIDT: [unintell.]--beat that dead horse but what somebody was saying that, one, we thought had hijacking beat and then kinda indicated that things were going so well that that's why we were able to focus on explosives. And yet, the kind of assessments that were being done didn't say it was going so well. So, that's what we're going to be. What we're [unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRINKLEY: We'd appreciate what you'd have to say.

MR. RAIDT: The checkpoint screening,

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[unintell.]--talked about the Red Team. And one of the big issues there and just kind of your comments on how, again, maybe it's the layering issue, was that we had a gap between, and this is pure physics, we understand that, between what was prohibited and what was detectable. And kind of what are your comments? Is that something that I assume everyone recognized and then how was that within the realm of acceptable risk, there's nothing we could do about it or, again, that was some layering that should have been able to take care of?

MS. GARVEY: I think it's certainly we'd like to think in an ideal world, but it was something layering could get at. Having said that, I think there was still enormous frustration that the technology was not perfect. That we were dealing with human beings who, perhaps, day in and day out lost some recognition of how important their jobs were.

And, again, not unique to Security, it's an issue--the human factor issue is something that

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aviation faces in safety and, frankly, I think TSA still faces it even with a, you know, a much better workforce. So, I don't want to say that it was ever anything that you would sort of say, well, it's just something we have to live with. I think it's something we recognized and knew had to be better. The Threat Imaging program was certainly an attempt to get at that. Certainly, the rulemaking that we were trying to do with certification of the screeners was something that we were trying to get out.

The work that was going on at the Tech Center. Again there again there's a sometimes a bit of a schizophrenia. We will say that the EDF machines don't pick up or that there's too much of a high false-alarm rate. And then others will say, well, wait a minute, the EDF machine, our standards are the wrong ones, we're asking too much of it. You know, we shouldn't have to pick up all that.

So, you know, we have some--I think we have some legitimate challenges around technology, that's still remains. So, it is a combination of

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thinking that we needed to do--we needed to have the redundancies that we first took. We needed to focus more on the human factors, and we needed to continue to pursue firm answers technologically.

MR. BRINKLEY: Maybe I--oh, go ahead.

MS. GARVEY: You know, and this is, perhaps, getting ahead of it because, just parenthetically, but I think if there--and then with the frustration that I certainly felt in watching Congress post-9/11, with the focus, and it was an understandable one, was get something physically that I can touch and feel and put into the airport.

But their will, it is virtually impossible to get a foolproof system, as we have seen in the last couple of weeks and saw with the fellow with the cargo--

MR. RAIDT: That killed himself?

MS. GARVEY: Right. But, so I always come back to one of the real key pieces is the intelligence.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah.

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MS. GARVEY: How robust is our intelligence system; how well are we sharing it; are the right people getting the right information? And I wonder what if we had continued with getting as many EDFs, but perhaps there had been less of that and, perhaps, more of an emphasis on intelligence piece.

MR. JOHNSTONE [?]: If we could, why don't we, just like in screening, I mean, we know that the screening system had some degrees of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

MS. GARVEY: No doubt.

MR. JOHNSTONE: No doubt. We had DOT IG, you had GAO reports.

MS. GARVEY: We had FAA.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Had FAA Red Team--we know the special assessment program and we know the system is not really that good. I mean, now, if it's a percentage of effectiveness, obviously, there's some percentage of effectiveness that are expected that you would have as an expectation when you have, I mean, there has to be some comparison

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going on somewhere on--we know that it's not perfect but how imperfect do we feel like it can be and so how we can determine how to structure the next layer. How do we fill in the gaps between the circles of--that we have in the layered approach.

So, I guess my question is, if we've seen the effectiveness of the screening checkpoint down in the teens and the 20 percent effectiveness and even though we think we may have hijackings done, I mean, one could argue that that's just because somebody hadn't decided to do it versus for their own self-interest and objectives versus the system.

MS. GARVEY: Well, it could have been that it was enough of a deterrent that they felt it--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --correct, but--

MS. GARVEY: --that they felt it was.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --and so--but the intel reports are somewhat contradictory to some of that. I mean, we're seeing some--there's some thinking in there that hijackings are still around, yet--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I'm--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --you see there's starting

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to be some disconnects--

MS. GARVEY: Right and I--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --but we don't and what I'm really driving to is the next layers which were obviously put in post-9/11 was the Air Marshal program and that piece. And was the hardening of the cockpit doors. Now, you're having air rage [ph] and where I'm really going is the hardening of the cockpit doors. This is obvious. You're having air rage incidents over time. There's been a history of some recommendations out of NTSB or through the system or through the system that we ought to do something about these doors to keep passengers from just breaking in.

MS. GARVEY: Really, I don't think--I don't remember seeing anything from NTSB.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Not probably during your tenure. It's actually--

MS. GARVEY: No, I mean, post-9/11, I remember, I specifically asked that.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Asked?

MS. GARVEY: Did we ever--

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MR. RAIDT [?]: Yeah, I asked Jim Hall and he said that they considered it--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Considered it.

MR. RAIDT: --at one point, but it never worked.

MS. GARVEY: Never worked, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: And--

MR. JOHNSTONE: There were some discussions--

MS. GARVEY: Never done it, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: There were some discussions of it.

MR. RAIDT: Oddly, there was, I just ran into this the other day. In 1965 FAA issued a rule yeah, to lock--

MR. JOHNSTONE: To lock the doors.

MR. RAIDT: --block cockpit intrusions. We have no idea whether that was repealed by rule or just kind of evaporated--

MS. GARVEY: Or just ignored.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And we know there was some key issues that--

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MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --that had, you know, that all had the common keys from Boeing.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. JOHNSTONE: There were some key control issues that I think were just very commonsensical that had at least been discussed and some push-back on--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --but that's why they were hanging by there and not hanging around people. I mean, there's something that's going on here in the other side and I don't know if it came out to like standards or somewhere somebody, and what we're thinking is, there was also a hardening of the cockpit door group that was meeting, led by flight standards in the late '90s. And trying to figure out how to do that retroactively, retrofit them--new stuff.

So, I'm just--and which FAA Security sat on. In saying that we need their in--they're putting input into this system of saying we need to

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do something at improving into these doors. I mean.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Now that might be primarily from an IAD perspective of into the cabin IADs versus hijacking--

MS. GARVEY: [unintell.]

MR. JOHNSTONE: But you get two for the price of one approach.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, although, ironically--

MR. JOHNSTONE: How do you think--how do you sort of think about, recall that process?

MS. GARVEY: Well, the flight, the securing of the cockpit door was actually an interesting one because I actually remember, you know, when I was at--when I was at the--at Logan, we brought [unintell.] and we brought some folks from Israel over to talk with us. And I remember a discussion with some of the Israelis about securing of the cockpit door. And it came up in one of the--Security wasn't even in the room. It came up with one of the flight standards--in one of the

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flight standards discussions in relation, actually, to a general aviation decompression accident. And accident around decompression.

And, at that time, one of the flight standards people said this is why we've always struggled with the notion of a secure cockpit door, because there are safety issues around decompression. There's always potential of a heart attack or something like that. But the decompression was the big thing.

And I said, well, I remember talking to the Israelis how do they do it? And I remember the discussion. The answer was because for them the risk for terrorism was greater than the risk of decompression. Obviously, at this point in our history, we weren't there. We sure were after September 11. But, at that point, we were not there. So there was discussion. Until we can figure out how to solve the decompression issues, we are concerned.

And they're not, again, it's valuing and judging risks and making judgment-based on what you

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know. So, that was--but that's interesting about '65, I'd never heard that before--

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, it's one of the things we're going to look into is how it happened.

MS. GARVEY: But it was, clearly something that Flight Standards was aware of for different reasons, obviously, as you pointed out.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, now I guess this, in your management team, and you have standards in there and you have your management team--

MS. GARVEY: The AVR people.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --that's correct. You've got them all--we're getting some--now, it's just hindsight, I mean, I'm not--just not meaning to be critical, but the observation is you've got security; you've got air rage, we have this other issue, we've got an increasing domestic threat. I mean there are some things starting to--

MS. GARVEY: Well, yes--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --and you're working through--I know you're working through that--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: --because they had the group and you're working with the industry.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But--

MS. GARVEY: But there was the decompression issue and I don't want to diminish that in any way--that was a very--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That at that time was basically overriding--

MS. GARVEY: --it was the safety issues that were--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --precedent--

MS. GARVEY: --yes.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --were taking the precedent?

MS. GARVEY: Right, because, again, based on what we knew, we felt--

MR. JOHNSTONE: And see, what the, but it from my official thought, though, is that that layer with a lessened effective security screen piece, checkpoint screen, not meeting, not coming up to some level, unless we were satisfied at 20 or

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30 percent effectiveness, which I don't think we were--

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --I mean, you're writing rules to try to make that better. It's that piece there is sitting there that doesn't have a layer because you can get to the cockpit--

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm, but again--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --but that's, I mean--

MR. GIBSON --mm-hmm, I understand and, again, I think your point is a good one that it's hindsight that makes that clearer. I think at the time their view was--and I want to clarify something. I don't think, I certainly would never say we stopped hijacking. We had, I don't ever view any problem in aviation as fully solved. I--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Actually, I think Jim May [ph], may have said that that--

MS. GARVEY: --oh, okay.

MR. RAIDT: Underwood, said that, too.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, Jim Under--

MS. GARVEY: We certainly had a better

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record than--

MR. JOHNSTONE: We hadn't had one, domestically, since '91.

MS. GARVEY: Ten years or something, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: They thought they'd won that war.

MS. GARVEY: I think, in aviation, that's probably a dangerous statement to ever make almost about anything. There may be some safety regulations where you feel--but even control flight in-training, as good as that is, you know--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That's a good point.

MS. GARVEY: --hmmm, you know, we get into the human factor issue again.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Let me backtrack for a second, then we'll go--let's get cargo and mail. And talk about aircraft protection and kind of the common strategy and aviation security alert levels. But we were talking about intelligence and the overseas threat.

Do you recall working with Irish or Canavan saying, hey, you know, we have a heightened

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threat overseas--were there any measures that you can remember that were put into place to address this heightened overseas threat or was it kind of thought that, well, we have the system in place is pretty strong, it looks very, very solid?

MS. GARVEY: Well, I think, certainly, the extraordinary measures program, you know, and at one point, I think it went up and I'm not going to remember exactly the number, but there were certainly over 40 airports, I believe that overseas that would fall into that category.

So that really was, you know, that was sort of at the core of how you'd take extra measures, extra steps overseas. And that really was the core of it.

MR. JOHNSTONE: [unintell.] I think of the ACSS measures, extraordinary airport measures.

MR. RAIDT: Because, again, it's a tough question and it's one that comes to us from the families, because, you know, all the testimony was focused at, you know, we weren't looking domestically, it was overseas, that was the nature

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of the intelligence community--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: --and the national intelligence assessment, you know, and world conditions and then the question arises, well, if that's where we define the threat, then what did we do to address it, then overseas?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: It--

MS. GARVEY: Well, I think looking--I think, well, let me just first go back to the--I think you have to look at those individual measures, they were additional steps and I won't remember all of them. But, you know, it's almost, in a sense, I view it as a beefing up of a lot of the measures that we already had in place; it's sort of taking it to the next level. Similar to what we've been doing with the Code Red and the Code Orange, post-9/11.

MR. RAIDT: So, additional steps were taken that summer, as you recall?

MS. GARVEY: Well, I don't know that they

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actually were taken that summer, I'd have to go back and look. But just when you view the extraordinary airports program, that's what we would do.

Notification of the airlines during that sort of spring and summer about increased concerns about overseas issues, but, again, without a whole lot of specificity, but interests overseas; be on your guard at the airlines; keep your--be sure you have your measures in place. Be sure that in those places where we've identified in the past, extra steps need to be taken, make sure those are taken. So, this, certainly, were going out to the airlines for that sort of thing for the summer.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Well, let's talk a little bit about aircraft protection. And some of the layers and one of them being FAMS [ph], we all know that that was a program that atrophied over the years and part of what we've been told was that, you know, with sophisticated checkpoint screening, it then made FAMS less important, and then you get back to the same question that if that was at 30 or

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40 percent, why would we, you know, eliminate a layer when we're performing at that low a level? If you can take us through kind of, from your perspective, what you were told about FAMS or the policy with FAMS or was it kind of a legislative thing that--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, it was in place, FAMS, was obviously in place when I came to the FAA; certainly had been briefed on it; certainly knew about it. I certainly knew that its focus was international.

I guess I would give it a slightly different--and I'm always concerned about sounding defensive, but I think, as I look back, one of the great challenges--I don't think I ever denied Security any request for either dollars or for personnel. Certainly not to my knowledge. Irish might challenge me on that, but I don't think I did. As I don't think I did with safety inspectors, as well. We had one bad year that kind of OFT [ph], but we, I think. But, having said that, there still were constraints within the

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budget. There still was the cap that you deal with as part of an overall DOT perspective.

And, quite honestly, even the \$100 million, I was very grateful to the Gore Commission, because they really made it almost impossible for either OMB or OFT or anyone to really cut that.

MR. RAIDT: [unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, so, but for that, I'm not sure we would have gotten and, I don't mean it to be critical. I feel for a Secretary of Transportation who has to weigh, the Coast Guard, the FAA, you know, federal highway, highway safety programs, extraordinarily powerful and important program.

So, within the context of the FAA budget, within the context of a security budget, and this may have been a wrong decision, but FAMS did not rise to the same level as some of the other programs. And it was a judgment call within the boundaries of what we knew we had to work with.

MR. RAIDT (?): Well, I appreciate that,

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and we're going to, Sam's going to have a little discussion on budget resources and we will be very interested in kind of the process, you know, of how you were supposed to make your budget. Did you say tell us what you need and then we'll get back to you or was it here's the amount of money you're getting, no, you know, divide your programs like we would in Congress where the subcommittees get a certain amount of money, then they have to divide it up in kind of your relationship with your associate director all the way through Transportation, some of those things.

MR. BRINKLEY: Interesting.

MR. RAIDT: And there are no binders there within the agency which--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, you want those answers now?

MR. RAIDT: Yeah. Just very quickly on the pilot and crew training. There was the common strategy and I know there were efforts that summer to try to upgrade it. Do you recall any conversations or issues about whether this whole

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paradigm of--with the hijacking that, you know, cooperate, do what they say, get it on the ground because of past history, same events, what to do. Was there ever any discussion of whether that's the right paradigm in this era of, you know, suicide terrorists, if not suicide hijackers? Any discussions that you recall?

MS. GARVEY: I do not recall any discussion about changing it. And, again, I want to stress that people really thought that was the right approach and even the suicide incidents that were cited earlier, only look as obvious as they do with the perfection of hindsight. They were, at the time, still viewed as very low risk.

MR. RAIDT: Right.

MS. GARVEY: In an airplane that is 40,000 feet in the air, cooperating, working with, cajoling, to some degree, really became the basis--was the basis of all of our training. And, ironically, I remember being in the Operations and Command Center, the Operations Center--I was trying to remember this one. It must have been a couple

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of weeks-- [unintell.] so many incidents, post-9/11 of scares and it was unclear what was really happening. We spent a lot of time there.

But there was an incident at Dulles that I remember and I remember being there. There was a flight attendant that had left a disturbing message. Came to the dispatcher, came to finally ended up at the FAA. And we were communicating with the plane, it had never left, it was--it had taxied out to a secure location at Dulles. And the pilots followed the training that they had always had, I mean, it was a week or two weeks, and they climbed out of the window.

MR. RAIDT: This was post-9/11?

MS. GARVEY: Post 9/11 and it was, you know, again, they were doing what they--which is get out of the way because they won't have somebody to pilot the plane. Knowing, now, of course. It turned out to be nothing, it was another, you know, sort of misunderstanding. But it was, I think, just an indication that, while I don't think that anything like 9/11 could ever happen again. That

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was the discussion the other night on TV about the fellow who had put the box cutters through. And a security expert saying, no one will ever back down in the face of box cutter--

MR. RAIDT: We have a new layer of security.

MS. GARVEY: --yeah, we have a new redundancy, don't we.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah. Two quick things on that. On exercises, do you recall participating in any exercises with respect to, you know, large or small emergencies with Security and, specifically, in hijack exercises, whether tabletop or anything else?

MS. GARVEY: Well, we had a number of exercise pre Y-2-K, which were somewhat security in nature that I participated in. We had a number, I'm not sure I would call it official, no I would not call it an official tabletop exercise, but I've certainly been briefed on what we do in the case of a hijacking when the ops center was open. I live, you know, seven minutes from the FAA and there were

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probably a half a dozen incidents when I was Administrator, where we thought was a potential hijacking, so I had certainly opportunities then to--

MR. RAIDT: That was prior to 9/11--

MS. GARVEY: That was prior to 9/11, none of them, of course, turned out to be, someone had pushed the wrong thing. A couple of times I was there and, so, could just walk across the hall. Other times I was at home and in communication and one time came into check to see what was going on.

MR. RAIDT: And we'll want to talk to you a little bit later on that one. And then the last one on aviation security alert levels. We know it was a matrix of, you know, here's the conditions that leads to this alert level, Bill knows more about this than I do and at that alert level says you do these things. And, that, of course everybody could think--what alert level was it justified?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. RAIDT: Do you recall as far as that,

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there's two general questions, though: Do you recall any discussions about the adequacy of the aviation security levels, whether they needed to be looked at or kind of the justification that we remained at three in the environment that was leading up to that summer? Anything along--

MS. GARVEY: I don't, I don't.

MR. RAIDT: And who would make the decision as far as aviation security was concerned?

MS. GARVEY: Well, from my perspective, it was, clearly, coming out of Security arm of the FAA with Admiral Flynn and his successor. But, clearly, that was based on work that they were doing with--close work that they were doing with the FBI or with the intelligence agencies, which he would often communicate I mean, based on--

MR. RAIDT: So, if we wanted to go to four or take it back to two, how would that work, would he make a recommendation to you and you'd make it to the Secretary? Where did that decision end up?

MS. GARVEY: Generally, I mean, it would be Irish coming to me, S60 going to the Secretary.

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MR. RAIDT: Do you recall any changes--

MS. GARVEY: No.

MR. RAIDT: --in the level during your
tenure?

MS. GARVEY: No, oh, gosh, I don't want to
be so quick to say that. I just don't remember.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. You know, on any of
these, if you have more information later.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The process was,
definitely Irish would go to you, you'd go S60,
S60 would go to the Secretary?

MS. GARVEY: Actually I wouldn't go to
S60, that would almost happen, you know,
simultaneously, in other words Irish and S60 would
already have discussed and worked with the
intelligence community then they would
simultaneously--

MR. RAIDT: That was why the Secretary
would have to okay that?

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRINKLEY: Do we want to--do you want
to take a few minutes break?

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MS. GARVEY: Um--

MR. BRINKLEY: If you're fine, we can continue, but, it's up to you.

MS. GARVEY: Well, how much longer is this going to take?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Seriously, we don't know.

MS. GARVEY: Well, let's take a break, then, if you don't mind. Thank you, I appreciate that.

[BREAK.]

MR. JOHNSTONE: We're resuming the interview and Mr. Brinkley is finishing up on some other business so we will start back up. John, were you finished with the vector?

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, compliance.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, we'll do just some short questions, including a couple from the 9/11 families on enforcement and compliance. I wanted to start with one that we've talked about the intelligence data that you received, in terms of defining the threat. And vulnerability data you received from inside the system on vulnerabilities.

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As we're trying to look at the decision-making process within the system, at large, including Congress and the White House in addition to the agency level.

We're trying to understand the process. And so, the question occurs about, you know, you were evaluating the threat through intelligence and vulnerability through performance testing and other forms of systems evaluation.

What about, how did you bring it all together to do risk assessment and risk management? And, in particular, we're looking for where in the system consequence assessment came into play. So, can you talk to us a little bit about--

MS. GARVEY: Do you mean consequences for the airlines or--

MR. RAIDT: Well, here it would be more in the form of when you're doing--I should make it just more general for you to explain how you did risk management or risk assessment at FAA during your tenure? On consequences, that's mostly an attempt to get at, okay, if something may have a

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remote possibility of happening. But if it has, well, like an asteroid impact. You know, something outside of this realm, you know, the chances are, in any one year are exceedingly remote, but the scientific record shows that eventually, there'll be another asteroid impact with global catastrophic impact. But in terms of, for example, in reading the documents that we looked at a little earlier on consideration of suicide hijackings in the intel summaries. They said, well, we think this is unlikely, but the question would be, okay, unlikely, but what are the consequences of successful domestic suicide hijacking would obviously be more than a traditional hijacking of, you know, the taking of hostages and negotiating on that.

So, how did you put it all together, in terms of making your budget and policy priorities?

MS. GARVEY: Right, right--well, certainly, in terms of risk management, many of those decisions were based very much on what intelligence was producing; based on their work

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with the other intelligence agencies. We were better, though not perfect at data analysis. We were better and got better in the last, you know, few years. The FAA, I think, historically, can be data-rich, but information poor, like a lot of agencies; not unique to the FAA. And, I might add, like I'm finding, like many in the private sector, as well.

So the real challenge is how do you analyze that data. We were better at that on security; we were better than that on safety. But we were, you know, very much, as an agency, I think, relying on the professionalism of the people we had in the intelligence shop; their relationship with the intelligence community, the recommendations that would come from there.

And, again, not to lay too much on the Gore Commission, but we felt that had given us a fairly good blueprint that on the areas that we needed to focus.

MR. RAIDT: Would it be fair to say that your priorities, then, would be more threat-driven?

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MS. GARVEY: Oh, yes, I think very much so. In fact, I think it was--I've seen this quote and I may have included in my testimony, Brian Jenkins [ph] quote about security is often reactive. And I think, again, from an administrator's perspective, one of the great challenges both for security and for safety is how do you determine the precursors? How do you identify the trends?

Historically, as an agency; historically, as an industry, aviation has developed agendas, whether it's safety or security, on historical data. We look at past accidents; you do that with the NTSB. You look at those accidents; you make determinations, you look at past security events, you make determinations, you make policy judgments.

And so I think one of the great challenges, as a community, not just for the FAA, but as a community, is how do we identify the precursors. How do we identify the trends. I think we are doing--this may be unfair, but let me just say, I am more familiar with the way we're

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approaching it from safety. Because that was purely the domain of the FAA.

I am, perhaps, less clear on how the intelligence community made be dealing with the same challenge. But for us, risk assessment, at that time, was based primarily on the intelligence that was gathered by the professionals. And the work that they did.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask you to move on, to ask you a couple, one of the things the Commission is trying to do is to get answers that 9/11 families have submitted. Let's only ask you two of those at this point.

I think one of these may have even been asked at the hearing. Question? Why did screening contractors pay 10-cents on the dollar for fines imposed on them for violations? Why were the fines lowered?

MS. GARVEY: You mean, in what cases were they lowered? I mean, actually--

MR. RAIDT: This is a general question--

MS. GARVEY: --okay.

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MR. RAIDT: --and so I think what--

MS. GARVEY: And fines, if I might add, again, somewhat from out here on the safety side, fines were, we'd gone to Congress, as I understand it, way before my time, and take no credit for this, to raise the level of fines from \$1,000 to \$10,000. So, and there is, and I think from the FAA's perspective, the goal was compliance; the goal was to fix the problem. The goal wasn't necessarily to raise money from the airlines, but I do understand the argument that the larger the fine that the more you grab their attention.

MR. RAIDT: Is that within your recollection that they would be reduced as much as 90-cents--

MS. GARVEY: No--

MR. RAIDT: --on the dollar?

MS. GARVEY: --not at all, no. So, I'm puzzled by that and I'm not saying it's not true, I'm just not aware of that.

MR. JOHNSTONE [?]: Let me ask the question, though. Obviously, there's a piece

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in--when Irish or even Standards or somebody fines them, I mean, now it's going to go into some process.

MS. GARVEY: Right, there is an opportunity, absolutely.

MR. JOHNSTONE: How would you describe that process and the, you know, some of these things, language can they challenge, I mean, sort of describe this process and how do you think it would come out, even give a perception that we're down to 10-cents on the dollars in the fines that actually--

MR. RAIDT: And I think Ms. Giavo [ph], was the source of the 10-cents on the dollar.

MS. GARVEY: I wonder, did she ever recommend that we raise them or did she ever take a look at them?

MR. JOHNSTONE: I think she was--the inference, from my recollection, at the hearing--and I guess I can go back and look--was that it was the negotiation process that got them this 10-cents on the dollar.

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MS. GARVEY: And I don't know whether I'd call it a negotiation process. Although that--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Well, it leads to that--

MS. GARVEY: Sure, absolutely.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --perception.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and the way the process would work is that the fine would occur, you know, on site with an individual inspector. He would make a finding, you know, make a recommendation. It would then go on to the regional office and then on to the, in some cases, to the headquarters--and then on to the headquarters, obviously.

And there were opportunities for the airline to submit--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Rebuttal?

MS. GARVEY: Rebuttal, if you will.

MR. RAIDT: Basic due process?

MS. GARVEY: Exactly, it's a due process and so there probably were opportunities and that there probably were times the amounts were reduced.

MR. RAIDT: Were you involved in--

MS. GARVEY: No, no, not to my

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recollection.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Would that be General Counsel?

MS. GARVEY: It would be General Counsel, that really became very much--

MR. RAIDT: Would there have been any cases where you would have been involved in--

MS. GARVEY: I don't recall any.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Do you recall ever being talked to by members of Congress or by Secretary, saying, Jane, you know, this guys can't sustain a lot of penalties and fines or anything like that?

MS. GARVEY: No, I do remember, I do know that we had a policy to publish it, which was fairly new post-Gore Commission to publish some of the fines.

MR. JOHNSTONE: This was after a year or two years after--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, after it had been resolved. And the airlines were not happy with that, and we heard a lot of complaints about that. And, you know, in fairness to them, I supposed if

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they felt that they had corrected the problem and it was a year later the public was left with the sense that they hadn't corrected it, we continued, though with that policy, we felt it was important.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Did you have that publication having a good effect that they were so worried about that that they--

MS. GARVEY: Well, I think it obviously had enough of an effect that they were calling to complain about it. But I do think, I will say that I think the whole issue of fining and so forth is probably one that deserves a review.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The question is now, for me, now in retrospect, now, I mean, you inherited this system of compliance and enforcement. Did you think that you had all the enforcement tools you needed?

MS. GARVEY: No, clearly, we didn't, because just by the very virtue, I think of our going after the rulemaking and changing that, I think we felt this was not working. I mean, part of it is that I think the airlines view was that

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this was the cost of doing business. And I'm not sure--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That's like [unintell.]--

MS. GARVEY: --right, I'm not sure, you know, it would--I'm not sure at what level, but I bet it was pretty darn high if you reach a point where they would say, boy, this is just too much. So, I'm not even sure the fining process per se--

MR. RAIDT: Did you seek any changes while as Administrator?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I don't know. That did not, I have to say that in a list of priorities and list of things that we were dealing with, you know, we were getting compliance, it was not a system that I would tout as one of the best systems. But it was not the highest on my priority list.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask another--the other question from the families. They have asked--the 9/11 families have asked the Commission to ascertain whether the Attorney General--now this is coming up for the period just before 9/11--whether

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the Attorney General or any other high federal officials stopped taking commercial flights in the period just before 9/11 because of security concerns. Do you have any information with respect to this question?

MS. GARVEY: No, I have no knowledge of that, not at all, not even heard that.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And it would be your expectation if there were any such policy, you would absolutely be in on it?

MS. GARVEY: I think so, absolutely.

MR. JOHNSTONE: That takes us to

MS. GARVEY: Must be time for lunch.

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. BRINKLEY [?]: It's a very succinct conversation or it could take you a long time, I guess. And then, we know it's an arduous process and there's a lot of now, previous interviews with the Security staff. And I'll give you my own, I was there--I worked on the background check for over a year in ACP and between having to spend a year working with Mike Chase every day, which is

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maybe cruel and unusual punishment in itself, is, in fact. One thing I haven't said to him today, you know, we never went anywhere. We never got the thing passed and the only way that ever got passed, is it was through legislative authority. We never got it through the rulemaking process, which is--you know, that's my own personal experience with this process.

Tell, me, what--I mean, you're having to do it for more than just security. So, just sort of tell us what you think the whole, this, what the issues are and why, maybe what are some alternative approaches that should be considered for things that need to go fast and for security.

I mean, we started putting out SDs almost as a work-around--

MS. GARVEY: We did.

MR. BRINKLEY: --to rulemaking, so--

MS. GARVEY: And we've done it with safety and AD.

MR. BRINKLEY: So, what do you think about this?

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MS. GARVEY: It's enormously frustrating and the tension and the challenge between balancing what should be an open and public process, for people, people should have an opportunity to comment, probably most of the time, with few exceptions. Balancing that with the need to be responsive. And it is a balance that we have never--and I don't know that any agency has, in government, has successfully--that they successfully found the right balance.

For us at the FAA, it was probably more of a challenge, certainly more of a challenge than I remember in Federal Highways, we had so few rules in Federal Highways, if any, when I was there. So we were, for me this was a very new challenge. It was not an experience I had seen, at least personally experienced at Federal Highways. We had an enormous number of rules, enormous number of safety rules, security rules, we had airport rules, which are not in the scheme of things, probably nearly as important but aren't important to airports.

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And Congress made an attempt to--before I got there to say that there would be kind of expedited process for the FAA. That there should be a category of rules that didn't have to go through the process of going to OMB, of going to DOT and then to OMB.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Do you remember what the period of that was?

MS. GARVEY: Was it included probably in the '96 Act, was there something in that?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, that was a reauthorization.

MS. GARVEY: I think it might have been in that. And I'm quite sure it was a congressional directive. I have to say, in practical reality, everything was still a significant rule. In other words, Congress didn't say, what was significant and what wasn't. And from the Secretary's office perspective, and it may have been, you know, I don't know why. But, everything was still a pretty significant rule, there were few exceptions.

We had the one level of safety before I

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got there, which moved very quickly. But you can certainly see what would happen when you don't have those layers post-9/11, because there were a lot of things that got out in TSA I notice as not the same. Their TSA legislation, I think, has more of a streamlined ability. Be interesting to see how well that's worked.

MR. BRINKLEY: Rumor is they're not going to use it. OMB's still going to use the regular process.

MS. GARVEY: So, it's a real challenge. We tried several things. We had a task force to look at ways we--

MR. BRINKLEY: Was that Challenge 2000--

MS. GARVEY: Yes, exactly, we made a series of recommendations in that. We tried bringing OMB and OST in earlier and into the table, you know, very early in the discussion, but OST has, I think one person who does the FAA rules. And it God help us if he's ever ill or he's not able to deal with the rules, he's a very competent person, I know, and, certainly, professional, but

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it's really a lot for one person to take on.

We tried meeting with the General Counsel, [unintell.] McPhaton [ph], first and Kurt [ph], when he came. And there were, you know, I think all these assurances that we would try to move them faster and we might move a little bit. But it just--institutionally, we had not yet sort of crossed the code to really get this done in the kind of expedited way that we should. I think the notion of--and we have had very interested Secretaries offices in relationship with the OMB. So in even the kind of direct relationship to kind of deal with it, sometimes, was not encouraged.

MR. BRINKLEY: One of the things that sort of strikes me, is that it's a dilemma that I don't know how to address, but maybe you have an idea, is, in fact, cost-benefit piece of this.

MS. GARVEY: At some point.

MR. BRINKLEY: Drives you down two paths: One, it opens up a path for the industry, who, in this particular case in aviation security, expanded prior to 9/11 is paying the bill. I mean, you

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could have your budget and resources issues is more FAMS than your FTEs and the EDS machines and that kind of stuff. But, in fact, and your Civil Aviation Security Inspectors, but the people that are footing the primary bill in the operational end of this. Is, in fact, you're regulating it and they're having to implement it, were, in fact, the carriers.

So, the cost-benefit analysis piece of that drives the ability for the industry to push back in any manner and methods of push back that they have access.

MS. GARVEY: And that occurred with the screener because some of the first, one of the reasons we pulled it back at one point is we had gotten in all kinds of trouble with the small business community, since most of these are small businesses. And the first years in Congress were devastating. You know, we were going to put people out of business; we were, you know, what we were going to ask of them was just and we had to, I don't remember the exact sequence, but the first

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cut at that, had to come back and we had a pretty active small business administration and was legitimate. And, again, you know, I don't want to minimize them, they are legitimate concerns. But at what point do those concerns take precedent over the security issues.

So, you're right. Examining the cost-benefit analysis. And it's actually something that I had talked to Jim Hall about, and we had, I felt he was going to be a helpful ally. Because we certainly see that on the Safety side, as well. I said, can we, can you and I figure out a way to offer an alternative?

I mean, it's never enough, as you know, to say, let's just toss out the cost benefit. But what are some--let's talk to some of the smart people we know. Are there some economists at MIT or are there some folks that we can turn to? And it was late in Jim's tenure, unfortunately, and we never really took that. I mean, we never really took that. I asked our folks to--I had asked our folks from policy to try to come up with some

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alternatives. This was pre-9/11. This was just sort of generally.

MR. BRINKLEY: Did you ever have any discussions, though with the CEO's and the senior leadership in air carriers, most specifically about security issues, that there was a study done in FAA, post PanAm-103 that basically indicated that PanAm-103 cost the industry, about \$800 million for the system, and there was a finite period of time and Lynne was probably most familiar with that.

MS. GARVEY: Right, yes, she was.

MR. BRINKLEY: But in fact is, the backside of that is the overall cost to the air carriers, they lost their airline. So, I mean, when you start dealing with cost-benefit analysis, there's a philosophical difference approach over and above sort of their business model a different view.

Did you ever have those kinds of verifying discussions with the air carriers--

MS. GARVEY: Not necessarily with the CEOs but with the Bob Bakers, you know that sort of

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level, you know, the operating guys. And, as a matter of fact, Bob Baker was on the MAC the Management Advisory Board and one of the things they looked at was rulemaking and I can remember the discussion in that group which included, you know Ed Bolin [ph], and oh, gosh, the fellow who heads Atlantic, Wisconsin Air, Crowley. I mean, there were enough people from the industry when those discussions were taking place.

And, you're right, I mean, in some ways the best business decision they can make is to invest more in safety or invest more in security--

MR. JOHNSTONE: In security.

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely. And at one level, they understand that and the operating guys probably understand it better. I'm--they understand it sort of intellectually, but then somehow when the rule hits the street and they see a dollar figure, it becomes, perhaps, it's not always expressed in their comments that they would get back.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because the other side of

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that, the other piece of that, I think, the other flip side of the coin. Now, I'll go to the specific rule now, it said out in the Federal Registry, the summer of '01, was the changes to 107 and 108, which has a domestic threat in it, for 12 737 Bojinka type--and they used that--

MS. GARVEY: They used that as an example--

MR. BRINKLEY: --example to deal with the cost.

MR. JOHNSTONE: In the cost benefits.

MR. BRINKLEY: In the cost-benefits estimate. Now the question we asked the intel guys is that, is that based upon the intel or is that based upon the [unintell.] to cost-benefit analysis with the carriers? I mean where is the--

MS. GARVEY: And what was the answer do you--

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, the answer is, we had 12 airplanes in Bojinka--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: --and so they used that,

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but in quite frankness is, it's a way to get to the cost-benefit analysis, to change the rule.

MS. GARVEY: So, I think--

MR. BRINKLEY: So, my dilemma that I'm seeing in the rule-making process is when you're asked, when, I don't mean to put words in your mouth, but when Bill says when you're risk-management approach is driven that the same time for rule-making, it might not be totally threat driven, it's driven, also, by this cost-benefit analysis process. So, we've got a chicken-and-egg problem. If I have a threat and the only way I can get through it is do I hide the threat so I can get through the cost-benefit analysis because sometimes the threat is not that concrete?

MS. GARVEY: Or sometimes you want to get their attention and--

MR. BRINKLEY: Do you want to get their attention and how do I get there from here--so--

MS. GARVEY: And, in a sense, I mean, that had occurred, so there was a view that--

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MR. BRINKLEY: It was a way to get there.

MS. GARVEY: --it was a way to get there.

MR. BRINKLEY: So, the question was that the real threat in the summer of 2001?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: Or was that example from 1995 used to help you get there in 2001?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: Especially when you spent all this money on EDS.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, you know, I guess from my perspective, it's, you almost have to come at the cost benefits from two ways. One is, as you pointed out, you make a case to the airlines and I don't know that you should need to make a case, but there is a case to be made that says the more you invest in safety, the more you invest in security, the better you are.

I mean, I always felt that there was some contradiction, when folks would say, well, you know, airlines don't really care about safety. Well, you know, what, they have to care about

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safety because if you have a catastrophic accident, then it's the end of their business. And the best of them understand that.

MR. RAIDT: Do you think that, [unintell.] a quick aside, do you think that would be the same with regard to security? I mean, we have some indications that they created safety in a different way.

MS. GARVEY: I think because they had more recent terrible experiences with safety. I mean, 1998, without a civil aviation accident was an extraordinary year. But it was, you know--

MR. BRINKLEY: The exception.

MS. GARVEY: --the exception. I mean, the following year was Alaska; was Little Rock. So, their world was, much more driven, I think, by the [unintell.]

But the second piece on cost benefit is--and this is where I was going with Jim is--is there either an alternative to the basic sort of cost-benefit approach that we take or are there a cluster of rules that we can agree to and say,

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guess what? It doesn't matter what it cost, we simply must do it. And how do you, then, define how do you develop a criteria to determine, and that's a very big challenge, because we'll have different points of view on that and I would suspect even the NTSB and FAA would have to face up to it.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, that brings us actually to my last piece on the rule-making process and these other outside influences, besides the industry and special interests and associations and this congressional pressure from backwards at you. How did you view that--in the role of oversight from the Hill an the informal congressional pressure that ATA or can be--

MS. GARVEY: There is no doubt that the airline industry has proven its effectiveness at various points, whether it's on technology that they want or so-called a bail-out bill that they feel that they need post-9/11. And, certainly, they would either go directly to Hill and ask for legislation.

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I mean, again, this is before my time, but you mentioned the background checks. There was a heck of a lot off pressure, I think, even that ended up in legislation, some language in legislation that precluded the FAA from doing--carrying the background checks as far as they wanted. So, that's probably the, you know, the clearest.

MR. JOHNSTONE [?]: We were already doing the rule-making percent, diluting it, but I think in the end it got even more--

MS. GARVEY: Eve more.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --more so.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right, so there's no doubt that they can exert that pressure. And we would often see it in budgets and so forth. Can I recall a time when an individual congressman or a chairman or a senator called me to say, don't do a security rule? No, I think where we had probably some of the most difficulty on some of the security issues is the L-3 and envision piece which you all have been through and know about.

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So, I'll give it a little more thought. I don't particularly, I certainly--you certainly knew there was pressure out there; you certainly knew that people were doing some work on the Hill. We saw in a couple of instances, like the background checks; we certainly felt it on some of the direction we were trying to take the EDS machines and how quickly we could get both technologies out. And I don't remember other ones, but other ones may have--

MR. RAIDT [?]: And along those lines, do you remember any instances where OMB or the Secretary or somebody from the White House would say, Jane, you know, the air carriers, really don't want this, is there anything that you recall that kind of stood you up and said, wow, you know, that's--

MS. GARVEY: I don't really recall that. I don't--I cannot recall, certainly not the Secretary. I mean, we would get rules back, again, the screeners. You know, because OMB felt it was too--we weren't justifying it, there wasn't a

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cost-justification. Crew rest, I mean, I remember that even the last days that I was there at the FAA, you know, getting that back because it just wasn't working out with the cost benefit. Which I think drove some people to take what might have been--

MR. BRINKLEY: Creative steps?

MS. GARVEY: --right, right.

MR. RAIDT: But you never say any naked political--

MS. GARVEY: No, I really didn't, I really didn't. I really didn't. Maybe I just didn't recognize it.

MR. RAIDT: [unintell.] were concerned more about safety and security because they had more recent experience. Do you--did you ever at all perceive or do you think in retrospect that part--that there was an attitude, too, that with security is that, well, with safety, we're responsible for our air frame, you know, it really is our--with security, or acts of God, you know, no one's really going to blame us if a terrorist does

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X, Y, or Z and it's really the government's responsibility anyway. And, besides, you know, we want a little bit of hands-off, that's why we've got a contract, rather than we take this so seriously, let's build our own team and really see this as part of our business model.

Did you get the feeling that they regarded security as an externality?

MS. GARVEY: I think that safe, your characterization. And to some degree, I think that's a concern, maybe even more of a concern today, that post-9/11 when the government stepped in and--I personally just think, you may have heard from others, but I'm concerned that the airlines are saying we can really wash our hands of it.

And, in fact, I think one of the really great challenges for government as we move forward is to determine more clearly than it is determined right now, what are the roles of the various players within the industry.

MR. RAIDT: We do want to get your recommendations at the end and we really appreciate

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your--

MR. JOHNSTONE: And that's one that you really put your finger on that's been troubling us and we have a couple of issues we'd like to run by you on that.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But before we move rule-making and kind of pinned to this other issue, we're going to be interviewing Carol Hallet [ph]. Are there any questions you would suggest that we ask Carol Hallet?

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I'd love to come back.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Would you think about that question?

MS. GARVEY: I would.

MR. JOHNSTONE: We have until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, all right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: You have a little bit of time.

MS. GARVEY: Got a little bit of time, good.

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MR. RAIDT: You were going to talk hijacking and--

MR. BRINKLEY: In the end, I really wanted to, did you feel like you really had the resources you needed, I mean, in a [unintell.] sense? We know you get capped; you get OMB; you get through this process; it goes through this sausage-making machine and you're trying to enforce here and you're getting--you're trying to cajole to compliance, but you've got to have the tools to enforce.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: So, part of that is actually having the resources to enforce.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I don't want to sound like I'm attacking, because, you know, how hard did I push, you know, and how hard did we all push and should we have gone to Congress and really often--

MR. BRINKLEY: Did the normal DOD back-door approach to--

MS. GARVEY: I know, I should have

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learned--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. BRINKLEY: You had a perfect model--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I know, I know, we tried it couple of times and were successful, but not always. You know, I don't think there was an element within the agency that, if I were really, if I were really, if I really examined it carefully or answered you honestly would not have said I could not have used more resources. I mean, that's true for inspectors, safety and security.

But it's not true for controllers at the time, because I think the controllers had always as, some of you know, been pretty [unintell.] on the Hill themselves, they had beefed up their own members. But if you look at other areas, in terms of personnel and in terms of training. I think training was the thing that, again, across the Board, when you go through, like all agencies when you go through, you know, some shrinkage, you tend to let that go.

MR. BRINKLEY: The reason I ask and it

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really started before your time, was that the Red Team, actually shrunk in the mid-'90s, with budget limitations, they lost personnel. Post PanAm-103 that that was supposed to be a much, when Administrator--

MS. GARVEY: Fucci [ph].

MR. BRINKLEY: Fucci, yes, started it, created it, it was supposed to be about 30-some people, you know, we're down to a Red Team of a handful.

MS. GARVEY: And now, there's no Red Team, is that right?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, it's different in TSA.

MS. GARVEY: Okay.

MR. RAIDT: It's not where you're sitting.

MR. BRINKLEY: It's organized differently, but it--

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, it's not the same.

MR. BRINKLEY: --it's hard to, it's really--but they do have some--they do have resources, but there's probably a question do they

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have enough resources at the same time. So, I mean, I'm just trying to get a feel for, when you do get constrained, I mean, there is not an infinite amount of funds here.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, let me ask it, in your day-to-day work, I mean, you listed three of the major roles and missions of FAA and you have to divide your time, basically, between those three. What percentages would you sort of thing about you dealt with in a macrosense in safety and security and systems?

MS. GARVEY: Much more with safety and efficiency. In part, because that was what was eating our lunch. If you look at the congressional record, for example, you're going to see probably, I think in the double digits by the time the summer of 2001 came. Double digits the number of times I had been before Congress on congestion and delays. It was an issue that was paramount for the IG; it was an issue that was, certainly, paramount for the industry; so, it was capturing and demanding a

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great deal of my time. You know, I'd be at the Command Center, working directly with spring/summer teams. Safety, the same--the same thing, I mean, there were concerns about crew rest; we had been looking at a lot of the issues of post-Little Rock crash. How we were going to get the crew rest issue resolved. We knew we were going to get pushed back from the industry. We were not sure that our cost-benefit analysis would support it.

So, we had a number of those issues. I also, at the time, just parenthetically, had a change in leadership at Safety and it was very important for me to get the right person there, so I spent a fair amount of time.

Having said that and that is the reality, having said that, I never felt that, and I hope Irish didn't or Canavan or Irish or people in that time period didn't feel that if there was an issue they couldn't get my attention.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's not, I don't mean to--they have not--

MS. GARVEY: So, I mean, that is one of

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the challenges that a place like the FAA that you, and, clearly, post-9/11 when you were on a wartime footing, setting up a separate agency whose only mission was transportation security, certainly was the right one in my view.

MR. BRINKLEY: Anything else on the pre-9/11?

MR. RAIDT: No, just, we were talking about the IG and Congress and Industry. To what extent do you think that the public, because I remember that summer, you know, a lot about the customer bill of rights and--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, the customer bill of rights, exactly.

MR. RAIDT: I mean, and one thing is, you know, our charge is to present an honest depiction of the country and, you know, no one gets a pass.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: And, you know, what, do you have any comments with respect to the public demands, what they were?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, certainly, and, again

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the Jet Blue experience of two weeks ago is just a, that's a mild indication, could you imagine what it would have been if we combined the delays in the skies with long security delays? The public was focused on, you know, get this country, keep this country moving. Let's, we want to travel; we want to get where we need to go. And that was really the mood of the time.

I remember reading an article that described the summer of 2000--2001, rather as every day was like the Wednesday before Thanksgiving. And that was the perception out there. That was the perception. And to some degree, it was the reality, certainly in places.

And, by the way, underneath all that from my perspective is were we getting a system, were we being faced with a system that was getting so congested that safety was going to be affected. You know we stepped in and put a lot of the system in place at La Guardia and we took hell for that, frankly. We took buck from our friends in Congress, too. But because it was reaching that

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saturation point. You know, where our [unintell.] are we having more of those? I mean, there were some really serious safety issues, as well as just keeping the country moving and [unintell.]

MR. BRINKLEY: That brings up a question that I've read and there's one document that uses this term and it's alluded to in another. And fact is that security was a disruption to the system, that it was considered a disruption to the system. And we talked about that briefly at the beginning. Where this is sort of that security was never engineered into the system like changing out aircraft engines at so many hours, which is engineered to the whole ops tempo that security was never engineered into this system and a system's approach with the carrier.

Does that, how do you view that? Does that make sense to you?

MS. GARVEY: It makes sense that others outside the agency would view it as a disruption. I don't think internally that was the view. I mean, you know, the Air Traffic side of the house

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can be pretty kind of the big gun, so to speak, they're the big guys on the block. But they understood the security issues. Certainly, the safety folks did. But I think it's probably a fair assessment to say that if you were working at an airline, you might view it as a disruption.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because in the end if you look at roles and missions security is there starting at implement.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: I wouldn't even plot it if it was outside--viewed that way inside the agency.

MS. GARVEY: Right, exactly. Yeah, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: But if you look at it--if you step back and look at it from the industry perspective, the industry figured out how to do maintenance and take care of stuff out of the system. And figured out how the process was going to work--

MS. GARVEY: Right a very good point.

MR. BRINKLEY: --and how/what the delays were and crew rest and crew transfer. I don't, did

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they figure--did you ever see an indicator that they understood that you need to check in and get through security in a certain length of time and you can't show up 15-minutes later for some business traveler all just because he wants to be there?

MS. GARVEY: Right, no, I--

MR. BRINKLEY: He expects you to do--he does what to the security system to make the customer satisfaction higher than security factors.

MS. GARVEY: Right, and to get back to John's point, I think even the public expected to be able to come 20 minutes before the flight.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because we allowed them to do that.

MS. GARVEY: Because that was the, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, if you had said, no, if the industry had said--

MS. GARVEY: That would have been an interesting and it would have been interesting to see what would have happened. Do you think that congressman--do you think the public really would

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have stood for that?

MR. BRINKLEY: Don't know. We do know now, we have a better feel. It took an event like 9/11, but they're pushing back; they're even--

MS. GARVEY: They're even pushing back on that.

MR. BRINKLEY: --nothing now, I mean, that's my personal opinion.

MS. GARVEY: I mean, it's a good--you're right.

MR. BRINKLEY: What happens if we say, no? In the industry, if the industry really thought that this was that major an issue for them. They could have said no different than, I'm going to pull the door down 10 minutes for you're done getting on because I--I mean, you can do positive passenger bag match, we know you can, because you do it all that he time overseas.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: But can we do it domestically? I guess so. If you decide you're going to cut everything off at 15, 20 minutes and

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once they check in they--once they go on you put the bag on.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRINKLEY: But that's sort of in retrospect.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: But, was it engineered into the system? Maybe I'll ask you to think about that.

MS. GARVEY: I'll think about that, yeah. And my initial reaction is that I think you make a good point that it was not engineered in quite the same way.

But, in fairness, let me think about that, not engineered in quite the same way that safety was. Which they had had, again, much more experience with. I mean, the safety piece was, really, built in--

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, you could argue when you find the security director about four layers down, versus the safety director, the vice president for safety who sits next to the--on the

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right-hand seat/

MS. GARVEY: Although, then you have people like--then you have the airlines like, United that has Soliday right up there who is Safety and Security.

MR. BRINKLEY: You mean, legislatively, Irish belongs in your triumvirate around the table--

MS. GARVEY: Around the table.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because earlier in the FAA it was three or four layers down.

MS. GARVEY: That's a good point.

MR. BRINKLEY: and it had to be legislated after PanAm-103 to be directly answerable to the Administrator?

MS. GARVEY: That's right and then the FAA had to require of the airlines that they have a counter, with Soliday's reporting to the CEO.

MR. BRINKLEY: That was something that they--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I am told that that

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was, again, that was slightly before my time in the Busey period. I've talked a little bit with Busey about this.

MR. BRINKLEY: They tried to do that, I don't think they ever--

MS. GARVEY: It was not mandated, it was the bully pulpit sort of thing. And, you know, again, I think of this Soliday because he was such a leader in that field. There was a fellow at Northwest who was very good--

MR. BRINKLEY: Doug Laird [ph].

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, who was that? Was it Doug Laird?

MR. BRINKLEY: He was there when I was, in the early '90s, he was head--he headed--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, he had influence at Northwest, that's always the key, uh-huh.

MR. BRINKLEY: As a matter of fact he was there, I think when they did start CAPS.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right, that's right.

MR. BRINKLEY: Let's change gears and talk a little bit about 9/11, if we could please.

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MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRINKLEY: And I want to talk to you, first, about the overall view, your view of hijackings. We've talked a little bit about hijackings. We hadn't one for ten years. It's in the system, but it's--it would appear, now, and it may be an unfair view, that hijackings were really not viewed as an equal threat to explosives. That we had done a good job on hijackings. We had screening checkpoints, we felt that PanAm-103 obviously was IADs, we, at lease TWA-800 re-enforced that with \$100 million, so it really re-enforced PanAm-103 findings with more IAD emphasis and the baggage piece.

MR. RAIDT: No domestic hijacking since '91.

MR. BRINKLEY: No domestic hijacking since '91.

MS. GARVEY: And I think there was another piece if I could; there was no domestic hijacking since '91 and there still was a sense that with hijacking, you had some kind of control and that if

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you negotiated and followed the, you know, followed the procedure, you had a good shot, that generally what these people wanted was transportation somewhere or they wanted political prisoners released. So you had a shot at surviving, which is what it's all about. With an explosive, the horror--

MR. BRINKLEY: Of catastrophic--

MS. GARVEY: --of catastrophic events, I think put it in a different category.

MR. BRINKLEY: And so in that regard--

MR. RAIDT: Can I ask, an aside on that. This goes back to the consequence question of suicide hijackings. You know, something that was considered but considered unlikely. But just as explosions would have catastrophic effects--

MS. GARVEY: I think it was more, again, because of the risk associated with the whole likelihood of it.

MR. RAIDT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GARVEY: But there was so little, I mean, truthfully and, again, I don't want to

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suggest what Irish would say or what Mike Canavan would say, but I think if they really thought there was an oppor--that this was so real that we better make it, this has got to be reflected in our baseline or we better do something. I don't think they shouldn't be [unintell.]

MR. BRINKLEY: At least you didn't.

MS. GARVEY: No.

MR. BRINKLEY: Even though we've had a lot of suicide bombers; we had a lot of suicide--

MR. RAIDT: Truck bombs.

MR. BRINKLEY: --truck bombs, we had suicides using other modes of transportation over periods of time. I admit that none of that ever, we never had the transfer to aviation.

MS. GARVEY: And the thought of the training that they needed to go through, what they needed to know to get there, as opposed to a driver's license or something maybe not even a driver's license, you know, it just--it did not seem--it does not rise to the same level as these--

MR. BRINKLEY: Okay, I just wanted to

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touch on that particular item.

MR. JOHNSTONE [?]: And I think you testified before during the hearing kind of where you were and how you found out, so I don't see any need to really cover that again. But to kind of get in more of the process. And you talked about how there--you had heard half a dozen instances where there was a hijacking that may have occurred that you came into the office. Describe--

MS. GARVEY: Before, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --yeah, describe to me what your responsibilities as FAA Administrator would be. You were told they were what you perceived they were in the event of an emergency. And to the extent that was backed up with standard operating procedures or memoranda and, you know, whether, Zellers or the chief of staff or somebody would call and say, okay, Jane, here's the situation, here's your legal authorities and that type of thing. And kind of the idea who is supposed to be the hijack coordinator at FAA. If you can kind of go over those realm of issues.

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MS. GARVEY: Right, well, I'll divide it, for general statements, then, perhaps relate it specifically to 9/11.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yes.

MS. GARVEY: Certain, again, for the lead in hijacking, it was security. If you had a potential hijacking, the security ops center was activated quickly. I would, in the cases where you'd had six incidences, it would be someone very senior in security who would notify me. And I would be notified probably quietly before the Secretary's office and those at DOT. But there's a whole list of people who are notified in those cases.

Some of that was changed slightly when Secretary Mineta came in, John Flaherty wanted to be notified of more incidences than we had done in the past, so there were changes, depending on the individual Administrators. I did not--I would not be the one notified. I mean, my view in the hijacking was that if it was serious enough I needed to get--and this is what I was told that I

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needed to get to the Ops Center or be in direct contact with whoever was on at that time. And I could do that if I was home through the phone network that was set up. It would not be unusual, for example, to have myself and Monte on a phone call if there were difficulties of any sort, whatever the hijacking or at anything else.

MR. RAIDT: And were you expected to go on the system expecting I've got to make these particular decisions?

MS. GARVEY: Not necessarily; not necessarily. I mean, fortunately, all the instances that I mentioned resulted in it was generally monitoring something as it arrived at its destination or waiting for it to get to its destination. Knowing that the FBI, again, you know it was protocol for knowing that the FBI had been notified; intelligence community, so those folks would be taking the appropriate steps. I mean, I think I saw my role as mostly there to oversee what was happening; to, obviously, make a decision if it needed to be, but we did not have that pre-9/11.

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We did not have that sort of a situation.

MR. RAIDT [?]: And there was the direct checklist that someone was--

MS. GARVEY: I didn't have a checklist. I think Security may have, Lynne would know that. And then I would be available to talk to the Secretary's office, which would, occurred with almost everyone of the pre- the instances that we, once they'd been notified, sort of midway through, I'd give a call over to, plane's coming in, it's, you know, a certain distance away or whatever.

MR. RAIDT: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: So, I'd be available. But, quite honestly, because everyone of those instances turned out not to be an issue, probably it was--it's hard to imagine those as kind of a warm-up for 9/11.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Closer to, in some ways, for the preparations to Y-2-K, where, you know, it was clear that we all had to be prepared for--

MR. JOHNSTONE: I think I asked this

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before, but just to clarify, with respect to these sets of instances, we're going to get into 9/11 and before we really should get your account of kind of what happened that day.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Do you recall, again, any particular exercises where different elements of FAA, FAA headquarters, Air Traffic Control, and to the extent military and law enforcement be called in. To kind of go over how that was supposed to be orchestrated. Was there any--

MS. GARVEY: I don't recall that. And Monte would be a good one to ask. He did participate in some exercises. And I had certainly been briefed on where I was supposed to go and so forth, in terms of--

MR. JOHNSTONE: So, sorry, you were pretty confident, you know, on those sleepless nights that all managers have at work, what could be that you were pretty confident that whatever contingency you knew what your role was supposed to be in--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: --and that your subordinates knew what they were doing.

MS. GARVEY: Right, and vis-a-vis Security, again, having Monte as the Deputy who had many years of experience was certainly a plus. And Lynne was there, that was certainly a plus, as well. Lynne was, of course, not in that role, on 9/11.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And do you recall any conversations with Irish or anybody like, or Canavan to say, you know, did you kind of go over any scenarios, contingencies, either around the table, like, okay, this happened--

MS. GARVEY: You know, actually, not with Canavan, but early on with Irish. We were at a management meeting. Where were people going to be and the need to always keep them making sure we knew exactly where people were. We had a couple of issues at times where pagers weren't working and sort of reminding them once again, and saying, you know, let's make sure, you know, let's make sure we all follow the procedures, know exactly where we're

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going to be et cetera.

MR. JOHNSTONE [?]: Let's, why don't we go into, kind of, just tell us about the day, when you were notified, when you thought particularly important decisions were made or when matters were called to your attention, or when you knew other elements of the system were notified.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And then, I'd like you, as you do that, to kind of think of three or four different areas and what you expected was their role in the kind of roll-out of the day. And that would be headquarters, you know; Air Traffic Control; what the Command Center there was doing. Law enforcement, particularly the FBI. And then kind of the National Command Authority, White House, President, Vice President. And the air carriers. And this is a lot of players in this drama.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So, take us through the day and kind of identify where those support points

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were and kind of what your expectations were of these different kinds of areas.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right. And I apologize if I'm repeating what I said to you in the past, but that morning wa--I had just returned from a trip to Texas the night before. Very grateful, still, that I was here that day. And we were at the Secretary's office having breakfast with Madame Durand who was, at the time, head of the Transport Minister in the EU and we were discussing the upcoming Montreal session on environmental issues. We had great, great differences with Europe on where we needed to be environmentally, what the regulations ought to be and this was the Secretary and my attempt to reach a compromise before we went into a Montreal session, that would be, without the compromise somewhat contentious.

So, we were sitting in the Secretary's conference room. We had, literally, just begun the breakfast. The Secretary was there, I was there, Madam Durand was there, two staff people, I believe

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from the Secretary's office, one from the FAA and she had Michel Auriel [ph], her chief of staff and, I believe one other staff person.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Who was the person with Michel Auriel?

MS. GARVEY: Auriel and it's actually Michael, it's a male, I was trying to do the pathetic French pronunciation, which I'm not very good at.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Oh, I'm sorry, on the French side.

MS. GARVEY: Yes, Michel Auriel was the chief of staff to Madame Durand.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The FAA person was?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I think it was Karl Burlson [ph].

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: I think it was, it was either Karl or Louise and I apologize for not remembering exactly.

MR. RAIDT: And Karl is no longer chief of staff then?

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MS. GARVEY: That's correct. Karl was doing the environmental and that's why he was there. I don't think Louise was there. He was doing a great deal of the environmental work for us, so he would have been the staff person there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And Mineta was there with Flaherty, was he--

MS. GARVEY: Flaherty was not in the room, actually, Flaherty, may have been someone from Chief Counsel who was in the room for the Secretary, I'm not sure.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And, I'm sorry, again the room was the--

MS. GARVEY: The, you know where the Secretary's office is, it was the conference room, the large conference room where we had all of our intermodal meetings with the--we were having breakfast.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: So, we were still sort of very much in the pleasantries and the opening of the meeting and so forth. And all of a sudden,

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John Flaherty opened the door and very uncharacteristically said, Mr. Secretary, Administrator, we need you in here right away. No, pleasantries, no, good morning, just, we need you right away.

MR. BRINKLEY: The time, when that was?

MS. GARVEY: It was, literally, just as the plane had hit.

MR. BRINKLEY: Okay.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The first plane?

MS. GARVEY: The first plane, yes.

Because, yeah, yeah. So we walked into--actually rushed into the Secretary's office. CNN was and I believe it was always on, so I honestly don't know whether John got a call or whether he just literally saw it on the TV. I think it was that he said they just had the TV on and someone said, oh, my goodness, look at this. We walked in, the Secretary said, oh, my God. And all of us, I think had an initial first reaction unspoken, but an initial first reaction which we said to each other afterwards, which was it was a small plane, someone

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either had a heart attack; someone horribly and inadvertently went into the World Trade Center.

I went to the phone and called the Ops Center and said what's going on, what do we know? They said, what's going on in New York. And the answer I got was, we're not sure, we have, you know, we're not sure and we have literally just gotten word that we may have a potential hijacking.

So at that point, I don't think there was a connection--there was not a connection.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Between what you were seeing

MS. GARVEY: Right--

MR. BRINKLEY: Between it first hit and the hijacking?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, yes, so I just put the phone down and said to the Secretary, I will head right back to the FAA and will be in touch with you. So, I left immediately. The Secretary went back into explain to Ms. Durand what was going on. The meeting, obviously came to a pretty quick conclusion.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: Do you remember the time?

MS. GARVEY: The time, yeah, it was literally right after--

MR. JOHNSTONE: It was before the second one hit?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, because by the time I got back to the FAA, which is diagonally across from the Secretary's office, the second plane had hit. So, by the time I got up to the 10th floor, we now had two airplanes.

At this point, I went right into the operation and the net, the two centers there at the FAA, both were very active; there were people already in the room. The Deputy was there in the room and it began--that began the series of briefings.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay. Let me ask you about the room and then, do you remember when you placed the call to the Ops Center, do you remember who it is that--

MS. GARVEY: No, I don't.

MR. JOHNSTONE: All right. So, you get up

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there and you see the Operations Center and then there was another room the video-teleconferencing center, is that correct?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, there are essentially three rooms. I mean, there's essentially the two principal rooms; one is the Ops Center, which is the regular communication; the second one is the room that Security would use as a kind of--as the net where--and they're adjacent to each other separated by, at that time, a kind of glass wall with a door that goes in.

The third, of course, is just right off that would be what we call the vault. The room where you get the secure briefings from the White House and that was unknown to anyone else. I mean, that wasn't obviously the security and--so that nobody would just--you wouldn't use that ordinarily.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So, when you went up to that, which room did you go to?

MS. GARVEY: First stopped right in the Ops Center and then immediately went, I mean,

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really, I think I immediately went into the Security area. Number of people were up there. You know, many of them, of course, I wouldn't know, but people from literally, by that time, people coming into the room, literally from all aspects of the FAA.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Any people you did recognize in the room?

MS. GARVEY: Lee was there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Longmire?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, Lee Longmire?

MR. JOHNSTONE: This was in the secure room or in the Operations Room?

MS. GARVEY: Security net room.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Security Operations?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, Security Ops room, yeah, where the net is. You know, Mike Canavan, of course, was not there. There was a great deal of concern about making sure we could get ahold of General Canavan.

And at that point it was, really, information flow. What do we know, what's

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occurring, what's happening. Tremendous, tremendous concern. But, still, somewhat, you know, somewhat unclear what was happening.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And was the Deputy there?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, he had already come over from his office. I mean these two rooms are directly across from the Administrator's suite, so it's very easy access.

MR. RAIDT: And he was in the head room, also?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: You know, at that point, it was we were in communications with the Command Center. The Command Center was reporting, you know, essentially what was happening in the system. Which, at this point, we weren't quite clear. We weren't quite clear.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The Command Center, you mean the Herndon--

MS. GARVEY: Herndon, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

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MS. GARVEY: And our communication was essentially through Herndon, I believe, and you'd have to ask Monte direct. He may have had a direct conversation with the Boston and New York folks, but for the most part, Herndon was our sort of central point for that.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And who was, kind of the person in charge at the Herndon Center?

MS. GARVEY: Well, Linda Schuessler was there. I don't believe Jack Keyes [ph] was on that day, in fact I know he was not. Linda was really, the key person. And Keyes' Deputy, whose name is completely escaping me--

MR. BRINKLEY: Sligo ph?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: So, I, at this point, went back to call the Secretary's office, said, you know, we know there's been the second plane, great concern, we're gathering information from the regions and are gathering information from centers

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in communication with the Air Traffic Control center. And you know, we'll certainly keep you informed. And I honestly do not remember [unintell.] came over. But I know that--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Jim came--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I'm just trying to remember--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Jim said he came to the SVTS room.

MS. GARVEY: Okay, yes, that was probably closer, that was probably about an hour later that we had the--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That's the vault.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, what I call the vault. Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: I think that's what he said in our interview--

MS. GARVEY: That's when he came over, okay.

MR. JOHNSTONE: He said he came on over.

MR. RAIDT: And the call from the information guy and the calls that are coming in

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from the regional offices and air traffic control facilities, was that something where people at the Ops Center would have to call them saying, hey, what's going on? Or was the calls flowing from them to providing information or was that--was it coming to the Ops Center or was it going to APC and then to the Ops Center or was it just a mix of them?

MS. GARVEY: It was all of the above. I mean it was all of the above. Boston and New York was, first of all the lines are open, so you hear a lot of this stuff, you almost, you don't have to pick up the phone and call, I mean, there are communications lines that the Command Center can open to the field, and so a lot of that was coming in.

And, quite honestly, I was not asking who was giving what information, I was just asking, yeah, what do we know. Where are the Security people? What's happening in Boston. I mean, at that point, the Security people were out doing the interviewing that they needed to do, looking at the

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[unintell.] machines looking to make sure that the calibrations--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Is this before the third or Pentagon crash where we're falling?

MS. GARVEY: You know, even before the Pentagon crash they were starting to do some work at Logan and gather some folks and get some information. But it was, clearly, the Pentagon crash that was the final, you know, as the Secretary said, what, he says, once is an accident, twice is something else, but the third time you know you're dealing with a program, you know, you're dealing with something that is, you know, beyond what is normal.

And, quite honestly, at the second plane, there were discussions, even internally, is this something, is this a terrorist attack?

What was probably the most problematic in that morning and I'll get to the notion about bringing down the planes. But what was most problematic was the last plane and there still was and I do not, to this day--and I've asked the FBI

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about it, as well. We do not know where this came from, but somewhere someone believed that a plane had gone down on Ohio border.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, we've heard that.

MS. GARVEY: Had you heard that? You've gotten that, as well?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Feedback--

MS. GARVEY: But we never could trace that down, I mean, it was something that sort of came up in the Security Operations Room.

MR. JOHNSTONE: I tell you what we do understand about that is that a call came from a county sheriff--

MS. GARVEY: Sheriff, county official--I--

MR. JOHNSTONE: --that someone, and by that time the transponder had gone off and they said well, transponder off, no coms, plume of smoke, and then that became the reality.

MS. GARVEY: Reality, mm-hmm.

MR. RAIDT: Wasn't it, too, and then I want to take this away too long, but the sheriff had heard reports of look for--

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MR. GIBSON Oh, right, right.

MR. RAIDT: --regional or the

MR. JOHNSTONE: The ITC--

MS. GARVEY: He thought he was responding.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, yeah, and it became a kind of almost a fact. You know, again, and the one regret I have and actually, I think you'll hear this from several people at the FAA, but we did not take copious notes of times. We should have done that. We were so, so in the midst of it that we just simply didn't do that. But I do remember saying to Monte and this was probably after the Pentagon, look, stay here, get things organized. I want to go downstairs. I want to check on the day care center and I want to check on people who are leaving--keep people who are leaving; we had people in the FAA who had spouses in the Pentagon and so forth. I want to check on the day care center. I want to make sure our people are leaving without panicking and are leaving quietly and as well as they can be.

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And then I also wanted to call the CEOs, I wanted to do a round of calls at least to United and to American. I'll tell you, before I got to the door, I think, I mean, it's not always clear, before I even got to the door, I got a call from Don Cardy. Tremendously concerned about American 906.

MR. RAIDT [?]: Did you have any conversation with the airlines prior to the Cardy call?

MS. GARVEY: Our folks did, we were working with dispatchers--

MR. RAIDT: Did you?

MS. GARVEY: No, prior to the Cardy call, it was--

MR. RAIDT: And Cardy called after the Pentagon crash but before the fourth plane was down?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I'm pretty sure about that, I wish I could be more definitive about that.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Back up, just a couple, two points. The dispatchers or FAA was talking to

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dispatchers, was that communications that was direct from the Operations Center or from the Command Center in Herndon to the dispatchers?

MS. GARVEY: It's the Command Center that would be--

MR. JOHNSTONE: The Command Center was talking in the dispatchers.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So you were kind of clued in on that?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And then, when you, there was a room that you were in and you kind of understood that this was a terrorist situation?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I can't really tell you at what point we really knew that. I mean, certainly

MR. JOHNSTONE: In general, before or after the Pentagon would you say, in general, if you had to guess?

MS. GARVEY: I'd say slightly before the Pentagon.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: Before the Pentagon.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay, and--

MS. GARVEY: Just when the second plane went in, it just felt terrible, it felt all wrong, we knew it wasn't a small Cessna, we knew that couldn't happen, just, I mean. In fact, I remember going back in the car and hearing it on--that a second plane had hit and saying to myself, this, you're under attack, you're under attack.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Definitely the view by the time I got to the Command Center. I mean, to the 10th floor, that we were under attack.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So, now let's kind of get into these other--these other areas. You got into the car to go back over to the FAA. You hear on the radio, and your sense is this is not right something's wrong. You get up there, people are gathering information. You have this personal sense that, you know, until you can get it confirmed, what, kind of what was your expectation

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of what that room was supposed to be doing, what the air traffic control command center was supposed to be doing and then kind of with the Secretary and White House or was the nature of such a riotous event kind of just one of confusions?

MS. GARVEY: It was, I don't know that I reflected on what every, you know, what each person should have been doing, but what I can tell you is that even though it was extraordinarily busy, extraordinarily tense, it was still pretty calm and very professional.

People were uncertain, but there wasn't hysteria in the room. There was an intensity that I've never seen; certainly a level of concern that I had never seen, but people assumed positions; people, there was not a sense of I don't know what I'm doing. There was a sense of professional, what we need to do is find out what's happening in the system. And that was really the focus.

No one said, we're under attack. And people said here's what we know. You know, we got this call at x-time, here's--and it was clear from

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the conversation in the room that others had already been pulled in. It was always my understanding that NORAD was part of that. I know this would come to debate back and forth, I've not seen anything since the hearing, but, clearly, there were other people on the phone on the call, it was clear that it was broader than the FAA.

You know, my assumption was it was the FBI and the intelligence committees. We had people, I believe, and want to go back and check that, but it was not unusual to have people from Defense ever at the Command Center.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Well, that's an important point because--and, incidentally, there's another team, as you know, that's been working on our stuff--

MR. GIBSON Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --but I guess, it's kind of the expectation where we have a situation, where, you know there are two planes in, and the third one in, and the idea that, okay, we've got to muster our resources. You know, we don't know what

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else is going on up there. Let's find out what's happening in the system. To the extent there had to be some coordination, the expectation was that something air traffic control would do because they're to date have direct access to the dispatchers and air carriers; they have direct access to, you know, their air traffic control towers. That that's where, kind of the rubber was hitting the road with respect to, you know, notifying NORAD, although that wasn't an expectation and within the Operations Center that we've got to get on the phone to NORAD, we've got to do X, Y, Z?

MS. GARVEY: It was, no, because, again, at this point, we didn't know for sure, you know what it was, so it would ordinarily be an air traffic issue, you know, that would be the initial reaction would be let the air traffic control folks do what they need to do, but let us gather. You know, be ready, we're not sure what this is, so we need to be prepared. An that's often the case, I mean, it's--you know it was often the case that

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until it's very, very clear, I'm trying to think of something comparable and I'm afraid at this time I can't quite think of anything, but, so, initially, it really was the air traffic controllers.

But, again, remember that the air traffic controllers would have been hooked in even to the Security piece very quickly, I can't tell you exactly when, perhaps Monte could. But at what point did they get--did they immediately--or did they join the net.

And, by the way, that's not to say, and you'll hear this, and certainly, I'm sure the FAA will go over this, if they haven't already with the other team. Post-9/11, there were changes. I mean, I think the air traffic controllers did a terrific job.

Having said that, I think we, institutionally learned that we needed to tighten, you know, our lines of communication, clarify our lines of communication. I think it worked, but, like, every catastrophic event, there are always, I think a series of improvements that you can make.

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And we did that, post-9/11.

We changed the whole Operations Center. the Operations Center, the communication, not the Security side, but just the regular Ops piece, quite obviously has wonderful people in it. But not people with, perhaps, training that you'd like to see in a state of near war.

MR. RAIDT: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And--again, little hindsight issue, but with respect to, liking it to a fire department, if an alarm gets rung, you know we don't know the nature of it, but everyone has a good idea of their roles and missions.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Describe your view of kind of on that day, how you felt everyone, whether everyone understood their roles and missions. And obviously, that's been improved upon since.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But just describe--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I--I and I wasn't there, initially. I think people by the time I got

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there were very, very professional, were assuming the right roles. I am told that there was a little confusion at the beginning, there was some uncertainty. I was not in the room when, you know, the initial event occurred. So, I can't speak to that directly and perhaps Monte could, but I am told that there was some confusion, just making sure people got there as quickly as they wanted them to, and some sort of intensity and, you know, calling people up and getting them up there.

MR. RAIDT: And did you feel like everyone knew what they were supposed to do out of preplanning or out of professional, you know, instinct or kind of a combination?

MS. GARVEY: Probably a combination. Probably a combination and having them now, having said that, recognizing that there was nothing--there was no sort of--nothing in our recent past that would prepare us, that real right--

MR. JOHNSTONE: [unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: --exactly a real experience

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phase for that. You had to draw a lot on the professionalism.

MR. JOHNSTONE: We'll go ahead and take

MS. GARVEY: Cardy's greatest concern when I talked with him was that he could not quite believe that that was his plane that went into the Trade Center. He said, is that an American plane? I mean it was as though, it was just almost incomprehensible.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: He knew what the answer was, but it was--you almost had to say it. He asked what we knew. I told him what we knew at that point, which was still very little. I asked him if he had a sense of where all of his planes were. Were there concerns. He said they were pulling all of that information now. I offered him, of course, assurances that we would do everything that we could and that we ought to keep the lines of communication open.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Was there any discussion at that point or later about anything you were

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requesting him to do in terms of notifying his flights, using their ACAR system or in some other way or did you inquire of him what were they doing?

MS. GARVEY: No, at that point, I did ask him what they were going to do. He said at this point we're trying to get a read on exactly where all of our aircraft are--

MR. JOHNSTONE: He didn't elaborate on what they were doing?

MS. GARVEY: No, and I also knew that our, you know, our folks were in close communication with theirs. And that was one of the questions that I asked are we talking to the airlines? Yes, we've got them, yes, we're hooked in.

And, and in some ways, by the way, that spring/summer plan served us well. We had begun a process of every morning beginning at 5:30 in the morning calls with all the dispatchers on what was the condition of the system, what were we planning for that day and we would run conversations every two hours, so there was, a, you know, institutional kind of frame work for people to communicate and

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communicate well.

I went downstairs, Monte was in the main, at the net, taking information, gathering information. I went downstairs first, to the day care center, to make sure that parents who were collecting children who needed to, those that were going to stay behind, making sure that there was proper coverage. I remember running into and walking down, rushing down with a lawyer from the FAA who was going down to get his children. I remember telling him, be careful, you know, take them home and be careful going home.

And I stayed downstairs for not a very long period, but for a little bit of time just to make sure people were exiting carefully. There were still a number of people who were staying behind or the decision had not yet been made but just making sure that those people who had questions, many people standing in the foyer just fixed on the TVs that were there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Then after you made your rounds downstairs in the day care center--

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MS. GARVEY: Came back upstairs and called Jim Goodwin [ph] and Leo Mullen [ph] and called Goodwin, first, again, it was really just more, just really reaching out, saying, you know, we are here to keep the lines of communication open, what do you know at that that point, we're still gathering information, although he--

MR. JOHNSTONE: You did know it was United flight.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and he knew that, as well. The reason for the Leo Mullen call which occurred a little bit later in the day, a little bit later in the morning.

MR. RAIDT: So Goodwin was first?

MS. GARVEY: Yes. Was because at one point, when I went back over there, there was concern that we were not able to, we had lost contact with four other planes and I think they were all Delta, but I cannot swear to that. But I knew just a couple of them were Delta. And called Leo, same kind of conversation. Here's what we know, he was saying we are gathering information.

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He knew at that point that our folks were in very close communication with his own team. At that point, frankly, Leo was more concerned about American and United. He knew they had lost planes and they had lost passengers. And was really also inquiring after that. So they were very brief conversations, very short conversations. But just more to reach--to reach out to them.

MR. JOHNSTONE: At this point, where, you know, Delta is at a loss for other--contact with four other planes. There was a sense that we don't know what's going on.

MS. GARVEY: There was a great sense, but, yeah, that what is happening, what's going on in the airspace.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And place this generally in time, is this before 93 is reported down or--

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. JOHNSTONE: This is in the period between the Pentagon crash--o

MS. GARVEY: And the call's very, very quick, yeah.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: So the fact that I got major event going on, we don't know how extensive it is, we need to worry about what's going on in the rest of the national airspace. At what point did the deliberations start and with whom did it start about, okay, how do we respond to what we don't know? Talked about what happened, talked about closing down the airspace?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And how we address other flights?

MS. GARVEY: Exactly. And just to be clear, while new information was being gathered by the security folks, in places like Logan, quite honestly I was not focused on that at that point. I knew they were doing it. I knew that the initial read was nothing unusual that nothing unusual had occurred, but the real challenge at that point was what do we do about the airspace system.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: And the first indication was that Monte and at this point, I think I may have

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been on the phone with the Secretary's office and Tom Flaherty. The Secretary by this time had left, had gone to the White House, which is, you know, the standard procedure for him. And we were in pretty direct communication. Either he was calling over right away or we were calling him, we kept the line open so we could do that very quickly.

And I think I may have been talking to John Flaherty. And at that point, Monte said, the air traffic controllers are bringing some planes down in certain areas, obviously, focusing on the Boston/New York. We had kind of a ground stop for the Boston/New York area first. And it was pretty clear that the controllers were concerned and concerned enough to, on their own, which is, by the way what they should do, take the appropriate action at the local level. So, they were bringing down--not bringing down, that they were first of all created a ground stop and both Boston and New York.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Since--I'm sorry--

MS. GARVEY: They then sort of created what was kind of a sterile zone where they wouldn't

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let any planes into that area. So they were taking action that clearly, now as you look at them, were leading to get them all down.

MR. BRINKLEY: And it was it your sense that those decisions were being made, you know, from towers from RTs, from TRACONS or was it from Linda saying--

MS. GARVEY: It wasn't from Linda. I think it really began in, you know, it began in the centers. It began in the centers, it began at the facility. They, to their credit, I mean, obviously, checking right back in with, so it was coming into the Command Center, almost simultaneously.

MR. BRINKLEY: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: And that piece of it, by the way, I don't know that I'd ever change, because they are the closest to it. They're there. They're making those decisions, so that piece, I think was the right way to do it.

MR. BRINKLEY: They do that every day in weather?

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MS. GARVEY: Exactly. I was just going to say that, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, that's what they do.

MS. GARVEY: That's what they do. That's their job.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's their job to make this decisions, every do, no stop and I don't like this.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right, exactly. So, in my view they were doing what they should do, there was no reaction on my part about dear, God, what are they doing?

MR. BRINKLEY: The system was working?

MS. GARVEY: That's right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So, you're on the phone, you believe, with Mineta who had gone--and then somewhere Monte had notified that okay, we're making the sterile some spots here, take us from there.

MS. GARVEY: So at that point, we said to each other, we gotta bring the Secretary's office

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into this a little bit more. We've got to let him know, these guys are moving faster, probably than even we knew. So we called the Secretary's office. Actually I had gone out. And I don't even remember, there was an incident, I think just out in the hall with some folks. For some reason, I had stepped out and right at that point, the Secretary called and Monte said, we were just getting ready to call you. He said--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Was that incident outside--

MR. GIBSON No, I don't even, I think my chief of staff had phoned home and was anxious to go home, and I was telling him go ahead, you know, at that point to go ahead. He had young children and a wife who was not home and out of town, so--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That was not Bill
[unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: Right. It was not a big deal.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right let me draw on that just for a second. I mean, it's not a terribly

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important deal. But was it that concerned you is that here we are our system is in a huge emergency here and the chief is--

MS. GARVEY: I said to him, I said if you feel you need to go home, you should. He did not go home at that point. He did go home about two hours later. So he actually didn't leave right at that point, but I said, if you really feel you need to, you've got to take care of your family.

MR. JOHNSTONE: You didn't feel ill served, then?

MS. GARVEY: No, because you know, what, I really found, I mean, you know, in those situations and the way the chief of staff position at the FAA, and I think that this Administrator has a very similar. That's sort of the administrative piece. The real operations person is your Deputy. So the Chief of Staff is kind of your administrative arm, keeps the trains running on time, make sure that the paperwork is going, but your key person is for operations is Monte. But Tom did not go home, made another call, but I understand.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: All right. okay, so.

MS. GARVEY: So, at that point, Monte said to the Secretary, we really think we need to bring down, to bring down the system. But the goal is our concern where there's enough uncertainty in the system we think we need to bring the planes down. The Secretary listened, cupped his--the phone and clearly was in communication with someone else in the room, I am told it was the Vice President. I assume it was the Vice President. And he said, bring them down. Okay, bring them down.

Now, the reality is, and I think the Secretary has since acknowledged this, that the controllers were beginning to do it, as you said, Sam, they were doing their job.

And here's where there may have been, this is where the communications in the time stress are not always what you'd like them to be. The Secretary had been trying to get a clarification, said to Monte, well, they'll come down, won't they? I mean, they will come down? In other words, if you tell them they'll come down?

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And Monte being the good, by-the-book guy that he is, said well, theo--you know, he was saying--he was speaking theoretically, he said, well you know, it's always the pilots call. Because that is the rule, the pilot's the main man.

MR. JOHNSTONE: It's the international rule.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: It's his airplane.

MS. GARVEY: That's right. That's right, so he was being very precise and exact. And I think what the Secretary heard was well, we'll kind of leave it up to them, which is not what Monte meant, and he said.

MR. JOHNSTONE: did the Secretary understand that?

MS. GARVEY: I hope so, I think so, yes. Yeah. So there was a kind of a and at this point, I said, Mr. Secretary, they're all coming down, yeah, they're all coming down. God you're being so precise, but there was clearly a misunderstanding

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on--both on Monte's part on what the Secretary was really trying to get at and then when the Secretary heard it.

MR. JOHNSTONE: The Secretary had in mind, though that he must have known that, hey it is the pilot's aircraft, you know, do we have the authority to tell him to come down.

MS. GARVEY: I think he must have, or he, I think if you asked him now, he'd say, of course, I knew that the pilots. But he heard Monte say, what he heard was, and there was not a pilot in the system who didn't.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But there's no doubt in your mind Monte meant that--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, no doubt at all.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --that we will--

MS. GARVEY: No, doubt at all.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, and I think there's another thing. There's an issue of negotiation of where you come down, I 'm not.

MS. GARVEY: Well, that's true.

MR. BRINKLEY: I think that's the real

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issue is where do you want me to go. You want me to do what?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, no thank you. Or and there is that negotiation.

MR. BRINKLEY: They do talk like that, I can get here better than I can--

MS. GARVEY: Right or I'm concerned about my fuel. So, I'd rather go here, absolutely.

MR. BRINKLEY: Very seldom that I do that, I mean

MS. GARVEY: That's a good point, Sam. Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: There's runways, there's tons of things now that are going to the detail. The devil is in the details. And this guys, se the pilot is still responsible for everybody sitting behind him.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: And they're got to work, that's a whole, that's not that I won't come, it's just--

MR. JOHNSTONE: What are the technical--

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Sam this is a good time to raise the issue again, because this is where, you know, at least from the Secretary's mind, Vice President mind, your mind, everybody's mind that, okay, we've got to do whatever we can to stop any other plots that might be in the offing.

MS. GARVEY: Or we were just uncertain, we didn't know what was out there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And, again, this kind of goes back to answering the family question of--not that, you know, there's evidence it could have made a difference, but just how did the system operate, of okay, we don't know what's up there, so that's why we've got to bring them down. Let's, you know, we need to notify how the cockpits, you must secure your cockpit, don't let anybody in because you're know you're going to be a weapon of mass destruction. Was there any discussion about, you know, one doing that or who is responsibility for actually making that step?

MS. GARVEY: It was really, you know, the direction was to bring them down, and that was

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really the focus. And it was, really the controllers and the facilities, I suppose as I look at back at it now, discretion how much information they were going to give the pilot.

A number of the pilots knew what was going on, they had heard from their colleagues in other planes--

MS. GARVEY: Who had picked up some of the radio. Some of the controllers, just because of the limited amount of traffic they had in their sector might have given the pilots more information.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right.

MS. GARVEY: But honestly, we didn't do that, though, because there was a lot of concern. I was worried about Towers that we're used to getting three aircraft in a week, all of a sudden, perhaps being--we didn't know, were they going to be asked to take more--the important thing was to give clear correction to the pilots to bring the planes down. To just get to a destination as quickly as they could. And if we felt there was

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enough--to answer your question, did we give them clear orders, secure the cockpit? I know I didn't. It's probably a question worth asking Monte. whether he felt there was more discussion .

MR. BRINKLEY: The training, and I think and then this is a question in retrospect. I think, basically the training was--and we'll review this with the air traffic guys--that did not share a lot of hijacking information--

MR. GIBSON Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --to everybody else in the system, it's in the protocol.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: So, you would have remember we're already implementing protocol--we're already using their training and what they did, they're dancing with their training in this point in time.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: As they start their own initiatives. So, their protocol, it would have taken, I think, a direct requirement to override what they were inclined.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: Start using the code words.

MR. BRINKLEY: The code words and some of those things are there and they don't do that. So--

MS. GARVEY: And that's always the balance, you don't know all of the pilots, you don't know how they're going to react; how they're going to respond. But I have to, we did not have that sort of conscious discussion.

MR. BRINKLEY: Do you remember later ever going back afterwards and reviewing what happened that day, if you said, you know, maybe we should have told everybody? I mean?

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely and--

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, and reviewed that?

MS. GARVEY: --in fact, Monte did a couple of pretty intensive reviews that I was briefed on at least once or twice a week as they went through the process. Made one mistake which I will tell you about, but one was on the operations room itself. I mean, the whole operations, both the

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kind of people we had there, who we were going to have lead that room. So, we made a number of changes there. We made some changes with respect to how we notify and who notifies Defense. I mean, when the first notification, I do remember, I think it was around 8:20, I can check. But somewhere around that when the first notification went to NORAD. I mean, it essentially went at a pretty low level and that's because we had a pretty good controller who said, if I'm not going to get the right response from the NORAD supervisor or my supervisor isn't going to go get the right response, I'm going to call directly myself.

And he did, and good for him that he did. so, we clarified some of those things. People that we didn't do a good job on. And this is really one that bothers me. I don't think we documented enough of what our--you can see the results in the changes in the protocols; you can see the results in the changes and the way the operations centers works, but I'm not sure we actually wrote enough down in those months or the month or so afterward

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about what our deliberations were, what we considered. There was so much going on, not the least of which was the beginning of the standing up of the tail [unintell.] that we probably didn't do as much toward capturing--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Capturing the thoughts and rationale.

MS. GARVEY: And the rationale and what out thinking was and what the concerns were. So, in hindsight, that is another, you know, that's an area that we--well.

MR. BRINKLEY: SVTS, when did you go to the first SVTS?

MS. GARVEY: I'm going to--and this is I think it's around 11:00; I think it may have been earlier than that, though, does that sounds a little bit later. But I think it was after we we'd started to bring the planes down. But it was somewhere in that period.

And my recollection of that is it was pretty much information from each--

MR. BRINKLEY: If I remember correctly,

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everybody went around and said this is what we're doing.

MS. GARVEY: Right, this is what we're doing; this is what we know; yeah, yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Could we ask son the question of when that he planes are coming down and they're landing and your concern is, primarily, to get them down safely. And the air traffic control system, as many have said, had performed a Herculean task that day.

Was there discussion either with the FBI or anyone else about, okay, you've got, you don't really know what's going on and the four planes had crashed now. You don't know what's going on about other possible plots and all that. You bring the planes down. Is there a discussion about, okay, what do you do with them when they land. In terms of the passengers and the aircraft.

MS. GARVEY: Not in an intelligence sense. And that's an interesting observation. There had not been that. there was a sense of what do you do with the passengers and, not immediately, but

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certainly within the next several hours. What do you do with the planes, they're all in the wrong place?

The biggest concern were the passengers that were stranded in Canada. Under terribly difficult conditions. But not in a sense of should we secure--

MR. BRINKLEY: And check them--

MS. GARVEY: I'm not sure, frankly, that there would have been the resources to do that. I mean, again, in other places where the planes were landing, were probably places that I don't know, you'd have to go back and look, but were they places that even had a Security network in place or a system in place or would there have been enough FBI. We did not do that.

MR. BRINKLEY: It wasn't a subject that Lee or somebody came up--

MS. GARVEY: No, no--

MR. BRINKLEY: --and said, you know, we really need to screen--

MS. GARVEY: --no--

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MR. BRINKLEY: --try to figure out--

MS. GARVEY: --no--maybe we should keep everybody for, say 12 hours or five hours or whatever.

MR. BRINKLEY: Keep them on the plane long enough till we can get them off and frisk them and--

MR. JOHNSTONE: You wouldn't know the basis of Secretary Mineta's testimony to the Commission where he said that there were anecdotal reports that the grounding had prevented a number other plots that day, but we don't know the details and we'll never know them. I mean, I'm paraphrasing him somewhat. But that was the gist of his testimony.

MS. GARVEY: No, I had one fairly intensive briefing with the FBI post-9/11. And quite honestly, my focus shifted pretty quickly after 9/11 to one, how do we get the system up? But, then, also, what do we do, what does an agency do? How do I support the Secretary in standing up to TSA? I thought the FBI had a lot to do without

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getting a call from me to get briefed every other day.

What I did want to know, and what was often asked of our representative over there. And, frankly, I think what was a given with the FBI is anything in your investigation turning up something that you need to respond to? Are you learning anything that would cause us to either change a security directive; create a new security directive; and, in fact, there were security directives that came in place because of that sort of information. So, the lines are definitely--the communication was definitely open at that point.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And this is something that [unintell.] going to--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --let us know tactics, plots, anything that we can--

MS. GARVEY: Right, and he was there, I mean he was hearing a lot of the same things.

MR. BRINKLEY: This was post-9/11?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, that's post-9/11,

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post-9/11. And I remember--the reason I mention that is because I remember the question being asked, were there other plots and it was kind of an evasive answer, to be honest with you and I don't know if it was evasive because people didn't really know--not dissimilar from what the Secretary says, you know, it would not be--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Reservation that came from the FBI?

MS. GARVEY: The FBI, yeah. And evasive may be the wrong word, but it was an imprecise answer.

MR. RAIDT: Anything else, talk about the Executive Summary, talk--

MR. BRINKLEY: Yeah, talk about that, and then I have one other question.

MR. RAIDT: On the tactics and everything, as information was flowing in--well, where did information flow into ATS-1, about, okay, box cutters in the cars at the airport, the phone calls from flight attendants and some of the passengers to the relatives on the ground suggested knives.

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Where was that information flowing to? It's just going to you or everybody simultaneously and then, you know, this issue, I want to get to the Executive Summary and the gun issue. Were you ever apprised that there was some suggestion that a gun was involved?

MS. GARVEY: Not on 9/11. And I could not tell you exactly when, but certainly when it began to surface, maybe even through the cracks, but it began to surface and that was, really, the first time that we had--that I had heard that. I know GAO took a look at it and so forth. We, certainly went back internally; we could find no validation of that.

MR. RAIDT: We have a sequence of four documents called Executive Summary. They were prepared at FAA. The first one is dated September 11, 2001--

MS. GARVEY: Yep, we would get these--

MR. RAIDT: This one is dated September 12, though at the bottom is it was actually prepared in the afternoon of the 11th. And we've

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received testimony earlier that these summaries were prepared for you and the senior leadership--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: --in a working center set up on the third floor where--whose goal was to write down

MR. JOHNSTONE: --[unintell.] lot of grunt work downstairs, while you were doing the nets and stuff like that.

MS. GARVEY: Exactly.

MR. RAIDT: Did you--do you recall receiving these at any point on the 11th or seeing them afterwards?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, we received many of them.

MR. RAIDT: Oh, okay.

MS. GARVEY: I mean, we would receive them quite frequently.

MR. RAIDT: You received many of these?

MS. GARVEY: Well, sort of summaries of what was happening. I mean, there was a lot of information and really got your information, I

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guess, essentially, in two ways. I mean, there were the sort of oral briefings that you'd get from the Security people, sometimes a couple times a day. And then the Executive Summaries that would come in, like, quite frequently, I'm trying to remember if it was as often as once a day--but--

MR. RAIDT: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: --we'd get.

MR. RAIDT: And if you'd look at the second paragraph of, that one's more readable, but it's basically the same information--it's the one you were looking at is more legible.

MS. GARVEY: Okay.

MR. RAIDT: It's essentially the same information. And this is the second document which is the 5:31 on 9/11 document.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. RAIDT: Which contains accounts of, mainly, things happening on American 11.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right, and I'm sure I saw it, whether I actually saw it on the 12th or a day or so after--

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MR. RAIDT: Well, here is the same document that was prepared on the following day, it's the next in a sequence.

MS. GARVEY: Well, they both say September 12.

MR. RAIDT: Yes, if you look at the bottom line there--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I see.

MR. RAIDT: --you can see and they say that this one was, in fact, produced on the 11th, even though it's dated the 12th, so this one precedes the one that you're looking at now. But in the second paragraph, the information is basically the same.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. RAIDT: Which does relate a report from Ms. Clark at American about the gun.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: And has some information about reported bombs on the flight. Do you recall seeing those?

MS. GARVEY: I'm sure I did see them. I

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mean, I really, saw most of them. What I can't tell you is whether I actually saw it on September 12.

MR. RAIDT: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: And it may have been that I was relying more on the oral briefings at this point.

MR. JOHNSTONE: But you did see one that talked about the gun? And we spent a lot of time--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, yeah, I'm sure I did, but I can't tell you, John, is whether I saw that before or after some of the questions were raised and I went back and may have looked at this again.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask a quick question on that, then, because we've been doing our own inquiries and interviews on that--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: --and between us, I mean, it's not turning over anything--

MS. GARVEY: New.

MR. RAIDT: --particularly new, although we think we've pinpointed how it is that this story

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got in the system.

MS. GARVEY: Okay.

MR. RAIDT: But, was there any discussion that you recall with respect to that Executive Summary or all three things that John or Bob said that either from the air carriers or within FAA that said, hey, that's a whole different ball game, if we're getting into the area of prohibited items, the guns and things that were detectable, you know, the air carriers are at great risk--the FAA is at great risk of, you know, public criticism, that type of thing. I mean, the question again that always raises a suspicion is right or wrong was an Executive Summary. And, then, you know, John Flaherty kicks in and just says, hey, you know--

MS. GARVEY: Right, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: --this is a huge allegation, check that out and then it disappears.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. RAIDT: But there could be very good reasons why that happened, but was there a feeling that, boy, this--this put us and the system at risk

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as opposed to what are the facts.

MS. GARVEY: Right. No, I mean, I would have been naturally horrified if that were the case. But I don't ever remember anyone, you know, anyone saying to me, you know, God, this is horrible. What I do remember is, look there's been a report of a gun is that accurate? How would we have gotten a report like that and the discussion that, look, these things are being pulled together at a lower level; they're getting it from lots of sources. [unintell.], as Condee Rice says, created some confusion. And, frankly, that made eminent sense, particularly having been 9/11 when we were hearing about, you know, the plane going down in Ohio.

And when I went to the FBI, which was sometime, I believe, in October, there was no mention of a gun. They showed us--this may be classified, so I'll just be careful about that, it may not be.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's all right if it's up to the Secret level we can handle it here--

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MS. GARVEY: Okay.

MR. BRINKLEY: --we're all actually cleared at the ES level, but--

MS. GARVEY: All right, I mean, they certainly showed a number of pictures of things that they found and there was certainly no discussion of guns, no evidence of that; not--things that I've not seen reported in the press, but were not--

MR. RAIDT: Just to give you a chance, because I want to read from your testimony on this point before. And just relate it--first in direct response to a question you said that you had, quote, "no evidence with respect to the use of guns, bombs, or box cutters," but then you added, "there was a report--quote, "there was a report that at one point surfaced, and it may have been even part of a written report, but it surfaced from somewhere in the field. It may have been from American Airlines in particular that spoke about a gun." Would this--would these documents have been the written report that you were recalling?

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MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I mean, if I saw anything, it would have been this.

MR. JOHNSTONE: An then with respect to other weapons or tactics, did you ever hear anything from the FBI or from your internal people about other tactics, such as riding in the jump seat; or having, you know, pilots uniforms or any other tactic that--

MS. GARVEY: The Secretary had received a report about a uniform that had been shredded in a hotel room in France. And the pilot's, all the pilot's identification was stolen, this was post-9/11. And there was tremendous concern about that. In fact, I think the Secretary mentioned it a couple of times publicly. It turned out to be a fabrication. And it turned out that the flight attendant had shredded the uniform himself, because of difficulties he was having and so forth and so on. So, that was the one that I remember created a great deal of concern. I did not hear and no, nothing from the FBI.

In fact, what I found interesting with the

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FBI is that there were a number of things found at the scene that could have been used as a weapon, that were very harmless. I mean, theoretically, letter opener; but we've never heard, you know, and, again, it was just sort of showing pictures of what was on display there.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Mainly at the Pentagon and at Pennsylvania?

MS. GARVEY: Right, Pennsylvania.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Then you didn't see any evidence from--

MS. GARVEY: No, what--and even a very small, a very thin, you know, piano wire had been used in one way. And that, I mean, it just made you realize how, if somebody is determined to do that, how even the most mundane articles could be--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right, become weapons.

MS. GARVEY: --become weapons.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: But I heard nothing about the jump seat.

MR. BRINKLEY: Let's talk about the jump

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seat just a tad, procedurally.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: And we're trying to run this to ground. There's been the reports that--essentially reports that a number of the--some of the hijackers my have actually used jump seats--gotten into jump seats and flown some. Now, whether the--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Before 9/11.

MR. BRINKLEY: Before 9/11.

MS. GARVEY: In commercial air flights?

MR. BRINKLEY: Yes.

MS. GARVEY: Really?

MR. BRINKLEY: Yes, and so, we're trying to--talk to us about, now we're not sure if that was true or not. But the question is, talk to me about--what is the procedure to get jump seat authority? I mean, just because you show up in--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: --a uniform and it looks like, you know, another--I mean, there's got to be reports. I mean we know that uniforms can be

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bought, they can be stolen, they can be lost at the cleaners--

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

MR. BRINKLEY: What is the process and who can--and who watches that stuff in FAA?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, yeah. A lot of that is watched by Flight Standards. I mean, for example, the controllers like the jump seat and would, certainly, use the jump seat privilege and that is the sort of professional argument is that they need to understand it. And then, there is an argument to be said for that. The flip side is that, as Ken has pointed out in one of his very early reports to me that it was also used as a convenient way to get to vacation spots and so forth. So, you know, like many good things, it can be abused. Right, and it was with the FAM program, with the Familiarization Program as we knew it. So we actually had to suspend it for a period of time and worked with the IG and came up with a series of changes that the controllers needed to go through.

For flight inspectors, I think we didn't

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see nearly that kind of abuse, but it was often the same principle of riding in the jump seat, just to familiarize themselves with the aircraft and so forth.

But there are procedures that people have to go through. You can't just show up. You have to have, you know, a special authorization that's given to, you know, that's given to the individual. Between airlines, I probably want to get more clarification from the FAA. The airlines, themselves, would often--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Recognize their colleagues?

MS. GARVEY: Right, their fellows--that's right their colleagues and, I suppose, theoretically, if they had a pilot's license and there was a spare seat or whatever. My experience with the airlines is they were more apt to dead-head and not use the jump seat. But they could, they could use the jump seat. And, in fact, post-9/11, I think a number of the pilots raised that concern of not, actually, I think it was just

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the opposite of not wanting to go back using the jump seat much. So we had a period of time when it was not being used. I don't know what the status is now, but how the individual colleague, the colleague between the airlines, how that was regulated, I think you'd want to go back to the FAA and clarify that a little bit.

MR. BRINKLEY: See if we had regs, and then, of course, how the airlines did--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean I would assume a few pieces, how we regulated it or not or had--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --or how we allowed the--or how they treated it among themselves.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, among themselves. exactly. And I think there is a--there's still, again, a bit of a contradiction between wanting to allow the crew to move quickly and easily, even through the system as it is now. And then, also recognizing, as you pointed out, Sam, that it is possible to steal a uniform and that just showing

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up in a uniform may not be enough.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's sort of my last, from my perspective. I just--I want to talk a little bit about the follow-on SDs [ph]. Obviously, somewhere in this process, we're going to turn this system back on. Before we can turn it on, we need these guys, we're looking at what SDs did we have to put in place to--before we'll flip the switch on letting them fly.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

MR. BRINKLEY: How did--I mean, how intimate were you with that process and how and how did you talk with the carriers about determining what we're going to do and what we're not going to do?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah. Both Monte and I were briefed pretty regularly on what the changes were going to be. Some were obvious, like the no knives, which was an interesting conversation with the CEOs, but some were obvious, like the no knives; no curbside checks; the re-enforcement, some kind of re-enforcement of the cockpit door.

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Some came about as we learned more, again, through the whole FBI process. Some were more controversial than others. Airports had a lot, particularly small airports had a lot of difficulty with the 300-foot rule. But, while I think both Monte and I relied on the professionals who were working with the FBI to come to us with their suggestions or with the notions or the ideas that they had--and we were briefed very regularly on them--

MR. RAIDT: The professionals within FAA?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, within FAA, but also knowing that they were bringing in, you know, the FBI, they were basing it on intelligence. There was not the notion that we were going to say this is what you ought to do.

The Rapid Response Teams, I'm not sure that they actually produced, thinking about it, the recommendations that came out of it, I don't think necessarily resulted in SDs, but they certainly resulted in actions that we were going to take. For example, changing the crew training; the

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re-enforcement of the cockpit door, was sort of more of a time line, in 90 days, to get it done.

So, some of those may have actually turned up in an SD, but they all resulted in actions that we needed to take. So, we got briefed pretty regularly.

MR. JOHNSTONE: What was you--what was the interesting conversation with the CEOs on--

MS. GARVEY: Well, I just, one I've seen reported, but I never felt it myself, but it was questioning whether getting rid of the knives, what would we do about first-class?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Oh, for silverware?

MR. RAIDT: For silverware.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, sort of left meat loaf, I think is really the answer isn't it?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Yeah, pretty easy answer to that question.

MS. GARVEY: And, actually, in fairness it was just once--and I think the others kind of groaned. I think it was kind of like an initial kind of without thinking kind of reaction.

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MR. BRINKLEY: When you started briefing them on the Sds, did you get any push-back?

MS. GARVEY: I think--I did not get push back. We were pretty clear and the Secretary was involved and a number of those conversations were pretty clear that, look, we're going to be making some changes.

And, at that point, I think people were--there were two things that were occurring: One is they really wanted the system up again. You know, when you have those first conversations. And, secondly, they did realize the severity of it. I mean this was--this was pretty horrendous. And I remember one very difficult conversation the Secretary had with the CEOs where he sort of banged the table and said, do you realize what's happened? You know, do you realize? And they finally, you know, this was two or three days into it. We had conversations with them the first night. And I think the second night sort of on their own and they were fine. They were, I mean, again, I think it was the severity of the moment.

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And the desire to get it up.

Having said that, of course, with each passing month, and as more and more SDs were coming out, there was, at the Security Director's level, I think, some questioning of what we were doing. Some questioning whether these were the right things or it was really a waste of time. And to some degree, I understand that. I mean, some of this was we were--we didn't have a lot of options at the time and a lot of things we could do very quickly. So there was, there were certainly some, including, perhaps, the 300-foot rule for some of the small airports. That, you know, we put it in quickly, we said, let's get it in and then we'd re-examine.

So there were some difficulties, yes, with the Security Directors. I think there was also, in the beginning, some communication problems. Where we were moving fast and, perhaps, the right and amount from the airlines perspective of outreach to prepare people for it wasn't there. But, those things happen. It is essentially my view of that.

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MR. BRINKLEY: Well, we did have one interviewee, basically, that said they had an SD they drafted downstairs, came upstairs, now, and upstairs, did that person mean, basically, you? Now, I'm not sure if it meant you, it could have been Monte. But basically that the interviewee indicated, the testimony was, the original SD came up and it came back downstairs and it said you guys gotta water this down--this isn't--

MR. RAIDT: We were told this was on the day of 9/11.

MR. BRINKLEY: Yeah, this was the original on that started--

MR. JOHNSTONE: After a consultation with the airlines, that was the--

MR. BRINKLEY: Yeah, and the allegation was that after consultation with the airlines they came back down and said this is too harsh. And I mean, we have that, there's a data for it. So, do you recall--

MS. GARVEY: I do remember--I do remember a very, when the first SD, and I don't remember

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that it actually came to me, I'm not sure it even got that far. But that the initial reaction is, we put everything on the table. We put everything and then we, that is the FAA and that--and I can't remember which element--I would be surprised if anyone said water it down. I would not be surprised--

MR. BRINKLEY: That was the description.

MS. GARVEY: --right, and I would not be surprised if someone went back and said we need to make sure that all this really makes sense; meaning we need to make sure we can do all of this. Sometimes there was actually the implementation of it. And I'd want to think a little bit more about which elements of it and how, I don't think the actual SD, but we did go through an exercise, really, of just sort of laying down, not in an SD but in a piece of paper saying what are all the things that we need to do. And some were deferred [ph] to slightly later. I'd be, and I should go back, even for my own memory just to look at what was taken out--

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MR. RAIDT: Do you recall--

MS. GARVEY: --and see how significant it was.

MR. RAIDT: --do you recall any modifications based on input from the airlines that day?

MS. GARVEY: I don't remember that it was really based on the airlines input, I really don't. I don't know whether Monte had conversations with folks, I don't recall him saying that.

MR. BRINKLEY: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: I mean, I do think there was an issue of also trying to be fair about it, too. But I'd like to take a look at it to see what was either deferred or deleted.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, if you could clear that with us whenever you get a chance, that would be helpful.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Just one quick question, you had said that you felt like one of the deficiencies when you looked back was not documenting the changes in looking back. More

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specifically, since there were so many elements of FAA between headquarters and then the regional offices, the [unintell.] all the air traffic control facilities, I mean we're dealing with an enormous number of auspices that had some input or, maybe, had communications with the aircraft. Was there an individual at FAA headquarters that, okay, let's get in everyone's stories into one central spot? Or was that seen as the FBI's job, or would, take us through that a little bit. I know, it wasn't documented to the extent that you would like to have. But was there an effort made to try to bring everybody's story together?

MS. GARVEY: Sometimes, there was an effort made. And, as a matter of fact, just, even, from a practical point of view, the opening up of the airspace system and, in particular the opening up of Reagan National involved all of the players being at the table. So, it was not unusual for us to begin the day with a meeting with all the key players, end the day with a meeting of all the key players.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: Mm-hmm.

MS. GARVEY: And, for example, and Lynne would be a great one to talk to about this. But, for example, opening up Reagan National. First of all we had to hear--Air Traffic had to hear from Security what were the measures that they felt were necessary. Security was--but then, Air Traffic had a whole series of things that they had to do to make sure that, okay, they could respond to that, including, by the way, talking to the Secret Service, about some of the provisions that the Secret Service cared about.

When it came to crew training, for example, that involved AVR as well as Security. There was really, there were none of these issues that could be dealt with even by Security in isolation or very, very few.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And it's absolutely important for it to get on the record, I guess the first of my question is a little bit different, inasmuch as, for instance, all air traffic control centers that had contact with the aircraft or the

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air carriers, was there an effort to say, everybody who had some connection to the flights--

MS. GARVEY: I know what you're saying.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --tell your story and then we want everything in here so we can put something--

MS. GARVEY: I don't think we did that well. And the reason--I'm basing that more on my recent readings of the press reports of what the Commission has tried to get from it. From what I understand, I actually called Shirley Miller because I was pretty horrified to see--and I said, how did this happen? And she said, you know, we actually thought we had everything, but you know there are facilities out there and we didn't push hard enough.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Mm-hmm.

MS. GARVEY: You know, she said, we've got to get it--we'll get it and she said, she thought they'd get it quickly, but--

MR. RAIDT: Culturewise with respect to FAA why, I mean, on something of such enormity to

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everybody, you know, that if, particularly now, I mean, and realize that there were other parties of getting the system safe and addressing looking forward and that the FBI was investigating. You know, I think we all agree it would have been important to do such a thing. You've been very candid that, you know, that you wished there had been more documentation.

But in the aftermath, how is it that you think that that type of--culturewise--that people would say, well, we've got these files bearing on our communications with the aircraft and what happened that day, you know, that it wouldn't dawn on somebody at these centers that this might be important not only for headquarters but to the Commission?

MS. GARVEY: I think post-, sort of pre-Commission, but post-9/11, I think people really believed that they did have the most significant documents, that the Command Center had such--and we have made some changes which gave the Command Center more prominence into that. And I

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think we probably, honestly believed that we had the necessary information and that anything that might be in the field might even be redundant. I'm supposing here because, certainly, we've asked that, you know, I'm sure they've had enough briefings and I know Monte had probably even more than I did on sort of what happened and what occurred, even in preparation for some of the hearings we were going through that.

And I think we believed we had all the relevant information. Sort of post-Commission, I think there's a little bit in talking with Shirley, I think there may be a little bit of folks have gotten involved in a new Administration and a whole bunch of new issues and they may not have focused on it, quite as much as say, Shirley Miller, might have wanted them to focus on it.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right.

MS. GARVEY: And I think--

MR. JOHNSTONE: They are now ?

MS. GARVEY: They are now, yeah. But there is sometimes in big bureaucracies and I

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certainly have learned this, you know, it's always like the question you were asked--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Right.

MS. GARVEY: --and you hope that people understand that the question you ask, if you haven't asked exactly the right one, then, you know--but if you haven't asked it, you may not get always the right information. I've had a little bit of experience with the FAA on that.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Anything else.

MR. BRINKLEY: I know we want a change in the recommendation.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Before that, that's such a perfect segue, is there anything with respect to 9/11 or beforehand that we should have asked that we didn't or that you think it's critical that we know for our mandate or maybe something you prepared yourself to talk about that we didn't ask?

MS. GARVEY: No, and I'll tell you, if you're asking, primarily for the Commission or are you asking more do I think we should have done something?

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MR. JOHNSTONE: Either way.

MS. GARVEY: You know, I've thought a lot about, you know, should the FAA have done things differently. What should we have done differently. And it's always, I think a little bit easier to respond to and there's probably no one in government who doesn't say, gosh, we should have paid more attention; we should have done this and I think if you ask any agency, they will tell you that.

It is though, most evident with the beauty of hindsight. When I now look at here some of the things, and forget that it was in the midst of a whole bunch of information and, you know, so, it's been a hard question for me to come to a good solid answer on.

I feel we did a very good job knowing what we knew. I believe there were lots of areas where we could have done even more, you know. The Red Team is one example where, you know, Ken, in his report--and he and I talked a lot as he was doing that, mostly again to say, what am I missing here,

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give me some help. And one of the things he had made the point, which I think is a very good one, is just even circling back to people and letting them know what you're done with recommendations. What ones were implemented and what ones that may have been started. Lynne recognized that even before the IG, when she came in. She did a first briefing on that. She said, in hindsight, she should have done, you know, more. She did one thing with the Red Team when she brought them in and said, I want you guys to know about the work that you've done and what changes we've made because of that.

So, there are those sorts of actions. In total, I think we responded well to what we understood the threat to be.

In terms of the Commission, I guess, my greatest and this is, I'm going to be maybe more candid than I should be. I guess I feel we have a lot riding on your, you know, on your sense of looking at it and recognizing that hindsight will lead you one place, but I think one of the great

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challenges you must have, among many is putting yourself into what it was like, as you said in the very beginning, John, what was the tenor of the times, where were we? And I think that's a great challenge as you sort through all of the information that you're getting.

I think I'm running out of steam. I don't feel like I'm being articulate anymore.

MR. JOHNSTONE: One of the things, though, and we're looking at one of the things that concerns us, actually is not just to tell the story fairly in the tenor of the times, One could argue you may get too many dots to connect, not enough dots to connect.

MS. GARVEY: Gets back to sometimes too much data but not enough information, exactly, yes.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And a system that allows you to work that. And that might be--with that comes--okay, if that's a fairly, I mean, I don't want to say it's a common, flaw, but it's a recognized problem for a lot of bureaucracies.

Is recommendations, our real challenge, we

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have the fairness issue of telling the story --and getting the facts right. At the same time, it's where--we now have to figure out from now, what am I going--what are we going to recommend to the American people to try to mitigate prevent or mitigate this from happening again.

So, now, you've been at DOT for a number of years. And so, we're not just--we have to be not only somewhat clairvoyant to defend the aviation system but the entire transportation security system. So, given your experiences and time in DOT, what do you think?

What are your recommendations?

MS. GARVEY: Well, the first one I'm going to make is probably one you've heard before and that is--and I think it's particularly, Sam, because of what you just said, this is not just about aviation. But one can only imagine what the TSA is beginning to wrestle with in terms of ports and containers and so forth.

The whole basis of good intelligence and how is that intelligence shared, probably in a much

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more institutional and systematic way than we've done it in the past. How are we set up to gather--well, first, to gather the intelligence and then to share the information. And I think that's really critical.

And it probably needs to be--and I don't know how it should be. I mean, I have no idea how it should be institutionalized, but, I mean, clearly, somehow, whether it's within the FBI or whether it's within the CIA or whether it's someplace separate. But someplace that really has all of the relevant information. So that an agency or the affected industry is hearing from, you know, in a sense one entity. So, I think that's a very big one.

I think, secondly, clarifying the roles and responsibilities is something that we have not fully done yet. We alluded a little earlier to the notion that there may be a sense that the airlines can walk away from this now. And, obviously, that's not the case. But even with that, what's the role of the airports? I think there's some

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tension now between the TSA and the airports.

MR. RAIDT: Do you have any--do you want to elaborate on how--

MS. GARVEY: Well, you know, this is interesting, because in some ways it's counterintuitive to the idea of having an established TSA that is sort of omnipresent and responsible for everything. But I think you could--and I haven't given it enough thought--but I think you really could carve out a role for the airports that would not give the TSA, for example, all the responsibilities for the perimeters and for some of their airports that they know so well.

I mean, when you look at the way local authorities are set up--we've got local police--it's not the FBI that's doing everything, there is a real, you know, sort of local presence and local responsibilities.

MR. RAIDT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GARVEY: So, I think that there is a role that airports can play.

MR. RAIDT: Let's talk about airlines.

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MR. JOHNSTONE: What do you think about going back to the previous system--where they own the security, I mean, they had the five pilot programs through the five levels, Cat X, Cat 1, Cat 2, that's still privatized. I mean.

MS. GARVEY: Would you have the airlines own it?

MR. JOHNSTONE: There's a school of thought that says, regulate them and really hold them accountable.

MS. GARVEY: Well, that's, you see, actually if you go back to where we were. And this does not put me instead with where the Congress ended up. But, I think you can have them. The question is, is there federal control? Is there federal control as opposed to does it have to be a federal officer?

MR. RAIDT: It seems to be the emerging thinking around Dulles that what about private screeners under contract with the federal government?

MS. GARVEY: Exactly.

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MR. RAIDT: Contractual arrangement.

MS. GARVEY: It's a contractual arrangement, we have that all the time in aviation. I mean, the issue is, is it wholesale/retail, you know or what kind of a relationship is it with the screeners. Where I thought we had difficulties is because we were, you know, we were more wholesale--we were up here and we had the airlines in-between. And so, it's the full, I think control being able to really manage that from a control point of view.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask you for your reaction or recommendation and by very brutally honest about it is that I mean, you have one school of thought that's saying that when you take the screening role away from the air carriers, the it further indemnifies them against lawsuits that you take away a very powerful hammer. I think Mary Scallo [ph] and others would say. And I think there's something to that.

MS. GARVEY: Sure, sure.

MR. RAIDT: That one way to address that

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is to call on through the bully pulpit are recommendations for boards of air carriers to have a committee on security. You know, you've got people walking looking with their audits and executive compensation and everybody has it. Does that make--you've worked a lot with the air carriers, does that make a sense? Is security represented on their boards to a point where it gets built into a system as opposed to--

MR. BRINKLEY: The board of directors have to have a security subcommittee to be active--

MS. GARVEY: Right to be effective, and they don't now. Yeah, that's an interesting notion. It certainly creates a higher visibility and brings in the real directors.

MR. BRINKLEY: And if we were--one of the things that we're bound to do is we want to make sure that any recommendation that is made is vetted well. And thought through and--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I'd like to think about that, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: If you can identify, maybe,

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a couple of people in the air carrier world that may be outside of their corporate structure now who could give us some good candid dispassionate advice on whether that is workable.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I wonder about Ed Soliday, do you know, I mean do you know Ed Soliday at all? Ed was Captain Ed Soliday was at United. He's very, very straightforward.

MR. BRINKLEY: How do you spell that?

MS. GARVEY: S-o-l-i-d-a-y, I actually think I have his number. Have you talked to Arnie Barnett [ph], too, at MIT, he was very big on the Bag Match, Dr. Arnie Barnett. Let me think about that. Ed can be a bit inflammatory, but--

MR. RAIDT: Well, that doesn't rule us out talking to him--we've talked to plenty--

MS. GARVEY: I will tell you the one, I'm still a little bit hesitant about getting them back, I want them on the hook, but I haven't figured out--

MR. RAIDT: And how.

MS. GARVEY: --how, because I still get

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concerned that even if they are supervising it, if they're connected to it at all that their mission is.

MR. BRINKLEY: The question is, how to engineer it in. We're back to the--

MS. GARVEY: We're back to the engineering, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: How do you engineer it into the system if they're not part of the system.

MS. GARVEY: If they don't own it?

MR. BRINKLEY: Or they don't own it. I understand, I don't have the answer.

MS. GARVEY: No.

MR. BRINKLEY: One of the things a number of years ago, for example, was to talk about to put, create, for lack of a better word, a non-profit security.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, yes, Bob Crandall [ph],

MR. BRINKLEY: We said, uh, uh, uh, and they owned, they're getting the money in their tickets. And if you took 600 million tickets at \$10 a crack. If I can't run security in America

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off that amount of billions of dollars.

MS. GARVEY: It might be worth looking at that recommendation.

MR. BRINKLEY: It is hugely--

MS. GARVEY: The last [unintell.] of authority [unintell.]

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean they're hung. I mean, they're into this, I mean, they're having--and you create this board of directors, not only are you requiring their corporate boards, but you create this overall board of directors of government and private to regulate it, to oversee it.

MR. JOHNSTONE: It's kind of like that accounting standards board where it's--

MR. BRINKLEY: Yes, so the question is how do you pull them all back in and they all you can't take anybody out of the system that way. Nobody gets a free ride.

MS. GARVEY: Right, I mean, there's certainly--

MR. BRINKLEY: I don't know the answers.

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MS. GARVEY: --they're certainly on ramp control, which I think is still an area that needs a lot of--access control--

MR. BRINKLEY: Access control--

MS. GARVEY: Those are certainly elements where, even if the feds stayed directly with the screeners, there's the baggage handlers, there's the ramp guys--

MR. BRINKLEY: That's right, you've still got SIDA [ph] issues and SIDA challenges and all the issues associated, if there involved in it up to their necks--

MS. GARVEY: That they'd really have to take more a role in--

MR. JOHNSTONE: And what about this issue that no matter where it is, we're still going to have this imperfect screening system. And you put your finger on it immediately about the fact that we look to crew training as the big layer that--people are going to get through. Now, how are they going to get through and succeed in the cabin? And, yes, we have FAM, what about the idea

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that now that the air carriers have been relieved of the screening layer that they put a lot more attention, time, and money into that layer, start training flight attendants--

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely, that's a great idea.

MR. JOHNSTONE: --wh--

MS. GARVEY: I mean, frankly, that's and you're going to get and I'm sure you already have, a lot of support from Pat Friend [ph]. Did you see that in the recent reauthorization bill, Northwest changed, got changed from Shell to May and Pat Friend is very, very--she called me about that, very concerned about that, on training. And that to me, I mean, you're right. Passengers think differently now, and even just given the--

MR. BRINKLEY: But one of the things that we thought, and like to get your impression on this, is that the way the system is built and I always have to draw it and these guys have seen this, like 50 times and I apologize. Is we always build things like this. These are the security

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circles that you start all the way out here at the airport edge and you have any and you have screening and you end up having--this will be the FAMS and the on-board kind of stuff.

But we know, that through inspections that's the way you usually see it drawn. What we really know is that they don't look like that. They look like this.

MR. RAIDT: So, they're not perfect?

MR. BRINKLEY: They're not perfect, they have deficiencies and defectiveness in them.

MS. GARVEY: Isn't that interesting, yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: This is how they really are.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, that's true.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because this is somewhat percentage; and this has some percentage of effectiveness an this has some percentage of effectiveness. The bad guys went through like this, because they were able to observe it and watch it and it was static.

MS. GARVEY: That's the other piece, too,

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isn't it?

MR. BRINKLEY: It's randomness, it has to be movable, it has to be not observable. And it gets back to engineering. Then you got, how much time do you have to be there to get, so you can get through this, so you can get on the airplane, so you can push tack on time. And so, and they're diametrically opposed.

The randomness is that it is diametrically opposed to the predictability of push back and take off and landings on time. And this is an unknown out here, and the only way you'll get the whole system to work is it has to all be built in together to include where the bags come in sideways.

This always--and I don't, this is my point about it's never been looked at--

MS. GARVEY: From a systems--

MR. BRINKLEY: --from a systems approach. So, and how do you build in this randomness and still maintain the overall systems predictability?

MR. JOHNSTONE: Can I follow up on that,

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Sam, because you testified a recommendation, you said that for the future, we need to increase the layering of the aviation security system and make security measures more unpredictable to the enemy. And I'm just on this point.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Could you elaborate? I mean, do you have any?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, well, frankly, I mean, that's, it's also, and I think it's another Brian Jenkins' quote, when he talked about the veils of secrecy between it. And that it has to be random and unpredictable, because you can't, I mean, you're absolutely right, it's too easy for a terrorist to spend time and these are the folks who are willing to spend years and--

MR. BRINKLEY: Watching the system.

MS. GARVEY: --watching. And so, you have to keep changing, you have to make it random. And one of the concerns, and I've, again, because I don't want to be. I don't want to be critical. But I have not yet seen our of TSA--and it may be

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that they've just been so dedicated to getting these deadlines met--but I've not yet seen what a systems approach really means. What is the security system ten years from now or five years from now?

And I've actually acted because I'm spending a day a week at MIT and said to my colleagues out there, do you guys have any ideas for what a systems approach really looks like? I mean, how do you start from the time somebody makes an inquiry about a ticket to the time he or she gets to his or her destination?

MR. BRINKLEY: But you have to have some basic fundamental principles of security embedded into the system--

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --to do that. You have to actually have an understanding of the basic security principles so that you can then figure out how it ought to look and how technology changes and what to spend money in R&D on and how you--

MS. GARVEY: Right, and we're not there.

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MR. BRINKLEY: I don't--I'm a little like you, I haven't seen that.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: But I mean, those are the--we're looking at those types of recommendations on trying to make something that--whether it's legislative authorities; whether it's roles and responsibilities, you can cajole people to do, basically sign up for; whether it's some very specific near-term things that can improve the system more efficiently and effectively now, in the near term with a view of the long term; and the relationship, of these pieces. And then, of course, from that is how to transfer those into the other segments into the five modes of transportation.

MS. GARVEY: Do you--

MR. BRINKLEY: And I have one other thought.

MS. GARVEY: No, I was just going to ask if you feel as though Israel has done that well? Do they have a systems approach? Is there any place

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in the world that has a systems approach?

MR. BRINKLEY: When you only have that few airplanes, the answer's, yes, but it--they can [unintell.] profile, they don't have civil liabilities issues--civil liberties issues, they just--

MR. JOHNSTONE: One main airport.

MR. BRINKLEY: No, as you know, no El Al airplane spends [unintell.].

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: So, the best answer is that's easy. It's not, it's actually not a model. Too many people look at it as a model and it is not.

MS. GARVEY: It's not a model for us?

MR. BRINKLEY: It is not a model. One question I have for you in thought for a recommendation is: risk-management. How did you--a systems approach to risk-management? I mean, you've got a finite amount of resources; you've got, I mean, you've got four or five--there's three basic principles in risk

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management and that's figuring out the threat; figuring out what your capability/vulnerabilities are and weighing out what the consequences are and you sort of figure out.

Because in the end, there's a lot of policy and there's a lot of politics and there's a lot of other issues associated with this process.

Did you have a risk-management process inside FAA or if you had to think about that would you do it, maybe, to have a systems approach to that?

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I think that's definitely in the area where there could be more robustness. I mean, I don't think--partly, I don't think that we, as an agency, we did it, perhaps, more intuitively and maybe based more on the professional expertise that we had. But is there and it was better. I mean, the data analysis was far better, which gave you, I think a more robust approach to risk management. But I think that could be an area. In fact, I just made a note to myself to ask some of the MIT folks what have they

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seen in risk management.

MR. BRINKLEY: Great.

MS. GARVEY: And, again, I think we're a little further along in the area of safety because we've had more experience and longer experience.

MR. BRINKLEY: But you've got a lot of mechanical business, there.

MS. GARVEY: That's right--

MR. BRINKLEY: Because you've got [unintell.]

MS. GARVEY: Exactly, they argue about that standards, you got it.

MR. BRINKLEY: But you've got a standard and you can figure out whether you want a duplicate or a non-duplicate based upon when it breaks. Security doesn't have that sort of rigor to it mechanical--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --on hydraulic failures or systems failures, so how do you, I mean, some of it is intellectual, I mean, human factors failures that are embedded in this process.

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MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: You can do it in the safety side, because, anecdotally, along with mechanical failures, you can look at some ability at times to be duplicative on the mechanical side because you know of the human factors failures.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRINKLEY: And you can sort of weigh that out with experiences. On the security side, on the threat side, and in an evolving, warning threat--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. BRINKLEY: --who has patience to observe and whatever, it becomes a little more difficult.

MS. GARVEY: More challenging.

MR. BRINKLEY: More challenging, much more challenging. So, maybe some thoughts on--

MS. GARVEY: I will, I'll give some thoughts. I have a list of five questions, which I'm not going to remember right now, but I know I used to sort of keep [unintell.] rules and so

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forth, I'm going to e-mail you those.

MR. BRINKLEY: Great.

MS. GARVEY: And if it's all right with you, I will follow-up with some of my MIT colleagues and see if they have anything.

MR. BRINKLEY: Please do.

MR. RAIDT: And your thoughts on the rulemaking process.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: We are open for business. We're open for ideas. We would hate to be limited to only the brain cells in this room.

MR. RAIDT: God help us.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DAVID CANNOLES

BY

JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 Commission

MILES KARA, 9/11 Commission

DANA HYDE, 9/11 Commission

JEFF BROWN, 9/11 Commission

DAVID WIEGAND, FAA Counsel's Office

Thursday, March 25, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's March 25 and we're at the FAA Headquarters about to begin an interview with Dave Cannoles. I'm John Azzarello of Team 8, 9/11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9/11 Commission.

MS. HYDE: Dana Hyde, 9/11.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9/11 Commission.

MR. WIEGAND: David Wiegand, FAA Counsel's Office.

MR. CANNOLES: Dave Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave, thanks for taking the time to come and meet with us today. I'd like to actually start off by having you give us a brief overview--a brief overview of your career in the FAA in terms of various positions you've held leading up to 9/11. And then a little more detail of the position you held on 9/11 and the duties and responsibilities attended at that position.

MR. CANNOLES: And I'll be as brief as I can. I'm celebrating my 33rd year with FAA. I started out as an Air Traffic Controller;

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progressed through the ranks of staff and supervisory positions; became a facility manager of Erie, Pennsylvania; later, Newark, New Jersey; came through a couple of staff positions in Washington headquarters.

I entered the Executive Service in 1987 as the Division Manager for the FAA's Eastern Region, Air Traffic organization. Since 1985, I spent a lot time either as Deputy or Director of the FAA's Office of Air Traffic Investigations and Evaluations. And it was that post that I held on September 11, 2001.

In November of 2001, I left to head up a new position created by the FAA, Director of Emergency Operations and Communications. And I have just recently, within the past couple of weeks, been named the Director of Air Traffic Safety Oversight.

MR. AZZARELLO: In November you became the Director of Emergency Operations and Communications?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And today, the position you have now?

MR. CANNOLES: The Director of Air Traffic Oversight.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you tell us a little bit more about the position you held prior November 1, the one you had on 9/11 as an Air Traffic Investigations and Evaluations--what sort of the not 9/11 duties, which, obviously, which were vastly different--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --or somewhat different, at least, but the ones of the daily routine, daily responsibilities.

MR. CANNOLES: The organization had two divisions, I reported to the Director of Air Traffic. One organization handled the investigation of accidents and incidents which involved Air Traffic. We also did litigation support for the Department of Justice in representing FAA in litigation connected to aircraft accidents.

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The other was an internal evaluation process, conducted within Air Traffic. We did several hundred facility evaluations each year. I had four field branches that performed that function that were located in Dallas; Fort Worth; Seattle; one out here at Dulles; and the other one in Atlanta, Georgia.

So the principal duties were to monitor the operations system each day. I had specialists on-call 24-hours-a-day along with myself. Where we were briefed of air traffic incidents that occurred in the system. Part of my job was making sure that the Air Traffic leadership was briefed on those each day, so that we could bring any anomalies to their attention. Through the analysis of those events and the evaluation processes and the trends we saw in the field, we were able to make recommendations for system improvement to the other directors within Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: In your chain of command, who did you report directly to?

MR. CANNOLES: The Director of Air Traffic

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through the Deputy Director of Air Traffic. On 9/11, the Acting Deputy was Jeff Griffith and the Director was Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: Bill Peacock was out of town on 9/11, is that right?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, he was.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, on 9/11, you reported directly to Jeff Griffith?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And would Jeff Griffith have reported to ATS-1 or right up to the Deputy? Did he report to Steve Brown or Peter Challen [ph] or did he go--

MR. CANNOLES: I think it was kind of circumstantial. I mean, formally, his report was to Peter Challen and to Steve Brown, but, you know, with an urgent need for information, for example, I'm sure Jeff was permitted and encouraged to go directly to the Administrator.

MS. HYDE: I want to check the senior level here, it's a pretty small group of folks and if we could, technically, on the chart you report

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to someone, but you talked and worked and interacted all the time?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why don't you take us through the morning of, when you arrived to work and take us through sort of leading up to the first report of the hijack of American 11?

MR. CANNOLES: I got to the office between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m. on 9/11. As was my habit, sat down and began independently reviewing the previous day's activities, instances that had occurred in the system; so on and so forth.

My staff began arriving about the same hour and we would, after 30 or 40 minutes of review on our own, we'd get together and kind of compare notes; discuss what we might know individually for the benefit of the group.

Bill Peacock was out of town that day. I recall getting a text-page sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 in the morning, which stated there was a confirmed hijacking in progress out at Boston Logan. I had a television in my office, so I

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turned it on to CNN because frequently, they developed information about as quickly as we did and I wanted to see what they had.

Shortly after I tuned in, I saw the hole in the World Trade Center and the report that I think the initial report was that a small airplane had crashed into it. Having been manager of Newark tower, my view out my office window was the World Trade Center and I have a familiarity with the area and looking at the damage, I recognized that it was a large aircraft that had crashed into the structure.

Knowing that, I left my office on the 4th floor and came here to the 10th floor to report to Mr. Griffith my suspicions that the hijacked airplane had crashed. I passed him in the hallway, actually before passing him in the hallway, I went by another office and saw that, indeed, a second aircraft had crashed.

I saw Jeff, he said there's a hijacking in progress. I said, no, it's not a hijacking, it's now an accident. He said go set up a telephone

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conference, which I proceeded then to do.

MR. AZZARELLO: If we can go back over some of this. You said the text page you got between 8:00 and 8:30, you said it was a confirmed hijack out of Logan?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember who sent you that?

MR. CANNOLES: It was sent to me by someone in the New England Air Traffic Division, I believe it was one of their quality assurance specialists.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, it came from the ANE to ROC?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah. I'm not sure it was the Regional Office Center, it could have--our structure, each of the nine Air Traffic Divisions has their own quality assurance department. And while they weren't straight-lined to me, I didn't have direct authority, they kind of got program guidance from my organization. So, we had a close affiliation with these people; we knew each other;

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interacted, frequently. So, I think it was from an Air Traffic specialist in the Region that I got that page, I don't recall exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: The ROC has their own QA guy separate and apart from the Boston Center?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, it's not the ROC, it's the Air Traffic Division.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, okay.

MR. CANNOLES: The ROC's kind of a separate entity.

MS. HYDE: The procedures in a hijacking before 9/11, from your position, would you have, formally, in the protocol had any role to play in the hijacking?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MS. HYDE: No. And, because your job is, on a daily basis, we have some familiarity with the QA folks, with the Centers of Accident Investigation, that's what you were doing at the time?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And, were you on the

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notification list from May and Jesse and the folks up in the WOC who were making--around the same time, making notifications to senior people in the Department about the same information, the hijacking information?

MR. CANNOLES: I doubt if I was on the list. They may have let me know as a courtesy, but I would have been down on the bottom of the list, because hijackings--

MS. HYDE: This was clearly not your role?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was your office's position at that time, the acronym, I don't have all these things down?

MR. CANNOLES: AAT-20.

MR. AZZARELLO: AAT-20?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And when you were notified via page, did you pick up and call somebody at ANE or talk to anybody?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I grabbed two people

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out of my organization, Dan Diggins and Tony Mello--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --and told them that I suspected there had been an accident with an airplane flying into the World Trade Center--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --and asked them to accompany me to the 10th floor. Again, we met Mr. Griffith in the hallway. And we went down and set up a telephone conference among the affected parties, which was pretty much our protocol when an accident occurs.

MS. HYDE: Your pro--oh, I see, so normally not your hijack--not the hijacking--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --when there's an accident, you

--

MR. CANNOLES: right.

MS. HYDE: --you go set up a telecon?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You set that telecon up

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where?

MR. CANNOLES: We set this particular one up in the Director of Air Traffic's Office in his conference room.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, we sat with May this morning and she--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, we have a--

MS. HYDE: --did a bit of a schematic for us what the floor looked like.

MR. AZZARELLO: The WOC here, duty officers, the [unintell.] center that stood up?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: SVTS, then there's a skiff right here.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We understand that your--the Air Traffic suite's down here?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, they're actually over in this corner of the building.

MS. HYDE: Right, we just sort of drew it out so we'd have a room there we could visually think.

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MR. CANNOLES: Great artwork.

MR. AZZARELLO: We thought Doug--

MR. CANNOLES: We're impressed, okay.

MS. HYDE: I bet, we were so confused after a while and then we thought we had to stop and draw it out.

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who's office did you set that up in?

MR. CANNOLES: Director of Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: By name whose office?

MR. CANNOLES: Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was Bill Peacock? Is that where you were saying there was ordinarily that for an aircraft accident, actually, you would set up a telecon and would it generally be set--is that true or?

MR. CANNOLES: I've run them before out of my conference room on the 4th floor. It just kind of depended on circumstances.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's no assigned location--

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MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --to conduct it from?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: But, generally, if there were an aircraft accident, that would trigger some follow-up responsibility for you--

MR. CANNOLES: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --ordinarily?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And on your way up to the 10th floor you take Diggins and--Dan Diggins and Tony Mello with you?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you saw the second crash on TV before you saw Jeff Griffith?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, I saw that up here somewhere, I think it was by the Deputy Administrator's office. I think they had a television on and I saw the second one.

MS. HYDE: And so you set up the telecon after the second one?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, that's my

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recollection.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me just stop for a second here, because I'm putting this together in my brain which tacks differently than anybody else's. You established a telecon immediately to handle an accident in the [unintell.] office. Concurrently, there is a crew that's being set up in the WOC/[unintell.] to handle the ongoing operational situation?

MR. CANNOLES: Exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: With those two separate nodes set up on this floor, how did the regions and the Command Center know who to call with which information?

MR. CANNOLES: The regions were all following their own stated protocol, so they'd know, for example, that you call in an accident to the WOC. All that was done. What I was doing was kind of over and above, if you will. The people I called in were the managers of the key facilities, and the executives from the affected region to kind of do an off-to-the-side management of the crisis.

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So, the protocol, I mean, for example, Jeff Griffith was down in this facility for a good part of the day and he would come down periodically, give me direction, I could give him information. Once or twice I sent people down here with messages to him, but we were kind of doing separate things.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you say Griffith would come to you, you mean, down in the Air Traffic suite?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Down there and then, where would--when he left there, where else would he primarily spend his time that day?

MR. CANNOLES: I think he was, primarily, up here in this operation with the Deputy Administrator.

MR. AZZARELLO: This general area here, the WOC and the Crisis Center?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. KARA [?]: I see an inherent danger here and let me just put this up, I see an inherent

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danger of where perishable, tactical information out in the field might get into one node here and not to the other node. How do you de-conflict that? As a senior Manager, how does FAA deal with that?

MR. CANNOLES: Well, first and foremost, the regions weren't simply talking to me, for example. The regions had dual linkage set up. So they were plugged into the Ops Center, as well as the telecon that I was running. Plus, anything I thought that was germane to the leadership of the agency that had to be passed on was passed on immediately.

But, I know, for example, I had New England and Eastern Regions on initially and Frank Hatfield [ph], was not only reporting through those venues, but would also share with us on our telephone conference things he was picking up off the other ones that we weren't monitoring.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was Hatfield your primary contact in the Eastern Region?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, he was on, as well as

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two or three of his field managers. But he was the principal. He was the executive for that division.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about--did you speak to Rick DeShawn [ph] that day?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm not sure if Rick was on or not, he may have been, but I don't recall.

MR. KARA: Let me carry my analogy one step further where we have two nodes in FAA headquarters and we've talked of that information coming up, through these two nodes.

Now, from these two nodes, upwards to the national level or to the military, does that not come from you at all? Yours is strictly downward or do you also flow upward to, for example, to the White House or to the National Military Command Center?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I had no communications with the National Military Command Center or the White House. That was all being done from here and I knew it was being done from here

MR. KARA: So, can I--based on what you've told me--there are parallel paths of information

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coming up to this headquarters, but there's de-confliction [ph] and cross-communication doing--going on among the senior management, but from this level upwards, it's a single line of communication from the WOC?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Well, just to infuse reality here. There was a lot of chaos that morning.

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MS. HYDE: You know, like [unintell.] of a herd and it's understandable chaos, you know.

MR. CANNOLES: I wouldn't call it chaos. It was--

MS. HYDE: Describe for us--

MR. CANNOLES: --it was unusual.

MS. HYDE: --your sense, I don't want you to get honed in on some sort of model--

MR. KARA: Let me just make it perfectly clear that I'm looking at the flow of information and I want to establish that the flow upwards from this was not on two paths, but was on one path.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, yeah.

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MR. KARA: Thank you.

MR. CANNOLES: Bear in mind that we went in to work an aircraft accident. You know, that's what my team was trained to do. And, as such, we would probe the region, you know, the region would give us what they knew; we would ask compelling questions that, you know, needed answering. We would provide guidance to, you know, go get this information; look for this; give it to us and we would provide that upwards in a formal briefing.

You know, this thing suddenly became, obviously, much more than an accident. So, yes, we did a lot of invention on the run. And this thing, rather than becoming just a device for gathering information, became part of the command-and-control structure one way or the other.

MS. HYDE: This thing being your telecon?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Okay, well, let's sort of backup and get, from your own words, what happened. So, you go down to the conference center there?

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

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MS. HYDE: Are you still with your staff folks?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: And then, how did you go about setting up the conference? What do you recall you did?

MR. CANNOLES: We--I recall the three of us, initially, the size of the group grew very quickly.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: And I probably can't tell you with any accuracy everybody that was there, but I can tell you many of the people.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. CANNOLES: I went in and instructed, I think Tony Mello, I said, get Eastern and New England up on the lines; they did, we operated from a speaker phone.

MS. HYDE: Now we have some familiarity, but tell me, when you were asking for Eastern and New England, who are they contacting--those were the regional centers, right?

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MR. CANNOLES: We probably would have made the first call through the Regional Ops Center.

MS. HYDE: Probably gone through the ROC, okay.

MR. CANNOLES: However, given what was going on, if we weren't successful in getting through right away, which is likely, we would have gone directly to the Air Traffic Divisions because, again, of our familiarity with working with the people. We know their numbers, we know where they live, so--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --but one way or another, we got them--and we had a dedicated conference line, for events like this. So we didn't need any help in setting that up. We already knew a bridge number to call and the password and so forth.

MS. HYDE: You mean, you had, like an 800-number with a PIN that was always active or I'm just bringing it down to my level of familiarity?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, you had a dedicated

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conference line, so you said you were calling people or your staff was calling people saying call in--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --and this is how we're all going to get together on the bridge?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: So you didn't actually need any of the operators or duty officers or duty officers with the facilities to work a bridge, for you?

MR. CANNOLES: Right, right.

MS. HYDE: So, your first up was to get Eastern and Northeastern. Did that mean that you go to the [unintell.] level, the center level or you're just talking to the Administrator at the Administrative level?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I'm sure, again, my focus was to get the executives from those two divisions. But, I'm sure, as the conversations started, I either directed or on their own volition, they started bringing up the key managers.

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MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: I know we had the manager of New York Center, Washington Center, I believe the New York TRACON, probably Newark Tower, Boston Center and possibly, Boston Tower.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you had the Air Traffic Managers of all those facilities--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --at some point in the time on the line?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm sorry, could you just run through those again, New York Center?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, remember, initially, it was New York Center, New York TRACON, Washington Center, Boston Center, Boston Tower, I think we had Newark Tower up, but I don't recall precisely. We may have had LaGuardia, as well. And this was the initial group, before the day was over, we had, virtually, the entire nation on the line.

MR. AZZARELLO: These were the initial people on?

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MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And when those people start beeping in, do you, what--do you recall what were usually your first questions? What were you trying to do at this point?

MR. CANNOLES: The first thing we were dealing with was the accidents. You know, candidly, we didn't know why the accident occurred at that point. We knew there was an airplane down, so we're trying to get information from Frank Hatfield and his managers. Slowly the information surfaces that, you know, both airplanes, you know, for example, their transponders were turned off. Screams were heard on a frequency. And slowly--slowly, the picture comes together that, you know, these were hijackings and probably intentional crashes. You know, which is something we didn't have a great deal of experience dealing with.

Then--

MS. HYDE: If I could just step back a little bit.

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MR. CANNOLES: Sure.

MS. HYDE: If you would have had the Boston folks on from the get-go, we know that pretty early on, they heard some startling stuff--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: --and they started before around the 8:30 to 9:00 time frame, there was a conference between Security and, I thought the Regions and the Boston Center, before we even had the first hit. Was that information fed into your telecon, when you first got it up?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, I don't recall the timing, exactly, but, yeah, we got that information.

MR. AZZARELLO: After you set the telecon up?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: And, do you remember at this point, did you hear any specifics about what the threats were that they heard--

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MS. HYDE: --from Boston, do you recall

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hearing the Controllers there had heard, we have some planes?

MR. CANNOLES: No. We, my office gathered that information. We had it all collected in this building by sometime that afternoon. And, as a matter of fact, I recall listening to the tapes myself for the first time, and it wasn't until I had replayed it many times that I could even make those things out. So, I don't know if a Controller understood it the first time or not. It took me two or three iterations before I could make out what the individuals were saying.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me, just throw something specific out there on that. Terry Biggeo [ph] was the [unintell.] in EBW [ph] and he calls and speaks to the Command Center in Herndon what they had about the time of the second impact, which was around 9:03 to report that the tapes had been pulled and that they can confirm at that juncture hearing the phrase, we have some planes. Is that something that--was that a line that you were monitoring? Was that something you heard from the

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carrier?

MR. CANNOLES: No, we had the Command Center on our conference, initially, but, again, when, you know, this could have been a separate operational telephone conference they had. I don't recall hearing that, specifically. But I do recall that we knew early on that there was enough heard on the frequencies that we knew it was relative to an aircraft being seized.

MR. : Who was the primary point of contact at the Command Center?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't recall who was on and it changed several times during the day.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so you bring up the call, you think you have the Command Center on when you first--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, I'm sure we did.

MS. HYDE: --you've got a speaker back in that room or--

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: --or were each of you on a different speaker?

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MR. CANNOLES: I was on a speaker-phone just like this one on the table.

MS. HYDE: And you're the moderator, you're directing the conference?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And are Tony and Dan next to you around this point?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Was anybody taking notes around you?

MR. CANNOLES: I asked someone, when we went in. We started putting notes up on a white-board, similar to this over here. I, you know, I recall that somebody probably had a legal pad or something and at some point, somebody either introduced or we asked for a laptop computer, which was brought up. I recall Dan trying to operate it, he was seated at the end of the table. And we produced a summary or chronology, which is full of errors, based upon my subsequent review.

But we were trying to chronicle the big stuff that was taking place, with the full

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knowledge that the real logs being held by the facility would contain the exact times that, you know, this sort of thing was executed. But we were just trying to keep a broader view of what was happening in our world down there.

MS. HYDE: So, the notes back on the white-board, that wasn't white butcher-block paper, it was a white-board?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And so, then, at some point, there's, maybe there's a legal pad and someone's making notes. And then, also, the laptop, a request for that--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --get the information down. And as you're gathering situational awareness, do you hear about other aircraft that are acting funny or acting suspiciously?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes. And I've never been able to track any of this stuff down. But, for example, at one point we had a high-speed target heading towards Boston. We had reports of four

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aircraft heading for Norfolk. We had a bomb threat at Pittsburgh; a bomb threat at Boston; a bomb threat at Cleveland, as I recall.

You know, Delta won't take instructions, he's over Cleveland. So-and-so won't divert to so-and-so, there was a tremendous amount of traffic. And I'm sure a lot of it was based on confusion. There was a tremendous of volume being exchanged.

MS. HYDE: So, in terms of the Command Center, did you see--to you're sort of [unintell.] or [unintell.] into that coordinating information-sharing node here?

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: And the Command Center's linked into you? What was your sense at the time what the Command Center was doing?

MR. CANNOLES: The Command Center was doing what they should have been doing, which was handling the traffic flow. And that's why, when we talked about, you know, information possibly being disconnected earlier--

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MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --I had comfort in the knowledge that despite the Command Center's presence on this telecon, that they had other people who were off doing what they should be doing, which was the interaction with the field facilities. And, similarly, that FAA's intelligence capability, security entities and so-on and so-forth were being taken care of up in this facility.

MS. HYDE: When you said what they should be doing, do you mean grounding the aircraft? You talked a little bit about positions to land or at least ground stop first and then land the aircraft?

MR. CANNOLES: We've read a lot about that. The only first-hand experience that I had with it was that Frank Hatfield made a statement or asked a question about, you know, we don't know what's going here, maybe it would be prudent to stop the system and I concurred with his suggestion and said, words to the effect, that you're right, let's stop the traffic in the Northeast.

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Some minutes later, Jeff Griffith either came down or I met him in the hallway or something and I told Jeff that we had stopped traffic in the Northeast and he said, yeah, we just did a national ground stop. So I think there were a lot of efforts, even from the facility level to stop traffic, a lot of parallel efforts that took place that about the same time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can I back up just a second to your initial contacts with the Eastern Region Air Traffic People in the New England Region? Who were your primary initial contacts up there, was it in the Eastern Region, Frank Hatfield?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, because that's where the accident was.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, if you remember, I think, I believe that [unintell.] in the Eastern Region he was, I think not in the office at the time of the first impact, might have been at a dentist appointment or something and delayed and came in later. Do you recall any difficulty in

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connection with that in terms of trying to reach him or did you get him on a pager or a cell phone while he was out of the office?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I don't know how we connected with him. But I can remember his voice on the line so he was there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and how about the New England Region?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I don't recall who was on up there, who the principal was. It was probably Bill Yuclivitz [ph] or one of the branch managers acting in the Division Manager's absence because I don't--the Division Manager wasn't there, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: Bill?

MR. CANNOLES: Yuclivitz?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yuclivitz?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, he's a dear friend, but please don't ask me to spell his name.

MR. KARA: You call him Bill a lot?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah. Y-u-e-k and something else after that.

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MR. AZZARELLO: I think, I don't know had been developed yet, but I think it was a meeting in Boston [unintell.] the New England Air Traffic Manager might have been there?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm not sure. But I don't recall being on that conference.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, what about New York Center, when you got there, was that Mike McCormick [ph]?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, yeah. I knew Mike, I worked with him years before, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: How about, do you remember who from the TRACON in New York was linked in through the initial telecon would that have been?

MR. CANNOLES: It should have been Lorretta Martin [ph], but I don't recall, precisely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if Bob Berch [ph] was on?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember Karl Juraseck [ph]?

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MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about GDC, do you remember who, was that Ramirez [ph]?

MR. CANNOLES: Not, sure, I'm not sure if Louis was out there, and he probably was, if you're asking. I don't remember who was on there from there. I know the facility was on.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about Boston Center, do you remember was that Terry Biggeo or someone else?

MR. CANNOLES: I seem to recall it was a woman and I can't recall her name at the moment. I should know it, I believe she was the manager at the time.

MS. HYDE: Back in sort of the sequence here. The call was set up after the second hit on the World Trade Center. Was it before the Pentagon had been hit?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: And what information, if any, do you recall about that aircraft?

MR. CANNOLES: We had, of course, we were

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still looking for two other aircraft at this point in time.

MS. HYDE: You say, of course, but at what point and which aircraft were you referring to?

MR. CANNOLES: I can't give you the call signs with specificity, but, of course we knew two airplanes that hit the World Trade Center.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: We also had two other airplanes that were unidentified out in the system that we couldn't pinpoint and say precisely where they were. Dulles TRACON was on the line with us and, at some point, Dulles reported or, perhaps, Frank Hatfield reported, that Dulles had reported to him that there was a fast-moving target coming towards Washington.

By that time, there were a number of people on our conference room. One of whom was Jeffrey Logue, who was a member of my staff and I asked Jeffrey to step into the next office and look out the window to see if he could see the airplane. There was a progress report being given on our

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telecon, I don't remember precisely, but it was that the airplane is, for example, 20 miles from Washington, it's now 15 miles from Washington, and so on.

Jeffrey went next door, came back and reported that he had seen smoke from the Pentagon. So we surmised at that point that this airplane had flown into the Pentagon.

MS. HYDE: When you say that countdown of miles time in-bound, so that must have been from somebody who had it on a scope, you don't have any scopes from--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --did you?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And so you're thinking that that must have been Dulles--

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, it was.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall, was National on this Telecon?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't recall.

MS. HYDE: And had you heard anything from

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Indie before this?

MR. CANNOLES: No, no.

MS. HYDE: Would they be on the call, at this point?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm not sure if we brought Indianapolis in, but I don't recall having heard anything from them at this point. I think we brought Cleveland in before Indie, it would kind of be the normal progression for traffic up in the Northeast.

MS. HYDE: I see, you would have brought Cleveland in before?

MR. CANNOLES: I believe so, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: You said that after the second crash, before the Pentagon crash, there were two aircraft, that I guess, you were getting some concern about?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the Pentagon was hit, did you equate the Pentagon strike with either of those two aircraft?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, I mean, obviously, we

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didn't have absolute identity or knowledge of who, specifically, the aircraft was, but it was very clear to us that it was an intentional crash like the ones in New York.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, actually what I'm--what I want to know is the two that you were concerned about after the two crashes in New York and before the Pentagon crash, did you then equate the Pentagon crash at some point afterwards with one of those two planes that Air Traffic was concerned about that--

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --you couldn't pinpoint?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how did you, on what basis did you make that connection? What information did you have before the Pentagon crash that led you to equate it with, oh, that must have been one of the two that we were concerned about that we couldn't pinpoint?

MR. CANNOLES: Well, you know, first of all, it's very unusual in the MASS, even with the

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volume of traffic that's handled, to lose identity of an airplane. So, when you've got two airplanes and you don't know where they are. And you have a crash, the odds are pretty good that's one of them. We got a report either before or after the fact--probably from Great Lakes. We had probably brought Great Lakes up when we brought Cleveland Center in. And we had gotten a report from someone, probably, Great Lakes, that there was a missing aircraft in Indianapolis.

And from that they would have given us the airplane's call sign and we would have, at least theorized that this was one of the two aircraft we were still looking for.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you think that--the initial information led you to equate the two came from Great Lakes region when they got, at some point, into the telecon you were on?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you think that somebody, because you started by saying, you knew there were two unidentified aircraft. And as I sort of piece

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together what you just said then that Great Lakes or somebody, Cleveland, must have said one of them was out of Indie. Was there an instruction given to you, the participants on the telecon to be looking out for these aircraft? I mean--

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sure, yeah, I'm sure at some point we said something along those lines, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember requesting the participants to tell their Controllers to put on their primaries, if they weren't already selected?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was somebody in the room trying to log down, note these suspicious aircraft that were being reported? For example, those two, was somebody trying to note down like the Great Lakes Region called in and said we can't find American, you know, 1? Somebody writing and trying to keep track of these?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, I think there was an attempt to do it and it turned out to be a very poor attempt. I reviewed what was produced on that

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laptop and I don't know how many inaccuracies are in there. And, again, I probably didn't pay a great deal of attention to it in the heat of battle. And, also, with the knowledge that official logs were being kept elsewhere that could help us reconstruct this thing later.

So, I don't know if they captured everything we discussed or not, I--there's a lot in there that I recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: It would have been some combination of the note pad on the wall and/or note takers and the laptop?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And was all that preserved post-events, post-time line?

MR. CANNOLES: I know the laptop--I know there was a disc produced off the laptop and there was a printout done of it, which, again I was pretty disappointed in.

The white-board was not--and my suspicion is that many of the inaccuracies that I saw were caused by somebody trying to take data from the

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white-board and plug it in at the right times. And we didn't do a real good job with it.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't think the white-board paper, you think was--you think it was not preserved?

MR. CANNOLES: No, it was not. It's an erasable board, there wasn't any paper involved. So--

MS. HYDE: Well, if you say you were sort of disappointed, were you judging the product, against sort of the facts that we know now that we know what happened--so that there were inaccuracies first what, you know, what we now know as reality or the product was not, as you recall, the reports, however false those reports may have been, it didn't reflect the reports that were coming in and actually what was being discussed at the time?

MR. CANNOLES: Well, when I expressed disappointment, it's at the product, itself. The people I had asked to do it were making a banging effort to keep up, but there was, again, such an extreme volume of activity--

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MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --and in the middle of trying to capture something that was being said on the telecon, they were also following instructions to, hey, call this person, get them in here. So, it wasn't directed at the people who were trying to do it. I just--I don't believe that it was absolutely reflective of what all was taking place all along.

MS. HYDE: What was taking place contemporaneously?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could I show you a log quickly on [unintell.]--

MS. HYDE: Sure.

[PAUSE.]

MR. CANNOLES: Don't know what this one is. This is not the document that I refer to.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's not, you don't believe that could be a chronicle--

MR. CANNOLES: No, this appears to me to be something that was produced in Eastern Region

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somewhere.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, this looks like the one that was produced on the telecon that I was running. Yeah, this is the one--that's the one.

MR. AZZARELLO: And for the record, we're looking at Chronology of Events September 11, 2001, and it's a straightforward listing of times.

MS. HYDE: That's a helpful description.

MR. KARA: As opposed to the ABA-30.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you this, Dave. There's a report, I mean, we were just looking at a log that you thought might have been produced by the Eastern Region.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm

MR. AZZARELLO: And there's an entry in there around 9:35 a.m., it says, maybe not American 11 into the World Trade Center per McCormick. Before, I guess--I have a question to ask before I get to that, so I'll also add to that that there's various pages that we reviewed from all facilities. What we've seen of that from a number of different

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FAA facilities and locations, interjected into the system, so to speak, after the two world Trade Center Crashes and, yet, before the Pentagon crash was some information that American 11 that maybe it's still airborne; and maybe is not one of the two aircraft that impacted the Trade Center.

In fact beyond that it may be headed to Washington, D.C. Tell me what you recall about that?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm not sure if it was American 11 or United 93. United 93 was the aircraft that crashed in Somerset, correct?

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: I remember we were trying to identify the location of both of those airplanes at one time. There was some confusion and it was from other facilities, not involved, one of which reported at one point, hey, we're seeing on the traffic situation display, he's over, you know, Kansas city or something, which was--turned out not to be the case.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Which aircraft do you remember as that?

MR. CANNOLES: I think it was United 93. But the initial--the initial indication, I can't remember if I remember this from when it happened or if it was a subsequent investigation. But Indianapolis was convinced at the time that they lost American, that that was a downed aircraft, that that was an accident.

So, while there was interest in looking for him, I'm quite sure that the initial reports were we lost the airplane, he crashed, he disappeared, he did something. And, then, of course, confusion developed after that one, when the FAA reached out and said, you know, we're looking for the possibility of an airplane crash in this area, one of our flight services called a few law enforcement agencies, who then called back into the center and said, hey, we hear there's an airplane crash near such-and-such. So, we assumed, initially, that airplane was down.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's 77 you assumed was

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down?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me what you assumed about the first two crashes based on, when you set up the telecon, you have a rep from the Eastern New England Region; the plane from the Northeastern Region--crash in the Eastern Region, you have a ZBW and a New York rep on the line, you've got McCormick, who is pretty close to the Ops for what's going on real time in New York. What was your situational awareness, when you start that telecon, vis-a-vis the two impacts at the World Trade Center--in terms of equating them with an aircraft? Based on your conversations with McCormick when he first saw you and others?

MR. CANNOLES: You know some investigator had a lot of questions and very few answers. The first accident, for all I knew, could have been a malfunction on the airplane; could have been any number of things. By the second one it was quite clear that the airplanes had been taken and intentionally crashed. And I don't remember any

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specific statement that validated that conclusion. But as information became forthcoming, and I'm sure at some point, someone at Boston told me that, yes, we heard screams or, yes, we heard the phrase we have some planes, or something like that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you equate it, though with the two planes that were initially reported--

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --from Boston as they hijacked and in danger?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes. And in both cases, regarding this two aircraft, we were fortunate or not in knowing that both airplanes had turned in the general direction in which they had turned. So, we kinda knew where they were headed.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about the concurrent reports that ELTs associated with those two aircraft, how did that play into your analysis?

MR. CANNOLES: That just simply tells you that an airplane's impacted with something. It didn't tell us, you know, who it was, but it added a degree of certainty to it.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, can you remember hearing either directly from Mike or through Frank Hatfield in the region, any belief for saying to the effect that maybe there wasn't any doubt about whether or not American 11 had impacted the World Trade Center as it said in this Eastern Region time line?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't remember, it, there could have been some uncertainty, but I don't remember it.

MR. KARA: Do you recall Mike ever saying at all that he thought that two different things had--that there was more than one instant aircraft that [unintell.]

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about there were some media reports, initially that it was a GA aircraft that might have--

MR. CANNOLES: I heard that, myself, on CNN, I'm sure. And, again, just looking from the first television clips, I knew that was wrong, just based on some aviation experience, it was,

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obviously, a much larger aircraft. And I don't even recall that being discussed once we got the telephone set up. I think we were all past that stuff and we knew that it was a big transport category airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you don't remember at all any report that said that after the first two Trade Center crashes and before the Pentagon that American 11 might still be out there headed to Washington is completely something you have no recollection of whatsoever?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't have any recollection of it. It's possible, but I don't recall it.

MR. KARA: Were either of the two carriers American or United up on your net?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. KARA: We didn't get any inputs from the companies at all?

MR. CANNOLES: I recall asking, I think I went out to one of the regions and said has somebody called the company to check and see if

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they're in communications? and the answer came back negative.

MR. KARA: How about in terms of the identification of the aircraft that impacted the towers or the Pentagon?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about, when, after the first two crashes, when you set up the telecon and you hear that there's two other aircraft that are around that there's some concern about in the system because they can't be located. Do you know, one way or another, whether that same information is over here on this end of the--or in the Operations Center? Do you know if they have that same information that there's two out there, that--we'll call them two missing aircraft, or whatever you want?

MR. CANNOLES: My assumption is that it was because that would have been the formal reporting process. And even if that were not the case. Jeff Griffith and I were in contact, I don't know, every several minutes and were exchanging

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that sort of information?

MS. HYDE: Via telephone or walking back and forth?

MR. CANNOLES: Actually, I had Jeff Logue go out and commandeer a couple of walkie-talkies someplace, be that was one of the few things we could get to work; the cell phone system, obviously, wasn't doing too well. So, we were using that, somewhat, but more than likely, it was face-to-face. If something of tremendous importance given the circumstances came up, I either sent somebody down here to tell Jeff we're missing another airplane or I did it myself or he came down or whatever.

MR. AZZARELLO: So are you--

MS. HYDE: And what do you recall falling into that category on that morning?

MR. CANNOLES: I remember telling him we had shut traffic down on the Northeast and he responded that that's fine, we just issued a national ground stop.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

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MR. CANNOLES: He came to me at one point and he said, hey, make sure that, you know, we've got adequate staffing to keep our facilities going, which I did. I'm sure I shared some of the early reports that turned out to be unfounded, you know, those four airplanes heading for Norfolk, coming in from the Atlantic and there's a high-speed target here and there. You know, is that stuff came in that the attempt was to share it as rapidly as possible, but you had to do a lot of filtering and prioritizing to determine what was real and, of course, those didn't turn out to be that way, but I'm sure I shared those threats with them.

MS. HYDE: Did you share the in-bound from Dulles? The information of fast-moving in-bound target counting down towards Washington?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't recall, specifically. I do know, and it seems to me that Frank Hatfield volunteered that the White House situation room had been notified.

MS. HYDE: How would--this Hatfield seems to have good way of, you raise his name a number of

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times and seems to know a lot of what's going on.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: How is he getting his information?

MR. CANNOLES: Hatfield's the manager of the manager at Washington National--

MS. HYDE: He's the manager of the manager?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: He's the lead

MR. CANNOLES: And since I used to have the job, I was familiar with the assets he had available to him.

MR. KARA: That would be Louis Ramirez or whoever he sees at ZDC keeping Hatfield informed--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, and Louis is out at Washington Center.

MS. HYDE: He's at National Tower, is that what you're saying?

MR. CANNOLES: No, he's at ZDC?

MS. HYDE: He's at ZDC?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

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MS. HYDE: So, Hatfields at ZDC--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, Hatfield's at the Region.

MR. KARA: No, Ramirez is at ZDC.

MR. CANNOLES: It's like Who's on First. But, Frank, and you know, I wasn't there, I don't know what he's got, but whether he's in the facility or not, he had done the same thing that I had done. He'd brought handful of his people and, you know, started a phone bank up and started this management of information.

MR. KARA: Did your net merge with his net at some point or were they--become almost indistinguishable?

MR. CANNOLES: I really don't know how to answer that. He, obviously, you know, he was getting information from an individual on a phone down there and sharing with me, you'd say that it merged. But, as far as putting the lines together, no. But there were, you know, there were a lot of people sitting around with two phones to the side of their head that day. And that's how a lot of

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stuff was getting back and forth.

MR. AZZARELLO: What is it, again, specifically, that you recall Frank saying about that approaching aircraft?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm pretty sure that it was Frank. Someone had, someone stated on the telephone, and I think it was Frank, logically, it would have been Frank that the White House situation room had been notified about a fast-moving target coming towards Washington.

MS. HYDE: That could have been Dulles, too, I mean, you know, at a much lower level than him to pick up the phone and they talked, yeah.

MR. CANNOLES: Could have been, but I suspect it was Frank.

MS. HYDE: Okay. So, you, stepping back, said, that early on, you would be--or, rather, missing aircraft, various people have thrown out different numbers, but [unintell.] from the folks at the Command Center that from early on, they thought they were in the universe of 11 and the White House thought that it was the universe of 6;

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are you pretty clear that your, you know, from your vantage point, your universe of missing or way off-course, wayward aircraft of 2?1

MR. CANNOLES: Initially, yeah, ultimately, I mean, we knew very decisively who the four airplanes were; their identity, where they come from and all that the rest of that. But, obviously, that didn't happen as we walked in the room and turned the phone on.

And, as I said, you know, during this period of time, there were the varied reports of the high-speed airplane heading towards Boston; four airplanes in-bound off the Atlantic in distress. So, at any one point in time we were probably trying to figure out what was going on with a half-a-doze to a dozen airplanes.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: To define, initially, though that the period after the second Trade Center crash and before the Pentagon, is that generally--is that the period where you have the two aircraft that were missing that you were trying

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to locate?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, I'm--I'm, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: One of them you believe you were able to equate later with 77 hit the Pentagon, correct?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: The other one, is it likely that one of those, the other one could have been Delta 1999, which came into the picture, too, from Boston?

MR. CANNOLES: I recall two events with Deltas and I don't know if it's the same flight, in either case. But I remember one Delta, who was giving us some trouble on the orders to the de-bird [ph], he didn't want to do that, and for that reason, he became suspect and it seems to me that there was an inquiry made much later in the morning, well after the fact about the possibility of another Delta having been hijacked back several hours earlier. And we chased it down and found there was nothing to it, but that's--those are the only two events I remember with Delta.

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MR. AZZARELLO: With Delta?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, on your telecon, aside from the information of the fast-mover coming toward Washington, was that, at any other point, information being fed in about an aircraft that was, you know, hijacked and that was being watched its movement?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah there was a Delta and Cleveland comes into mind for some reason. I don't know if we told the guy to land at Cleveland and he said, no, he was going to continue on to Dulles or what the deal was. But he was very much suspect and there was a great deal of concern following that flight because we feared that, you know, somebody had taken command of the aircraft.

There were some other ones. And, you know, these things were cropping up all over the chart. There was a Korean Airlines later on in the day that was in-bound to Alaska that erroneously got reported as being hijacked.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

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MR. CANNOLES: So, there were a number of kind of lesser events--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --that went on during the day and during that period of time.

MS. HYDE: Well, I'll ask the question this way, you don't want to ask it according to a call time you probably didn't know these call signs, maybe you did, but what was your awareness at that point about what we now know as Flight 93?

MR. CANNOLES: The preliminary information was that--and, again, I can't recall the precise source--but was that they had lost radar identity and radio capability with that flight that call sign somewhere in Indianapolis Center's airspace.

MR. AZZARELLO: You say 93 lost radar coverage in COMS?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was the preliminary information?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, in Indie's airspace?

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MR. CANNOLES: Yes, and that's significant in Air Traffic terms because Air Traffic will assume an aircraft accident if they have simultaneous loss of radar identity and radio contact. So that verbiage was significant that to us and that told us that they had an airplane crash or disappeared.

I don't recall if we accepted it as that at the moment, but that would have been the preliminary second test.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, were you aware at that point that that was similar to the characteristics of the first two aircraft at the Trade Center?

MR. CANNOLES: No, there's a more than a subtle difference here because the first two aircraft stopped responding to us and either changed transponder settings or turned transponders off. This guy disappeared. And that's a totally different story to us.

MS. HYDE: Tell me, so, did you do that--when you were in investigations, did you do

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accident packages on all four of these flights later?

MR. CANNOLES: My staff did, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Then you must be familiar with a lot of stuff we know now, like, I appreciate you our trying to take your head back to what you knew then, but your head must be infused with a whole bunch of information we know now having done these Air Traffic investigations of what actually happen.

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: So you know what you're describing is Flight 77, what happened in Indie's airspace was that the target, it disappeared; it wasn't primary coverage. Are you saying that your head back that morning was that that was--that information was what you thought was the Pennsylvania flight, the Flight 93?

MR. CANNOLES: I would honestly say, I didn't know.

MS. HYDE: So, what you recall is learning on the teleconference that in Indie's airspace there had been lost radio and radar contact and

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that there was this, you know, assumption maybe not iron clad, but that aircraft was down?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Put that aside for a moment. What do you recall, specifically, if anything, about an aircraft around Pennsylvania or another aircraft heading towards Washington. Was any of that information being received on your telecon?

MR. CANNOLES: Again, there was either information coming from the Eastern Region Air Traffic Division or from Dulles, higher, direct, it could have been either one that was giving us this countdown of this airplane heading towards Washington.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. CANNOLES: The other aircraft, we knew was missing. I can't determine from what source, I can't recall from what source. And we were polling different facilities, you know: Do you know where this airplane is? Did you work this airplane? And it took us a fair amount of time to sort that down.

The first reports we got on United 93,

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was, I believe came from a Kentucky police dispatcher who said that they had a report of an aircraft in so-and-so; Longdon [ph], Kentucky, or someplace. And, you know, I remember in my own mind saying, you know, my God that must be him. It turned out to be a real nasty crash in Pennsylvania, instead.

But, no, we didn't have good identity on where the airplanes were.

MS. HYDE: Let me just tell you some facts.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MS. HYDE: Now, that are in your accident package that you know afterwards. Did you know that Cleveland Center's watching 93? They've got a tag, they've got a data block; they have awareness of other aircraft turning off transponders and being hijacked, dropping out of the sky?

And they believe they hear screams more toward 11:00; they hear funny sounding voices and transponders turned off and they've got a primary target that they're watching for a 30-minute period

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of that aircraft, traveling through airspace and ultimately goes down. watching it all the way.

Are you saying that information, that's a different character of information than what you're describing and that's what, you know, maybe we can go back to the accident package and talk to these people.

That information about the 30-minutes of time, we've got an aircraft; we've heard screams; it's a clear sign of hijack. and here's it's path, I can see it. That information wasn't being fed into your telecon?

MR. CANNOLES: Not that I recall. I recall information being given to us that there was a target headed towards Pittsburgh because Pittsburgh decided they were going to evacuate in the middle of all of this. And I don't remember if I was told that that correlated to that flight track specifically or not.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, this is a different character. This is a disappeared plane. This is I hear screaming in the cockpit, I'm damn sure this

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is hijack and I see a target.

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Bomb on-board.

MS. HYDE: Bomb on-board.

MR. AZZARELLO: Bomb on-board.

MR. CANNOLES: First of all, I don't think, if I had a frequency with 10 airplanes on it and heard a scream. I wouldn't bet money on it being any of those airplanes.

MS. HYDE: This is their account of the people who were from Cleveland. Having been out there and interviewed and they've written statements. This isn't my characterization.

This is when you're talking, everyone from the bay supervisor to the ALMICK [ph], and to the manager of the facility that morning. There wasn't a lot of ambiguity in their minds, because, first of all, they've already gotten from other centers, you know, hey, this is, you know, I've had hijack; I've had hijack. So, it's not, you know, where you are at 8:30 in the morning, when this hasn't happened in a decade.

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So, they've heard that, then they hear, in fact it was on a speaker and more than one person heard it. They hear bomb on-board; they hear an airplane; and down the line they all say, it wasn't--you know, they know what's happening here. And they also say that they're burning up the phone lines calling people, telling them, okay, I've got a primary here's where it is, I've heard bomb on-board.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: And there's about 25 minutes of time before it actually plowed into the ground. So, if Cleveland was on--it may be that Cleveland was not on your call at this point, or that Cleveland's information, for whatever reason wasn't being fed into your call. It seems like information, having talked to all the people and seen their statements from that facility that you would remember because it was specific.

MR. CANNOLES: I do remember somebody telling me about a target headed towards Pittsburgh. I remember that much. And I remember,

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subsequently, we were looking for where the airplane was going. There was an initial report of an aircraft accident. We thought it was in the vicinity of Camp David.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: First came the report of the crash near Longdon, Kentucky or someplace in Kentucky; then I recall it was Camp David; then I think we finally got the precise location based on the eyewitness of another airplane.

MR. KARA: Who was your POC at HEL on your, was HEL up on you net and who were you talking to?

MR. CANNOLES: It should have been Chris, no, Nancy Shelton [ph], I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave, were you AAT-20 on--

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --on 9/11?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you put this together, this summary?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, my staff did.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you a question about this, they put it together, I assume you reviewed it and approved it, being it was released as an official FAA document?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It says at 9:39 here, ZOB Cleveland Center, notified Great Lakes Region about United 93. And as you see up above that, the information that was passed to the Great Lakes Region is that screaming, bomb on-board and that they were tracking it; so that it had changed altitude, without a command from them. And that it was, they clearly linked that up with the screams and what they were hearing over the frequency to Controller and reported that to his supervisor and up through the ROC and when I say the ROC, I'm saying the Great Lakes Region, could have been through--

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --the Air Traffic Division.

MR. CANNOLES: See, this was a summary and

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a synopsis that my staff compiled after much review of data and so I don't know if this was somebody at 39 and 12 seconds that had listened to this tape five times and discerned these words or if this was a natural reaction.

MS. HYDE: [unintell.] all of what we are wanting is what you recall from your conversations that morning.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: We've been and we've talked to all the people so we talked to the controllers and they told us that they knew it immediately. I know it takes five times and pulling the tape and the whole thing. I've known it, so we don't-and, you certainly don't have a reason because you weren't conducting all these interviews. What we want to make sure that we get right is that to the extent you're sitting Washington and you're sitting in headquarters that morning, and you are a coordinator contemporaneous that morning of information--

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

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MS. HYDE: --do you recall receiving the information that morning here--

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MS. HYDE: --that Cleveland had this flight all on-board screaming, everything, you're right, we now know about it?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't recall anything that specific.

MS. HYDE: Okay, because if you did the plane was tracking, you know, towards Washington. It was something they knew, you sort of see where it's heading in terms of coming this way. But you don't recall any of those threats to Washington or knowing that the plane was coming?

MR. CANNOLES: Not before the information from Eastern Region and/or Dulles Tower.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's take a look back at your chronology that you've identified that there were two times right around 10:00 o'clock.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MR. KARA [?]: Are those a fair assessment of what your net was picking up on 93?

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MR. CANNOLES: I can't testify to the accuracy of the times--

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. CANNOLES: --but I'm sure those reports were, yeah, I'm sure those reports are the character of what we were receiving that morning.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know who would know best--who would be in a position to be able to tell whether or not that information on your chronology from your telecon was accurate and how close in time it was to when they received it, you know, the person who was responsible for trying to log the chronology events on the telecon you were working on?

MR. CANNOLES: Probably Dan Diggins or Tony Mello. I think Dan was the primary note-taker. And he's about adept at a laptop as I am, so, but he might be able to give you more definitive information on that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I don't--when I show you this entry--or was it a step that means that they were on the telecon with you, but I guess,

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having looked at it afterwards or your staff having reviewed it and trying to find out after the fact, the information flow and how far it got; this, I think, was put together the 17th of September, I think.

MR. CANNOLES: We actually started that on the 11, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: And it carried forward for about a week?

MR. CANNOLES: --yeah.

MS. HYDE: What was the purpose of putting this together? I mean, was there a task, an assignment?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, the first thing we focused on on the 11th--I ran that telecon until mid- or late-afternoon.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: And then I went down with the staff to start putting information together for law enforcement. We briefed the FBI very early the next morning.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

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MR. CANNOLES: And we had, you know, while it wasn't a glossy product at that point in time we had transcripts. And the reason that I questioned whether or not that was somebody hearing it the first time or not--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --was when we brought--when I called the FBI late on the 11th, I said we have voice trans--voice tapes and you can hear someone speaking in Arabic and, while I don't profess to be a linguist, at that point in time, I'd heard some of those things two or three times and didn't realize that it was an Arabic-speaking person speaking English.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. Well, you know there are two planes, I don't know whether--

MR. CANNOLES: Oh, yeah.

MS. HYDE: I don't know whether you're referring to 11 or 93. Of the four hijacks, there are two aircraft where you had captured on your tape.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

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MS. HYDE: One is 11.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: And you've got a certain [unintell.] what it has to say. And then the other is 93.

MR. CANNOLES: One of them was clearer than the other one.

MS. HYDE: Yeah. So, I don't know which one you're referring to.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MS. HYDE: So, did you brief the FBI early next morning and did they ask you to put together this summary or how did this come about?

MR. CANNOLES: No, we did that internally for FAA purposes. There were, as you know, congressional hearings that took place, and we did it to try to build a factual representation of what Air Traffic had in the way of data.

MR. AZZARELLO: You put it together for purposes of informing who, again?

MR. CANNOLES: Our own leadership--

MS. HYDE: But this [unintell.] did you do

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the briefing at the White House or did Jeff Griffith do the briefing at the White House?

MR. CANNOLES: Jeff may have, I did not.

MS. HYDE: Okay, do you know if this product was requested for a briefing at the White House?

MR. CANNOLES: I know I gave Jeff copies of this briefing, but I don't know that he specifically presented this.

MS. HYDE: Okay, but do you recall when you were asked to do it, were you asked to put something together for the White House?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I don't think so.

MR. KARA: And there was no communication between you and the military so, anybody in NORAD in terms of preparing a briefing?

MR. CANNOLES: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: I noticed that on some of the four aircraft, on the entries of the chronology, there's notations of when not only the WOC was notified, but when--the Operations Center when the WOC was notified, headquarters or Command

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Center even.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: If you look at 93, it had the notification from Cleveland Center to Great Lakes Region, but there's no indication of any notification time to either headquarters or to the Command Center in Herndon. Did that mean that--what does that mean?

MR. CANNOLES: Again, and I recall reviewing the transcripts on that, it seems to me that the supervisor at that facility, called the ROC and said we have--we suspect that there's an airplane down and it's so and so and so and so and so and so. That would have migrated its way into the WOC as an aircraft accident. So, there wouldn't have been a requirement nor a necessity to tell Herndon about it necessarily.

MR. AZZARELLO: I was going to raise that question because some of the tapes at Herndon have conversations about United 93. I believe one of them, there's the one from Cleveland--

MR. : Cleveland counts it down

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with the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Cleveland Center called the Command Center at some point and told them about problems with 93 prior to its crash. And at other Command Center locations where there were manager NOM positions, there's discussion about United 93 before it crashed. And I guess it strikes me that there's nothing in the report about the notification to either the Command Center or the WOC about United 93.

Do you remember if you--in discussions with your staff about that, okay, did you go over the records, did you look at the transcripts or, you know, talk to people and see when, if at all, the Command Center or the leadership was advised of the situation of 93?

MR. CANNOLES: No, I don't recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about the--there were some entries in the summary about military contacts with NORAD. And there's references to logs from the NORAD logs. Is that something that you know you and/or your staff said that's something you had

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access to--any NORAD documents or was that pursuant to discussions that your staff had with people from you or the other side with NORAD?

MR. CANNOLES: Jeff Griffith either gave me or showed me a copy of NORAD's logs early on the development of this document.

MR. KARA: Post-9/11?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah. So, I'm sure we used, you know, some of that information. I recall, for example, that NORAD had an earlier time of us notifying them on one of these events than we had in our logs. Don't ask me why I remember that, but I do. And I failed to add and I probably should have, that on this telephone conference that I was running, one of the first things we did was reach out to our military liaison people here and brought them into that, so we had the military out there, was pretty early on.

MR. KARA: When you say here?

MR. CANNOLES: Here on the Air Traffic staff.

MR. KARA: Colonel Atkins or--

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MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, yeah.

MR. KARA: Was she down in your office, then, as opposed to here in the ROC--or not your office but where you had your--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, Cheryl was next door to me.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. HYDE: She was next door to you, but listening to your teleconference?

MR. CANNOLES: She was--she was down, I'm sorry, she was next door to my office on the fourth floor. After we got up and started this, I asked one of my staff to get ahold of her and get her up there. And I remember she came up and joined us at some point that morning.

MS. HYDE: At some point in the morning. So, do you recall whether she was a part of the teleconference when it first got going?

MR. CANNOLES: No, she was not, she came up after the fact.

MS. HYDE: Well, in your mind, did you ask her to come, because you thought you needed a

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military, would you usually have a military liaison on your conference?

MR. CANNOLES: That, and I felt she had need to know the information. She didn't know it otherwise.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so if she wasn't on there in the beginning of the conference, did you reach out to somebody else in the beginning? Is that because she wasn't in the facility at the--I seem to recall something that she sort of arrived here, late or something.

MR. CANNOLES: Hmm. I don't remember, you know, asking to find her until, you know, I don't know--it's so difficult to place the times that we were--I'm guessing, but we were an hour into it. And it suddenly occurred to me or someone else in the room, I think it was me, that, hey, we ought to have Cheryl up here. So somebody did an outreach to her and, as I recall, she came herself. I don't recall one her other people being there, I think it was here.

MS. HYDE: Were you familiar with NORAD

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that morning? Do you know who NORAD was or what they did?

MR. CANNOLES: Oh, yeah.

MS. HYDE: And, do you recall any of the participants on your call asking if the fighter planes had been scrambled or jets were--military was involved in--

MR. CANNOLES: I think we were told once or twice based on information from our centers that, for example, NORAD had scrambled out of--out of--it wasn't P's [ph] Air Force Base, I forget where it was, but there were fighters dispatched from the Northeast and there were also fighters dispatched from Langley. So, I knew that on the telecon. The primary interface with NORAD--and I know this from being a controller and having worked with them before, is at the facility level where we have procedures for how they take off and get to where they need to go and so on and so forth. So, I was quite confident that that was taking place.

MS. HYDE: Actually, from a hijacking perspective, the protocols at the time were all the

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opposite, that the coordinator of hijacks at NORAD is supposed to be between the NMCC and headquarters folks here. What you just described is sort of an every-day control of airspace--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --and training scenario. Did you--were you familiar with the hijack protocols and the idea that the coordinator would reach out to the NMCC, in terms of getting fighters scrambled and that being the process?

MR. CANNOLES: I knew, generally, that in a hijack situation that NORAD was a player.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: Because I really didn't do hijacks or wasn't involved with security, I didn't know the precise procedures.

MR. KARA: Did you--were you aware of who the FAA headquarters hijack coordinator was on 9/11?

MR. CANNOLES: I think I did, I think it was Aviation Security, it should have been, to my way of thinking.

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MS. HYDE: You're right in thinking that somebody the office, that's not, you don't really have an individual, it's the office in charge of hijacking would be the security office--

MR. CANNOLES: Probably Ross Hamory, but--

MS. HYDE: Was the security [unintell.] office, by Canavan or was that a different office?

MR. CANNOLES: Was Canavan the guy that quit?

MR. WIEGAND [?]: You say ACS, right?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. WIEGAND: He was ACS-1 on 9/11.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, yeah, it was.

MR. KARA: That would have been the office that was the hijack coordinator?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah. And Air Traffic had a role in that, too. But it was on the operational side of the house, so it's not something that I had a lot of familiarity with.

MS. HYDE: You said a role in that too, where do we look for that? What do you mean?

MR. CANNOLES: I mean that they have an

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office that does pretty much constant interface with NORAD on security-related issues. They do a lot of work with the White House on intel matters, so they're kind of on the intel side of Air Traffic, if you will, for a lack of a better term. So, they would have had involvement in that.

MS. HYDE: Who was that office headed or part of that office on 9/11?

MR. CANNOLES: Jeff Griffith had formerly headed it. I think his deputy, Mike Scirillo [ph] was probably in charge of it on 9/11.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. CANNOLES: And a couple of individuals, Ricky Hostettler [ph] and Scott, his boss, were two individuals I can think of that did it.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. So, in terms of the fighter scramble issue, it's fair to say that your recollection was that you received information from participants on your call that fighters had been scrambled?

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

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MS. HYDE: And that your assumption, then, was that it was a matter that the Center should be handling in terms of that. And that you weren't giving any directions to anybody to involve fighters in any of these instances?

MR. CANNOLES: Absolutely not.

MS. HYDE: Well, stepping back from it, after you heard, even as early as the first two incidents that went into the towers. I assume that by the telecon, pretty soon, you concluded it was deliberate or not?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, it was part of an attack.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: Surely by the time the Pentagon gets hit, I would think it now seems like an attack. To the extent there's still information about others out there, why do, you know, the obvious thought would be, we're being attacked, the FAA can't control or do anything to respond to that situation, this is a matter for the military.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

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MS. HYDE: Were you concerned that the military may not be receiving all the information they needed to launch an air defence operation to guard against this attack?

MR. CANNOLES: As far as I recall, before the Pentagon was hit, I was aware that there were fighters in the air. And I assumed they were in the air because proper coordination had taken place at some level, military was alerted, and so on and so forth. I'm sure it would have been appropriate on this telecon for me, for example, to say, hey, have you guys notified the military about this? I may have done that, but I don't recall any specific instances. But, clearly my effort in bringing Colonel Atkins up there was so that the military would have a voice and, you know, set of hands in the activity that we were trying to manage.

MR. AZZARELLO: When did the thought that it might be an action--at what point in time of this sequence of events did you say, all right this is deliberate, it's not an accident, it's an attack?

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MR. CANNOLES: Probably just before the second airplane hit the World Trade Center or right after the second airplane hit the World Trade Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the second?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, it didn't take, it didn't actually have to wait, in your mind, have to wait till the third strike on the Pentagon to say this is deliberate?

MS. HYDE: Do you remember anything about this entry that's on your time line 10:14--fast-moving aircraft, 60 NW of DC Southeast-bound, headed towards DC?

MR. CANNOLES: I think that's the one I referenced earlier and that would have been either a description by Frank Hatfield or Dulles or Washington Center, one of the Eastern Region facilities.

MS. HYDE: Oh, I took that earlier description to be what we now know as 77, I'm sorry, were there two different--am I confusing two

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things? Before 77, do you recall a count-down situation where in-bound 20 miles, 15 miles--

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: --and then you sent Jeff to look at the window and smoke comes up from the Pentagon? Right?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Okay, separate from that, tell me what was your recollection of this other crash?

MR. CANNOLES: I'll bet it's the same--I'll bet it's the same, but I'll bet the time is not correct.

MS. HYDE: Well, we know from your--I see what you're saying. Because we know--you recalled the go look out the window and then there was smoke coming out the window. You can pretty much correlate that that was all about the Pentagon.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: This report, I think is a separate report, because I've seen it not just on your telecon, but it's not just--it's about that same time [unintell.] so my sense is that somebody

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was putting out to the system, then, that there was another fast-mover coming and what comes to mind, if it's 60 miles away, is some notion of 93.

MR. CANNOLES: Could have been, but I don't recall.

MS. HYDE: You don't recall anything about that?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MS. HYDE: It says at 10:20 DOD reports two more--two more, suspicious wayward--

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sure it happened, but I don't have any specific recollection.

MS. HYDE: Not communicating with the aircraft?

MR. CANNOLES: Like I said, there was--at any one time there were a number of suspicious activities--I think everybody's awareness was fairly heightened by then, and everything looked suspicious.

MR. AZZARELLO: The reference to the logs, I think you said Jeff either showed you or gave you from NORAD?

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MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if those, I think you'd seen, I think you [unintell.] with tail numbers in them. At certain points in the log, United Airlines tail number and American Airlines tail numbers, do you remember that?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who would have--who on your staff, if it wasn't you, yourself, would have been the person that would have looked through those logs and sort of see where, if at all, did that fit in the chronology with the FAA materials that the tapes stress [unintell.]

MR. CANNOLES: Probably either Tony Ferrante, Tony Mello, or Dan Diggins.

MS. HYDE: So, at some point, do you remember, in terms of the sharing back and forth between the two, the ATC and the WOC, did you send one of your folks down to sit at a position in the ATC and--May thought this might have happened--an Air Traffic person came down to participate in what was the Primary Net.

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MR. CANNOLES: I don't think it was one of my folks.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall getting information from other agencies that the ATC folks may have been gathering from the Primary Net?

MR. CANNOLES: No. We were reporting out, but we weren't getting a lot back.

MS. HYDE: Did Mr. Belger come into your call at any point?

MR. CANNOLES: Not that I recall.

MS. HYDE: Do you know where he was receiving his information from?

MR. CANNOLES: Jeff Griffith was with him and Jeff told me he was with him, so I knew they were down here, probably in the ACC or the SVTS.

MS. HYDE: Did you know who was on the SVTS, at any point?

MR. CANNOLES: No. As a matter of fact, it wasn't until two months later that I was briefed on the SVTS, when I became [unintell.] to the organization.

MS. HYDE: You mean, [unintell.]

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MR. CANNOLES: I knew essentially what was there, but I didn't know the parties and all that.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you say briefed on--you mean briefed specifically what occurred that day in connection with SVTS or--

MR. CANNOLES: No, [unintell.] capabilities. There were issues related to it that are pretty highly classified so, they did their job and they didn't tell me before then.

MS. HYDE: What was your sense of what the Administrator was doing?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't think I worried about it tremendously, but I, you know, if someone had asked me at the time, I would have been certain that she was with Belger down here.

MS. HYDE: You don't recall seeing he, either?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you assume she was with Monte Belger?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you see Peter Challen

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or Steve Brown much that morning?

MR. CANNOLES: Not that morning. I saw--I recall seeing Steve that afternoon and Peter may have bounced in maybe once or twice, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: During sort of the height of the activity, though, between, say, 8:00 and 11:00, you don't remember seeing--

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --either Steve or Peter?

MR. CANNOLES: No, no. The only superior that I saw at that point in time was Griffith.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that would also include Shirley Miller--you didn't see her down by your--was she down by your--unit--you have nothing to recall--

MR. CANNOLES: She might have dropped in, but I don't recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your main POC, though, was Griffith?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you go over this with your staff, like, who would have--well, let me just

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back up, before that, who on your staff would have contributed to pulling this together? Tony Ferrante?

MR. CANNOLES: Tony Mello.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tony Mello, Diggins, anyone else?

MR. CANNOLES: Doug Gould, Jeff Logue, I think Molly Boyne assisted in it B-o-y-n-e. Catherine Meyers [ph], I think those were the main players, if not all of them.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to what extent did you review this, if at all, with those that produced the product, along the way and/or after completion?

MR. CANNOLES: Both.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell us about that, the process or the review process.

MR. CANNOLES: We would have been turning this out as we developed it, so, you know, as quickly as we got a transcript, I'm sure I was giving it to Griffith and later Peacock. So, and some pieces of it were developed, I'm sure much, earlier than others. And we kind of refined this

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thing as we went through it, too, you know, there were political needs to be met, e.g., the hearings that were going to take place.

MR. AZZARELLO: Congressional hearings?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, therefore, you know, kind of a plain language synopsis became important at some point. I'm not even sure if we incorporated one in that. But I think we had that thing produced, I don't know, 72 hours, probably.

MR. AZZARELLO: You have quotes from actual transmissions made from the various centers, so--

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --is it safe to assume that somebody was reviewing the actual tapes--

MR. CANNOLES: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and transcripts that's how they were produced. And there's actually specific times when the secondary radar [unintell.] transponders were shut off or changed?

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, I guess you had the

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end pats [ph], and the radar [unintell.] as available to you?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: What other sources, to your knowledge was available for review as this was an ongoing project--or were all transcripts from any facility I would imagine would be available if they wanted to pull from them?

MR. CANNOLES: Correct and we had those--if memory serves me correctly, we had most of the key re-recordings in here that afternoon, electronically. Most of the radar data, we had the ability to ship around electronically, too, so I think we had that that afternoon, as well.

MR. : Did anybody start working the issue of buying in American 77 and [inaudible] dropping completely off the radar?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I don't think we got around to that for a day or so. That was the one in--was that Indie Center?

MR. : That's Indie Center.

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, I think, as I recall,

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Monte Belger asked me that question and I said, you know, we probably know the answer, but we're going to probably have to go back and research it. And at that point we involved airways facilities and they got into radar sort boxes and all that kind of stuff that, you know, finally led us to the conclusion that, hey, gee whiz, we don't have any primary radar coverage in that area.

MR. : And was that analytical pushed any further than that or was it just a one-time shot to figure out that you didn't have primary coverage? Did anybody ever ask the more compelling question, why didn't you have primary coverage?

MR. CANNOLES: No, the agency had, you know, pretty much discarded primary coverage as an essential tool, you know, in the preceding years. So, that question didn't come up. I mean, obviously, when we didn't have data on that airplane, it was very unfortunate, but--and it was my understanding, actually, that there was one system that tracked it, but it wasn't somehow

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presented to the processor.

MR. : From your investigating perspective, wouldn't it be important to you to have the primary capability?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, but--

MR. : And the but is?

MR. CANNOLES: The but is the agency decided we didn't need it anymore so I didn't have it at my disposal.

MR. : Did you get a vote on that?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember, did you put a backer on figuring out, as well [unintell.]

MR. CANNOLES: That was something, yeah, I'm sure I did, I don't know--it was probably Diggins. Diggins is an automator and he's got a very, very high degree of understanding of automation and systems, much better than my own.

MR. AZZARELLO: As each of the four flights were broken down, Dave, on 11 and 175, with a specific reference to NEDS logs and time of FAA

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notification of NEDS? I'm sorry, FAA notification--yeah, to NEDS about the hijackings of 11, let's say a specific 8:40, the Northeast Defense Sector logs represent they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration on the events 711, then a similar entry for 175 at 9:05.

There are not entries, however, for American Airlines 77 and United Airlines 93 about notification, at all, from the FAA to NEDS about those two flights. Did you discuss that with the staff?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sure I did at the time. And I recall the question was debated rather hotly around the time of the hearings.

MR. AZZARELLO: What do you recall being the nature of the debate--the hot debate?

MR. CANNOLES: The nature of the debate was did the FAA give the military sufficient time? Did the military take too much time to respond? You know, who's at fault here?

As I recall, the first word went out to them, I don't know, very early on in the process

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through Otis RADCOM.

MR. AZZARELLO: The word went out to who?

MR. CANNOLES: To the military and I couldn't tell you who the specific detachment was or anything. But a supervisor, I believe at Boston Center or at Otis or something made the first call out and said, hey, tell the military this is what we see going on. I believe that was--

MR. AZZARELLO: That they put on with respect to American 11?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: I recall that was the first signal out. The second flight--the second flight, it occurs to me it took us some 20 minutes to get to them or something like that. And I could be wrong, I'm really dealing off ancient memory here.

MR. AZZARELLO: On United you're talking about the second?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. CANNOLES: The second airplane that

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hit the World Trade Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: Um--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I don't know if you--I'm going to ask you, if it was, the controller on the position when [unintell.] was tracking 11 as a primary, as handed off to him as a primary by Boston Center--

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --it just so happened that it was his own lucky day, that when 175 turned off its transponder, and went off course, it was on his scope, too.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, there was some lag in that controller noticing, maybe roughly a five-, six-, seven-minute lag from that controller noticing that, wow, there's a [unintell.] targeting host--a tracking host and it's a different transponder signal.

But then that was passed to Mike McCormick and Mike, when he met with us, I don't know

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[unintell.] some frustration he had in trying to communicate that to the Eastern Region, when he became aware that we might have a second hijack in the system on this 175 and he had some attempts to contact the Eastern Region, but that on more than a few occasions was told by some staff people ongoing that they could not and refused to interrupt regarding a hijacking, which was obviously American
11--

MR. CANNOLES: Wow.

MR. AZZARELLO: --was that considered at all with--

MR. CANNOLES: I've never heard that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: You actually didn't get started until after that, though in your telecon.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your telecon didn't get started until after the second hit.

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, that's on 175. But now, going forward to the last two flights, I mean, it does sort of--I mean, let's be honest here, it

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jumps out at you. You're looking at notifications from the FAA to the military. And, as you said, there was a debate or a spirited--it's my word, I guess, debate or discussion about when did the military have notification? And was it their reaction time that lagged or was it FAA reaction time in either recognition or communicating the information over to the military.

And that's when it jumps out at you that there are times on 11 and 175, pursuant to NEDS logs of when they were notified. Now, obviously, from the FAA perspective, you don't just have NEDS logs or NEDS data available to you, but you have a host of FAA data and I would venture to say that the closest or probably the most accurate to the ground troop that would occur that day are tapes of controllers who would have been on position when that plane ran afoul of it's course or when screaming was heard on-board--

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and I would, I mean, I'm assuming that, to that degree, that those tapes by

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your people were looked at to see, well, when did we first have an opportunity, whether it was recognized or not by the controllers--was our first opportunity to recognize something was a miss--

MR. CANNOLES: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: --was that done?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: A third check?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, then, I would imagine that there was some specific discussion about, well, what did we say about three and four, there's just--there's nothing in here, what does that mean? does that mean we didn't notify them? Does that mean we did tell the military, but we disagree with the military about when we did notify them, based on what our records say and what their records say?

MR. CANNOLES: I never had to answer those questions. But it was--it has always been my assumption that by the time the first two airplanes hit the World Trade Center, the military was firmly

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plugged into this series of events with FAA, through the SVTS, if nothing else. And I don't know that to be factual. But that's always been my assumption.

MR. AZZARELLO: You assume that they are assuming and going forward, but what about when your people are then digging in sort of a source document, the primary source type of stuff, like, transcripts, tapes, FAA logs, Command Center logs. And then, now, they come back to you after some effort--I'm sure a lot of effort and hours spent in listening to tapes and reviewing documents.

And I mean, I'm imagining that this happened. And if I'm wrong, then stop me and tell me, but I imagine if they reviewed a lot of these source materials from the FAA perspective they had some military documents, like logs and they would have reached a conclusion as to when on each of the four aircraft, the FAA made a notification to the military. Did that occur?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't think so. And it was my conclusion that there weren't, nor does

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there have to be four separate notifications. That, because, again, NEDS cedes whoever it was plugged into what the FAA was doing by this point in time, they were getting it real time the same as we were.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, was that--was that a topic of discussion? Did you and your staff conclude that there were not separate notifications on 93 and 77, but that you assumed because some element of the military was already plugged into on 11 and 175, that that notification would spill over and cover those two planes, is that what--

MR. CANNOLES: That was my assumption.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's the conclusion you drew after discussion with your staff?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Well, you know, because of the nature, David, we know of the system, that you have centers that control pieces of the pie of airspace, and all these aircraft were involved and went wayward or NORDO from different centers, and one center doesn't know what the other center is

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doing--

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: --and so they said all the centers knew what [unintell.] was largely from your telecon. You know, that when you go back out to the center world, then you're three states away from somebody else.

MR. CANNOLES: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: So, if I could just sort of ask you if that was your assumption, given that these were all aircraft that went wayward or off, as you know when you reviewed the investigation in Cleveland and Indie that two happened to both be in Boston or New York right next to each other, but the other two aircraft were miles away in different airspace, with different people handling them.

MR. CANNOLES: Well, again, remember that the third aircraft was assumed to be a crash. So, I know of no protocol that would have the FAA--I mean, yes, down the list in accident notification, you would call somebody affiliated with the military. You certainly wouldn't call NORAD and

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say, hey we had an airplane crash.

MS. HYDE: And why was that assumed to be a crash?

MR. CANNOLES: Simultaneous loss of radar and radio and the disappearance of a target after that.

MS. HYDE: The key there is the third factor because--

MR. CANNOLES: No, no.

MS. HYDE: --well, we know that the other two planes had that same set of circumstances, the only difference being that, I guess the happenstance, there happened to be primary radar coverage over in that part of the country.

MR. CANNOLES: But I'm not sure they turned their transponders off, either.

MS. HYDE: Eleven did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Eleven did.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Totally, didn't put it back on.

MR. CANNOLES: I know one changed

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code--two of them changed code, one of them turned off.

MR. AZZARELLO: One changed code and the second did--

MS. HYDE: 175 changed code, 11 turned off.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay. But the simultaneous loss of radio and radar would have been the first triggering event. And I, you know, you guys presumably interviewed the controller at Indianapolis. I don't know if the controller at Indianapolis was aware of what was going on in New York.

MS. HYDE: They were, some of them were aware of what was going on in New York. Command Center, actually, by the time this happened, 8:56 we'd already had a hit on the first Trade Center and, certainly, by the second one or whatever, calls were going out, but [unintell.] penetrated in one way or the other. As I said, let me just to follow this. So, and what you speak about the sort of false notification of Kentucky, whatever, that

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really happened an hour and a half later. But when you go look at the military side of things, they actually kept good records there, and so, yes, that false reporting came back in, but it's, like, 11:00 o'clock.

So for two hours, you have a system where and you were in charge of the investigation that day, so you know, I don't, certainly, tend to tell you what, I'm sure you or your staff must have found out from going and talking with these folks. But I guess, maybe I should stop there and say are--were you aware of any of this from your investigation, from your efforts that day or in your role after that day?

MR. CANNOLES: I was aware of the concern and the criticism about timely notification, certainly. And I remember we put forth a lot of diligent effort trying to find out, okay, when was the first contact made and did what and so on and so forth. But I can also remember that--and I'm surprised, today, when you tell me that we didn't make any notifications on the last two. There had

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to have been communications between the FAA and the military. But it's my sense that the military was engaged with us fully at that point, so they knew about it as quickly as we did.

MS. HYDE: Probably, the FAA, as we know [unintell.] you're absolutely right, Dave, dead center. The FAA--somebody in the FAA was talking to somebody in the military, the problem being that between the center structure and Herndon and the WOC and the ACC and the Cannoles and the NCC that you don't get--the twain shall not meet, in terms of the people who actually have the information about the aircraft and the people who, from the military, are passing on.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MS. HYDE: And, as a leader, I mean, again, tell us, this wasn't your billet on 9/11, your billet, as I understand it was the investigations part, just sort of I think post facto looking at it, not the day of. But from your vantage point of looking at it afterwards, did you reach these conclusions, that there was not the

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notifications between the facilities and MEADS
[ph]?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I'm sure I did,
but, again, it was with the comfort and security
that I felt we were joined at the hip with DOD by
that point in time so that the appropriate
notifications would be made.

MS. HYDE: I'm trying to understand why
you had that comfort and security, what was the--

MR. CANNOLES: Because of my limited
knowledge of hijack procedures and how we interface
with DOD and other entities, I was pretty sure that
a net and a conference had been set up by that
point in time and that all the players were active
in it. I didn't have time to go check on it. And
it wasn't my role to do that.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm, that morning, certainly
not. Afterwards, when you were--

MR. CANNOLES: But I was pretty sure that
was being taken care of.

MS. HYDE: Okay. Hi.

MR. : [unintell.] Deputy Chief

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Counsel.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. : My boss [unintell.] talking to Mark [unintell.] and he asked us to give this to you right away. Here's what--we found out that there was a document back in March of '02 that MITRE had put together concerning 9/11, and we never formally got it. But when we were talking to one of our folks, Nancy Kalmonowski [ph], who you're supposed to interview later today, we realized this is something you're going to want to see. Our biggest concern was that because you were talking to her today, we want to make sure that you had it so that if you wanted to discuss it with her how it was put together whatever, you wouldn't be surprised. Mr. Marcus asked us to get it to you and let you know. He said get a copy to you, he wasn't looking for it directly.

MS. HYDE: Well, that's okay.

MR. : So, I brought two copies here. Basically what happened is, Nancy had conversations with MITRE, oh, we think somewhere

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about October of '01, about putting together kind of a summary of what happened, recommendations. There were discussions for about three or four months, a meeting, maybe around about February. And then, in March, she was invited to kind of see what they tentatively put together. Other things were going on in FAA and, so, it wasn't important to get it, so we never asked for it; we never got it. And again, it wasn't something FAA generated, and, frankly, that's why it took us a little while to recognize that it's something that you'd want.

But, what it has, in addition to summaries of what they looked at, there are some MITRE recommendations in there of things that they thought would be a good idea. Because we got this today, we've asked some of our folks to look at those recommendations. Because we figure once you see them, you're probably going to want to know from FAA, either what we've done or what we think of them.

The MITRE folks, I assume, if you wanted to talk to them about why they recommended they'd

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be willing to do it. And we kind of gave them a heads up you may want to talk to them.

MR. KARA: MITRE was contacted?

MR. : Yeah, we, they are a federally financed research and development corporation. We have an existing contract with them for lots and lots of services. And so, this is something we can routinely get from them about doing a special procurement.

MS. HYDE: Okay, you know what I might recommend? We're sort of ten minutes away from finishing with this witness and I very much appreciate you wanted to get this to us. We're running a little bit behind, anyway.

MR. : Okay.

MS. HYDE: I think I've understood about 60 percent of what you've said, but I have a lot of questions for you. But--

MR. : [unintell.] come back later.

MS. HYDE: I don't want to take this gentleman's time--

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MR. : Okay.

MS. HYDE: --and ask any questions. So, why don't we leave this and then, if Mr. Wiegand can find you right after--

MR. : I'll be in the Deputy's office waiting for you. All right, sorry to interrupt.

MR. KARA: I'm just glad it wasn't mine, James. [unintell.]

MS. HYDE: We were almost done with May's issue [unintell.] I think we're supposed to be talking about the weather or baseball or something. Since I know nothing about baseball.

MR. CANNOLES: I got conscripted. I mean, we recognize we could have done a lot of things a whole lot better in the way of communications. I felt pretty good about being given a challenge to try to turn this into something above what it was on September 11 and May was, you know, it's real easy for an old manager to be stuck in their ways and not want to progress and change. But she was wonderful

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MS. HYDE: May, yeah.

MR. CANNOLES: Had a good time working with her.

MS. HYDE: Actually reminds me we're [unintell.] but I do want to tap your knowledge of all the changes that have taken place.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so let's just wrap up in terms of, again, not the hat that you were wearing that morning, because that morning, you didn't have those responsibilities. But the look-back effort afterwards. The effort that went into producing that document and the other documents. I mean, is it the case that some of the things that we're discovering two years later having gone and schlepped out to all these facilities and talked to all your people about, you know, the conversations were happening, but the notifications were going between the right people who had to be having them.

Was that stuff that you knew because of your efforts after in the weeks or couple weeks after 9/11?

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MR. CANNOLES: I gotta--being totally candid--I thought that the system worked as well as it could, given it's design on 9/11. I think it did pretty much what it was designed to do. But, yes, given the magnitude of the tragedy and the way we performed in light of the attack on the United States, we recognized a lot of things to change. And I, you know, was part of the way things got changed subsequently. So, yes.

MS. HYDE: You generally answered the question, I just--on the specific point, is it the case that before hearing us today, that you always did believe that notifications took place [unintell.] on the last two flights, 77 and 93?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: You did?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: You thought that they--even sitting here today, that before you walked in here, that those notifications did occur?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, and I, you know, I don't know--I sit here with a degree of comfort

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when I say that. And I don't know if it was because Cheryl Atkins had joined my conference and she was sitting there and aware of it or if it was just because I had some knowledge of how hijacks were run that I--

MS. HYDE: Well, and those examples make me think that you're addressing the response to that morning.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Actually, I can see how you would think and have that degree of confidence that morning. I'm saying afterwards, when you were charged with heading up the look-back effort, did you think from your investigation that those specific notifications had happened? What you learned afterwards, when you had your staff go out there and put it all together?

MR. CANNOLES: Obviously, not from the product we prepared, but I think this is an accurate recollection. I think I can recall a conversation with a member of my staff saying it doesn't matter, the military was working with us by

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then. They knew about these things when we did.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because, I want to just clarify an early statement you made, Dave. You said that you didn't--you were surprised until I told you that there was apparently no notifications on the last two. Just so we're clear, I think what I said is that what jumps out at me as I look at this summary, which, was prepared, as you say, in part for questions that Congress is going to have on who knew what when, what they do with the information.

I said what jumped out at me as you read it is there's reference to NEDS logs and specific notifications on the first two and there's nothing, it's just the lack of an entry regarding the last two. And is the reader supposed to conclude from that that there was no entry or what is the reader supposed to conclude from that, was my first question.

And then I asked if you discussed that with your staff, because I would imagine that that

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would have jumped out at you and you would have said, all right, well, we have specific notification times on the first two, which would show how much time, if any, the military had to reaction, why don't we have them on three and four? Did you have that specific discussion with your staff?

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sure I did. And, again, in the case of 93, if that's the one that crashed in Somerset, I would not have been surprised to see no notification there--

MR. AZZARELLO: Why is that?

MR. CANNOLES: Again, because it was a presumed crash.

MS. HYDE: I thought you said--

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sorry,--

MS. HYDE: Seventy-seven's out of Indie's airspace.

MR. CANNOLES: Seventy-seven's Indie airspace--77 would not have surprised me, a presumed crash, I can fully understand nobody talking to NORAD about it. The other one, again,

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if I'd have seen it, I would have said, hmm, we didn't find anything in the logs, well, they were working with us by then, so.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, good. Ninety-three, as we said, the controllers were watching, they were having discussions, actually there's more than two or more Command Center discussions where the primary target is being tracked, with the knowledge that there's screaming on-board or screaming on the frequency and the threat of a bomb on-board. And, you know, when you put that sort of against the background of your other comment, that there was a spirited or heated debate about who knew what when--was that--let's just focus on 93, what do you recall being discussed about the notification or lack thereof from the military perspective and the FAA perspective on United 93, which is the last plane that went down in Pennsylvania?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't have any recollection of anything specific to that flight. I remember statements on the telecon indicating the airplane was heading towards Pittsburgh. I

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remember a subsequent discussion of the airplane being crashed near Somerset which followed an assumption by somebody with a false report of a Kentucky crash and the one near Camp David. I don't recall any conversation relative to the--

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall any conversations with your staff about the reporting of each separate flight from FAA facility to--on up that chain of command and then, if it was reported over to the military? For example, when you look at 11, there's sort of a chronology of Boston Center and then the military being notified.

When you look at 77 and 11, they talk about notifying the region on the WOC, but you don't sort of see that chain of reporting on the other two. Was that discussed? Did you know, that?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't recall.

MS. HYDE: Let's talk for a couple minutes about the changes. Your new position, explain or maybe the position that you were given immediately after 9/11, Director of Emergency--

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MR. CANNOLES: Operations and communications. In November of 2001, Monte Belger called Frank Hatfield down here, here's Frank, again.

MS. HYDE: Frank's all over the place.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: I don't know how we've missed Frank.

MR. KARA: We know how we missed him.

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, but you're going to have to go to Baghdad to find him for the next month. You don't need to talk to him, don't worry about it.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. CANNOLES: He brought Frank down and he said, hey look, you know, we could have done a lot better things in the way of communications, you know. Frank, take a look at it and see what you think. Frank's a respected division manager. He's got a fresh field perspective. So, Frank got in touch with me for a lot of it, because he knows I have experience with it. So, anyway, when he got

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through with the work group. Monte asked me--he asked Frank and Frank said, no. He asked me if I'd head up a new Emergency Operations and Communications Group. And the idea was to modernize what the Command Center had in the way of capabilities--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: --personnel, you know, a number of other things. So, this telecon that I started on September 11 became a living thing. We have never hung up the phone. And one of the early things we did with that as that day progressed was bring the military, NORAD, NEDS, SEDS, a host of other people into it.

So, the first think I did was institutionalize that telephone conference, which is still going on in the next room, as the Domestic Events Network.

And that way, today, we assure that, lest there be any confusion, or late reports to anybody, that right now, as we speak, if there's a lost communications with somebody in the system, it's

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reported here and NORAD gets it the same time we get it.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: We also put in some other improvements. For example, we record that now so that, God forbid, there's ever another tragedy like this we can reconstruct it and find out precisely what happened.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: And, in addition to that, upgraded the equipment infrastructure; hired some people; brought on some supervisory people with a broader knowledge base, perhaps than those that we had at that time. And we've also brought in a liaison from TSA that sits beside us and they're in the operation 24 hours a day so we can coordinate activities.

MS. HYDE: So, where you definitely involved in working with NORAD to figure out--

MR. CANNOLES: Nope.

MS. HYDE: --you still didn't--you worked for the FAA side of how to talk to NORAD?

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MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MS. HYDE: Were you in the group that was out there introducing yourselves and finally sort of understanding NORAD's operations?

MR. CANNOLES: No, that was Jeff Griffith, primarily and, later Linda Schuessler.

MS. HYDE: That's all. So, if you had to name the changes to post-9/11, there are physical changes to the WOC; we've heard about the staffing of the WOC; which included supervisors, plus the PSA person, since PSA was set up; and then there's the BEN. What else is missing?

MR. CANNOLES: Those are the biggies. The BEN's probably the single largest enhancement, I think, we've made to monitoring the nation's airspace. And that may or may not have been described to you. But that consistently has somewhere between 40 and 50 participants between our facilities, law enforcement, various military entities. We tried, based on what we learned from 9/11 to make sure that all the players are plugged in all the time, so there's never any doubt who has

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what when.

MS. HYDE: [unintell.] in the field and talked to [unintell.] about it.

MR. KARA: Everyone speaks highly of its usefulness.

MR. CANNOLES: Good.

MR. AZZARELLO: The other two, do you have those other more minor changes?

MS. HYDE: Which ones?

MR. CANNOLES: Equipment upgrades.

MS. HYDE: The equipment and the physical changes to the WOC and the ability in staffing.

MR. CANNOLES: TSA liaisons.

MS. HYDE: What about NORAD liaisons? Cheryl Atkins, you know, 10 of her or something?

MR. CANNOLES: Air Traffic handles that. When I took over the Emergency Operations, I left the Air Traffic family. So, Air Traffic still continues to do that on their own because of security requirements. So, as the host of the BEN, for example, you know, I know that NORAD's a party to it, but Air Traffic determines who in NORAD that

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should be, through their coordination and liaison with the military.

MS. HYDE: I see. The people, post-9/11 working with NORAD are the Air Traffic side, you're doing upgrades here that would facilitate communications with NORAD. And I assume there's a bunch of facilities people that are joining with NORAD on the radar issues?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes, yes.

MS. HYDE: Do you know who those people were?

MR. CANNOLES: A guy named Greg somebody who went back to the Great Lakes Region, started the effort. I can't think of his last name at the moment. I don't know who is currently doing it, but there was a massive effort right after 9/11 to provide FAA radar and radio capabilities in the NORAD. And I got a couple of early-on briefings that the project was underway. I don't know what the--I know they had some successes, but I don't know what the status of it is.

MS. HYDE: And the position that you're

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taking soon, is that also a coordination--

MR. CANNOLES: No, this is brand-new, this is a brand-new one that the Secretary of Transportation announced today. It's the Director of Air Traffic Safety Oversight.

MS. HYDE: What would be the responsibilities of that position?

MR. CANNOLES: I will be regulating Air Traffic from a safety standpoint. I will be to Air Traffic as Flight Standards is to the air carriers.

MS. HYDE: I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is a new position that was created?

MR. CANNOLES: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: When was it created?

MR. CANNOLES: We started talking about doing this about five years ago and I actually participated in a study to build the concept and it mimics what many of the European countries have done as far as safety oversight in air traffic. And it also complies with some international requirements that were levied on us that we're

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trying to stand up for.

MS. HYDE: Safety from the perspective though more of the sort of day-to-day safety with airspace management issues or emergency crises? It's more the former, yes?

MR. CANNOLES: More the former, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it be day-to-day stuff?

MR. CANNOLES: The regulator.

MS. HYDE: The regulator.

MR. CANNOLES: So if they want to change a procedure that could adversely affect safety, they've got to get my buy-in to it, that sort of thing.

MS. HYDE: Okay. Well, in terms of looking back on the day, now, do you have anymore thoughts that you think would be important for us to understand, or to know. Also, do you have any recommendations?

MR. CANNOLES: I think you've seen evidence of the recommendations I would provide and that's basically in our ability to communicate m

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ore rapidly with NORAD and others.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: In retrospect, I don't think anybody anticipated a threat that looked like this one, and I wish we had.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think that that line solves as to the best it could be solved, the need to or meets the need to communicate rapidly with NORAD and others at a player's insistence?

MR. CANNOLES: Absolutely.

MS. HYDE: Before 9/11 and since you've held so many Air Traffic positions in the field in here, were there exercises between you and NORAD to avoid doing a hijacking or a crisis of this type?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I'm not sure about the hijacking stuff, I'm sure there was. But we did exercises but it was more along the lines of national defense stuff. And, again, I was never on the security side of the house, so I can't say for sure whether or not they did things with hijackings. I'm sure somebody did, but I'm just

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wasn't--

MS. HYDE: But even in Air Traffic Control, there are some folks out in the field remember I did do this exercise, but it was almost always of a tabletop flavor, that they weren't real people real participants.

MR. CANNOLES: We did, I can remember operational exercises where, you know, we're going to scramble these airplanes; we're going to do this; we're going to do that and, you know, we'd play those games with them. And they weren't tabletop. For the most part they were very real exercises. But I can't remember anything ever specific to a hijacking.

MS. HYDE: So what would be the emergency crisis that we'd scramble aircraft, like, what would be a scenario that would include--

MR. CANNOLES: The way I grew up with NORAD was NORAD was to defend our shores. So, as a controller down in Norfolk, Virginia, for years, you know, I'm familiar with, you know, unknown airplanes being picked up and the Air Defense

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Identification Zone and NORAD scrambling and us participating, and so on and so forth.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: I just want to go back, briefly, Dave to two areas on the day of. On 93, after it crashed, was there any report then, according to you, given your position in aircraft or aviation accidents and instances was there specific reports floating in to you once it was confirmed on the ground that there was a crash in Pennsylvania? Did you receive that type of information that confirmed there was an aircraft down there?

MR. CANNOLES: I remember that coming across the telecon and it was a report from another--it was confirmation from another aircraft that was in the vicinity and saw the airplane crash.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, second, and lastly, back to 77. I want to know if you were aware of: At the same, I guess, overlapping the time when it was considered that it might have gone--the plane

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might have crashed somewhere on the Ohio/Kentucky border, there were still discussions and efforts from Command Center of the time located. With the information being--lost, we don't know where it is and are unable to locate it. It was completely off radar and they were saying they were trying to find it. And they were reaching out to the various centers, even going back to Dulles, saying, hey, is it on the ground there? Is there any chance it didn't take off? Were you keeping--were you being kept abreast of that effort? Were you aware it was even going on on the Command Center side through other FAA facilities?

MR. CANNOLES: Not directly, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you independently making efforts, though, to see if it was still out there as opposed to just assuming that it had crashed?

MR. CANNOLES: We were making efforts and I can't tell you with certainty if they were independent because the Command Center might have been operating off what we were asking them. So,

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it could have been one and the same.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. You say you would consider it as a possibility, but you didn't conclude that it had crashed without some more definitive evidence?

MR. CANNOLES: Right.

MR. KARA: Based on the package that was just given to us during the course of this interview, it appears to [unintell.] the MITRE Corporation conducted a series of interview with key personnel. Were you interviewed by MITRE for this study?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't remember.

MR. KARA: And they have an appendix which refers specifically to the Operation you set up and that they used the formalized term Air Traffic Situation Room, is that there terminology or was that the terminology that was developed for what you established?

MR. CANNOLES: That came, yeah, that the Air Traffic Situation Room [Technical interruption.] --on this corner of the building

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for a while and then, before the Domestic Events Network it was known as a Sit Room.

MR. KARA: And you don't remember being interviewed. Do you remember if any of your people were interviewed for this and if those interviews were taped?

MR. CANNOLES: I don't remember being interviewed personally. I don't know if anybody in AT-20 was. And if they were and if they were taped, I'd be very surprised.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. HYDE: Well, in terms of producing this report, not that we've had more than 30 seconds to look at it, but--

MR. CANNOLES: Please don't tell me there's a chapter with my name on it.

MS. HYDE: I'm sure there will be.

MR. KARA: No but there's an appendix that describes what you just talked to us about.

MS. HYDE: What I'm struck by is your office, or your staff. I would think would have fed them some of this information unless they

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totally created the wheel with that and started from ground zero. I would think that your office with have worked sort of close with these guys in doing this.

MR. CANNOLES: Well, remember, I left that office two months after September 11.

MS. HYDE: Right. So, did you know of this effort?

MR. CANNOLES: You know, I think I heard about it, but not until James Whitlow came in here and presented it to you, did I recall, it was, I don't think it was anything I was involved in. And, one other clarification: This thing that started out very small with my staff, you know, like I said, they never hung the phone up, so this thing--my people eventually went back to investigative work.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. CANNOLES: We only stayed till about midnight on the 11th and the next day we were briefing the Secretary and the FBI and we were doing what we typically did. And other people

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moved in behind us. Because now came a need for, you know, granting waivers to emergency operators in the airspace; and coordinating foreign and international flights and doing this and doing that.

So, there was a migration. So, there were people who worked the Air Traffic Sit Room, which, again, I think is a generic discussion of the BEN and they could have worked with them, I don't know.

MS. HYDE: Okay, actually, this is all a look-back effort, so it all goes to the job that you went back to doing September 12 as opposed to the job that you ended up doing on September 11.

MR. CANNOLES: Okay.

MS. HYDE: So, this all speaks to that side, just going back and recreating what the effort was. Do you know in the two months before you left that office was anybody on your staff working with these people to put this together?

MR. CANNOLES: Not that I'm aware of.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the after-the-fact review in an attempt to [unintell.] earlier when

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you referred to this, it was a bit of a hot topic [unintell.] especially between the military and the FAA, do you recall there being exchanges or being present at any meetings or conferences where there was a NORAD representative present to discuss the issue of notification of the planes?

MR. CANNOLES: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about your staff, did they at any time tell you, well, we think that we notified NORAD at x:time, but someone from NORAD's telling us otherwise? Anything like that? I'm trying to get a sense for why?

MR. CANNOLES: Yeah, there were discussions like that and specifically I go back to the log that Jeff Griffith showed me or gave me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. CANNOLES: I think, if I recall, that was classified and I think he showed me the document, but I think we did a comparison of times and we found some ambiguity between them.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember that even being discussed between NORAD element and

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[unintell.]

MR. CANNOLES: I don't ever remember talking to anybody from NORAD about it. Dan Diggins or Tony Mello may have.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you could help me out with what would be the source of your basing that statement that you know it was a topic of hot discussion?

MR. CANNOLES: Oh, I'm sorry, I was referring to, for example, I recall there being some debate in the media. Or perhaps, it was a question posed to the Administrator on the Hill. But I recalled there being a question, about you know, who did what to whom and, you know, did everybody do the right things?

MR. AZZARELLO: To the extent that you recall it being hotly debated, it would be external to the FAA and not being debated by the FAA either internally or with NORAD representatives?

MR. CANNOLES: I know we debated it with the NFA, I mean, because there was concern that, you know, did we do the right thing, and I think in

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the final analysis we felt like, yeah, pretty much we had.

MR. AZZARELLO: You debated it, I'm sorry, with who?

MR. CANNOLES: Within the FAA.

MS. HYDE: I think we're good. I think we've got all afternoon.

MR. CANNOLES: I'm sorry, I didn't do it.

MR. KARA: I just looked, Appendix T is the Air Traffic Situation Room and Notes from 11 September, but it starts later in the day, it doesn't start with the morning of.

MR. : You have to forgive us, but somebody gave them.

MR. AZZARELLO: That concludes the interview, it's 3:40 p.m. with Dave Cannoles, thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

LYNNE OSMUS

BY

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN AZZARELLO

SPECIAL AGENT MILES KARA

SPECIAL AGENT JEFF BROWN

DAVID WIEGAND, FAA COUNSEL'S OFFICE

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

2:27 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. KARA: It's March 30th. We're at FAA headquarters about to begin an interview with Lynne Osmus. I'm Miles Kara, 9-11 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9-11 Commission.

MR. WIEGAND: David Wiegand, FAA Counsel.

MS. OSMUS: Lynne Osmus, Assistant Administrator for Security.

MR. KARA: And we will be joined shortly by John Azzarello, 9-11 Commission. Lynne, we've had a chance to look over the interview that was conducted by Team 7, and we understand that you were late arriving that day.

MS. OSMUS: Yes, I was.

MR. KARA: Just to set some common ground if you could pick it up that morning as you're notified at home and just walk us through your getting here and where you go--

MS. OSMUS: Okay, sure. Claudio Manno called me at home. He was our director of our Office of Intelligence at the time. I was home getting over the flu and called me somewhere after

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9 o'clock, give or take, maybe a little bit earlier than that, and left a phone message because I was actually downstairs in the basement where we don't have a phone, and he said just wanted to let you know there's an aircraft that perhaps has been hijacked. It's off course heading towards New York City. So I immediately hopped in the shower because I figured no matter what happened, I better get in there. My boss, head of the Security organization, was out of town that day, so that was another reason I wanted to get in.

By the time I got out of the shower, Claudio had left another message saying that aircraft that he had talked about before had evidently flown into the World Trade Center. So I tried to call him back and the circuits were busy. I was never able to get a line through. By the time I got into the car and heard Lee Giopino on the news, he was reporting two aircraft. And so I made my way into Washington. I live out in Gainesville about 40 miles due west of here.

You know, it was one of those surreal

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things. Hardly any traffic on the road until I got inside the Beltway on 56, and then there were more unmarked, black police vehicles than I thought existed in northern Virginia, screaming past me every few seconds. I mean amazing, and I got into the Roosevelt Bridge and hit a long traffic crawl from the river and sat there for probably 30 or 40 minutes watching pedestrians walk out of town. This would have been--I'm sure I consulted my watch at the time, somewhere around 10:30-ish and I think maybe a little closer to--

MR. KARA: This is after the Pentagon has been hit then.

MS. OSMUS: I think at this time, right, all four aircraft had been involved, and, yes, after the Pentagon because I could see the smoke coming out of the Pentagon while I was sitting on the bridge. Probably took me, oh, I would guess, 45 minutes, maybe even an hour, to get from the bridge to this building just because the city was gridlocked. And then of course everybody was told to vacate, so I had a hard time getting in the

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garage because not many people were coming into the building, but anyway got that taken care of.

Came into my office which is on the third floor here as you know to check in with my immediate staff and find out what the status of my boss, who actually was in San Juan, to make sure he was trying to get transportation back, which he was. And then I came up to the 10th floor to the Operations Center, poked my head in to see Lee Longmeyer who was the director of Operations at the time. He was the executive in the Aviation Command Center, which we called it at the time, and then went into classified facility next door where Jane Garvey was seated along with Monty Belger and two or three other people, and for the life of me I can't tell you who they were because I just don't remember. But my initial conversations with Jane was to see what IOU's we had for her and kind of get the status of what was going on. And then went back out and talked to Lee a little bit. Went downstairs to try and figure out what we knew, what we didn't know, and, you know, to think it through

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a little bit to figure out what our next steps ought to be.

Part of what we did subsequently was, as you know, we had some staff sitting in the Aviation Command Center getting reports in. We had our principle Security inspectors up there that were in communication with United and American specifically--

MR. KARA: Let me actually stop you at that point and share with you a rather sophisticated schematic--

MS. OSMUS: Isn't it, though?

MR. KARA: Actually May Avery helped us put that together. And just to orient you, we believe this is where Lee was sitting in the ACC, and these were the nine positions or so--

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. KARA: --four in front of him. The WOC where May Avery and her people were over here. This is the mock. David Kenols was down here and what we now know is the Air Traffic situation. And of the two secure facilities you mentioned, one of

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them is this skip area over here, but then there was also this secure video teleconferencing system over here.

So let's drop back a second to you coming up from the third floor to the 10th floor. And you enter this complex and hit which direction?

MS. OSMUS: I would have come in through the walk--take that back. Something about today's setup.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm John Azzarello. How are you?

MS. OSMUS: Nice to meet you, John.

MR. AZZARELLO: Nice to meet you.

MR. KARA: I got started already, John.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's fine.

MS. OSMUS: Right, the door was on this side, so I would've come in to see what was going on with Lee, and I don't remember if all these positions were filled. I kind of think perhaps not, but maybe they were. We had at least four or five folks there, including some of our principle Security inspectors and other staff that worked on

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the external program area that knew aviation security.

Essentially on the phone with United and American and our field facilities and Boston and Dulles. Jeff taking report. They were just taking, running logs of anything that was being reported because it was so early in the game we just didn't know what had happened. We were trying to capture all the incoming information to be reported out by--

MR. KARA: Lee was supervising the operation.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I think Lee was in there when I first went in. Subsequently he also went into this room to give Jane and Monty updates on what we were hearing.

MR. KARA: Right. Let's just set that back for a moment if you could, Lynne, and who is with Tim? We understand this is sort of a raised dysam. Do you recall who was with him?

MS. OSMUS: No, I don't.

MR. KARA: Throw a couple of names at you.

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MS. OSMUS: At some point in that day or next, I mean it's a fog to me in terms of chronology, Sam Labido was in there who was the manager of the principle Security inspectors for some time. Terry Reilly was in there at times. Mike Morse was in there at times. I can't tell you who was in there when I first went in there.

MR. KARA: How about Jeff Griffith and Doug Davis?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember.

MR. KARA: You don't remember the two of them?

MS. OSMUS: No, I saw them around in the course of the day. I can't tell you who was in there when I first--I was actually fixated on Lee just to find out from him what he had in terms of--

MR. AZZARELLO: Does anyone--

MR. KARA: We're on the agency.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: Had you been here that morning--would you have been here instead of Lee?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, Lee would have been

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there. I would've been helping in that to assist him. I probably would have been over with Jane and Monty in the M Classified facility.

MR. KARA: And when you say Declassified facility, you're referring to the secure video teleconferencing system.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. KARA: And that's the national level system.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. KARA: So Jane was on with whoever. This is the other end. In addition, to this connection to the outside world, was the ACC also connected to the outside world? Was Lee connected to other agencies? You mentioned the two airlines.

MS. OSMUS: Gosh, let me think. I don't know. I don't know at that time if they had any net going or not.

MR. KARA: Are you aware that there were two different nets set up off this bridge, a primary net and a tactical net?

MS. OSMUS: I knew there had been earlier

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in the day. I know that from looking at the log entry.

MR. KARA: And could you help us out? What's the difference between a primary net and a tactical net?

MS. OSMUS: Primary net is a--there's a--let me back up a little bit. Operations Center has a book. Today they still have one. Back then they had one before we took--the responsibility went to TFA, and for all kinds of instance, there was an automatic list for people that would be put on a net. So in the event of a hijacking or some kind of aviation incident, there would be a primary net set up with FBI. If it involved international folks, Department of State. White House situation, --was on there, DOB was on there, and NMCC I think would be the DOB rep and was typically on there. You know, and some folks on in listen mode only. And that was the net that we or the official in charge would run from the FAA perspective. It was an FAA net.

MR. KARA: To connect to the rest of

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government.

MS. OSMUS: Right. So all the interested parties that either wanted to know or had some input into decision-making about a particular event had access all at once. Now in addition to that, one or more tactical nets could be set up based on what instant was being managed, and let me make up a different one just to give you an example.

We had a hijacking out of Frankfurt to the U.S. some years before this, mid-1990's.

MR. KARA: Lufthansa, '93.

MS. OSMUS: Lufthansa, that's exactly right. A primary net was set up as I described it to you, including State Department and those folks, and oh, the carriers to the ground there too. We had a couple different tactical nets set up. One was the FBI because we wanted to make sure we were giving them the right kind of support, at Dulles, where I think the aircraft was going in case they wanted to practice with a similar aircraft their hostage rescue technique. We had a tactical net set up with our field facility to make sure we were

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deploying folks. The kind of logistical support stuff that you don't need to clutter the national net with. So that's kind of conceptually how to do.

MR. KARA: Did you actually work the '93 hijack team?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I did. That was mine. It started out about 7 in the morning, finished by close of business at 5 that night.

MR. KARA: What role did you play on that team?

MS. OSMUS: I was this person. Then I was director of Operations, so I was the lead for the--

MR. KARA: You were actually in this position in February, March of 1993.

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. KARA: I'm going to come back to that in a moment. But we understand that in addition to the tactical net that was set up here, the Air Traffic situation room set up, what, until a couple of days ago, we thought was the Kenols net, and it was strictly an Air Traffic situation that was run

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down here next to Peacock's office.

MS. OSMUS: In the conference room, yeah.

MR. KARA: Were you aware that that net was set up?

MS. OSMUS: I'm aware of it now. I wasn't aware of it then. I knew Air Traffic had ongoing discussions with their field facilities, but I was kind of oblivious to where they were doing it and who was on it and that sort of thing.

MR. KARA: From a management perspective, our question of interest is with two tactical nets, one here and one here, who did the regions and the centers know who they're talking to, and where are they supposed to funnel the time sensitive information that Jane and Monty needed in here?

MS. OSMUS: Well, I'm not sure we ever had this set up like this before because it was such a different circumstance, but we had different populations on the net. I mean Lee would have had field facilities within the Security organization reporting up. I gather these were essentially Air Traffic controllers?

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MR. KARA: This was straight Air Traffic. This was more of the security oriented net.

MS. OSMUS: Right, so for that period of time anyway, we had two channels and connection coming to Jane and Monty--

MR. KARA: Who was the deconflictor for them if there was a difference between who--

MS. OSMUS: I suspect Monty was probably the deconflictor.

MR. KARA: Monty was kind of the deconflictor.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. KARA: And, John, Lynne actually got caught in traffic and didn't get here probably till well after the Pentagon and then in fact after all four incident aircraft had been resolved and then she gets here about 11 o'clock, give or take--

MS. OSMUS: Give or take.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it was definitely after reported aircraft crash in Pennsylvania.

MS. OSMUS: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can we go back for a

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second to something Lynne mentioned?

MR. KARA: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: The primary net you said is sort of a pre-established list of people to contact. Is that actually synonymous with this list in the Crisis Management handbook? This sort of lays out I guess some responsibilities in the event of an air crisis, and there's a tab at the back. It's tab 4.2 I think it is and 4.3. One references attack and the other references a primary net.

MS. OSMUS: Yes, this looks like the one. I don't know whether this edition is the most recent. I just haven't looked at it in some time. But it's conceptually the same thing.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think that was the one that I marked on the front page where it says 9-11, etcetera, if you can read it. I think it's a little--

MS. OSMUS: 9-11-01.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: No, you have two on 9-11-01.

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Oh, this page?

MR. AZZARELLO: --was the manager of that.
It would have been--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: We were given a couple of different versions of it and one of these--I guess this one is dated October 23rd. It's not to my knowledge not my handwriting. We're trying to figure out who might have been put on there by an FAA rep as opposed to a Commission rep just to establish that as the one that came out--a draft that came out maybe after 9-11 with some revisions.

MS. OSMUS: I know there were some revisions going on. We're kind of in the midst of it. It's not because of 9-11 but, you know, updates are already in process. Maybe that's what it is. But, right, that's essentially the primary net members and the conflict of the tactical net.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is I guess part of a larger Crisis Management handbook, an FAA's headquarters handbook. Is that right?

MS. OSMUS: Yes. The Washington

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Operations has something like this where I think we have somewhere between two dozen and maybe 30 kinds of incidents that folks tried to plan ahead to think through if X, Y and Z happened, who'd need to be in communication, who'd be the lead on it, who'd want to know about it, and that sort of thing.

MR. AZZARELLO: In this particular chapter, it's titled Air Piracy, I guess that would cover some of the various protocol that would be triggered in the event of a hijack.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's governed in part by this--protocols laid out here.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the AVA--see if we have a correct understanding of it, the AVA 30 or the manager of the WOC, once they're instructed to initiate a primary net, would then default to a similar list like what's in that tab and then they would start bringing those people in--into the primary net. But as far as moderating the information coming over the primary net and

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deciphering its usefulness or credibility, that would be generally the job on 9-11 of Lee Longmeyer or whoever sat in the position--

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --of hijack coordinator, is that right?

MS. OSMUS: I'm not sure what we called them. The executive in charge, whatever. I don't know if there's a title in this order or not, but the person in charge of the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you can help us out then if you--

MR. KARA: I'll go--and she can look--yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: What's the interaction or the interplay if you can tell us between this document which is an FAA order. Is that the 7610, the military--

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah. And it lays out up front I guess purpose and an individual FAA that they call a hijack coordinator, and you can just

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take a minute to review that and I might ask you a few questions.

(Interviewee reviews document.)

MS. OSMUS: You call them a hijack coordinator in this document. Decisions--help or other actions like that in the event of a hijacking would all be coordinated with a Lee Longmeyer type position, so this is an internal--that rings a bell with me, but for practical purposes, if Lee was the person in charge of the ACC, he would have coordinated responses to NMCC like this. And the reason that FAA had ever asked an NMCC for support--in fact we were asking Lou--if he needed it. Typically where you have an aircraft out of radar range and it's hijacked and you don't know because the pilot and co-pilot can't speak overtly with us, you can't tell where they're going necessarily when they're out of radar range. What the NMCC or their other assets could do is follow them and essentially give geographical identifiers to us. We knew that the aircraft was still heading to the U.S., but they'd taken a swing up north and

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that sort of thing.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that was--, right?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, and NMCC came on the line and asked us if we needed flight following for Lufthansa.

MR. AZZARELLO: And my understanding is that the Canadian Air Force that day passed off the coverage.

MS. OSMUS: They had a flotilla coming down off that aircraft because we had the flight following the aircraft--

MR. KARA: Was some protocol in existence from the Lufthansa case?

MS. OSMUS: I don't know whether this document was to be honest, but, right, the protocol was in existence, yeah.

MR. KARA: The formalized protocol of FAA notifying NMCC and then there are things that the military is supposed to do on its side actually resided in this position during Lufthansa and this was you, and Lee held this position, and let me back up one step. If General Canovan had been here

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that day, where would his position have been?

MS. OSMUS: Probably like what I said mine would have been. In and out of this to monitor the situation to see if they needed help.

MR. KARA: And with the presence of both of you, this still would have been Lee Longmeyer--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Excuse me. Maybe you could help me out, Lynne, with the language of the document. It says the FAA hijack coordinator, and then in parentheses the director of the--what is--the director or designee of the FAA Office of Civil--what position on 9-11--who held the position of the director of FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security?

MS. OSMUS: Lee's position was director of the Office of Security Operations. This title I think is an old one when the director used to be the head of the Security organization. He was elevated to, I don't know, some 10 or 12 years ago

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I guess, to an associate administrator.

MR. KARA: In light of block chart E, is this the entity we're talking to about whatever the name?

MS. OSMUS: This is the one that was current on 9-11, where it's an associate administrator. This order I think is dated prior to becoming an associate administrator, it was a director position.

MR. AZZARELLO: So on 9-11, Lee was the director of ASC Operations and Op Center.

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And was there a director on the Intel side?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was that on 9-11?

MS. OSMUS: Claudio Manno.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: So actually on this line of block chart, this would be--ACO would be Lee. ACI would have been Claudio, and then ACS would have been John Tennevan, and you would have been ACS2.

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MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, now I understand where some of the ambiguity comes in. And so by saying the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security, if that phrase was used on 9-11, that doesn't clearly tell you whether or not you're talking about the director on the Op side or the intelligence side, right?

MS. OSMUS: This doesn't because the language is director or designee, so if you want to change it to the organizational thing that was current on 9-11, it would have been the associate administrator or designee, and the designee was Lee Longmeyer. We had the director of Operations undertake that responsibility for some time. I'm kind of surprised this wasn't updated actually.

MR. KARA: But he was aware that was his duty that day? Given that events hadn't happened, it was his job to fill--

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were saying the pre--let see--we know on 9-11 there was an ACS1 and

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ACS2, Canovan and yourself. And then beneath those positions we have ACS Intel which was Claudio Manno, and ACS--

MS. OSMUS: Right, ACI is the Intel office.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, that's Claudio and this is--

MS. OSMUS: And that's Lee.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's Lee Longmeyer.

MS. OSMUS: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and then that was the sort of lineup so to speak on 9-11. And this was drafted you're saying before this was broken in?

MS. OSMUS: It must have been because this title appears to me to be a title that was in effect prior to the establishment of the associate administrator, which means--let's see. It was early '90's I think that change was made.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that mean that when this was written, there was no ACS1 and 2, or was there no ACI and ACO?

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MS. OSMUS: AS1 at the time was called director. Same designator, just called a director.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, ACS1 was the director at the time.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. KARA: And actually you were ACS2 on 9-11. During Lufthansa which--

MS. OSMUS: ACO1.

MR. KARA: You were down--

MS. OSMUS: Director of Operations.

MR. KARA: You were it. You had Lee Longmeyer's job.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so when this was written, this would have really referred to--this would have been ACS1, or his or her designee.

MS. OSMUS: Exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so it would have been the associate administrator for the Higher Civil Aviation Security Division.

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MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or whoever they wanted to designate to be the hijack coordinator.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. KARA: You said that designation was to Lee Longmeyer. Was that a formal designation in writing or was that verbal?

MS. OSMUS: Well, it was certainly practice and had been for years since we went into this organizational setup.

MR. KARA: At least since spring of '92.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah. I would think then the position description for Lee for AC01 would indicate the lead on crisis management I would guess, you know. You'd have to look and see. It was clearly understood throughout the organization though that AC01 was the lead on that.

MR. AZZARELLO: AC01.

MS. OSUMS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Now it's very much clear.

MR. KARA: You cannot believe how

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confusing this is.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I can.

MR. AZZARELLO: When I first looked at this, the way I interpreted it, Lynne, was I thought in reading this and then having this chart beside me, I saw that on paper they were saying that the ACS1 position, or General Canovan would have on paper, either he would be responsible for being the coordinator or his designate.

MS. OSMUS: I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then I thought it would just go down the line. If you were around as ACS2, it would fall to whoever the senior Security person, and then just on down the line. I didn't realize that this sort of was trail somewhat, that it wasn't modified to reflect the sort of new division of hierarchy here at the ACS.

So you're saying if you walked or run to ask upper management on 9-11, or pre-9-11, in the event of a hijacking and there needs to be coordination with NMCC, what position fills that.

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You're saying you're understanding at least it was pretty widely known it would ACO1 to fill that position.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And let's say Lee Longmeyer weren't around on 9-11, would that just fall to the most senior ACO person?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: So Lee was here that day and he filled the job he was supposed to fill.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. KARA: Now, Lynne, let me ask you the more global question. The procedures are well established here, and they're well established on the NMCC side and the DOD side. The FAA will make the request. NMCC will query NORAD as to whether there are assets available. The approval will go to the--and then things will happen. That's not the way it happened on 9-11 because the fields had simply went straight. Did that help or hinder the fact that the field took matters in their own hands

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and called the military direct as opposed to exercising the protocol as we see it here?

MS. OSMUS: Well, I don't think this protocol really had application on 9-11, meaning it certainly wasn't the traditional hijacking where you knew you had an aircraft that started from this position and was going some place, and you had some time, even if it was just a short period of time to work it. The whole concept of the hijacking protocol and the way they were negotiated in all of the thing becomes strategy in all of that stuff that you all are aware of is predicated on a hijacking that took some period of time. This was a series of events happening so fast, even calling them hijackings the way we used to define hijackings is really a misnomer.

So this escort of hijacked aircraft I don't think was an issue that entered Lee's mind. They were just trying to figure out what the heck was going on out there. And they really weren't from Lee's office managing the action. It was simply reporting what was coming in because there

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was so much confusion. We couldn't define what action there was to be managed, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I understand what you're saying what might have been crafted obviously with a view toward the events that evolved on 9-11, but what we're I guess trying to figure out now is as we read the protocol that was in existence to the extent that one could default any protocol for the military assistance, which obviously was enlisted that day at some point, from reading this document here, the Escort of Hijacked Aircraft, it lays out a procedure where the hijack coordinator reaches the highest level of the NMCC for military, let them know what sector a hijack was reported from, and then when the NMCC gives its blessings, so to speak, or authorizes direct coordination between the FAA and field facility, the responding military of--then they can coordinate FAA's tracking of the primary target and relay any information to the military so they can try and tail it. And we've gone through I guess the other protocol about tailing it from behind,

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not being within sight, and being covert about it.

And what we've seen is that on 9-11, even as the multiple events unfolded, as Miles said at some field level, Boston Center went directly to Neads at some point and also reported up their chain of command, but told Neads about the aircraft and the information they had so that they could take, you know, whatever action they were authorized. And I guess what we're trying to figure out is even though that might not have been--obviously the--short-circuited this--takes a long time to go up to the top of the FAA headquarters chain at NMCC and then say, okay, well, now the people at the operational level who really need to converse with one another can now start passing the vital information back and forth to take operational action at this level.

If you had to say that that was going on somewhere, even if it wasn't following this protocol to the T or maybe it was way off the protocol, but what location and people would you point to on the 10th floor on 9-11 when you got

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here that you observed or learned afterwards, as the people and the location where that was being done, that being there was some attempt to pass the knowledge as to each of the four hijacked aircraft from the FAA headquarters level when they got it to make sure that the military had it at some level so that they could coordinate the operations at the operational level?

MS. OSMUS: I don't know. I just don't have any first-hand knowledge of where that was going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you learn in the aftermath or in the aftermath of the attacks when there was after-action reviews, there were summaries put together. You know, one summary we've seen is the summary of Air Traffic events that AAT20 put together. Was there any discussion on an upper management level as to how that worked that day in terms of that being--how did we as an FAA entity, as the FAA, was doing at passing institutional knowledge that we had about each of the four hijacked aircrafts, whether that was

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passed directly from the centers or whether it was information that they passed up to headquarters. Let's see what happened when--did it all get over to the military in a timely fashion, and if so, great, if not, why not? Was that done after the fact?

MS. OSMUS: I know there were a lot of discussions with Air Traffic and Monty and others kind of looked at how that all transpired. To be very honest, I was up to eyeballs in trying to figure out security counter measures and what this new threat was, and I was just not involved in that discussion. I know they happened after the fact because I talked to Shirley Miller and kind of tracking the discussions and the reports that have been provided to you folks. But they weren't meetings that I was in.

MR. KARA: Was Lee Longmeyer because of the position he held that day been a part of that process?

MS. OSMUS: No. The folks in the three organization were just--I mean staffing the ACC

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permanently, getting counter measures out, deploying our folks--to make sure they were being implemented the right kind of way, and then also started working to figure out how the common strategy needed to be adjusted, and there was some staff level work with Air Traffic to take their adjusted procedures after this scrub that was done to incorporate them and how future events were managed, but these were just discussions we just weren't in because we were focused on other issues.

MR. KARA: And as ACS2 when you showed up that day and Lee was in position and doing what he was supposed to do, there was no management step you had to take or direction you had to give.

MS. OSMUS: No.

MR. KARA: And so you positioned yourself really to help the administrator and the deputy administrator in what they were doing.

MS. OSMUS: And tried to get folks organized on the third floor because we recognized we were in this 24/7 for a while. So trying, you know, to get the organization set up to see what we

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were--

MR. KARA: I'm glad you mentioned that because when I looked back over your--

MS. OSMUS: Is that where you're going for?

MR. KARA: Well, it's a sidebar we need to look at because when you were interviewed by John Raidt and Bill Johnstone, you had described three centers of activity at FAA headquarters, the Aviation Crisis Center that we talked about. And then the other two entities were on the third floor, and I gather at that point, you had not recalled or perhaps weren't that well aware that ATC had its own tactical net down here. So I could--

MR. WIEGAND: Excuse me, Miles, when you refer to tactical net, and the order that you're referring to, are you using such a term of--to find in FAA handbooks or as in layman's terms?

MR. KARA: Let me change it. The tactical net is as we described it and it's up here. This was the Air Traffic situation or a net. And I'll

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refer to it hereinafter as the Kenols' net.

MR. BROWN: Or Kenols' console.

MR. KARA: Yeah, to distinguish and that's a good point, but we could add then to John Raidt's interview that the fourth level of activity, but you focused primarily on the three you knew about.

MS. OSMUS: The one that I was working, right.

MR. KARA: Right. And the other two down on the third floor, they was an ACS working room.

MS. OSMUS: ACS is the Security organization.

MR. KARA: Security organization, and that was your own?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, is this the Security director, what became the Security director room?

MR. KARA: And then there was an ACI watch office, so that would have been Claudio.

MS. OSMUS: That's right.

MR. KARA: And did either of those two entities also--

MR. WIEGAND: You working with a Chuck--

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MS. OSMUS: Right, right.

MR. KARA: Would any of these two entities down on the third floor have their own telecon that day?

MS. OSMUS: No, let me talk to you a little bit about what those were. The ACI watch, the watch in Claudio's shop and the Intelligence office is one that pre-existed before 9-11, been around for years and years. 24/7 operation where they had their--work in there, getting incoming Intel stuff and these folks would be available to reach out to us at off-hours if there was some breaking intelligence that caused new counter measures to be developed and issue a warning to be sent out to the carriers whatever. They have secure communications with other folks in the administration, and they had some communications that day because I've seen log entries. They keep log entries of all calls that connect, so they've got excellent tracking, and I imagine you guys have looked at that sort of thing. There were some calls from a system called Annoy 1, at least that's

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what we call it, which is sort of a red line instant, sort of a telecon, I guess you could call it. Multiple parties are hooked into a line. When somebody within the intelligence community were to get information out of--

MR. KARA: On that point, on Annoy 1 line, that rang downstairs on the third floor.

MS. OSMUS: Yes, and there may have also been a line here, but I'm not sure whether we had people in that skip the whole time.

MR. KARA: The skip would have been manned by Claudio's people up here.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, that's right.

MR. KARA: And then it's conceivable the Annoy line call which is originated by CIA could have come in up here.

MS. OSMUS: Well, I know for sure we had it on the third floor.

MR. KARA: But you had it on the third floor?

MS. OSMUS: So I know there were some intermittent discussions using Annoy 1. It wasn't

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like a standing telecon type thing. The other room on the third floor which Chuck Berk wound up being in charge of was simply a room about maybe a third of the size of this one, down the hall from our Security front office, that we used for different things over the years. In this case we put about six or seven Aviation Security specialists in there with computers, and their first tasking, just because we were trying to get organized, was bring down the logs and the other notes that were being taken by our folks here to start putting them together into briefing documents.

MR. KARA: So that was sort of later in the day actually.

MS. OSMUS: That's right.

MR. KARA: As opposed to the--the point would be that Crisis Management stayed up here and the activities down on the third floor were--

MS. OSMUS: Where staff support could pull together the results of that, right, exactly.

MR. KARA: So we didn't have a separate entity down there--

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MS. OSMUS: That's right. No telecon, no communication with the field, nothing like that.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. WIEGAND: That was down on the third--

MR. KARA: That's the third floor, yeah.

MS. OSMUS: Right. And then some days after 9-11, I want to say, Chuck will know the date because it's burned into his memory, five or six days, something like that, we established that room as the focal point for a Security directed working group. Chuck was asked to be in charge if it came in from the group that he had been working which deployed the EDF equipment. And we had again six to eight specialists in there that their full job was to develop the Security directive, get daily input from the field and from the carriers about what was working, what wasn't clear, what needed adjustments, and the Security directors that were out there, and pumping them out with revisions on a daily basis.

MR. KARA: Let's come back now to the 10th floor and the interface between Lee and the SPTS,

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which is sort of where you got in sort of the middle of that. What were the questions that were being asked and answered by that point and time that you got there to the national level?

MS. OSMUS: When I went in there, and there was a connection. You could tell that there's pictures on the wall as you can see the TV shots of other entities. I don't--

MR. AZZARELLO: This is in the civics?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah. I don't remember any--Jane was sitting like this on the phone and facing the door when I came in. Monty was over here. So they were not actively involved in the communication at the time. And the other folks asked me if I could remember if anybody was on or talking about anything, and I don't. I think we would have been paying attention even if it wasn't directly questioning the FAA about something, which is why I suspect I was in there at the time in between discussions that they have a line active so that if anybody needed anything, they could immediately come on. So I don't remember hearing

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anything from the national level.

MR. KARA: Do you recall if the shoot-down authority had been discussed at that time, or were there ongoing discussions about that authority?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember hearing anything about the shoot-down authority then.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: And I can't tell you when I first heard that was even an issue.

MR. KARA: Not even that day perhaps?

MS. OSMUS: It may not have been. There was confusion about--I mean there was confusion for a while about what aircraft it was that went into the Pentagon and what happened to the one that went down that crashed, and, you know, questions about whether that was DOD action, and that's when I think when I first started even hearing the issue, the shoot-down authority. Honestly I can't tell you if it was in the press or in this building. Again we were just so focused on the external Security counter measure piece that, you know, and I wasn't watching a lot of TV. I didn't want to

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see that. We just had to keep focused on doing the job we were doing.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that part of when you say questions about whether or not DOD action caused the fourth to come down in Pennsylvania--not that the DOD caused it to come down. Do you remember hearing questions of that nature would you say on the civics or elsewhere?

MS. OSMUS: No, it was on the civics. Literally it was on WTOP coming in in the morning. That was my only outside source of data at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: Through the media. CNN. That's how most people saw the second crash.

MS. OSMUS: I know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can I just go back to the tactical net for a second, just to clarify. You said, I think that Lufthansa--well, you said this tactical one. I want to clarify that. So in the Lufthansa, you said there was more than one tactical that was going on, right. You were in conference with the FBI and maybe you wouldn't want

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them in the loop at all and the other FAA facilities. Well, do you know if there are more than one tactical net to become along after 9-11 or any point after that morning, that there was more than one tactical net going on that morning within the FAA?

MS. OSMUS: I've only heard of one, but I haven't asked that question directly, so I don't have any personal knowledge of it. In the Lufthansa, when we had some kind of short-lived tactical net set up and served it's purpose and then went away, you know, so it kind of just depends on the nature of the circumstance and what other information needs to be discussed. I'm not aware of another one. I'm aware of one tactical net that was set up, but again I haven't, you know, looked into that one way or the other.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and we understand that that would be something where they would call in for the Operations Center here and just give a code to get on that phone--it's not something that they have to hook up through the Washington

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Operations Center, but it's a pre-established code if you need to get on the tactical net with headquarters. They just call in and they get bridged through and it connects the various FAA facilities, so it could be--

MS. OSMUS: I think that's right, but if May told you that, it's right.

MR. KARA: From your perspective, the various centers of activity that we talked about and the position you held up in this particular area, what was the role of the Command Center out at Herndon and the information that was gathered that day? How was that getting into the mix up here at headquarters?

MS. OSMUS: I didn't have any involvement with information from Herndon. I shouldn't put it that way, but when I was talking to Monty and Jane, and I was finding out from them what was going on, I'm sure their status reports came in part from Herndon. So I did kind of get it indirectly.

MR. KARA: Straight to them or through Lee, or how would they get this?

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MS. OSMUS: I gather it was through Lee. I would suspect that it was here, but I'm sort of making that up because I haven't asked that question.

MR. KARA: Okay. The two possibilities were through Lee up here and through Dave Kenols then?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. KARA: Now on '93, for Lufthansa, the Command Center at Herndon didn't exist, right, because it wasn't in existence in '93?

MS. OSMUS: I don't think it was yet. The use of the small version--building, and in the old traditional hijacking, some of the seats would be sold by Air Traffic people to be on-line to whatever facilities they needed to monitor to kind of pull them--

MR. KARA: Was there any Air Traffic people in these seats on 9-11?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember. I know there was darn near a full room, but I can't tell you who all was in there.

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MR. KARA: But your observation would have been that that was Lee on the Security side more than the Air Traffic side.

MS. OSMUS: There may have been Air Traffic folks in there because we typically--I mean they knew routinely. Hijackings they would come, so would Public Affairs. So would other, so it's possible that they were there. Again, I'm just focused on Lee and I'm kind of oblivious to who the others were.

MR. AZZARELLO: I probably should direct this question to Lee--by all means tell me, but I'm going to take a stab here. Your ability to help me already in understanding these documents.

MR. KARA: Plus you had the last hijacking in '93.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Crisis handbook for Air Piracy on the primary net says that it's established immediately upon activation of the ACC, which is the Region Crisis Center. Then it says that the net--what we mean operational, that this is established by the net manager, the primary net

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manager I guess. Would that be, if you know, was the manager of this primary net and the moderator of that be one and the same in the person of Lee Longmeyer?

MS. OSMUS: Yes, it'd be Lee, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. And the tactical net, it says the CAS Crisis Management team, that their manager has the--is the person I guess who activate the tact net if necessary. Would that be, if you know, is that also--the tact net is that moderated or managed by someone other than in Lee's position?

MS. OSMUS: Usually it's moderated by somebody else with Lee's knowledge because it's hard to be on two nets at the same time. So typically, and you need to confirm this with him because I'm just sort of giving you the sort of history of how this usually worked, typically he would rely on one of the senior folks with expertise in a certain area to talk with the FBI, as an example, through somebody that knew airport layouts and the FBI would want to deal with. He'd

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have them be the lead, and the reason his desk was with an elevated level is that it allowed him to kind of monitor the discussions that are going on around the others, and they'd be reporting back to him on what was going on in the tactical net.

MR. AZZARELLO: So although the tactical net is generally something for a net for internal communications for FAA entities, my guess the discretion lies for someone moderating it to allow outside parties to--if they think that it's necessary for them--

MS. OSMUS: If relevant, exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: --to get information, to get proper clearance security.

MS. OSMUS: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Tapping on your involvement in the Lufthansa hijacking event, the primary net listed one of the potential participants being ACC. And then also with the FAA regions involved and likely to be involved and the Air Traffic control facilities, and we want to see if we understand this correctly if we're

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misinterpreting it. It seems like to us from reading the cold document is that having those parties on the line in response to an air piracy event allows the communication flow between--if we're reading into this--would be not just any air control facility but those affected in tracking the aircraft to be able to share that information with you and NMCC. Was that your understanding of what went on in the Lufthansa event? Was there a primary net set up so that--did you have the facility that I guess would have picked up the Lufthansa aircraft as it approached U.S. air space, and were they on the line at that Air Traffic facility with the NMCC representative?

MS. OSMUS: We had the Air Traffic facilities--on the East Coast because we're coming down the corridor from, you know, Maine down past New York and here at--not a good time of the day to come down. So it was heavy traffic time.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you didn't know obviously what part of the East Coast was going to be--

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MS. OSMUS: Well, it was following a designed route. I mean they were coming into Dulles and that's where they wanted to come. The thing that I was just going to clarify a little bit is the purpose of having everybody on the line is--is to inform the FAA manager, and NMCC is one of the resources that can be used by FAA if needed.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's to inform--who is to inform you say?

MS. OSMUS: It's to inform Lee Longmeyer in this model and me in the Lufthansa model because that person is the decision-maker in that particular event.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so they monitoring it, getting all the up-to-date field information to the primary manager.

MS. OSMUS: Exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then you're the link to that NMCC if they're on the list there.

MS. OSMUS: Exactly, exactly.

MR. KARAS: Let me just take that one step further because over on the other side of the fence

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the military has established a thing called air--conference call where they're looking to FAA to be the inputer for precisely the same region to keep the Secretary of Defense informed and commander-in-chief NORAD. Did you recall the air--conference call being up that day, and who in the 10th floor would have been participating in that?

MR. AZZARELLO: Which day?

MR. KARA: 9-11, I'm sorry.

MS. OSMUS: I actually didn't know of that thing until you just said it, so, no, I wasn't aware of that on 9-11. Honestly the whole issue about NORAD and Air Traffic communications was not something I focused on at all until more recently knowing of the interest of the Commission.

MR. KARA: Okay. We haven't talked to Lee Longmeyer yet, but John Raidt and Bill Johnstone did and he, Lee, recalled that most of his dealings with senior officials on 9-11 were with Belger and Lynne Osmus, that you became sort of a right-hand person, if you will, or not a right-hand person,

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but between him and Monty and Jane. Were there any major issues that morning that we haven't talked about that you can recall?

MS. OSMUS: No, not really. I think the reason that day is such a blur to me is that there was so many unknowns. We were just, you know, reviewing and reviewing every information that came in to try to figure out what the heck had happened and what we were going to do next to start Air Traffic operating again because we knew it couldn't until we knew enough about the problems to put fixes in place.

MR. KARA: What did we learn? What are we doing better and what do we still need to do better?

MS. OSMUS: Today?

MR. KARA: Yes.

MS. OSMUS: I think the key to me in all of this is getting the right intelligence because we have--I mentioned in the other interview--intelligence community knows enough about what's going on as we did during--specific

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threat. The government responds and the industry responds, and that was--and we heard it on WTOP again just this morning that there were confirmations from some of the detainees that there were more attacks planned on or about 9-11 and other places a few days after, but when air service started again, the security was too tight. So I mean the counter measures have worked in the past, but you have to know what you're protecting against.

MR. AZZARELLO: There was actually an incident that was noted and it's actually even in Dave Kenols' and the Air Traffic suites, they kept a log of what they considered I guess some relevant and significant events. And one of the entries was an event referenced in JFK Airport that after--I think after the first four attacks were completed, that there were some men who were unwilling to disembark from an aircraft, I think it was a TWA aircraft in the JFK Airport.

MS. OSMUS: The ones that were just put on the ground?

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MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah. They were not allowed to take off in light of the events in New York. They were grounded with the New York ground-stop, and there were three men they believe of Middle Eastern descendant who were at JFK on a TWA aircraft who when refused to get off at--and it was reported through ACS and Security. And we have some people looking at it. I don't know what they found on field level out in New York in terms of their listening to NYPD to go figure out what it was about. But do you ever remember having discussed in the aftermath of 9-11 whether or not that was potentially another attack?

MS. OSMUS: There were a couple of them. I don't know the details about them, but I'm sure I did at the time. There was another one, another group of people that wound up in the El Paso area after having--I can't remember if the aircraft was on the ground. They traveled by train to El Paso, and those were working--they were kind of tracking him through the Intel office through the Bureau and others. And I had never heard that any of them

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were confirmed as other tag teams or anything. But there were two or three groups of people that looked pretty suspicious to us at the time.

MR. KARA: I got a question about those telecons again. I'm sorry to be going back and forth between the two. How was Intel on that day? How did you learn--this is through the news media, or were you getting information in a different way?

MS. OSMUS: Oh, that day we got the report from I think it was from a carrier that there was one individual who had managed to smuggle a gun through the security checkpoint in Frankfurt.

MR. KARA: And that's a good point because we didn't talk about that in terms of input information from the two airlines that day, and I'm talking 9-11 here. Both American and United set up their own crisis management system. How was that information that they held in their perception and awareness of events getting into the--

MS. OSMUS: The principle Security inspectors as I mentioned earlier. There was one flying to American and one flying to United. I

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don't know if those people were specifically up here, but they were alternately with other folks hooked in with the carriers' crisis management unit reporting back and forth.

MR. KARA: Do you recall who those people were?

MS. OSMUS: Janet Riffe was the CFI for American, and I know she was up in the ACC on 9-11.

MR. KARA: Janet Riffe for American?

MS. OSMUS: Yes. R-i-f-f-e. And United was Steve Jenkins, and I don't remember whether he was here. I think he was, but I have to confirm that.

MR. KARA: And their specific title was--

MS. OSMUS: Principle Security inspector.

MR. KARA: And they specialized, or one of their duties was for those two specific airlines individually as we talked about?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. KARA: Principle Security inspector.

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. KARA: Okay. Did John Raidt and Bill

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talk to you at all about that, their duties?

MS. OSMUS: I don't think so.

MR. KARA: I'll mention it to them. These two people, are they still here? Do they work in this building?

MS. OSMUS: They both work at TFC.

MR. KARA: They're with TFC.

MS. OSMUS: Janet I think is down in North Carolina. I think Steve Jenkins is still in the area.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this might not be accurate in terms of the time entry. This is a log of Dave Kenols. It says asked him to keep a log of events to find out--he cautioned us they might not be accurate in terms of the time entries. But JFK correlates Middle Eastern person who refused to embark--UAL 93, gate 2, 10:07. So at some point do you specifically recall any follow-up to that? Do you recall any?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember this specific one, but as I said there were two or three that the Intel office was tracking with the Bureau and

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others, and I'm not aware that we ever got confirmation in any of them, but they identified the people and figured they were bad guys. I'm not sure whether, you know, the Bureau was still working it, and they just don't know yet, but we've not gotten any affirmation that I'm aware of.

MR. AZZARELLO: In the aftermath of 9-11 and the weeks that followed, did anyone at headquarters, anyone at executive live, assign the task to particular individuals to find out, well, what did the FAA know collectively from the Air Traffic Control field facility level all the way up to headquarters? You know, what did we know and when did we know it, and what is the earliest that we could have conveyed any information that we had to the military so that they could process it in and then take any appropriate action if they deemed it appropriate? Did that fall into--

MS. OSMUS: I think that whole discussion about what the Air Traffic actions were done, and the thing that I mentioned earlier where Monty scrubbed those issues with the Air Traffic folks,

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but again I wasn't--

MR. KARA: Something like this?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I've not seen that either, but I think there were some revisions made to the procedures as a result of some of those discussions, but I wasn't in them, so I've only sort of learned about them after the fact.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were sort of on the periphery in any of that?

MS. OSMUS: I wasn't even on the periphery. I was on the third floor in the little--looking at the scary Intel stuff.

MR. KARA: So if I show you the list of notifications to the military that day that were generated some time after 9-11, you were not--

MS. OSMUS: I've seen some of these documents in the last few months but not in the moment--

MR. KARA: And as a senior executive within FAA, were you in the next step that came up with the news release that was put out in August of 2002, the FAA time line?

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MS. OSMUS: I don't think I was. We worked on some time lines, again on the external security stuff, you know, when the airports opened, about the process, but I don't remember contributing to this one.

MR. KARA: But the corporate one in the Office of Record is actually a gentleman. Do you know who that gentleman is?

MS. OSMUS: Bill Schumann.

MR. KARA: Or was?

MS. OSMUS: No, I don't actually. No, I don't.

MR. KARA: Dave, do you?

MR. WIEGAND: I can tell you that during a little break, I went to my FAA director and I typed the name in and the name doesn't appear anywhere.

MR. KARA: So he's not with us.

MR. WIEGAND: It appears he's no longer at the agency, at least according to what the--

MR. KARA: And we appreciate you taking that step for us. Lynne, you're a fountain of all knowledge, and obviously we don't know what we

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don't know.

MS. OSMUS: Put your feet up. Here we go.

MR. KARAS: Have we covered the ground with you? Is there something that we would be remiss if we hadn't asked you?

MS. OSMUS: I really can't think of anything. Yeah, nothing comes to mind.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is there anything that you could suggest in going forward? The Commission is obviously concerned about their ability to make recommendations, and then they liked to be able to make recommendations, I should say, to this Administration and Congress about what changes could be made that haven't already been made that would either help prevent or mitigate the damage from a future attack. And I guess that would affect the use of the aviation industry.

We know you've made a lot of changes post 9-11. One of the ones we've highlighted is the--were there any ones that haven't been made yet that you think could and should be made? Maybe there are financial constraints that are holding

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them back. Maybe there's just not money in the budget being approved. And I mean not just resources but, you know, technology, equipment, better radar, whatever, anything that you're aware of that you would like to recommend or have the Commission think about as a possibility?

MS. OSMUS: The only thing that comes to mind, and it's a very big picture only because I don't have any specific concern about any technology or, you know, kind of small slice of it, but in aviation crisis management as we've sort of been talking about here, because decisions have to be made so quickly, I think that the efforts that the TSA and the FAA have started already need to be really focused on with DHS and any others that have--to practice how we do this because PSA was new and now they've gotten experience from some of this and their learning curve's a lot shorter. DHS is still in the formative time. FBI has a big role in this. --has a big role, and I know there's a big exercise coming up in May where I think some of this will be sorted through. But as we add folks

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to the pot that have an important role in aviation crisis management, we all need to figure out how to continue to do this in some kind of coordinated practice way. And I think that gets to be a challenge as you have more and more entities with some--ready for it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure, I mean I think one of the issues in the media recently as a result of our hearings among other reasons to generate the discussion was the discussion about the two hijackers--who at some point right before 9-11 the FBI was made aware of, or the CIA, and they were watchlist individuals, but that--those particular names never got to the FAA Security people as people to be aware of, a flag if they tried to get on a flight. And I guess in terms of how that flow of information works post 9-11, we should direct that to TSA, right?

MS. OSMUS: From the Intel piece. I mean, yeah. I was actually thinking more of once you have an incident, you know, there's FAA and TSA and DHA and NORAD and everybody else who has a play,

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able to talk and some kind of communications then, whether it be a telecon or other, and make informed decisions back and forth.

MR. KARA: What's the exercise in May coming up?

MS. OSMUS: It's going to be Topoff 1, and there's sort of two parts to it. I don't know that it's going to be aviation specific, but it's, you know, kind of underscoring the need to do the practice so that we if we have the real events, we'll be ready to do it. I just think we weren't--you can't have enough emphasis on that sort of thing.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doing the drills, actually walking through it, so you know what works.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: On that note, actually I did just remember something else. We would be remiss not to ask you about it. There was a hijack exercise that we heard about. It's under the FAA field facilities that was run, an FAA sponsored exercise that you--at NORAD participated in in the

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mid-'90's. I mean I don't know the--roughly '95, '96 where the FAA enlisted the assistance and the assets of a commercial airline. One of the companies volunteered one of these, and one of its commercial jets to use, and in fact some FAA employees we were told volunteered to be passengers on this airline, and it actually got airborne and they simulated walking through a hijack scenario. And they're calling the DOD and calling NORAD and trying to facilitate the tracking of the commercial jet as it was crossing the country reported as a hijack. Do you remember anyone who participated?

MS. OSMUS: I didn't participate in it. I don't know when it happened. I left the Security organization in '95 and didn't come back again until 2001.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where were you in between? I'm sorry I missed the intro.

MS. OSMUS: I was Chief of Staff for about four years and then I went to Brussels for a couple of years.

MR. KARA: See, when you become the Chief

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of Staff, then--then you get a reward, like Brussels.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, so I was out of the Security organization for about six years.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would you still be kicking and screaming in Brussels?

MS. OSMUS: It was awful--but what you're describing isn't inconsistent with the approaches that have been used before where, you know, the carrier gives an aircraft, the people pretend to be hostages, you know, that sort of thing. But I don't know the specific example that you're reciting.

MR. WIEGAND: I think it might have been called Twin Star.

MS. OSMUS: That name doesn't mean anything.

MR. WIEGAND: That was '95.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, it doesn't mean anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: If we wanted to set a follow-up on that with someone in terms of trying

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to find out who the person who might have knowledge of the result of that exercise--

MS. OSMUS: I would recommend Terri Reilly at TFA.

MR. AZZARELLO: Terri Reilly?

MS. OSMUS: She runs their Operations Center that's currently located out at Herndon literally across the street from the FAA Herndon facility. R-e-i-l-l-y. And she, while she was still with FAA, had the responsibility for doing our own crisis management training and orders in-house and, you know, doing the data tracking. That's why I know she was one of the people that spelled Lee in the ACC on 9-11 and thereafter. She was out of the country on 9-11, but she was there after, and she has a very good recollection of this sort of thing, so if she doesn't know off the top of her head, she will probably remember the staff folks who were involved and working it and she can at least point you in the right direction.

MR. KARA: We'll tell her you said so.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, she'll love it again.

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MR. AZZARELLO: No, we'll just have to tell her we heard it from some little birdy.

MS. OSMUS: The phone will ring on my end. No doubt about it.

MR. KARA: Anything more, John?

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MR. KARA: Lynne, thank you very much.

MS. OSMUS: You're welcome.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DANIEL DIGGINS

BY

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN AZZARELLO

SPECIAL AGENT JEFF BROWN

SPECIAL AGENT MILES KARA

UNKNOWN PERSON, FAA

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's Tuesday, March 30th, 2004. We're at FAA headquarters in Washington about to begin an interview with Dan Diggins. I'm John Azzarello, 911 Commission, Team 8.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 911 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 911 Commission.

VOICE: --Chief Counsel's Office, FAA, Washington.

MR. DIGGINS: I'm Dan Diggins, Accident Investigation, FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dan, if you could just start by--we generally start by trying to get a flavor for your background and your career in the FAA. So if you can tell us sort of briefly when you started and take us through briefly the various positions you held leading up to 9-11, and then when you get to 9-11, I'd like you to explain in a little more detail what position you held on that day and what duties were--duties and responsibilities that went with that position that you held on 9-11.

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MR. DIGGINS: Sure. I got hired by the FAA in 1979 as an air traffic controller out in Seattle, Washington. I remained a controller for--an active controller for about six years, and then I did staff work in the field facility, the air traffic control facility, and I designed procedures that the airplanes flew.

MR. BROWN: So around 1985, is that--

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, 1986, somewhere around there.

MR. BROWN: 1986.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, somewhere around there.

MR. BROWN: And you went to field facility then?

MR. DIGGINS: I was in the field facility and I worked in the field facility as both a controller and a staff person. It was a center, so it took a whole lot of air space, the northwestern part of the country.

MR. BROWN: And you were a controller and also a--

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MR. DIGGINS: A staff person.

MR. BROWN: Okay. Where'd you go from there?

MR. DIGGINS: From there I went to the regional office as a regional staff person in the procedures branch.

MR. BROWN: What year was that?

MR. DIGGINS: That was 1988.

MR. BROWN: And what region was that?

MR. DIGGINS: That was Northwest Mountain Region.

MR. BROWN: Northwest--

MR. DIGGINS: Northwest Mountain Region.

MR. BROWN: Mountain Region?

MR. DIGGINS: Right.

MR. BROWN: And you went there as a staff person?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct, until 1990.

MR. BROWN: What did you with the staff there at the Northwest? Procedures and--

MR. DIGGINS: Procedures and environmental assessments, environmental impact statements.

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MR. BROWN: And then in '90, you said
you--

MR. DIGGINS: Then in '90 I went to work
in the Air Traffic Evaluation Division which is a
part of Washington headquarters, but I was based in
Seattle.

MR. BROWN: And this is sort of a shift
now, right, a basic shift of positions from
procedures and all?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct. And I stayed in
that position until 1995 or 6. I actually can't
remember. '95 or '96, and then I went back to the
Center as an operational supervisor.

MR. BROWN: Back to the Seattle Center?

MR. DIGGINS: Seattle Center. That's
correct.

MR. BROWN: As a floor supervisor?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. BROWN: Of controllers?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Prior to that it
was an investigative background that you were--I

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mean investigative duties?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how long were you at the Seattle Center as a supervisor?

MR. DIGGINS: About two and a half years.

MR. BROWN: Then where did you go to?

MR. DIGGINS: Then I moved to Washington here as an air traffic investigator.

MR. AZZARELLO: '98, '99 roughly?

MR. DIGGINS: '99.

MR. AZZARELLO: '99?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you came to FAA headquarters as an air traffic investigator?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who were you working under?

MR. DIGGINS: Dave Kenols (sp).

MR. AZZARELLO: You reported directly to him?

MR. DIGGINS: No, there was an intermediate manager, Tony Frily (sp).

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. So it would be you--chain of command?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. How long did you hold that position for?

MR. DIGGINS: Three years.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were in that position on 9-11?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you could describe for us, Dan, what your job duties and responsibilities would be on a typical day pre-9-11 in the absence of an aircraft accident or incident.

MR. DIGGINS: Investigate air traffic incidents within the system. Anything that was reported that involved Air Traffic Control, investigate it fully and see what Air Traffic's involvement was, if any.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any incident, any Air Traffic incident?

MR. DIGGINS: Anything unusual, whether it was classified as an incident or an accident,

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anything that was not normal.

MR. BROWN: So that would include separation there as it occurred at the facility?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that something that they would notify headquarters on if there was like an error in separation by a controller at a field facility--headquarters?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, the facility would notify their respective region, and the respective region would in turn notify headquarters.

MR. BROWN: So it would go up the chain of command in an event like that.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about in the event of an accident, an aircraft accident, there's a crash? What kind of response would that trigger for you?

MR. DIGGINS: We'd check and see what Air Traffic Control's involvement was, if any. And there are two things I was involved in mainly is supplying radar information if they couldn't locate the airplane, getting radar information and

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analyzing the radar to try to locate the wreckage and then also see if Air Traffic had a part in the cause of the accident.

MR. BROWN: So your responsibilities in crashes would include radar analysis?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. BROWN: What else? Would you also look at cold tapes--

MR. DIGGINS: Cold tapes, Air Traffic services. Basically review the air traffic services.

MR. BROWN: Air traffic controller communication analysis?

MR. DIGGINS: Communication, techniques used. Just the performance of the air traffic system.

MR. BROWN: So you want to see how the system performed, and if it affected in any manner the crash.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct. And if we needed to make any changes, then we'd make changes if there are some things that presented themselves

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that were flagrant problems.

MR. BROWN: How about if there was a hijack pre-911 reported in the system? Would that trigger any specific role or responsibility for you in particular and then after you, comment on your division that you worked in?

MR. DIGGINS: We would be notified. I'm not an air traffic controller anymore, so it's been a few years since I looked at it, so I don't really remember what the exact response is and what the requirements are.

MR. BROWN: So your division would be notified but wouldn't have, if I'm understanding you correctly, wouldn't have any direct responsibility in responding to the--? Is that fair? I don't want to mischaracterize it.

MR. DIGGINS: I can't say either way because I don't know what the rules are. I don't remember what the rules were prior to 9-11.

MR. BROWN: Do you remember if your division even had a role if there was a reported hijack pre-911, or if it did or didn't have a role,

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could you at least comment on that?

MR. DIGGINS: I actually can't remember if we did or not. I know we'd be notified, but I don't know what the official response would be or the requirements would be.

MR. BROWN: So you don't recall if you had a response while in your division?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. BROWN: And that would've been--what's the official title of your division?

MR. DIGGINS: Air Traffic Investigation.

MR. BROWN: Air Traffic--what's the--

MR. DIGGINS: AAT 20.

MR. BROWN: AAT 20.

MR. DIGGINS: Right.

MR. BROWN: But you do remember that you would be--no AAT 20 would be notified in the event of a hijack.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. BROWN: But in terms of having the role, you're not sure whether they had--

MR. DIGGINS: We played some role at that

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point, but I couldn't quote line and verse what that role would be.

VOICE: I think the difficulty might be, if I may, is he's probably thinking what responsibilities are outlined specifically in, for instance, 7110.65, the Air Traffic Control Manual. I mean they undoubtedly had some involvement. The question is what that manual says. I guess maybe that's the problem.

MR. DIGGINS: There is confusion. Like Andy says there is because there are specific things to do as a controller and you're aware of a hijacking, but I'm not sure we have it so detailed to that letter for other offices that get notified what they do with that information.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you do have an understanding I guess of what goes on in that controller level. They have their guidelines that are published and the FAA orders in the manual in terms of if you think you have a hijack. Example, somebody's squawking 7500, you tell your supervisor. Your supervisor goes up the chain of

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command, it gets to headquarters and that triggers some responsibilities, so weeks pre-911 for some people at headquarters, like a hijack coordinator. Were you familiar with that that there was a hijack coordinator pre-911 according to FAA protocol?

MR. DIGGINS: I think I remember that, but it's hard to distinguish between pre-911 and post-911 for things that I'm no longer working.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure. Let me see if I can help you out with that. Maybe we can focus in a little on some areas. There was a--now you wouldn't have been here anyway, if I can remember back to your chronology year. '93, where were you?

MR. KARA: He was in--

MR. AZZARELLO: There was a Lufthansa hijacking in the early '90's, ballpark 1993, that the system responded to, both military and FAA headquarters involvement, but you weren't here. You were out in Seattle I think.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you wouldn't have had--you've never experienced pre-9-11 being in the

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middle of a hijack, reported hijack, and responding to it, correct?

MR. DIGGINS: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Well, how about when you come to headquarters in '99? You come to support AAT 20, which is Air Traffic Investigations. Do you recall at any point after you got here in '99 at headquarters, from that point up to 9-11, did you ever participate in any hijack training or drills at a headquarters level?

MR. DIGGINS: No, I don't recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: Don't recall whether or not you did, or you don't think that you did?

MR. DIGGINS: I did not participate in any formal training, but I do not recall if there was any informal training.

MR. AZZARELLO: But no formal training.

MR. DIGGINS: No formal training. I'm sure of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now you say formal, but you say there may be informal training that you don't recall?

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MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, we could have had discussions informally going through the ranks and things like that. That could've happened because that happens on many different subjects and at many different times. But I don't remember if that happened for hijacks. I just don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Because they were drilled obviously in a field facility level, and you probably--I don't know. Maybe you were familiar with that--controller and a supervisor in Seattle that they would often have, what they call, dice and dynamic simulated training sessions where you'd sit at a computer as a controller and see if you can detect a hijack scenario on your radar screen, either by the squawk code or someone--did they have that type of training when you were in Seattle?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I know we've been told it varied from, you know, flashing the hijack code to someone playing the role even of the pilot and using the code word "trip" so that the controller

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could discern that situation as a hijack and report it up the chain of command. So to the extent that they had those say field exercises at a controller level, you don't recall having those type of specific formal exercises that you participated in any way here at headquarters after you got here in '99? Might have been going on somewhere else here at headquarters, but not that you participated in.

MR. DIGGINS: I don't believe I participated in anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

VOICE: I think the difficulty in that question, if I may, is you're talking operational in the field as to how to deal with a hijack. In Washington, the type of thing you're talking about or what an actual controller is doing, hijacking, isn't quite the same animal. They're more sort of after the fact evaluating how the system functions, how the controller handled a specific incident. So he wouldn't really be on the operational end. He would be on the evaluation end after the fact.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your group would come in,

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AAT 20, after there was an incident or an accident. So, for example, if there was a hijack that resulted in a crash, you'd come in after the fact to evaluate it?

MR. DIGGINS: See if they did their jobs because their jobs are clearly spelled out how they're supposed to respond.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, but there is, just so we're clear, there is protocol on the record in terms of responsibilities at the headquarters level in the event of a hijack being reported from the field level up to headquarters. It triggered some responsibility for people at headquarters level in terms of--

MR. DIGGINS: I'm sure there are. I personally, of course, don't get involved with it, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: And I just wanted to make that clear. I'm not suggesting that that's your responsibility. I just wanted to see if there was any cross training in that, or if you were ever exposed to that. That's all I was--

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MR. DIGGINS: Most of the time in the job that I held there, just like Andy said, we're notified after the event, and we provide any support to investigate that event, but we don't generally react during the operational phase of the event.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. So you sort of react after the operational phase proceeded then.

MR. DIGGINS: We do.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think that's a good sort of segway to 9-11, unless--I want to make sure my colleagues don't have any questions--do you guys have any background stuff for him?

MR. BROWN: All right. Let's take us to the day of 9-11. Tell us about how that day evolved when your tour duty started and then when you first became aware that there was either a hijack or an incident recorded in the system of concern to the FAA.

MR. DIGGINS: I was sitting at my desk. It was prior to 9 o'clock. I know that. I can't tell you exactly when. But Dave Kenols and Tony

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Mellow--I know you talked to Dave. Have you talked to Tony yet?

MR. BROWN: We've spoken to him last week.

MR. DIGGINS: Both of them, though, walked by my desk and Dave says come with me.

MR. BROWN: This is prior to 9 o'clock?

MR. DIGGINS: Prior to 9 o'clock, and it was before 9 o'clock.

MR. KARA: Were you on the fourth floor?

MR. DIGGINS: Fourth floor, correct.

MR. BROWN: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: Dave looked visibly stressed, I think is the way to look at it, and--

MR. KARA: Who was with him?

MR. DIGGINS: Dave and Tony Mellow. He said come with us. We're going to the 10th floor. I says okay, what's going on. He says an airplane just ran into the World Trade Center.

MR. BROWN: That was the first--I mean you might not have know it then, but now with the benefit of hindsight, that was American 11 as the first aircraft crashed?

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MR. DIGGINS: Correct, correct. My first inclination was to think it's a small airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair to say then that that's the first information you had that day that something was wrong was actually after there was a crash when Tony and Dave Kenols came by and said let's go, there's been a crash in the Trade Center?

MR. DIGGINS: It's fair to say it's accurate. That's the first time I knew about it.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm saying you didn't--there was no news report you heard or anything like that? Okay. So take us from there. What happened?

MR. DIGGINS: I went in the elevator with Dave and Tony. We went up to the 10th floor, and on the way up, I asked, you know, what was the weather, thinking, well, maybe it's a small airplane and somebody got caught in the weather, it didn't hit, and he says it's a--which means ceilings and visibility unlimited.

VOICE: The old Empire State Building

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crash.

MR. DIGGINS: So it was a clear day up there in New York, and I think Dave said something to me about he thinks it's a big airplane. This is either in the elevator or once we exited the elevator before. I don't know, somewhere in that process going to the 10th floor. Then I said what the hell's going on here.

MR. BROWN: You'd never heard that term before. We've heard about how beautiful a morning it was and how clear the skies were. Was that--what was that?

MR. DIGGINS: Ceilings and visibility unlimited. It's an old pilot term. I'm an old pilot.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have background in the--

MR. DIGGINS: Commercial aviation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Commercial?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. KARA: Did you fly what, 727's?

MR. DIGGINS: 727's and turbo--I wasn't

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too good flying in the '70's. I was living in my Volkswagen so I thought there was a better way to make a living.

MR. BROWN: So Dave tells you on the way up then that he thinks it's a larger aircraft.

MR. DIGGINS: Something like that, yeah.

MR. BROWN: Where did you guys go when you got up to the 10th floor?

MR. DIGGINS: We went to a conference room off of the director's office.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that off Peacock's office?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is now a famous diagram--and this is the layout of the 10th floor, and let's see if you agree that it's fairly accurate. That's the west end, and this is where the walk is on the east end with the crisis center, and at the west end, there's an air traffic room of suites in the corner. And if you flip it over, we're told in the corner of the west end was Peacock's office, AAT 1, and then the conference

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room, and then Jeff Griffith's office, and then another room over here. Is that fairly accurate, or how do you remember it?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, that's about right. Yeah, AAT and the conference room right here, and the secretary's over here.

MR. BROWN: Now where did you and Dave and Tony go to?

MR. DIGGINS: We just came right in here.

MR. BROWN: Into the conference room?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. BROWN: Is that pretty much Bill Peacock's conference room, which is for the Air Traffic suites?

MR. DIGGINS: I think it's for the Air Traffic suites up there. Anybody can use it.

MR. BROWN: Just want to put a name on it to refer to it. It's been called a few things. But it's a conference room in the Air Traffic suites.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then what did you

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proceed to do when you entered the conference room?

MR. DIGGINS: There was a telecon. I think somebody dialed into the telecon, but I don't know if they were already dialed in, whoever was in the room before we got in there. I don't know if they were dialed in already or Dave dialed in or something, but there was a conference going on.

MR. BROWN: So somebody started the telecon going?

MR. DIGGINS: There was a conference call, and I don't remember the mechanics of it, but I was not involved in setting it up.

MR. BROWN: What do you remember about when in the sequence of events did you learn that there was a second crash?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, well, we were getting set up in this room for the conference call. People are checking in and I'm hearing some conversation from the New York facilities, names, people that I recognize--Mike McCormick from the New York Center, Frank Hatfield, the division--I'm recognizing the voices on the conference call. We

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didn't have a television in this room, so it was obvious that we were trying to get updates, or wanted to get updates from CNN, so there was a television in this room--

MR. KARA: Peacock's office?

MR. DIGGINS: Peacock's office, so me and Jeff Lowe go on into this room and get the TV and try to drag it into the conference room. We did, but we didn't have enough cable. The cable wouldn't go far enough. So as we're fustering around with the cable, and I'm trying to pull it into the doorway here so we could see, that's when I saw the second one hit on the TV because the TV was this close to me as I was doing it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you saw the second crash on the TV.

MR. DIGGINS: On CNN. My first instinct was as the first one, but then it became clear it was the second one.

MR. BROWN: So you thought it was a rerun at first.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, my first instincts

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were that. It said live up in the corner, and I'm thinking live. And then the announcer said something.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just for the record, we're just joined by Dave Wiegand. Okay, so what are you thinking? What sort of goes through your mind now when you see the second one and you realize it's not a replay of the first crash but a second crash?

MR. DIGGINS: A moment of disbelief, like what the hell is going on now, you know, and I think I went in and told Dave it looks like we got a second one or something. Jeff Lowe and I, we were--it basically took our breath away. I remember that, and we just didn't know how to react to this. We just went in and told Dave and company, Dave Kenols and whoever else was in the room, looks like we got number two or something. I don't remember the exact words, but it was--it made it clear that it was another event. We made it clear to them there was another event.

MR. AZZARELLO: In terms of causes, are you thinking now--are you having any thoughts on,

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all right, it's a clear day, like you said, it's--in your former pilot--are you drawing any conclusions now as to is this intentional or unintentional? Is it an act of terrorism? Is it are we being attacked? Is that entering in yet or not in your thought process?

MR. DIGGINS: No, no. I didn't have an explanation. It defied explanation at that particular moment in time, and it didn't make any sense to me what I was seeing. My first thing was maybe it was an incapacitated pilot, but what's the chance of having two incapacitated pilots, so it wasn't making sense to me at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you thinking that it was probably really intentional after the second one, that's it's some more intentional acts?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't say as I was at the moment. Within short order, it became clear whether--surrounding discussion. It was a little bit chaotic in this room at this particular moment in time. So it's hard to say what you thought, what somebody said and then you would absorb what

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they said and then you think it too. I don't know so.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure, but before--let's say before the Pentagon was hit, we now know there was about 35 minutes in between. 9:03 was the second crash and 9:38 was the Pentagon. So about 35 minutes in between. In that 35 minute period, do you remember thinking to yourself--and I ask you this because you're a former pilot, so you've flown a commercial aircraft. You've flown a 727. You know how that sort of works and how they relatively fly with a lot of precision and then you have a clear day.

Now you've got two crashes, and you're--investigation--to try to determine what caused these crashes. Just try to get your sense for historical purposes what's going through your sort of mind at any point then after the--before the Pentagon--then at some point in between there start to think about whether or not this is not pilot error, not accident, not medical reasons, but intentional acts by someone.

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MR. DIGGINS: After the second one hit and before the Pentagon, it was clear these were intentional acts to me. It was clear to me. But I can't tell you how--

MR. AZZARELLO: Just asking if that thought--

MR. DIGGINS: Absolutely, before the Pentagon, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So now you're in that room and the telecon's getting up and you see the second aircraft go in and you tell Dave, or you and Tony let them out, and then take us from, as best you can recall, after seeing the second crash on TV, and take us up to when you learned that the Pentagon had been struck. Tell us what, as best you can, recreate what transpired in the room, or what you did in between the second aircraft crash of the Pentagon.

MR. DIGGINS: Okay. More and more people are joining the telecon from more and more facilities and regions. They're checking in. I think there was somebody on there from the

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FBI--some law enforcement was on the telecon, but I can't tell who or when they joined, and it became apparent that we were into unknown territory here of what's going on. We're not quite sure we understand what's happening here, but we're trying to react the best we can to the air traffic system, trying to understand what's going on out there, you know, because we had a lot of airplanes flying out there. You know, there's a chance we might lose a couple more. So we're trying to--and I guess the Command Center's on the line also, and we're trying to alert people to be aware that this activity is going on. Of course, not everybody's on the telecon, so we're all kind of just sharing information what we know, when we know it.

People reporting that anything strange--when I say people, the air traffic facilities who were actually monitoring the airplanes and reporting if there is anything strange is happening to an airplane under their surveillance. I remember an American--and it turned out to be American 77--Indy Center lost

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radios and radars simultaneously with the airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you remember hearing this on the telecon that the Indy Center lost radio coms and radar--

MR. DIGGINS: And radar, and they were treating it as a suspected aircraft accident.

MR. AZZARELLO: Radar with 77.

MR. DIGGINS: I'm sorry?

MR. AZZARELLO: They lost radio coms at Radio 77. They were treating it--

MR. DIGGINS: As a suspected aircraft accident, which is a normal response when you simultaneously lose radios and radar.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, let's back up to something you said a moment ago. You said that you were learning of the activity. Was this only over the telecon or was there also other phones in the room--

MR. DIGGINS: People were coming in and out of the room and discussing it. It was just a beehive of activities, so it was mainly through the telecon. The remote areas, the places that weren't

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located right here would give us the information over the telephone.

MR. AZZARELLO: The people that were in and out of the room with information, was that information that was flowing in to a different location than the FAA headquarters? Right down at the other end, you're saying you have the WOC and the crisis center. Do you know if any of those people were bringing information that was coming into the WOC or the crisis center? Were they bringing that down to the suites to make sure that--

MR. DIGGINS: I have no idea. I didn't follow those people around, so I don't know where they were getting the information and how they were getting it. I just know people were coming in and out of the room and sharing things. Some of it was duplicate, some of it was new information.

MR. BROWN: Who were the people that were coming in and out of the room?

MR. DIGGINS: I remember somebody from the Air Force.

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MR. BROWN: Someone from the Air Force?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah. Didn't know the individual. I think Jeff Griffith came in, and I think there were other people that I did not recognize.

MR. BROWN: So an Air Force representative?

MR. DIGGINS: Somebody with an Air Force uniform on. I don't know if they were--

MR. BROWN: You don't remember if it was any member--do you know, Colonel Adkins? Do you know if it was her?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a woman, but I don't know--I don't think I ever learned her name.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't know on 9-11 who Cheryl Adkins was. Just a woman with an Air Force uniform that was coming in and out?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a woman--because I eventually--the woman I'm thinking of, and I don't know if it's Cheryl Adkins or not, the woman I'm thinking of, once I started a running log on my laptop, I asked her if she could type, and she says

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yes, and I says start typing, and she said what'll I type. I says everything important you hear in this room.

VOICE: And she was in uniform?

MR. DIGGINS: She was in uniform, yes. Never did find out her name, though.

MR. BROWN: You had a running log going on the laptop?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, I need to back up here a little bit. As the information was coming out, people were saying that there was a Delta airplane, Delta 18, 1989 or something like that, that there was--it seemed like somebody was thinking it was hijacked and then the airline says no, it's not. Then the controller was talking with the pilot, and the pilot didn't seem to indicate anything strange was going on, but people were suggesting that this airplane was--maybe next in line to something, and I never did find out why they believed that.

So we were writing things on the white board, such as that, American 77--these things were being written on the white board.

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MR. AZZARELLO: On the white board?

MR. DIGGINS: Right. And other things were written that we already knew. Like number one had hit the Trade Center at this point--and whatever. And I don't remember exactly everything that was on the white board, but I wasn't writing on the white board, but other people were, and it was pretty apparent that this white board isn't going to last very long at this method.

So I don't know how I came downstairs to the fourth floor and I grabbed my computer back and grabbed my laptop. I don't know if Dave told me to do that or did it instinctly. I don't know. So the result is I went down to get my laptop, fired it up, and I started typing everything I saw on the white board.

VOICE: --

MR. BROWN: --

MR. DIGGINS: That was me.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was him. Was Dave Kenols reminding everyone that whatever was said or any instructions given must be remembered and

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recorded, and the white board was used at first and then later the questions and answers meticulously were committed to the laptop computer?

MR. DIGGINS: Meticulously?

MR. AZZARELLO: I didn't write the book.

MR. DIGGINS: That's a little bit of literary license. Dan, you have to take that up with Pamela--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know who she is. She never interviewed me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's see if we can go back over some of these events. You've covered a lot of ground here, Dan. You're in the conference room, and before we get to the report from Indy Center on 77, I want to see if I can get a handle on the situation of awareness of the first two crashes. Before the Pentagon's hit, what was the situation awareness regarding which aircraft might have caused the first two impacts at the Trade Center? Do you remember if it was equated with--

MR. DIGGINS: Keep in mind I was out of the room for a little while when I went down to get

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my laptop, so probably no more than four or five minutes. But I think it was clear to us that the first one hit. We probably were about 90 percent sure it was American 11.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were--

MR. DIGGINS: But there was still a doubt because we--you know, I don't think anybody really spotted it, but it kind of intuitively made sense.

MR. AZZARELLO: And just see if I can jog your memory on maybe this never reached the headquarters level on you said Delta 1990 was in a mix and you didn't know what was happening, why that was being looked at as a potential hijack. We heard up in Boston from interviewing the field facility individuals that they quickly started to evaluate what was in their system,, and so you've developed so you can take and develop some sort of a profile to fit the form of the first two--as they both left from Logan, 11 and 175?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: They were both 767's, Transcontinental, from Logan to LAX, and the Delta

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was a 767 from Logan to I believe Las Vegas.

MR. DIGGINS: I remember that was discussed on the telecon too. That was discussed, but I remember there was something--the controller asked the pilot if he was okay, and I guess the pilot's response was we're okay, but somebody felt that the pilot wasn't okay, and I don't remember--it's one of those things that became a circular reasoning type of thing, you know. He fit the profile perhaps. That's the first time I had heard that, but it makes sense.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they talked to the Delta pilot but I'm sure trying to read the pilot they had--maybe someone had a sense that maybe thing aren't all right? Was it that type of thing like--

MR. DIGGINS: It was confusion. People thought this airplane was in danger, but the pilot said no, he's not, but now that we're tuned into thinking hijack, just because the pilot says he's not doesn't necessarily mean that's accurate.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there anything though

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in particular, was it a feeling that somebody reported that it seemed like the pilot wasn't speaking openly or might have had--or was it just we should take some precaution?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't recall we took it to that level of detail on the phone.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: Then again, this was all second and third-hand through the phone because the controller's actually talking to the airplanes relaying to the supervisors, supervisors relaying it to somebody else, and then they're relaying it to us.

MR. KARA: You were 90 percent on American Air 11. How about United 175?

MR. DIGGINS: I think at that--what I recall. Let me think about it here a second. I'm not sure I was aware of 175 losing its transponder or being a subject airplane at that particular moment in time. Shortly after the second one hit, I don't think I was aware that United 175 was a candidate.

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MR. KARA: You don't recall Mike McCormick's voice on that telecon at all talking about another--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't recall.

MR. KARA: Were you aware in the immediate aftermath that New York and New York Trade com were running the technical side of business to try to find out what happened on 175? --pulling the tapes or running the--

MR. DIGGINS: I was aware of that, but I can't tell at what time that I became aware of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess did you find out either that day or in the aftermath that 175 was actually different from the other three flights in the sense that it didn't completely shut off the transponder but changed the code twice?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: Changed briefly--

MR. DIGGINS: Sure, I was--to analyze the radar initially.

MR. AZZARELLO: We've seen that the Tracon

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people were following it I guess under the new transponder code as it was pointed out to them, and they watched it sort of descend and then some personnel statements, which maybe you were even privy to at some point, you know, they watched it go 4,000, 3,000, 2,000. Was it your recollection, though, that that Tracon wasn't reporting--they weren't on this open telecon reporting that type of real live information on 175? Certainly not at that point--not at the point you were up on the telecon--

MR. KARA: Actually, John, it might've been the New York tower that--

MR. AZZARELLO: The New York tower reported seeing an aircraft go into the building but the Tracon was watching the sort of target descend--

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember that discussion, but if that discussion happened, that might've been the time I was out of the room. The timing is about right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Could it also be that--I mean that was the point of impact. Could it be that the telecon was just sort of in its infancy stage and was getting up and going at the point of the second impact?

MR. DIGGINS: I know why I didn't hear it. I was in the other room getting a TV.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were getting--

MR. DIGGINS: I was in the other room getting the TV. That's why I didn't hear it.

MR. AZZARELLO: At that point when you were getting the TV, was the telecon--to your recollection, was it up and going, or was it really just--

MR. DIGGINS: Gaining speed.

MR. AZZARELLO: Gaining speed.

MR. KARA: At that point, was there already somebody writing on the white board?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now take us to early when you said Indy reported that they lost coms and radar. Did that come over the telecon?

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MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if that came from Indy Center where they were on the telecon, or was it coming through a region to the Great Lakes?

MR. DIGGINS: Who I heard it from on the telecon, I can't tell you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. You said that they reported it as--whoever was reporting it was saying that they thought it was suspected action. How was that information evaluated by yourself and others in the air traffic situation. I know you said ordinarily that's a--simultaneous loss of radar and coms, but this isn't sort of a normal, but--still developed as a not so normal day if there have been two crashes at the Trade Center. And after the second one, pretty much a lot of people were thinking well, this is an intentional act by some group of people.

So given that background, how were you and the others in the room evaluating this information that there's another one that they lost radar coms

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with? Are you thinking--are you in this situation, yourself and the others, thinking, yeah, an accident, or were you thinking something else?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't answer for the other folks.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yourself, you.

MR. DIGGINS: There's no question in my mind. I believed there was an intentional--if it was an accident, it was an intentional crash. If it was a crash, it was an intentional crash.

MR. AZZARELLO: If it was down, you're thinking done intentionally.

MR. DIGGINS: Right. I think it was intentional, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about--did you have any thoughts yourself on whether or not it was down at that point based on what they were telling you they knew about it, had lost radio com. Did they have anything more specific on confirming one way or another why they thought it might've been down?

MR. DIGGINS: Just because of the simultaneous loss of radios and radars. That's how

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we're trained to react. That usually means an accident, means a crash, whether it's intentional or not, that points to a crash.

MR. AZZARELLO: But I guess what I'm getting at, and that wasn't a good question. But I mean is if you have any awareness at that point that the first two crashes did involve--or at least American 11 involved shutting off the transponder and both planes stopped communications with the controllers before they crashed, how much weight are you giving to the fact at that point that well, maybe it's not a crash, but, you know, maybe this is a third hijack in the system and it's aiming for a building and it's out there somewhere and we need to find it? I mean was that also in your--

MR. DIGGINS: There was discussion whether we were getting any primary radar returns on the telecon. I remember that discussion, and the answer was negative. No primary radar returns, and that could mean a couple of different things.

MR. BROWN: Tell us what that could mean.

MR. DIGGINS: There's no radar being

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displayed, no primary targets being displayed, and in high altitude environment, the controllers don't display primary targets. So there was some discussion, is it being displayed and they just haven't selected it yet. Something along those lines, but it was pretty clear that there were no primary targets being displayed period. So to me that meant the airplane might have just gone straight in.

MR. BROWN: And I guess we came to an appreciation in the field of how that works then that generally a high altitude and--transponding aircraft and don't have primaries on but they can--

MR. DIGGINS: But they can select it, they can select it. If it's being sent for their selection.

MR. BROWN: If they're getting the return from the--

MR. DIGGINS: If the--radar is sending them primary returns. The radar might be recording primary returns, but it may not send--

MR. BROWN: Might not be feeding that

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information--

MR. DIGGINS: Correct, to the controllers. So it doesn't matter if the controller pushes the button or not, it's not going to display it because the radar processor is not sending the information.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall part of the discussion being about--there being no primary radar returns on 77? Do you recall there being any instructions being given to have those controllers try to turn on their primaries? What was their--if you know, what was their situation where it's an Indy Center? Do they realize that there were two crashes out in New York, and that the primary transponder was off on one of the aircrafts?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't tell you if any Center was even on the line. So I just know somebody from either the region or the Center was on the line, but I can't tell you--you know, you're talking about a controller with a headset on talking. I can't tell you what that individual knew at that particular moment in time. I can't tell you that.

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MR. AZZARELLO: No, we can get to that. I think what we'll do is we'll try to go through that area later if that was something you looked at in the aftermath as an accident investigator with what they knew what the situation awareness was after, but before we get to that, I appreciate your separating and let's go with the day of.

Let me ask you this then. Did anybody in headquarters then say, hey, help make sure they have the primaries on because he just might not be squawking with his transponders. So let's make sure they have their primaries on and they're looking for this.

MR. DIGGINS: There was discussion about it, but I can't tell you whether it was commanded or just information that was shared with us. I can't tell you that, but it was clear they were not receiving primaries.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: John, let me interject for a second. --air traffic situation, the telecon that you were familiar with. We were told that within

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the ACC complex and the bridge that there were two nets, primary net and a tactical net. Primary net we understand is they send it outward to other entities. Tactical net we understand was an internal FAA net. How did we distinguish that net from your net down here? Or are they same? Are we talking the same thing or are they two different nets?

MR. DIGGINS: Two different. From my estimation, they were two different things. But I can't tell you if that person was on our line or if--I don't know. I didn't set up the telecon so I--

MR. AZZARELLO: In terms of the focuses of them, though. You can shed some light on whether they were really is a distinction in the purposes of them or maybe not. Did the tactical net telecon as we understand it in an event of a hijacking incident could be activated at the direction of someone in management so that there could be internal discussions among FAA entities, like field facilities and Tracons, etcetera, to gain some sort

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of, you know, some sort of realtime situation awareness of what's going on within the air traffic system.

Would you describe that generally as similar to what was going on in the Kenols' telecon trying to gain sort of situational awareness on a broader regional/national perspective on what was going on within the FAA system air traffic-wise in terms of there being any other potential hijacks out there?

MR. DIGGINS: That's pretty much what was going on in this conference room. Trying to understand the air traffic, trying to get information about the air traffic system and what's happening out there as the clock moves on.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to distinguish not just trying to gain situational awareness and information on the two that are already crashed, but was it also a purpose in that conference to gain going forward to try and figure out are there any other problem flights in the system now that are out there that could be hijacks that we need to

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deal with? Did you think that--

MR. DIGGINS: I think it's easier to say that now in hindsight, but at the time, I think we were just trying to understand what's happening and what any events that are happening realtime and try to figure out what's going on, see if they're related.

Because we knew pretty much at that point that these things were intentional, the first two were intentional, and then we were talking about maybe a hijack of a Delta 1989 or 1988 or whatever the number was, and then American 77. It becomes clear that there seems to be some type of activity going on in the system, but we don't know where it's next going to show up.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the involvement that that become one of the elements of the telecon as that information flowed in to try to keep a handle on it?

MR. DIGGINS: We're trying to discuss anything unusual happening from any controller who's monitoring, that are controlling the flights

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of any unusual activity and report that to us.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you're using Command Center as sort of a lynch pin or point of contact because they're in touch with all the facilities too, the field facilities?

MR. DIGGINS: Any way we can get it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember who from the Command Center might've been on the line? Was it one of the NOM's or perhaps some of the millions of people on duty that day, Ben Sliney (sp), John White, Linda Schuessler, any of those people you recall being on--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know Sliney, but I know John White and Linda Schuessler, and I can't tell you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if it was a male or female voice representing Command Center?

MR. DIGGINS: Can't tell you that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: Let me ask this question. If the administrator or the deputy administrator who were in the SPTS or talking to the national level

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entities, who would they turn to for their tactical information internally and what FAA knew and what the situational awareness was? Would they turn to the Kenols telecon down here, or would they turn to the ACC?

MR. DIGGINS: Either one. Any method. There's different communication routes to get to the guy actually with the headset on.

MR. BROWN: Let me ask you about 77, following up on any further information. Did you learn at some point prior to the Pentagon being hit that they've lost radio and radar within? What's the next piece of information, if any, that you receive on American 77?

MR. DIGGINS: State police were notified to look for what we call a smoking hole in the ground. That's my term to look for a crash.

MR. BROWN: To look for a crash.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, exactly.

MR. BROWN: And do you remember how they were given--were they given a location as to where you thought the plane went down?

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MR. DIGGINS: Somewhere in Kentucky.

MR. BROWN: Would it have been where--generally in the location where they lost radio and radar?

MR. DIGGINS: A good place to start looking, and the airplane was headed westbound, so airplanes usually go crash in the same direction they're traveling, so you can go from the point there west.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, Dan, you said earlier I think that even if they turned the primary on, it doesn't necessarily mean they were getting the feed to their console. I guess we now know in hindsight that where Flight 77 did commit it's turn back to the east coast, that it went into sort of a spot, a dead spot, so to speak for lack of a better term, where the FAA believes that there was no radar feed, primary skin pain feed going back to the controllers and Indy Center. Did you know that that--gap existed on 9-11?

MR. DIGGINS: During the event?

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, prior to the event.

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MR. DIGGINS: Prior to the event, no. During the event, no. Later on at 9-11, I did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, then I guess maybe was that related to when you said it doesn't necessarily mean--was that knowledge that you gained afterwards when you said it doesn't necessarily mean that they're getting the primary feed even if they turn the switch on?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, I used to be a radar guy, so I know radar pretty well and air traffic. There's a couple of reasons why you may not see a primary target. It's not being processed and sent for display, it might be outside of radar coverage. It could be something else, some letter out there blocking out the return. There's many different reasons why you wouldn't see primary.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's from your experience, just general experience of radar analysis?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes. Where the guy is--in reference to the radar site, how close he is, whether he's going to--or straight towards it, how

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far away. I mean all those things affect the radar performance. That's just RF energy bouncing off the airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now you talk about the crash site in Kentucky. When do you learn that the Pentagon has been struck, or how do you learn? Tell us how you learned that the Pentagon was hit.

MR. DIGGINS: I'm not sure. I really don't remember, but I remember there was discussion of a fast-moving, unidentified target.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that coming over the telecon?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes. Headed towards Washington.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember where it came from?

MR. DIGGINS: They said it was headed eastbound, that it was out to the west headed eastbound. So I went to the window and looked. I don't know what I was expecting to see, but they were giving us the play by play. Somebody was giving us the play by play that had radars going

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from them, in front of them. Dulles said it was moving and they were giving us how many miles away from D.C. it was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember who was giving that play by play, what location it was coming from?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: And again, this sort of play by play of the aircraft approaching?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Approaching D.C.?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't tell you the mileage, but somebody was clicking off miles for us.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could you narrow it down to when they started clicking off at the earliest point out? Like what was the farthest point out? Was it less than 10 miles, more than 10, less than 50 miles?

MR. DIGGINS: No, it was around the 50 range, but I don't know where they were measuring from, so downtown D.C. is a vague term and it was

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50 miles away, something like that. So away from more, I can't tell you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Not much longer then is your recollection--it was not much longer than 50 miles out if they were tracking it? Was it for--

MR. DIGGINS: I wouldn't hold me to 50, but that's about the ballpark figure. It could've been 40, it could've been 30. I don't know, but it was more than 10 I can tell you that.

MR. AZZARELLO: How did that end? They're giving you a play by play. Does it go down like single digits, like it's five miles out, it's four miles out?

MR. DIGGINS: No. No, never thought about this in two and a half years, so bear with me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure.

MR. DIGGINS: Somehow I think somebody said they see smoke from the Pentagon or something. And Jeff Logan and I went out to look out the window to see if we could see it, and I don't remember seeing anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you don't remember

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looking out and seeing a plane approach the Pentagon area.

MR. DIGGINS: I'm not sure we could see the Pentagon from the window I went to.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which window was that?

MR. DIGGINS: It was in Peacock's office.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you were--

MR. DIGGINS: It was over in here, yeah. We didn't spend much time. We just went to look out the window to see if we could see anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could you see smoke?

MR. DIGGINS: No, no, I couldn't. Then I went back into the room, conference room.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did there come a point in time after that where someone reported the Pentagon was hit right after that?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, it came to us, and I don't know the time frame, but it came to us that a pilot, a C-130, reported seeing what he thought was a--I think he estimated it as a 757 or 767 or something. He said something about the type and the shiny airplane or something like that hitting.

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I haven't listened to these tapes in two and a half years.

MR. AZZARELLO: --C-130--

MR. DIGGINS: The pilot reported an airplane had struck.

MR. AZZARELLO: He reported that a commercial aircraft struck the Pentagon?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct. He gave some details that kind of led us to believe that it might be the American 77. That's the thought I had in my mind.

MR. AZZARELLO: You just took me into my next question. You equated to at that point, based on situational awareness of what you were hearing that 77 was lost and a fast-approaching aircraft and then his report of the commercial aircraft, you took that to be 77--

MR. DIGGINS: As a possibility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes, you're not certain, but one of the things that entered your mind as a possibility.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if prior to the report of the Pentagon being struck by an aircraft, by the C-130, was there any discussion in the telecon room about coordination with the military, either on that report of 77 being lost, or just in general a military aircraft being scrambled to assist?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, there was conversations about the fighters scrambling out of Otis for American 11 earlier on. I remember that. Are you asking about the military responding to American 77?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, what I'm talking about I guess is, you know, on 11 there was a report, the hijack report reaches the military at some point and they launch Otis and they're up over the New York area some time after 9 o'clock. Was there any discussion about has these new aircraft--not new as the reports--new reports of other aircraft that could be potentially hijacks like 77 or later on 93? Was there any discussion about making sure that the military had that

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information?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't recall. I don't recall. I'm not sure this was the purpose of the telecon that I was on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about that. We'd like your insight on that. Was that perceived by you as one of the purposes of that telecon, or was it perceived not to be to coordinate with the military--coordinate information such that whatever your situation awareness was in that room, that that was going over to the military side if they needed that information?

MR. DIGGINS: Again, I believe the purpose of the telecon was to understand what was happening in the system air traffic-wise.

MR. AZZARELLO: Internal to the FAA air traffic.

MR. DIGGINS: Internal, yes.

MR. KARA: At what point in time in this telecon now and in that room was discussion of United 93 and Delta 1989 come into play?

MR. DIGGINS: I think some of them are

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happening within the same time frame, but I can't tell you when or how, but there was discussion about United 93 made an unauthorized turn, and it's headed towards Pittsburgh, and I remember the Pittsburgh towers--we got word that the Pittsburgh tower controllers were going to evacuate. But I can't tell you where in the time frame the discussion was had.

MR. BROWN: Do you remember if you first heard about 93 before or after the Pentagon--you heard that the Pentagon was struck?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't tell you that.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about at some point that morning you learned, I assume, that 93 was reported crashed somewhere in Pennsylvania. If you can, do you recall how soon prior to that that there was any reports about United 93 being a potential hijack or in distress or reports of, you know, this screaming frequency and the bomb on board? How much lead time would you say relatively speaking did you get at all on that coming over the telecon before it was reported crashed?

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MR. DIGGINS: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you get any--do you recall hearing reports though about 93 coming over that telecon before the report that it had crashed?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, yeah. As I just said we were talking about it. There was discussion about it, but I can't tell you the time continuum of where that was. Prior to obviously a crash. You know, once I look at all the time sequences of all the events, I can give you a general idea, but I don't have it committed right to my brain.

MR. KARA: --Kenol's chronology. Is that what you put on your laptop?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, except for the mistake on the time, that's me. It was kind of confusing in the room, so I was in the middle of copying things off the board and typing out what I heard at the same time.

MR. BROWN: What was the time mistake you're referring to? Was there a particular entry?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, 9:47, first impact with the World Trade Center. Well, it was 8:47.

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So I think that was my initial mistake. I typed this one--the Pentagon and I just continued with the 9 and I just carried it on for the time frame.

MR. KARA: We're not holding you to the time you put in. That's a state of the art document as of the day.

MR. DIGGINS: Doesn't look too meticulous, but--

MR. KARA: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You never talked to Pamela--

MR. DIGGINS: I remember looking at this after the fact, and I didn't get my laptop back for three months.

MR. AZZARELLO: -- believe she said that.

MR. BROWN: I definitely do believe that she said it.

VOICE: --

MR. DIGGINS: --ahead of time I could remember things a little better.

MR. KARA: Actually I'm sitting here--I hadn't looked at that in terms of '93, and I--On the left-hand margin the entries on '93--

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MR. AZZARELLO: And we don't mean to suggest in any way, Dan, that that, you know, that those times are accurate. We understand there's a lot going on in the room, and you're getting information, you know, realtime and yet at some point along it ended, and I'm sure discussing the realtime information was important, you know.

MR. DIGGINS: I don't type as fast as--

MR. AZZARELLO: And if your recollection is different from, you know, what those times are, by all means we're interested in your recollection.

MR. KARA: And it's part of the sequence--

MR. DIGGINS: May I take a moment here?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, go ahead, take your time.

VOICE: Can we stop the recorder?

MR. KARA: Yeah. We'll just cut it off.

(Pause.)

MR. KARA: We're back on the record with Dan Diggins on March 30.

MR. AZZARELLO: --give the chronology of events which we think was kept at some point in the

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situation room that day by yourself and/or others. Was that generally your recollection of the sequence of events?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, it does.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell us what you recall now.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, it does. Talks about Delta 1989, and that's pretty much the way I remember it because when it became clear the pilot said we were not being hijacked or something, that's where I typed in capital letters. I remember that. And I remember the United 93 report stopped east of Pittsburgh headed eastbound. The VFR saw them. I remember that. I remember that now. VFR is another little--

MR. AZZARELLO: So is the report from the VFR--

MR. DIGGINS: From VFR. I remember that.

MR. BROWN: Where was it at that point?

MR. DIGGINS: 40 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, heading eastbound.

MR. BROWN: So pretty much southeast of

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Pittsburgh headed eastbound?

MR. DIGGINS: Right. And then the countdown of an airplane headed towards Washington was--that countdown was for United 93, not American 77. I remember somebody giving us countdown, but evidently it was for United 93, not American 77. I just know it was an airplane headed eastbound. After reading this, it looks like it's--

MR. BROWN: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so you think that it wasn't then 77. The earlier countdown was related to 93?

MR. DIGGINS: --fast-moving aircraft 60 northwest to D.C. southeast bound headed towards D.C.

MR. KARA: That specific line item is a reference to '93 you think--

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which one is that? The 60 northwest down at the bottom?

MR. DIGGINS: --

VOICE: Okay, your recollection is that--

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MR. DIGGINS: 60 northwest.

MR. KARA: 60 northwest is a '93 reference.

MR. DIGGINS: Right. That's when they were counting down.

MR. KARA: And I'm not sure we got this on tape. I think we did, but you're the person that was typing these entries in that day.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. KARA: And your source of information was one of two places, either coming from--so this was coming from the telecon.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have a recollection that there weren't two separate mileage distances given on that day after--on the Pentagon and the 93? Could there have been two separate instances of report of aircraft approaching?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't believe so. I remember one countdown, and I remember the window I went to look out was up in the northwest direction.

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So that would make sense. I don't know what I was expecting to see.

MR. KARA: So there was not another at least aircraft in the system at this point in time based on your recollection of the chronology as you executed it that day.

MR. DIGGINS: Well, we were aware that the American 77 had lost radios and radar.

MR. KARA: That was the other loose airplane in the system at this point in time, 77 and 93. Delta 1989 was a different sort of an animal, and there was not yet a fourth aircraft sitting aside 11 and 175.

MR. DIGGINS: There was a TWA--something about refused to go somewhere, and there was some discussion about that, but I'm not sure that that was just the pilot's not understanding what's going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember whether there was any discussion about military notification on that at the 93, if that's the one 60 miles out and it's approaching the Capital area,

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and now you've had two crashes in the Trade Center and one at the Pentagon. I'm not suggesting that it should have been done from that area. I'm just asking was any discussion going on back in that conference room that geez, if it's approaching, it could be headed for, I don't know, it could be headed for us. It could be headed for the FAA building, it could be headed for another Washington building. Let's make sure the military--is anybody saying, hey, let's make sure the military had this info? Any discussion like that?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't recall that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: I think if there was, I would have typed it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you think at the time, though, that that was going on somewhere else in the 10th floor, or were you down at the other end, if you did at all? Did you have any understanding of that in terms of military coordination that that was a function being performed somewhere else in the FAA headquarters?

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MR. DIGGINS: I'm not sure my thought patterns even went in that direction.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Fair enough.

MR. DIGGINS: We were still trying to understand what was going on with American 77. Again I was one of many people involved here, so I can't tell you about all the other participants.

MR. KARA: You said at one point you thought law enforcement was on. You thought it was the FBI. Do you recall any more about that when they came on and what their participation was?

MR. DIGGINS: No, but I remember some conversation, and I can't tell you what it was, but something maybe--on the telecon. Whether it was FBI, Secret Service, I don't know. I was left with the impression that there was somebody there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there any discussion that you heard come over that telecon about authority being given by the President or Vice President to take commercial aircraft out and shoot down whatever that was issued that day?

MR. DIGGINS: I remember hearing about it

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and discussing it that day, but I can't tell if it was during the telecon or later on in the day when my activities took me out of the telecon. I don't know. I remember the discussion that day, but I can't tell you.

MR. KARA: Do you remember any discussion about an aircraft with respect to Air Force One?

MR. DIGGINS: Aircraft being what?

MR. KARA: Just being a threat to Air Force One?

MR. DIGGINS: There was some discussion of Air Force One being on the ground at Andrews. I remember that or something like that, and there was some discussion of the timing of the departure of Air Force One and somebody had some concerns, but I can't tell you. But I remember there was discussion about Air Force One. I thought I had it in here somewhere.

MR. KARA: On the ground in Florida? You said Andrews. I just wanted to--

MR. DIGGINS: No, I remember there was some discussion about Air Force One and maybe I

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just assumed it was Andrews or something. I don't know, but I remember--yeah, here it is. Air Force One. Airborne. I don't know what that means.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your recollection back here--do you recall talking about it later, or did you recall hearing about it over that telecon in Kenols' telecon?

MR. DIGGINS: Like I said I can't tell you. I remember some discussion but I can't tell you with whom or what venue.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me ask you if you recall if it occurred in connection with hearing about--the fast-moving aircraft 60 miles out which you say now you're equating with United 93. Do you remember that being any part of the discussion, like as it's approaching, was there any discussion about all right, well, you know, what are we going to do. What's going to happen. Is anybody positioned to do something because there's been three crashes now. Was that not part of, as best you can recollect, not part of that

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discussion?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember. I don't really remember discussing too much military activity on this telecon because I would imagine I would've written it down.

MR. BROWN: Do you recall if anybody that came down into your room, that not your room, but that Air Traffic suite area, like Jeff Griffith, for example, somebody in that position in Air Traffic, or anyone like that at that level of management, did anyone like that ever come down into the room to discuss coordination of the military that was going on elsewhere on the 10th floor?

MR. DIGGINS: Griffith came down once, and Dave left the room and went out and talked to them briefly out in the hallway. So I don't know what those discussions were. I haven't--

MR. KARA: Where was Doug--

MR. DIGGINS: He was downstairs on the fourth floor.

MR. KARA: He stayed downstairs on the

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fourth floor.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can we go to--do you have anything else on the day of?

MR. KARA: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can we go to--sort of shift gears now a little bit and go post-9-11?

MR. DIGGINS: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: In your efforts to sort of go back and look at--realizing that there's a lot of issues going on in the air traffic systems. The national system was shut down and brought back up roughly a week later. But in the aftermath, in the immediate aftermath, say the first week after, we understand there were efforts made understandably to go back now and try to find out just what happened when with each of the four hijacked aircraft. What did the FAA know in terms of the field facilities and the controllers, when did they know it, who did they communicate it to, and they're just following the chain of communication as well as looking at the radar, to try to

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reconstruct what happened. Can you tell us about the extent of involvement if any you had in those efforts?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, that first night, or that first day, after I left the interview room or the conference room, I went down to my office on the fourth floor, and I proceeded to collect radar information on the four airplanes. It was sent to me via e-mail.

MR. AZZARELLO: This was later on 9-11.

MR. DIGGINS: Later on 9-11, yeah. Now we had an FTP site.

MR. BROWN: What's that called?

MR. DIGGINS: File Transfer Protocol. It's a website that you can transfer large amounts of information to. Both Doug and I were pulling radar information off the FTP site through e-mail. We were getting voice communication, digital voice communication sent to us.

MR. BROWN: Voice meaning the controller communications?

MR. DIGGINS: Controller, yeah. ATC

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communication. I spent the rest of the afternoon working on that, and then in the early evening after I got some of this voice communication, specifically with United 93, because that was probably the most gruesome with all the voice communications that went across the ATC frequency.

MR. BROWN: Do you remember the--

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, I screened it and made a CD of it and eliminated a lot of background noise so it could be heard a little bit clearer. I did believe it enhanced it so you could hear what was going on, burned a CD, and actually went up to Marty Belger (sp) and company and played it for them. That was about midnight on the 11th. Also did some coordination with the FBI.

MR. BROWN: And you played that for the 93 comms? You put it on a CD and played it for Marty Belger?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct, and the head of FA Security as I recall. He was in the room.

MR. BROWN: Was that Canivan? Was he back then?

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MR. DIGGINS: Was that Mike Canivan (sp)?
Was he back from Puerto Rico?

MR. KARA: Or was it Lynn?

MR. BROWN: Was it Lee--

MR. DIGGINS: I can't remember the name.
It was just a fleeting moment in the office, and I
remember saying to Marty this is tough to listen
to, so you might want to discriminate who listens
to it.

MR. AZZARELLO: We heard a cockpit voice
recorder from 93. You hear like this screaming--

MR. DIGGINS: You hear a gruntle attack.

MR. AZZARELLO: Invasion of the cockpit?

MR. DIGGINS: It was pretty clear on the
ATC tape.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you able to get an
approximate time then of the cockpit intrusion and
takeover from that--listening to the communications
of the air traffic controller?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know if that
particular moment in time. Having that and the
radar information, I could do it, but at that point

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I wasn't focused on--

MR. AZZARELLO: Not that early on, but did you subsequently learn, though, then that I think the radar reduction data shows that the transponder would show up 9:40 or 9:41?

MR. KARA: Or rather 93--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah. By the way, I'm looking at the summary of air traffic hijacked events, Source AAT 20, and at the date on some of the radar reductions, or some of the radar data that says prepared by AAT 20 on 9-17.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, I did all those.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you do these here?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that was prepared roughly six days after the event, some of this data, September 17th?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, the--product was done--

MR. AZZARELLO: But it was ongoing--it was an ongoing work in progress.

MR. DIGGINS: Right. I started working

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that the night of.

MR. AZZARELLO: Actually started on 9-11 work.

MR. DIGGINS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, actually--so I guess in the aftermath and the days that followed at some point you come to know that the transponder was shut off after the cockpit intrusion and the communications?

MR. DIGGINS: I knew it that night.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, you did know it at some point later that night?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, because I had the radar information. The radar was sent to me. I could correlate the radar--

MR. AZZARELLO: Summary of it.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: When was the first transmission 9-28. Am I right?

MR. DIGGINS: Let me just--

MR. AZZARELLO: Unknown origin, and then it evolves in the screens, and I think--

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MR. BROWN: Could I see it?

MR. DIGGINS: The night of 9-11, I knew all this information. I put it together with a radar and some of the voice clips that were sent to me. And one of our guys was out in that direction and I directed him to bring back the original voice tape. He was out there, and he drove during the night, and he brought back the original voice tape.

MR. AZZARELLO: You got the original recording from Cleveland Center--

MR. DIGGINS: I told him to bring it back because I knew that the FBI would--

MR. AZZARELLO: Want to hear it?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who actually did a lot of the legwork on the groundwork on putting this document together, this summary. Was it yourself and who else? Did you have anybody else helping you on this?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, sure, I did. There was a whole bunch of us doing it. Doug Gould, Tony Mellow, Jeff Meyers.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff Meyers?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes. Actually I think he was around, but I'm not sure he did much hands-on work, and Tony Ferroni (sp).

MR. AZZARELLO: Tony Ferroni you said. Would you say the four main people who worked on it were yourself, Gould, Tony Mellow and Tony Ferroni?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, without question. Doug and I did most of the technical stuff, and I think Tony did the typing.

MR. BROWN: Doug did a lot of typing the work?

MR. DIGGINS: Technical stuff. He worked with the terminal radar and worked with the in-route radar.

MR. BROWN: So he just did technical radar work?

MR. DIGGINS: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was your understanding as to the purpose of putting this together, or it was multi-purpose, but who actually asked you to it together? Who instructed you to

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develop this summary?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was it Dave Kenols--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know. We knew what our duties were, and I was just putting the technical stuff together and I'm not sure. I'm sure there was a plan. I'm sure you can ask Dave or Tony.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's ordinarily the type of thing you'd get to work on in your division--

MR. DIGGINS: The technical stuff analyzed what happened. We were trying to analyze what happened.

MR. KARA: Let me put a question in here. All right, at this point in time and the immediate aftermath when your compiling the essential details, what radar information or what additional information did you get from either the 84th--or from the Northeast Air Defense Center?

MR. DIGGINS: I had all available radar information on the--I talked with the facilities themselves to find out--the field facilities--to

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find out what--

MR. KARA: The FAA field facilities.

MR. DIGGINS: FAA--I went through the NTSB to get information from--the 84th--also asked for any terminals along the way, any type of radar source that we could get, and I left it up to the other facilities because they knew their regions better than I did.

MR. KARA: That was on the radar site. Did you get any tapes or logs or that kind of information from the Northeast Air Defense Sector or the military?

MR. DIGGINS: Logs? You mean administrative type stuff like that?

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. DIGGINS: I didn't ask for that. I don't know--

MR. KARA: We're still on the immediate aftermath as it plays out over the months. Things are little bit differently, but let me just for the record. Very soon after the Northeast Air Defense Sector put together a briefing of events that day

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and within those, say, the first week after 9-11, did you have access to the Northeast Air Defense Sector's briefing of events that you recall?

MR. DIGGINS: I remember seeing something, but I couldn't tell you the source of it. I remember a military--

MR. KARA: Well, there was an additional briefing that was done, and that was done over at Andrews by the 113th Wing by the Air National Guard.

MR. DIGGINS: I was not part of that. I don't know.

MR. KARA: And the person who put that together is Major Kane. Do you recall a briefing by a Major Kane?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. BROWN: When you say you remember seeing something from the military, was it like in the form of like a chrono, a briefing?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a document.

MR. BROWN: A timeline type document?

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MR. DIGGINS: Yes, yeah. But I can't tell you what source.

MR. BROWN: Did you have any--there's some logs here that are cited military logs from--did you have--I understand somewhere here at AAT 20 you might have had access to the log, the--log of events. Do you remember if you--

MR. DIGGINS: I remember having one in my hand, but I don't know where it came from. Maybe if you could show it to me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure. Does this look familiar? That's a copy of a log from the Northeast Air Defense Sector.

MR. DIGGINS: No, this doesn't look familiar. There was a typed one that I saw from somewhere.

MR. KARA: You also have provided by FAA, and it's dated 9-20-01, a list of times which represents notifications to the military. Does that ring a bell, or did you prepare that?

MR. DIGGINS: I didn't prepare that, but I remember watching somebody prepare it. I think it

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was Tony Ferroni, but I'm not sure.

MR. KARA: You think Tony prepared this very specific list of notification?

MR. DIGGINS: I remember seeing it.

MR. KARA: Did that become an issue more than it had to be addressed by Tony and the staff, that includes you, about when the military was notified and what they were told?

MR. DIGGINS: Become an issue?

MR. KARA: Yeah.

MR. DIGGINS: Not that I recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you have the military press release with the times? See if that's in there.

MR. KARA: I've got three FAA press releases. I didn't bring the NORAD one with me.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm sure we have that. Do you remember seeing--there was a NORAD timeline that went out on September 18th, and it listed--it was bullet fashion with one page. It would have each of the four flights, FAA notification, when they scrambled and when the aircraft crashed.

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MR. DIGGINS: That's probably the thing
I'm--

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that what you think we
were looking at?

MR. DIGGINS: But I'd have to see it to
make sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: We don't have that with
us?

MR. KARA: I don't.

MR. DIGGINS: But this is not familiar to
me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Make sure I don't
have it with me.

MR. KARA: I have one but not the other,
John.

MR. AZZARELLO: You have that one, not the
other one, okay. I don't think I have a copy. I
want to take one shot. There's one folder here it
might be in. Well, let me ask you about--what do
you want to do?

MR. KARA: No, he was just saying there's
an online, and I said--

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VOICE: --

MR. AZZARELLO: Kevin probably has it at his fingertips, but one thing that I do recollect from the NORAD timeline is it had an 8:33 a.m. notification time on there for the press release, September 18th, for notification on United 175. It was one of the things we discussed with the NORAD officials, and it's actually on this list of--the list that I showed you was I guess was a list of notifications to the military regarding the four hijacked planes that the Commission asked the FAA to produce after the hearings. I believe this was in response to the hearing, is that correct, in May--

MR. KARA: This was done in the immediate aftermath.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, it was done--there's actually a date on there. I stand corrected, you're right, September 20th. So this was done within two weeks after. Because the New York Center asked our military liaison specialist to give military assistance, and you think that was

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the source of the NORAD press release showing 8:43 as the notification for 175.

When you look at the radar data, they didn't change the transponder on 175 until 8:46, till three minutes after that, and it doesn't appear that the controller working 175 even recognized that the transponder was changed until about five minutes after because he was working American 11, which he was tracking as a primary at that time as a reported hijack. Do you recall that issue being looked at at all when you were putting together--you and the others were putting together the FAA summary of events and times of notification on 175 to the military?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

MR. KARA: John, you might just point out that on this document, he has this line item right here.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is all 175. It says--

MR. DIGGINS: I'm not sure I understand where you're going with this. Maybe I can--

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VOICE: If I might interject something. I apologize if I confused anything to you, but the times you're talking about aren't necessarily synchronized. What I think is between the military and the FAA.

MR. KARA: We understand that but--

VOICE: I understand that.

MR. KARA: Appreciate the fact that the--concerning 175, there are two times at issue that are in the public domain. One is the--and the other is the time we're about to discuss which is the 9:05 time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Initially at 9--on the NORAD press release on September 18th, they said at 8:43 Eastern Standard Time that the FAA notified the military about United 175 as a possible hijack. And there appeared not to be any source for that in the FAA records as being an 8:43 notification. I mean I'm not going anywhere other than trying to see if it was a topic of discussion on the FAA end when you were trying to put together the FAA timeline of--well, when did we notify the military

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on each of the four aircrafts. And if it did break from what the military was saying that they believe the time of notification that they received was, if there was any discussion about that between the people putting together the FAA timeline and the people putting together the NORAD timeline.

It would seem to us that there could have and potentially should have been some cross communication between the two entities. You know, if--I'm talking about when I notified you with something, and you're talking about when you received notification from me of an event that, you know, one might think there was some interaction between the two agencies to figure out who knew what, when. And I guess if you look at the summary that the FAA put together, it says 9:05 according to the--logs is when they received notification of 175 as a possible hijack.

MR. DIGGINS: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you see that entry? One of the reasons why we do want to show you the MCC log from--is because there is an entry in

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there, a log at--this is Zulu time obviously--13:05, which equates to 9:05, United 175 possible hijack, Boston-LAX. That's why we asked you if you saw that because we were wondering whether or not that was the source of the--this is the--MTC--log, and it's cited in there. We wondered if it's something you looked at because it appeared somebody did look at it and try to put together the timeline of chronology of events.

VOICE: If I may quickly--and I apologize if I'm confusing this, but my observation is more mechanical, and perhaps I'm missing this because I don't--if the point is--the question is to what the specific times are. It can well be that the military clock is not the same as the FAA clock, so there can be a variation because they are not synchronized on supposedly on--

MR. KARA: And I appreciate that and that really is not the issue and we have separately checked the clocks on both sides, and we know what the error is, and the error is very small between the two. What we're looking at are the times that

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show up. For example, on the FAA press release in August, 2002, this 8:43 time shows up again quite definitively. So that's where we're coming from on that.

MR. DIGGINS: Well, I think I can explain it to you.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: Do you have the transcript of the United 175? The ATC transfer.

MR. BROWN: I don't have it right here with me, but it's probably--

MR. AZZARELLO: It's in that book.

MR. DIGGINS: I think it's in here. Because United 175--American 11 passed underneath United 175. They crossed--

MR. KARA: Correct. That's correct.

MR. DIGGINS: American 175 was instructed to look for traffic down or where, altitude unknown.

MR. BROWN: 175 was actually--

MR. DIGGINS: And that happened at about 8:43 in the morning, okay? So United 175, he

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looked for the traffic. They said altitude unknown. Then he switched over to New York Center frequency. His first word on New York Center frequency, "We don't know what's going on back there, but it seems like it's a hijacking. We need to get to your frequency to report it." That might be why United 175 is tied with American 11, and that might've been what was reported.

The United 175 said he heard something, so that might be the time because when you showed me your initial NORAD log, it talked about--that thing right there, it talked about we believe this is still related to American 11, but it's United 175 that's reporting it to New York Center. So that's probably the origin of that. It's not saying it was reported to the military. Probably saying New York Center asked to get military assistance. We believe this is related to American 11 because that was probably the--when he checked on with the New York Center, United 175, the controller says okay, we'll check it. He probably turned around and said to his supervisor this guy says something's

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happened on Boston Center frequency. New York Center probably entered something in their log that says they checked with the military about it. That's probably the origin of that. It's about American 11, not about 175.

MR. KARA: Let me continue the discussion for a moment because I looked at the radar reduction. The two flights crossed paths about 8:38. The discussion when he comes up on frequency certainly happens later than that and could be another timeframe that we're talking about.

But also in the transcripts we see from New York Center there's a call from the--desk at ZMY to the Northeast Air Defense Sector that is time contemporary to the discussion we're having. And I just put that out as another possible source of the 8:43 timeframe.

MR. DIGGINS: I think just the way that's written, it might be written wrong. It deals with American 11, but it's United 175 reporting events of the last frequency, and he doesn't know the call center of the airplane.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, this says that the Center asked the military liaison specialist to get military assistance--believe it relates to American 11.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And not 175. Understand.

MR. DIGGINS: So I think that's--

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me just give a little more background from what we've seen on that. When the 175 gets into New York air space, and then around 8:41, they get on and they tell the controller there listen, we thought we'd wait till you got to New York to tell you this. We've heard some--on takeoff, we heard some suspicious transmissions on takeoff from Boston, which would sort of coincide with when the cockpit conversations are calling on 11 with the hijackers in the cockpit saying stay in your seats, don't move, being heard by 175, okay, and he tells him about that. This is after he's crossed over 11 and looked for the altitude of 11.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and what we're trying to figure out then if this is equated to a report on 11 back on September 20th, then this press release comes out in August of '02, and I think they still have--it says FAA notifies NORAD, Northeast Air Defense Sector, about the suspected hijacking of 175. Why would that still be carrying the day almost a year later if--

MR. DIGGINS: Somebody got confused. It was United 175 doing the report. It was somebody just getting confused --in there. Nothing happened at that particular moment in time yet to United 175. What are we arguing about?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, no, we're not arguing. We're trying to find the source of the 8:43 time because we don't see any call from New York Center and 8:43 to the military, and we're asking you then in your work on this and the other staff work on this summary of events were they able to find the call at 8:43, which would show that the military and New York Center was calling on anything, calling the military on 11 or 175?

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MR. DIGGINS: I don't know. I don't recall, but I think that entry has to do with American 11 as reported by United 175. We didn't know it was--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, and we're not--

MR. BROWN: We agree with you. We agree with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Logically it would have to be if the call was made, it would logically have to be about 11 because 175 wasn't being hijacked at the time. We agree with that. We're just hoping that maybe you could tell us that you saw or was able to pin this to a source because we haven't been able to pin an 8:43 call.

And obviously you looked at part of that--not you particular, but the people at the FAA in their efforts to reconstruct what happened that day obviously pulled tapes from the various facilities, and I would imagine if there was a tape, an 8:43 call from ZMY to the military, that would be something that maybe you could help shed some light on for us.

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MR. KARA: On your timeline--this is a contemporary document shortly after 9-11.

MR. DIGGINS: Right.

MR. KARA: That is helpful because you do not memorialize the 8:43 time in there, but then what's happened is, and there are other timelines out there etched in the public domain which have--this 8:43 time has assumed a mythology of its own, and we're trying to dispel the mythology of 8:43.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, we're just simply looking for your help to see if we could further explain this mythology and pin it to something and say here's the data point that somebody along the way, you know, misinterpreted and suddenly they thought that it was on, you know, notification at 8:43.

MR. DIGGINS: 8:41 and a half. That's when United 175 checks on Boston Center and said hey, we heard something weird back there. It's not too farfetched within the next minute and a half somebody from New York Center talked to the MOS and

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said hey, this is what United reported back here, but what they did with that information, I don't know. But that's probably the--in this whole thing. So I don't know. It's the only thing that makes sense to me.

MR. KARA: You're the author.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're the author, so we're just asking if somewhere along the way somebody said, yeah, we have a communication from New York military about reporting an aircraft that they felt was in distress. But to your recollection, there was no case like that that your staff came across.

MR. DIGGINS: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Because there's a call at 9:03 from New York military position to--. We don't have the live call, but what you hear is--it's made to the IV section, and you could hear another IV tech at--say second hijack, and this is occurring right about the time of impact, and the IV tech is saying--, second hijack. And then they repeat a call sign, United 175, and then a few

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minutes later in that-- transcript, she says where did you get that from, and the woman in the back, the recipient of the call, says New York military guy. So that's on 175 because it's connected to the call sign, and that comes in at roughly 9:02, 9:03, at or about the point of the second impact. And frankly that's probably tied to getting in their log at 9:05. You got to give or take a minute for--on the time entry on the log on 175. If we could follow up just one last--

MR. KARA: Maybe we could just summarize for like--I think I'm not--at this point in time, we had the definity work.

VOICE: --

MR. KARA: Dan Diggins is one of the authors of "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11th, 2001." The 8:43 time which shows up in various documents we talked about is not captured in here. And this is a contemporary document that you did in the radar and the transcripts available to you immediately after 9-11.

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MR. DIGGINS: Is that a question or a statement?

MR. KARA: No, that's just a statement. Is that an accurate statement?

MR. DIGGINS: I haven't looked at that thing in two and a half years. I can't tell you if it's in there or not. If you say it's so, then--

MR. AZZARELLO: It's not--we're not here to quiz you, and we're not trying to be adversarial. What we're struggling with is, as you could imagine, there's a lot of information in the public domain. Some of it's accurate, some of it is not. Unfortunately one of our tasks by the commissioner is to nail the facts of the day, and when nailing the facts of the day, you have to look at what's out in the public domain already. And if it's accurate, corroborate it, and if it's inaccurate, we have to explain that it's inaccurate. And with the help of you and the other good people at the FAA, if you can help give us some insight as to why you think it might have been an inaccurate report, we would greatly appreciate

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that.

It doesn't have--I don't think--so we're clear. I mean this is not a game. There's nothing here at 8:43 on United 175. It has the 9:05 time as the notification to the military on 175, okay? I wanted to ask you a question about the other two aircraft that came later in the day, the 77 and the Pentagon, and the 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania. And we'll certainly give you time to look at this because you didn't look at it in two and a half years, and you know what, frankly, if I had realized that you didn't know we were going to be going over this with you, my mistake or our mistake, we could've told you to look at this beforehand because I don't want it to be a quiz. I don't want you to feel like we're playing a gotcha' game because we're not playing a gotcha' game. And I would've liked it better if you had the opportunity to review it. If we had thought of that collectively beforehand, we would've afforded you that opportunity. This would've gone maybe quicker and you might not have felt like we're

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trying to play a gotcha' game. But, please, by all means we're not playing that. We're just trying to nail the facts of the day. The facts of the day, just nail them.

And what I wanted to ask you is that on 77 and 93, and you can look at this if you want right now, there's no notification in there to the military for either one of those two aircrafts. And you can page through the chronology from the last two flights and then we want to just ask you a couple of questions about that.

(Pause.)

MR. KARA: We're back on the record with Dan Diggins on March 30th.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, one of the things I wanted to ask you about is there was no notification times on--because of the military--on the last two flights. When we met with Dan Kenols, he said that that was one of the topics that I think--I mean I'm paraphrasing him. It was a hot topic of debate, or hotly debated or disputed subject matter in terms of what did the military

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know when on the last two flights and what did the FAA know when on the last two flights. And I just wanted to tap on your recollection of that issue and any discussions that were had that you were either privy to, participated in or heard about notification on the list.

MR. DIGGINS: Don't remember discussing it. I don't remember it happening. I wasn't paying attention to military notification during the entire time.

MR. BROWN: During which entire time?

MR. DIGGINS: Through the events happening.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you didn't, but somebody, right, thought it was important enough to put a military notification on the first two flights but not on the last two. And I guess my question to you is if we the reader, or someone picks it up and reads it, what if anything do they infer that there's no note entry for the last two? Are we to infer that that means that there wasn't any notification, or that the FAA didn't even know

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whether there was notification or not to the military in the last two?

MR. DIGGINS: I can't tell you. I just don't know. I wasn't privy during the time about military notification. I wasn't paying attention if it happened or it didn't happen. And I didn't research that particular aspect of these post-events.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if somebody did? Somebody must have looked at the--log and researched that aspect. Would you agree that it appears that way at least because, you know, somebody's referencing the--log in terms of when they say they were notified by the FAA of the first two accidents.

MR. DIGGINS: It could mean they were notified and nobody recorded it. It could mean that they were already on line here and the events as they were happening and reacting so notification wasn't necessary. I don't know. I mean all those things are possibilities, but I can't explain why it's not in here.

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MR. AZZARELLO: You say it's your recollection it wasn't ever even discussed--you never participated in any discussion in trying to figure out what the notification was to all four flights and not just the first-

MR. DIGGINS: I didn't participate in any discussions about that. I'm left this job within three weeks of 9-11 happening, just after this document was published, and I was no longer in this position, so I can't tell you what happened after that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did anybody have that role? Doug's working on it. Doug Gould, Tony Mellow, Miles Ferronti and yourself. Did you corroborate with one another? Did you talk about the roles that you each had in putting that together? I mean was it divided out in the roles? For example, did you say you were looking at radar and Doug Gould did some technical radar. Was somebody separately assigned to listen to all the comms or communications with controllers?

MR. DIGGINS: We were doing it all

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together. Doug and I did most of the listening to the comms, synchronizing the-

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug Gould.

MR. DIGGINS: Doug Gould. We did most of that. As to looking to see if notification to the military was done, if that box was checked, I didn't do that. I can't speak for Doug whether he did or not. I didn't.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let's talk about the bigger picture in the aftermath of 9-11. As Dave Kenols said, in the aftermath of it as the following week approached, it was clear to him and I don't know if it was clear to you, but at some point it was clear to him that an AAT 20, they were asked to reconstruct the events and that Jane Garvey would be potentially responsible for going and testifying on Capital Hill before Congress to let Congress know what the FAA knew in the reconstruction of the events and what happened and when it happened.

And also on another hand, that NORAD and the military would be asked, and General Everhard

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was, the four-star general at NORAD, asked to go before Congress and give the military side of what happened, when and when did they know. And I think as Dave himself agreed, and you don't have to agree with this, but it would seem to us that one of the fundamental things that the parties would look at, the FAA and the military, is when did we, the FAA, know about each of the four aircraft, that they were potentially hijacked, especially when you get to three and four because now you've had two crashes in New York. And now it's sort of beginning to set in the system that this is intentional. So that if there's a third and fourth potential missile out there that's going to be used on the suicide mission that when do we have the first opportunity to recognize that--we, the FAA as a whole--and communicate that to the military who then have the obligation to get fighters up in the air and, if they get approval, do something in response to the attack on the country.

And I guess having said all that as a background statement, were you part of any of that

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discussion about trying to figure out when did the FAA know about all four aircraft, each of them individually, and then when did we communicate that to the military so that they could take action?

MR. DIGGINS: I wasn't part of that discussion.

MR. AZZARELLO: Don't recall any of that discussion.

MR. DIGGINS: I prepared the radar information with the voice communication and with other notifications in a PowerPoint presentation and in this to make a pictorial display of the events and how they happened, but it was never designed to include every particular notification, so I didn't have any discussions specifically about notification of the military on any of them. I included some, the ones I knew about, and the ones I didn't include, I didn't know about I guess.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. So to the extent that somebody did review the-logs that wouldn't have been you. That would've been someone else who contributed to the summary. To the extent that the

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logs, the military logs, are quoted for notification times in the first two, that wasn't you that was reviewing the logs.

MR. DIGGINS: Somebody had access to it, but it wasn't me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, okay. Fair enough.

MR. DIGGINS: Okay, I think it was Ferroni, but I'm not sure. You have to ask him.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, okay.

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, that's what I prepared.

MR. KARA: This is your PowerPoint--

MR. DIGGINS: Because it was hard to understand the sequence of events.

MR. AZZARELLO: I noticed that you do have the Cleveland Center tapes and the controller who was listening to the United 93 who heard the screams on board and all that. That's the tape I think you said you wanted them to drive over. Did you also, you and any of your staff, get help on this listening to the watch desk tapes? Like were they looked at as an area that we should look

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at--we, the FAA--should look at and listen to to see--in terms of when did management or TMU people know about what was going on and what did they do with the information?

MR. DIGGINS: What watch desk?

MR. AZZARELLO: The TMU at Cleveland Center.

MR. DIGGINS: Okay. I didn't.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. I mean I asked that because I noticed that some--there's also some times given for notification from the Centers to the ROC, to the Regional Operations Center and also to the WOC, to your headquarters. And some of those I think are connected to calls that are from the watch desk of the various FAA in-route facilities, so I was just wondering if that was--

MR. DIGGINS: I did listen to some watch desk tapes, but I think it was the Boston Center and New York Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: I'm sure I didn't listen to Cleveland.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if--I guess maybe if you did, give you an example, of Cleveland--someone at Cleveland Center, and I think it might have come from the OMEC position, does call the Northeast Air Defense Sector about United 93 at one point that morning? Do you remember if you ever heard that, anything like that? Were they given that notification?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember ever seeing that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: I'm looking right now at the PowerPoint demonstration which you put together. This is a dynamic presentation. I think we saw this and we were just given the slides, but this is your work?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. KARA: And there's one entry. It's on the slide having to do with the return eastward bound flight of American Air 77, and the entry is "9:24 to 9:30, Eastern time. Dulles Airport ASR 9 radar displays the fast-moving primary radar

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return. Several controllers working radar positions at Dulles observed the same primary target tracking eastbound." Do you recall or how will we determine the genesis of the 9:24 time as to why that says 9:24 to 9:30?

MR. DIGGINS: They're two separate entries.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: The first one is--it's in red, and the one I'm showing is the actual looking at the radar after the fact, and that's when the radar presented itself in that six minute period in there. That's when the radar actually gave a return, so that's what the time is meant to signify. And then somewhere during that time, can't tell you when, you know, because--a report somewhere in that time that that happened.

MR. KARA: So we take from that that it's not necessarily at 9:24 that someone saw it on the radar.

MR. DIGGINS: Correct. That's when the radar first showed the target.

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MR. KARA: That's when it could have been.

MR. DIGGINS: That's when the radar first showed the target.

MR. KARA: The radar--the Tracon radar distinguished from the--

MR. DIGGINS: Right. That's when it first saw the target.

MR. KARA: And do you recall when we visited the Tracon, there are two radars--Dulles and Martinsburg, West Virginia, and we were told that Martinsburg did not come into play in terms of the--

MR. DIGGINS: I was at Martinsburg, and you couldn't see anything in Martinsburg because of the hills.

MR. KARA: And you did check Martinsburg.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

MR. KARA: Okay. So the earliest the Tracon could have seen it--let me put it in your terms. The primary displayed at 9:24 on the Tracon radar--

MR. DIGGINS: Available for display.

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Whether--saw it, I can't tell you that.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. BROWN: Can I see the other--

MR. AZZARELLO: Just another quick question if you know. On the FAA timeline release--you have a 9:24 as a notification on FAA notifies NORAD, the Northeast Air Defense Sector, about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. That's not in the summary, the FAA headquarters summary here--I said summary. There's no notification--in this summary, and from what we can discern from the tapes, the people that could have seen potentially 77, we're looking at ZBC or the Tracon, there's no calls out to the military at that time. The first call that we see comes from ZBC to the military around 9:34, three or four minutes before impact. At that point, they say we've lost. They called--because--wants to talk to them about other reports they're getting from Boston that involve potentially Washington, and so Washington Center calls and says well, let me tell you about the one we lost. We can't find it, but

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it's out there somewhere. We can't locate 77.

As far as we can see from our review indicates that's like the earliest that that call sign is even advised to--the military is even advised that there's a problem maybe with that aircraft, that call sign American 77 that's lost. We can't locate it. We haven't seen anything that would take that time from 9:34 back to 9:24 and make it even a suspected hijacking. Did you see anything of that nature along the way in putting together this summary here?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, I don't know. This was prepared a year after the event pretty much, and I don't know who prepared this and what they used for their source to prepare this. That was prepared within weeks of the event. We took whatever we had available to prepare that. I know it's the same government, same agency, but I can't comment on this because that doesn't make any sense to me.

MR. BROWN: What doesn't make any sense?

MR. DIGGINS: That time doesn't make any

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sense.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: Because at the time of the event, we didn't know that there was a primary target there. That's the first moment the primary target showed up. Nobody knew what that meant.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right. And that's what we've seen.

We wanted to see if that was your recollection.

MR. DIGGINS: That doesn't make any sense. I think somebody's taken some license with this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you about--

MR. KARA: I'm sorry. Who's the OPR for that?

VOICE: You mean the name here?

MR. KARA: The office record.

VOICE: It says contact, William Schumann.

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know who that is.

VOICE: Okay.

VOICE: He may not be air traffic.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We'll talk to whoever put

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that together hopefully at some point, and one would like to think that if there's a press release on behalf of the FAA, that they might want to check with the investigators and the people who did the ground work. One might think that they'd want to do that. Far be it for the world to be round.

MR. DIGGINS: I can tell you right now 9:24, we had no idea where American 77 was.

MR. KARA: That's actually--

MR. AZZARELLO: And I appreciate you're getting right to the point. We just want to make sure we're not missing something. See we have to interview everyone because we don't know. You know, you've got a timeline there that says one thing. You've got a summary here that doesn't sort of coincide with that 9:24. We've got to talk to the people who lived it to see if maybe that's right, maybe this is right.

MR. DIGGINS: We were looking west. We weren't looking east.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thinking that it was on its intended path. Yeah, let me ask you about

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this. One other element that really strongly thrust itself into the situation that morning, one other report that gained a lot of traction, not just at the FAA, but at the military side, gained a lot of traction was a report came in after the two towers were hit, after 9:03, and before the Pentagon was hit. That American 11 may not be the aircraft that impacted the Trade Center, that it may still be out there and it may still be airborne headed south to Washington.

And in fact, I don't know if you or your people looked at this, but it's all over the Boston Center tape for Collin--who is the MOS guy. He calls--and says it may still be out there. And Doug Davis, who was working in the crisis center, he said that he got that information from someone in headquarters after the first two crashes and repeated it in the crisis room where everybody's manning the line. So I don't know where it went from there. But it got in the system and I can tell you we see it at various points of the FAA system and the NORAD system, a concern that

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American 11 may still be airborne. What do you recall about that?

MR. DIGGINS: We didn't know for sure. We absolutely did not know for sure, and if we did zero in and think American 11 was the absolute airplane that hit the North tower, you folks would be here critical saying well, it wasn't, if it wasn't, okay. So we didn't know who was who. The thing is this is a primary target fast moving. It makes sense it would be American 11 but not absolutely. There's a chance it could've been somebody else. You don't know. You just simply don't know.

Nobody had any idea what size the airplane was that hit the North tower at this moment in time, so you keep your options open. Like I said, I was pretty much 90 percent sure it was American 11, but there was still 10 percent that he could still be wandering around out there. That's what you're picking up on.

MR. AZZARELLO: What we're saying I guess is that if there was a thought at some point after

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the first two crashes in New York that American 11 may still be out there, then I guess that would have raised the issue then of what was the other plane--there was two crashes in New York at the Trade Center. So if 11 is still going south to D.C., then what was the other plane that hit the second Trade Center? Was there any discussion about that?

MR. DIGGINS: Not that I recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if something entered the system to cause somebody to think oh, it may be American 11 didn't crash? Because obviously there's always a question, and I'm trying to draw a distinction that maybe it's a little bit of a fine line, but I think there's a distinction between--we're 90 percent sure that 11 went in, but we can't be virtually certain until we get some real concrete information after putting together the radar, listening to the comms, obviously if there were records to recover, and people putting together a--number and that would be one of the obvious ways too. But I did visit a distinction,

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and tell me if you disagree, between that and you know what? We're now thinking, though, that that's incorrect that 11 went in there, and that we think it's heading southbound. That there's some piece of information leading someone in the air traffic system to believe that it's still airborne and heading towards Washington. I mean that's a little bit more specific--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't think his characterization is accurate.

MR. AZZARELLO: What characterization?

MR. DIGGINS: Something leading them to believe that. I don't think that's right. I think it's a possibility, and that's a lot different than leading you to believe that it's still airborne. It's just a possibility. And I think it's prudent if somebody did discuss that possibility.

MR. AZZARELLO: What I'm referring to is the conversation from Boston Center is they called--and they say we just got information from Washington that American 11 is still airborne headed to Washington, that it's not the one that

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hit. And you hear it on the military side repeat in--chat logs--

MR. DIGGINS: It's his opinion.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's not the one that went in there. From you're looking back on the events afterwards, it was just someone's opinion then that it didn't crash and that it was definitely still going southbound towards Washington?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a possibility. It was a possibility in my mind. Did I have any factual data to support that? No, but it's a possibility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, did another factor enter to bolster that possibility? For example, we saw that the New York Tracon at some point later that morning on 9-11 was recording the Sikorsky (sp) helicopter, they thought hit one of the Trade Centers. Somebody at the Tracon did a data radar reduction and said, pull the end tabs or whatever, and said we think that it's a Sikorsky helicopter that left Poughkeepsie at 8:03 was the first plane that crashed at the Trade Center. And I guess what

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I'm trying to ask is did that factor in? Did that cause somebody to then say well, if that Sikorsky hit the Trade Center, the first Trade Center, that maybe American 11 is still going to D.C., and we ought to give the heads up to somebody in D.C.

MR. DIGGINS: Keep in mind that the moment and time here right after the first one hit the Trade Center, radar replay is an instant. You can't just--

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand.

MR. DIGGINS: So if you're looking at the radar scope, and you saw a fast-moving target, unidentified target, and it looks like it may have terminated at the North tower, you don't know who it is, where it came from. You have an idea of the relative speed so you know it's going pretty fast, but you didn't happen to be the one monitoring the radar at that particular moment in time, you're going on--information from other people that were looking at the radar. And if that's the information you're going on, you're going to think of different possibilities.

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And if I show you a radar route play one time because it's live, and you don't get the opportunity to see it again, your mind will go many different directions on what you think you saw. And that's what those people were dealing with at the time. So I can't speak for a guy that thought maybe American 11 is still out there in his reasoning, but I'm just telling you that I do remember some discussion, and I was just going by what somebody told me they saw on the radar at that moment in time. So I was using other ideas.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I understand that the day of things don't necessarily happen realtime, like getting radar. I guess my question is now more focused on after the fact when there's time to review it, and it's not 9-11, and it's 9-12, 13, 14, or 9-17, and when this is put together, did anybody consider whether or not that was an event, a report to the military that American 11 was airborne headed to Washington. That that was an event because it entered the system, that was something to be considered as to whether it should

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be filtered somewhere in the timeline, that that was a report that the military, frankly at some point took action on, the report that it was still airborne.

MR. DIGGINS: Then you already know more than I do. I don't remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't remember any discussion about that, okay.

MR. DIGGINS: But I remember discussion about it may be still out there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Still headed--

MR. BROWN: Did that come over the telecon?

MR. KARA: On the telecon, was the companies on there? Was American and United on there?

MR. DIGGINS: Eventually. I'm not sure when.

MR. KARA: But not in the early going probably, but at some point--

MR. DIGGINS: Unless they spoke up. We didn't have a list--this was an ad hoc telecon

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happening in realtime.

MR. BROWN: Do you remember if that came over the telecon that American may still be out there? Was that discussed by someone on the telecon?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't recall. It was discussed in the room, but I can't tell you.

MR. BROWN: You don't know whether it was live--okay.

VOICE: --

MR. DIGGINS: I'm sorry?

VOICE: --

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, the controller in Boston said it came from a telecon in Washington and from a week ago it wasn't--though it might have potentially been AA headquarters telecon, one of the various telecon's that were going on here at headquarters. So that's why we thought--obviously that's why we're asking Dan and we'll ask anybody that was part of any telecon because there might have been circular.

MR. DIGGINS: I do remember now some

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discussion on the telecon about something coming toward Washington from the north.

MR. BROWN: From the north?

MR. DIGGINS: Right, but I can't tell you what time frame it was and how detailed it was. I think people are starting to see ghosts.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the first two Trade Center hits.

MR. DIGGINS: You know, the thing is primary targets, they're just dots in the radar. It's a moment in time trying to connect the dots. I was on the space shuttle investigation also when that came apart. Had a billion little dots out there. Which ones do you connect together to show which one's a previous snapshot in time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that the kind of thing he's talking about now is something that could be very helpful to us and help us piece this together. And one of our thoughts was or theories was that everyone now is looking for primaries at the second crash in New York. Everyone's more alert about primaries in the system because they had shut off

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the transponder and could someone have seen the primary target heading southbound from the north that they couldn't equate with a commercial airline or call number that they believed could be a commercial airliner based on the space in between the primary targets on the sweeps that they think, hey, this looks like a commercial jet, commercial airliner. We can't tie it to a call sign. Maybe this is 11, and maybe that's what caused the report to go out in the system and somebody in Boston hears it and says oh, and more affirmatively tells the military, hey, I think American 11 is reported it's out there.

That's why we're, you know, we're hoping to tap on everyone's memories to see if they can shed further light on what might have created that or led to that report that it was still out there. Do you remember if maybe somebody said on this telecon or in the room, hey, well, there's a primary heading south? Maybe that's 11. You know, maybe it didn't go into the Trade Center.

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember it tied to

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American 11, but I do remember somebody saying there's a primary target heading towards Washington from the north.

MR. BROWN: From the north. Was it--that was before the Pentagon was hit.

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, hell, I don't know.

MR. BROWN: You don't know.

MR. DIGGINS: No, I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Do you remember what that was--was it ever resolved like we find out where it was, and it was just a fleeting report?

MR. DIGGINS: I think it just went away.

MR. AZZARELLO: Went by the wayside.

MR. DIGGINS: Like I said, I think people are starting to see ghosts.

MR. AZZARELLO: Understandable.

MR. DIGGINS: That's your opinion only.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure, sure. Do you remember if Boston was tied into that telecon?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that at a regional

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level or the Center level? Do you remember?

MR. DIGGINS: Probably both, but I can't tell you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, okay. Thank you. Anything more?

MR. BROWN: I think we definitely owe it to you to definitely ask you--very focused on changes to the system that could be effectuated some. I know there have been many since 9-11 already made by the FAA, including the--which is one that everyone cites that was very important--change in the system. You have a tremendous amount of experience, and you have a sort of nice meld of background. You were a pilot. You know what it's like to be a commercial pilot dealing with a large aircraft. You have radar experience and controller experience. And given that blend of experience you have, if you were sitting in the shoes of the Commission, and you had an opportunity to make recommendations to Congress as to what changes could be made, either technical changes, equipment availability that the FAA

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doesn't have yet, staffing, resources, any changes you can think of that would either make the system safer against either to prevent the future attack or to mitigate the damage in the event of a future attack, using the AVH and, you know, against the background of use of aircraft by terrorists, what changes if any would you recommend making and have already been made or consider making?

MR. DIGGINS: You want me to just come up with something?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, and you know what? This is something you could spend the time to think about, and if you think of something that you think is important that you would like to see considered by Congress in terms of making a change to make the system safer, then you know what? By all means you can--you have Miles' card?

MR. KARA: He does now.

MR. AZZARELLO: You can call us or call Andy and tell him, look, these are the recommendations, you know, that I would consider making if it would make the system safer. I

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realize it's not the kind of on-the-spot--I would've thought it might have filtered down by now because we generally ask everyone.

MR. DIGGINS: It probably did.

MR. AZZARELLO: So if you do, there's something you think of, we'd appreciate your interest in this.

MR. DIGGINS: The only thing I can say to you is use a radar. The radar was a primary source to identify something's gone weird in the system for these events. I mean radar helped in the voice communication also, something like that.

Using radar to try to determine what a plane is doing is not an easy task. It's easy after the fact when you know the answer to tell what he should have done and what really happened. But during the time, you don't have the luxury of seeing the projection of where this things going to go. All you have is a little history on it. And there's many reasons why a plane loses transponders, and hijacking is about the thousandth thing that you have in your mind as a controller.

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So it's just very, very difficult realtime to use radar and try to make that leap that a loss of transponder and an unauthorized turn--I think we're kind of--we'll do that now but at the time--but the next events, trying to figure out what an airplane's doing by looking at the radar, they might be a little more creative.

MR. BROWN: Sure. You can think of a different way now.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think someone has mentioned the issue of whether or not aircraft, commercial aircraft, should have a transponder code embedded somewhere in the aircraft where if someone invaded the cockpit, they couldn't turn it off. Do you think that that's something that is practical and would be an option that should be considered, or does it have drawbacks having it permanently set on the transponder code where it can't be turned off, somewhere buried in the equipment of the aircraft? If it could be seen technologically, it could be done?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, sure, it could be done,

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but then you have massive caught on the radar scope and then you can't do the job which the radar was intended to do-

VOICE: So many codes, they couldn't reassign them because they wouldn't have enough numbers.

MR. DIGGINS: You just assign enough numbers. I mean technically it's feasible operationally. It puts a lot on the--time responses. It's very difficult to do what the air traffic system was designed to do. The air traffic system was not designed to detect hijacking.

MR. BROWN: Right. Well, I think now there's more of a focus on that post 9-11. Or do you think not?

MR. DIGGINS: To be aware of weird things that might go in a different direction, but again it's not designed primarily to detect hijackings.

MR. BROWN: Do you think it could be improvements in there where it could be--I mean in the aftermath of 9-11, whether it's a role that--seems to be part of a role that's was put on

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the FAA to some degree that now they have to sort of be, you know, investigates. Controllers have to have like the eye in the sky. They have to be sort of having an investigative hat on too that if something goes wrong, start to think well, is this a hijack. Is this another 9-11 when--

MR. DIGGINS: The choice of words you use is prevent. This is prevent. Radar is a historical information. Whatever you see on radar has already happened, so I don't know how you put--

MR. BROWN: Litigate, or litigate the damage, meaning potentially gaining an early recognition of the hijack in the system and reporting it to the military--position to take some action potentially if need be.

MR. DIGGINS: It's historical information.

MR. KARA: Okay, we're concluding the interview with Mr. Diggins.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JEFF GRIFFITH

BY

JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 Commission

JOHN FARMER, 9/11 Commission

LISA SULLIVAN, 9/11 Commission

DANA HYDE, 9/11 Commission

MILES KARA, 9/11 Commission

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: [in progress] --by the FBI and CIA and other agencies. This book this particular group that you're looking at today is a part of [unintell.] looking anything the day-of events that I'll saw we're looking at the immediate response to the attacks on the day of. And what we're trying to do is, at best we can, have a full and complete understanding of what happened that day and try to recreate it; particularly, with a real specific emphasis on the crucial morning hours when the four aircraft were hijacked. And then following on to the rest of that day. And we're looking at the interaction between the FAA and NORAD that day [unintell.]. So, obviously, that leads us to the FAA number of people interviewed including yourself. So, hopefully, you can bring us back, as best you can to that day, you know, events and what you were doing and your interaction that day with the events as they evolved.

And is there anything before we start that you want to ask of us before we start the

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questions, is there anything you want to talk about?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I guess, I'd like to tell you that we're collecting so much information and in an effort to make sure we collect it accurately, I mention [unintell.] tape record it--

MR. GRIFFITH: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's March 31, we're at the Commission Office in Washington and we're about to begin our interview of Jeff Griffith and I'm John Azzarello, Team 8, 9/11/Commission.

MR. FARMER: John Farmer, 9/11 Commission.

MS. SULLIVAN: Lisa Sullivan, 9/11 Commission.

MS. HYDE: Dana Hyde, 9/11.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9/11 Commission.

MR. GRIFFITH: Jeff Griffith, citizen.1

[Laughter.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff, thanks again, for taking the time out from your schedule to meet with us, we really appreciate it. And we'd like,

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actually, to get a sense--I know you said you were with the FAA for 36 years in total or thereabouts. And if you could give us a brief--it has to be because there's 36 years here--give us just sort of a flavor of the various positions you held at the FAA leading up to 9/11 and then, when you get to 9/11, tell us a little bit more, obviously, about the position you held that day and the responsibilities that were attendant to that position.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, I will. My total federal service was 36 years. I had--I enlisted in the military for four years in '66, after receiving a letter from the Draft. So, I went into the United States Air Force, four-year-enlistment and became an Air Traffic Controller. And my field of work was, really, a computer programmer, but I'd gone to vocational school and learned how to be a programmer. But ended up as an Air Traffic Controller in the Air Force. Served three and a half years, a year of that in Vietnam; discharged in January of 1970 and hired on with the FAA as an

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Air Traffic Controller in June of that year 1970.

I was a controller for a number of years; started out in a small place in Macon, Georgia; went to Atlanta, Georgia, as a controller; and then, in '76, moved into management and held different supervisory and management positions through the years. I won't go through all of those, but they were all Air Traffic Control-type jobs, staff jobs.

I ended up as the manager of Minneapolis in 1990; '91, I was the manager of Chicago for several years. And left there into a regional management position Chicago. In 1996, I came to FAA headquarters as an SES and was a program director in three organizations, all SESs. The first was the Airspace Management Group; in '97, I moved into the Ops side of the house and, essentially ran the Air Traffic operation from '97, as a program director for Ops and then plans and procedures. And then, in around '99 or 2000, I was selected as the Deputy Director of Air Traffic, which was the Deputy to the Air Traffic

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organization, AT-2 was the designator for that if you're looking it up on the WOC chart, AAT-2.

MR. KARA [?]: That would be over in this--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, right here. AAT, I was the Deputy over here under the Associate. And that was the position that I held on 9/11 of 2001. Essentially the job was--we had 24,000 people in the group. Our Ops budget was about \$3.5 billion. And our job was to operate some 500-plus Air Traffic Control facilities on a day-to-day basis. And maintain, first, the safety and also the efficiency of the Air Traffic Organization.

MS. HYDE [?]: Who was the director of that on 9/11?

MR. GRIFFITH: Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: And so, you would report to Bill?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then from Bill's office it would be right to the Deputy Administrator?

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MR. GRIFFITH: No, we went to the Associate which was--the Deputy Associate, was Peter Challen [ph], and the Associate was Steve Brown and then Monte Belger and, then, the Administrator, Jane Garvey.

MR. GRIFFITH: I had 15-direct reports, all but one of them were SESSs and they each had a certain piece of the group; we had nine regions; we had nine regional division managers and then we had a group of program directors, which was the job that I came up through and then a couple of staff people that--one of them did evaluations and the other one did international.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you were managing facilities in, you said Minneapolis and Chicago, was that en-route centers?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, they were both towers and TRACONS, approach control tower at the airports.

MS. HYDE: Did actual investigations report through Air Traffic Service group or through AAT?

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MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MS. HYDE: Oh, I'm sorry, they're over there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Accident Investigation reports up to Regulation and Certification--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: Nick Sabatini [ph].

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: You said they report to Nick Sabatini?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Yes, over here we have [unintell.] they're actually over here.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and they report to Regulations?

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. KARA: Let me get one question out of the way here: Where were you at in Nam?

MR. GRIFFITH: Lu CAT [ph] Central Highlands.

MR. KARA: Central Highlands?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

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MR. KARA: As a controller?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. KARA: You had all that heat--

MR. GRIFFITH: Mobile RAPCON [ph], we actually served Bucan [ph] Air Base and Koon Yahn [ph], and On Kay [ph].

MR. KARA: Right, and what year were you over there?

MR. GRIFFITH: Sixty-nine.

MR. KARA: I was down in the Northern Delta.

MR. GRIFFITH: Really?

MR. KARA: You didn't control me.

MR. GRIFFITH: No one controlled you. You were out of control.

MR. KARA: We did admire, I must tell you, we did admire the Air Force's ability to have air conditioned trailers for no electricity.

MR. GRIFFITH: We had to keep those radar units cool or they won't work.

MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff, could you give us pre-9/11, just a little like, flavor of what type

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of operational issues you would deal with on a normal, sort of routine, day-to-day basis?

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, first thing every day, we reviewed the day before's operations to look at number of what we call operational errors, breakdown of separation. There would usually be anywhere from zero, which was usual, to 10 to, sometimes more than 10 a day. So, we'd get a briefing on what caused the breakdown of separation, how close they got, what was there a near mid-air collision report filed, those kinds of things. Then we'd go through and receive a briefing from the Command Center on the efficiency of the operation; how many delays were encountered; what airports; what caused the delays; was it weather; was it congestion.

And then we'd go through other things that were kept in the Administrator's daily log, like, runway incursions; anything that affected safety. We'd look at staffing problems, those kinds of things. That briefing in the morning usually took an hour and we'd get through that. Then, my job

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as first level to the field was to go back and pick up the phone and call the division manager where these situations occurred and/or were significant and get a more detailed briefing and possibly schedule a telecon for later in the day where we would listen to tapes and get that kind of information.

And then, you know, with program responsibility, we usually had meetings to go through on budget; meetings to go through on modernization of the Air Traffic System, so we had a facilities and equipment budget, F&E budget that usually ran about \$2.9 billion a year and we were constantly looking at ways to spend money better and the different contracts; there were a couple of systems that were draining a lot of money and always answering congressionals and those kinds of things.

There was usually a lot of activity by the IG, so, you know, we'd have strategy meetings, we'd go meet with the IG. At times we would meet with the NTSB on closing out certain recommendations

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that they would have.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you involved with the issue prior to 9/11 about whether or not to decommission certain of the primary radar capabilities?

MR. GRIFFITH: I was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell us about your involvement in that and your recollection of that issue.

MR. GRIFFITH: The FAA had issued some kind of a paper and I can't remember whether that was a decision document, I think that's what it was--a decision document to decommission primary radars. There are, I'm just going to say, as a matter of example, because I don't remember the exact number. But there are about 150 of these systems out there that, first of all, cost a lot of money to buy. And, secondly, cost a lot of money to maintain. Some of the systems, ASR 1's and 2's [ph] were 30- to 40-years old. And the quality of the radar you would get from those systems, was not as good as it could have been if it were a newer

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system. So, the decision was made to--we went through the safety analysis--because right on top of a primary radar dish is another radar dish--a secondary--it's not a dish, it's a rectangular--there's a secondary radar that's getting similar information, the only thing it's not doing is it's not getting a skin ping from the fire of a signal from a transmitter or a receiver. But what the second one does is it receives the information that the aircraft has the equipment and it says here I am, here I am.

And the secondary radar is much cheaper because you don't have to process radar or anything else, you just have data and you flow it. So the decision was that primary radar was no longer needed to separate graphic in the [unintell.] environment. Now we were going to keep primary in the terminal environment and there are approximately 250-plus terminal radars out there that have a range of 60 miles up to 20,000 feet, something like that, where you still have primary coverage and you could--and the likelihood of a

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collision with an aircraft without transponder was in lower altitudes, because above 10,000 feet everybody had to have one of these transponders under the rules.

And, so, the whole idea was to provide safe and efficient air traffic control service, you did not need primary radar.

MR. KARA: At the high altitudes?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, at the high altitude. And, so, in an effort to save a significant amount of dollars that the FAA was spending on primary radar, that was--my shop, in fact, landed--when I was the program director for operations, which was Ops and Planning and Procedures, my shop ran it.

MR. AZZARELLO: It was your belief or opinion that the safety at those higher altitudes would not be compromised by the elimination of the--

MR. GRIFFITH: Absolutely, absolutely, in fact, in the air traffic control environment today, controllers don't look at primary radar above 18,000 feet, because that's called Class A air

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space and you have to have a clearance juste to go above 18,000 feet in the U.S.

MS. HYDE: But they--as we understand it, the NTSB had objections and DOD had objections to this and, I believe, as I understand--and tell me if I'm wrong--NTSB's objection was that in the event of electronic failure of an aircraft, the rule says, yes, you need your transponder, but transponders do fail. And that you'd have a plane up there blind and you'd have a controller blind, in terms of directing the aircraft and, so, when--tell us a little bit about the--didn't the FAA do a study or some sort of safety analysis?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Was there a statistical analysis that was done?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, that was done by the certification people and they do a safety-risk analysis at 10 to the minus-seven or 10 to the minus eight, and we had long discussions about that. I can't quote any of that to you because I remember being involved in it several years ago,

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but--

MS. HYDE: Who are the certification people who do the safety analysis? Would it be here, airport certification?

MR. GRIFFITH: It would be, no, it would be under Nick Sabatini and the AFS people.

MS. HYDE: Oh, the AFS Flight Standards?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember any of the debate from the DOD's perspective?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't recall a debate with DOD. The NTSB was really the entity that raised the major objections. And it was because of what you said. But, you know, I don't recall any time in the last, I'll say 15 years where we've had a situation where an aircraft has lost total transponder capability at high altitude and it's been reported through the system. Now, if that did occur, remember the Air Traffic Controller's job is to always separate airplanes. And then radar is an

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aid to do that. So, if for some reason you don't have radar capability, you revert to what we call procedural control.

So, every aircraft files a flight plan that's cleared on a flight plan route at an altitude. So, if, for some reason, you lose a target on an aircraft--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --then what you do is you protect that route from point to point at that altitude at the required separation. And then you use time after that. So, you'll protect that altitude for a period of time after that aircraft passes a particular point and then you tell them to report at point. And there are many waypoints, intersections, navigational points along these routes where you could, if you wanted to, you could get an aircraft to report to you every five or ten minutes, so you did have procedural controls that you used in the event of the loss of that transponder.

MS. HYDE: The DOD--thank you for

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that--the DOD concern, I believe, related to the perimeter of the country and to the extent that those were--and they might have been in the old system, too, I don't know how many [unintell.] 1's and 2's were around the perimeter.

MR. GRIFFITH: They're the new ones, though there are some fours.

MS. HYDE: The 1's and 2's were just in the interior?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: I see.

MR. GRIFFITH: ASR 4's were bought joint by the FAA and the DOD and there was never any intention to take the primary radar off of the perimeter sites, you know, it was only going to be in the interior.

MS. HYDE: I see. And the plan, do you remember, you used the word decommission--was the plan to go out there and essentially unplug and collect the equipment or was it just to let, through attrition, those that broke not to fix them--what was the decommissioning plan?

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MR. GRIFFITH: The plan was to, when--and we had a date picked out--and I won't try to remember it.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: But we had a date picked out and on that date, we were going to turn the high voltage off on the primary radars of the selected sites. That did a couple of things for you: First, it meant that you no longer had to maintain the parts supply in case of outages, and there were significant outages that we were addressing. And, also, the personnel that were required to do the preventative maintenance checks on these pieces of equipment, which were very extensive, no longer had to do those, so you could use your person-hours elsewhere and, you know, as you were continuing to try to reduce the number of people that you have in the workforce.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they were going to be shut down--when you say turn the high voltage--

MS. HYDE: Turn the high voltage--

MR. AZZARELLO: Turn them off?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Turn them off.

MR. AZZARELLO: Not a phase-out, it was just going to be shut them down?

MR. GRIFFITH: Turn them off, yeah. And when you did that, then the plan was to come back, because, you know, the buildings would continue to be air conditioned because there was a secondary radar there.

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And you still had to do the requirements for secondary radar. And, you know, a sail would still be spinning that big primary sail around but, you know, you'd come back and eventually replace the antenna with just a standard antenna and pull the racks out of the building and those kinds of things. And then when you were building additional sites, they would be built to a different standard.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. So you didn't really need to pull out the equipment because you had the secondary radar stuff co-located with it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

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MS. HYDE: You would just keep the building cold, service the secondary and turn off the power for the old ASR 1 and 2 primary?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember, had that date happened by September 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, we never got to that. The NTSB had really raised some questions that, you know, as an agency, we did not feel comfortable moving ahead until we had resolved their issues. And so, we were working resolve NTSB's issues and we never got to the point where we even considered--like we always maintained the spare parts and, you know, we never went into kind of a transition of not buying spare parts and those kinds of things.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember what some of the NTSB issues were that the FAA wanted to address before turning the switch off?

MR. GRIFFITH: The primary one that I recall was they were obsessed with this notion that an aircraft not under Air Traffic Control without a

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transponder would collide into an airliner full of people. And that their thought was that primary radar was something that would prevent that from happening. Which, could in a terminal environment, where those small airplanes fly, but, again, above 10,000 feet, their likelihood was, as proven through these safety-risk analysis, was nil.

MR. KARA: At any time in those discussions whatsoever did the notion that an airplane could be used as a weapon or hijacked and used as a weapon come up?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MS. HYDE: That someone would purposely--

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: It was an electrical malfunction they were worried about?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then a mid-air collision by commercial aircraft with one another?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not with one another because, again the likelihood--the likelihood of a commercial airliner losing a transponder at the

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altitudes that they operated at, was just--it just didn't happen.

MR. FARMER [?]: What would, well, they would have had a GA at that altitude?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. FARMER: A GA at that altitude would--

MR. GRIFFITH: All above 10,000 feet.

MS. HYDE: We've been out and we've talked to a lot of controllers. They, as I recall, the testimony from the controllers we spoke to was, it happened sometimes, it wasn't frequent, but, like, maybe once a year at a high altitude, you'd have somebody lose their transponder. Certainly it happens frequently that you'd have to ask them to recycle as a controller--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh sure, that happens.

MS. HYDE: But I do recall from the interviews that we had that every now and then you would have somebody have some sort of failure and lose their transponder. That's not to say--I don't think we talked to many controllers who ever had this sort of--had a [unintell.] lose all

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electrical. But I think--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, and that's the point that I--I did want to come back to that because I think you said just a little while ago that, did you say in the 15 years, sort of prior to 9/11, you don't recall an aircraft completely losing it's transponder that you could remember or being reported up to headquarters, certain?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I did want to come back there because it was my recollection, too, that when we met in the field with the en-route controllers, that they said, in talking about the events of 9/11, that it was very typical to lose radio for brief periods of time--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --pilot inattentiveness, malfunction. And then when we got to the transponder issue, there was enough controllers who said, unusual, but I recall it happening, you know, say, maybe once a year or, you know, once or twice in my career, where it's happened, where you've

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lost the transponder, but not for a significant period of time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, I'll agree with that.

MR. AZZARELLO: You agree with that?

MR. GRIFFITH: But what I was referring to was for the duration of the flight.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, okay, I wanted to clarify it because I didn't know how long--

MR. GRIFFITH: Sure, I mean, the number one will fail and you'll lose, you know, you'll lose it and your computer datablock will go into what we call coast configuration. You know, it coasts along with it, so the first thing you do is check your equipment then you go to the pilot and say, not receiving transponder, reset, squawk, 2365. Okay, and, you know, the pilot says, okay, well, we'll just turn on our--we'll turn the other one on is what they'll say--and then they're turn the other one on.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's a backup one?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, and then it come

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right on.

MR. AZZARELLO: If they had temporarily lost transponder signal at an en-route facility, is that the type of event that you would expect, whatever it should have been reported up to headquarters?

MR. GRIFFITH: Not temporarily, but if an aircraft had lost a transponder for the duration, let's say, a transcontinental flight, that would be very, very unusual.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were there any guidelines, either formal or informal about that, like that would inform the field [unintell.] managers about when to report? Like how would--if I were a field facility manager and someone, one of my controllers said, you know, I've got a New York to L.A. flight and it lost its transponder, you know, for an hour of the flight, versus two or three hours, is there any--is that just use your judgement?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, that would show up. It would show up in two places: Each facility keeps a daily log of what happens in that facility.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And there's a person responsibility for filling out that log. So, if something happened at this minute, you know, they put it in the log. If something happens the next minute they put it in the log. Next, it's all reported to--a situation like that would be reported to the command center. And it would be in a Command Center daily log. And something like that would be briefed in that morning briefing, when I told you.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be an event worthy of briefing headquarters?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: Let me just--in your experience, at the headquarters reviewing each day, the events of the day before, it doesn't stick in your mind that there was a duration loss of transponder?

MR. GRIFFITH: It does not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall any of the

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daily briefings let's say in five to ten years preceding 9/11 ever being informed by a Command Center that there were even temporary losses of transponder signals--

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --no? Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Even working in Chicago, you know, I mean, you know, we had a tower and approach--our approach went out to 40 miles up to 14,000, 15,000 feet. And I was the manager there for three and a half years or so, and, you know, we were working 3,500 airplanes a day in and out of there, and never in that period of time did we have somebody that had a complete transponder failure where we had to work them on primary radar, air carrier.

MR. AZZARELLO: And where would you rank the occurrences where you lose radio communications and transponder, any recollection of that ever occurring in your tenure? On either side, either at headquarters or in the field?

MR. GRIFFITH: Only in the event of a

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crash. And that's what happens when an airplane crashes.

MS. HYDE: When you have electrical, well, has there, that's complete electrical failure on a plane?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm talking about commercial airplanes.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: If somebody had a Cessna 310 that's 40 years old, you know, that, you know, they take out on the weekends--

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: --that's going to happen. What happens at 3,500 feet in [unintell.] conditions.

MR. AZZARELLO: But for commercial--

MR. GRIFFITH: In commercial airplanes--

MR. AZZARELLO: --you don't recall where it was lost other than for reasons of crash?

MR. GRIFFITH: Other than crash, no I don't.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you never got back to,

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I guess, shifting back to the primary radars the date was sort of, I guess, at some point, there was a date to shut down the primaries, but before that date ever occurred, before you reached that date, there were concerns that the FAA was trying to address that the NTSB raised, that they wanted to address before going forward?

MR. GRIFFITH: Never got there. So, then, I have to believe it was after 9/11, this group called JITANDA [ph] was formed, which was a joint military civil group that was looking at, okay, what are we going to do about having a common operating picture for everybody, because you had Customs and you had all these other agencies, now, that said, hey, we gotta know what's moving--

MS. HYDE: JITANDA?

MR. GRIFFITH: J-T-A-N-D-O.

MS. HYDE: J-T-A-N--I'm sorry, spell it again.

MR. GRIFFITH: J-T-A-N-D-O and it was Joint, I remember the J was for Joint, but--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

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MR. GRIFFITH: And, you know, we had generals and everybody on that thing.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sounds like a marshall art.

MR. GRIFFITH: It was incredible the number of people that went in there, you know.

MS. HYDE: You never knew radar was such a hot topic.

MR. KARA: It was joint but was it led by the civilian side or the DOD side?

MR. GRIFFITH: Both, it was led by General Eberhard [ph] from NORAD, four-star. An the FAA side was a guy named Jim Washington, who was our requirements director. And so they--and they had a whole lot of people working on that group with them. Because, of course, you know, what the military wanted was, you know, a 3-D, one-second update rates and we're saying, well, don't forget we don't need this to separate airplanes. Because you have to remember, when you put something like that in an operational environment, you have to

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take it out for maintenance. It doesn't just do that on its own. Sometimes you have to take it down for six hours, you know, just to--

MS. HYDE: And we can quote you on the military wanted 3-D?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. KARA: One-second refresh rate. Universally shows up on all scopes that are of interest to it.

MR. GRIFFITH: They wanted 3-D, you can't [unintell.] one second. I mean, and I was kind of the bad-guy in the group, because, you know, I said, you don't want to put this in an operational environment, where people are screaming about being stuck on an airplane for six hours because of a radar lapse. You don't want to do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you at these group meetings?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I wasn't on a team--

MR. AZZARELLO: Were they based in Washington?

MR. GRIFFITH: Jim was on the team and his

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office was given lead on it, so I sent people to it, you know. There's no sense in two SESs eating up all that time, so, you know, I sent some L-bands, 15s or whatever.

MR. AZZARELLO: Anybody have any radar issues?

MR. KARA: At this point, it's a little bit of a digression but it's on the radar side. Blank spots in the interior? Lack of radar coverage interior of the United States? Are you aware that there was absent coverage?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh sure, yeah, you can look at the coverage charts. We had coverage charts, we knew where all the gaps were. And it's usually mountainous terrain because, you know, we try to put these things on top of mountains, but, you know, sometimes there are mountains that are still higher, so you know, mountainous terrain causes you to lose sectors of primary and secondary coverage, so, but you know, we know where they are. We have engineers that do all our coverage charts for us and all controllers are briefed. Here's where you

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don't have radar coverage. And we had minimum [unintell.] altitudes and, you know, all those things so that.

MR. KARA: Were there blind spots in the Eastern United States?

MR. GRIFFITH: There were a couple, yeah. In Pennsylvania, there were a couple.

MR. KARA: Is that knowledge that would have been commonly known? Could I as a private citizen or an interested citizen get on the Internet somewhere and learned where those--

MR. GRIFFITH: No,

MS. HYDE: You mentioned the coverage charts--so there were actual charts that were available to controllers as to where there was or wasn't primary coverage?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, the coverage charts weren't available to controllers because they were a planning and an engineering tool, but the coverage charts were used to develop the training material the controllers, so instead of a controller looking at, you know five different

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colors of lines that mean nothing, you know, you put that down into training and you give them one chart that says, look, in these areas you don't have radar coverage at these altitudes. And so, they're trained where that is and they learn it and retain it.

MR. AZZARELLO: The controller, are you saying?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that when they're working a particular geographic area, they're familiar with where gaps are?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And where is that chart, at the facility level that training?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And where are the charts--the coverage charts, where would they be kept or maintained? Are they at headquarters, in the field, both?

MR. GRIFFITH: In the regional offices.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doesn't go below the

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region, though, the coverage charts?

MR. GRIFFITH: Only if requested.

MR. AZZARELLO: And headquarters, I assume, has a--the training people have--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, now, there may be, you know, out of a couple hundred, you know, 20 centers and a couple hundred approach controls, you know, there may be coverage charts at some of those facilities, but the idea was that, you know, we provided the information to the facility in a non-technical format and we didn't want them interpreting where, you know, we didn't want them interpreting. We said, look, you don't have radar coverage here, the flight check shows that they are given copies of the flight-check information because the flight checks are actually done by the facilities. But, you know, the idea is you take technical engineering information, you convert it to air traffic controller training information and then, you know, they apply that when they--

MR. AZZARELLO: So, the technical information that the charts would contain was--I

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want to see if I understand it correctly, was sort of converted into controller language and they were tutored on it in that respect?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, the technical information, the diagrams, show, you know, the way radar works is it fires out all these signals and--it's nanoseconds and they're fired out and if it hits something it bounces back into the receiver and it picks it up and it measures the time that it took to do that and it says, okay, there's something there. But, you know, an airplane, you might get 10 or 12 hits on an airplane so you can validate the position of the aircraft and then, you know, you make assumptions for assigned range, et cetera. And say, okay, that's where the aircraft is.

Well, in areas where you have terrain or buildings or other things that, you know, either reflect the signal or prevent it from getting out in certain areas, then you are, you know, the technical engineering charts just have all this information about how many signals were fired and

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how many were received and all that. But what we do is cook that down into, in this area, you don't have radar coverage below 8,000 feet. So, if you're going to be vectoring airplanes, don't vector them in an area below 8,000 feet.

MR. AZZARELLO: You distill how much you tell the controller--

MR. GRIFFITH: right, between the 310 and the 330 radial off of a certain DOR from 25 to 30 miles, you don't have radar coverage below 8,000 feet.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're oversimplifying the math ahead, I'm thinking, well, should that not be--if I'm the controller, shouldn't I have the radar coverage back if I'm at scopes or the manager there, as opposed to the region that doesn't have the scopes or the headquarters that doesn't--

MR. GRIFFITH: The controller does have it at the scope and they have it, either in a little TV display up there that they select a page on or in their position binder or something like this; or if it's significant enough for the map to be drawn

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on the radarscope, then, you know, you can draw that on the radar scope with lines.

MR. AZZARELLO: Draw, you mean, the part that there's a gap in?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right on the screen and they can see it as they're directing traffic--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --so that they know if it's going to go into a gap area potentially--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --or in a binder?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: If what you're speaking to--my sense is that you're speaking to the area of, primarily, low altitude where there's known to be, because of the terrain some significant airspace that's not covered by radar?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: That's what you're were just describing. I mean, we'll take this to the relevance here and I'm sure you know what it is,

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which is the flight 77 and the testimony and the statements from the Indie controllers that were controlling this aircraft and it disappeared and we hit our primaries and nothing's there. And the consequence of that was, essentially, that that aircraft went undetected for 30 minutes to Washington, without anybody seeing where it was because it made this turn and that turn was not captured on primary radar. And there it went in.

So, I--we've talked to those controllers, but their statement is that we didn't know that there was a gap at that particular area, you know, because this is at 30,000 feet.

MR. GRIFFITH: It probably wasn't.

MS. HYDE: Whatever it was.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: What's your understanding of the situation that happened with 77? Is everything, have you known what I just told you?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure.

MS. HYDE: Yeah. So, what happened to 77, then? There wasn't a gap in the radar?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Well, you know, I would say what happened is, first of all, the four aircraft were at four different centers.

MS. HYDE: Don't talk to the four aircraft, just 77. Just what happened with respect to 77 in Indie?

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, the transponder was turned off.

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: The controller was trained to do something. The controller was trained to separate everything in front of that airplane because in all of history, for hijackings or any other situation where an aircraft has been taken over, the aircraft has always continued on a planned route of flight and gone to a destination and landed and some kind of negotiations were carried out--I'm talking about in the U.S. now.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, yeah.

MR. GRIFFITH: Some kind of negotiations were carried out. That was the hijack scenario that we trained to. And we--so, first of all, they

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didn't know the airplane was hijacked--first of all

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: All they knew was they lost the target. And they couldn't talk to the airplane.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, they did exactly what they were trained to do. They were trained to look ahead to see if any other airplanes were climbing or descending through that airway and immediately protect that block of airspace.

Now, while they were doing that, the airplane, obviously turned around and went the other way. And when airplanes are moving at 500 miles an hour, it doesn't take long for them to get out of that controller's area of jurisdiction. So, you're looking for an unknown at that point. You're not looking for a known.

MS. HYDE: Let me--the question I have is a primary radar question.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: Is it your understanding that

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77 was picked up by Indie Center as a primary target after the transponder was turned off?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'd have to go back and look at the data to tell you that, because I haven't looked at the radar data.

MS. HYDE: Well, we have looked at it and it wasn't [unintell.] and we're looking at the subject. The consequence of that is and if you're--there's a controller here who feels very strongly about this situation, that he doesn't see anything--

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: --in front, to the left, to the East, nothing when that transponder turns off. Had there been a primary target in any direction, he would have been able to--as was the flight with Flight 11, happened to see the primary target, he would have been able to see that primary target, understand that it was likely to be the aircraft that he just watched. And watched the path of that aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

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MS. HYDE: Because there was no primary coverage, he was not able to do that.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know that to be true so I can't say one way or the other what the controller was thinking.

MS. HYDE: Yes, and I didn't mean you to. I really meant to address the question of the gaps in coverage.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: The fact, as I understood you to say, controllers knew areas of the country geographic area where there wasn't coverage and that there was a process where they were trained on it and that there were maps given to them or maps available at their desk or at the scopes, whatever.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: Is it your understanding that that's universally that every gap in the country is, first of all, known by the FAA and then, also, memorialized somehow and then finally communicated to the controllers?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

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MS. HYDE: Every gap?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: And how--

MR. GRIFFITH: It's part of the certification. But controllers are also given theory training on radar. They're given theory training on things like what happens when an aircraft turns, perpendicular to an antenna and the antenna is firing at the same rate the airplane is moving, so you don't see that airplane on primary radar. So, air traffic controllers are trained on navigational aids and theory and those other things. So, remember that we use--the FAA uses Air Traffic Control radar for separating airplanes. And when airplanes do something different and you have a non-logical environment where they're turning, descending, and the reflectivity of the aircraft is not re-enforced with secondary radar--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --then that's not what air traffic control is all about.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're understanding that

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when 77 did make its turn that it did go into an area where there was a lack of radar coverage, was that your understanding, after the fact and going back to look at this?

MR. GRIFFITH: I recall this general knowledge that we did not see some of these airplanes on primary radar. Now, I'm, you know, it's been a while and I'm not going to go on record and say it was [unintell.].

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's say, to the extent that there was a flight any one of them that did pass through a gap in coverage, do I understand you correctly to say that if it did, that the controllers should have known about that because they would have been trained on that--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, these controllers work in sectors every day of their life. They know where they don't have radar coverage.

MS. HYDE: But, to get back to your first point, when you're working high altitude--

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MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: --you're not working a low-altitude sector, you never have reason to use primary coverage because, by definition, you're working planes at 30,000 feet and everybody has a transponder. So, how would they know from their experience in working that sector that there isn't primary coverage up there unless they were specifically told that at 30,000 feet in this particular area, you don't have primary coverage?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, because they're trained for contingencies. And contingencies are things like what if you lose the secondary radar? Well, a controller is required to maintain the skill of the use of primary radar. And so, they should be, from time to time, when they're not, even though they're not required for separation purposes, they should be reaching over, you know, in DSR, they should be turning on their primary radar at certain times during light traffic at 10:00 o'clock at night where they're working three airplanes. And they should be refamiliarizing

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themselves with their environment.

MS. HYDE: With the primary radar coverage in the environment?

MR. GRIFFITH: Absolutely, that's their job.

MS. HYDE: To me it seems inconsistent with the fact that the FAA is saying that they don't need primary radar coverage. So, how would you both have signed off on a plan to take primary coverage out of the picture because it's so irrelevant, but then be saying that controllers ought to periodically be just checking out to see if they have primary radar coverage in those areas?

MR. GRIFFITH: Because the notion of taking primary radar out of the en-route environment, was a plan. And a decision had been made on it. But controllers had not been trained that they were going to be doing things differently, so the training that they had was a radar environment with primary and secondary radar.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. KARA: Can I make just one more

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thought on that? Seventy-seven, there's a technical side to this which we are reportedly understanding and getting better in that and that is the matrixing system which has radar sort boxes and it would be a controller's contention, for example, that it simply wasn't on my scope, but it might have been in the system and didn't get there because of the matrix. Can you speak to that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I know that. I cannot speak to it from a technical point of view. I can speak to it from an operational point of view. You know the term is called mosaicking.

MR. KARA: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And, you know, and I know that when systems are certified, they're certified based on the number of--you may have three sites that have coverage in the same area. And so, the automation system works in all of the target returns; it looks at the strength of those returns; and, you know, they may be--not may be, they're probably not at the same location, which is why we have separation standards, which is why separate

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airplanes by five miles in the en-route environment, because sometimes the equipment may only have them four and a half miles apart, but, you know, we're showing them as five.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, so, yes, I understand from mosaicking, but I won't try to tell you from a technical point of view.

MR. KARA: Were questions asked by the senior management level in FAA about that anomaly, or the possibility of that anomaly with 77 in the aftermath of 9/11?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not from me.

MR. KARA: Or that you are aware of at other senior level?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I was not asked that, nor did I ask it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any sense of how big these guys are on the radar?

MR. GRIFFITH: East of the Mississippi River, they're very small, if at all. And as Dana said, in the terminal environment, where, you're

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down, you know, 12,000 feet and below, you're going to have more of them because, you know, airports have buildings around them. And different things and terrain, but at the high altitude, there are enough of these sites where the number of gaps East of the Mississippi would be very small. I'm not going to tell you they don't exist because sometimes an inversion of temperature where the air gets warmer as you go up, bends radar signals and so you may have a temporary time where you're not getting a good primary target because of temperature inversion. So, the controllers are briefed and trained on all these anomalies.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about West of the Mississippi?

MR. GRIFFITH: There are gaps because of mountainous terrain, yes. And because of sparse population, we don't have them as, you know, in as many places, so, you know, you're going to be working at some of the long-range ends of the systems in some cases.

MR. FARMER: So, if a plane were flying

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off primary radar for 10 minutes or so, would that be--and 77 disappears from radar for about what 12 minutes?

MS. HYDE: The question is it doesn't disappear from everybody's radio?

MR. FARMER: Well--

MS. HYDE: It disappears from the controller's at some period in time.

MR. FARMER: Yeah, and one of the theories is that it was flying through gaps in the radar coverage. That's a pretty big gap, basically.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, I would say that, you know, it was a combination of things that caused us not to be able to see where that airplane was once we lost it.

MS. HYDE: Combination of the matrix problem on the radar?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, it could have been a matrix, it could have been a gap, but it's also the whole thing to do with, you know, flying perpendicular to an antenna, you know, who knows the attitude of the aircraft? Normally, we work

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airplanes in a certain climb-descent configuration, turn-rate configuration. So, you know, and the speed of the aircraft.

You know, the controller's sector that was working this, I would guess, if the airplane would not have been in that controller's sector, more than 10 to 15 minutes because, you know, we have seven--we have this airspace divided up into 753 different sectors. And so that controller has an area this big. And once that airplane gets outside of there, then, you know, you've lost your chance of opportunity to find it. Let me pose this, maybe you can help us answer this question. American Air 11 does significant things. It, first of all, it goes NORDO, then the transponder stops and there's some change in altitude and direction. Moreover, it's being worked in two different en-route centers, Boston and New York.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. KARA: Yet, the controllers of record for 11 are able to track all of that and establish another track to 11 also on American Air 11.

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Controller in Indianapolis, only one center involved, not two, was faced with the same set of circumstances that occurred with 11 are not able to do that. How do we explain that to ourselves and to the American public?

MR. GRIFFITH: It's like trying to explain two different drivers going through an intersection. One hits the red light and goes through and the other one stops. You know, controllers personalities, while in many cases, the same, they're just like every other part of, you know, the population, they're all different. And so, you know, these particular controllers were sharp, they were on top of it, they nailed it, you know, on 11. On 77, you know, I don't know how many airplanes--I don't recall how many airplanes the controller was working, but--I mean, you've got to remember these people come to work every day and nothing like this ever happens.

MS. HYDE: Is that your assess--did you look at the controllers who lost 77? I mean, is that based upon you having looked into this issue?

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MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: But listen, I've managed big facilities--

MS. HYDE: But do you know that 77 that from an equipment standpoint that the controllers who were working 77 actually had the means to see that target?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh sure.

MS. HYDE: That you think there was a primary target displayed to their scope?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I don't know if there was or not, but--

MS. HYDE: So, if there wasn't a primary target displayed to their scope, what were they to do?

MR. GRIFFITH: Controllers have capability--first of all to turn primary radar on--

MS. HYDE: Okay, so if you have a controller who tells you, the minute I see it disappear, I hit primary, and there's nothing there.

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MR. GRIFFITH: The second thing they do is they raise their hand and get a supervisor over there--

MS. HYDE: None, none.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then everybody--

MS. HYDE: Everybody's looking at a blank scope because the equipment doesn't record it.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't believe that.

MS. HYDE: You don't believe that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't believe that at all.

MS. HYDE: You don't believe--so you think that actually there was--do you know what was--did you look into whether the SATORIS and all the--

MR. GRIFFITH: I looked at them all, yeah.

MS. HYDE: And so you think that the controllers for 77 did see it or, I'm sorry, could have seen it had from an equipment standpoint?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I know from what you've told me that the controllers on 11 started a primary track on 11 and the controllers in Indie had the same capability.

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MS. HYDE: But, as I understand it, they didn't have a primary target being communicated to that scope.

MR. GRIFFITH: They didn't see one.

MS. HYDE: You think they didn't see it?

MR. GRIFFITH: That's what I'm telling, you they didn't see one.

MS. HYDE: And this is based on you going back and looking at the SATORI and this isn't your supposition, you know, this to be true?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I'm not going to--I looked at a lot of data and it's been a long time ago. So, I'm not going to sit here and tell you that I recall every detail.

MS. HYDE: It seems like you're pretty certain of your recollection and so, I--and I appreciate that, I very much appreciate it and we need to know that.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I know how the system works and I know that the FAA spends millions and hundreds of millions and billions of dollars for infrastructure.

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MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: And the purpose of that infrastructure is to provide the best tools. Now, I will agree with you that we had made a decision to turn primary radar off--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: But that's not part of this discussion at all.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I ran that infrastructure for a number of years and I know there are holes in it. I know that, you know, the training standards that people are training by and for me in my experience to believe that someone would not have been able to see a primary target on that aircraft, it's very difficult for me to accept.

MS. HYDE: Did you, for 77, look at the issue of the Higbe [ph] tower and the other tower whether the signal actually picked up a target and whether it was communicated to Indie Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MS. HYDE: No, okay.

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MR. KARA: You're doing well, John.

MR. AZZARELLO: Before we get to the hijack scenario, in the event of an aircraft accident, a crash, what would you play individual at Air Traffic Division, you, Bill Peacock, what roles would you fulfill in the event of a crash or oversee the management of the inquiry, tell us about that relationship--

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --between you and Accident and Investigations and how that works.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, I'll define crash. If it's a Cessna 172 on a Saturday morning, I'll learn about that on Monday morning. If it's an air carrier with people on it, I'll learn about it in a few minutes. And, you know, this particular situation happened, we were all there. Had we not been there, we had a very disciplined notification process where everything is brought into the Washington Operations Center. But, you know, inside of Air Traffic, it goes to the Command Center, we carry text-pagers with us all the time

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and, you know, so division managers and everybody would get that word to Bill Peacock and I very expeditiously.

Now, my job at that point is to Peacock and I--our job is to get as much of the information as we can and begin briefing to the Administrator, because she's going to have other associates in there, and you know, that was kind of the protocol we had with Steve Brown and Peter Challen was, you know, we were a team of Peter and Steve and Peacock and I were a team. So, you know, we always worked as a team. so, if anybody had information we all worked it together on something significant.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if there was an accident you would get your information from? Who would you get it from in order to brief the Deputy and the Administrator?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, the first notification would probably come on the text-pager from the division manager because the Washington Operations Center usually does some kind of a call-up. You know, they'll configure, maybe, 8 or

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10 people on one conference at a time. And so our people normally, just, you know did the direct notification. Also, the Command Center, as soon as something like this happens, the Command Center finds out about it from the Center, right away. And then, you know, the Command Center does an automatic text-page to Peacock and I, so, you know, we're either in the building headed down the hall or we're at home grabbing our coats and cell phones and headed for the building.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who were the people who would look to get the data to reconstruct the accident or the cause of it and look into those issues?

MR. GRIFFITH: We had our evaluations group and quality insurance staff; those people were 24/7 call. And as soon as anything happened, their job was to work with the same--with their counterparts in the 9 regions. Because we really trained these people to be experts in handling these situations. And the worst thing you can have is some SES like me trying to say, hey, you know,

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did we get an ARPS [ph] print-out, did we do this; did we do that, you know? Usually they try to be real nice, but, really, what they say is, hey, back off a second, you know, we're doing everything right, you trained us right. so we work down through our quality assurance people in headquarters who reported directly to me, into the regional office, who reported to the Air Traffic Division into the facility. Okay?

So, if it were a center, that network goes right from the people in the facility talking to the controllers and the supervisors that were working the event, right up to the region and, you know, right into the front office.

MR. FARMER: Center, Region, Command Center, Headquarters, is that right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, at that point, once notification's made by the Command Center they're kind of off to the side, so it works all the way through the QA chain right into the front office.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean who does the actual--is it AAT-20, is that the office that does

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the Accident Investigation, Dave Cannoles' group?

MR. GRIFFITH: They do the aircraft incident investigation. The accident investigation is done by Nick Sabatini's group, AAI. And those people, they work hand-in-hand all the time, you know, know what I mean. So, you can imagine they're automatically talking to each other, too, you know. And then, you know we're putting a team together. A team's going to go to the site. You know and support the NTSB. We have union requirements where union reps are permitted, via the contract, to go to the site. So, you know, all that is put in motion because we have these check lists. We put everything in motion and we get everybody where they need to be.

Because, you're right, you know, everybody wants data. They want to know right away. So, we're playing tapes, we're interviewing controllers; we're getting radar data. The AF people are out certifying equipment to make sure it was all working properly, you know, and so, in very fast order, you know, you put together, you know a

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one-page to the Administrator, okay, this is what we know.

MR. AZZARELLO: You mean, equipment and control and conduct all those related issues?

MR. GRIFFITH: Listening to tapes. We'll listen to see if a controller made a mistake, if they inadvertently issued a wrong altitude; if they inadvertently issued a wrong heading. We're looking. And we're also looking to see if there were any negligence on our part, you know, where a controller, you know, may not have been paying full attention to duty. We do drug and alcohol testing, all that stuff's going right away.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I want to shift gears a little bit and talk about protocol for hijacking pre 9/11.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: If there was a report of a hijacking in the FAA system. Tell me about what role you would play in your office and the interaction white-board the other FAA facilities.

MR. GRIFFITH: Hijack situation, people

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would convene in the Washington Operations Center. The FBI would immediately be brought on-board because they have the lead--had the lead. And, you know, again, what you're doing is trying to stabilize the situation; get information; keep airplanes out of the way. And then begin to, you know, work through the scenario with FBI as the lead and, you know, bring it to some kind of resolution. So, our job is to, you know, be right there in the Washington Operations Center, linked up with the Administrator, in conference areas, you know, and maybe every 15 minutes we would--

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you, the FBI's the lead law enforcement investigating agency. But what about the--enlisting assistance from the military to track the aircraft? How would that--tell me about the protocol for that pre-9/11 for getting military assistance?

MR. GRIFFITH: Notification capability included DOD. One of the things that we had in my group was a group of senior military officers that were in our building. We provided office space for

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them. They reported to me. There was a senior person that oversaw the group, but it was the ability for us to have instant dialogue with the military on anything that was going on in the system. And so, prior to 9/11, you know, hijacking events were serious, they were critical. But they usually could be orchestrated. So, you could plan what are we going to do in the next 10 minutes, be we're talking to the airplane, they're on radar surveillance; we know where they're going. They told us they're going to go to this airport. You know, you're beginning to--other people are beginning to do things about that, if they--

MR. AZZARELLO: But before we get to that factually the operations and tracking the operations and tracking the aircraft. There's still the notification to the military. You say you had these senior military people at headquarters and they reported to you?

MR. GRIFFITH: right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And are you saying that one of the purposes of having those people there

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was to coordinate a hijack event?

MR. GRIFFITH: to make them aware of a hijack event. You know, before 9/11, as I said, the whole hijack scenario was a procedure written down that was orchestrated. And so--and you had time to deal with things. And if the military, if there were a plan being considered to involve the military, then, you know, it was done at the high level and it was done as part of the people in the Washington Operations Center.

Okay, the military people, you contact your office and, you know, if you know, if the Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation wants to do this, what will you do about that?

MR. AZZARELLO: What were the military people, the senior military people at headquarters, what would they do on a day-to-day basis, being that hijackings didn't occur on a sort of, you know, obviously, on a day-to-day basis? What would they do then?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, we had--the FAA was formed in 1958 under the Act, the FAA Act. And

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before that, we had a Civil Aviation Agency. And we were like many other countries around the world where you had a civil agency and you had a military environment. And you always kept everybody apart. So the military had all these big pieces of airspace and the civil airplanes had to stay out of it. And, you know it was, really, not a very good joint use operation.

The Act of '58 was intended to create a federal system where the FAA promoted air commerce and supported the military. And under the Act, we began to set up a series of agreements, back and forth, between DOD, DOT, FAA and these agreements had things in them, like, you know, we had agreements with, for example, the different commands of the military. Not the different--not like with the Army or the Navy or different commands, like, inside of the Air Force or different commands inside the Navy. And these agreements set up protocol and put processes and procedures in place to operate the system as a federal system where the military and civilian

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airplanes could operate in the entire airspace and everybody accomplish their mission.

So, you know, if you dig down through the Act and the different agreements between the FAA and different military organizations, you'll see that there's protocols and procedures. And we've got a handbook this thick on military operations; 7610.4. And so, and a handbook on operations and administrations 7210.13. And all these agreements, processes, and procedures are laid out in there.

MR. AZZARELLO: How long were the senior military people at the FAA headquarters, how many years, that you're aware of?

MR. GRIFFITH: Many years, I can't tell you exactly.

MS. HYDE: Who were these folks on 9/11?

MR. GRIFFITH: What?

MS. HYDE: On 9/11, who was the senior military person?

MR. GRIFFITH: Cheryl Atkins.

MS. HYDE: Colonel Atkins?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I'm trying to get an understanding on what the senior military people, like Cheryl Atkins would do on a day-to-day basis, absent a hijacking incident.

MR. AZZARELLO: They reported to Bill Peacock and I and I was the rating official for several.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you this. If you're military, let's say the Air Force, NORAD, is running a major exercise, which, actually, is one of the things that did happen on 9/11. And they're coordinating, obviously, the reservation of airspace for them, wherever it may be [unintell.] five or whatever to conduct their exercise. Would that be an example of an instance where, let's say, a Cheryl Atkins as an Air Force representative would help coordinate the use and reservation of that airspace at a headquarters level? Was she, like, a liaison at the headquarters level to coordinate those type of events?

MR. GRIFFITH: The people that did that worked under Cheryl and under people that she

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worked with. So the only time it would get up to here level was if there was a problem, like, if, you know, the military said, we're going to shut down the Eastern half of the United States for four days. You know then we would raise the flag and say, hey, Colonel Atkins, these guys are asking for something we can't do. You know, and then she'd get involved and, you know, start knocking heads.

But, you know, usually--now, like, we in Air Traffic, had people assigned to all of the air defense sectors. We had one at Tindle, we had one at Griffiths Air Force Base in New York and we had one at Western Air Defense Sector out in Washington State. We had one at NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain. So, this four people were FAA people that were on our staff that were required to coordinate on a day-to-day basis all of the activities with NORAD.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you had them in NORAD and the three NEADS, SEDS and WATS at the three sectors.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, and at Cheyenne Mountain.

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MR. AZZARELLO: With NORAD at [unintell.]?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, again, that would be the other half of the equation, the FAA liaison back to the military to coordinate the use of that airspace?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, let's go pre-9/11 and, as I say, a hijack reported in the system. And hypothetically, they're going to commandeer a plane to take it to Cuba and you want to get military aircraft to tail them--how do you practically--take me through the steps--how do I get somebody in a position of authority at the military to then take the military action that's necessary--I'm on the FAA side, I want to get somebody in a position of authority with a uniform on to now say to NORAD, go. Help the FAA launch. Go call ZBW because the plane's in Boston Center and I need you to get on it and they know where it is. Okay, what do I do? Take me through the steps.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Washington Operations Center people start working through that. Say, okay, we need to get DOD. The person in charge is four-star Eberhard in Cheyenne Mountain. The Administrator or Deputy Administrator would call the general and say, look, it's been determined by "X" whether it's FBI or whomever that they want to scramble on this aircraft and they want it to occur at this time and this place. And then the general would say, okay, we'll do that. Or, hey, all my guys are out training today, we don't have time. You know, who knows what they would say. But, usually, in a significant situation, they're going to say, absolutely, they got people on strip alert, you know, and they say launch. And those guys are in the air in seven minutes.

MS. HYDE: So that's what somebody at Washington at the WOC or within headquarters to call Eberhard?

MR. GRIFFITH: That's, since we never did this before, that's the way it was--

MS. HYDE: That's right, we shouldn't get

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too stuck on sort of a procedure when we know that procedures were never used. So, we can talk about what actually happened that day and then sort of, but I guess what this conversation is is to take out of your head what actually happened that day and tell us as you're walking to work on 9/10, you know, what your understanding of what would have happened?

MR. GRIFFITH: You go to the Washington Operations Center, it's a very high-level decision.

MS. HYDE: That's the next question, who at headquarters, I mean, the folks, the duty officers at the Washington Operations Center are certainly not--they're facilitators. So, who in your mind on 9/10 would have been the person to coordinate with Eberhard?

MR. GRIFFITH: The Deputy Administrator.

MS. HYDE: And did you have in your inadvertently that you would go through the NMCC, there was this paper process, on paper it was that the hijack coordinator would contact the NMCC and the NMCC would get in the loop. Was that in your

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thinking at all before this event?

MR. GRIFFITH: We would have pulled the book and laid it down right in front of us and we would have followed it step-by-step-by-step.

MS. HYDE: And so, the pulling the book out would have gotten you somehow a hijack coordinator--

MR. GRIFFITH: Who would have arranged--

MS. HYDE: Who, wasn't, under whatever interpretation within Air Traffic Services, was somewhere in Security? Not clear where, but someone in Security would have called the NMCC. So, how does that jive with your gut reaction, which I take to be very genuine that Monte or the Deputy Administrator would have called Eberhard. It's two different processes?

MR. GRIFFITH: Because those, well, those, that's the way it was really done. Any decision that would consider a shoot-down of an aircraft would be done at that level. It would not be done--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, we don't want

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to--we're not on a day of 9/11 yet. And I don't want to meld the two together.

MS. HYDE: Let's just go, because--the conversation about how it would have happened always ends up in the process.

MR. AZZARELLO: Had you ever worked a hijack before?

MS. HYDE: Have you ever worked a hijack?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You weren't around with the Lufthansa hijacking?

MR. KARA: He was out in Chicago.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they ever, well you know, they did have a training exercises, I'm sure you're well aware in the field, where the controllers would go into a [unintell.] facsimile training. They'd see the 7500 code pop up or someone would be playing pilot on the other end and yell trip and whatever and they would go supervisor, I got a trip, I got a 7500. But what would happen from there, in terms of, was that ever drilled all the way up the chain of command to say,

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well, okay, well, now, how does this play out if we really need to get military assistance?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure, I mean, we had--everybody has an undisclosed location. But we had this undisclosed location that we went to once a year, you know sometimes for a couple of days and we played all these games. You know, and we tabletopped and we tabletopped and, you know.

MR. GRIFFITH:

MS. HYDE: Well, actually, we're going to ask more about those undisclosed, but we're talking about from headquarters. I think the question that John was drawing on was your experience and years at the centers. And help us with the following. Both from the paper perspective and from a training perspective and from interviews with controllers, it seems very clear what the controllers do at centers when there is a hijack. And that's all that's written down.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: What we can't find and maybe you can point us to is, first of all the paper that

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would tell a supervisor and a manager, either if it goes to a base supervisor and then to an OLMICK [ph] what they were supposed to do?

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, do you have a handbook? It's 7210.3. And in there you will find the topic of hijack. And you will find a general description of what you're supposed to do with hijacks.

MS. HYDE: Even if you're a supervisor, not from a controller's perspective, but from supervisors and a manger?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Then, at the facility level, there will be an order that has hijack procedures in it that the Air Traffic Manager is responsible for having. And, you know, it will be in a contingency handbook. You have contingencies for hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, hijacks a whole number of--bomb threats. And in there you will have a section on hijacks.

MS. HYDE: And that'll vary from facility?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: When you were in Chicago and you were the manager of Chicago, you wrote, there's the national guidance would you say embodying 7210.3?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: But there was also a Chicago-specific--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: --order about hijacking?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. There was a specific order about Air Traffic Control in Chicago that had contingency planning in it, so there wasn't this separate order about hijackings, it was a section in an order that said, if you have a hijack here is your responsibility. And on the 7110.65 has Air Traffic Control procedures on the code 7500.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: And there's a separate order that talks about flaps down--

MS. HYDE: Right and there are certain things for controllers.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: The guidance, though, for supervisors and managers is in 7210.3.

MR. GRIFFITH: No, it's the facility order.

MS. HYDE: Well, I thought you said the first--your first response was first you go to the supervisors and managers, the national guidance for them was 7210.3.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. And then you have a facility order that applies to your facility. So, and in the facility, you have, for example, supervisors desk drawer. Pull the drawer open, they're might be 10 envelopes in that drawer, brown envelopes.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: One of them says hijack. And you pull that thing out, you lay it down in front of you and it's got excerpts from 7210.3; it's got the facility notification procedures; it's got an accident incident reporting form in there with everybody's name and phone number that you're

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supposed to call and what time you call them. You know, it's--

MS. HYDE: Do those facilities hand in their orders to the Chief to national? I mean, reality is that however many facilities there are and, you know, you as a manager will react different than somebody else. This is the point you were making to me earlier, a different point. Different people. If they really went out there and ask for every facility to give us their order that directed managers what to do in a hijacking on 9/11, would we find, first of all that every facility has such an order--

MR. GRIFFITH: I hope so.

MS. HYDE: You hope so, do you think that you would?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, here's how I know that they probably would. Ever Air Traffic Control facility is evaluated every year by an evaluation team.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And they have a checklist.

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And we hate those guys. Because they come in and if you spell hijack with a hyphenation in it, rather than a single word, you get a demerit, okay, but the idea is they have a checklist and they evaluate every large facility and medium facility every year. Now, one year is called a full facility evaluation. The next year, it's called a follow-up. So they go in and they look at your demerits, they report them to you. They say, okay, you've got 90 days to fix these problems or whatever it is.

Okay, so, then you're kind of put on watch if you've got a lot of problems. They come back the next year, hey drag the old report out and they compare it to the same checklist and they go through it again. Okay. And if you don't have a hijack order, it's going to show up as a problem in your report.

MS. HYDE: Do you know if the evaluators, one of the items that they have to look for is a hijack order?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. It might not say

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hijack, but it says emergency procedures or contingency procedures or, I don't have a thing in my brain that--

MS. HYDE: And what I could guess is that I--that makes perfect sense, I wonder when, if we really drilled down on it, that emergency procedures were required to include hijack?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yeah. Should be a brown envelope in everybody's drawer because we train it, you know. And everybody knows where that drawer is.

MS. HYDE: So, then my second question is, if we could go out tomorrow and gather everybody's order, and we find that everybody has one. What would your estimation--what would we find in terms of the directions that these orders would be giving to managers in terms of notifications? Do you think there would be consistency and that everyone, all of these orders say, manager, you know, should some say manager you call the Command Center; some would say manager you call the region; some would say manager you call the Command Center and the

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region; some would say manager you call headquarters?

MR. GRIFFITH: They will all call their Regional Operations Center.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And the Regional Operations Center will begin setting up a bridge of regional people and make notification to Washington Operations Center immediately.

MS. HYDE: Do you think that the obligation of the facility is discharged, so to speak, by calling the Regional Operations Center? Are they supposed to do something more than that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, they have a list of who to call; local FBI is Joe Smith; office is this; phone number is this; local law enforcement; airport management. The list applies to that specific location. If it's an en-route center, then it's more of a regional call, okay, but--

MS. HYDE: In terms of the obligation, though, to make internal FAA notification does--

MR. GRIFFITH: It's on the--

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MS. HYDE: Does the Regional Operations Center satisfy that obligation or would you also need to call the Command Center, would you need to do anything beyond, in terms of internal FAA notifications, anything beyond the calling--

MR. GRIFFITH: You'd notify the Command Center, you'd notify your Air Traffic Division manager.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you say the Command Center are you talking Herndon or the Regional Operations Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: Herndon.

MS. HYDE: And you think anyone within the facility it's their responsibility to call headquarters, to call the Washington Operations Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: You know, I don't recall, I'd have to get it out and look at it, but, you know.

MS. HYDE: But there's not going to be one uniform, as you say.

MR. GRIFFITH: The reason you don't want

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everybody calling the Washington Operations Center is because what if they already had one two hijack--

MS. HYDE: I'm not advocating everybody to call the WOC, I'm just trying to get--

MR. AZZARELLO: We're just trying to get an understanding?

MS. HYDE: --I'm just trying to get an understanding, I'm not advocating that you should call the Washington Operations Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: The protocol was that you call your Regional Operations Center because you had trained people to deal with that and they knew what to give--

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it fall on the Regional Operations Center, then, the Regional Center to notify headquarters, is that how--

MR. GRIFFITH: They would notify the Washington Operations Center, yes.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they would notify the regional to notify the WOC.

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MR. GRIFFITH: And then you follow the checklist and you do everything that checklist says.

MR. AZZARELLO: See, we're looking for your assistance here and struggling a little bit on the documents with this because, you know, you've mentioned the 7210, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We've looked at that and that shows you--we've looked at 7210; 7110.65, that's the Controller says notify supervisory personnel.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's, I'm Joe Controller, I let my area supe know, or it goes to the OLMICK, on your desk and as far as their training goes, they've all pretty uniformly said, we're done, because understandably, they've got a scope and they got aircraft to control. They can't leave the scope and coordinate a response or further action.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. So, they're done.

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Now, we're just trying to figure out how it gets from the supervisor at the facility to headquarters, so that when you get to the tie, you have it where you say, where the Deputy Administrator has to then coordinate with the highest level or a higher level of the military. How do we get from Point A to Point B? How do we get from Joe Controller at the field facility to Monte Belger, then saying, okay, I'm going to go call General Eberhard? And I haven't, we haven't been able to find that in paper how you get to headquarters, although now you're saying is the paper should be at each field facility?

MR. GRIFFITH: Aply.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: There's 8020.11, did you look in there? 71--7210.56 did you look in there, System Effectiveness. You know, there's a whole series of orders that pertain in the way you build your local procedures inside that facility.

MS. HYDE: Though you just cited, it's not hijack specific, so what you just said is orders

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that address how each facility is supposed to have it's own emergency--

MR. GRIFFITH: Accident Incident reporting yes.

MS. HYDE: Accident Incident reporting?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, so a hijacking is an incident. They used to be in more detail in the 7210.3 for hijacking, then they pulled it out a few years ago and I think we put it in that 7210.56 and 8020.11, we kind of pulled that out of--

MR. AZZARELLO: Taking a look at that 7610 that you mentioned, at that military order. Escort of aircraft?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: This says here that the FAA hijack coordinator the director or his designee to the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this is a chart that's getting us to the various--that's ACS--

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: How would I--how do you

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interpret this in terms of who the hijack coordinator is? Are they saying it's the ACS or someone else?

MR. GRIFFITH: I wouldn't see it happening that way. But what I would see is, yes, there is, when you go in the WOC and you have--have you seen it?

MS. HYDE: Well, we've seen the new, but we can't--

MR. AZZARELLO: They gave us a map, this is one of the--there's that, and these are the stations--crisis center.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, they have a Security person sitting right up here and that person's the boss.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. That's the hijack coordinator, whoever's sitting up here--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right that person is the boss.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And Monte will come in and stand behind him and ask him questions, you know.

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And while this person may be calling the NMCC, I can assure you that the Deputy Administrator is going to be calling the guy over at NORAD saying hey, we got people working this down here about an intercept, you know, are you guys, you know. I want to know at this level because, you know, the accountability is so high in these situations.

MS. HYDE: Well, let's, maybe we should get to the day of.

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm not going to speak for Monte in this situation, at all, you know--

MS. HYDE: Sure.

MR. GRIFFITH: --because the only thing I can tell you is what--

MS. HYDE: Well, it's hard to do the paper situation [unintell.] necessary and I think you've been helpful in terms of alerting us to each facility's own emergency preparedness procedures. But--

MR. GRIFFITH: I wish I was still as up as I used to be, but I'm not, you know. I make money now.

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MR. KARA: I have just one question before we move to the day of. You were very specific when you said accident/incident reporting and a hijacking is an incident?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. KARA: Which incident management is over here on the Air Traffic side?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I would use this as the guide, okay?

MR. KARA: Because on 9/11, as we move into that discussion now, the incident which is the hijacking of American 11 becomes an accident.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. KARA: Where do these people over here on the Accident Investigation side get into this structure that we're going to be talking about?

MR. GRIFFITH: There will be people from Nick Sabatini, everybody's got a place in here--

MR. KARA: They'll be down in here?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. KARA: But the boss, still comes from, yet, a third-line organization?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, nobody did anything without talking to this person.

MR. KARA: So the boss is here; the incident is here; accident is here, both sides are represented here.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, but, you know, at this point, you become a team.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, we got a problem, we gotta fix it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's get to the problem of the day. You're at work on 9/11 and tell us.

MR. KARA: You need a short break before we move on?

[BREAK.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, we're back on after our break. And, Jeff, you were just about to tell us about the day of 9/11,

MR. GRIFFITH: Yep.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you first became aware that there was a report of a hijack or a problem in the aviation system.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, I was in my office on the 10th floor, Bill Peacock was away at a union meeting in New Orleans. And Dave Cannoles, who was the manager of our Evaluation staff walked in my office and said we just had an aircraft hit the World Trade Center. I said what do you know about it? He said, we don't know anything, just know an aircraft hit the World Trade Center.

My assumption was that it had to be a small airplane. I said, okay, what am I doing. [unintell.] we're getting information. I said okay. Then, I can't remember a lot of detail after that because--like whether I walked down the hall at that time--we were--our office was right down the hall from the Administrator's and right down the hall from--

MR. AZZARELLO: The Air Traffic suites, the West end, I guess?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right we're down in this corner, my office was here, Jane was here and then--

MR. AZZARELLO: Actually someone's drawn

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a--I guess a diagram of that, corner suite--with Peacock--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, Peacock was there, conference room and then my room and then, oh, yeah, this is what we did on 9/11, yeah.

So, I turned on my TV in my office to CNN and saw that people were saying it was an airliner. So, then, at some point, I said, okay, I headed down the hall. It might have been a minute later, it might have been five minutes later, I don't recall that part. And I headed down the hall and I went in this door, into here, and it was packed.

MR. AZZARELLO: You went into the Aviation Crisis Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: The ACC room?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you, just for one second, let me ask you one question, about when you turned on the TV and you saw CNN, and you said that when Cannoles told you about it you had this vision that it was a small aircraft. Did you share that

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same vision when you saw the TV screen or were you thinking something else?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, when I, as soon as I turned CNN on, there was information about it being an airliner, okay? I said, there's something really wrong here. So, then I, you know, I headed down here and ended up at this position, next to Lee Longmire. And had the Command Center on the phone and started a dialogue with the Command Center about what do we know, what are doing?

MR. AZZARELLO: And you said you were standing next to Lee Longmire and who's on with the Command Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: I was on with the Command Center. Lee was, you know, pulling all the Security elements together. You know, they were setting up a SVTS, you know, Secure Voice thing--

MR. AZZARELLO: Where was that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Have you been told about that?

MR. KARA: We know about that, yeah.

MR. GRIFFITH: All right, so they were

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setting that up which was in a location nearby. And the White House wanted information, everybody wanted information.

MR. AZZARELLO: Had you heard, at the moment when you walked in the Command Center, had you heard the word hijack yet from anybody?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just crash?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. HYDE: Had the second plane hit yet?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't believe so.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, wouldn't that have been pretty quick to set up the Command Center, though if it was after the first crash, if you walked in there and then Longmire was already there and--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, it would have been 20 minutes, if I recall.

MS. HYDE: I think, well, we have some--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, yeah, maybe we can find the time with--

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MS. HYDE: We have the WOC log.

MR. AZZARELLO: We have the WOC log--do you have the WOC log out? Oh, here, I'm sorry. But let me ask you another point about orientation: Do you recall that when you walked in to the Command Center and walked up here--hold on to that, though. When you walked into the Command Center and came up here by Lee is one of the first things you did get on with the Command Center, do you remember?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, I think we can orient the time then. We have the Command Center transcript where you were on at some point. And is that when you, then, handed the phone to Doug Davis and asked him to stay on with the CC?

MR. GRIFFITH: At some point. I rem--here's what I remember. First of all this whole thing was a blur. And that's why I'm having trouble remembering when I went in there. It may have been after the second one hit the tower that I actually went into this room.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Because I can tell you, I think, when you get on with the Command Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm just trying to pull it together.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure.

MR. GRIFFITH: You know, I, very early into this, I spent a lot of time in with Monte and Jane, you know, there's that conference room between their offices.

MS. HYDE: Right, actually, we talked to Shirley later, I think she would tell you that there was a meeting happening in terms of the first notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have your regular staff meeting that day?

MS. HYDE: You have that staff meeting on Tuesday, that morning.

MR. GRIFFITH: That was done.

MS. HYDE: And you get a page about the--

MR. GRIFFITH: Who reported that?

MS. SULLIVAN [?]: Shirley, I mean this isn't like a, [unintell.] at the end of the day,

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isn't that everybody's recollection--we just want to ask you about--

MS. HYDE: She said, [unintell.] conference that went on, it would have come through [unintell.] breaking up [unintell.] I don't know.

MR. GRIFFITH: Thing that I distinctly remember about the first aircraft was Cannoles telling me and I was in my office alone, when he told me.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, it could have been that we had been at, you know, who knows what we were talking about.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall prior to his telling you about the plane hitting the Trade Center you recall getting a page where they informed you that a plane was missing and might have been hijacked?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't recall a page. The first thing I recall is Cannoles and--here's what's coming through my mind right now.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Cannoles notified me on the first one on a telephone call. And I remember I was in my office alone. I turned CNN on and not long after that, he showed up in my office.

MR. AZZARELLO: So he called you first and then he showed up in your office?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's the way I recall it. And I think at that point is when the second aircraft hit. That may be the point that I rushed down the hall into--that may be the point at which I entered this room. Now, between those--I don't recall if--

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if you saw the second aircraft strike on the TV?

MR. GRIFFITH: I did, but it was a playback, you know, I don't think I saw--because it kept rerunning every--you know, all day long.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: You know, and I remember in short order I was on the phone. I was up here with the Command Center, John White.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's his transcript

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here, I think, with the Command Center. Mike is it
Audis [ph] Mike Audis at the Command Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know his name.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Mike Susmansi [ph],
and Susmansi said I Mike Susmansi said I have Jeff
Griffith on the line, he needs to talk to either
Linda or John.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be Nancy
Kolonowski [ph]? Do you remember, was she with
you?

MR. GRIFFITH: Could be. I'm not real
good about this part of it because--[unintell.] and
reacting, okay?

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm. And it says I
talked to Linda Schuessler and John White.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Because Keyes [ph] was out
of time.

MR. AZZARELLO: John White gets on with
you?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, John gets on.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is--it's an FAA transcript so the time is around 9:18 is when you get on with the Command Center, which is roughly 15 minutes after the second Trade Center was hit. You asked him for a number that you can call anytime to talk to him and you get a non-number.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, so here's, I remember before I left my office, I had Cannoles in front of me, and I said to Cannoles, go in this room, which was our conference room and set up a situation line and get all the division managers on it and get a situation line going. Get your people to immediately start collecting data, right this minute, because I knew that we were going to get a barrage of press and everybody else wanting to know what was said, when it was said--NTSB and everybody else. I said, start at this minute with your people collecting data. And don't stop until I tell you to.

I mean that may not have been my exact words--

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MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. BROWN: --but, you know, I put a whole lot of intensity in get data and get it now. And a whole lot of intensity in, you know, getting the management team up there, getting this situation line set up and, you know, getting us together as a team so that we could start responding. And that was, you know, that's my recall of the first few minutes of this.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, Dave Cannoles you asked him set up the situation line in the Air Traffic Suites area.

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't ask him to, Cannoles's is the kind of guy you gotta look in the eye to get him to do it.

MR. AZZARELLO: All right.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, that's what I did.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, they're back here in the conference room?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And setting up a situation line. And did you want him to get the Command

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Center on the line, too?

MR. GRIFFITH: Everybody.

MR. AZZARELLO: Everybody, okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Set up a situation line and get everybody on it. Because in my mind that was going to be my vehicle for, you know, I knew I was going to be up front somewhere and if Monte or Jane or somebody said I need this, then, you know, it ended up I was sending runners down there, you know.

MR. KARA: This hub of activity down here, then, becomes an extension of you up here?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, it actually did. In fact, this, what we were doing down here in the Air Traffic conference room, ended up lasting for days and days and days and days. And then it was finally transferred up into the WOC, but, yeah, it just kind of became a network to the operational element in the field.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you happen to know when the Boston Center called, or the region called to report the hijacked plane? Do you know who they

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talked to?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't, I may have known that, but I don't recall that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who, if they called the right person, who should they have been calling, I guess, is my question.

MR. GRIFFITH: The Regional Operations Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: But I mean, so when the Region calls the WOC?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who, in the WOC should they have asked to talk to?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, the Duty Officer picks the phone up, I mean, that's the procedure.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they report to the Duty Officer?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then he or she transmits the message to--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, they set up the notification process whatever they have as an SOP.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember when you first heard that the plane was hijacked?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't because the things that jogged my mind are, first aircraft at the World Trade Center, okay. Well, wait a minute, it's commercial aircraft, something bad wrong, okay? So, we're getting our team response ready, trying to get information, then second aircraft hits World Trade Center, you know. At this time, you know, my recall is I'm down here at this position and I'm talking to John White.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's where--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I'm talking to John White and I'm getting a little rough with him, you know, but essentially, we were getting ready to get on a SVTS and brief up, you know. And so, you know, I was getting information. Okay, what do we know? What airplanes are lost? From to--to where; what are the call signs and, you know, and we were getting false reports, you know, it was a Delta, a Continental that turned up as false reports. There was a false report of a crash in Kentucky. And

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we're trying to sort through all this. And then, you know, somebody says, hey, an airplane just hit the Pentagon.

Okay, and that's when I, you know, in my mind, I said, we gotta shut this thing down. So, at that point, you know, someplace along the line, Doug Davis was standing in the back of the room and I said, you come here, sit here, you know, you're my eyes and ears. And we're getting reports of people, you know, closing down facilities and all this stuff and, you know, ordering people back to work. And, you know, name it and it happened.

MR. KARA: When Doug takes your place, what does that free you up to do? What becomes your activity?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I headquartered to be able to talk to Lee and, you know, we had Lee in there. We had Lynne, you know, this kind--this corner up here got real busy, you know, of people asking what have we gotta do--what have we gotta do? Cheryl Atkins shows up, so, you know, we're all going through what are we gonna do--what are we

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gonna do? I walked in to Monte and said, Monte we've got to shut this thing down. He said, can we do that? I said, yeah, we can do it. He said, well, then do it.

And I went back in and, you know, Doug Davis, we got into this conversation about, okay, we gotta shut the system down. Put everything on the ground. And the Command Center says something like, we already did that. I said, wait a minute, you guys don't go running off on your own here, you know. Let's get this thing together and get it done, you know.

And so we went through that. Go in do another SVTS.

MR. KARA: Were you on the SVTS calls?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I was kind of the, you know, Lee, I think it was Lee, I can't remember if Lee was doing it--I think Lee did a lot of it. But whenever they wanted to know operational things about, you know, who are the airplanes, where are they now, what do we know, then, you know, I threw a lot of stuff away when I left FAA, but, you know,

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I was keeping one of these pads with me and I was writing down times and, you know.

MR. KARA: When you used the term "they" here, you know, who's the they?

MR. GRIFFITH: The SVTS.

MR. KARA: Well, the SVTS, the SVTS is a room, so you're looking at other people, when you go in there you're sitting and you're looking at other people aren't you?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. KARA: Who are, now in that context, who are the they?

MR. GRIFFITH: I can only tell you labels, Justice, FBI, you know, because sometimes they had four people, you know, four pictures on one screen, you know. I didn't have a clue who they were, they were all, you know Administrator and above level, so--

MR. KARA: Was the White House on at the point in time that you were in the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember, because we were in there so much, I mean, sometime during

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that day they were on, but, you know, the intent was to get information to them because they were sending out some kind of crisis team.

MR. KARA: And this line of communication upwards, there's also established in the room where you and Doug go are--

MR. GRIFFITH: Doug Davis.

MR. KARA: Doug Davis, excuse me, there was also established a Primary Net?

MR. GRIFFITH: the Primary Net was over here for inside the Air Traffic Organization.

MR. KARA: No, no, let me, John help me out.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me note for the transcript, this second [unintell.] you got on the line with John White in the Command Center, okay? You ask him for--to give you a number where you can get him because you've been calling and it's been ringing off the hook.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: He tells you about New York's ATC-zero, you ask why, and then he says

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because they don't know what the security threat is to their facility, they're trying to work it out, they get a first-hear ground stop for ZNY for New York Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: You then tell them to go ahead with the New York Report. He continues on that we went, first-hear ground stop on all New York arrivals; we just went to nationwide; then he talks about the TRACON believes they can still work aircraft. Then he says, reference the agency, see if we can start getting the aircraft--take an inventory of all the aircraft [unintell.]. And he still have some suspected aircraft. There's a third aircraft at Delta out of Boston that we're still checking on and we haven't really established the second aircraft that hit the second tower. You say all right; he said it's either American or United, we don't know which. You say, it's United 175, see if you can find out the departure point and destination.

And do you remember, I guess, at this

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point, you've been made aware that 175--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --do you remember where that information came from?

MR. GRIFFITH: In this corner.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're up here--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, we're up there, you know, there's the group up there. And I don't know where it came from.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you tell them to, the United 175 was going to Los Angeles because--okay?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then you tell them there's a question about a Chicago to L.A. flight, you ask them to check with the Center. And then you say, could he get awareness out to all the TMCs or the Traffic Management Unit and report any unusual circumstances direct to the Command Center of loss, identification or any radio--any unusual radio transmissions, everything.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, you give him, John

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White that direction, I guess.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: You want Command Center to reach out to the field facilities, anything unusual report up to them.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how are you going to monitor that from Command Center to headquarters? Are you going to do it from the Command Center or will you go somewhere else to monitor that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right here.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And that's what I had Doug there for. I eventually gave the phone to Doug and--

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, that's about four pages later.

MR. GRIFFITH: --and, you know, but what we were trying to do at this point is figure out what's going on, you know, are there more; where are they; you know, are we missing other airplanes, you know. And we're feeding that to everybody in

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the room. I don't know if Cheryl Atkins was there at the time, but I know she was in that room--

MR. AZZARELLO: At some point?

MR. GRIFFITH: --at some point. But, you know, our thing was to figure out what was going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then I'm going to ask you about this next one. John White tells you, I have one of those reports for you and this is roughly 9:25 a.m. because there's the--American 77 comes about, Dulles to L.A., flight level 35 zero, West of Charleston, West Virginia and Indianapolis airspace they have lost the target. They're going back and looking for the aircraft now. They don't have a primary or anything like that.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that the first knowledge you had of 77 that day?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You ask what time, and then he tells you about 10 minutes ago, reference the earlier statement that they lost and can't find

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the primary. So, he then goes on to tell you about the Delta. And what do you remember about the Delta aircraft that John White told you about?

MR. GRIFFITH: The only thing I remember about the Delta, and I was writing them all down on my pad I was carrying around with me, but in fact, I remember on one of the SVTS, I reported that Delta, I reported up on the Delta, I remember that going out before they figured out that we had it. but, you know, the thing I remember about the Delta was, it was a problem--it was a problem, oh, no, it's not a problem, draw a line through it and get on with the next problem.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then, how about the discussion about trying to do a nationwide ground stop? This continues on with John White himself and he tells you that there's some sort of threatening tape from somebody. Do you want to do a nationwide ground stop? And you said, we're talking about that right now. Just have Cannoles, correction, let's make sure we get this information out to all the centers to report to you any unusual

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transmissions or any loss of radio.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you tell him to stay on the line, don't hang it up--don't hang up the line. And that's when you see here, John thinks you're still on, he says-- John thinks you're still on, he says, Jeff, and he says this is Doug sitting next to Jeff, so, is that, I guess, was that, I guess at this point you turned the phone over to Doug.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, Doug was a trustworthy guy, you know. I mean, you had people that you knew could get the job done and people who couldn't. I saw him in the back of the room, he was doing a totally different job. I drug him in and sat him down, you know. He was a champion.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember Doug said that he received some information prior to sitting down at that phone, he remembers you telling him, that, hey, man this line for me.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: But that prior to that, he

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had entered the c and based on some information that somebody gave him about American 11, which we now know is the first aircraft to hit the tower--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that someone gave him some information that it was still airborne and headed South to Washington and that he entered the Crisis Center and pretty much announced it that, hey, American 11 is--it's still airborne, it's headed to D.C. Tell me what you recollect about that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember that at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't remember him saying that at all?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, do you remember anything about that report? Anything at all about a report that American 11, which Boston initially believed had impacted the first Trade Center, that subsequent to that, believed being held by the system that something directive had changed and

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someone said, well, wait a minute, we think it might still be out there headed South to--we don't think it went in the tower?

MR. GRIFFITH: What I was doing with that information was, I had one of these and, you know, I was writing down a time and making a notation, just doing that, that kind of thing. But I don't recall that piece of information, just don't recall it.

MR. AZZARELLO: What do you recall doing when John White tells you about American 77 and that it was lost and they don't have a primary on it or anything like that, what did you do with that piece of information?

MR. GRIFFITH: I made it known, again, I can't remember--I can't remember who was converging in this corner right here, but, you know, there was a railing here and then a kind of a ramp that went down to this door into the SVTS, and there were four or five people there that were, like, really key people. Monte was in and out, but, you know, there were, there were people from Security there

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that, you know, how you work in a building and you see these people for five or six years, you know, and you see them in the elevator and you wave in the hall and stuff, you know? You never know what they do, you know, and all of a sudden you're in this crisis situation and--

MR. AZZARELLO: And there they are.

MR. GRIFFITH: --there they are, you know, they're all Security people.

MR. KARA: You mentioned Lynne Osmus was one of them?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm pretty sure that Lynne--well, I can't be--I know that Lynne was either over here or over there.

MR. AZZARELLO: I want to ask you one more question--I want to ask you some questions about the SVTS, but one more question before we get there is: You have Command Center on the--first you're on with John White and then you have Doug Davis as the conduit--

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --between Command Center

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and headquarters and if I heard you right that back in the Air Traffic suite you told Cannoles to get a situation line open including Command Center there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you've got, you've sorta got two ends to the 10th floor. You've got Cannoles down on the West end talking to Command Center trying to figure out what the air traffic situation is and then you have the Crisis Center, Command Center's on, John White with Doug Davis, what's your recollection of what efforts, if any, were made to coordinate that information or to deconflict [ph] it if there was conflicting information coming from the Command Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: The purpose of Cannoles setting up a situation line was, initially, to get information out to our division managers and out to our team, it wasn't necessarily one to set it up as, okay, this is going to be a new command post. It was set up a situation line so that we can get information out to our people, because--

MR. AZZARELLO: You mean, Air Traffic

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Division?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, to our 500s and to our program directors. Air Traffic Division 500s.

MR. AZZARELLO: What's the 500, is that regional level?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. So, because, that's one of the things that was important to me, you know, when things happen, get--what information, you have two people so that you know, you don't have rumors and other things causing problems about coordination. So, you know, I had Cannoles set that up, in turn, you know, some of the regions chose to set up a separate one inside their organization out to their field facilities, you know, because they're telling me things, like, people are leaving facilities and stuff. And then saying no, no, everybody goes to work, everybody stays, nobody leaves, well, the Union's objecting; I don't care about the union we'll fix that in a month or two, but right now, nobody leaves. We've got airplanes to put on the ground.

So, that was the tone that was set and--

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did you also have field facilities on, was your intent, initially, was that you were going to go below the region, too, though to get the en-route centers and the TRACONS on?

MR. GRIFFITH: We ended up with the centers on there, and at some point, some of the TRACONS, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that by design or--

MR. GRIFFITH: --that was, really, to get the system started back up, you know. Because, you know, as tragic as it was, there was a real urgency to get those airplanes back in the air. Aviation is a \$900 billion-a-year industry for the U.S. and it's a genuine engine for the economy. So, you know, part of our job was not only get it shut down, but get everything thing in place where you can get it going again as quickly as possible, but you're now, making sure first that it's secure and then safe. And then efficient.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so I'm Jeff Griffith on 9/11 and I want to know what's the universe of potential, additional potentially hijacked aircraft

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that are out on the system, after the first two crashes. You've got two crashes at the Trade Center. You get on with the Command Center and now they're beginning to tel you about reports that are filtering in on a Delta, on American 77 that was lost.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: If I'm you, that day on that floor and I want to get a handle on the situational records, how many other potential suicide bombers are in the system right now, where do you go for that information?

MR. GRIFFITH: That's why I had John White--

MR. AZZARELLO: You say here?

MR. GRIFFITH: --you heard me say to John White stay there and do not hang up that phone. And then I told Doug Davis, you sit down there and you stay here and don't move and you talk to John White and I had already told John White, go out and get unusual reports reported directly to you.

MS. HYDE: Right, I mean, but, again, sort

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of what's happening that day that we know from the Cannoles call. For example, the real-time countdown of 77 plowing into Washington, you know, 30 miles out, 20 miles out, 10 miles out, is being reported on the Cannoles call. The way we know that is that Mike Scirillo [ph] is standing or actually has a relay person and Mike is conveying that information, actually, ultimately to the White House. So, our sense is that either Dulles had to have been on that, somebody with a scope that had that target that had countdown information about how close. And that's early. We know that that would have been sort of in the 9:30/9:35 time frame. And I appreciate you telling us what the purpose of the call was, what the call was servicing was actually, at least from some that we know of, was actually serving, though, as a center for information being driven in that the Command Center, plus the Command Center's POSC display and doesn't have a real-time scope that maybe the Command Center didn't have. So, I want your reaction to, first of all, you know, take 77, as an

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example, and that it's bearing down on Washington. Does that information that you were getting from your connection Command Center or did you get it from somebody down in the Cannoles' room or elsewhere?

MR. GRIFFITH: I got--I did not get it from this room. I had information that there was a fast-moving target 30 miles West of Dulles moving East. I had that information and I don't recall where it came from.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I recall that I had it and I shared it. And I--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who did you share it with?

MR. GRIFFITH: The people in the room you know.

MS. HYDE: The people in the ACC?

MR. GRIFFITH: The people here.

MS. HYDE: Did you share that, do you know if that went into the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think that went into the SVTS because, you know, initially, we

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thought that--we didn't know who it was, but we thought it might be military jets scrambling to the Capital region. I remember that thought. I didn't share that, but I remember that thought.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And I recalled that we had a requirement at Washington National to report any unusual aircraft situations to the Secret Service.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: And this report, generated at Dulles and got to the Secret Service and I was told that that had happened. And that met my--the concern in my mind at that point was, okay, did we tell the Secret Service, somebody told me we did. Okay, that part was done.

The next think I heard was that there was a C130 off of Andrews that had reported that on Air Traffic Control frequency that American 77 went into the Pentagon, was not American 77, that aircraft just hit the Pentagon on the West side.

MS. HYDE: And--

MR. AZZARELLO: You equated the fast-mover

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with the crash at the Pentagon?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because of the timing of it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Well, that gets to two points, actually. First of all, you're down here, you're on the line with the Command Center. Where else are you getting Air Traffic information, if not from, you know, either Cannoles or people down here?.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, as I said, I had runners from here to here.

MS. HYDE: Right, and that makes sense because there's a lot of information coming in here and the runner idea we've heard about. What I'm wondering if we're missing is was there someplace else that Air Traffic information--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not a word, no.

MS. HYDE: So, basically, you had Air Traffic information here, primary source was the Command Center?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: And then you had Air Traffic information down here, which was much broader than the Command Center, which was--ended up being centers and local, at least we know local people were on it with scopes, and there were runners going between the two?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: On the issue of 77 and hearing about the C130 report, that report came from National and the folks at National with their own binoculars, virtually saw it go into the Pentagon.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: Nevertheless, we've heard from many people in the ACC or the WOC that day that there was confusion for hours later about what hit the Pentagon. What aircraft, you know, first of all, was it a commercial aircraft as opposed to, say, a helicopter and then trying to identify which carrier and which plane it was. Do you recall that frustration, trying to understand what actually went into the Pentagon?

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MR. GRIFFITH: No, I think it was--I think in my mind, I had resigned to the fact that, you know, an airplane hit the World Trade Center once; an airplane hit the World Trade Center twice; an aircraft hit the Pentagon, there were airplanes missing in the system, so the only conclusion that you could pull out of the back of your mind is, it had to be one of those airplanes.

MS. HYDE: Well, and that makes sense, certainly now and we know that National folks watched it go in and the C130 report. Yesterday, speaking to Shirley, you know, she recounts Monte being so frustrated with not knowing what went into the Pentagon that he was, you know threatening to get in his car and go over there and figure it out himself.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you have any insight into how it was that Monte didn't know what had hit the Pentagon?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I hadn't, let me just put it this way. I had no report that it was

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American 77.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I had no report of that,
but--

MS. HYDE: But you had a report from the
C130 that it was a commercial, a big aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it was described as
that aircraft.

MS. HYDE: As which one?

MR. GRIFFITH: "That."

MS. HYDE: Just the fact that the C130 had
seen what, an aircraft?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Just an aircraft?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: I see. So, the C130 report
wasn't anymore specific than aircraft as opposed to
helicopter?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. It was articulated to
me that a C130 off of Andrews observed that
aircraft or the aircraft hit the West side of the
Pentagon. That's what was relayed to me. And then

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through some kind of conversation, I determined that the C130 was going back to Andrews to land. That they pulled it off of whatever mission it was on and it went back to Andrews. But, did I know at that point that it was 77? No, but, in my mind in thinking--you know, I'm thinking that, you know we've already had two commercial airliners hit two sites, we're missing airliners--

MR. AZZARELLO: You're including it as one of the missing airliners, but you equated the fast-moving vehicle over at the Pentagon crash, when you first heard of the fast-moving VFR, did you equate that with any particular aircraft that was reported missing at the time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I think I did. Yeah, because I remember very specifically report, you know, we've got a fast-moving airplane 30 miles West of Dulles, and it's headed East, you know, for D.C. or something like that, you know, in my mind it's gotta be fighters, they're coming here to protect us, you know. And then the next one C130 reports an aircraft hit the Pentagon, in my mind,

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I'm--

MR. AZZARELLO: You're thinking commercial, but you're not thinking airline company at that point?

MS. HYDE: You not thinking AA 77?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're not even thinking American or United or--

MS. HYDE: You just know that you've got a list of missing aircraft and AA 77 was one of them?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. Well, I don't even know if 77 was one of them at that time. I can't recall that. Because I remember that my list had American 11, it had United, what was it 193?

MS. HYDE: 174.

MR. KARA: 175.

MR. GRIFFITH: 175.

MS. HYDE: And United 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think I had United 93 on there yet. But I had a Delta airplane on there; I had a Continental airplane on there.

MS. HYDE: Did you keep that list from the

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day?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I shredded everything when I left.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, for months I kept this folder in my desk, I kept it locked up, thinking somebody's going to want this, you know. And then, when I left, you know, I couldn't take anything with me, so--

MS. HYDE: right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you think you got beyond the fast-moving vehicle information, you said from which end, because what I'm seeing on the transcript on this end with John White and Doug, he tells you, John White tells you around 9:25 about the American 77?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then the next thing you see on this transcript regarding the crash is that a plane crashed into the Pentagon comes in at 9:41, which is roughly three minutes after the crash. So, there's nothing on this line about fast-moving

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VFR. So, I guess, my question is are we to conclude [unintell.] was there any other lines of communication for Air Traffic situational awareness?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: I mean, this was limited to the Crisis Center and the Cannoles telecon.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, the intent was to set up with the Command Center to get minute-by-minute notification and to get everything, anything unusual reported to the Command Center and reported into this room. that was the intent.

MR. KARA: Regardless of where it came from, whether it came down from--

MR. GRIFFITH: Whether it came here--

MR. KARA: --or it came from John White--

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: --or it came from the SVTS.

MS. HYDE: Well, but, at the end of the day we can say that 77 was reported at and we have a time to it up to here, right? You say--

MR. AZZARELLO: At 9:25 they say they

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can't find it, it's missing.

MS. HYDE: Right, but what's reported about 77 is that it's missing, there's no detailed--there's no information about position of the target, where 77 is.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's where they lost it, West of West Virginia.

MS. HYDE: So, I want us to get this right. I want us to know that 77's reported up to here, we know this to you, that 77's missing. But there's nothing that the Command Center's reporting about the position of where 77 is. Separate than that, and I think without a call sign associated with it, there's a report coming in from Dulles that there's a fast-moving target. The two are not married up to be 77?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: We know 77's missing, we know we have a fast-moving target heading towards D.C. And once Dulles picks up that target, someone's got it on a scope and someone's able to give position information at where it is and where it's going.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Right to notify Secret Service.

MS. HYDE: And to notify Secret Service.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. KARA: Let me throw one more piece of information in on the time line. We know from the tapes and transcripts from Dulles TRACON that the controller who actually first spotted it on the scope, that time is about 9:32/9:33, John is that correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: [unintell.] 9:30.

MR. KARA: At the time she sees it when we plot the lat/longs for it's position, it's not West of Dulles, it's actually East of Dulles, so that's 30 miles West of Dulles piece of data that's floating out there, 30 or 60, plane [unintell.] suddenly doesn't start to compute?

MR. GRIFFITH: Thirty miles east of Dulles would have been East of D.C.

MR. KARA: No, right, no, the plane at that point of time when Danielle O'Brien [ph] picks it up on her scope, the plane is actually East of

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Dulles, not West of Dulles.

MS. HYDE: The plane is East of Dulles airport?

MR. GRIFFITH: How far East of Dulles?

MR. KARA: Yes. See if I've got the times on here. This is 9:33 and these are 12 seconds, so you can back off to 9:32 and here's Dulles over in here, so at 9:32/9:33, this is American 77, it's actually over in here someplace, I don't know exactly, but Dulles is up here.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so getting back to the report is that we've seen in the system, the words are that it's West of Dulles?

MR. KARA: Well, I don't know that that report's on 77, the--the terminology here is 30 miles West, the terminology later on in their own chronology is 60 miles West, but that comes much later in the morning, it's not contemporary with the fast-moving aircraft approaching the White House.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know where the discrepancy is. I know that that's what registered

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in my mind, we had a fast-mover--

MS. HYDE: Right and it may be that the time is earlier, it may be that the time is--

MR. KARA: Because we had this entry in the Cannoles' chronology is at 10:14 a.m., fast-moving aircraft 60 Northwest of D.C. And I just want to make sure we're not equating this to 77.

MS. HYDE: No, I think this is a different aircraft.

MR. KARA: Actually, Dan Diggins, told us that he--Dan Diggins did that, he said that's 93, when we talked to Dan Diggins.

MR. AZZARELLO: You see the timewise at least it's being logged around--

MS. HYDE: But, but--

MR. KARA: He typed this in.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, and does he remember hearing 93, but he just didn't type it

MR. KARA: We drilled him on that a couple of times and he came back both times to that was the 93 entry, right?

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MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know.

MS. HYDE: Actually, we, John and I, of course will have another interview, so I wanted to maybe get out of sequence a little bit and talk about what you've mentioned a couple of times, which is the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: Do--what you recall about the SVTS, and were you participating in the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: Picked it up?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall when you first went in it or--not a time, but in terms of a sequence, even if we take the 77, the Pentagon hit as a, maybe, a reference point?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't, I know that, you know, what my recall is it's somebody gets my shoulder and says, look, we've got a SVTS coming up, the White House wants to know what the situation is, get information. So, you know, and I started asking John White, okay give me call signs,

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give me point of departure, give me point of arrival.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: A point of destination, tell me what you know at this time.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, I remember writing that down--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --and then going into the SVTS and reporting what I had gotten.

MS. HYDE: So, when you went into the SVTS, do you recall was there video pictures up or was it just audio?

MR. GRIFFITH: That was video.

MS. HYDE: You could see some faces?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I was pretty sure it was video. You know, we used to do these military SVTS a fair amount of the time.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: But yeah, I can remember speaking and looking at--

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MS. HYDE: People?

MR. GRIFFITH: --people, yeah.

MS. HYDE: And do you remember who else from FAA was in there, when you were in there?

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't say for that particular one because we did a number of these things that day and for the rest, you know, forever. So, I can't--

MS. HYDE: Was it Monte or the Administrator, do you recall?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't recall if they were specifically in there or not.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I was taking my direction from the person in charge, you know, sitting there--

MS. HYDE: You were taking direction from Lee?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, sometimes it was Lee, sometimes it was some other guy, a great big guy?

MS. HYDE: Mike Morris?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember, I mean,

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as far as people I see in the hall, you know, I'm taking orders from this guy.

MS. HYDE: Do you think he was the one who directed you to go into the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know, I just know that I remember somebody getting my attention some way saying, look, we've got a SVTS coming up, the White House wants information, they want to know what the situation is. Get information.

MS. HYDE: Is it your impression, when you went in there, was it that this was a call that was already underway or that this was a call that was just being formed?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't have the impression it was already underway.

MS. HYDE: So, you think you were sort of there at the beginning?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah.

MS. HYDE: You were there at the beginning of the SVTS being set up, put up? I'm trying to get a sense when you walked into it, was the conversation going on and you're coming in to

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report information or you're sort of in there as the conversation's getting going about what's out there?

MR. GRIFFITH: It seems to me, like, it was one of these things of, you know, there were different agencies on there, I can't remember who they all were, you know, the FBI and the State Department, whoever, and the Coast Guard was on there. But, I mean, that's my recall, the logs may show that they weren't on there, I don't know.

MS. HYDE: I'm only--

MR. GRIFFITH: My recall is that there was a certain set of people there and, you know, they were talking about different things, you know in the security forum and then something came up about okay, what's the status? Do we know what airplanes are missing, et cetera, et cetera. And that was my cue and I said here's a report that we have as of this time and I reported what I had gotten from the Command Center.

MS. HYDE: And then did you stay after that? I mean, about how long were you in there,

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was it--

MR. GRIFFITH: Five to seven minutes, probably.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so you didn't linger that for an hour or something?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, no, no, I had work to do.

MS. HYDE: You went back out to figure out the information?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Did you go in there more than once that morning and give a report? Did that happen a couple of times?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, you would sort of periodically come in and give reports about the aircraft situational?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, but I don't remember the SVTS, like, being an endless thing. You know, I remember going in there and several times we had, you know, it was this thing of, okay, we're going to be on a SVTS in 10 minutes, you know, here's

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what we need.

MS. HYDE: So you remember the SVTS constantly being up?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't.

MR. KARA: Did you sign in and out when you went into the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'd like to say that I did, but, probably not. We won't worry about that?

MS. HYDE: Not worried about the log keeping. When you went in that--so your recollection is in the morning that there was a couple times when you sort of did the same drill, go in there and giving updates?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah, I'm pretty sure.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember the substance of any of those updates? I mean, for example do you remember if the news you'd heard from 77 was reported on the SVTS? You had said before you didn't think it was.

MR. GRIFFITH: Didn't think it was, I think that we had determined by this time that the

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two aircraft that hit the World Trade were--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --I can remember saying we believe it is American 11 and United 175.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: I think we had that much information. But not 77.

MS. HYDE: All right. That would be consistent with Dick Clark's book. The part about, except those words were coming out of--

MR. GRIFFITH: I read in the Post about his 357 magnum--

MS. HYDE: Those words were coming out of Jane Garvey's mouth.

MR. KARA: And speaking of him, who was moderating the SVTS when you were in there? Or even the tag at the bottom of the screen that said--

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know, the moderation was always done by, there was, like, a--there was a group of people and it was always a squashed picture and you couldn't tell who they

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were--

MS. HYDE: Because the narrow, it was a wide--

MR. KARA: The view mount?

MR. GRIFFITH: I guess so, but I can remember, they weren't in one of those four screens, you know, one or two TVs had four screens to it.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And it seems to me like they were always up there where you couldn't tell who they were.

MR. KARA: They got real fuzzy?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall seeing "Stars and Stripes?" DOD on the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yeah, the Joint Chiefs was on, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall, I mean, did you recognize anybody?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not from--not from knowing them before than, subsequently, I--

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MS. HYDE: In uniform or civilian?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uniform.

MR. KARA: [unintell.] JCS.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, it was one guy that was a one-star that was always in there. He and I got to know each other afterwards, but--

MR. KARA: General Winfield [ph]?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, he was a black guy and I can't remember his name.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was on the SVTS that day, you said?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I have to be honest with you on that particular SVTS that day, I can't tell you that he was the guy that was there. But there were people there with stars, you know.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And there was one guy that always sat at the head of the table that had a suit on and I didn't know who they were.

MS. HYDE: Did you hear a conversation about military aircraft or scrambling military aircraft?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MS. HYDE: What do you recall of that?

MR. GRIFFITH: That conversation came up several times during the day, so I don't remember at which point was the first time I had heard it.

MS. HYDE: It came up on the SVTS several times?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, no, I'm back out of the SVTS, now.

MS. HYDE: Okay, stick in and we want to talk about that conversation, but in terms of the SVTS, do you remember a military aircraft being discussed on the SVTS?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not early on, I mean, you know, obviously, in days subsequent when we were setting up the CAPS and, you know, doing a lot of those things, but--

MS. HYDE: Right, aside from the compromise or hijacked aircraft, were you discussing on the SVTS, do you recall, about the ground stop and the decision to take down all the planes, to land all the planes?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Not in the first one because we hadn't done it yet. But, yeah, at some point, yeah, we said--

MS. HYDE: You reported?

MR. GRIFFITH: --yeah, we reported. You know, we put direction out, you know, put everybody on the ground ordered aircraft to land at the nearest airport where you're capable.

MS. HYDE: Ground and landing planes, right. You talked about 77, do you, I guess the first thing to ask about would be your knowledge of 93. And you may not have known the call sign then, you may have known about it as an aircraft over Pennsylvania or something like that. Do you recall what information you had about 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: I did not have much information on 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: I have something here that may help jar your memory.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Here's the Command Center transcript, between Doug and John and it's when

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Doug gets on and says sitting next to you in the Crisis Center. Doug, we just had another report, he tells you about--he tells Doug about 93, lost, was in Cleveland Center's airspace around [unintell.] just reported they heard screaming on the frequency and people have a bomb on-board the aircraft. Departed Newark en-route to San Francisco was the report. Doug finds out the type of aircraft, we're tracking him, right? And the Command Center says, White says, we're--correct, we're still tracking him at this time. And then they interject another report on the Continental 321 over South Bend, Indiana, that squawked the hijack three times, but they made contact with the pilot and the pilot said everything's okay. But they wanted to find out why he squawked the hijack.

And then they go back to 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the plane crashed in the Pentagon and he says, United 93, we spoke about it before, he's reversing course over Akron, they just lost his transponder and he's heading East

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now. So, now, he's done the U-turn, he's not going to San Francisco and they lost the transponder. And it's a 757, it descending they say; and then there's reference to the crash in the Pentagon in the background again, on CNN. The diversion of all international aircraft in-bound, they had to divert to Canada.

And then the ground stop is discussed and then, United 93, actually, on the ground stop, Dough asks the Command Center, says we did it on our own already and that's when Doug said don't take any action like that, this needs to be coordinated. And you referenced that before and Doug was--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I told Doug to tell them that, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, Doug recalls you standing there telling him, listen you've got to coordinate this--

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't quite use that language, but that's

MR. AZZARELLO: Heard you were a little

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more colorful.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I was.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, this puts us at around 9:46. And then he goes right back to, so you tell Doug to tell them, look, don't take those actions on your own. He says, okay, United 93, go ahead, it's 29 miles out of--290 minutes out of Washington, D.C.--29 minutes out of Washington, D.C., and tracking towards us. This is the one that reversed course in Ohio, that's all I have, White says. And then Doug says keep someone on the line, I need you on the line, pretty much, okay.

Then we go to 9:48, John, okay, the United 93 is 29 minutes out of where? He's heading toward the Washington area, he was at flight level 35 Zulu, he turned around in Akron, Ohio, and is tracking toward the Washington area at this time. What type aircraft? Again, United 93, Boeing 757. You there, John? Yeah, White's here. Doug says they're pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93. And then John says, okay, oh, do we want to think about scrambling aircraft. Doug, Oh, God, I don't

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know. John White, that's a decision somebody's going to have to make, probably in the next 10 minutes. And Doug said, oh, you know, everybody just left the room. And there's some garble, fragmented unintelligible background conversation, then he says, Doug, I have another one. And then for Delta 1989 entry. Tell us about, what's going on here where there's a discussion going on on 93 reversing course and approaching, where--who's pulling you away, where to discuss what?

MR. GRIFFITH: I have to think about that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess the question is who's the they that's pulling you away to talk about 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: I have to think through that one a little bit. I know one of the conversations that was going on is who really has the authority to shoot down an airplane? And we all pretty much decided that it was the Secretary of Defense.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that a conversation that was going on in the SVTS or in the WOC or--

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MR. GRIFFITH: No, this was in a corner.

MR. AZZARELLO: In a corner?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: In a corner where, by the Crisis Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: It was somewhere, you know, it could have been in this corner, it could have been back here, I don't remember exactly, but somewhere we had this conversation about, you know, wait a minute, there's talk about shooting down airplanes. Okay, who has the authority and we gotta get this right, because you know, the--I had not read anywhere in our publications about shoot-down authority. So, you know, who gives the signal to shoot down? Because in my mind there were fighters in the air; and they were responding, you know, to the situation. And there wasn't anything specific in my mind about shooting down Flight 93, but there was this thought of, wait a minute we've got to start defending ourselves here, this thing's getting way out of hand.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

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MR. GRIFFITH: And, you know, part of that was shutting the system down. And another part was this people talking about shooting down airplanes. So, and I have to tell you the protocol for shoot-to-kill at that point, I don't think anybody could have said what it was.

MS. HYDE: But, should I read in to what you're saying is that there was concern about notifying the military and getting them involved because they might actually shoot down? I mean, sitting here today, it sounds all of like that's a decision for somebody else, not--it's not the FAA's decision to figure out who in the chain of command and the military person, I'm sure you know that. It's not--it's so above everybody's pay grade or it's not even within your agency. But what I take from you recounting that is that there was sort of a concern about getting the military in there because they might go ahead and do that. And there was concern about getting the military involved.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I never had a concern about getting the military involved, because I know

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that those military officers that I told you about, you know, that are in our building, that report in the Air Traffic organization, I know that those people were doing things. I just know that. And so, you know--

MS. HYDE: How do you know that--what do you know about what they were doing? For example, the sort of real time, 30 miles out or 30 minutes--

MR. AZZARELLO: Twenty-nine minutes out?

MS. HYDE: Twenty-nine minutes out--how do you know that--do you recall giving to Cheryl Atkins, Cheryl, we've got one 29 minutes out of D.C. after we've already had [unintell.] on the Pentagon?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not that, but, you know, I remember one time going back to this room and there were people in military uniform in there, I won't name them for you because I don't remember which ones they were, but there were people in military uniform in here and I'm pretty sure Cheryl Atkins was in here, you know, I can't tell you at what point she showed up, but you know, I--I--

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MS. HYDE: Well, Cheryl reports to you, just let me play devil's advocate for a moment. And to make an assumption that Cheryl, because she's a military person, somehow knows what you know, when you--you or Doug your are the primary, you know, clearing house for information. If you not, you know, you would have to tell Cheryl that and instruct Cheryl to do these things. What Cheryl picks up and what she happens to do with it, it doesn't sound to me, but tell me if I'm wrong, like a very intentional way of asking. I've heard you say a number of times that the military people or Cheryl were there. Do you have any sense, were you directing the military people to do anything?

MR. GRIFFITH: Never.

MS. HYDE: And do you have any specific--

MR. GRIFFITH: Giving them information.

MS. HYDE: You were--so you were giving Cheryl information.

MR. GRIFFITH: Anything that I knew if she was beside me, I would say this or this, in fact, she may have been telling me some things.

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MS. HYDE: Do you recall seeking Cheryl out if she didn't happen to be standing beside you to tell her any information to convey to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: Seeking her out? No, you know, if my, in my mind I can have a vision of, you know, there were a couple of times that I was over here, but most of my time was spent in this corner in the SVTS or a couple times back here. But there were a couple of rare times that I was over here. I can remember Cheryl Atkins somehow there. Now, whether it was in those moments, I don't know. I can't tell you that.

MS. HYDE: And whether she happened to be there next to you, what I'm saying is, did you ever because she reported to you, did you ever convey to her, Cheryl, this is something we've got to get to the military? This is information the military has to have?

MR. GRIFFITH: Listen, with Cheryl Atkins, I had no concern about her conveying anything to the military because we had a relationship where I

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told her what I knew, everything I knew and I knew that she was reporting back in, [unintell.] wasn't there, but, you know, people were over there and I knew that she knew the people to get to.

MS. HYDE: My question wasn't directed at to who she was going to tell it. My question was, do you recall giving Cheryl information and telling Cheryl, Cheryl, convey it to whoever you convey it?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MS. HYDE: Just get it to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, the only thing I recall in that area is--here's what my concern was. When people started talking about shoot-to-kill, shooting down airplanes. We have a responsibility called Rules of Engagement, okay, and that's where the controller vectors the military guy until they see the airplane they're going to shoot down. We have never done that before. And aside from a controller passively reading it, you know, in fact the rules of engagement for the shoot-down of aircraft, didn't exist at that point. The only Rules of Engagement we had that existed at that

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point, were for drug interdiction. So, a controller had never had a responsibility to vector military airplanes to a point where they could engage another aircraft, a civilian aircraft to shoot it down. And so, that's what was going on in my mind.

MR. AZZARELLO: FAA Rules of Engagement, versus military Rules?

MS. HYDE: Did you know that NORAD had controllers that could vector--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure.

MS. HYDE: --that they didn't need the civilians to controllers to vector them?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure, I've been to NEADS.

MS. HYDE: So, then, tell me, why did you think that you had, what you just said about there was no controller, I take it you mean civilian controller, FAA had ever done that before?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: But then, a civilian controller wouldn't have to do that.

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MR. GRIFFITH: But remember, that it's, you know, under the rules of the day, this was a federal administration and that the airspace didn't belong to the military at that point and civilian airplanes were being vectored to land at airports. There were 4,500 civilian airplanes--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --who were being put on the ground.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, the military, unless they were doing due-regard, would not intentionally just go out and vector airplanes for intercepts--

MS. HYDE: Unless they're told that it's a target that's a hijack. What I take you say before, you said there was a conversation going on about who has authority to shoot down aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: So the folks, whose ever gathered in that small group understands that these are now aircraft that are controlled by CARF [ph]. That this is, you know, you've had a plane into the

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Pentagon, you've had two into the World Trade Center; so now, you've got a different situation. If you were having that conversation about an aircraft controlled by a terrorist and who would have the authority to shoot it down--I'm trying to understand why you were concerned if an FAA controller would know how to vector or perform Rules of Engagement when it seems clear to me that that's wholly a military function, you know, that the military wouldn't need a civilian controller to vector him or here in there. The military would just need to know.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, remember that that aircraft is operating in airspace with a lot of other airplanes that are civilian. and so, you know, whether or not NORAD had, what are we talking about, 93? Whether they had him identified, I don't know. But I wasn't having that kind of a conversation. The only conversation--the only thought that was going through my mind is that if they're going to start talking about shooting down airplanes in a civil system--remember the fighters

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that were up in the air were talking to the centers of whose airspace they were in.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And they were also using UHF or HF or whatever they had to talk to NORAD.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: But, you know the person, they were operating inside the airspace system that we had control over. And so, my thought at the time was, they're going to be talking to air traffic controllers about shooting down airplanes or about something and, you know, that's something that we have never done before.

MS. HYDE: So, did that lead you to conclude that you didn't want to tell military about those?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, absolutely not.

MS. HYDE: This conversation is about, we're thinking about scrambling aircraft. And that decision, someone's going to have to make it and then everybody left the room.

The point is that the military.

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MR. GRIFFITH: --[unintell.] from the military, never.

MS. HYDE: So did you convey the 93 information to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know whether I did or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: The next reference to scrambling is--

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't tell you whether I did or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: --John--he tells John, Doug that Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling; that's at, like, 9:53, which is roughly 10 minutes before 93 crashed.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember--were you part of any conversation with Monte Belger and Peter Challen about whether to scramble or not on 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I'm not going to say,

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no, because I was talking to Peter and Monte like all the time, so, you know, I don't know where that conversation went.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let's follow it up. It says Doug, I was just advised that we are scrambling in the Washington and New York area, this is John White telling the Crisis Center--

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that's what I've been told, he said. Doug says, okay. Then they go to an update on Delta 1989, okay, it's not being hijacked, as you said, that was the one that went back and forth. And then he says, okay, we don't have a position any longer on United 93. He did pass right over Pittsburgh, last time we saw him. So, they're tracking him real-time at Cleveland Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: 9:56 and we lost him over Pittsburgh. That's the general area.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: United 93 is 20 miles

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Northwest of Johnstown. So, somebody's picked it up now. 20 miles Northwest on Primary. Back on Primary--we now know that there was a momentary switch of the transponder on-and-off on 93, right, Miles?

MR. KARA: No, once it's off, it's off till the very end.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then someone picks it up on Primary.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's a report from another aircraft and pretty much, if you follow this through, and it's almost crash time. At least we don't see it from this line. Just a second the United 93 was spotted by a VFR at 8,000 feet 11 miles south of Indianhead just North of Cumberland, Maryland, that's 10:00 o'clock, three minutes before crash.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then it pretty much crashed. Secrets [unintell.] talking about NORAD, what, I guess the fundamental question that I have

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following up to what [unintell.] says--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --it sounds like, they're telling me, we don't want mischaracterize, but it sounds like you have some concern and maybe it's shared by others--tell us--about the fact that the military may want to take action, as in shooting down a commercial aircraft within a system that you say is a national airspace system that the FAA still has control of and that you have concern that your controllers are not trained in vectoring military aircraft to shoot down a commercial aircraft. Was my summary of your concern accurate?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I mean,--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who shared that concern with you? Was that shared by others at or--at your level, above your level or, did Monte Belger, for example, share that concern that your controllers may be asked to vector--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, see, I don't know. But, remember, the story continues. I mean there were other airplanes that they were talking about

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shooting down, okay? And I remember at some point, you know I got on the phone with General Eberhard, I ran back to my office, got on the STU [ph] phone, I called General Eberhard and I talked to him for a little bit, you know, we're shutting this thing down. You know, he said, yeah, we're launching. Okay, then--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who spoke to Eberhard?

MS. HYDE: He did.

MR. GRIFFITH: I did, I called Eberhard, yeah.

MS. HYDE: When was that, was that after the--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, I don't have a clue, you know, I don't have a clue. And then, you know, the next thing was, you know, I--you know, my focal became Larry Arnold, who was a major general down at Tindle, he and I, like, for 24/7 for a few days after that, but I remember, you know, we were going through this thing of, you know, this thing about shooting airplanes down may be a real thing here, you know. And so--

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MR. AZZARELLO: Your focal point on 9/11, General Arnold of your--

MR. GRIFFITH: Cheryl Atkins was my focal point as far as I was concerned.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you talk to General Arnold on 9/11?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, what you're saying is, you talked to General Arnold. Do you know when, again, that conversation that you reached out--did you reach out to Eberhard first?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, because to be honest with you, I had never talked to Larry Arnold in my life.

MS. HYDE: So, Eberhard directed you to Arnold?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I asked my guys, I said, okay, whose the commanding general at NORAD something like that, you know, And It's Ralph Eberhard. I said, okay, what's his number, you know, and I called him. Told him who I was, told him what we were doing. I said I'm sure you've got

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a lot of information, I just want to give it to you straight what we're doing. He said, I'll give it to you straight what we're doing.

MS. HYDE: And do you have any idea--

MR. AZZARELLO: [unintell.] secrets--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, no, I don't.

MR. KARA: But the purpose of your call was to inform him that you were bringing the system down?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, the purpose was just, you know, we hadn't gotten a real strong link with the command element of the military. And, you know, and Cheryl was doing here thing and--

MS. HYDE: What was Cheryl's thing as you understood it? What was Cheryl's thing, who was Cheryl coordinating with, as you understood it?

MR. GRIFFITH: The people that she coordinates within the Pentagon.

MS. HYDE: You don't know?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I--I didn't even know--

MR. AZZARELLO: Hold on, one more question. I understand the concern about, you

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know, the shoot down and the lack of maybe FAA controller training in that area, but as Dana said, that decision has to be made by a pay grade well above everyone in this room and I'm sure many other people in the room that day at the Crisis Center, with all due respect. So, but in the interim, all right, while that decision is being contemplated by the FAA and whoever else--who, in the meantime, is addressing the issue, if anyone, well, let's let at least NORAD know that we've got this United 93 that's bearing down on the capital and the capital's already been struck, the Pentagon's been struck and this may be coming for another government building, it could be coming for who knows where and while the people at the right pay grade are contemplating whether or not to pass the authority down to the fighter jet to open fire, let's at least let them know where it is and see if they can track it and be in position if somebody decides that the appropriate action is to open fire or do something else for that matter.

Was that issue being addressed as best you

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can recall, by you or anyone you are aware of?

MR. GRIFFITH: Here's the way I would assume that would be address.

MS. HYDE: It's so, we've got to leave. The reality is that we're going to come out with a report and that we have to address where information was on Flight 93. And one of the things that we have to talk about, I'll be very straight with you. And I certainly don't want our report to catch you or anybody else by surprise, you know, we want to give you the full opportunity to respond to it and tell us, you know, we don't come to the table with any agenda. We want to try and understand these facts.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: So we have to focus on 93. We have to focus on what people's recollections are of that day and what data sources we have from that day. And we understand that years have passed and that if you don't have a recollection, we certainly don't want you to invent one, you know.

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm not going to do that.

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MS. HYDE: It may not be there. But with respect to 93 and whether anybody the word about that aircraft, we have from the source trickled up to the WOC or the ACC to headquarters. And then we have this segment that says they're discussing whether to scramble, we take that means to notify because you don't scramble aircraft on your own, the FAA. So that means to notify. And then the last we have is everyone's left the room.

MR. GRIFFITH: We would not even initiate the idea of scrambling airplanes.

MS. HYDE: No, all you would do is--you're the FAA, you're not the military, all you would do is notify the military that you've heard bomb on-board--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MS. HYDE: --got his transponder off that is 29 minutes out--that is whatever minutes out. To your knowledge did anyone, you or anyone else notify the military about 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: I did not. Here's what my expectation would be on 93. That the system that

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we had in place with the representative that I had up at Griffiths Air Force Base in the Northeast Air Defense Sector, as you said, those people are watching, they are looking and seeing what's going on. And I would expect that the person that I have up in, I call them NEADS would be talking to Cleveland Center direct to exchange information.

MS. HYDE: Why would you expect that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Because that's their job.

MS. HYDE: So you're saying, your testimony is that the--

MR. KARA: Is that Steve Culbertson [ph]?

MR. GRIFFITH: Steve, yeah.

MR. KARA: But Steve to Cleveland or Cleveland should initiate that to Steve?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, listen, NEADS knew what was going on at this point in terms of airplanes--in terms of the system being disrupted. And, you know, my expectation is that those guys in NEADS were on their high alert--NORAD--

MS. HYDE: As a manager, did you do anything to ensure that your assumption that your

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people, many, many below you were actually conveying real-time information about targets that were known to be hijacked?

MR. GRIFFITH: Did I do anything to convey?

MS. HYDE: No, as a manager, did you do anything to ask whether that assumption that you're saying, whether Steve Culbertson, the person, knew what you knew about and the Command Center knew about hijacked target and that everybody was lashed up and speaking in real time about this target?

MR. GRIFFITH: As a manager, the first thing I did was require the Command Center to put the word out to get any unusual information.

MS. HYDE: Right, we got that.

MR. GRIFFITH: And the avenues--

MS. HYDE: And when they get the information about a target that's clear as day, bomb on-board, they've heard, I mean, there's no question that this is somebody whose no longer being controlled by the pilot and the crew--more over it's heading towards Washington. Did you do

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anything to ensure that that specific information was passed to NEADS through Steve Culbertson or through whomever?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I--if I had information. My recall on this information that you just read to me was that Steve was--or that Doug was kind of broadcasting that information. When it would come in over his headset, it was kind of broadcast out in the room. You know. And for those that were around, you know, I can remember him doing things like that. Now whether it was 93 or not, I don't know. But I can remember that Doug became a very significant resource of information.

But, you know, the other side of this is there are military people in the Command Center 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in what we call--

MR. AZZARELLO: In the CARF you're talking about?

MR. GRIFFITH: In the CARF, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I've got to ask you this, Jeff.--

MS. HYDE: I apologize for having to

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leave.

MR. AZZARELLO: I have to ask you this, Jeff. You're now talking about there's military people in the CARF, okay. And there's Cheryl Atkins and military people at headquarters. And we're talking about Steve Culbertson is at NEADS as a liaison.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And now, that's three different locations and people that you've pointed to as--if I'm understanding you correctly, as people that you would expect somewhere there would get the word to the military about aircraft that day.

But that doesn't comport with either the protocol that's laid out in the crisis handbook and the policies that we talked about earlier today.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Nor is it laid out in your description of putting the policy aside of what would have happened in a hijack scenario and you talked about each center has their instructions and

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the center would call the ROC and the ROC would call the WOC.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And at some point there would be coordination by the guy who runs--the Security person running the ACC with the military. And then at another level, a dual sort of track, the Deputy Administrator would be, if there was a hijack and military assistance was requested would be calling General Eberhard, or somebody at a higher level at DOD?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, those were the two procedures that you said, these are your words that the way the system worked on 9/11 that that's how the notifications would go? But now, you're talking about three different kinds of notifications that we haven't seen anywhere on paper or as--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, what I told you was what I view as my assessment of what should have been happening.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I told you about those procedures that were in each facility. I believe that hijacks NMCC is one of those people that the, like that the Air Traffic Control Center would call. I believe so. If not, then I--

MR. AZZARELLO: You mean in the center orders. The think the Center is supposed to call NEADS directly?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, NMCC is the National Military Control Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's the--right at the Pentagon?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. Well, I don't know if they're at the Pentagon or if they're down at Langley, to be honest with you, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: This net that's set up here in the Crisis Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: One of the nets that's set up there is the Primary Net. And that's referenced in the Crisis Management Handbook. And the Primary

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lists, as one of the participants, as the National Military Command Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, that's basically what we need you to help us with. So, the way we read the procedures in place, such as in the Crisis Management Book for Air Piracy, that there's a hijack coordinator, someone in Security that you've talked about up at this desk in the Crisis Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: right.l

MR. AZZARELLO: Lee Longmire, that's where Doug Davis is; you're standing for a lot of the time that day.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's where the information comes in. And the way we read the policy, that's the position that coordinates with the NMCC on reports of hijacked aircraft, so that the military can take whatever action they deem appropriate?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Decide whether to scramble; decide whether to tail the plain; decide, I guess on 9/11, whether to shoot a plane?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's the way we understand the flow of information was supposed to get to the NMCC. And what we see is we want you to help us. We see it at least it coming into the ACC--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --because this is the conversation where the Command Center is now doing what you instructed them to do, which is go out to the centers and let us know about any suspicious aircraft. And how, here's the report of one, 93, it's reached FAA headquarters and it's reached the Crisis Center--isn't that supposed to get--isn't that supposed to go from somebody at the Crisis Center at an Upper Management Level, over that the NMCC, aren't they supposed to then--why are now saying, well, no we think Cheryl Atkins maybe would

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have called--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I'm not saying that they should or would have done anything other than what the procedures said. But what I'm saying to you is that in my mind, you know, I know that I've got Steve Culbertson up at NEADS and I know that he's going to be engaged doing his job. He's got a job to do and that's when NORAD, you know, forget 9/11, when they see an unidentified target 40 miles out over the coast moving in a that a high speed that nobody knows who they are, they scramble on that aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's when NORAD sees it, but this is the FAA sees it on its cope in there system.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it's not Culbertson, he doesn't have a scope over Cleveland Center. It's Cleveland Center that's watching this aircraft that's reported to have--they hear screaming and bomb on-board.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: So, how does Culbertson, being up at NEADS, Northeast Air Defense Sector, how is he supposed to be the play in that notification to NEADS when it's Cleveland Center looking at a scope and telling their Command Center and their headquarters that there's a plane, here it is, we're tracking it on Primary and it's got a report of a bomb on-board?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, what I said was forget 9/11, okay?

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Any other day of the week, if NEADS sees an unidentified target out over the Atlantic headed in, and they decide to scramble, then it's Steve's job to be the interface with the FAA facility that's, you know, that these fighters are going to move into their air space.

MR. AZZARELLO: I hear you and I don't mean to argue with you, Jeff, but that's not what happened on--let's talk about 9/11. It wasn't NEADS spotted the aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: I agree with you.

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MR. AZZARELLO: It didn't come in from overseas. It wasn't coming in over the ocean. It was inland over Cleveland.

MR. GRIFFITH: I agree with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, how, would you suspect--how would you expect that information, given the systems in place on 9/11--what's your understanding of how that information was supposed to get from Cleveland Center's eyes on the scopes to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: My--I did not go back and look at Cleveland Center's checklist for hijack, so I don't know what they did. But my suspicion is that that log still exists and it would say NMCC for hijacks.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you're saying that you think the Center's supposed to call NMCC on 9/11, that was the procedure? That's different than the procedure that we've seen here in an headquarter's document.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, well, you have, here, let's see what you have here.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Let me show you the hijack escort procedures here. The military order it's a special military order 7016. See this one, escort of hijacked aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: The hijack coordinator, the escort service from the military will be requested by the hijack coordinator by direct contact with the NMCC. Normally, NORAD escort aircraft would take the required action--whatever that action is. And then it says, however, for the purposes of these procedures, the term escort aircraft applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. Then the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the hijack coordinator of the identification and location of the squadron that's tasked to provide the escort aircraft and then the NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between the FAA and the designated military unit.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, I mean, the way I read

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this is, the request has to be made formally to the Pentagon to the NMCC and then when NORAD says okay, well, where's the aircraft, FAA? Oh, it's in NEADS region, so NEADS will coordinate and where are you tracking it? Oh, Boston Center, okay, well, now, let's put together Boston Center in direct-line of communication at NEADS so they can pass the information on where the aircraft is on the scope and then vector the military to tail it.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: In accordance with the procedures. And I guess what we're saying is we didn't see that--we don't see that happening with 93. And where would you say the system broke down if that didn't happen with 93? I mean, I can't be anymore straightforward than to say where did it break down.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, what this says is that this person will do it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: That's what this says. This meaning the special military operations, which

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is an FAA Order 7610.4

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, right.

MR. GRIFFITH: That the hijack coordinator will do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I'm not, I think, you know, I'm trying not to be argumentative, but I'm at a loss to understand--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, you should be.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's no, if there hasn't been a hijacking in the system since '93 in Lufthansa, okay, and if it's not being drilled, a scenario where there's a hijack where Steve Culbertson is called, okay, Steve, you're up at NEADS, so, therefore, if any aircraft becomes hijacked within an FAA center that overlaps NEADS geographical location, you're responsible for getting that information from the Center and coordinating with NEADS. We talked to Steve Culbertson, that's not our understanding of--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, that doesn't exist.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, that doesn't, I mean, so then why would we think that Steve Culbertson

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would be the guy to look to on 9/11 to tell the military about United 93? If it's not in the protocol, then how would he know, did somebody tell him that? Was that the training? Was the training different from the protocol?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, Steve would follow the 7610.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me give you a hypothetical: Hypothetically, if NEADS didn't know anything about United 93 until after it crashed, okay, and, yet, we see it has reached specific information on United 93, its location as it's bearing down and approach D.C. is being passed to FAA headquarters and FAA Command Center in Herndon, if that information never got from those locations at the FAA's highest level of management to NEADS, so they could even be aware of it, as being a potential suicide bomber, where did the system fall apart then, if it did, indeed.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I think that on 9/11, the system was never designed or tested to respond to what happened on 9/11. Because, if you remember

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what I told you earlier, hijacking situations and this is just me speaking, in my mind, hijacking situations were things that you could anticipate what was going to happen next, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Usually they'd go to Cuba--

MR. GRIFFITH: They'd go to Cuba or--

MR. AZZARELLO: --they'd make terrorist demands to release some prisoners?

MR. GRIFFITH: They would always land somewhere and begin some kind of--

MR. AZZARELLO: But that's a different issue from you still had a system in to notify a hijacking. Now, let's look at what happened on that day. On American 11, Boston Center notified their superiors at the ROC, at the region. They simultaneously reached out for Cape TRACON because they knew they were co-located with Otis because they wanted to get the information to them quickly.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then they called NEADS correctly. I'm sure I'm not shedding any new light

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on you because I know you were instrumental in having this Summary of Hijack Events prepared after the fact. So, if the system works in terms of the military did find out about American 11 about eight, let's say six to eight minutes before it crashed. On United 175 for a myriad of reasons, one of which is the same controller who was tracking 11 as a primary was tracking 175, for that and other reasons, there is not a realization that 175 is now a second hijack in the system, until roughly ten minutes before it crashes. But they notified the military. Okay, New York Center's military operations specialist calls NEADS and tell them about it.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they get notification on the second one, although it's too late to do anything. On American 77, it was lost, no one knew where to locate it, they didn't know where it was, but they knew it was lost. That, even, eventually gets reported to NEADS by ZDC. Now, I understand that none of this is going in accord with the

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policy.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, which is that it's not going directly to policy because you don't go directly from the Center, at least as we read it right to the military--you go up your chain of command and you get someone at a higher pay grade at FAA, you know, among others the hijack coordinator, specifically, to contact the NMCC and maybe there's that other upper layer of, like, you said, Monte Belger, the Deputy Administrator, may call the NORAD four-star general, but that's where the coordination starts, at the highest level and then they say, okay, let's put together the two operational people facilities together; the FAA operational people who have the scopes and the NEADS operational people who have the fighters in order to control them.

So, I mean, it seems to me that although that didn't happen on the first two flights. At least the military did get notification.

Now, on 77 a few minutes before it

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crashed, someone from ZDC called NEADS and said we lost it, we don't know where it is, but it's lost out there in the system. What we see on United 93 is it doesn't get there. It doesn't get there at all until after it crashed, to NEADS.

MR. KARA: And then gets there from ZOB.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it gets there from Cleveland Center, five minutes--roughly four or five minutes after it crashes, Cleveland Center calls and says, you know, we got a plane here with a bomb on-board. But, way prior to that, Cleveland Center, it seems has discharged its obligations by going up the chain of command and they told the Great Lakes Region, it's in the summary prepared by Dave Cannoles and his group, that United 93 in the summary it says, 9:39, Cleveland Center notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center of screams and statements from an unknown origin believe to be United 93. That's 9:39, to be fair and 59 seconds, we'll call it 9:40.

But we know that even six minutes before this, at 9:34, at least as early as 9:34 the

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Command Center possesses the same information about screams on 93; bomb on-board and headquarters knows it because Doug Davis is on the phone sitting in that room with the rest of the people who are trying to manage the crisis response.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we also know from what we've read that they track it, it's on Primary. They see other characteristics develop, transponder shut off. Well, that happened with American 11 and it happened with 77. We're told that it changed course. That happened with the first three aircraft that crashed, went off course.

There's no radio communications at all; that happened with all three of the first three aircraft that crashed on 9/11. So, as this situational awareness continues to develop, if you know, otherwise, let me know, because obviously, you people spent time too, putting the summary together and I'm sure one of the things that they looked at was, well, when did we know that each of the four aircraft were possibly hijacked, they're

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in distress.

Then what did we do with that information? Did we notify the military. I mean, we know notification to the military is an important issue. What we've seen is there was basically a disconnect on 93. And that information never got, pre-crash, to the military despite the fact that for roughly 30 minutes, it's being tracked and reported, as it's being tracked to the Command Center and the headquarters.

Now, I've given this long speech.

MR. GRIFFITH: [Laughs.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Now would you say, then, that the system somewhere then, did fall apart, that that information should have gotten over--would you agree that that information should have been at least communicated to the military? I'm not suggesting you should call the military and say, shoot it down, if that's your decision. But would you agree that the FAA, as an entity, should have conveyed the information it had on United 93 to the military as they did on the three previous

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planes?

MR. GRIFFITH: The procedures that were in place at the time, should have allowed for that to happen--for military notification. My thought is, if you go back to the other three aircraft and apply the procedures that should have been followed to and a search through the record for each one of those aircraft, the procedure of, you know, get the Center log out, okay who are they supposed to notify and who are they supposed to notify, and follow that string, that if people hadn't gone beyond the procedure, similar things could have happened with the other three aircraft.

And that's what I was trying to explain a few minutes ago about, you know, we've got Steve Culbertson up at NEADS. Okay, we've got Cheryl Atkins in the room. We've got people out at the Command Center. there's a full-bird colonel, you know, I wrote his rating on the Command Center that you know, in peaceful times ran the CARF, but in other times we set up what we called the cell.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

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MR. GRIFFITH: On how to deal with situations like this on a real-time basis.

MR. AZZARELLO: Situations like a hijack the services cell is supposed to deal with a hijack?

MR. GRIFFITH: How to deal with movement of aircraft through the system, military aircraft, what the military aircraft are going to do, whether we're going to war or whatever we're doing, making sure that we have a coordination with the war staff down at Langley. Okay, so, you know, at this point you have to decide, you know, when does this become a full-scale military action. And we ended up setting up the cell at the Command Center, because once we got the system shut down, we made the determination with the military that nothing would move in the system unless it were coordinated through the cell. So, you know, those were other things that were going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: But on 93, you talk--Doug has said they were talking about, whether to scramble right now.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I don't know who "they" are, to be honest with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, he said, Jeff's being pulled away so--

MR. GRIFFITH: May they thought it was me that was talking about scrambling, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, it says you're being pulled away.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I understand what it says, I can't remember who I was pulled away by or--

MR. AZZARELLO: They're pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Are we to assume, then that the people at headquarters assumed that the Center was doing it. Did they just assume that, well, Boston Center reached out for NEADS, so maybe Cleveland is.

MR. GRIFFITH: We didn't have a procedure at that level--at my level to relay that information because we considered ourselves--the

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way the system should have worked is the procedures should have required that to happen at the operational element before it was--

MR. KARA: John, I need to take another shot at this one--

MR. AZZARELLO: This is, the way we read the procedures is, and we've talked to the people out--I'll use Boston Center as an example.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: The knew that some elaborate written procedure was set out. Some policy and protocol that in the event of a hijack you have to go all the way up their chain of command--that "they" "headquarters" an somebody there in a higher position than them, would call the NMCC and then once the people at the NMCC got the approval for NORAD to get involved, as we just read before, then NORAD will say, okay it's Northeast Air Defense, now marry them up with Boston Center and let them coordinate the response to the hijack.

MR. GRIFFITH: I understand that.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Boston Center understood that, but they also understood that would take a significant amount of time, to go up the ladder and across and they thought outside the box.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: They said, well, we're going to do both, we're going to tell our supervisors and start that chain of command going up. And at the same time, we're going to reach out to NEADS directly and we're going to let them know what we know so they can get a head start on this.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which they did.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, let's go to United 93 and at the end of the--not the end of the day, but it's the end of the fourth attack.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I understand that on that day that things, I'm sure, were quite hectic and I'm sure that there was a lot of anxiety and that we were being attacked. So, I'm not

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suggesting that everybody had the time to pull out its procedure and say, okay, let's make sure we did this--up the chain, over and down, okay? But did somebody on United 93, take a moment to say, okay, look, we know you have a written policy, okay and, in terms of notifying the NMCC to get military assistance. But we know that maybe that wasn't followed on some of the prior aircraft and who was saying, well, let's make sure that either this policy was followed so that the military does know. Or, if it wasn't followed, let's take an effort that the military knows from somebody thinking outside the box like Boston.

If it's not the Command Center or headquarters that's telling the military about 93, well, then that leaves it to go back to the center and say, well, did they tell them? Did they do like Boston did and go off-script, so to speak and think outside the box? Because if they didn't and we're sitting here and we don't call the military and tell them about 93, then the military doesn't know about it.

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And I mean, that's where we're at now.
We're asking for your comment on that.

MR. KARA: Yeah, let me--let's turn this
over.

MR. AZZARELLO: Turn that over.

MR. KARA: Turn that over.

MR. GRIFFITH: Let me give you one answer,
I did not report 193 or flight 93 to the military.
I don't recall reporting 93 to the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, do you recall,
obviously, it was on the radar screen at the Crisis
Center because Doug is getting updates on it by the
minute and he's sharing it with you and I don't
imagine that you kept that to yourself. Is it fair
to say that you shared that information?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you discuss what you
were getting on United 93, what Doug was telling
you about its approach to D.C.? Were you
discussing that with Monte Belger, for example--or
Peter Challen or Steve Brown?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember who,

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specifically. But what I said earlier, Doug was broadcasting the information he was getting, as I recall and not on just this one, but when he was getting important pieces of information, he'd hold up his hand and he'd make sure it was known. Okay, so I know that that was happening. And I know that we were there. My recall was that Cheryl Atkins was in the room.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you were discussing 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, my recall is that she was in the room. But, you know, did I personally have a procedure that I was following to say, I am going to notify the military? No, I did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, did anybody notify the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well--

MR. AZZARELLO: What was discussed about 93? Did anything at all get--about 93.

MR. KARA: Can I--let me step into this. At this point in time, procedures apply, we understand what Boston did. And that's one

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aircraft. By this point in time, we've got three aircraft and a fourth that now, you're aware of. National-level mechanisms were put into place, FAA has established its own mechanisms and there are additional lines of communication that are set up and are supposed to work to include the SBTS. But within the ACC, there is a Primary Net and you had the protocol on the Primary Net to include the NMCC would be up on the Primary Net, if we read your procedures. So that would be a line of communication to the military, I would think.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, that was back here someplace, I mean, I just--

MR. KARA: But you were part of that but you weren't part of the--you were part of the ACC latch-up but you weren't part of the Primary Net to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. KARA: In addition, on the military side, they set up an air threat conference call to which FAA was supposed to be a party. Do you recall being up on the air threat conference call

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that was set up on the DOD side at all that morning?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. KARA: Okay, so those are two lines of communication that were available over and above any of the procedures that were established or over and above what the centers, themselves, might do.

In addition to that, now, we've got, let's talk about Colonel Atkins for a moment.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. KARA: We understand, talking to Dave Cannoles--Dave Cannoles said, Cheryl and her people, she's got about three officers, you probably rated Cheryl, but she's got three or four additional officers--that when they made their presence known, he established them in a sub-cell in this conference room down at--

MR. AZZARELLO: Opposite end of--

MR. KARA: Down here. Now, it's probably the case that Cheryl as the senior officer is back and forth because you describe her as a proactive person, so she could have been here periodically.

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But we understood her role to be more to assist Dave Cannoles to grab ahold of that piece of the pie and not be an outreach to the military. Did you see her differently than that?

MR. GRIFFITH: This didn't happen until day two or day three.

MR. KARA: Okay, this is not a day of?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I mean, they may have camped out in there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Not a day of?

MR. GRIFFITH: I remember when we did this and because we had to put STU phones and everything else in there.

MR. KARA: So your understanding would be that Cheryl, if she was camping, she might have been down here, but she would have been up here, as well, because she's the senior military officer on-board?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh yeah, yeah, no, she, Cheryl was in the thick of it, I can tell you that. I just don't remember--

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't know when she

got--

MR. KARA: And we'll have to talk to her about what her lines of communication were. But--

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't have one recollection one way or the other whether she got in the thick of it before or after the fourth crash?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I gotta tell you, at this time, yeah, I'm worried about that airplane, but I'm worried about 4,500 other airplanes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, but there wasn't reports of bombs on-board the other 4,400.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I know that.

MR. KARA: But he's going to bring them down because they made the decision to do it.

MR. GRIFFITH: You know, we decided to put 4,500 airplanes somewhere and I had to do it fast.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's a lot of work, I know.

MR. GRIFFITH: And we did it without

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error, you know. Some people don't understand just, you know, how good this air traffic system runs. But, you know, we did that and we had other things going on in the system.

But the other thing is, we didn't know how many more of these we were going to encounter while we were doing it.

MR. AZZARELLO: But that Washington the one on the radar screen then that appeared to be the most--

MR. GRIFFITH: I know, and, I mean, shoot me--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, no, no.

MR. KARA: Oh, no, let's take you up to Steve Culbertson now, because Steve and Bill--

MR. GRIFFITH: What can I say?

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not suggesting it was--I'm not suggesting that--

MR. GRIFFITH: Put me in there because, you know, I'm the guy they can't fire.

MR. KARA: No, let's try--

MR. AZZARELLO: I wanted to get your sense

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as to who--obviously, it's a point of concern.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, it is.

MR. AZZARELLO: You said people were talking about--

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm concerned about it, too.

MR. AZZARELLO: --I'm sure, everyone, like you said, people in the room were saying, look, we're being attacked, we've got to defend ourselves, what are we going to do?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: The next sign of an attack is this, okay, bomb on-board, reverse course it fits the profile. And I'm just trying to get at, did somebody at a level, say above you, discuss this or at your level or above, say what are we going to do about 93 now? It is approaching, what are we going to do. Do we try and get military assistance. Do we tell them about it and do we think that they may shoot him down? I mean, that was a concern, I guess, if they were going to shoot it down if the controllers weren't train.

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Let me ask it bluntly, was that--did that cause somebody in that room to say, let's hold off, wait a second, let's hold off and think this out before we call the military and specifically tell them that we heard a report on 93 of a bomb on-board, because they, then, may ask our controllers to vector them right up to that plane and take it down and shoot it. And let's think out the ramifications of that before we make the call. Did that occur?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, that didn't happen. I just have to tell you that by this point, it may have been a wrong assumption, but it was an assumption of mine that we had the military in the loop. And, you know, we had people sitting at these phones and it was an assumption of mine that the military was getting information and I was satisfied the way Doug was broadcasting the information, you know, he wasn't saying to two or three people come over here this is what I've got, he was speaking loudly in the room saying, hey, this is what I got, this is what's going on now.

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and it was my assumption that, you know that x-number of people that were out here were doing that

MR. KARA: And we believe that your assumption should have been right and accurate for this reason: The Primary Net should have brought up the NMCC to be a part of it. Doug shouted that out, it should have been heard on the NMCC at the Primary Net, conversely, the air threat conference call should have had FAA looped into it and Doug's broadcast of this information should have gotten to the NMCC through their own telecon, if you will.

Were you aware that there were difficulties and that neither one of those nets was able to effectively bring the other up that day?

MR. GRIFFITH: Only after the fact.

MR. KARA: You knew that after the fact?

MR. GRIFFITH: Only after the fact. I knew we had com problems after the fact, you know.

MR. KARA: So, we accept, we think your assumption is accurate as a senior manager, that's you probably should have made that assumption, but

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the fact of the matter is, neither of those nets was brought up effectively so that [unintell.]

MR. GRIFFITH: That's the hole, you know, what I mean. But I can tell you it's plugged, it's fixed. I mean, Larry Arnold and I, you know, we sat down and said this is never going to happen again. I mean they were talking about shooting out a Korean airliner--

MR. KARA: That was later on in the day.

MR. GRIFFITH: But, you know, I'd kick some butt over that, you know, just because of the way it was being handled.

MR. KARA: At what point in time did you learn that the two entities were not on at some substantive level as they should have been?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't even, it wasn't on 9/11.

MR. KARA: Right, it was--

MR. GRIFFITH: It was like, the--in the--the way things finally went was, this line back here actually became a very reliable source of information.

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MR. AZZARELLO: The Cannoles one?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, because we had all the senior managers in the regions were on it and we had really good dedicated people that--

MR. KARA: Let me bring up Steve Culbertson. Let me tell you a couple little things we know about Steve and his activities at the Northeast Air Defense Sector and an individual named Bill Ayres [ph], do you Bill Ayres--long, long time--he's a NEADS employee that works airspace management. So, he and Steve Culbertson were sort of hand-in-hand. Steve does two things. In about this same time frame, 9:30; 9:35; 9:40; Steve approaches the floor and he says, I've got to have a STU-3 line and I've got to call somebody, we know nothing more about that. And Steve is trying to reach out to somebody on the STU-3 line; in about the same time frame. Is it conceivable that he was trying to--who would Steve have been reaching out to on a STU-3 at FAA headquarters?

MR. GRIFFITH: At FAA headquarters?

MR. KARA: Yeah, during this time of

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crisis?

MR. GRIFFITH: He would have been reporting in to Alton Scott [ph].

MR. KARA: Who is?

MR. GRIFFITH: His boss.

MR. KARA: And where does Scott sit on the--

MR. GRIFFITH: He worked for me.

MR. KARA: So he would--

MR. GRIFFITH: In this organization, he actually was--

MR. KARA: So, Culbertson actually works for you down through--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yes, see, you know, before I went up as AT-2, I ran the Ops group, and Steve reported in there to one of the division managers, who happened to be Alton Scott.

MR. KARA: And was Alton Scott a part of this management construction with the agency?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, he wasn't up here.

MR. KARA: He was not in the ACC?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, he--

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MR. KARA: So Steve could have been trying to call his impression in his office and he--

MR. GRIFFITH: If he was calling FAA headquarters, my guess is he was calling Alton Scott.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that who he said he was calling, somebody at FAA.

MR. KARA: No, I just meant, I just interjected and that's a good. Now, the next thing Steve did, he and Bill Ayres in the battle cab at Northeast Air Defense Sector, they set up a phone bridge. They realized that they had to have that and he set it up with, do you remember, John?

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know.

MR. KARA: I think they set it up, maybe with the centers and maybe the Command Center; maybe the WOC we don't know and that was Steve's attempt also to reach to heal the community. Were you aware that Steve had set up that additional line to--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I, you know, Steve's one of those guys, I knew he was up there. I can

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tell you, before 9/11 the NEADS job and the Tindle job SEADS [ph] were both vacant and we had a hiring freeze on and we weren't allowed to move people; weren't allowed to do anything. And the guy that we headquartered out at Cheyenne Mountain was retiring, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, yeah, I think we heard about him.

MR. GRIFFITH: Dan Schmekel [ph].

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, I just, I went outside, I went against my superiors, orders and everything else, and I filled those positions with, I put Paul, can't remember his last name, but I put the guy down in [unintell.] and I put the guy in the NEADS and made sure that Cheyenne Mountain was covered, you know by detail while we were doing this.

If we hadn't done that, you know, it would have been worse.

MR. KARA: Yeah, Steve was trying to help.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, he was trying to

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help, he was a great tool.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess what we see is it seems like there was one pipeline of information coming in the Command Center that included an aspect of air traffic situation awareness and then, also, in the Cannoles room there was a similar line feeding information about air traffic awareness and sometimes the twain didn't meet, as you well know.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I think the example that we used earlier was when Dana talked about 93, I'm sorry not 93, 77 approaching and they didn't call it that, they called it a fast moving vehicle, or and then the Pentagon was hit. And that, as we can see, was coming over the Cannoles telecon. And, in fact, Mike McCormick was on that. I don't know if you remember--do you know Mike from the New York Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: I know who he is.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mike was on that telecon and he says he remembers--

MR. GRIFFITH: He's the guy I ordered back

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to work.

MR. AZZARELLO: Told him to get back in there? Mike said he remembered being on that telecon when that report was made.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, he showed up as a real hero here and let me tell you, if I could have fired that guy on the spot, he'd have been gone.

MR. AZZARELLO: Really.

MR. KARA: How about Terry Goodshoe [ph] at Boston?

MR. GRIFFITH: Who?

MR. AZZARELLO: Terry Goodshoe?

MR. KARA: Goodshoe at Boston?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. You know, the only thing I knew about Boston was Batina the tower chief up there, the lady that's a tower chief; she started doing some things that made sense, you know. and there were other people, as well, but this guy in New York Center, you know, I'd have fired him on the spot.

MR. AZZARELLO: What--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, he shut his airspace.

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MR. AZZARELLO: He shut it down.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, give me a break.

That's beyond the point.

MR. AZZARELLO: But he was saying, I guess he was on the phone with Cannoles and he said, hey it's approaching, five, six, seven miles out a VFR and that information [unintell.] Cannoles telecon from what we could see it didn't appear to get up to the Crisis Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: He should have been reporting that to the operational element, because the operational element was here. The administrative element was here and this was never intended to be an operational system.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh.

MR. KARA: Okay, that's a key point.

MR. GRIFFITH: That's--

MR. AZZARELLO: You're one of the first people that described that in the distinction that was--Cannoles felt that was more of an administrative?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, like, hey, this is,

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hey, we just, you know, Cleveland Center just reported that their whole evening shift says they're not coming to work because they're afraid. Okay, well, that's administrative, it's labor, let's get a labor law guy in here and let's handle that. You know, but this is the operational element over here--

MR. KARA: This is where it should have been.

MR. GRIFFITH: --you know that shows you guys like Mike McCormick who are always wanting to be the hero instead of following protocol and doing things the way they're supposed to be done.

MR. KARA: Here's, let's back up to 77 for a moment. The controller at Dulles sees a fast-moving aircraft and she says, National anybody, so the National tower, Dulles tower, the Secret Service and maybe Washington Center are aware and they're following that plane in real time.

MR. GRIFFITH: Good for her.

MR. KARA: But that information that is

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held in the Washington area, doesn't get to this building except when Eastern Region calls the Cannoles line about three minutes later. The information sifts up and comes and gets reported in to you guys three minutes later from Eastern Region through the Cannoles line.

MR. GRIFFITH: And what should have happened was, you know, that's why, in my \$3.5 billion a year that I staff a traffic management unit at Dulles where they hire people and pay them \$120,000, \$130,000 a year, they know what their job is, they report that to the Command Center, it's the operational element, and then it goes up here the way it's supposed to go. You know, but everybody's out here trying to be--you know, the managers are all trying to be heroes, you know. Tell me, don't tell them, tell me.

MR. AZZARELLO: On that note, when we were in New York Center, and I want to know if you found out about this in the aftermath putting together the summary--Mike McCormick says that after the first crash, when they saw--when the controller

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handling 175 realized that it had changed transponder code, he did make an assumption which turned out to be accurate that the new code was probably 175, because it was so close to where the--

MR. GRIFFITH: I doubt he assumed--

MR. AZZARELLO: He thought that that was a possibility, I shouldn't say he assumed, he thought this may be 175 that now was on this new code, because he couldn't find it anywhere else and that he reported it up the chain and that when Mike McCormick got it, he tried to call the region, the Eastern Region to let them know but couldn't get through to let them know.

MR. GRIFFITH: Hey, Mike McCormick, again, I pay 12 people in New York Center as traffic manager people to provide that information direct into the Command Center, the operational element, you know. Managers shouldn't try to be heroes and report this through another side. That's what we have the operational element for and that's why you fire people, you know. I don't know if you saw

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Mike McCormick on national TV giving his recount of all this--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, I didn't.

MR. GRIFFITH: --you know, but I'll tell you it made me almost sick to my stomach, you know, about this was the worst day of his life and, you know. You know how I feel about Mike McCormick now.

MR. KARA: Your frustration tells me that you weren't getting the information and you're now learning that information is going everywhere but where it should have been, which is right straight into this room.

MR. GRIFFITH: You're right.

MR. KARA: When you and Lee Longmire could have done something about it.

MR. GRIFFITH: We pay people a lot of money to a year to be the operational element. And that's why we have that Command Center. If you haven't been there, you ought to go see it. It's the nerve center and it's where things happen. And that's exactly why we spend millions of dollars a

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year for that thing to be there.

MR. KARA: When you say Command Center, you're saying Herndon.

MR. GRIFFITH: Herndon.

MR. KARA: Herndon, yeah, we've been there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, you know, that NOM on that floor should be the most knowledgeable person about what--

MR. KARA: Yeah, you're talking to John White, so you're talking to the guy that should know everything.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, and these people have been told earlier, if you remember, anything going on tell the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know, I don't know if you knew this, maybe you do or you didn't, but we were told that the message that Mike McCormick said he got a message from Dave Cannoles that said, get on this telecon now with Cannoles, he wants you on it. Exactly what you understood happened, that Dave ordered--did Dave Cannoles order Mike to get

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on the telecon with him, though?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Even assuming he did, though, you're saying that Mike should have had enough of an understanding that if he needed to be on the line with someone giving operational information, it shouldn't have been with Cannoles, that it should have been--not with the Accident Investigation people, but it should have been with the operations people?

MR. GRIFFITH: What can people in conference rooms with speaker phones do about stopping airplanes? Nothing.

MR. KARA: Let me take advantage of your--the military operations specialists at the centers--that's--the military operations specialists at the centers, seem to be, their performance [unintell.] appear to be uneven.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, well, I'll tell you all about that. I was a proponent that there ought to be one at every center. And, you know, we went through this staffing cut, where we had to cut

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positions. And I've always been a proponent of the military and interaction with the military. And, you know, it was always my position that there ought to be an MOS at every center and they ought to be linked in at there operational level with an element of the military

And so, what happened was, over the years, you know, decisions were made that we're not going to have these positions anymore. Well, we kept some guys around, you know, like Hank Tracy [ph], down at Miami and some of these other guys around the center, you know, that are my age that, you know, k should be out cutting grass somewhere.

But, you know, we kept them around and they were very dedicated at what they did and they maintain a perfect liaison with the military. And you'll find that on 9/11 and other days where we had one of those people in place, that things got done with the military and things happened.

MR. KARA: There was only one place that happened, that was at Boston, that was, I think Cullen Stoggets [ph].

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MR. GRIFFITH: Sure.

MR. KARA: Performed well that day. But I don't think we can make that same assessment about his peers at the other three centers.

MR. GRIFFITH: About Miami, you couldn't say that?

MR. KARA: No, no, no, no, no, not Miami. New York, Cleveland and Indie.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think he had peers at New York, Cleveland and Indie.

MR. KARA: Well, there were people that were in the position, let me put it that way.

MR. GRIFFITH: What I'm talking about is the--see what the centers did was they off-loaded the military operational specialists duty to the traffic management function.

MR. KARA: Exactly.

MR. GRIFFITH: And so, they didn't have true MOS specialists, they had somebody doing a collateral duty that was called an MOS worker.

MR. KARA: That's it, with the exception of New York. New York had--in fact the MOS in New

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York sits in his own little space because he's got the STU-3 and there's some classified things in there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Who is that?

MR. KARA: Who's the New York, Felzer [ph] was New York.

MR. GRIFFITH: Bob Felzer.

MR. KARA: No, I was talking about the difference between Cullen Stogget's performance and the other MOSS. And what he told me was that he had thought--had that MOS position to be a robot's position and it was. And what has happened is they've collapsed it into the TMU and people has it as an additional duty.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just like another duty?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, one of the first things Larry Arnold and I agreed on was we were going to put a staff military officer in every center. And we did that, we put them out there before we even launched the system.

MR. AZZARELLO: It all makes sense.

MR. GRIFFITH: And we had 24/7 coverage in

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each center where we had a military person sitting right in there. And if there was anything funny going on, they knew about it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Put an end to it right away.

MR. GRIFFITH: Absolutely. Like I said, when we start this system back up, the military is going to be fully aware of what's going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: We should get to the aftermath.

MR. KARA: Yeah, we're ready to move--

MR. AZZARELLO: One more question before we go to the aftermath. Not to belabor the point, but you strike me as a strong-willed individual.

MR. GRIFFITH: I am.

MR. AZZARELLO: You strike me as someone who has a lot of character and strong will. In that I don't see you being pulled away from an important situation by any schmo, for lack of a better term. And just so that we can get an accurate picture of, at least how high up the ladder at headquarters that people were aware, at

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least, of the 93 situation; when Doug is repeating it from Command Center and you're there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't see any--just anybody sort of pulling you away at that point in time who's just not your boss or not somebody in a superior position.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess I'll give you one last crack, do you remember who may have pulled you away, who might have been privy to hearing the information about United 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: I wish I could, I don't. I, you know, I gotta tell you, at this particular point in the game, I had my hands full. You know. Because I, you know, I understand all the problems with hijacks and all these other things, but I also understand all the problems associated with trying to get 4,500 airplanes on the ground without running into each other, you know. And so--

MR. KARA: Was it the Administrator that pulled you away?

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MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't think so, Jane, you know, most of the time I talked to Jane was in her office, I would go to her or she would already be in the SVTS and, you know, I'd go in and sit down next to her. But, you know, I spent a lot of time with Peter. Peter was excellent that day.

MR. AZZARELLO: Peter Challen?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah, Peter and I spent a lot of time together. Steve Brown was, you know, any--any policy things that came up, you know where they could help, I mean, they were in the game.

And then, of course, I talked to Monte a lot but, you know, Monte, he was the Deputy Administrator, so I had to, if I had something for Monte, it had to be important because, I mean, they were talking to the Secretary and everybody else.

MR. KARA: Do you remember Secretary Mineta's chief of staff, John Flaherty being over there that day? When I say over there, I mean in the--

MR. GRIFFITH: SVTS?

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MR. KARA: --yeah in the SVTS or--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, DOT didn't have a SVTS, so they had to use the one at FAA, so I'm sure Flaherty was around.

MR. KARA: Yeah, for them to even be on the national level, they had to be over here in your space.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I didn't interact with them.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you find out--what about in the aftermath, because after 9/11, I know we've heard that, obviously, the Administrator wanted to be briefed and Monte Belger wanted to be briefed--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, what happened, [unintell.] recreate the situation, [unintell.] type of thing. Did you come to learn after 9/11, one way or another, whether or not Mr. Belger or Jane Garvey were made aware of 93 as that information was coming in from the Command Center?

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't.

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MR. AZZARELLO: You don't know one way or another whether they knew afterwards?

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember being in any meetings, though where they were briefed where, when they were told about what happened with 93 that they expressed any ominous surprise, whereby they said, jeeze, how come I don't remember knowing about that on that day or--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, there were a lot of tough questions being asked a lot after 9/11 by Monte and Jane. So, you know, but specifically to that, I don't recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, even as we stand here today and after all the after-action and review with kind of the tapes and the transcripts and the radar and the people tried to remember what happened, you would say you still don't know one way or another. You, personally, don't know one way or another whether Monte Belger or Jane Garvey were made aware of 93 before it crashed?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't. And I have to

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go back, again, to what my mind tells me and, you know, at the point we were dealing with 93, I felt confident that, first of all, when I pointed to that and said, you know, somebody was getting this to the military, but I also felt confident--and that's what I was trying to explain before--I know I didn't do a very good job. But that I know our traffic controllers and I know that air traffic controllers in a touch situation are going to go outside the box, just like Boston did, and so, you know, that's why, you know--I knew that we had military at the Command Center; I knew we had people at NEADS and SEADS--

MR. AZZARELLO: You were certain somebody was covering?

MR. GRIFFITH: --and you know, I just--I thought we were all joined at the hip by that time and that, you know, when Doug Davis makes his broadcast and we're all saying, aw, man, this sounds really bad, that, you know, that people are sending information and, you know, the military's making their decision about--and then, you know,

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the word, scramble came up, you know. And I went into my own little internal thinking about you know what are we going to have to do if we have to provide an intercept, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, who would you--you were there that day, so help us with the atmosphere. Who did you perceive as Monte and Jane relying upon to give them updates on additional aircraft that are in the system and reported as hijackings as possible suicide missions? Who did they look to? Who Washington their management person that they look to--

MR. GRIFFITH: They looked to me. I don't know whether I told them or not. I'll be honest with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: But did they look just to you or were they looking to others, too?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, they were, you know the person that was in charge of the room there--

MR. AZZARELLO: The Security person?

MR. GRIFFITH: --right. You know, that person's--I wish I could remember his name, but I

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can't--but that person's--

MR. AZZARELLO: If I threw it out there would you remember? Lee Longmire?

MR. GRIFFITH: --no, it wasn't Lee, Lee was kind of in and out

MR. AZZARELLO: Mike Wikert [ph]. He's on one of the logs, Mike Wikert, as having.

MR. GRIFFITH: I was really impressed with the guy, I can tell you that.

MS. SULLIVAN: Mike Morse [ph], specified that he was the moderator for that room for a part of the morning on 9/11.

MR. GRIFFITH: Is he a big guy?

MS. SULLIVAN: Yes, very big guy, middle-age; [unintell.]

MR. GRIFFITH: He was probably the guy, loosing some hair?

MS. SULLIVAN: Yeah, [unintell.] a comb-over.

MR. KARA: She picks up details we don't.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't have that problem.

MR. KARA: It might have been Michael

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Morse?

MR. GRIFFITH: It might have been, I know that I'd only see this guy in the elevator and stuff, you know, and I think, you know, he looked like a GS-14 bean counter to me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me throw an observation out and let me know if this is something that you discussed after 9/11 in reviewing the facts of what happened in talking to the various centers. One thing that Miles and I and the team have observed is that Boston Center seemed to know where to go quickly to think outside the box because they're a center that borders controls planes on the border of the ocean.

MR. GRIFFITH: They've got this much airspace.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they interact often with the military because of Whiskey 105 and the warning areas, so they sort of, it wasn't foreign for them to say, oh, we know where to go if we want to think outside the box and go right to NEADS.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Because we deal with those people on a frequent basis.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Ditto, New York. We're on the oceanic sector here.

MR. GRIFFITH: They've got this much airspace.

MR. AZZARELLO: They flood it with a lot of traffic, too, in the State of New York, and Boston. But they knew, the issue I'm sort of getting at, it wasn't foreign to them. NEADS wasn't foreign to them because they often interacted with them on their exercises. And we saw a different picture, our team when they went out to Cleveland Center because they're inland and they're over land and they didn't have an occasion--

MR. GRIFFITH: Very little restricted airspace.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they didn't have an occasion to interact with the military often to know, oh, we go out of the box we know who to call

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here?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We would know it's NEEDS and we had a number for them. Did that at any point after 9/11, when you looked back at it was that discussed, or did you think about that issue? That--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, well, I can't say that specifically, but, you know, the one thing that I did was re-enforce this military shop that I had, you know, Alton Scott that Steve Culbertson made his reported in to, you know. I mean, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: The FAA liaisons at the various sectors?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, we ended up putting three or four of those people at every one of those locations. And, you know, we really expanded our presence in all the air defense sectors and at NORAD. And, you know, put a lot more responsibility on that one shop so that, you know, we had an operational link--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

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MR. GRIFFITH: --24/7 to the military.

And it--

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you talk to the folks out at Cleveland Center, though, about, you know, the events of 9/11, how they ultimately did, after 10:00 o'clock somebody, I don't know how, but somebody there got the number to the NEADS and called them direct.

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I didn't talk to them about that. No, see my link to Cleveland Center was through the division manager in Chicago. So, you know, that's the difference between the operational element and--

MR. AZZARELLO: The division, Chicago's after the region--the--

MR. GRIFFITH: --yeah, see the manager at Cleveland Center reports to the division manager in Chicago.

MR. AZZARELLO: Great Lakes ROC, Great Lakes Region?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, so, you know, that's why I try to keep focusing on the operational

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element, you know, we had an outstanding operational element in place. You know, where we had people reporting directly into the Command Center--

MR. AZZARELLO: Which was what you said, let me know--remember that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: You told White you go out and canvas the centers let them report to you anything unusual, radio loss, anything.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess what I'm looking at behaviorally, like, that's like, my--our opinion, I don't want to speak for all of the team members, but some of us felt that that's what led Boston and New York to think out of the box so quickly because of their familiarity with NEADS.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Whereas, that didn't exist with Indie Center or Cleveland Center. And I guess from a behavioral perspective trying to understand why people did certain things under pressure on the

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day of 9/11, is that an issue that you guys, I guess at a management level, did you ever get down to the leads at that level to discuss well what caused our people in Boston and New York to immediately think outside the box and reach for NEADS as opposed to the people in Indie and Cleveland. Was that an issue that was explored?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, sure, they did what they knew. You knew.

MR. AZZARELLO: But was it explored? I mean, now looking back, assuming that that was happening. Was it discussed? Did somebody go and talk to Cleveland about it and say, jeeze, why didn't you--did you guys think to call direct to NEADS like Boston and New York and if not, why not? What was your--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, we assumed that if we let things continue to happen, that they would continue to happen that way. And that's why Larry Arnold and I put a military staff in each center immediately so we had a military lieutenant colonel 24/7 in the center and my direction to the division

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managers was, you have a person--you have a military person in every one of your centers and the person running that watch is going to be joined at the hip with that person until we say stop.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, is that sort of the stopgap that took you to the deadline until the deadline got up and running, that was going to be--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Let's talk about the aftermath now. Is this document--was this one of the documents that was used to brief the White House on September 17?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: It wasn't?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because we were, I think Shirley said that it was when we asked. We asked Shirley Miller in the production of documents, we understand there was a meeting where some of the White House representatives wanted to be briefed.

MS. SULLIVAN: She said that was one of the documents Jane Garvey was using to go the Hill.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, to go to Congress.

MS. SULLIVAN: Yeah, I don't know what she said about the meeting with the White House, she might, also take that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, she did in an e-mail to Dana. Dana asked, we understand that there was--well, let me ask you.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, what meeting are you talking about, let's get there first.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's get there first. Let's put this book, the summary aside, and I'll ask you this. After 9/11--well, starting that day even, from 9/11 going forward to the following--till the end of September.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you involved at any point with trying to figure out what the FAA's knowledge of events was on that day? Kind of, basically, just recreate what happened?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And tell me about your efforts, there.

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MR. GRIFFITH: Well, my efforts there started with Dave Cannoles, when I told him, before I left his face, your job is to get information. And start getting it now. I have to tell you, I wasn't real happy with him. He was dragging his feet, you know, because I know, you know, from TWA 800 or John F. Kennedy, Jr., or any time you have any significant incident, you can't get information fast enough. Because the only thing people will do to you, until you show them the information, is criticize you. So, that was one of the first things in my mind when I looked Cannoles in the eye and I said your job is to get data and start right now. And get it fast. And, you know, I mean, days later, I'm asking for, hey, can I see the radar tape from Cleveland Center, we don't have it yet? Why not, you know, and I'm calling the division manager up in Chicago saying, you know, why can't you do this it's a simple--it's a simple process, put it together and get it here. Okay, so it was like pulling teeth getting information. And, you know, Cannoles doesn't like me a lot, since then,

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because, you know, I was in his face a lot.

But, you know, we finally got it together. He's got a guy working for him named Tony Ferrante that, you know, is really great. And that poor guy worked night and day for weeks. But we finally got it to the point where we could brief the FBI and other--the Secret Service and other elements. And, you know, that may have been one of those meetings on the 17th that you're talking about. The only meeting that I went to at the White House--

MR. AZZARELLO: Was I think the one on the 17th, does that--

MR. GRIFFITH: --I really don't know what day it was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Roughly, well, did you go there like within a week of the attacks?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. You were only at one White House meeting?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I was at a lot of White House meetings, but this was like the one where we went and did a briefing.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, okay, tell me about that one.

MR. GRIFFITH: And the briefing was associated with protecting the National Capital Region. It was primarily a Secret Service Briefing of a lot of PowerPoint slides. We, the FAA, had maybe five or six slides in the package, of which Mike Canavan who was the chief of security at the time briefed some of them, and I briefed the others. Our briefing focused around how are we going to keep airplanes from taking off at National on Runway 36 and flying right into the White House? How are we going to--

MR. AZZARELLO: So was it how to prevent a Reagan National departure from attacking the White House?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah. Or one landing on 18 from, you know, flying by and doing a left-wing down and popping it. And there was a whole lot of classified stuff there. Dick Clark was there and, you know, it was a long briefing and, you know, the whole purpose of the briefing

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was to--

MR. AZZARELLO: It was protection of the National Capital Region purpose of the briefing?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that the sole purpose of it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Sole purpose, that's what it was, that was a briefing that I attended. Now, I have to tell you that the briefings that were done on this document, I delegated to Dave Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I did not give any briefings on this document.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this White House meeting where you did present a briefing on protecting the Capital region, the one that Secret Service made a presentation to?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, they were the primary and--

MR. KARA: Clark took the brief? Was he the person?

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MR. GRIFFITH: He was the guy we were briefing.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, Secret Service, you would say, had the lead?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, and then there were DOD people there and they were briefing on, you know, what eventually became the exercise, if you recall, in the paper, you read that they had these missile sites around D.C. and they were ready to shoot down airplanes and that kind of stuff.

MR. KARA: So that wouldn't have been Arnold, then, that was there?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think Larry, no, Larry was not there. The Pentagon guys that were coming over were mainly Army guys.

MR. AZZARELLO: In any briefings on the Summary was it delegated to Dave Cannoles?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, any briefings on this document were delegated to Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was this--well, let me ask you this: did they brief you when they put it together, Cannoles and his group?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, I got tons of briefings. I got briefed on half a dozen versions of that before we decided we had the right one.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, they had you in the loop as they were starting to develop it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I was looking at tons of stuff.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were there any meetings, post-9/11, internal to the FAA just about discussing what did the FAA know when, and what did they do with the information? Which, I guess, is part of what's in that summary?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, I mean, we were briefing, I can't tell you specifically, but, yeah, we were, I mean, that was like a constant daily--

MR. AZZARELLO: How about coordination with the military because we've seen some e-mails and some documents that are even referenced in the summary, like a NEADS, the Northeast Air Defense Sector Logs--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah that came about--

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you have a copy of the

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log?

MR. KARA: Which log?

MR. AZZARELLO: The MCT Tech Log?

MR. KARA: Yeah, I do.

MR. AZZARELLO: And somebody indicated, I forget who it was--it might have been Dave Cannoles, even that you thought, someone, either Cannoles or Brown or somebody thought that you were given a copy of a NORAD log to sort of help coordinate, you know, notifications between the FAA and the military.

MR. GRIFFITH: During 9/11?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, after, in the aftermath.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, because they--

MR. AZZARELLO: They called it NORAD log.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, Larry Arnold, I talked to Larry and said, look, we need information, you know, and so he made sure that we got, you know, whatever we needed and I made sure he got whatever he needed.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, who was--was General

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Arnold your main point of contact for--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --the aftermath trying to pull together what happened between shared information between the military and the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, because what they did was, they designated CONAR, who was Larry Arnold, as the principal NORAD person. And, you know, but General Eberhard was a four-star, he couldn't be involved in day-to-day stuff, so they designated Larry Arnold. He was already CONAR and, you know, and they gave shoot-down authority to three people, which was Larry Arnold, a general in Alaska and Eberhard. And then they had a Rules of Engagement for Shoot-down and that kind of stuff. Then we coordinated other things, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: To the extent that there was communication between the FAA, any FAA facility and the military that day, you got, obviously two ends of communication. You have records, you the FAA have records to show you what was going on, say, in the field facilities, their tape

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recordings, radar, impasse and stuff. But, in terms of trying to get the whole picture on conversations and communications with the military.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: It would be fair to say that General Arnold was the point of contact that you needed at the local top.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I imagine was there someone on General Arnold's end who was asked to put together the military time line and then to reach out to--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, they had some colonels and I had my guy, Alton Scott, and, you know, obviously, Larry and I didn't have time to, you know, go searching through logs and making an okay send them this and not that one. We had somebody do that for us and brief us and then, you know, we'd authorize it.

But, you know, after 9/11, before we even started the system back up, we put an order out to all controllers, Ikes Rillo [ph] signed it, and it

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was like a conformance monitoring order that it made it a requirement for all controllers to report unexplained loss of com; unexplained transponder interruption; unexplained altitude change or heading change, immediately, you know, back into the Command Center and then immediately to the military.

And so, that was one of the things that we put in place before we even started the system up. Because there was a concern that, you know, you start getting airplanes in the air and all of a sudden, it happens again.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, right.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then we had the military people in the centers that I told you about and then we had the hotline that everybody was--

MR. AZZARELLO: What led you to--well, let me ask you this: Did you look--do you remember seeing this log at some point? If so did you--

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't tell you if I saw that one to be honest with you. I remember,

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Darlene Freeman was doing this work.

MR. AZZARELLO: Darlene Freema?

MR. GRIFFITH: Freeman.

MR. AZZARELLO: F-r-e-e--

MR. GRIFFITH: M-a-n.

MR. AZZARELLO: Freeman, and she was doing work on what, on?

MR. GRIFFITH: She was tasked to come up with doing a review of the coordination between the FAA and the military on 9/11. And I can remember giving her, you know, things. I don't know if she was able to get this direct from somebody like Cheryl Atkins or if I got it from Larry.

MR. KARA: Would [unintell.] come of her work and one that you would have approved? What he has, for the record, is a list of notifications provided to us by FAA of when the military was notified on which aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: This looks like that, I know that Darlene sat down with me and went over everything she had. I mean, she was really good about it.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did anybody at the White House or Administration ask to be briefed, too, on the overall picture of what was the interaction between the FAA and the military that day?

MR. GRIFFITH: Not to me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Are you aware that any briefings occurred where somebody else represented the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I'm not. I want to say I don't recall, but the meetings that I was going to at the White House--

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about those, what were they about?

MR. GRIFFITH: Most of them were SVTS, except for every Friday at 4:00 o'clock, of all times, we had this meeting over there with, first it was Wayne Downing [ph].

MR. KARA: Jim O'Downing [ph].

MR. GRIFFITH: And then after him was another Air Force four-star, he might have been a three-star, can't remember his name. But, in fact, all the ones with Downing, he did them all by SVTS,

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which made it pretty nice.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, so you're saying that any--these other meetings that you attended post-9/11, not the briefing--on protection of the National Capital Region, but the other meetings a lot of them were done by SVTS at FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, we just said, hey, let's get together on the SVTS at 4:00 o'clock [unintell.] come over here.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was all of the different subject matters that were discussed at those meetings?

MR. GRIFFITH: A lot of it had to do with intelligence. And my part of it was any issues that came up regarding the air traffic system, I'd provide a briefing on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any other issues, intelligence, anything else discussed in those?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, they had a protocol that they went through. They had, like, an intelligence briefing and you know, the different elements would report out and you know, I can't say

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who they were because when we were together, they were all in a blue suit with a blue tie and--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who were the different agencies represented?

MR. GRIFFITH: Secret Service; DOD--

MR. AZZARELLO: When you say DOD was it a big DOD or NORAD or--

MR. GRIFFITH: Joint Chiefs kind of guy. FBI, CIA.

MR. AZZARELLO: Those were the people that were present. Anybody from--anybody like in Dick Clark's position, similar to that.

MR. GRIFFITH: Dick was not in those meetings. He'd be on the--if we had a SVTS, he would be on the SVTS from time to time, but he had people he delegated some of this stuff to.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, Dick Clark may have been on some of them or his designee?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. And they, really to be honest with you, most of this was making sure that everything was secure; making sure that people were aware of, you know, what the current chatter

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was.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, the purpose was to share intel and talk about--and security?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, and then, you know, like Homeland Security was putting in this color-coded system and then we were having meetings; separate meetings about that. And what the responses would be. So, we in FAA put together a scheme of okay, if it goes to yellow, we're going to take these actions.

MR. KARA: Let me step back for just a second. Pardon me for--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, go ahead.

MR. KARA: Prior to 9/11, in early July 2001, do you recall a meeting with Dick Clark or with the White House concerning the threat level that summer?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I didn't attend those meetings. You know, the Security people--

MR. KARA: That would have been Canavan and--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, Mike and those guys

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attended those.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: so when it came time for the FAA to present their, sort of account of the events that day, was that done, as far as you could understand, was that done by Jane Garvey when she testified before Congress?

MR. GRIFFITH: I know that I didn't do it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm not--I'm not sure how Jane and Monte handled those things.

MR. AZZARELLO: When this Summary of Events that Cannoles put together at your directions, this was a finished product? Was Jane and Monte briefed on it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who was present for that briefing?

MR. GRIFFITH: The only thing I can tell you is that, you know, Cannoles did the briefing--

MR. AZZARELLO: So, it was briefed to the

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Deputy and the Administrator by Cannoles?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it was briefed, if I recall right, it was briefed to a group of principals, you know, which would have been associate administrators and, you know, because they, obviously, wanted everybody to know what was going on. And so I can't give you a lot of detail about it, you know, because we had so many meetings after 9/11. But I remember--I remember this: I remember there were a half dozen runs at it, you know, and--

MR. AZZARELLO: How high up the loop did the runs go--

MR. GRIFFITH: Just to me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just to you?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, you know and I--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who presented it, though, when it was a final product, when Administrator Garvey and Belger and a group of principals, who did the briefing to them.

MR. GRIFFITH: Cannoles. Yeah, I feel pretty confident about that, because, you know, I

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mean, I told him I wanted him to be the expert on this. And, you know, that we needed to be able to articulate what was in there and it needed to be right. So, he and Tony Ferrante were the two principal people involved in doing the briefings.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me show you some references in here to notifications to the military as they exist in here. This is on American 11. There's an 8:40 Northeast Air Defense Sector logs indicate--we could represent, you know, that we got this from NEADS and this is the NMCC kept log from 9/11. And we think this is the log that they're referring to in the FAA Summary. The logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration on the events concerning 9/11, when you look at 8:40, which is 12:40 Zulu, possible hijack AA-11.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, 175, second, crash that day; 9:05, they have a--I believe. Northeast Air Defense Sector logs they were notified by the FAA of events concerning that would be 1305 Zulu,

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right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: United 175, possible hijack, Boston/LAX. And, again, this is, we didn't put this together, but we think this is the log they're referring to, the problem was Dave Cannoles didn't remember seeing this log, he didn't think he did, which sort of seems a little odd now, to me, because he thought that this log was given to you and that you had--not this--I won't say this particular log, no, I have to say it correct, he said a NORAD log, he believed that was given to you and that you might have seen at one point, but, to your recollection, too, Miles--but that he didn't actually put this together. He does not remember using this as a reference to put the military notifications in.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, this was the work that Darlene was doing.

MR. KARA: That's what I was just going to say, it's probably done by Darlene Freeman.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now when you get to 77,

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though, and 93, there's no NEADS notification indicated here.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, if you look at--you can look at all the entries down here, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: If this, indeed, was a document that Darlene or someone else was looking at, you don't see anything on United 93, it's says scramble on Langley, I got Langley on battle stations, okay; and you have 9:11 a.m., both hijacks, UAL 175 and American 11, hit World Trade Center. And there's a 9:16 Eastern Time a United tail number listed and souls on-board. And then an American tail number at 9:24. We now know, from looking at the records that the--this tail number is to United 175.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this tail number at 9:24, it goes to American 11, so they go with the first two hijacks.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Then you see hijack American 11 flight headed to Washington, D.C. We've listened to the NEADS tapes, this seems to coincide with exactly what the report that they thought American 11 was still headed--didn't hit the Trade Center, it was heading South to Washington.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Langley is scrambled on the American 11 flight at 9:24. And you go down here, you see American 77, 9:34 a.m., lost, unable to locate; that was the call I told you about early ZDC, Washington Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: [unintell.] couldn't find it. Langley airborne, then they hit Delta 1989, possible hijack.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: It was before we were told it was a special track and then they said will land in Cleveland possible. Now at 10:01 and then finally at 10:07 bomb on-board, UAL 93 over

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Pittsburgh with a mode 3.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: It seems to me that if somebody had this log and that's what they used to put the notifications of 11 and 175 that raises the obvious question, why didn't they put 10:07 as the notification of UAL 93. And why didn't they put 9:34 as the American 77 notification, lost and unable to locate, because it appears by call sign in here.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you--put that aside for a second, okay. Did it come up as a topic of discussion when it was briefed by Dave Cannoles or whoever? Did anybody in the room say, it would seem to me an obvious question, that, we got a notification here a time on 11 and 175, what do we say and what does the military say about the last two flights, when did we notify them of them? Dave Cannoles said he remembered it being a topic, I'll use his---try and use his exact words--

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember are these

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in here?

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm sorry?

MR. GRIFFITH: Are these in here?

MR. AZZARELLO: The other, the various other entries?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah?

MR. AZZARELLO: Which of these, you'll have to point--no, that's not anywhere in here.

MR. GRIFFITH: That's not in here?

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MR. GRIFFITH: And here is--

MR. AZZARELLO: Bomb on-board, at 10:0--there's no notification, I'll show you what happens on 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: It doesn't show up in here?

MR. AZZARELLO: No. Here's United 93. If we're to--this is the FAA time line, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's got the controller overhearing the screams and no reply and the bomb on-board.

MR. GRIFFITH: Did you get a copy of

Darlene's [ph] report?

MR. KARA: All we and the reason I showed you this is, we had--we do not have a report attributed to Darlene, we have this single piece of paper, which may be a synthesis of her work. This is dated the 20th of September 2001.

MR. AZZARELLO: As you can see in here, we were told it ends here. They're saying in here 9:24, it shows them regarding--the NEADS log show them regarding notifying, FAA notifying 77. If you look at 9:24, it just says American Airlines 11 hijacked but that doesn't say 77, call sign and, in fact if you look at the tail number, that's 11. I would think that that, whoever--would it be fair for me and if it's unfair tell me--would it be fair for me to assume that someone in an FAA position putting this together would recognize the significance and importance of checking the tail number to see which flight it goes with? It would seem that that would--may be somewhat fundamental from an FAA perspective in trying to identify an aircraft by call sign if you have a tail number.

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MR. GRIFFITH: The likelihood of us having a tail number of a commercial aircraft operating in the system is very nil. We just don't do it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if I were the person putting together the FAA Summary of Events and I was looking at this log--

MR. GRIFFITH: I'd wonder how they got a tail number.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, well, if I don't have a call sign associated with it, is it fair to say that I'm not in a position to assume one way or another whether this is American 77 or 11 if it doesn't give me the call sign, it just gives me a tail number?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, you could go back to the airline operations center and say, hey--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who had that tail number on that day--334AA on 9/11?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which of the two aircraft was it, 77 or 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: But, I mean, the likelihood

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of us knowing the tail number of any of these airplanes without the pilot telling us is--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, and this is a NEADS log. I meant after the fact if you tried to put together.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know how NEADS would know.

MR. KARA: Oh, they got it from the center--

MR. GRIFFITH: They got it from the Boston Center.

MR. KARA: They got it from the Boston Center, another example of Boston Center sharing information.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, Boston Center went to the American Airlines Operations Center and said, what's the tail number?

MR. AZZARELLO: But there's no notification in here if you go through the Cleveland Center tells the ROC, it says at 9:39. In fact, the conversations we saw before with Doug Davis and the Command Center being notified is not

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in here nor at headquarters on this. And nothing on NEADS. It ends, the crash time was, they have down as--what time do they have the crash 10:0--it should be--

MR. KARA: Of 93?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, they don't put the crash time, they say the primary radar terminated at 10:04. And there's nothing in here about notice to the military on this.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah--I don't know where Darlene's work is, but--

MR. KARA: Is she still here?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Aside from here work, though, wouldn't that be an obvious question for somebody to raise when this is briefed and discussed, like, all right, well, we have notification times on the first two, but what about the last two?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, we had, Larry Arnold and I and other people had numerous discussions about, you know, who notified what to

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whom and when was it done and, you know, how do we react to it? How do we respond to it? And so, that's what Darlene's was asked to do was, okay, look Jeff says one thing, Larry says another thing, you know, we've got all these pieces of paper, so, you know, sit down and go through them; and give us one report, which she did and it's longer than one page, I know that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, Dave Cannoles remembers it being--try to paraphrase it, use the words he used, though, it was a topic of hot debate. Who knew what, when?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And when did the FAA tell the military? Did the military have time to react?

MR. GRIFFITH: It did.

MR. AZZARELLO: They did not have time to react and that was hotly debated.

MR. GRIFFITH: It was, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who, were you present for any of those debates where it was spirited

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debated in a spirited fashion?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, you said you talked to Larry Arnold, did you debate with him?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, yeah Larry and I, you know, I'm assuming by what you say that--you didn't know about my meetings with Larry till I told you--

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: --you know, so I'm assuming that this is coming from, the White House, I don't know where it's coming from.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, do you know if the questions are coming from the Administration or the White House about who knew what when?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I knew that--here's what I knew. I knew that people were saying, hey, the military's saying one thing; you know, other people are saying another. And--

MR. AZZARELLO: The other people being the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. And, it's--

MR. AZZARELLO: Who, when you say people,

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say it's people from where?

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't tell you that, I--

MR. AZZARELLO: Outside the FAA or inside
the FAA or--

MR. GRIFFITH: You know how it is after an
accident or anything else, everybody's pointing
fingers.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: Wasn't my job, you know,
they should have told us. So, Larry and I just
approached it from a very pragmatic point of view.
We said, look, the truth is there somewhere, so,
you know, get the people to get the logs and, you
know, wherever the truth is, we don't care, we just
want to know the truth.

And, so, Darlene was given the task of,
you know, go find out. And--

MR. AZZARELLO: Go find out what the truth
is--

MR. KARA: On the FAA side, who did Larry
give that task to on his side?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know who Larry gave

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it to because, you know, I remember that, I talked to Larry about the logs. I said, hey, Larry can we have your logs? Well, they're classified. Okay, well, you know, what do we need to do to get the information we need? Well, let me work on it. And then, you know, finally at some point, he said, yeah, we're going to sanitize some of the logs and we'll provide them. And they were. But as far as, you know where all that went, I mean, I don't know whether that was between--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, Darlene has pointed out once she can get one side of the picture unless she has a counterpart in the military--

MR. KARA: She works as--

MR. AZZARELLO: --who's saying, well, this is what we think happened, right, to put together the big picture.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, her job was to screen the logs.

MR. AZZARELLO: Screen the military logs?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. KARA: And she was working with Scott

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or for Scott, Alton Scott was some point above her?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, Darlene was SES.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who did she report to on this task?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, no, no, her office was right next to Monte's. So, you know, she was an SES, was like a Senior Advisor or something.

MR. KARA: A special assistant to Monte or to Jane?

MR. GRIFFITH: I really don't know what her title was.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: All I know is when Darlene said do something I did it. So--

MR. KARA: Oh, when she said do something, you did it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, I did, yeah. She sat up there in the front office.

MR. AZZARELLO: If you're Joe citizen, we'll pick up this summary and you see there's two notifications on 11 and 175, one on each the first two. And there's no entry in this FAA summary of

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Events for Notification to the Military on the last two flights, what is it we're supposed to, if anything, what are they supposed to assume, either that there was no notification or that it's unknown from an FAA perspective when they did notify the military on each of the last two flights?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it's unknown. I mean, if I were Joe Citizen it would--I'm confident that the military got the information, you know. Can I go back and say here's where it was--

MR. AZZARELLO: At some point, that, and like on the day for each of the four planes?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, when things were going on, I'm confident that, like, when Doug made the announcement on 93, I'm confident that, through the process that we were using that had evolved from people being in that room--

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: That the military got the information.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, unfortunately, their logs show that they got it--

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MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah I know. Did you get the NMCC logs?

MR. AZZARELLO: We got the NMCC logs?

MR. KARA: Yeah, we got the tape of the air--

MR. GRIFFITH: See if we had a breakdown in the way we were giving it to them, then--

MR. AZZARELLO: But wouldn't it have gotten, I mean I'm just--to play devil's advocate, right? You got the finger-pointing going on, obviously the military would like to say, well, we didn't have enough notice. Obviously, the FAA would like to be in a position to say well, we gave them notice to do whatever it was--

MR. GRIFFITH: As soon as we got it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, but if you're the military and you know you got an NMCC logs, you got NMCC tapes, and you got operations--they know where to go. They're just like, you at the FAA collectively know where to go to find out what happened when--when did we know something was wrong with a flight?

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MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: The know where to go to the Ops Center and find out when did they know?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: You go to the Ops on 93, you see that they know after crash on 93. Was that, I have to imagine that if you had any sort of spirited debate with Larry Arnold that that might have come up, like, him saying, well, you know, our people at NEADS tell us that they didn't know about 93 until after it went down.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, oh, yeah, Larry and I had a lot of heated conversations.

MR. AZZARELLO: But did you have one of that nature, where he said, you know, hey, I gotta tell you, Jeff, on the last one our position is we didn't know about it, according to all the NEADS people in the logs and what the tapes show on the floor that they weren't told about that last one that crashed in Pennsylvania till after it went down?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm sure that either Larry

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or one of his colonels working for him said that. Which got us to the point of saying, look, we don't, Larry and I agree. We Just want the truth. So that we can fix whatever the problem is. It didn't matter to me, if it was me, then, you know, fire me, I don't care, you know. But it's just the idea that--well, I don't know what government agency you work in, if you do, but you know, I've worked in government for a long time and I know that people are looking for scapegoats, you know. It got into a lot of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I worked at [unintell.] for about 10 years.

MR. GRIFFITH: Did you, okay, so it's like, for me, I say I don't care about that stuff.

MR. AZZARELLO: I worked at a line level and I worked at a supervisory level. And we were trained similarly as you reflected, let's just find out the truth, whatever happened happened and we're here to achieve justice whatever that justice is.

MR. GRIFFITH: Exactly and that's where Larry and I were and so.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did Colonel--do you remember talking to a Brigadier General Moore [ph]? Doug Moore?

MR. GRIFFITH: Doug Moore, yeah, that name sounds very familiar, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because I think he's on, like one or two written communications talking about coordinating, you know, what does the military have in their time line, what does the FAA have in their time line of notifications and all that.

MR. KARA: It's possibly--

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I don't want--and, Jeff, I don't want to put words in your mouth or make any assumptions, I want to see if you really do have an independent recollection of, at least on one occasion of discussing with either General Arnold or one of his officers that the issue of 93 that, hey, the military them saying to you, either General Arnold or one of his representatives saying, you know, Jeff, I gotta tell you on 93, our people at the Ops level in the military and NEADS

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are saying they didn't know about till after it went down, so that's the truth. So, if something broke down, so let's talk about the DEN and obviously it didn't get where it should have gotten, so let's talk about how that's going to happen now, how can we make that work. And make the country safe for going forward.

Because the DEN is a great creation from what we can see, and everybody praises it, but it seems to have resulted from someone's realization that there was a problem, that somewhere there's a manifestation of it, you know, a lack of communication and someone says, all right, well hey how do we fix that? And I think it was a brilliant move by whether it be yourself or whoever to say, know, here's where it broke down, this is the truth. Ninety-three didn't reach there and maybe if we had a DEN, it would have gotten there quicker.

And I'm asking you if you have any specific recollection on that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I have some recollection on

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that, I can't--I can't tell if it was Larry because, I can remember when we were going through this finger-pointing thing. I can't remember if Larry told me that--directly that it was fighting a fight if we didn't get 93, because Larry and I didn't have a good relationship or whether somebody was telling me that, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you ever talk with a Colonel Marr [ph] or a Colonel Spiker? Bob Marr?

MR. GRIFFITH: Bob Marr, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: You talked to Bob Marr?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm pretty sure, yeah--

MR. KARA: How about Colonel Scott?

MR. GRIFFITH: Don't remember Scott.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because Marr was the guy fighting the battle that day in your battle commander, he was the battle commander. So, he would have been the guy--

MR. GRIFFITH: At [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: He was at NEADS.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, he was at NEADS.

MR. AZZARELLO: He was the battle

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commander at NEADS, so he would have been the guy with a finger on the pulse of the operational floor at NEADS that day for what they knew when.

MR. GRIFFITH: I gotta tell you, you know, my attitude when we got into the finger-pointing and all that stuff was--

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's solve it.

MR. GRIFFITH: --I don't care, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's just fix it.

MR. GRIFFITH: If it's us, then shame on you, you know, we'll deal with it. If it's them, then let's help them fix it, but, you know, I don't care what happened, what I care about is that it doesn't happen again.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, is it fair for me to assume that you had a conversation with someone, you're not sure whether it's Arnold, but someone in the military, perhaps, General Arnold or someone else about the fact that the military said they didn't think they had any prior notice on 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, that's fair.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that a fair assumption

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for me?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then we have--you know what's interesting is that--then you have the FAA time line.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that have--

MR. KARA: He needs his lunch. No, I just wanted to know if this was the outcome of the discussions. FAA didn't put out a press release until nearly a year later in what were the internal discussions at the senior level in FAA is why it took so long to put that time line down and finally what drove the decision to put it out?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: This wasn't something did you have any input in or did anybody consult you on it before they released it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Schuman [ph] always talked to me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did he?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, is it fair for us to assume that the Public Affairs unit of the FAA, if they're going to release a time line of events in 9/11, if they can't sort of do it of their own accord, they have to look at somebody in Air Traffic--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah, Schuman was good about that, he never put anything out that we didn't approve.

MR. AZZARELLO: They have 9:24 being FAA notifies NEADS about the hijacking or suspected hijacking of Flight 77. As you know, from our interview with you, we don't think that happened until 9:34 and it was notified as lost, unable to locate, not hijack.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then we don't have United 93, as you say, after 10:00 o'clock.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Maybe you could help us on this. This is interesting, given your discussion with General Arnold. The military comes out with a

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time line and, indeed, they present it at public hearings, last May, that says at 9:16, they were notified of United Airlines 93. Okay. A couple of things on that now.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: We now know that United 93 wasn't even hijacked then. Because the screaming on the frequency and the bomb on-board doesn't occur until 9:28, we've heard the cockpit voice recorder it was played for us by the FBI. The takeover of the plane hadn't even occurred yet. Now, how do you square that--that seems to run directly counter to the military advising the FAA that, hey, we didn't even get any--we didn't get any advance notice, we got post-notice on 93.

MR. GRIFFITH: That's wrong.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, none of these are wrong, but if you have any insight of this, if you saw it or in discussions about it, why, then would they want to come out with something that says they had 45 minutes advance notice when they didn't get it until after the fact?

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MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: It doesn't make any sense.

MR. KARA: Did the 9:16 time come up in your discussion with General Arnold? A very early notification--

MR. GRIFFITH: Larry and I didn't talk about, you know, that particular level of detail--we didn't sit down, with, you know, numbers.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: What we talked about was, hey, your bosses and my bosses are saying things, you know, we're the guys that are supposed to fix it, so let's fix it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the DEN pretty much addressed many of the [unintell.]

MR. GRIFFITH: I think so.

MR. AZZARELLO: People like it and people praise it when we go out to the centers and the TRACONS. Do you have anything else, let me-- Jeff, you're a wealth of experience, I'll ask you one final question we ask everyone. You are the

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Commissioners and you've got to make recommendations to the Congress and the Administration on changes to make that haven't already been implemented, things like the DEN. Or maybe it's even equipment or technology that you think should be available now, to the military or FAA. Anything from resources to equipment and technology, to procedural or substantive changes as it affects the aviation industry that you think haven't been made and could be made to make the country safer to either mitigate the damages from a potential future attack, terrorist attack, using aircraft or this industry, or to prevent one way or the other.

I know preventing is hard and the easiest way is to keep them off the plane or from coming into the country. But either on prevention or mitigation, you have a wealth of experience. You have a military background, you have many years at the FAA. Anything you'd like to see done that from your perspective you think could be done as practical that would make the safety of the system

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and mitigate damage in a future attack if it should happen. And it's a tough question to just ask on the spot and expect you to come up with, I know generally people would like to reflect on that. And so, to the extent that you want to reflect on that and you think of things in, you know, the coming weeks even before we close out our Commission work, you have Miles Kara's card, we really do encourage you to call, Miles or any one of us and say, you know, what, I thought about this it's a serious question, it's a good question, and these are the recommendations that I would make if I were the Commission to enhance the safety of the system.

So, I don't want to put you on the spot now and say you've gotta come up with something, now, I'd like the benefit of your reflection and your thoughts. Because you've got a lot of experience. Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I'll think about that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, if there's something

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you think of--

MR. GRIFFITH: I'll tell you where my brain takes me. It takes me to immediate notification, so that and notification to the right place. And that's one of the things that we tried to do with that order when we put it out and said any unexplained heading change, altitude change, et cetera, report immediately

MR. AZZARELLO: When the new orders went they're going to constantly be modified adding moved in to look for, you mean.

MS. SULLIVAN: They were all put out, right, to all the centers?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah, because Mike and I sat down and said, look, we've got to get something out before we start the system up. So Mike, I said put this order out, Mike, it's got to cover at least this. And he did, he did a good job.

But then, you know, you know, I just have to think back to what these controllers were going through. Those airplanes did what they did, and,

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you know--it's what, 8:30, 9:00 o'clock interest he morning whatever it was when these guys were working these airplanes. It's a busy time in the morning for center controllers. Some of them were working 20 airplanes, you know, and--

MR. AZZARELLO: We can say the Indie Center guy was working about--approximately 16 aircraft and John who was here before, John Farmer, Dana interviewed the controller who had 93 on his screen--

MS. SULLIVAN: Out of Cleveland.

MR. AZZARELLO: Cleveland, I'm sorry right.

MS. SULLIVAN: He had--

MR. AZZARELLO: He did an incredible job--

MS. SULLIVAN: Marine sector, marine center?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: He did from what, from looking at the tapes and listening and their interviewing him, he did just an incredible job of feverishly moving anything and everything that

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was--

MS. SULLIVAN: It's tough work being a controller.

MR. GRIFFITH: But, you know, so the FAA's the only [unintell.] now, you know, and everybody's fighting over dollars. I'm looking at the 05 budget talks and all that. Everybody's fighting, well, we're going to take a half a million away from you or, excuse me, a half a billion away from you and all that.

But, you know, I ran that budget for three years the F&E budget for the Air Traffic Organization about modernization and, you know, when the FAA is bringing new technology into the operational environment, it's already ten years old, you know. Because you're gone through so many processes of the acquisition and so many processes of budget and, you know, you've got this much money this year, you plan on this much next year, well, wait a minute, you know, Congress says, no, you're going to get this.

And until the FAA gets a capability to

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mange it's own budget, I mean, you can have congressional oversight from the DOT or OMB, anybody else, but, until they get a fair shot at raising their hand and saying, okay, I've identified where my problems are, and I've identified what needs to be done to fix them. Now, give me the dollars to go fix them, you know, instead of saying, oh, okay we'll get to it in ten years.

And by the way, when you put in front of the controller in ten years, it's already ten years old.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're suggesting we just streamline the process.

MR. GRIFFITH: Conformance monitoring should not be a controller responsibility. Controllers are separating airplanes. So, airplane down in this corner of their sector which is this big, you know, comes in reports in, says I'm here, okay you're here, I check your altitude, I check your real flight, you're clear, you can get all the way through my sector without me having to talk to

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you again.

I got 18 other airplanes that are climbing and descending and pointed at each other, but I've already in my mind decided that this airplane can get from here to there in the next ten minutes and I don't have to do a thing with them. Okay, so what am I doing? I'm separating airplanes.

Well, if that airplane turns around and goes the other way, it might be three minutes before that controller notices it, because they're marking strips and they're doing keyboard entries, and they're talking, they're coordinating, you know. So, automate conformance monitoring, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, look at American 11, the same controller who was tracking it as a primary before it crashed happened to the unlucky guy to have 175 get hijacked on the same screen on his watch.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, so automate conformance and make the system do something when it occurs. In other words, you know, just because

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a controller filters out primary radar, doesn't mean the system doesn't have primary radar on that aircraft, it just means the controller's not watching it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're saying, are you saying, let's see if I can understand how that can work in practice. So, you're saying, like, let's say, the controller's watching a flight to the left of the screen and it's transponding and one to the right turns its transponder off and goes primary have the system signal him.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, put up a red flag.

MR. AZZARELLO: Start beeping, red flags up--

MR. GRIFFITH: And have the computer automatically seek and find the primary target that's somewhere in that system down in the basement and track it. Don't make it a controller responsibility.

MR. KARA: Well, that comes back to the day when the primary's in the system, but it's for whatever reason.

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MR. AZZARELLO: It's the 77 issue--it's--

MR. GRIFFITH: It's not there for air traffic control, it's there for issues unfortunately that involve bad guys. So, you know, don't make a controller say, oh, while you're separating those 17, 18 or some controllers separate 30 airplanes, you know, while, you're doing that, oh, by the way, if you don't see this guy make a 180 and get outta Dodge, you know, you're fired. Let--and it could be done, I mean, I do a lot of automation work now, you know, in the private sector, it can be done.

MR. AZZARELLO: Hadn't heard that one before. That would--

MR. KARA: What that the private sector can do it or that--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, the suggestion to get that suggestion.

MR. KARA: We're concluding the interview.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

LINDA SCHUESSLER

BY

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN AZZARELLO

SPECIAL AGENT MILES KARA

SPECIAL AGENT KEVIN SCHAEFFER

SPECIAL AGENT JEFF BROWN

BROOKE LEWIS, FAA COUNSEL'S OFFICE

Tuesday, April 6, 2004

2:28 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's Tuesday, April 6. We're at FAA headquarters about to begin an interview with Linda Schuessler. I'm John AZZARELLO, Team 8, 9-11 Commission.

MR. SHAEFFER: Kevin Shaeffer, 9-11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9-11 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9-11 Commission.

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis, Office of the Chief Counsel, FAA.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Linda Schuessler, FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Linda, could you just for the record spell your last name?

MS. SCHUESSLER: S-c-h-u-e-s-s-l-e-r.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could you sort of start off, Linda, by giving us an overview of your career with the FAA, the various positions you've held along the way with brief descriptions, and then when we get to 9-11, tell us what position you held that day, and then we'll go in a little more detail in what duties are attended to that position.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay. I was hired in the FAA in 1974 as an air traffic controller in the Atlanta Center. And I've spent the majority of my career in Atlanta Center. I held numerous staff positions, first-line supervisor, area manager, assistant manager for air station procedures, assistant manager for training. I was also the assistant manager for the air traffic facility and would detail to the air traffic manager for a period of--in total, I don't know, eight or nine months.

Subsequent to that, I came to Washington headquarters. I was the assistant division manager for in-route and terminal procedures.

MR. AZZARELLO: When did you get to headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: 1998.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you at that Atlanta in-route center then from '74 to '98?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, when--a couple of other positions that I held I went also to the Southern Region headquarters. During that time

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span, I think probably the first stint in the Southern Region was somewhere around 1985, 1986. This is as a standardization and certification specialist.

MR. AZZARELLO: At the Southern Region headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where is that located?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That is also in Atlanta. Subsequent to that, I went back to Atlanta Center, what position I can't tell you at this point, you know, one of the positions that I've named. I went back to a facilities and equipment specialist back in Southern Region headquarters prior to going back to Atlanta Center I believe as a first-line supervisor.

So in headquarters initially I came up here as a assistant division manager for in-route and terminal procedures. Subsequent to that I went out to the Command Center as I believe the efficiency--you're not going to hold me to these titles now--manager for Efficiency. Then also at

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the Command Center, manager for tactical operations. And as a manager for Tactical Operations, that means I'm the facility manager for the Command Center, and that's where I was on September 11th.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's go back up to '98. At FAA headquarters, you're assistant division manager for in-route--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And terminal air traffic procedures.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could you give us just a little idea of what that role consisted of?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was national oversight for the procedures used in the air traffic control facilities in the country. That also included runway--program, and at the time, contract tower program as well.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're involved in runway-- program?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Federal contract towers and the development and implementation of air traffic control procedures.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Federal contract towers. Is that--I think we visited one--the tower off of Cape--at Otis? Is that a federal contract tower?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I don't know. I'd have to go back and look at records, but there are numerous contract towers throughout the national air space system. And they're contracted out and certainly the FAA oversees--

MR. AZZARELLO: The performance?

MS. SCHUESSLER: --the performance and management of those facilities.

MR. KARA: Does that include the military-run towers, like for example Langley is a military-run tower?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, it does not.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you were working at the FAA headquarters in that position and you were also working on the overall efficiency of the air traffic system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: At the Command Center, there were two--

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm sorry. I'm talking

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about headquarters.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're not in that position--overall efficiency of that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's part of it, but it was certainly not a major part of that particular role.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so then we'll call it the headquarters. I'm sorry, the Command Center. You got there around roughly what year?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was May of 2000.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's when you started at that Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I believe so.

MR. AZZARELLO: We won't hold you to the month. Roughly. What was your first position at Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was the division manager for efficiency.

MR. AZZARELLO: And just jumping ahead a little bit for a second. Is that the position you held on 9-11?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Let's start with that one then.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Division manager for Efficiency. Just give us a general idea of what the day-to-day functions are.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Day to day, it was the management of the administrative staff that included training, quality assurance and procedures and automation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Management you said of the administrative staff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Pretty much. The administrative staff which consisted of quality assurance, training, procedures and automation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Quality assurance, procedures--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Training and automation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair then to assume that you were not involved in--how involved were you in the operation of--

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Certainly you've got to be involved in the operation to be able to develop procedures and training, but I did have a peer and that was John White, and he was the manager for tactical operations, and subsequent to this position, and I believe it was somewhere in the December, January time frame, John and I were assigned the different roles, and I became the manager for tactical operations, and he became the manager--division manager for the efficiency.

MR. AZZARELLO: For efficiency. Okay, now when did that occur then?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I believe it was December, January time frame.

MR. AZZARELLO: Of--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, January, '01, December '00.

MR. AZZARELLO: So at that point you become division manager--

MS. SCHUESSLER: For tactical operations.

MR. KARA: Was one of those two position more senior than the other?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Not more senior. They're peers. However, the division manager for tactical operations is considered the facility manager. So they're responsible for the entire facility, although as a peer, you are responsible for again the training procedures type of oversight.

MR. AZZARELLO: And John White was--if I'm mistaken, correct me--John White fell more into the role you had in May of 2000 at that point?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was some of the roles and functions you filled in that position as tactical operations manager?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again, as the facility manager, so, yes, I was responsible for the day-to-day operation and the operational quotas, but I was also responsible for the integration, for instance, of some of the products and services that were being provided by John and his staff.

MR. AZZARELLO: I assume there's a lot of overlap and interplay then between John and yourself.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Very much independent services and products that we have to work very close with together.

MR. AZZARELLO: In terms of an operational issue, he would be the boss of the operations?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about Jack Keyes? Where does he fit in this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Jack Keyes was the program manager, so he was responsible for the traffic management program itself. And so he was the superior for John White and myself.

MR. AZZARELLO: The program manager?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what are his--outline just briefly for us his various responsibilities as program manager.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, a program manager--he's the program manager for the traffic management functions throughout the national air space system, whereas John and I, we did have oversight on some of the facilities in the fields.

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Our main focus was the Command Center proper itself.

MR. AZZARELLO: So Jack's focus would be on a national global or a national sort of level, and your focus is a little more than operation of the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Most of our focus is on the Command Center, but in order to be focused on the Command Center, you have to understand the role of the Command Center because they do provide the umbrella organization for all the traffic management in the national air space system. So for instance if there were disagreements between the field facility as far as the traffic management, the initiative that needed to take place, the Command Center holds the trump card in making that determination what is to be accomplished.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair for me to assume, and I'll ask for your comments on this, but is it fair for me to assume that in your position in January, '01 as tactical operations manager that

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you would have a full and complete--would have to have a full and complete understanding of the operations on the field level, for the in-route center level and the Tracon level, and, you know, the terminal approach?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think so because again we're an independent--interdependent system. So the calls that we would make at the Command Center, we would need to understand the impact, but we would have not only on the field facilities but on the customers as well.

MR. AZZARELLO: If there was an operational decision that needed to be made and you were at the Command Center as well as Jack Keyes, would you have the ultimate decision on that, or be on your own accord, or would you have to consult with Jack Keyes on it?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I would have the decision-making authority, but certainly there would be decisions if he were in the facility that I would consult with him prior to making that determination. But from an operational

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perspective, tactical operational perspective generally speaking, even if he was in the facility, I would make that decision.

MR. AZZARELLO: Day-to-day routine stuff you wouldn't necessarily consult him on, is it fair to say?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Issues that bear importance you would--is it fair for me to assume those maybe you would consult with him if he were there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: More strategic type decisions that might need to be made, you know, so we can make plans for the future in the traffic management world, you know, what impact it would have on customers long-term, what impact it would have on field facilities, what impact it would have on the Command Center. Again, more strategic type decisions. Certainly we would sit down in consultation and work through those issues.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you a question about the relationship between the Command Center

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within the FAA and the airline companies. Was there any one of either yourself, John White, or Jack Keyes that was responsible for sort of overseeing that area, the relationship between the company airlines and--as it affected the business of the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, we don't--well, as you know, we don't oversee the airlines. We work in consultation with them and a lot of Jack's role would be to work with airlines at his peer level, but that's not to say that John and I also wouldn't have discussions and routine phone calls with airlines as well. Again it depends on the issue at hand and what needs to be done. If it's tactical, certainly John and I would handle it. If it was more long-term type concerns and issues, it might Jack. It may be the three of us.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about the relationship between the Command Center and headquarters? Can you give me a description of what that relationship was in 2001?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, the Command Center

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is a headquarters facility. Even though it's out in the field, it is considered a headquarters facility. So if you're asking was a management member of the headquarters staff, yes, as well as we were.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that considered a headquarters facility?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, it is.

MR. KARA: What is the showup on this--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, so if you're look at under Air Traffic Services, under Air Traffic Service, we did have several programs at the time. One of those happened to be the program that Jack was responsible for, and that was for--I've forgotten the exact title.

MR. KARA: So was he a direct report to Bill Peacock or to Challen?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, actually he was a direct report at the time to Jeff Griffith who was the deputy for Air Traffic Services.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then Bill Peacock was

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Jeff Griffith's superior.

MR.KARA: Right.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then Challen was Peacock's superior.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So Keyes would report to Peacock and Griffith.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thank you. Well, let's say not a long-term range but on a tactical operational decision that was of a great magnitude, let's say, like the nature of 9-11 was, there were major aircraftings. For operational purposes, would Jeff Griffith be the, say, point of contact for Jack Keyes and upper management level to coordinate a major operational issue?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That would be his direct superior, and certainly if Jeff was not available, he would go through Mr. Peacock and, you know, continue on up the chain.

MR. SCHAEFFER: As the tactical operations manager at Herndon Command Center, did you have

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any--counterpart within a WOC or within headquarters here?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Want to focus now actually on pre 9-11 procedures and protocol. What was your understanding of the procedures and protocol in place for a highjacking pre-911, both in a macro sense and as a role if any that the Command Center had?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Pre-911, we did have procedures in place for a specific transponder code to be squawked, and I think you've probably also seen documentation as far as the--if it needed to be relayed covertly, you know, to use the word trip. Also included in that directive was procedures to have--also send a message to air traffic controllers if necessary.

And pre-911 I think the indication that when an aircraft was hijacked, that the people that commanded the aircraft would be to take it some place and land it safely. So most of the procedures were geared for that type of handling of

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the aircraft in a hijack situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take us through the procedures. Take us through, let's say, pre-9-11 from a control level. Let's work with the scenario where a controller that is screened, and he has reason to believe for whatever he observes or she observes, they believe they have a hijack on their hands.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now take us through how that gets from the controller to the upper executive management decision.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay. Specifically since my background is a Center controller, if I was a Center controller working and I observed 7500 on the radar screen, certainly I would try and alert the supervisor to come work with me, but I would also be talking to the pilot to confirm that they meant to squawk 7500. And there our procedures in place if they do not respond, or if they respond, you know, covertly with their call sign and use--behind it rather than confirm, yes, we're

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squawking 7500, then we would take appropriate action. And in this particular case, that appropriate action would be the supervisor would notify the operations manager at the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's the--position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then the operations manager would inform in the region the Regional Operations Center, and then they would inform headquarters.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it goes from the facility OMEC to the region?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And when the OMEC notifies the region, is he calling like a 24--an equivalent of a ROC, like a 24/7 ops--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. That's exactly what it is. And concurrently, you know, they would be also notifying their management chain. You know, they would be notifying--you know, we've done some realignment since September 11th, but at the

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time, they would've also been notifying their superiors in the Air Traffic divisions in the regions as well as notifying the ROC.

MR. AZZARELLO: You need to help us with this, this terminology. The ROC. That would be the operational center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, Regional Operations Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's the ROC, and that's like equivalent analysis to the WOC?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Exactly, exactly. So you've got nine regions and so you've got nine ROCs. And they're a 24/7 facility, and they're responsible for gathering this type of information, and they would forward it to the the headquarters operations center.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it would go from the ROC then to the WOC.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the ROC would notify the WOC of a hijack.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right. And, of course,

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I'm not the expert piece here. You would have to also find out people that worked the ROC, what other notifications did they make, but I do know they notified the WOC. So headquarters personnel are cognizant of the situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do the ROC's have their own written protocol for informing hijacks that you're aware?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know. You'd have to find out from them.

MR. AZZARELLO: From a ROC facility.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. We've seen documentation at a controller level on the FAA orders and the protocol--followed. I think it's the--

MR. SCHAEFFER: On the WOC, do they simultaneously inform the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Pre-911, there was not I don't believe a process in place. Typically what would happen would be the Command Center would be notified by the facility. But again the Command

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Center pre-911 didn't really have a role to play in hijack situations per se because the WOC would be notified, and at the headquarters level, we had a hijack coordinator who at that point would work through the hijack situation. And they would be the individual responsible for notifying DOD components of the situation and ask for an escort if that would be necessary.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Is that normally because the Command Center then has to continue squawking with the facility, the effected facility--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably.

MR. SCHAEFFER: --get that information to the Command Center.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the Command Center will become aware of it because they have this sort of interaction with the field facilities.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: We're looking at this part of--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Some of the thought

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process there is the Command Center is responsible for, you know, the flow of traffic through the net, so this could be a disruption in the traffic. Therefore, it would be a natural inclination to notify the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: For example, you're saying in a traditional hijacking scenario for commercial aircraft hijacking, I'm going to take it all through, say, from--they're supposed to go to Boston. They're going to take it to Cuba, you'd have to coordinate, you're saying, other aircraft and keep it clear and that will be to a Command Center.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Sure. Well, the local facility would do that, but it would also have an impact, you know, because just because you're moving one aircraft or two aircrafts, you would have an impact on the flow of the net to the Command Center and would become cognizant of it, and if necessary, take some national initiatives.

MR. AZZARELLO: Reference the controllers' guidance for a hijack procedure, would that be part

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of the 7210.3 where it talks about air piracy?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It would probably be both in the .3 and also the .65, and we also had a long-standing order how to handle hijack procedures.

MR. AZZARELLO: Looking now at 7110.65 and Section 10-2-6, Hijacked Aircraft. In reading that, I highlighted here in yellow. It says, "Notify supervisory personnel of the situation." So that would have applied, correct--is that what you're referenced earlier--you're the controller. You see this hijacked squawk code--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. One of the first things you do is try, you know, and bring your supervisor--make your supervisor aware of the situation. As you are handling the situation, the supervisor can ascertain as well, you know, whether you need any other assistance.

MR. AZZARELLO: Help us with understanding on the basis for the understanding that goes then from the supervisor to the OMEC, and how do we get from the OMEC at the field facility to the ROC and

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the WOC. We've heard that described before as the understood protocol. Is that understood just as a matter of practice, or is that whole chain of notification also in a document somewhere because we haven't seen any document that says well, the supervisor then has the obligation to notify the ROC and then the ROC notifies the WOC?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I'd have to look and see in the .3, but certainly it is common practice if it is not documented in most of the FOP's and at operational quarters that the Operations manager, when they have significant events, then I believe it's documented in the .3. I would have to find it. Any significant event would be forwarded to the WOC.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you think it would be in this same 7110 or the 72--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think it's probably in the .3 that indicates that you would forward any--

MR. SCHAEFFER: I got--instead of .3--what is it John?

MR. AZZARELLO: 7210.3--

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MS. SCHUESSLER: 7210.3, I believe is probably procedures outlined in there that give guidance to facilities when they need to elevate a significant event.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that should have some written guidance or protocol for Centers' obligations to notify their superior in the event of a hijack?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess it would be a Center or any field facility including Tracon.

MS. SCHUESSLER: But typically Tracon's route that information through the Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about after--we've been told at the Center levels--I think Miles, we were at one Center visit where you saw a sort of a book like this, a binder, the Center had with I guess their procedures and their protocol in it. Would that be protocol for hijackings? Are they required to be kept at the Centers too, like sort of on-hand, or is that something that doesn't have to be kept, just either kept or understood? Let me

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just back off and ask you this. Those procedures to the extent they're in 7210.3, would they be uniform in terms of--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. So it wouldn't be that the Centers had--different Centers would have different protocol then?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, they should not--you know, the 72.3 is national direction and guidance to all the facilities.

MR. AZZARELLO: It should be uniform guidance.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. BROWN: John, this is the name of the manual that you're referring to.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Facility Operation--Manual?

MR. BROWN: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: What's the number on that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: 7210.3.

MR. AZZARELLO: The section that I had--the part that I had showed you was .3R. Is

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that just one of the chapters within the--is that the relevant chapter or--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, when you say R without looking at the title--because throughout the year, we do revisions and updates to the handbook, and usually at the very front of each handbook, it tells you when the revisions are. And until a new handbook is put in place, they will put letters behind it. So that's revision R.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, and then at--

MS. SCHUESSLER: If that's what it is.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then a subsequent revision might be .3S?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: .3S.

MR. AZZARELLO: .3S.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now you sort of outlined the procedures only up to the WOC in the event of a hijack pre-9-11. And our understanding is the Command Center didn't have a defined role other

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than obviously being affected by the flow of traffic. Is that accurate?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's accurate.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would one of the Command Center stood up for operations--

MS. SCHUESSLER: The Command Center that you visited has been in operation for 10 years. There was a smaller version of what we used to call flow control in headquarters, and I don't know the exact standup date of that particular facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: But the new one that we were at at Herndon, 1994 that opened?

MS. SCHUESSLER: 10 years, yeah. They just celebrated their 10th year anniversary.

MR. AZZARELLO: And prior to that, there was a smaller version?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, there was a smaller version here in headquarters.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how long was that at headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I don't know. You'd have to validate that with someone else.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if the hijack protocols that are spelled out in the 7610.4 is the special military operations, escort of hijacked escort? Do you know if that was drafted before or after the new Command Center was opened in '94?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, gosh, I wouldn't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, wouldn't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'll leave this out, though, because you mentioned the hijack coordinator pre-9-11. Is this the chapter of the FAA orders, Order 7610.4, special military operations, that lays out and defines the role of a hijack coordinator?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, but I can't tell from this whether this was pre-9-11, post-9-11. I don't have the date on here, but just looking at it, outlines what we have talked about pre-11, pre-September 11th is far as the hijack coordinator. "The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact

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with the National Military Command Center."

MR. SCHAEFFER: And then for the 7610.4 as it existed on 9-11, those are--the legacy of those regulations are kept in tact, right? You'd be able to get that if it existed.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right. Yes, we should.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think our understanding is that this was provided to us as the one that was in existence on 9-11. Is there any way we can verify that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, we can. You know, I just don't see dates--you know, aviation--yeah, you can see the directive and the date. This is a different directive than the 7610.4. And I don't see any dates on here. That's the reason I'm saying I'm not sure exactly whether this is pre or post September 11th.

MR. AZZARELLO: So these generally don't have a date on them. Do you know what the mechanism would be for instance?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That I don't know. We'd have to look and see whether they were just

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inadvertently--

MR. SCHAEFFER: --that's after 7, so it would probably be up front maybe on the whole thing--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, it certainly would be on the cover, but you don't have the cover here. But some of these other directives have it up at the top.

MR. AZZARELLO: If we maybe at the conclusion of our meeting today--of our interview, if I can get a copy of this to you and maybe you can confirm for us then whether or not that was the one in place on 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, we can do that.

MR. KARA: On my copy, which we pulled off the Internet and this states the date we pulled it off the Internet, but at the end of the URL, it says 07-01. Would that be July, '01 perhaps?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Maybe. I don't know. We can go back and validate that.

MR. AZZARELLO: So your understanding then of the role of the hijack coordinator, is that

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someone--is that a position held at headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. Someone that is head of the Security organization.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what in your words is the description of that person's role as it affects enlisting the assistance of the military in the event of a hijack?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, you know, again looking at that documentation, and I believe this was probably--if not the document that was in effect, it was very, very similar. And that is that individual would be the coordinating individual to work with DOD, you know, to ascertain what actions need to be taken, and certainly if we needed escort assistance, that they would make that request.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the coordinator would work with DOD to coordinate a military response?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: On 9-11, what was your understanding as to who the hijack coordinator was at headquarters?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know who that was. And of course again from my role in the Command Center, nor would I know who that was at the time, you know, because I was going through the Air Traffic chain, management chain rather than working directly with that individual.

MR. SCHAEFFER: I'm not sure I understand it. I don't think we've seen it in terms of laying out--in terms of a traditional pre-9-11 hijacking. And the role of the Command Center there, you mentioned that you didn't think there was any like--protocol for the ROC to notify the Command Center, but the Command Center would likely get awareness of that because of the time at the facilities, but the WOC, definitely there was protocol to notify the WOC. Once that notification, you have to deal with the hijacking, what role then did the Command Center play in, say, the aircraft that's going to land at a given airport asked and things like that. Was that--anywhere in terms of the Command Center's role once you have to deal with a hijack scenario?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, you will find in all our directives that it talks about making decisions and on best information that you have got. So there probably, to my knowledge, there was not any documentation that said in a hijack situation the Command Center shall do bump, bump, bump, bump. So what we do is make our best judgement call. So typically the Command Center's role is to monitor the flow of traffic in the national air space. So the example that you used, John, if you say you've got an aircraft at Boston that a request is made that we're now going to Cuba. Certainly the local facilities would work through because they're talking to the pilots right there and make sure that the pilots are out of the way. But from a Command Center perspective, they would also be involved in working with the local facilities to see what we needed to do with the national flow of traffic. So we would keep all that traffic out of the way. But from a tactical perspective, the field facilities are talking to the pilots and moving the aircraft.

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MR. SCHAEFFER: And then when there's a tactical operations manager in that scenario that we're talking about that wanted to go to Cuba, does that individual assume a role of connectivity between the WOC or headquarters here to take direction? I'm assuming that headquarters is not going to direct the facilities that they've got to go through the conduit of the Command Center. So who within the Command Center becomes the--I assume it's a tactical operations chain.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, it would either be the tactical operations manager or the NOM on duty, the National Operations manager, you know. As far as protocol, what would be set up, you know, you would have various telecons set up to provide the direction and guidance from headquarters. So we would probably have, you know, either Bill Peacock or Jeff Griffith on the phone talking to the Command Centers saying these are the decisions that we're making, and therefore we need to do whatever actions we need to take. And we'd be working that in concert with headquarters and the Command Center

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and then taking the appropriate actions with the local facilities.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the hijack coordinator on 9-11, you said you did not know who it was then, and I guess you say in your position, it wouldn't be someone then you'd be required to know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, not really because we'd be working it through the Air Traffic chain.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just asking you to do me a favor and take a look at the document and understanding the titles and the hierarchy of FAA headquarters. Could you tell me by reading first the introduction what position, what office that the FAA hijack coordinator is defined as? As what office or what person would hold that position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, I believe it to be in the--the designate in the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so ACS would be the office.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, Miles, do you have

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your chart?

MR. KARA: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be the associate administrator's office in Civil Aviation Security?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, and again, I know they've also done some restructuring since September 11th.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would the associate administrator for ACS would that be the equivalent of a director?

MS. SCHUESSLER: You'd have to ask them. I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Ask who?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I would start with Lynne Osmus. She is now the associate administrator for Security. So she would have that background and knowledge.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you're reading on this would be someone in the Associate Administrator's office for Civil Aviation Security that would be deemed the hijack coordinator as defined here.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and in the manual,
7610.4.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have an
understanding on 9-11 or prior to 9-11 the
relationship of the Office of Civil Aviation
Security intelligence and operations levels?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know who held the
highest position in those offices on 9-11, ACI1 and
ACL1?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. What about Lee
Longmeyer? Did you know Lee Longmeyer?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I knew of him and,
you know, several other names, but I couldn't--I'm
not sure on September 11th or even before or
shortly thereafter I could've told you the names of
the individuals because that was not--those were
not the people that I typically would interact
with.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Who would you most frequently interact with in headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, you know most of my interaction would be with the Air Traffic world, so at the associate administrator level, if you look at this organizational chart, peer to peer you're looking at Peter Challen and Steve Brown being the peer of the associate administrator up here. So those two individuals would have perhaps daily or routine contact.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who would you have routine contact with in Air Traffic and Air Traffic Services?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again Bill Peacock and Jeff Griffith.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be your most frequent points of contact in Air Traffic.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about do you have an understanding--did you pre-9-11, Linda, as to where headquarters in the event of a hijacking pre-9-11, where would headquarters look to to gain the best

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realtime situational awareness of the air traffic situation as it affected the hijacking?

MS. SCHUESSLER: From a headquarters perspective, you know, when the administrator would become involved in this type of a situation, they would turn to the Air Traffic Services organization. And then subsequent to that, it would roll down to Air Traffic Service, again Bill Peacock and Jeff Griffith. They would reach out to the appropriate facility. It may be the Command Center in some cases. It may be a local facility in others.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it would depend on the situation as to where they reached out to in the field to get realtime situational awareness?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And were you to come from a field facility or you said a Command Center could be too?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about prior to 9-11, your knowledge of hijack training as it existed?

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Let's start at a field facility level, at a Center, and Tracon level. Did you have any understanding as to the nature of the training that was implemented at all at the field facility levels for hijacks pre-9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think most facilities routinely what we call refresher training would include hijack procedures in the refresher training.

MR. AZZARELLO: What type of training would that be?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Refresher training, we have several different types of training we call refresher training. Those procedures that just need to be reviewed periodically.

MR. AZZARELLO: So is that--that training is you have to review the written materials of the protocol as it affected among other things--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think each facility tailored it to what might be appropriate. It might be that you reviewed the written documentation. It might be classroom style. It

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might be computer-based instruction. Whatever they deemed appropriate for that particular facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: So--cover the gamut of training mechanisms. You have basically just--one method would be to review the protocol in place, and I guess what would happen? Would they have to sign off that they reviewed the appropriate protocol?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you mentioned I think there would be classroom training?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It would be classroom training. There could be team training where, you know, a supervisor with a group of controllers that he or she is responsible for might review various documents.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you mentioned computer training. Would that be equivalent to what people refer to as dynamic simulated computer dysam?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It could be dysam, but, no, what I was speaking to more so was a PC-based, computer-based instruction. CBI is what we call

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it.

MR. AZZARELLO: CBI?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: How does that work? Can you give us sort of an example?

MS. SCHUESSLER: You have lesson plans that a controller can go in and sign in and take a lesson off a computer, answer questions, get positive, negative re-enforcement depending on the answers that they give.

MR. AZZARELLO: Such as posing questions to you, or is it--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, it can be posed a question and let's say you get the answer wrong, and they come back and say, no, that's not correct. Here's the answer and here this is why the answer is correct for instance.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about prior to 9-11, do you know if the facilities also had training whereby a controller would sit at a computer and simulate a hijack? And specifically I mean they're looking at a computer screen with squawking

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transponding aircraft in their assigned space, and then all of a sudden, let's say, one squawked 7500.

MS. SCHUESSLER: It's possible, but I don't know for sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about when you were in Atlanta in the in-route Center? What types of training did you participate in or have knowledge of then at the Center level when you were in Atlanta?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Just as I spoke of, you know, various types that we just mentioned.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they have at that--in Atlanta, did they have a computer dynamic simulator in its areas where a controller goes sits at the computer as if--at a radar screen like a real-life--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did any of that training--was there any hijack training pre-9-11 that occurred at the Command Center when you were there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember. We'd

have to go back and check any records.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you recall that being a part of the regular training? Do you have a regular training program?

MS. SCHUESSLER: There is a regular training program out there and, you know, that training would be documented, but I couldn't tell you whether that was part of the training or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't recall one way or the other whether hijacking was a scenario training at the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, it wasn't a scenario that was training because that at the Command Center, you do not have the radar screens like you would at the in-route facilities to do the simulation that you just mentioned.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, well, do you recall one way or another whether it was trained in a sense of okay, here's a report of a hijack and it's coming from Cleveland Center and it's come into Command Center. Okay, now, let's follow that through. What's the role of the Command Center?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: That type of training I don't believe was conducted, but you would have to validate that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we can validate that through you say records of part of training--

MS. SCHUESSLER: You could go back and check training records.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't believe I'd ask for those or have those. Is that something when we conclude here you'd help us follow up on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. KARA: I've got a training control question, Linda. I'm sensing that the Air Traffic managers at the in-route centers do not report to the Command Center. They're not direct reports.

MS. SCHUESSLER: That is correct.

MR. KARA: Who is their direct report.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Their direct report, again we restructured, but what we call our assistant division managers, the 501's, and they report through them to the division manager, the 500's. And so then they would report, the 500's in

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the field, would report to Jeff Griffith-

MR. KARA: Jeff Griffith.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --and Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a good point, Miles. Let's just follow that. Let's go back to earlier when we said there would be a hijack, let's say, at a Center level. And I think you mentioned, Linda, that one of the things he would call the ROC.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you also said something about they probably also call Air Managers. Let's say I was an Air Traffic manager at New York. I'm Mike McCormick, and I have a report of a hijacking, and I tell the ROC. Who would be my Air Traffic superior at the region?

MS. SCHUESSLER: In his particular case, it would be Eastern 501, the assistant division manager.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's 501, the position at the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: It used to be. I mean

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all that's been changed now.

MR. KARA: But we're dealing with 9-11--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, correct.

MR. KARA: (Inaudible).

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. SCHAEFFER: So the 501 is at the ROC level?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, the ROC level is actually a position that is in the regional office, and they're in a different line than Air Traffic.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So if we say ZNY, he would report to--the Air Traffic manager would report to AEA 501.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and then 501 reports to AEA 500.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, AEA 501 reports to--was Rick Deshaun, was he the 501 in New York, do you know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. KARA: And then they would report to

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Griffith.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: And you had the same reporting channel out at CC.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: So in general terms as I look at it from the outside in, the Command Center is equivalent to an in-route center in terms of management structure.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. With the exception--it's equivalent, but again the Command Center has 51 percent of the vote if you needed to--

MR. KARA: You got the trump card.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --to do tactical traffic management type issues.

MR. AZZARELLO: Frank Hatfield held our position in the Eastern region.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think you're right.

MR. AZZARELLO: If he was the manager of the region, and that would be AEA 500.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. And, you know, going back to the Command Center training on hijack, remember the Command Center really didn't have a role to play in hijack situations other than to be able to effectively manage the flow of traffic. So whether or not they got trained on hijack procedures, I tend to think not, but I don't know that. There was no reason for them to be trained other than the fact we need to be responsive to moving the flow of traffic if that became necessary.

MR. AZZARELLO: They, you mean the employees at the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about at FAA--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Because they don't talk to pilots.

MR. AZZARELLO: Basically they speak to the Center people?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or the Tracon people.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or the tower people.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: We can cover it all. What about at FAA headquarters? Do you know if pre-9-11 if they had any, if you're aware, did they have any hijack training and drills here where you have to, you know, the WOC gets a call. You got to stand up the crisis center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, that I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're unaware?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: And who would be, if you know, in your view would be the person that we should direct those type inquiries to here?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again you might start with Lynne Osmus from the Security organization. But at the time, I know that the WOC did not report to her, and I don't know who it reported to.

MR. AZZARELLO: So we should check with ACS people. That would be I think ACS1 was Mike

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Canervan and Lynne Osmus from ACS2 on 9-11? Does that ring a bell?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you know if the headquarters WOC had a training program?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That I don't know. Yeah, don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I guess we might not know that generally, but what about specifically. As best you can recall, in your time at the Command Center, did the Command Center participate in a hi-jack training exercise with headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not to my knowledge, but again, you know, if you look at protocol, it wouldn't necessarily mean that we would be involved from a Command Center perspective. It might have been that they played out the roles and responsibilities here at headquarters, you know, without any involvement from the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: When actually I'm not implying that they should have training at the Command Center. And maybe the answer is they

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didn't because it wasn't seen as necessary, given what the protocol was for responding to a hijacking. But I guess just asking for your independent recollection, understanding we have to confirm it with the training records. Is your independent recollection that the Command Center while you were there never participated in a hijack training exercise--headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: With headquarters, I don't remember that occurring, no.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Would the Command Center have been notified that headquarters was participating in training with the facility? Would they be notified of something like that on a regular basis?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I wouldn't say yes or no. I would say not necessarily.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess before we get to the day of, maybe one or two preliminaries and pre-9-11 protocols and procedures, what if there was--let's start with an action, if there was an aircraft action pre-9-11. Would that be something

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that Command Center would be tasked to perform a role in in the event of an accident?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not per se, other than to be involved again in the flow of traffic. It might be, you know, you have an accident. Typically what would happen is a particular airport, for instance, the local facility would, you know, talk to the Command Center and between the two facilities, we'd make sure that we either cleared aircraft in the vicinity or ground-stopped aircraft coming into the facility and got that word out to city aviation community. If it was more widespread than that, more actions were necessary, the Command Center would initiate those traffic management initiatives.

MR. AZZARELLO: And as far as the division responsible for investigating an accident, that would be at headquarters.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: What did they--

MS. SCHUESSLER: At the time, it was AAT20.

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MR. AZZARELLO: AAT20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know who held that office?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes. That was Dave Kenols at the time.

MR. SCHAEFFER: That's the Evaluation Investigation staff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And after 9-11, you went from the Tactical Operations manager at the Command Center since 9-11 to where you are today have been where?

MS. SCHUESSLER: After the Command Center, I also held the job that you just talked about, AAT20.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And when did you go to AAT20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I would say it was probably--and this is real wild guess here--I'm thinking it was probably somewhere in the summer of 2002 maybe.

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MR. AZZARELLO: How long--

MR. SCHAEFFER: The year 2002, not in--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I'm thinking it's
May time frame, 2002.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay. How long did you
hold that position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Let's see. In
November--kind of getting my dates here--in
November. And I'm trying to remember whether it
was 2002. Yes, it had to be. In November of 2002,
I was detailed to the deputy director for Air
Traffic when Jeff Griffith retired. Held that
position for four months. Returned back to AAT20
until I was selected for the deputy director for
Air Traffic Services permanently, and I'm thinking
that was April-May time frame of '03.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you returned to AAT20
until roughly May of '03?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's when you were
appointed a perm position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, but again we've

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undergone a realignment, so in February of this year, my title now is vice president for System Operations.

MR. AZZARELLO: In May of '03, what was your title again?

MS. SCHUESSLER: May of '03, let's see. We went from--what did I just give you?

MR. AZZARELLO: When you left, you went back to AAT20--

MR. SCHAEFFER: VP, Systems Operations Services is current.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right. One prior to, okay. The deputy director for Air Traffic Services.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Same position.

MS. SCHUESSLER: As current?

MR. SCHAEFFER: No, I mean did they just change the name?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So I take it that the AT20 is the deputy director of--

MS. SCHUESSLER: AAT2.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, AAT2, that would be the director for Air Traffic Services?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that equivalent to the position that Griffith held?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were acting for four months and then you went back to AAT20, and then came back as the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Permanently--

MR. AZZARELLO: Permanent--okay. If there is a--if there was an error in separation of the Center or facility level, would that be something at headquarters and Command Center would get involved in?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Command Center would not get involved in that. It would be handled at the local facility level through the regional office to AAT20.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that would fall under Kenols pre-9-11.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you tell us a little bit about the aircraft tracking capabilities at Command Center, the TS--system, traffic situational display? What's your understanding of the nature of that information, the ability? Could you describe to us how one at the Command Center is able to track aircraft if at all through that system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, the Command Center is really not tracking aircraft per se, you know. What you have out at the Command Center is a radar feed from the host data, and again, you're better off talking to an automation specialist rather than myself. But out at the Command Center, that is more for reference rather than certainly for any type of separation use.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's certainly not for radar, right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, that's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who would be, if you would direct us to the guru of the understanding? Who

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would that be?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Tim Grovak.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tim Grovak?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Anybody have any pre-9-11 questions? Let's go to the day of.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you need a break or anything? Are you okay?

MR. AZZARELLO: Want to take a break or anything?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I'm fine.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Want to go to the day of 9-11, and I guess before we get into of where you were and--

MR. KARA: Excuse me. We can use my chart.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: These is just a chart with some names we were able to fill in with the assistance of some of the people who were on duty

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that day on 9-11 at Command Center. We understand that Severe Weather positions. There were numerous of those positions that are up front in the Command Center as you're facing the screens that are on the front wall. And then behind them, we have a position 14 we understand is a New York Center position. To the right of that, 15 was a Boston and Cleveland position, and then 16 to the right of that is a Atlanta, Jacksonville and--

MR. KARA: Miami.

MR. AZZARELLO: Miami. And 25 behind me we understand was Indy Center and D.C. Center. And to the right of that at 26 we understand was the MTMO position. Is that accurate understanding?

MS. SCHUESSLER: If it's not completely accurate, it's very, very close.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there anything there that doesn't sound right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no, I mean it sounds very accurate.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then the 34 position we understand is a NOM. I think we--got from

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Command Center. Yeah, they did find it. 34 would be NOM. 14, New York. So we're just going to leave that up as sort of a reference if we ask you to reference to the day if you were on the floor at a particular point or conversing with somebody. We'll just ask you to reference that on the diagram.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why don't you just start out if you could, Linda, by telling us when you came to work that day, when your shift started, and then when you first became aware that there was a problem with the national air space system regarding a potential hijack and how you became aware of it?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay. Typically my day would start, I don't know 6:15, 6:30 when I reported to work, and I'd go, you know, put things in my office, and then I would go out to the operational quarters, talk to the NOM on duty. Typically it was someone left over from the mid-ship so I could see how the night went. And I

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was also either there when the day shift NOM showed up, so I heard the position relief briefing so I could, you know, get a feel for what the day was going to present, or I would ask the mid-shift person if the day shift person was not there, I needed to go back to my office. You know, I would maybe talk to a few people.

I'd go back to my office. I would review the previous day's log, and I think we've talked about this before. You know, one of the things that we would do on a routine basis is review the previous day. So I'd go back to my office, review the data and then we would have our staff meeting at 8:30.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your staff meeting at 8:30 was to review the previous day's with the staff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, with the staff, you know, but prior to that, you know, I would look at the logs so I could either be prepared to say well, how did this happen, or I think this was a good idea.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that a daily meeting?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, yes. It's a daily meeting.

MR. KARA: And as the facility manager, you led those meetings as opposed to John, or did you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I led the meeting.

MR. KARA: You led the meeting?

MS. SCHUESSLER: And so at 8:30 we would meet. And on that particular day, what I remember that day, it was a day like today. I mean it was gorgeous. It was beautiful, and so a few minutes before 8:30 is where we're gathering to sit down and talk about the previous day's events. Ben Fliney was the NOM--

MR. SCHAEFFER: Ben was the NOM?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Ben was the NOM.

MR. AZZARELLO: You mentioned before mid-shifts and night shifts. How did the NOM's shifts run? How many shifts in a 24-hour period?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, there's typically three, and usually the mid-shift NOM would be--it would not be a NOM, a permanent NOM. It would be

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one of the first line supervisors, one of the NTMO's that would be working the mid-shift.

MR. AZZARELLO: When does the mid-shift go? From when to when?

MS. SCHUESSLER: You'd have to ask them, but, you know, it could be anywhere from, you know, 10 to 6 or 11 to 7, you know, those type shifts.

MR. AZZARELLO: Be overnight?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It'd be the overnight shift.

MR. AZZARELLO: 3 to midnight.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. So I would come in in the morning and, you know, before they got off duty and ask them, you know, how was the evening shift, how was the mid-shift, what do we anticipate occurring for the day.

MR. AZZARELLO: So Ben would have been sort of just starting his shift too that morning.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that meeting starts

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roughly at 8:30 and then--so when you go in that meeting, do you have any knowledge going into that meeting that there's any problem with a hijacked aircraft?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, and that's what I was getting ready to say. If you remember since you've been out to the Command Center, the meeting room that we usually met in was the EOR, which is right out here, remember?

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that where we met yesterday?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's a conference room?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yes, and so the staff would come in there, and typically what you would have is the NOM on duty would come in and actually report out to the previous day's events and also report what we can anticipate for the current day. So on that particular morning just as we are gathering and we're started, Ben comes in and says Linda, I'm just getting word that we may have a hijack in progress. He says I'm going back

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to the floor to monitor the situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would he typically then not be at the meeting when it started then?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: He would have to stay on the floor?

MS. SCHUESSLER: He went back into the operational quarters so he could monitor the situation.

MR. KARA: He was coming to the room for the meeting.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: He would've participated in the meeting, but he found out about a potential hijacking and came in and reported it?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and said this is what we have. And then one of the things that you will find that, you know, we do a pretty good job of sharing information on the status of what is occurring in the national air spaces. I mean that's what he was doing. He says I won't be at the meeting, you know. He didn't use those words,

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but, you know, just that word that we have a possible hijack. I'm going back to the operational quarters to monitor the situation. And that was all right because we had enough other people in the room to review the previous day, and certainly I had looked at the log as well. So we began going through the previous day's log.

MR. SCHAEFFER: In terms of if there's a hijacking, was there a general reaction within the room in terms of--Ben's got it. He's going back to look for--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, he's got it. We had certainly capable people out on the operational quarters and he was the operations manager for the day. Nothing out of the ordinary other than the fact a hijack situation certainly is something that had not occurred in a while, and it beared keeping a close eye on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: At that point, did Ben have any other amplifying information other than a potential hijack in the system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, that's all we knew

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about, and that's all he shared at this point.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall what you personally at that point--I mean you mentioned at that point hadn't been--I guess there hadn't been a hijack in the system in a while. In terms of the opinions that you might've formed at the point, what did you think about the potential of it being an actual hijack versus maybe not, maybe a false report?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't think that I really had an opinion one way or the other. You know, again we had quite capable people on the floor and they would handle it, and if there was anything that became more pertinent for me to be cognizant of, I felt quite comfortable they'd come and inform me. And in fact, that's exactly what happened.

MR. AZZARELLO: What happened?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably within five to 10 minutes, we had a first line supervisor. It was Tommy Pacion (sp) came into the EOR and he says, Linda, he says we've gotten word now that we have a

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possible stabbing of a flight attendant on the hijacked plane. So with that, I disbanded the staff meeting and asked everybody to report to the operational quarters to see what support we needed to give to the operation.

MR. AZZARELLO: So this Tom Pacion reported a possible stabbing of a flight attendant on the reported hijack?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did he say where he learned that from?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't believe that he did, no.

MR. KARA: As--time frame, do you recall if the meeting started on time at 8:30?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so. Pretty close. Maybe a few minutes afterwards.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that report of a possible stabbing of a flight attendant--did that transform from a possible hijack in your mind to an actual one?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Certainly with more

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information that was significant and, you know, on the surface, certainly it appeared to be a very serious situation.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Did you know at that time if it was American Airlines?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you ended the meeting at that point?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Ended the meeting, asked everybody to report to the operational quarters.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the next development with regard to the reported hijack?

MS. SCHUESSLER: So when we reported to the operational quarters, if you remember in the Command Center, we have large screens up front, and one of the capabilities is to put in one of the television channels. And about that time, we had gotten information that CNN was reporting a small general aviation aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. If you also remember out at the Command Center, there's also TV monitors. At some of the consoles we keep the weather channel on. We keep

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CNN, you know, just for any developing aviation type or related situation. So we put I think the center monitor on CNN, and by that point they had already put a camera on the World Trade Center and we could see the smoke, and again they're reporting small general aviation aircraft hitting the World Trade Center.

As typical in any type of incident where you have a crash, it's very common for the local facility and the Command Center to work to move the traffic from that general area, and that's what was occurring in the New York area shortly after that happened.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was Tom Pacion the NTMO that day? Was he one of the NTMO's then?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think he was down in Severe Weather, but you would have to validate that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think we called him a four--three NTMO's? Is that correct on a normal--

MS. SCHUESSLER: On normal, and what I remember was I believe Tommy was down in Severe

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Weather, and you had Mike Ardist in the east area and Ken Smith in the west area.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I guess Arthur Classen was there but I guess who's training that day I think you said?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I really don't remember Arthur being part of that equation right now.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, did they have training, say, one a week for the NTMO positions, or is that a weekly or a monthly training--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, there is periodic training out at the Command Center. Typically on Tuesdays is when the training would occur.

MR. AZZARELLO: So now the screen's on, the center screen's on, and they're reporting a small GA and you see, the I guess the hole on the Tracon, the smoke. What are you personally thinking--how are you processing the report of the small GA aircraft accident with the report of the hijack? Are you acquainting the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. Not acquainting it to it at all.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And are you hearing anything more about the reported hijack at that time and you get back out to the floor?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not that I can recall. What I remember next, though, was the--again with the screen up there seeing another aircraft flying close to the World Trade Center and thinking gosh, they're getting awfully close to do some sightseeing to see what's going on. And that's when it became very obvious at that point that it was a large commercial jet and obviously that one hit the World Trade Center as well.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you remember seeing the second crash carried live by CNN?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Had you heard about that the first reported hijack yet was an American Airline, or you still didn't know what company it was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, didn't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that holds true for when you saw the second crash?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, still didn't know.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Can you tell me again in this time frame is John on the floor as well at that time?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I believe John was on the floor, and Ellen was on the floor. Loraine Lamachka (sp) was on the floor. And again after the second aircraft, we were working with local facilities to ensure that the air space was clear so they could handle the situation at hand. I think at that point, we had issued ground stops going into New York. We were working with local facilities too. They were clearing aircraft out of that general area, you know, the transitioning traffic around that time frame. We did the same thing for Boston Center.

MR. KARA: Let me step back just a second here, Linda.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. KARA: At this point, something has happened to both World Trade Centers. You have a report of a hijacking in the system. You now have

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flushed the managers, if you will, to the operations floor. What becomes the division of labor among yourselves and then John and Ellen and the others?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay. At that point, what I felt we needed to do was, you know, for Ben being the NOM, he needed to help orchestrate what was going on in the operational quarters. He did not have the time nor should he have staffed the NOM position per se, so I asked Ellen if she would staff that position.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which position was this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: The NOM position. That doesn't mean that Ben wasn't the NOM because Ben was the NOM, but he was sitting at the NOM position answering the phone calls because that's where a lot of the incoming calls were coming from. I think by that period of time, a telecon had been established with Air Traffic headquarters, and they had asked for a person to be on that line full-time, and that was John White's role.

MR. AZZARELLO: So John White's role was

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to communicate with headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, and I think he was on the line with Jeff Griffith.

MR. KARA: Lorain?

MS. SCHUESSLER: And Lorain, I don't remember her being, other than a--oh, I know. Lorain was the shadow for John.

MR. KARA: For John White?

MS. SCHUESSLER: For John White, correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you sort of elaborate a little more on the shadow?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Shadow, go-for. So if he needed information to feed headquarters, it might be Lorain going to the appropriate party to ask those pertinent questions or to feed that pertinent information to John so he could relay it to headquarters. That doesn't mean that she was the only one doing that because he was relaying information because I know I talked to him. I know Ben talked to him and some of the other NTMO's talked to him.

MR. BROWN: Can you go back to the

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watching--recall, if you can, where you were. You see the second hit. You're standing there. How soon after then are we talking about these divisions of labor working--how close would you characterize it for that point in time?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I would say it was pretty close only because I think we were all in the operational quarters, and I don't know what this signifies on your map, but that's about where I was standing.

MR. KARA: Center of the--I think the note I have there is the hub of activity.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, because I was going to say that's generally speaking where I was standing, and so as we divided up the labor, you know, we tried to use some of our staff support too to be in supporting roles. If you remember about this same time, we started getting information from field facilities. As I said earlier, field facilities would notify Command Center of situations that may have an impact on the flow of traffic. And this particular case, I think we had

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specialists in the Command Center reaching out to their responsive geographical areas that they're responsible for and asking them, because we had asked them to go out and have them report anything unusual. So at the time, pre-9-11, if an aircraft was off frequency for, you know, a few seconds, a minute or two, you know, it was worthy to keep an eye on, but it was not anything significant that you would become overly concerned with.

On that particular day, we did, or if we were to lose a radar track for a few seconds, because that happens sometimes with what we call radar stitching between sort boxes, etc., we knew it would come back. If it didn't, again we would deal with the situation. So any of those type situations we were telling the field facilities please notify us of those type of unusual events.

MR. KARA: And if I could just two points. Otherwise I'm going to lose my bubble here. Tim Goldback (sp), did Tim also have an operational role out there as part of that management structure?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: He was part of the management structure, and I can't picture Tim being there.

MR. KARA: And at this point, do you see a need, or have you established a--manager between what John White is going to hear from headquarters and what the various positions are going to hear from the field facilities themselves?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, not a deconflicting, but what we were doing--what I was doing was bringing the management team, you know, every few minutes because again, all these positions were staffed. The NTMO's were working with their specialists. Every few minutes I would gather the management team in the middle of the operational quarters and say, okay, what information are you hearing, what is going on, and we would try and put those pieces together. And we explored various options, so, and then I know I'm jumping ahead here, but by the time the decision was made to have all airborne aircraft land, we had already explored that option to say, well, do we

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need to do that. But we didn't think earlier that that decision was warranted with the information we had.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, before we jump further ahead, actually I want to backtrack for a second to go over some other situational awareness. You see the second aircraft go in on the PD, and at the point when you saw that, had you even heard anything about a potential second hijack in the system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, well, as I say, no. I don't know. I don't know, but again, we're operating with the mindset that that first aircraft is a general aviation aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: The mindset is still there. The general aviation aircraft is the first one in--

MR. AZZARELLO: When you see the whole in the building, you're not equating it with a hijacking.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

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MR. AZZARELLO: You don't think the--a small GA.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Sure, sure. I mean that's what CNN is reporting. We've not at the Command Center heard of information to tell us otherwise, and so it's the second aircraft that we visually see of. This is a commercial jet. You can see the commercial jet coming in.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me ask you this then. Did you equate the second crash as you saw--did you equate that with oh, that must be the first reported hijack?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no. I mean hijack to us--a paradigm has changed since September 11th. You know, a hijack in the past has always been somebody is commandeering an aircraft to go to another location, certainly not to hit a building.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the question of if you remember hearing about a second reported hijack prior to seeing the live crash, the second one, wouldn't that be something you think you might remember? I mean having one hijack you referenced

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I think to most people--sort of unusual because there hasn't been one in the system in a while. There were two reported prior to seeing that last--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember when we had notification of the second one, John. I don't know that. All I can tell you is when the second aircraft hit, to equate hijack with that particular incident was not there.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand that. Separate question, though, is that--just so I understand it. My second question was just you remember one way or another whether or not you even heard about a second possible hijack before seeing the crash.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Not sure one way or the other?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no. Don't know.

MR. KARA: Let me approach it a little more globally.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. KARA: Let's say there is emerging

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information within the system about both the first and now a second hijack, and that information is coming up. Would you expect that information to flow to the region from the facility and to headquarters from the facility to headquarters, or from the facility to both headquarters and at Command Center? What was your expectation of the flow of information?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again it's typically, you know, hijack, flow of information would be through the ROC and through the Regional Office up into headquarters.

MR. KARA: And then--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then at some point--

MR. KARA: --John White--would be the expected flow?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably, but we would also probably have some of the specialists in the Traffic Management units in the facilities also calling the Command Center specialist. And see that was the information that we were starting to get in. We were starting to get lost call, we were

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starting to get, you know, losses of radar. We were starting to get bomb threats, all that type of information. So one of the other things that I had one of our staff specialists do was to--there was a white board down in Severe Weather, and Gail Carter was the specialist. I asked her to gather the information of all the aircraft that we had that type of data incoming on--

MR. AZZARELLO: You're referring to--which area is that? 3 and 4?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right in the middle. Yeah, right in the middle of Severe Weather. And then she would track the aircraft by call sign, and she would have the pertinent information that we knew of and was reported to us, and then throughout the course of the, you know, the next couple of hours, we'd have the dispensation of--

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the name?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Gail Carter.

MR. AZZARELLO: Gail Carter?

MR. KARA: This comes back to my point on the confliction, Linda, because you are describing

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that there are going to be two parallel chains. You're going to have the TMU's at the various facilities calling ZBW--TMU will be calling the ZBW position here, but you've still got the formal flow of information down back to John White. And what I perceive based on what you just told me was the management decisions in order to manage it was to set up the whiteboard down--or you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: To try and sort through the information that we were getting. That was part of the whiteboard, but again remember every few minutes, you know, the management team--

MR. KARA: And the huddles if you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right. Would come together and say okay, what have you heard now.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is the whiteboard, is that like an easel of paper? Is that an erasable board?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, it's erasable.

MR. AZZARELLO: Erasable board?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Before you got the word out to all the Centers and field facilities to

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report any unusual circumstances, I'm imagining that something led you to do that, meaning something that did lead you to believe then that what you were seeing on TV was a hijack, an intentional act. How'd you get--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again, I don't make that nexus at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, does anybody at any point tell you or report that Boston Center at some point has reported that they believe that the hijacked aircraft that they reported was the one that went into the tower?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think that came out I'd say much later. I don't know what much means, you know, but all it is is kind of a blur in my mind. You know at some point, yes, I did hear that information, but I can't tell you when.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you saw the second crash on TV live, you were able to recognize it as a commercial airline.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes. Just because of size.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Because of the size of it. What was your thought process at that time? Given the fact that it was a clear day, did you draw any conclusions?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I did. We thought it was--you know, what was going through my mind was they saw an incident. They were trying to get a little bit closer to see what was going on and perhaps misjudged it. You know, again the nexus was not made in our minds, in my mind, as far as the hijack in that particular incident.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you say in the second crash you thought it was accidental? You thought it was a commercial--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Initially, sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: --airliner. Pilot trying to get close to view the damage at the first Trade Center and then--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then certainly I think the normal reaction too was shock and disbelief because pilots don't do something like that.

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MR. SCHAEFFER: Did you think--at all at that point?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: At the Boston position, 15, there was a report. I think it came in from the facility, from their OMEC shortly before 9 a.m., roughly 12, 15 minutes after the first impact that they believe it was one in the same, meaning the crash was the hijack that they reported. So to the best of your recollection, I'm asking you to try and recall it, did that information get to you after you saw the second crash?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember whether it did or not. At some point it did during the day, but I couldn't tell you when.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I mean how wide open should we leave that then? At some point in the day, should we leave that--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, not the later on in the afternoon.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you give us a ballpark?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I don't remember. In my mind, I do not remember it being before the second incident, you know, immediately after the second incident.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about before the Pentagon was hit? Do you remember if it was before the Pentagon was hit it came to your attention that they believed that the facilities had reported that there were two crashes that they thought were connected to the two hijacks?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again, I don't remember, John. I don't remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about--I'm going to press that.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, and--

MR. AZZARELLO: How about before the fourth crash in Pennsylvania?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, and I think, you know, I don't know when the connection was made in my mind. All I can remember was after the second aircraft, obviously it was a commercial. We were getting information coming in about unusual

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situations. We were exploring the options trying to ascertain what we thought was going on in the national air space system. I think some time after the second incident, we did make a decision to ground-stop all the aircraft in the NAD.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who made that decision? After the second incident?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I believe it was after the second incident, and I believe it was made immediately after the second incident because again we were trying to pull all the pieces together. Again most of these decisions were made. They were collective decisions, you know. It wasn't one person that says oh, this needs to happen. We were pulling all the information together.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about New York? Before you get to the national--sequence-wise, where does that fit in with the New York and Boston deciding to ground all their departures?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, without having the time line in front of me, typical protocol would be after an incident of--the first incident, we would

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institute a ground-stop for the New York area and transition the aircraft in the New York air space out of that area so they can deal with the immediate situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Understanding that that's typical--so you say normally even after the first crash, then typically in the New York area, ground-stop departures from New York?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about arrivals and traffic through the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And that's--yeah, and all the transitioning traffic, aircraft that are in air. You would make a determination, okay, can we allow, depending on where the incident happens to occur, can we allow those that are in the air in bound to a particular airport, can they land, or do we need to divert the aircraft. So all those decisions typically are made, and to my recollection were made that day after the first incident. And then it was after--I'm thinking it was after the second incident. We also expanded

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that to the Boston Center air spaces as well.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then--

MR. SCHAEFFER: Just go back to this so I'm clear. I've written it out maybe differently. After the first hit, was a ground-stop instituted or ordered from the Command Center to the New York area, after the first hit?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't think it was ordered from the Command Center. Generally speaking a local facility will work with the Command Center to say this is what we need to implement.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And then through the second incident, just to be clear, was that the same thing? The extension to Boston--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. SCHAEFFER: --that was generated from the Command Center, or was that in conjunction with--

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was an in-concert, you know--and again, you'd have to check the time sequence to get the accurate time.

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MR. AZZARELLO: In tracking that, let's say New York Center after the first or second crash decided they wanted to ground departures, prevent arrivals and not have any traffic to their air space, could they issue that notification, or would they have to go through Command Center for advisors?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, they'd go through the Command Center to get that full dissemination to all the aviation community.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could they do anything of their own accord to start that beforehand?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, they can call the adjacent facilities and implement ground-stops.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they can call the Tracon, the towers, and say we're going to ground-stop everything?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Including no more arrivals and no traffic through the air?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, because they need to handle the immediate situation.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. --Boston.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they could initiate it and then ask the Command Center's assistance.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about a national ground stop like the one that was issued?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That would be the Command Center only. And so after the second incident, sometime thereafter, determination was made with the information at hand to implement a national ground stop.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that something after the incident? Do you remember if that occurred after the Pentagon was hit?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yes, I know it did.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the second incident before the Pentagon, the national ground stop was ordered by the Command Center.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: And at that point in time, it's after the two World Trade Center towers are hit,

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then within the national air space system it's a bit quiet and there aren't any more reports for a little bit. So something's driving you to make that decision before there really was something else going on.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, we are still getting information, you know, from even West Coast facilities saying we have an unusual situation and this is what it is, or we've lost com with a particular aircraft or lost radar. You know, so it was enough little bits and pieces that again we were getting throughout the national air space system. It wasn't just the East Coast facility, and so we were--

MR. KARA: It was the totality of the picture you were getting.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. So we were trying to pull that information together, and as we were pulling that information together, we were saying, okay, what do we need to do, what are our options, what do we need to explore. Then recognize too John White is on the phone with

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headquarters and they're also discussing what decisions need to be made as well. So we're all sharing information.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Was the national ground-stop correlated to knowing that there was multiple hijackings reported within the national air space?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That was part of the decision that was made, but again it wasn't just the hijack situation. Again as I remember we were getting information saying that we had the bombs on board aircrafts or, you know, we were losing communication with aircraft, etcetera. So it was all those pieces of data being put together that we thought that we needed to keep the aircraft that were on the ground on the ground.

MR. SCHAEFFER: So to go back to what John was--what he was pursuing before in terms of when you realized that there are now multiple hijackings reported within the system, you're trying to put a--you said, you know, you didn't know if it was later in the day, but now knowing that the

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ground-stop ordered before definitely was before the Pentagon was hit and that is as you recall partially deduced from the fact that there are multiple hijackings, so we can say that there are--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, that would be part of the equation, but again I don't have a clear memory of saying oh, yes, the two aircraft that have hit the World Trade Center are part of the hijack scenario. I do not remember that at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who made the national ground-stop decision? What individual or individuals--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, you know, a lot of these decisions that were made were options that we had already explored and collectively said, okay, these are are our options. So to the best of my recollection, you know, the management team, we said, okay, we think we need to implement the ground-stop.

MR. AZZARELLO: You weighed in. John White weighed in.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not so much with John

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because he was on the phone over here, so when we pulled the management team together, again we kind of congregated in this area. John was not--he was close, you know, but not within touching distance, and that's where Lorain helped provide his input.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who would you have consulted with on the ground-stop position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, part of the information flow certainly is back and forth at headquarters, you know, so as we're making some of these decisions, we are feeding that information through John up to headquarters.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the national ground-stop, just so we can define it, that is preventing departures--any further departures from the United States, correct?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct. Any aircraft that are on the ground, they're required to stay on the ground, but you have to remember too that we've got, you know, that applies to all aircraft, but as I remember, we also had to go back and make sure that everybody understood this also applies

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for--aircraft because they're flying somewhat with a different set of rules.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just so we're clear too on our understanding, that's different from--isn't that different from taking all aircraft out of the sky? That was a separate--

MS. SCHUESSLER: All that's a separate--yeah, that's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's not add any more aircraft to the system right now.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Let's deal with the situations that we have. Don't let anybody else get airborne.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's freeze the national air space picture so to speak.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, the best we can.

MR. SCHAEFFER: John, he's on the telecon into headquarters. That's your link. Are there any other links then that you're conveying then--all that information's going through him?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, it's going through him, and I do remember there was another telecon

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that was set up, and it was over here on console I believe 43. And I don't remember the exact time that was set up, but early on someone answered the phone saying they were setting up a telecon. They had asked for me to be on it, and I can't tell you even who was on there. You know, I picked up the phone and I told them that I had various issues that I needed to tend to. I would get somebody to be on the telecon, but it probably wouldn't be me.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you know who that was calling? Who called--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. I don't even--you know, because I didn't spend much time on that line at all.

MR. SCHAEFFER: They didn't identify themselves?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, they probably did, but, you know--

MR. AZZARELLO: But it was the headquarters' request for somebody at the Command Center to get on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, well, they were

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specifically asking for me, and at the time, you know, John was on one line, they wanted me on another line, and I felt like I needed to do more in the Command Center and part of what I was also trying to do was to send all non-essential people--I mean because at this point, we had a lot of personnel in the facility coming in to watch. Again, you've got the big TV screen up there and, you know, just to watch what is occurring. I sent all non-essential personnel out of the facility so we could just deal with the situation at hand. I worked--

MR. SCHAEFFER: Before we get off that--on that position 43, someone answered that phone and said they wanted to establish a telecon with Linda. They called you over, you pick up the line and then you explain that you're not going to stay on it. Do you remember what was conveyed then?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah. I said I don't have time. I've got to do things at the Command Center. I'll get somebody else to monitor it.

MR. SCHAEFFER: So left that open and

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brought somebody else over?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, but I couldn't tell you who it is.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MR. KARA: Let me come back to the ground-stop, Linda, and what I have in front of me are the advisories that were put out by the Command Center as provided to the Commission. These are the ones that were given to us, and could we just briefly--the New York ground-stop, I've got an effective time--this would be the effective time, 9:05 or not?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That would be the effective time, but you also have to remember a lot of the paperwork, administrative actions, were taken after the verbal direction was given.

MR. KARA: Okay, so the verbal direction could have been before the 9:05 time--

MS. SCHUESSLER: In most cases, the verbal direction was given and then this followed.

MR. KARA: And the signature line is workstation 14 alpha. So does that mean that

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whoever was station 14 is the responsible official on this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and that morning, what we also had is everybody--you know, this is probably the neatest thing that I've ever seen as far as teamwork. Everybody in the facility really helped and supported each other in what needed to be accomplished. So when someone saw something needed to be done, you know, they was oh, I've got it. So it didn't matter whether they typically were responsible for that particular dissemination of information. For instance, they took ownership for it and everybody was okay with that.

MR. KARA: And for the record, the advisory for the New York ground-stop was Advisory 27 and Advisory 29 was the ground-stop for Boston, effective time 9:24, but the verbal could have been earlier than that. And the workstation is workstation 15 for the New York ground-stop. And then D.C. ground-stop is at 9:29 and workstation 25 is responsible for that, actually effective time--I'm sorry. I mis-spoke--is 13:30, which will

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be 9:30. And I'll come back to this ground-stop in a moment, and when we ground-stop all departures is Advisory 31, effective time 13:30, and that's workstation 24, which we really haven't talked about. So would that have been Ben over here at 24?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was probably Tim Smith.

MR. KARA: Tim Smith that did the ground-stop for all departures.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Or one of his specialists working for him.

MR. KARA: Okay. And then we come back. It's 9:30, the effective time here. The two World Trade Center strikes are at 8:46. Is that right, or is it 8:48? And 9:03 for the second tower. The Pentagon hasn't hit yet but we're doing a ground-stop for Dulles, Baltimore-Washington and National. Do you recall why that was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, if you look at the flow of traffic, the New York-Washington Center area are very much interdependent with each other.

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So a lot of times what you'll have to do is also move out a little bit further to adjacent facilities and keep that aircraft on the ground as well to keep them away from the New York area.

MR. KARA: Do you recall then if that was tied in any way to reports of American 11 or any other aircraft threatening Washington, D.C.?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: This was not tied to except Washington, D.C.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, not to my knowledge.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Did you say Tim Smith was on 24?

MS. SCHUESSLER: He was the West--

MR. SCHAEFFER: He was the West 24?

MS. SCHUESSLER: --for the day.

MR. KARA: Yeah, 24 was the position according to this that issued the nationwide ground-stop.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's talk about before the Pentagon is hit and after the two crashes up in New York. Was it that time frame, Linda, when you

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said you were asking the people to go out to the facilities to tell them to report--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think it was prior to that. I think it was shortly--well, it was that time frame.

MR. AZZARELLO: Shortly after the second crash.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so.

MR. AZZARELLO: Asked them to sort of canvass the facility.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, I mean we were already getting some of that information, but we thought it was significant enough to reach out to the facilities and ask them to report that information to us so we would have all that data as we were trying to ascertain what was occurring in the system.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so some of them are already starting to report, but you wanted to make sure that you reach out to make sure you know everything in the system in case that they're not self-reporting.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: You mentioned I think something earlier about, you know, losing radio communication where ordinarily that might not raise a red flag pre-9-11, but on that day, you were asking for those types of things to be recorded?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: According to your recollection?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about loss of transponders? Do you remember that also?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, and then that typically as I talked about what we call kind of a radar stitch. Sometimes if you're going between radar short boxes or radar sites, you know, you may have a couple of seconds there where you lose radar contact, but it's a known location and you know about it, so you keep an eye on it to make sure it's going to come back. It's those type of incidents we--when you're aware of them and you routinely handle them. On this particular day, you

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report them.

MR. AZZARELLO: So it's not unusual then to lose a transponder for a very brief period of time in certain parts of the air space?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: In your experience going back to your Center days too, how unusual was it to lose a transponder for a significant period of time? Let's say in excess of five minutes.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Five minutes typically is a situation that you would check into. I mean that's very unusual.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's unusual.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So usually it's a brief loss, not something in excess of five minutes.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what information do you think you received that would lead you to then canvass the Centers to report something that otherwise would be usable, like loss of radio for a brief period of time or loss of transponder? Like

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I'm imagining something came to your attention about those characteristics that led you and the others to say let's make sure that this situation isn't going on somewhere else in the system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, it just seemed that we had a large number of unusual events occurring in the system. So we went out and canvassed the facilities to report that information to us.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, putting aside for a second the large number of those reports coming in, we now know obviously in hindsight characteristics of American 11 and of United 175. Those are the first two aircrafts to go in. Let's start first with American 11. They lost radio and they lost transponder. They lost the radio roughly 8:14. They lost the transponder at 8:20, and the crash came at 8:46. We do know from what we've seen that the people in the Boston system were aware of that and in fact reported those characteristics fairly early on before the crash to Command Center. And I guess my question to you is then did that come to your attention at some point when you were

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canvassing, or did that lead you to canvass the facility? Then somebody then bring your attention--by the way, Linda, the aircraft--that the first crash we think was the hijack out of Boston, and they said these are the characteristics of it.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no. That was never formally said. Linda, these were the characteristics, so this is the events leading up to that event, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So then just so I understand correctly is it your recollection then that when you asked the people, your employees, to reach out to the various FAA field facilities, at that juncture, you did not have any idea of what the characteristics were of those hijacked aircraft that crashed into the towers in New York?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not that I remember, but again remember we're getting reports also from the West Coast of unusual events too. So again it's not just the East Coast Air Traffic facilities that were getting reports from. We're getting that from

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throughout the national air space system.

MR. AZZARELLO: I know the reports are coming in, but I'm looking at the actual events, not reports, but actual crashes. These are two aircraft that your facilities lost in New York reported as hijacked and observed certain characteristics of those aircraft while they were being hijacked and before the crash. They recognized that there was a loss of radio and a loss of transponder on one, and a change of a transponder on another. And I'm saying it certainly was reported to the people at say 14 and 15, and maybe I'm wrong, but that's the type of information I would expect somebody at those positions to bring to the level of their superiors to let them know--give them situational awareness. You know, hey, remember that hijack we reported from Boston that they thought was a possible? Well, now they're saying it's not a possible, it's a definite, and they think that's the one that went into the tower, and by the way, they lost coms and transponder. Is it your recollection that none of

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that ever reached your level prior to the Pentagon being hit?

MS. SCHUESSLER: As I said before, you know, some time that information--that type of information was probably shared, but I can't tell you, you know, no, it wasn't at the end of the day. I do know that. Some time during that time frame, and certainly some of that type of information and unusual circumstances were used to pull the picture together what was going on, but I can't say, oh, yeah, I remember when so and so told me this particular piece of information.

MR. AZZARELLO: But are you saying it didn't play a role in your decision to canvass the field facilities. That's what I'm having difficulty understanding.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not to my knowledge, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that was independent. So to the extent that you were looking for the characteristics of loss of radio or loss of transponder, it wasn't because you knew those were the characteristics of the first two crashes, or

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was it because other facilities were reporting similar?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was more the other facilities were reporting that type of information coming in that we went out and canvassed anything unusual, including loss or radar, including com, including bomb threats.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. What about a report that American 11, which was reported first as being one of the first hijack that was reported from Boston, and then as Boston reported believing that was the one that crashed in the Trade Center, there was subsequent to the two crashes in New York a report surfaced that American Airlines 11 is still airborne, that now they believe that not have been one of the planes that went into the Trade Center but still are airborne and headed to Washington, D.C. Do you recollect that information coming to your attention?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, I remember that type of information being floated out. That's why it was so difficult to ascertain what was going

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on because you're getting conflicting information. You're getting information on one hand that this is the situation. Then within a short period of time, no, no, no, that's not true. So again, you know, I think--perhaps, I don't know--you know, that was one of the rationales for going out and soliciting assistance from the local facilities. Tell us what's going on so we can pull some of this information together. When we issued the national ground-stop to the best of my recollection, you know, we still did not have a clear picture what was happening in the NADS.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the two crashes in New York and before the Pentagon, did there come a point in time before the Pentagon was struck where it was brought to your attention that there may be an aircraft that was headed towards D.C. or posing a threat to the D.C. area?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: How and when did you learn of the Pentagon crash?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I don't remember

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how I learned it occurred, but I do know after, you know, because we had explored, you know, various options and actions that we needed to take. So immediately upon learning the third aircraft had hit the Pentagon, we did make a decision to get all the airborne aircrafts on the ground regardless of their original destination. I don't remember how we learned that, whether we learned that through a facility, whether it was CNN. Don't know.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Just before we launch into that next phase, John, again before the Pentagon crash, recognizing which aircraft went into the World Trade Center, did you have any knowledge of that aircraft or the tail number or airline that was associated--that you recall.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not to my knowledge. I remember, you know, the Command Center does not have--they've got TSD but they do not have radar, you know. We are not a facility that we are tracking individual aircraft on a small scope so we can say oh, okay, here is this geographic location and here is the aircraft in that vicinity. That's

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not what the Command Center does, so we are relying on local facilities and in this particular, John White sharing some of the information that maybe he's learned from headquarters, the CNN reports that are up there to try and ascertain what the picture is.

MR. AZZARELLO: But you have contact with the Centers, right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, that's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they would be--

MS. SCHUESSLER: They would be our eyes I guess.

MR. AZZARELLO: They would be the relevant FAA entities who would have been controlling the aircraft and would have been in a position at least to recognize that they were being hijacked, right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: At this point in time, Linda, let me--for a moment. We've just now had the Pentagon struck. What has been the awareness of, any input from the Operations floor for military response?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, gosh, let me think. I know we had the cell active that day, and what I remember is after we left the EOR that morning after we all reported back to the operational quarters, there was one of the cell representatives in the hall that we shared the information. This is what we think is going on in the system.

MR. KARA: Now when you say the cell, you're referring to the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Air Traffic--

MR. KARA: Air Traffic Services cell.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: And who from the ATSC attended that 8:30 meeting that morning? Do you recall?

MS. SCHUESSLER: They don't typically attend.

MR. KARA: They don't attend the 8:30 meeting.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: But soon after the 8:30 meeting, or as you flush all the managers to the floor, somehow one person from the ATSC was

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involved.

MS. SCHUESSLER: But they were in the hall.

MR. KARA: They were in the hall.

MS. SCHUESSLER: They were coming out of the breakroom area. We were--

MR. KARA: Do you recall who that was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: Probably throw a couple of names in.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably not.

MR. KARA: Lieutenant Colonel Cherry or--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I know it wasn't Lieutenant--

MR. KARA: It wasn't Michael--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: How about Colonel--

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was a male, but that's all I can remember.

MR. KARA: It was a male, okay. But you're not involved with the Centers or with the Northeast Air Defense Sector from the Command

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Center in terms of scrambling aircraft--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: At this point in time.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: What is the role at this point in time of the--are they involved at all? Are they on the floor? What are they doing?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, since you've been out to the Command Center, you know--is in their separate room, and, you know, they work the movement of aircraft and certainly the role of the Service itself is a DOD-FAA joint mission to provide assistance to various types of situations, internal turmoil and that sort of thing. So they would be working very closely with--with the movement of military aircraft.

MR. KARA: But neither of those entities, the--or the ATSC is playing a mainstream role on the Operations floor.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. I know we are sharing information sporadically with them as the day unfolded, but I--

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MR. KARA: And the ATSC, are these uniformed Air Force officers that are in the Service itself?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: Their awareness of or any knowledge they gained of hijacking activity that's on the floor, does that in your mind constitute notification to the Department of Defense or to NORAD of a hijacking?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, we didn't have the responsibility for notifying NORAD, but we thought if it was pertinent enough to share with the Service, the cell individuals, and I think our expectation was that they would probably elevate it through their chain of command.

MR. KARA: And what was their chain of command?

MS. SCHUESSLER: We don't know. Don't know.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: We were doing so, though, trying to effect a military response, or by doing

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so, by sharing that information? Was that the mindset?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think our mindset was more information sharing because that was not our role and responsibility first of all to make those decisions for the military, but we wanted to make them cognizant of what might be occurring to the best of our knowledge and they can do whatever action they think was appropriate.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it accurate if we conclude that you didn't have any discussion with anybody at headquarters along the lines of well, we told the Air Traffic Services, the cell people, about the situation and the reported hijack, so the military isn't, you know, aware now and taken--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I know I didn't. I don't know how much information John may have shared with headquarters, but I know I didn't.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Were you familiar with what types of information was passed to the--and to the military via those routes? Specifically what types of information was passed to them?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I know I wasn't doing the direct coordination with them. I think to the best of my recollection, you know, once they became cognizant of it, they would also, you know, send a representative out to the operational quarters, you know, like all of us trying to gather information. If you remember, we also had representatives for Air Transport Association on the operational quarters. We also had National Business Aircraft Association. So I think everybody at that point, you know, was sending a representative to ascertain what information so they could take the appropriate actions for their own organization.

MR. KARA: At one time, Linda, and this is sort of anecdotal, but let me share it with you. We've talked to a--representative yesterday, and at some point, headquarters called him because they couldn't get through and they needed to talk to your unit, talk to someone on the floor. And the person from the--when he went to the floor to tell the floor that headquarters was trying to reach

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them, he was very careful to go to you first. Had you established that as an operating principle? If people was coming onto your floor, had to come to you first?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I don't think so, but I think in these type of situations, I think from an air traffic facility protocol, I think it's pretty well ingrained before you go into an operational quarters you check with the ranking official to get approval to do so.

MR. KARA: And you were the 51 percent holder of that card that day.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I just want to show you a couple of transcripts of the floor. This is a transcript from the--I believe it's the 15th position. Let me just check the tab. Yeah, position 15, so that's the Cleveland-Boston Center position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is after the first crash and before the second. Bob Pierce from NPSB

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is calling and he's trying to get information on departure, time and souls on board, destination for the first crash?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this is a question coming from someone we believe at the Command Center at that position 15, was sure this was the flight that obviously hit the World Trade Center is the same as the references for the first reported hijack from Boston. Terry Biggio says working from what we say, there's no doubt. So that type of specific information, you don't remember reaching you that early on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. But remember too, you know, one of the thing that I was also trying to do was make sure the Command Center itself was taken care of. I was trying to get non-essential people out of there so we could deal with the situation. I was also concerned for the physical security of the facility itself, you know, and I don't remember who I was working with to make sure the facility was secure, but we made sure that the

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guard gate was closed. We didn't have any other incoming personnel without checking with us first, those type of issues.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not trying to suggest that--I'm sure you had plenty to do. I was trying to find out whether this was brought to your attention.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, no, no. No, it wasn't.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is continuation of the position 15. That's the UA person who's recording the start time as 9:05 time. That was 9:05 local?

MS. SCHUESSLER: What is that again?

MR. AZZARELLO: This is the lead-in. In other words, the quality assurance person who made the recordings at Command Center tells us when the second tape stops, starts at 9:05 local. And it starts out with, I think that's supposed to be Tom, Tommy Paseon. It's confirmed on that--and it says we have claims, so one of the things that was going on was they were--at some point. I'm sure you

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learned it, if not that day afterwards that Boston was pulling tapes to try to find out what they had all heard from the cockpit. So it's roughly 9:05 when Terry Biggio from Boston reports to Command Center to position 15 that we confirm that they did say we have some planes as in plural. You see that as an important piece of information obviously because it means that United only maybe had the two in the system but maybe there's more. Was that brought to your attention at least that they pulled the recording--

MS. SCHUESSLER: But I don't know about pulling the recording. At some point I do remember being informed that we thought, and whether it was Boston, I don't remember all the particulars, but they thought that they did overhear a transmission with that type of information. But again you have to remember the mindset of that particular day. We were getting an awful lot of information incoming, some of it misleading, some of it disputing previous information that we had gotten. Our paradigms of a hijack was that they were going to

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commandeer the aircraft and land safely. The paradigm was not to hit buildings.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand, but wouldn't it be fair to assume that the paradigm started to quickly shift on 9-11 after the first two crashes?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, and then it did, and if you're actually--you know, if you go from start to finish, from the time that the first incident occurred to when we said okay, let's get all aircraft in the air on the ground, you're talking 45 minutes. You know, roughly 45 minutes. You'd have to look at the time line. 45 minutes for us to make those determinations. I think that's pretty darn good.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't think anybody here wants to make any comment on that it wasn't a good decision. I hope you can appreciate all we're trying to do in asking these questions. Among other things is just to try to find out the flow of information as it came to the Command Center. All we're trying to get at is did they had information that came to the position at the consoles filter up

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to upper management. Because I mean let's face it. The people making the decisions, are they at the consoles or are they more of the upper management people?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think you probably saw we had some of both. You know, probably the major decisions as far as the ground-stops and to land all the aircraft came from upper management.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure, and to the extent that information that we have some planes was reported being overheard at one of the hijacked aircraft. To the extent that's relative to deciding to take planes out of the national air space system, would you agree that the type of information you as a manager maybe would like to have known?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Sure, and as I said earlier, you know, I know I got that information. At what point, I can't tell you, John.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. How about that same time when they reported that there was some planes,

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were the words that were overheard, that Boston asked about is there a way to get messages to the airborne aircraft, to the crew, for security for the cockpit or something like that, through--or some other method? Do you remember if that issue was brought to your attention that morning?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember whether that particular issue was brought specifically to my attention, but I do remember I had conversations with the ATA representative that was on the floor at the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was that? Do you know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I can picture him, but I can't think of his name at this point. Maybe if you gave me a list of names, I could tell you, but I can't think of his name right now. But we were sharing information, you know, obviously that we had and we were asking him to contact the carriers with the information that we had. We also had Tommy Faceon with the Severe Weather people--they typically would have relationships and

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direct communications with the airlines. They were also sharing that information with them as far as what we thought was going on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Separate and apart from sharing information, do you remember if that specific request was ever made to the ATA rep? Do you remember specifically if he or she was ever told listen, why don't you call all the airlines and see if they can get a message out?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I do remember talking to him saying, you know, that this might be an avenue for you to get the information out to the carriers. And I don't know whether Tommy did that down in SBT and Severe Weather or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: What avenue were you--what method--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, we had two avenues to get communication with the airlines. We had our ATA representative that was there, and that's the individual that I was talking with, and then generally you had Tommy and his staff working with the customers from their perspective.

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MR. AZZARELLO: When you said to the ATA rep that this may be an avenue, how? What method were you suggesting?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, first of all, share the information that we had and that there was one suggestion that you might want to share information that's going on in the system. You know, there's two different ways that they share that information. They can do it via company radio and--, you know. That was their choice to make. That was certainly not an Air Traffic decision to make.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. That's certainly what I was getting at. Did you consider that to be the airline companies' decision, not an Air Traffic decision?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because similarly actually while we're on that issue, there's a call at Ellen Kingfield, at the position she was at, the non-position, and it came in from Bill Ellis, who's a 500, which we now learned as the Air Traffic

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manager. He would have been the highest ranking Air Traffic man of the region, right, in the New England region.

MS. SCHUESSLER: In New England, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: He suggests that--I'm sorry. This is someone calling on behalf of him. It says, "Bill Ellis to 500 has suggested or requested that you get an advisory out to all of his staff. Suggested running international traffic coming into New York to cockpit security." Ellen says, "Okay, send your request again." And he says, "That you put out an advisory to all dispatchers to advise that any traffic coming into New York internationals, especially to Boston Center--this is EBW--to increase the cockpit security." Maybe a no-brainer and you've already done it, but we just want to make sure that you know we tried to do something. Ellen does not recall whether or not she passed that on to anybody. Do you recall whether or not she passed that on to you specifically?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I'm not sure about

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the specific request, but I do know at some point, again, I don't know the time frame, we did reach out to the international community and, you know, shared what we could with what was going on, and at some point, we also ground-stopped all international from coming into the country.

MR. AZZARELLO: Reach out, you mean the international community meaning tell the international airline companies what was going on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not the companies, but the air traffic facilities. So we would call Europe Control. We'd call Gander. You know, the Air Traffic service providers.

MR. AZZARELLO: Service providers in those other locations that involved international travel.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: But was any request made that they contact the aircraft and tell them to secure their cockpits, or no?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not that I remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it your statement that that's not an Air Traffic decision to make but an

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airline decision to make? Would that apply to domestic and foreign international flights?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why is it that--just want your opinion on why you think it's not an Air Traffic decision to make on that day?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, because Air Traffic is responsible for the prevention of collision and the flow of air traffic. Prior to 9-11, certainly we were not responsible for any of the airline schedules, any of the decisions they made to divert any of the security elements. You know, that was not the pervue of Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was it part of the pervue of Air Traffic, though, to ensure the safe transportation of passengers from point A to point B in international air spaces?

MS. SCHUESSLER: If they--the aircraft and by extension, yes, that would be the passengers.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that would include the passengers? So that's why I'm just trying to figure out wouldn't that be something to consider

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the safety of the aircraft, then it's passengers were a concern or the FAA, that they would maybe want to consider themselves--who, the Centers, having the Center controllers call the--and tell the pilots they might want to think about--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I understand what you're saying, but that certainly was not the paradigm that we ran the national air space system prior to September 11th. You know, that was the responsibility solely of the airlines. If they had disturbances in the cabin, for instance, we would respond to whatever the pilots needs, whatever the airlines' needs were, you know, but our responsibility is not to deal with the immediate situation in the cabin.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, but that's a different situation than 9-11. Is there something about the paradigm or the culture or the relationships between the airline companies and the FAA prior to 9-11 that would have led the FAA or you in particular to feel constrained to implement that type of decision and say, hey, let's us, the

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FAA, tour our Centers, have them contact the pilots and tell them listen, you might want to see if you can secure your cockpit. You want them to be aware of an invasion?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. Again, I don't see that as an Air Traffic responsibility, an FAA responsibility. The airlines are aware of what's happening in the system, and certainly it's their role and responsibility to share that information and expectations with the pilot, not the FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: On American 77, which was actually--we know in hindsight was the aircraft that hit the Pentagon, there's conversations going on at the 25 position, I guess. Would that be the relevant one for Indy Center? 25 back there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think that's supposed to be Indy. Can you take a look at that one?

MR. KARA: 25A is Denzel Simmons.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just wanted to make sure if there's any additional--jars your recollection or if it was brought to your attention or somebody

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else's, or maybe someone on the floor. Apparently they were looking for 77 that morning?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Prior to its impact at the Pentagon, Jeff was able to time this off of the FAA tapes to see what time this actually occurred. It's roughly 9:21 a.m. So it's about 17 or 18 minutes before impact, so that would put impact 17, 18 minutes after the second crash in New York. This is Denzel Simmons from Command Center. He's called Dulles to talk to Mark Mecides, and they're asking about American 77. Dulles, anything unusual he wants to know with them coming out of departure. And this is Mark Mecides, "Not that I'm aware of. Is there something you guys need to tell me?" And then he says, "Well, you know what's going on here, right?" And he says, "Oh, very much so, Mark." And Denzel says, "Okay, all right, American 77. We're trying to find him, trying to find out what's the latest we had on him. We've got a couple of airplanes that we can't seem to locate." He says, "You know about 11 went in already and another one

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went in, and we don't know about 77 where he's at and what he's doing." He hangs on while Mark checks to see if there's any paperwork to indicate that he left the ground. Doesn't think he's on the ground because they don't have any paperwork on him. They're surmizing that at least he took off, and then there's some conversation about whether he's just appeared or reappeared on somebody's radar scope west of West Virginia. Want to clear that up.

That's 25A and by parallel, almost simultaneously, the 25B position, somebody's talking to--this is Bob, and I might be wrong, at the Command Center because we don't have anybody named Bob. But there's a Rob Rasky or Race, who was working there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Rasky?

MR. AZZARELLO: Rasky maybe? I'll show you the list that we have. We're trying to figure out--that might be a typo. They might have written Bob, but it might actually be Rob?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And somebody noted that they didn't think there was a Bob working that day. This is the roster that Shirley Miller gave us of the people working at Command Center that day, and obviously the managers and TMO's, the ones that I tallied, so those who are working. And Rob, I see a Rob Rasky. I don't see any other.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, that's probably right.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's a Robert Williams, but he wouldn't be sitting at that position.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Whatever it is, it's somebody from Command Center talking to the gentleman named Andy at the Indy Center, and he calls up and he says, "This is Command Center. I need you to tell me anything or everything you can about 77, where he is and if you have radar or not." We could just go down to they said we were talking to him right in the vicinity of Henderson. And then the person from the Indy Center I believe says, "I guess we were talking to him in the

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vicinity of Henderson, HNM. We lost communication on radar with him. Hang on, and I'm going to have the Ops manager tell you the story." Then the Ops manager gets on, "Hello, Command Center." "Yes, sir." The Ops manager at Indy, "This is John Thomas." He identifies himself. "Ops manager, I think we need to let everybody know this right away if they don't already. American 77 was over just west of Charleston, West Virginia, 3:50. It's a heavy Boeing 752 and disappeared off our radar scope about 12:56 Zulu." It's 8:56 Eastern time, which is in between the first and second impacts on the Trade Center. Along with lost frequency. We were treating it as a lost not--procedures to notify Search and Rescue and what-not when American Airlines told us they had some aircraft or an aircraft hijacked. We now believe that the aircraft may have been hijacked, although no one has, you know, we have nothing to verify that. But with the World Trade Center, we could have another loose aircraft out there somewhere. And then at the time of the loss, they want to know--Center

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asks, Command Center asks what altitude was he on, and they say flight level 350. And then Indy says, "He just lost primary also?" I'm going to ask the question from Command Center, and Indy says, "Lost all, yes, lost no primary or that we could see. Of course, we wouldn't necessarily be able to up the primary there anyway." And then they just sort of rehash what time this was that they lost primary and when they lost them at 12:56 Zulu. No ELT in their report.

It says, "Okay, any more information you get I'd appreciate it and I'll forward this immediately up to the--it says NOMEN, but it sounds like it's probably the NOM, and everybody that's standing up there. When we read this, hearing about how you were gathering in the center of the floor, we thought that maybe this was the type of information that was passed--when you said passed to the NOM and the people standing up there. Does that, reading the transcript, refresh your recollection about any of that? I'm not suggesting that you pointed that out with the Pentagon when

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that happened, but does that information on an American--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, that was one of the aircrafts certainly we were looking for, and that was one of the aircraft we had on our whiteboard, and, you know, as I say, they thought initially that the aircraft had crashed, and they started search and rescue efforts to my recollection. You know, so we thought the aircraft was already down. But again, it was up on the whiteboard waiting final dispensation before we, you know, totally discounted it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I guess that leads us to one of the follow-ups that Miles was talking about before, and that is do you have a mechanism in place, either you or any of the other managers there that day, to ensure that any of that type of information that's going to the various consoles is making its way to the decision-makers, to the managers. What mechanism if any did you have to implement that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, kind of on the fly,

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at that point, the specialists were trying to feed the information to the MTMO's.

MR. AZZARELLO: Specialists would be the people at the consoles, like the center area.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, right. So they were trying to feed that information to say, like, Mike Artiston and Tim Smith. And so as they were getting that information, you know, they were sharing it as we gathered with and perhaps prior to, depending on where I was and what was going on. Again that's the reason I put Ellen in in the NOM position to free Ben up to be responsible for the operational quarters. So, yes, they would perhaps share that information with Ben, and then we would try and pull all our cells together periodically to share the information that we had received so far, and that included information that John could share from a headquarters perspective.

MR. AZZARELLO: John White.

MS. SCHUESSLER: John White, correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So if I can recap it to try and understand it. The console specialists

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were expected to or pass the information to the NTMO's. Was that pursuant to instructions that came from either you or another manager?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's normal protocol, you know. Again, you know, through the chain of command, it's typical a specialist would report information, especially of an unusual nature to the NTMO. The NTMO would report the information to the NOM.

MR. AZZARELLO: But I guess there's one caveat there that typically they wouldn't report like momentary loss or short period loss or--. How did they then learn that this is something that now they should be telling the NTMO's, reporting what they ordinarily would do.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Because in one of our little huddles, we said okay, let's go out to the local facilities and ask them to report that information. So the specialist went out and retrieved that information. But the other thing that's unusual about this particular day and the protocol, yes, the specialists would report that

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information up to the NTMO, but remember typically speaking you may have one unusual circumstance of piece of information being fed at the same time. You know, it's not common, but you may have, you know, two or three, but certainly with the vast amount of information we were receiving that day, you know, we had more than one or two specialists reporting that same or conflicting information to the NTMO, and that's to Ben, and then collectively to all of us.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what was the mechanism again that you said you used to make sure that whatever that information was was reported to headquarters here? That was John White?

MS. SCHUESSLER: John White, yes, and again as I remember Lorain was assigned to provide assistance to him and whatever his needs were.

MR. AZZARELLO: And was that John White open a line with headquarters? Was that also looked upon as the way that you could get information to headquarters? That maybe you worked that NOM--

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how would John get that information being he was sort of looping the phone back to Lorain? How would he get that back to you?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, sometimes people, and depending on again what we were all doing at the time, sometimes it would be funneled through Lorain, sometimes, you know, it was a loud enough conversation that he would hear that information and feed it up, but typically through Lorain or somebody would walk over to him and make sure headquarters was aware of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: You did say earlier that there was a report that came in at some point that morning about a bomb on board. That actually was one of the reports that came from United 93. There might have been others, but what if anything do you recall hearing about United 93 before it crashed in Pennsylvania that you would be able to connect to the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I'm not sure that I can

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think of anything that I would remember to connect with United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what's your recollection of the situational awareness, you know, both generally and you personally on the floor regarding the last one that crashed in Pennsylvania?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, that was one of several that was still missing. I remember at some point, but I couldn't tell you when, when somebody thought that that was confirmed that it was United that went into the ground.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would before it went into the ground, Cleveland Center had reported to the Command Center about hearing screaming on board, hearing the screaming on frequency as well as the report of a bomb on board. Do you recall that reaching you on the floor that morning prior to the crash of 93?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I remember receiving the information on the screening. Whether the bomb was part of that, it could have been, I don't know.

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MR. SCHAEFFER: Linda, do you recall the Command Center having situational awareness on where 93 was or focused attention at all on United 93?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I mean I don't remember that being one that stood out. I just remember that being one that was part of the collection of aircraft we were trying to try and find out where the aircraft was. And I think that was the one that we thought had maybe gone in earlier and perhaps it really did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where do you think it had gone in?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, if I remember correctly, that's the one we thought had crashed earlier than the actual crash time. I mean we found that out much later I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where do you think it crashed, on the ground or in one of the Trade Center buildings?

MS. SCHUESSLER: On the ground.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the ground?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if it was reported to Command Center before the transponder was shut off? With that background, do you remember if anybody was trying to track it up on the TSD after it was reported?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, we couldn't have tracked that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, couldn't you have called up the call sign to see at least where the PSD reported was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, but that is based on, you know, kind of future information, and you wouldn't have a target.

MR. AZZARELLO: At least give you some time lag information, isn't it, if it's transponder? It's based on the host radar data feed.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, and I don't know what the time lag is. I don't remember we even thought about putting a tag on United 93. They may have done that at the specialist position, but I

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don't remember it being up on the TSD.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now you say John White was one of the avenues, or the avenue used to sort of have a flow of information between Command Center and headquarters that day, correct?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So they would have situational awareness of what you knew and vice versa. Is that fair to say?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: John White was on the phone with headquarters that morning specifically discussing United 93 at least as early as 9:34 a.m., which is in the transcript here, and I'll show you the passage where John's on here.

MS. SCHUESSLER: United 93 is the last one that went in, right?

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: It was asked by Jeff Griffith to man the phone on the headquarters side.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Jeff was in earlier. I can show you by reference that it was Jeff. This is an FAA transcript by the way that was provided to the Commission on October 21st of last year. And early on, it's New York Center is talking to Command Center, and I'll show you where Jeff comes on. Command Center East, Mike Artist answers the phone and says, "Mike, this is Nancy. I have Jeff Griffith on the line. You need to talk to either Linda or John." And Mike says, "All right. Linda is down here. John's right here. Hang on one second." And John gets on. John's on with Jeff citing a 918, and then Jeff's--sort of talking about--Jeff wants a number where he can call any time so he can reach John and someone at the Command Center. He gives them this number, 708-5144 will be open all the time. He says he's been calling that one. It's ringing off the hook, so make sure someone answers it, and wants to know about restrictions in the New York area, what the Air Traffic Control picture is there, and John informs him it's ATCO in New York, talking about

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the security expected at their facility. And when the first air-ground stop from New York Center, John tells him on all New York arrivals and then talking about an inventory of all the aircraft in the first year. They say we still have some suspected aircraft, that there's a third aircraft that Delta out of Boston that we're still checking on and we haven't really established a second aircraft that hit the second tower.

Then John says, "It's either an American or United. We don't know which." Jeff says, "It's United 175." So you can--that the departure point and destination. If that's the flow of information, at roughly 9:22 from headquarters to Command Center at least telling them what they believe the second--the call sign of the second aircraft. Was there any mechanisms to sort of get that down from here to the pit in the Severe Weather area so they could at least put that as reported by headquarters as to what they think happened to--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, the mechanism

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certainly would have been, you know, Lorain being the runner for John, you know, to share that information. Whether it was shared by--

MR. AZZARELLO: Another--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, couldn't tell you.

MR. AZZARELLO: So then they talked about its departure and destination point for the United. And then Jeff says, "There's a question about Chicago to L.A. flight. Can you check with Chicago Center or someone. In fact what we need to do is get awareness up to all the TMC's of the Traffic Management units and report any unusual circumstances direct to the Command Center of loss of identification or any radio or any unusual radio transmissions." Do you recall is that what sort of generated--

MS. SCHUESSLER: It could have, yeah. Don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now John says I have one of those reports for you. So this is something that John knows of. How we know them, I'm not quite sure. It's not apparent from the transcript.

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He says go ahead, and John says American 77. This is roughly 9:25. And we see in the other transcripts from the 25 position that we looked at before, at 9:21, they're looking for it, and they called Dulles, so at least, you know, for a period of time now, at least as early as 9:21, they're looking for 77. And John gives them the information. It's Dulles to Los Angeles. The flight level west to west Charleston, West Virginia, and at Indy's air space, they lost the target and then they'll go back and look for it. They don't have a primary. Is that sort of near as what we saw in the 25 position, and he tell him about 10 minutes ago is when they got the report. So I guess roughly that sort of puts it in reference.

And then they talk about--ground stuff. John is telling Jeff about threatening tape, and I guess they were trying to confirm what was said on that threatening tape. Jeff talks about getting the information out to all the Centers to report any unusual transmissions or any loss of radio.

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And then at 9:34 is when you see John tells Doug,
Doug who's now jumped on--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And Doug is replacing
Jeff?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, he says--John's
asking Jeff, he says, "This Doug sitting next to
Jeff."

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So he's sitting next to
him and he's on the phone. John White just
initiated a ground stop. He's reporting this at
9:27, and they talk about requesting information
about other aircraft and they're checking the
Chicago departures for--there's a problem about the
Chicago to L.A. flight. And he says, "I'm setting
the phone down. I won't hang up," and then he's
setting it down. And then he asks for Jeff.
Doug's on the line again, and he says, "Doug, we
just had another report. United 93, it was in
Cleveland Center's air space somewhere around Dryer
intersection. Just reported they heard screaming
on the frequency and that they have a bomb on board

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the aircraft. Departed Newark and went to San Francisco was the report.

So this starts at 9:34 and they continue to discuss that up through 10:03, which is the point of impact of 93. What do you recall if anything about that information on 93 coming to your attention?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I remember, you know, hearing some information about there may have been something on the frequency that was unclear, but I think that's about the same time frame that we had already issued the ground stop, and that was about the same time frame that we also issued the notification to get all airborne aircraft on the ground, you know, to go ahead and clear out the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is there some sort of tracking of 93? Just to see if any of this sort of jars your recollection. Some of it already was brought to your attention, somebody carried the message for him. "United 93, we spoke about it before," John says. "He's reversing course over

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Akron. They just lost his transponder, and he's heading east about now." Wanted to know what kind of airplane. He identifies 757 and the aircraft is descending. Doug confirms he's descending. Correct. And then Doug says, "You heard that somebody crashed on the Pentagon." He says, "Yeah, I see the picture on NBC." Talks about diverting all international aircraft in the U.S., diverting them, then they come back to 93. "Okay, United 93, John says, go ahead." And this is roughly 9:46. "He's 29 minutes out of Washington, D.C. 29 minutes out of D.C. and tracking towards us. This is the one that reversed course in Ohio. That's all I have." Doug says, "Keep someone on the line at all times." "Back to United 93. At 9:48, United 93 is 29 minutes out of where?" John says, "He's headed towards the Washington area and he was at flight level 350. He turned around in Akron. He was tracking towards the Washington area at this time." Doug asks type aircraft again. John tells him the type, and Doug says, "They're pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93." John says, "Do we

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want to think about scrambling aircraft?" Doug replied, "I don't know." And John says, "That's a decision somebody's going to have to make probably in the next 10 minutes." Doug tells him everybody just left the room at that point and then they go into another report about the Delta 1989.

About whether or not it's a hijack or not and where he's headed. And then we come back to 93. There's a reference Doug is saying John--talking to Monty now about scrambling. John says that he was advised that they're scrambling in the Washington and New York area. That's what he's been told. Do you know if you learned any of that information about scrambling in those areas from somebody?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I remember we did get some information that they were scrambling, but I couldn't tell you specifics or time frames.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then at roughly 9:56, John White says, "We don't have a position any longer on United 93. He did pass right over Pittsburgh. That was the last time we saw him. That was the

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general area." And then John says, "United 93 is 20 miles northwest of Johnsville." Doug confirms that on primary. He says, "Well, that's a report from another aircraft."

That pretty much takes us up through 10 o'clock. As you can see, there's conversations though from 9:34 through 10 o'clock. And you could see John is getting information, and it appears is getting information fed to him by somebody who's watching it.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And then I'm guessing, you have to find out, but I suspect he's probably getting it from one of the specialists who's been in contact with the local facilities. You know, but again, from a Command Center perspective, I think by that time, we have taken all the actions that we can take to keep aircraft on the ground and to get them on the ground safely. So at this point at that time frame, all we're doing is monitoring and sharing information.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just want to get a sense though of your situational awareness. Were you

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plugged into this information that John was getting about 93 amongst the other things he talked about?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I remember John sharing information with Jeff and in the back of my mind, I was thinking it was more American 11, you know, how far out he is, that maybe it was United 93. You know, I don't remember at this point.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then were you always looking right in the center here?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Generally speaking, or, you know, if talking to MBAA and others, you know, within probably a couple of feet, you know, generally speaking, I stayed in that general location.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And did you stay here on the floor the whole morning?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Going forward that morning, I guess, when John's talking about the scrambling, you know, passing to Doug the bit about scrambling, do you remember if he consulted you, or did Ben consult with you at any point about that

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issue, whether somebody in the FAA headquarters, or else we should be addressing the issue of whether to scramble on 93?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That specific flight, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any flight?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't recall those conversations taking place, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall headquarters wanting a report as the morning progressed about how many aircraft were left in the international air space system once the decision was made to ground all aircraft?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I remember those type of questions being asked, and John would provide that information.

MR. AZZARELLO: And how is that information being obtained at Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, on the TSD, there's a feature that you can access and it will give you the number of aircrafts that are airborne.

MR. AZZARELLO: That will tell you whether it was--and that's based on the host B--

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And do you remember any other specific requests coming into Command Center from FAA headquarters about closing down the--air space system?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Closing down.

MR. AZZARELLO: Grounding all aircraft, taking them out. Any other further requests from headquarters to Command Center on that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not that I recall, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just sharing your information on how the system--how the planes were coming down out of the systems?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, you know, we had collectively made the decision to go ahead and land all the aircraft, and I remember John sharing that information with headquarters to make sure they were informed of what actions we thought were appropriate.

MR. AZZARELLO: There's a reference in one of the transcripts of either the 14th or 15th position, New York or Boston, just after the second

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aircraft. Someone from the center reports, one of those two Centers, they're saying do the procedural series and then we have two of them now. What do you think about those--should we think about getting the military involved? How about you folks down there? Do you have any knowledge on that or any input on that, and the person at Command Center console says one of the supervisors is going to the--right now. In context, it looked like they might have been referring to you, but they don't use your name. In fact, do you know if that was you?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I don't know. You know, again, you know, we had the Services field personnel out there and we were sharing information, well, periodically. You know, they were coming out to gather information, and they were making the phone calls. But did I say, hey, I think you need to scramble, no, I did not do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, this specific reference was not in the sense of sharing information. It was more of a reference, hey, what

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about getting military help and then I don't know who they were referring to, but they said sounds like, well, one of the supervisors I think is going to the--now.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, and we knew that there were some military aircraft that was scrambling. You know, again, that's not our call to make. That was not the Command Center call to make.

MR. AZZARELLO: The headquarters call.

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was the headquarters call. It was the military call, so we felt like we were sharing pertinent information for them to make those determinations.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay, you don't personally recall going into the spaces requesting the military get involved in responding to the events? And if you didn't go, were you aware of anyone else, any other supervisors, going into the--to get the military involved in responding?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not directly to get the military involved in responding. It was more to

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share the information that we had.

MR. AZZARELLO: Linda, Dave Kenols had a telephone in the Air Traffic suites on the 10th floor that day, separate and apart from the crisis center and the WOC, and respectfully I'll refer to I guess, for a lack of a better term, as the Kenols' telecon or the Air Traffic telecon.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Was that the one that Jeff was on, or no?

MR. AZZARELLO: It was actually--

MR. KARA: A different one.

MS. SCHUESSLER: A different one.

MR. AZZARELLO: Different one.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: In fact it's referenced in the book ground-stop--referenced by numerous individuals we've interviewed.

MR. KARA: Yeah, Jeff was here in the crisis center and was on the--

MR. BROWN: Primarily focused up here--

MR. KARA: --on the tactical net.

MS. SCHUESSLER: He was in the old WOC

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then.

MR. KARA: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: They stand up as a crisis center in the event of an accident or a hijack.

MR. KARA: The Kenols' telecon was ongoing then until Peacock's--

MR. AZZARELLO: Between Peacock and Griffith's office, Dave set up a telecon in here.

MR. KARA: Okay. Were you aware that there were two different--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, and that's the reason I say I know I was called to this particular telecon and I told them that I couldn't staff that position, but certainly I'd have somebody on there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that Kenols--do you know if that's what happened--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if Dave--we've interviewed Dave and he was fairly certain that he did have somebody on from Command Center but couldn't identify who.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Other than that, I

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couldn't tell you either.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you know him well?

MS. SCHUESSLER: David? Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: So if it was him on the line, you recall that in fact if that was him, or you just don't recall?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't recall who it was. Yes, I can't quite--I know somebody wanted me on the line. I remember somebody answering the phone from the Command Center and, you know, I answered the line and whoever it was said I need you to stay on this line because we're going to have, and I don't know if they used these words, but the implication was certainly in my mind that we're going to have an open telecon. And I knew that we already had John on one, and I had other duties to tend to, so I wasn't going to do it, but I would make sure that it gets staffed.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you understand the line that John was on to be sort of an operational situational awareness line?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I knew it was with

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Jeff Griffith, so, yes, from an air traffic perspective, it was very operational.

MR. AZZARELLO: So what was your understanding of that other telecon that they wanted you on from headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Didn't know and at the time, you know, it didn't--I mean it mattered that we have somebody on there because they wanted a presence from the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: What would be the purpose if Dave Kenols is running a telecon knowing his position on that day? What would be the purpose of his telecon? Would that be for operational purposes, administration or otherwise?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: In your opinion, did you think there was a need to have two open lines with headquarters on that day?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, to the best of my recollection, most of the information that I remember flowing back and forth was the telecon that John was on. So I'm not sure what information

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was on this other line.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think there'd be a need for two lines though between--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I don't know. It depends. You know, it depends on if--I don't know. You know, not knowing how busy the line that John was on. I mean it was so busy that they couldn't share the information and in a timely enough manner maybe they needed another line to discuss various situations. So it was possible.

MR. SCHAEFFER: The telecon that John was on to the WOC, you say that was according to standard protocols for a situation that would be standard?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Would it be outside of the standard to establish other telecons if necessary?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, no, no. That would be part of the norm.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Part of the norm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: But again, they may have, not knowing, but they may have had a situation on

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the line that John White was on that they needed to explore further, but they needed to continue to address maybe realtime tactical information and the other line could be used to continue sharing information. So it's not inconceivable for me to have two lines, but I don't know what was on the second line.

MR. AZZARELLO: During the real sort of height of the hijackings that morning, whether it was say between 8:30 and--let's say from the first hijacking to when the air space was cleared and all aircraft on the ground roughly. Were you on any of the lines for any significant amount of time, meaning more than five or 10 minutes?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: We just ask that because we just want to make sure we're not missing something. We know John White's on the one open line at the NTMO position. But we don't see that you're on any open line or in any prolonged communication.

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's true because if

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you remember right after the aircraft got down, you know, we had certain aircraft that we needed to get back to Washington, key government officials. We had Medo-Vac. We had, you know, the situation certainly in New York that we were trying to get lifeguards. We were getting phone calls on lifeguard aircraft and could we allow that aircraft to go in. We were getting calls about military aircraft. You know, so a lot of that is what I was either fielding questions or sharing information.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you spend the majority of that time on the floor area?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, yeah. It was all on the floor.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you didn't go back to like one of the admin offices that get on a hard line or a phone there.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to the extent that Dave Kenols did have somebody from Command Center on his telecon, it would not have been you. Is it fair for us to assume that?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: It would've been someone else.

MS. SCHUESSLER: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know who that someone might have been, or you don't know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I can't remember at this point.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Anyone want to ask questions?

MR. SCHAEFFER: Just in terms of--the conduit to the ROCs terminating to the Command Center, who would they be coming in to?

MS. SCHUESSLER: They wouldn't be coming in to.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Not at all?

MS. SCHUESSLER: The ROC would not generally speaking have interfaced with the Command Center. The ROC is the interface between field facilities and the regions and headquarters.

MR. SCHAEFFER: But do you recall then on 9-11 any information flow to and from any ROC?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't think so. You know, the ROC would have gone up to the WOC, and then all of that would have been cascaded down through the headquarters--

MR. SCHAEFFER: Oh, sure, sure it would.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --telecon.

MR. AZZARELLO: In the aftermath of the attacks of 9-11 and the weeks that followed, we know there was substantial efforts on the part of the FAA to sort of--among other things obviously there was a group of people who were focused on pulling together a summary of events for a number of reasons. Obviously to memorialize a rather historic and important event, to prepare--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, we thought we did good. That was the other thing.

MR. AZZARELLO: To prepare Administrative Garvey, things for her appearance and testimony before Congress, and obviously not at that point because they didn't know about it, but at some point thereafter Administrator Garvey came by--after she left the position came back before

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the Commission in May also to testify. Were you involved in any of that, the efforts in the aftermath to try to pull together a chronology of events as it affected all of the FAA facilities in management levels.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Chronology of events, I would say no. In preparation for Secretary Manetta's testimony, I would say yes. Did not believe there was any role in preparation for Administrator Garvey testimony.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you would've been involved in the preparation of Secretary Manetta's?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Just from an Air Traffic group perspective. I'm an Air Traffic representative. It was part of some of the discussions.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were there at the Center preparing him for a testimony before Congress?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: How about for our testimony before the Commission?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: For--

MR. SCHAEFFER: For the Commission, Secretary Manetta's and Ms. Garvey's testimony before the Commission.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I was not involved with Administrator Garvey at all, and I know on two different occasions I went over to have discussions with Secretary Manetta and his staff.

MR. AZZARELLO: Those discussions that Secretary Manetta and his staff, were any of those discussions focused on the facts of the day of, what occurred the day of 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I'm sure they were focused on the facts, but it was quite honestly a very, very minute part of it really focused on the Air Traffic actions per se.

MR. AZZARELLO: Small part of it you're saying?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about one of the issues that was discussed in the aftermath and as we've been told by some of the people at FAA

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headquarters that they were looking at issues like the obvious, like when did we, the FAA as a system, learned of each of the four hijacked aircraft, and that in turn when did we notify the military about each of the four hijacked aircraft so that they could take whatever action may be appropriate.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Sure. I think that's probably been one of the questions that continually gets asked, when was the military notified of any of the events.

MR. AZZARELLO: In the FAA's effort to put that together after 9-11, were you consulted or involved in any of that, about your knowledge of events?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Certainly I was asked to the best of my recollection what I remember, and there were other people gathering information from--and I did not go out and talk to anybody else to ascertain, you know, what they remember. They came to me and said, okay, Linda, what do you remember in the sequence of events.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who were those people that

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were trying to gather your recollections for that purpose?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Some of that was the AT20 staff.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that Dave Kenols' staff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember who it was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I know Tony Ferronti and probably Doug Gould.

MR. KARA: Do you recall Darlene Freeman getting involved at all from the Administrator's office?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I never had any contact with her, no.

MR. KARA: Then or now?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no, not at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: And did Dave Kenols staff, be it Tony Ferronti and/or Doug Gould, did they speak with you specifically about the issue of notification to the military, your knowledge or

your recognition of it?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the nature of their discussions?

MS. SCHUESSLER: You know, what do you remember about when the military was notified, and, you know, when I would walk through the Services--aspect of it out from the Command Center. And that was coupled with some of the information that we had heard through the specialists as far as the facilities up in the northeast, and that was the extent of it I believe.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was your knowledge of notification to the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, we did not make a formal notification from the Command Center. You know, our notification was information sharing with the Air Traffic Services cell and the fact that we received information, and again, I don't know whether it was the Boston Center or what New England type facility, but we did have information that one of the Air Force majors--that they had

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been notified.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you find it at all unusual or normal that they would come to you from your Command Center perspective that day and ask you about what you knew about notification to the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, and again we're just gathering information on today's events.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm a little confused about--you said to us that your understanding of the protocol is that it wouldn't have been your role to do so.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So were they coming to you saying that look did you have discussions. Well, we know it's not your function as laid out, but we want to see if you did tell the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember them saying specifically we know it's not your role and responsibility, but, you know, what notification did you make if any. I don't think it was framed that way. It was just did you have contact with

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the military. If so, what did it look like.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and when you had those discussions, though, did they ask you about when you had those contacts with the military, did you ask them to scramble--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know whether they asked that or not, but I know we did not ask the military to scramble.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you make that clear to the AAT20 people who were asking you about your conversations with the military on 9-11 in terms of having notification sent?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think so because what we did at the Command Center was share the information that we had with the Service itself. We did not notify DOD.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you get the sense from the questions that the AAT20 people were asking you, did you get the sense that they were trying to find out whether or not you or anyone at the Command Center made a request to the military for fighter assistance, whether it be formal or

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informal?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, because again I think one of the questions is being asked in a lot of circles is did the FAA notify the military, and if so, when did it happen.

MR. AZZARELLO: And so yet you did get that that was pretty much one of the issues--was trying to find out if anyone at the Command Center had asked for any official assistance in terms of getting a fighter aircraft?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And where we can clearly then understand from you that you made it clear to them that you did not request any military assistance for fighter aircraft to scramble on any of the aircraft that day?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I can't tell whether I told them point blank no, we did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: What do you remember? I don't want to--

MS. SCHUESSLER: You know, again, I don't remember that I said no we did not make that

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request because I don't know that their question was that specific. I think their question was what notification did you make from the Command Center to the military if any.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they elaborate on what they meant by notification, or did they say information sharing? What about requests? Did they ask you specific questions? Did you make any request of the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know. Yeah, I don't know whether they asked me that specific question or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think they left the meeting with you with the impression that military assistance was requested by you and the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no, I don't believe they left with that impression.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you think they should have left with a clear impression that you did not ask for military assistance?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

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MR. LEWIS: When ATT20, when they did that re-visit with that, when was that roughly?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, it's been a while. I don't know.

MR. LEWIS: Well, was it like in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, or was it in 2002, or was it last year?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I do remember it may have been after, you know, as they're trying to pull the information together. It could have been then. Don't remember that but certainly do remember it after the initial round of hearings when it became very apparent, you know, one of the questions was, you know, when did the FAA notify the military.

MR. LEWIS: After the initial May, 2003 Commission hearings. Is that correct?

MS. SCHUESSLER: But the time frame, just the initial hearing--

MR. LEWIS: Of the Commission hearings?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. LEWIS: Okay.

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MR. KARA: Let me start with this list
and--

MR. AZZARELLO: I want to just ask if you remember--in the immediate aftermath of events in terms of the testimony that was requested on the Hill, Congress, from both the FAA and the military is who, what, when, and then when was the military notified. Do you remember if those questions could have been posed to you in conjunction with that or early on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, early on as they're gathering information. You know, I can't remember that being posed, but as we're sharing information, this is what we get at the Command Center. I would imagine that would be one of the questions asked, but I don't know that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember this is all in the summary that the AAT20 put together on September 17th, it's dated. Do you remember if you were ever consulted on preparation, which it has notifications to the military on two of the four flights?

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MR. LEWIS: Are you familiar with that, Linda?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Now that I'm looking. I think I have subsequently seen this, but it was probably--the first time I saw this was when you guys first came into the FAA to, you know, start the preliminary work to find out the sequence of events, and that's probably when I became aware of that.

MR. KARA: This document was contemporary to the testimony that John just mentioned in October of 2001, which is notification to the military prepared in September of 2001. Do you recall having any input to that or seen that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think I have probably--well, I don't know. What is this? CIA network. This doesn't seem like a typical FAA--well, a typical Air Traffic log just because CIA network is one here, so I don't--

MR. KARA: Now this appears to be a headquarters compilation of entries from different logs if you will.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, okay, and I'm looking at the date on there, you know. If we're looking at September of '01, I was not in headquarters. I would be at the Command Center, so, no, I don't think I would have seen that.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Linda, as far as the AAT20 leading--basically they led the reconstruction efforts, is that fair to say after 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Within the 2001 time frame following the attacks of 2001, while you were still at the Herndon Command Center, did those folks or did headquarters folks send people out to Command Center to talk to you and any of your personnel about the events of 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. Now I know they had routine--I say routine--I know they had contact with Ellen King because Ellen came with the Quality Assurance manager, and she was the focal for the effort of gathering the information for the Command Center.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you know what types of

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information gathering they were doing with the Herndon Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, some of it was the log information. Some of it was--well, I don't know. You'd have to talk to Ellen because I'm under the assumption that some of it was taped transcripts and that sort of thing as well.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Of those tapes, did you review those tapes? Did you review any of the transcripts of those tapes following the events from the Herndon Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Did the FBI come out to the Herndon Command Center at all post-9-11?

MS. SCHAEFFER: I don't know. You'd have to talk to Ellen. I do know subsequent to September 11th, the FBI did call us on several occasions the day following and asked us to do several different runs on call signs of aircraft. For instance, you know the second digit is a two. You know, run all the aircraft with the second digit two and send it to this particular number.

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We had a number of those types of--

MR. SCHAEFFER: But not in terms of going back to interview any of your personnel relating to their actions on 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MR. KARA: Linda, you replaced Jeff Griffith, right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: Did you and Jeff have a turnover concerning an on-going conversation he had developed in relationship with General Arnold at Konar?

MS. SCHUESSLER: General Arnold was one of the--if I remember correctly--Jeff tried to introduce me to most of his contacts prior to him leaving, and currently I have relationships with--

MR. KARA: General McKinley?

MS. SCHUESSLER: --General McKinley and General Brussard.

MR. KARA: General--he's the deputy down there, right?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. KARA: Yeah, but in terms of Jeff and General Arnold had a sustained conversation over time about mixing and matching the two time lines that each agency held, and were told sometimes heated discussions concerning who told who when. Was the flavor of that passed on to you from Jeff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, not even aware of any of that.

MR. KARA: And did you continue that kind of dialogue with General Arnold?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: Or with General McKinley leading up to our May, 2003 hearing?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, General McKinley and I did have a brief conversation just to indicate that, you know, our records have, you know, a little bit different information and, you know, that's the extent of it. We didn't try and marry any data together or have any further dialogue to say, you know, this is what we need to do about it.

MR. KARA: And you were AAT20 in the

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summer of 2002 I think you told us.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so.

MR. KARA: At that point in time, NORAD provided this headquarters information that had been developed just subsequent to 9-11 done by an individual named Sherry Gott, and she was asking for clearance for a briefing she was going to give, and she forwarded the information here to two entities. She forwarded it to Major Nix who-within your domain. She also forwarded it to Tony Ferronti to take a look at it, and Tony said we don't have any problems with this. Do you recall that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Linda, going back to your conversation, do you recall one conversation with General McKinley?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Was that before our hearing or was that after our hearing?

MS. SCHUESSLER: To the best of my

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recollection, it was probably after the hearing, you know, because again, you know, I think that hearing highlighted the fact that we had disparities as far as maybe some of the time frames.

MR. KARA: And those conversations continued subsequent to our visit to headquarters NORAD, within the past month or two?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, not with me.

MR. KARA: Not with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was there discussion about different information on time lines, notifications to the military by the FAA?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yeah.

MR. SCHAEFFER: How did you leave things with General McKinley? How were things left in terms of the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Just acknowledging the fact that there were differences and, you know, part of the conversation was that he was not the official on September 11th. He was not in that position on September 11th anyway. You know, he

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came in inheriting that situation. So we just talked, you know. Again we have an information sharing relationship and, you know, contact and after the hearings were over, you know, we just comment on the fact that, you know, that was one of the elements that came out of the hearing, that we have different information on what time the contact was made. But again no dialogue to say oh, we need to change things. Oh, we're concerned about it, you know. This is just the way it is.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Which notification times were the subject of that conversation?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I've forgotten on some of the time frames. If you were to probably go back and look at some of the testimony, and I've forgotten who in the FAA testified one day. I don't know whether it was--

MR. SCHAEFFER: None of those stand out to you as which notification times of the four hijacks were the ones who--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, the difference was I think the FAA--one of the time lines had DOD

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notification because of the Otis Air Force Base call. And then there was a time frame I think when NORAD had--it was, I don't know, 15, 20 minutes later that their first notification to--I don't know if it was Konar or NORAD now, occurred. And that was I guess the time gap that came out in the hearings that the FAA and DOD had a difference of what was logged.

MR. SCHAEFFER: How about anything regarding United Airlines 175?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. We didn't talk about any specific flights. We just talked notification in general.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Did General McKinley call you, or did you initiate contact with him?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think I probably initiated to the best of my recollection.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have any discussions with General McKinley regarding any attempts by either the FAA or the military to try and verify the sources, being that they seemed somewhat flinching?

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think both parties--I think they both felt comfortable that we have already tried to verify with tapes and transcripts and talking to people, so the fact is this is what we show in the difference.

MR. AZZARELLO: So to an extent they were different than the conversation would have been in that each side felt comfortable with their--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think so because again the sequence of events that day I think in all arenas that yes, we have logs that we're responsible for maintaining, but not all the information on that particular day was put down in the time frame that notification was made. You know, people were making wags as far as the time. Certainly you can validate some of that information with tapes, and I think in both cases that's what we did.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And I'm sorry because I want to go back, and I'm sorry to revisit it, but when we went through your post-9-11 jobs, I was writing down, and maybe I wrote them down wrong,

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but you were tactical operations manager until about May of '02, and that's when you went into AAT20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And then you were there until November of '02?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, but then--

MR. SCHAEFFER: And then you were here at headquarters.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, at AT20 is also here.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Right.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So I left the commander, came up here and was AT20, and then in November, I replaced Jeff when he retired.

MR. SCHAEFFER: That's AT2.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay. And you stayed there you said for about four months?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and then went back to the AT20 job.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And that's in the April,

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May '03 period.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think so.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, November, December, January, February. Had to be February. February, March time frame. And then went back to AT20.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And then stayed there--I'm just trying to--you're saying following the hearing which was in May of '03, you're talking to General McKinley in your capacity as AT2 or as AAT20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: In that particular case, it's kind of a--it doesn't really matter because one of the things that Jeff did when he retired, he handed off most of the security elements to me. I mean because I had my clearance, and at the time when I was upstairs replacing him, I was assuming the Security roles that he had AT20, or excuse me, of AT2. And so behind me was Bruce Johnson, and then rather than try and get Bruce up to speed, the decision was made by Bill Peacock for me to continue on with the Security role until we filled that position in AT2 permanently. And at that

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point, we'd make that permanent handoff.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Linda, in some of the military time lines that they compiled, they reference a line of communication between the FAA and the military on the morning of 9-11, referencing particularly the latter two hijacks, the Pentagon and the crash in Pennsylvania. Would you have any insight as to what line do you think they were referring to?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it be one that you would have heard at the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. Are there any other comments on that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I was just thinking I know you had talked to Colonel Atkins prior to me. I was under the impression, but maybe incorrectly, that she was on the same line that John was on.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the John White line?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yes, and that may

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not be true because she may possibly have set up another line that she's talking to the military on, but she's in the room with some of the FAA folks.

MR. AZZARELLO: How long have you held that impression that Colonel Atkins might have been on the line that John White was on?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I know she was in the headquarters arena.

MR. AZZARELLO: But is that a recently formed impression, or is that one you held as far back as the immediate aftermath of 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It's been a while. I mean that's part of her role and responsibility as the liaison.

MR. AZZARELLO: What's that? What do you understand her role to be?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Part of her role for the FAA is to be the liaison to the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: Including in a hijack scenario?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, no, no. I mean this was obviously more than a hijack scenario.

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She was in the headquarters arena, so she would be one of the resources that the headquarters people would utilize to work through some of the issues on that current day.

MR. KARA: Let me share your impression what we understand based on our talk with Cheryl, and since we've talked about it today, again to refresh this is from Jeff Griffith and Jeff's talking to John where you are out there. The other telecon we talked about was on Dave Kenols' setup down here which was set up in this room right here. We understanding talking to Cheryl Atkins that when she came to the 10th floor, she actually came to this facility here, and over time was talking to whoever she talked to out of her phone bay over here but was in and out of the Dave Kenols' telecon arena. She does not recall going up to this location, but she does recall Jeff from time to time coming down to here. That's our current understanding. We're perfectly willing to change that if you have something different.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. I mean she and the

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people up in headquarters certainly they know better than I.

MR. KARA: Yeah, and Dave Kenols also thought that she had established her position down there. So we're just curious as to how you gained the impression that her role might have been different than that on 9-11.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, and you know it may have been, you know, bits and pieces as far as the information shared with John White. I don't know, but if indeed she was sharing information with people here in headquarters, you know, the conduit between headquarters and the Command Center mainly was through John White. So it wouldn't surprise me at all that information wasn't shared through that avenue.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did that issue come up in connection with your discussions with Kenols' staff about recreating the events? Did they discuss with you the issue of Cheryl Atkins and her role here at headquarters?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not her role. Part of

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that would be the notification question again as far as when was the DOD notified.

MR. AZZARELLO: Again what was the nature of that discussion that you had with Kenols' staff because you wouldn't be here to know what she did? So were they informing you about what they thought her role was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, when the question came up as far as, you know, when was DOD notified, she would be one of the conduits that would be used here in headquarters, and I had been here in headquarters. Tony Ferronti worked for me for a period of time in AT20. So as you are beginning to gather some of your information, you know, he was one of the information gatherers that was pulling some of the information for the, you know, your Commission together.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, during these discussions, did you talk about the notifications to the military that would have been in accord with the existing protocol? In other words, did they AT20 people say to you did you have discussion with

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them about--well, what about the hijack coordinator? Did that person call the NMCC area?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not to my knowledge, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the discussions would be outside the confines of the protocol that we looked at earlier here that you discussed with the Kenols' staff people?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think that's--

MR. AZZARELLO: When the Kenols' people talked to you about military notifications and your knowledge of that and their knowledge of it, were those discussions outside the context of notification that would be in accord with this procedure?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, and I think people were just trying to gather information, you know, with their other notifications at FAA facilities or a representative made to the Department of Defense.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be outside the written protocol.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

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MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand.

MR. SCHAEFFER: You spent some time in AAT20, can you give us a flavor as to what do you consider some of the touchstones of the events of 9-11 that exist within the FAA in terms of products or bodies of materials that capture what happened on 9-11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, I became aware of this which was just before I guess as you were coming into headquarters, and from my time at AT20, you know, that was not necessarily a closed issue, but it was a closed door. All that information gathering had been accomplished already. So there was nothing for me to do in that regard in the AT20 perspective until, you know, you came into being and said okay, we need information on the events of September 11th.

MR. SCHAEFFER: You know, AAT20, their folks as you were said went out to the Command Center, or contacted the Command Center. Were those interviews that were conducted, or were they

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discussions, or how were those kind of instituted?

MS. SCHUESSLER: To my best recollection, they worked through Ellen King. I do not remember them coming out and doing any interviews, whether on the phone or in person.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was her discussion with you about notification more formal or informal?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, this came out of the, you know, what I remember. I'm sure they must have asked that after the events. I don't remember that specifically, but where I'm going is after the hearings. Then the questions became very apparent that there was a discrepancy.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And for my question, going back to after the events, in terms of after the events, reconstructing what happened close to the events before the Commission existed. Do you have any knowledge of interviews that resident within AAT20 of interviewing FAA personnel after the events?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not at the Command Center, no.

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MR. SCHAEFFER: How about anywhere else?

MS. SCHUESSLER: That I wouldn't know.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And you don't have any knowledge of that--meaning AAT20 after 9-11 that does exist at all?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, because again that was kind of a closed issue by the time I got to AT20, the investigation was completed, and it was over and finished.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And I'm sorry, when you left AT20 to go to your current job now, what month again was that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was--let's see. Left it in November when Jeff Griffith retired, and that was November of '02. I was there till February, March time frame. I was there for 120 days.

MR. AZZARELLO: February, March, '03.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and then went back to AT20 and then was selected for AT2 April, May time frame I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: May of '03.

MR. LEWIS: '03, yeah.

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MR. SCHAEFFER: You went back to AT2.

MR. AZZARELLO: To Griffith's position.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, right, and there was a detail. You know, mine was a four-month detail and then behind me Bruce Johnson came in, and he also had a four-month detail, and then he was selected for AT1 and I was selected for AT2.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was AT20 from say May of '03 until the end of the year of '03?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Tony Ferronti was acting until we made a permanent selection, and I don't remember when that was made, and Tom Davidson was selected as the permanent manager.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it be Tony Ferronti's position then--he held that position after the Commission hearings in May from then until the end of the year. To the extent that there was any need to discuss discrepancies between military notifications and FAA, that came up at the hearing? Would he do that then following up on that issue?

MS. SCHUESSLER: If we needed to go back

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and, you know, contact transcripts, tapes because that's the office that would hold that responsibility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or answer, for example, the specific Commission questions. Like did you go check on this. There were some questions--Administrator Garvey was asked to go submit answers--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, that office is the primary information gatherer for that type of issue, but that wouldn't necessarily mean that they would be the only ones involved.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would it sort of start there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. I don't have any more questions.

MR. BROWN: Linda, we appreciate your great indulgence. It's been a long time to go with a bathroom or lunch break.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Are we supposed to have lunch?

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MR. AZZARELLO: That concludes our
interview.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

TONY FERRANTE

BY

JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 Commission

MILES KARA, 9/11 Commission

JEFF BROWN, 9/11 Commission

BROOKE LEWIS, FAA Counsel's Office

Monday, April 19, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's April 19, 2004, we're at FAA Headquarters in Washington about to begin an interview with Tony Ferrante. I'm John Azzarello of Team 8, 9/11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9/11 Commission.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9/11 Commission.

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis, FAA Chief Counsel's Office.

MR. FERRANTE: Tony Ferrante from Air Traffic Operations.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mr. Ferrante, can you sort of just give us a brief interview of your career in FAA, when you started and leading up to the various positions you held leading up to the position you held on 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: Actually, I started on June 18, 1982, at Pittsburgh International Airport. I had spent the previous 10 months at Pittsburgh as a military controller deployed following the strike in 1981. I liked it so much, I never left.

I stayed there for about four years. I

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transferred to Miami, Florida, and at the end of 1985, again, as a controller in Miami and I moved into a staff specialist position in 1988. In 1989, I was promoted to a supervisory position. In 1991, I was promoted to the Assistant Manager for Plans and Procedures.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can you back up for a second?

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: '88, what was your position there, you were still a--

MR. FERRANTE: Supervisor, at Miami tower.

MR. AZZARELLO: In 1988?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what was the supervisory position in '99?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm sorry, it was '89--

MR. AZZARELLO: And that was?

MR. FERRANTE: A staff position in '88, supervisory position in '89.

MR. KARA: All at Miami tower?

MR. FERRANTE: At Miami tower.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And then an assistant manager position in '91.

MR. AZZARELLO: An assistant manager's position at the tower?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: In Miami?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: In 1993, I transferred to Washington headquarters, December of '93. And I was a specialist in the Civil Operations Division.

MR. AZZARELLO: Civil Operations Division?

MR. FERRANTE: That was an organization that actually closed in 1995 or 1996, as a result of a reorganization. So, let's see, that was December of 1993; in April of 1994, I was promoted to the Assistant Division Manager of the Civil Operations Division. In 1995, is when the reorganization took effect and at that point, I was named the Manager of Terminal and Flight Service Operations and Procedures.

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MR. AZZARELLO: That was in '95?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, approximately April.

MR. AZZARELLO: And your title again?

MR. FERRANTE: Manager, Terminal and Flight Service Operations and Procedures. That was ATO-120 for acronyms. I stayed in that job until October of 1997, when I moved into Air Traffic Investigations, first as the Assistant Manager and then, approximately one year later as the Manager of the Air Traffic Investigations Division.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, in '97, you started as Assistant Manager for Air Traffic--

MR. FERRANTE: Air Traffic right, that was AAT-200, actually 201, as the Assistant.

MR. AZZARELLO: 201?

MR. FERRANTE: Right. And then approximately a year later as the Manager. I was detailed for a while in there, so I don't know the exact dates.

MR. KARA: And the Manager's position is AAT-?

MR. FERRANTE: AAT-200.

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MR. AZZARELLO: In '98, you had that position?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. And I have held that position since then. I have done various details as the Acting Manager of the Evaluations and Investigations Division; that's an SES slot and I've acted for approximately two years out of that five-year period.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's the position you still hold today, AAT-200?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. KARA: And you report to--in AAT-200, you report to--

MR. FERRANTE: Well, on September--

MR. KARA: --11th you reported to who?

MR. FERRANTE: Dave Cannoles.

MR. KARA: Dave Cannoles, okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Dave Cannoles was what? AAT--

MR. FERRANTE: AAT-20. AAT-20 has two divisions; one is Evaluations; one is Investigations. Dave was the direct report to the

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Director of Air Traffic, managing both. MR.

AZZARELLO: So, AAT-20 is two divisions?

MR. FERRANTE: Two divisions, Evaluations and Investigations.

MR. KARA: And you head the Investigations?

MR. FERRANTE: I head the Investigations Division.

MR. KARA: Curiosity, who had the Eval?

MR. FERRANTE: Tom Carmody. Tom passed away approximately two years ago.

MR. AZZARELLO: Investigations--okay, so you headed the Investigations--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --Division. And then he reported--he being Cannoles--reported up to Air Traffic?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes--

MR. AZZARELLO: To--

MR. FERRANTE: --at that point it was Jeff Griffith and--

MR. AZZARELLO: Peacock?

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MR. FERRANTE: Bill Peacock.

MR. AZZARELLO: We understand on 9/11, you were out of the state, out of D.C.?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct, I was in Chicago

MR. AZZARELLO: I picked that up from Fran Frenier [ph].

MR. FERRANTE: Oh, okay. She had a little bit of edit--I guess writer's little bit of a writer's license in some of her comments, but pretty good reading.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did she--you were interviewed by her?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. Most of that she was able to piece together to herself. At that point we were not able to discuss most of what we knew from those events. That was at a request of the FBI, also the NTSB.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about, when you got back from Chicago to the D.C. area, when you arrived back and when you got to work what was your personal involvement in the aftermath of 9/11.

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MR. FERRANTE: I arrived about 1:00 o'clock in the morning to my residence on September 12. I reported to the FAA building at about 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday the 12th. I immediately started to see what information we had already gathered; what information we still needed. At that point, there was, I guess the forerunner to what we now call the Domestic Event Network. That was an open conference bridge that had been set up in the Director of Air Traffic's Office.

I checked in through there, periodically throughout the day. Dave Cannoles, I believe, at that point still spent most of his time up there. I think, sometime early that morning we met with the FBI. That was the first time we met with them concerning what information we could provide. We started turning over radar data, voice communications data.

MR. AZZARELLO: You and Dave Cannoles monitored the data, also?

MR. FERRANTE: I did not monitor the data.

MR. AZZARELLO: He did--

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MR. FERRANTE: I think Dave was still there at that point.

MR. KARA: Bill Peacock's office, there's a conference right next door--

MR. FERRANTE: That is the conference room--

MR. KARA: An that's where the network you're talking about was down there?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. KARA: Very sophisticated we have.

MR. FERRANTE: It is.

MR. AZZARELLO: So the FBI--you met with the FBI on this call, you and Dave?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, along with, I think Doug Gould was there, as well, and he was actually the technician running the equipment for us. One of the first thing were voice communications that I know you guys have heard all of the tapes, but there were some communications from the alleged hijackers and up to that point, we really thought they were speaking in a foreign language. It was the FBI who pointed out to us that they were

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actually speaking in English.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were reviewing some ATC tapes?

MR. FERRANTE: We were reviewing ATC tapes. We were reviewing controller statements; facility logs; primarily still in the data-gathering stage.

MR. BROWN: How about, did you review any SATORIS ph?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't believe we had a SATORI available until later the day of the 12th, perhaps even the 13th but, yes, we did review SATORIS.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if you reviewed them at the FBI that week or--

MR. FERRANTE: I was not present when the FBI viewed the SATORIS. I was present when they viewed what we call RAPTOR or the terminal recordings, since that we do in a common bay. But I'm relatively sure that Doug Gould had the FBI in our SATORI lab, there's only one area where we're able to play SATORIS there because--

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MR. KARA: That's the one we've been in from time to time.

MR. FERRANTE: You have?

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, he--Doug Gould probably was the liaison for that?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, Doug Gould was our primary focal point between the agencies and the FBI at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about, could you tell us what TSDs were located on 9/11, if you know, in FAA headquarters? I'm told there was one in the ACC. Did you know that?

MR. FERRANTE: No, the ACC being--

MR. AZZARELLO: The Aviation Crisis Center, I have a really good sketch here of the Aviation Crisis Center. Yes, I know there was one there. There were others in various Air Traffic offices, I don't know exactly where. I believe there was one on the 6th floor from when Jeff Griffith--

MR. KARA: The 6th floor?

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MR. FERRANTE: The 6th floor. Mike Scirillo's office.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell us, where this sort of universe of TSD locations in headquarters as best you can on 9/11, where they were then?

MR. FERRANTE: One in Monte Belger's office; one in Mick Scirillo's office--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mick Scirillo's--well, Monte's up on the 10th floor, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, mm-hmm. Jeff Griffith's was also on the 10th floor.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did Jeff Griffith's office have one?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. And I believe Mike Scirillo still had one, although Mike moved into the office that Jeff had vacated. I don't know if Jeff took his upstairs when he went or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mike Scirillo was on 6th, you think?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sixth Floor, that's three, any others?

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MR. KARA: Actually I've got four.

MR. AZZARELLO: I have Belger, Griffith,
Scirillo--

MR. KARA: And the one in the ACC.

MR. FERRANTE: And the one in the ACC.

MR. AZZARELLO: One in the ACC room, is
that it?

MR. FERRANTE: To my knowledge.

MR. AZZARELLO: Fourth floor, Peacock.

MR. FERRANTE: You know, I believe he had
one, I can't say with certainty if he did or
didn't.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if the data
from those TSDs was something that was preserved
and then given to the FBI or reviewed by the FAA
after 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't believe that it was
given to the FBI with the exception of certain
pages or certain pictures that were taken that
showed snapshots of events as they were taking
place in the country. Primarily, it was when the
system shut down because it has the ability to show

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the number of active flights. I know we used some of those same pictures in a book we put together within the first couple of days after that's called "Summary of Air Traffic Hijacking Events."

MR. KARA: I think I have that.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Like this one?

MR. FERRANTE: That is that one.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be maybe--

MR. FERRANTE: That would be a picture from a RAPTOR or an ASR-11, I'm sorry an ASR-terminal radar source. TG would be a picture from a center, probably taken off of a SATORI display.

MR. AZZARELLO: Trying to find where a TSD or a slide of a TSD displayed, if one exists. Do you think you had some of those in here?

MR. FERRANTE: I thought--that's Boston Center. I thought there was one in there indicating the number of flights that were active after the ground stop had been issued. I think that's it at the very end.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, is that it?

MR. FERRANTE: That's a TSD picture.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a TSD?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. That's the traffic in the Northeast at 8:47?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it shows 77 and where its location and 93?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It shows each of the four subject aircraft?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. : Tell us about the FAA efforts at headquarters, post-9/11 to know the chronology events to try to find out what happened when? What did the FAA know and when in its various field facilities and its upper levels of management?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, starting, I believe on Thursday afternoon is when we started putting together this book with--

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MR. AZZARELLO: This one?

MR. FERRANTE: --right--with the original goal of having that completed on Saturday, although we didn't meet that because information was still pouring in. We were trying to be as factual as we could and gathered data from all of the facilities that had contacts with any of the four flights. And we started to develop a chronology from the time that they started their taxi out or even requested an ATC clearance, up to the point where they either impacted with the terrain in Pennsylvania or in one of the buildings either the Trade Center or the Pentagon.

MR. : So you started on Thursday, you wanted to complete it on Saturday, but you had a lot of information come in--

MR. FERRANTE: There was a big push that the Administrator wanted more briefings, more materials. And that's what the real driver behind putting this together was. MR. AZZARELLO: The big push was for more--

MR. FERRANTE: Information material on

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what had taken place and what we knew factually for each one of the aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that in connection with any briefings that the Administrator was scheduled to deliver or was it just a general: I want to know what happened, when coming from Administrator Garvey?

MR. FERRANTE: Actually, my direction would have come from Dave Cannoles and I don't know of any scheduled--I learned later that there were going to be some hearings on the Hill, but I don't think I knew that at that point. Dave told me that we needed to have a chronology; we needed to be able to depict what had happened with each one of the flights.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: And that's when we took him to the very laborious process of developing that, while at the same time still working with radar files; still working with voice data; still getting tapes in from various facilities and still having contact with the FBI to make sure they had all

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these information that they needed.

During that first week, there were probably three or four visits that FBI agents made where they would generally leave with CDs that had WAV files with the voice communications or the radar pictures, as well as radar data.

MR. AZZARELLO: And give me the parameters of the chronology for each of the four flights as laid out for you by Dave Cannoles?

MR. FERRANTE: From start to finish? That was what our parameters were, so we looked at. I think if you read the chronology that we put together, we started from the point where the aircraft received taxi instructions up until the point that there were confirmed either accidents or crashes into buildings or terrain.

MR. AZZARELLO: You said to the time of crashes or past the time of crash to when it was confirmed to have been the aircraft that crashed in that particular building?

MR. FERRANTE: Till the time it was confirmed.

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MR. AZZARELLO: So to the time of crashes, including the time after the crashes were confirmed?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Should we, assume that that also includes or did that also include, then the time in-between taxiing to confirmed crash that somewhere in there would also include a time when the military may have been notified by the FAA on each of the four hijacked aircraft?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, we tried to put in all the significant events that we could identify at our--you know, our resources at that point were either facility logs, personnel statements, of course the radar data, the voice data and so forth. So, what we did was, we tried to build a chronology that had all four of the events. And our office routinely does this. A normal accident investigation process, we start five minutes before the first contact with the ATC system and we go until five minutes after the last contact, or, you know, if it's a crash, and we know it's a crash,

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five minutes after that event.

MR. AZZARELLO: Can we list separately, the various sources for that chronology you had, Air Traffic Control tapes, is that correct?

MR. FERRANTE: ATC tapes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Radar from both centers and terminals.

MR. AZZARELLO: Radars from TRACON and en-routes?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm. What else?

MR. FERRANTE: Personnel statements.

MR. AZZARELLO: Personnel statements.

MR. FERRANTE: And facility logs.

MR. AZZARELLO: And facility logs?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that the universe of everything?

MR. FERRANTE: To my knowledge at that point, yes.

MR. KARA: What's interesting about that

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list is that there's nothing, there's no data sources from inside, in terms of logs or anything else that was maintained in the headquarters, itself. This all came from the field?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't have any WOC logs--that would include WOC logs?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why, wouldn't that be part of--

MR. FERRANTE: We've never had WOC logs, you know, our role as Air Traffic Investigations in determining how the Air Traffic system performed.

MR. KARA: Who was separately gathering together all the relevant information from 9/11 as it related to the headquarters itself?

MR. FERRANTE: I know security had their own efforts underway. I don't know what the WOC would have had underway at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm going to get [unintell.] on American 11, a New England Regional Center advising the WOC of a suspected hijack of 11

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and it's not clear to us, I guess, where that source of that would have been, Can you shed some light on that--what--the source was?

MR. FERRANTE: It probably came from the logs we received from Boston Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: ZBW's logs?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: They would have when the New England Region advised the WOC?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, they would have that in the form of personnel statements from supervisor said when this was notified and so forth.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, wouldn't that be when Boston Center notified New England Region?

MR. FERRANTE: But, see they would have been on lines with them and had their own conference bridges set up with those entities.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that wouldn't have been, I would mean, just from the layman's view, I would think that--being unfamiliar with how you reconstruct your events. An entry for when the New England Region told the Washington Ops Center, I

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would think would come from either New England Region log or the Washington Operations Center Log. You're saying it wouldn't come from either one of those.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, it could have come from either of those, I don't know the exact source.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. And then--

MR. KARA: Let me back up a second. When you get the facility logs in relevant data that kind of facilities in your terminology is towers, TRACONS, and en-route centers.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. KARA: How about the Region logs from the ROC, the ROC at HEL; the ROC at AENE and AEA, did that come in to you as part of your data gathering?

MR. FERRANTE: More than likely.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: It's not a normal part of an accident investigation that we would get that.

MR. KARA: But you think it might have

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been in--

MR. FERRANTE: Here's what I do know, that every entry in here, we had a piece of paper that documented that entry, because if you look at some of the entries we made, we even, if we didn't have an official FAA log that listed that, we listed that this time derived from a personnel statement. Let me see if I can find a sentence that said that. There are probably some of those in almost all of them. We tried to stick to facts, yeah, right here. This time approximately based on personnel statements from XNY.

So, we didn't have a log entry that said that, but we thought it was important information and we took it from another source.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what about here, see you seem to be trailing--tracking the information through the FAA system. And you have it going, earlier on, you have the Boston Center reporting the hijacking. And then you have the region notifying the WOC and then you have the WOC notifying ACI, that's a headquarters activity,

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correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then conferencing the region in with her. Wouldn't you have had a WOC log available to you to, you know, somebody, not you personally, but somebody in your group to be able to cite to that entry for the WOC to notify ACS?

MR. FERRANTE: More than likely.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, just to clear up the confusion, you said you had facility logs but not including the WOC logs, do you want to modify that now--

MR. FERRANTE: We may have had WOC logs, I don't recall if we did or didn't. But it would seem that this entry came from either a ROC log or a WOC log. Again, in a normal course of business, we would not access either of those two logs.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, but I think, recognizing this is not--this probably wasn't the normal course of duty.

MR. FERRANTE: This was not a normal

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course of duty.

MR. AZZARELLO: It is also citations in here to NEADS logs or military logs, did you have that available to you and your staff, the NEADS logs?

MR. FERRANTE: Some of that information we got from the military liaison, Colonel Atkins. So, I'm sure that we had some level of NEADS logs that indicated what time we had given certain notifications to them.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where do you have NEADS logs, indicate they were notified by the FAA on the events concerning American Airlines 11?

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is--

MR. FERRANTE: Now, we may have derived this information from Boston Center, Boston Center may have told us that the NEADS logs indicate such and such. I don't know if we had specific copies of the NEADS logs, but we had someone who told us that this is what the NEADS logs said. We may have had the actual logs.

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MR. KARA: Here's our problem with the NEADS logs, that's not a problem, Tony, but here's what we did. The NEADS logs, in and of itself, is a classified document.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. KARA: We happen to have an unclassified extract with us, so the transmission of that log to fairly and accurately portray the log that day would have had to have been a secret document. Did you accumulate classified documents as part of this?

MR. FERRANTE: No, none.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: None that I'm aware of.

MR. KARA: None that you're aware of, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm going to show you this unclassified version of the NEADS log.

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take a look at that and just see if it appears to be a document that you might have seen.

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MR. FERRANTE: No, I have never seen this before. And, to me, it's kind of interesting that it's a handwritten log.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why is that?

MR. FERRANTE: Because, normally, all the logs that we see are typed.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would you have recognized that kind of thing if you had seen it before?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Somebody in Dave Cannoles, I may have to look back in the interview, I don't recall exactly, who, but either Dave Cannoles staff, Dan Diggins or someone, seemed to indicate that they did recall a NEADS log was given to somebody in the FAA to compare to see what the military said they knew, when, because--

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know that we had NEADS logs that--I know I've never seen this particular log before. I think we had information that was provided by NEADS on what time they were notified of specific incidents and that's what we used.

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MR. AZZARELLO: But you don't know the source of where you got the information of what NEADS was notified and when?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, who were the people sort of, at ground level, pulling that together, if you could tell me? I mean, like, who's responsible, for, say, these entries and who drafted them?

MR. FERRANTE: I didn't do all of the typing myself, I did 90 percent of it. A lot of it--what we did was, Miles, you've see the bay that we operate in.

MR. KARA: Right.

MR. FERRANTE: We put up a big piece of cardboard, we took a computer, hooked it up to a projector so we could project it on the wall and w started developing the log. So, it had input from Dan Diggins; it had input from myself; it had input from Doug Gould. Many of the entries were physically typed by myself or by Catherine Meyers who was a specialist that worked for me. And it

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was based on what I told her to type.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that apply for each of the four hijacked aircraft?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And each of the incidents?

MR. FERRANTE: For this entire document.

MR. AZZARELLO: The entire document.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you--

MR. FERRANTE: I oversaw the production of this entire development.

MR. AZZARELLO: And oversaw, it what about drafting, were you--did you draft it--

MR. FERRANTE: A good portion of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: --who else drafted the language in it?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, again, I had Catherine doing some of the typing on it, so it may have been where I told her to make an entry, you know, pertaining to notification of "X" and she used her own words in making that notification. But, again, it was being projected on a board where

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I'm able to read what's being typed and then I would say, move on or what the next entry is.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not talking about the personnel who was sort of doing the typing. I mean, in terms of the decision-makers, who decides what substantive information goes in that summary in those chronologies? Other than you. You said a good portion of it.

MR. FERRANTE: The decision making of what went in these chronologies was me. The physical entry, I did the majority of, but not all of them.

MR. KARA: You were the author of this document

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. KARA: And the document was approved by?

MR. FERRANTE: The document was given to Dave Cannoles, I believe, on Sunday evening, maybe Sunday afternoon. He came back and told us how many copies to be made, how many copies we needed.

MR. KARA: Who did he get it approved by?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know--

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MR. KARA: But he came back--

MR. FERRANTE: --I don't know--

MR. FERRANTE: --relatively quickly and
said X-number of copies?

MR. FERRANTE: Right, I don't know that he
actually got it approved, you know, Dave, at that
point, was in meetings a good portion of the day
with the Administrator or the Deputy Administrator,
with Bill Peacock, Jeff Griffith--

MR. KARA: On Sunday.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you gave the report to
Cannoles on Sunday afternoon?

MR. FERRANTE: I believe it was Sunday
afternoon.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if--we
were told that the Herndon folks were asked to work
that weekend, including Sunday on putting together
their chronology and looking at--reviewing their
own tapes from their Command Center. Was that
connected to this assignment?

MR. FERRANTE: No, no.

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MR. AZZARELLO: It was not?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was that connected to?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm sure that they were trying to go through the same exercise that we were going through and develop all the information that they could. We worked weekends for at least three weeks.

MR. AZZARELLO: But they seemed to have been directed to do so by somebody in the chain or command.

MR. FERRANTE: It may have been directed by Jeff Griffith to put together all of the Command Center entries and all of their logs.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that be an element that you'd want to put in here in a chronology and, if so, why? And if not, why not?

MR. FERRANTE: There may have been elements that were germane to this, but this document was geared towards what we normally did following any major aircraft accident. We have

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traditionally done briefing items for the Administrator that have gone all the way up through the food chain detailing those events. Those events, we try to be as factual as we can and stick to information that we're able to derive.

They're preliminary in nature, they're done very quickly to get a picture of what's happened, and they are all subject to change in the weeks and months that follow. So, initially is, within the Air Traffic Investigations group, we reach out to the facilities; we get radar data; we get voice data; we get facility logs; we get personnel statements and we build briefings based on those.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you usually leave the Command Center out of the loop in terms of looking for their tapes or their chronology and their notes and their time lines of what they knew when?

MR. FERRANTE: At that point in time, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: At that point in time
you--

MR. FERRANTE: On September 11 of 2001, we

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had very little, if ever, interaction with the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, I'm not talking about interaction, I'm saying, let's say, pre-9/11, there's an accident, and it occurs in Boston Center's airspace or in Boston TRACON.

MR. FERRANTE: We have nothing to do with the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's not a branch or an element of the FAA that you would look to to get their tapes to see what they knew when or--

MR. FERRANTE: No. The only time we would ever have contacted the Command Center is if we had an incident that we were conducting an investigation on and that investigation indicated there might have been traffic management issues associated with it. For example, if we had two aircraft that collided in Boston and it was because the two sectors were overloaded with traffic, at that point, we might have reached out to the Command Center to get what they knew of the event or what they knew of the traffic loads. But short

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of that, never.

MR. AZZARELLO: But how about under the unique circumstances of 9/11, did it, was it discussed--did it occur to anybody that--to think about whether or not Command Center had information that might have been relevant to the four hijackings that you might want to look at in the bigger picture and weave in with a big-picture chronology?

MR. FERRANTE: We may have had some of the Command Center logs when we were developing, this, I don't recall. But normal course of business, we had very little interaction with the Command Center at that point and I don't think we thought about looking outside of the Air Traffic facilities where we knew we had the actual voice communications; we knew we had the actual radar; those were the factual things we knew that we could point to and say, here's what happened at what time and when.

MR. AZZARELLO: I understand that that would give you what happened and when, as communicated from the Centers. But, as it would

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pertain to the flow of information within the larger FAA wouldn't you want to look at the Command Center and what they knew regarding the four hijacked aircraft if they had relevant information on them?

MR. FERRANTE: Not necessarily, because remember the roles were very different then. The Command Center had knowledge of flow restrictions in the system. We were not interested in any flow restrictions in the system. We were not interested in the shut-down of the system following the hijackings, except to the extent where we--

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's look--

MR. FERRANTE: --no we never looked to the Command Center for any information that they may have had.

MR. AZZARELLO: But let's look at what really happened on 9/11 and what I would assume somebody in FAA headquarters in investigations or chronology reconstruction may have been privy to. And let's look at the fact that there was an open line from the Command Center manned by John White,

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who was the manager of the Command Center and somebody here in ACC at headquarters. And right next to the WOC in the Crisis Center. Did you, I assume that's something that you became aware of, am I wrong?

MR. FERRANTE: I did become aware of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: When did you become aware of that?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know, probably when I came back to Washington on Wednesday. But I didn't think much about it because that was a line that primarily involved Security and the Air Traffic Command Center.

I was more interested in the material that was gathered in the conference room down in Air Traffic because that was more of what happened when. Again, when I looked at the Command Center and the materials they gathered, most of their information dealt with the shut down of the system or any restrictions that they would have put in place. The actual departure of the aircraft, the routes of flight that they were flying, I mean,

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that was much more accurate sources getting that from the facilities involved.

MR. AZZARELLO: But, let's go back to you said you thought that that open line between John White and the Aviation Crisis Center, you know John White is the Manager at the Command Center?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I assume at some point in trying to reconstruct this that somebody made you aware that John White was told to stay on that phone to give information to--by Jeff Griffith who told him to stay on the line.

MR. FERRANTE: I don't think I learned that at all until you telling me right now. I think what I knew is that there were more than one teleconference that were taking place. That there was a teleconference that was taking place within the Air Traffic Conference Room because, initially, my staff had been up there.

Of course, I was in Chicago at the time. I learned this after the fact. I also learned that there was another teleconference that was going on

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between the Command Center and field facilities, as well. I don't know what information was shared. But, again, that information wasn't as germane to me because it was all in the aftermath of what had taken place not with what had led up to what had taken place.

Now, for a period of, probably a month, the Command Center had their own separate telecons going on. I don't remember the exact date, but at one point, the function of what we now all the Domestic Events Network, or the Situation Room, depending on how you title it, at one point that was assigned to us in AAT-20.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, let me--

MR. FERRANTE: So, at that point is when the Command Center asked if they could consolidate and we'd only have one telecon going because I understood at that point that the Command Center was actually on both.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, let's talk about that now. We see the Command Center giving situational awareness on some of the hijacked

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aircraft on the morning of 9/11 before they crashed. Okay, passing that up to FAA headquarters through two different nodes of communication; two different modes. One was the John White speaking to either Jeff Griffith or Dough Davis, were you aware of that after 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: You were not--I believe you said you were aware that John White was speaking somebody in ACC?

MR. FERRANTE: I was aware that the Command Center had a teleconference going and that John White had been manning it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And were you aware of who was manning it on the headquarters end?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you didn't know that Jeff Griffith and Doug Davis was manning that line?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and did you know Doug Davis prior to 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And--

MR. FERRANTE: I've known Doug Davis for probably 15 years.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and you've known, I assume you know Jeff Griffith and who he was?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: They're both Air Traffic people, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, why wouldn't you want to know what Command Center was saying to Air Traffic people at headquarters, because then you know it's not Security on the other line, you know it's Air Traffic people on the other line.

MR. FERRANTE: I didn't know who the teleconference was going with, my assumption was that the Command Center had field facilities on; the Command Center had much more instantaneous communication ability with field facilities than we've ever had in headquarters, up until the point where we established that Net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, right, but they

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had--but you did understand that John White from Command Center was speaking to two people from Air Traffic, did you understand that after 9/11, when you were looking at recreating the chronology of events?

MR. FERRANTE: In the first two or three weeks after 9/11, no. Yes, I learned of that after 9/11.

MR. AZZARELLO: After the--after this--

MR. FERRANTE: But this was already--this was--in fact the copies of this were done in our graphics office on the 6th floor on Monday morning, which would be the 17th.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, when you drafted this--let me ask you this? When you drafted this and it was made final on the 17th, when this was made final, were you even aware at that point in time that there was a telecon between John White and anybody here at headquarters?

MR. FERRANTE: No, no.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you didn't even know that John White was on a telecon when this was

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drafted?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You found that out afterwards?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, sir.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know at the Tactical Net that was open here in the Aviation Crisis Center before you completed this?

MR. FERRANTE: No, and if you ask me today, I couldn't even tell you what the Tactical Net is or who's on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you didn't even know there was a tactical net when you drafted this?

MR. FERRANTE: No. Air Traffic, to my knowledge has never been a part of the Tactical Net. I know that Secure--I know this now; I know that Security had two different types of Net, they had a Primary Net and a Tactical Net. And the exact day I learned that, I don't know, but it was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know prior to 9/11 that there was such a thing as a Primary Net?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know if I knew the

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term Primary Net, I knew that the way the old set up of the Command Center was, prior to 9/11 and they refurbished it, there used to be a series of desks, in fact, you have it set up here, okay, this is the WOC--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: --I had a lot of interchange between the WOC. Every now and then, they'd invite me to come in and I had to walk through a door here and come up through here and walk in. So, I knew of all these desks with the computer screens, but never had any action, except for one occasion where we had a suspected hijacking event involving a Northwest flight that had inadvertently squawked the wrong code.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me as you--

MR. FERRANTE: And at that point, Admiral Flynn was the Director of Security, he called me at home and had me come out at 2:00 o'clock in the morning.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you this: Did part of Administrator Garvey's desire for

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information, you said there was, I think did you say there was some sort of push to get information?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Understandable, because national tragedy, country was attacked, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Catastrophe, four planes crashed, three into buildings, one on the ground, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Over 3,000 people died, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I assume that Administrator Garvey was one of many people in national leadership in federal government that wanted to know what happened, when? Would you agree?

MR. FERRANTE: I would agree.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would you agree that part of Administrator Garvey's desire to know who knew what, when would include what FAA headquarters knew

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and when?

MR. FERRANTE: I believe that she did because there was a group that was formed. And I don't know exactly when this formed, but Darlene Freeman was heading up a group that was pulling together all of the pieces from within the agency, or at least that was my understanding of what that work was.

For example, that book was given to them after it was published.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, now--

MR. FERRANTE: So, that was a separate entity, that wasn't like Air Traffic was putting it together.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, I want to understand your assignment so I don't ask you any unfair questions. So, is it your statement that this summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events as it encompassed the flow of information within the FAA as an entity--is it your statement and your position here today that this was not supposed to address what FAA headquarters knew and when they

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knew it?

MR. FERRANTE: That is correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so this is--

MR. FERRANTE: That was designed only to provide factual information as we would have if it had been one aircraft that had crashed, for example, American 587, we would have developed a similar type of understanding of what had transpired and developed a briefing. This just happened to be with four that were termed to be terrorist attacks. So, this is only how the Air Traffic System performed. Not how the FAA in whole performed.

MR. AZZARELLO: And not how headquarters was made aware of the situation and what kind of decision-making the headquarters might have gotten involved in?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And is that traditionally the case, whenever there's an accident or a hijacking?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, my role in Air Traffic

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Investigations, that is my title, Air Traffic Investigations is to determine how the Air Traffic System performed. And that would be from the clearances issued to aircraft, to the services provided to aircraft; up to the point where we had either a you know, a terrorist incident that crashed into a building, we'd never seen those before.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, to the extent that you do in this document talk about what the Washington Operations Center did, for example, notifying ACI about the situation, that's just fortuitous that that happens to comment on something that was done at headquarters?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: A part of any accident is the notification chain we go through. Because we normally--you know, any accident that happens in the system, even if it's a VFR with one fatality, I've got somebody on call 24-hours-a-day. We get notified of all of those.

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MR. AZZARELLO: But doesn't that notification change, usually, go at some point to headquarters? Doesn't headquarters, somebody at headquarters want to know if there's an accident and, you know, 200 people died in a plane crash?

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's not doesn't ordinarily--part of your function your division, though?

MR. FERRANTE: Oh, absolutely, it is my responsibility to do that, because what I do is, again, I have people on call 7-days a week, 24-hours a day. So the phone rings at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, right? And they have an item that they think needs to be briefed up to senior executives. Before they could call Dave Cannoles, they had to call me, because I made the decision whether or not we're going to get Dave out of bed.

So, if it were a VFR with one fatality, I would say, no, we'll brief him in the morning. But if it were an IFR, American 587 with 200 fatalities, you can bet that I'm going to get Dave

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Cannoles up, who would then get Air Traffic up, who would then bring up the ATS, as well as the Deputy Administrator and the Administrator. And many times we brief them at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of events that took place.

MR. AZZARELLO: And when you reduced that to a chronology or a report later, you don't usually put in then, when you notified somebody at headquarters? Or would you put in, notified Dave Cannoles; called him at 2:00 a.m.?

MR. FERRANTE: No, we wouldn't have put that in. We would have put just the factual information on what was done when it was done, what happened.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why would you--then explain to me why would you just cut out the chain of notification prior to it getting to headquarters in an accident?

MR. FERRANTE: If I had briefed the Administrator at 2:00 o'clock in the morning--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, in general, I'm not, just in general.

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MR. FERRANTE: In general, if I brief the Administrator at 2:00 o'clock in the morning and then I come to work the next day and I'm putting together a briefing on what happened in that particular accident, I would not add that I notified the Administrator at 2:00 o'clock in the morning. That would not be part of the formal briefing package that goes up.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it would not go in the formal chronology of events?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Headquarters notification is always left out, you say.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, headquarters notification to executives is information purposes. The primary thing is, you know, obviously, we've got a bit Public Affairs staff that are going to be getting calls. And part of our decision-making on when we wake up executives is what's the potential for media and do we need to brief them at 2:00 o'clock in the morning or can this wait?

MR. AZZARELLO: Put executives aside.

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MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's talk about staff in Washington Operations Center, the 24/7 Watch Center, on the 10th floor.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Aren't they usually notified when there's an aircraft incident?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, they are.

MR. AZZARELLO: An accident, incident, or air piracy?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, they are.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that normally be something you would include in a chronology if you were looking at an event after the fact?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You wouldn't?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because WOC notifications--

MR. FERRANTE: Because WOC notification takes place before I know about it. Because if it happens in Kalamazoo, Michigan, tonight, Kalamazoo,

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of course, is going to call the Regional Ops Center in Great Lakes, who's going to call the Washington Ops Center, who's going to call me at home. So, I'm getting notified from the WOC of what happened and I get a phone bridge between me and the Great Lakes Region in Kalamazoo, and I start going through the Air Traffic investigatory process of what happened when and so forth, and then I build a briefing based on that factual information I can derive from that.

Now, if I have to subsequently brief that up to other executives, that's not part of the briefing that I'm going to produce.

MR. AZZARELLO: And if you reduce it to a written chronology, you are not going to put in the notification from the Region to the WOC in that instance?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: You're not going to?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Even if, does that apply even if the Washington Operations Center is

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notified of an event before the event [unintell.], for example, let's take 9/11, the WOC was notified about American 11 before it crashed.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that then, make the notification to the WOC something you might want to include because they were aware of it before the event came to an end?

MR. FERRANTE: No, because the WOC had other notification requirements besides Air Traffic. They bring Air Traffic in so that we can start developing information.

Another example for you is Payne Stewart's accident. Several years ago, I don't recall when. They departed from an airport in Florida; they lost pressurization; the aircraft goes in flight-level 410, actually a little bit higher than that and it flew for four and a half hours. We flight followed that aircraft for hours. Yes, we got notification from the WOC, from the Southern Region to us here in the building as it happened on normal duty hours.

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But when we wrote a briefing of what took place in that accident, we talked about the ATC clearances the pilot had received; when we lot radio communications; and the fact that the military had actually shadowed the aircraft because it was pertinent only to the point to where at some point during that particular accident, the military pilots had looked in the cockpit and said it was frozen.

MR. AZZARELLO: So there was nothing beyond what happened in the aircraft, even though the notification to the Region or--

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yet you put notifications to the regional sites.

MR. FERRANTE: We were probably asked to in this particular case.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, now, explain that to me, because now I'm having difficulty understanding why would you want to then know what the ROC knew, when, but not what the headquarters knew then?

MR. FERRANTE: I think one of the first

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issues that came out and I don't recall the flow of how this came out, was--because we had already started on putting together briefings, in fact, we probably did two or three different briefings with limited amounts of information that got translated into this book. For example, the chronologies that you see, there are individual chronologies for each one of them, when they received their clearance; when they taxied out; when they departed; and the communications we had.

At some point, we were asked to put all of that together into one master chronology--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: --which we did. And at some point, I think the question of when we notified the military on each of those events was asked and we went back and tried to recreate to the best of our knowledge when who was notified in terms of military messages.

MR. AZZARELLO: Military notification was an issue we understand that did come up.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, but notifications to

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other headquarter elements were not something we looked at.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, then, when you look at this and you do see there are references to regions to Great Lakes notifying Washington Operations Center about a loss of radio and radar with American 77, for example, is an entry in here. Is that an entry you would not ordinarily put in here?

MR. FERRANTE: Ordinarily, I would have had an entry in there that we were notified of a simultaneous loss of radar and radio contact. It would not have said it was done by the Great Lakes Region to the WOC. In a normal--

MR. AZZARELLO: When you would say "we" in a normal, who does the we encompass, FAA headquarters?

MR. FERRANTE: AAT-20. The inves--the Air Traffic Investigation staff.

MR. AZZARELLO: That element of headquarters?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do they notify AAT-20

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through the WOC when there's an accident?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Ninety-nine percent of the calls, and I happen to be on call this week--

MR. AZZARELLO: So then maybe this is--

MR. FERRANTE: --so they all come through the WOC.

MR. AZZARELLO: --would you put that in a report, usually? We were notified of an aircraft incident?

MR. FERRANTE: Normally it would say something like, received notification of, if I were doing a briefing on it. But I wouldn't specify who I received that notification from.

MR. AZZARELLO: But you would put we were notified?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that would be in the chrono?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, then maybe we just

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misconnected and this is semantics and stuff we're just not on the same page. But it would seem to me you--you said before, you would not ordinarily put any notification into the WOC or to headquarters of an aircraft incident or accident. But, now, you're saying you would ordinarily put in a briefing and in a chrono, we were notified of an aircraft incident and the we would refer to AAT-200?

MR. FERRANTE: It would depend on--every accident case is different. All right, every single accident is different, I've never seen two alike yet.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, understanding accidents are different, but what about, don't you have a protocol for trying to put in a briefing or a chronology what FAA entities were notified and when?

MR. FERRANTE: Normally we would start with at 21:11 and 14 seconds American 11 or ATC experienced a simultaneous loss of radar and radio communications with American 11. And we would start from there, normally.

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Depending upon what might be significant in any of those notifications we would say we received notification something happened. Because it means that there were some that were germane to that. For example, we received notification from a sheriff's office of a downed aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. FERRANTE: To us, that confirmed the crash. So, in that regard, information like that would have gone in as far as a notification, but to say that we were notified by the Great Lakes ROC, 99 percent of the time would never have been put in.

MR. AZZARELLO: But it was here?

MR. FERRANTE: It was here and I believe it was, somebody asked us to go back through the chronology of who was notified?

MR. AZZARELLO: Including headquarters, then did somebody ask you to go back and include notifications to the WOC or to headquarters--to any headquarters folks?

MR. FERRANTE: The primary, what, I don't

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know what the specific tasking was, but the idea behind it, at least to my knowledge or recollection is the idea was to find out who we told when about each one of these aircraft.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who the FAA told?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who the FAA, at what level, headquarters, who they told and when or at any level of FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: At any level.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, then, wouldn't you have to examine what every level of FAA knew, including at a headquarters level?

MR. FERRANTE: From my position in AAT-20, that would be impossible. I don't know what everybody in the agency knows. I only know what Air Traffic knew. So, in those cases where I was trying to build a chronology of what took place. The information I had available to me, I used.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Information I didn't know, I didn't go seek.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Then let's stick with me on this issue and let's play this out okay. If part of this overarching assignment for the FAA as a whole was, find out what the FAA knew when and who they told it to, okay? That would include TRACONS; en-route centers; regional offices; and headquarters, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they would all be elements of the F--

MR. FERRANTE: No, because notification of an incident begins with the facility, so, when I went through to determine notifications, it was when facility A or Facility B notified either an operations center or how we notified anybody pertaining to those.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would that include military--would that include a military notification, right? Part of this overarching--

MR. FERRANTE: In this particular document, we went through to find out when we had made military notifications.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Right, that was part of this, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: To go through and see when we the FAA made military notifications, right?

MR. FERRANTE: When, we, the Air Traffic System made military notifications.

MR. KARA: He's talking Air Traffic consistently here and you're talking headquarters FAA. You guys are on two trains on different tracks.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me ask you that--was there

MR. : His office puts out an Air Traffic package after [unintell.] it takes a standard format, he's been doing it for 20 years. And this is the slight modification of that, that kind of effort.

MR. FERRANTE: That is correct.

MR. : He's taking a snapshot which is not agency-wide, he's looking at his facility--

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MR. FERRANTE: I don't have knowledge of what information is available to the agency. I've known of Civil Aviation Security for years. I don't know what they can develop. I don't even know how I would go about getting access to it.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm not talking Security--let's take Security and let's throw it right out the window, okay, I'm going to open a window, I'm going to take Security and take ACS, and I'm going to throw it right out the window.

MR. FERRANTE: Got it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I'm going to look at Air Traffic.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm going to look at AAT-1, all right, I'm looking at Bill Peacock, Jeff Griffith.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Are they in Air Traffic?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, they are.

MR. AZZARELLO: They're an element of Air Traffic in FAA headquarters, correct?

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MR. FERRANTE: Yes, they are.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you or anybody else, when they put together this "FAA Summary of Hijack Events," make an effort to determine--not down below, not at the TRACON level; not at the Center level; not at the Tower level; and not at the Regional Operations Center level, but at the FAA headquarters level, the people that supervise Air Traffic in the FAA at headquarters--did anybody make an effort to determine what they knew when regarding each of the four hijacked aircraft and who they told what with respect to that, when, at a headquarters level. What did they know when and what did they tell the military and when did they tell the military? Did anybody say, let's take a look at what the decision-makers at FAA headquarters did? That's a fair question, does he know if anybody looked at that?

MR. FERRANTE: Not to my knowledge.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it wasn't part of your assignment?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Nobody said to you in putting this together--and that's a fair question, I think, what with all due respect because--

MR. LEWIS: [off microphone] you can't hold that heat in here, I mean, you've already drilled this man about areas that are way outside his purview.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm going--well, it's not way outside his purview, Brooke, if it says--

SIMULTANEOUS CONVERSATION: [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: And, Brooke, for the record, it was Mr. Ferrante that said that they were asked to look at notifications to the military. Okay, by the FAA, so--

MR. LEWIS: By Air Traffic.

MR. AZZARELLO: --by Air Traffic and there's an element of Air Traffic at headquarters, do you agree.

MR. FERRANTE: See that would have come--

MR. AZZARELLO: All I'm trying to find out is if that was encompassed--that's a fair question. When you were asked to look at Air Traffic

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notification to the military, did they say that they were restricting that to levels below FAA headquarters, that it was just field facilities notification to the military?

MR. FERRANTE: No, but that was how we approached it, because that's where the notifications would have taken place.

MR. AZZARELLO: Notifications to the military would have taken place from the field facilities?

MR. FERRANTE: From a field facility, it would have come--it would have gone through an ROC and ROC may have notified a military entity because they had different reporting obligations than we did. See, in a normal accident, we don't have military notifications.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, but I'm talking about--this is a hijack.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's go with, in a hijack scenario, as we understand the protocol, and--

MR. AZZARELLO: Get the Crisis Management

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Handbook out so that we will be on the same page.

Do you have Chapter 7, Miles?

MR. : Was that in effect on September 11 or did that come out after September 11?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, this was effective. Escort of hijacked aircraft is supposed to be an FAA Hijack Coordinator.

MR. : And that's always from Civil Aviation Security.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, and that's a person in Civil Aviation Security?

MR. : Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: That makes direct contact to the National Military Command Center. Okay. And they are the entity then, and that person, the Hijack Coordinator is responsible for notifying the military, correct?

MR. : Correct.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, asking, if appropriate, for an escort aircraft, a fighter

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escort aircraft, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you're saying that comes from ACS?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's headquarters, it's not Air Traffic people asking for the military escort?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's FAA, but Air, but security.

MR. FERRANTE: What made this different and what made us want to look at other notifications was an individual in Boston Center who took it upon himself to reach out and call Otis Air Force Base and try to get aircraft scrambled.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Now, there was no protocol for that that I ever knew of within Air Traffic. I have been a controller working an actual hijacked aircraft; I have been a supervisor in a facility where a potential hijacking was in place; and I

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have been an investigator called into this building at midnight for a suspected hijacking event. All of them were run by Security. All of them.

MR. AZZARELLO: All right, then this is the issue, then. How do you answer the question in this summary, okay, for your superiors--how do you answer the question of when the military was notified without looking at what the protocol was in existence at that time, which would be FAA headquarters here in the hijack coordinating position would notify the military and ask for assistance? So, how could you do that task then, without taking a look at--without looking at what did the Hijacking Coordinator do, even if it is a person in Security. Maybe he's not in Air Traffic, but if they're asking you for--but to make an inquiry of when did "we" the FAA notify the military on each of the four hijacked aircraft, how do you, I mean, isn't it fair to say you can't perform that task without looking at what the Hijack Coordinator, what protocols existed and whether or not they were following them?

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MR. FERRANTE: No, I don't think so, at all, because again, starting from Boston Center where we had a controller reach out and call Otis Air Force Base, there's an entry in there to that effect, that that took place. So, when we were asked to find out other notifications, we looked through there to see, okay, what notifications were made. From an element of Air Traffic to either a WOC or an ROC that later translated into a notification to the military. So, some of the information was from the military. And I think, in one particular case, the only notification, United 93, Somerset, Pennsylvania. I think the only notification to the military in that particular case was the military liaison that happened to be in the room. When they turned around in the conference down the hall.

MR. AZZARELLO: What conference room?

MR. FERRANTE: The AT-1--

MR. AZZARELLO: Bill Peacock's room?

MR. FERRANTE: --Bill Peacock's room.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what military liaison

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are you referring to there?

MR. FERRANTE: Colonel Atkins.

MR. AZZARELLO: On 93?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, do you think that was before 93 went down or after?

MR. FERRANTE: That I don't recall. But at that point, they had that conference going and all that information was coming in. They had other. I don't even know who was on this conference, but I know they had military elements on this conference. And those information were discussed on those bridges.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who looked--just so we're clear, though, you said it's the obligation, you would look at the centers because they would call the military. That's not our understanding. That might have been what Boston Center did on 9/11.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, I looked at the centers to see who they notified, right? If they notified the ROC or the WOC, because in order to notify Civil Aviation Security, there was never a

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direct link that went from Air Traffic into Security. We didn't have that--

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, how would--

MR. FERRANTE: --we would do that through the ROC and the ROC would bring in Security or we'd bring it up with the WOC and they would bring in Security.

MR. AZZARELLO: Walk me through pre-9/11, if there's a hijacking. What's your understanding of how the FAA, as an entity, notifies the National Military Command Center and asks for a fighter escort? Walk me through your understanding of the protocol.

MR. FERRANTE: It is that someone from Civil Aviation Security makes a determination that we want to--

MR. AZZARELLO: Before it gets there--how does it get there?

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm at Boston Center, I think I have a hijack, I'm a controller, I tell my boss--

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MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I tell the Almick or I tell the supervisor.

MR. FERRANTE: The supervisor--

MR. AZZARELLO: Take it from there on.

MR. FERRANTE: --the supervisor or the Almick should have called the ROC and described what they had. And at that case, it probably would have been elevated to the WOC because a suspected hijacking event is relatively rare in our system. The WOC would have notified Civil Aviation Security in the course of their notification process. So, this Crisis Management that you have here, that was Crisis Management procedures that the WOC had. You'll not find this in any Air Traffic facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: That's how--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, what you find at the Air Traffic facilities they have an obligation at the center to tell the ROC, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, that's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And at the ROC level,

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you'll find, and am I correct in assuming, then, at the ROC you'll find some guidance that they should notify the WOC if there's a hijacking?

MR. FERRANTE: I believe that to be correct. I have never seen what the relationship is between the ROC and the WOC. I can only tell you from my firsthand experience what it has been.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so if I understand you correctly, pre-9/11, you understood the protocol for notifying--for enlisting military assistance would be from the Center to the ROC, from the ROC to the WOC, the WOC at headquarters notifies ACS, which is a headquarters element, who then calls the NMCC and says we need a hijack escort, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. That's the way, at least, the protocol had it laid out?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you were asked to, as part of the summary, right to answer the question when did "we" the FAA notify the military correct?

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MR. FERRANTE: It was more--it was more like, see when we made notifications to the military or see if anybody else reached out and called the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: Anybody other than the protocol--were you asked to look at the protocol and say was that followed and when did ACS, when did the Hijack Coordinator notify the ACS--were you asked to look at that or no?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: You weren't.

MR. FERRANTE: It's Fond [ph], from Boston Center making notification to Otis.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so you would ask to look at that?

MR. FERRANTE: So, what we looked at was to see did Cleveland Center make any notification--

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Even though there was no protocol for it, did Cleveland Center notify the military? All right, did Indie notify the military?

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, let's look at that. Let's take Cleveland Center.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they notify the military who did they notify? In looking at Cleveland Center, did you see that they called and notified their Regional Operation Center relating to United 93?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, yes they did. I believe they did, because the information came in from the ROC, so it had to have come from the facility.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's find 93 here in your report. Let's see, 93 Newark to San Francisco. 9:28 is when the--9:25 appears to be the last regular communication, correct--

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --from the aircraft? And at 9:28, you have the radio transmission of possible screaming and the struggle?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you have the

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controller transmission--9:39, you have Cleveland Center notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center about the screams and statements?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct. And you see, again, my look at this is who the facility notified in order to try to make that change. And only what I could document, either through a facility logs or from another source and somewhere we had information from NEADS on when they said they were notified.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you had tapes from Cleveland.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, or we had personnel statements where we would --

MR. AZZARELLO: Personnel statements?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know then that Cleveland Center also notified the Command Center?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't know that? Okay, you didn't know that they did that?

MR. FERRANTE: No, and I would ask in that

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particular case, the Command Center would not have had a role in that with the exception if we were going to restrict traffic flow through Cleveland Center's airspace as a result of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: But they told them and gave them periodic updates? And did you know that those updates went from Command Center to the Aviation Crisis Center, from John White to the Crisis Center?

MR. FERRANTE: I did not know that, no, but I'm not surprised by it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why are you not surprised at it?

MR. FERRANTE: Because if there was a link established between this building and the Command Center and the Command Center was getting information, the information came flooding in, from a variety of different sources. So, I can tell you that if I had been interest room--if I had got information from one entity, I would certainly have, you know, given it to another entity. So, I'm not surprised that the Command Center said,

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hey, we got an update on United 93, whatever that update might be.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know that Cleveland Center was, as they reported that information about United 93, that it was also monitored on the Tactical Net--

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --at FAA--in headquarters in the Aviation Crisis Center?

MR. FERRANTE: On that particular day, I didn't even know what a Tactical Net was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Nor there was one that had been established.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, no idea about that. Would that be why those communications are not in here?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did anybody look at what--this is the difficulty I'm having. If the Hijack Coordinator is the person supposed to notify the military--the Hijack Coordinator is the person

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who is supposed to notify the military and ask them for a fighter escort, okay? And if that person sits in the Aviation Crisis Center, works up in this area when there's a hijack and they activate the Crisis Center and he's in here, okay. And that information was coming into there. Then how could this document then, address whether or not the military was notified if you don't look for logs, tapes, communications that would have occurred in the normal channel where the military would have been notified? Do you follow my question or no?

MR. FERRANTE: At that point in time, I had no idea what the role of this group was. As I said, i had been invited in there on one occasion and this was Admiral Flynn was a former director of security for the agency. They had a Northwest flight that inadvertently squawked 7500 as it was flying across the coast as to London or somewhere across the pond. They had just left U.S. airspace, they had no direct communications with us. They called me at home and asked me to come out only because of my Air Traffic knowledge, not because of

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anything else.

So, I spent a total of a half hour here, I gave Admiral Flynn a short briefing and I went back home. Because it was a Security issue and they handled it. And most of the work they did was confidential, secret, top secret, whatever they never invited outside entities. so we never went to Security asking them what information they had learned, who they passed it on to?

MR. AZZARELLO: On what event are you talking about?

MR. FERRANTE: On any of the events--

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, let's see 9/11, specifically.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's after 9/11, you're involved in some much bigger effort to try and pull together what happened when in all the different facets of that day, is that fair to say?

MR. FERRANTE: No, my--I'm involved in trying to pull together everything that happened within Air Traffic.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, then, let me ask you this. There's two ways to approach notifications here, right? There's a protocol that was in existence on 9/11, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: That protocol would include an element from Security asking--formally asking the NMCC to assist in a hijack scenario, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's one avenue to look at to see what did the FAA, when did the FAA ask for military assistance, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have anything to do with looking at that formal notification?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who looked at that?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: You have no idea?

MR. FERRANTE: I have no idea. I would assume that Darlene Freeman group there was trying

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to pull together the agency response, not the Air Traffic response.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's leave that aside, then, you don't know who was doing it. Okay, let's put that aside.

Now, let's go to, there's--it was very evident that Boston Center acted outside the box, let's say outside the written protocol on 9/11, is that fair to say?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: You agree with that?

MR. FERRANTE: I agree.

MR. AZZARELLO: They did not have an obligation to call Northeast Air Defense Sector, under the protocol to ask for help?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: But they, nonetheless, acted outside the box and called the military?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: You also wanted to, then, look at, well, did Cleveland act outside the box, right?

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MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they call the military about United 93?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what about American 77? That was lost in Indianapolis airspace, did you look at Indie Center and see if they acted outside the box and called?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, we did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, how about New York Center?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, we did.

MR. AZZARELLO: You looked to see if they had acted outside the box? So, was it your role, then--so I understand your role--was it your role, then, to look at let's see, you, Mr. Ferrante, take a look and examine what notifications can you find that Air Traffic made to the military outside of which ones might have occurred under the protocol?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Somebody else is going to do that, maybe, but you're going to look at what

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were the notifications to the military by Air Traffic that were not in accord with the protocol--that were outside the box of the protocol?

MR. FERRANTE: I wasn't thinking about the box of the protocol. I was thinking about who did Air Traffic tell and when

MR. AZZARELLO: Who did Air Traffic tell and when? Okay, But that would have been not in accord with protocol to notify the military to depend on looking at Air Traffic.

MR. FERRANTE: But I wasn't looking for the protocol or specific to the military. Who did Air Traffic tell and when?

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So, if they told and ROC, all right, that was one form of notification. If they told the WOC direct, that was another form of notification. If it was broadcast over what we now call the DEN log, that was a different form of notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, but there was no

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DEN on 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, it wasn't called the DEN, it was the forerunner of DEN, in Pam Frenier's book, I think she refers to it as "the never-ending telecon."

MR. AZZARELLO: That's the Cannoles, the one that Dave Cannoles started?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct, that's the conference room--in the Air Traffic Room of 1000 West, end of this hall--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: --right? They started a conference with Dave Cannoles and Tony Mello, Tony was my deputy at the time, still is. We both worked for Dave Cannoles. I don't know who was in there, I wasn't here at the time. They started the teleconference--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: --that is now monitored inside this room, still to this day, 24-hours a day/7-days a week.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's how the

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military finds out today?

MR. FERRANTE: Today.

MR. AZZARELLO: But on 9/11, when Dave Cannoles set that up, are you saying that he set that up and that, on 9/11 with the intent that that would be the way that they would notify three-year military?

MR. FERRANTE: No, absolutely not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, well, then, let's separate those. I might be the DEN today, and the way to notify them, but it wasn't on 9/11, as Dave Cannoles ran it?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: On 9/11, there were two ways you can look to determine what notifications went to the military right? One would be, well, what's our protocol? Did we follow it? And you didn't look at that, you weren't asked to?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: The other way would be, did we act outside our protocol and did somebody that wasn't supposed to call the military to ask

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for help--to ask for help, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's the part you looked at?

MR. FERRANTE: Not looking at did we act outside of our protocol, did we act inside of our protocol, looking only at who did we tell, when did we tell them.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who did we tell and what did we tell them at Air Traffic Facilities?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which, it jut so happens would then fall out of the protocol because if not, the Security people? Okay.

MR. KARA: And because of what Boston did.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. KARA: As I sit here and listen to this, the one thing that comes through loud and clear is because Boston did what they did and they proceeded to do what they did here.

MR. FERRANTE: I've got to tell you, I'm born in Massachusetts, if you would have asked me,

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Otis Air Force Base closed 25 years ago and there's nothing there. So, had I been a controller on duty in Boston Center, unless I had other knowledge that had changed my perception of it, I would have never thought to call Otis, because that's an Air Force Base from when I was born. It's not active anymore.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, I understand, you weren't paying attention to protocols--

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: -you were just looking at what did we, Air Traffic facilities tell--notify the military and when? When do we notify and when do we don't?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: But now taking a look at Air Traffic Headquarters to see if they acted outside the box?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, let me--

MR. FERRANTE: Because I didn't have knowledge of Air Traffic--

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MR. AZZARELLO: --hold on--one question--

MR. FERRANTE: --doing anything in or out of a box. I have knowledge that these teleconferences were taking place, but from the knowledge I had is they had field facilities, as events were happening, they had these field facilities brought up on these lines. Today, we have all 20 centers all the time. Back then, they had Boston Center come on. When it moved into the New York area, they had New York Center come up. When it moved into the events taking place in Great Lakes, they had Cleveland Center come up.

I walked into the ROC--I don't know, it might not have been the ROC, I was in Chicago. I walked into the Great Lakes Regional Office because I could not get a car--obviously, the system had already been shut down. And I was trying to make arrangements to borrow a government van.

This was approximately 11:00 o'clock on Tuesday.

MR. AZZARELLO: I read that in the Frenier book.

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MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you a question now about Boston Center, you knew the controller, himself, is watching planes. So, he's not going to be the guy that called NEADS and asked for help, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be from the TMU area right?

MR. FERRANTE: Not necessarily.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Traffic Management Unit area? Well, where did you find him, where did Boston notify Northeastern? It wasn't at a controller's station, right? It would be one of the supervisors?

MR. FERRANTE: It would have been one of the supervisors, it would be my estimate.

MR. AZZARELLO: Where did you look, then, to see if Cleveland acted outside the box and called the military?

MR. FERRANTE: Facility logs; statements from the supervisor as to who they notified when

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and what we had access to in tapes at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, tapes, would that include tapes that you had access to from the Traffic Management Unit area and the supervisors area, the Almick and the TMU area?

MR. FERRANTE: If there had been any pertinent transmissions, we had, that's what we had asked for, any position that had pertinent transmissions with anything to do with 9/11.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you would ask the, part of that I assume, then you would ask Cleveland's management, supervisors, and Almicks, and at the TMU supervisors, hey, did you make any notifications?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know if we asked that specifically notifications to the military. We would have ask the questions who did you notify on this and when, because that's how we learned--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, didn't you --the military if you were looking to see if they acted

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outside the box like Boston and called the military?

MR. FERRANTE: We were asking who they notified, we didn't care who it was. Anybody that we notified and when we notified them. Because that's how we came to closing the loop to on American 11, is it? Seventy-seven, excuse me, that hit the Pentagon.

MR. AZZARELLO: But didn't you--you said that Boston acted outside the box and called the military directly and you know that. That's not what they were required to do, but they were thinking on their feet and they did it?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And you said you tried, didn't you say you tried to find out if Cleveland did the same thing?

MR. FERRANTE: But we didn't ask, did you operate outside the box?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, did you ask them--

MR. FERRANTE: We didn't ask did you go outside the protocol

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MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't ask did you call the military?

MR. FERRANTE: We asked who did you notify on the aircraft, right? And when did you make that notification?

MR. AZZARELLO: To include the military, was it clear to them that you didn't mean just FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: Oh, it was anybody--

MR. AZZARELLO: --anybody you notified. And did they tell you that they called Northeast Air Defense Sector?

MR. FERRANTE: No, they did not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, they didn't tell you that?

MR. FERRANTE: No, not that I can recall.

MR. AZZARELLO: You never heard the tape where the--one of the supervisors from the Cleveland Center called Northeast Air Defense Sector?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: No idea that that tape existed?

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MR. FERRANTE: I'm hearing it from you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Until I'm telling you today?

MR. FERRANTE: I mean, there are hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of tapes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, are there--how many supervisors were there, were there hundreds and hundreds of supervisors out at Cleveland Center. Would you have interviewed all the management on duty at Cleveland Center and say--to find out if they did notify the military?

MR. FERRANTE: no.

MR. AZZARELLO: You wouldn't have asked all of them who were on duty?

MR. FERRANTE: In fact--

MR. AZZARELLO: So, how could you be sure that you didn't get in touch with somebody who did notify the military.

MR. FERRANTE: We asked the Regions to do that to determine who we had that notified anybody--

MR. AZZARELLO: That notified anybody?

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MR. FERRANTE: --right and what we got was information such as this, where they notified the Great Lakes ROC. So we added that in here. I don't know who else may have been notified from Cleveland Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Cleveland Center is on a phone call calling--receiving a call from Northeast Air Defense where they discussed United 93. At sometime after 10:07, 10:08.

MR. FERRANTE: Unless that was contained in somebody's personnel statement, within the first week of the events, we would not have known it at that point, nor would we have gone backwards in time after the event because the rush to put this together, I mean, this was printed on Monday morning.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about the three years that have passed since this? No one's ever brought to your attention that Northeast Air Defense Sector was told by Cleveland Center that there was a bomb on-board United 93 and there was screaming on the frequency? This is--

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MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: --this is the very first time, April 19, 2004, as we sit here today, is the very first time you become aware that Cleveland Center did make the military notification?

MR. FERRANTE: They may have told me that, I don't recall, but, again in the aftermath of--

MR. AZZARELLO: If they had told you that--

MR. FERRANTE: --before I produced this?

MR. AZZARELLO: --would that have been in there.

MR. FERRANTE: It would have been in there.

MR. AZZARELLO: What if you learned that after producing that, would you have thought that that was something you could bring to the attention of somebody or amend the report to put it in there?

MR. FERRANTE: At the time that we completed this, we turned a copy of this over to Darlene Freeman and there was another group. And as we developed additional information, if we had

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learned that within the first few weeks of it, more than likely, we would have turned that over.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would have told them.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: The--

MR. FERRANTE: And we would have done that through Dave because Dave was the one working with Darlene. I saw Darlene once during that--

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave?

MR. FERRANTE: --Cannoles.

MR. AZZARELLO: --Cannoles was working.

You were the author of this document that says at 8:40 Northeast Air Defense Sector logs show that they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning American 11, correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: The FAA, but really, what it was was Boston Center, right, that made the call, it wasn't FAA, I mean, as after it wasn't headquarters it was FAA, you just didn't modify where it came from--

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --it's FAA notified the events concerning 11. This is the log entry at 8:40. This is the NEADS MCC log--

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --which is where all their information sort of comes into it. Somebody identifies an aircraft as a suspect aircraft that day. 1240 Zulu, which is 8:40 a.m., possible hijack AA-11 Flight.

MR. FERRANTE: ?Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, this appears to accurately, at least reflect this NEADS log here. And you're the author of this, but you're saying you didn't see these logs?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I never saw this log, I probably have a chronology, in fact, I don't know exactly what's it titled, but I know that there is a chronology, probably on one sheet of paper that has four or five different notifications to it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, that might be it, then. That one--

MR. KARA: Have you seen this one?

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MR. AZZARELLO: --have you seen that one?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I have, but I don't know if I saw this at the time we were producing that.

MR. AZZARELLO: The date on this is September 20, so that would have been produced after that.

MR. FERRANTE: But we have--

MR. AZZARELLO: So you saw [unintell.]

MR. FERRANTE: I saw something else, you know, for example, in looking at this now, I've been asked about this document recently. I couldn't tell you what [unintell.] stands for, that's not a term that I think anyone in Air Traffic would understand. Washington Ops activates the Primary Net which includes the NMCC and Secret Service. The NMCC, until you just told me the National Military Coordination Center? Well, it's also the National Maintenance Coordination Center that we have in the Command Center at Herndon.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take a look at this NEADS log and tell me where you see the first reference

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to United 93 on there.

MR. FERRANTE: First reference is at 1407, where it says bomb on-board, United 93 over Pittsburgh.

MR. AZZARELLO: 1407, 10:07 Eastern Time right?

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Take a look at the chronology you authored for 93 and tell me if you see anything in there 10:07 of notification to the military?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: In fact there's nothing--

MR. FERRANTE: At 10:07 is when we say he crashed and that was based on a pilot report.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was based on the Falcon jet?

MR. FERRANTE: Right. And we didn't know that, you know, that's why this time is approximate, there's a lot of personnel statements on United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: Help me with this, then,

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what were you--when you put that together, help me with this, Tony, what were your thoughts, then on United 93 and there not being any notification time for the military, when you drafted that and handed that up to Cannoles? Did you have any conversation with him? Because what strikes me, you know, bluntly is there's a notification time there on American 11 and it refers to the NEADS logs?

MR. FERRANTE: Right?

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, we just looked at that. Now, let's look at United 175, I'd like to see what you say on that. Okay, United 175, again, this is the document you authored, what does it say at 9:05?

MR. FERRANTE: NEADS logs indicate they were notified by the FAA on the events concerning United 175.

MR. AZZARELLO: See if you can find that on the NEADS log right here, 9:05; 1305 Zulu.

MR. FERRANTE: United 175, possible hijack Boston to LAX.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that's in there?

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MR. FERRANTE: That's in there.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's in this report?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, sir.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then, it strikes us and I would like your comments, as why it's found at 10:07, report of United 93 bomb on-board, why wouldn't that be in here, too. And the other two references are in this?

MR. FERRANTE: In the first place, I've never seen this log before. From some chronology, we got notifications of what we made. If we had a notification that Indie--or a log--

MR. AZZARELLO: So did somebody give you something then, you didn't see this, but somebody gave you a sheet of paper that would have had the 8:40 time the NEADS logs--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it would have the 9:05 time?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: But it would have not included the 10:07 time in it?

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MR. FERRANTE: It may have included the 10:07 time, but in reading our chronology, we're showing it crashed at 10:07. So is it germane to the issue that we notified the military at 10:07, although the aircraft has already crashed. So, we may not have thought it important enough to even add in there at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if the notification came at the same time that you got a notification of a crash, you might not have put it in there, because you would not have thought it might have been germane?

MR. FERRANTE: We may not have put it in there, that's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Even though part of your assignment was to find out when the FAA advised the military? So, you, are you saying that if you advised the military after the fact, you would have left it out because it's too late they can't do anything about it?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know what the reasons were behind it, but if it didn't go in the

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chronology, because, again, in keeping with what happened prior to the impact with any of the buildings or with the crash he had in 93, we were looking for what transpired during the flight. So, if we made notification of a possible bomb on United 93 at the same time we're saying he crashed, we probably would have left that out.

MR. AZZARELLO: Why again, I'm having difficulty in understanding why you wouldn't have put it in.

MR. FERRANTE: I don't understand the importance of the relevance of it at the point where he crashed, we're also telling them about the aircraft with a bomb on-board.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, wouldn't that just mean that they got late notification?

MR. FERRANTE: I could.

MR. AZZARELLO: If that's the first reference you see to it?

MR. FERRANTE: But I've not seen this log. I'd have to go back and find what logs we did use because we did have log entries and how we made all

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of these.

MR. AZZARELLO: But there's nothing prior to 10:07 that says the military was advised through another avenue about United 93?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, just so I understand, if there was no indication to you, no evidence that they were notified prior to 10:07, would that have been left out because it was after the fact or at the same time that your report, that there's a report that 93 crashed? Was there a discussion about it?

MR. FERRANTE: About the--

MR. AZZARELLO: The 10:07 time?

MR. FERRANTE: --you know, it's two and a half years ago, I don't recall if there was discussion about it or not. In looking at, when we made notifications during the flight of each of those four aircraft, anything that we could point to and say, okay, we have a log entry that says we did A at such and such time, we'll put that in there.

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MR. AZZARELLO: That's what I'm having difficulty here.

MR. FERRANTE: But if we had a log entry that said that we notified the military and we also have a log entry that showed the aircraft that crashed at the same time, we might not have put that in there. I don't know that I knew United 175 had ever been notified to NEADS, because when you asked me the question when we started this, I told you I didn't believe we notified them at all, except through the individual who was down at the end of the hall, Colonel Atkins. Because at that point, the military was on that line.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, well if you thought it was Atkins, then where is it in here--where's the entry that says Atkins--military Atkins was aware of United 93 down the hall talking to Cannoles or what? Why isn't her, why isn't the notification to her if that's the only one you thought existed?.

MR. FERRANTE: Because I don't think we had that information when we put this together.

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MR. AZZARELLO: What that Atkins had--

MR. FERRANTE: That Colonel Atkins had been in the room. Remember I was not in the room at all during September 11.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I'm just asking you because you said Atkins was the--you thought maybe was in the--

MR. FERRANTE: I learned that after the fact be there was a lot of discussion that by the time that United 93 had crashed and also by the time American 11 had crashed, you know, my understanding was there were numerous military entities that were in that conference, as well. I don't know who was on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Going back to the NEADS log, you see 14:15, it says down, UAL 93 down North of Camp David bomb?

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: So that would indicate, at least, on their chronology that they were advised of it with a Mode-3, before they were advised that it was crashed, right?

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MR. FERRANTE: Oh, okay, 15:27, okay. I thought that was a time, that's a beacon code, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a beacon code right. So this is not, to the extent that there was a decisions, a conscious decisions to leave the WOC to 10:07 notifications, you did not make that conscious decision?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you-and you don't remember discussing it with anybody?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't recall any notifications that we had made on United 93. My--up until you showed me this, I thought that the only notification had been made through Cheryl Atkins who happened to be in the room and--

MR. AZZARELLO: But you found that out afterwards?

MR. FERRANTE: --and that was, and again, when I put this together--

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't know--

MR. FERRANTE: --unless I had a piece of

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paper that I could show, where's how or I had a personnel statement, I didn't add it in there, because I tried to stay factual.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, when you gave this to Cannoles, Dave Cannoles, did you have, wasn't there some discussion of or what--where's the notification on 93, you have one on 11, Tony, that you cite in the logs. You have one in this document you gave me on 175; and it says the NEADS logs indicate at 9:05, that they were notified of United 175. Well, what do the logs say, Tony, about United 93 and American 77?

MR. FERRANTE: I can't find you anything in the logs that indicated we notified the military. And that's what I would have said to David.

MR. AZZARELLO: That you can't find anything in the logs to indicate that the military was notified?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: How does that square with this, though, here's an entry right here--

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MR. FERRANTE: I never saw that.

MR. LEWIS [?]: [off microphone] That's coming through Atkins.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is not coming through Atkins.

MR. LEWIS: He says that he never saw that document. [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: It wasn't Atkins, so he didn't say this came from Atkins?

MR. LEWIS: [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: You said this information came to you from Cheryl Atkins?

MR. FERRANTE: I have never seen that information before.

MR. AZZARELLO: You didn't say this came from Cheryl Atkins?

MR. FERRANTE: No, what came from Cheryl Atkins was the fact that she was in that room. And at one point, I don't recall when it was, she acknowledged she had been in there when there was discussion of that aircraft.

MR. LEWIS: [off microphone] [unintell.]

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MR. AZZARELLO: No, he said he saw a one-page document, not this log, you said you saw a one-page document that had--

MR. FERRANTE: Someone else had put together a chronology of when notifications had been made.

MR. AZZARELLO: The NEADS, was it from the NEADS perspective of what they were told it was?

MR. FERRANTE: You know, I can't recall, what perspective it was, I know it's going to be in the documents that we've turned over to you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, the only--

MR. FERRANTE: But there are volumes and volumes of materials.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, the logs--the NEADS log that you are citing in the report that you oversaw and drafted, you're citing to the very thing that you say you never got to see.

MR. FERRANTE: I never saw this particular log, never, today was the first time.

MR. AZZARELLO: You cited to a NEADS log.

MR. FERRANTE: We had a sheet of paper

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that looked similar to this, although it's not this one that I don't know if Jerry Shakely [ph] putting it together or somebody in the Air Traffic staff that was based on what they had transcribed from the Never Ending Telephone Conference down there since you don't want to call it the DEN, although that was the forerunner of the DEN.

MR. AZZARELLO: It became the DEN.

MR. FERRANTE: But there was some sheet of paper on who we had notified, when. So, if we had something that we could point to and say, okay, here is--bingo, we made notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: But somebody apparently had access to the NEADS logs because it's quoted in your summary.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. LEWIS: [off microphone] [unintell.]
classified.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's cited here.

MR. FERRANTE: Somebody put together information on when we notified NEADS, but it doesn't contain all of this information.

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MR. AZZARELLO: And it just pulled out on the information on what, on each of the four flights?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, well, I don't know if it had United 93 on it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was that? Who gave you the NEADS information?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't recall, it was something that we generated during the course of trying to write this. We had information that was being faxed in--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, who did you work with on military notification, there must have been somebody you worked with on when was the military notified, that had classified clearance that was able to look at the log?

MR. AZZARELLO: I may have cut the sheet from Dave, who got it from somewhere on the 10th floor. I may have got the sheet from Dan Diggins, who had done some of the work in capturing the notes on the day that it happened. But we had a sheet of paper that deals with chronologies that we

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used as our basis of when we notified them.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was--deals with an FAA chronology?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I wanted to know, though, if you know, who dealt with the NEADS chronology, what they had given to the FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know who dealt with the NEADS chronology. What I saw, similar to this Notification to the Military, right? You see this entry says the NEADS log show--

MR. AZZARELLO: But.

MR. FERRANTE: I never saw a NEADS log, I saw a line that says NEADS log shows.

MR. AZZARELLO: That an FAA person gave you--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that may have that--

MR. FERRANTE: So we would use that as far a notification for United 175, although I never saw the NEADS log, this tells me and this is--and I don't even know who put this one together.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, this was three days after.

MR. FERRANTE: I have to suspect this was done by Security. Yeah, but this was done on the 20th and this probably is not the first version of it. This is probably the final version of it.

MR. AZZARELLO: The person that may have put this together, indicated that they were asked to look at what differences there might be between what the FAA summary said on notifications and what the military had said.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I'm curious as to whether you were brought into that.

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because if you drafted this and somebody was looking at differences or inconsistencies between what the FAA said they told the military when in here, versus, what the military said they were told by the FAA and when--they didn't bring you into that?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Even though you put this together?

MR. FERRANTE: no.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: See, but I had a sheet of paper that had some--had some resemblance to this--

MR. AZZARELLO: It's a sheet of paper and you don't know who gave it to you, though?

MR. FERRANTE: No, you know, I gotta think it was probably given to me by Dave or it could have been given to me by Dan. Because we had a lot of people that were involved in the writing of this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave Cannoles again, but why would you think that they might have been one of those two people, that it might have been one of them that gave you the NEADS, the information of what the NEADS log showed?

MR. FERRANTE: Because our quest for information in trying to develop this, there were really three main people that I relied on for information. It was Dave that was coming back with

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what he needed or what was going on; Dan Diggins; and Doug Gould.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so those were--

MR. FERRANTE: I had four or five other staffers that helped, you know, assemble things and, you know, take care of documents and store and so forth. In fact, at one point in time, when I told people that they were going to have to work through the weekend, you know, that's always a real popular thing that you do as a manager, right?

MR. AZZARELLO: I was a [unintell.] decision--

MR. FERRANTE: So, when I told them, I said, you know, everybody had volunteered repeatedly, we'll do whatever it takes, we'll help you have what we want. I said, I need to have Dan, I need to have Doug, the rest of you are welcome, but you're not required to be there. And they all came.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tell me about American 77, where do you have, do you have anything on a notification to the military on that?

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MR. FERRANTE: I don't think there was any notification to the military on American 77 because I recall it was, to me, a comedy of errors that we confirmed that the aircraft had crashed. So, I would think that the first time we have anything on here are these end entries, where we're on a line with the Secret Service at the time. So, this would not be--would not constitute notifications to the military, unless the military was somehow notified in this time frame up here, to my knowledge, there were no military notifications other than what I read in your log.

MR. AZZARELLO: What did you read in here? See anything in here about notification on 77?

MR. FERRANTE: No, American Airlines, hijacked 13:24, but it doesn't have a number, it has a registration number.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a tail number.

MR. FERRANTE: So that could have come from American Airlines to another entity because we would not necessarily have been able to get a tail number. The only way I can go in and get a tail

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number is if we go into the actual flight plan where it's filed.

MR. AZZARELLO: That actually came your Boston Center folks.

MR. FERRANTE: Oh, it did?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know whether they probably had it in the flight plan information they have.

MR. AZZARELLO: They got it from the Airline, that's the tail number to 11.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: But if, hypothetically, you saw this log, you wouldn't know from this whether that was 11, 77, or--

MR. FERRANTE: Could have been a completely different airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: But would you know as an accident investigator that you could with a tail number call the airline and say find out in an accident investigation which of your aircraft had this tail number?

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MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then they would have told you 11?

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about here, 1334 Zulu, American 77, isn't that a refer flight to LA, lost, unable to locate. It doesn't say where it is, but it says lost, unable to locate rather than a specific call zone.

MR. FERRANTE: And that's all it says, it doesn't say anything about notification. I don't know where they picked it up. They could have got that from the company. Again, it wasn't that they were notified of that and, again, to my knowledge the only notification we did was right here when we notified the Great Lakes ROC.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And I don't even know, all I know of how the process works, but I know we had a flight service station in Terre Haute that had reached out and started calling trying to find a downed aircraft. They ended up talking to a

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sheriff's office in, I believe it's Ashland, Kentucky, right?

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Who, in turn calls Indianapolis Center and says we have a report of a downed aircraft are you missing one. We just closed it--and confirmed that that aircraft crashed.

MR. AZZARELLO: You think that's what happened there.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a good memory even though it was almost three years ago.

MR. FERRANTE: A lot of this I've relived in working with Miles of the course of the last 8 months or so and I don't mean that--

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you spend a lot of time with the Boston Center folks who did think outside the box and had a--was giving up some periodic updates to the Northeast Air Defense Sector?

MR. FERRANTE: I did not spend any time

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with any of the individuals, personally.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did any of your staff?

MR. FERRANTE: No, because the FBI said that they wanted to conduct their own investigations, so we facilitated the investigations of those personnel. In the first three weeks, following September 11, I would go home, on an average day, I'd go home that midnight and be back at 5:00 and that was what I did, every day for the first three weeks. So, I did not go to any facility, the only interview I asked to be conducted I think I sent Jim Fosse [ph] to Cleveland Center to talk to the controller that worked United 93. And I think that was a request that was made a week or so after the events had taken place where the Administrator wanted to know how the controllers were doing.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, just so, I'm clear on the final analysis here in the summary. So, when you had this in on the 17th as a final product on the 17th--

MR. FERRANTE: As a preliminary final

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product.

MR. AZZARELLO: --preliminary final product on the 17th, was it your understanding that this document did not address any military notifications as they might have been under the normal protocol through the Aviation Crisis?

MR. FERRANTE: That is correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, was that discussed--well, along the lines did you have a discussion with Dave Cannoles, for example, that hey, Dave, this has got the Air Traffic Element below headquarters Air Traffic. This is just TRACONS and centers and what they did in terms of talking to the military. But there could have been other military notifications that the FAA made at a headquarters level either by Cannoles, down in Air Traffic or somebody in the WOC or somebody in the Crisis Center, so you ought to look at that because that's a gap that's left open here? Did you have that kind of discussion?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I didn't and I probably wouldn't even have considered having that type of

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discussion. I probably would have told Dave this is what we're able to validate through facility logs and the facility records as well as statements and information that we had.

But when we developed this, I don't know exactly when, but I did know that Darlene Freeman had been tapped to chair a group that was looking at the overall response and I do know that we gave her a copy of this so, you know, if I were to have that conversation Dave, it would just be make sure Darlene's got a copy of this, because this is as far as we went with it. With the assumption that they're going to go--

MR. AZZARELLO: Going to go the rest of the route?

MR. FERRANTE: Right and I never saw a product--

MR. AZZARELLO: IT was clear to Dave Cannoles then that this did not include the Security notifications that could have occurred?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Through the formal

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protocol?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It was clear to Dave?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm relatively certain it was clear to Dave.

MR. AZZARELLO: How about to Doug Gould and Dan Diggins, was it clear to them that this didn't include the formal notification branch that you didn't look at that?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay. What about what was going on with Cannoles that later transformed into the DEN. Did you, as part of your inquiry to form this summary, did you look down there, finally try to find out from them whether or not they made notifications?

MR. FERRANTE: I looked at the log they had and the first couple of entries that they had in the log, I thought there were some glaring discrepancies in the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me know if this looks like the log. It was given us by Shirley on the

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16th which was Friday. I had asked for--just so you know, what yielded this document, is in the Frenier book.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: She references that Dave Cannoles said that anything that's recorded has to be taken down, they have to keep track of any questions or any answers that are given from that telecon he was running.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And asked somebody to commit it to a laptop?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, he asked her for any documents that would reflect the chronos he kept either on paper or typewritten and this is what we got. And I want to know if this is a log, did you look at this chrono from the Cannoles?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I never saw this. I saw a typed version of this, but believe--

MR. AZZARELLO: It's page 30, I think it is.

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MR. FERRANTE: I did see this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Does that seem to be the Cannoles one, then that this is time lines, Catastrophic Occurrences?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know who titled it and here's what I know of that. And, in fact, I believe it's been determined that Tony Mello made that statement, not Dave.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And what had taken place. It's similar to what you have here, a white-board, people are writing stuff all over the white-board, the white-board's getting full. Dan Diggins says, hey, let me run down and get my laptop. This is Tony's recollection that he gave. Because I was familiar with the document request you had asked for. In fact, I provided another copy to Shirley, but I knew we had already provided you with this one.

So, in any event, Dan gets his laptop, he starts typing this. So, yes, we start looking at this, but you know, when you see some of the things

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that are fast-moving between from Poughkeepsie towards the Trade Centers, you know, I don't know where that came from. 10:10, 9/11 calls, 40 southeast of Johnson, PA, black smoke, that one's not even that bad. But when you look at some of these times--I remember the first time I looked at this it seemed to me like they had the first impact with the Trade Center, about an hour after it actually occurred.

MR. AZZARELLO: Seventy-seven they have at 10:41 in Kansas City's airspace 10:45, possible crash--

MR. FERRANTE: Right, and you know, what this was, the only thing I can guess is if you look at the aircraft situation or the TSD, you refer to it, it continued to project the aircraft's flight across the country. So, how it got into holding, I don't know.

MR. AZZARELLO: So there was something about this?

MR. FERRANTE: But, obviously, you know, this is long after he hit the Pentagon.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Sure, it's over an hour later.

MR. FERRANTE: So, when I'm looking at the chronology on this, I said, okay, this is, you know, obviously the work of people who are pressured--

MR. AZZARELLO: You're not counting on it to be reliable or very reliable?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct. So rather than rely on this that I could not say, yes, we can document this happened when; this happened when, we went to the facility logs. We went to what we could prove this is what happened, when it happened.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then somebody, I guess, alerted to you to the fact that they were having a telecon down there and you might find some relevant information down there from what they were doing there is that--

MR. FERRANTE: No, I knew that they had the telecon down there. But then again, I got back into Washington, early in the morning on Wednesday.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. FERRANTE: I know at least twice during the day, I had actually gone up to the room. One time it was to see Dave Cannoles, another time was, probably, 11:00 p.m. of that first day, when I went up to see Eric Harrel [ph], who was working at the time. And this is, I mean you guys have probably seen it by now, but there used to be a sensitive document called "Unlawful Interference of Aircraft Hijack Procedures?"

MR. AZZARELLO: Yep.

MR. FERRANTE: So, I went upstairs. I remember going upstairs to have a conversation with Eric because I was kind of concerned that I didn't think Eric understood it that well and Eric was the procedures manager.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's referenced in this Crisis Handbook?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I think it's what 72--

MR. AZZARELLO: 7210?

MR. FERRANTE: --.149?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

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MR. FERRANTE: It's like two pages, it's a 1980 document that was signed by [unintell.].

MR. KARA: Tony, if you had been here on 9/11, where would you have been?

MR. FERRANTE: In the bay. Or, if--I probably would have been in the conference room with Dave, at least for the start.

MR. KARA: Down here?

MR. FERRANTE: Down here in 1000 West.

MR. KARA: Okay. And Jeff Griffith was up here, would you have been involved up here at all?

MR. FERRANTE: As I've said, I'd only been in there once. I knew it existed, I'd been through there several times on going in to see that the folks in the WOC, but we were never a player in any of the events they had.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is this the one that you were talking about, 7210, 7110.149?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, that is it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Unlawful Interference? This is the one that was in effect on 9/11 in 1980?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. So--and I don't

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recall all the specifics, but there was a question, don't we have an order that covers hijacking? And Eric Harrel commented that, no, it's been cancelled. And all three-year information is not contained in 7110.65. And I said, no, that's not true, Eric was the procedures manager, I wasn't, but I was trying to have this conversation with Eric because I thought that document still existed. Later that night, it was probably midnight, maybe even 1:00 o'clock on Thursday morning before we found a copy of the document.

MR. AZZARELLO: Were you aware that there were the procedures, though, the protocols for a Hijack Coordinator, someone from Security to make military notifications?

MR. FERRANTE: I didn't know all the functions at that time. I learned them after. I've been in kind of a unique situation. I worked a hijacking very early on in my FAA career.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which one, Lufthansa?

MR. FERRANTE: It was United and I got to think of the flight number, it was a United flight

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going from Chicago to Pittsburgh and the hijacker wanted to be flown to Washington, D.C.

MR. KARA: That was in the '80s, then?

MR. FERRANTE: It was in 1983, I believe, because I remember, I was working the 3:00 to 11:00 shift. The supervisor had come in, because in Pittsburgh we had two controllers that went to the tower; one controller and supervisor came to the TRACON because by midnight there was quiet enough to the point where the supervisor unplugged and just one controller worked in the TRACON.

So, the supervisor comes over to relieve me. The phone rings, he says I'll be right back. He comes back over, he says I need you to stay for two hours overtime. And then tells me that we have a hijacking. And that I'm thinking, wow, this is really something.

So, we've got this order in front of us, we've got the FAA 711065 in front of me, and I've got nervous; I have sweaty palms, I want to do all the right things. And so, I'm looking at all this overt/covert phraseology,

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and the guy checks in. He says, Pittsburgh approach this is United--I don't remember his number--United 93, gentleman sitting next to me says he's got a bomb, we're going to need to land opposite direct on runway 10-Left. So, all that training and all of those sweaty palms was, United so-and-so, Pittsburgh approach, roger.

But in that particular event, I do know that my supervisor at that time was a gentleman named Darryl Knopple [ph], he stayed on the phone with Civil Aviation Security in the ROC, I didn't even know what ROCs and WOCs were at that point. I finally got relieved, maybe 12:30 or so. I went up to the tower cab because this was a United 727 that was parked parallel to Runway 14--

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: --and Security was in the tower, they were directing all kinds of things from within the tower cab, and what they did was they convinced this guy they didn't have enough fuel to make it to Washington and if he didn't release the passengers, they weren't going to give him the

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fuel. and the flight crew ends up walking out with the passengers. Turned out to be nothing.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me just, sort of non sequitur, though. From that back to the Command Center. Miles and Jeff help me out, but my recollection is we met with Linda Schuessler and asked her about any inquiries that were made by Dave Cannoles or yourself and the Accident Investigations people. She said that there was an inquiry at the Command Center about did they make, were there any, you know, what's the earliest that we told anybody in the military about any of these aircraft. and that Dave Cannoles and you know the Cannoles/Ferrante group, maybe not you personally, but that while your collective effort and Dave Cannoles, under his supervision was to found out what they may have told the military. Let's see what the earliest possible notification might have been from there. Even outside the box, because they're not--as you said earlier, they're not even usually part of the hijack notification system.

MR. FERRANTE: I think that's very

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possible that Dave had communications with the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: About trying to find that--

MR. FERRANTE: About trying to find notifications. I had no communications myself with the Command Center trying to find those. But I do recall something now about CARF [ph], and that's an element I don't fully understand that's located out at the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. FERRANTE: That CARF made some notifications. And, so, they probably picked those up from the teleconferences that the Command Center was involved in.

MR. AZZARELLO: But how's there, I mean, there seems to be, I mean, how do you guys connect this whole agenda, then, because if it's your assignment, so to speak, Tony, to pull this together and to look outside the box and say what did Air Traffic do outside the box, noted by the military? Well, Command Center's part of Air

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Traffic correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they would have been outside the box notification if they made it, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Just like Boston?

MR. FERRANTE: That's right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, Dave Cannoles, asked Linda, lookit, but if you're ultimately responsible for drafting this and putting this together, don't you and Dave have to discuss that, hey, Tony, I got somebody checking on the Command Center for you, too, to make sure that maybe--make sure that they don't have any military notifications.

MR. FERRANTE: We may have had that discussion, but I don't recall it. And in the normal course of business, we would not have even considered it. Because, again, we were looking for facility notifications that we could document, we could say this happened when.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, so what should we

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infer from that then is that if somebody did ask Command Center to check their records, check their logs or tapes, whatever source it is to see if they notified--somebody from there notified the military about any of these four aircraft. If it's not in here, then what are we to conclude from that? That they didn't make notification or what? Tell me.

MR. FERRANTE: I would suggest you need to conclude one of two things. Either that contact never existed and I believe that it may have, between Dave or somebody in the Command Center notifications or that, perhaps, there was a chronology that was put together by the Command Center of what they knew as far as when NEADs had been notified of certain things. It could have come from them because I described that one sheet that I looked at. It has entries similar to this, but it was not this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so let's look at--

MR. FERRANTE: We may have got something from the Command Center that said--

MR. AZZARELLO: [unintell.] was notified.

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I apologize that before, I was a little bit worked up as you may could tell--

MR. FERRANTE: No, no, please don't--

MR. AZZARELLO: Italians are want to get worked up sometimes and I apologize for that. But this is the issue I'm having difficulty grasping or coming to terms with and that is: Linda Schuessler recalled that there was some effort to ask the Command Center whether or not they made any military notifications. Because there was an effort by the FAA to find out, well, did we notify the military, even if it was an unconventional notification. If it wasn't according to protocol. Let's just scan, you know, let's scan the field here and find out if any of our FAA facilities notified the military, anybody in Air Traffic; TRACON centers, Command Center anywhere.

Obviously, even headquarters, if you were looking at maybe what Cannoles was doing down there with his Air telecon, that would have been potential notification there from headquarters to the military.

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It makes sense to us that in the aftermath of 9/11 that it's going to be a big issue at some point from a higher level of government to find out who knew what, when. And, as Jeff Griffith, himself, said, it was a topic that was hotly debated in terms of how much time did the military have to react?

Did we give them early notice and what kind of notice did we give them on each of the four flights?

And I'm not paraphrasing some of your former colleagues and current colleagues who have come here before us and said, clearly, when something goes wrong in government, there's going to be finger-pointing and there's going to be an issue of, if there is fault to log, at that point, before everyone even knows, you know, could anything be--could anything have been prevented, there's going to be an oh, a lot of finger-pointing going on. Who knew what, when? Did we communicate the information--we, the FAA--to the military and then you know did they react in a timely manner?

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Did we react in a timely manner? That would sort of make sense that that inquiry would go on at some point.

And, against that background, I'm asking you if you participated in any conversations like that where there was a discussion and debate about notifications between the FAA and the military and the military and the FAA not agreeing on that?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So to the extent that that did occur, if it did, it would have been at a level above you?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to the extent that somebody asked Command Center to look at whether or not they notified the military outside the box, you were not notified of that or you're not sure.

MR. FERRANTE: I was unaware of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: You aren't aware that they were making that effort?

MR. FERRANTE: I seem to recall something, but not in the time frame that we were working on

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this. They-

MR. AZZARELLO: They were called in to work at the Command Center that weekend, Friday, Saturday, Sunday, the weekend that this was being, this was Monday the 17th?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: They were working feverishly that weekend--

MR. FERRANTE: And they possibly could have produced a document that was dated September the 17th that we never saw. You know, I don't know if they did or they didn't, they possibly could have.

MR. AZZARELLO: What did you think--

MR. FERRANTE: But remember--

MR. AZZARELLO: --if they were tasked to see if there were any notifications to the military form the Command Center outside the box as part of Air Traffic?

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Would you expect to have been notified of that for the purposes of your

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summary here because that was--

MR. FERRANTE: It depends on who tasked her to do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, Dave Cannoles.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, if Dave Cannoles did, he probably would have said something to me, but it would make more sense to me that Jeff Griffith tasked them to do that, and that may have been because Jeff was attending meetings white-board he Deputy and the Administrator at the time. I never saw the Deputy or the Administrator other than one pass through they gave, probably a week or so after the event, when they thanked people for all the hard work.

But, also, recall that at some point during this time, they had set up the group with Darelene to do that. And that tasking may have been, if Dave was involved in it as a result of what they were trying to get Darlene in trying to come up with the final FAA position in response of what they did.

MR. AZZARELLO: If there was--

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MR. FERRANTE: See, my role has been wonderful, for the last five years, I haven't had to worry about the finger-pointing and the blame because I've been reporting facts. So, you know, if we're at fault for things, we're at fault for things.

MR. KARA: Tony, why was the formal final FAA chronology not published until 2002?

MR. FERRANTE: I couldn't tell you. Up until about six months ago, I never even got news.

MR. KARA: Up to six months ago, you didn't even know that you had a chronology on the street?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, I've never seen this chronology, but, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: You weren't consulted on that?

MR. KARA: No.

MR. FERRANTE: No, they probably took it from this document, you know, just a quick scan, does it resemble what's in here?

MR. AZZARELLO: It's got a 9:24

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notification on American 77. So, is that--

MR. FERRANTE: I never saw the product that was produced--9:24 is the time we showed that we notified the Great Lakes Region.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right it doesn't say anything about the--

MR. FERRANTE: Doesn't say anything about the military, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: But it says--

MR. FERRANTE: It says FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77; FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: I know, I know you're not--

MR. FERRANTE: At this point, we'd already confirmed he'd crashed, if I'm not mistaken.

MR. AZZARELLO: You do on 77?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I know you know on 93, because you were citing the controller frequency

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communications that United 93, you know, wasn't even hijacked at the--

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely, right. I don't know where this came from, I never saw this.

MR. AZZARELLO: Clearly, you couldn't have notified the military about a plane that wasn't hijacked?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct. And gentlemen, I really do gotta go to the dentist, I mean, I've got three teeth, I can pull them all out if you want. I am here all day tomorrow. I mean I'll spend all eight hours with you if you'd like.

MR. KARA: We're concluding the interview.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
MONTE BELGER
BY
JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 Commission

Tuesday, April 20, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: It's Tuesday, April 20, 2004, we're at GSA about to begin an interview with Monte Belger. I'm John Azzarello, Team 8, 9/11 Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 9/11 Commission.

MS. HYDE: Dana Hyde, 9/11.

MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, 9/11 Commission

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis FAA Chief
Counsel's Office.

MR. BELGER: Monte Belger.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thanks for taking the time to come, from what I understand you've spent some time already spent some time with one of the other teams on the Commission. Could you just start briefly by giving us just a real brief overview of your career with the FAA, where you started and the various positions you held leading up to 9/11?

MR. BELGER: Well, I was a 30-year career employee at the FAA. I started my career in 1972, as an entry-level security inspector. Had a variety of jobs in the FAA Security program up

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through Washington to the New England Region to the Great Lakes Region.

And then when I got to the Great Lakes Region in 1980, around that time frame, I then moved out of Security into another program in FAA, I became a division manager in the FAA's Airports Program, which is a safety and grants program focused on airports. And then, shortly after that was selected to be the Deputy Director of the Great Lakes Region.

And in 1988, I was selected to be an Associate Administrator in the Washington headquarters. And I moved to Washington in 1988. And finished my career there. I had several Associate Administrator jobs in the Washington headquarters.

And in 1997, when Jane Garvey became the Administrator, she asked me to assist her for a while as the Acting Deputy Administrator, and that while turned into five years. So the last five years, I was the Acting Deputy Administrator and retired in September of 2002.

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MR. AZZARELLO: September '02. Could you just give us an explanation of sort of the scope of responsibility of a The Deputy Administrator?

MR. BELGER: Well, as The Deputy Administrator, my responsibility, number one, was to, you know, support the Administrator and be her number one advisor and assistant. The way that Administrator Garvey worked was that we worked as a team. Virtually everything that shew as involved in, I was also and, obviously vice versa.

My responsibilities were FAA-wide. Every program, 50-some-thousand people. The FAA's responsibilities and I would say that the Administrator and Deputy were responsible for the whole scope of the FAA activities.

MS. HYDE: And were you ever confirmed?

MR. BELGER: No, no. That's a long story, interesting, story.

MS. HYDE: I'm sure.

MR. BELGER: And that's fine with me, it really wasn't in my personal best interest to be confirmed.

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MS. HYDE: You took it for retirement?

MR. BELGER: Nominated, but--yeah, yeah. Nominated by President Clinton, but by that time, by the time the nomination went to the Hill, it was in the last year of his Administration and there were no--I mean, nobody was being processed.

MS. HYDE: Right. It was good luck.

MR. BELGER: But that was fine, it turned out just perfect for me.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: And it was obviously, those five years were obviously okay with the Administrator and two Secretaries, so--I mean, they could have made a change anytime they would have wanted to.

MS. HYDE: So, the Secretary when you started was?

MR. BELGER: Secretary Slater.

MS. HYDE: Secretary Pena and were you there for both?

MR. BELGER: No, when Jane became the Administrator, when Jane Garvey became the

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Administrator, Secretary Slater was already in office.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: Actually, he selected her. So I was the Deputy through his four years, and then until I retired in 2002, after Secretary Mineta came.

MR. AZZARELLO: Who was, on 9/11, the highest ranking Air Traffic person under you?

MR. BELGER: Well, I guess the highest ranking would have been Steve Brown, who was at that time ATS-1, I guess it was. Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, then it goes down from him, [unintell.] under him, an the Peacock--

MR. BELGER: Peacock, and Jeff--

MR. AZZARELLO: Report up through Allen Brown?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what about in Security was that Canavan?

MR. BELGER: Mike Canavan, General Canavan

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was in that office at that time.

MR. AZZARELLO: And under him was Lynne Osmus?

MR. BELGER: Lynne Osmus was his Deputy.

MR. AZZARELLO: Anybody have any other background questions before we get to the day?

MS. HYDE: Well, maybe we should chronologically start a bit with the summer before the day.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. HYDE: and I know you discussed these matters with Team 7. We wanted to revisit them in the area that we're focused on, which is understanding the protocols for hijacking and what happened in terms of hijacking response on 9/11.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MS. HYDE: In that context, to the extent that--well, I guess the predicate question is: Were you aware of heightened threat activity during the summer of 2001 and, specifically, threat activity that contemplated hijacking?

MR. BELGER: Well, I'm aware of the

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information circulars that the FAA sent out, obviously I saw those. I am aware and remember a couple of times when, I guess it was Admiral Flynn, actually, at that time, the year before, had brought up some concerns. So, I think my answer is, yes, I was ware of the circulars that were being disseminated. I was aware of what was on the news. I was aware of Al Qaeda as a potential threat, I think they were mentioned in a couple of information circulars that the FAA sent out that summer.

So, yeah, I was generally aware.

MS. HYDE: Well, let's, taking Admiral Flynn and whatever concerns of the year before. And honing specifically into that summer, the information circulars--this is where John is more useful. What specifically do you remember about the threat that summer to Aviation Security? And, particularly hijacking risk?

MR. BELGER: Well, the general--my characterization of the general theme all the types of threats that were discussed that summer was that

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number one they were predominantly focused on overseas, U.S. interests abroad; and when there was a discussion of aircraft and hijacking, it was, generally, in the context of a more traditional hijacking in order to get something, you know, hostage release or money or whatever. So, I would characterize it more, mostly focused internationally and then, secondly when there was a discussion about hijacking it was more international in scope.

MS. HYDE: What were you learning, specifically that summer, did General Canavan brief you, bring information to your attention about these threats. You just characterized your impression, I'm trying to get beyond to, how did you get that impression?

MR. BELGER: From the information circulars, from the discussions about the information circulars and from just my general discussions with the Security people.

MS. HYDE: So, your discussions with the Security people would you, that summer, do you

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remember that they briefed you on a heightened threat alert?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember any particular briefing in which there was a focus on heightened Security that was given to me.

MS. HYDE: You don't remember given to you any briefing that summer?

MR. BELGER: That was focused on a heightened level of threat.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember any meetings on that subject?

MR. BELGER: I mean, I talked to the Security people all the time. Talked to them all the time, but I don't recall any specific, you know formal briefing or any relevant discussions where they said, you know, this is really heightened, this is extraordinary, this is different, I mean, I don't remember that.

I knew all the Security folks, I grew up in Security. And there's absolutely no doubt that if there was something like that, the intel folks and Lynne and General Canavan would have brought it

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to my attention.

MS. HYDE: And to the extent you don't remember any of it being brought to your attention, do you, is your understanding that they didn't know of that?

MR. BELGER: No, I can't say that they knew, I'm just saying it wasn't brought to my attention and I think they would have.

MS. HYDE: So, my understanding is that there was not a circular that summer that dealt with hijacking threats, certainly not in this country.

MR. BELGER: I think that's what I said.

MS. HYDE: So, you had mentioned before that you are aware of the circulars, and, do you think I'm wrong there, was there a circular that summer dealing with the hijacking threat?

MR. BELGER: I'd have to go back and look at them, but what I said, the general aim was when hijacking was mentioned in those circulars, it was mentioned in the context of overseas.

MS. HYDE: Do you know that any of those

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circulars that summer mentioned hijacking?

MR. BELGER: I'd have to look at them, I think they did, but, again in the context of overseas. I mean, that's clear, I can go back to look at them, it's not a hard question to answer.

MS. HYDE: And would the circulars pass through your desk, you would approve them, how would they be sent up from Canavan's shop?

MR. BELGER: They would just come up in the context of making me aware that the circulars were going out.

MS. HYDE: As a formal process was there sort of a distribution sheet where you needed to, you know, they needed to go up to your office and sign off on it before it went out?

MR. BELGER: No, not for the circulars. It's fundamentally ethic, they're the best people to make that call. They made that call and, generally, they--depending on, again, on the severity of it, they might talk to me beforehand, or I'd certainly look at it afterwards.

MS. HYDE: They might talk to you

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beforehand, so it wasn't a prerequisite that they speak to you before sending it out the door?

MR. BELGER: I did not have to sign off on information circulars that were going out.

MS. HYDE: And you would learn after they were sent out about the content?

MR. BELGER: Generally at the same time, yes.

MS. HYDE: And that would be in calls every day between the Security office and you or how--there wasn't a briefing, there wasn't a meeting with them, a process that you met with them once a week?

MR. BELGER: I don't think there was a standard process to meet with them on a regular basis. They met with us every day or twice a week in staff meetings. They clearly had an entree into my office any time they wanted. They came to see me whenever they wanted to or needed to.

MS. HYDE: But you don't recall them coming to see you that summer about a heightened threat activity?

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MR. BELGER: No, not, like I said, other than the normal information circulars that were distributed.

MR. : Did you get the impression from the level of circulation of the ICs that summer that it was any different, say, than previous 12 months or two years? Was it in your perspective did it appear heightened or did it appear that it was a normal flow of threat information coming through?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, you know, I've thought about that. I've gone back and thought about that and I haven't gone back and looked at the number of information circulars that were sent out in 2000 or beyond. So, I can't give you a numerical comparison, because I haven't done that. I'm sure you can get that and see how many information circulars were put out in 2000 or '99, I don't know if you've done that. Is it similar.

MR. : The other team that interviewed you has got that focus and I apologize--

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MR. BELGER: No, it would be curious to, actually, I've thought about that several times to see just from a numerical comparison whether there were more in 2001 than there were in 2000 or '99 or '98. But to get back to your question. And, again, this is my recollection of what I was thinking about three years ago. And my thought was that those information circulars, as I said before, were fundamentally focused overseas or fundamentally, when they did reference hijacking were the typical traditional type of hijackings, I should say.

And I didn't get the sense, nor was it ever recommended to me that the FAA should do something beyond what we were already requiring the airlines to do, which they were already at a heightened level. I mean, when you look at the aviation industry compared to other modes of transportation and they were clearly already at a heightened state of awareness and preparedness. And there were no recommendations to, send out any directives, do anything different and I didn't come

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to that conclusion myself.

MS. HYDE: Well, we now know that the President was briefed on August 6. In a briefing that said that there were people in this country taking actions, preparations consistent with hijacking. Did that information ever come to you?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: And if you would have received that information, first of all, it's not overseas, it's in the country and the action is specific hijacking, would it have led you to do something?

MR. BELGER: Well, it would have certainly led us to look at what we could have done. It's a hypothetical question and I can't answer it without knowing what would have actually been presented to me. But I can assure you--

MS. HYDE: It's been in the New York Times what the TDB said for you and I can get it for you off the line.

MR. BELGER: Well, again, it's a hypothetical. I don't know I can't assume that everything that was in the presidential briefing

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would have been given to me, so I don't now.

MS. HYDE: Well, for purposes of this, say that information came to you.

MR. BELGER: I think it, I don't know. I mean that's a hypothetical and I can't answer that. It really depends on what information was given. All I can tell you is that in every situation going back to the 1970s when there was specific information given to the FAA about a specific threat and there were some countermeasures that could be taken, the FAA took them,

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: That's the--I can't answer that any better than that.

MS. HYDE: Well, let's try and let's say this. The information, as I understand what you just told us is that the news that there was a terrorist organization in this country making preparations consistent with hijacking, okay. So, it's not overseas.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: And the threat is hijacking.

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MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: First of all, that news never came to your attention at the FAA?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Do you know if that news ever came to Jane Garvey's attention?

MR. BELGER: I don't know.

MS. HYDE: In terms of passing Security information was it the case that she had some route to General Canavan or some conversation there that you wouldn't have been involved with?

MR. BELGER: I--

MS. HYDE: Was she meeting with anyone?

MR. BELGER: I'm not going to speculate. I mean, I don't think she knew, I don't think she would have known anything that I didn't know.

MS. HYDE: About Security?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, but I can't answer that question [unintell.] 24 hours.

MS. HYDE: But she never mentioned anything to you that, Monte we've got

MR. BELGER: No, absolutely not.

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MS. HYDE: So, take the information that came to you in August of that summer was a terrorist group, in this country, making plans and preparations consistent with hijacking, that's not in any information circular that went out, you know that.

MR. BELGER: That's correct.

MS. HYDE: You know that.

MR. BELGER: That's correct.

MS. HYDE: Would that kind of news prompt you to take what steps? Issue an information circular?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, look that type of information coming from the highest levels of the government would have prompted, I think the FAA, Department of Transportation, the FBI, Justice, Secret Service, CIA and everybody else to come together and do something, it wouldn't have been the FAA in a vacuum.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: The FAA would not have been out there, you know, the FAA would not have been

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leading the charge [unintell.]. That clearly would have been a law enforcement, intelligence organization lead. The FAA would have done its part from an aviation standpoint. The Department of Transportation would have done its part, but, you know that's--and, again, that would not have been an FAA initiative in a vacuum. It would have, in my opinion, been a governmentwide multi-agency type of response.

MR. : Let me ask you this question, Mr. Belger, the PDB, the famous August 6, PDB, we now know is in the public domain. There's a companion distribution called the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. Were you or Jane Garvey on distribution to receive--

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : Do you know if, perhaps, General Canavan was at the FAA headquarters was even getting this?

MR. BELGER: I don't know how far down that particular went.

MR. : But it didn't flow up to--

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MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : --headquarters.

MS. HYDE: Aside from the August PDB, do you recall from that summer knowing of a White House Terrorism Working Group meeting in July, at the beginning of July that talked about domestic threats to the country?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that.

MS. HYDE: Were you familiar with the CSG or Dick Clark?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MS. HYDE: And had you spoken to Dick Clark? I mean, what relationship, better question is, actually, could you describe what relationship, if any you had--

MR. BELGER: I did not have personally any relationship with intel. I mean, I was aware of the group, I was aware of Dick Clark by name, probably only, I'm not sure I ever talked to him before 9/11. I was certainly aware--

MS. HYDE: Who was the FAA's representative?

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MR. BELGER: It would have been General Canavan and before him Admiral Flynn. It was the head of Security who was our representative to those groups.

MS. HYDE: And did General Canavan report to you after he attended those meetings and the threats, what he learned at the White House.

MR. BELGER: My recollection is that he generally did, I can't say specifically about this meeting you referred to in June or July, I just don't remember.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall any meetings that summer him reporting to you about any meetings of threat--

MR. BELGER: I don't recall any specific, you know, briefings or meetings. I knew they met, I mean I knew about the group, but I can't tell you that I remember any specific discussions or recollections of any meetings.

OFF MICROPHONE: [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: No, brief, I'm sorry brief. I'm not aware of any specific briefs from General

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Canavan about any of those meetings.

MR. AZZARELLO [?]: Insofar as those meetings might have been held on the Security teleconferencing system, who had the authority to attend in your name?

MR. BELGER: Well, it wasn't in my name, I mean it was the ACS-1 who was the representative to those groups.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would have been General Canavan, then? Had those meetings been SVTS? My question is: That would have been General Canavan and not you?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't think I ever attended any of those meetings during that time period. I mean, in my previous career, I was in charge of Security back years ago and I went to those meetings, and I did the same things that General Canavan and Admiral Flynn and the others did, but for the 1994 or 5 on, I didn't do those things.

MS. HYDE: So, your impression of the threat that summer, to the extent you characterize

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it, you said your recollection is that it was focused over--the threat was focused overseas and to the extent hijack was mentioned it was a traditional kind of hijack.

So, you characterized your recollection of the threat, does that mean that you believe that there was a heightened threat of those two types of activities, traditional hijackings overseas, that summer?

MR. BELGER: It means that--

MS. HYDE: I guess I'm not getting the sense that you because you don't have any specific briefings on it, you know, you're not aware of the CSG, and the other agencies, certainly not aware that the President was receiving about domestic activities and preparations for hijacking. So, I'm sort of tossing back the question to you and I'm struggling with were you aware generally that there was a heightened threat of terrorist activity.

MR. BELGER: Well, you're using the word heightened, which I haven't used yet.

MS. HYDE: That's my question.

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MR. BELGER: I'm not going to use it just because you're asking me to use it.

MS. HYDE: No, no, no, I'm not asking that. The question is were you aware of a heightened and the answer may be yes or no.

MR. BELGER: Well, I'm going to answer it the same way. I'm aware of the threat information that was disseminated, I'm aware of how it was characterized. My recollection is kind of the way I summarized it. And whether that was heightened or not, you know, I'm not sure. I'm honestly not sure if it was heightened. I mean, I can tell you that in light of the circulars that were put out in that summer, none of them were accompanied by suggestions or recommendations that the FAA ought to require anything more than we were already doing. So, I mean, that's just the facts.

MS. HYDE: Yeah. But you've been and I appreciate; and I now seek when you were thinking about volumewise whether there was a comparison. Because your career was in Security and because you were at the FAA for 30 years, you're uniquely

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qualified to assess and compare, you know, because you've seen the '70s, the '80s and the '90s and the threats in each decade, so I'm asking you to do that based on your experience.

MR. BELGER: If ou want to go back to the '70s and early '80s, there was an actual hijacking every weekend. So, that's not, you don't want to do that. I don't think you do. I mean there was a hijacking every weekend.

MS. HYDE: I want to draw on your knowledge and to say, how would you--you look back on it--

MR. BELGER: There was a hijacking every weekend in the '70s and early '80s. After PanAm-103 in 1988, my guess is, I don't know this. My guess is, if you went back and look at the circulars and information in the year after that there was probably an increase, probably a greater number.

MS. HYDE: There's a difference between actual events and threat information about intel information--

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MR. BELGER: Yeah, I agree.

MS. HYDE: --about Security and that. So, judging it not by whether they were actually carried forth, but whether there was an increased level of intel about these kinds of threats and I guess just isolate it to the '90s then. Looking back to the summer of 2001, how would you compare your knowledge and understanding of that intel level, threat level to other years.

MR. BELGER: I'm going to answer it the same, way. I honestly don't remember the threat levels, the circulars and the information that came in 1990 or '88 or '87. I can only tell you factually what I remember about '91.

MS. HYDE: About 2001?

MR. BELGER: 2001, I'm sorry, 2001. About how those circulars were worded, what the information was, and the fact that the FAA thought, and I still think today, that the procedures that we were requiring were adequate, based upon the information that we had.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm, okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Just from your perception, without, you know, how accountable the information circulars were, let's say after the attacks on that day unfolded, in the ensuing days, do you remember having the thought that while, you know, we were sort of flat-footed here in terms or do you remember having the thought of, well, I guess, you know, there was a little bit of a heightened awareness here at some level, so maybe they knew something was coming but, you know, nothing--

MR. BELGER: That's a very good question and I thought a thousand times, I'm sure, as have other people, you know, is there something I should have done; is there some questions that I should have asked; is there something the FAA should have done to have been better prepared. And I honestly can tell you, I'm not sure that I can come up with any specific thing. Based upon what I knew in the summer of 2001 that would lead me to say, jeeze, I wish we had, you know, done something different.

MR. AZZARELLO: I probably wasn't clear, then, Mr. Belger, my question, I wasn't getting at

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that or asking--

MR. BELGER: Okay, I'm sorry.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's more along the lines, I guess of what Dana was asking you about, which is sort of looking back, did you have a general sense without knowing what the number of circulars were--

MR. BELGER: Yes, okay, no--

MR. AZZARELLO: --what I'm looking at, is in a reflective way, you might have had a sense of whether or not there was a heightened threat leading up to that, by your reactions to the event of that day, by saying, you know, on the one hand, was your reaction either, wow, you know, I don't remember even seeing anything on this, that this might have been coming, I guess no one knew it. Or, was it, well, I guess there was a little bit more of heightened information or a little more heightened threats that summer, but nothing specific enough, still, for us to know that something like a hijacking like this was going to occur?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, my reaction, I think at

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that time was surprise that, you know, that an event like that could occur and did occur in the United States. I've got to tell you I was genuinely surprised. I did think back about, you know, what did I know, what did we know. I can't--I think my reaction at that time was, again, you know, jeeze, we thought the threat was fundamentally focused overseas and we thought that if it were a hijacking it would be a more traditional two- or three-day long hostage-type of situation, in which, you know, we and the FBI had learned how to manage.

MR. : Do you recall, in 1993, the last hijacking that had domestic consequences was what Tom said in the spring of '93, do you recall that?

MR. BELGER: No, tell me more and I might.

MR. : It was an individual who had demands, he hijacked a plane in Europe. It was, everybody knew it was coming, it was coordinated and the Air Defense Response was Canadian was handed off to [unintell.] Air Force

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Base, this was in the spring of 1993. Lynne Osmus ended up sitting in the ACC--I guess in the AC-01.

MR. BELGER: Okay, I don't remember it.

MR. : It is the last hijacking--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I knew.

MR. : --where the National Air Space System responded.

MR. BELGER: I knew it had been a long time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know, to the extent that you talk about the threat being focused fundamentally overseas, that's one issue, I understand that, obviously, it speaks for itself; but then, you said also to the extent that hijacks were considered still as a threat that summer, it was based on the traditional paradigm of, you know, hostages or ransom?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that still focused overseas or was there any information on threats that summer regarding a potential domestic hijack, but based on the traditional model?

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MR. BELGER: Well, you can go back and look at the information circulars and answer that question, specifically. But my recollection was that a couple of the circulars, you know, in 2001 or even earlier--even the year before. Generally, I'm sure you're seen all those circulars--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. BELGER: You guys ought to look at them, I mean, you really ought, you know, if you're going to ask this detailed a question, you really ought to look at them. Because they're very specific in terms of what they say. Many of them there's a comment paragraph, that's just kind of an FAA comment that says, you know, we have no specific information that there's a threat within domestic air space. Or we have no specific information there's a threat against U.S. carriers or whatever the comment was. So, you have to--you gotta really look at each one of them and see--

MR. : Team seven is in detail and I don't want you to think that we're not, we on the Commission are not addressing it--we--

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MR. BELGER: I understand, it's just that it's hard to answer those types of questions without really looking at the document itself and seeing what was the information that was passed and what was the comment or what were the comments?

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a fair question, but I think we were trying to get a sense, in a much more general nature of whether or not your reflections at the time equaled--leading up to it and in the aftermath of 9/11, whether your reflections on the events were, well, there was a heightened awareness this summer. Or that there wasn't, wow, this came out of left field because this seemed to be no different than any other summer.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, my understanding when I tried to reach is that the information circulars that summer, I believe I know that the few certainly, like August to September 11, I'm less familiar with the July, there were two during that time frame, one dealt with heightened security on flights that Salman Rushdie was on.

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MR. BELGER: Okay.

MS. HYDE: And the other dealt with
Pakistani--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MS. HYDE: --Americans in Asia,

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MS. HYDE: --were very, very specific.

MR. BELGER: Well, that's consistent with
what I said.

MS. HYDE: There was nothing and I think
you probably know these facts better than we do.
There was nothing at all about a terrorist group,
let alone a terrorist group--

MR. BELGER: Well, I'll tell you what,
let's get the circulars and look at them.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall anything?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm

MS. HYDE: And I guess I can do that.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think I do, yeah.
Let's get them and look at the circulars for 2001.

MS. HYDE: For the summer

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

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MS. HYDE: I will try to do that.

MR. BELGER: Whatever you think the
circular

MS. HYDE: Then we can come back to this.

MR. BELGER: I mean, that's not a--I'm not
trying to play games, I mean, they are what they
are. I mean, they're there, and you can look at
them and see what was said, I mean, it's not, you
don't have to rely on what I think they said.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: I mean, they're there and
what they said is what they said.

MS. HYDE: And you can rest assured that
that will be done, for purposes of this
conversation and, as you can imagine from a
scheduling perspective, we don't want to have you
have to come back here again for another
conversation.

MR. BELGER: I appreciate that.

MS. HYDE: Unfortunately, we are in the
winding down days--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

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MS. HYDE: --and each team has more interviews to do than there are hours in the day. So, for purposes of this conversation and to keep the schedule, we went ahead knowing that John and I are not particularly well, versed in the circulars. And hoping that you would sort of help us out in telling us what they say.

MR. BELGER: Okay, I mean, I think I have, I mean, I think I characterized what I thought they said. And I do think there were some in the 2001 time frame, I don't know if it was summer or spring or--

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: --or that made reference to the potential for terrorist activities, again, fundamentally overseas.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: But I mean, that's a very straightforward factual thing to just look at them and see what they said.

MS. HYDE: So, we look at them and see what they say, outside of what they say, and, as I

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understand the process was, you didn't necessarily sign off on them before they went out and that you would be informed of them after they did go out.

MR. BELGER: Or at the time they went out.

MS. HYDE: You don't recall any briefings on a heightened terrorist threat that summer; you don't recall any specific meetings on a heightened terrorist threat; you don't recall having the White House--a meeting at the White House that, you know, Canavan would have informed you had happened that he had attended or that you attended or any knowledge.

You don't recall having any knowledge of the information that was in the President's PDB which was specific to preparation to hijackings, and domestic activity. And I want to make sure that I'm summarizing all this. And my impression is because I think you've assiduously avoided using the word heightened, pointing out that it was my word and I didn't mean to put that word in your mouth.

Your impression is that my impression from

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our conversation about that summer in general and how that compared with other periods of intel and threats that you experienced in your career, is that you don't know and you can't compare it to other times. So you can't say whether you thought it was heightened or about the same or less even.

MR. BELGER: I mean, look, Dana, all I can tell you is that there were a number of information circulars that went out that year. They characterized as best the FAA could what the threat to aviation was based upon the information that the FAA had. Now, clearly, you know, the FAA didn't have all of the intelligence information that you guys might be uncovering. You know the FAA got what was relevant--

MS. HYDE: We're trying to figure out what the FAA had and what I'm saying is did the FAA have anything that wasn't reflected in those circulars, to your knowledge?

MR. BELGER: Not to my knowledge.

MS. HYDE: So, if the circulars don't say it, then the FAA didn't have it.

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MR. BELGER: To my--they didn't have it or they weren't permitted to say it.

MS. HYDE: Do you have any knowledge that the latter--

MR. BELGER: No, no, no, I'm just saying that could be a condition, given by the intelligence organizations that you can't pass this information on.

MS. HYDE: Okay, but, in terms of internally--

MR. BELGER: I have no knowledge of that.

MS. HYDE: --as a leader of the FAA the Deputy, did you know of anything, any constraints that were placed on the FAA about knowledge that they had that they couldn't--

MR. BELGER: I have no specific knowledge.

MS. HYDE: Do you have any general knowledge?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I mean, that happens all the time. I mean, there's a general. You know, sometimes it's sanitized and you can't use the raw material that's provided. So, sometimes it

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has to be cleared through the originating organization in terms of what you can pass on in an unclassified way.

MS. HYDE: So, in the summer of 2001, was it ever brought to your attention that there was threat information that that restriction was--

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: --being placed on the FAA disseminating it?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: There's one way you characterized what I had said, that I would say a little bit different.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: I mean, I did have, you made it kind of sound like we never talked to security, which is just the opposite of what I was saying. We talked to the Security folks, got information from them and talked to them almost on a daily basis. I do remember some, you know, discussions about, along with the information circulars, about

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terrorist organizations and those types of things.

But to answer the question as specifically as you asked it, I can't recall any specificity of a particular meeting.

MS. HYDE: Well, why don't you tell me about the conversations that you do remember

MR. BELGER: I think I just did, I mean, that's all I know. I remember a short briefing that actually Admiral Flynn gave at one of our staff meetings, about the status of one of the terrorist groups and I don't even remember which one it was.

MS. HYDE: From that summer and General Canavan took over from Admiral Flynn before the summer, right, earlier in the year?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, sometime early in 2001, I think yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember any of those conversations, I won't call them briefings, I won't call them meetings, any conversations with General Flynn or General--

MR. BELGER: Canavan?

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MS. HYDE: --Canavan, about--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember any specific ones, no, no, I don't.

MS. HYDE: Well, why don't we move on and then, we can double back to the circulars.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, just one other issue I want to discuss before we get to the data. Was there any in the year or two preceding 9/11, were there any hijack drills or training at the, let's say, the headquarters level of the walk in the air Aviation Crisis Center level where, you know, they drilled down, on, okay, here's a mock hijack comes in, how do we set up the Command Center and open the lines of communication to see if everything works, you know, test the plumbing-type of think for a lack of a better description.

MR. BELGER: I don't remember the timing, but there were, periodically, national hijack-type of exercises that involved multi-agencies. I don't remember if one was done in 2001 or 2000, but there were multi-agencywide exercises. It's also possible, I don't remember, but it's also possible

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that our Security groups might have had their own exercise or--I just don't remember the timing.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, we know there were some multi-agency ones, in fact, I might as well ask you while we're on this subject, about, there was one, apparently, in the mid to late '90s, loose Twin Star, it was a hijacked training exercise. It was live, they had actually simulated it.

They got an aircraft from an airline company that the airline said you can use the aircraft. And FAA people volunteered to be passengers on the hijacked aircraft. Do you remember that?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember it specifically, but over the years, I know those things have occurred. I mean, that's not the first time, probably, that that's happened. So, I don't remember specifically.

MR. AZZARELLO: We learned from the field at the facility level that they had various hijack drills as part of their regular training.

MR. BELGER: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: You know, they go to a screen and it simulates

MR. BELGER: Right, right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm interested now more within the FAA, leaving out the other agencies--

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. : --was the hijack protocol, exercised at the upper level management at FAA headquarters? Meaning, what does the Security folks do; what do the upper executive management level do?

MR. BELGER: Good question and that's going to lead me to talk about the future, if I can for a minute.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Again, I don't remember a specific testing within the FAA, That doesn't mean it wasn't done in the months preceding 9/11. But, you know, it's time to start talking about the future. When I retired, one of the things that was high on my priority list. Actually, I mentioned this in my first interview with you all's

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compatriots is that prior to 9/11, in my opinion, the management and the response protocols between the FAA the DOD and the FBI, fundamentally, those three, were very well established. I mean, there were memorandums of understanding between the FAA Administrator and the FBI Director; it was clear who had decision authority between the FAA and the FBI; it was kind of clear when you brought the military in and whether it was the FBI's decision or the FAA Administrator's decision, depending on whether the aircraft was in flight or not in flight. And there was a definition of that.

Excuse me, a legal definition of that. And I don't know, I hope, my concerns are--I hope my concerns are overflowed. But I don't know if that type of specificity exists today. I mean, the DOD has a much bigger role, obviously. You've got a whole new organization TSA, the FAA's role is greatly diminished.

The FBI's role, in my opinion, is diminished from what it used to be. And talking about demonstrations and tests and exercising the

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system, I would hope that one of your all's recommendations would be that those key agencies start doing that pretty regularly. And that it gets funded and done in a pretty, you know, a pretty formal and sophisticated way.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me, just tell you what we're sort of, you know, going through and interviewing some people, obviously, from headquarters. And I'm not getting the sense that there was any specific training or drilling at headquarters and I don't want to come to that conclusion unfairly or inaccurately.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and I don't remember any.

MR. AZZARELLO: If there were, would that be the type of thing that would be brought to your attention as a Deputy Administrator, if there was a hijack training exercise that involved the upper level of headquarters management at your--

MR. BELGER: Yes, yeah, I think it would have been, yeah.

MR. : In terms of a report to

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you, maybe, the drill that this is the result--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, again, I don't remember any of those, but I think it would have been brought to my attention, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Well, I'm glad to let you decide. Can you comment on those division of responsibility prior to 9/11? Specifically, we hear a lot from DOD that FAA ha the lead on hijacking. And I think the paper bears that out to be true.

MR. BELGER: Correct.

MS. HYDE: And I believe even between FAA and the FBI there--FAA ha the lead until aircraft was on the ground and there was some determination made that--

MR. BELGER: It was no longer in flight.

MS. HYDE: It was no longer in flight and that there was an actual threat and that the FBI would sort of switch to be the agency on point?

MR. BELGER: That's generally right.

MS. HYDE: So, in either scenario, it's not DOD, it's a law enforcement issue with the FAA

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in charge, while the aircraft's in flight?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: I'm trying to understand why that division?

MR. BELGER: Okay, I can explain that. You have to go back to the 1980s. There were a couple of situations, hijackings, I think, down in Florida

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: In which law enforcement took action, including the FBI, took action which put the aircraft in more jeopardy than it was otherwise. In other words, they--one I remember, and I don't know the particulars other than just to tell you this. The tires were shot out as the aircraft was departing.

There were other instances where law enforcement was just kind of off doing their thing without regard for the consequences to the aircraft from a safety standpoint.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: So, actually, I think this

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was--I think it was actually by law, by legislation, I believe--I might be wrong, but I believe it was through legislation that the Congress came to the conclusion that a hijacked aircraft is an aircraft in distress.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: And it's fundamentally a safety issue, while that issue is in flight. And there was a definition of in-flight, which basically, if I remember right, said from the time the doors close for departure until it's open and the passengers are free to leave. That might not be precisely, but something like that.

And, so, given the act that it was an aircraft in distress and it was safety factors involved, there was an agreement that the FAA Administrator would be in charge during the time that the aircraft was in flight. And the FBI being in charge after the aircraft was no longer in flight.

MS. HYDE: And is that a role that the FAA advocated in that legislative process? I mean, is

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that the role that the FAA wanted?

MR. BELGER: I wasn't involved at that time, so I don't know. I can't answer that. I don't know. I was a lowly inspector in Tampa, Florida, at that time. But it worked pretty well from the early '80s an the legislation was then followed up by MOUs between the FAA and the FBI and the roles were kind of--

MS. HYDE: And when did DOD get in the picture to the extent it was included in those MOUs?

MR. BELGER: When requested by either the FAA or the FBI.

MS. HYDE: And, I guess, that's what the paper says. I was wondering why--do you have any understanding of how DOD, because it seemed to be an FAA/FBI issue up till then. How was DOD brought in, but what was the thinking behind bringing DOD in at all into the situation?

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean, I can answer that maybe by giving you some scenarios.

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

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MR. BELGER: First of all, when there was a hijacking, the DOD would have been brought into the communication net immediately, I mean, they were part of the team managing the incident. If the FAA wanted DOD, for example, to send up aircraft to follow a hijacked aircraft, they would have requested DOD to do that. If the FBI, on the other hand, needed DOD assistance for whatever they were planning to do, you know, they would request it.

MS. HYDE: So, then DOD was always considered to be a player that the role of DOD was unlike what needed to be ironed out between the FAA and the FBI?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: The role of DOD was always static, which is upon request?

MR. BELGER: If needed, they would respond.

MS. HYDE: If needed, respond and respond in a way that would simply monitor, i.e., they've got the assets, get the asset up, but not take any

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other action.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: To your knowledge, prior to September 11, was there ever a hijack situation that contemplated DOD playing a different role than--

MR. BELGER: You mean like shoot-down?

MS. HYDE: --and monitoring, yeah.

MR. BELGER: No, not to my knowledge.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, conversely, were there hijacking situations where DOD was not requested. As I read the protocols that were in effect, the DOD could be requested to escort but not necessarily--

MR. BELGER: That's right and, again, it depends on the situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall any hijack instances back in the hey-days when DOD was not called upon?

MR. BELGER: Well, I suspect there were a lot of them, you know, depending if it was a 25-minute flight from Miami to Cuba, I don't think

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DO would have been requested to do anything. But on the flip side, I remember a 1976 or something like that. The first real kind of terrorist hijack in the U.S. the Croatian hijacking that went from Chicago to Gander to Paris and London, the DOD followed that aircraft into Canadian airspace. And, you know, it would depend on the situation.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then turned it over to the Canadians, presumably?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: You remember, I guess, conversely, you don't remember any other incident pre-9/11, where the DOD was asked to perform a role other than just tracking and monitoring an aircraft pre-9/11, other than what's laid out sort of in the protocol?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall other than those types of requests that you just said.

MR. AZZARELLO: Tracing, Identifying.

MR. BELGER: Monitoring.

MR. AZZARELLO: Monitoring.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, visual contact. Yeah,

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do you remember, well, also, I'll check. Remember the golfer?

MR. AZZARELLO: Payne Stuart?

MS. HYDE: Payne Stuart.

MR. BELGER: It wasn't a hijacking, but the military went up and followed that airplane.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it, just so I understand correctly, did you say, though, that the DOD would, even in pre-9/11, whenever there's a hijacking situation unfolding, they would be brought into the loop as someone to at least monitor, tune in--

MR. BELGER: They were always a part of the communications.

MR. AZZARELLO: Oh, is that right, okay.

MR. : And with that background and understanding, then as we move into 9/11 and we look at the escort of hijacked aircraft protocols, there is established in here and at some point it was established, the role of the hijacking coordinator. Do you recall when that role was established and where in the headquarters it was to

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reside?

MR. BELGER: I mean, since 1970, there's been somebody coordinating, you know, the management of the situation. So, I mean somebody's been in charge,

MR. : But somebody below the role of the Administrator or Deputy Administrator?

MR. BELGER: Oh yeah, I don't ever recall it being the Administrator or the Deputy Administrator.

MS. HYDE: Oh but then, we talking about the protocol designating that thou shalt have a position, so to speak.

MR. : Right and whose profit line or whose dollar line does it belong?

MR. BELGER: Well, I don't know, I'm not quite sure I understand. I mean, obviously, it would ha been security. Bank in the early days ACS-1 was the manager of security incidents. That changed over the years as the organization got bigger and grew when there was a director of operations and those types of things, but there was

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always a senior Security person.

MR. : And do you recall when that responsibility was fixed in the ACS that the term hijack coordinator came into being?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MR. : Is it your recollection that it was usually always a Security person?

MR. BELGER: That?

MR. : Was always a hijack coordinator?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, yeah, I can't ever remember a situation where it was--

MR. : I mean, maybe you can help us out with this, I mean.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : It's the '76 Para Military operations order.

MR. BELGER: Is that an Air Traffic Order?

MR. : My understanding is that it is.

MR. : Chapter 7, Crisis--

MR. : No, that's not the crisis,

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I guess it's the '76 [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: I'm just thinking is it a Security order or is it an Air Traffic order?

MS. HYDE: Air Traffic.

MR. BELGER: Okay, that's what--I thought the 7600 was an Air Traffic, okay. Okay, so this is not what we were talking about. This is not security.

MR. : Right but it's also got a hijack coordinator.

MR. BELGER: Within Air Traffic?

MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: Okay, got you.

MR. : Well, it's a little confusing because if you look at the 7.11--

MR. BELGER: Okay, so this is what I was--this is the FAA hijack coordinator.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Which would be a Security person, a director, this would be Canavan.

MR. : That's Canavan.

MR. BELGER: That's Canavan.

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MR. : Or his designee.

MR. BELGER: And I think on 9/11, it was, I forget the guy's name, the hijack coordinator which would be ACS-1 or his designee on duty, Washington headquarters, request military [unintell.]

MR. : And then it talks about, right here what the escort service when the DOD would be requested by the coordinator directly from the military command.

MR. BELGER: Right, okay, right.

MR. : And then it talks about the NMCC authorizing direct coordination between the FAA and the designated military unit.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : So putting the field operations level--

MR. BELGER: Right directly together, right, through the NMCC.

MR. : Right, this is, I guess we've been struggling with, I guess, on sort of the definitional basis is they call this individual the

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director of Office of Civil Aviation security.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And this is sort of the start, given us by the FAA, in terms of the positions held on 9/11 and the designations of the offices.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Now, I'm having trouble equating the Director of--

MR. BELGER: This.

MR. : --okay, so it's synonymous with the associate Administrator?

MR. BELGER: Yes, the date of this is 2003?

MS. HYDE: No that was pulled off the Internet.

MR. BELGER: Oh, okay, I'm sorry, so I don't know what the date is.

MR. : That was one that was in effect on September--

MR. : We believe this was the one that was in effect and most of the people, of

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all the people we have asked that they believe that this was the one in effect.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay.

MR. : Is it that this lag, in other words, that lagged sort of the reorganization?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, this reorganization, with which we started calling, Security Associate Administrator was probably a 96, I'm not sure, '96, '97, something like that; maybe, even, '95, I'm not certain.

But prior to that, it could have been '94, '95--prior to this designation, this person was called the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation security. It was an office.

MR. : So, Canavan's position--

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : --pre [unintell.] organization, he was the director?

MR. BELGER: Right, so my guess is, I don't know, but my guess is when this order was written, this was accurate, it was the director--

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MS. HYDE: [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: It was not updated to keep track with the organizational title, would be my guess.

MR. : Now, the question on that is the designee, is he, is that something, if you know, is that done, like, formally, was there an internal memo sent around that actually designates, you know, Mr. X or Ms. X, as the hijack coordinator? How would that become through upper management?

MR. BELGER: It could have been, I don't know how, exactly they did it but it could have been done two different ways in my view. One, probably he designated someone, ou know, to have the watch, to be there ot manage an incident, should it occur. Then they probably had procedures if that person was incapacitated or for some reason couldn't be there. They probably had a kind of a hierarchy of who's next in line. [

I remember a situation, I hate to tell you guys all these old stories, 1975, again, when I was

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a staff specialist in the headquarters on a Friday afternoon and there was a hijacking and I was like the 10th guy on the list and I ended up being the coordinator.

MS. HYDE: Is it the situation that's not only a paper, you know, it's not like every day when someone goes away from a weekend or is out on live, but says, okay, today you've got the designation. It's basically the senior person within ACS.

MR. BELGER: I don't know exactly how they did it, but it could have been just as you said.

MS. HYDE: Your example sort of shows that reality is--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, Friday afternoon at 6:00 o'clock and I'm the only one there, so I was the coordinator until--

MS. HYDE: You're now the coordinator.

MR. BELGER: --the senior folks came back in.

MR. : Lynne Osmus told us, and she was the hijack coordinator for the Lufthansa

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hijacking--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --she told us, traditionally, and we're trying, with your help to get where this tradition started. The tradition really evolved to the AC-01 position.

MR. BELGER: That's generally right, I think. Like I said when the organization got big enough to have a director of operations and, which are the AC-01, right. That's consistent with my thought.

MR. : And Lynne, in fairness to her, recalled that happening, but she couldn't recall if there was a piece of paper of some specificity that designated the AC-01 as the hijack coordinator.

MR. : But you would expect it to fall, if it went down the sort of chain of command, to fall in the ACO more than the ACI?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, operations, yeah. And you want the intelligence folks off doing their thing, not managing the

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situation. That's my opinion. You want them helping to get intelligence.

MR. : Monte, I'm retired military, so let me just put it in plain simple military terms. If that were a military chart, ACI would be the J-2 or the G-2 and the ACO would be the G-3 or the J-3.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And the three always run the operations, the Intel is the supporter does that make sense?

MR. BELGER: That's the way I see it, yeah, yeah. You want the Intel folks not burdened by managing the situation, you want them off--

MR. : Feeding the information.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. : Do you recall who the AC-01 was on September 11?

MR. BELGER: Well, I was trying to think of his name.

MR. : We're going to help you in a minute.

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MS. HYDE: We--well,

MR. BELGER: Lee Longmire

MS. HYDE: Lee Longmire.

MR. BELGER: Lee Longmire, yeah, I think Lee was the person who was running the show. Yeah. Well, I hope that helps.

MR. : Well, would that be, I guess, would that be the person, let's say as the hijack event unfolded, the hijack coordinator or the AC-01 be it Lee Longmire or anyone else for that matter, would that be the person that, as events unfolded at headquarters, you wanted to go to get an operational picture or snapshot of where we are at, you know. Give me a briefing. Was that the guy you would go--

MR. BELGER: I would go directly to that person, absolutely, like I did that morning, absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, let's go to 9/11, the day of. And sort of tell us how you--when you came to work and when you first realized that morning that there was a an issue with an aircraft

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being in jeopardy in the system?

MR. BELGER: Well, I usually got to work about 7:00 a.m. or a few minutes before 7:00. So I assume that day was no different. It was a very typical morning. I think we had a meeting with our Air Traffic folks that morning, as we generally did on a Tuesday morning, just kind of a summary of where we are and, you know, what the issues were and just kind of a general status meeting with the Air Traffic people.

I think, during that meeting--my recollection is--during that meeting, Jeff Griffith got a page or a call and I don't remember exactly what he said, but he said he got a page and there was an aircraft that had lost transponder contact. So, he stepped out to go see what that issue was.

I think the meeting ended, I think I went to the men's room and probably got a cup of coffee. It was a few minutes--I think it was a few minutes after the first aircraft had hit the World Trade Center that I was walking back into my office.

Shirley Miller met me at the door and said

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an aircraft has just hit the World Trade Center and we immediately walked into the Operations Center which is right across the hallway from my office. And I went to the position where Lee was, right up in the front of the room and was looking at the television monitor and started to get status reports and started to monitor what was going on.

MS. HYDE: Just stepping back to Jeff, your recollection of what ever notice he got during the meeting. Is it that the aircraft had lost--was there any news about a hijack?

MR. BELGER: No. All I remember him saying was the transponder.

MS. HYDE: So, when you saw the first hit, you had no knowledge of a hijacking?

MR. BELGER: No, absolutely not.

MS. HYDE: When did you first learn about that there was a hijacking being reported?

MR. BELGER: I don't think that that dawned on me that that was even a possibility until the second aircraft hit.

MS. HYDE: Well, stepping back, we know

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that early on, there was a [unintell.] walk information of the hijacking in the Northeast and even set up a call between the region and security. Did any of that news filter up to your level?

MR. BELGER: What time did they do that?

MS. HYDE: 8:25, 8:30, before the first hit.

MR. BELGER: Okay, no.

MS. HYDE: Did any of this news about, there was a hijacking in the Northeast out of Boston, Boston's starting up the phones on--

MR. BELGER: No, let me put the timing in perspective I think. It was, 10 till 9:00 or maybe even 5-minutes to 9:00 by the time I got back and walked into the Operations Center.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: And the picture was on CNN. I had got a quick update from Lee and the folks in the room. The phone started ringing off the hook.

MR. BELGER: So, Longmire was already in the room?

MR. BELGER: I believe he was there, yes.

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MS. HYDE: But Longmire doesn't tell you, besides this burning tower, we've got news of a hijacking?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't remember any discussion about a hijacking. I mean, my--the thought--the discussion that we had when I was standing in the Operations Center was, jeeze, you know, could that be a general aviation aircraft? It doesn't look like the damage was big enough to be a commercial aircraft. And there was an incapacitated general aviation pilot, I didn't have any idea what happened.

So, it was just a matter of, probably less than 10 minutes before the second aircraft hit.

MS. HYDE: Backing up to you didn't have any idea what happened, so did you have the audio on for the news broadcast when you were watching it on CNN?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember if the audio was on or not.

MS. HYDE: And your view of the scene, just visual was that the smoke wasn't warning of a

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bigger aircraft? You're still thinking small?

MR. BELGER: That was what I thought.

MS. HYDE: And the person that you're speaking to, when you're in the--so you walked into the WALK [ph], actually or--

MR. BELGER: We walked in here--

MS. HYDE: --an then you'd gone over to the ATC?

MR. BELGER: --right, this is where--Lee was--

MS. HYDE: And Lee's giving you an update?

MR. BELGER: I think it was Lee, I believe it was Lee.

MR. : And so you didn't stay in the WALK?

MR. BELGER: No, like I said, I went immediately to the Operations Center--as you see here, Security Operations--

MS. HYDE: Do you recall who--are you sure that Lee was there?

MR. BELGER: I'm not positive. I remember during the morning he was pretty much there, I

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don't know if he was there at that time.

MS. HYDE: So, you're not positive it was Lee who sort of informed you. Do you recall any of the other people?

MR. BELGER: The room was--there were quite a few people in the room.

MS. HYDE: Your sense at that phase was that there was quite a few Security people?

MR. BELGER: Oh, there were, yeah.

MS. HYDE: But you don't--

MR. : So when you say Longmire briefed you, it might not have been that early, it might have been later, you mentioned that Longmire briefed you but--

MR. BELGER: Well, I walked in, I started talking to people, what's going on? You know, whoever's there, I'm talking to; I'm trying to find out what the hell's going on.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: There's no formal briefing.

MS. HYDE: Right, and then what the hell's going on, nobody says we've got, we've had a

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hijacking? You don't--

MR. BELGER: I was in there for two minutes, maybe.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: Then the phone starts ringing and I'm back in my office, talking to Air Traffic to see what they knew.

MS. HYDE: So, the phone starts ringing--

MR. BELGER: The secretary's--

MR. : Was that back in your office or the in the ACC--

MR. BELGER: --no, in my office which is right here, right across the hallway--

MR. : Okay.

MS. HYDE: So somebody pulls you back in your office because you've got a phone call?

MR. BELGER: I don't know if I had a phone call or if I just went back to call Air Traffic.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. : Who would you have called at Air Traffic?

MR. BELGER: Probably Jeff.

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MR. : Air Traffic was not in--

MR. BELGER: They probably never picked up
the phone.

MR. : Right down the hall--

MR. BELGER: Yeah--

MR. : They were not represented
in the Air--in the Aviation Crisis Center at that
time?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, don't
remember, they could have been, could very well,
have been, they've got a desk there. So, an then
there was, I mean, the Secretary's Office started
calling to get status reports. I had several
discussions, I think the second airplane hit at
what, 9:0--

MR. : 9:03.

MR. BELGER: --:03, okay, so, probably
less than 10 minutes after I had initially walked
into the Operations Center. And I was actually on
the phone with John Flaherty when the second
aircraft hit. I didn't see the second aircraft
hit. I don't remember seeing that until 2:00 or

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3:00 o'clock the following morning, when I was home to take a shower.

MS. HYDE: So you go back to your office to talk to try and get the Air Traffic people. Do you remember, did you reach anybody or you just called down there and you're not sure who you talked to?

MR. BELGER: I talked to a million on that day, literally, I mean--

MS. HYDE: Okay, but you remember you were on the phone with John Flaherty when the second aircraft hit?

MR. BELGER: And the reasons I remember that is, I didn't see it. I remember him saying a second aircraft has just hit. And, like I said, I didn't even see that replay until the following morning.

MS. HYDE: And had he--had the Secretary's Office, was he the person that--

MR. BELGER: I spoke with him, I talked to the Secretary; I talked to Michael Jackson, I talked to some of the staff people over there.

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MS. HYDE: And was the Administrator calling over to you, as well?

MR. BELGER: She was, she was over in the Secretary's office in a meeting. I talked to her about that same time, also.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. And they're all calling you saying what's going on?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: And at this point, you know what's being reported on television, you don't know of anything about a hijacking.

MR. BELGER: I'm not even sure I knew what was reporting on television. I'm telling you, I was in here for, like two or three minutes and then went back to my office to--

MS. HYDE: So, in this two or three minute conversation or brief or whatever you describe it, what did you learn?

MR. BELGER: Airplanes hit the World Trade Center.

MS. HYDE: That's it?

MR. BELGER: That's it.

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MS. HYDE: Nothing about hijacking?
Nothing about terrorism?

MR. BELGER: Uh-uh.

MS. HYDE: Nothing about commercial
airplanes? If anything your impression, I believe
you said was that small because was that because of
the size of the hole?

MR. BELGER: That was the discussion we
were having, yeah.

MR. : So, your Security folks
didn't have any--no mention of the reports that
were coming in even from the American Airlines
calling in from the field facilities about American
Airline representative Bob Moreno even called in
and said they thought one of the stewardesses was
stabbed and people were in control of the cockpit?
None of that--none of that flowed up to--

MR. BELGER: Not in those two to three
minutes.

MR. : In that early time.

MR. BELGER: Not in those two or three or
less than five minutes--

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MS. HYDE: Right, so before the second, if you isolate the second plane being hit, which is you recall you were back on the phone and you may have talked to some of these people and were on the phone with Flaherty. So, up until the point of the second aircraft being hit, you, from the head of the FAA, don't know anything about hijackings, about stewardess being stabbed, about anything other than an aircraft hit the World Trade Center?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Which is what everybody's seeing on television?

MR. BELGER: Right, right. Doesn't mean that there weren't 84 people trying to get to me to tell me that in those two or three minutes.

MS. HYDE: Well, the aircraft was hijacked about 8:15 and the conference call was set up around 8:25 so, I'm not wanting to limit the question to the two or three minutes, I'm saying at any point up until we know 9:03--

MR. BELGER: No, like I said, I didn't have any indication until I walked back to my

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office, which was 10-till 9:00, 5-till 9:00 something like that, had absolutely no idea.

MS. HYDE: And then, all you had indication was what was evident from the television?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: So none of this information within Security and the FAA and the Centers and all of this, none of that got to you?

MR. BELGER: No, no, no.

MS. HYDE: When do you recall the first time you heard of news about any hijacking of one aircraft, two aircraft?

MR. BELGER: I think after the second aircraft hit, which was, like, 9:03, my recollection is, I went back into the Operations Center and started talking in more detail with people and that's when this information started being made available to me. And I think about that same time, Jane was on her way--the Administrator was on her way back, also.

So, then we started getting more detailed

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information from the Duty Officer, from the Security people and from Air Traffic.

MS. HYDE: So you're right up to this point that you've seen or not seen, you know, you've been told of the second hit?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MS. HYDE: The second tower.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Go back into the Ops Center or to the ATC?

MR. BELGER: We were back and forth.

MS. HYDE: Back and forth in-between the two?

MR. BELGER: Back and forth here in my office the phone's ringing off the hook, you know, it's trying to go back into my office to take the calls with the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary just because it was a quieter place to talk

And it was right across the hallway.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: So we were on the phone almost constantly.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if, when you were on with Flaherty, you learned of the second aircraft, crash, did that, do you remember if that prompted you to quickly get off the phone, did you then go to get what information had been gained--

MR. BELGER: I think we both got off the phone pretty quickly. Yeah, I don't recall any detailed discussion after he said that to me. I think we pretty much both got off the phone.

MR. : And your mind set at that time was to go down and try to find out, am I correct, and I understand that that's when you said we're going to the WALK area, see what else you could--

MR. BELGER: That's when I walked back over, right, to find out what was going on.

MS. HYDE: So, what are your thoughts about, when you walk back over, who did you talk to or what did you learn?

MR. BELGER: I talked to everybody I cd.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

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MR. BELGER: That's when I started learning that there were, you know, the potential of a hijacking, the potential, the problems with the second aircraft that hit. We started getting, through Air Traffic reports of other aircraft that might have been in distress.

We started getting all kinds of reports coming in that were some strange and we just started trying to manage through all of that and find out what was fact and what was fiction.

MS. HYDE: What was the process you started to manage through all that, who was doing what?

MR. BELGER: Well, you know, the Security person here--

MS. HYDE: Who you think was Lee?

MR. BELGER: Lee was, I'm not sure if he was there 100 percent of the time, but I do remember that Lee was the senior person, yeah. He was kind of running the net. He--

MS. HYDE: Do you know that he had the net up at this time?

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MR. BELGER: He had a net up.

MS. HYDE: When you went back after learning of the second crash?

MR. BELGER: I think so, I mean, there were a lot of people there they were all talking, so I gotta assume they've got a net up.

MS. HYDE: So, I'm trying to understand if you knew that or it's an assumption that you made?

MR. BELGER: That's an assumption I made, I mean, I didn't ask is the net up? I mean, i that was just operating it was functioning.

MS. HYDE: You knew he was on the phone, so the assumption was the net, he was talking through the net.

MR. BELGER: He was talking to airlines, he was talking to airports, he was talking to people that I would normally assume would be on the net. Can't tell you I asked specifically, is the net up? It's just kind of routine that it is.

MR. : Do you recall either Jeff Griffith or Doug Davis sitting next to him up there on the dais, do you recall who else was on the dais

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with Lee?

MR. BELGER: No, I mean, people were in and out, at one point I ran people out there were so many people in there. I literally, got upset and said, get the hell out of here if you don't need to be here. I mean, we just had too many people in there. I mean, so there were people in and out constantly, in and out of here constantly. In and out of my office constantly. In and out of, well those were the three primary places I was.

I mean, it was constant, you know, talking to people and trying to figure out what was going on.

MR. : Did you get into this area at all, in Bill Peacock's arena and what he had set up down there with Dave Cannoles?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I don't, I mean, I knew they were down there. Actually, I don't think I had time to go down there until later in the afternoon.

MR. : But that morning, you don't think you got down there?

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MR. BELGER: I don't think so, I don't remember, I don't remember even having a minute or second to do anything other than talk to the Ops Center, talk to the Security folks, talk dot Jeff primarily as an Air Traffic interface and talking with the Secretary's office; talking with thousands of other people who were calling from the airlines, the airports.

MR. : You say Longmire was talking to people you expected to be at the airport, airlines, and stuff like that. Was it on a box or how do you know he's talking to the people that he would ordinarily talk to on the net? Is he telling you that? Is he taking a break to tell you that? Or is it on an open speaker or?

MR. BELGER: Well, there are some open speakers and you've got people talking back and forth. You know, the person sitting here says, I'm talking to American, Lee or I'm talking to United or i'm talking to DOD or whatever, I mean, it's kind of a--

MR. : So there's open

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communication, in the room--

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah.

MR. : --verbally, back and forth?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, you say, hey, Lee, I've got United what do you--do you need anything or--

MS. HYDE: When you think of "the" net what--and because you had said, talking to airports and airlines and people you'd expect to be on "the" net. Who, what is "the" net that you're referring to? Is it a net that involves airports and airlines and who else or is there something different? What do you have in mind?

MR. BELGER: Well, there, this is a technicality that I guess I learned, even after 9/11, so let me not answer it in terms of what I learned after 9/11.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Always, going back to the '70s, there was a reference in Security to two types of nets.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm

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MR. BELGER: The Tactical Net, which was kind of internal to Security, internal to FAA, I should say.

MS. HYDE: Right.

MR. BELGER: Internal to FAA. When you're trying to find out what the heck do we really have here? Do we need to get other agencies involved.

MS. HYDE: Within an agency, right.

MR. BELGER: An then, what's generally referred to, at least in my terminology is the Primary Net.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: At which time you bring in the other federal agencies and those were, typically, and they might even be described in an order, but they were typically the Secret Service, FBI, DOD, which would be the NMCC, generally as a point of contact.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: If it was a hijacking of a particular airline, obviously, that airline, if it was at an airport, obviously that airports; you'd

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get the primary Air Traffic facilities involved on that Primary Net. In other words if it was at an airport, you'd get the tower on that net and whoever needed to be in the loop in terms of communication, would be on what I call the Primary Net.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. : If I understand the interplay between the two and the evolution, so to speak of them, would you expect in an air emergency situation for the tact net to go up first to find out what's going on internally? Or is that not the assumption that I should make that it could be that the Primary Net goes up first?

MR. BELGER: Well, it could be, my answer to that would be depending on what do you know at the time. In other words, if your first information that you learn is I got a hijacked airplane squawking the hijack code and you know something kind of that definitive, then I think the coordinator should immediately implement the Primary Net.

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If it's another scenario saying, hey, we've got this airplane, we don't quite know what's going on and the Security folks need to talk within air traffic to find out what they've got going on, then you do the Tactical Net first.

MR. : So how [unintell.] on the day of it the Security folks who were involved in establishing the net if they were aware that there was a reported hijacking in the system and then there were reports of violence on-board, for example, then you would expect the Primary Net to go up sort of instantly?

MR. BELGER: That would have been my expectations.

MS. HYDE: Well, let's not talk--what do you know happened in terms of the nets being established on 9/11? Do you know if there was a Tactical Net established on 9/11?

MR. BELGER: I only know after the fact, you know, by reviewing the data.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so after the fact.

MR. BELGER: I gotta tell you, when all

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this was going on, the last think I was thinking about was, you know, which net did they have going--

MS. HYDE: So, what is--

MR. BELGER: --that was the last thing I was thinking about?

MS. HYDE: --why was that the lat thing you were thinking about?

MR. BELGER: Because I was talking to a million people and doing a thousand other things. And I'm assuming that they've got the right people on the nets. Because they always have been before.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so after the fact you learned that the Tactical Net was established?

MR. BELGER: Right about 10-minutes to 9:00, is that about right?

MS. HYDE: You know, I don't know the--I don't know.

MR. BELGER: I think--

MS. HYDE: What's your understanding of the--

MR. BELGER: My recollection of the logs

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that I saw was that the Tactical Net was requested by the Security folks and set up about 10-minutes to 9:00.

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

MR. BELGER: Which was a few minutes before I walked in.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm, and the Primary Net--your source is those logs that says that the Primary Net was set up about 9:20?

MR. BELGER: Right, right.

MS. HYDE: And on that morning, do you remember speaking to anyone who informed you or said, I've got the tact net or I've got the Primary Net?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MS. HYDE: So, from the morning, people were just feeding you substantive information and not really telling you--they must have in some conversations said a source for it, but you don't recall anyone saying this is from the Primary Net and this is from the tact net?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

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MR. : What do you recall about those two nets in relationship to the net that the Eastern ROC [ph] set up?

MR. BELGER: I don't know. I don't know what they were doing in the regions.

MR. : From your perspective, it would be intuitive for the ROC to set up it's own?

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, oh, absolutely, yes, definitely and for the regional Air Traffic people to set up their coordination; and for the regional Security people to set up their coordination, yeah.

MR. : And then that tie-in to the net you have established in the ACC, then would be on the tactical side since that's as opposed to the Primary Net?

MR. BELGER: Generally, the tactical side, like I said before, though, unless it was one of the primary facilities--

MR. : If it was a prime facility would then go over to get into world outside of FAA.

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MR. : Would it be protocol for the regions, the ROCs to set up both a Security net and Air Traffic net or do they merge those two?

MR. BELGER: They could have done it either way.

MR. : Either way. How about if you--if you could separate what you learned on the day of or in the aftermath.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : We know, in the aftermath, I guess, we learned that Dave Cannoles had a little telecon going down on his end that they called the Cannoles Telecon for lack of a better term or the Air Traffic Suite Telecon, which they now, let's solved evolved into the Den but there's a lot of people that want to say that the Den evolved from that or from some other people's ideas. But putting all that aside, when did you learn that Dave Cannoles had a sort of separate or a node of communication going on down at the other end of the --the East end, I guess, of the 10th floor?

MR. BELGER: Are you talking about down in

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Air Traffic?

MR. : Yeah, down in Air Traffic,
yeah.

MR. BELGER: Oh, well, I knew those folks
were together that morning, I don't know what time,
but I knew Air Traffic was having their
communications.

MR. : What did you think was,
this doesn't, because I don't have an understanding
in terms of not looking at the protocol is not
something that I see in any crisis management
handbook or any other guidance in terms of what
role or function that would be expected to perform
those folks down there if they were running it
properly.

What is your understanding of what
role--how did that fit in the overall information
gathering process?

MR. BELGER: Well, my understanding was,
like I said, I didn't really go down there, I think
until the early afternoon. But they were--my
understanding was that they were talking--they,

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down here in Air Traffic, were talking to the Command Center, the Air Traffic folks out at the Command Center in Herndon.

And they were probably talking to some of the field facilities, getting, you know, Air Traffic, what's the word I'm looking for, Air Traffic-specific type of information. You know, within their organization, which, I think kind of is not an abnormal thing to do.

MR. : Are they getting specific Air Traffic information.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Let me step back a minute on that point, on Air Traffic. Now you had the Command Center out there, which is sort of a focal point, if you will, for real time information--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --because they're talking to the people that have the scopes, they have their own TSD display?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And as they look back up

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to headquarters, where is their primary responsibility for reporting? To Dave Cannoles down in his suite or to the Aviation Crisis Center? Or are they reporting to both places?

MR. BELGER: Both. They should have been, you know, tied into the communications here in the on the net and I see absolutely nothing wrong within their organizational chain of command, also talking to the folks here.

MR. : And within headquarters, now, just reflect back on September 11, 2001, within the Aviation Crisis Room, bill Peacock's office, your own office, and General Canavan's suite down on the third floor--

MR. BELGER: Third floor, right.

MR. : --who had TSD displays?

MR. BELGER: The only one I'm aware of is in the Operations Center. Air Traffic might have had one, I don't know.

MR. : In the WALK, itself--

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : --as opposed to the ACC?

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MR. BELGER: I don't know, I don't remember if there was one in the ACC. I know there's one in the WALK, because I remember looking at it, after we'd made the decision to bring everything down and we could see the airspace clearing.

MR. : You remember seeing that in the WALK Center?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah.

MR. : And then you and Administrator Garvey did not have TSD in your complement.

MR. BELGER: No, I don't need to have--Jesus, the last thing they want me to do is start trying to copy airplanes.

MR. : Do you know if they had it in Air Traffic, for instance, or Bill Peacock?

MR. BELGER: I don't know.

MS. HYDE: That morning, do you remember somebody monitoring the TSD or feeding information from there?

MR. BELGER: I doubt it, I mean, it's not

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real time radar, you don't want to use it for that purpose.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: It's a delayed.

MS. HYDE: Delayed, that's what the Command Center has, so to the extent you're reaching out to the Command Center for their information, they've got the same think you've got sitting right there.

MR. BELGER: Right, but they are a heck of a lot better interpreting it than I am.

MS. HYDE: No, I'm not saying you, personally, but I'm saying I believe there were trained Air Traffic Controllers--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: --from Air Traffic--

MR. BELGER: But they would never use a TSD for precise location of an aircraft.

MS. HYDE: I understand the difference but to the extent that you're calling out to the Command Center for their knowledge about location of aircraft--

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MR. BELGER: Right. What I said was, now, no, no, don't. I said, after we made the decision--

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

MR. BELGER: --to bring everybody down--

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh.

MR. BELGER: --we were looking at the TSD to get a picture of how the airspace was clearing.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Nothing more precise than that.

MS. HYDE: So, when you're trying to figure out later on if there's an in-bound aircraft heading towards Washington, as reports were coming up be it whatever, you wouldn't use the TSD sitting in the WALK to see if you could see it?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: But you would call out to Herndon to try and ask them about it?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MS. HYDE: No, you wouldn't do either?

MR. BELGER: No, you'd rely on the

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facilities they have the real time radar there.

MS. HYDE: And the facilities are they linked into this net, all the facilities because this was a crisis involving many different facilities.

MR. BELGER: No, that's one of the reasons you have this communication down here is so these folks can talk directly--

MS. HYDE: So how are these people getting their information to the decision makers over here? If these are the guys who've got the real information--

MR. BELGER: Well, they're talking.

MS. HYDE: Well, this is as I've been told, is a long hallway and it's not like you sort of shout across the room, we've got three minutes out, two minutes out.

MR. BELGER: I'm missing our point. Ask me something, I'm missing our point, so.

MS. HYDE: I'm trying to understand in terms of crisis management--

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

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MS. HYDE: --with threatening planes that you now know are missiles.

MR. BELGER: Well, okay.

MS. HYDE: And understanding having two strikes and by now, let's just assume we've got the Pentagon under our belt, too. So we've got aircraft that are--

MR. BELGER: So, we'll narrow it to 9:40.

MR. : A part of the Pentagon being hit which was at 9:38.

MS. HYDE: Yeah, we could step back, but just so there's--

MR. BELGER: The Pentagon at 9:38, okay.

MS. HYDE: --no ambiguity that aircraft out there are threatening, some are compromised, they can be used to attack us. I'm trying to understand why not put somebody here so that you've got somebody over your shoulder telling you, obviously a trained Air Traffic Controller, not you or Shirley, but why not put a trained Air Traffic Controller here so that they can understand at least know.

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MR. BELGER: I'm relying, at that time, I'm relying on almost constant communication with the Air Traffic people.

MS. HYDE: So, now you're in constant communication with Air Traffic people so you're not walking down there, how are you?

MR. BELGER: I told you I didn't walk down there until later in the afternoon.

MS. HYDE: So you're talking to them on the phone?

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

MS. HYDE: And that's Dave Cannoles?

MR. BELGER: Dave, Jeff, most of my discussions were with Jeff.

MS. HYDE: Jeff says he was mostly over here.

MR. BELGER: Good. That's where I was, mostly.

MS. HYDE: Right, exactly and--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. BELGER: He's got one phone in his ear talking to these folks.

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MS. HYDE: So this is, they've got the important information, this is where you need to get your information from, the Air Traffic people?

MR. BELGER: In terms of the location or the activities of aircraft?

MS. HYDE: In terms of the threat that you now have buzzing about the skies, the reason you--

MR. BELGER: That's what I said, location.

MS. HYDE: That was the whole ball game, right.

MR. BELGER: Yes, it's got to originate from the controllers.

MS. HYDE: It's got to, right, it's got to originate from the Controllers, the whole ball game is, everybody's focused on what's going to hit us next, where's our next wayward aircraft coming, right?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: So you're not thinking about, you know what happened at the magnetometers in the airports,

MR. BELGER: Exactly.

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MS. HYDE: You're past that.

MR. BELGER: Exactly.

MS. HYDE: You've grounded your aircraft, the whole thrust of the crisis now is [unintell.] Air Traffic. So, all that information is coming from down here?

MR. BELGER: A lot of it is, it could have been coming directly into here. Could have been

MS. HYDE: Do you recall any source of that information--

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: --that you relied on from here?

MR. BELGER: There was an Air Traffic person in this room--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: --as there always is.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall who that was?

MR. BELGER: No, I have no idea, we were in and out there were different people during the day.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: I don't know who it was.

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Jeff was--would have been the leaders. There was a DOD person in this room

MS. HYDE: Who--

MR. BELGER: I don't know who it was.

MS. HYDE: There was a person

MR. BELGER: I remember seeing uniforms there in the morning. I don't know.

MR. : You only got a very few uniformed people, to draw on.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : And the senior person, we understand was Colonel Cheryl Atkins?

MR. BELGER: Cheryl, yeah.

MR. : Do you know Cheryl?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, sure, yeah.

MR. : She thought she was, actually if you flip this over, this is Bill Peacock's office, the conference room where Dave Cannoles sets it up and then the military, see right there where it says military.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay.

MR. : Cheryl thought she set up

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an additional conference room down here, but later in the day.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, could very well be.

MR. : Well, let me see if I can gain an understanding of so how the flow of information is coming in for Air Traffic situation warnings. You're trying to get your best. I assume that, and tell me if I'm wrong, I don't want to put words in your mouth. But I 'm assuming that after the second strike up in New York, you're trying to--you and your people here at the Crisis Center are trying to get as best they could of a real time picture of what's unfolding in Air Traffic.

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

MR. : And I guess what I need to know is you mentioned Command Center. And let me just step back and ask you did ou expect the Command Center to have a line of communication open to this room, the ACC Room?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think that was my expectation, yeah. I said, like, I said before, I

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expect them to have both.

MR. : Both?

MR. BELGER: Here--

MR. : Oh so you expected the
Command Center to have two lines?

MR. BELGER: That would have been my
expectation, right.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: The Air Traffic folks here,
the Air Traffic representative in the ACC
Operations Center, would have been talking to the
Command Center; they would have been talking to
Boston, New York or wherever else and, also, I
would have expected that from an Air Traffic
management standpoint, they're also talking to them
down here?

MS. HYDE: And that's your expectation.
Do you know that that was happening on the morning
of 9/11?

MR. BELGER: I know that it was happening
here.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

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MR. BELGER: And my expectation was it was happening here. I can't tell you that I heard them talking to them and I can't tell you I saw a transcript, but that's what they should have been doing.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. : And from your perspective, we understand we've been told consistently by everybody we talked to that none of those lines at either location were taped on 9/11?

MR. BELGER: I don't know.

MR. : Did our Administrator Garvey ascertain that at your level that there were no recorded conversations?

MR. BELGER: As far as I know, they were not recorded.

MR. : Is that something that you would have expected and is something that being on line with the communication center going into, perhaps Air Traffic and the Aviation Crisis Center, not from a written protocol, but just sort of a common-sense application of what they should be

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doing in a crisis situation?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think, you all tell me, if I'm wrong, but I think the Command Center, lines were recorded.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. : Yeah, from all

MR. BELGER: So I would expect that, I mean, that's kind of an operational ongoing precision facility but--

MR. : And we do understand that there was a line of communication open and I don't know if you were aware of it, between John White--do you know John White down at the Command Center?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. : He had an open line going from Command Center to, initially, Jeff Griffith.

MR. BELGER: Okay, that would make sense to me.

MR. : And do you know Doug Davis?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

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MR. : Okay, Doug was then asked to sit that phone and not get off the phone.

MR. BELGER: Okay

MR. : Do you know--do you remember where that was occurring, on the headquarters end, where would Doug and Jeff speak to John White.

MR. BELGER: I assume it was down here. I assume that was down here in the Air Traffic organization.

MS. HYDE: I'm going to have to leave for another interview in about 20 minutes. So, I wanted to go through a series of questions before I do.

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MS. HYDE: Specific to the SVTs that morning and your recollection of how you learned of the SVTs, when you first participated in the SVTs, could you speak a little bit to that?

MR. BELGER: Well, there were numerous--

MS. HYDE: Well, they're all happening in this room.

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MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Let's take SVTs as a facility in the other room.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, there were numerous, I don't remember what time they started, I mean, they were going on all day.

MS. HYDE: Uh-huh--and--

MR. BELGER: So it was myself, the Administrator, it was Jeff, Lynne, we would have been the primary people participating in this. I don't remember what time the first one was called, but they were going on, like all day long.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: No, they were going on for days.

MS. HYDE: Right. So, what is your first recollection of walking into the SVTs room.

MR. BELGER: I don't have a first, I mean, they were, they started and then they were kind of continuous. I mean it was a status, they generally, were call for I think for the White House. It could have been different people, but

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they were generally for the purpose of status, you know, what's going on, what do we have, what decisions. They were multi agency, it was, generally state.

MS. HYDE: I think I know, I generally know,

MR. BELGER: So, I don't, I mean, I can't--

MS. HYDE: I'm interested in any specific--you have no specific recollection about anything related to the SVTs? That is who the participants were, when in terms of sequence.

MR. BELGER: I just told you.

MS. HYDE: Okay, so that's general--

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MS. HYDE: --that morning you remember seeing--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MS. HYDE: --okay, the participants--

MR. BELGER: It's all day long, I mean, they were going on kind of regular.

MS. HYDE: And what is your recollection

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of the participants, DOD?

MR. BELGER: DOD.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: State.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: FBI.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Secret Service.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: FAA, DOT.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: White House, CIA. I can't tell you they were all on every one.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: But those were generally the people that were on those.

MS. HYDE: And who do you remember seeing from DOD?

MR. BELGER: I don't know their names.

MS. HYDE: Would you recognize Secretary Rumsfeld?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, I don't recall

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Rumsfeld being on any that I was in.

MS. HYDE: Okay, would you recognize General Myers [ph]?

MR. BELGER: General Myers was not in on any that I was on.

MS. HYDE: So, was it somebody--

MR. BELGER: These were people like Pete Varga or Verga [ph], that's a name that comes to mind. There were other uniformed people, that I did not know at the time. The reason I remember that name is that he came--I think he's civilian, but he kinda consistently stayed on those conference calls throughout these weeks and months.

MR. : Let me just clarify a point on that, because DOD has its own SVTs node separate from JCS.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Were the uniform people on at the same time that Pete Verga was?

MR. BELGER: Sometimes, yes, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember who from the White House was?

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MR. BELGER: The only one I remember was Dick Clark, he chaired a couple of them. I guess assistants. No, I'm thinking of a woman.

MS. HYDE: Lisa [unintell.]?

MR. BELGER: Lisa, yeah, I think she might have chaired a couple of them, if not chaired, she was right there with him. I don't remember, I don't know those people, so I don't--

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. And, as you recall, you recall this as being a sort of series of SVTs is this from the equipment people we learned that the video was up all day, but that people would sort of come and go from their chairs and provide updates. So, it's not call a meeting; call a meeting; call a meeting, it's sort of an open meeting that people come and go in and out of.

MR. BELGER: It was both, I mean, some were called. There were calls so that we had the right people there at specific times.

MS. HYDE: Are you talking about that morning there were some that were called.

MR. BELGER: Throughout the day, yeah.

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MS. HYDE: So, if we focus on before noon. The idea, do you recall any being--any meeting being sort of called before--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, I don't remember.

MS. HYDE: Uhhh--

MR. BELGER: But it wouldn't surprise me. But, again, there should be a record shouldn't there of when they were activated or?

MR. : Actually your log, FAA did maintain the log every day but that morning.

MR. BELGER: Well, what about from the point of origin, which was really the White House.

MS. HYDE: There's some record of if.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MS. HYDE: The--you have no recollection of who first asked you to go into the SVTs?

MR. BELGER: No, I have no idea.

MS. HYDE: Was it before the second strike, before you--

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, no.

MS. HYDE: Was it before the Pentagon had

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been hit?

MR. BELGER: I don't think so, that was--

MR. : 9:38--

MS. HYDE: Forty, and we'll not fixate on times, but sometimes in sequence that morning, do you remember going in there and talking about, you know, is there an aircraft hitting the Pentagon?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't remember going into the--I don't remember going into the SVT room before the aircraft hit the Pentagon, no.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall when you went in there were you the one that was providing the information? Were you the one to speak?

MR. BELGER: Well, it's like I said, it was myself, it was Jane, Jeff.

MS. HYDE: Who's talking, was it Jane?

MR. BELGER: It depends, sometimes I went, she didn't go; sometimes she went, I didn't go, depending on what else we were doing?

MS. HYDE: So you provided information?

MR. BELGER: If she's there she's providing it.

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MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: If she's not there I'm doing it.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm

MR. BELGER: Sometimes Jeff would step in if it was a level below what I knew. Generally it would have been one of the three of us.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: If Jane was there, she would do the talking. If she wasn't, I would.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm. And would you, what's the type of information you were asked to provide?

MR. BELGER: Well, it's general status, you know. How many aircraft are in the system? What kinds of reports do you have of aircraft that might be in distress, is there other threat information available, you know, general, what's the status of what's happening in the airspace.

MS. HYDE: And sort of alluding back to this conversation; where were you getting that status from, folks here in the ACC?

MR. BELGER: Getting it from everywhere,

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the ACC and from out here.

MS. HYDE: And are you going back and forth between SVTs and around here?

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely.

MS. HYDE: From gathering information and then feeding it into the SVTs?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: And if it's not you, it Jeff or Jane doing that.

MR. BELGER: And to through the Secretary; and through the airlines and, you know a thousand other people that are calling at the same time.

MS. HYDE: Do you remember providing any information to the SVTs about the flight that we now know the call sign and probably didn't know then of 93?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember any specific real time discussion about any of those flights on the SVTs.

MS. HYDE: So that would be, any of those flights meaning 77 that hit the Pentagon?

MR. BELGER: Yes, any of them, right. I

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don't remember any specific, you know, before. After the fact, obviously, but I don't remember about any--

MS. HYDE: About any of the hijacked flights and the SVTs wasn't up for 11 and 175?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't remember that at all. Are those supported, I don't know.

MS. HYDE: I don't know either.

MR. BELGER: That would answer your question.

MS. HYDE: So, your role, either when I say you, I'm encompassing Jane or Jeff Griffith was to provide general information about the status of aircraft that were up or that were being reported to you as in distress. You don't recall any specific conversations about the aircraft 77, 93, that we now know was hijacked?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: Did you learn from the SVTs, do you recall learning from the SVTs, about either one of those, DOD or others were telling you about reports--

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MR. BELGER: Not in the SVTs, I don't recall learning that, no.

MS. HYDE: You didn't learn anything, you don't recall learning anything from the SVTs that you didn't know about distressed aircraft?

MR. BELGER: No, right, right.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall any conversations in the SVTs about scrambling fighter aircraft?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: Not by DOD, not by Dick Clark? Not by anybody?

MR. BROWN: Uh-uh. Now, again, you know, this was, the timing that you're asking to scramble, that would have been--

MS. HYDE: To pick apart what we know now, there's a lot of things, you know realities don't match there. There may have been conversations 20 minutes after, what we know now happened 20 minutes before.

MR. BELGER: Right, no, what I'm saying is, I'm trying to answer your question precisely. I don't remember any, make sure I'm understanding

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the question. I don't remember any discussions on the SVTs, kind of real time discussions, kind of DOD is doing this or I think most of these SVT discussions were after that timing.

MR. : After the aircraft?

MR. BELGER: After, like, 9:40 or so.

MS. HYDE: But, actually, I don't want to put you in the position to try and put a clock on things and make that. Just tell me anything recollection you have. I mean don't sort out the next day and try and sort out, you know, sort of 2:00 p.m. on or something like that. But any discussion with, say, from whenever you got into the SVTs, until noon or 1:00 o'clock, any discussion you recall about scrambling fighter aircraft?

MR. BELGER: No, not until after the fact.

MS. HYDE: You mean after my question that afternoon or the next day?

MR. BELGER: I'm sure there were discussions, yeah, and about what happened. There were general discussions about what happened, who

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did what, you know. What was the status? What do we know. I mean that was the general purpose of those SVTs on that day is who knows what and what do we know?

MS. HYDE: There was general discussions about what we do know. My question was about scrambling. And as I take your answer that--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember any specific discussions about scrambling.

MS. HYDE: That morning, say up till 2:00 o'clock?

MR. BELGER: No, none, not on those calls. Not to say that the DOD didn't say, you know, we scrambled x-amt of out at Langley at x-time and we did this at Otis, I mean, they could have said that, but I don't remember that in those context.

MR. : The SVTs can be used for two things: they can be used for crisis management or consequence management. You're describing consequence management. What Dana's focusing on is this real time, crisis.

MR. BELGER: Oh, okay, that helps me. No,

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no, no, the SVTs, the meetings I was in, the SVTs were not incident management type of discussions.

MS. HYDE: Well, you're being asked to provide information about how many aircraft are airborne, how many aircraft are distressed. I don't want to provide ambiguity by calling it one--

MR. BELGER: That cleared it for me, that wasn't ambiguous to me, that clarified it.

MS. HYDE: I'm want to ask broad questions about whether you recall at anytime in any of those meetings and I'll put the time up until, say, that early afternoon any conversation about scrambling aircraft?

MR. BELGER: No.

MS. HYDE: And you recall no information on the SVTs, from you or from any other source about 77 or 93?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall that, no.

MS. HYDE: And the nature of what you--

MR. BELGER: Other than after the fact when we were relaying what we had learned.

MS. HYDE: Well, tell me after the fact

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what you would place when, the next day?

MR. BELGER: No, that afternoon, probably, yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, after the fact, when you relayed what you learned, and then you're referring to the afternoon?

MR. BELGER: Probably, yeah.

MS. HYDE: So, it's in the afternoon that you would relay.

MR. BELGER: No, wait, wait. So, whenever we knew which aircraft hit the first World Trade Center, for example.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: If there was a SVTs after that, whatever information we knew about that flight, would have been provided. You know, it American Flight umpty-ump from X to You, the information we had is it departed at whatever time it was; I mean whatever general information we had, we would have provided it.

MS. HYDE: So do you recall providing for the SVTs or Jane of Jeff anyone from FAA, while you

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were there as a witness, providing any information to the SVTs about 11 or 175, the aircraft that hit the towers?

MR. BELGER: No. not until after the fact.

MS. HYDE: Well, I'm not saying before the fact, I'm saying at any time.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, five times I've said, yes. Yeah.

MS. HYDE: Okay.

MR. BELGER: We gave whatever information we had to the folks on this calls.

MS. HYDE: And what information did you give to the folks on those calls about the aircraft that hit the towers.

MR. BELGER: I mean, whatever we knew at the time, I can't answer any more specific than that. I mean whatever we knew at that time, we passed on.

MS. HYDE: Did you know at that time that it was American 11 that hit the first tower?

MR. BELGER: At what time?

MS. HYDE: Did you know anytime before

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noon?

MR. BELGER: I think we probably, did, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you have a specific?

MR. BELGER: I think that was known, is that the first one that hit the tower?

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: That was identified pretty shortly after it hit, wasn't it? I think it was.

MS. HYDE: Ten different people have ten different views on this. So, I don't think there is any ground truth. We've disassociated ourselves from what going to now. Put yourself, you're there that morning, do you recall informing people on the SVTs about.

MR. BELGER: Like I said, I don't recall. I mean, I had a thousand discussions that day and I can't tell you specifically what I said in which discussion.

MS. HYDE: The discussion we're focusing on is the SVTs when ou were relating to the White House and to DOD and we're focusing on the aircraft

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that we now know were hijacked.

MR. BELGER: All I can tell you is, whatever we knew at the time the questions were being asked, we provided it.

MS. HYDE: Turn to the conversations with the Secretary. Describe those--well, describe first of all, did the Secretary contact you or did you contact the Secretary? How was that initiated.

MR. BELGER: I think the first call was from the Secretary. And it seemed like we were talking to him, you know, like every other minute, it seems to me. Giving him status reports. It was either talking to the Secretary or to John Flaherty or to, I think a couple times to Michael Jackson. So, we had kind of--it wasn't an open line, but it was kind of continuous, you know, multi minute calls with the Secretary. Starting from about a little before 9:00 o'clock.

MS. HYDE: And were you taking those calls in your office or in the ATC or in the SVTs room, where were you--

MR. BELGER: Generally, we took them in my

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office because it was a little bit quieter and easier to talk. Couple I took and Jane and/or I took here in the Operations Center. I don't recall ever talking to the Secretary when I was back here because this is kind of noisy and active. So, I would have done it here or in my office; generally in my office.

MR. : I'm sorry where was the here?

MS. HYDE: In the office.

MR. BELGER: Here in the Operations Center which is a little more open, it was less crowded and less noisy than--

MS. HYDE: Did anybody else, to your knowledge, besides you and Jane speak to the Secretary that morning?

MR. BELGER: Not that I'm aware of.

MS. HYDE: And did you recall speaking with him once we got to the kiosk, the bunker at the White House?

MR. BELGER: Yes. I didn't know where he was.

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MS. HYDE: Did he ever tell you that I'm in the bunker at the White House?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember. I don't know if he told me where he was.

MR. : To the extent you became aware of that after, where he was?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember if he told me or if it was afterwards. Because he didn't need to tell me where he was.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall, and maybe this would have clicked and been a memory you remember, him saying that I'm next to the Vice President. Did you know that morning that he was next to the Vice President?

MR. BELGER: I don't think so. I don't think so.

MS. HYDE: What kinds of questions was he asking?

MR. BELGER: Well, obviously all this who, what, when, where, and why, status questions. He saw some reports on television that he was asking about, you know, things that the media was

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reporting. As we got into the morning, there were a number of reports of various aircraft that might have been in distress, mostly of which were false.

There were a number of reports, you know, of bombings and bomb threats, and things like that and, you know he was asking what we knew about any of those situations. I remember just one specific I remember, there was a report of a--I think it was a Korean aircraft, but I'm not positive now. That was squawking the hijack code up in Alaska and we thought it might have been hijacked and it turned out it was nothing, I think the pilot was just trying to get attention. Trying to get somebody to talk to him to find out what was going on.

So there were a number of situations like that that were being reported. We were trying to clarify all those, sort through what was real and what wasn't and try to give him the best information we could about what, you know, what was going on.

MS. HYDE: do you remember speaking to him before the aircraft hit the Pentagon?

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MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, I spoke to him, like I said, shortly after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center.

MS. HYDE: Did you know that an aircraft was coming into Washington low and fast, the aircraft that we now know as 77 that hit the Pentagon? Did you know that before it happened.

MR. BELGER: Let me think, tell me the time again? Because I have to, I work off times, that's just the way my time works.

MS. HYDE: And, again, I don't want to put a time on it. My question before you knew at one point that the Pentagon had been hit. Do you recall, and this would have been after the second crash.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yes, yeah.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall there was an aircraft bearing down on Washington--

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MS. HYDE: --flying low and fast

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I do remember, yeah, yeah, I do remember, yeah. So, let me put that in

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perspective from what I knew at that time.

We had thought, by this time, we had thought that American 77 had crashed, just looking back on it, I would say that was a likely scenario that the Air Traffic folks were thinking.

They lost contact with it. I remember at one point we were thinking that we had five aircraft that we needed to be really concerned about. The two that had hit the World Trade Center and American 77 and United 93 and at that time, what we thought was, maybe an unidentified, could have even been VFR, aircraft high-speed flying back in an easterly direction. So, yeah, I remember that.

MR. : Do you recall [unintell.] hit the Trade Center?

MR. BELGER: Right American 77 which we thought had crashed and it was actually kind of confirmed by some reports from state police, which, in retrospect, was probably circular reporting. United 93 and an unidentified target that Dana was asking about.

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MS. HYDE: Actually, I'm not sure, and, again, I want to recall taking your head back to not everything you learned afterwards and look back.

MR. BELGER: No, this is real time.

MS. HYDE: That morning, do you recall learning that there was an aircraft flying low fast, coming towards Washington, you know, it was minutes out?

MR. BELGER: Right, yeah, I just said, I guess I did.

MS. HYDE: And that, what I'm referring to is the incident that we now know was 77 and hit the Pentagon. I think there was some confusion as I understand it about what hit the Pentagon. You all weren't familiar with that at first.

MR. BELGER: Right, right.

MS. HYDE: So, that report that there's at this point, you know that there's been strikes in New York?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: One does not necessarily know

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that Washington is a threat here or is at risk. This aircraft that we now know is 77 that it went, circled and hit the Pentagon. Did you learn that that aircraft was coming towards Washington, before it hit?

MR. BELGER: I think so, yeah.

MS. HYDE: And do you recall if you conveyed that information to the Secretary? And if you don't, recall--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember talking to him about that. Doesn't mean I didn't, it's just that I don't remember.

MS. HYDE: Is that an experience where you thought that, you know, we've got a plane heading toward our Capitol somewhere. Is that how it registered with you or was it of a different sort?

MR. BELGER: I think the timing that I'm thinking about, it wasn't that we got--it was an unidentified primary radar threat.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: The folks West of Dulles had identified, if I remember right and the speculation

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was that it was a VFR aircraft.

MS. HYDE: I guess just to focus on the conversations with the Secretary and then I'm going to have to leave. Next question would be, and maybe it wasn't conveyed to you in this manner. After the Dulles primary track speculation of VFR, do you recall learning that there was another track of an aircraft that was compromised, hijacked also on en route to Washington? I'm referring to what we now know as 93, but I wouldn't expect that you'd have known it at that time as 93?

MR. BELGER: Well, if I remember right, I mean the log is--or the chronology can clarify this, but it was like, it was a little before 9:30, I think that we first knew that there was a problem with United 93 and it was about that same time, I think that there were the first reports, at least that I was aware of that there was this unidentified track heading East. So, I think we might have known about United 93 at the time. I don't remember that we knew that it was actually turned and heading back towards Washington at that

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time.

MS. HYDE: The one that turned and headed back toward Washington that hit shortly after 9:30 was 77.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Ninety-three's meandering around Pennsylvania.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MS. HYDE: Do you recall if you would have known about this track at the time that it would have been described to you as meandering around Pennsylvania or coming out of Cleveland or something like that. And when you say we knew, certainly the Center knew, my question to you is--

MR. BROWN: No, I would say I.

MS. HYDE: --yeah, is whether you knew, what you knew about track. And my next question is did you convey what you knew about track to anybody? And you may not recall either one.

MR. BELGER: Oh, sure, if I knew, I would have provided it to whoever we were talking to?

MS. HYDE: Did you know?

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MR. BELGER: I knew that we had a problem with United 93 about that 9:30 time frame it seems like to me.

MS. HYDE: When do you recall hearing about the problem with 93.

MR. BELGER: Wait back up. There were dozens of situations where we thought we had hijacked aircraft.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Dozens.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: So, United 93 was one of those. It turned out to be a real one.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm

MR. BELGER: But there were just as--there were dozens of reports that, initially, you know, came in to us just as seriously as United 93.

MS. HYDE: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: You know, pilots squawking the hijack code. Aircraft that aren't following Air Traffic Instructions or whatever. So the first time, I probably learned about 93 or somebody said

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something to me about 93 was probably in the context of all those others of dozens of ones that people were telling me about.

MS. HYDE: Do you, you're using the word 93, do you remember from that morning hearing about 93 as one of the call signs that were popping up?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, oh, yes, I'm sorry--did I--93?

MS. HYDE: That morning, you were being told United 93?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, that's what I said before.

MS. HYDE: I mean we know it now, but that morning, you knew it was United 93.

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

MS. HYDE: And what did you know about that situation? Did you know that it was heading towards Washington?

MR. BELGER: I mean I think I knew--I'm not sure I can answer that specifically. I knew as we were going along everything that everybody else was hearing. I mean, I'm sorry, but I can't--I

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mean, so I guess the answer is, yeah, I knew what everybody else knew.

MS. HYDE: Well, I think that, I mean, I don't want to quibble with words there, but I think our experience is that not every--one cannot assume that everybody knew what everybody else knew.

MR. BELGER: Okay, I understand. That's fair.

MS. HYDE: So, that's not particularly helpful.

MR. BELGER: I got you.

MS. HYDE: The best thing I can do is ask you what you recall that morning?

MR. BELGER: I was getting reports of United 93. We knew it by the call sign. That's what I said before, we thought we had 93 and 77 under VFR aircraft. I don't remember specifically what people were telling me about 93 other than it was another one of those aircraft in distress.

MS. HYDE: Thank you.

MR. : We're going to take a small break.

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[Break.]

MR. AZZARELLO [?]: We'll back on with Mr. Belger on the 20th, second session.

I'd like to just come back in.

MR. BELGER: Can I, I've been reflecting these last five or ten minutes. Can I say a couple of things, just to before we get into a whole bunch of other specific questions.

MR. AZZARELLO: Sure.

MR. BELGER: In response to Dana's last question about United 93. I said, I think, that, you know, I was hearing things and passing it on kind of at the same time as other people. I should have been clearer there. Because my recollection is that the time United 93 was in distress, everybody was kind of following that realtime, including the military. And the Primary Net had been set up; the F16s out of Langley had already been scrambled, they were being held over the Washington area and I recall interviews in the news media after 9/11, where the military said they were holding them there in preparation for, you know,

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United 93, if it came close to the Washington area.

The point I was trying to make is everything was realtime with United 93, with I think, in my view all the participants.

MR. AZZARELLO: Including, you're saying the military?

MR. BELGER: In my opinion, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Including the military and the Primary Net you're saying you knew was up then?

MR. BELGER: The logs that I have gone back and looked at have indicated that the Primary Net was set up at 9:20 and I think United 93, the first indication was six or seven minutes after that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, independent of what the log said which I imagine you saw after 9/11.

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: I want to sort of focus really on what you remember occurring that day regarding 93, because we've seen a number of logs we showed to some folks, we even created them and we've said there's a lot of inaccuracies in these.

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MR. BELGER: No, I meant to be that specific. My recollection, my memory, my memory is that by the time of United 93 everything, the people, the military, the FAA, were hearing that information realtime at the same time.

MR. AZZARELLO: That the FAA people were hearing it realtime.

MR. BELGER: And the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what's your basis of believing that the military was hearing it real time?

MR. BELGER: The net was set up. I have three bases, I guess, but one of these bases is after the fact so.

MR. AZZARELLO: I want you to give the day of bases.

MR. BELGER: Okay, the day of and then I'll tell you the other one after. The day of, we knew that the F16s had been scrambled. We knew they were over the Washington area. We knew that--I knew that the military folks were on the net, so my assumption was they were hearing it at

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the same time the FAA was.

MR. AZZARELLO: Your knew the F16s were scrambled and over the Washington area?

MR. BELGER: Right, they were scrambled in response to 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then you say they were scrambled in response to 77?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: That would be Langley, was it?

MR. BELGER: I think that was Langley, I believe it was. Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay the second thing was the military was on the Primary Net or--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's the day of, how did you know they were on the Primary Net?

MR. BELGER: I saw them there, I mean, they were there. I mean.

MR. AZZARELLO: Saw them physically in the room, you think?

MR. BELGER: I think I did, yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: In the ACC room?

MR. BELGER: Yeah. I think I did, but let me, even if I didn't. If you want to, I mean, the Primary Net was up the NMCC should have been on the Primary Net, I mean, that's just the way it's supposed to happen.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me, I mean, there's a difference between the bases here and I want to make sure I don't misunderstand.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and I want to be clear, too.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was the second basis is you saw a person with a military uniform in the ACC or you knew that the net was up, the primary--

MR. BELGER: I knew the was up would be a more precise way to say it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because there's a difference, because the person in the room might not be.

MR. BELGER: I understand, you're right, you're right. I knew the net was up.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then, secondly, did

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you know, have any indirect or indirect knowledge that they were on the line, I mean there's a difference between they're supposed to be and they weren't?

MR. BELGER: Right I understand and you're right, you're exactly right, I cannot say that I asked is the NMCC on the net. They were supposed to be and I've not heard anything to the contrary but this is after the fact. I haven't heard anything to the contrary that says they weren't.

MR. AZZARELLO: And at this point I want to come back to the point that we were discussing this thing about using SVTs as crisis management versus consequence mgmt.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the specific question here is, during this time frame and this awareness of 93, were you on the SVTs and was it being used to track 93, realtime?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall that. I don't recall that at all.

MR. AZZARELLO: You recall that it was o r

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it wasn't?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall the secure conversations being used for tactical purposes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. BELGER: Not the ones I was on.

MR. AZZARELLO: And specifically tactical purposes to track 93 as it came in?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't recall that for any that I was participating in.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, and let me just amend that 93 or 77.

MR. BELGER: Or any of them.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the reason I say it that was is to distinguish them between the northern situation, the New York situation; which is 11 and 175 at 8:46 and 9:03.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And there's sort of an arignum [ph], if you will before the attack on the Pentagon unfolds.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And do you recall in the

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position at you held that day as Deputy Administrator how you first learned that there was threat--totally apart from New York how there was now a threat to Washington, D.C., as well?

MR. BELGER: Well, obviously, when American 77 hit the Pentagon, we knew. Clearly we knew then.

MR. BELGER: Right. I mean, I think from my perspective, that's the first.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall any recording--

MR. : May I say that when the Pentagon was hit, obviously--it was an obvious indication of a threat to Washington. You say 77, but how do you square that with your belief that they--that 77 had crashed--at the time it would have just been the aircraft.

MR. BELGER: At that time we did not know that it was American 77.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you have any indication, that Washington, what I was getting at, was that Washington it was a potential threat to

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Washington prior to that impact of that aircraft at the Pentagon? Well, let's back it up, you said, you heard, you do recall hearing about a VFR approaching--

MR. BELGER: In an easterly--high-speed easterly direction West of Dulles Airport.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that the first indication that you had--

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that the capital area might be--that it might be a threat to the capital.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think that's fair.

MR. : And you don't recall reporting that a plane might be approaching from the North and it might be American 11 which hadn't crashed into the World Trade Center?

MR. BELGER: No--

MR. : You don't recall that?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : So your awareness then of the threat was the West of Dulles--

MR. BELGER: Right.

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MR. : --fast moving VFR
approaching from the--

MR. BELGER: Right, I do recall--

MR. : --and, John, and then I'll
turn it back to you and none of that was being
discussed in realtime, I mean, on SVTs?

MR. BELGER: None that I was on, I mean,
if there were other--

MR. : It would have been
somebody else--

MR. BELGER: --it would have been within
other circles, yeah. Just so I don't lose my train
of thought, on United 93 because you asked me, and
rightly so, you asked me to discriminate what I
think I knew that morning, versus what I learned
subsequently. So, let me now, just mention two
things that I learned subsequently.

MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: There were, I mean,
interviews by several Department of Defense folks
made the point that the fighters out at Langley
were positioned over Washington, should there be

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another approach by aircraft, which could have been United 93. So they were in position. And, you know, I don't know this, but I've got to assume they were in contact and people were telling them what was going on. So that's one.

And, then, secondly, I remember seeing, because I asked a thousand questions about this, right after 9/11, you know, did we do the right things? Is there any chinks in our armor in terms of our notification? And all of the information I got was that by the time of United 93, there was an open line of continuous communication with the military. And, in fact, I recall seeing a NORAD press release that said that.

MR. AZZARELLO: So your request post-9/11 was to your staff?

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did we, the FAA, do everything we could in terms of notifying proper notifications?

MR. BELGER: Absolutely, absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that for each of the

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four flights?

MR. BELGER: For each of the four.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did we give proper notification on each of the flights?

MR. BELGER: Absolutely, and so, I never got anything that indicated to me that there was a problem with United 93; never saw anything from DOD that indicated there was a problem with United 93. In fact, to the opposite, they were saying that there was continuous communication with the FAA and until the time I left the FAA, I never heard from DOD that they had any problems with--

MR. : Sounds like you might be hearing something different now.

MR. BELGER: Well, you know, I hear all this urban legend crap that everybody else--

MR. : Tell me what [unintell.] what did you hear?

MR. BELGER: That there was some problem with the FAA's notification of the military on United 93.

MR. : Well, where are you

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hearing that from, recently, obviously? When you said you had thought, post-9/11 your folks told you that, you know, that there was an open line on 93.

MR. BELGER: No, I mean, to be very candid. I'm hearing that from people that are alleging that you all had said that.

MR. : People we've interviewed?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MR. : It's not [unintell.] and sat through many of these interviews, I've said to plenty of folks [unintell.] not that this was a game of anything, we just, we're telling you folks the same thing that we told the military, which was this is where we're at and this is what we're finding.

MR. BELGER: Yes, sir.

MR. : If you guys would know of something different that would change this story or augment it or edit it, then let us know.

MR. : Remember how you laid it out for me?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, so I really want to

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help, if there's--if you have those--

MR. : We have to, pure and simple, we have to tell the story of 9/11 as accurately as we possibly can to the American people.

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely. And I want to help--well, let's--

MR. : I wanted to go through. You said your staff told you there was an open line between the military and the FAA?

MR. BELGER: Well, that's the net.

MR. : Okay, that's the net?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I'm saying NORAD said--

MR. : Okay, NORAD--

MR. BELGER: --in the press release, that there was, I believe it was continuous communication.

MR. : Okay, you saw the NORAD press release, right?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : That was September 18, I think, about a week after.

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MR. BELGER: It was in that time frame.

MR. : Did you get it from Kevin?

MR. : Okay, so there was an open line discussing 93?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think, I mean, again, I think there were continuous communication.

MR. : Was it discussing other aircraft, do you remember?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, United 93, specifically.

MR. : Now what about, that's different from the two things you learned afterwards. You talked about the DOD interviews that they gave.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : About the fighters over the D.C. area should another aircraft approach.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Do you remember if they mentioned 93, too?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember if they mentioned 93 specifically, I just don't remember

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that.

MR. : Okay, now the second one, though--

MR. BELGER: The implication was, in the context of the story, the implication was United 93, but I don't remember who said that.

MR. : Okay, yeah, the implication was that 93 may have been one of the aircraft?

MR. BELGER: Right that they were, you know, kind of prepared for.

MR. : Right. Now, let me ask you about the second facet of this.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : An that is, let's forget about what NORAD told its staff to do or what press release they put out. Obviously, you had, from an FAA perspective, you had an interest in finding out what we know.

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

MR. : What did we know and when did we know it?

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MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And what did we do with
it?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Specifically, did we tell
the military as soon as we could after--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : When you asked that
question of your folks about, walking backwards
with 93, what did they tell you that they had found
in their review of what the FAA records and--

MR. BELGER: Yeah--

MR. : --and telecons--

MR. BELGER: --right, what I was told was
that the NMCC was on the Primary Nets.

MR. : Okay told them that
the--okay, so they're telling you that the NMCC's
on the Primary Net?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : So when you say the open
line there the net, you mean the Primary Net and
that the NMCC was on it?

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MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And did they get that, was there any indication that they got that just from the log or there was an assumption, or--because we're back to--even in the aftermath, you can always assume some said--

MR. BELGER: Well, I think they're--I think, now, obviously, this is a matter of record so you should have it, but when the Operations Center calls other agencies to bring them into the net, they record that time, so there should be a recording a document that says what time the NMCC was called and added to the Primary Net right.

MR. : They log it, you're saying?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I mean, that's what they're supposed to do.

MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: They're supposed to--you know, I called, Secret Service was in the net at x-time; NMCC was in the net at x-time and they just kind of go down the list and call people and log

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it.

MR. : What we learned about that from the log is, obviously, we want to look at what notes they had from the day because they take handwritten notes and then later on they try to--but during the morning, we understand as the morning was unfolding getting much more hectic, they went from sort of handwriting notes to try to share a computer in the middle and log it in.

We asked for the handwritten notes, just so that you know, they apparently were never preserved or at some point were not kept. So, we're just left with, you know, the most contemporaneous format of the initial efforts, we're just left with, basically, the typewritten log that, you know, was done later in the morning, where they added the earlier information presumably that was on handwritten paper--handwritten on paper.

MR. BELGER: I don't know, I haven't seen it. But the question to ask of the FAA folks.

MR. : This is one of the--

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MR. : That's not the
handwritten--

MR. : This is the chrono that we
were given by the ADA 30 of the WALK an they have
9:20 Primary Net activated requested by Wickert.

MR. BELGER: That's the security guy,
right.

MR. : Now this one doesn't have,
who might have logged on and when?

MR. BELGER: The duty officer, I was just
telling, is supposed to be--the duty officer should
have kept, generally, it's handwritten on a kind of
a summary page, who he called--who he or she
called, and at what time they were added to the
Primary Net or put into the net. Now, the question
to the FAA folks is, does that exist?

MR. : And we were told that
nothing of the handwritten notes do. That this
was--this is the result of the log keeping efforts
of the WALK folks that day. Obviously, not as
detailed or contemporaneous as we would have liked
to have seen. But it is what it is and it's what

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they gave us.

MR. BELGER: So, the summaries I saw, I mean, more--longer summaries than that one, basically said to me, the Primary Net was established at 9:20, including NMCC, Secret Service, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. : Okay, I think I know what you're talking about, is this other document that we had.

MR. : I'm looking for my copy of it.

MR. : Let me see. Okay, this is just a document done by a woman named Tracey [ph], I don't know if you know Tracey Packman [ph].

MR. BELGER: Yes, I know who she was.

MR. : She was, I guess, on the staff at headquarters, but I don't recall what she--

MR. BELGER: She was on the staff of the Associate Administrator that was in charge of all of our regional activities. So, she was stationed in the headquarters. I mean, you know, we pulled

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in a bunch of different people to come together and try to capture some of the information, so I guess she's one of them.

MR. : This is, I don't know, we'll explore with her how much of a final or a draft product this is, because it, at times, seems to be chronological here and it says 9:20 Ops Center sets up Primary Net, including NMCC--is this the document you were--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember seeing that one, but I remember seeing something like that--actually in several chronologies.

MR. : And this is not, though in the WALK chronology, which is back to the question, I guess is if the WALK did it and set it up and this is the official WOC chronology, then--

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean, I guess, what they're saying is the Primary Net activated, they're just, I mean, the Primary Net's supposed to include all these people. Are these times? I don't know what these--I don't remember seeing this, but those look like times to me.

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MR. : Sure but this doesn't tell you--you would agree wouldn't you that it's activated and suppose to include--

MR. BELGER: No, yeah--

MR. : You'd rather see--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, that's why I said that the ideal thing would be to have the handwritten entries that says, I called the NMCC and they're on the net. But it looks to me like that thing that Tracey did, I don't remember seeing that before, but that looks like those are times.

MR. : That's what it looks like, yeah, it does look like these are times. We'll see if we can shed any further light on it.

MR. BELGER: If that's true, then the NMCC at 9:--what time?

MR. : 9:20.

MR. BELGER: 9:20, okay, which is what I was told.

MR. : Now, so you were told that the NMCC was on the Primary Net?

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MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And you don't know whether or not that was from the logs or did anybody have it--was anybody able to affirm it other than it appeared in some logs that they were on?

MR. BELGER: I mean it was given to me in chronologies that were prepared--

MR. : Okay. Well, I gotta ask you the question about United 93, then?

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : I imagine your folks determined the time of--approximate time of hijacking and takeover of the aircraft? Do you recall anything about that?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I mean, I think, let me think about times for right now; 9:28 is that right?

MR. : Yeah, 9:28 it was like--so to the extent that it was a NORAD press release that indicated that they knew about it earlier wouldn't that have sort of raised a red flag for your folks at the FAA if NORAD was reporting that

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they knew about United 93, was reported to them prior to 9:28--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and I do recall seeing, yes. I recall seeing a document that was prepared--and, actually, we talked about that. There was some NORAD record that they had been notified about 93 even before we knew 93 had a problem. And so, I mean, we assumed that was just an error on NORAD's part. I mean, I can't explain why.

MR. : This is that press release that came out on 18 September. Do you recall Jeff Griffith specifically having a conversations with General Arnold at CONAR [ph], about the time line and how you guys were going to jointly put out a time line?

MR. BELGER: You mean, after 9/11?

MR. : Just after, right--in the days right after--

MR. BELGER: No, uh-uh, I don't think the FAA ever put out a time line, as I recall.

MR. : Actually, they did, they

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put it out in August.

MR. BELGER: Oh, okay, yeah, a year later, yeah.

MR. : Yeah, and since you said that, is there a reason you didn't put out a time line in the immediate--

MR. BELGER: Well, I think we were real sensitive to what Justice was asking us to, you know, not put out anything.

MR. : To not put out anything, you're saying this is guidance from Justice?

MR. BELGER: I--I mean that's my recollection, anything, is probably not the right thing but to be very sensitive to what we were putting out.

MR. : And did they elaborate on it any further?

MR. BELGER: I can't tell, you, the lawyers would have to speak to that, but I just don't think the FAA put out a time line. Maybe we did in--maybe we did as--

MR. : Was that specifically in

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relation to being sensitive about what information the FAA releases about chronology and what they knew when and when they--

MR. BELGER: I mean, that's my recollection, yeah, yeah.

MR. : Do you remember who from the Bureau said that?

MR. BELGER: No, I have no idea.

MR. : Who brought it to your attention?

MR. BELGER: I don't know it was just general--it was just general knowledge.

MR. : It was just general knowledge that they were saying to be careful about it not, not any--you don't recall anything specific?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall anything specific.

MR. : And that was put out in public press release or in any format?

MR. BELGER: I mean, publicly--

MR. : Was anybody within

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government or, you know, in Administration asking for or wanting the information that the FAA had so that they could see what--

MR. BELGER: Sure, sure, I mean, we gave chronologies to the Department of Transportation; we passed those on to--and, obviously, you know, if the White House or Justice if they--I don't remember specifically, but, obviously, if they'd asked we would have given them the same.

MR. : I want to go back to one of the two bases for thinking that the military was following 93.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : That the F16s were scrambled you know and over Washington and you believe they were scrambled in response to 77?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : I'm having a tough time understanding that if your recollection on the day of, which is reflected in some conversations and transcripts is that 77 crashed somewhere, then why would they have been launched in response to--

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MR. BELGER: Okay, very good question, let's be clear that they were launched in response to what I will call the unidentified aircraft. We didn't know at that time it was American 77. So, that's a good clarification. I mean, I remember one of the most frustrating things for me that whole day was not being able to quickly determine which aircraft hit the White House, I mean, the Pentagon.

MR. : So you said Langley was scrambled in response to the aircraft that was later determined to be 77?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, which was, at the time an unidentified--I mean, I'm just going by what NORAD said. And what, I mean, we knew they were scrambled.

MR. : In response to an unidentified aircraft that later turned out to be 77?

MR. BELGER: That would be the accurate way I would say, it yeah.

MR. : If we can separate now,

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what NORAD might have said about it, I want to know your FAA review as the Deputy Administrator in the aftermath saying your folks.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : All right let's find out what we knew when and did we relay that and did that cause the scrambling and coverage of these aircraft or not. You tell me if you know something differently, but from what we've seen from the tapes and at the controller level and all that, United's--American's 77 was lost over radar in INDY Center and so far as we can see, it was lost completely, no one picked it up as a primary or otherwise--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --until someone picked up a VFR, you know six, seven, eight, I mean, Dulles TRACON as you reflected, picked up--

MR. BELGER: Yeah--

MR. : --they didn't know it to be 77, but they thought it to be a fast-approaching VFR. But from the time of the loss of that

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aircraft till Dulles' report that there's a VFR--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --we have not found a single thread that would indicate that anybody was even thought that they had 77 on their radar screens.

MR. BELGER: I think that's accurate because--

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: --we thought that it had crashed.

MR. : Right, which is what you said earlier.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : So, then, how could Langley have even been--identified aircraft which later turned out to be 77?

MR. BELGER: Well, a couple. Two reason, I think, I mean, I can't answer for them--

MR. : Right, but from the FAA's side.

MR. BELGER: One, they did get a

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notification about the American 77 hijacking.

MR. : Who is they?

MR. BELGER: NORAD or the military NORAD. They got a notification about American 77, so we were thinking it crashed. I don't know what they were thinking.

MR. : How did they get--didn't they only get--correct me if I'm missing something--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : How did the military get independent information on 77 not being crashed but potentially being hijacked if they don't get it from the FAA--

MR. BELGER: I don't think they would have.

MR. : It would have had to have come from the FAA?

MR. BELGER: I think it would have had to come from the FAA.

MR. : Okay, well, then, in your staff's efforts to recreate after the fact, what

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information did they give you that some FAA facility did find it and did report it as hijacked to the military?

MR. BELGER: No, wait, let's back up. I mean, there was a report from the FAA to NORAD, that should be in the logs that there was a suspected hijacking of American 77.

MR. : In whose logs should it be?

MR. BELGER: It should--in NORAD's logs.

MR. : The NORAD's logs, the day of, their operation logs?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Who in your shop at the FAA had access to that post-9/11, the NORAD logs, did you see a copy of it?

MR. BELGER: I saw, I mean, it was in the press release.

MR. : But the logs, I'm not talking about the press release, I'm talking about the logs.

MR. BELGER: I don't know that I've seen

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any original NORAD logs.

MR. : Well, or a photocopy of them?

MR. BELGER: I mean, or even a photo.

MR. : But this is a copy of a NORAD log or NEDS, I don't want to loosely.

MR. BELGER: So what does it say about--

MR. : Well, before I get to what it says about it, I want to ask you about, if you'd seen it before, a copy of it?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : You haven't, well, okay, then have you seen this summary of air traffic hijack events that your people prepared?

MR. BELGER: Yes, yeah.

MR. : Who did you understand had prepared this summary?

MR. BELGER: It was an Air Traffic.

MR. : Air Traffic folks?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Do you know who in Air Traffic?

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MR. BELGER: I don't have any idea, I mean, AT-20 that's the office.

MR. : Is that Cannoles?

MR. BELGER: I don't know, I don't know what job he was in at time, so--

MR. : Were you given a copy of this?

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, sure.

MR. : Were you briefed on it?

MR. BELGER: We discussed i that, yeah.

MR. : There's an entry here, this was on--they give a chrono on each aircraft--

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : It says 8:40 Northeast Air Defense Sector logs say that they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning 11--12:40 Zulu, possible hijack American Airlines.1

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : It appears to correspond to this log, that is a NEDS log.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : So, somebody had this at

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the FAA.

MR. BELGER: Okay. Well, obviously, yeah, I assume that the Air Traffic evaluation folks went to NORAD and asked them.

MR. : Yeah, I would assume, so.

MR. BELGER: I mean, they talk to these guys every day.

MR. : Mr. [unintell.] says he put this together, but that he did not have access to the log.

MR. BELGER: To--

MR. : He thought there might have been--he thought that somebody might have distilled information out from this and given it-

MR. BELGER: I don't know who personally would have gotten the information from NORAD.

MR. : Okay. Where do you see 77?

MR. BELGER: I don't know, let me see here. Scrambled on American 11--

MR. : Otis fighters, did you know that on the day of 9/11, that the Otis

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fighters were scrambled on 11?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, United 175 possible hijack; American Airlines, November 334AA, I don't know if that's--

MR. : That's another one.

MR. BELGER: That's another one, too. Okay. Hijack American flight something to Washington, D.C. Is that still American 11?

MR. : That's 925, that's 11, yeah, and we'd appreciate your insight on that, on your thoughts?

MR. BELGER: At 9:25?

MR. : Yeah, if you can give us your insight on that we've seen from various FAA sources that after American--

MR. BELGER: 9:25--what time did American 11--

MR. : Put aside the specific time frames, I don't want you to get caught up in that, let's look in sequences--

MR. BELGER: Okay, that's what I was trying

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MR. : American 11 went in at 8:46; 8:46 a.m. it crashed.

MR. BELGER: Well, this couldn't have been American 11 then.

MR. : Well, we know that in hindsight.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Because we know--we might not have known it at 9:25 on that morning, but we certainly know now as we stand here today or maybe after 9/11 that it was American 11 for sure that went in to the North Tower.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : That went in at 8:46, the second crash in New York, the United 175 went in at 9:03.

MR. BELGER: Right, okay.

MR. : After that, after that those first two crashes, and there was a report throughout, through various parts of the FAA system, that there was a belief that American 11 may still be up there airborne headed South to

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Washington. Which would have meant that if it was on its southerly path--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay--

MR. : I mean it didn't strike the Trade Centers, that it would have continued on. If it continued on, logically, it would be headed to Washington, D.C. and cause a threat to them.

MR. BELGER: I think I do remember--

MR. : But what we've seen from the NEDS Operational report--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --the report comes in to NEDS that there's a report out of Washington that American 11 is still airborne, from the Washington Telecon, that it's still airborne and headed South to Washington. That yields the Langley scramble on the aircraft that they thought was headed to Washington that was not.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And there are various reports of that. There are people from headquarters on 9/11 around this same time that are

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making calls to the Command Center asking people to check on PSD, check with centers and see if American 11 is either headed South to Washington; someone else is asking the Command Center to call Cleveland and see if it's headed West--

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : --because the PSD is showing a hollow target projecting West on American 11 and I wanted to know what your recollection of that was as it came into the system on 9/11?

MR. BELGER: I mean at that level of detail and specificity, would have, I didn't have any knowledge of that at that time. I mean, all of this is happening in 45 minutes. And that level of detail, I don't think I would have known, until after--until we reconstructed it after the fact.

What did NORAD say about scrambling on 11?

MR. : I don't want to--I sort of at this juncture would rather not sort of strain your mind with other extraneous factors that other agencies might, you're having a tough enough time sort of separating what you knew on 9/11 and what

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you knew afterwards.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : But, if you didn't know the level of detail, I understand that would encompass American 11.

MR. BELGER: Well, here's an American 77, you asked me.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: 1334, 9:34, is that--

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: American 77 flight lost, unable to locate.

MR. : Right. But that, see, that dovetails with what I told you we found so far is that lost, unable to locate. And I can tell you that came from Washington Center, that information.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : To Northeast.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : that's a lot different than we lost it, we found it, we located it, it's headed to Washington, therefore, leading to the

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scramble of fighters and I track it.

Now, let's talk about when you folks learned about that in the aftermath. I guess I want to ask you two things. Before you go to the post-9/11, I want to ask you a question about American 11, if they did think it was reborn, then it would pose--it would be a loose aircraft in this instant posing a threat to some critical infrastructure, potentially in Washington, if they said, that was the report, it's headed to Washington. Understanding that you would not necessarily get that level of detail, of who's tracking, exactly what it is, I would think that it came to gain a lot of traction at headquarters on 9/11 and I would think that they might want to elevate that to an executive level of management, that there's another missile out there, so, you know, headed for potentially a target in the nation's capital.

And I'm going to be frank with you, I would be totally shocked to think that no one raised, brought it to your attention even in a

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general sense as Mr. Deputy Administrator, by the way, you know, the first one we thought crashed, we were all laboring under that assumption, we now are no longer laboring, we now think it's actually headed for the nation's capital, where, by the way, we all happen to be standing in an FAA building.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : I'm not trying to be--I'm not trying to poke fun at it, but I'm trying to, like, call it for what it is and what I see that you gotta keep track of missiles that could be headed to take out human beings and buildings on that day. And I would be shocked if they didn't share that with you.

MR. BELGER: I mean, in this 45 minutes, which have now covered in over two hours, two and a half hours of talking about what I might have done in 45 minutes. I remember vividly, the discussions about American 77; the thought that it might have crashed. The fact that we might have had an unidentified VFR aircraft heading East. I don't recall. I recall, you know, discussions about

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dozens of other aircraft that we thought might have had a problem. I don't, specifically, vividly recall talking about American 11 coming at--to Washington from the North.

MR. : Okay, you don't recall anything about that. What about in the aftermath when we didn't have the time constraints of the day of or with all the various information? What about, you know, when you have a little bit more, to have your folks look at it in hindsight and concentrate on rebuilding a chronology effort when they're not under pressure and they're focused on that assignment. Did somebody bring it to your attention after? Hey, we got, you know, we've seen these entries or logs or phone calls and tapes that people are saying they think American 11's still up there?

MR. BELGER: I'd have to go back and look at the chronologies that were given to me, but I don't recall in those, like, summary chronologies that you've shown me, that I would have seen, I don't recall that being highlighted in those logs

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or chronologies.

MR. : Do you remember Doug Davis mentioning that American 11 was airborne?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : He, by the way, when he met with us, said that he was given information by someone at headquarters and pretty much went in to the ATC and announced it, that it was--

MR. BELGER: I don't know.

MR. : --which could be the way that it got, also into the system.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I don't know.

MR. : But no one brought that to your attention afterwards?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that, no.

MR. : What do you remember, then, about 93, you say, you remember that the basis for believing the military was following it and one of them was that the F16s were scrambled and were over Washington. That seems to be a little general as opposed to them following it. I mean, scrambled and over D.C. is a little different

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from them either knowing where it is or being followed

MR. BELGER: No, I should, but I was making the assumption--

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: --that they were in the loop, that they were in the communication net; that they were in the Primary Net and that they were hearing information on a realtime basis. And we talked about why I made these assumptions there.

MR. : I want to sort of follow up on 93 on the day of when information was--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --do you remember getting updates on that aircraft as it was in flight?

MR. BELGER: I remember, again, I don't remember specifically. But I do remember that that was one of the four that we really had the time to kind of get some updates. The others kind of happened so--at least the first two, certainly, happened so quickly that, at least at my level we weren't getting any updates.

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MR. : So, you remember getting information on United 93, before it crashed?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Is it fair for me to use the phrase that, as opposed to maybe the first three, you were a little bit more ahead of the curve on that one?

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, absolutely, yeah, we were.

MR. : Do you know if about at headquarters, yourself or anyone under you or Jane Garvey, checked just to make sure that the military was in the loop? Did anyone say, hey, let's make sure we're getting these updates on 93, let's make sure the military's--

MR. BELGER: I didn't do that, so I don't know if anybody else specifically did. Well, let me say though, I mean, I knew that--I mean, maybe it was an assumption, again, but it sure sounded like, from all the discussions I was having with the Air Traffic folks that they were talking to the military.

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MR. : Yeah, how did, yeah, let's step back from what the military knew, did you know if the right folks at FAA, folks that you would expect to have the need to have that information so that they could communicate it to the military, did you know that they had that on 93?

MR. BELGER: Well, I assumed that since they were part of the Primary Net and they were all hooked up down in Air Traffic.

MR. : So, you're saying the people in the ACC had the United--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, Jeff Griffith and the people that were working for him.

MR. : And you assumed that they were hooked up with the people down in Air Traffic suite?

MR. BELGER: Correct.

MR. : Did anybody in the after review of the FAA look back and confirm whether that, indeed, was happening, that there was a contact between Air Traffic and the ACC and that the information on 93 was being shared by the right

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people at FAA? Did they-

MR. BELGER: All I can say is that the information that was given to me, the chronologies that were given to me, indicated that NMCC was on the Primary Net.

MR. : So, help me out with the summary here that we got from your AT-20 people.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : We got the notification I showed you on 11, A40, and it cites the logs.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : We've got a notification on 93 cited in the logs, I'm sorry, I'm looking at 175, the second aircraft to crash in New York. This would be the second one, here. That's the second one that struck the Trade Center, 175, Boston/L.A.

MR. BELGER: Right, okay.

MR. : They have communications between the controller and the aircraft leading up to when it was taken over.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

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MR. : Then they have personnel statements for what people observed as the aircraft was on its final stages.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : An then they have the impact time at 9:03. And then they have 9:05 and the NEDS logs indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning 175. So, roughly, two minutes after the log showing that they were notified.

And this is the NEDS log and they yeah, 175 possible hijacking, so that would appear to be, somebody had access, obviously, to the NEDS logs and referred to them.

MR. BELGER: I don't doubt that, yeah.

MR. : It certainly looks like that because they're citing the NEDS log. So, we would assume that--and I know that Jeff Griffith said that somebody provided him, I think, one of the NORAD folks provided him a copy. The FAA, we the FAA had a copy.

MR. BELGER: Okay, I never say it, but,

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okay, I don't doubt that.

MR. : Now, when we get to 93, you can, you know, read the three pages or the two and a half pages yourself, but I'll represent to you that there's no notification time in here.

MR. BELGER: Right, and that doesn't surprise me.

MR. : Why, tell me why not?

MR. BELGER: Because from, and again, going back to my assumption, or my two assumptions, from this time on, from 9:00--before this time, from 9:20 on, my assumption, my belief, my--what I was told is that NMCC was on the net, so it's kind of like the three of us on this conference call we're all hearing the same thing, there's no record of me turning to you and saying, hey, I'm notifying you of what you just heard.

MR. : And that's because you're saying the FAA believed that the NMCC was on the net?

MR. BELGER: Yes, that's what I believe, that's what I was told.

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MR. : Then, I have to--why would it not, then, make sense to put in there that there was an open line, just like NORAD did on their release, as you said, why not put in that there was an open line and--

MR. BELGER: I don't know.

MR. : --that we believe notification occurred at this time?

MR. BELGER: It could have, I think--

MR. : What that is is that--an the same thing applies for 77--

MR. BELGER: In other summaries, I saw, there was an indication of the 9:20, other summaries prepared by the FAA.

MR. : I want to show you from the NEDS log that, obviously, some person in a position of responsibility at the FAA did have to work on this.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Among other things, maybe, I don't know. But listed for the first citation of United 93, in here. That's United tail number,

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that goes with 93; just so you know, one of your Boston folks gave the tail number and they wanted to know what it was, souls on-board and tail number--just sort of standard--

MR. : 93 or 175?

MR. : I'm sorry, 175. The first mention we see, and you can look at it yourself is 1407 bomb on-board UAL 93 over Pittsburgh, with a mode 3 an a lat and long. 1007.

MR. BELGER: All right.

MR. : And that is 1007. And I would pose the question to you that was this reviewed with you at all that your folks, obviously, and your staff, are relying on the log to give the notification time on 11 and 175. The leave blank, the notification times for United 93. The basis that you say you have for your belief that they did know about it, that they--the military-- knew about it was because of the open line--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --but the open line's not

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even cited in here.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Nothing's cited and the source that they're using, at least, for what the military says that they were told by FAA and when, mainly this NEDS log shows a 1007 was the first time that United 93 was mentioned.

MR. BELGER: Okay, but I've seen other summaries that did note the 9:20 Primary Net being established which included the NMCC. So, I mean, this, I don't know just when that was prepared, but my guess is, you could probably--my guess is every summary that was put together had some different information--added information in it.

MR. : But this is an FAA summary put together on September 17 at 6:30 in the morning, which is the day before the NORAD press release goes out to the public.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And which, parenthetically, we are told the Administration was alerting a briefing from the FAA and the military

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on what happened on 9/11 and what they knew when.
Did you participate in the briefing or the
Administrator Garvey do you know?

MR. BELGER: With whom?

MR. : The representatives of the
Administration.

MR. BELGER: Geeze, I don't--we had dozens
of meetings. I mean, I don't remember specifically
that--

MR. : Within the first week
after the events of 9/11, do you recall an initial
meeting where the Administration wanted to know--we
want a representative from the FAA and the
military, we want to know what happened when?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that.

MR. : Would you have remember if
you attended?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember attending a
meeting like that.

MR. : You don't remember either
hearing about it?

MR. BELGER: I don't, I mean, like I said,

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there were--I remember, just generally, that there were dozens of status briefings and meetings. I don't remember that specifically the way you described it.

MR. : This is something Shirley Miller faxed me last night. This is material that she says from the Administrator's briefing book for the Congressional hearings.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Okay, so--I guess before we look at the material, would you agree with the assumption that I'm going to make now, and if you don't, by all means tell me.

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. : But I'm going to make some sort of underlying assumption here, that if the Administrator of the FAA and the highest-ranking person is going to brief Congress on what the FAA knew when and what they told the military when--I'm going to kind of assume that the FAA folks are going to do a little work--not you, but your staff's going to do a little work to try and get it

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right--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, sure.

MR. : --to find out what happened.

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

MR. : And, certainly, to the extent that there's any indicia of an indication early on to the military, that, obviously, would reflect favorably on the performance of the FAA, one would think that would be included in the Administrative brief. Is that fair to say?

MR. BELGER: Sure, if it was known, yeah.

MR. : This is marked September 18, which, I guess, coincidentally is the same day as the NORAD press release.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And this is United 93. This is from the briefing book.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I remember seeing that.

MR. : You do remember this?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : The Roc, 9:39 an then

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Cleveland Center notifies Pittsburgh TRACON of the unauthorized turn toward Pittsburgh, loss of transponder--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And then it just says primary target terminates. There's no time here about notification to the military. There's a note that says a specific time for FAA notification of the military is not available.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : However, FAA in the Northeast Air Defense Sector had established a line of open communication discussing American Airlines 77 and it is believed--it is believed--that UN 93 was also discussed. It doesn't sound too definitive, but there's a belief that it is.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Tell me about if you remember this--it seems like that's an important point that it would have been discussed with regard to this specific chronology on United 93?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think it was

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discussed, and I think, again, it is my belief--it's my belief that the NMCC was on the Primary Net and United 93 was discussed on that net.

MR. : And if someone, though, were able to go confirm that in the aftermath leading--prior to this document, or up to the date of this document, 9/18, then wouldn't they have used stronger language, like review of the Primary Network?

MR. BELGER: They might have, I mean, again, these people were under enormous--I mean the person who wrote this, probably hadn't slept in a week. I think I may--if I got two hours sleep a night that week, it was extraordinary. So, I can't fault them for not being as specific as we, four years later might have thought they might have been.

MR. : It doesn't even have a notification at all, it's just a footnote sort of.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, but it's very accurate and honest. I mean there is no specific

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notification time.

MR. : It doesn't give a general one, either, it doesn't give a time frame.

MR. BELGER: I mean, again, because I've already said this 15 times, if I think they all heard it at the same time, that is what I think,

MR. : Okay, did anybody discuss the possibility that they didn't hear it? Was that brought up during the discussion with United 93?

MR. BELGER: No, an the reason being--no. The answer is, no. And, as I said earlier, I never got any indication--I never got any indication from the military that they were not aware of United 93 status.

MR. : You, personally, didn't?

MR. BELGER: I never did.

MR. : None of your folks did?

MR. BELGER: I never did--

MR. : Do you know if any--

MR. BELGER: I don't know, I mean, they never told me so how would I know? Up until the time I left, I never thought, was never told,

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nobody from the military ever said to me, and I asked Shirley this, also, and nobody ever said to here--that they wee concerned about United 93 notification. I mean, that's--

MR. : One of your Air Traffic folks had had conversations with General Arnold from CONAR an they said that notifications to the military from the FAA was, and I'm using now, quotes from, virtually verbatim from two of your people who were in Air Traffic, that it was, quote/unquote, "the topic was a hotly debated topic,"--

MR. BELGER: Between?

MR. : --hotly debated and disputed between the FAA and the military as to what each party knew when, and specifically when the FAA notified the military.

MR. BELGER: This is like, after the fact?

MR. : After the fact, that there were some heated exchanges about when the FAA actually knew stuff and when they told the military.

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MR. BELGER: I have no idea.

MR. : That was never brought to your level of attention?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MR. : Would you expect that to be something that should have been brought to your attention?

MR. BELGER: If it wasn't resolved.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: The fact that there was heated discussion, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't come to a resolution.

MR. : It was also stated that a CONAR representative took the position that they did not have any advance notice of United 93, the fourth airplane.

MR. BELGER: Okay, like I said, that's, I haven't heard--

MR. : You never heard of that before?

MR. BELGER: I don't believe that--I might be wrong, if this is a matter of record that can be

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checked, I don't believe that came out in any of the hearings. That DOD said that--I mean, I don't believe that came out in any press reports; I'm just saying it never came to me officially or unofficially. It certainly, I mean they had plenty of opportunity to complain if it were true, both in hearings and dozens of interviews.

MR. : Well, we haven't been able to find the Primary Net, certainly not between the hours of 8:30 and 10:30. Now, we all know at 10:30, all four crashes were over.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : I haven't been able to find any recording of a Primary Net.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I don't think it was recorded.

MR. : I can tell you, that we have a recording of what's referred to as the Tactical Net, from FAA headquarters. That they had a line called the Tactical Net.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And we do have a part to

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that, and not because it was recorded, from the Command Center, from I mean the WOC or headquarters, but we have the Herndon end of it, the Command Center at the Herndon end of the recording.

MR. BELGER: Okay, do you follow me?

MR. : Do you follow me?

MR. BELGER: They're talking to these people down her, probably.

MR. : No, what we have is, this is, we're calling it the FAA Tactical Net, is on here, the moderator, I'll show you where it first comes in.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And we have this transcript is from the Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, from position No. 14, which is the CNY, New York Center position in Herndon.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : So, we're picking up from the Herndon end--

MR. BELGER: Well, I think that's

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different than the Tactical Net we're talking about here. This is--that's probably Air Traffic's terminology for it.

MR. : You think this is going on down at the--

MR. BELGER: Well, let me see it, let me--generally the folks in the Command Center were talking to the Air Traffic people down in--

MR. : It says FAA's Tactical Net go ahead. Who are you trying to get in touch with? AEA--

MR. BELGER: All right, that's Security.

MR. : Pete Falcone [ph], Pete Falcone.

MR. BELGER: All right, that's security, so that's probably here.

MR. : That's here?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, that's probably here. That's what I thought, because it's Pete Falcone, moderating--

MR. : Okay, gotcha.

MR. BELGER: --that should be centered in

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here. And he asked Pete Falcone, this is Marcus Aroyo [ph], who we know is Eastern Region Security at the time.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : AEA Security, which net is this?

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : This is tactical, Marcus. Now that's Peter Falcone. So, I could be wrong, but I'm, based on the protocol--I've got Pete Falcone, who should be security in the ACC telling one of his security folks at the region--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --this is the Tactical Net.

MR. BELGER: We just called it the internal FAA net,. right.

MR. : This is, we're getting from the Command Center, this transcript, this tape, in other words I have this tape because we got the Command Center at Herndon, was obviously listening--they were on the line.

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MR. BELGER: Okay, all right, that's what I said before, okay, that's right. Yes, they should have been on, yeah, that facility should have been on the Tactical Net.

MR. : And I'll represent to you that, and you can look at it, but there was conversation here were there was updates about United 93.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : In fact, there's even a conversation about the fast-moving aircraft, at 9:36, roughly--fast moving VFR moving towards the White House.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay.

MR. : Be alert that this information is coming from Air Traffic, that's the Eastern Region reporting on the Tact net?

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Falcone copy. Falcone and his people copy. And that four, now there's four, United 99, Newark to San Francisco over Cleveland, someone says, no, United 93. It's the fourth,

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someone corrects him. This is [unintell.] passing on from [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : He gives the information on this going forward. This is another Command Center gentleman saying from our understanding American 11 was the first to hit the World Trade Center, it was originally Boston/L.A.; he talks about 175; and then the other two flight call signs we have are United 93 and American 77. And at this point, there aren't 12, 13, 20 in the mix yet. More come later. And then they have an update on United 93, you'll see this throughout their updates on 93, so the Tact net is monitoring it. But we know the military's not on the Tact Net because that's internal FAA.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. : And we see that this is at 10:14 a.m. do we have NMCC on-board, someone asks, NMCC, someone says NOCC is on; question, military Command Center? And then answer, I believe that the Maintenance Command Center that checked in in

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the FAA Tact Net. You probably should get a military entity on here. We also received word from Air Force 1

MR. : This is still the Tactical Net.?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : This is still the Tactical Net, I understand we should get a military entity on here.

MR. BELGER: All right. It doesn't mean they weren't on the Primary Net.

MR. : Right.

MR. : Still, this is much later than 10:15, about 30 pages ahead. This is Air Traffic Services cell at Herndon, I'd like to find out if NORAD is up on the net?

MR. BELGER: Okay, that's a military person.

MR. : FAA Tact Net, they want to know if the military's on this bridge. Air Traffic Cell, okay, this is the Command on the Air Traffic, there's no indication that--Air Traffic Services,

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I'm trying to find out if NORAD is up on the bridge yet? This is the Air Traffic Control Center, I have not hear them on here. So, this is on the Tact Net again, well, past 10:15, people are asking for--

MR. BELGER: Right. Well, but, let me, if you go back to. There's a person and it looks like it was probably Falcone, running the Tactical Net. He ought to be passing whatever information comes out of this Tactical Net onto the coordinator and getting it into the Primary Net.

I mean, that's kind of his job, yes. So, he's getting a lot of, you know, kind of detailed information from the FAA facilities. He's right--he should--I assume he's right here, he should be right here. He ought to be passing whatever's relevant, whatever he's learning on to the folks on the Primary Net.

MR. : Well, what just sort of strikes me, as a reader, and a listener to this tape is the Tact Net's moderated and you can hear that, he's on it Tact Net, this is Tact Net, we got

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Herndon on--and they keep saying no at NMCC yet.

MR. BELGER: Okay, I'm not even sure if they should be on the Tact Net.

MR. : Right someone indicated to us that they probably shouldn't have been on here, but what you don't here, what's conspicuously absent, I guess, is nobody from the Tact Net side, i.e., Peter Falcone saying, hey, if you wanted NMCC, get on the Primary Net, you're on the wrong net or roughly, they're on the Primary Net. There's no indication that from his end, at least, that he's even aware that they are on any net, call it Tact call it Primary call it a Cannoles Telecon, call it the ABC telecon, he's not indicating.

MR. BELGER: I assume you will talk to him about that.

MR. : Pete? Yeah.

MR. BELGER: But see, that's the same--that Tactical Net summary, the same type of discussion was happening on the Primary Net. The coordinator's talking to--

MR. : Well, you're assuming

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that, but we haven't seen it yet.

MR. BELGER: No, I'm assuming it from 30 years in history.

MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : But what we're trying to find out and it's not, I'm not passing judgment on whether or not--I'm just trying to figure out was it up.

MR. BELGER: And I'm going to try to tell you how you can tie that down factually.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: That's what I'm going to try to help you. God, almighty, I want to help. And there, this--what frustrates me about some of this discussion, quite frankly, is there are factual ways to answer your questions without relying on what people remember four years ago.

MR. : Okay, I'm going to be 100 percent, I'm going to be 100 percent straight on this, because you know what? I don't--you know what my stake in this is, Mr. Belger? I want to

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just know what the truth is and give it out to the public. That's our job to find out--

MR. BELGER: I'll tell you what I would do if I were you.

MR. : And I'll tell you what--I want you to know what my efforts were. If I've asked once, I've asked a million times of your former colleagues across the street, could you help us find the Primary Net because it's referenced in the documents and we can't find it for the love of God.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : I can't find it and tell me where I can find it. And you know what? I get this. And I get a shell game, I get, I don't know, maybe it's here; maybe it was--

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. : An indicia of it, even if it's not recorded, you tell me who was on it. Nobody can even give me a name of an FAA representative who was on the Primary Net that day. And I'm baffled by this.

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MR. : John, let me take over for just a second.

MR. AZZARELLO: I have talked to Shirley, I've talked to Linda Schuessler, I've talked to Shirley Miller ad nauseam about, can you at least tell me where it was conducted from or who was on it.

MR. BELGER: Hold on, let me tell you--

MR. : Wait. One level below you, here's as close as we've come--we have come to the--

MR. AZZARELLO: No, don't even, let's hear how we should get it before we say any--I don't want to pollute Mr. Belger's mind on anything what shoulda/coulda what somebody else said. I want his input on how we can find it. If he can tell us.

MR. BELGER: If I were going to try to factually zero-in on what you're asking. These are the questions I would ask. So, bear with me for a second here, I'm this is the result of ten seconds of thought, but bear with me. Here's the first think I would do. From the Washington Operations

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Center, do they have a log of when other agencies were ratchet into the Primary Net?

MR. AZZARELLO: We asked for that.

MR. BELGER: Did they say no?

MR. AZZARELLO: They say handwritten logs are non existent or they were discarded or this is the only one that exists.

MR. BELGER: Well, you know, I--I'd go ask again.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it's not--

MR. BELGER: And you're right and it wouldn't be on there, it would be on kind of their daily notes of when they call people. So, that's number one. Number two, whoever was running the Primary Net, for the Security organization, if it was Lee Longmire or if it was somebody else standing in for him, at 920, ask them who was on the Primary Net?

Ask the other agencies, you know, were you on the net with the FAA from at least 9:20 on. And by other agencies, I mean--

MR. AZZARELLO: We've asked.

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MR. BELGER: In terms of the notifications to NORAD, rather than relying on an FAA report that says, NEDS log shows nothing. I would ask specifically, is there an FAA record? In other words, when somebody in the Boston Center called NORAD, was that an FAA entry on some FAA log or can you talk to that person who made that call to tell you that he made that car.

In other words you were asking me, and rightfully so, why is the FAA just relying on what NORAD's logs show? So, I'd go back to the FAA and say, you now, who made this call to NEDS and is there some documentation within FAA. And there might already be.

MR. AZZARELLO: Here's something that Miles just reminded me it does exist on September 20, so this is a document that was produced by the FAA to us and it's called notifications to the molliter. And if you want to look at this, it's a sequence of events. This comes out on the 17th, it says the FAA summary. It doesn't say anything about 93 or 77, but it quotes the logs.

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MR. BELGER: Okay, this is what I'm getting at. So you can get FAA records, not just NORAD records.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we've listened to the TRACON tapes, we've seen--

MR. BELGER: So, you're not just relying on--

MR. AZZARELLO: No--

MR. BELGER: --what you asked me before about--

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MR. BELGER: --okay, good, that's good.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then the NORAD press release comes out a day after this.

MR. BELGER: Okay, good--

MR. AZZARELLO: Then Darlene Freeman [ph], believes that she may have been the author of this, only this looks like it's familiar language, one of these entries looks like the words she would use.

MR. BELGER: She did do some of the

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summary work for us.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we were told that one of her specific assignments--we were told actually by you, was to compare what the FAA had in terms of notifications and what the military has--

MR. BELGER: That's what I said before, I wanted to know if there were discrepancies.

MR. AZZARELLO: And this is what was produced on the 20th, you have Boston TRACON called--Boston Center asking Cape TRACON to call Otis to get help on 11.

MR. BELGER: Yes, I remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then at 8:38, they called directly to NEDS.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: In the interim they find out TRACON they can't just scramble without authorization, that they've already figured out that they--and we know that this is thinking outside the box, it's parallel notification. That's not protocol but they were assuming--

MR. BELGER: And my hat goes off to them.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Absolutely, and their logs, see now the NEDS log show they got the call.

MR. : And that's a direct reference, we think to this document.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we've listened to the call from both ends, we've listened to it from the ZBW end and from the NED ring.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: We're tracking all tapes we got from any angle. Now, this is, we'll come back--that's just an anomaly, we'll come back to that later, but it's at 8:43. NORAD put in their press release that they FAA told them about United 175. We've looked at the controller who was on 175 at that time and he was not even aware that there was something amiss until after, 8:46, because he was tracking, he was responsible for American 11.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, we don't know where this came from, but your representative, Darlene Freeman, says that they believe it's related to 11, the first hijacking, but it might be the source of

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the NORAD press release which says it was--see they put 8:43 in the NORAD release for FAA notification to NEDS.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: From what we can see the transponder wasn't changed on 175 till 8:46, so there would have been no indicia for the Controller looking at her screen or talking to the aircraft to know there was something wrong.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, clearly, whatever the source at NORAD is inaccurate.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We have yet, just so you know, we have yet to track this, though the 8:43 time to what's the source of this time.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: The document says New York Center asked their military liaison specialist to go get military help.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: We have yet to see that in

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a log, but it suggests that maybe there's some New York Center log which would have an 8:43 time when someone said, go get help.

MR. BELGER: Right. That's what I was getting at.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's go down, it says 9:05, the NEDS log show them notified--FAA notified the military regarding 175, again, it's the NEDS log. So this would indicate that either Darlene Freeman had access to that or somebody else was giving her the information from the log. But we know it was provided to, according to a couple of folks that the FAA had access to the log.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: [unintell.] was convened between 9:16 and 9:25 by the CIA; it says Washington Ops Center activates the Primary Net, which includes NMCC and [unintell.] at 9:20.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: NEDS log show 9:24, FAA notifying them regarding American Airlines 77.

MR. : That's the entry where the

tail number is.

MR. AZZARELLO: This is the difficulty we have with that one, we think this is just totally wrong, because that, the NEDS log entry is at 1324 is American Airlines tail number hijacked, but that's the tail number of 11. And so, if anybody bothered to check the tail number, they would know that that's not 77, but 11.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And, in fact, we have the pull and [unintell.] in the floor where your Boston folks are reporting the tail number on American 11, as it comes across on the call--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: --roughly within a minute of it being logged just saying here's the tail number on 11.

MR. BELGER: Okay. So, that's obviously an error.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it's also in connection, by the way with the belief that American 11 was flying South to Washington.

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MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Not on notification of 77.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Then you have 9:26, FAA Net Logs. We have yet to find any net logs. Either Primary or Tactical or any other deemed net.

MR. BELGER: [reads to self] I don't know which net log that would be.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, that says, though, that there was a discussion about possibly both New York, accidents, or New York crashes being caused by American Airlines flights. That was a belief at some point in the system, that American thought both--they thought 77, which was thought lost, and then crashed, had actually crashed--

MR. BELGER: That's right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it says, this may be the source of the 9:24 NEDS entry on, I guess on 77. And then it says NMCC and Secret Service on the Net. I don't know which net, she's referring to, because previous sentence is Net Logs. I don't know if that's Tactical or Primary.

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MR. BELGER: Well, My--I mean.

MR. : But there's no second--

MR. AZZARELLO: There's no second page--

MR. : --there's no second page
to this.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and there's not mention
even to 93 of even reliance on an open line and you
have the NORAD press release which is two days
before this, which obviously, you folks had,
because you asked them to do a comparison between
what the military was saying--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --we told them when--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and when we were saying
we told them when. And there is a notification of
93, there's four asterisks, it says the FAA needs
to establish an open line communication discussing
77 and 93.

MR. BELGER: Right, that's what I was--

MR. AZZARELLO: But that's got adopted by
your folks on the 20th.

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MR. BELGER: Well, you know, you're right, I mean, I can't explain why whoever wrote this didn't include that in this document.

MR. BELGER: Let me ask you this--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, did they discuss it with you, I mean, this obviously--

MR. BELGER: No, again, my assumption all along was just what this says. And I, you know, I would have read this, I would have said, yeah, I know about 93, it was already in open continuous discussion, so there was no discrete notification. I mean, that's what I thought when I read this.

MR. : We were told that this publication by NORAD on the 18th caught FAA headquarters by surprise. Did that surprise get communicated to you and Jane?

MR. BELGER: I was surprised.

MR. : Hmm? l

MR. BELGER: I was surprised.

MR. : You were surprised?

MR. BELGER: I was surprised they put out a press release.

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MR. : Did you or Jane call General Eberhardt [ph], or did someone call their Public Affairs people and say why did you do this?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, I don't know. Actually, I think our Public Affairs folks did talk to NORAD. Oh, yeah, I was surprised that they put out a press release.

MR. : Because frankly they got out in front of you with this.

MR. BELGER: Well, I was surprised because I thought we were kind of not going to be releasing chronologies.

MR. : Yeah, how does that dovetail with your earlier statement that DOJ was saying be careful about what you disseminate out there.

MR. BELGER: Well, that's why I was surprised. I mean, I had, I can't answer for why NORAD did it.

MR. : There are discussions between Jeff Griffith and General Arnold at Tindle Air Force Base, we have--those discussions have

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been characterized to us as being heated at times.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I--

MR. : And there are differences between the two agencies between who was told what when.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Your guidance form DOJ is not to publish a time line, you're in discussions with NORAD and NORAD on the 18th, in my military terminology took the high ground, they put out their release. But what happens at the highest levels of FAA when this happens?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think we were surprised just because we didn't know it was coming. I don't think, when we went back and looked at it, I don't think that there was, if I recall right, there was nothing inconsistent in there with what we thought. So, there was no reason to get alarmed about inaccuracies in it. We were just shocked that they did it.

MR. : But this doesn't rely on cite to this notification on 93 occurring sometime

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in this open line that started at 9:--what did I say, 9:16?

MR. BELGER: I'm sorry say, again?

MR. AZZARELLO: You have asked Darlene, right. I don't want to make assumptions that--

MR. BELGER: I asked her to compare. I asked her to look at everything we had and tell me if there was a problem.

MR. AZZARELLO: And to give you--what is this, this is the FAA position on when they notified the military, it's her document?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: What I'm saying is what's conspicuously absent is any reference to any open line between FAA and NEDS discussing United 93.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, that's what I said, I can't--I don't know why she didn't include that in here. I don't know. What I said was, there was nothing that appeared to me to be in error with what NORAD said. That was all I said. That's what I said a minute ago.

MR. AZZARELLO: Wouldn't there have been a

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discussion with her if you decided not, that there was nothing on 93 on this, there was no citation when FAA notification on 93, which you might not say conflicts with the NORAD one, but NORAD has additional information on 93, they're saying there was an open line of communication with--

MR. BELGER: Well, I guess I inherent--I knew that, I mean, I knew that, I mean, I knew it. So, the fact that she didn't put it on the paper, didn't alarm me, I knew it.

MR. AZZARELLO: You knew it or you assumed it was occurring on this open line, that there was communication--

MR. BELGER: I knew that the net was set up, I knew they were supposed to be on it, I knew that all the briefings I got said they were on it. I'm telling you what I knew.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm going to put myself in your shoes, now. I'm the number two guy at the FAA. I have a lot of assumptions on what should have happened on 9/11

MR. BELGER: Well, for us.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Some assumptions on what should have happened on 9/11 according to--

MR. BELGER: On what they told me, by what I was told. That the NMCC was on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, somebody you're saying went back and confirmed post-9/11 and said they were on the net, the NMCC was on the net.

MR. BELGER: The briefing papers I got, like this one, says they were on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, this one doesn't say it.

MR. BELGER: Well, it says, which includes NMCC.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, it says that they're on the net.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you get any confirmation that they were on the net when United 93 was discussed?

MR. BELGER: No, I did not go and say, you know, is NMCC on the net at this moment? No, I did not.

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MR. AZZARELLO: No, if they were really, really on the net, if they stayed on the net? That they stayed on the net and they were on it when that information came across.

MR. BELGER: They can tell you were they on it all the time or not.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask you a more fundamental question: You've been in FAA for 30 years, you were in it before you left. I don't need to tell you something as rudimentary as if we want to say that the military was actually aware of 93, because we had lead time on it, then we, potentially, would we not, look to the Cleveland or the people that might have been controlling within the FAA that might have been guiding the interceptors towards United 93. Wouldn't that be some indicia that the FAA could look to to see if there was any communication between the FAA and the military about tracking down a suspect missile--

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that was headed for Washington, D.C.?

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MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Wouldn't that be a good way to say?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Because they can't just go find it till the FAA says, you know, here's United 93, Cleveland says it's tracking them as a primary, and now hook your folks up with Cleveland Center and they're give you a lat and long of where he's headed?

MR. BELGER: Right. And I don't think there's a record of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, I don't, I would imagine that would have been--was that something that was brought to your attention after 9/11? In the aftermath, that there was no indication that any FAA air traffic controllers were coordinating--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I knew that, yeah, I mean, it was what it was, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's some indication, is it not, that there may have been a disconnect between the FAA and the military on

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getting an aircraft a fighter escort to go find
United 93?

MR. BELGER: Well, so what you said is
just kind of speculation, so allow me to speculate,
I mean--

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, well, no, it's not
spec--in all fairness to the record, it's not
speculation that your people told you there was no
FAA--

MR. BELGER: Okay, so you're talking about
the absence of something.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. BELGER: So, let me talk about the
absence of something in it, which might make a
difference for you.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MR. BELGER: You can also paint this
picture that by the time of 9:20 or I'm sorry by
the time the F16s had scrambled from Langley and I
forget what time that was, they're over the
Washington area--

MR. : 9:24 they scrambled.

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MR. BELGER: --all right, so they're over the Washington area shortly after that. They're there. The military said, they kept them there in case there were any other aircraft that they needed to respond to, at least they said that publicly. Everybody in the world, in my view, knew what was happening with United 93 at that time.

I can't show you a discrete notification, you're absolutely right, but I think the military folks at the Command Center knew; I think the military liaison folks in Air Traffic knew; I think that NMCC was on the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: But in order to coordinate a response on the military end, who was--was is it the NMCC would have asked--

MR. BELGER: The NMCC would have requested or DOD would have requested. Or, as it was reported, you know, somebody would have given an order.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, the FAA headquarters generally has to request DOD assistance on a hijacked aircraft, right?

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MR. BELGER: In general, yes, although this was not your normal hijacking exercise.

MR. AZZARELLO: And somebody had pointed out the aircraft, we have it on our system somewhere and we--need you to go--

MR. BELGER: Right and, in fact, they--in fact they did that with another aircraft that was over the Washington area.

MR. AZZARELLO: You brought up something now that I want to address. You said that you wanted to speculate that--talked about speculation--and I want to draw a distinction between there is--it's not speculation if somebody comes and tells you, we have not found any air traffic control tapes that would indicate our controllers were vectoring military fighters toward--

MR. BELGER: Right, I new we weren't, right, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: And we've interviewed all the controllers at Cleveland and no one seems to recall that.

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MR. BELGER: We weren't', we didn't do that.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if it's not, if it's just that there's an absence of that is that we haven't found it, then tell us, because if it existed--

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, no, it wasn't done, I mean I don't think there was any evidence or recollection that the military was--that the FAA asked the military to do something regarding United 93. I'm not aware of that at all. No, don't think that happened.

MR. : Give me the last question.

MR. BELGER: I don't think there's any record--it didn't happen, I don't think the FAA asked the military to do anything regarding United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: It wasn't clear to me until you just said that now. So you don't think there's any record that shows--

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, no, no, there's no record--

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MR. AZZARELLO: --that the FAA asked the military to do anything with the plane?

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, absolutely, I don't think there's any record of that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Short of asking them to do something, is there any record that they even alerted the NMCC that they were tracking United 93 as a primarily and they thought it was hijacked with a bomb on-board?

MR. BROWN: No, there is no record I can point to. But I'm telling you, I think the NMCC was on the Primary Net.

MR. : I want to come now, John, to the specificity that we do know. There's a dais in the aviation crisis center and Lee Longmire is looking down on the 9 or 12 positions. Is that your recollection of what that room looks like?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, right.

MR. : And, variously, we've been told that Jeff Griffith and Doug Davis were here in constant communication with John White out at the Command Center in Herndon.

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MR. BROWN: Okay.

MR. : However, we agree with you that that conversation, perhaps, was taking place down there. We're not 100 percent sure.

MR. BELGER: I think they were back and forth. I think Doug and Jeff were back and forth.

MR. : Back and forth between Cannoles and up here?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : And what we can pinpoint, then, based on what you just said, is where the hub, if you will of wherever was Doug Davis who was glued to the ear, was he down here or was he--

MR. BELGER: I thought he was down here.

MR. : You thought he was down in Cannoles.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Now, then we've been told that in the first row below that pick, port or starboard, is the primary operator for the Tactical Net, let me scratch that word primary, the operator or the Tactical Net and the Operator for the

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Primary Net and then behind them they had recorders, we were on a computer.

MR. BELGER: Okay, correct, okay.

MR. : And then in the middle here somewhere would be Janet Right, who was in communication with the companies, if you will?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Does that square with your understanding? I know that's getting a level of management a little bit below where you--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I know those functions existed, I didn't know what exactly, yeah.

MR. : And we are trying to identify who these two people were below that were Tactical and Primary. And you're in and out and you're management awareness. Can you help us out on that at all?

MR. BELGER: No, I can't.

MR. : Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: We're almost finished up. I just want to make sure I clarify this because I now the military is an all encompassing term. And

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what I want to make sure is--

MR. BELGER: Well, actually that's a good point, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you said there's no record that the FAA asked for military assistance on 93, does that cover NMCC, NORAD, NEDS, the military?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I mean, I think that's my understanding.

MR. AZZARELLO: And the same would apply with respect to, there's no specific pointing out that we could have evidence, nothing in the record that the FAA pointed to any branch of the military on United 93 and said, hey, it's out there, it's a hijack, we wanted you to know about this?

MR. BELGER: I can't, I have not been shown and I don't think you've been shown any discrete documentation ?

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MR. BELGER: I don't

MR. AZZARELLO: And let me tell you where we're at--this is where we are at right now, is that

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there's no record on a NEDS floor that it ever came in until 10:07, which you see in your log. We've listened to all the tapes and there's nothing that would indicate, and when you hear it come in on the floor at 10:07, the tape and the call comes in--

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --you hear the IB techs yelling out 93 bomb--bomb on-board.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, it had already crashed.

MR. : Yeah, that's right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, let me, I'm not finding that, and tell me if this was in any way considered as a possibility in the aftermath of 9/11. Where we're at now, is we're believing that, based on what we see, and what we're reviewing, that there might have been assumptions by a lot of people that the military was on the line, the NMCC, that maybe they were aware of 93 but maybe, that those assumptions prove to be inaccurate and that they were unaware of it. I mean, have your folks looked at that in the aftermath of 9/11?

MR. BELGER: Not that I'm aware of--not

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that I'm aware of.

MR. AZZARELLO: Was that even discussed?

MR. BELGER: No, because there was never any indication, like I said from the military that they were not aware of United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: So to the extent that General Arnold or one of his representatives told somebody in the FAA Air Traffic that it never reached him?

MR. BELGER: No, that was never brought to my attention. It's never on any of these logs; it's never, I don't know that you--if you've got a document, for God's sake show me and I'll--if you've got something show me. But, I mean, it never was brought to my attention that there was a notification problem with United 93.

I'll say, again, it never came up in hearings; it never came up in any press reports that I saw. I was there for a year after 9/11, it never came up.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you call, I would feel, if I were in your shoes, and you might not

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have felt the same. If I were in your shoes, I'd feel a little bit, if I can find the right word here, a little bit confused if not frustrated or maybe even upset, if I were told by DOJ, you know, be careful, did they say don't put out any time lines yet, did they want you to run it by them before it was put out?

MR. BELGER: No, I wasn't upset, that's kind of the normal when you're in the midst of a possible criminal investigation. The hugest criminal attack on the country in its history and it's kind of normal that you just don't have agencies go putting out stuff.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you saw the NORAD one, though, did you want to reach out to them and say, wait a minute, what's going on here? You said not to put anything out, now they've put something out.

MR. BELGER: Well, actually, I think our public affairs folks did do that. Yeah, I mean, I think they did contact NORAD and say, what's going on?

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MR. AZZARELLO: So the reason for the DOJ, then, which I didn't know earlier was is because of the potential of criminal prosecution they didn't want to--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think so, I mean this was a huge, I mean the biggest criminal attack in the history of our country.

MR. : But what then, causes the FAA a year later, almost a year later to go ahead and put out a--

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean, this is--it's a year later, all this stuff was kind of in the public anyway, a year later?

MR. AZZARELLO: Did the DOJ say that was okay?

MR. BELGER: I assume they did, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember?

MR. BELGER: I don't know, no one ever made.

MR. AZZARELLO: One last--

MR. BELGER: I was going to make another point, go ahead.

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MR. AZZARELLO: This is on the transcript from the Command Center, it's from the MT analyst position, John White was seated at this line, I think.

MR. BELGER: Okay, he's the number two guy at the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yes, Jeff Griffith at 9:18 a.m., it says [unintell.] zulu, Jeff Griffith on the line, I need to talk to Linda or John, John's right here. John gets on, hold on for Jeff.

MR. BELGER: All right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Hi, Jeff; Hi, John.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Griffith says he wants phone number where he can reach him at any time.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: John gives him this number for the non-5144, says I've been calling it, it rings off the hook, nobody answers, pretty much he wants a line there. This is, whenever you see MTM, that's John White talking at the Command Center. He's giving him information on the first day of

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ground stop--

MR. BELGER: Are you sure that's always
John White?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, he stays with this
phone.

MR. : He's glued.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah,

MR. BELGER: But you don't know if that's
the same number?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, no, he doesn't call
another number--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: He says I've been calling

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: They haven't really
established the second aircraft that hit the tower,
okay. Jeff says, all right, and then John says
it's either American or United, we don't know
which. Okay, Jeff knows it's United 175, tell me
if you can give me it's departure and destination?
John says, it's Boston, I'll get you the
destination, what else do you need. And then he

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tells him, Jeff, you know 175 was going to Los Angeles. You still there, John? Yeah; okay, John stays on. All right, John, stay with me; you got time for some information? Let me ask you one. Jeff wants to know about a Chicago-to-L.A. flight just to check with Chicago Center; get some awareness out to the PMCs or the traffic manager units, report any unusual circumstances direct to the Command Center, loss of ID, radio, unusual, anything.

MR. BELGER: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, John says to Jeff, I have one of those for you. Go ahead. American 77, go ahead. Dulles to L.A. and he gives him the indicia that it was played level at its last top; where it was last seen; where they lost the target and that they're looking for the aircraft.

Now, they don't have a primary or anything like that. That's right before 9:26.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that's 9:25.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: These are FAA transcripts we were told were produced immediately on that following weekend at the direction of somebody at a higher level, potentially at headquarters and that, specifically, they wanted to see this call because they knew John White was on it with headquarters and it was a direct link of communication to see what was going back and forth, do you recall that?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, it shows, just what-- one of the things that jumps out is that it's 9:25 they had no idea where American 77 is, so that, certainly would conflict with the FAA--with NORAD saying at 9:24 they were told it was reported as a hijack. They didn't know where it was at this point at all and there was no indicia that it was hijacked.

MR. BELGER: Okay, wait a second, who--

MR. AZZARELLO: NORAD--

MR. BELGER: --no, but who in the FAA? I mean, we're talking about notification, who made that notification?

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, we don't know?

MR. BELGER: From the facility? I mean it could very easily, I mean I could see a 10-second difference and these are in minutes, now, not seconds.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. BELGER: I don't know who did that.

MR. AZZARELLO: The only calls coming into NEDS at that time was regarding American 11, may still be airborne headed to Washington.

MR. : But the specificity of the tail number on--

MR. BELGER: The wrong tail number?

MR. : Right it's got 11's tail number--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: You think that's the source of the NORAD's confusion

MR. BELGER: Yeah, gotcha there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, when did you get that? What time did you get the information, Jeff wants to know. John tells him about 10 minutes ago

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on losing 77.

MR. BELGER: So, about 9:15.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it's 9:26, Jeff says, we're talking about that right now, just got a Cannoles correction, just make sure we get this information out to all the Centers, report any unusual transmissions.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I want to go forward to 9:34. This is now Doug, sitting in for Jeff Griffith. It says, Doug, we just had another report, United 93 it was in Cleveland Center's airspace somewhere around [unintell.] just reported they heard screaming on the frequency and that people have a bomb on-board the aircraft.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Departed Newark en route to San Francisco was the report. This goes on from 9:34 a.m. to past the time it crashes.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, it does sort of comport with your statement that the FAA was out in

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front on this one, in the sense that--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --29 minutes before it crashes.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, we now know that this is at--this is being discussed from Command Center and at headquarters by Doug Davis?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: And Jeff Griffith?

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug's recollection is, he passed this information to one of three or four people, either Jeff Griffith, who was standing by him much of this time--

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Peter [unintell.], Steve Brown, or Shirley Miller.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that if he's glued to the phones, then the decision makers can do whatever they feel necessary. This goes from a

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plane crashed into the Pentagon is reported at 9:41, just three minutes after impact.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug, yes? This is John giving information, United 93, we spoke about him before? 9:41, yeah, John. He's reversing his course over Akron, they just lost his transponder, he's headed east-bound. What kind of airplane, do we know yet? 757. Okay, he's descending, John says correct, John says, you heard that somebody crashed into the Pentagon; yeah, that sounds [unintell.] that is, these are reference to diverting international in-bound aircraft. Now, John, hang on, please make sure someone is on this line at all times. John, keeps saying are you there? I'm here. Put in a national ground stop, all airports, everything on the ground, Doug says, from headquarters. We've already done that, John White says, who told you to do it? We did it on our own. Okay, don't take any action like that on your own, this whole thing needs to be coordinated.

It's Doug's recollection that Jeff told

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him to pass that on, being his superior and that Doug wouldn't have given that kind of admonishment for making that order.

MR. BELGER: Thank God they did.

MR. AZZARELLO: United 93,

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, United 93, Doug says go ahead. It's 29 miles out--29 minutes out of Washington, D.C.--29 minutes out of Washington, D.C., and tracking towards us. The one on reverse course out of Ohio. Doug tells him go ahead. John says, Command Center, that's all I have. All right, please keep someone on this line. At any time, Doug, tells John, right.

Now, it goes forward and it's tracked. 9:48, he's headed toward the Washington area, he was at flight level 350, he turned around at Akron, Ohio, and is tracking towards the Washington area. Doug tells John, stay on the line. Type aircraft? He wants to know again. John gives him Boeing 757, are you there, John? Yeah, I'm here. They're pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93. So,

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Jeff Griffith is obviously there at the time as Doug's getting this information. Do we want to think about scrambling aircraft, John says, from the Command Center? Doug says, oh, God, I don't know. John says, that's a decision somebody's going to have to make probably in the next 10 minutes. Now, it's 9:59, roughly 14 minutes before impact.

Doug says, you know, everybody just left the room--unintelligible then, after that. This is an FAA transcript that came out [unintell.] yeah, it's an FAA-provide one.

Now, let me just ask you, if everybody just left the room as they're discussing this and pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93 and somebody decided whether to scramble or not on it. Would that have been occurring--would everybody have left the room as if--what room do you think they're talking about? Do you think they're back in Air Traffic, it would be unlikely that everyone left the--

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, yeah, they're down

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here.

MR. AZZARELLO: They're down there in the suite? Then it says, Doug, I have another one. Go ahead, United 9--United Doug says 1989 Cleveland to Boston has a confirmed hijack in northern Ohio. That's the one that's, I don't know I'm sure you learned in the aftermath that at first it was a hijack, then it was--

MR. BELGER: There were a lot of those.

MR. AZZARELLO: --but at this point this is the only other one that's entering the system as a potential at this time, other than United 93 and the fact that 77's lost--

MR. BELGER: At least the only one that they're talking about.

MR. AZZARELLO: That they're talking about?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, there might have been others that--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, that we have seen, I mean, there might have been, but we don't see them, filtering into the Command Center yet?

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MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Or into headquarters?

MR. BELGER: Right, and right, or it might have been, yeah, you're right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then they talk about a call sign for a different aircraft from JFK; they're talking about Cleveland and Los Angeles, that would have been--I don't know what flight that is, turning around and going to Boston; that's the Delta I think; they decide that's--what's his call sign? That's a Delta, I told you. Okay.

John, now at 9:53, Doug says to John, to John White, Peter's talking and he thinks that's Peter Challin [ph] talking to Monte now about scrambling--

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --which he said would have been you, at 9:53. Do you remember having a conversation--that's roughly 10 minutes before 93 crashed.

MR. BELGER: No--

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember having a

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conversation with--

MR. BELGER: --I don't remember talking with Peter Challin till much later in the morning about anything.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug, I was just advised that we are scrambling in the Washington and New York area. This is John White telling Doug that he was just advised--

MR. BELGER: Right, a minute later.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that they were--we are scrambling in the Washington and New York Area.

MR. BELGER: Yep.

MR. AZZARELLO: John White tells him that's what I've been told.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: He says okay, and then they get an update on the Delta 1989, he's not a trick flight, he's returning to Cleveland, so that's out of the picture, pretty quickly.

MR. BELGER: Do you know what that means, a trick flight?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

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MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: 7500 will be the overt way and [unintell.] and covert way. We don't have a position any longer on United 93, John tells Doug at 9:56, roughly.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: He did pass over Pittsburgh the last time we saw him. United N3, 20 miles Northwest of Johnstown on Primary. That's a report from another aircraft, somebody got a visual on him. Then they're asking about a Continental, whether anything's known about a Continental 321, no update on that.

And then I don't think there's any other discussion on 93, other than when they hear that it's crashed. Oh, I'm sorry, no, just a second, the United 93 was spotted by a VFR at 8,000 feet 11 miles south of Indianhead, just north of Cumberland, Maryland.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm. You know, right, yeah, okay, I'm with you.

MR. AZZARELLO: And United 93 was waiving

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his wings, he went past the VFR, I don't quite know what that means, he's rocking his wings. Then you have to track it down, it's reported--

So the scramble was 53 you were talking about it. John White reports that somebody, I guess down at the Command Center--we are advised that--we are scrambling in Washington--

MR. BELGER: Right, so that goes to my belief, I can't give you a document that proves this, but the military knew what was going on with--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, they were already scrambled to that--to the Washington area for reasons other than 93?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And there's no other indication at NEDS that they ever were--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, this is way above my pay grade; way above my pay grade, but I'm sure you all know of media reports where somebody in the Administration was going to give a shoot-down order.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Well, they had to know what was going on to even think about that.

MR. AZZARELLO: To give a shoot-down order on what? On a particular aircraft? On 93? You have to know about it to give a shoot-down order, okay?

MR. BELGER: I don't know what they knew but--let me--

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me ask the question--

MR. : No, let's go back to Dana's question for a moment, was shoot-down or the authority to engage a rogue aircraft discussed on the SVTS when you were on the SVTS?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that being discussed.

MR. : And in particular--

MR. BELGER: I can't say it wasn't, but I don't remember that.

MR. : Particularly in reference

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to 93?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: Understanding that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft, I understand would be above all of our pay grades, yours, even though you are the number two guy at FAA, I don't expect you would make that call.

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Obviously, somebody else had to make that call. But you'd have to know about it to put an order specifically to take it down. We don't see any indication at NEDS was aware of it to pass an order to a pilot to take it down. Is that an issue that you thought about post-9/11 in the weeks and months that followed that that, you know, the fact that, wow, how could, you know, maybe--how could they be saying that maybe they were in a position to take it down and maybe they didn't even know--

MR. BELGER: No, I didn't think about it, because I'll go back to what I said before. I had no indication, after 9/11 and before I retired, I

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had no indication that there was a notification problem with United 93. I mean, I didn't, all of this is new to me that NEDS is saying they weren't notified of United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: Somebody at CONAR in the immediate after the week and the days that followed 9/11, told one of your higher ranking FAA folks that we never got any advance notice on that.

MR. : What did--

MR. AZZARELLO: Somebody in CONAR, it was either General Arnold or one of his representatives.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: Either General Arnold or one of his representatives told one of your Air Traffic folks, pretty high up in the food chain that was working on these notifications back and forth and conversing with him back and forth that--

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, he told Jeff Griffith.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: He told Jeff Griffith
that--

MR. BELGER: I didn't know that.

MR. AZZARELLO: --we didn't get any heads
up on 93.

MR. : This is part of that
heated discussion that--

MR. AZZARELLO: This is part of that
heated debate.

MR. BELGER: That reminds me of what I was
going to say--okay let me go--okay, this is another
piece to consider. Prior to 9/11, on this primary
hijacking net, it was the NMCC that was the
military point of contact.

MR. AZZARELLO: What, according to their
protocol?

MR. BELGER: Right, it wasn't NORAD. It
was NMCC.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right.

MR. BELGER: And of course, we relied on
NMCC to do whatever they needed to do--

MR. AZZARELLO: Absolutely.

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MR. BELGER: --within DOD. So, I'm not saying that NORAD was on this Primary Net.

MR. : Understand.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : You're saying that NMCC was on the--

MR. BELGER: That's what I believe, yes.

MR. : We're still working that out.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I want to be clear about this, too, just so we know what may have been shared with you or not shared with you. To the extent that General Arnold or his representative told Jeff Griffith and potentially others that were working for Jeff that the military had no advances notice on 93, that was something that was either intentionally or unintentionally not give to you, not shared with you. It was either intentionally or unintentionally not shared with you.

MR. BELGER: It was not shared with me.

MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I'm going to ask you: I'm the number two guy, I'm you.

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MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I would be pretty ticked off if my folks didn't share that with me, because you're asking, you've given a specific task to Darlene Freeman, I want to know about distinctions, between what the military says we told them and what we think we told them when. That's certainly a distinction. That's a big difference. That's the military saying, you guys might have been tracking this for a while, but we had zero heads up on that.

And the FAA believing, having an assumption based on a belief that there was some log or some record that indicated the NMCC was on a Primary Net that they did tell it to them or that they heard it. That's big, that's not little, I mean, we're all, you know. Come on, you know, we're talking about the fourth aircraft to be a missile to take out American lives that day when, I'm not talking about the first one where we were caught, really off guard. We're talking now an hour and 18, 17 minutes later between impacts.

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And we were out in front of it and your folks are saying that we're talking to that what stands out in their mind on 93 is we weren't behind the curve on that one. And that's a phrase that you and others have adopted, if they were ahead of the curve.

That's a pretty big issue for the Deputy Administrator or for that matter the Administrator, to never have discussed and I'm only left with, we as the Commission Staff representatives, are left with the impression that it was either hid from you, I have to accept you at your word that you didn't know about it.

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, then, should I draw the conclusion that to the extent that other folks are telling us that they discussed it, that they hid it from you and what if they tell us they did share it then it's just a difference in recollection if they say that that was shared--

MR. BELGER: Well, if somebody says they shared that type of information, I'd like for you

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to tell me so it would help me. Did they?

MR. AZZARELLO: There is no indication that it was--it was apparently an issue that was discussed widely within the FAA, they seemed not to think that it was a secret that there was some discrepancy. There was a couple of folks that said it was in AAT-20, too, the folks that were from Accident Investigations were looking at it and they said, well, it was a topic of hot debate. What we knew when, particularly on the last aircraft.

MR. BELGER: But did it ultimately get resolved? That's kind of where I--

MR. AZZARELLO: Not that we understand that there was agreement on it, no. They didn't come to an agreement on it, our understanding is they didn't say you're right or we're right.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, but how can you say--

MR. AZZARELLO: Here's what we're left with.

MR. BELGER: The NORAD release gives no indication that there was a problem with notification, none, zero, at all.

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MR. AZZARELLO: They're not holding that belief today as we sit here.

MR. : No, but they're fighting their own, they go out with this on the basis they do--

MR. BELGER: But I can't, you know, I only know what I knew. And there was NORAD was saying, you know, we were in continuous discussion about United 93. That's what they said.

MR. AZZARELLO: But prior to that coming out is when your folks in Air Traffic and Accidents Investigations was working on a time line, conversing with NORAD, looking at their logs and, you know, all it takes is a cursory look at the log to show that the first time that they mentioned 93 is 10:07. so, you know, there's a potential discrepancy right there. And they took the position that we didn't know about it.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, hang on. There's a real difference in a discrete log entry and a continuous discussion.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's not on your plate.1

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MR. : That's not on your plate, I'm not asking you that, that's their issue.

MR. : That's their issue to work with.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's something they have to explain and, believe me, we've discussed that issue at length. But what I'm telling you is that your folks say that prior to this coming out, it may be part of the reason why they were taking a little bit of shock when this came out was that your folks position was, that they had some disagreement, they thought maybe that they did tell them about it and that NORAD, the military was saying through CONAR, we had no heads up on that.

MR. BELGER: No, I never heard that. I never heard that there was a disagreement with what was in that press release.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, when Darlene Freeman did that one-page notifications to the military for you that was supposed to address any discrepancies, she never brought it to your attention that we can assume.

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MR. BELGER: It's not--

MR. : This is two days after
that.

MR. BELGER: It's not that she never
brought the United--she never brought what General
Arnold apparently said to--

MR. AZZARELLO: Right, that's correct.

MR. : That's correct, and this
mysteriously to our point of view, and I think you
might agree with it [unintell.] as if there should
have been a second page--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I can't respond, I
can't answer that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And what it does do,
though, is it omits any adopting of the language of
an open line discussing these flights.

MR. BELGER: No, no. Activates a Primary
Net.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, this line where it
says an open line of communication discussing this.

MR. BELGER: I think that's the same
thing.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Activating it is the same as discussing specific flight numbers?

MR. BELGER: No, I'm saying, actually it's open. I mean, it's like you and I get on the net and we're all hearing the same thing at the same time.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's--she's got this with her.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: And she's asked to see if there's any discrepancies between this and what the FAA says they told the military?

MR. BELGER: Gotcha.

MR. AZZARELLO: She knows that they're saying there was an open line discussing specifically these two flights?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: This document in specific you asked her for notifications to the military--

MR. BELGER: That's right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --on each of the four flights.

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MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. AZZARELLO: It gives it on 11?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: It gives the source for--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --it says the logs show
notifying of 77--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --the log shows, it
doesn't refer to the open line.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it doesn't say
anything about United 93.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: That is different from
adopting or that this--

MR. BELGER: I mean, if she had written
down here, I don't know why she didn't. If she had
written in here at 9:20, this means that there was
a continuous discussion about United 93.

MR. LEWIS[?]: Then here's the problem
with that, 93 is not in distress at that point in

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time.

MR. BELGER: I know, this is even before.
Before.

MR. LEWIS: Yeah, if you start that--

MR. BELGER: This is before, so they were
on the Net when there was the first report of
distress.

MR. LEWIS: I seriously, I mean, he's
seriously not sure--

MR. AZZARELLO: I'll tell you what.

MR. LEWIS: There's a supposed elephant
standing here in the middle of this room. I don't
understand how it is that you think that there is a
problem in the [unintell.] discussion is on.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, no, time-out right
now. We have both sides of this in our brains and
we're working to a common--because we have both
sides of it in our brains and I don't think that
it's fair that you object at this point in time
with what you just said. You've only got one side
of it, we've got both sides in our brain.

MR. LEWIS: Well, you know, tell the man

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who it is saying there's a problem.

MR. BELGER: Help me recollect.

MR. AZZARELLO: I told you that, I took the position--how much [unintell.]

MR. LEWIS: Somebody at CONAR.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, General Arnold or his representative, if you'd taken notes, that's what I said; General Arnold or his representative--

MR. LEWIS: Has formally told you that the--

MR. AZZARELLO: --formally advised the FAA--

MR. LEWIS: --they had no idea that 93--

MR. : --they had no advance notice on United 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: I'll repeat it again and we were told by an FAA, Jeff Griffith, that General Arnold or his representative one or the other told him we had no advance notice on United 93. Can I be any clearer than that?

MR. LEWIS: How could they possibly be discussing shooting it down, if that were the case?

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MR. AZZARELLO: Well, I'll tell you what, you ask the White House and then get back to us with an answer, okay?

MR. : That's the third piece we have in our brain.

MR. AZZARELLO: You ask the White House and then bring me an answer on that.

MR. BELGER: I'll ask you--

MR. LEWIS: Do you have an answer that relates to this?

MR. AZZARELLO: All right let me ask you the obvious question, obviously a difficult question, now that we're at this point. Did somebody at a pay grade above you, as in, somebody in the Administration, suggest that to the extent that there was any disputes between the FAA and the military on notification times for any of the four hijacked aircraft, that they would resolve that dispute?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, are you aware of whether anybody arbitrated any dispute on

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notification times other than the FAA and the military?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Other than the FAA and NORAD?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: No one?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, are you aware of, even that there was a dispute on United 93?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: Are you aware if there's a dispute on any notification times on any of the four aircraft?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that's why I think it is difficult, with all due respect Brook, when you do jump in because you haven't gone through the hundreds of tapes; the hundreds of logs; the hundreds documents from both sides, from the military and from the FAA. And with all due respect, when we're done, you can look at this

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later and see that all I'm left with is I was told that Mr. Belger asked one of his special assistants to give him specific notification times on each of the flights. And there's nothing here that references United 93 in any shape, manner or form, that could be arguably, say, notification--

MR. LEWIS: I understand if you tell us, but you can build back to it by saying they were on the line--

MR. AZZARELLO: You can't build back to it from this document. This was the document that was the notification.

MR. BELGER: There are a bunch of documents, that's another one which--

MR. LEWIS: [unintell.] That piece of paper is not something that argues a position, it just gives--

MR. : He's about to help us out here, go ahead.

MR. BELGER: I mean, I remember seeing this, I think. But there's another document which I used kind of as my continuous reference point and

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it was like a matrix, the four aircraft with five or six times and under United 93, notification, I think it said, that it was not applicable or something like that.

MR. : Is it this matrix where they put all four of them together in the back?

MR. BELGER: No, no, no, no, this was a one-pager.

MR. : Oh, it was a one-pager.

MR. BELGER: It had the four aircraft up top; it had four five or six entries, vertically and for notification it had times for the four notifications.

MR. : I don't think I've see that.

MR. BELGER: For United 93, it said, N/A, which is Not Applicable. This was the document that I used, it was one that Darlene prepared. It's the one that I kind of used. We went through a bunch of iterations, I think, it's kind of the one I used as the--not kinda, it is the one I used as the--I'm sure she--

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did you know that--not our team, but Team 7 interviewed Lee Longmire? He said it was standard procedure to put the military in the communications link as soon as possible so that they could monitor the aircraft?

MR. BELGER: Yes, that's what I said.

MR. AZZARELLO: The link up from the FAA Command Center was supposed to be with the National Military Command Center. It was his expectation that the NMCC and the FBI should have been included in the link--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --as soon as there was a crisis center set up.

MR. BELGER: That's what I said, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: He later learned that this didn't occur, but he wasn't sure when the situation was rectified.

MR. BELGER: I think it was 9:20 when it was rectified.

MR. AZZARELLO: It appears from the context of his interview that he was talking about,

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after, later that morning as the events were well into the progression of the attacks, not 9:20.

MR. BELGER: Well, the Primary Net should have rectified it, that's --

MR. AZZARELLO: What I'm saying is it's his belief that it wasn't but perhaps it was later than that.

MR. BELGER: I believe it was at 9:20.

MR. AZZARELLO: You don't think that's it? That's all I have, we generally have asked--

MR. BELGER: Yeah--

MR. AZZARELLO: --and I certainly think that someone in your position and experience at the FAA should be asked if they have any recommendations, that they would make--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I do, yeah I do. Yeah, when I met with the group for the first time, I gave you some security type recommendations.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MR. BELGER: The single biggest recommendation I have--I hope you guys focus on this is, it's along the lines of making sure that

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we're--we, the country, are prepared if this should happen again.

So, let me just--I said this a few minutes ago, but you got a brand-new organization with TSA in the loop now. And the TSA Administrator has assumed the responsibilities that used to be the FAA Administrator's for managing a hijack incident. I don't think that legislation's been changed. I mean, it was changed to give it to the TSA, I don't think it was changed since then.

So, I just have this gut feeling that the procedures between the military, NORAD, specifically, FBI, and TSA and FAA in their lesser role now, haven't been exercised enough. I hope I'm wrong. But I mean, one of your recommendations ought to be a clear set of MOUs between those key people. Some periodically well-funded, well-thought-out exercises because in today's world, prior to 9/11, I mean, NORAD's got an, obviously, a much bigger role, FAA's got a lesser role; FBI's probably got a lesser role. And it's now really TSA and NORAD.

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MR. : The modern, to make a short--it was FAA and NORAD before, and now it's TSA and NORAD?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, well, actually--

MR. : But FAA still has a vested interest in it, it's--

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, they're still in the game. Actually it was even FAA and FCC.

MR. : I'm sorry, NMCC, right.

MR. BELGER: Which was in the old and now it's NORAD to the forefront and TSA to the forefront.

MR. : Right, okay, got it.

MR. BELGER: And that's best--

MR. : And was it--in your estimation was it a mistake to transfer those authorities?

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, I don't think so, I mean, once you set up the TSA organization, I think that responsibility to manage the incident kind of goes on with the territory. so, no, I don't think it was--

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MR. : Should it have been something that you think should have stayed where it was?

MR. BELGER: Should, I mean, should TSA not have been established.

MR. : It should not have been transferred, that authority to them.

MR. BELGER: Oh, no, well, once you established TSA, then I think that authority has to be transferred.

MR. : Well, I guess then the question would be do you think that maybe it shouldn't have been established and it could have stayed within the FAA or somewhere else, other than--

MR. BELGER: I don't have a thing on that.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess I would be remiss to ask you one other question.

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: Follow it up on where we ended?

MR. BELGER: Okay.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did it ever come to either your attention or, to your knowledge, anyone else in the FAA after 9/11, did they ever begin to believe that maybe the military couldn't have been in a position to take out 93 based on their knowledge but were reluctant to raise that because someone at a higher pay grade had said that they were in a position to take it down?

MR. BELGER: Well, I'm not sure I follow you. I mean.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you ever, I mean, in your chronology review, in your after-action, you know pulling together the events, did any information come to your attention that would create the impression that, jeeze, you what? Maybe the military did know about 93 like we did and maybe they weren't in position to take down 93 and then decided that there really wasn't much they could say or do?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think that in one of the congressional testimonies, the NORAD spokesperson, I don't remember who it was. This

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was one of the hearings that I think the Administrator was--or maybe even before you guys, maybe it was even the 9/11 early on.

MR. AZZARELLO: The joint inquiry?

MR. BELGER: Hmm?

MR. AZZARELLO: The joint inquiry before the 9/11 congressional inquiries?

MR. BELGER: It could have been or it could have been one of your early hearings where I think the Administrator was on with some NORAD folks.

MR. : Well, we had a hearing in--

MR. : In May of '93?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember the forum, but whoever the NORAD representative was said very clearly, we couldn't have done anything if we were notified.

MR. : On 93?

MR. BELGER: On 93.

MR. AZZARELLO: I don't know if it was said in Congress, but I know at our May hearing in

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2003, one of the NORAD representatives gave an indication that, you know, even if we had gotten in position about how to having to shoot down targets--take it down--

MR. BELGER: Right, that's what I'm saying, I mean, they weren't, I don't mean this critically, he said it, I mean he said it, but they weren't prepared to follow-through with that, so, that's been said publicly, I think.

MR. : It was said at that hearing, right?

MR. : That's what Arnold said.

MR. AZZARELLO: What about, they also said at that hearing, though, that they knew about United 93 at 9:16, correct, they said 9:16. And that's 12 minutes before it was even hijacked.

MR. BELGER: Well, I can't answer that.

MR. : That may be our signal, John.

MR. : That's it.

MR. : Sir, thank you so much.

MR. BELGER: Well, I hope I helped.

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[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JANE GARVEY

BY

SAM BRINKLEY, 9/11 Commission

JOHN RAIDT, 9/11 Commission

BILL JOHNSTONE, 9/11 Commission

LISA SULLIVAN, 9/11 Commission

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. AZZARELLO: Wednesday, June 30, we're at GSA about to begin an interview with Jane Garvey. I'm John Azzarello, Team 8, 911/Commission.

MR. KARA: Miles Kara, 911/Commission.

MR. LEWIS: Brooke Lewis, FAA, Counsel's office.

MS. GARVEY: Jane Garvey, former FAA Administrator, 1997 to 2002.

MR. AZZARELLO: Thanks for taking the time to meet with us again at the Commission. We actually just wanted to follow-up in some specific areas with you, given we're at the point now where we're pretty much wrapping up our investigation and producing a final report. We know that you've met with Team 7 on at least one or more occasions. And we've had the opportunity to review the memorandum that they produced as a result of your interview, so we have some specific follow-ups from there. Adn then there may be one or two areas, mostly focused on the day of 9/11 and what you did and

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what you observed while at FAA headquarters on 9/11, that Team 7 may not have addressed because it wasn't their particularity.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, if we can just sort of go over those few areas, then we'll be finished. So, if I could just sort of go right into the day of September 11 and see if I understand a sense of where you were, I guess when the first crash occurred.

It's my understanding from reading your interview with Team 7, that you were with Secretary Mineta at a meeting?

MS. GARVEY: That's correct, we were meeting with one of the commissioner's from the European Union. We were preparing for a conference that was going to be held in Montreal, an ARCAO [ph] conference that was going to be held in the middle of September. We were in very different points with the Europeans over environmental issues and the goal for the meeting for the Secretary and myself was to try to find some compromise, try to

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find some common ground with the Europeans over environmental issues.

And it was held in the Secretary's main conference room at the DOT building, 10th floor.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember when that meeting was scheduled to start, when it did start?

MS. GARVEY: I think it started about, I would say, about 8:00 in the morning, because it was also a breakfast meeting, so we were--we had been served breakfast and were beginning the discussion in earnest at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: We have some data points in terms of what was the earliest recognition or knowledge by anyone at FAA headquarters that there may have been a hijacking in the system reference American 11. And we determined that that earliest time is roughly in the 8:20 to 8:30 range. Within that 10-minute period of time. Within that 10-minute Boston Center had recognition based on overhearing some transmissions from the cockpit of American 11 that they most likely had a hijacking.

They, then, engaged in their process of

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notification, which included multiple pages being sent, apparently, throughout the chain of command, through the region up to headquarters. And we believe that at headquarters, Dave Cannoles, may have received a page in that 8:20/8:30 time frame, alerting him that there may be a hijacking in the system reference American 11.

And I guess what we'd like to know from you is did any of that information come to you in the form of an urgent phone call or message to you at the meeting that you were at, prior to the first crash at the Trade Center?

MS. GARVEY: It did not, which is not unusual. We had--since I've been at the FAA there have been , you know, many, I don't want to say many, but certainly several potential hijackings . Thank God those turned out not to be the case, but it was normal for the operations folks to gain information to try to get a little bit more information, figure out if they were dealing with a real situation or something that may not have been real. So, I did not receive that early

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notification.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the first knowledge or information that you had the morning of September 11 that there was something amiss in the national airspace system with regard to any aircraft?

MS. GARVEY: John Flaherty, the Chief of Staff opened the door to the meeting. He was coming from the Secretary's office into the conference room where we were seated. He opened the door, said Mr. Secretary, Administrator, we need to see you right away or something to that effect.

Obviously, the Secretary and I got up immediately and went into the Secretary's office. Again, the Secretary's office was adjoining. And we could see, the Secretary had the TV CNN on and we could see the first--we could see what was being shown on the television, which was the World Trade Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: So when you--that was your first recognition of it was Flaherty called you out

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and you see the aftermath of the crash--first crash?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, and went immediately to the telephone to call the Operations Center at the FAA headquarters. I think, simultaneously, he may have testified to this--I think simultaneously, perhaps, Monte Belger may have been calling on another line, calling over to the Secretary's office. But I was, at that point on the call or on the phone with the Operations Center. And said, I'm looking at something here on television, World Trade Center, can you give me some information what's happening. And they said, we are not sure, now we are also monitoring a potential hijacking of an American Airline.

MR. KARA: They separated out the 240--

MS. GARVEY: They were, in their own mind that had not been reconciled at that point.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you called, you said you called the Operations Center, is that was the 24/7--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --you would have gotten the duty officer--

MS. GARVEY: Right. And then asked was Monte there, yes. And said well, I'll be over immediately.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you speak to anyone else in that first phone call other than the operations backups?

MS. GARVEY: No, I don't believe so. I don't believe so, I may have talked to Monte at some point, and I quite honestly can't remember if I talked to him directly there or when I got over--more remembering when I talked to him when I got back to the building.

MR. AZZARELLO: But you may have, you're not sure if you talked to him before you got there. So the situational awareness, so to speak of the Washington Operations Center Duty Officer was that he or she informed you that there was a hijacking that they were monitoring but they did not necessarily connect or they didn't connect the two events in this phone call with you?

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MS. GARVEY: That is correct, that is correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did they--were you left with the impression that the Duty Office believed that that hijacked aircraft was still airborne somewhere?

MS. GARVEY: I don't think I had an impression one way or the other. I think that they were still, just said it was unclear.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, but you--

MS. GARVEY: They said it was unclear.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, but you--were you left with the impression, though, that those two events were not connected, yet--the hijacking and the plane?

MS. GARVEY: Probably at that point, yeah. I have to say that my own sort of intuitive gut reaction was, ooh, you know, what--certainly caused a great concern. I mean, I can't say that I necessarily connected them right away. But certainly struck a cause of great concern to have two incidents at the same time.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair to say that you were concerned that maybe they were connected? Did you--thinking.

MS. GARVEY: I don't know if I would say that, that's giving me probably more intuitive, probably, credit, than I'm, more with the benefit of hindsight looking back at it. But I think what concerned me is just that you would have two incidents occurring within the air traffic system at one time. Even assuming--even assuming that the first one was a small aircraft. Whatever happened at the World Trade Center was very serious; hijacking is very serious to have two occurring at the same time was certainly something that anyone would be concerned about.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's a very good point, I guess, if they were not connected then you'd have two incidents on your hands?

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Which would be even maybe greater concern?

MS. GARVEY: Right, yeah.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Now, I did see in your earlier interview you said that, I guess you had heard the reports according to the media that it was a small plane, did you have any independent impression yourself when you saw the TV, whether or not you thought the crash was caused by a small plane or a large commercial airplane?

MS. GARVEY: I think it was probably more colored by what I heard on the TV, but that would not--that would not have been surprising. I think, you know, it might be someone's first reaction that it would be a small Cessna or something to that effect. Someone may have had a heart attack, there might have been a malfunction, something like that. My first reaction was certainly not that it was a large commercial aircraft, it would not have been that.

MR. AZZARELLO: And after speaking to the Operations Center, did you leave the building then?

MS. GARVEY: I reported what I had heard to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary who both were still standing there and said I'm going to

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head right back to the FAA headquarters, which I did.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you told Mineta and Flaherty and left?

MS. GARVEY: And left, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then you went directly to FAA headquarters, right?

MS. GARVEY: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: When you arrived at headquarters, where did you go?

MS. GARVEY: I went immediately to the 10th Floor. My office, the Deputy's Office, Monte Belger is right across from the Operations Center, so went, actually directly to Monte's office--

MR. AZZARELLO: Across from the Operations--

MS. GARVEY: --yeah, and we walked from there sort of talking and walked across to the Ops Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall when you arrived at headquarters and saw Monte Belger, do you recall whether or not there was any information you

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had on the second--

MS. GARVEY: The second plane--

MR. AZZARELLO: --crash?

MS. GARVEY: --the second plane had hit and it may have, it occurred sometime between my leaving and arriving, which, of course, and I--which Monte reported, although I think even as I was coming into the building, you know people were discussing it, obviously, in the building. And so, I may have even heard it before I heard it directly from him, as I was walking in.

And just said to Monte, what do we know? He said we're still gathering information, we know that they've both gone in, but we're still, you know, we're still monitoring and gathering information. We walked over to the Operation, at that point, our people were clearly, you know, gathering in the Operation Center. I said is the net up. And he said, yes. So, that began the day.1

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me back up a second. Now, on American 11, there was some information

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given to Command Center and headquarters that there was a hijacking before the first crash. When you arrived at headquarters, and the second crash had already occurred, did you find out or did you learn whether or not a report of a second hijack was given to headquarters prior to--

MS. GARVEY: I did not know at that time, no. No, I did not know. Just that the plane had hit--

MR. AZZARELLO: Just that it had been crashed--

MS. GARVEY: Exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: --not necessarily, you did not hear that there had been a second reported hijacking, but that there had been a second crash.

MS. GARVEY: There had been a second crash.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you--taking you past the day of September 11, now, did you learn in any subsequent after action, reviews, whether or not that information was held by the Operations Center or anyone at headquarters, the information being

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that there was a second reported hijack in the system, did that information reach headquarters before the information of a second crash reached headquarters?

MS. GARVEY: I'm not sure. I mean, I certainly got no indication that any information had been held from headquarters, headquarters was receiving it, you know, when they received it. So, I didn't get the sense that anything had been held back.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, and I'm not trying to sort of attach any motive to whether information got there or not. I guess, what we have determined in our investigation and what we presented at our hearing a short time ago, was that from our investigation, and interviewing all the folks at headquarters, what we determined was that there was no notification that went to headquarters from any field facility that there was a second hijack in the system prior to there being a crash.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, that the situation

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awareness here at headquarters appears to be that they learned of the second crash before they learned that there was a second hijacking.

MS. GARVEY: I think that's probably accurate. I will say, once the second crash occurred, though, I think, certainly for Monte and myself and I suspect for everyone else, something changed. I mean, we knew we had a situation unlike anything we had had before. We all believed that something very significant was happening in the system that was quite different from anything--

MR. AZZARELLO: As soon as the second crash occurred?

MS. GARVEY: Right, so to some degree and not to minimize it at all, but to some degree whether it had been hijacked or not, or whether we had received notification, what we knew became almost, I don't want to say immaterial, but became less important than the fact that we knew we had a significant event occurring in that he system, we had something going on here that was unlike anything we had before.

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MR. AZZARELLO: So, I guess, then to summarize it, then, you don't have any independent information that you learned--

MS. GARVEY: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that there was an awareness of a second hijack before the second crash--

MS. GARVEY: That's correct.

MR. AZZARELLO: --was acknowledged? Okay, and I guess getting to your point on the second crash, did you see the, either live or a replay on TV of that second--

MS. GARVEY: Certainly saw the replay, don't believe I saw the--

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair to say that seeing the replay that was there a recognition by yourself and others that this appeared to be a deliberate act in terms of watching the second?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, that's absolutely accurate. I think the Secretary used to say something about the first incident could be an accident, the second one could be an incident or

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something but by the third one, you knew you had
a--

MR. AZZARELLO: Pattern or--

MS. GARVEY: --a pattern, yeah, a program.

MR. KARA: You asked Monte if the net was
up. What was your--what was going through your
mind about what net were you thinking about when
you asked him that question?

MS. GARVEY: I really was referring to the
Security folks--

MR. KARA: The Security folks--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I saw a couple of
the Security people in there so, I assumed that
they were--

MR. AZZARELLO: So you were in the
Security Center and the Crisis Room also?

MS. GARVEY: Right, sort of between the
two.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you--who do you recall
from Security being in the Crisis Room sort of
setting up a response team?

MS. GARVEY: Well, you know, certainly, I

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remember seeing Lee Longmire, Longmire, sorry,
And I think Fran was there at that time also--

MR. AZZARELLO: Losito [ph]?

MS. GARVEY: --Losito, I believe was there
at that point. There were a couple of other people
I knew by faces, but I'm not sure of the exact
names. Certainly saw some Air Traffic people in
the room.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did you remember seeing
Jeff Griffith?

MS. GARVEY: Jeff was certainly that and
I'm certain he was there all day, so I don't know
if he was actually in the room when I walked in or
if I may have seen him later in the morning.

MR. AZZARELLO: What, in particular, if
anything, prompted you to think, apparently, pretty
early on about whether the net was up and asking
Monte Belger whether or not the Security folks had
a net up?

MS. GARVEY: It was really just a routine
question. It was really just something that you, I
guess, and part of it maybe by seeing the Security

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people. It seemed to be to be a natural question just to say, you know, what's going on, is the net up, who else was--you know, what do we know. I mean, really, it was probably a stream of questions like that. You know, have we--have you heard again from the Secretary's office, there were sort of a stream of those sorts of questions. Do we know where people are? Do we know where--I mean, from my perspective, for me that day, there were sort of you know, three paramount concerns at the morning went on. I mean one, was obviously the Air Traffic Control System, which was always significant and I think, as you all reported, I think Air Controllers did quite a job that day.

And the second was to make sure that we were keeping the right lines of communication open, particularly to the, you know, to the other agencies, but particularly to the Secretary's office.

And the third was, really, the employees within the building itself. People were confused about what was happening. We had a day care center

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there. You know, concern about children at the day care center. So, there were those, I think three concerns as we, certainly as I went through the day. and I think that was probably true for some others. The immediate issues was, obviously, the Air Traffic Control. And also making sure we were communicating with people.

MR. AZZARELLO: The concerns, to make sure that I have them down accurately are the Air Traffic Control System?

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: The, I guess, having a good open line of communication with the Secretary's office.

MS. GARVEY: Chiefly, with the Secretary's office and other agencies as well, but particularly, I would say the Secretary's office.

MR. AZZARELLO: And then the concern about the safety of the folks in the building--

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --evacuation, if necessary. Okay.

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MS. GARVEY: right.

MR. AZZARELLO: I guess going back to the, one more follow-up on the net.

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: It's our understanding there are a couple of different nets, the Security folks get going in that room and were you referring to any one in particular? I mean, there's an internal one we understand--

MS. GARVEY: right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and then an external one with other agencies.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did anyone in particular you were referring to or--

MS. GARVEY: I think in my own mind, I was really referring to the net that brought in the other agencies. I knew, certainly, from briefings that I received from Monte within that time frame, that the Air Traffic Control folks had their own tactical net, their own communication lines that were open to the various facilities. So, I

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certainly knew about that, as well. But, particularly seeing the Security people in the room, I think, the focus would have been more on--

MR. AZZARELLO: The one with the external--the one with the outside agencies?

MS. GARVEY: Well, the, yes, the Security net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, we do understand that some of the Security folks would occasionally drill the process of responding to an air emergency event like a hijacking--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --or a similar incident--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --where they would go and, you know activate the crisis room and take their positions?

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Conversely, we have heard through most of interviews, if not all of FAA headquarters that the folks on the upper levels of management there do not recall participating in any

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of those type drills. Of course they don't have any of those assignments to you know sort of run the crisis room or take a position in it. Is your recollection of that different or--

MS. GARVEY: No, I think that's, I believe that's pretty accurate. I can tell you that there were a couple of times, and I'm not going to remember the exact dates, but more in the Admiral Flynn period where we had some potential hijacking and they occurred during the day, when I was actually there. And so I went over to just watch them in both cases, they turned out not to be the case, but in both cases, I was able to observe the how they were able to, you know come together and, what they did and so forth. So, to that extent, you know, I was somewhat familiar with it.

There was one hijacking incident, again, when Admiral Flynn was there, that occurred that I remembered that occurred quite late in the evening and he called me at home. I lived probably a five minute walk from the FAA building across the Mall. And I remember saying should I come in? It was

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sort of the middle of the night, late in the night anyway and Admiral Flynn said no, not at this point. I just wanted to give you a briefing, wanted to just let you know, we'll monitor it and fortunately called a couple of hours later to say, you know, everything worked out, it was not a--it was not anything.

So, I've had that kind of familiarity with the net.

MR. AZZARELLO: Based on your observations or interactions in the Crisis Room, who, if any one individual did you see as the person in charge of that room? Is there someone who was running the crisis room, who was managing it or the person that you would go to?

MS. GARVEY: No, I think that day, I really was turning to Monte.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: So, I probably, particularly, again, that's a very good situation, I--my inclination was to turn to Monte to ask the questions and so forth.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Did you spend any, I guess, appreciable amount of time in that Crisis Room, or were you just sort of in and out or were you in there for a period of time, where you actually could observe what was going on there?

MS. GARVEY: There were periods of time, when I was in there for 5 to 6 minutes. It's hard to remember exactly what the time frames were, but it's probably more accurate to say that I was in and out checking on things, coming back. But, you know, certainly there were periods of times, particularly as we were bringing the planes down, where I was in there listening and watching.

MR. AZZARELLO: So you rely pretty much on Monte Belger to give you situational awareness, is that fair to say or--

MS. GARVEY: I think it's a combination of watching--of asking Monte, but then also going in and out of the Ops Room.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, so, in terms of you don't, just so I don't misunderstand--

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --what your position is. What I'm hearing, I guess, is that you didn't have direct contact with anyone in the Crisis Room in terms of whoever may have been in charge of it, you weren't speaking directly to that person, but you were going to through Monte Belger?

MS. GARVEY: For the most part, I do remember speaking to Lee, later on in the morning at a couple of points and sometimes when we would be in the office if we had just briefed the Secretary's office, we'd have someone like a Jeff Griffith come up in and say, here's what we know or someone from Air Traffic. Or a Cannoles, for example, or we might have Lee come in or someone from Security to say here's what we know. And it could have been, you know, Lee, or it could have been someone directly under him, one of the Security people. And that was primarily to make sure as we were communicating with the Secretary, we were giving him the most current information.

MR. AZZARELLO: We were, because we've been sort of struggling to identify that one person

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and it's not someone that's readily identifiable; that one person who we can say he or she took command and control of the Crisis Room and was the, let's say the filter for decision-making or information sharing with upper management. We have yet to identify that one person and I'd like your comments, Ms. Garvey, on this. My--but our, I think joint impression is, we'll give you what our impression is and we'd like your comments on that. What Miles and I have observed, in terms of what went on in the Crisis Room that day are two general phenomena: The first one is that Security, on paper, were the folks or division that generally would coordinate and organize the response to a hijacking event from the Crisis Center, they would be the folks in control of the Crisis Room and organizing the response; generally, it would have been Civil Aviation Security highest ranking operations person--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and that there would be Air Traffic elements on the internal net with the

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Security telling them what's going on in the field reference the hijacked airplane.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: But it would be a Security-run event or response to the event. Whereas what we've seen--what's transpired on 9/11 is after there was a recognition that this was a multiple attack on the country, that Air Traffic became a very important and vital element and, potentially, even more important their participation than the Security folks, because they were the people--Air Traffic--who had their hands on the aircraft, were controlling them and who would be the first to know that something was amiss, with another aircraft; that it was either off course or lost coms.

And that there appeared to be, I guess, potentially a little void in someone taking control of that room because of those two elements. I'm trying to find the proper word--it's not clashing, but just the interaction of the Air Traffic--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --folks with the Security folks, given the events of 9/11 was not something that on paper, at least, indicated that the Air Traffic folks should be in control of, but it seemed like on that day, out of necessity, you would want them to take a leading role in the response.

And our impression is that, potentially, there might have been a little sort of folks not knowing or you know looking at each other and, maybe, not having a clear leader in the room because, you know, there was a little bit of, I guess, confusion about who, maybe, should maybe have taken control of the response.

MS. GARVEY: I think your assessment is a fair assessment. I think that's a fair assessment. I think what's remarkable, though, and maybe it's because a lot of these people have worked together so often in the past and over so many occasions, including drills for Y-2-K, which seems like a distant memory at this point, but I think what's remarkable is that they still did incredibly well.

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There was, I think you're right, and I think that's why when you look at some of the after-action recommendations and some of the changes that were made, I think tried to address some of those issues.

So, I think that's a fair assessment, but I think, in spite of that, people acted quickly; they acted professionally. I was struck at many points during the day, how very calm people were, even those folks who had spouses at the World Trade Center. So, I think that's a fair assessment. And while, certainly going over there, while I was very much aware of the kind of intensity within the room, the urgency within the room, I was struck by the sort of professional calm that also existed.

And I think your assessment of the Air Traffic control organization, kind of assumed more of a role, is an accurate one and, quite honestly, even in hindsight, was the right one. I mean, it was the Air Traffic control person that was in jeopardy primarily. I mean, we didn't know what was happening. It was, really, I think appropriate

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for them to assume more leadership roles. So, I think to some degree the professionalism, I think really exhibited itself by the fact that they were able to quickly secure that control.

MR. KARA: Let me put names to that.

MS. GARVEY: Okay.

MR. KARA: I know you were in and out and all of these people work for you and you said you [unintell.] to be the foremen, if you will, in the room.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. KARA: But, as John lays out, what we end up with is there's a dais in that room that looks out on 9 or 12 positions--

MS. GARVEY: That's right.

MR. KARA: --that are functional positions--

MS. GARVEY: Yes, absolutely.

MR. KARA: --people are working hard.

MS. GARVEY: --Air Traffic, generally, yeah.

MR. KARA: Yeah, and the dais is set up

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for three people, but we believe that ultimately four people at various times, in various combinations were on there on one such Lee Longmire and, perhaps, Fran Losito, which would be the Security side of it. Then next to him were Jeff Griffith and Don Davis.

MS. GARVEY: Doug Davis--

MR. KARA: Doug Davis from the Air Traffic side. Is it your recall in any of your forays over to the Crisis Center that you saw those four in any combination or one side more in charge than the other?

MS. GARVEY: No, as a matter of fact, I think I saw a lot more sort of interaction, kind of the exchanging of, you know, either a couple of folks staying together, more sort of communication among them.

MR. KARA: And these are the names right? Are there--

MS. GARVEY: No, you've got the names right, absolutely, Doug Davis and Jeff--

MR. KARA: And then Lee Longmire and Fran?

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MS. GARVEY: And, Fran, yeah, I mean there were other people, obviously, as well. I just don't remember.

MR. KARA: The only other name that was a potential for being on the dais, that I heard was Morris, right?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, Mike Morris.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, yes, okay.

MR. FARMER: I'm sorry to barge in, John Farmer.

MR. KARA: John, watch the cords, you'll hang yourself.

MR. AZZARELLO: We were, I guess, we were, what we noticed is, now, the protocol, obviously, that Security run the event [unintell.] I guess, given the events of 9/11, the Air Traffic element, if one could foresee what was going to happen, maybe would have said, we'll have an Air Traffic person run this event. And what you're saying is you saw that element get involved--

MS. GARVEY: right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that day in the room. I

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think the other issue that--I said there were two, sort of phenomena that we observed.

The second one was, in the Crisis Room, that there were a lot of upper management folks. In particular, like a lot of people remembered Monte Belger being in the room and obviously wanting information and wanting to know what was going on in response to the hijackings.

And I think one of the other things that we observed is there was a sense by some of the people in Security or Air Traffic to perhaps want to defer to senior leadership, who were present in the room, in terms of, okay, I'm not the Deputy Administrator, or, you know, I'm not the Director of Air Traffic Control, or the Deputy Director, so, maybe, perhaps, I should defer to them in such a situation like this to make decisions, when those are the folks, though, who were not, it appeared, intimately, familiar with the hijack protocol and procedures.

That had not undergone the training that the Security folks did to run a response for such

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an event. And one of our observations, I think, Miles and I talked about is that that appeared to, at times, maybe cause some potential delay in immediate action by the folks from, say, either from Security who might have wanted to make a decision or take control of the situation because they saw some executive management people there.

And I wanted to know if you, either on that day or in the aftermath in any after-action reviews, you know, if any of that--of an issue of that nature was ever brought to your attention or if you observed anything of that nature that day?

MS. GARVEY: That's interesting--that's really an interesting observation and it's a new one to me. I had not heard that from folks post-9/11. And Monte's an interesting person, because, of course, he came up, you know 35 years or 30 years within the FAA and he certainly had a background in Security, as well as Air Traffic. So, might there be people who might want to defer to him, that, you know, that has a ring of truth about that. I could see that.

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On the other hand.

MR. AZZARELLO: In fairness, I'm not saying that anyone, in particular--

MS. GARVEY: No, no, absolutely I'm not--

MR. AZZARELLO: --said that--

MS. GARVEY: Oh now, absolutely.

MR. AZZARELLO: --I didn't take this action because of it, it's more of an impression that we have from just observing what happened in that room.

MS. GARVEY: Right, and the uniqueness of the situation, I think, could certainly cause people, if not to defer, at least to want to have buy-in, so to speak. But I, really, honest, I didn't see any evidence where a decision could either not have been made or were delayed to the point of being, you know, affected, or--or--or turning out to be the wrong decision because it was a late decision. I didn't see any evidence of that. And, while I think Monte has a lot of credibility in the organization, I think he's also, I don't think he's that intimidating. I don't

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think people would feel that. That's not historically how people have viewed him.

And I must say, certainly, the work that the controllers did in the individual facilities, which is exactly what they should have done, which is putting the place some ground stops and putting in place some restrictions early on; certainly, I think, indicated that they were willing to make some of those decisions, head on. And in a timely fashion.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let me ask you about, connectivity with the military, in particular. You asked, you said early on, when you got to the FAA headquarters, you search warrant the Crisis Room was going and you wanted to know if the net was up and Monte indicated, he said, yes, that it was up.

Did you or Monte ask the specific question to anyone in the room, is the military on the line in here? Do we have connectivity with the military so that we have an open line with them, and can communicate with them?

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MS. GARVEY: I believe in the string of questions that I asked Monte, you know, including is the net up, I said, is the--I think I said DOD and Monte said--you know, are they on the line or are they involved? Yes. I know I asked about the FBI, as well. And I know Monte answered, you know, affirming that they were on the line. And at that point, they may have been.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that, can you give us a frame work or eventwise, was that before or after the Pentagon was hit?

MS. GARVEY: Well, this was before, it was after the second, but it was just as I had arrived.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, after the second crash, but before the Pentagon was--

MS. GARVEY: Before the Pentagon, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, let's talk about that in connection with the military. I'm sure you're aware that after our hearing that one of the issues on United 93 was that that plane was being tracked for roughly a half hour and that the Command Center was given the pretty constant

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updates to headquarters. It was John White at the Command Center giving the periodic updates to either Jeff Griffith or Doug Davis, who, we believe were in that Crisis Room--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --on United 93. And that no specific notification on that aircraft ever went over to the military on United 93. So, how do--help us out, how do we square--how do you square the--your position that you were told that there was some connectivity with the DOD after the second crash at the Trade Center and before the Pentagon was hit--how did that square up, then with no notification going to the military on 93.

MS. GARVEY: Well, I think to some degree we have to acknowledge, and I think people have acknowledged that--and I think our actions acknowledge--that we needed to change the way we communicated. One, we needed to have direct connection with NORAD; we now have the damage that I know you all know about and have heard a lot about. So, I think we have to acknowledge that it

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was not solid communication by any stretch of the imagination.

But, having said that, I think, particularly after the second crash, everything was real time. There were informal, there were military liaisons were on the floor at the Command Center, you know, Colonel Atkins was in headquarters, I had seen her myself. There were people, you know, so there was a kind of real time communication. I mean, I'm understanding that, you know, that in watching some of the other testimony that, you know, Richard Clark of the NFC had communicated directly with NORAD, as well.

So, I am not excusing, I'm not saying we didn't need to make changes, we obviously did. And I that, I think was one of the first things we acknowledged. But I do think there was communication. I think there was real time communication and I think.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you know if United 93 was airborne on 93?

MS. GARVEY: Real time in terms of people

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were communicating with each other, the net was up, it was operational, people were communicating from the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me tell you what we found--let me tell you what we have found.

MS. GARVEY: You guys have spent much more time on this.

MR. AZZARELLO: We really, you know, we dug deep, long, and hard on this and have come to some pretty strong conclusions and I want to know that if you have any information or evidence to the contrary, we would welcome that at this point. [

We heard from people at headquarters refer to Colonel Atkins as an assumption that maybe she was involved and maybe involved in getting a military response. No one, though, had any specifics in terms of her being involved early on. In fact, most people remember her coming to the 10th floor, after the fourth crash.

We've interviewed Colonel Atkins, she indicated that she was not up on the 10th floor until pretty much after the four incidents, the

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fourth hijackings and the crashes were over. And that more important and specifically, she was never asked to assist in getting a military response. That it wasn't her duty, it wasn't her position as a liaison at headquarters, she was not someone who was tasked with the responsibility of obtaining military assistance.

MR. KARA: And was down at the other end of the--

MS. GARVEY: She was in that end in the Air Traffic--yeah, that's right--

MR. KARA: Correct, but not in the Crisis Room.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, to the extent that we have tried to evaluate folks at headquarters, saying, well, Colonel Atkins was there. We really see it as a non-factor in getting military assistance on any of the four aircraft.

MS. GARVEY: Fair.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is that a fair assumption?

MS. GARVEY: I guess my only point was

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that, even as part of the--my only point is that the military liaisons on the floor at Herndon, even Colonel Atkins being part of the Air Traffic operations. There was information that was flowing pretty freely and pretty directly. And--

MR. AZZARELLO: But that might, what it appears to us, to the extent that that was occurring with respect to Colonel Atkins, or the Military Personnel Command Center--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, she may have--

MR. AZZARELLO: --would be after the fourth crash.

MS. GARVEY: Is that true for the Herndon folks?

MR. KARA: Then, we're going to talk about that--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I understood that they were there from the very--

MR. AZZARELLO: The Herndon folks, I guess, now, but that's not to say if Colonel Atkins was asked to do something before the fourth crash--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, no, that's not--

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MR. AZZARELLO: --she wouldn't have tried to get help but that's--

MS. GARVEY: --she would have--

MR. AZZARELLO: --but I guess the point is, you know, her position is, she very clearly stated to us unequivocally that she wasn't involved in any response, wasn't asked to and really didn't get involved in the 10th floor until after the fourth crash.

With regard to the Command Center personnel. We know that there was some folks in the CARF [ph] on the civil side, that were asked just to find out by Ben Slyney [ph] whether or not Otis was trying to--whether someone was sending fighters down from Otis or somewhere else to help New York, look out for New York? And that some information came out back from the CARF that, yeah, the fighters are on their way down--

MS. GARVEY: On their way down.

MR. AZZARELLO: --to New York City. Again, though, no one, as we understand it, no one from the Air Traffic Service, itself. None of the

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military personnel around there, either Colonel Zibareth [ph] or Cherry--

MR. KARA: Cherry, Lieutenant Colonel Cherry.

MR. AZZARELLO: --Lieutenant Colonel Cherry were asked prior to the fourth crash to, hey, we need help, we need the military, we need NORAD, can you contact them and get assistance?

That was, as far as we understand, as far as our interviews with them, they were not asked to do that either, prior to the fourth crash. In fact when the air threat conference call does finally, when the FAA does finally get a representative on the air threat conference call, it's not until after the fourth crash, approximately 10:15, give or take a few minutes, that the FAA has an actual representative on the air threat conference call. And the individual who is then placed on that call is a gentleman named Raifford Brooks [ph], who is not a military--not military personnel, but civilian from the CARF unit.

And we've interviewed Mr. Brooks and, you

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know, he's someone involved in the mass movement--coordinating the mass movement of troops, no familiarity with hijack responses or no hijack training, in terms of what's the protocol for getting military assistance.

And, you know, frankly, when we interviewed him, he was a little bit overwhelmed. He was told to sit on the call because, you know--

MS. GARVEY: But, you know, because I did see that discussion at the hearing and just for a point of clarification. Maybe this is my own clarification. I always understood that those kinds of military calls were for the military. And that we, ordinarily never participated in that. It was unusual to be asked and that he was assigned to it just simply to monitor it.

All the things you've said are exactly right. But that it would not have been a normal--it was because this was so unusual--to have anyone from the FAA on what was, essentially, an internal military call, am I correct on that?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, the, what we have

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found is that--well, the air threat conference call. It started as a significant event conference and then it sort of elevated to an air threat conference call. They involved interaction communication from the military and other agencies. However, on their checklist, the FAA was not one of the preset agencies.

MS. GARVEY: Right, right, that's what I meant.

MR. AZZARELLO: Nor were they an alternate agency.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: We believe, because of the threat they perceived to be a missile threat, as opposed to a hijacking--

MS. GARVEY: Exactly, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: --of a commercial airlines.

MS. GARVEY: It became much more a Defense, it was a Defense, military sort of--

MR. KARA: Well, actually, and you can give us a little insight on this. The National

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Military Command Center is sort of set up to be the hub, the focal point for crisis management for the government--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. KARA: --which implies something beyond the Department of Defense. And it's accurate to say that FAA and FEMA, for example, were not on their preset list. But it's been portrayed to us that the conference is built in such a way that the National Military Command Center can add on anybody it wants to--

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely.

MR. KARA: --which is what they were trying to do.

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely, which is what they did. And I think they did the right thing. I guess the only thing that concerned me is that when I heard it on the, you know, just watching the hearing, I guess what concerned me. And please bear with me, I will be a little defensive on this stuff. That it sounded as though this was sort of a routine thing and that the person we would

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ordinarily assign to that would be somebody who would know the stuff and be prepared.

MR. KARA: Right.

MS. GARVEY: And, clearly, if we were ordinarily on the check list--

MR. AZZARELLO: You would have had--

MS. GARVEY: --we would have, yeah. We were doing, we were asked to do something that we wouldn't ordinarily do. And so, everybody was busy, we took a person who I don't know and I absolutely, the poor guy must have been overwhelmed. But my understanding is the direction to him was listen, monitor, you know, be helpful if you can--

MR. KARA: Answer questions if you can, don't--

MS. GARVEY: --answer questions, yeah, exactly.

MR. KARA: And, in fact, that's what he did, for example, fighter support for Air Force One, to escort in the Attorney General--

MS. GARVEY: Exactly, exactly, clear the

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airspace or whatever, yeah.

MR. KARA: The point we learned from all of that is he, the log showed up that he showed up that day for duty at 10:00 o'clock. And then, at about 10:17 or so, he is suddenly saddled with this duty. He does the best he can.

MS. GARVEY: He does the best he can, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think what it points out, this example, and I'd like to know if this was something that was discussed at your level in after-action review. What it points out, I think is the lack of--significant lack of familiarity with each other's agencies; the FAA and NORAD and DOD or the bigger, actually DOD and the military, is that the military's reaching out to the Command Center or that's where they reached out to, to try to get somebody on the air threat conference.

They wound up with this civilian, Raifford Brooks, from the CARF unit. When, where they really needed to get was to headquarters because that's where he decision-makers were in terms of

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the hijack coordinator, the Crisis Room, and the people with--supposedly the people with the information, the situational awareness and with the authority to say we need fighter escorts and we need them in response to this aircraft and this is where it is--this is where the aircraft is at the time.

So, what they really needed to do was to connect up with headquarters.

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And headquarters, on the other hand, really needed to connect with NORAD and that didn't happen on either end until later in the morning, after the fourth, from what we could see in any meaningful way until after the fourth crash.

Where it appears to us, that if there was more interagency exercises leading up to 9/11, perhaps, one would think with the benefit of hindsight, spurred on by the heightened threat of that spring and summer of 2001, that if that had caused the agencies to flex their communications muscles with one another, that, perhaps, these gaps

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would have been identified. And is that something that you looked at afterwards, with your staff?

MS. GARVEY: Oh, absolutely. Again, that is exactly why the DAN [ph] was set up, I mean, there was, I think, a much greater recognition that we needed to be in much closer communication; there needed to be tighter links with--and more direct links with the military.

But, John, even just going back to that for the moment, even, you know, should we have done more sort of exercises pre-9/11, I think that certainly, I wish we had, with the benefit of hindsight, I would certainly say, absolutely, in the same way that we did leading up to Y-2-K.

Again, not to repeat what I know has been said by many people far better than I'm going to say it, but, again, most of what we looked at in that summer, pointed to something that was going to happen more overseas. And I think that's reflected even in the number of aircraft that NORAD had and where they were positioned on that day. It was definitely still an outward thrust and an outward

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protection.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think, even if the threat were seen more as one coming from abroad, wouldn't the basic necessity for communications still need to be tested? In other words, even if the threat were coming from a hijacked airplane from overseas and if the attempt was to penetrate U.S. borders.

MS. GARVEY: Right, but I didn't think that, again, just not to put too fine a point on it, but while we never eliminated the domestic threat, the real threat, as we understood it, as I understood it was that the event would occur overseas, it would be in the Middle East.

MR. AZZARELLO: Occur, okay, of course that's--

MS. GARVEY: Right, that it would occur there.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay.

MS. GARVEY: Again, not to say that the domestic threat was eliminated.

But I think your points are, you know,

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certainly well taken. I mean, should we and was it right to make the changes in terms of communication? I think without a doubt. And I think that if there's a lesson learned that's clearly one of the lessons that a communications structure that included people all together that included a much more direct communication.

I have to say and, again, I guess the puzzle, as I listened to the hearing is why the NMCC did get off, did they, you know, were they, maybe, connected to something better?

MR. KARA: Now, we're going to tell you about your line.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let me tell you about that line. Right before I hit that one, I've just got one other point on United 93. To sort of solicit your views on a bigger picture issue. And that is Command Center. On United 93, right after headquarters is told that the aircraft is, you know, there's bomb threats and, you know, the plane is being hijacked.

At roughly the same time, Cleveland Center

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calls the Command Center and says, listen, we're tracking this aircraft, you know, we can get a local base here, even though they're not an alert NORAD fighter base, we can get some assistance. And they were concerned because they didn't want to lose track of the aircraft and they wanted to make sure someone from the military took off after it to tail it.

And someone at the Command Center, one of the Air Traffic Control specialists said, headquarters has that and that decision's got to be made there at a higher level than you or I. In fact that, on paper, that certainly was the protocol. It wasn't the Command Center function and one of the things that we wanted.

MR. : The Center had no real role in--

MR. AZZARELLO: The Command Center did not have a real--didn't have any defined role in responding to a hijack making decisions vis-a-vis fighter aircraft and military assistance. As we understand it, the Command Center role in a

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hijacking was, they were alerted about the hijack and their role was to make sure that that aircraft did not pose a safety threat to any of the other aircraft in it's path.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that they would coordinate the national airspace clear around it on its path, which path maybe they didn't know where it was even headed. But that was their role.

And what seemed to happen ad hoc that day is, the Command Center became the nerve center for information because they're the ones with the first line of contact to the field facilities and the Air Traffic Controllers who are on the scopes; not directly, but through their management, they have the most direct connectivity to the folks with the real time air traffic information.

And it sort of--it struck us and, in fact, some managers from that facility, thought that the events of 9/11 would be an event to seize upon to [unintell.] the Command Center to put it in the forefront as the facility that could be most useful

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in coordinating the response to an event like the events that occurred on 9/11.

And that that was the time to recognize the Command Center for what they believed to be its intended purpose when it was set up, but that it never fulfilled, to be the Command and Control Center, not just the system center. And do you have any views on that? Did you discuss that after?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I think, first of all, to some degree, they really are, I mean, the Command and Control. If you look at every day and you look at the collaborative decision-making, that emanates and begins, that was run by the Command Center. So, when you have the kinds of discussions that occur every day, particularly in bad weather situations and you have conference calls that come on, go on every hour, it is the Command Center that is essentially calling the shots, if you will.

I think where it gets more challenging and more difficult is that there are still situations where the local facility--and I think this is

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always the tension--where the local facility has the most information. And where they have a lot of expertise, as well. I love the Command Center. I'm very big on the Command Center, I wanted this collaborative decision-making to be there. So, I have a lot of respect for them.

But I also respect the local facilities and know that out of those facilities, we can sometimes see some very, very talented folks who ought to be making some of those decisions, as well. So, I think it is having to find that right balance between recognizing that the Command Center, yes, is able to pull information from around the country. But, also, recognizing that there are a host of decisions that still need to be--and should be made at the local facility.

I thought that while we struggled with that, I thought we've done a better job at sort of giving the Command Center more appropriate control. And I say that we, that's not me anymore, but--

MR. KARA: Where do you put the regions?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, where are the

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regions?

MR. KARA: How do you put the regions in the structure.

MR. AZZARELLO: On 9/11, the protocol on paper was the Center, if they had a hijack would notify the region and the region would notify headquarters and headquarters would activate it's Crisis Center and then the hijack coordinator would organize and respond to the hijacking. No where in there is the Command Center. And, you know, obviously, we have the benefit of hindsight at seeing how things worked on 9/11. And with the benefit of hindsight, it would appear that the Command Center would be the better facility as opposed to the regions to coordinate the response to a hijack, to go from the center to the Command Center to headquarters. Or to have the Command Center have the decision makers at the Command Center to coordinate the military response.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right after 9/11, in the aftermath of 9/11, was that examined, the structure

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and the protocol for hijack response and the fact that the Command Center didn't have a role and, perhaps, maybe should have--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and I believe that has been changed. Am I wrong--

MR. AZZARELLO: After 9/11?

MS. GARVEY: After 9/11, yeah. I believe. I will tell you, one of the greatest political challenges for any Administrator is what to do with the regions. And I that's far beyond--far beyond long before me--

MR. KARA: Beyond your pay grade, ma'am?

MS. GARVEY: I was going to say, long before me, other--other Administrators have tried that notion of sort of examining the regional facilities. I actually think with--and one of the goals we had in 2000 and 2001 was, as we set up the Air Traffic organization was to use that as a way to sort of, in the light of day, and with a lot of congressional support, one would hope, examine the whole structure of the regional centers.

And, frankly, the 20 centers of the

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regional organization, but, also, the 20 centers. True, 9/11 put a lot of that on hold on the Air Traffic stuff.

MR. AZZARELLO: From our vantage point, it seemed that the regions involvement in hijacking response didn't create an extra layer and, perhaps, was not necessary.

MS. GARVEY: I think, probably, in hindsight, you're right. Again, I think, before 9/11, the traditional hijacking that did not create--it was not a red flag, because you had more time, and you had--and, frankly, most of them turned out to be all right. I don't think it was flagged as so much of a problem.

I will tell you that from an operational point of view, I felt we were, because there was such political sensitivities around some of the regional issues, I felt we were sort of operationally, giving more control to the Command Center and we began with the collaborative decision-making, which was very controversial at the time. Because we were giving so much

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responsibility to the Command Center, on a daily basis in operating the system.

MR. AZZARELLO: Some of the Command Center management folks felt that, in the very beginning that it was going that way, that they would have more command and control of the Air Traffic System, but that because of some political sensitivities and some major push back from the regions, that it didn't continue down that path; that it only reached a minimal level and then they were, sort of, pushed back a little bit to the background and the regions reasserted themselves in the command and control structure.

MS. GARVEY: Hmm, post-9/11?

MR. AZZARELLO: No, no, no, pre-9/11, leading up to 9/11. And I'm saying after it's creation in the mid-'90s.

MS. GARVEY: I had lots of discussions with Jack Keyes [ph] about that, I thought he felt that he was making progress on that, but maybe not.

MR. KARA: When we looked for it on the line of block charts, you can't find the Command

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Center, on the line and block chart, it's very down over in Air Traffic, somewhere in there. It's not a visible entity to the outside observer.

The outside observer, looking at the FAA as a command and control structure or mechanism and knowing that the Command Center at Herndon plays the role it does, it's almost a commenting dissonance, a disconnect in your mind to try to find them in any way shape or form, having a key role to play. And, I don't know, I haven't looked at the current one, John, if it's any better today.

MS. GARVEY: That's interesting, because I--

MR. AZZARELLO: Well, the current situation because of the deadline sort of cuts all that out and the military's listening real time on Air Traffic.

MR. KARA: Yeah, the DAN trumps everything.

MS. GARVEY: The DAN trumps, exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: Let's get to the line, now, that you talked about. The Primary Net was

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supposed to be the line the military was on. We've talked to the individual from the FAA who was the person managing that net. Mike Wickert says he got it up and, you know, got in that position roughly 9:20, but that's early on. That's when it gets going. That doesn't mean everyone was on it at that point. People just started to climb on.

He remembers very briefly a DOD or military representative being on from the Pentagon, before it was hit, for a very, very brief period of time. And then them not being on. And him thinking that maybe it had to do with the fact that the Pentagon was hit, maybe that they lost the communications.

However, that Primary Net did not function in any shape, manner, or form that day the way it was supposed to. The way we understand it and the way he explained it. That Primary Net is supposed to have not only the military on it, but the Air Traffic Control element from the field, the people that are watching the potentially hijacked aircraft, so that they can pass information on the

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net. Hey, here's where the aircraft is now, it's in New York Center's airspace, we've lost coms, we've lost radar, whatever the situation is. And then, if the military's on that line, obviously, they're getting that information simultaneously and they'll be able to coordinate a response.

We were told by Mike that there was no Air Traffic Control element on his line. They were on the other net, they were on the internal net, the Tactical Net. So, he's not getting any updates, he wasn't getting any updates on United 93 on his line. He had some awareness of it because people were shouting in the room, right. But not getting anywhere on this and that he remembers a few federal agencies being on it, maybe DOJ, and Department of State were two that come to mind that he recalls.

MS. GARVEY: FBI?

MR. AZZARELLO: Well--

MR. KARA: Interesting.

MR. AZZARELLO: --FBI's interesting because the FAA headquarters log from the WOC lists

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the FBI coming on at roughly 9:21--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --it says FBI Jeff Bower [ph], is on from the FBI at 9:21. When you listen to the Tactical Net, which there is a recording of from the Command Center end, because they record it, you see Jeff Bower checking on the Tactical Net at 9:21 and announcing himself, FBI, Jeff bower.

MS. GARVEY: Hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, and that led us to believe, even at some point, that maybe there really wasn't a Primary Net early on. We thought maybe it was just everyone was on the Tactical Net. In fact one of your former employees that we interviewed who was tasked interest he aftermath of 9/11 to do a review said that she believed that the Tactical Net later that morning, just morphed into the Primary Net. That that became--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, I remember--

MR. KARA: That was Darlene Freeman.

MR. AZZARELLO: That was Darlene Freeman's group. So, what we have determined is that--from

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interviewing both ends of this, the military and the FAA is it never really got up and going to be any meaningful type of communications net. That the Air Traffic Control folks weren't on it, they weren't giving updates on any potentially rogue aircraft or missing aircraft on the Primary Net.

To the extent that the military was on it, they were potentially on for, you know, a cup of coffee, so to speak, for a short period of time. It's not clear why that connectivity wasn't held or why they didn't recognize it on either end for a period of time.

Continuing on the FAA side, what's interesting to us is a lot of other people in the room don't even remember seeing anybody manning that position for a period of time that morning-- the Primary Net position that's supposed to have the military on it. That most folks didn't have any recollection of anyone standing in that position, be it Mike Wickert or someone else; don't really recall anybody standing there until after the fourth crash.

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The person who logs the event, [unintell.] the Primary Net, sits right behind that person in the Crisis Center and is supposed to be on a computer logging the events that he learns, that he or she learns, [unintell.] hearing it, because they can plug into the Primary Net, or they get notes passed to them by the person on the Primary Net and they enter them into the computer log. That person was interviewed by Miles. And doesn't even remember who was standing--

MR. KARA: He could not recall who was in front of it--

MR. AZZARELLO: --doesn't remember anybody being in that position.

MR. KARA: But concurrently haven't to literally look through that position, he described with great clarity and accuracy, the four people that we agreed--

MS. GARVEY: Right, right.

MR. KARA: --so he could see and he knew there was someone on the Dais--

MS. GARVEY: On the Dais.

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MR. KARA: --but he could not recall, in fact, at that point in the interview he broke down, when he said, I can't recall who was sitting in front of me.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, poor guy.

MR. AZZARELLO: I think that what we've seen is that there was an assumption by a lot of folks at headquarters that the military had to be on the line somewhere. Be it the Crisis Room, the WOC, the Air Traffic suites where Dave Cannoles had set up. You know, later on that morning, they see someone after the fourth crash, like Colonel Atkins walk around in uniform. All right, the Military's--they're involved somehow.

But, you know, what strikes us is that, you know, didn't someone that day, you know, while the events were unfolding, just ask the question, okay, where's the military, are they on the Primary Net? Are they on the Tactical Net, are they on the line anywhere here in this room?

And the earliest time that we see a recognition from the FAA headquarters then, that

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there's not a meaningful connectivity with the military, we believe occurs shortly after the fourth crash. Monte Belger, apparently, according to others, came into the room and yelled out in no uncertain terms, you know, did anyone have the military in this room, on the phone in this room? And they--there was more than one witness that recalled--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, he lost it.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, not being quite--not being happy, I understand that, but under the circumstances was, you know, was using some strong language and wanted to know where are they? Are they on? And the people--

MS. GARVEY: Because he believed up until that point, which is why he said to me, when I said is the military on, he said, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: But--

MS. GARVEY: He was absolutely, I mean, he is a letter-of-the-law-guy, so--

MR. AZZARELLO: I think that's when he came to the realization that the assumption was not

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a good one, that somebody had them on the line. What we've been able to determine and if you have any information to the contrary, then we'd appreciate you telling us--what we found is that at around 10:15 on the Tactical Net, you hear Pete Falcone yell out, is NORAD--is NMCC on here? We need to get them on the line.

MR. : At what time?

MR. AZZARELLO: At 10:14, actually to be exact. And to paraphrase Pete, I'm not at the level of management, when I'm yelling that out on the Tactical Net, which generally does not have the military on it anyway, unless somebody tells me it was my boss. And he said, he--I don't know whether or not he specifically attached that to Monte Belger, but had some recollection that somebody, I think was making a request and I was passing it on, hey, are you on my line, and they weren't.

And Mike Wickert, who was, apparently, at some point that morning running the Primary Net recalls Monte coming in and screaming out to the military, I checked on my line, they weren't on my

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line. So, we believe that occurred right around that 10:13/10:14 time, which, unfortunately, at that point, United 93 was down already. But we've been given all that, I mean, 93 crashed in Pennsylvania; and we are mindful of the fact that even if the FAA had been able to contact the military and had been able to vector an aircraft towards that, a military fighter aircraft towards United 93, the worse case scenario would have been that they shot it down and what happened that day was a crash, so certainly it didn't cause any greater loss of life, the fact that the FAA wasn't able to link up with the military that day.

Obviously, the bigger picture going forward and what was more important is why did that fail? Why did the coms fail, the communications fail, because, God, forbid if it happens again post-9/11 and an aircraft reaches it's target, you'll have more lives lost,

but a lot of assumptions we believe were made that day, you know, at the headquarters level, that the military was involved somehow and that they were involved in

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the response to United 93. And they weren't. And there doesn't appear to be recognition of that by executive management at Monte's level, until shortly after.

MS. GARVEY: But do we know why they may have dropped off? I mean?

MR. AZZARELLO: The military personnel?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: On the other line that we interviewed, Major Chambers [ph].

MS. GARVEY: Right, because I think one of the things I noticed, Monte said at that hearing was, in my 30-years' experience, you know, when you call the NMCC, they're on the line, they're on the line. So, he sort of--

MR. AZZARELLO: We've interviewed Major Chambers and he's the guy who remember at some point that morning fielding a call from the FAA and his sort of summary of that call is that a junior officer that are in the Emergency Action Cell, was tasked to do, as you can imagine a number of things while as the FAA was doing that morning.

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MS. GARVEY: Sure.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it's a push to talk hand set, so you can't leave it on intercom. And he was on it and said, you know, there was minimal information, a lot of dead space; a lot of just nothing coming over to us. And that, frankly, is corroborated by the FAA representative who said, I really wasn't, I didn't have much to say, there wasn't much going on on my--

MS. GARVEY: There was not--no we didn't have [unintell.]

MR. AZZARELLO: --I didn't have much information to give out and I wasn't getting any. To the extent that DOJ or DO, Department of State was on, they're not feeding me any information. I mean, he doesn't have Air Traffic on, so I'm not getting information and so, therefore, I don't have a lot to give out. So, and I think that was being perceived at the NMCC end--

MS. GARVEY: I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: --and so they would periodically put it down, put down the phone, run

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and do other tasks. And, ironically one of the tasks they were tasked to do immediately was around 9:20, at the same time, probably, that the call came into them, they're being told to get the FAA on the significant event conference and then the air threat conference.

MS. GARVEY: I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, while the military was trying to get an FAA representative on a secure line, because they perceived this to be a terrorist attack and they wanted to get your agency on a secure line, the FAA is reaching out through an unsecured line on the Primary Net, but caveat, that Primary Net is not functioning the way, at least on paper, it was intended to function, in terms of coordinating the military response, they didn't have the right elements on it, notwithstanding the military involvement, the right elements were not on to help the Primary Net manager coordinate a response.

MR. KARA: And the military has to have their lines secure, because as this thing

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escalates, it could well go into COG and they even have to go into compartments that they have to stay secure.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I think that goes to a larger points that we'd like your opinions and comments on and that is, even to the extent that any domestic hijacking remained, even a minimal threat, if not a larger threat in the summer of 2001.

Had both agencies sort of flexed their communications on both ends, there would have been, perhaps, a realization that, hey, wait a minute there is really an attack on the country through the use of commercial aircraft or for the use of the NAS, we, the military are going to want you to participate on this secure line.

And the way your protocol is set up at the FAA, you're going to try and pull us in on an unsecured line, well, we need to get these apples and oranges together in the same basket. And obviously, with hindsight you can see that on examining the conduct that day, but it would appear

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an issue that could have been identified pre-9/11 in terms of communications issues, if both agencies had more--had done some exercises together, joint exercises prior to 9/11/

What we saw is that there really weren't.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, again, I would, I think you're absolutely right, with the hindsight, you know, that's an excellent point and that's, I think a lesson learned.

But, again, given the context of the summer of 2001, believing that the threat was greater in other parts of the world and that that's where the threat would occur, it was not something that, you know, sort of leaped to the top of the list. We certainly did exercises, you know, in preparation for Y-2-K. There certainly were those sorts of exercises, so, and, clearly, that would have been a benefit at the time.

But I don't think--and I think because the net had worked in other hijacking situations, this was unparalleled, of course, but I don't think we had seen that sort of difficulty that would have

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said, we better have another training exercise here.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I do recognize the other scenarios of hijackings pre-9/11 time wasn't necessarily of the essence.

MS. GARVEY: Time was not the, right, exactly.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember, there was an exercise, I think it was called Twin Star, which was one of the only, I think joint exercises that we were able to identify that occurred, we believe, later in 1996, between the FAA and the military, where there was actually an airline company that actually allowed the exercise the use of their aircraft for the exercise, and some FAA employees even volunteered to play the role of passengers.

And the commercial aircraft, actually was a live exercise. They got airborne and it was reported as a hijacking. And then the communications started between the FAA and the military to try and track that aircraft. And I was wondering if--what we were told is that it didn't

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work so successfully that day. And they were never able to--

MS. GARVEY: I worked, actually for Federal Highway, in 1996.

MR. AZZARELLO: Okay, were there any exercises like that in your tenure that you can recall?

MS. GARVEY: There may have been at the Security level, in fact, I'm quite sure that there were. There were none that I participated in, though.

MR. KARA: Just to come back on the line that the FAA established that morning, the 9:20, line. The log clearly shows the FAA made the connection and the NMCC did pick up the line at the other end, but that connection being made, we don't find anything on either side that leads us to conclude that the line was ever officially or effectively used that day. But it was opened to be sure. The log entry is accurate. But nothing carried forward, at least that we've been able to find.

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And I talked to Shirley Miller three days ago on this and I said, Shirley, if anybody knows anymore information or has anymore insight for us, please let me know.

MS. GARVEY: Right, you were certainly talking to the right people. No, I mean, what I can tell you is that from my perspective, I was receiving briefings as the morning went on. I may have made a false assumption that some of it was coming from the net, but it was clearly coming from both the Security people and the Air Traffic people.

I will, and particularly, now that you've said that, much of what I was getting, though, was clearly Air Traffic stuff. It was Air Traffic information and, really, the sort of Security/FBI information, those were things that we heard after, you know, later on in that afternoon and in subsequent days.

We knew we had a situation, obviously; we knew we were under attack, but all of us at that point were focused on let's hear what the Air

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Traffic piece and most of the people who were in our offices during that morning, were the Air Traffic people, the Air Traffic organization.

MR. KARA: And Air Traffic did, in fact, have two lines of communication set up--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. KARA: --they had the Cannoles' Air Traffic Suite and then the line that Jeff set up between himself and John White out at the Command Center.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember, did you convey any information regarding United 93 on the SVTS to the White House representatives or other?

MS. GARVEY: I believe we said we were tracking it. Either I said that or somebody else said, I think, on one of the SVTS. I must say those conferences have run together in my mind. I mean, I know that we had several that morning. I know there was a sharing of information among the agencies. It was more status--quite honestly, I'm not sure that we heard anything on those calls that we hadn't already heard from other sources or from

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other discussions in the morning, but it was more quick, tactical, what's happening reports.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember when you first went into the room to participate in the SVTS, when you got to headquarters?

MS. GARVEY: Pretty early on in the morning, I do not remember the exact time. I know that Clark was on it. I know that the FBI, State, the various agencies that you would have expected.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you recall whether it was pre- or post-Pentagon being hit that you were on the SVTS?

MS. GARVEY: I think it was pre-, but I cannot be exactly sure.

MR. KARA: Was Richard Clark, running the SVTS?

MS. GARVEY: Yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: He was running it, Clark was?

MS. GARVEY: I think Clark was running every SVTS that I was on, that I remember.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember any DOD

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representatives being on?

MS. GARVEY: I remember DOD being on, I cannot tell you who exactly was on from DOD, but I--FBI, I know was on.

MR. KARA: Do you recall Don Rumsfeld being on?

MS. GARVEY: The ones that I, I don't remember, and I think I might have remembered that.

MR. KARA: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: But I don't remember him being on.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember any on directions aimed at the FAA coming over the SVTS from the White House, from Clark?

MS. GARVEY: More--

MR. AZZARELLO: Suggestions or corrections?

MS. GARVEY: --more status reports; more, you know, keep us up to date, where are we, you know, that sort of thing; more status reports.

MR. AZZARELLO: Trying to get information?

MS. GARVEY: Information, yes.

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MR. AZZARELLO: Was there any discussion on the SVTS about the grounding of aircraft with Clark?

MS. GARVEY: At one of the SVTS there was some discussion, and I think the actions may have already begun.

MR. AZZARELLO: That's actually--

MS. GARVEY: Not consistent?

MR. AZZARELLO: --yeah, I'm piecing together our time line, I think we--what we have put together is that there might have been a suggestion coming over the SVTS and the OAS about trying to ground all aircraft from the sky so that you could sort of get a handle on what's still up there that's a rogue aircraft, that's not listening to us, that's not coming down.

MS. GARVEY: That's very possible.

MR. AZZARELLO: And that that was passed over to the Command Center and they had indicated they had started?

MS. GARVEY: They started already, yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any discussions about

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fighter aircraft, do you recall in the SVTS in terms of fighter aircraft and where they were headed or whether or not they were affording protection to the D.C. area?

MS. GARVEY: I remember at one of the SVTS, there was some discussion about the fighters being up. I cannot exactly remember where but that actions had been taken. I think that was one of the things that DOD may have reported on .

MR. AZZARELLO: To the extent that you said, I thought, you recalled some discussions about 93, do you recall them being on the SVTS while Clark was present about 93?

MS. GARVEY: I'm not sure, I wish I were clearer on that, sorry.

MR. AZZARELLO: So, you're not sure whether they were real time discussions? Or discussions maybe after 93 went down? Are you clear one way or the other whether or not they were real time or perhaps afterwards?

MS. GARVEY: I thought at the point we were talking about tracking it, but I, you know, I

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should be careful on that, because I really am not 100 percent sure. Some other things are clearer.

MR. AZZARELLO: One of the other questions, I had a follow-up with your Team 7 interview was that you indicated that there was--you indicated an open line for communications with the field and was asking them what was happening. Through what mechanism was that open line?

MS. GARVEY: It was really through Doug Davis and the Air Traffic folks in that part of the room.

MR. AZZARELLO: Doug got information from--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah, actually, that part of it, as I think came to light in the hearing, that part, the early part of it did work well, in terms of gaining the awareness of 93. The request went out to the field facilities to report any suspect aircraft--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

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MR. AZZARELLO: --and within minutes 93 was reported and it came up to Delta, at headquarters.

Do you remember, I guess, lastly on 93, there's--one of the two efforts is on the transcript, Doug's phone call with Command Center. In one instance Doug said that they're pulling Jeff away to talk about United 93. And this was, roughly, I don't know 10-minutes before impact, give or take a few minutes. Do you recall participating in any conversation with Jeff where he was pulled away to discuss with either you, Monte, or others the fate of United 93?

MS. GARVEY: No, I remember many discussions, I mean, several discussions, not many--several discussions with Monte. A couple that Jeff was in, I don't know if that one, in particular, whether he was actually pulled away to discuss it, but just, again monitoring it, watching it, a great deal of concern, a great deal of anxiety over it.

MR. AZZARELLO: And I guess, in that same

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vein, right around the same time, maybe a few minutes before that when John White says to Doug Davis, hey, are they going to scramble on 93, because someone sure has to make this call in the next ten minutes or so, you know, it's 29 minutes out of DC. At some point Doug says, Peter is talking to me--referencing Peter Challenge, talking to Monte about scrambling, do you recall, did you participate in any--

MS. GARVEY: I did not participate in that?

MR. AZZARELLO: --with Peter?

MS. GARVEY: I did not participate in any--

MR. KARA: How about Peter and Steve Brown, were they major players that morning?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, they were very visible, very much around yes, yes.

MR. KARA: We've covered all the points that we--was there anything left in your mind, having heard all the hearings now and things--

MS. GARVEY: I wish I had paid more

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attention to that a lot of the hearings. There was one note that I just wanted to clarify and I may have misheard it, so if I, have please don't hesitate to push back. But, at one point, I think in the last hearing, I think it was Commissioner Layman [ph], mentioned that he thought that the FAA and I think he mentioned me, in particular, or the Administrator in particular, had received the--he referred to it as the August 6 memo. The only think I know of the August 6, was the Presidential Directive. And I think he said that that and, perhaps, other information had been filtered by a special assistant that I had.

And he referred, I think, back to Claudio Manno, that he thought that he had heard that from Claudio Manno. I just wanted to at least correct it, if I can. One, is that classified documents, top secret documents, none of that was ever filtered by anyone in my organization. And, in fact, those would have not gone through a special assistant, but would have come directly to me either by--the Security Associate Administrator, in

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this case it was Canavan, before that, Admiral Flynn. Or they would have come to me through Monte.

And I certainly did not see the August 6, which is, by the way, not to say that I would have done anything differently, this is not a criticism one way or the other. But I simply did not see it. I don't believe anyone at the FAA, either General Canavan, though I've not spoken to him directly, but I don't believe he saw it or I think he would have told me if it was significant. And Claudio, I don't believe saw that, so.

MR. KARA: How did you receive your daily intelligence briefs?

MS. GARVEY: Well, certainly, obviously, if it were classified or anything, information I want to be clear about that, I got that directly. The only thing I didn't get it is over the phone. We were very careful about not doing anything like that over the phone. If I was out of the office, they either alerted me that I needed to see Admiral Flynn or Admiral Canavan or Monte when I got back

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and I would do that or Monte would see me, personally, if the others were not around.

The daily ones, generally came through Monte, through Shirley, Monte and I can't say that I saw every single one, but certainly anything of any significance. One of the reasons I was very eager to have Monte as the Deputy was because of the breadth of experience that he had and the depth of knowledge that he had of the agency and particularly in those areas where I did not feel that my background--and Security, certainly, you know an area where his years of experience I thought was very valuable.

MR. AZZARELLO: Is it fair to say, I guess, is it fair to say with regard to the content of part of that PBB [ph], did the information come to your attention through any form or from any agency the intelligence that there were folks in the United States believed to be associated with terrorist organizations that were taking--engaging in preparations consistent with hijackings?

MS. GARVEY: No.

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MR. AZZARELLO: None of that reached you prior to 9/11?

MS. GARVEY: Exactly. And even the Mossoui incident, which I know people have discussed, this is after 9/11 and I've gone back to ask those questions. As I understand it, we did receive work from the FBI in early September, maybe sometime, perhaps, around September 4, and that a memo was or it was part of an information document that came up to the Administrator that I may or it came, I think to Mike Canavan. I may very well have seen that, but the fact that the memo said someone was in custody and the FBI had it well under control, would have been a signal to me that that was a good thing. That would not have signaled to me, I need to act, I need to, you know, it was.

MR. AZZARELLO: The Phoenix memo, did that information come to your attention?

MS. GARVEY: No, I don't think it came to anyone at the FAA.

MR. AZZARELLO: Any of the Security folks?

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MS. GARVEY: And the Security folks, my understanding is there's not, you may have heard, have no information on that. Some of this came to light after I left the FAA and so, some of that information, I, you know, have obviously not been able to ascertain.

MR. AZZARELLO: Five minute break and then we'll take about 10 minutes to wrap up?

MR. KARA: Okay, we're going to stop--

[BREAK.]

MR. KARA: We're back on the record with Jane Garvey on June 30.

MR. AZZARELLO: Could we, actually follow up on your interaction with Secretary Mineta after you arrived at headquarters, could you tell us what communications or interactions you had with the Secretary after you arrived back at headquarters after the second crash?

MS. GARVEY: Yes. The communication with the Secretary in his office was pretty direct and pretty frequent; all throughout the morning. I would say, you know, either I was speaking to him

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or Monte was speaking to him on a very, very regular basis. Having lost a little bit of the track of time, but not unusual or it would not be, I think, inaccurate to say, you know, at least every five to ten minutes we were in communication with him.

And, certainly, when any information, new information arose, we would contact him. But he was very good about calling us quite frequently. If he was in the car and heading to a secure location, he was calling us, as well.

MR. AZZARELLO: What kind of information was he asking for?

MS. GARVEY: Pretty much, the information that you would expect. What do we know? Where are, specifically, what information are you hearing? What are you hearing from the facilities? What's the, you know, what's the Command Center got? He was definitely on a receive mode.

MR. : Do you recall him asking about whether the military had been contacted or whether they were involved?

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MS. GARVEY: I don't recall that. There were some conversations that I was not part of that Monte was into.

MR. : Do you remember if you had contact with or communications with the Secretary after you arrived at headquarters and before the Pentagon was hit?

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I'm sure we did. I will not remember exactly--

MR. : I'm trying to put in context, I guess, one of the comments in your earlier interview with Team 7, basically they were discussing after the fourth crash, that there was a challenge in terms of determining about what to do with the national airspace, after the fourth crash in terms of getting all the aircraft down. And by that time, I guess, Secretary Mineta and John Flaherty had left to go to the White House.

And, I guess Monte had informed you that Boston and New York had already gone ATZ-zero and that the controllers had already started to take down all the aircraft from the national airspace

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system and was it at that point you and him, Monte Belger, needed to get the Secretary more into the decision-making loop.

MS. GARVEY: On that particular issue?

MR. : Was it on that issue?

MS. GARVEY: It was definitely on that issue, yeah. I mean, I felt he had been part of the loop, you know, all morning, but on that particular issue.

MR. : So, to the extent that Dick Clark raised that issue on SVTS prior to the fourth crash, the issue being grounding all aircraft and to the extent that that was being discussed and done at the Command Center level at that point in time Secretary Mineta was not in the loop on that then?

MS. GARVEY: He may not have been, I'm not 100 percent sure, again of all the sort of sequence of those activities, but I know that the controllers began the action before the final, you know, decision was being made. But, we clearly felt--I think, by the way, and I notice that there

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was some discussion of this at the last meeting about whether or not, you know, any criticism had been leveled at the controllers. Boy, I thought they did just--and I think everyone, you guys seemed to agree that they did just a magnificent job.

MR. : On both sides, military and civilian.

MS. GARVEY: Right, and did the right thing and starting with bringing folks down or starting with the ground stops in Boston and New York and moving it to--

MR. KARA: Absolutely.

MS. GARVEY: --exactly the right thing. Obviously, anything of that magnitude you want to have the Secretary of Transportation--

MR. : Sure.

MS. GARVEY: --and, frankly, as soon as we got one quarter of the way through, you know, talking about it, he was, do, you know, let's do it. It was a pretty instantaneous, as you would expect, reaction.

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MR. AZZARELLO: I think the genesis of that comment was, just when Jeff Griffith found out Ben Slyney had started, had made that decision already, and started to ground the aircraft, just so, you know, it wasn't completely unfounded. He said in the transcript, he says, Jack says, what are you doing making a decision like that, don't do anything like that, that has to be coordinated through the Administrator, don't do anything like that again without going through us.

So, he was, now this is, he's--Jeff is telling John White, not that Ben Slyney directly, so he's chastising the decision by Slyney through telling John White, don't you folks down there make any calls like that without going through--it has to be made at the highest level. So that's the genesis of it. Just so, I wanted you to know, it wasn't completely on their level.

MS. GARVEY: Was it that he was, I think, I know what I heard after the fact that there was some concern, not that they had made the decision, but more that they had been a little slower in

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letting folks know, since we were on sort of a real time thing but maybe, but you may be--

MR. : On the paper, it reads as, he said, Jeff says, take down all the aircraft, you know, ground all the aircraft, and White says, we already started that--

MS. GARVEY: Started that, yeah.

MR. : When did you start, he said, I don't know five-, ten-minutes ago. Well, don't make any calls like that; don't do that without consulting with us.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. : There was a meeting, I don't sort of going forward post-9/11, a White House briefing on September 17. Did you attend that briefing at the White House?

MS. GARVEY: I know I attended a discussion in Andy Card's [ph] office, in Mr. Card's office, I do not know if it was the 17.

MR. : It was shortly after--

MS. GARVEY: It was fairly shortly after, there may have been other meetings that the

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Secretary himself went to, without anybody. But at this particular meeting I don't believe--this was a--and, actually, this was a meeting that Michael Jackson was in, so I don't believe the Secretary was at that particular meeting, that I'm referring to, in any case. So, if there was a White House briefing of the Secretary, I was not at that.

MR. AZZARELLO: What was the nature of that meeting, what was the subject matter discussed at that meeting?

MS. GARVEY: With Secretary [unintell.]?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Really much more along the lines of, you know, again, status. What were we doing. I think at that point, it was a lot of the beginning of discussions on legislation and so forth, that may have been touched on, but it was, really, more a status of what we knew. The National Airport was a very big and hot issue. That was one of the key discussion points. We had the Secret Service there, as well. What were we going to do about National? Was there a way to

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bring it up?

What were we going to do about General Aviation, I think that there were some concerns that were being raised by some folks in some quarters about General Aviation. And I think that the Deputy Secretary was, really exploring as what some options might have been.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember who, if anyone was with you from the FAA at that briefing?

MS. GARVEY: I may have been the only one from the FAA there at that point. I know that Michael--I was, I think [unintell.] Deputy Secretary Jackson.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if there was any discussion regarding the events of 9/11 in terms of an after-action review, along the lines of who and sort of who knew what when in the FAA and a discussion along those lines?

MS. GARVEY: No, no, not at, no, that was not part of that discussion.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember a group that was put together at headquarters, we believe

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led by Darlene Freeman, she recalled being tasked at the DSW, yourself and, perhaps, more directly Monte Belger and that they put together a working group to support her to examine the facts of the day of to work with Dave Cannoles and his group to do an after-action review and determine what--within the FAA system, who knew what when with regard to each of the four hijacked aircraft; when did we have--

MS. GARVEY: Time lines and so forth?

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, absolutely, and I think they were really probably two primary purposes for that. We wanted to know so that we could learn and, obviously, if there were any changes that needed to be made, that was going to be one way that we would examine that. Although Monte also undertook a separate initiative, if you will, to really take a more specific look at the Ops Center, a more specific look at some of the Air Traffic Control issues and so forth. But we felt, obviously, we wanted to learn as much as we could

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to make the necessary changes that we had to.

Secondly, we also knew that there would be congressional hearings and we had to have information prepared and ready for both the Secretary and myself, you know, if and when we were called to discuss the events of 9/11.

MR. AZZARELLO: Did either of you or both of you give testimony to Congress where you spoke about the time lines?

MS. GARVEY: We did give testimony to Congress, both, as I recall, it was a--there were two hearings, at least, that I'm remembering: One, in front of Senator McCain's committee; another in front of Chairman Rogers. I think they may have occurred on the same day, if I'm remembering that.

MR. : Was that October--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, and we certainly gave as much information as we had at the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: In fact, I think some of the people who worked on the briefing book, that you said was one of the purposes to prepare you for any congressional testimony and--

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MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

MR. AZZARELLO: --figure out what happened in the events of the day of. Do you remember if there have been at least two witnesses of some of your managers who have alluded to the fact that there was, at times, early on, on 9/11, some heated discussions between military representatives and FAA management about who knew what when in terms of awareness of the four hijacked aircraft?

Particularly with 93, because, obviously, that sort of stands out as sort of a separation in terms of, you know, the military, as we now established at the hearing, that they didn't get notification until after it crashed from Cleveland Center, roughly four minutes after it crashed. And, yet, that information was held in the FAA both at the Center level, Command Center and at headquarters as early as 9:34 that the plane had been hijacked.

So, obviously that one sort of jumps out at you as, you know, the FAA, as an institution, had 29 minutes of advance notice that it was hijacked before it crashed and the military didn't

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get notice four minutes after it was in the ground.

And, according to at least two witnesses, that was the topic of some, you know, maybe not so cordial discussions about who knew what, when, you know--

MS. GARVEY: You know, I've heard that, but I checked it out or at least I've asked people, the people, the person that was supposed to be involved was Jeff Griffith. And he said he never had any sort of heated discussions. There were points of differences in trying to reconcile it. I know that was an issue. And quite, quite directly, I thought that had been resolved. I knew that, you know, that came to me maybe a couple of weeks, maybe a month after or a few days afterward, there was some difficulty or some differences of opinion of what the time lines were.

And quite honestly, that seemed very natural to me, given the amount of information everyone was receiving; given some of the confusion that was occurring that day. I said, well, you know, obviously, sit down with NORAD, see if you

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can work this out or figure it out, we want to be as accurate as we possibly can and we want to be, you know, we, obviously, want to resolve it, if we can, you know.

MR. AZZARELLO: Right

MS. GARVEY: And I was told that, in fact, that it had gotten resolved and--

MR. AZZARELLO: It's interesting you said sit down with NORAD and figure it out--

MS. GARVEY: --or the military.

MR. AZZARELLO: --because I don't know if you know this, but NORAD did give their--a copy of their log, their operations log from the floor of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, which would be the folks asked to dispatch the aircraft and respond.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And they had that log and that log indicates that 10:07 is when they got the first notification of United 93 and--

MS. GARVEY: I remember that part, but I do remember their log being in The New York Times

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or it was actually reported in one, there was one, their log or their time line was actually reported in one of the major newspapers, I don't remember which one.

MR. KARA: Well, it could be, on the 18th of September, they put out their press release.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, that was it, yeah, thank you, yeah, that was exactly it.

MR. AZZARELLO: The at the FAA Dave Cannoles believed and Jeff Griffith, at least were the two folks that had access to the log, that copy of the Northeast Air Defense log. In addition to that, they created a separate--someone created a separate document and written on the top of it it says, internal FAA briefing.

From interviewing Darlene Freeman and people in her group, it appears that that document was created in the aftermath of 9/11 to brief upper management on when did the FAA gain awareness of each of the four hijacked aircraft and when did they tell the military. And what's interesting on

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United 93 is it says 10:08 and it actually cites to the Northeast Air Defense Sector log and represents that that's the earliest indication of any notification from the FAA to the military on United 93, which, frankly, coincides with what we found in our investigation. And I guess what strikes us immediately is if someone within the FAA, internally, is briefing that or making a chart out of it--making that a point in a chart, how then, could it be that in May of 2003 the military comes before the Commission, as well as FAA representatives and say, you know, 9:16, we were told about United 93?

In fact, that very same internal briefing document, notes that 9:16 time by the military that they were, I guess early on saying to the FAA that they thought maybe was accurate, and the FAA notation is it can't be because at 9:16 the plane wasn't hijacked yet.

And that, obviously, I mean, jumped out at us immediately, too, as that the first thing that the FAA would be able to ascertain from Air Traffic

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Control tapes is when was the--if the plane was taken over, when can we tell that someone breached the cockpit?

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And so, that really leaps out at you, I have to say, and that's caused us great concern.

MS. GARVEY: Consternation.

MR. AZZARELLO: Yeah.

MS. GARVEY: Say that again, if the 9:15, if in fact in May that they testified--I'm sorry, I don't remember that.

MR. AZZARELLO: In May of 2003, the military came with this chart and slide show--a PowerPoint presentation and they said at 9:16, the FAA alerted them that United 93 was hijacked.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, I see.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it couldn't have been because it wasn't hijacked until 9:28. And that was known early on from the review of Air Traffic Control tapes. In fact there's a document created called Summary of Air Traffic of Hijack Events by

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the FAA--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: --that Dave Cannoles and Tony Ferrante's group put together?

MS. GARVEY: Tony, yeah, Tony's had put together, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: And it shows in that very time line for United 93 that 9:28 is when the series of transmissions occurred in the cockpit--

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

MR. AZZARELLO: --which alerted Air Traffic Control that United 93 was hijacked.

MR. : The--

MR. AZZARELLO: This is the May-- In fact, also, you see the FAA reports possible hijack of American 77, the FAA hijack summary that was prepared in September of 2001, by Tony Ferrante and Dave Cannoles does not list 9:16 as the notification for United 93. Nor does it list 9:24 as the notification of the hijack of 77. In fact, it gives no notification times to the military for either United 93 or American 77. And what jumps

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out at you when you look at this is, they had the NEDS log, because in the very same Summary of Hijack Events, it cites to the NEDS log for the 8:40 time on the notification time of American 11 and it cites to 9:05 as the notification time of United 175.

And you know, I've gotta be frank with you, this has really disturbed me for a while. And I've asked witnesses and in upper level management at the FAA, you had the log, obviously, from NEDS. You're referring to it in you're referring to it in your summary, which was created within 10 days of the attacks. And you cite to it for notification of the first two aircraft. You give no notification, no citation for any notice on the last two, when the log suggests, specifically, at least on United 93, that notice wasn't given till 10:07, why wouldn't you put that data point in? And, frankly, one answer I got was, well, why would that be relevant because it's four minutes after the crash?

To which, I had to point out that well,

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your notification that you put in your Summary for United 175, is 9:05, that's two minutes after the crash, so, what's the dividing line there, you know, between what's relevant and what's not.

MS. GARVEY: So, why--

MR. : Excuse me, I haven't been present when anybody said he had the NEDS log. I--no witness that I've heard said he actually had custody of the NEDS log.

MR. AZZARELLO: No, Dave Cannoles said he saw a copy of it, he things Griffith had it.

MR. : Okay, and I don't know what Griffith told you, but the witnesses I've heard said that it is quite possible that someone called the military and got that particular time point and referred to it as coming from the military. But it's not necessarily so that anybody who prepared that list of times was looking at all the times on that log. So, you know, to be fair, I don't think we can--

MR. AZZARELLO: That's your first--that's your interpretation--

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MR. : No, it's the witnesses.

MR. AZZARELLO: Dave Cannoles said that he saw the log and he things that--

MR. : I wasn't there for Cannoles, but--

MR. AZZARELLO: I'm telling you what he said.

MR. : Well, I guess I'm long, you said that Cannoles actually said.

MR. AZZARELLO: Cannoles said he saw it, he may have--he may, himself, have also, like examined it, but he knows that there was a physical log and that he things Griffith had it. Griffith had extensive conversations, interactions with General Larry Arnold and said he gave him--he gave me whatever I needed, so that we could find out what they thought they knew from us and vice versa--we shared information.

We interviewed General Arnold and he said, whatever the FAA wanted, if they needed some documentation, so, who knew what when, I told my staff to make that available to the FAA.

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MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm. That was my understanding that people were very generous, both on both sides, by the way. No one was trying to one-up each other or, you know, hang the other guy out to dry or whatever.

John, let me ask one think and I it's actually going back, I think to the net, because you gave me and on 93, certainly, a sense of what happened that I didn't have before. I guess one of the things that I get I'm still struggling with. Did the military or NORAD, then, did they had, must have had some communication with, even if it wasn't the FAA, they were getting information from the White House or from--

MR. AZZARELLO: On 93, no.

MS. GARVEY: No.?

MR. AZZARELLO: No.

MS. GARVEY: Really?

MR. KARA: We know there's a section in the Northeast Air Defense Sector they're called identification technicians.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

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MR. KARA: Their responsibility is to reach out and get information wherever they can. Those four young women in the space of an hour made about 20 to 25 calls to four--five centers. They talked to Cleveland Center twice before Cleveland Center finally told them about 93. Now, we don't fault Cleveland Center here, because Cleveland Center is made to report, via the protocols, to, they should have

MR. AZZARELLO: And they were told it was being worked when they said they would contact an independent base nearby, they were told, no, don't worry about it that decision has to be made above. On the FAA conference, about a minute before 93 crashes, someone on the FAA conference says, asks NORAD what information they have on 93, and they said, we don't have any information, we don't know about that aircraft.

MR. : That was 10:07.

MR. AZZARELLO: At 10:07, so it was actually--

MR. : Right as the Northeast Air

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Defense Sector has been notified, NORAD is--who hasn't heard this yet, is saying we don't have anything going to Washington.

MR. AZZARELLO: You know, I have to come back to it because, obviously, this is something that I've thought about long and hard. Come back to the point about the NEDS log and Brooke saying, that you know, at least, the witnesses that he sat in on that there was no one he recalled saying saw that.

Let's just even put that aside for a minute. How could it be that the FAA in an internal review in an after-action, who, I mean, you know, this is an agency that has to do reviews after accidents--

MS. GARVEY: All the time.

MR. AZZARELLO: --all the time. They know where to go to find the datapoints for when did we learn this plane was in distress. So, I think the simple, unavoidable fact here is that they had to know at 9:16 was not a good time for the military to stand behind and either put in a press release

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or come before the Commission in May 2003 and say the FAA told us at 9:16 about the possible hijacking of United 93. I mean, if that didn't jump out at the folks who put together the FAA summary of events, then I don't know what would have. I mean, they knew, I mean, their own internal documents that said that can't be because the plane wasn't hijacked yet.

Now, that's an internal document that was created in September, '01. So, that's why it begs the question: Why, then, in May '03, or immediately after the hearing, did not someone from the FAA who was still there stand up and say, well, wait a minute, we've got, you know, we know that can't be true?

MS. GARVEY: Well, I knew that wasn't true. I mean, I knew that. I saw that. Not the NEDS document, but I saw the press release. And I think that's when partly, or that was when we had the discussion--we need to talk to NORAD, because we got some different things going on here. So--

MR. AZZARELLO: In fact, Darlene Freeman

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said that they saw, she was asked, specifically--

MS. GARVEY: Kind of like--how did that, no, you're right.

MR. AZZARELLO: Darlene was asked specifically by Monte Belger to look at this NORAD press release and see what we, the FAA, have and if there's any discrepancies to bring it to our attention.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

MR. AZZARELLO: And so we wonder what happened with that discrepancy because we would think that would have been brought to the attention of Monte, then.

MS. GARVEY: I'm sure it was. But I think that that is exactly what, then the subsequent discussions with NORAD is, you know, we need to figure this out together folks. We didn't see the press release, as I recall, we did not--

MR. KARA: It caught you by surprise according to Darlene and others it caught you by surprise.

MS. GARVEY: Yes, we read it in the paper

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when everybody else read it. And I looked at it quickly and thought, you know, it didn't leap originally, you know, immediately, just quickly reading it that morning, but I know Darlene was asked to do that. And I know we did focus on that, but I thought that people, therefore, had gone to NORAD, we had had lots of discussions about, you know, what is the right time line, based on what we know. Based on this log and so forth. And that something had been pieced together.

I cannot answer the question about May '03. I mean, I was certainly gone then, and--

MR. AZZARELLO: To your knowledge, then did someone from the FAA call a NORAD representative to say this is wrong, back in '01?

MS. GARVEY: I actually believe that to be the case. I'd be surprised if someone--I'm quite sure that they were in communication about--I don't know if they started the conversation with that particular one as wrong, but it was more, I think we've got some inconsistencies, we need to figure this out together. I mean, that was what I thought

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was--and that before I left, now, again, that year after was very, very busy with TSA and with, you know, a host of other things new Security Directives and so forth; National; General Aviation; so many things.

But I was under the impression that we had resolved the differences with NORAD and that, you know, we had arrived at a time line that worked. At the time that I was there, until August of 2001 that was good information to know. But, quite honestly, it didn't come up again in discussions until after I had left, yes.

MR. AZZARELLO: Do you remember if there was anyplace back on the military's end from notification on United 93, because we've seen some documents, some written communications between, internally within the military and military and FAA, which would indicate that the military did get some written notification or verbal notification over to the FAA that on United 93, to the effect that they didn't know about it--they, the military--until after it crashed.

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MS. GARVEY: I'm not aware of that, yeah, I'm not aware of that kind of written documentation, I have not seen that. But I do know that we all knew that that was an incorrect time because of the reason that you gave. And that folks or I think, specifically Jeff, I could be wrong on that, but people from Air Traffic would then go back, talk with the NORAD folks and resolve it.

And I remember, at the time, and I've--no one was so concerned because people said, look, this was a confusing time, we got logs, you know, people were saying--nobody thought NORAD was either trying to do the FAA in or that we were trying to do them in. It was, really, we just need to resolve this. We need to spend some time and go through this. And this is going to be tough because we, you know, we've got some written information and some stuff we just didn't--we just moved too quickly and didn't put it down.

I've got to--am I going to prevent you from--

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MR. KARA: No, I think John hit everything we needed to hit. If you think of anything more, you can get back to us.

MS. GARVEY: Okay.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 032R-024-2001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
LYNNE OSMUS
BY
SPECIAL AGENT BILL JOHNSTONE
SPECIAL AGENT JOHN RAIDT

[No date provided.]

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay, first we want to identify ourselves for the record. I am Bill Johnstone with the 9-11 Commission.

MR. RAIDT: John Raidt with the 9-11 Commission.

MS. OSMUS: And I'm Lynne Osmus with the FAA.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And we are here to interview Ms. Osmus for the Commission, whose mission I think you already know, but I'll state it just as our requirements. The 9-11 Commission has two major functions as established by the statute that created it. Number one is to investigate the facts and circumstances of the 9-11 hijackings. Number two is to take those facts, take an assessment of where we are now, and make recommendations to the President and the Congress for further improvements. The particular component that Mr. Raidt and I are involved in with the Commission staff concerns aviation and transportation security. And here today at the

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FAA, we will focus exclusively on the aviation side.

In telling our story, we are looking at three parts, and luckily for you, Lynne, you can testify in all three of them as can Mr. Morse did the other day to tell you. I'm not sure how long that one went. But we are interested in looking at the way the system that was in place on 9-11 evolved, the system, the Civil Aviation Security, what happened on that day and the immediate aftermath, that is kind of part 2. And then finally where we are today, and we definitely want to get your own recommendations for the final part of our mission.

As we said before turning the recording on, the policy of the Commission is to record these interviews. The interviewees have every right to review the tapes afterward. Beyond that, for us, this record is open as long as we're working on the report. The final report is not due until the end of May next year, and at any point, we would appreciate any further thoughts or clarification

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that you might want to suggest. So our record will be open.

MS. OSMUS: Okay, great. Thank you.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Anything?

MR. RAIDT: No. Other than maybe we want to describe--we kind of want to do this in three phrases. Pre-9-11, Aviation Security leading up to 9-11, then what happened that day are the areas that we're most interested in. And then again, the most important parts, particularly as a veteran of the system, your thoughts and ideas about where we can go from here, and also a little bit of the after-action stuff from 9-11. I would kind of consider that as part of the--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSTONE: Very good. First, for the record, if you would tell us about the positions that you've held that are relevant to Civil Aviation before and after you came to the FAA.

MS. OSMUS: Sure. Actually this is the part that makes me feel old. All of my federal career has been at the FAA. And I started with the

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FAA in 1979, having graduated from college in '76. Just did, you know, kind of first odd jobs prior to that, including being a screener for a couple of years, summer jobs and that sort of thing.

MR. JOHNSTONE: So you were a screener prior to '79?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah. One of the summer jobs when I was in college. My first job with the FAA was a federal police officer out at Dulles back in the days when Dulles and the national airports were still owned by the FAA. And then in 1981, I was hired by the Aviation Security organization within the FAA in Los Angeles at a field office. And stayed there holding a series of kind of developmental assignments, including being a federal air marshal and--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Approximately when?

MS. OSMUS: That would have been '81 through '86 I think I was involved in--

MR. JOHNSTONE: Okay, so the FAM service was during that period?

MS. OSMUS: Yes, a couple of years during

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that time. And then I came back to Washington in a senior staff position in '86 or '87.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And that was--that position was?

MS. OSMUS: It was in the domestic security program and I was like a GS14, senior staff professional. Became a branch manager, responsible for airport security, which at that time was domestic airport security within the U.S.

MR. JOHNSTONE: And that would have been approximately?

MS. OSMUS: Probably '88, give or take. And then became the division manager, also responsible for airport security, probably a year or so after that. And then obviously in 1988 in September was the PanAm 103 attack, and we had a significant reorganization within the Aviation Security organization subsequent to that, and as a result, I was acting director in a new position that was established, director of Policy and--

MR. JOHNSTONE: That would probably be Aviation Security?

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MS. OSMUS: Part of Aviation Security. Essentially the difference then which carried through the organization--I mean if I could just take 30 seconds to explain it. We did an internal evaluation at the FAA led by folks outside of the Security Organization after Panama 103, and one of the conclusions they came to with which all the security officials concurred was when there's an instance like that, either an attack or even a situation where there's an increased threat, which leads to additional counter measures with surveillance and inspection and that sort of thing, the entire focus of the organization as it was configured then where policy and operational issues were not separated, were totally focused on the day-to-day operational issues and longer term planning, strategic planning, rule-making, anything that wasn't something that needed to be accomplished, literally within that 24-hour period fell by the wayside. Really didn't get the attention it needed. So the organizational changes after Panama 103 established an alternate policy

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which obviously contributed to day-to-day operational issues, but their main objective was the long-term planning, the rule-making to change the aviation kind of landscape for the future, the development of the security programs and proposals to the industry, the--and that sort of thing.

The operational part of the house was the larger piece of the organization in which all the field inspectors were invited, the federal air marshals were invited, the Principle Security inspectors and others, and essentially it was to conduct inspections and ensure compliance with the rules that were promulgated in the policy office. Obviously both shops contributed to that policy development and that sort of thing in order to keep it current and reflective of operational impact. But it allowed us to split our focus.

And frankly the time that it probably worked the most effectively was in 1995 when we had the Asia-Pacific threat. The operational people were totally consumed with that and got support from Policy, but the policy work

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continued. And when we looked back on that, it was that organizational cell and serviced us quite well.

So I was the director of Policy for a period of time, and then went for about six months in 1991 on a developmental detail as a specialist --with the administrator who was Admiral--at the time. And that developmental process was part of the preparation to become an executive, which I did in '91, I think it was.

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry, Lynne. You said the previous assignment was when?

MS. OSMUS: That was in late 1990's or early 1991.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Six months.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: And then in 1991, I was selected as director of Operations.

MR. JOHNSON: And when were you director of Policy?

MS. OSMUS: It must have been in 1990.

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MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: And I was director of Operations in the Security Organization till about May of 1995 when I went to be Chief-of-Staff for then Administrator David Henson, and I stayed as Chief-of-Staff until November of 1998. Jane Garvey was the administrator then. And November of '98, I went to Brussels with the FAA director of our office there which is the Europe-Africa and Middle East office.

MR. JOHNSON: 1998?

MS. OSMUS: Yes. And I stayed in Brussels until November of 2000. And came back for about 57 months as the acting assistant administrator for Aviation Policy and International. And then in June of 2001, went to the Security Organization to be the deputy associate administrator.

MR. JOHNSON: Administrator?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry. The date on the Aviation Policy International?

MS. OSMUS: That would have been from

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November, 2000 to June, 2001.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay. And how long were you in the position of deputy associate administrator?

MS. OSMUS: Until TSA took over management of the Aviation Security program which would have been February of 2002. Technically I was still in that position on paper for a while, but in the middle of March, we pretty much transitioned out of--I pretty much transitioned out of doing Aviation Security issues because TSA was up and running. So then I assumed sort of the liaison position in the Office of the Deputy Administrator, you know, working on things like the MOA that FAA developed with TSA and obviously trying to work out and coordinate a million issues that we both cared about, Air Traffic coordination issues and crisis management. In addition to kind of sorting out the personnel issues because--was transferring to a new organization.

MR. JOHNSON: And today, bringing us up to--

MS. OSMUS: And today, as the TSA role

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kind of diminished or became more normalized so it wasn't a full-time position anymore--

MR. JOHNSON: Your role was working with Control?

MS. OSMUS: Right, right. I assumed the responsibility of THE assistant administrator for that part of the former Security Organization which focused on internal security of FAA facilities and FAA personnel and the hazardous materials program. So the official title was assistant administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials. That is essentially the chunk of the former EPS that did not transfer to TSA.

MR. RAIDT: Well, that's an issue that we'll want to talk to you about, you know, the FAA's role in security now. And also kind of the impact of the evolution of those responsibilities to TSA, what impact that's going to have on the system.

And we were up in Dulles tower and we were talking to some of the controllers about what they have to do now, and I asked one of them whether

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they ever worried that some of their security focus is going to take their eye off their Air Traffic Control focus, and they said frankly they thought that was the case. So I'd like to talk to you a little bit about that too.

MS. OSMUS: Okay, sure.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah. Lynne obviously you have a wealth of information, or it's just because you've been here for so long, and, you know, it's real important for us to write the history of Aviation Security and how it's relevant to the system status on 9-11. So, you know, we'll ask you as many questions as we can think of, but if there's things that you feel that we should know, please fill in any gaps.

So I guess what I'd like to do is start with just a more fanatic question, and really we want to lead up to 9-11 and just describe the mission of Aviation Security as you saw it. And also what you saw as the weaknesses and strengths of the system. Ours is a very general question. We'll get more specific than that, but let's start

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with that.

MS. OSMUS: Okay. Well, the sort of the mission was to protect by making sure we had appropriate counter measures in the--for obviously aviation within the U.S. but also U.S. carriers that operated outside of the U.S. And over the years that had evolved from, you know, the 1970's when our focus was really on traditional, usually individual hijackers out of Miami or southern Florida that wanted to get back to Cuba kind of thing to a much more sophisticated series of requirements that apply to U.S. carriers wherever they operated around the world, and to airports located in foreign countries that had flights either by foreign carriers or U.S. carriers to the States, and foreign air carriers that operated to the U.S., when over the years kind of slogged through a myriad, as you might imagine, issues about sovereignty with other governments and that sort of thing.

And so by the time we came to 9-11 and rules that had been in place up until that was

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essentially one rule, Part 129, that applied to foreign carriers operating to the U.S., Part 108 then applied to U.S. carriers wherever they operated, and then a program of foreign airport assessments which was laid out in legislation to actually direct the Secretary to make determinations on whether foreign airports being served by U.S. supported carriers, then IKO standards. And that was really the key for us that we were assessing them against international standards, but it wasn't a U.S. policing against the U.S. standards.

And so you had IKO standards in effect at foreign airports, and then FAA required security programs that came from our rules and where the documents are not publicly available because they had all the nitty gritty counter measures in them that were approved and in place for every foreign carrier and U.S. carrier flying to the U.S. So our inspector workhorse traveled overseas. We had numbers of folks located in Brussels and other small offices across Europe and Asia-Pacific to

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inspect those with support from our opponents workforce.

So essentially the focus there was on passenger aircraft because historically the intelligence essentially had been both hijacking and attacks on aircraft with explosive devices or aircraft that carried people, which we can talk about later. The changes after 9-11 obviously were we simply had not contemplated aircraft being used as weapons as we saw on 9-11 and large numbers of people on aircraft to be used in exchange for hostages and the traditional hijacking and also where the huge impact that we saw after Panama 103 where the jumbo aircraft is blown up in midair. Those were the kinds of targets of opportunity and choice for the terrorists and-

Strength in the system, I think--actually it's interesting for me to come back with the Security Organization after having been gone for about six years, and I've kind of contrasted what I can see when I left in '95 to what I see coming back in 2001. And one of the big differences which

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I think was a strength was kind of the emergence of data system that had been in their infancy when I left in 1995, which were rarely automated. And when I came back, there were a series of systems that were placed with an inspection data on adequacy of screening, what kind of metal detector detected them, what kind of weapon and what kind of X-ray, if it could be sorted by screen, company and air carrier and airport and all that sort of thing, were much better in terms of data analysis and trend analysis, and being able to build on that kind of data.

There were others which I suspect you folks are aware of, those ones put together put together in the Policy office by Mike McCormick that gave us a more quantifiable way of saying we've got counter measures against all these avenues of access, what are they giving us, which ones should we bolster if the threat changes, and that sort of thing. So we had a more quantitative way of looking at the adequacy of existing counter measures, and then when additional threat came in,

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make more informed or better informed decisions not having changed those measures.

Weaknesses system-wide I think was associated with the hundreds of thousands of people at airports in this country specifically, but also around the world, that are involved in the implementation of Aviation Security, and sort of a human factors thing. Happily, knock wood, they aren't events that happen frequently. And so anyone, be it a screener or a carbo handler or a rat person or a mechanic, whoever, who all have safety and security obligations while they're working in airport restricted areas likely don't have at the top of their list of things to worry about that day, keeping an eye out for bad guys. So it's just sort of--complacency I think is too strong a word, but just the numbers of flights and things that go well on a daily basis didn't make a concern that even increased threats domestically something that the average worker in airports were aware of.

And that's one of the reasons that Claudio

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Manno's shop, and along with the folks from the Operations office of Policy spent a lot of time kind of over and over and over reaching out to Security directors of the carriers and the airport directors with information about the threat, as we saw particularly within the U.S. but overseas as well, to keep us informed that, although we hadn't had an event, that didn't mean there wasn't anything to worry about.

I mean I think the complexity of the system is really what I'm getting at and just the number of folks involved in it with whom communication needed to be maintained pretty regularly in order to keep the importance of their job right in front of them.

MR. RAIDT: Associated with that, what would you say was your greatest frustration as a manager in these areas with respect to applying security? Was it, you know, the whole horizon of things, whether it was in a ruling that was tough to do, people, you know, couldn't take it seriously because of the lack of actual incidents? What was

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it that frustrated you?

MS. OSMUS: Oh, I don't know. I wouldn't say rule-making I don't think. I mean we have the ability if we had a threat change in the moment to issue security directive and change security programs, but I really can't tell you I can think of a single incidence where we needed to get a different security measure out there and couldn't do it. It was a difficult construct, though, to work through the air carriers to get adjustments in, having the fundamental baseline measures like what's goes on at screening checkpoints and that sort of thing on a day-to-day basis, which I think is one of the real improvements of having a federal workforce, or frankly contract workforce that was overseen by federal supervisors. I think you could have got to the same place because the carriers are in the business to make money, and the security directors, the vast majority of whom I had gotten to know real well and they were good actors in either job, but they had to explain their requirements for additional measures that cost

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something to their higher up. And then they had to tell their bosses that they had grilled the FAA and, you know, poked at everything we told them was a threat to make sure it was.

Occasionally, probably a little bit less when I came back in 2001, but I've seen it a little more in earlier years, some of the Security directors would have been former, you know, FBI folks or DJ folks who have personal connections with people in the intelligence community. And they would go talk to their personal connections and perhaps get an opinion different than what our Intel office was putting out. Well, that's like, you know, somebody on the street calling one of my inspectors and asking for a personal favor. It's not the Agency position. But we did have that pretty continual debate, and sometimes not in a healthy way with the air carriers about what the threat was and why we were requiring measures of that--

MR. RAIDT: That's interesting. We've heard that from a few sources that this kind of

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back channels what's undermining the FAA. And so to capsule that, then we have the cost issue versus the absence of incidents which really drove--okay, we'd better do it, so it's kind of tough, and then the idea of that being able to show them the risk in the absence of incidents was undermined by the fact that some of the Security directors were going right to their former colleagues and getting opinions that undermined FAA--

MS. OSMUS: No, I have to say that the--part of that is when it was perfectly clear to the industry, like in '95 when we had the Asia-Pacific threat, that we really had breaking, you know, literally breaking. It's like being in the middle of the movie, unfortunately breaking intelligence reports coming just about every afternoon that we were responding to. There was no delay on their part in response. So when they really knew there was an issue, they were very effective with what they did.

MR. JOHNSON: Was that different overseas

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versus domestic too? Would you break it down-

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, actually I think that's an interesting point. We had always had a higher threat overseas, and I think that's right. I think there was sort of an easier ability for the carriers to understand that it was the more likely venue in that instance to occur overseas. After the World Trade Center bombing and then the connection that was made between the--threatening and the Asia-Pacific in New York,--obviously came to the conclusion that the threat within the U.S. with trans-national terrorists was higher than had been thought. That was one that it was difficult I think for the carriers to really understand it and quantify it.

Frankly I think people within the Administration were struggling with it too. I mean, you know, the FBI knew it, but they couldn't say how much of it was here that wasn't known about, and I think people were trying to be careful to really make that field assessment could be made and not overstated but not understated. So for a

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period of time we were trying to get the measure of what it was, and I remember one of the former--I guess it was Admiral Flynn--it's kind of like a Cheshire cat. You know, you've got the faith and you see it in--so there was a period of time when people were really trying to get the sense of it and without hard quantification, the carriers are not going to be persuaded. So I think that's a good point, as we were getting into that kind of new environment.

MR. JOHNSON: Can I ask you another general question, and then we'll--

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, I have one more general one.

MR. JOHNSON: All right. Do you want to ask your's first?

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, yeah, just because it's related to this. In trying to organize our report, and even though we're dealing with a lot of people who don't know the organizational structure of the FAA, we're trying to take great pains to be able to explain to people the situation. We're kind of

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divided up into institutions and Civil Aviation Security from, you know, Congress to the FAA to the air carriers to the airports, and define and give an exposition of what it is they were responsible for, and given those roles and responsibilities and then quantify and list the vectors of the layers, what each was designed to do, and knowing, you know those institutions and vectors better than this side of the table but looking at the institutions, the roles and responsibilities and the vectors in a general sense, how well do you think that worked, as far as the roles and responsibilities of regulation and operation, or did you see the weaknesses there? And also, you know, were you satisfied particularly as you came into the ASC that the effectiveness of the vectors as a layered system to counter the threat as the system understood it at the time?

MS. OSMUS: The role and responsibilities I think, and it maybe it's just because I've been involved in this for a while, they didn't trouble me. I mean partly because I was used to them.

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There had been debate of three or four times that I can think of over the previous 10 years about, maybe even going back further than that, about what legislative authority that required the air carriers to be in charge of screening was appropriate and should that be changed. And every time it was looked at, it was looked at by JO and the IG and others.

The conclusion was the carriers had to be in charge of it because it was their aircraft. They had liability for when on board that aircraft, and they were in the best position to know all of that. And the carriers up until 9-11 wanted to maintain that because it impacted their scheduling. They couldn't, I don't think, imagine the situation where they weren't in control of how the aircraft were loaded.

We were working to see if there were a couple of pilot projects we could initiate--San Francisco with a very dynamic airport Security director out there and others to see if an airport did it, the screening and so forth even on a

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limited basis, it would be a difference in efficiency. And really airports would want to do it from time to time if they saw the difficulty--logistical difficulties just kind of walked away from it.

So while I certainly think working through the air carriers as I described earlier was a difficult thing to do, it wasn't clear to me that putting that relationship someplace else would necessarily be a better fit at the time. I mean at that time, I could never--the federal workforce doing screening. We would've been laughed out of town. It would've been possible I think to have airport operators do it, but the issue would have been the same issue that FAA and other agencies have, broad regions across the country have, is an issue of consistency. And everyone would have wanted to have to do it to make the consistency work. We didn't have that kind of interest on the part of the airport operators or the carriers. So not that there couldn't have been different models, but there just wasn't the kind of impetus to make

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any different model work, given the really large change that would have meant.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, and did you ever get the feeling that cost was an issue with respect when the federal government said all right, should we take on this role knowing that that would be very expensive?

MS. OSMUS: Oh, sure. I mean, you know, we had just gone through downsizing, what, four or five years before that, and the numbers here even if they'd been the numbers like the industry--

MR. RAIDT: Did you ever wonder, hey, it probably would work better this way because OMB and others were saying, you know, this is just too expensive, it's a non-starter?

MS. OSMUS: No, not really. I mean part of my issue was having been a screener. I mean at the time I think we were making a little more than McDonald's but not a heck of a lot. There's huge turnover, and the company that I happened to work at was well managed and people were happy there. It was just a job without much of a progression, so

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I imagine the same thing in the federal workforce, and I think they will be struggling with that at some point. What do you do after you've been a screener for a year or two? It gets exceedingly boring. So I mean I thought there were implementation issues with it beyond just the fact that I didn't think that side of the federal workforce would ever be seriously--

MR. RAIDT: And how about the layers of vectors in Security in the threat as we understood it?

MR. JOHNSON: And maybe we could hear you talk about those in terms of strengths and weaknesses.

MS. OSMUS: Well, there were some areas that we knew we needed to do additional bolstering.

MR. RAIDT: Let's go through each vector. Let's start with the intelligence. What did you see as the strength and what was the weakness of the intelligence?

MS. OSMUS: Actually the strength--but I think the way the intelligence--was set up really

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was one of the best in government.

When I was at headquarters having come back from California in the mid'1980's, we had one guy who was a former military intelligence officer that was the intelligence to the FAA at the time. He was working through personal connections. The next person that came in started to establish an office, and things had gotten progressively better because folks were brought who were serious about their intelligence entities and were brought in here that were--and as Claudio will probably--they were--looking at the threat to the aviation perspective. And having seen the issue that this office identified kind of teed up the rest of the community to look at, evaluate and develop international intelligence--and that sort of thing.

MR. RAIDT: The 1990 act that set up how was a really good thing.

MS. OSMUS: I think so, yeah. The folks who were brought in to do it I think did a really outstanding job. What we thought had been lacking after Panama 103 as we looked at the intelligence

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sharing with the intuition that the FBI and others really recognized that they really had this stuff. I think that has significantly improved--the thing that was still I think a work in progress I suspect and still is a little bit is that, you know, the FBI previously had been and still is the--tutorial and investigative entity that kicks in after something happens. They were much, much used to looking out and anticipating threat as we were used to--. And so we didn't have, and I don't know how Claudio would have described that today, but there wasn't the same kind of information available about what was going on after--

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, he had a very interesting formulation. He was saying that they would tell the Intel communities you can tell us what's going on in the street in Kabul, but you can't tell us what's going on in Atlanta. And we heard that consistently that it was just felt that there was a real blind spot with respect to what was going on.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's one of the

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others I used at Detroit and Bangkok.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, right. So we knew there were things in terms of--as I described earlier--other vectors. My concern was were we getting things like EDS now, check the baggage, protection area (inaudible) and that's another big difference I noticed when I came back in 2001. We had hundreds of units out there that (inaudible). So I think that was the beginning (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: Let's talk about--is that all on Intel?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I think so.

MR. RAIDT: Well, let's talk about pre-screening, both kind of with respect to CAPS and a little bit--maybe you can help us put our arms around how some of these lists were developed that the air carriers have for people to watch out, but pre-screening in general. Let's start with CAPS and what you thought was good or bad about that.

MS. OSMUS: You know, I think to develop the criteria on which CAPS was made, and I'm sure

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you know by now it's not just one-way ticket (inaudible). It was very violent and we went back and looked at this again after 9-11, particularly in light of the suicide hijackers. The fellow that was Claudio's (inaudible) on CAPS, developments and implementation here who is now working in Ellsworth CFA, casually reached out to an Israeli expert on suicide bombers and suicide terrorists-

MR. RAIDT: And this is after 9-11?

MS. OSMUS: No, this was before. And the definition and criteria for CAPS. I'm trying to figure out how much you weight things which might identify or be associated with travel habits of someone--

MR. JOHNSON: Do you know when the outreach would have been?

MS. OSMUS: Well, let's see. CAPS was sort of put in place in the mid-1990's. They were kind of reviewing the criteria all along. So I'm not sure where we ever implemented it or whether it was one of those--

MR. JOHNSON: But mid-'90's would be the

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guess?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah, I would guess. James Padgett is the expert on it if you want to talk to him.

MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, he can give you hours of detail.

MR. RAIDT: But suicide bombers was something that was factored in--

MS. OSMUS: It was looked at, yeah, and the assessment of--the bottom line is (inaudible) on all the details (inaudible) but the bottom line was the attack by suicide bombers was not believed to be high on our list of concern according to an expert as well. This was consistent with what the community thought.

So criteria was good I thought. What we saw was implementation by carriers is pretty good, and there had been significant work done with the Department of Transportation and (inaudible) equity and how travelers were being identified to see if there were any ethnicity issues that we needed to

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worry about, and that was going okay.

But the problem with it is there's such a limited database on characteristics of people with terrorism, the targeting nation, that you use, what you can glean from that is a very small number, so we always knew that. It helped us focus resources (inaudible) when we needed to continue looking at it to see how we could either tweak it or replace it with the version (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, I've been fascinated, and I don't want to waste your time focusing on because Jim Padgett sounds like a good person but just the mathematics behind what he weighed and how at the end of the day you come up with something that people above this threshold (inaudible) and those below it--

MR. RAIDT: Would we have to go over to the TSA skid to be allowed--

MS. OSMUS: Yes, you will. Yes, you will.

MR. RAIDT: Although we were told that it was on the Internet that we'd have to go over to the skid.

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MR. JOHNSON: Right. Some students had done engineering of it and came very close.

MS. OSMUS: Is that right?

MR. RAIDT: Lynne, we were told by somebody, and I just want to get your reaction to this characterization, that they thought that the development of CAPS was rather ad hoc, that it was a bunch of people sitting around, just kind of making guesses that, well, goes back to the--something that looks a lot more professional?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, it was (inaudible). (Inaudible) and those folks was looking at it and we got into it with a lot of other agents but the one that (inaudible) which ones mattered and then translating that into what it would seem like in the U.S. I mean we've got (inaudible) further documentation versus the (inaudible) so it limited the things that could be looked at, but given the information and the data that was used, I think it was a pretty good first step.

MR. RAIDT: And the limited database of what attackers looked like, that was one of the

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problems with it, but did you see any problems with the net effect of who legitimate--civil liberty concerns or what was your attitude about that?

MS. OSMUS: The part that began I think to undermine the credibility of this because it couldn't be precise enough to only identify the bad guys, picked up a lot of people that by nature their travel would also be (inaudible) selectees-- flight numbers of Congress who traveled at the last minute might trigger one of the eight criteria, and the more that happens, the more people wonder if it's really picking out the right folks. So I think there was public confidence in it and then, you know, (inaudible) tend to have to change it in ways you'd rather not have to.

MR. RAIDT: Was there any frustration at any point where, you know, you felt, well, in 1986 you had Osama Bin Laden declare war against the United States and then in '98 reiterate that threat saying that the citizens were subject at 93, you know, where the threat is at home, where, you know, like we've been declared war against. Now why

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wouldn't we have as an automatic part of that anybody carrying a passport from, you know Arab--I'm saying this--the Arab countries, blah, blah, blah, blah, so we picked up all these people and that I presume was probably not allowed, you know, by the system. Was there any frustration either here or in the building that, you know, we shouldn't be getting in these people, but because of these other concerns we can.

MS. OSMUS: No. Primarily because we knew there were Americans (inaudible) terrorists groups and that people that look like Europeans or ethnic Middle Eastern folks were specifically used that time, so as has been shouldered in older people when (inaudible), but I mean people that clearly don't (inaudible) because it wouldn't have been a--

MR. RAIDT: (Inaudible) transcended that.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: One other aside on the CAPS. Can you talk to us briefly wherein about the consequences of CAPS?

MS. OSMUS: Sure.

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MR. JOHNSON: We had gotten testimony, including at the hearing we had back in May about the focus on unchecked baggage. So could you talk to us about how you thought that worked or not?

MS. OSMUS: Once we were certain that the threat (inaudible), our biggest concern was how to check baggage (inaudible) because at that point in time in the mid-1990's, the (inaudible) requirements for some segments of checked baggage but not all of it, and that was that we had had India Development which from years, actually quite a generation (inaudible) started in the last 1980's (inaudible) which you may have heard about and got significant funding from the deployment after TWA 100 (inaudible) but we got funding (inaudible) getting some of that equipment out in the field, but we knew given the (inaudible) degree with which it could be manufactured and then could be implemented in an airport that wasn't developed originally for those kind of (inaudible) equipment, it was going to take (inaudible), so CAPS was implemented to look at people about whom checked

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baggage we thought needed scrutiny (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: Was that specifically developed for that purpose?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: Not for a larger purpose?

MS. OSMUS: We've been exploring how you really focus in on people that you're really concerned about and CAPS is a concept of whittling down the entire (inaudible) population for additional scrutiny. It was under development for a while. But the implementation (inaudible) consciously was to focus on checked baggage.

MR. RAIDT: And to facilitate the phase-in because that was just a reality. In other words, you can only check one in 10 and let's try to identify who that one in 10 should be.

MS. OSMUS: That's right. So in CAPS (inaudible) re-checked baggage (inaudible) or (inaudible). And the other thing quite honestly was some of those things are kind of tough to do. (Inaudible), so we also wanted them to understand that when they got EDS (inaudible) a lot of them

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were more eager to get it. It would facilitate their flight operation. So it was a security thing and sort of an encouragement to the industry to help with (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: Well, while we're on this topic, after TWA 800, there was a security directive in fact that as we understand it, it's a practice (inaudible) that said that selectee not only had to have their baggage checked under the list of ways that were appropriate to do it, but also that they would receive additional scrutiny at the checkpoint. And that security directive we're told was expired in '97. And so we're curious. Do you have any knowledge of that at all?

MS. OSMUS: I don't. I wasn't in the skip at the time, and I've never heard of that.

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, okay. How would you react to that just as an observer?

MS. OSMUS: Not knowing the context of why it was issued, if it was issued, I can't tell you.

MR. JOHNSON: Who would be in that time period, '96, '97, who would be the authoritative

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people--

MS. OSMUS: Admiral Flynn would have been the head of the Security Organization, the first of nine Security directors.

MR. RAIDT: And he would have been the one to decide whether to allow a directive to expire.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. With respect to CAPS as it was devised to facilitate a limited capacity of the AVS, was there even at that time, was that seen as the sole purpose for computer (inaudible) re-screening, or was there a broader Band-Aid that wanted to--

MS. OSMUS: Well, prior to CAPS being developed, (inaudible), we kind of had the same problem over there in terms of focusing (inaudible) people that we're concerned about. So there was a manual pre-selection (inaudible) criteria that were required of U.S. carriers flying to the U.S. from foreign countries.

MR. JOHNSON: Do you know the time period for that one?

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MS. OSMUS: Oh, boy, when it was started. I don't. I can't tell you when.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: It's been there for some years. I would guess early '90's, maybe even a little before that, but that's just a guess on my part.

MR. RAIDT: And when was the CAPS--we should know this, and I'm sure we do. When was that first implemented? (Inaudible) high security directive?

MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: That's right. They did have a program.

MR. JOHNSON: That was endorsed by (inaudible), and that effort was what was gradually adopted by more airlines as I recall in that period and then--

MR. RAIDT: Was it (inaudible) or was it--

MS. OSMUS: No, I think it would have been a security program (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: So there was in effect a

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manual--

MS. OSMUS: A manual one.

MR. JOHNSON: And that was just overseas?

MS. OSMUS: Overseas, yeah. And that's why I say although CAPS was used for domestic check bags, it was under development--I'm to figure out a more sophisticated way of narrowing down the scope of the population traditional measures (inaudible). We were hoping at some point to get an automated version overseas. It was just labor intensive.

MR. JOHNSON: We were just trying to ask about that '96, '97--

MR. RAIDT: Did you have the idea that you wanted a broader scope--

MS. OSMUS: Oh, yeah, thank you, thank you. Right. Just knowing that thousands of folks travel on a daily basis, we figured if there was an automated way--a more sophisticated and accurate way to help us narrow down the people to which security resources were proposed, that would be a good thing.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. Oh, this no-fly-in and

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watchlist. We understand that there was--the only no-fly list was basically a security directive that said if these people show up, don't let them fly.

MR. JOHNSON: Is that correct?

MS. OSMUS: A couple of different things. We'll go back a little ways. Some years before 9-11, and I'm not sure the first time we got this request, there would be occasionally a request from somebody in the intelligence community who said look, we've got and X, Y and Z, these people traveling from here to here, where we think they're going to be (inaudible) in some part of the world and need information that may conclude they're a threat to aviation. Claudio's folks will verify that. And they would ask us, well, what would you suggest about that (inaudible). (Inaudible) and Claudio's folks would track the progress of these folks through their ICF and when their travel or their--they weren't picked up or whatever, or they were found out to be suspicious people after all, that security directive would be cancelled.

MR. RAIDT: Now was that information

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loaded into the CAPS software, or was this manually done?

MS. OSMUS: No. The carriers originally, they did it a different way. We sent it out to them by security directive. Some had the ability to load it in their automated (inaudible) pop up that way, and others did it manually, depending on the kind of system they had on a station by station basis.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, and just so I know the manual--I'm the check-in person. A person comes in and they establish their person, name, record or whatever they're checking in. I've got to look at that name and then go over--

MS. OSMUS: She's got something else to refer them to, yes, not automated, triggered (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: But some you said have the capability.

MS. OSMUS: Some, yes.

MR. JOHNSON: Which airlines specific?

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible), exactly.

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MR. RAIDT: And did that ever worry you guys operationally that, you know, that millions of people coming through that the person's supposed to check-

MS. OSMUS: Well, it didn't happen--I mean in those days, they didn't get that kind of alert that often. Tended to get folks attention and we only left it out there long enough, you know--we didn't leave it out there for a long time. So it gets back to that issue of keeping security at the job in front of everybody. But it (inaudible) because it was unusual enough they were likely enough to look.

The next thing that occurred actually since (inaudible) and I guess (inaudible). He at the time was doing big (inaudible) and actually came through on an official visit one time. And it was very clear that there were people looking for him, and so for a while, he was traveling out of the UK, had a very effective security firm at the UK that kept operationally security for his travel quite tightly done, but I think (inaudible) that he

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found that to be constraining. The security firm dumped him essentially, and he began traveling a lot and (inaudible) with his itinerary and that sort of thing. Very dangerous. So that drove us to prepare a security directive which we called something like threat to people or something like that. He was the only name on it, and it was specifically for that situation. Had several discussions with him too in the days when I felt like I was in the twilight zone and explained to him why, so that was that thing.

And then after 9-11, and the Bureau developed this very large list because I think at first it was 200 people. It grew for a while as we began to sort through it. That became what has been known as the watchlist.

MR. JOHNSON: So there was nothing other than in terms of the sources of information (inaudible) had to keep people off the plane. Essentially it was security directive pre-9-11.

MR. RAIDT: And the list that the air carriers may have had (inaudible) for people who

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had caused them problems that have no real--

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible). I don't know about that.

MR. JOHNSON: Didn't have any security-

MS. OSMUS: Now it may be--the only other piece that needs to be completed that is--occasionally the FBI could be working on something involving criminal directly with an air carrier, which was fine, but in terms of what we regulate and require, that (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: Okay. Anything else in the pre-screening that's there that we don't need to know about? Those are the two things we've already seen in the pre-screening?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, that's it. Okay. Let's go to checkpoint screening then. Again, kind of strangely this is how you divided up--addressed the threats as you know.

MS. OSMUS: Well, strength I think is finding the things that have been historical weapons used at hijacking which were guns, knives

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(inaudible) as well, and where we had been going with oh, probably from the early '90's to the time I got back in 2001 was helping to educate the screener workforce telecon (inaudible) suitcase and carry-on luggage. And moving away from, you know, kind of the antiquated big (inaudible) we had used in the early '90's, late 1980's to something that was developed by the (inaudible). I don't know if you've come across that before. (Inaudible) what we configured to look very different and were much more representative of the kinds of things that we (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) showed it to us.

MS. OSMUS: Did they? Yeah. Good, good. So the equipment that was there was again physically capable of detecting firearms and knives and things like that. Physically capable of detecting through X-ray or metal detectors (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: On knives, could you provide any more specific detail? (Inaudible). I don't think we've gone anywhere beyond SSI level at this

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point, but I thought you said at the outset, you'll indicate when in the (inaudible) of where we're going because we have great capability obviously in your facility here to go. I mean we're cleared up to SCI, but if you could just point out when you go above SSI level. We assume all of the rest is of SSI--

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible), that's right.
Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: But if you'll just point that out.

MS. OSMUS: Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: So if you could talk for a minute about the system's capabilities for knife detection and distinguish in terms of knife size or configuration, that would be, you know, helpful.

MS. OSMUS: Do you want to talk a little bit about how we came to the--

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, that would be good.

MS. OSMUS: Actually it happened years before I ever came to the Security Organization, but I remember some of the old-timers talking about

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it, and it was really two pieces. One was traditional hijacking that historically lasted some hours or some days. He picked out (inaudible) 47, which just went on and on and on. The ability to keep a margin (inaudible) at bay, even if you have a lot of hijackers, requires weapons that are sufficiently threatening (inaudible) that will happen. And so the weapons of choice were large knives (inaudible) to intimidating to, and the threat was (inaudible), and (inaudible) firearms.

MR. JOHNSON: And in terms of getting through the (inaudible) or whatever standards-

MS. OSMUS: (inaudible) some time in the '80's, and I can't give you a date because I've not been able to find it, but there was sort of an informal survey done of state law and (inaudible) were illegal and that three-inch determination arrived at as--

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry. The three-inch?

MS. OSMUS: I'm sorry. Four inch.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: As a size that was small

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enough to be legal, kind of typical size mounted pocket knives, cutlery and that sort of thing, and not large enough to be used as a weapon by the traditional hijacker. No more scientific than that.

MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: So that's really helpful.

(Inaudible) answer that question, but that was the IKO standard, and our sense was that while we were the ones that dictated IKO standards, so where did we get--so that's kind of how that went. Okay, so went from this to the IKO and then back at us through IKO.

MS. OSMUS: And I can't even tell you. I mean I'm not personally aware that the IKO--it wouldn't surprise me if it was. I'm sure that's how it got there. I just don't--IKO or not.

MR. RAIDT: When that standard was set, what's the process for setting the standard? That's just the decision. There's no rule-making associated with--

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MS. OSMUS: Those (inaudible) security programs, so it would have been in the (inaudible) and that sort of thing.

MR. RAIDT: At some point we want to talk about how those worked and how they were updated, that type of thing. So let's not forget that.

MR. JOHNSON: And now so this standard is set at four inches. Can you talk to us about the system's capabilities of enforcing that standard? And now we're talking mainly about screening, but if there were other elements, that'd be fine too.

MS. OSMUS: So three ways really that someone with a knife in their possession or a firearm could be (inaudible) checked baggage and observed in X-ray, or on their person and identified through the metal detectors as soon as they walked through them, or through a hand (inaudible) after that. Before 9-11, we didn't have the kind of physical (inaudible) that are much more frequent now. (Inaudible).

I don't know if you were given the tests that were done on the X-rays, but it's really a

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wire test, very, very narrow band of metal (inaudible) actually for an (inaudible) that's going to be seen because of it's broad surface, and even if (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: What level should we classify this at?

MS. OSMUS: Just regular (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: Okay. What would be the threshold in your view for knife size and X-ray detection? I mean would it be less than four inches?

MS. OSMUS: Oh, yeah. I mean--

MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: So if you have a knife like this laying like this flat, and you're reviewing this, and winding up even at two inches, you're going to see it. It could be just hidden from like clutter, but anything that (inaudible) which a metal knife will be on an X-ray, (inaudible) needs to be examined by (inaudible) X-ray operator can't determine what it is. If it's on edge, you'll see that line. It could wider than the wire tabs on

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the X-ray (inaudible) and it depends where it is. If it's on the side that's sticking, (inaudible) X-ray operator, but if the line is--

MR. JOHNSON: About an inch and a half. (Inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible) bag it then.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Knives typically aren't thick enough that even at an inch and a half flat, you're going to see that outline, and they're not just rectangular, you know, so I mean they're actually going to be an easy thing to actually--

MR. JOHNSON: Have you seen any of the press accounts of the weapons, purchases of the hijackers?

MS. OSMUS: No, I haven't.

MR. JOHNSON: If you were told that it's at least thought that they had been buying knives specifically that were less than four inches but were somewhere in the one and a half to two and a half, all the way up to four inches, at least (inaudible) in terms of X-ray detection, would you

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believe that those knives either would have been detected or would have registered in such a way because they were at a sharp angle so (inaudible) profile that that should have triggered (inaudible)?

MS. OSMUS: Well, you know, it depends. I mean depending on how they're configured in the bag, how much other stuff is in the bag, I would have expected them to be visible. Now on a plane, an astute X-ray operator that's worked long enough on the type of machine I mean the image can sometimes scratched. Worked there long enough, you can tell by looking at the image how big the knife is pretty much. So the other possibility is that if anybody saw the image of the knife, less than four inches, and then worked there long enough to know (inaudible) okay to go through. So there's a lot of tough positions (inaudible) with that.

MR. RAIDT: And how about the magnetometer? Would that calibrated where someone with a four-inch knife--

MS. OSMUS: You know, Lyle Malotky, if you

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haven't talked to him yet, is our technical advisor and he still is-

MR. JOHNSON: I'm sorry. What's the name?

MS. OSMUS: Lyle Malotky. M-a-l-o-t-k-y. He was the scientific advisor to Apius I and II when he was here, and I think he does similar work now at TSA. He worked with the Tech Center a lot and can tell you the quantity of metal, however that's measured, to trigger the metal detector. And it was associated with small firearms that we (inaudible) to be more and more available on the market.

MR. JOHNSON: So it would be--just to your understanding that (inaudible) that between two calibers as a test item. Is that roughly would be your guesstimate of the metal content that would trigger--

MS. OSMUS: We were actually developing test protocol using (inaudible) small guns, configured differently to make sure we were covering the--different metal detectors have different characteristics. So I mean Lyle can give

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you the (inaudible) to make it more accurate.

MR. RAIDT: (Inaudible) but policy-wise, what was the discussion with respect to making sure that we calibrated the calibration of the magnetometer with what was prohibited and what wasn't? Did somebody say okay, let's figure out the metal content of the average four-inch knife and let's calibrate to that level, or did we know there's going to be a blind spot, or was there not supposed to be a blind spot?

MS. OSMUS: I know we calibrated them to small handguns that we were concerned about going through. Whether we did at the Tech Center (inaudible), I can't answer that. I don't know.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. From a policy standpoint, was there any discussion, was there any concern that, okay, we've got a standard of four inch and we've got a calibration that's up here. We've got this blind spot. What do we do about that?

MS. OSMUS: I don't know the answer to that.

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MR. JOHNSON: Mr. May, do you have any comments--James May, for ATA at our May hearing--Sorry. At our hearing in the month of May testified that yes, they had box cutters on this checkpoint operations guide that's restricted items, but that the FAA standards that they were forcing--that their magnetometer were set to detect small metal content of small handguns or larger, and therefore they shouldn't be kept off. Do you have any response to Mays' comments?

MS. OSMUS: Box cutters, typical box cutters--I mean and (inaudible)--that small metal content wouldn't have been enough to typically trigger a metal detector unless (inaudible), which is why after 9-11, we (inaudible) screening and that sort of thing (inaudible), you know, and expanded the (inaudible) process to check baggage as well because we were doing additional measures to make up for it (inaudible) lack.

MR. JOHNSON: As a former screener, if you were given the words and no further explanation that box cutters were a restricted item, but

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utility knives less than four inches were an explicitly approved item. How would you--in your screening capacity, how would you have distinguished with the one than the other?

MS. OSMUS: Well, I didn't know, which I wouldn't have. I would've asked (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, okay.

MR. RAIDT: But as ACS2 time, I mean if there was any concern floating around that, you know, we have a detection capability. We have a prohibition. There's a gap. We're just confident that the hijack protocol that somebody with a four-inch knife isn't going to be able to do a whole lot.

MS. OSMUS: No, it wasn't something we were focused on. This is why (inaudible) difference in that reason. What we were seeing was the terrorists building (inaudible) in the '95 threat which (inaudible), and there are things hidden under seat cushions and life preservers and that sort of thing (inaudible). And we were getting reports of weapons being capable of firing

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one cartridge hidden in lots of belt buckles and other things that look pretty (inaudible). So we were concerned about that kind of (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: So we're going to hijack, and they ended up (inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: That's exactly it. And what we had seen in hijacking in terms of knives (Inaudible) big ones, big size. Frankly, I was worried about a five-inch knife at one time.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, but you had some confidence that the knives, large knives could be detected.

MS. OSMUS: Oh, yeah. They were detected by the hundreds every year. We have records about that.

MR. JOHNSON: Could you point us to those records because we have--in one of our earlier document requests, we got data from the checkpoints that someone actually used. And they're (inaudible), and now I'm beginning to wonder whether it was just because of the classification. But while they listed guns that were collected, and

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a couple of cases bombs or explosive devices, and none of them had any list of large knives confiscated at any of them. One of the FBI people writing the reports exclusively said that one of the checkpoints, by the way, no knives were confiscated. So if you could think about that, and, you know, let us know of where we might get data on whether or not that is true and whether they're collecting it at the airport level or at the checkpoint level. I mean even if it was at the airport level, that would be helpful because, you know, that limits our (inaudible) for the (inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I don't know about specifics that FAA--ACS used to do a report to Congress every couple of years is rolled up kind of programmatic (inaudible), and so there was a national compilation of things found and knives were--

MR. JOHNSON: Well, can we ask you though to just check and see, you know, what is the source for that and see if you can just point us to

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where--

MS. OSMUS: I think Courtney Tucker would be--he was the first that was preparing it when I was last here, and he's got--he's the person that keeps all the files at his fingertips, so if he doesn't have it in his personal possession, I bet he can tell you who does.

MR. RAIDT: All right. Anything else on checkpoints, Bill?

MR. JOHNSON: No, no. I have just one general, but were you going to go through the rest of them?

MR. RAIDT: Yeah, I'm going to access control.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, good.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. So on access control and on baggage and stuff.

MR. JOHNSON: That's more--let's just hold off on that.

MR. RAIDT: We might want to go back and talk to you on that.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, because we don't want

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this to go all day.

MR. RAIDT: On access control, the one question that I have is that I'm still not able to discern in my mind who the heck was responsible for--with respect to checking background. First, I thought it was the airports, and then I thought it was FAA and now I think it's the air carrier, but could you kind of run through all the different categories that people that work in an aircraft, who is responsible--now I know that anybody with access to the AOA has to be credentialed by the airport. But who is responsible for doing the background check and what did that background check entail?

MS. OSMUS: Airport employees have had access to what we call the five areas, the security identification area and have (inaudible) by the employer, by the airport operators. And my short-term memory is going to get me. I can't give you all the particulars of it. (Inaudible) I think went back I think 10 years--

MR. RAIDT: So it's a year gap and then

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they had to--

MS. OSMUS: Right, to trigger any criminal history, right. That changed over time, so I'm not sure that I'm giving you the most recent version. Some of it happened before I came to Aviation. Then we changed it again after 9-11.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, I'm with you up till then, but here's what then confuses me is that when you say airport employees, you're talking about not like the ramp rats and people who are--

MS. OSMUS: Somebody that works for Los Angeles International Airport.

MR. RAIDT: Okay. Now does the same rule apply if you're a ramp rat or something like that with respect to the air carrier? They had to do the same thing, the same year and if not, a background.

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. RAIDT: And the airport had nothing to do with that background check.

MS. OSMUS: Well, the airport had to do one before an airport could issue an airport I.D. badge

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for that employee. They had to (inaudible) by receiving some confirmation (inaudible) that a background check had been done.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, and then I assume the FSM or the (inaudible) look over to make sure that they were doing (inaudible).

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. RAIDT: All right.

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible) complicated. The other piece of it was we were--FAA was facilitating those background checks (inaudible) working as the point of contact because they had to go to OPM to get access to the criminal history. So there was a process that started, I don't know, four or five years ago, an increase (inaudible) kind of gone on line, which you get automated fingerprints. So we were the facilitator of it as well, so that's another kind of (inaudible) blurb a little bit.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, so basically the airport had to (inaudible) everybody with respect to airport employees. They had to do the 10-year background check. If there was a year missing,

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they'd do the criminal background checks. The air carriers did their folks, and the FAA facilitated access to the database.

MS. OMUS: That's correct.

MR. RAIDT: Now so that's with access control.

MR. JOHNSON: And in terms of strength and weakness of that, did you have any concerns?

MS. OSMUS: Was and is one of my biggest concerns. Getting back to my original comments, there's literally hundreds of thousands of (inaudible) that access and although for years part of their training to get I.D.'s knowing to challenge people, knowing when to wear them, knowing when the look (inaudible), behind them, you know, through a secure door. Incredibly difficult, and we were looking at this issue in ACS before I left in '95. I think it was in 1994 (inaudible) the same time the IG was doing the audit found terrific problems with it. And (inaudible) who was my deputy at the time spent just about all of his time for three weeks (Inaudible) and when we

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focused our inspector resources on that almost to the exclusion of everybody else, there was penalties in training increased (inaudible) significantly and then as we started to go back to a more normal spread of our resources, we could see (inaudible) attention.

MR. RAIDT: And on that line as the air carriers, do they now contract out with Sky Chef or, you know, the Gourmet or the Refueler, or whatever it is is the contractor. If they're in the OA and they're a contractor there, the air carrier has to see that those people have a background check bar none, correct?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, because that's one thing we do need to check about 9-11 whether, you know, the Sky Chef or Gourmet or all those people really did have--I was just astounded at the number of people that had access to the aircraft.

MS. OSMUS: Now remember again, in terms of where they are in the airport, not everybody in the AOA have (inaudible).

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MR. RAIDT: (Inaudible), okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Just to finish out on this so maybe we won't have to come back to access when we get to the other phases, are you aware of any evidence in terms of the 9-11 hijackings that would indicate this particular vulnerability was exploited in any way by the 9-11 hijackings?

MS. OSMUS: No, I don't know.

MR. RAIDT: So next is control. We want to talk a little bit about what we call aircraft protection which is we equate with access control, and that being that the protocols that the flight crew had with respect to hijacking and that type of thing.

MR. JOHNSON: Common strategy.

MR. RAIDT: Common strategy, and this feeds into what the vision of the hijack protocol would be. And why don't you ask the questions?

MR. JOHNSON: Okay. You talked about three things with regard to aircraft security. One would be the flight crew training. We've seen in the standard security program the outline that FAA

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provided, and we've seen the training film that was used back then. So it seems (inaudible) so you don't need to go into a lot of detail on it, but the other two would be the air marshals and how you saw them during your--covered them at several points in your career and you've been one. So you're uniquely qualified to talk on that. And then third would be aircraft hardening issues, and in particular your thoughts on the concept of cockpit door hardening. So if you could just talk about these.

MS. OSMUS: Sure, sure. The outline of the cockpit need to be trained providing to the flight crew for training in terms of (inaudible) hijack response was taken by the air carriers and developed into a training program to cover the security piece. It was typically presented at either an initial recurrent training for flight crew (inaudible). The principle Security inspectors were providing each of them major carriers. Many of the little ones worked with their principle Operations inspectors which were on

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the same (inaudible) looking at the adequacy of the (inaudible) training. And the two of them would collaborate and recommend approval for training programs and then also collaborate on oversight of the training program. It's one or the other and then sometimes goes through (inaudible) training. You know, they'd make sure there was really (inaudible) standard.

MR. JOHNSON: Do you have any thoughts on the content or the adequacy of the current strategy that existed up till 9-11?

MS. OSMUS: I mean we thought it was the appropriate content. It was in the process of being updated again. Not because we (inaudible) 9-11 hijacking (inaudible), but happily we hadn't had hijackings for some time involving U.S. carriers. In fact the last one, I think it was a foreign carrier, I think it was 1994 from Frankfurt over here. So we wanted to look at the content in terms of the FBI response to see if their technology could change the (inaudible), and little things, like the fact that there were cell phones

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that you could have on the aircraft (inaudible) plane phones. That was a twist that we hadn't envisioned, but, you know, it was that kind of outdated kind of (inaudible). No, but we were all (inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, now the FAM's-

MS. OSMUS: Air marshals. Yeah, they really evolved over the years-

MR. RAIDT: Before you answer, let me ask one more question on that. I have a friend who is a flight attendant and we talked about some of these issues, and I was just asking her about her training too I think with American because I've always been real curious as to why flight attendants call certain facilities from the aircraft--

MR. JOHNSON: During the hijack.

MR. RAIDT: Yes, during the hijack, and I said well, what were you told, what was her training. She said well, the training I had was that just if there's a problem, you contact the cockpit. That's all you do. And I said what

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happens if the cockpit's disabled, the pilots didn't--we've never even, you know, talked about that. It was always just call the cockpit. And I guess my question on that is that being the case, that's, you know, the proper training, at the same time as we were having, you know, air raids and cockpit intrusion problems, what's your best guess as to why there would have been some thought to saying well, what do we do if the cockpit is attacked, the pilot's (inaudible) respond to an emergency? What's your thought on that?

MS. OSMUS: The training is a little (inaudible). I mean it's (inaudible) completely accurate. The rest of their training was to understand the other resources (inaudible) for that aircraft (inaudible) communication systems to tell somebody something's going on. And then the rest of their training was what turned out to be (inaudible), which is calmly, rationally. You don't need to excite the hijacker. Try to, you know--

MR. RAIDT: Don't serve alcohol.

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MS. OSMUS: Yeah, just kind of let it play out while the law enforcement resources are brought to bear. From a safety perspective (inaudible) to protect kind of the occasional nut factor, if you will, by (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: I wanted to pass this on too and please take whatever steps you think, and I don't know if it was isolated, or there was a policy and there's no longer. I suspect it not's, but this individual said that the curious thing to her too is when she left, she just went on to another job, they didn't ask for the cockpit keys back or manuals or anything, you know, nobody asked for a thing back. And I assume that's changed, but just wanted to relay that. If you could do whatever you need to do just to --yeah, this was surprising, and I don't know whether that's really something that we ought to try to recommend if there is a (inaudible) real protocols about doing that.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, absolutely.

MR. JOHNSON: So that has evolved.

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MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I mean it started years and years and years ago when there were a series of hijackings down in southern Florida. It was actually in (inaudible) and it was made from (inaudible) volunteers from a bunch of different agencies. Literally from (inaudible) hijacking aircraft. And then (inaudible) director to establish a (inaudible) within the FAA which would have been early (inaudible) I think and that was the first group which I wound up being a part of for a period of time in (inaudible) compared to what they are today. We had training, not like the sophistication today, and it was pretty (inaudible) to protect against. So we didn't have any intelligence--we didn't know anything about how the bad guys might be training. We were just trying to keep people from (inaudible) aircraft. After the threat of an international hijacking began to emerge in international locations, the FAM training was adjusted to really critique (inaudible) dangers, (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: When you say they, was it by

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Presidential directive in the '80's. We were told that the FAM program started back in the '70's in customs or something?

MS. OSMUS: Oh, it did. I think it was voluntary, people from other agencies bringing together customs and others when it was established in the FAA there was a TVD involved.

MR. RAIDT: Oh, okay.

MS. OSMUS: And we (inaudible).

MR. RAIDT: When you say it's a voluntary, somebody said let's get an air marshal program. We're not going to have a dedicated air marshal. These are just different agencies saying--

MS. OSMUS: (Inaudible) in a hurry, that came together and worked, and I'm not sure how long that went on.

MR. RAIDT: But, I'm sorry, that was post--the PDD in the '80's was--

MS. OSMUS: The originally emergence of the IVF.

MR. JOHNSON: And do you remember whether that was Presidentially driven?

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MS. OSMUS: I don't know. I'll have to
(inaudible).

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, okay. We have some
conflicting information.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, okay.

MR. JOHNSON: No, that's okay. We don't
expect you to know everything.

MS. OSMUS: As you know, if my short-term
memory is worse than my long-term, (inaudible). So
in the early '90's the FAM force was training
(inaudible). Let me make sure I get the dates
right here. At that time, which would have been
early '90's, it was--we were hiring new folks
(inaudible) at FAA, and one of their--one of the
duties they had to agree to do was to be a federal
aviation marshal because they wanted to increase
the force. They were posted at all our (inaudible)
around the country. They came together in teams
(inaudible) and that was one of the duties they
needed to do (inaudible) and that sort of thing.
Over time, we concluded we could put together a
workforce to look at that little task force in

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early 1990's, (inaudible), look at the way we're configuring the federal air marshal force with the force to see if we were doing it most efficiently. And the conclusions from that, which they definitely made changes accordingly, but it was much better to have a voluntary federal marshal board made up of people that did it pretty much on a permanent basis because they wanted to do it. And then after so many years when they had enough travel (inaudible) they would rotate back into an aviation inspector position.

MR. JOHNSON: When was that approximately?

MS. OSMUS: That was the early '90's. If I could remember exactly when. Maybe '92, early '90 in any event. (Inaudible). And so we transitioned--

MR. RAIDT: Well, we know someone who we can ask for details on that.

MS. OSMUS: Yes, you can. He knows that inside and out. And training was increased as well (inaudible) standards to be a federal air marshal were increased. (Inaudible). There's also an

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evaluation of whether or not the program needed continuing (inaudible) and the threat evaluation was done and potentially we determined we needed to continue with them for threat of international hijackings continued to be at international locations. At that point in time, there was a (inaudible) was done again when Admiral (inaudible). We kind of looked at--giving the layout of the world at the time, the (inaudible) location at (inaudible) and that analysis continued

[Tape becomes increasingly difficult to hear that this point.]

[TRANSCRIPTION ENDED.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

MONTE BELGER

BY

BILL JOHNSTONE, 9/11 Commission

JOHN RAIDT, 9/11 Commission

[NO DATE PROVIDED.]

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. BELGER[?]: [in progress]--and then in 1986 or so, was selected as the Deputy Director for the Great Lakes Region.

In 1988, I came to Washington as an Associate Administrator. I think at the time that particular title was Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards, I believe was the title at that time. Security was one of the programs that was in my organization. I went to Washington around September of '88 and December 21, '88, PanAm 103 happened and my life was consumed by PanAm 103 for a couple of years. And from '88 until I retired in 2002, I was in Washington in a variety of senior management positions.

The last five years as the Acting Deputy Administrator from 1997 to 2002. And I actually retired as the Acting Administrator, about a month and a half just before I retired. I retired in September--September 13, 2002. And I went to work for--started to work for Lockheed/Martine Lockheed Martin in January of this year, January of 2003.

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MR. : With your history in the system, start with that with a general question. In the period leading up to September 11, 2001, what did you see as the strengths--the primary strengths and the primary weaknesses of the Civil Aviation Security System?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think the strengths, lets start there first. I think the strengths were manifested in the fact that there had not been a domestic hijacking or even a significant domestic security event for, jeeze, I don't know, eight or ten years, it seemed like, at the time.

There had been some international events, but nothing that affected U.S. carriers and nothing, domestically, so it appeared as though things were under control an working okay.

There was in place a, if I can use the word, profiling capability for passengers with checked baggage that was designed to kind of counter the explosives threat. In the several years, prior to 2001, the public interest, congressional interest, the primary FAA interest

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from the Administrator and my standpoint was on capacity and congestion. And we had a terrific team, that was one of the strengths I should say that, too.

People like Admiral Flynn, who was the head of security at the time was extremely well known throughout the intelligence communities, had great rapport. We had a great deal of confidence in him.

MR. : And what about on the down side, what did you see as weaknesses?

MR. BELGER: Well, as always, I think the capability or the ability to detect everything going through the screening points has always been a weakness. I don't know that we'll ever get 100 percent, but that's, probably, always been--at least in my view--a weakness. The inability to detect everything all the time.

And as it turned out, you know, I probably wouldn't have answered this this way at the time, but, as it turns out, I think one of the real weaknesses was the sharing of intelligence

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information.

MR. : But that's something
that's been more apparent to you--

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, you don't
know what you don't know.

MR. : Monte, thank you for being
with us.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, sure.

MR. RAIDT: In case it hasn't been made
clear, what we want to do is to create [unintell.]
pre-9/11 and 9/11.

MR. BELGER: I'm sorry, what was your last
name, John?

MR. RAIDT: Raidt, R-a-i-d-t, John.

MR. : I'm sorry, I should have
added just one other administrative thing that our
hearing record remains open, you know, anything you
care to submit post now--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --up to when we do the
report.

MR. BELGER: Just like on the Hill, huh.

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MR. RAIDT: Let me say for the record, too, that this wasn't operating for the first, you know, minute or so, so we provide the normal briefing on the purposes of the Commission and started to get Mr. Belger's background.

There's so much to cover, by obviously we'll use our time to actually focus on really, the essential things. I'd like to kind of go down with you, first, general treatment of intelligence and the security function from the Administrator's office, leading up to 2001. And then go over the vector to ask you a few questions, that we have on each of those.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. RAIDT: So, as a general matter, could you tell us, both for yourself and then interfacing with the Administrator the frequency and the methods by which you had obtained not only intelligence of what the threats are, but how's our security system doing?

MR. BELGER: Okay, well, let me start, I mean, with my background in security, I knew the

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people. I knew who to go to to ask questions if there was any specific questions. It was easy for me to go to the security folks and just, you know, find out what was going on.

But there was a daily, I think it was called a daily brief. My assistant, Shirley Miller, looked at that every day. She brought things to my attention that were appropriate.

MR. : Was this daily security or daily intelligence?

MR. BELGER: Intel, yeah, it was an intel brief that was classified. And Admiral Flynn or the intel folks would, I mean, they had an open door to the Administrator and myself if there was ever anything that they needed to get to us and they didn't hesitate to do that. So, I mean, I always felt comfortable that we were getting the information that they had. I never felt that they didn't have an open door to come to us. And they, I mean, they exercised it whenever they needed to.

MR. RAIDT[?]: And Shirley's brief, was that in writing or that was--

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MR. BELGER: It was the security intel brief, that she just looked at. I didn't look at it every day. She did look at it every day and brought, you know, whatever seemed to be significant to my attention.

MR. RAIDT: And did Jane receive that same written--

MR. BELGER: I would bring things to her attn.

MR. RAIDT: So--

MR. BELGER: Either I or Shirley or the security folks would bring things to the Administrator's attn.

MR. RAIDT: Okay, so, and just tell me if this is a short characterization: So, ACI would produce the daily brief;

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. RAIDT: Shirley would read it; if there was something that needed to be called to your attention, it would be--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. RAIDT: --and if it needed to be

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called to Jane's Attention--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. RAIDT: --it would go from you to her?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. RAIDT: And then, also the idea of an open-door policy, if anything from ACI or ACS would come in and--

MR. BELGER: They would go to Jane or to me, whoever they could get to first.

MR. RAIDT: And we're going to be taking a look at the intelligence case files and at some of those briefs. So if we need to go into specifics. At some point we might want to ask you about something.

But, let's talk about the spring and summer of 2001. Did you feel like that there was a greater threat--the threat level was increased in the summer of 2001 compared to a year or two before?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't think that I recalled anything that made me think that the threat level was higher.

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MR. RAIDT: Okay, so it was just--

MR. BELGER: You know, there was always a threat and for the several years prior to 2001, the security folks had put out bulletins and sort of made some circulars to try that keep the carriers aware of what was going on, but I don't recall anything that actually made me think the threat was higher.

MR. RAIDT: Let me ask--

MR. BELGER: Certainly not domestically.

MR. RAIDT: Right, and I want to talk to you a little bit--I'm going to get into [unintell.] vectors on intel. Because one of the problems has been, in the intelligence being [unintell.] from reading the joint and Intelligence Committee report, you know, the high degree of chatter and the great deal of information. Is that what you were talking about, where in retrospect you see the sharing of intelligence was a problem?

MR. BELGER: Oh, sure, I mean, the fact that these guys were in the country for four or five years planning and that, if I remember right,

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there were a couple, two that were on somebody's list that weren't on other folks' list.

MR. RAIDT: And you weren't aware of any of that--

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MR. RAIDT: Well, we'll go into that--let's talk about intelligence. There was nothing you ever saw in the spring or summer that, one, led you to believe that the threat was generally higher, or two, that there was any plot that even closely approximated a domestic hijacking or [unintell.] hijacking and using an aircraft as a weapon?

MR. BELGER: No, my general feeling was that the highest threat was international and it was explosives.

MR. RAIDT: Explosives and did that reflect the general impression in the building or was--

MR. BELGER: I think so, I think that would be a fair statement, yeah.

MR. RAIDT: And the intelligence

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information you received from Shirley, et al., certainly did nothing to--

MR. BELGER: I don't recall anything that was inconsistent with that.

MR. RAIDT: So, let's focus, then, on intelligence. And, I guess the two issues. Let me go with mine, Bill. Bill has one--that are of concern to us and what we've looked at. And we're disclosing a lot of the other stuff, strictly, because, you know, your time's valuable and I want to cut right to the chase.

One of the things that's really concerned us is that if it's fair to say that security measures were calibrated to intelligence and that the intelligence was developed by the IC with a liaison from the FAA, but that liaison position, both among state, FBI, and CI are critical positions.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. RAIDT: And one of the things that greatly concerns us is it seems, particularly with respect to the FBI liaison is that that individual

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is there doing a lot of other stuff that had little to do with the FAA.

MR. BELGER: Are you talking about the FAA liaison to the FBI?

MR. RAIDT: Yeah.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. RAIDT: And so, my question, I guess, for you, Monte, is do you recall any debate or conversation about how that--one the importance of the FBI liaison to have a good understanding of the domestic threat. Did you feel like some of it as reported from ACI that there was a blindness about domestic issues and threats; and, two, was there ever any concern about how the FBI liaison was spending his time in serving the FAA over at the FBI?

MR. BELGER: Well, I knew we had a liaison to the FBI, that we, the FAA, had a liaison to the FBI. I didn't have any knowledge of the concerns you're expressing about what he was or wasn't doing. That never came to my attention. And I don't recall anybody, you know, telling me that

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they had--I don't recall anybody in security telling me that they had concerns about the FBI liaison's actions or inactions.

MR. RAIDT: And were you ever aware of any effort by Irish or anybody else to say it was worried about the level and the quality of intelligence and sought to try to improve matters in that regard?

MR. BELGER: Well, yeah, I mean, let me answer that generically, even going back before Irish. I mean, the FAA, as you know, is not an intelligence gathering organization. We're, I keep saying we, but the FAA is, you know, dependent upon the FBI, CIA, State, DOD, whoever is gathering intelligence.

So, there was always a, oh, I don't want to say concern, but there's always this feeling on the FAA's part, you know, are we getting everything we need?

MR. RAIDT: Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: Are we getting all the intelligence we need--are we--and I don't really

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mean that to be critical, it's just a reality that we're relying on somebody else to give you the stuff and to tell you what you can release to the carriers in a nonclassified way. You always have wonder, you know, is there something else there I don't know that I should know.

So, in that generic sense, I think it would be fair to say the FAA folks, you know, kind of had that generic feeling, are we getting everything we need? And are we privileged to everything thing that we should be privileged to.

MR. RAIDT: Do you remember any efforts by Irish to exchange analysts that FAA would pay for a position in exchange for greater levels of access to intelligence?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember that specifically, but I know, even over the years, the FAA had made efforts with the CIA to get folks over there. We were able to get an FBI liaison, as you mentioned. I don't remember specifically, you know Irish doing anything, but I would expect he would have been, and so that wouldn't surprise me at all.

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MR. : And on those lines, did you have a concern about domestic versus foreign? Some of the Intel folks that we've talked to from FAA said that they thought they knew more about what was going on, let's say, in Beirut than in Detroit?

MR. BELGER: Oh, there's no doubt about that. I think just the volume of data, raw intelligence, internationally versus domestically would tell you that. We knew--we got more intelligence information about international activities than about domestic.

MR. RAIDT: And that's really honing in on what we are just trying to understand, is that, you know, from everybody, from ACI and from testimony on the Hill, everybody said the threat is overseas. And our question and it keeps coming back is, was our projection of the threat overseas because that's where we had the intelligence as opposed to we don't have a threat.

It wasn't that we didn't have a threat domestically, we didn't have the intelligence? It

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was that level of concern and on that particular level that we don't have eyes domestically, something that was a concern in the building prior to 9/11 or is that something that, in retrospect, as we look at it is a problem?

MR. BELGER: I think it was probably more retrospective. I mean, I couldn't tell you what capability the FBI had, at the time domestically.

MR. : Let me ask you about some specific intel information. And this will be a good point to do some more housekeeping [unintell.] up front. We are all, every one in this room has cleared to receive information, up from the top secret level, however, this facility is just set up to secret level. At any point in your--when we're going through this today. If you feel that the information rises above the SSI level, if you would let us know so we can note it in our notes.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And if it goes above the secret level, we'll need to make arrangements to get that information in some other place and time.

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But what I'm going to be using for this purpose is information that all was at the SSI level.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Including, provided by the FBI or by the FAA to the Joint Intelligence inquiry. So, I want to start by just asking you if you have any recollection of the following documents? A March 1998, FAA assessment, as produced by FAA intelligence, entitled "Osama bin Laden/World Islamic Front Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation?" it went through a brief description of bin Laden and associated parties. And it talked about a number of possible scenarios; foreign and domestic involving bin Laden. Does that ring a bell?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, I probably looked at that after the fact.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: I don't recall ever having seen that before September 11.

MR. : How about a 1999 FAA

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Assessment of the same title, it's just an updated version?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, I mean, I was aware that the security folks did those types of assessments and did those types of analyses. It's possible I saw it, I don't recall.

MR. : But you don't recall?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : And a 2000 document produced by the intelligence community, an intelligence community threat assessment which was authored by FAA's Office of Intelligence, entitled "Prospects for Aircraft Hijackings to Free Incarcerated Terrorists?"

MR. BELGER: I don't recall that one.

MR. : Now, after all that information--

MR. BELGER: Let me just say that, if I could--

MR. : Please.

MR. BELGER: I think this is at least important from my standpoint.

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MR. : Yeah.

MR. BELGER: I would have been comfortable in the '98, '99, 2000 time frame, that when the FAA security folks did those types of analyses--

MR. : Yeah.

MR. BELGER: --if there was anything that should have been given to the carriers, if there was anything that should have been given to the airports, if there was any action that should have been taken, you know, in the form of, you know, advisories or even directives, that they would have taken them.

MR. : Okay, and--

MR. BELGER: So, I would have felt comfortable back in that time frame that they were--

MR. : --well, let me ask you this about the implementation of that: If they wanted to issue an information circular or security directive or initiate rule making, in each of those cases, would that information that they were trying to undertake that effort, come to your attention?

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MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. : In all those cases, even
the ICS?

MR. BELGER: Well, now, the ICS, let me
say it this way--

MR. : Yeah.

MR. BELGER: At least after the fact they
would have. And with respect [unintell.] and rule
making before?

MR. BELGER: Again, according to the
criticality, you know, if it was something that
needed to be done at 3:00 o'clock in the morning
that was basically a phone call and--

MR. : Okay, well--

MR. BELGER: --I would look at it the next
morning.

MR. : --let me, the last
document that I want to show you and I'll show you
this one, is it's, many of these were classified,
but the existence of them was not. FAA Sent this
to the Joint Inquiry.

This is a, I'm going to let you look at it

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and I'm going to ask you about Slide 24. This is something that Pat McDonald [ph] prepared, starting in the years 2000 and it's an assessment of the terrorist threat to civil aviation. It goes--it was prepared to be given to folks in the industry, largely and, therefore, there's a more classified version that was given to those that had proper clearance in the industry. And this also was made available to FAA field personnel.

And it was, evidently, a traveling show prepared on a CD-ROM. The summation. You can turn now to Slide 24 and thereafter. And Slide 24 is another scenario that went through several more typical scenarios. But this, actually appears, this possible domestic suicide hijacking or aircraft-as-weapon scenario appears back, at least as early as the '98 assessment.

Now, Mr. McDonald, you'll see in there that after they posit the threat, they say, fortunately, we have no information that anybody's actually thinking about this.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I mean, there's a lot

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of evidence--

MR. : Yes, sir.

MR. BELGER: --that U.S. airliners were more likely to occur--that a hijacking was more likely to occur overseas than domestic hijacking, don't rule it out, but things aren't in the hijackers--

MR. : Right, but--

MR. BELGER: Covering all bases as the intel folks do, you know, they also said, well, yeah, it's likely that there could be a suicide bombing of a U.S. airliner, a low probability.

MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: But a major concern.

MR. : Do you recall this document or this subject matter, was this brought to your attention?

MR. : I don't recall this document. I mean, I think that was weird that we were doing this type of information sharing. Not only internally, but, also, with the airlines and the airports. I don't recall seeing this

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particular document, but I think I was aware, I mean, I was aware that we were doing this type of data sharing to the extent we could with the airlines, yeah.

MR. : Okay, just one more on that. We also realize there's a great volume of [unintell.] access [unintell.] Were you aware that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda prior to 9/11?

MR. BELGER: You know, that's a really interesting question. I think the honest answer is no, I mean, if you had come up to me on September 11 and asked me to, you know, give you a definition of who he was, what his organization was, I would have probably told you it was a terrorist organization, you know, probably knew they were in Afghanistan or that area, but I wouldn't have known. They weren't on my radar screen.

MR. : And not knowing about UBL, you know, then the next level that they had an active ongoing interest in civil aviation or is it something at least the intelligence community knew. And the thing that, and again, with all the

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hindsight, retrospect, the rule making that went out that summer talking about that terrorist cells are active in the United States with an interest in civil aviation, and there has been a debate in a lot of our interviews whether that was intended to trump up the threat in order to get past the cost-benefit for rule making or whether that was actually the threat that we have a very significant--

MR. BELGER: 107, 108, the revised suicide--

MR. : --yeah, I'm sorry. That we have a very significant threat and a pretty 9/11-like scenario as far as consequences were concerned. Do you remember that rule making--

MR. BELGER: Oh, I remember the rule making, that was a huge rule making, it had been underway for years to completely revise the airport and the airline security rules. So, yeah, I remember that rule making.

MR. : Do you remember the threat analysis that accompanied the--

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MR. BELGER: I read it, I would have read it--I would have read the preamble and I would have read the analysis that went with it.

MR. : And what's your sense as far as whether that was an actual threat that we perceived or a means--

MR. : Sort of remind him that the threat that was posited in there was essentially a domestic no [unintell.] that took care of up to 12 aircraft blown up over the United States.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I put that, though, in that category of that other one, that, you know, it's a low-probability but a high-concern.

MR. : Yeah.

MR. BELGER: So, you know there might have been some--I would not have thought about it at the time I would not have thought that they were playing with the threat analysis nor to justify the rule. But, in retrospect, I guess, it's possible.

MR. : So, the attitude at the time would have been, well, this is what they

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believe the threat to be?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. : Well, let's maybe go to the other vectors and talk about prescreening and let's talk about check points. And, I don't think we can go through cargo and mail and all that--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --but on prescreening with CAPS you had mentioned the fact that people who check baggage it was intended to address the bombing threat.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Here's the issue that we have the most concern about, is that prior to 1998, the effort to prescreen people and identify the group of people where a terrorist might be, that, and I think the rule said, that those who impose more than a minimal risk to the aircraft--was built on a hijacker profile and if you were a selectee, then you would have secondary screening of your person and carry-on bags as well as a look at your checked bag.

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Then the automated system comes in, you had the Gore Commission Report. You had the effort to try to ration a limited number of CTX machines. And the idea was to let's use the automated prescreening system, but tie only to checked baggage and [unintell.]--

MR. BELGER: Correct.

MR. : And here's I guess, how the family members looked. They have at least in the intelligence world in 1995, i.e., had a baseline working group. You have everybody saying the threat is increasing, increasing, increasing, including domestically. And then you have a rule that lapses, in the case of manual prescreening subsumed by automated and it actually looks like we relaxed the security rules, particularly with respect to the person and their carry-on belongings.

So, do you remember that rule making? do you remember the decision to let that manual system lapse? What's your overall impression?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, when did it lapse?

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MR. : It would have been '98,
late '97 or early '98.

MR. BELGER: Well, I remember the CAPS 2,
I mean being implemented--

MR. : Or CAPS 1.

MR. BELGER: Or CAPS 1, oh, yeah, yeah,
yeah. I remember that being implement. And,
again, my view of that was it was, you know, maybe
fewer people would have had their baggage
physically inspected, but that was the intent of
CAPS, was to zero-in in a more precise way on those
folks who, based on the information analysis would
have been the higher threat.

MR. : The threats just for
bombing or for hijacking or whatever the threat
was.

MR. BELGER: Well, I think, in fact, my
recollection is CAPS 2 profile--

MR. : CAPS 1.

MR. BELGER: --CAPS 1, I'm sorry, the CAPS
1, CAPS, at that time, it wasn't the CAPS 1 and 2.

MR. : Yeah, right.

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MR. BELGER: The CAPS profile was geared to those people who were checking baggage, only it wasn't applied to people who weren't checking baggage.

MR. : Right, and that's exactly the question.

MR. BELGER: So, it was geared to explosives--

MR. : Well, can we determine, because I think there are two aspects here: One is the profile that goes into making a selection of who needs to be looked at; but a separate subject is what do you do with the consequences of selection?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Is it your recollection that the profile, itself, you know, the information, and we've been over and looked at the weights and factors, which we won't discuss in any detail.

MR. BELGER: Did you talk to the FAA folks that developed it?

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MR. : Yes, sir, but--

MR. BELGER: But there's one guy, in particular, James--

MR. : Padgett [ph]

MR. BELGER: Yeah, he's--

MR. : But your recollection, I just want to isolate this--

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. : --to see if it's your recollection that the factors and weights used in determining who was going to get extra scrutiny that it's your recollection that that, too, was geared to bombers?

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. : And was there any discussion at the time, I mean, the record shows what happened. But was there any discussion at the time that you had an increased threat, an increased threat domestically, according to our own rules and, yet, in a way, we're reducing that before

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someone who is prescreened and selected received secondary screening of their person and their carry-on; and now, you know, we're reducing that to say don't worry about that, we're just going to look at their checked baggage? Was that a discussion that that might not be the best thing for security or--

MR. BELGER: I'm trying to recollect. First of all, I don't remember any discussions like that, but I'm trying to recollect is this actually was--what you're saying is it was a lessening of the number of the number of people who were actually secondarily screened?

MR. : Right.

MR. : No, I think you're talking about the consequences of what would happen to them. I don't think it's a reduction of the number of--but just whether they get hand wanded--whether they get physically searched--

MR. BELGER: Oh, okay.

MR. : --the person boarding the plane or just their baggage.

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MR. BELGER: My recollection was that if you met the profile, your bags either had to be physically inspected, through an explosive detection machine or x-rayed or they had to be cleared in, I think it was one of those three ways. If I remember right. I'm talking about explosive detection. So, everybody who met the profile, their bags should have been cleared through one of those three methods.

MR. : And I guess--here's what we're trying to get at is that family members who were looking at the system, say that, well, prior to the automation of the system, if you were selected from the manual system, as a selectee--the consequences of a selectee was that you had secondary screening of your person and your checked items, more than the norm.

Then that got changed to say if you're a selectee, don't worry about additional screening of your person and carry-on belongings, we're just going to check you for explosives in your checked bags.

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MR. BELGER: Well, I think that was a reflection, if that is actually what happened, and I'll assert, then I'll give you that, then that was a reflection of the fact that people were thinking that the threat was explosives but the screening system--the initial screening system was probably good enough and that the secondary focus ought to be on the checked bags.

MR. : And that was consistent with the War Commission--

MR. BELGER: Because the explosives were the threat.

MR. : Well, let's go out and talk a little bit about prescreening or I'm sorry about screening, the checkpoint screening. And, obviously, there had been 15 or 20 years of IGJ or, you know, it's FAA, the Red Team and everybody looked and said, well, it's not a perfect system, and there's no way it could be. You're never going to get it consolidated. They said there's no zero in the aviation business.

But, obviously, it was a long-time

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enduring concern that: one, even detectable items weren't going to get detected all the time and in some cases, only 40 to 50 to 60 percent of the time.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And if there were a whole range of items that were dangerous and, you know, that were prohibited that were not detectable. And so, talk a little bit about in your discussions with Irish or with the Administrator, your feelings about those problems and what to do about it and whatever, is it just inevitable and just keep plugging away. What was your attitude about it?

MR. BELGER: Well, my attitude about that, goes back to the days when I was a security inspector and working at the airports. It's a constant, it was and is still today, even the they're TSA employees, it is a constant effort to keep the folks alert and give them the best tools so they can see into those bags. I mean, have you looked at those screens? Have you looked to see? It's tough, man, it is hard. It's--to get to 100

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percent detection, you'd bring the airline schedule system to a halt.

So, it's always been trying to find the right balance between the detection capability, with the best equipment and the best people, you know in a system that's fundamentally built around schedules. I mean the most important thing to an air carrier is their schedule and it's always, from the very first day I ever went to a screening point as an FAA inspector, it's always been about finding that right balance.

Knowing that, I mean, heck, I knew from 1972 that it would never be perfect.

MR. : And with the idea that 100 percent is probably unachievable, what was your view of--and presumably zero-percent would be completely unacceptable.

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. : So, there's something in-between there, where did you think you were in 2000/2001? I mean was it what you'd thought the system was capable of being? Was it as good as it

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could be? Was it short in some way and what were you doing about it?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think in that time frame, the data that the FAA had from protection rates was, my recollection was, it was slightly improving. But it was still, I don't think.

MR. : That being the regular testing?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, the regular testing. But I don't think those rates were acceptable to any of us. I don't remember exactly what they were, but I don't think they were acceptable to any of us. And, you know, what were we doing about it? I think the emphasis for 20 years has been on better screening equipment, better people. I mean better trained people, not better people. But more highly trained people who know what to look for.

MR. : Can we talk about--I want to ask about a rule making on screener certification, which is one of the efforts that was underway for a long time.

MR. BELGER: Right.

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MR. : And when you testified after 9/11 to the Government Affairs Committee in the Senate, I think it was just two weeks afterward. And the question came up about well, what can be done on improving screening. And you were talking about the process and the screener certification, which, indeed had been mandated by Congress, at various times and recommended by the Gore Commission. And you said, you know, quote, "One of the problems we had in getting this" the screener certification rule "out sooner was the fact that there was no real objective way to test screeners other than to test objects that our inspectors use." Which really is not a good real-world way to test.

MR. BELGER: Mm-hmm.

MR. : So, if you could talk to us a little bit about that trainer certification rule, which was years in the making and was on the brink of being issued when September 11 happened. And the use of test objects versus other tests by your own special assessments division, like EAO and

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the DOT IG to find it.

MR. BELGER: Okay. I think that rule was actually on the verge of being finalized even before September 11 and Irish pulled it back. Admiral Flynn pulled it back, fundamentally, for this reason that we're talking about. That there was no good capability to quantifiably test the screeners. And he was waiting on and we were waiting on, not just being him, we were waiting on that capability. And what's it called, TIP.

MR. : TIPS.

MR. BELGER: TIPS, yeah, the Threat Image Projection System. So that there would be a measurable, quantifiable way to test the screeners. If you're actually going to have them certified, then you've got to have some objective measurable way to test them, just like you do a pilot or somebody who has to be recertified.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: So, we were waiting to get that capability in place to go with the certification.

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MR. : Let me ask you, we had, one of the carriers, I need to put it in an interesting way, so that it would, as the carrier recognizing that there was no way that it could be perfect in the limitations on both humans and equipment; that there were three levels: there are crazies, criminals, and terrorists. And we knew we could stop the crazies or we thought we could and the criminals. But a dedicated terrorist can do what they were doing that the system just wasn't designed to stop and couldn't stop. Is that a fair?

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean, I think that's a true statement about any security system. I mean, the more dedicated, skilled, trained, preparation one takes, the more likely you are to defeat it. You know, if somebody spends five years planning to hijack four airplanes on the same day and, yeah, that, U.S. domestic system probably wasn't designed to prevent that.

With weapons that probably weren't even--I don't know what they had to be honest with you.

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But with weapons that probably weren't even on the, don't carry list.

MR. : We should probably ask that question about the [unintell.]--

MR. : Yeah, I want to, can we do that one when I do the [unintell.] tying this together?

You talk about the threat information that you got from the intelligence side. And we've just been talking about vulnerability data that you received from testing and evaluation. And we've talked with other people about how the FAA reacted to both sets of information.

Let me ask you, in your position as Deputy Administrator, what in the way of consequence assessment and risk management, did you undertake in allocating your security resources?

MR. BELGER: I'm sorry, help me some more.

MR. : Well, all right, on consequence management, let's use as the example, what you talked to us earlier about, which was, okay, the suicide hijacking in the United States.

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Low-probability, but high-concern.

MR. BELGER: right.

MR. : So, an example of a consequence management concern would be, okay, this is a remote possibility, but if it did happen, you know, it would make TWA-800 look like another day at the office. So, that's what I'm talking about on consequence management. And on risk management, simply, how did you put the things together. National Academy of Sciences and others have questioned in the security area the capability, not only of FAA, but other U.S. government entities of bringing together threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and consequence assessment into a unified risk-assessment kind of matrix. So, that's what I'm getting at.

MR. BELGER: Well, I think the decision on the resources within the security organization would have been basically made by the security--by the Associated Administrator Irish, for the most part in the years preceding.

I mean, I know that the FAA's intel shop

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was significantly improved in the '90s, after PanAm-103, significant improvement starting in late '92, '93, somewhere in there. Their analytical capability was significantly improved.

MR. : And those folks are dealing mostly with threat assessment?

MR. BELGER: Right and vulnerability, I would say, also, I mean, I think they were making some vulnerability assessments, also, along with the folks in the field. But I think, perhaps they were looking at vulnerability along with threat.

MR. : But they weren't heavily involved in looking at your compliance testing, that level of vulnerability?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't think so, that would have been more in the operations side.

MR. : So, the question is, really is: How were those brought together? You know, you have the Ops folks doing these tests on vulnerability and system; you have your intel division, mainly focused on threats and maybe vulnerabilities in the larger sense; based on the

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targets that the bad guys might follow?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : But, presumably at the top of the organization would be where you kind of bring these things together.

MR. BELGER: That would have been at Irish's level, yeah.

MR. : And are you aware of that being done and how it was done, how he did--

MR. BELGER: I really don't.

MR. : One quick more thing on that. I checked my screening of fines that were assessed for the carriers when they failed. There's been a concern that a lot of fines were reduced, that they ended up paying 10-cents on the dollar.

How did that system work? And one of the quotes that we'd received was that the carriers treated the fines as the cost of doing business, you know, it was just factored in, they knew they were going to get them. It wasn't something that they took terribly seriously. The scenario is,

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okay, we've been fined, we've got a problem let's see what we can do to fix it. They just kind of negotiated, paid the fine and move on. Can you talk about both of those items?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, from very first-hand experience, from a variety of different positions, from the inspector position, to the staff position to the manager position, I've been in all three levels.

I mean, it's called a compliance and enforcement program, fundamental objective is compliance. There are times when you have to go the enforcement route, I mean, the civil thing, revocation or something like that. There are times in FAA's history where the emphasis on civil penalties has gone up or gone down, depending on the emphasis to put on certain programs.

You know, there was a time in the FAA's history when every single pilot deviation resulted in a civil penalty. Because they were going out of control and that was seen as a way to bring the pilots to get their attention. So the enforcement

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tool was used for that reason--to get their attention.

You know, when I was an inspector and I wrote up an enforcement report and the recommendation was to fine the carrier. I mean, I followed that case. I talked to the lawyer who was working it. I talked to whoever was ultimately making the decision whether to settle or what--so--

MR. : Is that standard process even today?

MR. BELGER: Well, it ought to be. There's nothing that says the inspectors can't pick up the phone and call the attorney and find out what's going on, make sure that their input is considered. It's harder--it's easier to bitch about it than it is to do that.

MR. : Are you aware--

MR. BELGER: [unintell.]

MR. : Are you aware of how many--whether the current--or let's say before you left of whether the current--or the then current generation of inspectors were following your

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example?

MR. BELGER: I don't know. I got the sense that they weren't because if they were, they probably wouldn't have had some of the complaints they had about the cases being settled.

And, frankly, I don't have a, I mean, without looking at the specifics, I'm just going to make a general statement. I don't have concerns about the way the cases were settled in the end. You know every legal proceeding gives the accused, you know, the opportunity to go in and make your case, make your extenuating circumstances. I was a part of several what's the word I'm looking for? Compromises, I guess. And one of the compromises I remember was the carrier, rather than paying a fine to the FAA, put x-thousands of dollars into putting new screening. So, again it was all about compliance in my mind, rather than--

MR. : [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: --the civil penalties were there for emphasis, you know, if you do something, you've got to pay the consequences.

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MR. : The 10-cents on a dollar figure? Does that seem accurate or inaccurate to you?

MR. BELGER: I don't know. It seems low to me, but, again, I think you have to look at the specifics.

MR. : But it was at the end, it was an ALJ process, quasijudicial, unless you want to go to the federal court, you know, and we give them time and money.

MR. BELGER: Right, when you get into the civil penalty arena, it is a legal proceeding.

MR. : And a lot of people have said, really, if you wanted to get compliance, always that publicity was a lot more fashionable.

MR. BELGER: I think that's exactly right.

MR. : And keep that in mind, because when we get to the recommendation phase, I want to talk to you about how to do that.

MR. BELGER: That's right, publicity was a much more feared consequence than paying the fine.

MR. : Yeah.

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MR. : Do you recall any instances where you mentioned decertification. We have seen examples of decertification being real good in the safety arena--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --especially in earlier years. Are you aware of any instances where security violations prompted threatened decertification action by the FAA?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't recall any.

MR. : Was that procedure a tool that was at your disposal or something that was--

MR. BELGER: No, it was always at the inspectors or the security organization's disposal. Now, I can probably think of situations where screening points were shut down or a period of time. If they weren't manned properly or if the machine wasn't working right, you'd shut the screening point down. Which, in essence, is shutting down the operation.

But I don't recall ever--I don't recall a situation where there was actually talk about

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revoking a carrier's certificate or [unintell.]

MR. : In retrospect, do you think that might have been, gotten their attention better--

MR. BELGER: I don't know that any of those--I guess I'd have to say, no, because I don't think that screening point violations rose to that level.

MR. : Monte, let's talk a little bit about kind of on-board strategies, common strategies in FAMS. And talk a little bit about the public input the FAA was receiving. That's something you talked about how Congress and the public and FAA's and whether you all have any documents that show the number of calls you are getting about, hey, my bags were on their time, I was delayed, as opposed to we were worried about security.

That's a part of the--a piece of the story that needs to be told, that you know the public's expectations had a role there, with democratic institutions, it's the way it works.

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MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : And then, let's get in a 9/11 piece and contrary to what Sam said, Miles, I think probably that's the right time for us to mix in because we're going to be going through the day.

MR. : Yeah, right.

MR. : Rather than us do our stuff--

MR. : --agreed

MR. : --and then do yours? What do you--

MR. : With one caveat, Team A still will need to come back to you at some point, because we haven't reviewed all the relevant documents and talked to all the necessary people.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : So this would be a tentative first

MR. BELGER: I'll be available.

MR. : But we will, we'll try to finish up with pre-9/11 shortly. Let's start with--

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MR. : And please tell us if you want a break at some point.

MR. BELGER: I'm okay, right now.

MR. : Okay.

MR. : There are two pieces that we're most interested in: one is the FAM program, an in common strategy.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : And kind of look at it, again, with an overview, you know, that intelligence was the first layer of security. Is it credible, is it specific, is it actionable. Absent that, then, you know, the pre-screening, hopefully will capture that population of people who mean ill--screening, you know, stop them from bringing on the tools to do what they intend.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And then, failing all that, what happens on-board the aircraft?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : I meant there was three pieces that we're interested in: FAMS; the cockpit

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doors; and the common strategy.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : So, recognizing that each of those layers has pretty significant deficiencies, the odds weren't terribly small that someone wouldn't actually get to that point in the aircraft.

On the common strategy, can you talk to us a little bit about your impressions of it. Efforts to up-date it; the means by which FAA assured that it remain relevant, and address the prevailing threat?

MR. BELGER: Well, the common strategy was developed and it was--I mean, my recollection was that it was improved several times over the years. I mean, it certainly was not designed to counter what happened on September 11. There's no ifs ands or buts about that. I don't ever recall a scenario or even a plan for thinking about what happened on September 11. So, I don't think you can say a common strategy was designed to combat that type of incident.

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So, obviously, it had to be rethought and replaced. But the common strategy was an effort to make sure that the FAA, the FBI and carriers knew what the strategy was when there was an incident.

And that's going to be one of my recommendations to you guys in the future. Because there is not a common strategy today.

MR. : Let's delve into that in detail when we get to recommendations.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Are you aware of, and I've heard that Mike Morris [ph], among others was leading, in 2000/2001 to update the common strategy, did you have any role in that?

MR. BELGER: I didn't have any specific role, but, I mean, I--it was updated over the years, several times, so, I mean, I would assume that they would be updating it.

MR. : And the two pieces that were supposed to go along with common strategy, the FAM program.

MR. BELGER: Right.

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MR. : We all know that that actually faded over the years.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : How would you answer the question that was posed to us that, again, when you have an increased threat and a concern domestically, and, yet the FAM program had, you know, it had said that we have confidence that the checkpoints were working. Well, as we've all discussed in all these interviews, that wasn't the case. So, why did the FAM wither on the vine?

MR. BELGER: I don't think, this is, I think the irony of my answer is going to be that I think at the time, people really didn't think there was an increased domestic threat.

I mean, the threat, every, you can see these things in these documents, obviously, you know, to me those were throw-ins. Domestic, suicide, very low probability, but--

MR. : A sense that you got from Admiral Flynn or from General [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: Absolutely.

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MR. : [unintell.] not domestic terrorism?

MR. BELGER: I never--I had no feeling, at the time that the domestic was higher than it was in the previous year.

MR. : And was the--so the FAM program for that reason wasn't seen as an essential tool or was doing okay, with--

MR. BELGER: Well, the FAM program died over the years, it was, basically, a resource question.

MR. : Mainly FAA resource or were the air carriers complaining that they were giving up high-priced seats or--

MR. BELGER: FAA resources, FAA resources, people.

MR. : Just, there were higher priorities in both in security and the [unintell.]

MR. BELGER: Right. Well, you know, and it's hindsight's 100 percent better in retrospect, but what eight, ten years not a single domestic hijacking?

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MR. : Ninety-one was--o

MR. BELGER: Yeah, right so ten years now. It's like--it's like, you know, I used to use this analogy, you have car thefts in the parking lot. So you put a guard in the parking lot and you go two years and you don't have a car theft.

MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: And the budget cutter comes by and says what the hell you need that guard for, you haven't had a car theft in two years.

MR. : And it's a tough question, it's like the baseball thing. If someone's 0-for-10 does that mean they're going to go for 11 or are they due for a hit?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And then the cockpit doors.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Can you, I know part of this is a flight standards piece, part of it's an aviation security, can you walk us through how we should be looking at this from both sides and what

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may be happening, because there were real serious looks of putting Keplar [ph] [unintell.] ditched? What's your knowledge of that?

MR. BELGER: I don't know that they were real serious looks. I know that over the years there were discussions about things that could be done to further secure the cockpit doors. The doors were supposed to be locked in flight, you know, on September 11. But, obviously somebody could, or three or four people could knock those doors down if that was st they wanted to do.

The issues that we got into, which were flight standards, certification issues about how to re-enforce those doors and the potential safety consequences that would be caused by re-enforcing those doors in the case of a decompression, were just, they were startlingly complex, as you saw.

So, you know, well, just make the door stronger, but that really affects the structural integrity of the cockpit when you have a decompression type of event.

I think the FAA certification folks just

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did a marvelous job figuring out how to get those doors hardened in a way that wouldn't significantly impact the safety.

MR. : You're talking post-9/11?

MR. BELGER: Post-9/11, yeah. It did have a negative impact on safety. I mean, we sacrificed safety in order to harden those doors.

MR. : Tell us a little bit about that.

MR. BELGER: Well, there was a certain extent of--you increase--by hardening the doors, you increase the risk of a catastrophic failure in the cockpit in some type of decompression.

Now, that was mitigated a lot by the work they did, but there was still some higher risk. But the FAA said, it's worth that risk in order to get the doors to harden quickly. And then we'll go back and kind of refigure the more complex certification to further mitigate that risk.

MR. : And that's the work that's ongoing now?

MR. BELGER: It's ongoing now, right,

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right. All future aircraft are going to have the built-in risk mitigation, whatever it turns out to be.

MR. : As person who's been in this business a long time, do you think was a right trade-off?

MR. BELGER: Oh, absolutely, yeah.

MR. : Post-September 11?

MR. BELGER: Yeah. Prior to September 11, I don't think you would have gotten any safety person to have made that trade-off.

MR. : Can I ask one last thing?
This will be my last--

MR. BELGER: But you see, this is really interesting, because the FAA is about safety, security, and efficiency trade-offs. There are trade-offs, you know, you can have 100 percent security, but you'll keep all the airplanes on the ground, you know, that's a ridiculous figure. You can have 100 percent safety, but you'll keep them on the ground.

So, there's--with every decision, there's

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a risk involved.

MR. : Let me turn in to the last pre-9/11 question I have. Which is safety versus security. I don't know whether you've had a chance to look at a 2002 report that the National Academy of Sciences or the National Research Council did for the National Academy of Sciences. Which has a section on transportation security and has a treatment of aviation security within it.

One of their findings was, they said it was striking to them that within the FAA, there was a tremendous dichotomy between how safety, which they classified as being handled by a unified system, clearly directed by one agency, the FAA, with an outstanding track record, as they classed it.

They contrasted that with security, which was handled in a shared way with a lot of entities involved and with kind of blurred lines of responsibility and, which, in their time, had a less outstanding performance.

We've had some people tell us that while

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safety was engineered into the FAA's work from the very start and was one of the main reasons it was created or even it's predecessors were created--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : --that security was kind of late to arrive and was kind of grafted on.

Can you, as someone who was in that system for a long time, could you talk to us about safety versus security in the FAA?

MR. BELGER: Sure, absolutely. So, you're right, I don't. I would not completely agree with their assessment if that's what they said, and here's why. First of all security did come later to the FAA, 1971/72 is actually when the FAA--'71 probably, is when the FAA actually took over responsibility for security.

MR. : Since the wave of hijackings?

MR. BELGER: Right. Cuban hijackings almost every weekend in '70, '71, '72. Actually in 1972, I think it was '72, the first airport and airline security regulations promulgated by the

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FAA.

But during that time period, '72-'75, when there were a lot of domestic hijackings, mostly to Cuba, Congress made a decision, the government made a decision that the FAA should be the lead agency for the management of hijacking incidents. For the reason that the hijacked aircraft was an aircraft in distress. And it was a safety issue.

So, the FAA, because of their safety responsibilities, FAA Administrator, ought to be in control of managing that incident. So there was a direct link between safety and security, even back in those days.

Hijacked aircraft, aircraft in distress, safety problem, FAA has the jurisdiction for safety issues, therefore FAA managed the incident.

MR. : As opposed, for example, the FBI?

MR. BELGER: Right, and there were memorandums of agreement between the FAA and the FBI, going back to the '70s that laid that out very clearly and it was well understood, and it worked

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really well, which, I'm going to go back. I don't think it would work too well today.

But let me--the other point I wanted to make is even in the security world--let me say it a different way. The analogy that the reports--that you say the reports said about the difference between safety and security, I don't think is accurate. Because even on the safety side, FAA's a regulatory agency, but the FAA doesn't build airplanes; the FAA doesn't fly the airplanes; the FAA doesn't train the pilots or the flight attendants. You know, the FAA is a regulatory agency; no different than in the security world.

The FAA set the standards, but the FAA didn't screen the people, the FAA didn't, you know, put up the fences around the airports; the FAA didn't put in the perimeter security or train the screeners. So, I don't think there's fundamentally any difference in the way that safety and security programs were managed or manifested themselves with the industry.

MR. : And I think that one point

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that they were making was that in the safety arena, there is a set mathematical goal, like 10 to the minus-9.

MR. BELGER: It's more precise, yes.

MR. : Somewhat more precise and can you give us your impression of whether it's that type of goal is applicable to security?

MR. BELGER: I don't think it is, somebody smarter than me would have to figure out what the formula was, but we used to sometimes think that the safety inspector's job was easier for that very reason. And it was clear fact and in the security it was more subjective. And in the safety world, you weren't trying to defeat an enemy that was trying to defeat you.

In the safety world you were trying to prevent accidents from mistakenly doing--

MR. : And you were saying physics as opposed to human.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and in the security world, you're trying to work against somebody who's trying to defeat you.

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MR. : How about industry receptivity to safety versus security regulation. Do you see differences there?

MR. BELGER: Oh, I think as a general statement the industry paid more attention to safety regulations than they did security regulations.

I mean, it's almost kind of human nature you go ten years, you don't have an incident. But you're still having safety incidents, --I don't really mean that in a negative way, it's just--

MR. : No.

MR. BELGER: --kind of human nature. But, yeah, I mean, we used to make analogies all the time about the safety guys trying to prevent accidents and the security guys trying to prevent, you know, people from willfully trying to do something bad.

MR. : And one last question and we can go to 9/11, if you're ready. Miles did you have any pre-9/11?

MR. KARA: Is the issue of cockpit keys,

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again, I know that was a flight standards/safety issue. Do you recall a conversation regarding security and what the standards were? We don't want people knowing that our flight attendants have keys and you know one key fits all cockpits. Was there any discussion that those weren't good ideas?

MR. BELGER: Well, yeah, I mean, it's probably not a good idea to have one key fit all doors. But I don't know that anybody who really thought it was a significant enough risk to do anything about it. It's certainly not the best safety or security practice to have a common key for every door. It's not a good practice. I don't think anybody would tell you it is.

MR. : And was that something that most people agreed, you were aware of that--

MR. BELGER: I was aware of it, yeah.

MR. : Do you think Irish and [unintell.] knew that?

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. : But in the end, you just didn't see that as a priority?

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MR. : Monte, then, let's go to 9/11, really what we're most interested in, if you can just give us your narrative of, you know, where you were that day and what happened. And take us through your day and tell us about the significant events and decisions and to the extent you ou can remember, you know, times.

MR. : Do you want to take a break before we start?

MR. BELGER: No, I'm okay, fine. I'll let you know, if I need to.

I was at work that day, just seemed like a typical morning. I was in a meeting I think down in the Air Traffic Organization, if I remember right. And I was walking back to my office. And my assistant was standing in the doorway, Shirley Miller, was standing in the doorway as I was walking up to the office and she said, we had to go to the Ops Center, a plane's just hit the World Trade Center.

So, I immediately went into the Operations Center, which is right across the hall from my

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office.

MR. : This was definitely after the first plane had gone in?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, this was, I walked in and the first thing I saw on the TV screen was the hole in the building.

MR. : Before, in place and time, before or after the second crash?

MR. BELGER: Before, before the second crash. So we were in the Operations Center for a few minutes. I was talking to the folks in the Operations Center trying to figure out who knew what. You know nobody really knew what had happened at that time. The speculation was--the most general speculation was that it was a general aviation aircraft, the pilot had had a stroke or fainted or whatever, or lost direction, or lost control, or whatever. I don't think anybody at that time thought that somebody had deliberately flown in a commercial aircraft into the World Trade Center.

MR. : Did Shirley say anything

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to you that ATC had picked up on strange threatening transmissions from aircraft or did remember anything before you went to the--

MR. BELGER: Not before we went in there, no.

MR. : And when you got there was that something that was immediately told to you?

MR. BELGER: After a few minutes, yeah, after a few minutes of talking to the air traffic folks. Yeah, we learned that they had had some concerns about that was American 11, was that--

MR. : The first, yes.

MR. BELGER: --that they--air traffic had had some concerns about that flight. But that was several minutes after I had been in the Operations Center.

MR. : But before the second?

MR. BELGER: I don't know. I honestly don't know, the second one was not too far behind the first. I was in-between the Operations Center and my office which was right across the hall. I was on the phone a couple of times with--called

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over to the Department to get Jane and she was actually, I think, already on her way.

Might have had a couple of discussion with people over in the Secretary's Office. I was actually in my office on the phone with John Flaherty from the Secretary's Office when the second plane hit the World Trade Center.

MR. : And do you remember your conversation with John, what you all were saying?

MR. BELGER: Well, we were talking and John actually, he must have been looking at a TV screen, because he said, a second plane just hit the World Trade Center.

MR. : You didn't see it on the second--I didn't see anything, really, until the next morning. I had no visual conception at all of what happened until the next morning.

MR. : So he told you, but prior to that, do you remember what you all were just trying to figure out what was going on or did you have any information you were sharing/

MR. BELGER: We were trying to figure out,

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you know, what that--who that airplane was.

MR. : Did he have any information?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : So he was really trying to get it from you?

MR. BELGER: He was trying to get it from us, yeah.

MR. : For the Secretary or--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. : So then he told you that second plane had hit?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And then what happened?

MR. BELGER: I think I went back into the Operations Center. So, the second plane hit at what time, 9:00

MR. : 9:02/9:03.

MR. BELGER: As you might expect, it was somewhat chaotic, but organized chaos, I think, at least in our Operations Center.

MR. : Who was running the show

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there?

MR. BELGER: I think probably I was. Yeah, we have people in there 24 hours a day and the security and air traffic people were available there to work in the Operations Center.

You know, the Boston Center, the New York Center, started to make decisions about that time to impose ground stops. Ground stops meaning nobody takes off within their airspace. All terrifically good decisions, I mean, I can't--I wouldn't second-guess a single decision that anybody at our field facilities made that day. They were all kind of instinctive, smart reactive decisions and I think they made in a scenario that had never been practiced before. Never even been thought of probably by most people, but it was certainly never practiced.

MR. : Miles knows this stuff cold, so forgive us--

MR. BELGER: Oh, no--

MR. : But as far as their authority to do that, was that something that they

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knew they had the authority to do, they knew they didn't, but they knew it needed to be done or what?

MR. BELGER: That's an interesting question, I am, frankly, I'm glad they didn't follow some of the guidelines and rules that were in place. I think it's great that some of those supervisors picked up the phone and called NORAD directly. I think it's terrific. Now, they do have the authority to issue ground stops, they always, the individual controller even has that authority. If there's a safety issue in his or her area. So the Center Manager or the Tower Manager, they have the authority to issue ground stops and they did it wisely, I think, in those situations. Or the Command Center has the authority to issue ground stops, obviously.

I think, actually, some supervisors picked up the phone and called NORAD around that time frame directly, which is, you know, their own initiative, their own smart, quick thinking and thank God they did.

MR. : And one of the things

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we're very interested in is the establishment of phone nets and how that happened, and, really, the opening up of centers. As we go along. So, take us down from Flaherty.

MR. BELGER: Even before the Flaherty call, when I was in the Ops Center, when I first went into the Operations Center, they were in the process of setting up a net. Which would have included all the air traffic folks in the Eastern region; air traffic folks in the headquarters; actually, they would have been setting up, probably an easier way to say it, they would have been setting up the normal security net.

Which would have included all the people that would generally be in on a security incident.

MR. : And our understanding is that there was a primary net and a tactical net--

MR. BELGER: That's true.

MR. : --and I'm still not sure what the difference is and who was supposed to be on which.

MR. : Good question, if you can

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lay that out for us.

MR. BELGER: Okay, well, let me get to that in just a second.

MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: I don't know if I can tell you who exactly was on the tactical net, but there's the strategy has always been, there's a primary net on which you have all the principal players. FAA, DOD, FBI, the FAA facilities, and that's kind of an open net to talk strategically about what's going on.

And then, there's a lower level tactical net where you don't have the lead persons on, but it's a more, you know, Joe, I need you to go do this or Jane I need you to go get this information from the screen pointer or, you know, John go check LaGuardia Tower and see--

MR. : Would it be cross-agencies, too, the tactical net or is that primarily FAA only?

MR. BELGER: That's a good question, I don't know.

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MR. : Okay.

MR. BELGER: It could have been either.

MR. : Could you check that out with, we've had some--on those who should have been on and anything to find out who actually was on, that would be helpful to us.

MR. : And Miles in the FAA deliverables, did we ever get anything in writing, you know, the checklist for here's who you put on the primary net, here's who you put on the tactical net?

MR. : I think we have a checklist, but I'm not sure we know the date of that and I don't have the details in front of me right now.

MR. BELGER: The Operations Center should have a checklist of who, you know, who they called, what time they were called and whether or not they were on the net.

MR. : Well, for example, we had one high-level FAA person who was in the Ops Center, said that it was his expectation that the

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National Military Command--

MR. BELGER: NMCC--

MR. : --NMCC--

MR. BELGER: --well, they should have been on it.

MR. : --should have been on the net and he later--

MR. : On the primary net.

MR. : On the primary net, and he later discovered they weren't on and he was not aware of when that discovery was made--

MR. BELGER: I didn't know that, I mean, they should have been on, they're on the checklist, I 'm sure.

MR. : You're not a ware of a discovery that they were not on--

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : --or an attempt to bring that up.

MR. BELGER: No, that's the first I'd heard that.

MR. : [unintell.] tell us as

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much as you can about the phone conversations and coordinations. You got off the phone with Flaherty?

MR. BELGER: That was after the United flight had hit the World Trade Center, which was what, 9:02, 03, something like that. So, I was on the phone with him. So, that's--then the focus, then was on, you know what are we doing in the system, what decisions are being made by the regions and everything that was told to me, I absolutely agreed with and endorsed. Around 9:20 or so, if my recollection is right. We were talking in the Command Center about a national ground stop. Ground stop meaning nobody takes off and we made the decision, got it collaboratively that there should be a national ground stop.

I think, in retrospect the folks in the operation of the Command Center out in Herndon were making that same decision. Stop at the same time, which I think was great. I don't remember the exact time, but it was around 9:20 or so, is that right? National ground stop decision?

MR. : And who had the authority

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to make that decision, both or one or the other?

MR. BELGER: It could have been--the authority, in my opinion, the Command Center in Herndon had the authority to do that. Obviously, the Administrator or I had that authority.

MR. : Would the Secretary have had that authority?

MR. BELGER: Oh, sure, sure, sure.

MR. : But Herndon was not acting beyond it's authority by ordering that ground stoppage?

MR. BELGER: No, not in my opinion, absolutely not. And even if they weren't, so what.

MR. : In anybody's opinion that you've heard was [unintell.] they had no authority to do that.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I had heard that some folks in air traffic were questioning the Command Center's authority to do that.

MR. : Air traffic that were in the--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, but in my opinion they

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had the authority. They do it on a routine, never a national ground stop, but they do it on a routine basis for localized ground stops in weather situations or back during the summer of 2000 we had all those congestion problems. So, they do that.

MR. : So, 9:20, talking about the ground stop.

MR. BELGER: Right. I think during that time period, it was, you know, trying to figure out which aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. We were starting to get a lot of reports about other aircraft that were not accounted for.

MR. : At this point had you had any conversations with the carriers?

MR. BELGER: I don't think I had at this point. I think the Administrator might have.

MR. : And they're not part of the primary net or the tactical net?

MR. BELGER: Not at that time because we didn't know who the carriers were. Now, eventually, American and United were brought in and I'm not sure just at what time they were brought

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in.

MR. : Into the primary net?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : Well, this took place, was it just before 77 hit the Pentagon that the carriers came in?

MR. BELGER: I don't know, I honestly don't know. It would have been whenever we were certain it was the United and/or American flights.

MR. : And are you pretty sure that the Administrator had been in touch with the air carriers in this relatively early time frame?

MR. BELGER: I think so. I think she was probably talking with American and United.

MR. : Miles do we know whether the primary and tactical nets were recorded or not.

MR. : We ought to pose the question, we have heard that they were not, but I would simply pose the question to you?

MR. BELGER: I don't know. I don't know.

MR. : No one has told us they weren't.

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MR. : One thought on that,
Miles, forgive me.

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. : If there were all these
other agencies, maybe the FAA didn't, but maybe
some of these other agencies like the FBI, they
have a recording?

MR. : We have one side of some
of the conversations from the positions at the
Command Center, but that's on the tactical net.

MR. : Yeah, that deliverable, I
think that's essential we get who the understanding
was who's on that checklist so we can query each of
those agencies to see whether they have.

MR. BELGER: Well, you ought to be able to
get that directly from the FAA Operations Center.

MR. : Yeah, I've got a crisis
management notification list, but I'm not sure if
that contains.

MR. : I tell you what the best
person to get that information from is Dave
Canoles. Dave Canoles is the head of the FAA's

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Operations Center.

MR. : We met with him.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, Canoles. He would be the best one to get that information from. There were--during this time period, there were very confusing reports about--

MR. : This is still around 9:45?

MR. BELGER: This is before 9:45, yeah, between 9:20 and 9:45, in that time frame. There were a lot of confusing reports coming in about aircraft that were unaccounted for. At one time, we actually got a report--and to this day I don't know where it came from--that an aircraft had crashed on the--I think it was the Ohio/Indiana border or--

MR. : Ashland--could it be Ashland, Kentucky?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, Indiana/Kentucky border, I forget. And there was speculation that that was American 77 that had crashed.

MR. : So, by this

MR. BELGER: After air traffic having lost

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contact with that aircraft.

MR. : So you became aware at this point of 77 being a problem flight or before perhaps?

MR. BELGER: I think it was in that time frame, yes, if I remember right, yeah. And at that time, we actually, you know, air traffic had lost contact. Excuse me--lost contact with the aircraft. We got this report of the crash, speculation that that was American 77. At this time frame, I'm quite sure that both the Administrator and I were talking to American and United during this time frame.

And, quite frankly, they weren't sure.

MR. : Do you remember who you talked to?

MR. BELGER: I talked to Bob Baker a couple of times. I think I talked to Russ Chew a couple of times.

MR. : Was he at American or was he out in the field do you remember?

MR. BELGER: Russ?

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MR. : Yeah, was he at the American Office?

MR. BELGER: I don't know where he was. Bob Baker, I think, was in Dallas.

MR. : Was Russ giving you any information or was he?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember, exactly, I remember getting more specific information from Bob Baker. And I think Jane talked to Don Cardy [ph] who's the American President. And she talked to United.

MR. : Did you talk to anyone at United?

MR. BELGER: I think I did, I'm pretty sure I did, I don't remember exactly who it was.

MR. : Okay. And in the same time frame.

MR. : Monte, so when you are getting all these reports coming in of other flights that we don't know and, obviously the whole ground stop was being discussed--

MR. BELGER: Right.

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MR. : Was there any discussion in the Operations Center that, hey, there's a lot going on out there, we can't keep everything safe, we're shutting down the system because of it.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : We ought to get communications to the cockpits saying, telling people what's going on, telling them to secure their cockpits, was that discussion had at all?

MR. BELGER: Was there a discussion about security in the cockpit?

MR. : Yeah, of notifying aircraft?

MR. BELGER: I mean, not that I was aware of.

MR. : What were you, I mean, you seem to be nodding that there was some discussion of some kind of communication?

MR. BELGER: Well, we were talking actually, the ground stop, the national ground stop, obviously, I think that was in the 9:20-something time frame. We started talked

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about, jeeze, you know, do we need to shut the whole system down? We were having those discussions.

MR. : While they were still landing planes that were in the air?

MR. : Yeah, definitely, it was not something that we weren't thinking about.

MR. : Can just ask this?

MR. : What were the range of people in agencies that you were personally talking to?

MR. BELGER: This would have been just within the FAA.

MR. : Just within, you were not talking with external agencies?

MR. BELGER: No, I was not, no not--

MR. : Jane was talking to the two airlines and you may have talked to--

MR. BELGER: I was talking to the airlines, too, I was running back and forth between the Ops Center and my office, I was answering the phone every couple of minutes from somebody over in

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the Department of Transportation trying to figure out what was going on.

MR. : You, personally, weren't talking to the NMCC or to--

MR. BELGER: No, I didn't--I didn't participate on the Net at all--

MR. : On the primary net.

MR. BELGER: On the primary net, on either net.

MR. : And who is the first among equals on the primary net within the FAA?

MR. BELGER: I guess, was it Ross Hamory, was he, it would have been whoever was the senior security person. I think it was Ross Hamory if my recollection is right.

MR. : Not Lee Longmire?

MR. BELGER: It could have been Lee, it could have been early on, Lee and then Ross replaced him.

MR. : It--

MR. BELGER: It would have been because Ross was--

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MR. : On the primary.

MR. BELGER: It probably would have been Lee Longmire. Because Ross wasn't even in security then.

MR. : So it was your expectation that if Lee or Ross, whoever from security was to be on that that they would be coordinating any military response?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, they did that routinely.

MR. : And Lee never said anything to you, do you remember at the day that NMCC was supposed to be on but wasn't?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : That was never mentioned to you?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : Is that information you would like to have had?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, probably. Would like to have known that. But I have the distinct impression that the military folks were on the net.

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MR. : At some point?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : You don't know--do you know when they were on ?

MR. : No.

MR. BELGER: No. And there are military liaisons out at the Command Center.

MR. : We were told that thought the NMCC was on the check list and everyone presumed that they were on that they weren't and we haven't been able to identify what time they actually came on. When was it your understanding that the military was responding to the crisis in one manner or another and who was coordinating that?

MR. BELGER: I don't think I knew that, you know that NORAD had actually responded, meaning put aircraft in the air. I don't think I knew that until after the Pentagon crash.

MR. : And do you recall any conversations going on with Jane or anybody else about where is the military on this or we need to

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activate the military? Was there the understanding--well, who was the hijack coordinator that day?

MR. BELGER: Well, it would have been the senior security person, if Lee, if he was the one. What section was it that NORAD and DOD were on the Net that they were aware of what was going on. And, you know, after the fact, I learned that NORAD had been notified directly by folks in Boston and New York, you know, in the 9:20-something time frame, I thought.

MR. : And can you describe your thoughts at the time that knowing that they had been called was that NORAD would be coordinating their response with air traffic control system?

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : So this was not something that the Washington Operation Center really had to worry about, the military had been called--

MR. BELGER: I would assume that they would be doing their thing.

MR. : Which was, really, an

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ATC--

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : And at no time in your awareness was the formal established procedure by the books to go through the hijack coordinator and call NORAD or call in NMCC and call NORAD and then ascertain that there were fighters available? None of that happened on that day?

MR. BELGER: Well, now, I'm sure it did, I mean, I can't be sure because I didn't hear it. But I assumed it should have been done on the net, also. But I mean this was so spontaneous, that I think NORAD was notified by our field facilities before they were notified by our Washington--

MR. : But you didn't know, you weren't aware that NORAD had been contacted by a field facilities until after the fact?

MR. BELGER: Till after the fact.

MR. : Did Jane, we'll save that till the end.

MR. : Do you want to, we've gotten to the point where we're up to about the

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crash of [unintell.] at the Pentagon. You want to take us through that period up till the crash of 93?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay. So, I don't remember exactly how I knew that--I don't remember exactly who told me that a plane had crashed in the Pentagon, but I was told obviously that.

A few minutes later, both Jane and I were on the phone with the Secretary. Shortly after the American 77 crash. And it was during that conversation that the Secretary said, that we should bring everything down. That was around approximately 9:40 or 9:45. And, of course, we immediately implemented that.

And I think we put the order out around 9:45, 9:46, to bring all the aircraft down, and then our attention turned to monitoring the system, monitoring what was happening in the system until about 12:15 or so, if I remember right, when we actually got the word that all the commercial and private aircraft were out of the system.

MR. : I think everything had

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been grounded by 12:15.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think it was 12:15 or so, that we actually got that word.

MR. : Now at some point in there did you learn of the crash of the fourth aircraft?

MR. BELGER: I was told of the crash, the United Flight shortly after it crashed. I don't actually recall doing anything to monitor that particular flight. I'm sure other people were.

MR. : At that point you recall knowing that it was 77 into the Pentagon--

MR. BELGER: Absolutely not, that was the most confusing part for me. I remember talking to both American and United shortly after the discussion with the Secretary. They didn't know which aircraft; they weren't sure which aircraft had hit the World Trade Center nor the Pentagon. United actually thought that both of their aircraft had hit the World Trade Center.

MR. : American or United?

MR. BELGER: My recollection, it was United, but--but the point is neither one of them

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knew which of the four aircraft had crashed where.

MR. : Do you recall who you were talking to at the airlines?

MR. BELGER: My conversations, at that time would have been with Bob Baker at American and I don't remember who the guy--

MR. : But someone at United.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, it would have been someone in their office organization.

MR. : Would you know the name if we said it?

MR. BELGER: It could--well, I mean, I know the ops folks, there was Pete McDonald [ph], there was a Andy Studdard--Stoddard--I just don't remember which one, I probably talked to both of them that day.

MR. : In your conversations with the air carriers, were they giving you helpful information or were they seeking information from you?

MR. BELGER: They were looking for information, they--

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MR. : Can you remember any piece of information that the air carriers gave you that was useful, interesting, accurate, reports from flight attendants on-board the aircraft, did Mr. Baker convey that to you at some point?

MR. BELGER: It seems like he did, recounts what was told to him, you know, about one of the flight attendant calls. One of the most frustrating things about was getting this time frame and we could not get confirmation. Or it seems like it took too long for us to get confirmation, that it was an American aircraft that had hit the Pentagon.

And I remember saying why can't somebody just go look at the goddam [unintell.] you know. It just seemed like it took too long to actually be sure that it was an American aircraft.

OFF MICROPHONE: [unintell.]

MR. : Okay, next item--the next thing we'd like to ask you is your awareness of the hijackers weapons and tactics.

First on that day, what did you learn on

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September 11?

MR. BELGER: The only think that I think that I was told on September 11, which I think was the result of the telephone--cellphone calls was that they had box cutters and that they stormed the cockpit.

MR. : And that was the result of information that you got from Mr. Baker, do you think?

MR. BELGER: And news reports, I mean it was all over the news. I think primarily the source of the news stories were the cellphone calls.

MR. : And nothing about knives mainly box-cutters?

MR. BELGER: I don't remember anything about knives, it was box-cutters four or five hijackers storming the cockpit.

MR. : Are you aware of [unintell.] but of an Executive Summary that was prepared, these two, this one comes first but this is essentially the same and this one's much easier

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to read. Did you see these Executive Summaries that day. Even though the second one is dated September 12, if you look at the bottom there's a time line.

MR. BELGER: Yeah. No, I didn't know anything about this.

MR. : So you did not see that Executive Summary?

MR. BELGER: No, I was up to my eyeballs--

MR. : On 9/11?

MR. BELGER: --on 9/11. I don't think I read or looked at anything for several days after 9/11.

MR. : And did you ever hear during the day about guns or any other weapons?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : Never heard a word?

MR. BELGER: No, not till several days later when I heard about this report that there might have been that American might have said that there was a gun. But I had no knowledge of that till a couple days later.

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MR. : Do you recall any discussions?

MR. BELGER: There was some discussion that the United 93 hijackers had said over the air traffic net that they had a bomb, I think.

MR. : Monte, this is, really, a very important point.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : I hope you can search your memory, the box-cutter issue, I mean, are you certain that came from media reports or do you remember hearing that from Baker or the United people?

MR. BELGER: I don't--I don't remember where I heard that. I mean it just seemed like it was all over the news. What I remember is it being all over the news. I don't remember if somebody told me that before. I just remember it being--that's what everybody was talking about. And I still don't know--I don't know what kind of weapons they had.

MR. : Did you ever have--did FAA

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ever have you write a statement about everything that happened that day from your perspective?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : If you'll turn to the point about the ground stop. And I want to quote again, if I can find it, from your testimony just after the event. This is, again, when we did our 9/25, so two week after when you were testifying in the Senate Government Affairs Committee. quote, "It is very possible that these items, meaning the hijacker weapons, did not go through the screening checkpoint. I think there was a newspaper report that after they did a thorough overhaul of one of the canceled flights, I found one of these box-cutters or paper-cutters in one of the seat cushions of the planes and there is no telling whether a passenger brought it on-board or it was planted, at this point."

Can you talk for a minute on your, on this particular subject?

MR. BELGER: Yeah. There was a lot of speculation, early on, that their weapons, whatever

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they might have been were planted on the aircraft.

MR. : And this speculation would have been taking place when, before the four crash or after?

MR. BELGER: No, this would have been later in the day on the 11th or 12th or 13th.

MR. : Now, let me ask you on that point, either at the time or do you think that was based on information or more wishful thinking?

MR. BELGER: No, it wasn't based on information.

MR. : Do you think it was wishful thinking?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, it was based on, I think, our security folks, maybe wishful thinking. The security folks probably thinking that there's no way in hell that they could get, you know, that many weapons through four screening points simultaneously. An then there were these types of reports where things were found after the fact, you know, under seat cushions. So, I would say it was speculation.

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MR. : Okay, this was two weeks later.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : So, that's still going on. All right, with that--

MR. BELGER: But I don't think there was ever any--to close the loop on that.

MR. : Yeah, please.

MR. BELGER: I don't think there was ever any evidence--none that I was aware of, that said that the weapons, whatever they had were planted, whether there was some inside, if that helps.

MR. : Okay, we go back to when the decision to bring all the planes down was made. Can you talk to us about the discussions that you were involved in about what to do once the planes landed? With respect to coordination with the FBI or local law enforcement?

MR. BELGER: Well, so, once the decision was made to bring everybody down, which was unprecedented, never had been done before, so there was not standard operating procedure--

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MR. : Right.

MR. BELGER: --we were making it up as we went along. We then turned our attention to trying to coordinate with the airlines where their aircraft were. There were hundreds of aircraft diverted to Canada. I had numerous conversations, starting around noon or so that day with the NAFCANADA people and with the Canadian government people, you know, what in the world are we going to do with these hundreds of aircraft that had been diverted to Canada? They had no idea what to do with the people.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: They didn't know how to handle it from the Customs standpoint. They didn't know whether to leave them on the airplanes or take them off the airplanes or what to do with them. I don't know if--did you ever see a picture of, I think, it was Halifax airport?

MR. : There were several of them.

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

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MR. BELGER: So that was a big part of what I was doing that afternoon. And trying to--that, and trying to figure out what decisions did we have to make in order to restart the operation. What needed to be done at the airports? What did the carriers need to do? What process did we need to go through to start operations back up?

MR. : On that day, on the 11th, was there any discussion about, and given this uncertainty in the reports of other possible plots; any discussion that you're aware of that maybe we should try to screen the passengers coming off these planes to see if we got any other bad guys?

MR. : Or check the manifests to see if there were some more five-member, middle-eastern teams?

MR. BELGER: I don't think there was, at the time. It would have been--let me put it this way, I don't think that I was a part of any discussions about that.

MR. : Are you aware of any such discussions later?

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MR. BELGER: No, well, later, I mean,
sure--

MR. : Or did you become aware
later of any discussions on that day on this point?

MR. BELGER: No, no.

MR. : FAA had said--a couple
people we talked to had said with regard to
notifying aircraft in the air that there were
problems and to do X, Y, or Z and, you know, once on
the ground, to do certain things that there was a
concern that--the worry about panic overrode the
need to do that? Was that--

MR. BELGER: I think that's a--I'm sure
that was a concern. Yeah, I mean, in the position
of the pilots or the flight attendants, what did
they tell the passengers, you know, so that you
don't have panic?

My focus was just on making sure we got
all those aircraft on the ground safely.

MR. : Were you worried about
panicking pilots, at all. In other words this
absence of saying here's what's happening do

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anything to protect your cockpit because we don't know who else is out there that that's not really done in any coordinated fashion, either by the FAA, it was kind of ad hoc with the air carriers. Was there a concern that pilots would be panicking?

MR. BELGER: Yea, I wasn't personally concerned about pilot or controller panic. I just didn't think about that. I just, I mean they were--I never thought that they wouldn't perform superbly.

MR. : And, again, please receive this in thinking of the retrospect--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I am.

MR. : If you look back, are you curious, does it seem like a gap that an order didn't go out to notify all aircraft of what was happening? Did some people look back and say, why the heck didn't that--wasn't that done?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, probably, I mean, in retrospect, it could have been done maybe more precisely. I mean I gotta think that the airlines put the word out through their communication. I'm

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not--I don't know exactly what messages the controllers told the pilots; I don't know exactly what the company dispatchers told the pilots. But, yeah, probably in retrospect, I mean, it certainly wouldn't have been a bad thing to do.

MR. : Because one of the--Command Center, they said, well, they had told the ATA representative and the expectation was that the air carriers would do that.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, again, you know, there was no SOP for what to do.

MR. : Miles, what else do you have?

MR. KARA: I've got a little bit of a potpourri of questions.

MR. : Were you ever interviewed by the FBI?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : Do you know anybody from the Operations Center that was interviewed by the FBI?

MR. BELGER: No.

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MR. : And the FAA never had you sit down and/or everybody in the Operations Center and say, you know, give us your best narrative of what happened with you that day?

MR. BELGER: We did that informally. And in retrospect, that's probably something that we could have done more formally. But, no, the answer's, no.

MR. KARA: Sketch out for me for a moment the hubs of activity, if you will, on FAA and DOT? How many hubs of activity were there and where were they located?

MR. : On 9/11.

MR. KARA: On 9/11, after the Ops Center. You go to the Ops Center and that's where you worked out of? Were there other hubs of activity?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah, I would say there were probably, just let me think a minute. I'd say there were probably, maybe four in the headquarters in the building.

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. BELGER: I'd say my office and the

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Administrator's offices are joined, so there's one hub of activity.

MR. KARA: Admin--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, the Ops Center, obviously.

MR. KARA: Ops Center, okay.

MR. BELGER: Air Traffic had their own communication hub set up down in their facilities where they were talking to the facilities, talking to the field people constantly--

MR. KARA: Localewise in the building, where was the--

MR. BELGER: On the tenth floor. Oh, the Ops Center?

MR. KARA: The Ops Center was on the--

MR. BELGER: On the tenth floor.

MR. : All of these are on the tenth floor, right?

MR. BELGER: The Air Traffic would be on the tenth floor.

MR. KARA: As well?

MR. BELGER: Down in the Associate

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Administrator's complex. And then the security folks would have a--they have kind of a core operation going down in their offices, which, I think is on the third floor.

MR. KARA: Third floor?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. KARA: How about over in DOT, was there a similar?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I don't know what they were doing in DOT to be honest with you. They were, I don't know.

MR. KARA: And then Herndon, was up, outside the Command Center.

MR. BELGER: Yeah, outside the headquarters building, Herndon would have been the next.

MR. KARA: And the primary contact with Herndon would have been the ATC or the Ops Center or both?

MR. BELGER: It would have been through Air Traffic.

MR. KARA: Air traffic out to

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MR. BELGER: It would have been both, but primarily Air Traffic.

MR. : Miles backtrack on that one. There was actually five that I want to make sure--

MR. KARA: Okay.

MR. : --and see if you agree, then we put our arms around them. The Operations Center; the Administrator's Office; ATC office on the tenth floor; the ACS working room on the third floor--

MR. BELGER: Yes.

MR. : --and then the ACI Watch. Would you agree the ACI Watch a lot was happening there?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, okay, but I put them in the Operations Center because that's where it physically was, it was in a room, yeah, it was a separate hub, yeah, which would be focused on intel stuff, yeah.

MR. : So, five.

MR. BELGER: They were physically in the

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Operations Centers

MR. : On the tenth floor?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I'll agree with that.

MR. : And if anyone was in contact with NORAD or the military, it would have been through?

MR. BELGER: Air Traffic.

MR. : Air Traffic.

MR. BELGER: Or the Ops Center--

MR. : Or the Ops Center.

MR. BELGER: --or the Command Center, out in Herndon.

MR. : And the primary net and the technical net were both in the Ops Center.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Now, was there a separate [unintell.] net and a separate security net that worked on that day?

MR. BELGER: My, I think the answer is yes. I think Air Traffic had their communication lines open and as did security.

MR. : Within the Ops Center was

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there a method used to record information [unintell.] simply putting butcher paper on the wall?

MR. BELGER: You mean on the particular flights?

MR. : Well, let's say, just trying to figure out what flights or which flight and the details of each flight was that kind of--

MR. BELGER: There is all the, well, I'll say it's been remodeled now.

MR. : On 9/11?

MR. BELGER: Yeah there was a board, a chalkboard to write on.

MR. : But in terms of an easel with butcher paper--

MR. BELGER: I think it was a chalkboard, if I remember correctly.

MR. : Who would have been the primary person recording information--

MR. BELGER: Whoever was there and the leader told them to write it down.

MR. : And I'm jumping around a

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little--on 9/11, prior to 9/11, FAA's ability to have complete radar coverage in the central United States, particularly over, let's say, over the mountains to our immediate West.

MR. BELGER: Right.

MR. : Can you speak to that issue at all?

MR. BELGER: Well, there are certain areas in the West and certain low-altitude areas [unintell.] but we didn't have primary radar coverage. That's why transponders were used for aircraft position locations.

MR. : Because of the altitude and because you didn't have a primary.

MR. BELGER: Didn't have primary returns in.

MR. : Did that vector, were you aware would that affect a plane at all with in particular with American Air 77 that day?

MR. BELGER: After the fact, yeah.

MR. : After the fact.

MR. BELGER: When we went back and

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reconstructed what happened, yeah. But the transponder was turned off. And the aircraft turned back East.

MR. : And it was lost.

MR. BELGER: And it was lost, there was no primary return for however long it was, and then a primary return was actually picked up, I think, by the Dalles [Dulles?] folks. They weren't sure what it was.

MR. : Was that sort of [unintell.], if you will, on radar coverage known prior--

MR. BELGER: Oh, yeah, yeah, sure, I mean nobody envisioned that, you know, somebody would deliberately turn off your transponder and change course like that.

MR. : And, if you could, speak briefly to other threats. 93 goes down, down that end the treats or are there other issues at play?

MR. BELGER: Well, 93 went down about what time? I'll say it this time, I didn't feel comfortable that we had everything under control

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until we got a call--Jane and I got a call from the Command Center, that said every aircraft was within 40 miles of landing. Which was basically, they're all under TRACON control.

MR. : They were all under
[unintell.]

MR. BELGER: Yeah, they were all under the TRACON control. So, I didn't feel comfortable until that time that we weren't going to have any other instances.

MR. : Let's go back to 93.

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : Ninety-three crashed at about 10:03 in Pennsylvania.

MR. BELGER: Okay, so until about 12:00 o'clock or so--

MR. : But how about the immediate aftermath, were there other threats to the Washington area in specific that you were managing or that you were aware of ?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't believe so. I think by that time we were pretty comfortable that

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we had--that we knew where all the aircraft were.

MR. : We're two hours, in, would you like to take a break?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, just take five minutes?

MR. : Sure.

[Technical interruption--break on CD--file renews at BELGER-2, same CD.]

MR. : One last question before we take our break is: Obviously for us it would be [unintell.] definitive narrative evidence is the most important and the best important and the best evidence are tapes. And just to make sure that we have everything. In each of these five hubs, who would be the person that you think--not necessarily responsible for determining who would know whether the phones were recorded?

MR. BELGER: All right.

MR. : In first in Washington Operations Center?

MR. BELGER: Dave Canoles.

MR. : Dave Canoles.

MR. BELGER: It's C-a-n-o-l-e-s.

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MR. : And how about the Administrator's offices?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think I would know that they weren't recorded, they weren't, as far as I know the phones were not recorded.

MR. : The ATC?

MR. BELGER: Either Bill Peacock or Jeff Griffith. Bill Peacock was the head of Air Traffic and Jeff was his deputy.

MR. : And the working room in the ACS?

MR. BELGER: Lee Longmire or--he'd probably be the best.

MR. : And then Claudio Fabraci [ph]?

MR. BELGER: Fabraci, intel, yeah.

MR. : So, if we asked each of those individuals, whether the phones that day were recorded, we would get a definitive accurate answer as far as you know.

MR. BELGER: They should know.

MR. : You knew that the Admin

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was not recorded?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, my phones and Jane's phones, unless somebody was doing it without out knowledge, were not recorded.

MR. : Well, we'll take a break, right.

[BREAK.]

MR. : Okay, we're going to resume the interview, it's 11:00 o'clock. We'll just have a few more questions and then maybe get into the recommendation stage.

We're trying to figure out, as far as telling the story of what happened, the narrative of it, was the roles of leadership and what they were doing that day. And we're having a hard time kind of figuring our Jane's activities on 9/11. You know, we might be venturing into a sensitive area here. I'm just curious, could you share with us your impressions.

I mean, from what we've heard just lay it on the table, that you were running the show. That you were the person, at least that's how people

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inside and outside the building perceived that you were the go-to person. And I guess if you could just describe how that arrived? Was that something that was expected or just evolved and kind of what was your responsibility vis-a-vis what Jane was doing?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think it just evolved that way, would be my answer. I mean, Jane, when this--when it first occurred, she was over in the Secretary's Office. She immediately came back. I think she and I were together all day. the only time we were probably not together would be when she was in her office, you know, on the phone. And at one point she went downstairs to the lobby to try to, you know, just console folks who were leaving the building.

MR. : Let me ask you--

MR. BELGER: Just to offer some moral encouragement.

MR. : Did that concern you all in that you've got this active emergency that's trying to be managed that, you know, that was,

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obviously a very compassionate thing to do, but was that the proper thing to do?

MR. BELGER: Well, I didn't second-guess that at all. I mean this was later in the afternoon. This was after everything was on the ground. And, you know, we were in that mode of trying to figure out what do we do tomorrow. And I mean people were very, very concerned about their relatives; their neighbors.

I mean, Shirley, who's my assistant, her husband worked at the Pentagon. And you know, she was terrified, until she learned that he was safe. So, he didn't know if our building was going to be targeted or what. So, I think it was a very appropriate thing to do.

Yeah, I don't know, I think she--she was there. She was making decisions along with me. I--

MR. : So, you didn't feel kind of abandoned or--

MR. BELGER: Oh, Lord, no. I mean, it's kind of my nature just to take charge.

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MR. : So, you worked as a team?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I have no second-thoughts or reservations about, you know, what she did that day. No. We were there together.

MR. : Did you ever hear anybody in the building issue second thoughts, or, you know?

MR. BELGER: No.

MR. : There was a general good feeling about the way the leadership handled the situation?

MR. BELGER: Well, let me just say, I never heard anything negative. But I, you know, I had been through some of those things before. And I think we did a pretty good job of keeping the Ops Center and the headquarters under control and, you know, we called all of the senior managers together in my office, sometime late in the morning. And activated our remote relocation site.

Got the people knowledgeable about what they were supposed to do. And you know, just got

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sensitized to what--this was going to be a three-or-four-day exercise and don't plan to go home for a while and, Jane spent a lot of time; not a lot of time, she spent more time than I did talking to United and American and the airlines, but that was appropriate, I think.

MR. : Were you all in touch with members of Congress, do you recall that?

MR. BELGER: I wasn't. That was the last thing on my list. That's a joke, that's a joke, it's a joke.

MR. : That's all right, we understand.

MR. BELGER: We both worked on the hill we understand that and his laughing was--our congressional liaison folks, I'm sure were on the phone with them all day.

MR. : Can I ask you about after-action reports?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : We talked to a bunch of folks at FAA who talked about that. What

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are--first of all, are you aware of an after-action report, as such, being undertaken in FAA?

MR. BELGER: Not a formal consolidated after-action report. That's one of the things, in retrospect, that we probably could have done better. But I tell you, my, at least my thought process--

MR. : Yeah, please.

MR. BELGER: --during that time. In retrospect that's maybe something we could have done better. Now, having said that, though, there were hourly discussions with Air Traffic, particularly about what processes did we need to put in place, you know, to improve the communications between us and DOD. What did we need to do to get DOD people in our facilities actually, which we did. What did we need to do to improve and streamline the communication from the field to NORAD.

And we changed some of those procedures, I think within days.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

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MR. BELGER: And made it a lot more flexible and appropriate for the field facilities to directly call the NORAD folks without going through the region with headquarters.

So, we implemented those kinds of things kind of quickly, I think.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: So, we were going through a self-assessment and self-critique daily and changing things. What i can't show you is a consolidated, you know, after-action report. But we knew. Here's how my thought processes--

MR. : Yeah.

MR. BELGER: We knew that the FBI was investigating everything, starting from that day. And our instructions were to our people, you know, give the FBI everything. So, there was some thought that we didn't want to be in doing our own review at the same time the FBI was in our facilities doing their review and gathering all their information.

Then, sometime after 9/11, I don't

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remember when, the other Commission started doing their review. So, we figured everything in connection--

MR. : The Joint Intelligence?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, right the Congressional--so we figured, you know, everything's going to come out.

MR. : Are you aware was time, at least a start was attempted at doing an after-action report? Do you recall any attempts to do that?

MR. BELGER: No. Not in any agencywide, not agencywide-type of report. Now, Air Traffic might have started to do their own, I don't know.

MR. : Did the action on Capitol Hill and with the Administration in terms of reorganization, did that have an impact on your decision on an after-action hearing?

MR. BELGER: I don't follow you, no.

MR. : The establishment of TSA, did that after--

MR. BELGER: Well, no, I don't think so.

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No, I don't think so, no.

MR. : One pre-9/11 question: Do you--were there exercises that the Administrator's Office took part in on emergency response, table-to-type stuff that you recall?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, over the years, not a lot, but there were some over the years. Mostly table-top, mostly, you know, telephonic communication exercises.

MR. : And how often would you say, one a year?

MR. BELGER: Maybe once a year at the most.

MR. : And was that coordinated with ATC and other agencies or was it an internal. How does the FAA headquarters respond?

MR. BELGER: It could have been either of those. Some might have been a security-oriented incident. The Command Center, just, every now and then just did a communication check. Or the Operation Center, not the Command Center. A communications check was to make sure that they

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could communicate with everybody.

MR. : Uh-huh, but do you recall any exercises of a security nature where that was practiced with Herndon or was the exercise mainly inside the building?

MR. BELGER: There were some that were even broader than the FAA. Some security exercises--

MR. : Uh-huh.

MR. BELGER: --that were broader than the FAA in which the Herndon folks might have participated.

MR. : And Mike Weikert would have been the best person, do you think to talk about that, do you know?

MR. BELGER: I don't even know that name, Mike Weikert?

MR. : Yeah, wasn't that the name, they told me that was kind of the exercise person--

MR. BELGER: At the Command Center?

[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. : But did you ever recall any exercises that practices domestic hijacking or--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, yeah.

MR. : Do you remember when--

MR. BELGER: I don't remember exactly. You know, and during the years, also, I mean over the course of time, there were false hijack alerts, in which the system would get tested. The Ops would get activated, the net would get activated. So, it was exercised over the years.

MR. : This was something that John had mentioned earlier and we didn't get around to it, but in helping us, you know, I mean, so much is we're doing this obviously all with the benefit of hindsight. And we did want to give you a chance to kind of give us a time text. And it was like for your insights on, you know, what was the mind set? What were the priorities that you were perceiving from the public? Did you have access to polling data? What was the pressure from Capitol Hill? In the summer and early in--or throughout

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the summer of 2001, what was the context under which you were operating?

MR. BELGER: That's a good question. From the spring of 2000 through the summer of 2001, the focus, the pressure was on capacity, congestion, and delays. I mean, just look at the news stories; the congressional hearings, during the summer of 2000. There were dozens of hearings it seems like. All focused on congestion, delays. Interest from the White House; initiatives that we took for what we called the Spring 2000 Program, I mean it was briefed all the way up to the White House.

MR. : What was that that Spring 2000 Program?

MR. BELGER: It was an initiative we took with the airlines to be more collaborative with the airlines in decisionmaking; to implement some new weather prediction tools. We actually opened up the Command Center for airline employees to come work there. An initiative that would be more collaborative, share more information, hopefully make smarter decisions.

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MR. : In the Command Center, you mean Herndon?

MR. BELGER: Herndon, yeah. So the focus was clearly on capacity.

MR. : And did you guys have any database, because, you know, we've looked at the hearings, we've looked at the headlines and, I mean, that is an important part of the story, you know. Everybody was, this is what people were focusing on.

But from a purely public perspective not Congress's representing with their constituents worry about, did you all have a database or a call where you logged what people called about and what could we get information as far as the percentage of calls that were on these different subjects?

MR. BELGER: the FAA didn't but DOT does. The Consumer--the Consumer Hotline. The DOT tracks delays by carrier and they tack all types of consumer calls, whether it be lost baggage, delayed flights, inappropriate attention by the carriers. There's a database in DOT that would show during

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that time period, there was a significant increase in complaints about delays.

MR. : And did the subject about a Passenger Bill of Rights--

MR. BELGER: Yeah--

MR. : --play into this?

MR. BELGER: --that came up, yeah, yeah. That was the result of all the delays and the way that passengers felt they were being treated by the carriers.

MR. : And, in addition, if someone you know, as people had concerns about security, you know, what do you guys do--that would also, would that presumably be in this database?

MR. BELGER: There would be--if there were complaints about security, they would be in that database, yeah.

MR. : Who would we call about that database?

MR. BELGER: It's the DOT Counsel's Office, I don't know who the person would be. But they actually publish a report every month.

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MR. : Oh, really?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, it's on their Website, actually. They publish a monthly report of airline delays; percentage of flights on time; and then they categorize passenger complaints in a bunch of different categories.

MR. : Is there anything else that you'd like to talk about on the context setting of things that were--any non-security matters the other priorities in FAA--

MR. BELGER: Well, I mean the context would be, Jane and I were focused on delays and congestion. Not a day went by during the summer of 2000 and 2001 that that wasn't our priority fundamentally, unless there was some other crisis.

You know, the domestic security situation seemed to be well in hand. We have a very good security organization with a well-respected, well-known, well-respected in the intelligence community, leader. We had a--

MR. : This was when Admiral Flynn was--

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MR. BELGER: Irish, yeah.

MR. : What about when he was
replace by General Canavan [ph].

MR. BELGER: That didn't work out too
well.

MR. : And not only post-9/11,
but are you saying that with respect to pre-9/11?

MR. BELGER: Well, I don't know, pre-9/11,
he came with a great reputation, also. He wasn't
there too long before 9/11, I forget exactly when
he came?

MR. : March, I think.

MR. : Did you see him as active
in--you didn't see him as active and knowledgeable
as Irish Flynn or how would you compare the two?

MR. BELGER: Well, I don't want to be
critical, but he was as knowledgeable as Admiral
Flynn was, in my opinion. He didn't have the grasp
of the FAA's procedures and policies and
relationships as did Flynn, but he hadn't been
there that long either.

MR. : Do you recall of him, when

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he took over and I think anybody who takes over a job kinds of assesses where things are.

MR. BELGER: Sure.

MR. : Do you recall him coming forward in 2001, saying, hey, you know, I'm the new guy here and I've looked, and I've got real concerns with this, that, or the other thing?

MR. BELGER: No. I don't recall that at all.

MR. : So, in your impression was he comfortable or uncomfortable with--

MR. BELGER: I had to assume that he was comfortable, given the fact that I don't recall that he ever said he wasn't.

MR. : Did you ever get a sense from him what his top priorities were with security, what his agenda was?

MR. BELGER: Well, I think it was the same as all of ours, I mean, I think it would be the same as all of ours, which was, you know, the focus was on international terrorism, bombings, trying to improve the screening system. Clean those 107 and

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108 rules out.

MR. : Do you recall any specific major initiatives that he had in mind?

MR. BELGER: I don't recall, no.

MR. : Before we go to recommendations and keeping with those elements. Is there anything, I mean, you know our mandate, understanding the evolution of the aviation security system, you know seeing what happened on 9/11 and formulating recommendations. Before getting recommendations, is there anything that we should have asked you that we didn't that we need to know to do our job right or that you came prepared to talk about that we didn't cover?

MR. BELGER: Well, that's a good question. No, but I'll certainly call you. But I will tell you your question to me about Jane surprised me. I hadn't anticipated that. That was the only question, you know, that I hadn't quite anticipated.

I might have been the guy that was doing the talking and--but we were a team.

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MR. : And let me just say for you that it's not we have any indications to the contrary. It was more just to capture your response.

MR. BELGER: Okay. We were a team for five years, though.

MR. : Well, with that, I think we'll turn now to the last part, which is to get your recommendations--

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I thought about a couple.

MR. : In many ways, we see that as at least as important as telling the story, if not more important. So, please.

MR. BELGER: Well, I got maybe three recommendations. I could do a lot, but there are three that I think are really kind of critical.

The first I mentioned: My biggest fear today is that there's no-- Let me back up. Prior to 9/11, the FAA and the FBI knew--and the military--knew how to manage hijackings. You know, they'd been doing it since the '70s. There

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was a protocol between the FAA and FBI and the military and it worked.

MR. : And you're talking here about the common strategy?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, the common strategy was a part of that protocol and there were memorandums of agreement between the FAA and the FBI as to who did what when, who was responsible when the aircraft was considered to be in flight; the FBI was responsible when the aircraft was not in flight. And that was very clear and there was no confusion when it came to making the decision as to who had the authority to make that decision.

MR. : Mm-hmm.

MR. BELGER: I don't think that's the case today. I'm worried that, particularly with DOD's new, more active role that when it gets down to a crisis, it's not going to be clear who really has the wherewithal to make which decisions, at which time.

And my biggest recommendation would be that TSA, FAA, and DOD really put together and

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practice some protocols and scenarios and work through these issues of who's going to do what to whom, when?

MR. : Do you have any guidelines as someone experienced in the system of how if you were doing it in FAA, if you were made king, and could write the protocol, how would you do it?l

MR. BELGER: Well, there ought to be, first of all the fundamental premise going back to the '70s that the FAA was in charge of a hijacked aircraft while it was in flight; and that was actually in legislation, that transferred to TSA. But I gotta think today that DOD would question that.

MR. : You think it would be a good thing, though, to retain the primacy of TSA in that position or do you think that's something that just needs to be analyzed?

MR. BELGER: Well, I personally think they should retain it, but I think it needs to be made clear to everybody that that is their role. And even before--after I left the FAA, I helped the

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current Administrator on a couple of things before I went to work with Lockheed. One of the things I recommended to her, which to her credit, she did follow up on, was that there needed to be an exercise between the FAA and TSA. They actually did that over, I think over a day and a half.

MR. : Do you remember when?

MR. BELGER: It would have been November or December

MR. : Of last year, 2003?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and I actually sat in on one afternoon of the exercise, it was a great exercise.

MR. : And this was specifically on hijacking coordination?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, it was a table-top type exercise. And really kind of exposed the TSA folks to what happens.

But I'm just concerned with orders out there now to shoot down aircraft, the DOD, by their nature are going to be very aggressive. I just don't think that roles are real clear or broad

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that's what I think.

MR. : Kind of gets back to be about shooting down [unintell.] prospective drug smuggling. Are you worried in your mind that, you know, the law of unintended consequences could come up here and we end up shooting down something that didn't need to be shot down?

MR. BELGER: Yeah.

MR. : How about other aspects of that, because we were out at Air Traffic Control at Dulles and they were showing us what they do and how certain things they have to be watching for this. Do you ever worry that, again, you mentioned very well, about safety, security, and efficiency, there always has to be a balance that safety in any way could be compromised and a new security paradigm and, if so, specifically where?

MR. BELGER: No, I don't think I'm worried about that. I mean, give me an example of--I don't think I'd be worried about the security procedures--

MR. : Compromising--

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MR. BELGER: --compromising safety. Other than things, like, you know, the cockpit door, which was minima.

MR. : You want to go on, I think you said you had three.

MR. BELGER: Well the other one relates to CAPS. I think some type of capability like CAPS to really further identify who the bad guys are is absolutely needed. Given the fact, I don't think we're ever going to get to 100 percent detection capability. Seems to me you're better off knowing who the people are rather than knowing what they might be carrying. I mean, the most honest, let me put it this way. The good guy carrying a knife is not a threat. The bad guy with his bare hands is a threat.

So, I think, I know there are bit privacy concerns and I'm sensitive to those but some type of capability like that has got to get implemented. So you can have better knowledge of who the pl are, not what they might be carrying.

MR. : From what you know of the

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development of CAPS, do you think they're headed in the right direction?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, I think so, I mean, I don't have any first-hand knowledge, but I think they are, yeah.

MR. : Was there another recommendation?

MR. BELGER: Yeah, and this goes to the intelligence sharing, which starts with having the better capability of knowing who everyone is who enters this country. I mean the fact that these guys were, you know, 19, 20 of them in the country for four or five years planning this is just astounding to me. So I think, you know, I know there are some efforts underway to put some processes in place to better identify people coming into the U.S. particularly from visa states. But that's got to be done and that information's got to get shared with all the intelligence agencies.

And I'm still not sure, today if there's a common database. I don't think there is.

MR. : Maybe you can help us on

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one issue that's come up--

MR. BELGER: Okay.

MR. : --because I know you testified before Congress and then had to respond to a lot of public inquiries on the different aspects of the system. We talked a great deal about this issue of the veil of mystery over security, don't tell the bad guy your weaknesses, over what's important in the democracy of public oversight and things don't get fixed until you call attention and everywhere we turn, whether it's border patrol or FAA, you know, people get in trouble for talking about weaknesses, but then they don't get fixed until they're talked about.

What recommendations do you have for us of balancing the veil of mystery versus the need to know?

MR. BELGER: Well, that's a good question. Maybe it takes somebody, I'm thinking out loud now, maybe it takes somebody other than the owner of that information to make a decision that it's worth the risk to talk about it. In other words, maybe

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it takes somebody outside the FAA to say--

MR. : Or TSA?

MR. BELGER: --or TSA, now, yeah, thanks. Maybe it takes somebody outside of TSA to say, you know, it's okay to talk about the weaknesses in the screening system. Or maybe it takes somebody outside of Customs to tell them, you know, it's okay to talk about some of the border security issues.

I don't know it's going to be hard to get the owners of that data to come forward and talk about it. It's going to be hard.

MR. : And the idea of talking about it in public forum where the IG issues report or GAO. Did ou ever see that as a huge problem, like when the latest IG thing, not only, oh, my God, our system has a problem, let's go to work or was it telling these guys what to do?

MR. BELGER: 99.999 percent of the time the IG never told us anything we didn't already know.

MR. : Yeah. But how about that

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aspect of did you when you saw those reports go public because you had that--

MR. : Do you see that as a vulnerability--

MR. BELGER: Oh, sure, sure.

MR. : That's a tough question.

MR. BELGER: Sure, you would like for people to think and I know this is naive, but you would like for people to think that if they try to carry something through the screening point, it's going to get caught. You don't want people thinking that, well, I've got a 60 percent chance that I can get through. Even if it's true, you want them thinking that they're going to get caught.

MR. : Anything else.

MR. BELGER: I hope that was helpful.

MR. : Oh, very helpful and thank you very much for all of your time.

MR. BELGER: I'm glad to and I'll be glad to follow up with them. And who should, if I have any other thoughts or--

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MR. : Either of us, yeah.

MR. BELGER: I apologize again for my
voice.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c **AND** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On December 29, 2004 (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Center), New England Region (NER), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 35 Fieldstone Drive, Nashua, New Hampshire were interviewed at their place of employment by USDOT/OIG Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c The interview had been arranged through Center management. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview and provided the following information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c has been employed by the FAA for approximately 22 years. He worked initially as an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) and has worked in various Air Traffic staff positions during his career. His current title is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the Center. In September 2001, he was assigned as a (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c in Air Traffic management.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c has been employed by the FAA for approximately 16 years. Prior to the FAA, she worked as a (b)(6), (b)(7)c She has worked in administrative/support positions with the FAA. In (b)(6), (b)(7)c she was employed in her current position.

According to (b)(6), (b)(7)c the Center has a Military Operations Specialist (MOS) position assigned to the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). The MOS position is usually staffed only when the military has notified the FAA in advance of military activity that might impact airspace under the control of the Center. This does not happen with enough frequency such that the MOS position is staffed that often and even when the position is staffed on a certain day, it is usually as a collateral duty.

Both (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were working at the Center on September 11, 2001 (9/11). (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that after the events of that day began to unfold, their primary point of contact was (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the NER Quality Assurance

Prepared by: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c Date Prepared: 1/3/05

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INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AND

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Division. It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c understanding that most of the requests relayed through (b)(6), (b)(7)c came from Dave CANOLES and Tony FERRANTE at AAT-20 in FAA Headquarters. There was some direct contact between the Center and AAT-20, but (b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled that this was via telephone and no record of telephone calls was kept. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicated that most of the tasks they were assigned came via telephone calls as opposed to e-mails.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he prepared a "partial" transcript of Center radio communications with the military that he believed was sent to AAT-20. The cover memorandum that he prepared was dated 9/15/01 and the "partial" refers to the fact that the transcript contains only transmissions that were pertinent to the event, in this case the circumstances surrounding American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11). The memo lists all of the parties involved in the transmissions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c noted and (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed that the MOS position at the Center was not staffed on 9/11. (b)(6), (b)(7)c noted that the transmissions in the partial transcript are transmissions with the military at Cape Cod, Massachusetts from the "severe weather position" in the TMU. The severe weather position requested that the military (Air National Guard) at Cape Cod scramble fighters. This request was made after conversations between the Center and Cape Approach.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that his cover memorandum and the partial transcript were faxed to the NER and he assumed from NER to AAT-20.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he prepared an earlier transcript on the day of the actual occurrence of AA 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175). It was his impression that FAA Headquarters was trying to get an idea of what was said and was coordinating with all of the air traffic control facilities involved. There were no questions about communications with the military for the first few days after 9/11.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c **AND** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The Center had responsibility for preparing the “aircraft accident package” on AA 11 because the initial sector that handled the flight was in the Center’s airspace. All of that material was sent from the Center to (b)(6), (b)(7)c as all of the 9/11 documents have been centralized at the FAA in Washington for FOIA purposes. This package has the transcripts, personnel logs, facility record of operations and weather information, but no radar data. New York Center had responsibility for UAL 175; Washington Center had responsibility for AA 77; and Cleveland Center had UN 93.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that they did all of the radar inputs for 9/11 for AA 11 and UAL 175. They used “radar viewpoint” to produce the radar document and this was provided to AAT-20. This radar information did not track military aircraft. (b)(6), (b)(7)c did the terminal “RAPTOR” work that enabled the playback of radar data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c indicated that the question about the military probably came up around the date of his memo, 9/15/01. Neither (b)(6), (b)(7)c nor (b)(6), (b)(7)c were really thinking about the issue when it came up nor did they know who initiated the request or why.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he built “WAV” (wave) files of the transmissions covered by the 9/15/01 memo and e-mailed the files to (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Based on his review of the file, (b)(6), (b)(7)c believed that (b)(6), (b)(7)c of the FAA in Washington received the memo by fax.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he was aware of the issue where an individual from the FAA indicated that AA 11 was still airborne at 9:24 a.m. on 9/11. The FAA person was (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who was a staff person that talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c and this would be in the accident package.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he probably did a partial transcript of the MOS position. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was shown Attachment 6 to the JRI-2 action lead request that indicates three wave files for the Center (ZBW) MOS position. (b)(6), (b)(7)c reviewed the

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c **AND** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

document and indicated that no additional wave files exist. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicated that based on the last page of the attachment, someone must have asked for the "Huntress" conversations which are the MOS wave files. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he probably did a partial transcript for the MOS position. All of this should be in the official accident package and was most likely provided to NER and AAT-20.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the Center uses a high capacity voice recorder, which records 24 hours per reel of 1" tape. Portions of this tape are copied to a regular sized cassette and then through the computer, the recording is converted to a digital format and a wave file. Conversions were done only when asked for and the wave files are not part of the accident package.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the Center still has the master reel for 9/11. They have prepared "certified re-recordings" from the master reel.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was asked when the Center first notified the military. (b)(6), (b)(7)c reviewed the partial transcript and advised that the transcript contains a reference to the Center telling Cape Cod TRACON that they wanted to talk to Otis Tower (Air National Guard) at 12:34 UTC or 8:34 a.m. EDT. There is no indication as to when the ANG got aircraft into the air, but they probably needed (b)(6), (b)(7)c authorization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he recalled there were some direct conversations with AAT-20 personnel in which he was asked about conversations between the Center and (b)(6), (b)(7)c and the Center and Cape Cod. He knew the issue was the military notification, although no one from AAT-20 ever said exactly why they were asking. He did not recall who at AAT-20 he spoke to on this particular question. He did not recall receiving any written inquiries on the issue from AAT-20.

Neither (b)(6), (b)(7)c nor (b)(6), (b)(7)c were ever asked to alter any documents or transcripts by anyone for any reason.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4/5

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042R0122001

INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c **AND** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7) and (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to supply the reporting agent with copies of the relevant documents from Center files.

At this point, the interview was concluded.

-#-

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

5/5

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(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

TIGR CASE INPUT SHEET

Investigation Number: 042R0122001		Opening Date:	Action Date:
Case Title: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9/11 Commission		Case Agent Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)c	
DOT Element:	Priority:	Subject	
City/State:			
Judicial District:	AUSA/Atty Name:	Initial Consultation Date:	
SUBJECT(S)/OTHER(S)			
1) Relationship: -	Last Name:	First Name:	MI:
2) Relationship: -	Last Name:	First Name:	MI:
3) Relationship: -	Last Name:	First Name:	MI:
4) Relationship: -	Last Name:	First Name:	MI:
5) Relationship: -	Institution:		
6) Relationship: -	Institution:		
Joint Agency Referrals:		Other Monetary Results:	
Agency:	Date Sent:	Date:	Amount:
ROI Date: 8/31/06	Approv: (b)(6), (b)(7)c		12006
Close Investigation Date: 12/12/06	Input By & Date: ENTERED <input type="checkbox"/> DEC 13 2006 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
Summary Predication Input: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No			

TIGR

Case Status

Current Status

Change Status

Case No: 042R0122001

Elapsed Days

Start
12/12/2006

0

Description: Closed

Status History

Description	Date
Open	08/24/2004
Open	08/24/2004

IV-STATUS

Return

Oracle Forms Runtime - [Case Summary]

File Edit Records Investigations Report Reference Menu Window Help

Investigation Summary User ID: I2HWLO Date: 03/16/2005

Case Details

Case No: 042R0122001 FY Old Status: Open
 Title: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

Add New Case Add Associated Case Search Brief Brief Edit

Lead Case Agent: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Assigned Region: Region 2
 Case Started: 08/24/2004 Sup. No.:
 Shared: Congressional? Qui Tam:
 CC#: Civil Comp. No:
 DOT Element: Federal Aviation Administration
 Priority: Employee Integrity
 Subject: Other

Jurisdiction / ROI

City & State: NEW YORK NY
 Judicial District: Southern District of New York

Last Name First MI
 AUSA:
 Initial Consultation:
 Type Date
 Report of Investigation

Days / Costs

Staff Hours: 2,176
 Case Elapsed Days: 204
 Travel Cost: \$13,830.38

Base / Associated Cases

Case No	Title	Status
Base Case: > 042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	Open
Associated Cases: >		
>		
>		

IV MAIN Text Pages

Record: 1/1 <OSC> <DBG>

Folder #2

042R0122001
(b)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2005 11:00 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: 9-11 Report



draft_final_repor
t_27a.doc (12...

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached for your review is the FAA/NORAD Statements to the 9-11 Commission report.

I spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)c this morning and he advised that plans are still in place to issue a joint transmittal letter covering our respective reports. The acting IG at DOD is (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

He affirmed my understand from our last meeting that he would write the first draft of the transmittal letter upon receipt of our near final report. If you don't have any concerns I will provide him with a copy of this most recent draft report.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

042R012200(b)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 5:49 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Fw: 9-11 Report

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I'm resending the report. If you have any questions please feel free to call me on my cell phone as I'm on leave this week. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
CC: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Mon Nov 14 11:00:10 2005
Subject: 9-11 Report

(b)(6), (b)(7)c



draft_final_repor
t_27a.doc (12...

At (b)(6), (b)(7)c attached for your review is the FAA/NORAD Statements to the 9-11 Commission report.

I spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)c this morning and he advised that plans are still in place to issue a joint transmittal letter covering our respective reports. The acting IG at DOD is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He affirmed my understand from our last meeting that he would write the first draft of the transmittal letter upon receipt of our near final report. If you don't have any concerns I will provide him with a copy of this most recent draft report.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 9:37 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE (b)(6), (b)(7)c Interview



042R0122001_I

(b)(6), (b)(7)c_2005-C

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Have you had a chance to review? If not please do so, sign and then return signed copy to me. Thanks (b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 9:09 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Interview

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Will you please review, sign and send to me. If you have time today can you call me at my desk regarding your meeting with GAO? Thanks (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 9:26 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: UPDATE: 9/11 FAA Statements Investigation



draft_final_repor results-in-brief_DOD-Briefing200
t_outline_0.1... 0.2.doc (32 K... 5-02-11.pdf (60..

On Friday, 2/11 (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interviewed. Though he admitted to talking to Jeff GRIFFITH on a near daily basis following 9/11 he did not have any recollection of having been asked for or providing a copy of the NEADS log to GRIFFITH. Further, he did not recall having agreed to use the military's logs as the source for FAA notification to the military.

DOD has pretty much completed their field work with the interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)c We have some additional field work concerning FAA communication of suspicious aircraft (up their chain-of-command and to the military) pre and post 9/11. I don't anticipate that the remaining field work will take more than two days. However, prior to conducting further interviews on that aspect we still need to complete a review of the FAA orders that were provided to us and obtain some that were not provided. We also are waiting on a copy of FAA's report concerning the KY Gov incident in June 2004. Today, I am supposed to talk to (b)(6), (b)(7)c about both of these items.

Following the interview on Friday, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I met with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c to discuss our joint report. As can be seen in the message below I have provided them with a copy of the draft report outline and a copy of our results in brief as follow-up to our discussion on Friday. They in turn have provided a copy of their results in brief (see attached PDF file). Their brief also contains their proposed timeline (see page 13). They are shooting for Mid March to complete the draft report.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c has indicated that they will most likely issue two reports. The first will be unclassified, joint with us and will report the results of our joint review of the Commission's allegations. The second will be classified and contain their recommendations.

b)(6), (b)(7)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 6:43 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Outline

(b)(6), (b)(7)

As discussed, attached please find a copy of our results in brief and a draft report outline. The outline has not been approved by my HQ yet so it is subject to change. (b)(6), (b)(7)



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 12/12/2006

Title: FAA- NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

Summary of Predication

Case opened at the direction of DAIGI, DOT-OIG based on a referral a July 24, 2004 from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the Commission). During the Commission's investigation they discovered evidence that public statements made by North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials at a the Commission hearing on May 23, 2003, and elsewhere, regarding the actions of NORAD and FAA officials in responding to the 9-11 attacks were not accurate. The Commission did not investigate whether these statements were knowingly false. The Commission specifically noted four statements made by retired General Larry ARNOLD in his testimony on the 23rd of May as being inaccurate.

- 1) The FAA notified the military at 9:16 a.m. that United Flight 93 (UN93) was hijacked.
- 2) The FAA notified the military of the hijacking of American Flight 77 (AA77) at 9:24 a.m.
- 3) When the Langley fighters were scrambled, their objective was to respond to the reports at 9:16 that UN93 was hijacked and at 9:24 a.m. that AA77 was hijacked.
- 4) [Military] Officials were tracking UN93 and intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached Washington, D.C.

The Commission believes that NORAD and FAA made significant efforts to get accurate information as to what had transpired, within days of September 11th. The Commission further believes that once accurate reconstruction information was developed by NORAD and FAA they both had the burden of correcting the public record and insuring that information, including testimony provided to the Commission in May 2003, was accurate.

Investigation will be conducted in cooperation with Department of Defense, OIG. DOT-OIG's portion of the investigation will seek to determine whether FAA officials knowingly made false or inaccurate statements at a Commission hearing on May 23, 2003 and/or elsewhere regarding the action of FAA officials in responding to the September 11th attacks.

Updates

12/03/2004 Investigation to date has revealed that the FAA's Evaluations and Investigations Staff (formerly AAT-20) prepared the FAA's initial 9-11 chronologies. This effort began on or about September 11th and continued through the end of the month. All subsequent timelines, which we have identified, that were produced by the FAA and that referenced military notification were based upon the work products generated during this period.

Witnesses indicate that AAT-20 had access to some information from the military that they likely received sometime between the 13th and 17th of September 2001. Though preliminary at this stage, some evidence and witness testimony suggests that AAT-20 had information, from FAA and military sources, concerning the correct time that it notified the military about United Flight 93 (10:07 EDT) but removed it from its final military notification chronology. We are currently working on determining the exact information AAT-20 obtained from the military. Further, we are identifying the extent of the internal information, which pertained to military notifications, AAT-20 had obtained when it completed its chronologies.

Witnesses have advised that sometime after Former FAA Administrator Garvey testimony before the Commission in May 2003 the Department's Chief of Staff may have made requested that FAA validate their timeline data. Though we are currently working on pinning down the precise request from the COS; we have learned that the work product apparently generated as response to the COS's request was based on existing timelines. Further, no source materials were review and no further validation was conducted in preparation of the work product. We have some additional interviews and re-



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 12/12/2006

Title: FAA- NORAD Statements to 9- 11 Commission

interviews to conduct in connection with this finding to further pin it down.

During our investigation we discovered that the FAA had two public websites containing incorrect references regarding when the FAA notified the military about American Airlines flight 77. We brought this to the FAA's attention and they changed both sites to read: "9:20. The FAA establishes an open phone line with other government agencies and the military to share information about missing or suspicious aircraft. (revised entry 10/21/04)." The new statement is consistent with the Commission's conclusions. However, the Commission does point out that this teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.

02/15/2005 On 2/15/05, the DOT-OIG, along with DOJ-OIG received a request from Congressmen Conyers, Oberstar and Waxman By letter dated February 15, 2005, requesting that we investigate the DOT's role in the classification and declassification of a 9/11 Commission report (the 3rd monograph) of the FAA's pre-9/11 knowledge of aviation threats and to determine whether the classification review of the report followed applicable legal requirements governing prompt declassification of information (Control #2005-018). We investigated DOT's role in the classification and declassification review of the 9/11 Commission's third monograph, focusing primarily on the FAA's review of the monograph and the timeliness of the FAA's response to DOJ. We found that FAA did appear to promptly process the DOJ request for review of Part II of the 3rd monograph. Records shows that on 9/1/04 FAA received Part II of the monograph from DOJ and provided a reply on 9/16/04, one day before DOJ's imposed deadline. Furthermore, DOT's role in the classification review was greatly limited by the fact that all of the classified information contained within the monograph came from agencies other than the FAA and thus, the FAA had no authority to recommend the declassification of any of the information contained therein. DOT-OIG's response to the congressional has been drafted and is pending review.

04/15/2005 On March 10, 2005, Congressman Shays sent a request to Christopher McMahon, RADM, MARAD, who is assigned to the DOT-OST Office of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, as follow-up to his testimony at a March 2, 2005, hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. The purpose of the hearing was to examine the proliferation of categories of information that are not classified but are withheld from public disclosure. Congressman Shays asked for McMahon's response to ten questions. In light of the pre-existing work conducted as part of this investigation, OIG-HQ requested a review of the first six questions in Shays' letter. The first six questions primarily concern the FAA's and DOT's response to their classification review of the 9/11 Commission's 3rd monograph.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

04/26/2005 Investigative work is essentially complete with regard to the Commission's referral. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) DOT's report is essentially complete, pending further review and revision.

06/23/2005 On June 1, 2005, a meeting was held with DOD-OIG to clarify how we are going to jointly report the results of our response to the 9-11 Commission's August 2004. referral. (b)(5)

(b)(5)



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 12/12/2006

Title: FAA- NORAD Statements to 9- 11 Commission

The joint letter is being prepared to cover our respective reports.

CONGRESSIONAL

During the conduct of our review of the Commission's referral, in February 2005, Congressmen Conyers, Oberstar and Waxman asked DOJ-OIG and us to review the declassification of a 9/11 Commission staff report (monograph) on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) pre-9/11 knowledge of aviation threats. Our review found that FAA completed its review of the monograph in a timely fashion, that none of the classified material in the monograph was originally so classified by FAA, and that the TSA's review of the monograph consumed more than three months of the approximate five-month period that passed between delivery of the monograph to DOJ and its delivery to NARA. On June 14, 2005, JI briefed the Congressmen's staff and transmitted to them our final report. No further action on this Congressional is anticipated.

10/13/2005 The draft report/letter documenting DOT-OIG's response to the 9-11 Commission's referral is being reviewed and edited. The joint letter is being prepared by DOD-OIG to cover our respective reports.

01/10/2006 In November 2005, the revised report was forwarded to JI-2 for review. (b)(5)
(b)(5) On Dec. 20th a power point presentation and hand-out were prepared, to be used during an OST briefing, and forwarded to HQ for review.

04/01/2006 Following late December 2005, inquiry from DOD-OIG on the status of the OIG's report, case agent had discussions with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c about reporting out on this matter. Revisions were made to the report. An OST briefing was revised and submitted to (b)(6), (b)(7) on 1/17/06 and then again on 2/1/06, following further revision. Following a subsequent conference call with (b)(6), (b)(7) and (b)(6), (b)(7)c case agent prepared an executive summary document and on 2/16/06 submitted it to (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(5)

(b)(5) Following the last conference call, the executive summary was prepared as a potential alternative to an OST briefing. (b)(5)

08/09/2006 In May 2006, additional work on a final report commenced and again in July/August 2006. A draft report was submitted to the Acting IG on 8/2/2006. A copy of the draft report was also to be given to the "10th floor" for comment.

During this period it was decided that a joint DOD report will not be issued.

There were numerous media inquiries about the status of the report and subsequent news articles in Vanity Fair, Washington Post and NY Daily News, to name a few, about the status of our report.

Final report is pending.

10/01/2006 On August 31, 2006, the final report was issued documenting the results of our review from a referral made by the 9/11 Commission staff regarding certain inaccurate statements made by FAA officials regarding their notifications to DOD during the September 11 hijackings. Our investigation included examining whether FAA officials knowingly made any false statements. The report contained the review results, which indicated that, we did not find evidence to conclude that FAA officials knowingly made false statements, purposely omitted accurate information from any statement, or intentionally failed to correct an inaccurate statement after becoming aware of it. However, the review did discover that three FAA executives did not act to correct an erroneous FAA response to a Commission Question for the Record (QFR) after learning it was inaccurate. The report contained recommendations to the FAA Administrator that FAA correct its QFR response and consider appropriate administrative action for two current executives. The other recommendations to the Administrator include enhancing FAA's capability to respond to and report on hijacked or suspicious



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 12/12/2006

Title: FAA- NORAD Statements to 9- 11 Commission

aircraft.

On September 12, 2006, DOD/OIG separately issued its public redacted version of its classified report on its review findings.

Investigation is to be closed.

FINAL UPDATE.



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 04/26/2005

Title: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Investigation Quarterly Synopsis

Case No: 042R0122001

Report Date: 04/26/2005

Title: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

was conducted in preparation of the work product. We have some additional interviews and re-interviews to conduct in connection with this finding to further pin it down.

During our investigation we discovered that the FAA had two public websites containing incorrect references regarding when the FAA notified the military about American Airlines flight 77. We brought this to the FAA's attention and they changed both sites to read: "9:20. The FAA establishes an open phone line with other government agencies and the military to share information about missing or suspicious aircraft. (revised entry 10/21/04)." The new statement is consistent with the Commission's conclusions. However, the Commission does point out that this teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.

- 02/15/2005** On 2/15/05, the DOT-OIG, along with DOJ-OIG received a request from Congressmen Conyers, Oberstar and Waxman By letter dated February 15, 2005, requesting that we investigate the DOT's role in the classification and declassification of a 9/11 Commission report (the 3rd monograph) of the FAA's pre-9/11 knowledge of aviation threats and to determine whether the classification review of the report followed applicable legal requirements governing prompt declassification of information. We investigated DOT's role in the classification and declassification review of the 9/11 Commission's third monograph, focusing primarily on the FAA's review of the monograph and the timeliness of the FAA's response to DOJ. We found that FAA did appear to promptly process the DOJ request for review of Part II of the 3rd monograph. Records shows that on 9/1/04 FAA received Part II of the monograph from DOJ and provided a reply on 9/16/04, one day before DOJ's imposed deadline. Furthermore, DOT's role in the classification review was greatly limited by the fact that all of the classified information contained within the monograph came from agencies other than the FAA and thus, the FAA had no authority to recommend the declassification of any of the information contained therein. DOT-OIG's response to the congressional has been drafted and is pending review.
- 04/15/2005** On March 10, 2005, Congressman Shays sent a request to Christopher McMahon, RADM, MARAD, who is assigned to the DOT-OST Office of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, as follow-up to his testimony at a March 2, 2005, hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. The purpose of the hearing was to examine the proliferation of categories of information that are not classified but are withheld from public disclosure. Congressman Shays asked for McMahon's response to ten questions. In light of the pre-existing work conducted as part of this investigation, OIG-HQ requested a review of the first six questions in Shays' letter. The first six questions primarily concern the FAA's and DOT's response to their classification review of the 9/11 Commission's 3rd monograph. SSA (b)(6), (b)(7) undertook a review of the questions and OST's draft response (4/15/05) to Congressman Shays (with respect to Questions 1-6) and, in essence, was comfortable with the responses. Further, the OIG has not developed any independent information that contradicts information contained in OST's draft response.
- 04/26/2005** Investigative work is essentially complete with regard to the Commission's referral. (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) DOT's report is essentially complete, pending further review and revision.



Memorandum

U.S. Department of
Transportation

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: INFORMATION: Meeting DOT Chief of Staff

Date: Mar. 30, 2005

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Asst. Special Agent-in-Charge, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Reply to

Attn of: JRI-2

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

To: File 042R0122001

On March (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2005, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I met with DOT Chief of Staff John Flaherty, special assistant (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The purpose of the meeting was to obtain information from Mr. Flaherty concerning the proposed DOT Emergency Response Organization (ERO) with the stated intent of incorporating the information into the OIG's response to a referral from the 9-11 Commission concerning allegedly inaccurate public statements made by DOD and FAA officials regarding the actions of DOD and FAA in responding to the 9-11 attacks.

Mr. Flaherty expressed essentially three concerns in discussing the Department's ongoing work on the ERO in connection with the 9/11 Commission's referral:

- 1) He did not see a connection to the proposed ERO and the allegations in the 9/11 Commission's referral.
- 2) He opined that the philosophy behind the Department's ERO is broader in scope than the very narrow issue in the 9/11 Commission's referral.
- 3) He expressed concern about associating the Department's ERO work as an outgrowth of September 11th or the 9/11 Commission.

Mr. Flaherty advised that he is more than happy to talk to the OIG about the ERO and welcomes an OIG review of the ERO.

- # -

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

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Page 1

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DOT108

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
 OIG, OFF. OF FIN. ADM. & INFOR-
 MATION MGT, JM-30
 400 7TH ST., SW, #7117
 WASHINGTON DC 20590
 ATTN: [REDACTED]

INVOICE NO.

26647

INVOICE DATE

09/18/05

**Payable
 Upon
 Receipt**

D-U-N-S 04-832-7484
 Federal Id. #52-1195809

DEPARTMENT OF
 DOT108

INVOICE DATE	INVOICE #
09/18/05	2664

TYPE TRANSCRIPTION - CASE NO. 031H-199-H001
 ITF IEWS

WORKSHEET: T6579

DATE	DESCRIPTION	Pages or Units	Rate	Amount
REC'D 9/2/2005	PGS 1-57 [REDACTED] 8/31/05 PGS 1-31 [REDACTED] 8/31/05 PGS 1-38 JOHN DAVID CANOLES 8/31/05 ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY MS WORD DISK	126.0	3.20	403.20
FINANCE CHARGE - 1.5% PER MONTH AFTER 30 DAYS				

NON-TAXABLE	TAXABLE	SALES TAX	POSTAGE/HANDLING	INVOICE TOTAL	418.20
403.20	.00	.00	15.00 .00		

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042R0122001
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 SEP-27-2005
 15:15
 CRRZ-17-DES
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 INVOICE DATE
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 Federal Id. #52-1195809

APE TRANSCRIPTION - CASE 042R0122001
 NT VIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

WORKSHEET: T6589

DATE	DESCRIPTION	Pages or Units	Rate	Amount
EC'D 9/6/2005	PAGES 1-44 ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY	44.0	3.20	140.80
FINANCE CHARGE - 1.5% PER MONTH AFTER 30 DAYS				

NON-TAXABLE	TAXABLE	SALES TAX	POSTAGE/HANDLING	INVOICE TOTAL 
140.80	00	00	15.00	

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09/13/05	261

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155.80

TOTAL P. 03



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigation, JRI-2
201 Varick Street, Suite 1162
New York, NY 10014

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Main Number

Request for Transcription Services

Tapes Pertain to Case Number: 042R0122001
Date of Interview: September 1, 2005
Date Tapes Received: _____
Number of Tapes: One (side two of previously submitted tape)
Turnaround: 10-15 Days
Persons Conducting Interview: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

Point of Contact

Telephone Number/Email:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Persons Interviewed:

Douglas GOULD	

Names or Acronyms which are used during Interview:

NEADS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	DEN (Domestic Events Network)
NORAD	David CANOLES	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Lynne OSMUS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	
Linda SCHUSSELER	ROC (Regional Operations Center)	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c	WOC (Washington Operations Center)	
VCAPS		

Additional Comments or Instructions:

Please append the existing transcript with the new copy of side two, which you previously indicated was undecipherable.

Please email a copy of the transcript to the point of contact address upon completion.

Please direct the bill for these tapes to the following individual:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

U.S. Department of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Office of Financial, Administrative and Information Management, JM-30

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 7117

Washington, D.C. 20590

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Approving Official

Date

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 7:52 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Sept 1, 2005, Douglas Gould (1 file - ms word)

Good Morning. There was a problem with side B of the tape. The sound quality deteriorated to ultra slow and became completely undecipherable. I found the address to send the invoice but should I send the transcript to you in New York?

Thanks (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Enclosed is side 2 of the 9/11 Gould interview, which starts on page 41 of the transcript. If you forward the tape to count 88 that is where the tape appears to have become undecipherable.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

9/22/2005



U.S. Department of Transportation
 Office of Inspector General
 Office of Investigation, JRI-2
 201 Varick Street, Suite 1162
 New York, NY 10014
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c 1250 Main Number

Request for Transcription Services

Tapes Pertain to Case Number: 042R0122001
 Date of Interview: August 31, 2005
 Date Tapes Received: _____
 Number of Tapes: Three
 Turnaround: 10-15 Days

Persons Conducting Interview: Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Dept. of Transportation Office of Inspector General

Point of Contact
 Telephone Number/Email: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Persons Interviewed:

John David CANOLES	Laura BROWN
Anthony FERRANTE	

Names or Acronyms which are used during Interview:

NEADS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	DEN (Domestic Events Network)
NORAD	Doug GOULD	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Lynne OSMUS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	
Linda SCHUSSELER	ROC (Regional Operations Center)	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c	WOC (Washington Operations Center)	

TRK # 7901-3943-0552

Additional Comments or Instructions:

Please email a copy of the transcript to the point of contact address upon completion.

Please direct the bill for these tapes to the following individual:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

U.S. Department of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Office of Financial, Administrative and Information Management, JM-30

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 7117

Washington, D.C. 20590

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Approving Official

Date



U.S. Department of Transportation
 Office of Inspector General
 Office of Investigation, JRI-2
 201 Varick Street, Suite 1162
 New York, NY 10014

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Main Number

Request for Transcription Services

Tapes Pertain to Case Number: 042R0122001
 Date of Interview: September 1, 2005
 Date Tapes Received: _____
 Number of Tapes: Three
 Turnaround: 10-15 Days

Persons Conducting Interview: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c Dept. of Transportation
 Office of Inspector General

Point of Contact

Telephone Number/Email:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Persons Interviewed:

Douglas GOULD	

Names or Acronyms which are used during Interview:

NEADS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	DEN (Domestic Events Network)
NORAD	David CANOLES	(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Lynne OSMUS	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	
Linda SCHUSSELER	ROC (Regional Operations Center)	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c	WOC (Washington Operations Center)	
VCAPS		

Tracking #: 7923-7480-8827

Additional Comments or Instructions:

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U.S. Department of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Office of Financial, Administrative and Information Management, JM-30

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 7117

Washington, D.C. 20590

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Approving Official

Date

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

5/13/05
5/24/05

5/13/05

Dan Noel

① In the joint exercises developed by FAA and did w/ TSA. info injected into A/T and WSC based on decisions they would effect the outcome. Security Aviation Ops (Watch)

|| no after action reports

wanted to get people communicating no fault, verbal debrief afterward enhance team environment and do verbal debrief.

* Jun 02 - Jan 03 did the exercises.

once perceived better communication would stop doing them.

② Since TSA moved over to TSOc have no further exercises is about trying (b)(6), (b)(7)c had to activate the Civil Reserve Air fleet and would not do both that and exercises.

③ TSOc came about in roughly

They developed various scenarios.

just HQ is involved
* A/T is involved @ DEN

- alt injected into scenario w/ inserts or people on staff would call and play role of AT facility.

TSO = Transportation Security Operations Specialist.

④ 7610 YK is an alt order.

@ regional level there are exercises that EOs might not be involved in.

④ AIT does do some exercise that also don't involve the EOs.

- TOPOFF III still drafting aft action. is in draft now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

④ The FAA has had a series of executive level exercises between FAA and TSA administrators.

both when they were part of DOT and since going to DHS.

- they are table top.

none had any field component. all activities outside the room are simulated.

5 completed

6 is being prepared for. 5/25

Principals brought need all operational direct reports
Chief Operating Officer

- cause of flux @ TSA it is very difficult to get these organized.

* w/ one major difference, MANPADs -
 They are all focused on the basics.
 Cause of turnover have to teach the TSA folks involved.
 Because, though, these exercises are very important.

* 9/11 caught g off guard.

- old style hijack scenarios were not effective for 9/11 type hijack

* The executive exercises are not documented in afteraction reports. In the majority.
 But I there was some good afteraction ~~reports~~.

Though there are no reports, there are lessons learned and actions taken to make corrections.
 They might need to just do it.

* There are instances where after fact the action officers and make changes. But can't always direct correct changes to exercises.

* Exercises are geared toward problem and try to work out the problems so see if changes can be made.

* (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

- after each of exercises 1-4 took notes and had official notetaker, Michelle Salinas

- after notes typed and approved note sent to audience
MANPADS

* (b)(6), (b)(7) 4 did notes and opinion of those involved were typed up and the playbook was provided to Under Sec of Policy @ DOT.

* need to balance risk of economics v security.

* need to rely on indirect evidence that the exercises resulted in changes.

② after exercise 4, process for running changed.
FSA + TSA jointly sponsored and FSA did most of work setup.

* By exercise 4,
5th would alternate agencies to take lead.
1 agency will take playbook prep. role.
5th TSA provided notes taken etc hosted etc.
6th TSA will host and created playbook.

7th has been agreed to FSA will host AMTI contract facility.

* FAA has made exercises part of agreements w/ other agencies.
for example, an agreement is pending w/ FARMU, (i)
says each agrees to participate in joint and multi-agency
exercises. do currently in DRAFT.

* Current agreement w/ TSA (MOU) blue tabs are examples
of lessons learned from exercises. - all blue highlights
in document come out of exercises

* Common Strategy # 1/3/05 is jointly prepared by
TSA-FAA.

[h. FSD - A/T communication]

- In exercise 5 (on CD) there were disagreements as to who call
to order a/c to land for security reasons.
o They arrived @ TSA doesn't want to direct movement of a/c
was agreed TSA suggest, FAA consent.

* Draft replacement for TSA-FAA MOU.
still not signed but is cleared @ DOT, FAA, OIG
but still pending TSA. [will enact it.]

- In 5 you can see development of authority of
FSD and AT merger, attached 10. to new
MOU. a/t would have a 1 page agreement w/
authority of a/t merger and FSD w/in a week of
exercise.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

* what lines are not recorded.

* why not.

* What type of equipment

- how long are they retained?

in when would they be pulled?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

5/24/05

* Can't put a recording on a S&E STU

⊕ also have a couple of other lines that are not recorded.

* Conference bridge 10 records on bridge.

don't record some of conference call.

can, optionally record a conference call.

* The DEW is always recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- main #, anything answered is auto recorded

6 his board off that main #.

⊕ The ~~the~~ lines for the CCP phone for administrator to

call in on are not recorded. This allows them to

call in when all are busy. Can record if xfr call

to conference bridge. ~~initially~~ not recordable, not

the switch. cause wanted them to have priority.

* 380 hrs for conference bridge.

can place a recorder on a conf call.

default is not to record.

* DEN is part of this conf bridge and always has

- 1 recorder on it. 100 hrs for DEN. will fluctuate.

* Bridge was purchased for emergency.

will allow X # of admin calls per hour so as not
over tax system.

* CCP hrs 4 and can't be recorded unless XCR into

conference bridge not recordable, unless XCR to

bridge. would have to XCR to conf w/other.

* STE Secure Tele Equip Approx 8 [uses 8 hrs not part of conf bridge]
STE will not allow one to record. [person to person.]

There are secure conf bridge that can record but
FAA does not own one. (= like Red Switch).

* Secure Video System: not recorded, are not the cover.

FAA is nearby user and does not record. Managed by WHCA.

* Satophone Fixed & Portable 1 Fixed + 1 port.

* own equip and lease service. a b/c form of comm.
can't record on those hrs.

* Red Switch is a system on network, FAA is user

* DEN is a huge conference call hosted to on the bridge.

* Main phone line w/ 6 hrs that can be recorded
default is to record.

* 3 faxes that use up regular phone line off switch.

* all office phones associated w/ work core off switch.

* DEN hold for 30 days.

look @ capability and that is how long they keep it.
recording onto DVD in a computerized format.

* after gets full, will hold for 30 days.

* thales recorder

[thales recorder] rewritable.



6/1/05

procedure is ^{not} documented to keep for 30 days.



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

EVIDENCE CUSTODY DOCUMENT

CASE TITLE FAA- NORAD statements to 9-11 Comm		PROJECT NUMBER 042R0122001	DATE AND TIME OF SEIZURE 10/1/04	LOG NO. 136
NAME OF PERSON FROM WHOM PROPERTY SEIZED Doug Gauld		LOCATION WHERE PROPERTY SEIZED FAA Bldg 10A 6th Flr, Washington DC		
TO BE RETURNED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE ONLY UNDER RULE 6(e), F.R.C.P. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		
ITEM	QUANTITY	DISPOSAL ACTION	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE - MODEL NUMBER, SERIAL NUMBER, IDENTIFYING MARKS, CONDITION, AND VALUE WHEN APPROPRIATE.	
1	1		Western Digital (w0400) hard disk drive S/N WMAAN1431466	
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF WITNESS [IF AVAILABLE]		NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RECEIVING SPECIAL AGENT		

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

10/1/04

received

Western Digital WD400
hard disk drive
s/n WMAAN1431466
from Doug Gould.

red by [redacted] 10/1/04
[redacted]
DOT-016

rec'd from: Douglas Gould
[Signature] 10/1/04

attempted 10/5/04

Image Masster Solo
Version: _____

Output to: IDE SCSI

Target Drive Model: _____

Target Drive Serial #: _____

Copy Mode: CRC32 SNG MULT Backup
Y N Corrected

Date/Time OK?

Verify: Full Other: (Specify: _____)

External: Direct PPort PCMCIA

Seize: 100% Other: (Specify: _____)

Safe Mode: Yes No

Bad Sector: Cont. Prompt (_____)

Wipe Remainder: Yes No

CRC32: Yes No

The suspect hdd would not initialize.

Safeback Backup Version _____

Safeback Copy Version _____

	N	Y	Auto	Cust
Direct Access	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Use XBIOS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Adjust Partitions	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Compress Data	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		

Custom Partition Info: _____

Disk	Capacity	Cylinders	Heads	Sectors	Special

Output to: MO HDD Manu/Tape: _____

Drive Manu/Model: _____ Tape Type: _____ Other: _____

Logical Codeblue: _____ Other: _____

Output to: MO HDD Other: _____ Direct to CDR Y N

Unerase XDF XDF32: _____ All Partitions? _____

Other: _____

Output to: MO HDD Other: _____ Direct to CDR Y N

Residue RedX RedX32: _____ All Partitions? _____

Other: _____

Output to: MO HDD Other: _____ Direct to CDR Y N

All Partitions? _____

Encase Version 3.22g Output to: MO HDD used fastblock.

Y N

Drive Unlocked: N/A Manu/Tape: _____

Drive Manu/Model: _____ Tape Type: _____

Drive Acquired: _____ Other: _____

Evidence File Loc/Name: _____	Date/Time OK? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Case #: _____	Compress Data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Examiner: _____	MD5 Hash <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____
Evidence #: _____	Password <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____
Description: _____	Output File Size: _____

Comments:

Suspect drive installed in DOT-OIG lab computer (b)(6), (b)(7)c as 2ndary master thru Fastblock.

Upon boot system reported "SMART failure predicted". Was able to boot into Win ME.

Created image w/ Encase v 3.22g in Windows. Reviewed image during remainder of week completed by 10/22/04.

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT _____

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

3/21/05

3/21/05

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

+ incident and emergency

* typically FAA means of notice, electronic via email. alt return for lost engine. 1-2 days per day.

* FAA incidents include CMC and some DOT officials. In those regards interdependent. DEN CMC is on the DEN. [COO]

hired in Oct 2003, came to June 04. no detailed elsewhere 1st.

+ CMC was already a 24 hr op when he started. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was prior dir. (b)(6), (b)(7)c no time or right transfer.

* Don't know the next 24 hr operation.

* This FAA was already including CMC and DOT senior officials in notices.

* CMC has been on the DEN for the last 3 months. could always call into and now is always on his. Watch standards don't always participate but if Sr. DOT official want they can.

email already in place. (+) When he got the
was digital papers
skyped. Still going out
to Sr. executive.

(2)

(+) There was an event that did cause CMC to be
on all the time. But doesn't recall
what caused the problem.

(+) He does feel he gets notices and alerts w/in
minutes of the situation taking place
seems truly and efficient.

(+) Blackberry

- no specific initiatives on the do list.
no plan in place for additional change.

- get email

* a/c turn around

* a/c emergency pressurization

* intoxicated abuse

* security related info that affects
system. bomb threat; suspicious; etc

- will say that radar is down,
weather problems

* CMC staff is a mix of details. Have 1 FAA detail.

* Some folks are Kon.

* Have USCG officers that staff.

* Qual board → CMC
not one of background

* was aware of KY gov. but not involved

not aware of changes could have but not aware of what they are.

- WOC would interact w/ Sr. watch officer -
Claudio Manno is SES

- DEM he would deal w/ the watch on Claudio

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

handles more operations
doesn't think he is tied to WOC

cmd is one of several.
cmd coordinator

- Coop
- COG Cont. of Gov't.

coordinates all exercises like TOPOFF 3
coordinates w/ NATO

* Regional Trans. Coordinators.
Emergency

Surge emergency coordinators for incident or threat, w/ people from O/A areas into. It is a component of emergency response team

- FAS is only one.

- MARAD will surge into cmd. when activate a lot of ships. They're a room in the cmd.

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

3/10/05

~~3/10/55~~

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

⊕ on 9/11 position: OEA A/T
was in NY on 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

currently (b)(6), (b)(7)c
10/18/01 is the first of whole year note.

* came to DC in early (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in
charge of (b)(6), (b)(7)c for A/T
brief for A/T.

* Created new org in A/T to take over ops security.
Roughly in March (b)(6), (b)(7)c

⊕ went to IRAQ to help rebuild aviation system
3 months in (b)(6), (b)(7)c and then again in
the summer of 04.

⊕ Started in FAA in (b)(6), (b)(7)c from Navy
was @ FAA as liaison since (b)(6), (b)(7)c
1st position (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

then went to Military operations w/ in FAA
became mng. (b)(6), (b)(7)c or so in
(b)(6), (b)(7)c became

* (b)(6), (b)(7)c
had problems in East Coast so took over
Eastern region (b)(6), (b)(7)c

WOC Review

* on 9/11 he was in NIC. he dealt w/ the day and worked non-stop.

or Scott

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

called and said things could have done better and see how could improve WOC. Drove and was in DC Monday for about a month and walked thru every aspect of WOC ops.

Balanced against criticism FAA

* Only people accountable to interface w/ (b)(6), (b)(7)c Garvey.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Danny ~~K~~ Noel.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

But was 1 person team. needed to be ramped from equipment standpoint and operational.

* We did not write a report of finding just doc. his suggestions for changes.

there was no written doc for equipment visit had an early discussion w/ (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Phone bridge display crowded dingy

Oct/Nov 2002 went back to NY

(3)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

committed \$

- screens for display of info
- physical layout was bad. just desks in a room.

He did little things, lights in stairs did not work.

* Comm capability needed redundancy, separate power systems.

* overall layout of room was to be implemented by person put in charge.

Dave Knowles recommended to take over.

they did all the configurations he recommended.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

wanted him to discover

- structure

- function

- capabilities

w/ eye on engineering,
he didn't tell him the issues.

lines of business - AIT would use ops center for communications for different issues evolved like near miss.

Deputy Admin.

- Security used center for different
 - A/F used differently.
 - external too such as DOT ops center.
- looked @ who how different lines used the WOC

* Emergency Ops Staff worked for Dep Admin.

EOS: prior to 9/11 people who planned exercises
 ↳ runs the WOC facility
 (Dep. Admin.) military reserve fleet "Civil Reserve aircraft fleet"
 weather emergency for crisis management center.
 ↳ to manage the facility on 10th floor in response to emergency

* in event of hurricane would set up an emergency ops center. Danny Noel ran it w/ approval of Dep. Admin. People from pre assigned list would get into center until crisis was over. Jr. level people staffed the EOC. Was separate from WOC.

1) WOC: Command and control for communications.
Common Center.
on 9/11 all info flowed into it and passed along. set up tel com, receive info and connect people w/ people.

2) ACC was activated only in select situations was only major incident.
~~was~~ is the security operations; was separate location. Not run by ops, 24/7 operations.

3) EOC ad hoc for crisis.

ACC is basically the same room as EOC.
it would be run by security - v - EOC
multipurpose room.

his sense was ops center was only communication center.
there was no operational skill set in the room.
there was only people w/ telcom skills.

FN this need in a true ops center needs to receive info, interpret, manipulate info and connect the dots and turn into actionable items. This did not exist on 9/11.

⊕ in 2000 (b)(6), (b)(7)c would not feel something out for a day later. And he would get mad @ staff, cause they didn't pass along but was cause they were not checked in to what Belag was looking @.

⊕ Need operations people w/ a/t background.

~~sectors~~ need people in charge who deal w/ on tactical.

⊕ A/t. / flight stds, shift merge w/ skill set. who will carry out

* there was lots of info coming in on 9/11 but no one was connecting the dots and no one put bigger picture together.

* EOS should be one function w/ w/c and merge them into on 9/11 had only GS-14

⊕ Personnel Executive Assist. turn into a small room - items.

- * Equip
- * Room
- * Comm Equip

COST - DOT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

is provided
cause there are events @ FGA and
no one called him or the CMC (OOT)
to tell it is going on.

⊕ Major snow storm w/ lots of a/c delays
in Chicago and OOT didn't find
out and no one let OOT know.
People w/ operational sensitivity should.

FH after 9/11 2 elements

Not function
of WOC
but in WOC.

didn't fully implement, ext. DEN
is not part of WOC. DEN
works for FH. He is DEN
mng. DEN is operational here.
every aft facility is able to report
on this line of suspicious. Also on
DEN is other govt agencies. Only
let people on if they can add to it.

NORAD, FBI Watch Ctr.

TSOC. all defense sectors, 1st A/F

WASH Cap. Police.

⊕ The CMC is not on the list of. CMC is
comm center for DOT also.

Ops Center will get info from DEN folks to
pass out.

- why was ops center put under security, they wanted to reduce # of direct reports to Dep Admin

- FD wanted it to report to Dep Admin for direct approval of a task.

* Page list would include the CMC.

again mnging a hijack would occur

@ DEN level and woc still functions as a Comm center.

⊕ Acc still up but as a comm function.

Woc did retain 805 and still exists.

- Center discover hijack 7600.

↳ Procedures to confirm hijack

→ TRACON or Tower: → different elements...

o Back on 9/11 immediately pick red phone ^{independent w/ capability} and called air defense sector Red phone.

Regional ops center.

ATCCS in Hunkon.

⊕ Region ops would call the WOC.

⊗ RTS Facility a/k/a Coop facility
Remote Transmitter Site

* after he ^{FH} left the WOC just as it was before 9/11
but co-located separate group run
the DEN and has tactical ops goes
thru the DEN today.

⊕ Snow would come across the WOC.

Command Center in Herndon would call
WOC about.

- Cmd Ctr has its own group of pages but
only sig will let WOC know

⊗ But subjective and still some discretion.

⊕ not existence to page out CMC

⊗ People who receive info can't make decision
to pass along. People don't know what should
be passed along.

* People in WOC don't know how to interpret info
that comes in, if info doesn't fit into check list
then it might not get passed along. Generalist

° a/t might recognize smthg that is significant
that has ops sig. considerations.

DEN will pass along info to WOC might pass along suggestions.

- WOC and ada staff are part on the Security staff. There is not an SES in charge of WOC.

* Currently there is too many layers for cross org.

Direct Emergency ops. → to ADA

⊗ SES to run Dave Canales. He had mngt from

← Em Ops Staff. - During Noel. 14 or 15 under

WOC mngt is (b)(6), (b)(7)c 14 or 15

DEN mngt would tie in the WOC w/ DEN people if done as he suggested.

* Dave Canales is not in charge of WOC etc.

• moved under security about 1 yr ago.

⊗ Security is not operational and since intel don't have much functions left.

1 thing he noted on 9/11 lacked capability to reconstruct what happened. So if there was another attack could reconstruct what happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c met him & implemented w/in 3 weeks of 9/11 to reveal on.

* Operational lines are revealed. some admin lines are not revealed.

DEN'S.

- Back brief: if there is a hijack in ANU will
make known to all 9 regions across the
country. not involved in this.

⊗ ROCs are not on DEN.

⊗ CCP Phone? not sure.

- we have a 24hr open phone line in DEN



- follow-up on WDC. FIN. believes in accountability.
if situation occurred should be central focal
somewhere in the food chain.

Emerg Op. }
DEN } not pulled together in place.
Command Ctr }
Intel }

DOT - ERO (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Ph: (b)(6), (b)(7)c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)c @ DOT he runs office of
Emergency Transportation. cmc works for
(b)(6), (b)(7)c in DOT. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

→ (b)(6), (b)(7)c works in security S-60
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

⊕ Respond to 9/11 criticism from ops

- Central location that does fusion of information. intel fusion center to understand the info DOT become agency that has intel and ops fusion center.

* Cmd divide does 1/2 Comm Center staff
1/2 24/7 trans intel and incident fusion of ops.

⊕ will die down

Trans Intel and Incident fusion Center.

move DEN over to TIIFC

and would then merge other modes too.

But w/ separate priorities.

Intel various Gov't agencies will get intel and filter and then send to TSA. TSA filters again and filter to DOT who filters to FAA security who filters and tells others.

* finds not react cause don't know bad.

* react to things that are overreact cause didn't know.

⊕ did brief get to operational folks

* That one in AEA was he briefed on intel in any way. No intel brief.

* Did not get a/r briefing from security too.

⊕ Before and after.

- Now will get intel briefings but because of personalities he

⊕ TSA TSOC his staff then gets some intel too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

042RO12200

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2005 6:02 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Re: NEADS Log

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I have had a search of the "September 11, 2001, Data Collection Project" room conducted and we have not located any copies of the requested document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Office: (b)(6), (b)(7)c **Facsimile:** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

03/30/2005 08:50 AM

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

To
cc
Subject

NEADS Log

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I am writing to follow-up on our 2/22/05 discussion concerning the FAA's search for the document that the FAA relied upon as the NEADS log as the reference in its 9/11 chronologies. I recall that the last time we spoke you indicated that to date your staff had not located a copy of the document in the FAA's records but that you had another place to search.

Has the search been completed and what were the results.

Thanks

(b)(6)
Asst. Special Agent-in-Charge
DOT-OIG

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Office of Inspector General

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF 9/11 COMMISSION STAFF REFERRAL

Report Number: CC-2006-085

Date Issued: August 31, 2006



Commission hearings, written statements presented to the Commission, and memoranda and transcripts of numerous interviews conducted by the Commission. Additionally, we reviewed documents chronicling the events of September 11, as well as over 1,000 other documents, including air traffic control transcripts and FAA and DOD event logs, emails, faxes, memoranda, and correspondence. We also assigned an investigator to assist DOD/OIG in its review.

Results in Brief

1. We did not find evidence to conclude that FAA officials knowingly made false statements, purposely omitted accurate information from any statement, or intentionally failed to correct any inaccurate statement after becoming aware of it, regarding FAA notifications to DOD about the September 11 hijackings.
2. Our investigation disclosed that FAA inaccurately reported on its public website in 2002 that FAA notified DOD of the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. on September 11. (In fact, no such notification was made.) FAA officials promptly corrected this error—which we attribute to FAA’s reliance on an erroneous timeline entry—after we brought it to their attention in Fall 2004.
3. We found that in its response to a May 22, 2003, Commission Question for the Record (QFR), FAA again inaccurately reported that it had notified DOD about American Flight 77. This, too, we attribute to FAA’s reliance on an erroneous timeline entry.
4. While investigating FAA’s QFR response, we found that it also inaccurately reported that the Air Force Liaison to FAA had joined an FAA headquarters phone-bridge and established contact with NORAD “immediately” following the crash of the first aircraft (American Flight 11) into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. In fact, the Liaison did not join the phone-bridge until after the third hijacked aircraft (American Flight 77) struck the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m.

We further found that three FAA executives (two current and one now-retired) learned of this inaccuracy from the Liaison shortly following FAA’s submission of the QFR response. The two current FAA executives told us they thought the Liaison, when interviewed by Commission staff, would correct the inaccuracy. However, the Liaison told us that no one at FAA spoke to her about making a correction and she did not address this issue when interviewed by Commission staff. As a result, this inaccuracy was not corrected with the Commission.

5. During our investigation, we also reviewed FAA's post-September 11 capability to notify federal agencies about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft, as well as FAA's capability to investigate its handling of a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. We found that FAA acted to improve these capabilities, including:
- Establishing the Domestic Events Network (DEN), a nationwide, continuously open telephone line managed by FAA, designed to allow federal agencies with jurisdiction over the security of U.S. airspace to communicate information in real-time.
 - Instituting new procedures for air traffic controllers on communicating information about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft over the DEN.
 - Installing equipment to record most FAA Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC) telephone lines. (Prior to September 11, FAA did not record any WOCC telephone lines.)

Based on our findings detailed below, we are making recommendations to the FAA Administrator for enhancing FAA's capability to respond to and report on hijacked or suspicious aircraft. We are also recommending that FAA correct its response to the Commission's QFR and consider appropriate administrative action for the two current executives who did not act to correct the record with the Commission. As a mitigating factor, and to provide some context, we note that at the time, the FAA, including these executives, produced over 6,000 documents and materials to the Commission.

Details

Background on Commission Staff Referral

As part of its statutory mandate to investigate the "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," the Commission examined the interaction between FAA and DOD. The Commission's findings included the specific hours and minutes when FAA notified DOD about the four hijacked aircraft. The summary chronology for each of the hijacked flights from the Commission's Final Report is attached as Appendix 1.¹

¹ The Commission's summary chronology did not list a notification time for United Flight 175; however, included in the body of the Commission's Final Report is the statement that at 9:03 a.m., at approximately the same time United Flight 175 struck the World Trade Center, FAA advised DOD that the aircraft might have been hijacked.



Memorandum


U.S. Department of
Transportation

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: **ACTION:** Results of OIG Investigation
of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

Date: August 31, 2006

From: 
Todd J. Zinser
Acting Inspector General

Reply to
Attn of:

To: The Acting Secretary
Federal Aviation Administrator

Introduction

By letter dated July 29, 2004, the General Counsel for the *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, on behalf of the Commission staff, referred to the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspectors General information concerning several inaccurate statements made by DOD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials regarding FAA notifications to DOD about the airplane hijackings on September 11, 2001. The letter noted that the Commission, which would “sunset” on August 26, 2004, did not investigate whether the inaccurate statements were knowingly false; thus, the Commission staff’s referral noted that this information was being provided to the Inspectors General for appropriate action.

Based on the Commission staff’s referral, our office investigated whether FAA officials knowingly made any false statements. We also investigated whether FAA officials intentionally omitted accurate information from any statement or failed to correct an inaccurate statement after becoming aware of it. Separately, but in coordination with our office, the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) undertook a similar review with regard to the actions of DOD officials, namely North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) officials.

In addition to conferring with Commission staff, our investigation included interviews of 34 current and former FAA and other DOT officials, government contractors, and other private citizens, and we examined voluminous records. Specifically, we reviewed the Commission’s Final Report, Commission Staff Statements, transcripts of

The Commission staff's July 29, 2004, correspondence identified the following inaccurate statements made by FAA and NORAD officials regarding the times at which FAA notified NORAD that United Flight 93 and American Flight 77 had been hijacked:

1. During the Commission's May 23, 2003, hearing, a retired NORAD Colonel inaccurately testified that FAA notified DOD at 9:24 a.m. that American Flight 77 had been hijacked. The Commission found that FAA never notified DOD that American Flight 77 had been hijacked. Instead, it found that, at 9:34 a.m., three minutes before American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, FAA advised NEADS that American 77 was "missing."²
2. FAA officials, despite having documents containing an accurate time within their possession, omitted from FAA's September 17, 2001, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," the time at which FAA notified the NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that United Flight 93 had been hijacked. The Commission found that FAA notified NEADS at 10:07 a.m. that United Flight 93 had been hijacked.
3. NORAD's September 18, 2001, press release inaccurately stated that the time of FAA's notification to DOD that United Flight 93 had been hijacked was "N/A," i.e., "not applicable." The Commission found the accurate time was 10:07 a.m. (NORAD's press release, captioned "NORAD's Response Times" is attached as Appendix 2.)
4. During the Commission's May 23, 2003, hearing, the same retired NORAD Colonel inaccurately testified that FAA notified DOD at 9:16 a.m. that United Flight 93 had been hijacked. The Commission found the accurate time was 10:07 a.m.

The Commission staff concluded that FAA officials had accurate information concerning the above four statements. Thus, the Commission staff referred to us the questions of whether FAA officials knew the above four statements were inaccurate and, if so, why they failed to correct them. We investigated these questions and also whether FAA officials intentionally omitted accurate information from any statement or failed to correct an inaccurate statement after becoming aware of it.

² The Commission staff also identified two other inaccurate statements made by the NORAD Colonel at the May 23, 2003, hearing. Because those statements involved actions by DOD officials, not FAA officials, they were investigated by DOD/OIG.

Investigative Findings

1. **We did not find evidence to conclude that FAA officials knowingly made false statements, purposely omitted accurate information from any statement, or intentionally failed to correct any inaccurate statement after becoming aware of it, regarding FAA notifications to DOD about the September 11 hijackings.**

- a. FAA's September 17 and 18 documents chronicling the events of September 11

We found that shortly following September 11, 2001, an FAA executive (now retired), his subordinate manager (now an executive), and their staff created two documents chronicling the events of September 11. The first document, dated September 17, 2001, was entitled "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events." FAA officials told us this document was prepared for, and circulated to, FAA, DOT, and other government agencies. The second document, untitled and dated September 18, 2001, was prepared for FAA internal use. These two documents (attached at Appendices 3 and 4) served as the principal sources for other FAA documents chronicling the events of September 11.

In preparing the September 17 and 18 documents, the FAA executive cited the Air Force's NEADS log and also had available a transcript from FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center. Both of these documents correctly recorded FAA's notification to DOD about the hijacking of United Flight 93 as having occurred at 10:07 a.m. Despite the availability of this accurate information, FAA's September 17 "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" is silent as to the time of FAA's notification to DOD for United Flight 93.

Similarly, FAA's September 17 "Summary" is silent as to FAA's notification to DOD about American Flight 77. The Commission found that FAA never notified DOD that American Flight 77 had been hijacked. Instead, the Commission found that at 9:34 a.m., three minutes before American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, FAA advised NEADS that American Flight 77 was "missing."

FAA's September 18 chronology document erroneously listed FAA's notification time to DOD about American Flight 77 as 9:24 a.m. The FAA executive, who was responsible for preparing the document, told us that he cited the NEADS log as the source for the 9:24 a.m. entry. We found, however, that he failed to cross-check the tail number listed for the American Airlines aircraft in the 9:24 a.m. entry. Had he done so, he would have discovered that the aircraft identified was American Flight 11,

not Flight 77.³ Therefore, we concluded that, because of the executive's lack of attention to the details in the NEADS log, he mistakenly believed that FAA had notified DOD of the hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m.

Further, the September 18 document inaccurately reported that the notification time for United Flight 93 was "N/A," i.e., "not applicable," when, in fact, the NEADS log and the Cleveland Center transcript both accurately show that FAA notified DOD of the hijacking of United Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m., four minutes after the aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania.⁴

We interviewed the FAA executive and manager separately and each told us that at the time they prepared the September 17 and 18 chronology documents, they did not believe they had an accurate notification time for United Flight 93, and for that reason they listed "N/A," meaning "not applicable." (We note that they took no further action to establish an accurate notification time.) We also interviewed other members of their staff, who did not contradict the rationale of the executive and manager for the lack of a notification time. We do not find this explanation to be reasonable because the NEADS log—which the executive and manager cited was the source of the notification times for the three other hijacked aircraft—and the transcript from FAA's Cleveland Center (which was also available to them) show the correct notification time for United Flight 93. However, while we could not determine whether these officials omitted the correct notification time for United Flight 93 for any reason other than what they told us, we considered two alternative possibilities:

First, we considered whether the FAA executive and manager may have adopted the "N/A" entry from NORAD's September 18, 2001, press release, a September 17 draft of which FAA's Office of Public Affairs had obtained. It is possible, for example, that the "N/A" entry in NORAD's press release created uncertainty on the part of the FAA executive and manager about the United Flight 93 notification time as they were preparing FAA's September 18 chronology document. Thus, they may have deferred to the NORAD release. However, despite the coincidence of the "N/A" entry in both NORAD's press release and FAA's September 18 document, when we addressed this possibility during our interviews, the FAA executive did not recall, and the manager denied, having seen any draft of NORAD's press release. We investigated the extent to which FAA and DOD collaborated on their chronologies of events of September 11. However, neither DOD/OIG's investigation nor our investigation

³ This entry in the NEADS log was based on an erroneous report that American Flight 11 was headed toward Washington, DC.

⁴ These two documents, along with multiple other drafts and versions of FAA's September 11 chronology, were obtained by the Commission pursuant to its mandate. Nonetheless, the Commission was able to produce an accurate chronology that is the definitive record of the events of September 11.

established any direct coordination between DOD and FAA officials regarding the chronologies.

Second, we considered whether the FAA executive and manager may have purposely omitted the notification time to avoid disclosing that FAA did not notify DOD until approximately four minutes after United Flight 93 had crashed. We asked them about this and they denied it. Further, we discounted this possibility because both the September 17 and 18 documents they produced reported that FAA had not notified DOD of the hijacking of United Flight 175 until approximately two minutes after it crashed into the World Trade Center. We found no evidence to explain why the executive and manager would have purposely omitted one after-the-fact notification and not the other.

Based on our investigation and factoring in the potential for human error under the circumstances that existed during the week following September 11, and the limitations of their recollections, we did not find evidence to conclude that the FAA executive and manager omitted the correct notification times for American Flight 77 and United Flight 93 for any reason other than what they told us.

b. NORAD press release dated September 18, 2001

The Commission staff questioned why FAA officials did not correct NORAD's September 18, 2001, press release, which inaccurately stated that the time NORAD was notified by FAA that United Flight 93 had been hijacked was "N/A," i.e., "not applicable." As addressed above, the FAA executive and manager maintained that they did not believe they had an accurate notification time for United Flight 93.

c. Retired NORAD Colonel's testimony of May 23, 2003

The Commission staff also questioned why FAA officials did not correct the retired NORAD Colonel's May 23, 2003, testimony in which he stated, erroneously, that FAA notified DOD at 9:16 a.m. on September 11 that United Flight 93 had been hijacked. During our interviews, only an FAA executive who attended the hearing acknowledged being aware of the Colonel's testimony. This FAA executive initially recalled having been "upset" about the timeline in the Colonel's testimony, and, immediately following the hearing, unsuccessfully attempted to speak with a NORAD official about inaccurate notification times in that timeline. However, following our interview and after reviewing the Colonel's testimony at our request, the FAA executive advised us that her recollection was it was not the timeline about which she attempted to talk to the NORAD official. Rather, she advised, she tried to tell the NORAD official that the Colonel did not include in his testimony information about

the phone-bridge that was established between FAA headquarters and DOD on September 11.

Finally, the Commission staff questioned why FAA officials did not correct the NORAD Colonel's May 23, 2003, testimony, in which he inaccurately stated that FAA notified DOD at 9:24 a.m. that American Flight 77 had been hijacked. As addressed above, we found that because of the executive's lack of attention to the details on the NEADS log, he mistakenly believed that FAA had notified DOD of the hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. Thus, we concluded that it would have been reasonable for any FAA official aware of the Colonel's testimony about FAA's notification time for American Flight 77 to have believed it was accurate because his testimony was consistent with FAA's erroneous chronology.

- 2. Our investigation disclosed that FAA inaccurately reported on its public website that FAA notified DOD of the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (In fact, no such notification was made.) FAA officials promptly corrected this error, which we attribute to an erroneous timeline entry, after we brought it to their attention in Fall 2004.**

We found that FAA posted its September 11 chronology in two documents on its public website. The first document, undated, was entitled *FAA Responds*.⁵ The second document, dated August 12, 2002, was an FAA "fact-sheet" entitled *Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001*.⁶ Both erroneously stated:

0924. The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77.

In fact, as previously addressed in this report, FAA never made such a notification. After we brought this inaccuracy to FAA's attention (in September 2004 on the first document and October 2004 on the second), the agency deleted it from each document. We found no evidence to indicate that anyone at FAA posted these documents knowing they were inaccurate. Instead, we found that FAA's Office of Public Affairs, which was responsible for preparing the documents posted on the website, relied upon inaccurate documents chronicling the events of September 11.

⁵ See www.faa.gov/Sept11portraits/chronology.cfm

⁶ See www.faa.gov/newsroom/factsheets/2002/factsheets_020812.htm

- 3. We found that in its response to a May 22, 2003, Commission Question for the Record (QFR), FAA again inaccurately reported that it had notified DOD about American Flight 77. This, too, we attribute to FAA's reliance on an erroneous timeline entry.**

On May 22, 2003, former FAA Administrator Jane Garvey testified before the Commission. During the hearing, she was asked the time at which FAA notified DOD about American Flight 77. Because Administrator Garvey did not have this information at hand, she told the Commission she would provide a response for the record that evening. FAA's response to the Commission's QFR, captioned "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001," which was submitted on the night of May 22, 2003, and read into the Commission hearing record on May 23, 2003, inaccurately reported that FAA notified DOD about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (FAA's response to the Commission's QFR is attached as Appendix 5.)

We determined that FAA's QFR response was prepared by a now-retired FAA executive and two current executives. We found that because these three executives had relied upon inaccurate FAA documents chronicling the events of September 11, they believed FAA notified DOD of the hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. We did not find evidence that these three executives knew that FAA never notified DOD that American Flight 77 had been hijacked.

- 4. We also found the QFR response to be inaccurate regarding the time at which the Air Force Liaison to the FAA joined an FAA headquarters phone-bridge about the hijackings. We determined that three FAA executives learned of this inaccuracy shortly following FAA's submission of the QFR response, but did not act to correct the record with the Commission; consequently, it was never corrected.**

We found that the QFR response incorrectly related that the Air Force Liaison to FAA joined the FAA phone-bridge on the hijackings and established contact with NORAD "immediately" following the crash of the first aircraft (American Flight 11) into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. In fact, the Liaison did not join the phone-bridge until after the third hijacked aircraft (American Flight 77) struck the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. The Air Force Liaison told us:

I was enroute to the [FAA headquarters] building when the first plane hit the World Trade Center. ... [S]o probably five, ten minutes after that, I got to the building. ... I went to my office. Everybody was there around the TV. We watched the events unfold. At first, we were kind of hanging back and saying, you know, there's something awful going on with the air traffic system[.] ... But at a certain point, not too long after that, it became

obvious that, you know, something really strange is going on and so ... I relocated. I went upstairs to the 10th floor. ... It was right after the airplane hit the Pentagon.

The now-retired FAA executive told us she learned during a conversation with the Air Force Liaison, which she told us may have occurred on the same day that FAA's QFR response was read into the record, that the response was inaccurate regarding when the Liaison joined the phone-bridge. The other two FAA executives also told us that they learned from speaking with the Liaison that the QFR response was inaccurate. One executive told us that she spoke with the Liaison within a few weeks of the submission of the QFR response, the other executive told us she spoke to the Liaison by the end of the summer. None of these executives, however, informed the Commission of the inaccuracy.

The now-retired executive told us she knew the other two executives were aware of the inaccuracy and assumed they would correct it. The two current executives told us they thought that the Air Force Liaison, when interviewed by Commission staff, would tell the staff that she did not immediately join the phone-bridge on September 11. The Air Force Liaison told us that no one at the FAA spoke to her about correcting FAA's QFR response during her Commission staff interview and she did not address the response when interviewed. Therefore, no one corrected this inaccuracy.

In our view, these FAA executives had an affirmative obligation to correct FAA's May 2003 response to the Commission's QFR directly with the Commission, as opposed to relying on the Air Force Liaison to do so. Part of the Commission's mandate was to examine, and accurately report on, the interaction between FAA and DOD on September 11. The time at which the Air Force Liaison joined the FAA headquarters phone-bridge and established contact with NORAD was relevant to the Commission's mandate.

5. After September 11, FAA improved its capability to notify federal agencies about, and investigate its handling of, hijacked or suspicious aircraft.

While investigating statements about FAA's notifications to DOD about the hijackings on September 11, we also reviewed FAA's post-September 11 capability to notify federal agencies about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft, as well as FAA's capability to investigate its handling of a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. We found that FAA acted to improve these capabilities.

a. FAA established the Domestic Events Network (DEN).

The DEN is a nationwide, open telephone line that allows federal agencies with jurisdiction over the security of U.S. airspace to share, in real-time, information about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. It is managed by FAA in its Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC). Some of the agencies and organizations that continuously monitor the DEN include: DOD (NORAD and NEADS), FAA air traffic field facilities, and the Department of Homeland Security.

b. FAA now records Washington Operations Center Complex telephone lines.

Prior to September 11, FAA did not have the capability to record telephone lines in the WOCC. FAA now records most WOCC telephone lines, including the DEN. Though there is no FAA policy on retention of the recordings from those lines, they are kept for six months as a matter of practice. Priority telephone lines used by the Secretary, the Administrator, and Deputy Administrator, and the lines used for classified voice and video communications, remain unrecorded.

c. FAA instituted new procedures for air traffic controllers on communicating information about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft over the DEN.

On September 11, three FAA divisions—Air Traffic, Civil Aviation Security, and the Office of the Deputy Administrator—were responsible for FAA’s response to a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. We discovered five procedures or protocols, three for Air Traffic and two for the Deputy Administrator and Civil Aviation Security staffs, regarding how information was to be provided to DOD about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. We found that these pre-September 11 procedures provided indirect lines of communication from air traffic controller to DOD about a hijacked or suspicious aircraft. As the Commission concluded in its final report, in this regard, FAA’s “existing protocol was unsuited in every respect.”

Following September 11, FAA issued a new policy, “Aircraft Hijack and Suspicious Inflight Activities—Response and Notification Procedures,” that requires air traffic control facilities to directly report a hijacked or suspicious aircraft to the DEN.⁷ However, four of the five pre-September 11 procedures also remain in effect. In order to avoid confusion about which FAA procedures govern FAA’s response to a hijacked or suspicious aircraft, we are recommending that FAA review its procedures and eliminate those that are inconsistent or duplicative.

⁷ FAA Notice 7110.422, dated 11/14/05, is the most recent version of these procedures. It is considered “Sensitive Security Information” and its release is governed by 49 CFR § 1520.

To evaluate the effectiveness of FAA's post-September 11 communication procedures, we reviewed reports by FAA and the House Subcommittee on Aviation regarding the June 9, 2004, flight carrying the Governor of Kentucky to Washington Ronald Reagan National Airport to attend President Reagan's funeral—an incident that resulted in the evacuation of the Capitol.

The Subcommittee's July 2004 report concluded that a number of "key" errors contributed to the decision to evacuate the Capitol. First, FAA allowed the aircraft (bearing tail number N24SP) to enter the Washington, DC Area Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) with an inoperative transponder.⁸ Second, FAA incorrectly broadcast over the DEN that N24SP had a transponder signal, but that its altitude read-out was not functioning. And, third, FAA failed to identify an aircraft radar return, which did not contain transponder data, as N24SP.

In response to these errors, we found FAA made several changes, including requiring every aircraft entering the Washington ADIZ to have an operative transponder with an automatic altitude readout. FAA also mandated refresher training for all air traffic controllers on, among other things, communicating over the DEN. FAA informed us that there have been no such similar incidents attributable to errors on the part of FAA.

Recommendations

1. FAA should correct its response to the Commission's May 22, 2003, Question for the Record.
2. FAA should consider appropriate administrative action for the two current executives who did not act to correct the record with the Commission. In our view, they had an affirmative obligation to do so in light of the Commission's mandate that included examining, and accurately reporting on, the interaction between FAA and DOD on September 11. The time at which the Air Force Liaison joined the FAA headquarters phone-bridge and established contact with NORAD was relevant to the Commission's mandate.

As a mitigating factor, and to provide some context, we note that at the time, the FAA, including these executives, produced over 6,000 documents and materials to the Commission.

⁸ The ADIZ is defined as the airspace less than 18,000 feet in an approximate 30-mile radius around Washington, DC.


3. FAA should institute a formal policy for the preservation of telephone recordings following notification of hijacked or suspicious aircraft.
4. In order to avoid confusion about which FAA procedures govern FAA's response to hijacked or suspicious aircraft, we are recommending that FAA review its procedures and eliminate those that are inconsistent or duplicative.

#

Appendices


1. Chronology for each of the hijacked flights from the Commission's Final Report. [1 page]
2. NORAD's September 18, 2001, press release, captioned "NORAD's Response Times." [1 page]
3. FAA's September 17, 2001, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events." [13 pages]
4. FAA's September 18, 2001, untitled chronology. [1 page]
5. FAA's response to the Commission's May 22, 2003, Question for the Record. [1 page]

**American Airlines Flight 11
(AA 11)
Boston to Los Angeles**




7:59 Takeoff
 8:14 Last routine radio communication; likely takeover
 8:19 Flight attendant notifies AA of hijacking
 8:21 Transponder is turned off
 8:23 AA attempts to contact the cockpit
 8:25 Boston Center aware of hijacking
 8:38 Boston Center notifies NEADS of hijacking
 8:46 NEADS scrambles Otis fighter jets in search of AA 11
 8:46:40 AA 11 crashes into 1 WTC (North Tower)
 8:53 Otis fighter jets airborne
 9:16 AA headquarters aware that Flight 11 has crashed into WTC
 9:21 Boston Center advises NEADS that AA 11 is airborne heading for Washington
 9:24 NEADS scrambles Langley fighter jets in search of AA 11

**United Airlines Flight 175
(UA 175)
Boston to Los Angeles**




8:14 Takeoff
 8:42 Last radio communication
 8:42-8:46 Likely takeover
 8:47 Transponder code changes
 8:52 Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking
 8:54 UA attempts to contact the cockpit
 8:55 New York Center suspects hijacking
 9:03:11 Flight 175 crashes into 2 WTC (South Tower)
 9:15 New York Center advises NEADS that UA 175 was the second aircraft crashed into WTC
 9:20 UA headquarters aware that Flight 175 had crashed into WTC

**American Airlines Flight 77
(AA 77)
Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles**



8:20 Takeoff
 8:51 Last routine radio communication
 8:51-8:54 Likely takeover
 8:54 Flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south
 8:56 Transponder is turned off
 9:05 AA headquarters aware that Flight 77 is hijacked
 9:25 Herndon Command Center orders nationwide ground stop
 9:32 Dulles tower observes radar of fast-moving aircraft (later identified as AA 77)
 9:34 FAA advises NEADS that AA 77 is missing
 9:37:46 AA 77 crashes into the Pentagon
 10:30 AA headquarters confirms Flight 77 crash into Pentagon

**United Airlines Flight 93
(UA 93)
Newark to San Francisco**



8:42 Takeoff
 9:24 Flight 93 receives warning from UA about possible cockpit intrusion
 9:27 Last routine radio communication
 9:28 Likely takeover
 9:34 Herndon Command Center advises FAA headquarters that UA 93 is hijacked
 9:36 Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking; UA attempts to contact the cockpit
 9:41 Transponder is turned off
 9:57 Passenger revolt begins
 10:03:11 Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, PA
 10:07 Cleveland Center advises NEADS of UA 93 hijacking
 10:15 UA headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in PA; Washington Center advises NEADS that Flight 93 has crashed in PA



**NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND**

Directorate of Public Affairs, Headquarters, North American Aerospace Defense Command & US Space Command,
250 S. Peterson Blvd. Suite 115, Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80914-3193 Phone (719) 554-6889 DSN 692-6889
NORAD and US Space Command website address: <http://www.peterson.af.mil/norad> or <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace>

18 September, 2001

Contact: (719) 554-6889

NORAD'S Response Times

PETERSON AFB, Colo. --The following timelines show NORAD's response to the airliner highjackings on September 11, 2001.

- * All times are Eastern Daylight Time; NEADS = North East Air Defense Sector, NORAD
- ** Scramble = Order to get an aircraft airborne as soon as possible
- *** Estimated = loss of radar contact
- **** Flight times are calculated at 9 miles per minute or .9 Mach
- ***** The FAA and NEADS established a line of open communication discussing AA Flt 77 and UA Flt 93

American Airlines Flight 11 – Boston enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS	0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (<i>Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s</i>)	0846**
Fighters Airborne	0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1)	0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	Aircraft not airborne/153 miles

United Airlines Flight 175 – Boston enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS	0845
Fighter Scramble Order (<i>Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass. Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11</i>)	0846
Fighters Airborne	0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 2)	0902 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	approx 8 min**** 71 miles

American Flight 77 – Dulles enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS	0924
Fighter Scramble Order (<i>Langley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2 F-16s</i>)	0924
Fighters Airborne	0930
Airline Impact Time (Pentagon)	0937 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	approx 12 min/105 miles

United Flight 93 – Newark to San Francisco

FAA Notification to NEADS	N/A *****
Fighter Scramble Order (<i>Langley F-16s already airborne for AA Flt 77</i>)	
Fighters Airborne (<i>Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC</i>)	
Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania)	1003 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location	approx 11 min/100 miles (from DC F-16 CAP)

NOTE: This appendix is an excerpt of the complete document (dated September 17, 2001) and contains only the chronologies for each of the four hijacked aircraft.



Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events

September 11, 2001

American Airlines Flight 11 (AAL11)

Boston – Los Angeles

All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

- 0756:27 Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BOS) issued taxi instructions to AAL11.
- 0800:00 AAL11 began takeoff roll, runway 4 Right, Boston Logan International Airport. All communications with BOS and with Boston Departure Control were routine and normal.
- 0809:17 AAL11 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW). **“Boston Center, good morning, American Eleven with you passing through one-nine-zero (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet).”**
- 0809:22 ZBW acknowledged AAL11. From this time until 0813:31 all communications appear routine and normal. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including AAL11. The flight was instructed to climb to twenty-eight thousand feet, subsequently to twenty-nine thousand feet, and issued a twenty degree turn for traffic.
- 0813:47 ZBW instructed AAL11 **“ American Eleven, now, climb and maintain flight level three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet).”** **There was no acknowledgement to this transmission.** ZBW made two subsequent transmissions to AAL11, neither of which were acknowledged. Between 0813:47 and 0824:53, ZBW made several radio transmissions attempting to contact AAL11. None of the attempts were acknowledged.
- 0814:45 ZBW during intra-facility coordination recognized that **AAL11 appeared to be turning right** but had not acknowledged the climb clearance to thirty-five thousand feet and did not acknowledge any further radio transmissions.
- 0817:59 A brief unknown sound (possibly a scream) from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio.
- 0820:48 **Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information was lost on ZBW radar displays. The aircraft was then observed as a primary radar target only.**
- 0824:38 A radio transmission partially unintelligible stated, “we have some planes just stay quiet and you’ll be ok we are returning to the airport” from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio.

Appendix 3 to DOT/OIG Report on Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

- 0824:57 A second radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet” – from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio.
- 0825:00 ZBW began notification based on radio transmissions that a suspected hijack was in progress. The New England Regional Operations Center (ROC), the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), and the ZBW facility manager were notified. Additionally, controllers began inter-facility coordination with New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of the possible hijacking. Coordination describes the last known altitude as twenty-nine thousand feet.
- 0826:00 AAL11 began southbound turn over Albany, New York. The last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.**
- 0833:59 A third radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move please we are going back to the airport don’t try to make any stupid moves” – from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio. AAL11 primary radar track was still southbound, and the last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.
- 0834:00 ZBW contacted Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (located on OTIS Air Force Base) and requested they notify the Military of the events regarding AAL11.
- 0835:00 New England Regional Operations Center advised Washington Operations Center (WOC) of the suspected hijack of AAL11.
- 0836:00 WOC notified Civil Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI), and conferenced New England Regional Operations Center and the Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center (ATCSCC).
- 0838:00 ZBW notified New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of possible hijacking of AAL11.
- 0840:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning AAL11.
- 0841:00 Military Command (VACAPES) issued scramble order on AAL11.
- 0844:00 ZNY facility manager notified New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (N90) of possible hijacking of AAL11. N90 began internal coordination of the aircraft’s last known altitude (twenty-nine thousand feet) and southbound course.
- 0846:31 Primary radar tracking of AAL11 was lost.**
- 0846:35 Impact at World Trade Center.**

Appendix 3 to DOT/OIG Report on Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

- 0850:00 Washington Operations Center activated a Tactical Net at the request of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI).
- 0850:00 Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower (EWR) advised N90 of possible aircraft crash into the World Trade Center.

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM

United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL175)

Boston – Los Angeles

All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

- 0804:55 Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BOS) issued taxi instruction to UAL175.
- 0814:00 UAL175 began takeoff roll, runway 9, Boston Logan International Airport. All communications with BOS and with Boston Departure Control were routine and normal.
- 0823:01 UAL175 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW). "Boston, morning, United one-seven-five out of one-nine (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet)."
- 0823:06 ZBW acknowledged UAL175. At this point the controller was busy due to the events surrounding AAL11. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including UAL175. All communications between ZBW and UAL175 appear routine and normal. The flight was subsequently instructed to climb to flight level 310 (thirty-one thousand feet) and after radar handoff, was issued a frequency change to contact the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY).
- 0840:32 UAL175 established radio contact with ZNY. "United one-seventy-five at flight level three-one-zero."
- 0840:37 ZNY acknowledged UAL 175. "United one-seventy-five, New York Center, roger."
- 0841:32 UAL175 transmitted to ZNY, "We figured we'd wait to go to your center, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed the mike (initiated radio communications) and said everyone stay in your seats."
- 0841:51 ZNY replied, "okay, I'll pass that along." (The controller ensured UAL175's comments were forwarded to the Operations Manager.)
- 0844:05 US Air Flight 83 transmitted to ZNY "I just picked up an ELT (emergency locator transmitter) on 121.5 (emergency VHF frequency). It was brief, but it went off."
- 0844:09 ZNY acknowledged US Air Flight 83.

- 0846:48 UAL175's assigned transponder code of 1470 changed, first indicating 3020, then changing again to 3321. ZNY air traffic computers do not correlate either of these codes with UAL175. Consequently, the secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return. *Note: The controller communicating with UAL175 was also monitoring the flight track of AAL11. Based on coordination received from ZBW indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention was focused on AAL11.*
- 0851:43 ZNY transmitted to UAL175, "UAL175, recycle transponder, squawk code one four seven zero." No response was received from UAL175. The controller made several attempts, repeatedly trying to contact UAL175 for the next four minutes. During this time, the aircraft was also observed making a left turn and descending.
- 0853:24 ZNY controller coordinated internally, asking other controllers if they saw UAL175, or if they knew who the unidentified radar target is on transponder code 3321. None of the other controllers replied in the affirmative. *Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be UAL175.*
- 0855:00 ZNY controller was busy trying to turn other aircraft away from the aircraft believed to be UAL175. The flight track of this aircraft had changed and was now headed southeast bound.
- 0855:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZNY.* A controller-in-charge (CIC) advised the Operations Manager (OM) that she believed UAL175 was also hijacked. The OM advised the CIC that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. The CIC began coordinating with the controllers working position and one of the controllers stated that UAL175 appeared to heading "right towards the city." The CIC returned to the OM position and heard a request for military aircraft to scramble. UAL175 was observed in a rapid descent
- 0855:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZNY.* A controller working a different position within ZNY reported that two aircraft, a Delta Airlines flight was given instructions to avoid an unknown aircraft. At about the same time a US Airways flight reported taking evasive action from an unknown aircraft. The controller reported that the unknown aircraft was now headed towards New York City. This controller, along with other controllers speculated that the unknown aircraft was an emergency and was heading for an airport to land.

- 0900:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (N90). N90 controller stated "at approximately 9:00, I observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center."*
- 0903:14 Second Impact at World Trade Center.
- 0905:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning UAL175.
- 0905:00 N90 received notification from the Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower of a second aircraft striking the World Trade Center.

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM

United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL93)

Newark – San Francisco

All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

- 0809:18 Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower (EWR) issued taxi instructions to UAL93.
- 0842:00 UAL93 began takeoff roll, runway 4 left, Newark New Jersey International Airport. All communications with EWR, with New York Departure Control, and with New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) were routine and normal.**
- 0924:30 UAL93 established radio contact with Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZOB), "Good morning Cleveland, United ninety-three, three-five-oh (thirty-five thousand feet), intermittent light chop." The controller was busy, the sector was responsible for sixteen aircraft. Of these, several aircraft were being issued new routes based on the events occurring on the east coast. The controller did not reply to this initial transmission.
- 0925:14 UAL93 again reported on ZOB frequency, "United ninety-three checking three-five-oh (thirty-five thousand feet)." The controller replied, "United ninety-three, Cleveland, roger." *Note: This was the third radar sector within ZOB to communicate with UAL93. The communications with the previous sectors were routine and normal.*
- 0928:19 A radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.
- 0928:54 A second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, "get out of here, get out of here" from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio. At about this same time, the ZOB controller observed that UAL93 had descended, altitude indicated thirty-four thousand, three hundred feet.
- 0929:29 ZOB controller asked UAL93, "United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no reply. The ZOB controller made several attempts to contact UAL93 without receiving any acknowledgement.**
- 0929:50 ZOB controller began moving other aircraft away from UAL93 due to the lack of acknowledgement of any radio transmissions. Several other aircraft on the frequency confirmed unusual sounds of an unknown origin. The altitude of UAL93 again indicated thirty-five thousand feet.**
- 0931:57 A third radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, may sound like an individual out of breath, more unintelligible words and what sounds like "bomb on board" from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.

- 0932:31 A fourth radio transmission stated "did you hear that transmission that reported a bomb on board?" from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.
- 0934:50 ZOB controller observed that UAL93 was climbing without an air traffic control authorization. The aircraft had started a turn to the southeast, also without air traffic control authorization.
- 0938:47 UAL93 altitude indicated forty-thousand seven hundred feet.
- 0939:12 A fifth radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, stated words that may sound like "captain, ...bomb on board, ...our demands, ...remain quiet"
- 0939:59 ZOB notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center of the screams and statements from unknown origin, believed to be UAL93.
- 0941:00 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information becomes intermittent and eventually failed on ZOB radar displays.**
- 0944:31 ZOB controller notified Pittsburgh Terminal Radar Approach Control (PIT) North Arrival controller of the unanticipated turn, the loss of secondary radar return and lack of radio communications with UAL93. The ZOB controller also stated that the projected flight path would result in UAL93 passing in close proximity if not directly overhead the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.
- 0945:00 PIT controller notified the Operations Supervisor of the events surrounding UAL93. The PIT controller also manually initiated radar tracking of the primary radar target.
- 0951:00 After determination by the PIT facility manager to evacuate, the controllers have completed coordination with adjacent facilities and the PIT facility has been evacuated.
- 0956:56 A small contingency of controllers (volunteers) returned to the facility and coordination with adjacent facilities pertaining to return to operational status is completed. The track of UAL93 was no longer visible on the PIT radar displays.
- 1000:00 *This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from ZOB. A ZOB controller's statement indicated that the pilot of a VFR aircraft reported sighting a United Airlines aircraft at approximately eight thousand feet in the vicinity of the Latrobe, Pennsylvania airport. The pilot also reported that the United Airlines aircraft's landing gear was down, the wings were rocking, and that the aircraft appeared to be in distress.*

1004:00 *This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from ZOB. A ZOB controller statement indicated that UAL93's primary radar target terminated in the vicinity of Somerset, Pennsylvania.*

1007:00 **In response to a request from a ZOB controller, N20VF, a Falcon Jet reported observing puffs of smoke in the vicinity of UAL93's last known position.**

1041:00 After receiving a telephone call from the Somerset, Pennsylvania police department stating that several "911" telephone calls had been received reporting an aircraft accident, a ZOB operations manager made official notification to Great Lakes Regional Operations Center. *Note: Although this is the officially documented notification time, FAA officials were aware of the accident as these events were reported as they occurred on a critical event teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration headquarters building.*

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM

American Airlines Flight 77 (AAL77)
Washington Dulles - Los Angeles
All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

- 0812:29 Dulles Airport Traffic Control Tower (IAD) issued taxi instructions to AAL77.
- 0820:00 AAL77 began takeoff roll, runway 30, Washington Dulles International Airport. All communications with IAD and with Dulles Departure Control were routine and normal.
- 0825:49 AAL77 established radio contact with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC), "Center, American seventy-seven with you passing one-three decimal zero (thirteen thousand feet) for one-seven-thousand (seventeen thousand feet)." All communications between ZDC and AAL77 appear routine and normal. AAL77 was subsequently handed off to the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZID).
- 0840:14 AAL established radio contact with ZID. "Center, American seventy-seven with you, level three thirty (thirty-three thousand feet).
- 0840:16 ZID acknowledged, "American seventy-seven, Indy center, roger, squawk three-seven-four-three." (Squawk is a control instruction to change the transponder setting within the aircraft). AAL77 was subsequently instructed to climb to thirty-five thousand feet and later cleared to navigate direct to the Falmouth navigational aid. When ZID acknowledged AAL77, the sector was responsible for fourteen aircraft; additionally four aircraft were in handoff status to this sector.
- 0850:51 AAL77 acknowledged the clearance to Falmouth. This was the last radio communication with this flight.
- 0854:43 AAL77 began a left turn towards the south without air traffic authorization. The altitude indicated thirty-five thousand feet. Shortly after the turn, the aircraft was observed descending.
- 0856:19 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information is lost on ZID radar displays. There was no longer any radar return information (either primary or secondary) on AAL77 indicated at the ZID radar displays. *Note: The initial review of radar data, and controller personnel statements conducted by ZID did not indicate any primary or secondary radar returns were displayed.*
- 0856:32 ZID controller attempted to contact AAL77, "American seventy-seven, Indy." There was no acknowledgement. ZID also tried to communicate with AAL77 through American Airlines company radios.

Appendix 3 to DOT/OIG Report on Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

- 0858:14 ZID also made several attempts to contact AAL77 through American Airlines company dispatch.
- 0859:00 ZID controllers began coordinating with other controllers to protect the airspace and altitude of AAL77's filed route of flight.
- 0909:00 ZID notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AAL77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.
- 0915:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZID.* The ZID Operations Manager requested that the Traffic Management personnel notify Air Force Search and Rescue of the missing and possibly downed aircraft. The Operations Manager also contacted the West Virginia State Police advising them of a possible downed aircraft and asks if they have any reports of a downed aircraft.
- 0920:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZID.* The ZID Operations Manager contacted the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZAU) and advised the ZAU Operations Manager of his concern that AAL77 may have been hijacked and that he (ZAU Operations Manager) should be on the look out (based on events occurring in New York)..
- 0924:00 Great Lakes Regional Operations Notified Washington Operations Center of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.
- 0925:00 *Between 0925:00 and 0930:00, this time is approximate based on personnel statements from Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control (IAD).* Several IAD controllers working radar positions in the facility observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed. *Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be AAL77.*
- 0933:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from IAD.* An Operations Supervisor at IAD advised the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House, fast moving. Meanwhile, a controller was providing the same information to controllers working at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower (DCA). The IAD Operations Supervisor also provided continuous updates on a critical event teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters building.
- 0933:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from DCA.* An Operations Supervisor at DCA was advised by IAD of the unknown aircraft. The Operations Supervisor at DCA immediately notified the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of the unknown aircraft's location and provided continuous updates.

Appendix 3 to DOT/OIG Report on Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

- 0936:00 Personnel at DCA issued traffic advisories on the unknown aircraft to a military C130 aircraft that had departed Andrews Air Force Base. When the C130 aircraft (GOFER06) reported the unidentified aircraft in sight, the pilot was instructed to follow the unknown aircraft.
- 0938:00 **GOFER06 reported that the unknown aircraft had crashed into the western side of the Pentagon.**

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM

Appendix 4 to DOT/OIG Report on Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral

	AAL11	UAL175	AAL77	UAL93
First Sign	08:20 ¹	08:46 ²	08:56 ³	09:28 ⁴
Probable time flight was known to be in distress	08:25 ⁵	08:52 ⁶	08:56 ⁷	09:32 ⁸
NORAD** NEADS*** Notification	08:40*	09:05*	09:24*	NA*
Estimated Crash time	08:46	09:03	09:38	10:04
All times are Eastern Daylight Time				

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.
2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.
3. AAL77 secondary radar return (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.
4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds; possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and "get out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C for UAL93 has descended 700 feet from assigned altitude
5. A radio transmission is heard telling passengers "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet."
6. UAL175 has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.
7. Aircraft is presumed crashed over Pennsylvania.
8. UAL93 is unresponsive to multiple calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three transmissions indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft.

*These times are derived from the review of the NEADS log.

*North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

FAA's Response to the 9/11 Commission's May 22, 2003, Question for the Record.

**FAA communications with NORAD
On September 11, 2001**

Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges that included FAA field facilities, the FAA Command Center, FAA headquarters, DOD, the Secret Service, and other government agencies. The US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line. The FAA shared real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges, in turn, shared information about actions they were taking.

NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.

U.S. Department of Transportation - Office of Inspector General - Investigations

CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING	TIME: _____ DATE: 8/22/06
ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU: (b)(6), (b)(7)c, Technical Security Specialist	SAC: ASAC: SA(s): FILE: 042R0122001
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.: OST-M40, (b)(6), (b)(7)c	TO: _____ INITIAL _____
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED: Telephone Line Recording OST Security Policy	

SUMMARY:

He was asked if OST (b)(6), (b)(7)c had a prohibition against recording telephone conversations of the Secretary. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he was not aware of such a prohibition and he has been with DOT since 1980. He advised that he will check with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and see if he has heard of anything. He also was not aware of anyone informally running a request to record special telephone lines for use by the Secretary and the request being turned down.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was not aware of OST (b)(6), (b)(7)c issuing any prohibitions against recording encrypted/secure telephone conversations. He is also not aware of a national prohibition.

ACTION REQUIRED?	
ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2006.08.22 15:08:49 -04'00'

U.S. Department of Transportation - Office of Inspector General - Investigations

CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TIME:	DATE: 8/17/06
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU:		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c Technical Security Specialist		TO:	INITIAL
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.:		SAC:	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c		ASAC:	
		SA(s):	
		FILE: 042R0122001	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED:			
Telephone Line Recording Written Determinations			

SUMMARY:

He advised that under DOT Order 1600.17, FAA would need to have a written determination to record telephone lines for public safety or national security reasons. However, no written determination is necessary for all party notices. An all party notification would be one where the parties involved in the discussion are told at the beginning of the conversation that it was going to be recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7) was not aware of FAA having submitted a written determination, but he was going to check with (b)(6), (b)(7)c to see if FAA had any of file. He also advised that if he did not find one that I contact (b)(6), (b)(7)c in OST General Counsel's office, who is (b)(6), (b)(7)c point of contact on these types of issues.

With regard to recording classified communications on STU/STE telephone lines, he was not aware of a prohibition. He recalled having a discussion with (b)(6), (b)(7)c about that. His only warning to FAA was that any recordings made off the STU/STE phones were classified and would have to be handled accordingly.

ACTION REQUIRED?

Wait on response to (b)(6), (b)(7) search for written determinations and a telephone number for (b)(6), (b)(7)c

ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c 2006.08.22 15:05:09 -04'00'

U.S. Department of Transportation - Office of Inspector General - Investigations
CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TIME:	DATE: 05/04/2006
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU:		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c		TO:	INITIAL
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.:		SAC:	
FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c		ASAC:	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED:		SA(s):	
Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC)		FILE: 042R0122001 (f)	

SUMMARY:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the secure telephone equipment (STE) in the WOCC still does not have recording capability.

The WOCC has not presently implemented a recording retention policy. (b)(6), (b)(7)c related that the recorders presently hold about 300 hours of communications after which they overwrite. The WOCC does not keep recordings for a set period of time. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that under most circumstances if an issue arises and a recording is needed the need is identified within a short period of time, days at most. They have not had any problems with recordings not being available when needed.

ACTION REQUIRED?

None

ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE	
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	(b)(6), (b)(7)c 2006.05.04 15:01:36 -04'00'
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	5/4/2006

U.S. Department of Transportation - Office of Inspector General - Investigations
CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input type="checkbox"/>		TIME:	DATE: 6/6/06
CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TO:	INITIAL
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Emergency Communications		SAC:	
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.:		ASAC:	
FAA (b)(6), (b)(7)c		SA(s):	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED:		FILE: 042R0122001 (f)	
Recording of the CCP Lines in the Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC)			

SUMMARY:

In response to questions posed to her on 6/2/06 (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the CCP phone lines are not recorded and could not be recorded because they by-passed the conference bridge, which is where the recording equipment is located. She advised that when they installed the recording equipment they looked into what it might take to record the CCP lines but decide it was not feasible for so few lines. The most important factor was having the lines not be caught in the call queue. Further, there might be situations where the Administrator, her Deputy or even the Secretary might not want to be recorded discussing what-ifs or other pre-operational decisions.

The STE/STU lines are not recorded because Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/9 and Executive Order 12398 (previously 13292) [sic] prohibit it.

ACTION REQUIRED?	
ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c 2006.06.06 16:05:32 -04'00'

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CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TIME:	DATE: 6/2/06
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU:		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
(b)(6), (b)(7)c Emergency Communications		TO:	INITIAL
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.:		SAC:	
FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c		ASAC:	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED:		SA(s):	
Recording of the CCP Lines in the Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC)		FILE: 042R0122001 (f)	

SUMMARY:

The CCP telephone lines that are used by the FAA administrator and deputy administrator to call into the WOCC come in directly from the telephone switch, bypassing the conference bridge--the conference bridge is where the WOCC's recording equipment is located. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that they set-up the CCP lines to by-pass the conference bridge so that the CCP lines would not go through the call queue. If there were an emergency going on and a call from the administrator or her deputy went into the call queue it might not get answered. She did not think that it was intentional that they did not record the CCP lines. However, she advised that she would need to double check and get back with me. I told her that I had a couple of other questions and that I could email all the questions to her, to which she agreed to respond.

ACTION REQUIRED?

Send (b)(6), (b)(7)c email.
 Wait for response from (b)(6), (b)(7)c

ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
Send (b)(6), (b)(7)c email message with questions on 6/2/06.	 William Owens 2006.06.06 15:33:42 -04'00'

U.S. Department of Transportation - Office of Inspector General - Investigations
CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		TIME:	DATE: 6/12/06
CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TO:	INITIAL
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Emergency		SAC:	
Communications		ASAC:	
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.: FAA, 202-493-5468		SA(s): FILE: 042R0122001 (F)	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED: Recording of STE/STU telephone lines in the Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC)			

SUMMARY:

On June 6, 2006, I sent (b)(6), (b)(7)c a follow-up email requesting her assistance in locating provisions in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/9 and Executive Orders 12958 and 13292 that prohibit the recording of classified discussions on STE/STU telephone equipment. During this telephone conversation I asked her if she had a chance to do any further research into the regulations she cited. She advised that she had not because she had been very busy. She advised that those regulations did contain the cites that prohibit recording of classified communications. I told her that I was not able to find them in the regulations she cited, I even pointed out that Executive Order 12398, which she cited in her 6/2/06 email to me, did not pertain to classified materials but instead related to budget issues (specifically, the "President's private sector survey on cost control in the Federal Government"). She agreed to find a point of contact that could provide me with the information I was seeking and email the name and telephone number.

ACTION REQUIRED?
None

ACTION TAKEN? N/A	SIGNATURE & DATE  William Owens 2006.06.12 11:48:14 -04'00'
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CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		TIME:	DATE: 05/04/2006
CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> INCOMING		ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TO:	INITIAL
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Emergency Communications		SAC:	
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.: FAA, 202-493-5468		ASAC:	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED: Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC)		SA(s): FILE: 042R0122001	

SUMMARY:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the secure telephone equipment (STE) in the WOCC still does not have recording capability.

The WOCC has not presently implemented a recording retention policy. (b)(6), (b)(7)c related that the recorders presently hold about 300 hours of communications after which they overwrite. The WOCC does not keep recordings for a set period of time. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that under most circumstances if an issue arises and a recording is needed the need is identified within a short period of time, days at most. They have not had any problems with recordings not being available when needed.

ACTION REQUIRED?	
None	
ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
None	(b)(6), (b)(7)c 2006.05.04 15:01:36 -04'00'
	(b)(6), (b)(7)c 5/4/2006

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C C

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CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING		TIME:	DATE: 10/19/05
ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION			
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU:		TO:	INITIAL
[REDACTED] External Communications		SAC:	[REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.: Federal Aviation Administration [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c		ASAC:	
		SA(s):	
		FILE: 042R0122001	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED: Follow-up questions related to 9-11 Commission Hearing Held in May 2003			

SUMMARY:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c called to advise that she reviewed the testimony from the May 23rd Commission hearing and after her review recalled what it was that upset her about (b)(6), (b)(7)c testimony. At the time, May 23, 2003, it was her understanding that FAA had an open line established within FAA headquarters that included NORAD. In May 2003, (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not know that FAA had established a conference call that included the NMCC but that they dropped off the call.

During (b)(6), (b)(7)c testimony he did not acknowledge the open line. In his testimony he mentioned that FAA's Boston Center was the only conduit of information and that was through NEADS. (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that the testimony left the impression that FAA was not talking to anyone else at NORAD, which at the time she felt was erroneous.

ACTION REQUIRED?

None

ACTION TAKEN?	SIGNATURE & DATE
	[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c 10-25-05

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CONVERSATION RECORD

TYPE: VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCOMING <input type="checkbox"/> OUTGOING	TIME:	DATE: 10/5/05
ROUTING OF THIS INFORMATION		
PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU: (b)(6), (b)(7)c	SAC: (b)(6), (b)(7)c ASAC:	INITIAL
ORGANIZATION & TELEPHONE NO.: Federal Aviation Administration (b)(6), (b)(7)c	SA(s): FILE: 042R0122001	
SUBJECT(S) DISCUSSED: Follow-up questions related to 9-11 Commission Hearing Held in May 2003		

SUMMARY:

I asked (b)(6), (b)(7)c who else went to the hearing with her wherein the testimony of a DOD official upset her. She advised that she recalled Secretary MINETTA, a member of his security staff and one other DOT official. She did not think that Shirley MILLER went with her; she did recall sitting with someone else but did not recall a name. She recalled that Jane GARVEY, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were at the hearing. I asked her if she might be combining hearings or thinking of the June 2004 hearing. At this point I gave her the Internet address for the 9-11 Commission's website (www.9-11commission.gov) and we went to the hearings sections. We went over the participants in the 5-22-03 and 5-23-03 hearings. With regard to the 5-23 hearing—the subject hearing—she advised that she went to that hearing because Secretary MINETTA was testifying. She was the only person from FAA Public Affairs that went. She recalled feeling very alone during that hearing and did not know if there was anyone else there from the other FAA lines of business.

ACTION REQUIRED?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to review the transcript from the 5-23 hearing to see if she could recall what about (b)(6), (b)(7)c testimony upset her and to see if it could help her recollection as to who else from the FAA was with her at the hearing.

ACTION TAKEN? (b)(6), (b)(7)c	SIGNATURE & DATE (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c 10-06-05
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MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OF DARLENE FREEMAN

On September 16, 2005, Darlene FREEMAN, Director of Corporate Learning and Development, AHD-1, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was interviewed in her office located at 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of Transportation (USDOT). FREEMAN was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004 referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, FREEMAN provided the following relevant information:

Immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, FREEMAN was tasked with preparing then-FAA Administrator Jane GARVEY for anticipated congressional hearings. In conjunction with that tasking, FREEMAN assembled a group of FAA employees representing various divisions of the FAA organization to brainstorm about what areas GARVEY would be expected to testify.

During the interview, FREEMAN referred to a briefing book that she created and which includes information that was provided to GARVEY as preparation for her testimony. Her briefing book is divided into 14 tabbed sections; the first two sections deal exclusively with the issue of FAA notification to the military. The remainder of the sections deal with such issues involving aviation security measures put in place post September 11th, the closing of the national airspace and airports. FREEMAN stated that substantive security issues were what was particularly focused upon because it was expected that Congress would require a lot of detail about these issues.

With respect to the issue of FAA notification to the military, FREEMAN recalled that then-Deputy Administrator Monty BELGER was particularly interested in this topic and consequently, FREEMAN directed that the Air Traffic Organization gather information related to this area.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 09/22/05**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

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FREEMAN referred to a document within her records titled, "Notifications to Military," dated September 20, 2001. She stated that it is likely she created the chronology based upon previously created documents that she had obtained from Air Traffic. She explained that she was not the original source of any information contained therein and thus, conducted no independent verification of its content. She recalled though that (b)(6), (b)(7)c of Air Traffic may have shared with her some of New York Center's air traffic logs during the time this document was created.

FREEMAN was shown a copy of what has been identified as the Northeast Air Defense Sector log (NEADS log) for September 11, 2001. She stated that it did not look familiar to her and that she did not believe that Jeff GRIFFITH, former Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services, ever showed it to her.

Within FREEMAN's records was a chart which included times for FAA notification to the military for each of the four flights, herein referred to as the grid chronology. This grid chronology was created by AAT-20 and revised on September 18, 2001. While FREEMAN was certain that she saw drafts of this document, she was able to produce none from her own files. She recalled that Dave CANOLES, Evaluations and Investigations Division Manager, brought her several iterations of the grid chronology because it was a work in progress and because BELGER would make suggestions about what information was needed in the document. FREEMAN recalled specifically that it was BELGER who directed that Air Traffic include "probable time flight was known to be in distress" in the chronology.

FREEMAN additionally stated that she recalled that Air Traffic brought BELGER a draft of a military press release that detailed the military's response times. She recalled that there was discussion regarding a conflict about one of the notification times for which the military was crediting the FAA. FREEMAN stated that the military was claiming that they were notified by the FAA at a time which was impossible because the particular flight was not known to have been in distress at the time. However, because so much time has passed since those events, FREEMAN was not certain about which of the four flights was the focus of the conflict.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On May 24, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 interviewed by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of
 Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of Transportation (USDOT).
 After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of
 the interview, AVERY provided the following relevant information:

Within the Washington Operations Center (WOC) there is a conference bridge with approximately 380 telephone lines. There are ten tape-recorders capable of recording conversations that occur on the conference bridge. The default setting is to not automatically record calls taking place on the bridge. They can activate a tape-recorder on any conference call taking place on the conference bridge.

The Domestic Events Network (DEN), which is run over the conference bridge, uses approximately, on average, 100 lines. The DEN is always tape-recorded.

The main number coming into the WOC (202-267-3333), is automatically recorded anytime that phone is answered. There are a total of six lines that can branch off the main number.

There are four CCP (not further identified) telephone lines, which are used for the Administrator and her Deputies to call into the WOC on a priority basis. The CCP lines are intentionally not recorded. The only way a call that comes in on the CCP can be recorded is if the call is transferred to the conference bridge.

The WOC has approximately eight secure telephone equipment (STE) phones. The STE's are set-up to not allow anyone to record the conversations. (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 was aware that there are secure conference bridges that a STE can work on, which could be recorded, however, the FAA does not own such a bridge.

Prepared by

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 06/06/05

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The secure video system (SVS) in the WOC is not recorded on the FAA side. The FAA is not the owner of the system; they are merely users of the system. The SVS is managed by the Whitehouse Communications Agency.

The FAA WOC also has one fixed and one portable satellite telephone. The FAA owns the equipment and leases the service. The satellite phones are used as a back-up form of communications should the land lines ever go down. The FAA does not have the ability to record the satellite telephones.

The WOC has three facsimile machines that are on a regular telephone line. The lines that the facsimile machines are on are not tape-recorded.

Any of the administrative office lines associate with the WOC are off the FAA's core phone system and are not tape-recorded.

Any tape-recordings of the DEN are held for 30-days. The FAA uses a THALES recorder to tape-record the DEN, and the other conversations on the conference bridge. The maximum recording capacity of the system currently in place is 30-days, hence, the reason the recordings are kept for 30-days. The tape-recordings can be transferred to a DVD in a computer readable format.

Addendum

On June 1, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the following additional information:

There is currently no documented procedure for maintaining the tape-recordings of the DEN.

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

On May 12, 2005, Manager of Strategic Operations Security, System Operations Security, Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed at his place of business by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, GOULD provided the following relevant information:

GOULD advised that FAA Order 7110.320 was the notice initially issued after September 11, 2001, which turned into FAA Order 7110.306a. FAA Order 7110.306a dealt with the FAA's handling of suspicious aircraft. GOULD has been unable to find anyone with a copy of 7110.320.

GOULD advised that once a Department of Defense (DOD) fighter aircraft intercept is authorized, the conversation with the fighter aircraft migrates from the Domestic Events Network (DEN) to the "red switch". The red switch is a secure telecommunications network owned and operated by the DOD. The network is used to discuss classified information. DOD controls who is allowed on the network. To GOULD's knowledge, the conversations on the red switch are not tape recorded. He believes this is because he has not heard an announcement to that effect and there is no tone while the network is active.

GOULD advised that today, four years after activation, there still are no MOUs with the agencies that participate on the DEN. The benefits of an MOU would be to document the rules and responsibilities of each participating agency, establish the agency in charge during specified events, and de-conflict authority of the agency in charge during interdictions. He advised that occasionally there is a conflict between the U.S. Customs Air Operations (USCS-AO) unit and the DOD regarding who is going to initiate and take charge during an interdiction.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 05/13/05

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

GOULD has noted that those who participate from the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)—an operations center run by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)—seem to lack aviation knowledge, resulting in inappropriate reactions to certain security events. As an example, GOULD related that when there is a check-point breach at an airport the TSA chief duty officer at the TSOC will order, in addition to dumping a terminal, that all aircraft that are ready to push back do so immediately and that all aircraft on approach to the airport not be allowed to land. Reactions such as those seem, to GOULD, to be an overreaction and have an unnecessary and negative impact the aviation system.

GOULD advised that the FAA does have a standard operating procedure and a training manual for internal use regarding the DEN, however, he did not think it had been signed by the FAA Administrator.

FAA has proposed to the TSA Interagency Procedures Working Group (IAPWG) that a MOU be drawn-up for the DEN but there has not been much movement in development of an MOU. GOULD advised that after two years, a CON-OPS was recently signed with regard to the National Capitol Regional Coordination Center (NCRCC). It started out as being nearly 50-pages but is now down to around 10-pages in length.

Beginning on April 15, 2005, the need for a code word for all aircraft that are to land at DCA will end. About one year ago the TSA and U.S. Secret Service (USSS) stopped reacting to code word authentication failures because there were so many false alerts. After April 15th, only general aviation aircraft landing at DCA are required to receive a roughly 40-minute pre-departure briefing from the TSA and FAA at the NCRCC. There is still a requirement for all those on board the general aviation aircraft to have been vetted through TSA and for a LEO to be on the flight.

The NCRCC is part of the TSOC. Within the NCRCC there is a "POD" that contains an FAA air traffic representative, a USCS-AO, USSS, and NORAD

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

representative on a 24-hour a day, seven-days a week basis. The FBI is also present but only during normal business hours. The FAA representative at the NCRCC monitors the DEN.

At the Potomac TRACON there is an FAA Eastern Region contractor that serves as the DEN monitor. The monitor on duty during the June 2004, N24SP event had Flight Service Station experience and was not accustomed to air traffic issues. GOULD described the DEN monitor at the TRACON as the single point of failure in the N24SP event. She had failed to pick out N24SP's primary radar target in spite of the fact that her radar screen was flashing "RDR" for N24SP—an indication that it was a primary target.

At the time of N24SP (June 2004), the NCRCC FAA representative had a radar feed that contained HOST data only. Immediately thereafter the NCRCC FAA representative was given the same radar feed as is in the TRACON.

The Power Point (PPT) presentation containing the radar depictions from N24SP is a not true representation of what the Potomac TRACON DEN representative saw. The radar depictions in the PPT are from RAPTOR, which used the ARTS radar from the TRACON. The only way to see the same radar picture that the DEN representative saw is to replay the radar at the facility involved. In the PPT, a plus sign, or virgule, on the radar depictions indicates a primary radar return. The circle around the return was likely added by the specialist who put together the slides to make the return more prominent. At a radar terminal, the ATC has the ability to click on the primary radar return and add a data block if one does not exist. Once that is done the return will blink RDR to indicate it is a primary only return. A letter will be appended to the plus sign after the data block is added. The letter will represent the radar sector handling the aircraft. The term CST on the radar depictions indicates that the return is in coast mode.

GOULD has been working on an Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal (ADAPT) system.

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

With regard to FAA's relationship with DOD, in addition to adding the DEN, the FAA has added liaisons to all the DOD sectors, WADS, NEADS, SEADS, CONR and NORAD. In addition, there are DEN liaisons at the sectors, WADS, NEADS and SEADS. By request of DOD, FAA is moving the DEN liaisons from the WADS, NEADS and SEADS sectors to NORAD and CONR.

GOULD advised that decisions concerning things like the size of the ADIZ/FRZ and separation standards are made at the FAA senior executive level. As an example, any changes to the separation standards require an executive safety study before the standard can be reduced. Things like radar accuracy would have to be taken into account in the study. If one wanted a separation standard that allowed aircraft to go from 5 miles of separation to 1 mile of separation and the radar was only accurate to half a mile, then the two aircraft might collide.

The DOD has the ability to declare an AFIO (Authorization for Interceptor Operations), wherein they take control and responsibility for their own aircraft. GOULD advised that DOD seems reluctant to declare AFIO since the liability during the event, if something like a mid-air collision were to occur, shifts from the FAA to DOD.

In 1996, the FAA removed the military operations specialist positions from many FAA facilities. Since September 11, 2001, FAA has determined that it was a mistake to remove those positions. FAA is in the process of trying to get approval to hire 65 Operational Support Specialist to assist with DEN communications, military liaison, and military exercises, among others activities. GOULD believes this would assist in sensitizing FAA to DOD tracks of interest.

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INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

On May 13, 2005, Danny NOEL, Manager, Emergency Operations Division (AEO-200), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Washington, D.C., and Michael MORSE, Executive Assistant to the Director of Field Operations, FAA, Washington, D.C. were interviewed at their place of employment by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, NOEL and MORSE provided the following relevant information:

NOEL advised that during joint communications exercises, which were developed by FAA and conducted along with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Aviation Security Operations Watch (ASOW), information was injected into the exercises that allowed for the response of FAA air traffic and/or FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC) staff to affect the outcome. The scenarios developed involved only headquarters-level staff and FAA air traffic staff from the Domestic Events Network (DEN). The FAA air traffic aspect was injected into the scenarios by way of paper inserts or people on staff in the WOC who played the role of the air traffic division.

At the conclusion of these exercises, no after-action reports were generated. The reason for not generating after-action reports was because the exercise planners wanted to focus on getting those involved to communicate; they did not want to fix blame for problems identified during the exercises. Though there were no written after-action reports, verbal briefings took place after the exercises.

The aforementioned exercises were primarily conducted during the period June 2002 through January 2003. The goal was to stop performing the exercises once it was perceived that better communication was taking place. However, the exercises actually stopped about the time the second Gulf War began. The main reason for this was because the FAA lacked the resources to continue conducting the exercise and activate the civil reserve air fleet at the same time. Furthermore,

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 5/17/05

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INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

TSA had moved out of the WOC and started its own Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC).

7610.4K is the FAA Order that guides the conduct of exercises.

NOEL advised that regional level exercises might be conducted that do not involve the Emergency Operations Staff (EOS) (i.e., of which he would not have awareness). He is aware that the air traffic division did some exercises that did not involve EOS.

He advised that the after-action report for TOPOFF III, which just recently completed, was still in the process of being finalized.

(AGENT'S NOTE: At this point (b)(6), (b)(7)c joined the interview.)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the FAA had a series of executive level joint exercises with TSA administrators (or equivalent at TSA) when they were still part of the DOT, which have continued since TSA was moved to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The respective agency heads will bring nearly all operational direct reports with them to the exercises. The exercises are geared toward identification of problems and trying to establish changes to identified problems. These are "table-top" exercises that do not involve field components. Any activity that might occur outside the room where the executives are is simulated.

Thus far, five exercises have been completed and a sixth is being planned for May 25, 2005. Given the amount of fluidity in TSA's management it has been difficult, but not impossible, to organize these exercises. With one major difference, that being exercises concerning MANPADS, the executive exercises are focused on the basics.

At the completion of the executive exercises, after-action reports generally are not prepared. During each exercise a note taker is designated. Upon completion of the

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INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

exercise the notes are shared amongst the participants. The fourth exercise does have a typed-up, after-action report that was generated and provided to the Under Secretary of policy at DOT. (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to provide the reporting agent with a copy of that after-action report. Though most exercises do not have after-action reports, corrective actions are taken based on the lessons learned. (b)(6), (b)(7)c suggested that they might need to do a better job of documenting the results of these exercises.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that there are instances after the exercises where changes are made as a result of lessons learned; however, it is not always possible to make a direct correlation between the change and the specific exercise. (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicated that some items learned from the exercises have been incorporated into the current memorandum of understanding (MOU) with TSA. He agreed to provide the reporting agent with a copy of the aforementioned MOU. Further, he indicated that the blue tabbed pages and the blue highlights are some items that came out of previous exercises.

A new MOU between TSA and FAA is currently in draft and nearly approved by all parties. Some examples of elements developed after exercise five are found in attachment 10, paragraph h., which pertains to the requirement to develop agreements of authority between local air traffic managers and the local Federal Security Directors. This came out of exercise five after disagreements arose as to whom to call in order to decide who should direct an aircraft to land for security reasons.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c also cited some elements in the Common Strategy, dated January 3, 2005, as having elements in it that came from lessons learned during exercises.

For exercises one through four the FAA was responsible for setting up and hosting them. Starting with exercise five it was agreed that each agency would take turns setting up and hosting it. TSA hosted five and will host exercise six. It has been agreed that exercise seven will be hosted by FAA.

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the FAA has tried to make conducting exercises part of agreements it has with other agencies. As an example he cited the pending MOU with the Federal Air Marshal Service wherein it states that each agency agrees to participate in joint and multi-agency exercises.

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MEETING WITH FAA-WOC STAFF

On February 22, 2005, Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c met with (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); (b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA; and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA, to discuss policy and procedures concerning the operation of the FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC). During the meeting the reporting agents were provided with WOC policies concerning the handling of hijacked aircraft and bomb threats that were in place on September 11, 2001. Copies of the aforementioned current polices were also provided. A follow-up meeting took place on February 23, 2005, with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The FAA Crisis Management Handbook contains provisions for handling 40 types of crisis events. All divisions within the FAA are bound by the provisions of the Crisis Management Handbook.

On September 11, 2001, the Aviation Command Center (ACC) was a separate room off of the Washington Operations Center. The ACC was activated during a crisis situation, such as a hijacking. The separate room no longer exists, however, an ACC will still be established during a crisis but it is now a part of the operations center complex.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c thought that there was an FAA Order that directed Air Traffic management's response to and handling of a hijacked aircraft. However, they did not know the order number.

On September 11, 2001, the WOC was part of the Deputy Administrators Office. On September 11, 2001, Dan NOEL was the manager of the WOC.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 2/24/05

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MEETING WITH FAA-WOC STAFF

Within the Civil Aviation Security Operations Manual (CASOM) there is a Communications protocol for handling crisis situations. The CASOM is a handbook as opposed to an FAA order. There are provisions within in the CASOM that set local policy on handling air piracy and aviation bombing threats.

ACI is the Intelligence Division that was a part of the former Civil Aviation Security Division. ACI was a 24 hour-a-day operation.

The Air Traffic Organization has an order pertaining to operation of the Domestic Events Network (DEN).

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was responsible for conducting a review of the WOC following 9/11. Further, (b)(6), (b)(7)c authored a memo titled "Restructuring Emergency Operations Personnel," which is dated October 18, 2001, documenting his recommendations.

No changes were implemented in the WOC following the June 2004, N24SP event, which involved the Kentucky Governor's aircraft. Some changes were implemented at the National Capitol Region Coordination Center (NCRCC) and the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) the later of which is physically located in Herndon, VA.

The FAA WOC uses CONFERTECH phone bridge/teleconferencing software. On September 11, 2001, they used a version of CONFERTECH that is similar to that which is currently in use by the WOC. When the WOC initiates an outbound call, the CONFERTECH software has the ability to display information about the person the WOC called, including the name, which is input by the WOC technician that is running the teleconference, and telephone number. However, when the teleconference is set-up to accept incoming telephone calls the telephone number is displayed but not the name of the party that called into the teleconference.

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MEETING WITH FAA-WOC STAFF

The WOC did not have the ability to record any of the lines on September 11, 2001. Following 9/11 that capability was added. However, there are some secure communication lines that are not recorded.

The WOC "Guidelist" that was followed and completed on September 11, 2001, is no longer available. The Guidelist is used, in the event such as an aerial hijack, to provide a list of those to be contacted and a form with blanks to indicate the time that each person was contacted. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that they have previously looked for the list and believe that it was lost during the renovations to the WOC.

The National Military Command Center (NMCC) was located in the Pentagon. The NMCC was evacuated on September 11, 2001.

(AGENT'S NOTE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c had previously provided the reporting agent with select copies of WOC polices that were in-place on 9/11 and those currently in-place.) (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to provide the reporting agents with the dates for any polices that are not already dated. Further, she agreed to verify whether the Crisis Management Handbook, Chapter 4, Air Piracy that was provided as being in place on September 11, 2001 is the correct version of that policy. She questioned whether that is the correct version since tab 4-2, Crisis Management Telephone Net, indicates that "...all emergency nets are recorded."

On September 11, 2001, (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c someone in the ACC as the Tactical
Net coordinator.

- # -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c			OIG	N	N	N	MOI generated for this interview	✓
OSMUS	Lynne	9/24/2004	OIG	Y	Y	Y		
(b)(6), (b)(7)c			OIG	N	N	N	ROC generated for this interview	✓
			OIG	Y	Y	Y		
			OIG	Y	Y	Y		
			OIG	Y	Y	Y		
			OIG	Y	Y	Y		
TRANSC.	A date in this field indicates transcripts still pending							

INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

On April 11, 2005, Danny NOEL, Manager, Emergency Operations Division (AEO-200), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Washington, D.C., was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, NOEL provided the following relevant information:

NOEL advised that AEO-200 is currently part of the FAA Office of Security and Hazardous Materials (OSHM). Prior to September 11, 2001, AEO-200 was part of the Deputy Administrator's Staff. In approximately October 2001, AEO-200 was reorganized and a Senior Executive Level position was created as its head and it also included the Washington Operations Center (WOC). That Senior Executive position was filled by David CANOLES. However, in February 2004, due to budgetary concerns expressed by Congress, AEO-200, to include the WOC, was removed from the Deputy Administrator's staff, the senior executive position was done away with and it was put under OSHM.

NOEL assumed his current position in March 2000, after (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AEO-200 is comprised of four teams. The first is the Continuity of Operations branch (COOP). The COOP is responsible for providing alternative worksites that include equipment and files containing polices and such for FAA senior leadership and key expertise. The second is Command and Control Communications (C3), which is responsible for providing emergency operations communications support. C3 also maintains FAA's VHF FM and HF radio communications systems for daily and emergency communications usage. C3 is in the process of implementing satellite telephones and converting the Department of Defense's old Auto DIN telephone system to the new Defense Messaging System (DMS). The DMS is used in the air traffic facilities. The third team is the communications security

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 4/11/05

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INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

team, which provides communications security, in the form of cryptography telephone equipment for C3.

The fourth team is the emergency operations team, which is responsible for coordinating personnel with situational expertise during emergencies; preparing, planning and conducting exercises, and handling crisis management. There are primarily five types of exercises in which the FAA participates. The first are interdepartmental, which are national exercises coordinated government wide. An example of such an exercise would be TOPOFF III that concluded last week.

The second type of exercise are the military exercises. During the "Cold War" and immediately thereafter FAA's role in these exercises was to support military mobilizations to Europe. The mobilization exercises then evolved into multiple theater mobilizations and now to more terrorism based exercises.

A third type of exercise the FAA participates in are TSA and FAA senior executive level exercises. These exercises normally relate to air piracy and MANPAD (surface to air missile) issues.

The fourth type of exercises is COOPing exercises. The Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC65), published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, requires annual COOP exercises. The FAA had been performing COOP exercises since 2000, even before FPC65¹. Further, in 2001, the FAA activated its COOP on a number of occasions.

The fifth type of exercise are communications exercises. The FAA units involved in these were primarily the WOC and Aviation Command Center in Herndon, VA. These exercises were conducted jointly with the TSA until about one year ago. They had the intended purpose of helping to establish a cross flow of information from one organization to the next. For example, the TSA would be injected with one piece of information and then the FAA was injected with another. Neither

¹ FPC65 is dated July 26, 1999. (<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/fpc-65.htm>)

INTERVIEW OF DANNY NOEL

party would be able to determine the full extent of what was happening unless they shared the information they were injected with. Immediately following 9/11 the FAA and TSA would conduct up to two of these exercises per week. For about the last year neither the FAA nor the TSA has conducted this type of exercise.

Normally, the interdepartmental, COOP, and military exercises are documented with after action reports. However, the TSA and FAA senior executive and communications exercises do not document their after action analysis. The communications exercises were considered "no-fault" and they had verbal briefings after the fact, from which the participants learned where improvements were needed. According to NOEL, after the senior executive exercises it was nearly impossible to get TSA to sit down for an after-action analysis because they were being pulled in so many different directions. NOEL was not aware if FAA conducted its own after action analysis but agreed to check on that point and get back to the reporting agent.

NOEL advised that FAA would like to conduct more cross organizational, FAA-wide, exercises but is hampered by funding problems.

The only exercises that FAA participated in that were no-notice were the communications exercises it conducted with TSA.

AEO-200 does not conduct exercises for the Air Traffic Organization (ATO). The ATO, however, is involved in nearly all exercises. NOEL advised that ATO might conduct their own exercises but that the reporting agent would need to talk with (b)(6), (b)(7)c the ATO emergency planner. Douglas GOULD is part of (b)(6), (b)(7)c staff.

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

On March 29, 2005, Douglas GOULD Manager of Strategic Operations Security, System Operations Security, Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, GOULD provided the following relevant information:

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts weekly live exercises with the participation of the FAA. Additionally, the FAA also participates in periodic congressionally mandated exercises like TOPOFF¹, which are coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security, and its own quarterly exercises. The FAA's exercises are planned by the FAA Office of Operations and Emergency Planning, which falls under the Security Division. The person primarily responsible for preparing the FAA's exercises is Dan NOEL.

Though the FAA Security Division is the primary point of contact for exercises administered by external agencies, FAA's participation in the exercises are frequently coordinated with the FAA ATO. Most aviation exercises involve air traffic facilities and/or the domestic events network (DEN), which is staffed by the ATO. Further, the ATO is responsible for providing deconfliction during exercises to ensure multiple exercises are not taking place within the same air space and to minimize impact on the national air space.

Following an exercise, there will be a post event teleconference and an after action summary will be prepared, which is referred to as a "hot wash." The agency

¹ TOPOFF offers agencies and jurisdictions a way to exercise a coordinated national and international response to a large-scale, multipoint terrorist attack. It allows participants to test plans and skills in a real-time, realistic environment and gain the in-depth knowledge that only experience can provide. (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0594.xml)

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 03/29/05

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INTERVIEW OF DOUGLAS GOULD

responsible for coordinating the exercise is normally responsible for preparing the hot wash. Though he was not certain, he thought that NOEL may prepare a hot wash after the FAA exercises. GOULD, however, was unaware of an air traffic facility manager preparing any hot wash specific to air traffic's performance during the exercise.

FAA "piggy backs" on the DOD exercises, thus incidentally providing the controllers involved with training. Many of these exercises involve scenarios where the subject aircraft is acting in a suspicious manner. All of the exercises previously described are planned in advance. The involved air traffic facilities are notified about the exercise in advance and usually bring in extra personnel to staff it. The military exercises are coordinated with DOD through (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c the FAA liaisons at CONR.

GOULD was unaware of FAA ATO conducting its own exercises to test preparedness of air traffic controllers in looking for and responding to things like unexpected primary radar targets. GOULD advised that the FAA Administrator has the authority to require such tests; however, his experience has shown that any increase in controller accountability is not well received.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On March (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c DOT, Office of Inspector
 General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the
 purpose of the interview (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the following relevant information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was hired by DOT in October 2003 and assumed his current position
 in June 2004. As Director of OET he is responsible for the DOT Crisis
 Management Center (CMC), continuity of operations program, continuity of
 government, and CMC surge events¹; coordination of exercises like TOPOFF III;
 and coordinating with NATO and the Regional Emergency Transportation
 Coordinators.

Prior to (b)(6), (b)(7)c becoming the (b)(6), (b)(7)c I (ph) was
 the (b)(6), (b)(7)c

When (b)(6), (b)(7)c started as (b)(6), (b)(7)c was already a 24 hour a
 day operation. He did not know when the CMC was brought on-line 24 hours a
 day. He did not recall who was responsible for bringing the CMC on-line 24 hours
 a day. He suggested that the reporting agent speak with DOT Chief of Staff John
 FLAHERTY.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c believes that when he started as (b)(6), (b)(7)c that the FAA was
 already providing, via electronic e-mail notification to the CMC and senior DOT
 officials, including the DOT Chief of Staff, notice of significant events at the
 FAA. This information is currently sent to Blackberry pagers. There are roughly

¹ Surge events occur when there is a pre-determined incident or threat to transportation causing designated
 personnel from the various DOT operating administrations to assemble in order to handle matters associated
 with the incident or threat.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 3/22/05

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

one to two dozen notices per day. These notices are independent of the information broadcast over the FAA's Domestic Events Network (DEN). The types of information the FAA's sends over the email system include aircraft turning around due to an in-flight emergency, intoxicated passengers, security related events that effect the national airspace, and FAA radar or air traffic facility problems. The CMC receives the notices and alerts from the FAA in a matter of minutes. (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that the CMC is receiving the information in a timely and efficient manner. He is not aware of any specific initiatives underway to further changes communications between FAA and the CMC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c thought that the CMC was added to the DEN within the last three months. The CMC watch standers do not participate in the DEN, they just monitor it. However, during events that might require the participation of a senior DOT official, the CMC has the ability to communicate over the DEN. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that there was a specific event that caused the CMC to be added to the DEN, however, he could not recall what that event was.

The CMC staff is a mix of staff detailed from the operating administrations, including one FAA employee, contractors and USCG officers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c is considered an enabler in the proposed DOT Emergency Response Organization. He suggested that the reporting agent speak with COS FLAHERTY if further information about the DOT Emergency Response Organization was needed.

There is one government wide National Response Plan with 15 annexes. Each annex is broken down by function with a primary agency responsible for each annex. DOT is responsible for annex 1.

The CMC does interact with the Transportation Security Administration's Transportation Security Operations Center. The CMC has someone on call to the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) when it is activated. The

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is part of the National Response Plan and when activated is adjacent to the HSOC. The IIMG is staffed by senior government officials who are dealing with strategic, forward looking issues. The HSOC tends to be more tactical and situational.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was aware of the situation involving the KY governor but was not involved with it. He is not aware of any changes having being implemented after that incident.

With regard to the FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC) and the DEN, (b)(6), (b)(7)c deals with (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not think that (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c was associated with the WOC in any way. He believes that (b)(6), (b)(7)c deals with operational issues.

The FAA is the only operating administration that has its own communication center. MARAD will surge into the CMC when they are involved in a large activation of reserve vessels. When they surge, MARAD will use a room adjacent to the CMC.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On March 10, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Washington, DC was telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the following relevant information:

From approximately (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c had been the (b)(6), (b)(7)c to the FAA. In 1990, he started with the FAA as a (b)(6), (b)(7)c in Washington DC. In roughly (b)(6), (b)(7)c he took a position with the FAA Military Operations. In (b)(6), (b)(7)c In (b)(6), (b)(7)c He returned to Washington DC in early 2003 to take an (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c In March 2004, he assumed his current position.

On September 11, 2001 (9/11), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c On the Saturday following 9/11 (b)(6), (b)(7)c received a telephone call from (b)(6), (b)(7)c Acting FAA Deputy Administrator, during which BELGER told (b)(6), (b)(7)c that he and the FAA Administrator (Jane GARVEY) had been thinking that on 9/11 things could have been better in the Washington Operations Center. BELGER asked (b)(6), (b)(7)c if he would look at the structure, function and capabilities of the WOC and make suggestions for improvement. (b)(6), (b)(7)c reported to FAA Headquarters on the next Monday and began working on reviewing the WOC. BELGER did not elaborate on what he thought could have been better.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c worked alone on the project but frequently interfaced with (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c WOC Director; Danny NOEL, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (position unknown).

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 03/10/05

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c did not prepare a report of his review's findings, however, he did prepare a memorandum titled "ACTION: Restructuring Emergency Operations Personnel," which is dated October 18, 2001. The memo addressed recommendations for reorganization of the WOC and the EOS. (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not memorialize any of his equipment based recommendations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c found that prior to 9/11 the different lines of business in the FAA, such as Security, Air Traffic and Airway Facilities all used the WOC differently. At the time, both the WOC and EOS staff worked directly for the Deputy Administrator.

Prior to 9/11 there were three organizations involved in communications, first is the WOC, which is responsible for command and control for all communications within the FAA. On 9/11 information was to flow into the WOC and be passed along to the appropriate parties. The WOC staff was responsible for establishing teleconferences.

Next was the Aviation Crisis Center (ACC), which was activated only in select situations and only during major incidents, like a hijacking. The ACC was not run by the WOC, it was separate and was run by the Security Division. Furthermore, the ACC was a separate function from Security's 24 hour a day, seven days a week intelligence watch.

Finally, there was the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC was activated by the EOS staff on an ad-hoc basis to handle certain types of crisis situations. The EOS staff was responsible for planning exercises, running the continuation of operations (COOP) centers, and managing the civilian reserve aircraft fleet (CRAF). Further, during, for example, weather related emergencies the EOS managed the Crisis Management Center (CMC) (also known as the EOC) for the duration of the emergency. After the Deputy Administrator approved

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

activation of the CMC, a pre-determined list of staff, depending on the situation, would be called upon to staff the CMC. The CMC was separate from the WOC.

The ACC and the CMC/EOC are essentially the same thing; one is staffed by Security while the other is staffed by the EOS. One or the other could be set-up in the same room connected to the WOC on the 10th floor of the FAA Headquarters.

During his review, HATFIELD concluded that the WOC was merely a communications center as opposed to an operations center. The reason for this assessment was that the WOC lacked staff with an operational skill set. The WOC staff was generalists with an emphasis on telecommunications. (b)(6), (b)(7)b opined that for the WOC to be a true operations center, they need staff with the skills to receive information, interpret it correctly, manipulate the information and turn it into an actionable event. This capability did not exist on 9/11.

As an example, (b)(6), (b)(7)c explained that in 2000 BELGER might not find out about some event until a day or so after and would go into the WOC to express his dissatisfaction with the WOC staff. He did this when he found out that the WOC knew of the event but failed to notify him. It would turn out that the staff was unaware that the particular event was of significance to BELGER and that he needed or would want to be briefed. Occasionally, the staff was unaware that the event was a part of something that BELGER had an ongoing interest in. (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that having WOC staff with an operational background would help to alleviate the aforementioned problem.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c recommended that the EOS should be just one function under the WOC; they should be merged into one unit. He recommended that the person over the WOC be at the senior executive level¹ and report directly to the Deputy Administrator. Further, the director over the WOC and EOS should have operational skills, such as air traffic or flight standards, as should the shift supervisor.

¹ On 9/11, the individuals in charge of the WOC and the EOS were only grade GS14 and 15.

INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Further, as (b)(6), (b)(7)c review progressed, he verbally recommended to BELGER equipment, space and communications upgrades. Within three weeks of 9/11 the capability to record the operational lines within the WOC was added.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that it would be important, should another significant event occur, that they be able to reconstruct what happened during the crisis. (b)(6), (b)(7)c worked on implementing the equipment upgrade in the WOC.

After 9/11, the FAA implemented the Domestic Events Network (DEN). As the Director of System Operations Security, (b)(6), (b)(7)c is responsible for the DEN. The DEN is an operational telephone network that is in place at all air traffic facilities. It is available to report any type of suspicious aviation activity. In addition, other government agencies participate in the DEN, including, but not limited to, NORAD, the FBI watch center, Transportation Security Operations Center, all NORAD defense sectors, and Washington Capitol Police.

The DEN is run by operational staff from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization. Though, currently, it is physically located in the WOC, it is not a function of the WOC. He advised that if something of import comes over the DEN the personnel staffing the DEN will lean over to the personnel staffing the WOC and explain what is going on and its significance. It is then up to the WOC to make the appropriate notifications.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that further improvement in the WOC is necessary and explained that the Department of Transportation (b)(6), (b)(7)c is frustration with information coming from FAA. He cited as a recent example, there was a snow storm in Chicago that cause many airport delays. (b)(6), (b)(7)c first learned of this event from the news, not the FAA. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the WOC was made aware of the weather delays but did not pass it along.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that if someone with operational sensitivity had been running the WOC when that information came in they would have known it was a significant issue and thought to pass it along to the DOT Crisis Management

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Center (CMC), which is like the WOC but located in DOT headquarters. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that the CMC is not a participant in the DEN. He opined that the CMC is likely on the pager list for the WOC.

Normally, a weather related incident, such as that described above, would come into the WOC through the FAA Command Center in Herndon, VA. The Command Center has a list of individuals/groups it pages or calls during significant events. The CMC is not normally paged by the Command Center. Whether the WOC pages certain people/groups or not is subjective. The individuals in the WOC are not operational people and can not make the same type of informed decisions about the impact a particular event might lead to and then who needs to be informed. Since the WOC staff does not have operational level skills, they do not always know how to interpret information. If the information does not fit nicely into a preexisting checklist then it might not get passed along to everyone who needs to know. However, (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that if the information was received by someone with an air traffic background they might recognize its significance and notify additional individuals.

Today, the DEN would operationally manage a hijacking. The WOC would still be involved but at the communications center level. The ACC would still be brought up but also as a communications function.

Prior to 9/11, if an air traffic center or tower confirmed a hijacking they would pick-up the "red phone" and dial the nearest air defense sector. They would then call the Regional Operations Center (ROC) and the Command Center in Herndon, VA. The ROC would in turn call the WOC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not know if the call to the air defense sector was listed in an FAA order or policy or if it was just common sense.

Immediately following 9/11 Dave CANOLES was named the Director of Emergency Operations with a direct report to the Deputy Administrator. This was a senior executive position, as had been suggested by (b)(6), (b)(7)c However,

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INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

about a year ago, the WOC reverted back into the pre-9/11 structure. The WOC was moved out from under CANOLES and placed under Security. The reason this was done was to reduce the number of direct reports to the Deputy Administrator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c thought it was important to have a senior executive over the WOC with a direct report to the Deputy Administrator for purpose of being able to accomplish various tasks across all FAA lines of business. Security is not an operational unit and further, they no longer have the intelligence function.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that there is not much function left for Security.

The ROCs are not on the DEN. The ROCs are really communications centers, as opposed to operational centers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c suggested that the reporting agent speak with (b)(6), (b)(7)c about the DOT Emergency Response Organization.

In commenting on the Commission's most recent report, (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that there should be a central point of accountability for communications if something were to happen again. His vision is for a Transportation Intelligence and Incident Fusion Center that merges the functions of emergency operations, the DEN, a command center and intelligence into one unit. He opined that there should be a central location for a fusion of information. With the fusion of information the intelligence staff would be able to meld with the incident response staff to make connections between current events and the intelligence that they had been receiving. At this time there is no fusion center in FAA or the DOT.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c also opined that with regard to intelligence, the various government agencies that generate or collect intelligence will receive it and then filter it. They then pass it along to the agencies like the TSA who then further filter the information and then pass along that further filtered information to the DOT.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

After DOT receives the information it is further filtered and then passed along to FAA who filters it yet further until they pass it along to the agency's leaders.

As things presently stand he finds that the operational folks do not necessarily know that they should react a certain way to an event because they do not have prior knowledge that it is bad; because the intelligence had not been passed along to them. On the other hand they might treat another event as though it were bad only to find out that the intelligence folks knew about it and already dismissed, however, the operational folks were again not told about it.

While he served as Air Traffic Division manager in the Eastern region was he not given any intelligence briefings.

- # -

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9/11 COMMISSION, MONOGRAPH #3 BRIEFING

In the February 10, 2005, New York Times is an article by Eric LICHTBLAU titled "9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings; Panel is Critical of F.A.A.". The NY Times article references a previously undisclosed report from the 9/11 Commission heralding new information about FAA's failures leading up to 9/11. The article indicates that the Commission's report claims that even though FAA Security had produced 52 intelligence reports (April 2001 through September 2001) mentioning Bin Laden or Al Qaeda, the FAA Failed to pursue domestic security measures that could have altered the events of 9/11.

On February 11, 2005, the National Archives released an unclassified but heavily redacted version of the Commission report cited in the NY Times article. This report is the Commission's third monograph.

There are two parts to the monograph. The first part is titled: "We Have Some Planes': The Four Flights – a Chronology" and the second is titled "Civil Aviation Security and the 9/11 Attacks". The first part of the monograph is a very detailed timeline of the hijackings. The second part of the monograph cites FAA's intelligence failures. It is critical of FAA's failure to piece together the threat information it was receiving from the intelligence community and its reaction to the threats in strengthening FAA's layered approach to security. The remainder of this summary will focus on the second part of the monograph.

Though the monograph is new the essence of its contents are not. On January 26, 2004, the Commission released, during their seventh public hearing, a copy of Staff Statement No. 3, titled "The Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks". Staff Statement 3 could be an executive summary for part two of the recently released monograph.

Below are some of the significant findings cited in part two of the monograph:

Though the FAA was the US agency primarily responsible for assessing intelligence for its relevance specific to US commercial aviation they were required to rely upon information provided to it from U.S. intelligence agencies, including FBI, CIA and State Department.

FAA had perceived weaknesses in domestic intelligence reporting. FAA did not always receive the domestic intelligence that was collected by the intelligence community.

FAA had no advanced information to indicate that any group was plotting to hijack aircraft (a/c) in the U.S. and use them as weapons.

Before action could be taken to strengthen security, FAA policymakers required either a security incident or “specific and credible” evidence of an “actionable” threat.

FAA had considered that terrorists might use a/c as weapons. However, FAA and air carrier officials perceived the threat as being predominately overseas.

Throughout the 1990’s, FAA Security’s own intelligence assessments expressed concern about the growing threat of terrorists to civil aviation.

Between March 14 and May 15, 2001, FAA conducted classified briefings at 19 of the nation’s largest airports about the growing threat posed by terrorists.

The aforementioned FAA briefings stated that from the hijackers’ perspective, “A domestic hijacking would likely result in a great number of American hostages but would be operationally more difficult. We don’t rule it out....If, however, the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable.”

FAA Security communicated threat information it had gathered to agency leadership in the form of daily intelligence summaries (DIS). The chart below lists the break down of the summaries produced during the period April 1, 2001 through September 10, 2001.

Number of FAA DIS’ that mentioned al Qaeda and/or Bin Ladin threats overseas ¹	52
Of the 52, number that mentioned hijacking as capability that al Qaeda was training for or possessed	5
Number of FAA DIS’ that mentioned terrorist suicide operations (not with regard to a/c)	2
Number of FAA DIS’ that mentioned protective measures taken for Genoa Italy G-8 summit to protect against air attack	1
Total number of FAA DIS summaries issued 4/1 – 9/10/01	105

¹ From the referenced footnote in the monograph it appears that some of the DIS’ that discuss al Qaeda talk about overseas threats, while others talk about US interests in the context of military and diplomatic facilities or of commercial interests overseas (See footnote 435).

In July 2001, FAA attended a National Security Council Counterterrorism Security Group (NSCCSG) meeting at the White House to discuss with domestic agencies heightened security concerns. During the NSCCSG meeting the FAA was told that the threat was understood to be abroad.

In June/July 2001, the U.S. intelligence community sensed that "something was going to happen" that summer. During the summary of 2001, an act of sabotage or a traditional hijacking was of concern to FAA.

In 2001, the FAA issued 16 informational security circulars. However, because the intelligence FAA received that summer did not provide details about a specific plot, the circulars did not require a significant upgrade of security. Following the NSCCSG meeting FAA issued 7 circulars. The chart below lists the break down of their content.

Number of FAA circulars that described threats posed by surface to air missiles	1
Number of FAA circulars that described threats overseas	5
Number of FAA circulars that described specific threats within the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel	1
Total number of FAA circulars issued July 2001 through September 10, 2001	7

From July 27, 2001, through September 10, 2001, the FAA issued four security directives. The chart below lists the break down of their content.

Number of FAA Security Directives (SD) that provided special security for chartered flights to/from Cuba	1
Number of FAA SDs that extended measures for clearing LEOs through sterile areas in airports	1
Number of FAA SDs that added names to the no fly list	1
Total number of FAA Security Directives July 27, 2001 through September 10, 2001	4

FAA officials cited the absence of hijackings as evidence that checkpoint screening was working effectively to stop hijacking.

FAA perceived the overseas threat from hijacking to be on the rise prior to 9/11. FAA cited in a July 17, 2001, proposed rulemaking to improve passenger screening and other security measures the presences of terrorist cells in the U.S. and their interest in targeting the transportation sector. OMB held up implementation of this rule because of concern over costs.

- # -

INTERVIEW OF JOHN FLAHERTY

On December 20, 2004, John FLAHERTY, Chief of Staff, United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), Washington, D.C. was interviewed at his place of business located at 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), USDOT. FLAHERTY was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004, referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Commission) to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. Also present was Laura McCLURE, Policy Assistant to the Secretary. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, FLAHERTY provided the following relevant information:

FLAHERTY became interested in the timeline of September 11, 2001, after the USDOT Secretary testified at the 9-11 Commission hearing in May 2003 and the Secretary and his staff spoke with the Commission. During the aforementioned, FLAHERTY became aware that the Commission had information that conflicted with the timeline presented by the military, especially with regard to the flight that hit the Pentagon (AMERICAN AIRLINES Flight 77 [AA77]). Further, FLAHERTY advised he felt that the Office of Secretary (OST) had not yet performed a thorough review of FAA's version of events.

In the aftermath of September 11th, OST concentrated its efforts on enhancing aviation security measures, overseeing direct-action teams, enhancing cockpit security, staffing up the Federal Air Marshal program and establishing the Transportation Security Administration. Up until the May 2003 time period OST had not asked anyone to explain what had happened on September 11th. FLAHERTY was therefore interested in learning what the FAA was telling everyone about the 11th.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 12/20/04

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INTERVIEW OF JOHN FLAHERTY

On a Monday or a Tuesday (June 3, 2003), FLAHERTY went to the FAA and was given a presentation about the timeline of events for September 11th. During the presentation it became clear to FLAHERTY that the FAA had not prepared the timeline for his sole benefit. The timeline appeared to be pre-existing and was quite elaborate. It was during the June 2003 meeting that FLAHERTY first saw FAA's September 11th timelines. FLAHERTY did not know about FAA's communication with the military on September 11th until the presentation.

During the FAA's presentation FLAHERTY raised three issues that he suggested the FAA should be prepared to resolve.

- 1) On September 11th, after AMERICAN AIRLINES Flight 11 was hijacked someone from an FAA field facility called FAA headquarters in Washington DC to provide a report. They spoke with (first name unknown) (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph). There was a long gap between the point where (b)(6), (b)(7)c received the information and when he passed it along to others in FAA HQ. FLAHERTY opined that the FAA should be prepared to respond to questions about the gap.
- 2) The FAA's timeline presentation regarding AA77 referenced points on a map that depicted when the FAA controller received AA77's radar return. However, the presentation lacked information about the times and distances as the flight progressed towards the Pentagon. FLAHERTY opined that the information did not contain enough detail and was not accurate enough. FLAHERTY was focused on this item due to questions he had received from the press about when the U.S. Government picked-up, on radar, AA77 prior to it having hit the Pentagon. The FAA's presentation did not adequately answer the question for FLAHERTY.
- 3) FLAHERTY also was interested in understanding the sense of urgency the FAA pursued in operational crisis communications on September 11th. He wanted to know minute-by-minute and second-by-second how the FAA handled the information they received.

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INTERVIEW OF JOHN FLAHERTY

As previously mentioned, FLAHERTY had received questions from the press about when FAA picked up the radar track for AA77. However, FLAHERTY had not received and did not tender any questions about when FAA notified the military on September 11th.

FLAHERTY did not specifically task the FAA with anything as a follow-up to the meeting in June 2003. However, based on certain individuals having previously dealt with him they may have decided to create a consolidated chronology in an anticipatory manner.

Prior to his June 2003 meeting with the FAA FLAHERTY was not aware the FAA had prepared any timelines. A May 29, 2003, e-mail message from (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c expressed FLAHERTY's anticipated response from the FAA when he requested to see a timeline. FLAHERTY expected that the FAA would tell him that they could not provide a timeline since the information was with the FBI. The message essentially relates that would not be an acceptable response because the FAA was expected to have kept a copy of everything they provided the FBI.

(AGENT'S NOTE: FLAHERTY was shown a copy of an FAA chronology attached to a June 13, 2003, email message from Shirley MILLER to Lindy KNAPP. The email reads, in part, "[a]t the meeting w/ John... he sounded like he preferred a master chronology w/ everything." The chronology is titled "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11th, 2001.")

FLAHERTY advised that he did not recall having previously seen the chronology. Upon a quick review of the chronology, he noted in several places that it lacked sufficient detail while in other places it seemed contradictory. FLAHERTY requested a copy of the chronology and offered to comment on it.

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INTERVIEW OF JOHN FLAHERTY

During his June 2003 meeting with the FAA, FLAHERTY advised he was hoping that their briefing regarding the timing of events on September 11th would match up with the Secretary's recollection of events based upon the real time information he was receiving from the White House. However, according to FLAHERTY, the FAA's timeline of events did not match up with what the Secretary recalled.

FLAHERTY did not recall if the USDOT provided any items during the 14-day period following the Commission hearings in May 2003. During this period those that testified could provide additional information for the record.

FLAHERTY was shown a copy of the FAA's May 22, 2003, question for the record (QFR), titled "FAA Communications with NORAD On September 11, 2001." He advised that could not comment on the item since he could not verify the accuracy of the information it contained.

FLAHERTY advised that his advice to the FAA, had they asked him, upon learning that information in the QFR was incorrect would have been as follows:

- 1) Meet with counsel for USDOT's;
- 2) ensure that their timeline of events was accurate;
- 3) meet with counsel for FAA; and
- 4) meet with the Commission and provide the necessary clarification.

FLAHERTY did not recall that there was a timeline in the Secretary's briefing package that was prepared for his testimony before the Commission. FLAHERTY opined that OST did not have a command of the timeline and, therefore, felt it inappropriate to allow the Secretary to testify to it at the May 2003 Commission hearing.

FLAHERTY advised that during the May/June 2003 time period he was not really following the Commission's hearings.

INTERVIEW OF JOHN FLAHERTY

FLAHERTY advised that in May 2003, the day before the Secretary's testimony, Linda SCHUESSLER came to USDOT to provide a briefing. She began to provide an oral briefing that indicated that FAA headquarters ordered the ground stop on September 11th. Upon hearing this, FLAHERTY told her to stop because he knew that was not true. However, SCHUESSLER "pushed back" indicating that those were the facts. Also present during this meeting was the USDOT Inspector General.

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Investigation Summary

User ID: I2HWLO Date: 01/01/2004

Case Details

Case No: 042R0122001 FY Old Status: Open
 Title: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

Add New Case Add Associated Case Search Brief Brief Edit

Lead Case Agent: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Assigned Region: Region 2
 Case Started: 08/24/2004 Sup. No.:
 Shared: Congressional? Qui Tam:
 CC#: Civil Comp. No:
 DOT Element: Federal Aviation Administration
 Priority: Other Investigations
 Subject: Other

Jurisdiction / ROI

City & State: NEW YORK NY
 Judicial District: Southern District of New York
 Last Name First MI
 AUSA:
 Initial Consultation: Type Date
 Report of Investigation

Days / Costs

Staff Hours: 0
 Case Elapsed Days:
 Travel Cost:

Base / Associated Cases

	Case No	Title	Status
Base Case: >			
Associated Cases: >			

IV-MAIL

Text Pages

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 6:06 AM
To: Beitel, Rick
Subject: FW: TODAY'S MEETING WITH DOD IG

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Please advise if you have any different thoughts.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 6:03 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: TODAY'S MEETING WITH DOD IG

(b)(6), (b)(7)

Thanks for the update.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Rick, Please advise if you have any different thoughts.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: 9/15/04 4:15 PM
Subject: TODAY'S MEETING WITH DOD IG

(b)(6), (b)(7)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Senior Investigator
U.S. Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
400 7th Street, S.W.
NASSIF Building, Room 7324
Washington, DC 20590-0001
Tel: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Fax: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2004 3:47 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc:
Subject: Case Plan



042R0122001_c 042R0122001_c
se plan.pdf (38 .seplan bullets_2.

Rick,

Sorry to bother you again, but I have some additional items for you. It was suggested that since this case is

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, (b)(7)e

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)

P.S.: I will be at the range tomorrow 9-15 but can be reached on my cell phone (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2004 2:14 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Team 8 Request



9-11Comm_tea
} items requestec

Rick,

Attached, please find a list of items from the Commission's Team 8 list that I proposed we request. If there are any additional items that we should request from the list please advise and I'll make the change. Once this list looks good I will be glad to also submit this request to (b)(6), (b)(7)c Please advise.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General
INVESTIGATIVE CASE PLAN

ORIGINAL

CASE NUMBER	CASE TITLE	ORIGINAL DATE
042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	8/26/04

LEAD AGENT:	APPROVED BY	DATE:
(b)(6), (b)(7)c		

ALLEGATIONS OR REASONS FOR THE INVESTIGATION:

Case opened at the direction of DAIGI, DOT-OIG based on a referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the Commission). During the Commission's investigation they discovered evidence that public statements made by North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials at a the Commission hearing on May 23, 2003, and elsewhere, regarding the actions of NORAD and FAA officials in responding to the 9-11 attacks were not accurate. The Commission did not investigate whether these statements were knowingly false. The Commission specifically noted four statements made by retired General Larry ARNOLD in his testimony on the 23rd of May as being inaccurate.

- 1) The FAA notified the military at 9:16 a.m. that United Flight 93 (UN93) was hijacked.
- 2) The FAA notified the military of the hijacking of American Flight 77 (AA77) at 9:24 a.m.
- 3) When the Langley fighters were scrambled, their objective was to respond to the reports at 9:16 that UN93 was hijacked and at 9:24 a.m. that AA77 was hijacked.
- 4) [Military] Officials were tracking UN93 and intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached Washington, D.C.

The Commission believes that NORAD and FAA made significant efforts to get accurate information as to what had transpired, within days of September 11th.

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U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General
INVESTIGATIVE CASE PLAN

ORIGINAL

CASE NUMBER	CASE TITLE	ORIGINAL DATE
042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	8/26/04

The Commission further believes that once accurate reconstruction information was developed by NORAD and FAA they both had the burden of correcting the public record and insuring that information, including testimony provided to the Commission in May 2003, was accurate.

Investigation will be conducted in cooperation with Department of Defense, OIG. DOT-OIG's portion of the investigation will seek to determine whether FAA officials knowingly made false or inaccurate statements at a Commission hearing on May 23, 2003 and/or elsewhere regarding the action of FAA officials in responding to the September 11th attacks.

RULES, REGS, OR STATUTES VIOLATED:	ELEMENTS OF PROOF REQUIRED
18 USC 1001 (FALSE STATEMENTS)	Whoever, knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material fact, or makes any false statements or representations, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

OPERATING ADMINISTRATION & PROGRAM INVOLVED:	Federal Aviation Administration
REGULATIONS THAT APPLY:	
CONTACT PERSON:	

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U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General
INVESTIGATIVE CASE PLAN

ORIGINAL

CASE NUMBER	CASE TITLE	ORIGINAL DATE
042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	8/26/04

POTENTIAL WITNESSES OR TARGETS TO BE INTERVIEWED:

NAME, TITLE, AND/OR POSITION	WIT /TARG	DATE COMPLETED	
		EST.	ACT.
Jeff GRIFFITH, Sr. Air Traffic Manager, FAA	W		
(b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA	W		
Jane GARVEY, former FAA Administrator	W		
(b)(6), (b)(7)c	W		
Shirley MILLER, FAA liaison to the 9-11 Commission			
ASMUS (possibly, OSMUS, Lynne)			
SCHUESSLER (possibly Linda M.)			
(b)(6), (b)(7)c			
Dave CANOLES, FAA			
(b)(6), (b)(7)c			

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ORIGINAL

CASE NUMBER	CASE TITLE	ORIGINAL DATE
042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	8/26/04

Doug GOULD, FAA			
Participants of FAA's after action group.			
Other logical leads as they develop			

DOCUMENTS TO BE OBTAINED:

DOCUMENT NAME	SOURCE IDENTITY	DATE COMPLETED	
		EST.	ACT.
(b)(6), (b)(7)c	Air Force		
9-17-01 Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events	FAA		9/10/04
Formal Accident Package United 93	FAA		
Formal Accident Package United 175	FAA		8/26/04
Formal Accident Package American 11	FAA		
Formal Accident Package American 77	FAA		
9-18-01 Press Release	NORAD		
Internal Briefing Document, RE: Military Notification	FAA		
FAA Order 8020.11b	FAA		8/26/04
Air War Over America: September 11 Alters the Face of Air Defense Mission	GPO		9/10/04

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INVESTIGATIVE CASE PLAN

ORIGINAL

CASE NUMBER	CASE TITLE	ORIGINAL DATE
042R0122001	FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission	8/26/04

Logs from various FAA facilities	FAA		
Other logical leads as they develop			

JUDICIAL REFERRAL:	ADMINISTRATIVE REFERRAL:
District of Columbia, EDNY	FAA

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:

To be determined.

REMARKS:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Originally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 DN: CN = (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Date: 2004.09.14 14:24:43 -04'00'

(Special Agent)

(Date)

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

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END=SEP-13 11:09

FILE NO. = 074

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-US DOT/OIG NY OFFICE JRI2-

***** -US DOT-OIG NYC - ***** - (b)(6), (b)(7)c *****

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

NORTHEAST REGION (JRI-2)



26 Federal Plaza
Room 3134
New York, N.Y. 10278

FAX FOR: _____ (b)(6), (b)(7)c _____

UNIT/LOCATION: DOT-OIG

FAX: _____ (b)(6), (b)(7)c _____ PHONE: _____

FAX FROM: _____ (b)(6), (b)(7)c _____

FAX: _____ (b)(6), (b)(7)c _____ PHONE: _____ (b)(6), (b)(7)c _____

SUBJECT: _____

MESSAGE: Complaint 14 pages MOEJ/Traffic 2 pages
Chet I 33 pages

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MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=SEP-13 10:30

END=SEP-13 10:40

FILE NO. = 072

STN NO.	COM	ABBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL.NO.	PAGES	DURATION
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-US DOT/OIG NY OFFICE JRI2-

***** -US DOT-OIG NYC - ***** - (b)(6), (b)(7)c *****

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

NORTHEAST REGION (JRI-2)



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Room 3134
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SUBJECT: _____

MESSAGE: Complaint 14 pages MOI's/Timeline 2 pages

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MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=SEP-13 10:09

END=SEP-13 10:16

FILE NO. = 070


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Boyle*

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CHAIR

July 29, 2004

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Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1900

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400 7th St., S.W., Room 9210
Washington, D.C. 20590

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JRI-2 AUG 24 2004 N.Y.

DOT-DIG INVESTIGATIONS

Dear Mr. Schmitz and Mr. Mead:

During the course of our investigation, the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States discovered evidence that certain public statements made by NORAD and FAA officials at a Commission hearing on May 23, 2003, and elsewhere, regarding the actions of NORAD and FAA officials in responding to the 9/11 attacks were not accurate. We did not, however, investigate whether these statements were knowingly false. Since we did gather evidence that may bear on this issue, we decided to refer this matter to each of you so that you may take whatever steps you believe are appropriate.

To assist you in examining this matter, we have included copies of the following:

- (1) A Commission staff memorandum regarding NORAD and FAA Statements Concerning Air Defense on 9/11.
- (2) An email from Col. Robert Marr to retired Col. William Scott dated June 2, 2003, which was forwarded to Commission staff.
- (3) The Final Report of the Commission released July 22, 2004; chapter 1 in particular pertains to this issue.
- (4) Commission Staff Statement No. 17, dated June 17, 2004.
- (5) Testimony of NORAD and FAA officials at the Commission's public hearing held on June 17, 2004.
- (6) Testimony of NORAD and FAA officials at the Commission's public hearing held on May 22-23, 2003.

Hon. Joseph E. Schmitz
Hon. Kenneth M. Mead
July 29, 2004
Page 2

If you have any questions about these materials, please call me at 202-331-4065. Please note that the Commission terminates, by statute, on August 26, 2004.

Yours sincerely,


Daniel Marcus
General Counsel

MEMORANDUM FROM THE 9-11 COMMISSION STAFF

Date: July 29, 2004

Re: NORAD and FAA Statements Concerning Air Defense on 9/11

This memo reviews some of the evidence the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9-11 Commission) reviewed regarding statements by U.S. government officials relating to actions taken by NORAD and FAA officials on September 11, 2001. This memo should be read in conjunction with the Final Report of the Commission released on July 22, 2004, in particular chapter 1 of the Report, as well as Commission Staff Statement No. 17, released on June 17, 2004, and the testimony of NORAD and FAA witnesses at public hearings held by the Commission on May 22-23, 2003, and June 17, 2004.

PRIOR STATEMENTS

On May 23, 2003, at the Commission's second public hearing, representatives of both the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") and the North American Aerospace Defense command ("NORAD") testified. Their testimony set forth the times at which the FAA became aware that each flight was hijacked on 9/11; the times at which the military was notified of the hijackings; and how the military responded. Representatives of both agencies have also testified about this subject before congressional committees. They have been interviewed numerous times for media accounts of the response on 9/11. The First Air Force has published an official history, *Air War Over America*, concerning the air defense effort on 9/11.

After reviewing radar data and primary source material obtained via document requests and subpoenas, and after interviewing officials from FAA and NORAD at every level, the Commission staff concluded, as explained in Staff Statement No. 17 and in the Final Report, that significant aspects of the May 23, 2003, testimony before the Commission were incorrect.

Timeline. At the May 23 hearing, retired Col. William Scott presented the Commission with a NORAD timeline of the operational facts of 9/11. This timeline reflected:

- FAA notice to the military of the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93 at 9:16 a.m. (forty-seven minutes prior to crash).
- FAA notice to the military of the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (13 minutes prior to crash).
- Both the timeline and Col. Scott's testimony indicated that the fighters at Langley Air Force Base were scrambled at 9:24, seemingly in response to the hijacking of American 77.

Objective. The timeline and Col. Scott's testimony indicated that the fighters were scrambled to meet the threat to Washington posed by American 77.

The representation that the Langley fighters were scrambled to meet the threat posed by American 77 prompted questions from Commissioners Lehman and Ben-Veniste about the details of the Langley scramble. Retired General Larry Arnold explained: "9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus--you have got to remember that there's a lot of other things going on simultaneously here--was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by the FAA. . . . We were advised [American 77] was possibly hijacked. And we had launched almost simultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, D.C., not in response to American Airlines 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way." We believe each of the four sentences in this quotation was inaccurate.

Inaccurate Statement #1: The FAA notified the military at 9:16 that United 93 was hijacked.

NORAD's first publicly available timeline of the events of 9/11 was released on 9/18/01, one week after the attacks. Prior to the 9/18 release, NORAD Public Affairs prepared a draft release, dated 9/16/01. The draft release listed the time 9:16 as the notification time for United 93.

Between the 9/16 draft and the 9/18 final release, that time was changed. In the final release on 9/18, the 0916 notification time for United 93 is deleted, and is replaced with "N/A." The release explains that the notification time is "N/A" because the FAA informed NORAD of the hijacking of United 93 while on an open line discussing American 77.¹ The Public Affairs Director stated to Commission staff that he deleted the 0916 notification time because he "lost confidence" in its accuracy, although he could not remember why he lost confidence in the time.

An email obtained by Commission staff in response to the Commission's subpoena sheds some light on why NORAD may have lost confidence in the 9:16 notification time. The email, sent on September 16, 2001, at 11:06 p.m. to NEADS from Brigadier General Doug Moore at CONR, commends the person at NEADS "who dug up the requested information from your logs and tapes," and indicates that it has been passed to "the proper FAA office" which will be "using this data to brief the White House tomorrow" [i.e., September 17]. The email then asks for follow-up information about, among other data points, "United 93, 1408Z [i.e., 10:08], Which center calls with information that UA 93 ... is heading for Cleveland? ... 1415Z [i.e., 10:15], Who reported to NEADS that aircraft had crashed?"² [DOD bates number NCT 0053404]

¹ Commission staff established that the earliest discussion of creating an open line occurred at approximately 9:50, and that the open line may not have been established until well after 10:00. NORAD now accepts that the notification of United 93 as a hijack did not occur over this open line.

² The NEADS log records the time as 10:07 for the entry described by Brigadier General Moore.

This email--and the response to it by NEADS--is significant because it reveals that someone at NEADS had searched the relevant logs and tapes during the first week after 9/11 and identified the notification time for United 93. It is a fair inference that, having identified the notification time for United 93, NORAD "lost confidence" in 9:16 and omitted it from the September 18 release.

The question, then, is why the discredited 9:16 notification time reappeared in NORAD's testimony before the Commission in May 2003. This question is highlighted by the subsequent Commission staff interview of Cherie Gott, a data analyst at NORAD. Ms. Gott told us that a timeline she created based on the 9/18 press release, which reflected no notification time for United 93, was forwarded on May 13, 2003, a week prior to the Commission's hearing, in order to prepare officials for their testimony.

Why was 9:16 reintroduced? Commission staff has obtained an email sent from Col. Robert Marr, the Battle Commander at NEADS, to retired Col. William Scott after the Commission's hearing, which sheds light on the subject. During the May 2003 hearing, Commissioner Lehman asked several questions about the path of the Langley fighters, which traveled directly east, over the ocean, and then north toward Baltimore, before heading west to Washington. Why, the Commissioner wanted to know, didn't the fighters head more directly to Washington, if they had been scrambled to respond to American 77, the plane that struck the Pentagon? Col. Marr addressed this question in his response to retired Col. Scott:

"The answer on AA77 is not easy, nor is it pretty. At the time AA77 was occurring we were focused on UAL93 which was the only confirmed hijack that the FAA had identified to us. My records show UAL93 reported as hijacked at 0916L, once we found it and identified it's [sic] westerly heading, we scrambled Langley at 0924L just in case it turned around toward DC, which it did later. At 0924L we also received a call from the FAA about AA77 with a follow-up call at 0925L. It is easiest to explain the simultaneous scramble order with the AA77 notification as the scramble being against AA77 - it takes a lot of time to explain to the public that you're scrambling fighters against a plane heading away from the possible target."

Col. Marr, in other words, attempted to explain the circuitous route of the Langley fighters in getting to Washington, D.C., by indicating that they were not in fact scrambled to respond to a report at 9:24 that American 77 was hijacked; they were scrambled in response to the earlier "report" that United 93 was hijacked. Thus, the reintroduction of the discredited 9:16 notification time enabled NORAD to explain to the Commission the odd route of the Langley fighters in reaching Washington.

There were two fundamental problems with the explanation. First, as at least some in the military have known since the week of 9/11, it is inaccurate. The plane had not been hijacked at 9:16; the hijacking did not occur until 9:28--after the Langley fighters were

ordered scrambled--and NEADS was not notified until after the plane had crashed. NORAD informed Commission staff at the close of Commission interviews at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs that it now accepts that notification did not occur until after the plane had crashed. Second, as we will now discuss, NEADS was not notified that American 77 was hijacked at 9:24.

Inaccurate Statement #2: The FAA notified the military of the hijacking of American 77 at 9:24.

Although American 77 disappeared from radar and radio contact at 8:56, the first notification to NEADS that American 77 was missing (there is no mention of its having been hijacked at this point) came at 9:34, ten minutes after the scramble had already been ordered at Langley Air Force Base.

One to two minutes later, NEADS received notice that an unidentified plane was six miles southwest of the White House. American 77 crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37:45.

Thus, NEADS did not receive notice that American 77 was hijacked at 9:24. In fact, NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked at all, let alone at 9:24; it received reports (at 9:34) that American 77 was missing, and (at 9:35 or 9:36) that an unidentified plane was near the White House.

What notification did occur at 9:24? The Mission Crew Commander's staff at NEADS maintains a handwritten contemporaneous log of information received and actions taken (known as the "MCC/T Log"). The 9/11 entry in the log at 9:24 records: "American Airlines #N334AA hijacked." This tail number refers not to American 77 but to American 11, the first hijacked aircraft that crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The subpoenaed tapes confirm that this time corresponds to NEADS's receipt of tail number information on American 11 and to reports that American 11 was still airborne and headed towards Washington, D.C.

Inaccurate Statement #3: When the Langley fighters were scrambled, their objective was to respond to the reports at 9:16 that United 93 was hijacked and at 9:24 that American 77 was hijacked.

Contrary to testimony before the Commission, the Langley fighters were ordered scrambled not because of United 93, which had not been hijacked, nor because of American 77, which had not been reported to NEADS, but because of the mistaken report that American 11--the first hijacked plane--had not hit the World Trade Center, but was heading south for Washington, D.C. The fighters were ordered scrambled initially toward New York, and then vectorcd toward Baltimore, in an effort to intercept that mistakenly reported aircraft. The best evidence for both this inaccurate report and the resulting scramble is the subpoenaed NEADS tape, which records that at approximately 9:21, the Mission Crew Commander spoke the following to the Battle Cab (where the Battle Commander, Colonel Marr, was located):

"Okay. American Airlines is still airborne, 11, the first guy. He's headed towards Washington, okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now, and I'm going to -- I'm going to take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him. Yeah. You sure? Okay. He's heading towards Langley, or I should say Washington. American 11, the original guy. He's still airborne"

Seconds later, the Mission Crew Commander ordered the scramble of the Langley fighters.

This report of American 11 heading south--the cause of the Langley scramble--is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversations at FAA centers, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, CONR, NORAD, and the National Military Command Center, and in other records. It is the opening report on the Significant Event Conference Call. The mistaken report was also readily acknowledged in interviews of operational personnel.

But in October 2001, for instance, NORAD Commanding General Ralph Eberhart testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the sequence of events on 9/11. General Eberhart did not mention the mistaken report about American 11 as a cause for the Langley scramble. Instead, he provided a timeline chart and verbal testimony that listed 9:24 as the notification time for American 77 and implied that this notification prompted the scramble of the Langley fighters.

The General elaborated, in responses submitted after his testimony for the record: "The FAA notified the NEADS that American Airlines Flight 77 was headed towards Washington, DC. NEADS then passed this information to NORAD's Air Warning Center At 0925, the NMCC convened a Significant Event Conference and during that conference, at 0933, NORAD reported one more aircraft en route to Washington, D.C."

NORAD's own Headquarters Intel Chat Log is inconsistent with this testimony, recording at 9:24:39 "original aa flt hijack is now headed to Washington scrambled lfi [i.e., Langley]" and then at 9:25:13 "2 acft that hit wt bldg not repeat not the original hjk aa acft." Furthermore, the Air Warning Center log at NORAD, to which General Eberhart refers, records, at 9:27, that "The original hijack a/c is still a/h and head for Washington, D.C. Otis F15 are trying to intercept the flight." It then records, at 9:36, that CONR has advised of the scramble at Langley: "LFI A/B Quit 25/26/27 3 A/B at time 1333 [i.e., 9:33]." The NORAD Headquarters chat log states, at 9:28: "R[eal] W[orld] Hijacking (original notification) assessed by Intel as headed to Washington DC/2XF-15s in tail chase." [DOD bates number NCT 0005098]

General Eberhart's submission for the record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, moreover, that NORAD reported "one more aircraft en route to Washington, D.C.," on the Significant Event Conference at 9:33 may have been literally true. Consistent, however, with NORAD's own records and the transcript of the Conference, the aircraft that NORAD reported to the Conference was *not* American 77, as the submission for the record implied, but American 11.

The mistaken report that the original American 11 flight was still airborne and heading for Washington prompted the Langley scramble. Because American 11 was reportedly heading south from the Boston/New York areas, and not east, the fighters were scrambled initially north, and then vectored toward Baltimore, in order to intercept the flight before it reached Washington. The fighters were directed to go to Washington directly when NEADS received the report that an unidentified aircraft was six miles southwest of the White House. To a large degree, those circumstances--not the asserted 9:16 and 9:24 notification times for United 93 and American 77--explain the circuitous route of the Langley fighters.³

Inaccurate Statement #4: Officials were tracking United 93 and intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached Washington, D.C.

At the Commission's hearing in May 2003, Vice Chairman Hamilton expressed concern that the detailed timeline presented by NORAD omitted a significant time sequence: when the shoot-down authorization was passed from the President through the chain of command to the pilots. General Arnold harked away from the claim that the order was received prior to the crash of United 93, indicating his belief that it had been received a few minutes later. Because the NORAD witnesses had testified that they had been tracking United 93 for some forty-five minutes when it crashed, however, General Arnold was able to state with assurance that the flight would have been intercepted prior to reaching Washington, D.C.

The issue of whether the military had been tracking United 93, and was therefore in position to intercept the flight if it approached Washington, DC, arose within days of the 9/11 attacks. On September 15, 2001, General Paul Weaver, overall commander of the Air National Guard which provided the fighters used to scramble Otis and Langley, told reporters that no fighters were scrambled or vectored to chase United 93: "There was no notification for us to launch airplanes. We weren't even close."

That same day, however, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz stated in a television interview that Defense Department officials had been "following" United 93 and were prepared to shoot it down if it approached Washington, D.C.

Officials have been steadfast since in stating that the military had been tracking United 93 and were in position to intercept and, if necessary, to shoot down the flight. Notably, Col. Robert Marr, NEADS Battle Commander, states in the U.S. Air Force's official history of 9/11, *Air War Over America*: "As United Airlines Flight 93 was going out [west toward Chicago], we received the clearance to kill if need be." Leslie Filson, *Air War Over America* (USAF, 2003), p. 68. Similarly, on an ABC News Special marking the one-year anniversary of 9/11, Colonel Marr made inaccurate statements about the interception of United 93.

³ Human error also contributed. The fighters were sent directly east on take-off, rather than north, and continued east for some sixty miles before turning north.

It is true that Langley fighters were posted high over Washington, D.C. But NORAD now acknowledges that the relevant headquarters--NEADS, CONR, and NORAD headquarters --were completely unaware of United 93 as it was "going out" toward the west. NEADS never learned of the flight until five minutes after it had crashed. NEADS never followed or was able to find the flight on radar, and was in fact still searching for the flight at 10:15, when the MCC/T Log and the subpoenaed tapes record FAA notification that the flight had crashed.

Furthermore, NORAD did not receive any form of shoot-down authority until 10:31. Even then, that instruction was not communicated to the pilots. There were Air National Guard pilots over Washington with rules of engagement allowing them to engage. But they had received their direction outside of the usual military chain of command and did not get into the skies over Washington until after 10:40. In short, the representation that the military had been following United 93 as it progressed, and was by virtue of this awareness in position to intercept the plane, was inaccurate.

KNOWLEDGE OF INACCURACIES

We have focused on finding out what happened on 9/11, not on investigating potential misconduct in the way those facts have been characterized. The following evidence may bear on the issue whether there was knowledge of the inaccuracy of the statements discussed above.

1. *Accurate information was readily apparent in documents, tapes, and other records available to the FAA and the military in the aftermath of 9/11.*

The fact that the Langley fighters were scrambled in response to the report that American 11 was heading to Washington is unmistakably apparent. Its prominence on the morning of 9/11 is reflected throughout the primary source material. It is set forth explicitly in NORAD's Headquarters Intel chat log at 9:24:39, in NORAD's Air Warning Center log at 9:27, and in the NORAD Headquarters chat log at 9:28. It is reflected in chat logs at CONR and at the NMCC. It is corroborated by the tapes from the NEADS operational floor. As noted above, at 9:21 the Mission Crew Commander reports to his superiors: "Okay. American Airlines is still airborne, 11, the first guy. He's headed towards Washington, okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now" The mistaken report is also the first substantive matter discussed on the Significant Event Conference Call, and is reflected in conversations at FAA Headquarters and FAA Command Center. In short, it is hard for us to understand how anyone seeking to reconstruct the events of 9/11 could miss this information.

Since this information was not mentioned in explaining why the Langley fighters were scrambled and why they were not sent directly to Washington, DC, officials had to seek an alternative explanation. They represented that the military was notified of the hijacking of United 93 at 9:16, and of the hijacking of American 77 at 9:24. We tried to understand if such a misunderstanding was reasonable.

We do not understand the use of a 9:16 notification time for the hijacking of United 93. The 9:16 notification time for United 93 and the 9:24 notification time for American 77 appear to have been derived from the same source: the "MCC/T Log." At 9:16 the log records: "United tail #N612UA/75 50B/." But this tail number corresponds not with United 93 but with United 175, which had crashed into the World Trade Center. A corresponding conversation on the subpoenaed tapes confirms that at 9:16, NEADS was receiving confirmation of the tail number of United 175.

NORAD's removal of the 9:16 United 93 time from its 9/18/01 press release because it "lost confidence" reinforces the question of why the time reemerged before the Commission in May 2003.

The 9:24 notification time for American 77 was theoretically possible. The plane had been hijacked by then. But the tapes from the NEADS operational floor, read together with the MCC/T's log entries, spell out clearly that NEADS received notification that the flight was "lost" ten minutes after the Langley fighters were ordered scrambled, and that NEADS received notice of a plane six miles southwest of the White House a minute later.

Again we believe the 9:24 is derived from an entry in the MCC/T log. It records, at 9:24: "American Airlines #N334AA hijacked." This tail number refers not to American 77 but to American 11, the first hijacked aircraft. The subpoenaed tapes confirm that this time corresponds to the receipt of the tail number information on American 11 and to reports that American 11 was still airborne and headed towards Washington, D.C.

It is possible that officials who reviewed the matter did not attempt to check the tail numbers to see what United and American flights were being mentioned. Since the Air Force relies on tail numbers as an aircraft identifier, such an omission would be unusual. But given the fact that officials also omitted any mention of the mistaken information about the southward progress of American 11, mentioned in so many other sources, such a failure to check the tail numbers of the reports is even harder for us to understand.

2. There is evidence that the FAA and NORAD engaged in an aggressive effort in the aftermath of 9/11 to reconstruct the events of the day, and that this review entailed examining the records that would have established the truth.

There are several indications of the initial FAA and NORAD efforts to understand what had happened. The September 16, 2001, email mentioned above from Brigadier General Moore to NEADS, for instance, commends the person at NEADS "who dug up the requested information from your logs and tapes," and indicates that the information has been passed to the FAA, which "will be using the information to brief the White House tomorrow." The email then asks follow-up questions about which FAA Center notified the military at 10:08 about United 93, and which center notified the military at 10:15 about the crash of United 93.

We have not obtained the documents referred to in Brigadier General Moore's email. We have, however, obtained a document from the FAA entitled "Summary of Air Traffic

Hijack Events," dated September 17, 2001, the day of the White House briefing and the day after the exchange of emails between Brigadier General Moore and NEADS. This was reportedly one of the documents used to brief the White House.

The FAA Summary corroborates the representation in Brigadier General Moore's email that information from NEADS' "logs and tapes" had been forwarded to the FAA. The FAA summary refers, accurately, to the times shown in NEADS logs for the initial notifications from FAA about the hijacking of American 11 and the possible hijacking of United 175.

With respect to American 77 and United 93, oddly, there is no mention in the FAA's "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" of the NEADS notification times. General Moore's prior email implied that NEADS had forwarded this information to FAA. FAA's omission of these particular notification times is suspicious, because these are the two flights where FAA's notification to NEADS was significantly delayed. (The FAA Center learned of the hijacking of United 93 as early as 9:34. NEADS was not notified for more than half an hour--at 10:08. And the notification was performed by the FAA's Cleveland Center on its own initiative--and not by FAA Headquarters.)

Interviews with senior FAA officials have confirmed that the adequacy of the notification to the military was a "topic of hot debate" in the days after September 11 between the FAA and the military. Jeff Griffith, the senior air traffic manager on duty at FAA Headquarters on September 11, recalled having heated discussions with General Arnold and others on the subject. He specifically recalled being told by the military that their position was that no notice had been passed regarding the hijacking of United 93 before it crashed. (This was true.) Because General Arnold was Griffith's point of contact that day and for the next few weeks, moreover, Griffith believes, but is not certain, that General Arnold told him this.

In addition, senior FAA officials have confirmed that FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and Deputy Administrator Monte Belger instructed a group of FAA employees (an "after-action group") to reconstruct the events of 9/11. This after-action group began its work immediately after 9/11 and reviewed tape recordings, transcripts, handwritten notes, logs, and other documents in an effort to create an FAA chronology of events.

One witness, Darlene Freeman, recalled that the group was specifically asked to determine exactly when the FAA notified the military that each of the four planes had been hijacked on 9/11. Several people worked on determining correct times for FAA notifications to the military. Ms. Freeman said the FAA realized this question would be asked by Congress and members of the media. According to Ms. Freeman, the issue of military notifications was of great "interest to the Deputy Administrator." Ms. Freeman stated the Deputy Administrator wanted to know when the FAA told the military that each plane was hijacked and when the military claimed it received notification from the FAA.

Ms. Freeman recalled that NORAD issued a press release--the release of 9/18--on the subject that "caught the FAA by surprise" because they were still working on determining

the correct notification times. She recalls that the Deputy Administrator instructed her to compare the notification times from the NORAD press release with the FAA's times. The FAA then prepared an "internal" briefing document that first week concerning military notifications. The internal briefing document includes a chart that lists the times for FAA notifications to the military.

The chart lists "10:08 a.m." as the military notification time for United 93 and references the NEADS logs as the source for the entry. The document is explicit that the FAA could not have notified the military that United 93 was hijacked at 9:16 a.m. because the plane was not hijacked until 9:28 a.m. No notification time for United 93 was given in either the FAA Summary used to brief the White House on September 17 or the NORAD Press Release of September 18. The 9:16 time was deleted from NORAD's draft press release and replaced, despite the NEADS log entry, with "N/A."

During the week after 9/11, NORAD also detailed an officer with technical expertise from McGuire Air Force Base to begin the process of transcribing the operational tapes from NEADS on 9/11. This officer recalls having been visited personally by General Eberhart during the week or so that he worked on the transcription. His work was suspended when, on September 21, 2001, the tape experienced a malfunction.⁴ He had, however, by that date transcribed the portion of the Mission Crew Commander position on which, at 9:21, the news is received that American 11 is heading south to Washington and the Langley scramble order is issued in response.

We therefore believe both FAA and NORAD made a significant effort, with high level backing, to get accurate information. We can understand initial confusion and uncertainty in the first week, and even the unfortunate reflection of that uncertainty in press materials prepared on 9/17 and 9/18. But, once accurate information was being developed--within days--both agencies had the burden of correcting the public record and insuring that subsequent information, including testimony provided to the Commission in May 2003, was accurate.

3. The official versions of the events of 9/11 overstated the effectiveness of the FAA's notification of the military and the military's response to the attacks.

In the aftermath of 9/11, if they had obtained accurate information about what happened, both NORAD and FAA faced potentially embarrassing realities. The FAA's standard operating procedures for notification of hijackings were disregarded on 9/11. The notifications that did occur, moreover, gave the military no realistic chance to intercept the aircraft, and were sometimes mistaken. NORAD scrambled the Langley fighters in the wrong direction against a nonexistent target. NORAD was, moreover, completely unaware of United 93--the fourth plane--as the flight was heading for Washington.

⁴ The reason for the malfunction is disputed. NEADS claims that the officer accidentally reformatted one of the tapes; the officer denies that this occurred.

None of this information necessarily reflected any negligence or misconduct by Air Force pilots or controllers. Indeed, they seem to have done all they could, given the information available to them.

Nevertheless, the official account seemed superficially plausible. By claiming that the fighters from Langley were scrambled simultaneously with the notification on American 77 and also in response to the hijacking of United 93, there was no need to acknowledge or explain why FAA gave NEADS the inaccurate report that American 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington--from the northeast (the opposite direction from the approach route taken by American 77).

The official account also appeared to support the claim that the military was tracking United 93 and was positioned and prepared to intercept and to shoot it down before it hit its target in Washington, D.C.



Memorandum

U.S. Department of
Transportation

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: **INFORMATION:** American Airlines
Awareness of the Hijacking of Flight 77

Date: November 19, 2004

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, JRI-2

Reply to
Attn of: JRI-2
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

To: Todd J. Zinser
Deputy Inspector General, J-2

As follow-up to our November 3, 2004, teleconference concerning American Airlines Headquarters' awareness about the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77), I have spoken with John Azzarello, John Raidt and William Johnstone all formerly of the 9-11 Commission and Chris Christensen outside counsel to American Airlines (AA) and AA's liaison to the Commission.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

¹ AA's emergency procedures require that access to the computerized flight data for an aircraft involved in an event, such as a hijacking, accident, or unruly passenger, be locked out.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

- FAA Air Traffic Control advised they had lost contact with AA77,
- AA77 was not responding to ACRS messages (similar to email) from AA, and
- AA knew that AA flight 11 had been hijacked.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

- # -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 7:02 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc:
Subject: AA Awareness of Hijacking of AA77



Memo_AA
reness of hijackir

Please see the attached memorandum, which is in follow-up to our teleconference on November 3rd.

Thanks
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

	A	B	C	D	E	F	
1	MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	PREPARED BY	DATE OF EVENT	FILE #	RECORDED	CLASSIFICATION	
2	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	12/23/03	4019815		S	
3	Albright, Madeleine		01/07/04	4014514	recorded	S	
4	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/02/03	3010881		S//HCS	
5			09/22/03	4017149		TS//Comint//HCS	
6			01/27/04	4017341		TS//CRU	
7			01/07/04	4017213		SSI	
8			01/08/04	4017212	recorded		
9			(b)(6), (b)(7)c	11/19/03	4017206	recorded	
10			11/18/03	4017205	recorded		
11			11/18/03	4020010			SSI
12			11/19/03	4017217	recorded		
13			01/08/04	4017199			
14			01/08/04	4017173	recorded		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
15			01/25/04	4017171	recorded	SSI
16			11/19/03	4017189	recorded	
17			11/17-21/03	4017215		
18			11/19/03	4017214		
19			04/26/04	4020035		
20			03/18/04	4018724		
21			08/14/03	3007032		
22			12/03/03	3012976		
23			01/28/04	4016225		
24			02/27/04	4018167		
25			03/22/04	4018139		
26			04/29/04	4019212		
27			01/14/04	4014516		
28			08/14/03	3005047	recorded	TS

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	A	B	C	D	E	F		
29	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/15/03	3009299				
30			12/18/03	4017272		SSI		
31			11/10/03	3012978		TS//SI		
32			03/08/04	4020717	recorded	S		
33			03/11/04	4020718	recorded	S		
34			03/11/04	4020720	recorded	S		
35			02/11/04	4017147		TS//HCS//Comint		
36			01/12/04	4013954	recorded	S		
37			05/27/04	4020032				
38			09/30/03	4016457	recorded	S		
39			10/24/03	4017211	recorded	SSI		
40			Ashcroft, John	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	12/17/03	4020543	recorded / transcribed	recording & transcription TS//CRU MFR is U
41			(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/02/03	3013001		
42					05/25/04	4020034		

	A	B	C	D	E	F	
43	Atta, Mohammed (review of investigation conducted by the FBI of Atta's suitcases at Boston, MA	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	02/10/04	4016228			
44	Atta, Mohammed and Marwan al Shehh / Travel Summary to Virginia Beach, VA on 2/19/01 and 4/4/01		02/17/04	4016256			
45	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		02/12/04	4016479		S	
46	Avalon Bay Communities (meeting to obtain documents)		11/25/03	4016241			
47	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		05/14/04	4020567			
48			11/13/03	3013003			
49			01/07/04	4020561			
50			11/05/03	3012087			
51			(b)(6), (b)(7)c	02/04/04	4017343		TS//CRU
52			12/02/03	4016458			
53			05/05/04	4019203			
54			10/15/03	4017261			
55		11/19/03	4020044				
56			10/20/03	4016459	recorded		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
57	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		11/17/03	4013961		
58			11/24/03	4018154	recorded	SSI
59			07/29/03	3004402	recorded (recording TS//CRU)	MFR (S)
60			12/04/03	4017344	recorded	TS//CRU
61			10/02/03	4016436	recorded	
62			01/14/04	4016601	recorded	TS//CRU
63			09/02/03	4017150		S
64			08/19/03	3009294		
65			12/09/03	3013629		TS//CRU
66			11/27/03	4020044		
67			01/21/04	4014735		TS//SI
68			12/11/03	4017345		TS//CRU
69			10/20/03	4013966		
70			10/21/03	3010868	recorded	S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
71	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/17/03	3007054	recorded	
72			02/02/04	4019773		
73			11/13/03	4016247		S
74			12/18/03	4016437	recorded	
75			02/02/04	4020636		
76			11/17/03	3013652		TS//CRU
77			11/07/03	3013619	recorded	S
78			04/23/04	4018716		
79			02/17/04	4018718		S
80			10/08/03	4017151		TS
81			01/06/04	4017152		S
82			09/09/03	3010887		S
83			03/02/04	4020575		
84			12/18/03	4019772		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
85	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		11/05/03	4017208	recorded	
86			12/11/03	4017153		TS//SI//Comint// HCS
87			11/10/03	3012979		TS
88			11/25/03	4013956	recorded	C
89			09/29/03	3009989		
90			10/22/03	3010864		
91			10/7/2003; 10/17/03; 11/21/03	4016438	recorded	
92			06/23/04	4020589		
93			06/22/04	4020598		
94			06/22/04	4020593		
95			04/19/04	4018788		
96			06/30/04	4020597		
97			06/22/04	4020583		
98			06/23/04	4020591		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
99	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		6/23 - 24/04	4020581		
100			06/22/04	4020582		
101			06/22/04	4020596		
102			04/21/04	4018786		
103			05/06/04	4019202		
104			6/23 - 24/04	4020580		
105			06/23/04	4020599		
106			06/23/04	4020595		
107			06/23/04	4020588		
108			06/23/04	4020587		
109			06/23/04	4020584		
110			06/22/04	4020585		
111			06/24/04	4020586		
112			06/22/04	4020592		

	A	B	C	D	E	F	
113	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		06/22/04	4020594			
114			06/23/04	4020590			
115			04/21/04	4018782			
116			04/21/04	4018784			
117			06/23/04	4020579			
118			04/19/04	4018783			
119			05/06/04	4020635			
120			05/27/04	4020637			
121			05/28/04	4020638			
122				4021340			
123				11/25/03	3012999	recorded	TS
124				09/09/03	3007045	recorded	TS//CRU
125				09/09/03	3009307		
126				09/30/03	4020391		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
127	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/30/03	4020392		S//SCI
128			09/30/03	4020393		
129			09/29/03	4017154		S
130			09/30/03	4020394		
131			09/30/03	4020395		LES
132			09/29/03	4020396		S
133			11/04/03	4017207	recorded	SSI
134			03/24/04	4019816		S
135			10/21/03	3010886		S
136			10/31/03	3012998		TS//HCS//SI/X1
137			02/05/04	4017146		TS//HCS//Comint
138			12/04/03	4013804	recorded	S
139			11/07/03	4020388		TS//SCI
140			06/24/03	3010888		protect identity

	A	B	C	D	E	F	
141	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/16/04	4017267			
142			9/16/03, 5/7/04 & 5/10-11/04	3010885 4019347		S U	
143			5/7/04 5/10/04 5/11/04	4019347			
144				07/23/03	3004542		
145				10/28/03	3012097	recorded	S
146				11/19/03	4016480		S
147				07/15/03	3010875		TS//HCS/SI/X1
148				08/14/03	3009306		
149				01/28/04	4017169		S
150				01/06/04	4017225		S
151				08/26/03	3007030		
152				12/18/03	MFR 3013626 INT 04017861	recorded / transcribed	TS//CRU
153				12/18/03	3013626-1		TS
154				01/12/04	MFR 4017346 INT 04018339	recorded / transcribed	TS//CRU

	A	B	C	D	E	F
155	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/12/04	4018417		TS
156			02/03/04	MFR 4017347 INT 04018341	recorded / transcribed	TS//CRU
157			09/16/03	3009303		
158			10/02/03	4017313	recorded	
159			10/02/03	4017312	recorded	
160			10/02/03	4017318	recorded	
161			10/02/03	4017310	recorded	
162			10/01/03	4017317	recorded	
163			10/02/03	4017316	recorded	
164			10/01/03	4017315	recorded	
165			10/02/03	4017314	recorded	
166			10/29/03	4016460	recorded	
167			05/06/04	4020011	recorded	
168		12/11/03	4017155		TS//TK	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
169	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		06/21/04	4020389		TS//SCI
170			12/12/03	3013620		
171			02/05/04	4019748	recorded	TS//CRU
172			05/19/04	4019814		
173			10/21/03	3010862		
174			7/17/03 and 10/16/03	3010865		
175			02/04/04	4016745	recorded	
176			02/04/04	4016746	recorded	
177			02/03/04	4016747	recorded	
178			02/04/04	4016748	recorded	
179			02/03/04	4016749	recorded	
180			02/03/04	4016750	recorded	
181			02/04/04	4016751	recorded	
182			02/02/04	4016752		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
183	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		02/26/04	4018143		
184			03/03/04	4017474		
185			01/14/04	4020571	recorded	
186			07/29/03	3004408		
187			05/04/04	4019094		
188			10/16/03	3010908	recorded	
189			12/15/03	3013628		TS//CRU
190			07/16/03	4017258		
191			12/09/03	4017156		TS//Comint//SI
192			11/07/03	4021261		TS//SI
193			11/18/03	4017348		TS//CRU
194			12/04/03	4019817		S
195			01/20/04	4019825		S
196			10/21/04	3010884		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
197	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/26/03	4016439	recorded	
198			09/05/03	3007043		
199			06/10/03	4021262		
200			12/02/03	4013959		
201			01/10/04	4014557		S
202			03/15/04	4018165		
203			11/19/03	4016440	recorded	
204			02/25/04	4018173		
205			11/12/03	3012981		S
206			08/19/03	3005042		
207			07/17/03	3007731		
208			07/18/03	3007732		
209			07/21/03	3007733		
210			07/24/03	3007734		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
211	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		t/t2-t3/04	40 t6222		
212			07/25/03	3007735		
213			07/28/03	3007736		
214			03/t7/04	4020568	recorded	
215			03/26/04	4020566	recorded	
216			03/25/04	4020465	recorded	
217			03/22/04	4020564	recorded	
218			03/26/04	4020563	recorded	
219			02/04/04	40 t9775		
220			09/25/03	30 t0883		
221			t t/06/03	402038 t		TS//SCI
222			07/3 t/03	300972 t		
223			t0/02/03	3009722		
224			t0/02/03	3009990		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
225	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		05/13/04	4020027		LES
226			05/13/04	4020029		
227			04/20/04	4019254		
228			10/16/03	4013969		
229			07/15/03	3003070		
230			09/29/03	3010890		
231			09/03/03	3009298		TS/CRU
232			01/12/04	4016481		S
233			05/19/04	401967		S
234			10/16/03	3012982		S
235			04/20/04	4018603		S
236			03/12/04	4020387		TS
237			month of January 2004	4014736		TS//SI//HCS
238			09/29/03	4017172		SSI

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
239	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/06/04	4020030		
240			12/17/03	4013759		
241			09/24/03	4016461	recorded	
242			04/27/04	4018995		
243			01/12/04	4017203		
244			12/15/03	4013958		
245			02/11/04	4019824		S
246			02/24/04	4020573		S
247			10/16/03	4016441	recorded	
248			12/17/03	4016766	recorded	
249			12/17/03	4016767		
250			12/17/03	4016768	recorded	
251			09/24/03	4017320		
252			06/12/03	4017325		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
253	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		06/04/03	4017201		
254			02/06/04	4017202		
255			07/28/03	4017326		
256			07/22/03	4017327		
257			12/22/03	4017323		
258			12/22/03	4017323		
259			07/28/03	4017326		
260			12/16/03	4016765	recorded	
261			12/16/03	4016764	recorded	
262			12/16/03	4016763	recorded	
263			12/16/03	4016762	recorded	
264			12/16/03	4016759	recorded	
265			09/30/03	3012969	recorded	
266			12/16/03	4016760	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
267	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/30/03	3012968	recorded	
268			12/16/03	4016761	recorded	
269			10/20/03	3010880		
270			04/26/04	4020024		
271			04/22/04	4020025		
272			04/22/04	4020023		
273			12/29/03	4019820		S
274			05/05/04	4020033		LES
275			07/22/03	4019354		S/FISA
276			08/15/03	3010869		
277			07/31/03	3007737		
278			07/16/03	3010882		S
279			08/05/03	3009720		
280			12/10-11/03	4019351		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
281	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/05/04	4020560		S
282			11/05/03	4017509		S
283			11/05/03	4017504		S
284			11/05/03	4017508		S
285			11/05/03	4017505		S
286			11/05/03	4017507		S
287			11/05/03	4017506		S
288			12/10/03	4016485		S
289			12/12/03	4016486		S
290			12/11/03	4016488		
291			12/10/03	4016490		S
292			12/11/03	4016602		S
293			12/10/03	4016495		S
294			10/29/03	3010918		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
295	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/29/03	3010919		S
296			10/29/03	3010921		S
297			10/29/03	3010917		S
298			10/29/03	3010920		
299			01/05/04	4016240		
300			01/05/04	4016244		
301			01/09/04	4016233		S
302			01/05/04	4016239		
303			01/05/04	4018564		S
304			11/20/03	4018561		
305			09/29/03	4017554		
306			10/01/03	4018555		S
307			09/30/03	4018556		S
308		10/01/03	4016251		S	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
309	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/30/03	4018557		S
310			11/20/03	4016246		S
311			11/20/03	4018560		S
312			11/20/03	4018562		S
313			10/01/03	4016250		S
314			10/01/03	4017550		S
315			09/29/03	4017551		
316			11/20/03	4016242		S
317			11/20/03	4018558		S
318			09/29/03	4017552		S
319			09/30/03	4016249		S
320			11/20/03	4013710		
321			09/30/03	4016252		S
322			11/20/03	4018559		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
323	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/01/03	4017553		S
324			09/29/03	4019829		S
325			10/03/03	4019845		LES
326			09/30/03	4019830		S
327			10/02/03	4019831		S
328			10/01/03	4019832		S
329			10/01/03	4019833		S
330			10/03/03	4017179		S
331			09/30/03	4019834		S
332			10/02/03	4019835		S
333			10/03/03	4019836		S
334			10/01/03	4019837		S
335			10/02/03	4016248		S
336			09/29/03	4019838		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
337	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/01/03	4019839		S
338			10/03/03	4019840		S
339			10/03/03	3013622		S
340			10/02/03	4019841		S
341			10/02/03	3012163		
342			10/02/03	4019842		S
343			09/30/03	3013632		
344			10/01/03	4019843		S
345			10/02/03	3012162		
346			10/03/03	4019844		S
347			10/27/03	3010914		S
348			10/28/03	3010912		S
349			10/27/03	3010916		S
350			10/28/03	3010913		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
351	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/27/03 and 10/28/03	3010915		S
352			10/28/03	3010911		S
353			11/06/03	4017493		
354			11/06/03	4017497		
355			11/06/03	4017494		S
356			11/06/03	4016236		S
357			11/06/03	4017495		
358			11/06/03	4017498		
359			11/06/03	4017496		S
360			11/06/03	4017492		
361			11/06/03	4016255		S
362			11/06/03	4017491		S
363			11/06/03	4016237		S
364			08/26/03	3012977		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
365	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/16/03	4019858		S
366			09/16/03	4019776		S
367			01/20/04	4019854		S
368			08/27/03	4016226		S
369			09/16/03	3012151		S
370			08/25/03	4019777		S
371			09/16/03	4019857		S
372			09/03/03	4019856		S
373			09/05/03	3012156		S
374			09/04/03	3012085		S
375			09/03/03	4019867		
376			09/03/03	4019866B		
377			09/03/03	4019866A		
378			09/16/03	3012155		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
379	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/04/03	3012157		S
380			09/02/03	4019855		S
381			08/27/03	4019865		
382			09/03/03	4019853		S
383			09/03/03	4017181		LES
384			08/26/03	4019852		S
385			08/26/03	4019851		S
386			09/02/03	4019864		
387			09/16/03	4019850		S
388			09/03/03	3012160		
389			09/04/03	4019849		S
390			09/04/03	4014762		S
391			09/16/03	4019848		S
392			09/03/03	4017264		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
393	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		08/26/03	3011149		
394			09/04/03	4019863		
395			09/03/03	3012161		
396			09/02/03	4019862		
397			08/27/03	4019847		S
398			08/26/03 and 09/15/03	3010899		S
399			11/12/03	4018475	recorded	S
400			09/04/03	4019861		LES
401			09/03/03	4019859		
402			08/26/03	3012158		
403			01/21/04	4019860		
404			09/16/03	4019846		S
405			09/04/03	4019868		LES
406			01/13/04	4016498		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
407	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/04/03	4017500		S
408			12/04/03	4017501		S
409			12/04/03	4017502		S
410			12/04/03	4017503		S
411			12/04/03	4017499		S
412			01/05/04	4017522		S
413			01/05/04	4017514		S
414			01/28/04	4016482		LES
415			01/07/04	4017523		S
416			01/06/04	4017515		S
417			10/21/031	4019870		
418			01/07/04	4017511		S
419			10/20/03	4019869		S
420			01/07/04	4017516		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
421	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/23/03	3012086		S
422			01/05/04	4017524		S
423			01/07/04	4017517		S
424			01/06/04	4017512		S
425			10/22/03	4019827		S
426			10/22/03	4019828		S
427			01/07/04	4017525		S
428			10/20/03	4019874		LES
429			10/23/03	3012153		S
430			10/20/03	3012152		
431			10/21/03	4019871		
432			01/06/04	4017527		S
433			01/05/04	4017518		
434			11/07/03	3013633		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
435	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/06/04	4017513		
436			01/05/04	4017519		S
437			01/05/04	4017510		S
438			11/14/03	4019872		
439			10/22/03	3012149		S
440			01/06/04	4017520		
441			01/07/04	4017521		S
442			10/22/03	3013623		S
443			10/21/03	4019873		
444			01/07/04	4017526		S
445			11/19/03	4013707		S
446			11/18/03	4017543		S
447			11/17/03	4017532		
448		11/17/03	4016229		S	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
449	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		11/17/03	4017531		
450			11/18/03	4017535		S
451			11/18/03	4017534		S
452			11/17/03	4016244-1		S
453			11/19/03	4017533		
454			11/17/03	4016238		S
455			11/18/03	4017541		S
456			11/18/03	4017542		
457			11/18/03	4016234		S
458			11/18/03	4017530		S
459			11/17/03	4017541A		TS
460			11/18/03	4017528		S
461			11/17/03	4017549		
462			11/18/03	4017540		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
463	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		11/18/03	4017539		S
464			11/18/03	4017548		
465			11/17/03	4017529		S
466			11/18/03	4016231		S
467			11/17/03	4017538		
468			11/18/03	4017547		
469			11/18/03	4017544		
470			11/18/03	4017546		S
471			11/18/03	4017537		S
472			11/17/03	4017536		S
473			11/03/03	4013965		
474			08/01/03	4019893		
475			10/16/03	4017479		S
476			07/28/03	4019876		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
477	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/10/03	4017485		S
478			10/09/03	4017480		S
479			08/01/03	3011150		
480			08/04/03	4019875		S
481			10/09/03	4017486		S
482			07/30/03	4019891		
483			10/09/03	4017488		S
484			07/30/03	4016435		S
485			01/28/04	4016245		S
486			07/29/03	4019892		LES
487			10/17/03	4017475		S
488			08/05/03	3012159		
489			08/06/03	4019901		LES
490			07/29/03	4016431		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
491	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/01/04	4019822		S
492			03/11/04	4019890		S
493			08/07/03	4019889		S
494			10/17/03	4017489		S
495			08/04/03	4019888		S
496			08/06/03	4019899		
497			08/01/03	4019887		S
498			08/04/03	3011147		S
499			10/17/03	4017476		S
500			07/29/03	3011567		S
501			09/05/03	3013624		S
502			08/07/03	3011401		S
503			01/28/04	4017481		S
504			07/29/03	4019898		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
505	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		07/31/03	4016434		S
506			01/28/04	4017487		S
507			11/05/04	4013962		
508			08/05/03	4019886		S
509			08/07/03	4019885		S
510			08/01/03	4019884		S
511			08/08/03	4017183		S
512			03/04/04	4017219		S
513			08/04/03	4019882		S
514			10/10/03	4017484		S
515			07/30/03	4016432		S
516			01/28/04	4017477		S
517			08/11/03	4019881		S
518			08/12/03	4019880		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
519	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		07/29/03	4019897		
520			10/09/03	4017482		S
521			07/31/03	4019883		S
522			01/28/04	4017490		S
523			10/16/03	4016253		S
524			07/31/03	4019879		
525			08/06/03	4017185		LES
526			07/31/03	4019896		LES
527			07/30/03	4019900		
528			01/28/04	4017478		S
529			07/30/03	4019895		LES
530			08/13/03	4019894		
531			01/28/04	4017483		S
532			08/06/03	4019878		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
533	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		08/12/03	4019877		S
534			06/02/03	4021263		
535			01/09/04	4014512		
536			06/01/04	4020309		
537			08/18/03	4017350		C
538			08/20/03	3009719		
539			09/16/03	3009723		
540			10/06/03	4017260		
541			11/19/03	3012985		S
542			12/11/03	4017263		
543			01/28/04	4014645		TS//SI
544			03/11/04	4018404		S//LES
545			03/11/04	4018543		
546			04/12/04	4018409		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
547	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/27/04	4018712		
548			04/12/04	4018408		
549			04/12/04	4018407		
550			04/09/04	40184 t0		
551			09/09/03	3007055	recorded	S
552			11/26/03	4013960		
553			10/22/03	3012980		S
554			11/13/03	3012083		S
555			02/06/04	4016483		S
556			01/19/04	4016985		TS//CRU
557			01/08/04	MFR 4019768 INT 04020067	recorded / transcribed	S
558			12/03/03	4013955	recorded	C
559			12/29/03	4017349	recorded	TS//CRU
560			01/28/04	4019749	recorded	TS//CRU

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
561	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/05/03	4016462	recorded	
562			11/21/03	3013618		
563			09/08/03	3010879		C
564			08/18/03	3007031		
565			09/12/03	3007048		
566			09/23/03	3007076		
567			08/19/03	3007740		
568			10/09/03	3012984		S
569			02/18/04	4020633		
570			10/07/03	4017303		
571			02/10/04	4016235		
572			1/19/04 2/10/04	4017200	recorded	
573			05/04/04	4019348		
574			03/02/04	4018720		S

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
575	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/22/03	3009311		
576			02/03/04	4016484		S
577			08/01/03	3003862		
578			10/03/03	4018476	recorded	S
579			11/20/03	301630		TS
580			09/03/03	3007060		
581			01/09/04	4013973		
582			01/13/04	4016474	recorded	
583			02/11/04	4016463	recorded	
584			11/04/03	4013963		
585			10/01/03	4016442	recorded	
586			09/10/03	3007043	recorded	S
587			02/24/04	4017167		
588			05/26/04	4020020		SSI

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
589	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/30/03	3010867		S
590			04/15/04	4018541		
591			9/10/03 9/30/03 10/8/03	4017168		
592			03/16/04	4018140		
593			10/17/03 and 10/20/03	3010872		S
594			03/23/04	4018713		
595			05/05/04	4020012	recorded	SSI
596			01/20/04	4019750	recorded	TS//CRU
597			05/11/04	4020031		
598			01/31/04	4017351		TS
599			01/31/04	4018414		TS//CRU
600			06/21/04	4020398		
601			10/22/03	3010906	recorded	SSI
602			05/12/04	4019751		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
603	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/09/03	4014598	recorded	TS
604			09/12/03	4017157		TS//HCS
605			11/20/03	4016464	recorded	
606			10/20/03	3010880		S
607			07/30/03	3004405		
608			10/08/03	4017216	recorded	
609			01/23/04	4017148		TS//Comint
610			08/25/03	3009293		
611			09/05/03	3009304		
612			06/02/04	4020311		
613			11/20/03	3012995		
614			10/15/04	4013971		
615			06/18/04	4021342		
616			11/10/03	4019752		TS//CRU

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
617	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		03/04/04	4018168		
618			10/29/03	3013631	recorded	S
619			10/29/03	4013715	recorded	TS
620			11/24/03	4019753		S
621			10/20/03	3012983		S
622			04/02/04	4020559		
623			10/18/03	3012165		S
624			02/09/04	4018181		
625			05/07/04	4020483	recorded	
626			02/18/04	4019754		
627			10/10/03	3010895	recorded	S
628			11/06/03	4021264		S/SI
629			12/04/03	3012975		
630			01/15/04	4014513		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
631	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/01/03	3009310		
632			10/08/03	3012988		S//TK
633			11/19/03	3012989		S//SI
634			04/12/04	4020014	recorded	SSI
635			11/03/03	3012986		S
636			04/01/04	4020015	recorded	SSI
637			02/24/04	4017197	recorded	SSI
638			10/22/03	3012987		TS//B
639			08/19/03	3009295		
640			01/14/04	4014520	recorded	TS//SCI
641			03/03/04	4019755	recorded	TS//CRU
642			01/09/04	4020386		TS//SCI
643			11/04/03	3010909		S
644			08/29/03	3009301		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
645	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/21/04	4018725		S
646			04/21/04	4021344		S
647			10/16/03	4013970		
648			09/09/03	3009297		
649			02/24/04	4020574		
650			11/21/03	3012164		TS
651			04/12/04	4020482		SI/SI
652			09/12/03	4017158		S
653			09/30/03	4017259		
654			11/06/03	4017196	recorded	SSI
655			07/26/04	4021345		
656			12/10/03	4016487		
657			11/05/03	3011148		TS
658			03/18/04	4020578		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F
659	(b)(6), (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c			4017195	recorded	S
660				4017353		TS//CRU
661				4018415		TS
662				4017352	recorded	TS//CRU
663				4021265		
664				4019349		
665				4016443	recorded	
666				4017302		
667				4017304		
668				4017305		
669				4017306		
670				4016603	recorded	
671				4013708		
672				4016243		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
673	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/06/04	4018405		
674			1/4-1/6/04	4016230		
675			11/05/03	4017194	recorded	SSI
676			10/03/03	3010871		S
677			04/29/04	4020719	recorded	S
678			10/28/03	4019756	recorded	
679			01/20/04	4018180		
680			01/20/04	4017269		
681			08/15/03	3007050		
682			12/19/04	4016477	recorded	S
683			10/28/03	4017193	recorded	SSI
684			01/16/04	4016489		S
685			04/19/04	4018781		
686			01/28/04	4019774		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
687	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/10/03	4013818 4017192		SSI
688			12/15/03	4020486		
689			02/11/04	4017191	recorded	
690			11/05/03	3011566		
691			11/07/03	3012150		
692			10/01/03	4017190	recorded	SSI
693			03/01/04	4020572		
694			01/20/04	4017268		
695			05/11/04	4019218		
696			month of September 2003	4017188		
697			08/12/03	4016254		
698			11/19/03 11/20/03	4016491		S
699			10/03/03	3010870		S
700			01/21/04	4018171		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
701	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/08/03	3013002		TS/CRU
702			10/03/03	4016478	recorded	S
703			09/24/03	4019204	recorded	S
704			09/24/03	4019205	recorded	SSI version
705			09/04/03	3012154		S
706			01/21/04	4016224		
707			10/20/03	4019346		S
708			12/30/03	4016232		S
709			01/21/04	4017354	recorded	TS/CRU
710			06/03/04	4020021		SSI
711			12/15/03	4017166		TS//SI
712			04/19/04	4021273	recorded	TS//CRU
713			11/25/03	4016444 Part I	recorded	
714			01/06/04	4016445 Part II	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
715	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/12/04	4016446 Part III	recorded	
716			11/12/03	4016447	recorded	
717			12/29/03	4013902	recorded	TS//CRU
718			05/10/04	4020485	recorded	C
719			12/16/03	4016492		S
720			07/21/03	3003644		
721			12/23/03	4019818		S
722			11/07/03	3013000		
723			04/29/04	4019352		S
724			03/18/04	4020577		S
725			10/14/03	4016465	recorded	
726			01/08/04	4020022		
727			11/05/03	4017159		S//Comint
728			08/29/03	3009305		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
729	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/14/04	4018544		
730			11/17/03	4016448		
731			01/06/04	4014519		
732			10/09/03	3010893	recorded	S
733			undated	4016466	recorded	S
734			10/23/03	4017262		
735			11/18/03	3012090		S
736			09/15/03	3010901	recorded	
737			02/06/04	4017355		TS/CRU
738			02/11/04	4016227		S
739			03/18/04	4019350		TS
740			01/13/04	MFR 4019820 INT 4020063	recorded / transcribed	S
741			01/05/04	4017266		
742			11/13/03	3012091		S

	A	B	C	D	E	F	
743	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		06/18/04	4021343			
744			???	4019757	recorded	TS	
745				12/12/03	4013709		
746				01/06/04	4020383		S
747				10/20/03	4016449	recorded	
748				01/14/04	4014517		
749				07/21/03	4020722		S
750				07/25/03	4019206	recorded	
751				09/11/03	3007074		
752				11/05/03	3011152		S
753				10/21/03	3011151		
754				09/01/03	3010878		S
755				01/23/04	4016769	recorded	
756				10/27/03	4016770	recorded	

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
757	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/27/03	4016771	recorded	
758			01/23/04	4016772	recorded	
759			10/27/03	4016773	recorded	
760			10/27/03	4016774	recorded	
761			01/20/04	4016775	recorded	
762			01/21/04	4016776	recorded	
763			10/28/04	4016777	recorded	
764			1/22/04 and 1/23/04	4016778		
765			01/23/04	4016779	recorded	
766			01/22/04	4016780		
767			10/28/03	4016781		
768			10/29/03	4016783	recorded	
769			10/27/03	4016784	recorded	
770			10/29/03	4016785	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
771	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/28/03	4016786	recorded	
772			10/30/03	4016787	recorded	
773			10/30/03	4020716		S
774			10/27/03	3012970		
775			09/29/03	4017356	recorded	TS//CRU
776			02/04/04	4016493		S
777			9/10/03 9/30/03 10/8/03	4017168		
778			03/11/04	4017473		
779			12/11/03	3013078		
780			01/12/04	4017229		
781			01/09/04	4017227		
782			01/09/04	4017420		
783			01/23/04	4017434		
784			01/12/04	4017228		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
785	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		02/10/04	4017440		
786			01/09/04	4017419		
787			03/05/04	4017449		
788			02/12/04	4017445		
789			12/16/03	4017415		
790			01/13/04	4017417		
791			02/13/04	4017447		
792			01/12/04	4017418		
793			02/11/04	4017443		
794			02/09/04	4017241		
795			01/28/04	4017435		
796			01/22/04	4017427		
797			01/13/04	4017230		
798			02/12/04	4017245		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
799	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		03/03/04	4017449		
800			01/22/04	4017235		
801			12/15/03	4017414		
802			01/23/04	4017433		
803			01/08/04	4017226		
804			01/23/04	4017237		
805			03/11/04	4017453		
806			02/13/04	4017247		
807			01/07/04	4017422		
808			01/14/04	4017425		
809			01/22/04	4017430		
810			01/14/04	4017231		
811			02/12/04	4017444		
812			01/30/04	4017438		

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
		C	D	E	F
813			2/10/04 4017242		
814			1/28/04 4017436		
815			01/22/04 4017236		
816			01/16/04 4017232		
817			01/22/04 4017432		
818			03/08/04 4017451		
819			01/07/04 4017423		
820			02/10/04 4017243		
821			02/12/04 4017246		
822			01/22/04 4017432		
823			03/26/04 4018138		
824			01/29/04 4017437		
825			02/10/04 4017441		
826			01/13/04 4017416		

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
827			/13/04	4017424		
828			/24/04	4018147		
829			2/09/04	4017439		
830			1/08/04	4017421		
831			02/11/04	4017244		
832			01/23/04	4017426		
833			03/19/04	4018146		
834			01/30/04	4017239		
835			03/11/04	4017454		
836			01/23/04	4017238		
837			01/22/04	4017429		
838			01/21/04	4017234		
839			02/10/04	4017442		
840			01/22/04	4017428		

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

	A	B	C	D	E	F
841	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		01/20/04	4017233		
842			03/08/04	4017450		
843			03/09/04	4017452		
844			02/09/04	4017240		
845			03/04/04	4017464		
846			03/16/04	4018150		
847			03/24/04	4018153		
848			03/16/04	4018148		
849			03/30/04	4018137		
850			03/10/04	4017465		
851			03/16/04	4018149		
852			03/19/04	4018152		
853			03/18/04	4018151		
854			02/19/04	4017456		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
855	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		02/19/04	4017458		
856			03/09/04	4018160		
857			05/04/04	4020054		
858			02/04/04	4017187		
859			03/01/04	4017463		
860			01/14/04	4017455		
861			02/24/04	4017460		
862			03/10/04	4018164		
863			03/09/04	4018161		
864			02/19/04	4017248		
865			03/10/04	4018162		
866			02/24/04	4018158		
867			03/09/04	4018159		
868			01/14/04	4017454A		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
869			02/24/04	4017462		
870			02/19/04	4017457		
871			02/17/04	4017249		
872			02/24/04	4018155		
873			03/10/04	4018163		
874			02/20/04	4018156		
875		(b)(6), (b)(7)c	02/04/04	4017198		
876			02/20/04	4017251		
877			02/20/04	4017459		
878			02/24/04	4017461		
879			03/11/04	4018165		
880			02/17/04	4017250		
881			02/20/04	4018157		
882			04/12/04	4020634		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
883	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		02/26/04	4018406		
884			07/01/03	4021266		
885			03/01/04	4018141		S
886			03/01/04	4018142		S
887			11/14/03	4017321		
888			03/03/04	4020715		S
889			12/03/03	MFR 04016829	recorded	
890			12/03/03	MFR 04016830	recorded	
891			12/03/03	MFR 04016831	recorded	
892			12/03/03	MFR 04016832	recorded	
893			12/03/03	MFR 04016833	recorded	
894			12/01/03	4017307	recorded	
895			12/01/03	4017308	recorded	
896			12/01/03	4017309	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
897	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/10/03	3010873		S
898			03/03/04	4018721		SI/SI
899			05/19/04	4019902		TS//SI//HCS
900			unknown	4020481		TS//SI
901			09/17/03	3007059	recorded	S
902			06/30/03	3003646		
903			12/17/03	4013721		TS//CRU//SI
904			11/12/03	3012990		S
905			03/16/04	4018166		
906			09/03/03	4017264		LES
907			09/03/03	3009296		
908			02/13/04	4016467		
909			04/02/04	4018717		
910			10/03/03	3010907	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
911	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/14/03	3012974		
912			10/14/03	3012973		
913			10/14/03	3012972		
914			10/14/03	3012971		
915			01/07/04	4016754	recorded	
916			01/07/04	4016756	recorded	
917			09/16/03	3012991		
918			01/16/04	4014599		
919			10/7/03 (part I) no date (part II)	4017186		SSI
920			11/21/03	4017324		
921			02/24/04	4016433		S
922			10/27/03	3010905		
923			08/07/03	3007029		
924			01/08/04	4019778		TS//CRU

	A	B	C	D	E	F
925	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/01/03	3012084		S
926			12/29/03	4017342		TS//SI//HCS
927			08/01/03	3007051		
928			10/20/03	4013967		
929			04/12/04	4018542		
930			11/25/03	4019758	recorded	TS//CRU
931			01/15/04	4013957		
932			08/20/03	3007741		
933			09/30/03	3009442	recorded	
934			01/21/04	4017204		S
935			12/22/03	4013744		TS//CRU
936			07/13/04	4021341		TS
937			01/28/04	4019286		TS//CRU
938			12/14/03	4013706		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
939	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/18/03	4017265		
940			10/16/03	4017328		
941			01/15/04	4016220	recorded	TS//CRU
942			08/24/03	3007147	recorded	S
943			10/09/03	4016468	recorded	
944			10/24/03	4017210	recorded	
945			11/10/03	4017467		
946			03/31/04	4020060		
947			03/29/04	4020056		
948			03/31/04	4020059		
949			11/20/03	4017469		
950			11/10/03	4017468		
951			10/27/03	4017466		
952			11/25/03	4017471		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
953	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		11/24/03	4017470		
954			03/31/04	4020061		
955			11/24/03	4017472		
956			11/25/03	4017257		
957			11/20/03	4017256		
958			02/24/04	4020055		
959			11/12/03	4017255		
960			04/01/04	4020062		
961			11/06/03	4017254		
962			05/10/04	4020063		
963			11/03/03	4017253		
964			03/30/04	4020057		
965			03/30/04	4020058		
966			10/14/03	4017252		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
967	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		08/18/03	3007052		
968			10/20/03	4017364		
969			01/21/04	4014521	recorded	TS//CRU
970			08/18/03	4017160		TS
971			01/22/04	4017270		TS
972			10/24/03	3010866		
973			06/09/03	3001041		
974			10/08/03	3009986	recorded	
975			12/06/03	4020484	recorded	
976			10/16/03	4016450	recorded	
977			12/11/03	4016494		S
978			10/28/03	3010910		S
979			10/21/03	4016451	recorded	
980			01/09/04	4013972		

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
981	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/16/03	MFR 4017357 INT 4018038	recorded / transcribed	TS//CRU
982			12/16/03	MFR 4019769 INT 4018038	recorded / transcribed	recording TS//CRU MFR U
983			04/12/04	4018714		
984			02/07/04	4019759		TS//CRU
985			01/09/04	4014922	recorded	TS//CRU
986			12/15/03	4013711		S
987			09/15/03	3009302		
988			09/11/03	3007063		
989			02/26/04	4017182	recorded	
990			10/29/03	3010900		
991			08/13/03	3007049 addendum 4019207	recorded	addendum S
992			01/29/04	4017358	recorded	TS//CRU
993			10/16/03	4020375		
994			01/07/04	4017222		TS//CRU

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	A	B	C	D	E	F
995	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		08/07/03	3013625		S
996			11/05/03	3012095		
997			4/19-20/04	4018787		
998			01/25/04	4018174		
999			10/23/03	3010892		S
1000			08/18/03	3005041		
1001			11/07/03	4020390		TS//SCI
1002			04/02/04	4018716		
1003			09/22/03	3012992		TS//SI//TK//HCS
1004			11/13/03	3012993		
1005			01/30/04	4019760		TS//CRU
1006			10/03/03	3010876		S
1007			10/21/03	3010884		S
1008		09/29/03	4016469	recorded		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1009	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/09/03	4016470	recorded	
1010			11/03/03	4017180	recorded	S
1011			06/14/04	4020600	recorded	
1012			10/20/03	4016452	recorded	
1013			10/30/03	4020562	recorded	S
1014			02/12/04	4019826		S
1015			04/17/04	4019353		
1016			09/30/03	4016252		S
1017			12/11/03	4017361		TS//CRU
1018			03/11/04	4021339		TS//CRU
1019			01/06/04	4017360		TS//CRU
1020			09/05/03	4017165		S
1021			02/19/03	4019761		TS
1022			03/03/04	4017362		TS//CRU

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1023	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		03/03/04	4020018	recorded	
1024			07/07/03	3007047		
1025			12/30/03	4013803		
1026			09/23/03	3010891		
1027			08/06/03	3007066		
1028			12/02/03	4017161		TS//HCS//Comint
1029			11/06/03	3012094		TS
1030			08/28/03	3007027	recorded	TS
1031			06/02/04	4020310		
1032			12/16/03	4013745	recorded	TS//CRU
1033			02/05/04	4019762	recorded	TS//CRU
1034			02/05/04	4017271		TS//HCS//SI
1035			01/25/04	4019763	recorded	TS//CRU
1036			01/13/04	4020385		S//SCI

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1037	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		08/29/03	3007028	recorded	TS
1038			08/27/03	4020721		S
1039			07/10/03	3004406		
1040			04/13/04	4018719		
1041			12/15/03	3013627		TS//CRU
1042			09/22/03	3009718		
1043			11/14/03	3012089		S
1044			12/19/03	4017363	recorded	TS
1045			09/02/03	3010874		
1046			07/13/04	4020727	recorded	
1047			09/15/03	3007046	recorded	S
1048			06/23/04	4020576		
1049			09/08/03	3007033		TS//CRU
1050			10/20/03	4017364		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1051	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/24/03	3010898	recorded	TS
1052			09/04/03	3009300		
1053			11/21/03	4017178		SSI
1054			05/12/04	4019765		TS//SI
1055			06/03/03	3007724		
1056			06/16/03	3007725		
1057			06/19/03	3007726		
1058			06/30/03	3007727		
1059			07/17/03	3007730		
1060			08/14/03	3007738		
1061			08/20/03	3007739		
1062			08/21/03	3007742		
1063			09/10/03	3007743		
1064			12/12/03	4017322		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1065	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/04/03	3013621		TS//CRU
1066			12/30/03	4016471	recorded	
1067			09/25/03	3009724	recorded	TS
1068			03/01/04	4017223	recorded	
1069			04/12/04	4018785		
1070			08/18/03	3007053		
1071			04/01/04	4018722		
1072			01/15/04	4016223		S
1073			12/28/03	4014515	recorded	S
1074			12/10/03	4017163		TS//SI
1075			12/01/03	3012997		
1076			11/13/03	3011565		
1077			11/25/03	3011564		
1078					3011156	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1079	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		12/02/03	3012996		
1080			10/29/03	3010904		
1081			01/22/04	4017365		TS//CRU
1082			01/28/04	4017366		TS//CRU
1083			07/18/03	3004407		
1084			11/05/03	4016472	recorded	
1085			11/06/03	4020382		TS//SCI
1086			10/08/03	3012967	recorded	S
1087			07/30/03	4019208		S
1088			08/05/03	4019210		S
1089			09/03/03	3007075		
1090			10/20/03	4019209		S
1091			06/02/04	4020028		SSI
1092			06/03/04	4020017		SSI

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1093	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/05/03	3007058	recorded	
1094			05/27/04	4020016	recorded	
1095			03/11/04	4020019	recorded	
1096			09/17/03	4017174	recorded	
1097			11/17-21/03	4017215		
1098			11/20/03	4017175		
1099			11/20/03	4020026		SSI
1100			04/14/04	4020009		
1101			11/21/03	4017209	recorded	
1102			11/21/03	4017220	recorded	
1103			11/21/03	4017221	recorded	
1104			11/21/03	4017178	recorded	
1105			11/20/03	4017177		
1106			11/21/03	4017224	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1107	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		04/15/04	4020036	recorded	
1108			12/04/03	4019821		S
1109			09/10/03	3010877		
1110			09/17/03	3012994		TS
1111			03/23/04	4018723		S
1112			10/14/03	4016473	recorded	
1113			01/06/04	MFR 4019770 INT 4019630	recorded / transcribed	S
1114			02/05/04	MFR 4019771 INT 4019631	recorded / transcribed	MFR TS recording S
1115			06/03/04	4019823		
1116			01/14/04	4016496		S
1117			08/12/03	3004411	recorded	
1118			10/24/03	3010897	recorded	TS
1119			11/13/03	4016453	recorded	
1120			08/28/03	3005418		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1121	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/20/03	4013968		
1122			10/20/03	4019211		S
1123			02/25/04	4020013	recorded	SSI
1124			01/09/04	4020384		S//SCI
1125			11/04/03	4013964		
1126			11/25/03	4017164		TS//HCS
1127			11/10/03	3012088		S
1128			11/07/03	3012096		S
1129			12/04/03	4017162		TS//HCS//SI//TK
1130			07/14/03	3007728		
1131			01/20/04	4014522		TS//CRU
1132			06/13/03	3010889		
1133			01/09/04	4016497		
1134			02/17/04	4017170	recorded	SSI

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1135	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/10/03	4016454	recorded	
1136			12/23/01	4017367	recorded	TS//CRU
1137			03/04/04	4018175		
1138			09/22/03	MFR 04016788	recorded	
1139			09/22/03	MFR 04016789	recorded	
1140			09/22/03	MFR 04016790	recorded	
1141			09/22/03	MFR 04016791	recorded	
1142			09/22/03	MFR 04016792	recorded	
1143			09/22/03	MFR 04016793	recorded	
1144			09/22/03	MFR 04016794	recorded	
1145			09/22/03	MFR 04016795	recorded	
1146			09/22/03	MFR 04016796	recorded	
1147			09/22/03	MFR 04016797	recorded	
1148			09/22/03	MFR 04016799	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1149	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/22/03	MFR 04016800	recorded	
1150			09/22/03	MFR 04016801	recorded	
1151			09/22/03	MFR 04016798	recorded	
1152			09/22/03	MFR 04016802	recorded	
1153			09/22/03	MFR 04016803	recorded	
1154			09/22/03	MFR 04016804	recorded	
1155			09/22/03	MFR 04016808		
1156			9/22 - 9/24/04	MFR 04016805		
1157			10/08/03	3010894	recorded	TS
1158			11/14/03	4016455 Part I	recorded	
1159			11/24/03	4016456 Part II	recorded	
1160			01/29/04	4019766	recorded	TS
1161			12/15/03	MFR 04016809	recorded	
1162			12/15/03	MFR 04016810	recorded	

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1163	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		10/01/03	MFR 04016828	recorded	
1164			12/15/03	MFR 04016811	recorded	
1165			12/15/03	MFR 04016812	recorded	
1166			09/30/03	MFR 04016813		
1167			10/01/03	MFR 04016814	recorded	
1168			09/30/03	MFR 04016815	recorded	
1169			10/02/03	MFR 04016816	recorded	
1170			09/30/03	MFR 04016817	recorded	
1171			09/30/03	MFR 04016818	recorded	
1172			10/01/03	MFR 04016819	recorded	
1173			10/01/03	MFR 04016820	recorded	
1174			10/01/03	MFR 04016821	recorded	
1175			10/01/03	MFR 04016822	recorded	
1176		10/01/03	MFR 04016823	recorded		

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1177	(b)(6), (b)(7)c		09/30/03	MFR 04016824	recorded	
1178			09/30/03	MFR 04016825	recorded	
1179			10/01/03	MFR 04016826	recorded	
1180			09/30/03	MFR 04016827	recorded	

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
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ANG Andrews Sasseville-1 S	73,722 KB	Wave Sound
ANG Andrews Sasseville-2 S	24,822 KB	Wave Sound
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ANG O'Brien-1	54,679 KB	Wave Sound
ANG Weaver-1	87,182 KB	Wave Sound
Anthony-1	40,013 KB	Wave Sound
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Arnold-1 S	53,491 KB	Wave Sound
Arnold-2 S	33,578 KB	Wave Sound
Arnold-3 S	82,084 KB	Wave Sound
Arnold-4 S	51,353 KB	Wave Sound
Arriza-1 TS	430 KB	Wave Sound
Arriza-2 TS	15,906 KB	Wave Sound
Arriza-3 TS	94,311 KB	Wave Sound
Arriza-4 TS	17,546 KB	Wave Sound
Arroyo-1	156,609 KB	Wave Sound
Atkins-1	62,765 KB	Wave Sound
Avery-1	75,031 KB	Wave Sound
Avery-2	49,720 KB	Wave Sound
Avery-3	7,968 KB	Wave Sound
Bach-1	85,520 KB	Wave Sound

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Team 6		File Folder
AAL Ahern-1	67,501 KB	Wave Sound
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AAL Alex-1	25,589 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Arpey-1	50,684 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Briefing-1	7,802 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Briefing-2	66,189 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Briefing-3	13,427 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Carson-1	12,486 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Clarke-1	14,184 KB	Wave Sound
AAL former Woodward-1	29,067 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Gonzalez-1	18,226 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Halleck, Marquis, Parfitt-1	35,189 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Halleck-Houck-1	57,746 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Marquis-1	110,084 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Marquis-2	68,254 KB	Wave Sound
AAL Wansley-1	92,964 KB	Wave Sound
Adler-1	68,921 KB	Wave Sound
AirServ Nelson-Gill-1	24,450 KB	Wave Sound
Albright-1 S	216,803 KB	Wave Sound
Andersen-1 TS	133,536 KB	Wave Sound
ANG Andrews Caine-1 S	7,967 KB	Wave Sound
ANG Andrews Caine-2 S	84,857 KB	Wave Sound

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Rename this file
- Move this file
- Copy this file
- E-mail this file
- Delete this file

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Bach-2	66,737 KB	Wave Sound
Baer-1	82,986 KB	Wave Sound
Balinger-1	190,499 KB	Wave Sound
Barry-1	84,883 KB	Wave Sound
Bateman-1	68,823 KB	Wave Sound
Battle-1	42,795 KB	Wave Sound
Baxter-1	87,707 KB	Wave Sound
Baxter-2	117,100 KB	Wave Sound
Bednarz-Shaw-1	126,923 KB	Wave Sound
Belger-1	106,546 KB	Wave Sound
Belger-2	1,475 KB	Wave Sound
Belger-3	29,815 KB	Wave Sound
Belger-4	114,818 KB	Wave Sound
Belger-5	111,706 KB	Wave Sound
Benjamin-2 S	133,082 KB	Wave Sound
Benjamin-3 S	71,942 KB	Wave Sound
Berez-1	216,489 KB	Wave Sound
Bing-1	72,487 KB	Wave Sound
Birley-1	53,491 KB	Wave Sound
Blair-1	52,722 KB	Wave Sound
Bodine-1 S	309,009 KB	Wave Sound
Bodner-1	44,944 KB	Wave Sound
Boivin-1	117,132 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Rename this file
- Move this file
- Copy this file
- E-mail this file
- Delete this file

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Boivin-2	30,036 KB	Wave Sound
Bonner-1	125,685 KB	Wave Sound
Booth-1	68,494 KB	Wave Sound
Boykin-1 S	142,977 KB	Wave Sound
Brown, S-1	4,419 KB	Wave Sound
Br...	61,461 KB	Wave Sound
Bu...	03,505 KB	Wave Sound
Bu...	18,991 KB	Wave Sound
Butterworth-1	32,294 KB	Wave Sound
Butterworth-2	78,431 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-1	89,290 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-2	16,963 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-3	15,546 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-4	125,035 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-5	125,575 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-6	61,277 KB	Wave Sound
Cadman-7	121,576 KB	Wave Sound
Call-1	1,916 KB	Wave Sound
Call-2	25,483 KB	Wave Sound
Call-3	25,757 KB	Wave Sound
Camp-1 TS	87,338 KB	Wave Sound
Canavan-1	103,366 KB	Wave Sound
Cannoles-1	128,950 KB	Wave Sound

Type: Wave Sound
Size: 4.31 MB
Date Modified: 6/15/2004 11:56 AM

start

interviews on 'kstreet...

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Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Carney-1 S	154,297 KB	Wave Sound
Cates-1	59,608 KB	Wave Sound
Challan-1	93,813 KB	Wave Sound
Chamberlin-1 S	133,228 KB	Wave Sound
Chambers-1 S	83,002 KB	Wave Sound
Chambers-2 S	55,429 KB	Wave Sound
Chapparo-1	57,122 KB	Wave Sound
Cirillo-1	74,369 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Barnik-1	58,107 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Dukeman-1	57,435 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Evans-1	57,627 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Herak-1	106 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Justice-1	66,109 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Kennedy-1	44,398 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Kerinko-1	61,378 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Kettell-1	71,062 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland O'Connor-1	24,920 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Pass-1	67,850 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Wernica-1	56,928 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Werth-1	90,695 KB	Wave Sound
Cleveland Wolbers-1	55,557 KB	Wave Sound
Cockburn-1	136,105 KB	Wave Sound
Coda-1	51,346 KB	Wave Sound

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Rename this file
- Move this file
- Copy this file
- E-mail this file
- Delete this file

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

start | Interviews on 'kstreet... | Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Colon, G-1	59,663 KB	Wave Sound
Colon, G-2	373 KB	Wave Sound
Colon, R-1	110,129 KB	Wave Sound
Concepcion-1	31,774 KB	Wave Sound
Connolly-1	132,496 KB	Wave Sound
CONR Del Toro-Millovich-1	48,385 KB	Wave Sound
CONR McKinley-1	87,189 KB	Wave Sound
CONR Morris-1	89,116 KB	Wave Sound
CONR Scott-1	54,691 KB	Wave Sound
CONR Scott-2	28,219 KB	Wave Sound
CONR Scott-3		Wave Sound
CONR Scott-4		Wave Sound
CONR Usher-1	72,011 KB	Wave Sound
Cook-1	69,364 KB	Wave Sound
Cook-2	25,104 KB	Wave Sound
Cornish-1	47,202 KB	Wave Sound
Costello-1	121,306 KB	Wave Sound
Cox-1	90,577 KB	Wave Sound
Cozine-1	43,338 KB	Wave Sound
Cressey-2 T5	130,048 KB	Wave Sound
Cressey-3 T5	4,168 KB	Wave Sound
Cressey-4 T5	25,606 KB	Wave Sound
Cutler-1	80,086 KB	Wave Sound
...

Type: Wave Sound
 Size: 53.4 MB
 Date Modified: 2/19/2004 5:19 PM

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

	Name	Size	Type
Music Tasks Play all Shop for music online File and Folder Tasks Make a new folder Other Places My Computer My Music My Network Places Details	Daly-1	87,323 KB	Wave Sound
	de la Vina-Harris-1	210,374 KB	Wave Sound
	Dean-1	49,664 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Baroukh, Kendall, Landau-1	53,894 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Baroukh, Kendall, Landau-2	90,360 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Brunsmann-1	101,082 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Gil-1	35,304 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Healy-1	62,422 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Hopkinson-1	73,450 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Krause-1	104,881 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Lower-1	81,959 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Spigel-1	152,680 KB	Wave Sound
	DHS Insp Willson-1	91,096 KB	Wave Sound
	Diggins-1	58,958 KB	Wave Sound
	Diggins-2	36,949 KB	Wave Sound
	Diggins-3	27,277 KB	Wave Sound
	Dudley-1	54,768 KB	Wave Sound
	Duncan-1 S	24,430 KB	Wave Sound
	Duncan-2 S	2,418 KB	Wave Sound
	Duncan-3 S	61,589 KB	Wave Sound
Duncan-4 S	33,976 KB	Wave Sound	
Erenbaum-1	110,825 KB	Wave Sound	
FAA Andrews AFB Marra-1	17,352 KB	Wave Sound	

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
FAA Crew CT Training Briefing-1	88,502 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Eastern McCartney-1	74,956 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Eastern Ruggeri-1	104,112 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Eastern Ruggeri-2	14,084 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Bueno-1	84,588 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Bueno-2	13,908 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Cooper-1	17,237 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Cooper-2	48,429 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Cooper-3	1,782 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Cooper-4	27,933 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Dean-1	67,012 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Dion-1	44,752 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Donoghue-1	106,046 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Hartling-1	94,229 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Jones, R-1	73,213 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Kula-1	55,608 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Martens-1	55,888 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Miller, A-1	32,722 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Miller, A-2	7,521 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Miller, T-1	73,542 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH O'Connor-1	59,228 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Roebuck-1	80,331 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Schippani-1	70,576 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
FAA NH Schippani-2	99 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Scoggins-1	73,460 KB	Wave Sound
FAA NH Scoggins-2	6,541 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Potomac Howell-1	16,179 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Potomac Masaitis-1	69,323 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Potomac O'Brien-Howell-1	71,266 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Potomac Padgett-1	33,758 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Potomac Sykes-1	8,064 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Washington Johnson-1	59,795 KB	Wave Sound
FAA Washington West-1	40,453 KB	Wave Sound
Falcone-1	166,125 KB	Wave Sound
Ferrente-1	149,286 KB	Wave Sound
Ferrer-1	50,187 KB	Wave Sound
Flaherty-1	108,233 KB	Wave Sound
Flynn-1 S	66,914 KB	Wave Sound
Flynn-2 S	81,950 KB	Wave Sound
Flynn, S-1	121,555 KB	Wave Sound
Fowler-1 TS	160,687 KB	Wave Sound
FREEH	594 KB	Microsoft Word Document
Freeh-1 S	292,447 KB	Wave Sound
Freeman-1 C	108,551 KB	Wave Sound
Freeman, D-1	93,012 KB	Wave Sound
Freeman, D-2	69,748 KB	Wave Sound

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interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I-)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Frye-1 TS	157,183 KB	Wave Sound
Furey-1	153,864 KB	Wave Sound
Garcia-1	119,850 KB	Wave Sound
Gardner-1 5	678,743 KB	Wave Sound
Garvey-1	73,098 KB	Wave Sound
Garvey-2	142,752 KB	Wave Sound
Garvey-3	79,706 KB	Wave Sound
These tasks apply to the files and folders you select.		
Gonsalves-1	33,436 KB	Wave Sound
Gonzalez, E-1	53,819 KB	Wave Sound
Gordon-1	49,460 KB	Wave Sound
Gordon HSC	33 KB	Microsoft Word D
GORE	247 KB	Microsoft Word D
Gore-1A 5	204,879 KB	Wave Sound
Gorelick-1	109,430 KB	Wave Sound
Gorelick-2	218,185 KB	Wave Sound
Gorelick-3	81,079 KB	Wave Sound
Goyer-1	41,002 KB	Wave Sound
Goyer-2	65,506 KB	Wave Sound
Grandrino-1 5	119,026 KB	Wave Sound
Griffith-1	82,551 KB	Wave Sound
Griffith-2	173,370 KB	Wave Sound
Gripper-1	71,416 KB	Wave Sound

start | interviews on 'kstreet... | Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:

Name	Size	Type
Gripper-1	71,416 KB	Wave Sound
Grovak-1	77,666 KB	Wave Sound
Hallett-1	190,583 KB	Wave Sound
Hanre-1 TS	62,144 KB	Wave Sound
Harty-1 S	114,126 KB	Wave Sound
Harty-2 S	29,796 KB	Wave Sound
Hawley-1	137,181 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Artist-1	76,593 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Bell-1	91,727 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Bell-2	43,084 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Bell-3	30,714 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Bell-4	14,482 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Broach-1	40,003 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Brooks-1	30,525 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Carter-1	29,799 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Cherrie-1	31,164 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Czbarenek-1	68,475 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Jordan-1	62,266 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Jordan-2	7,081 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon King, E-1	93,982 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon King, E-2	85,609 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Klassen-1	53,234 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Lansberry-1	23,659 KB	Wave Sound

start | interviews on 'kstreect... | Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Herndon Lansberry-2	30,351 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Radkus-1	37,836 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Raske-1	101,513 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Simmons-1	57,107 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Smith, Tim-1	82,786 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Smith, Tim-2	61,622 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Smith, Tony-1	70,614 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Smith, Tony-2	88,897 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Somersal-1	60,670 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Sparrow-1	47,253 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Volacka-1	67,976 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Williams, R-1	2,020 KB	Wave Sound
Herndon Williams, R-2	29,064 KB	Wave Sound
Holmes-1 TS	173,363 KB	Wave Sound
Holmes-2 TS	138,974 KB	Wave Sound
Honore-1 TS	81,232 KB	Wave Sound
Honore-2 TS	151,210 KB	Wave Sound
Hutchinson-1	82,152 KB	Wave Sound
Ijaz-1	116,473 KB	Wave Sound
Ijaz-2	47,758 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Adams-1	31,995 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Boone-1	151,573 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Byard-1	112,594 KB	Wave Sound

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

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interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Indianapolis Gayde-1	63,305 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Kath-1	58,385 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Lutomski-1	75,001 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Phillips-1	56,190 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Povinelli	115,466 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Schifano-1	73,440 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Schott-1	67,809 KB	Wave Sound
Indianapolis Weed-1	3,343 KB	Wave Sound
Indyk-1 S	143,976 KB	Wave Sound
Jackson-1	11,811 KB	Wave Sound
Jackson-2	48,840 KB	Wave Sound
Jackson-3		und
Jenkins-1		und
Jenkins, B-1		und
Jenkins, B-2	42,141 KB	Wave Sound
Jordan-1 S	138,137 KB	Wave Sound
Jordan-2 S	138,137 KB	Wave Sound
Kabolski-1	69,203 KB	Wave Sound
Kattouf-1 S	118,857 KB	Wave Sound
Kendall-1	115,878 KB	Wave Sound
Kendall-2	67,764 KB	Wave Sound
Kendall-3	32,272 KB	Wave Sound
Kendall-4	63,972 KB	Wave Sound

Type: Wave Sound
Size: 11.5 MB
Date Modified: 5/5/2004 10:23 AM

start [Taskbar icons] interviews on 'kstreetsvr' Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Kendall-5	14,959 KB	Wave Sound
Kendall-6	157,861 KB	Wave Sound
Kinton-1	150,440 KB	Wave Sound
Korman-1 5	67,378 KB	Wave Sound
Korman-2 5	79,293 KB	Wave Sound
Krajeski-1	59,899 KB	Wave Sound
Kraus-1	49,133 KB	Wave Sound
Kraus-2	8,024 KB	Wave Sound
Landsman-1	86,067 KB	Wave Sound
Landsman-2	26,562 KB	Wave Sound
Landsman-3	56,155 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Borgstrom-1 5	52,106 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Derrig-1 5	69,909 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Eckmann-1 5	90,429 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Eckmann-2 5	29,433 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Griffith-1	25,012 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Halford-1	2,080 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Halford-2	28,820 KB	Wave Sound
Langley Scherer-1	10,000 KB	Wave Sound
Lannon-1	10,000 KB	Wave Sound
Lannon-2	10,000 KB	Wave Sound
Lannon-3	10,000 KB	Wave Sound
Lannon-4	77,693 KB	Wave Sound

Type: Wave Sound
Size: 28.1 MB
Date Modified: 1/5/2004 4:20 PM

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Lawless-1	49,197 KB	Wave Sound
Lawless-2	10,370 KB	Wave Sound
Lawless-3	95,288 KB	Wave Sound
Lawless-4	17,198 KB	Wave Sound
Leldig-1 5	637,466 KB	Wave Sound
Leldig-2 5	637,978 KB	Wave Sound
Leldig-3 TS	332,140 KB	Wave Sound
Levitt-1	152,020 KB	Wave Sound
Lindsay-1	16,988 KB	Wave Sound
Long-1 5	2,646 KB	Wave Sound
Long-2 5	112,242 KB	Wave Sound
Longmire-1	153 KB	Wave Sound
Longmire-2	60,384 KB	Wave Sound
Longmire-3	113,439 KB	Wave Sound
Longmire-4	42,536 KB	Wave Sound
Lozito-1	80,246 KB	Wave Sound
Luongo-1	110,308 KB	Wave Sound
Maddox-1	63,609 KB	Wave Sound
Manno-1	154,074 KB	Wave Sound
Manno-2	113,319 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-1 5	43,149 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-2 5	38,409 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-3 5	555 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Marr-3 S	555 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-4 S	46,109 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-5 S	46,871 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-6 S	42,871 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-7 S	45,517 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-8 S	30,854 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-9 S	5,988 KB	Wave Sound
Marr-10 S	26,497 KB	Wave Sound
McCoy-1	72,556 KB	Wave Sound
McCoy-2	35,525 KB	Wave Sound
McDonnell-1 S	151,139 KB	Wave Sound
McEligott-1 S	212,643 KB	Wave Sound
McGee-1	29,928 KB	Wave Sound
McHale-1 SSI	180,474 KB	Wave Sound
McHale-2 SSI	45,579 KB	Wave Sound
McHale-3 SSI	40,442 KB	Wave Sound
McLaughlin-1	12,728 KB	Wave Sound
McLaughlin-2	63,586 KB	Wave Sound
McNamara-1 C	179,218 KB	Wave Sound
Meissner-1	97,169 KB	Wave Sound
Meissner-2	61,438 KB	Wave Sound
Meissner-3	5,070 KB	Wave Sound
Meissner-4	114,579 KB	Wave Sound

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Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Melendez-Perez-1	110,736 KB	Wave Sound
Mello-1	107,355 KB	Wave Sound
Mello-2	597 KB	Wave Sound
Merkley-1	44,071 KB	Wave Sound
Milam-2 S	100,834 KB	Wave Sound
Miller, J-1 TS	121,742 KB	Wave Sound
Miller, S-1	126,622 KB	Wave Sound
Mills-1 S	54,733 KB	Wave Sound
Moose-1 S	98,150 KB	Wave Sound
Moose, R.-1	102,462 KB	Wave Sound
Morse-1	76,291 KB	Wave Sound
Morse-2	59,912 KB	Wave Sound
Morse-3	92,370 KB	Wave Sound
Morse-4	166,246 KB	Wave Sound
MUELLER	716 KB	Microsoft Word Document
Mueller-1 S	265,518 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Aires-1	54,691 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Bianchi-1	43,805 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Bianchi-2	15,529 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Culbertson-1	32,281 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Daniels-1	45,952 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Daniels-2	12,267 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Deskins-1	89,865 KB	Wave Sound

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

	Name	Size	Type
Music Tasks Play all Shop for music online File and Folder Tasks Make a new folder Other Places My Computer My Music My Network Places Details	NEADS Deskins-2	36,265 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Deskins-3	26,281 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-1	34,711 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-2	47,437 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-3	46,182 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-4	40,787 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-Watson-Rount...	76,472 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Dooley-Watson-Rount...	65,235 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-1	89,213 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-2	18,783 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-3	10,448 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-4	50,986 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-5	47,112 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-6	86,387 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-7	17,453 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-8	48,453 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Fox-9	32,023 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Hendrick-1	52,330 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS Hendrick-2	32,403 KB	Wave Sound
	NEADS McCain-1	57,832 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS McCain-2	12,346 KB	Wave Sound	
NEADS McCain-3	48,076 KB	Wave Sound	
NEADS McCain-4	8,160 KB	Wave Sound	

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
NEADS McCain-5	34,021 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS McCain-6	32,660 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS O'Mara-1	33,412 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Powell-1	125,626 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Richmond-LaMarch-1	151,740 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Rountree-1	94,752 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Rountree-2	24,631 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Sanderson-1	79,006 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Thornton-1	30,660 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Watson-1	46,826 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Watson-2	63,562 KB	Wave Sound
NEADS Watson-3	22,516 KB	Wave Sound
Newark ATC-1	30,595 KB	Wave Sound
Newark Varcadipane-1	18,693 KB	Wave Sound
NMCC Kehl-1	97,396 KB	Wave Sound
NMCC Winfield-1 5	638,682 KB	Wave Sound
NMCC Winfield-2 5	433,126 KB	Wave Sound
Noel-1	74,528 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Cecil-Postgate-1 5	74,344 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD CMOC Hodinott-1 5	47,799 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD CMOC Matthews-1 5	11,835 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Eberhart-1 5	61,545 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Eberhart-2 5	67,808 KB	Wave Sound

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Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
NORAD Eberhart-1 5	61,545 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Eberhart-2 5	67,808 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Eberhart-3 5	7,967 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD FAA Davies-1 5	35,085 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD FAA Davies-2 5	128,129 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Findley-1 5	53,312 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Findley-2 5	50,677 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Findley-3 5	27,630 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Finkelman-1 5	55,441 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Finkelman-2 5	29,964 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Finkelman-3 5	7,960 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Glover-1 5	11,463 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Glover-2 5	46,955 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Glover-3 5	68 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Gott-1	46,381 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Gott-2	18,781 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Jenista-1 5	57,598 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Jenista-2 5	16,186 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Kupez-1 5	43,768 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Kupez-2 5	12,075 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Martin-1 5	38,058 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Merchant-Goddard-1	44,787 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Merchant-Goddard-2	23,108 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I-)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
NORAD Noll-1	21,504 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Paul-1	84,034 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Paul-2	26,174 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Perini-1 S	51,497 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Seaton-1 S	10,937 KB	Wave Sound
NORAD Seaton-2 S	32,126 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk FAA Casson-1	23,071 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk FAA Harter-1	68,865 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk FAA Struther-1	20,626 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Barkis-1	2,259 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Barkis-2	67,742 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Barkis-3	846 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Clipper-1	22,593 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Clipper-2	17,463 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Defeo-1	27,308 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Kluge-1	53,334 KB	Wave Sound
Norfolk Navy Peck-1	15,682 KB	Wave Sound
Oakley-1 S	148,288 KB	Wave Sound
O'Connell-1 S	116,379 KB	Wave Sound
O'Neil, K-1	67,388 KB	Wave Sound
Osmus-1	136,111 KB	Wave Sound
Osmus-2	56,272 KB	Wave Sound
OTIS Duffy-1	82,935 KB	Wave Sound

start | Interviews on 'kstreet... | Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

	Name	Size	Type
Music Tasks Play all Shop for music online File and Folder Tasks Make a new folder Other Places My Computer My Music My Network Places Details	OTIS Duffy-2	23,735 KB	Wave Sound
	OTIS Quenneville-1	41,573 KB	Wave Sound
	OTIS Quenneville-2	28,653 KB	Wave Sound
	Paccione-1	6,332 KB	Wave Sound
	Paccione-2	20,311 KB	Wave Sound
	Paccione-3	107,933 KB	Wave Sound
	Paccione-4	26,574 KB	Wave Sound
	Padgett-1	90,624 KB	Wave Sound
	Paquin-1	91,266 KB	Wave Sound
	Paquin-2	32,745 KB	Wave Sound
	Petterson-1	145,871 KB	Wave Sound
	Pollack-1	184,616 KB	Wave Sound
	Polk-1 S	34,396 KB	Wave Sound
	Polk-2 S	15,653 KB	Wave Sound
	Polk-3 S	18,380 KB	Wave Sound
	Ramirez-1	68,891 KB	Wave Sound
	Randol-1	84,373 KB	Wave Sound
	Raphel-1 S	111,089 KB	Wave Sound
	Ratliffe-1	136,724 KB	Wave Sound
	Rickert-1	35,557 KB	Wave Sound
Rickert-2	23,616 KB	Wave Sound	
Riffe-1	90,665 KB	Wave Sound	
Robinson-1	129,811 KB	Wave Sound	

start [Taskbar icons] interviews on 'kstreet... Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Robinson-2	3,478 KB	Wave Sound
Rollnce-1 S	90,021 KB	Wave Sound
Rooney-1	102,915 KB	Wave Sound
Ross-1 S	116,974 KB	Wave Sound
Ryan-1	108,982 KB	Wave Sound
Ryan-2	49,149 KB	Wave Sound
Ryan-3	106,432 KB	Wave Sound
Salata-1 SSI	114,371 KB	Wave Sound
Salata-2 SSI	33,336 KB	Wave Sound
Salata-3	87,654 KB	Wave Sound
Salata-4	6,814 KB	Wave Sound
Sampson-1 S	42,153 KB	Wave Sound
Sampson-2 S	95,989 KB	Wave Sound
Sampson-3 S	32,429 KB	Wave Sound
Sampson-4 S	5,192 KB	Wave Sound
Sampson-5 S	8,271 KB	Wave Sound
Schuessler-1	186,439 KB	Wave Sound
Schurott-1	45,022 KB	Wave Sound
Scruggs-1	133,146 KB	Wave Sound
Scruggs-2	114,017 KB	Wave Sound
Settles-1	86,618 KB	Wave Sound
Shaloff-1 S	82,064 KB	Wave Sound
Shaloff-2 S	75,169 KB	Wave Sound
...

start | interviews on 'kstreet...' | Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Shinn-1 TS	125,828 KB	Wave Sound
Simons-1 S	130,306 KB	Wave Sound
Sims-1 S	361,578 KB	Wave Sound
Slate-1	85,921 KB	Wave Sound
Slocombe-1 TS	51,914 KB	Wave Sound
Slocombe-2 TS	112,637 KB	Wave Sound
Smith, D-1 S	86,960 KB	Wave Sound
Smith, D-2 S	11,445 KB	Wave Sound
Smith, G-1 S	208,256 KB	Wave Sound
Snell-1 TS	88,013 KB	Wave Sound
Steinger-1 S	101,244 KB	Wave Sound
Steinger-2 S	60,316 KB	Wave Sound
Steinitz -1 TS	174,916 KB	Wave Sound
Stevens-1	108,348 KB	Wave Sound
Taffe-1	20,348 KB	Wave Sound
Taffe-2	3,278 KB	Wave Sound
Taffe-3	45,637 KB	Wave Sound
Talbott-1 S	251,463 KB	Wave Sound
Taylor, F.-1 TS	59,687 KB	Wave Sound
Thernstrom-1	83,326 KB	Wave Sound
Thernstrom-2	77,642 KB	Wave Sound
Thibault-1	138,681 KB	Wave Sound
Thompson-1 S	37,986 KB	Wave Sound

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

start [Taskbar icons] interviews on 'kstreet... Document - WordPad

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Music Tasks

- Play all
- Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks

- Make a new folder

Other Places

- My Computer
- My Music
- My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
Thompson-2 S	143,643 KB	Wave Sound
Thompson-3 S	11,851 KB	Wave Sound
Thompson-4 S	44,009 KB	Wave Sound
Tomsen-1 S	114,060 KB	Wave Sound
Tomsen-2 S	83,918 KB	Wave Sound
TOWNSEND	34 KB	Microsoft Word D
TRACON N90 Birch-1	69,863 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Coschignano-1	31,074 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Fanno-1	41,794 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Jiracek-1	71,188 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Saul-1	36,334 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Saul-2	32,925 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Tucker-1	69,863 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Vollaro-1	17,117 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON N90 Willey-1	12,692 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON Spence	55,021 KB	Wave Sound
TRACON Walsh	22,508 KB	Wave Sound
Tucker-1	149,183 KB	Wave Sound
Tucker, C-1	144,045 KB	Wave Sound
Turano-1	93,406 KB	Wave Sound
Turano-2	39,569 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Belme-1	44,934 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Knerr-1	70,668 KB	Wave Sound

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
UAL Lubkemann-1	30,652 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Miles-1	46,851 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Policastro-1	17,211 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Soliday-1	106,830 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Soliday-2	89,119 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Soliday-3	24,016 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Studdert-1	7,178 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Studdert-2	28,319 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Studdert-3	85,587 KB	Wave Sound
UAL Whiteley-1	17,012 KB	Wave Sound
Underwood-1	856 KB	Wave Sound
Underwood-2	107,782 KB	Wave Sound
USAIR Graney-1	35,287 KB	Wave Sound
USAIR Severance-Dillon-1	65,673 KB	Wave Sound
USAIR Tuohy-1	23,943 KB	Wave Sound
Van Steenbergen-1	29,044 KB	Wave Sound
Vanacore-1	11,898 KB	Wave Sound
Verga-1	92,402 KB	Wave Sound
Wainstein-1	82,922 KB	Wave Sound
Waller-1 TS	84,802 KB	Wave Sound
Waller-2 TS	33,425 KB	Wave Sound
Waller-3 TS	16,173 KB	Wave Sound
Watson-1 S	117,602 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
WATSON-1 S	512 KB	Microsoft Word Document
Watson-2 S	108,928 KB	Wave Sound
WATSON-2 TS	441 KB	Microsoft Word Document
Watson-3 TS	221,472 KB	Wave Sound
Weber-1 S	69,435 KB	Wave Sound
Weber-2 S	64,325 KB	Wave Sound
Weikert-1	92,302 KB	Wave Sound
Weikert-2	130,314 KB	Wave Sound
Weinbaum-1 TS	170,834 KB	Wave Sound
Weiss-1 TS	76,221 KB	Wave Sound
West-1	125,884 KB	Wave Sound
West-2	12,161 KB	Wave Sound
White-1	83,319 KB	Wave Sound
White, J-1	56,023 KB	Wave Sound
White, J-2	61,582 KB	Wave Sound
White, J-3	45,124 KB	Wave Sound
White, MJ-1 S	18,046 KB	Wave Sound
White, MJ-2 S	214,478 KB	Wave Sound
Wilcox-1	195,029 KB	Wave Sound
Wilcox-2	9,085 KB	Wave Sound
Wong-1 TS	157,200 KB	Wave Sound
Wright-1	101,400 KB	Wave Sound
Wyrsch-1	152,864 KB	Wave Sound

Interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Name	Size	Type
Yates-1	114,444 KB	Wave Sound
Yates-2	4,536 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Gary-1	7,814 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Gary-2	43,139 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC McFarland-1	31,417 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Mitchell-1	36,591 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Mitchell-2	10,475 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Mitchell-3	10,324 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC O'Hara-1	62,852 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Stone-1	26,275 KB	Wave Sound
ZDC Swinney-1	53,832 KB	Wave Sound
Ziglar-1	90,885 KB	Wave Sound
Ziglar-2	78,755 KB	Wave Sound
Zinni-1 TS	161,619 KB	Wave Sound
Zinni-2 TS	47,638 KB	Wave Sound
Zinni-3 TS	7,605 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Alfaro-1	45,118 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Barrett-1	58,045 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Bottiglia-1	108,781 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Bottiglia-2	2,295 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Delaney-1	73,066 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Dowis-1	45,702 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Felser-1	50,175 KB	Wave Sound

interviews on 'kstreetsvr' (I:)

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address I:\

Music Tasks
Play all
Shop for music online

File and Folder Tasks
Make a new folder

Other Places
My Computer
My Music
My Network Places

Details

Name	Size	Type
ZNY Barrett-1	58,045 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Bottiglia-1	108,781 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Bottiglia-2	2,295 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Delaney-1	73,066 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Dowis-1	45,702 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Felser-1	50,175 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Fournier-1	4,770 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Fournier-2	64,751 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Kurz-1	26,528 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Kurz-2	24,206 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY LaCates-1	54,052 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY LaCates-2	27,263 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY LaCates-3	971 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Leonard-1	31,119 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY McCloskey-1	57,980 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY McCormack-1	129,212 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY McCormack-2	105,619 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Merced-1	25,056 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Mulligan-1	84,939 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Palmieri-1	39,219 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Rosenberg-1	50,346 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Thumser-1	116,704 KB	Wave Sound
ZNY Tucker-1	71,851 KB	Wave Sound

start interviews on 'kstreet...' Document - WordPad

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Team 8 - 1

1. FAA-ATC Response to 9/11/01
2. Miller Reporting Co. FAA ATC transcripts + (b)(6), (b)(7)c transcript w/ notes
3. NY TRACON + NY CENTER interviews w/ air traffic controllers
4. FAA Command Center interviews
5. BOSTON CENTER interviews w/ air traffic controllers
6. FAA GREAT LAKES REGION, INDIANAPOLIS CENTER, CLEVELAND CENTER interviews w/ air traffic personnel

UNCLASSIFIED

Team 8 – 2

1. DOT/FAA interviews -
DOT, Potomac Tracon, Washington Center, Cape Tracon, Eastern Region
2. FAA Headquarters interviews
3. FAA ATC Command Center Materials
4. Notes on Team 8 work product
5. FAA ATC Public Source information
6. Channel 8 WJLA-TV request
7. 9/11/01 NBC "Today Show" Broadcast
8. UAL 93 Notes
9. NTSB Briefing notes
10. Notes from mtg with Commissioner Ben-Veniste
11. NORAD 9/11 Press Release and FAA notification times
12. FAA response to questions re. Paula Freni's book, Ground Stop
13. (b)(6), (b)(7)c notes on May 23, 2003 hearing testimony on civil aviation security
14. Miscellaneous

Team 8 – 3

1. Scott, William email [U]
2. Wherley, David [U]
3. Weaver, Paul [S]
4. Hutchinson, Billy [U]
5. Caine, Dan [S]
6. McNulty, David [S]
7. Sasseville, Marc [S]
8. Eberhart, Ralph [S]
9. Seetin, Robert [S]
10. NMCC Briefing/ Tour [S]
11. Chambers, Chuck [S]
12. Leidig, Charles Joseph [S]
13. Stuart, Mark [S]
14. "Shutdown Order" MFR [S]
15. DOD Positive Force Briefing [S]
16. USSS Briefing 7/10/03 [U]
17. USSS Briefing 6/18/03 [U]
18. Miles Kara documents (1) – JCS [S]
19. Miles Kara documents (2) – Andrews AFB [S]
20. Miles Kara documents (3) – Timelines [S]
21. Miles Kara + Dana Hyde documents (4) - DOD [S]
22. DOD documents on Rules of Engagement [S]

UNCLASSIFIED

Team 8 – 4

1. CONR + CMOC/NORAD interviews
2. DOD Interviews:
 - Andrews AFB;
 - Norfolk Tracon;
 - Giant Killer;
 - Langley 119th Fighter Wing
3. NEADS interviews
4. DOD Interviews:
 - Otis AFB;
 - NMCC;
 - Positive Force;
 - Minnesota ANG (Gofer 6);
 - TSgt Tollack
5. Kevin Shaeffer Work file
6. FAA Special Order 7610.4J

UNCLASSIFIED

TEAM 8 – 5

Mark Bittinger's Work Files

1. Response to the Pentagon and in Washington DC
2. Local Response to Terrorism Arlington County After Action Report
3. Briefing Notes and Materials – Miscellaneous
4. Briefing Notes and Materials – Response in NYC National Preparedness Standard
5. Briefing Notes and Materials – Private Sector Preparedness
6. Economic Impact Analysis - NYC partnership
7. Reports/ Briefing Materials – Evacuation and Emergency Preparedness
8. Building Owners and Managers International – “Emergency Preparedness”
9. Building Owners and Managers International – “Are Your Tenants Safe?”
10. Briefing Materials – Emergency Response Plans

UNCLASSIFIED

Miles Kara Work Files

~~Box 1~~

Inventory

TEAM 8-b

Folder 1. Domestic Cases Workfile

- TWA 800
- Air Force A10
- JFK Jr
- Payne Stewart
- Egypt Air 990
- Lufthansa 1993

Folder 2. FAA Subpoena Compendium

- ANE (New England Region)
- ANE Towers
- ANE TRACONS
- ANE ZBW (Boston Center)
- AEA (Eastern Region)
- AEA Towers
- AEA TRACONA
- AEA ZNY (New York Center)
- AEA ZDC (Washington Center)
- AGL (Great Lakes Region)
- AGL Towers
- AGL TRACONS
- AGL ZOB (Cleveland Center)
- AGL ZID (Indianapolis Center)
- ATCSCC (Air Traffic Control System Command Center)

Folder 3. Steno Notebooks

- Mar 31-Apr 1 Hearing, 2003 any May 27 - Sep 16, 2003
- Mar 6 - May 27, 2003
- Sep 16, 2003 - May 8, 2004
- May 8 - Jul 30, 2004

Folder 4. Hijacked Airplanes

- American Air 11
- United Air 175
- American Air 77
- United Air 93

Folder 5. Other Planes

- Otis Scramble
- Langley Scramble
- Air Force One

- Gofer 06
- Andrews Fighters

Folder 6. Misc Work Papers

- Wall Hangings
- Timelines
- Misc Thoughts
- NRO Exercise
- Misc e-mails

Folder 7 FAA Trips

- Centers
- Regions
- TRACONS

Box 2

Folder 1. FAA visits to Headquarters and Command Center, Misc Material

Folder 2. Miscellaneous Trips

Folder 3. NORAD, CONR and NEADS trips and related material

Folder 4. First Open Hearing Witness Information/Material

Folder 5. Misc Work papers concerning audio files and audio monograph. These papers are in two groups—FAA tape-related, and NEADS tape-related. They should be retained as is

TEAMS - 7th INDEPENDENT

~~Folder 6~~

~~Andrews Fighters~~

~~Folder 6. Misc Work Papers~~

~~Wall Hangings~~

~~- Timelines~~

~~- Misc Thoughts~~

~~- NKO Exercise~~

~~- Misc e-mails~~

~~Folder 7. FAA Trips~~

~~Centros~~

~~- Regions~~

~~- TRACONS~~

~~Box 2~~

Folder 1. FAA visits to Headquarters and Command Center, Misc Material

Folder 2. Miscellaneous Trips

Folder 3. NORAD, CONR and NEADS trips and related material

Folder 4. First Open Hearing Witness Information/Material

Folder 5. Misc Work papers concerning audio files and audio monograph. These papers are in two groups—FAA tape-related, and NEADS tape-related. They should be retained as is

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TEAM 8 – 8

- Alderson Reporting file
- Team 8 briefing notes and materials - response to the Pentagon
- Filson materials
- National Communications System Briefing Materials
- Team 8 briefing notes and materials – response to Shanksville, PA



9/10/04

Dianna Campagna

9-11 Comm.

This is a copy, original is in HQ.

Case Number: 042R0122001

Case Name: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

Allegations

The 9-11 Commission alleged that certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at Commission hearings and elsewhere, were inaccurate. Specifically,

- The FAA notified the military about United Airlines Flight 93 (UN93) at 9:16am;
- FAA notice to the military of the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 occurred at 9:24am;
- Both the timeline and Col. Scott's testimony indicated that the fighters at Langley were scrambled at 9:24 seemingly in response to the hijacking of AA77;
- When the Langley fighters were scrambled, their objective was to respond to reports at 9:16 that UN93 was hijacked and at 9:24 that AA77 was hijacked.
- Officials were tracking UN93 and intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached DC.

The Commission specifically referred to us the question of whether the above statements were knowingly false. They found evidence that the FAA and the military engaged in an aggressive effort to reconstruct the events of the day, that accurate information was apparent in material available to the FAA and the military in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, and that they should have known the aforementioned events were incorrect.

Results In Brief

AAT-20 prepared FAA's chronologies during the month of Sept. 2001

Beginning on 9-11 and continuing through the end of the month, the Evaluations and Investigations Staff (formerly AAT-20) prepared the FAA's initial 9-11 chronologies. All subsequent timelines were based upon these work products.

No timelines reference the 9:16 event, however, the 9:24 event is referenced in most of FAA's chronologies.

FAA and Military Shared information

Within a couple of weeks of 9-11, the former Deputy Director of Air Traffic Services obtained information pertaining to FAA's notification to the military from General Arnold or one of his staff. It is not clear what was provided to the FAA. It was agreed that whatever the logs said is what they would report; however, he later recanted this assertion.

In October 2001 an individual from AAT-20 sent to NORAD HQ copies of FAA's timelines, radar plots, and other miscellaneous information about the hijacked

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flights. These timelines did not contain military notification information.

AAT-20 did not cross check FAA's data against the NEADS' data

AAT-20 had some FAA military notification data when they prepared the chronologies

During the time that AAT-20 prepared its timelines, it appears they had access to some information from its own sources regarding when they notified the military but did not utilize it.

They had information about the correct time FAA notified the military about UN93 (10:08). This was in a draft of a notification chronology but CANOLES, Director of Air Traffic and Air Safety Investigations (AAT-20) removed it.

The aforementioned appears to be the only military notification information that AAT-20 had available to it while they prepared their timelines; however, we are still exploring this area.

FAA executives provided the Commission with a QFR containing factual errors

In response to former Administrator Garvey's May 22, 2003, testimony SCHUESSLER, OSMUS & BROWN prepared a QFR and submitted it to the commission. The QFR was read into the record on the 23rd. The QFR contained two factual errors,

It states that NORAD's logs indicate FAA notified the military about AA77 at 9:24.

Further, it states that "The U.S. Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone-bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line."

We learned from CANOLES, who was responsible for establishing the teleconference, that it played no role in coordinating the military response. He was not consulted in the preparation of this QFR. Further, those responsible for preparing the QFR learned, about two weeks later from the A/F liaison, that she did not immediately join the phone-bridge. Sheryl ATKINS told MILLER that she arrived at the FAA later in the day. Knowing this, nothing was done to correct the public record, instead relying on the liaison's subsequent interview with the Commission for the correction.

The FAA had posted erroneous notification information on the Internet

The FAA had two public websites containing incorrect references as to when the FAA had notified the military about American Airlines flight 77. We brought this

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to the FAA's attention and they changed both sites to read: "9:20. The FAA establishes an open phone line with other government agencies and the military to share information about missing or suspicious aircraft. (revised entry 10/21/04)." The new statement is consistent with the Commission's conclusions. However, the Commission does point out that this teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.

- # -

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

Case Number: 042R0122001

Case Name: FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission

Date Opened: 8/24/04

We are investigating allegations referred to us and the DOD-OIG, from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks against the United States (9-11 Commission) that certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at Commission hearings and elsewhere, were inaccurate. The questionable statements primarily concern when the FAA notified the military about certain hijacked aircraft.

We have learned that the FAA's Evaluations and Investigations Staff (formerly AAT-20) prepared the FAA's initial 9-11 chronologies. This effort began on or about September 11th and continued through the end of the month. All subsequent timelines we have identified, that were produced by the FAA and which referenced military notification, were based upon the work products generated during that initial period.

Witnesses indicate that AAT-20 had access to some information from the military that they likely received sometime between September 13th and 17th 2001. Though preliminary at this stage, some evidence and testimony suggests that AAT-20 possessed information, from FAA and military sources, concerning the correct time that it notified the military about United Flight 93 (10:07 EDT) but removed it from its final military notification chronology. We are currently working on determining the exact information AAT-20 obtained from the military. Further, we are identifying the extent of the internal information pertaining to military notifications that AAT-20 possessed when it completed its chronologies.

Witnesses have advised that sometime after former FAA Administrator Jane Garvey's testimony before the Commission in May 2003, the Department's Chief of Staff (COS) may have made requested that FAA validate their timeline data. Though we are currently working on pinning down the precise request from the COS, we have learned that the work product apparently generated in response to the COS's request was based on existing timelines. No source materials were reviewed and no further validation was conducted in the preparation of that work product. We have some additional interviews and re-interviews to conduct on the COS request topic.

During our investigation we also discovered that the FAA had two public websites containing incorrect references as to when the FAA had notified the military about American Airlines flight 77. We brought this to the FAA's attention and they changed both sites to read: "9:20. The FAA establishes an open phone line with other government agencies and the military to share information about missing or suspicious aircraft. (revised entry 10/21/04)." The new statement is consistent with the Commission's conclusions. However, the Commission does point out that this teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.

- # -

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(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

042R0122001

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, December 06, 2004 7:54 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: Recording of Interview

Thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, December 06, 2004 6:27 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Recording of Interview

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

As we agreed, attached is a copy of the recording that was made of (b)(6), (b)(7)c interview on 12-1-04.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 10:39 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc:
Subject: Transcripts



dot-oig_intvw_tr
anscripts.zip ...

(b)(5), (b)(7)

Attached are copies of the transcripts for DOT-OIG's interviews of the following:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Lyle "Tony" MELLO
Shirley MILLER

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

As we discussed, the page numbers on these electronic copies don't seem to match the printed copies the transcription service sent us.

Please let me know if you want to send anyone on the interviews that we have planned for next week (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mello 12-1 11:30am; Garvey 12-2 13:00).

See you on the afternoon of 12-1.
Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)



U.S. Department of
General
Transportation
D.C.

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

The Inspector General

Office of Inspector
Washington,

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001


Dear Mr. Stern:

I am requesting that a designee from our office be afforded access to the 9-11 Commission's "Team 8" files that your agency is currently archiving. We previously identified for (b)(6), (b)(7)c those items from Team 8's files that we want copied and she has marked them for easy identification. Since you expressed concern to William Owens of our office about the volume of material requested to be copied, my designee will further review the marked items in an effort to narrow the scope of our request for copies.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c provided on compact disks (CD) copies of certain interviews that the 9-11 Commission conducted. However, there are two CDs that appear to be blank and one of the files on a third CD is unreadable. We request another copy of the interview files that should be on the blank CDs and the unreadable interview file from the third CD. A list of the missing interview files is enclosed.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you require any additional information please feel free to contact (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Sincerely,



Charles H. Lee Jr.
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

(1) Enclosure

042R0122001

Enclosure to DOT-OIG 10-4-04 Request to NARA

Missing files from request of copies of 9-11 Commission interviews:

CD #5

FAA HQ

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

CD #7

FAA Potomac Sykes-1

CD #19

FAA Herndon

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2004 7:42 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: Heads up- New York Times media inquiry about 9/11 investigation

Do OST and FAA public affairs know?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2004 6:33 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Heads up- New York Times media inquiry about 9/11 investigation

Jim Dwyer, a general assignment reporter with the New York Times, called regarding a story he is doing for Friday on unfinished business of the 9/11 Commission. At the Commission's last public session in late July, they announced they were referring information to a variety of organizations for further review. Among the items announced in public session was the referral by the commission's general counsel of concerns that NORAD and FAA witnesses lied at one of the public hearings.

We confirmed (since it had been stated by the commission in open session) that we were doing an investigation, that it was ongoing, and that we didn't have a timeframe for completing it. We referred him to DOD IG, with whom he talked.

Mr. Dwyer asked whether this could result in perjury or other charges being filed. We advised that legal options range from administrative to civil and criminal (the latter being referred to federal prosecutors). We noted that we had previously investigated another 9/11 issue that had been declined for prosecution.

Again, the story is expected to appear in Friday's Times. The OIG investigation is expected to be a small portion of the article.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c



Memorandum

U.S. Department of
Transportation

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: INFORMATION: 9-11 Commission Interviews
of American Airlines Personnel

Date: November 1, 2004

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, JRI-2

Reply to
Attn of: JRI-2
(212) 264-8700

To: Todd J. Zinser
Deputy Inspector General, J-2

During our meeting on October 13, 2004, you asked if the 9-11 Commission interviewed any American Airlines personnel. At the time I had thought they had not. After further review of the Commission's final report and other materials I have learned that they interviewed approximately 14 individuals from American Airlines, including Gerard Arpey, Executive Vice President.

You also asked about American Airlines' communications with the FAA on September 11, 2001, concerning American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77). In that vein I have ascertained the following, which is presented in timeline format:

8:51am: AA77 transmitted its last routine communication¹.

8:54am through 8:59am: FAA air traffic control (Indianapolis Center) notified American's headquarters that AA77 had deviated from its assigned course, its transponder had been turned off and it was not responding to radio communications. During this period ATC attempted to re-establish communications with AA77 and in doing so sought assistance from American Airlines dispatch.²

9:00am (approximately): Mr. Arpey learned that communication with AA77 had been lost. He then ordered a ground stop for all aircraft in the northeast.³

9:10am (approximately): suspecting that AA77 had been hijacked, American's Headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center was

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE

AA77. After learning that United was also missing an aircraft, American's Headquarters expands the ground stop nationwide.⁴

9:20am: Monte Belger, former acting Deputy Administrator, FAA, believed that Jane Garvey, former FAA Administrator, had been in contact with the air carriers at this time.⁵ He had not had any conversations with the carriers prior to this point. Though the carriers were not part of the primary net at this stage, they were eventually brought into the net. Mr. Belger did not recall at what time the carriers were brought into the net.⁶

9:25am: FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters were aware that AA77 was lost.⁷

9:30am (approximately): Don Carty, CEO American, is on his way into the office and learns that AA77 has vanished. At roughly this same time Mr. Arpey orders all of American's aircraft to land, for which Mr. Carty concurs.⁸

9:37am: AA77 crashes into the Pentagon.⁹

9:20am through 9:45am: Mr. Belger spoke with Bob Baker at American and Russ Chew (possibly American or United), while Ms. Garvey spoke with Mr. Carty at American.¹⁰

Mr. Belger recalled that shortly after he spoke with the Secretary, (sometime after the crash of AA77 into the Pentagon), he recalled speaking with representatives at American Airlines.¹¹

If I can provide additional information on this topic please feel free to contact me.

-
- ¹ 9-11 Commission Report, pages 8 and 33.
- ² 9-11 Commission Report, pages 9 and 454 and footnote 54. According to the "Partial Transcript: Aircraft Accident; AAL77; Washington DC; September 11, 2001," for Indianapolis Center, Henderson Sector Radar Associate position, dated May 7, 2002, this dialog took place between 8:58am and 9:02am.
- ³ 9-11 Commission Report, page 9.
- ⁴ 9-11 Commission Report, page 9. 9-11 Commission sources are ARPEY and Larry WANSLEY interviews on 1/8/04. Both of whom are with American Airlines.
- ⁵ Memorandum for the Record, 9-11 Commission, Team 7, Interview of Monte BELGER, 11-24-03. The Commission interviewed BELGER twice for a total of approximately six and a half hours. The transcripts for these interviews are currently being created by Miller Reporting Co. It does not appear that they created a Memorandum for the Record for their interviews of GARVEY.
- ⁶ Team 7 recorded interview of BELGER on 11-24-03 (1:19approx). The 9-11 Commission also interviewed Jane GARVEY for nearly six hours, the transcripts for these interviews are currently being created by Miller Reporting Co.
- ⁷ 9-11 Commission Report, page 25.
- ⁸ USA Today, August 12, 2002.
- ⁹ 9-11 Commission Report, page 33.
- ¹⁰ Memorandum for the Record, 9-11 Commission, Team 7, Interview of Monte BELGER, 11-24-03.
- ¹¹ Excerpts from T7 interview with Monte BELGER, from 9-11 Commission's records. The interview with BELGER by Team 7 occurred on 11/24/03.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2004 11:55 AM
To: Zinser, Todd J.
Cc: Beitel, Rick; Lee, Charles H. (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: American Airlines Commission Interviews



9-11

Commission Interviews

Please see the attached memorandum, which is in follow-up to our meeting on October 13, 2004.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Pages 305 through 308 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

October 27, 2004

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached is a memo from (b)(6), (b)(7)c about ATC radar coverage. I had asked (b)(6), (b)(7)c to help me understand the gaps in radar coverage for Flight 77 on 9/11. (b)(6), (b)(7)c memo is interesting and very helpful.

I've also attached excerpts from the Commission report that raised questions about this issue.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Cc:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c



Memorandum

U.S. Department of
Transportation
Office of the Secretary
of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

Subject: **INFORMATION:** American Airlines Flight 77
and the Use of Radar in the National Airspace
System

Date: October 26, 2004

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Project Manger, JA-10

Reply to

Attn of: JA-10

To: Todd J. Zinser
Deputy Inspector General

This memorandum addresses the questions you asked about radar in the National Airspace System and the events of 9/11, particularly the tracking of American Airlines Flight 77. You wanted an explanation of the technical reasons why American 77 was not displayed to controllers when FAA's radar equipment tracked the flight. To explain this, the memorandum will also address how radar works, particularly in the high-altitude environment, as well as changes put in place since 9/11.

As you know, the 9/11 Commission Report stated that American 77 disappeared from the radar scope at Indianapolis Center at 8:56 a.m. when its radar transponder was turned off. Although a reconstruction indicated that FAA radars did in fact track American 77, the aircraft was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center for 8 minutes due to technical reasons. After radar again displayed the target, the Indianapolis controllers did not identify the target as American 77. The hijacked aircraft remained unidentified for 36 minutes as it headed for Washington DC.

Types of Radar Used In the National Airspace System

Radar has provided important benefits to the enhanced safety of civil aviation since the end of World War II. However, radar has some limitations that are not widely known. FAA uses different types of radar which are defined by what technology is used and which environment is the radar used.

- The dominant technology used by FAA is called *secondary* radar. Secondary radar sends an electronic signal to aircraft within range that triggers a unique

response from the aircraft's transponder. When the radar receives the response, the data are then processed and displayed on the controller's scope. Using cooperative aircraft equipment (transponder), secondary radar not only measures the direction (radial) and distance of an aircraft from the radar antenna, it also communicates additional data, such as aircraft identification and altitude. With the cooperative capability of secondary radar, FAA has significantly enhanced the tools controllers use to manage air traffic. For example, radar automation depicts a data block attached to displayed targets on controller displays that allows the controller to readily identify who the target is and monitor critical factors, such as altitude and airspeed. The limitation of secondary radar is the fact that the aircraft must have a functioning transponder for the radar system to acquire the aircraft and display it on the controller's scope.

- The other radar technology, *primary* radar, can track a target (when the radar receives enough "hits") without any cooperation from the target. Primary radar pumps a burst of electromagnetic energy into the sky that hits airborne targets and reflects back to a ground-based antenna. With a hit, the radar system can measure a target at a specific radial and distance from the antenna and depict the target on a controller's display. With enough hits, the radar automation system can display and track the target. Primary radar is limited to determining an aircraft's location and does not provide identification of the target. Because secondary radar has so many advantages over primary, FAA uses primary radar only as a backup system in the high-altitude en route environment.
- It is important to understand that radar automation systems do not display every primary radar hit on the controller's scope. If it did, the scope would become cluttered with false targets and confuse the controller. When the radar receives enough valid hits, the automation system will display a primary radar target, and the scope will display a solid shape called a "blip."
- FAA relies on radar to manage aircraft in two different environments, terminal and en route. In the terminal environment, where time-critical safety decisions are made and the accuracy of aircraft position is of utmost importance, FAA uses short-range radars that are very accurate out to 60 miles. Because terminal radars produce more precise position data, they allow FAA to reduce the distances between departing and landing aircraft. Conversely, for en route air traffic, FAA uses long-range radars that are useful to 200 to 250 miles. Normally, data from short-range radars are not sent to en route controller's scopes, except where en route controllers need short-range radar feed to maintain radar coverage. This type of short-range radar data was discussed in the footnote of the 9/11 Commission Report as tertiary and quadrarary radars.

Before 9/11

Before 9/11, FAA operated two basic types of long-range radar. Around the perimeter of the United States, FAA jointly operates with the United States Air Force (USAF) Air Defense radar network new generation Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4) systems. These radars have been optimized for use by both the FAA and the USAF.

Inside the perimeter of the United States, FAA exclusively operated and used legacy radar systems, most which have been in service for over 40 years. Beginning in the mid 1990s, FAA was working to decommission primary radars used by the en route control centers, such as Indianapolis Center. Because secondary radar is more useful, FAA concluded that the primary radar cost far more than its usefulness merited. FAA believed that primary radars did not play a role in the future of the National Airspace System. As a result, en route controllers use secondary as the main radar source for managing air traffic. In fact, the en route radar system has approximately 2 dozen sites where secondary radar is the only operating radar and no primary radar exists. The extent and location of these facilities is considered sensitive.

Understanding how FAA operated primary radar on 9/11 helps explain why it lost track of American 77. When American 77 turned off its transponder, the aircraft was in an area served by a "secondary only" radar site and no other backup radar used by that sector was tracking the target. On the controller's scope, the target with its identifying data block disappeared and no backup primary radar "blip" showed. When American 77 reappeared in a different area on a controller's scope as a primary radar target, controllers had little basis to identify the unknown primary radar target as American 77. Eleven minutes after FAA's Command Center alerted Dulles TRACON to look for a primary target, Dulles reported an unidentified primary radar target that turned out to be American 77.

After 9/11

Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the USAF added both the primary and secondary data feed from 50 legacy long-range systems to the air defense network. Subsequently, the USAF 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron tested all of the systems and reported that they failed to meet FAA's minimum detection standards. Based on their analysis, the 84th recommended further study and, where warranted, optimizing the radars to meet the combined mission needs of FAA and the USAF. FAA has made significant progress towards optimizing the jointly-used radars to provide the necessary data quality to air defense and homeland security organizations.

Also, progress has been made since 9/11 to address the gaps in primary radar coverage. Department of Defense (DOD) has improved its ability to receive and process radar data from FAA. FAA is feeding DOD and Department of Homeland Security data from more

long-range radars and a limited number of terminal radar sites. DOD and FAA are investigating alternative technologies to fill in gaps where no radar coverage exists, particularly in areas west of the Mississippi. For the long term, FAA and DOD, through the FAA's new Joint Program Development Office, are researching a wide range of technologies, such as non-rotational, multi-static, and wide area multilateration radar.

The most important issue facing the continued use of primary radar is who is going to pay for it. Currently, FAA is paying to maintain the existing long-range radars, but has no plans to replace them. It is an open question on whether the budgetary burden of paying for long-range primary radar will be a security funded function or a continuing requirement of the National Airspace System.

If you have any more questions, give me a call at (202) 366-1428.

this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put 'em over Manhattan. That's best thing, that's the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell 'em if there's more out there, which we don't know, let's get 'em over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play.¹³⁵

The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 9:25 and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city.¹³⁶

Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup. The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09.¹³⁷ NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.

American Airlines Flight 77

FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight.¹³⁸

The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane's projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.¹³⁹

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.¹⁴⁰

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared

it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.¹⁴¹

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center.¹⁴² The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.¹⁴³

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.¹⁴⁴

By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stop." While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.¹⁴⁵

The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The aircraft's identity or type was unknown.¹⁴⁶

Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to iden-

129. FAA memo, "Full Transcript, Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Jun. 17, 2002, p. 3.
130. "N90 (New York Terminal Radar Approach) controller stated 'at approximately 9:00 a.m., I observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.'" FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001. Former NORAD official Alan Scott testified that the time of impact of United 175 was 9:02. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. We have determined that the impact time was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
131. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114, 9:02:34.
132. *Ibid.*, 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position, line 5115, 9:05; Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview (Oct. 2, 2003).
133. FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Boston Center position, line 5115, 9:05-9:07.
134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marx (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2003); Davne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).
135. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:07:32.
136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling tanks in the vicinity of New York, the mission crew commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to New York to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command area that overlooks the operations floor) ordered "battle stations only at Langley." The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were ordered to battle stations at 9:09. Colonel Marx, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky. According to William Scott at the Commission's May 23, 2003, hearing, "At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what's going on." See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marx interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also Colonel Marx's statements that "[t]he plan was to protect New York City." *Films, Air War Over America*, p. 60.
138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions.
139. The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation. They agreed to "verticalize" the airspace along the flight's westerly route to the safety of other planes would not be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).
140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003). According to the FAA-produced timeline, at 9:09 Indianapolis Center "noticed Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification." FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001.
141. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position, line 4525; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East position, line 4530; FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.
142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the "preferred" radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the "supplemental" radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the "tertiary" and "quadrant" radars.
143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004). We have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center's airspace. The Washington Center's controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for primary radar returns.
145. John White interview (May 7, 2004); Elton King interview (Apr. 5, 2004); Linda Schueller interview (Apr. 6, 2004); Benedict Stoney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 14, 27.
146. John Henderbott interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
147. FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77; Washington, DC; September 11, 2001," Sept. 20, 2001, p. 7.

148. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10.
149. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34. The mission commander thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a "barrier cap" between the hijack and Washington, D.C. Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; *ibid.*, 9:33:58.
152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:33:50. For second quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:36:34; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39:9-39:37; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
153. Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-4 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-5 (East Feeder Radar position).
154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Davne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003). The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
155. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 7, 9:41.
156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08.
157. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 10.
158. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." See FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11.
159. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a "second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, 'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11. At 9:31:48, Execjet 56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too." The FAA responded at 9:31:51, "Okay, thanks. We're just trying to figure out what's going on." FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
160. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
161. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5154.
162. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 19.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
164. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 16-17; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; NS91UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 26-32.
165. FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 17-19.
166. For 9:46 question, see *ibid.*, pp. 19-20. For 9:49 discussion about military assistance, see *ibid.*, p. 21.
167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see *ibid.*, p. 23. Writer Monte Belger not the deputy director for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Peter Chellan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at 9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center "Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling." FAA memo, "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see *ibid.*, pp. 24-27.
168. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-27. We also reviewed a report regarding witness observations on September 11, 2001, whose authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was "10:06:05±5 (EDT)." Wan-Young Kim and G.R. Baum, "Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attack," spring 2002 (report to the Maryland Depart-



Memorandum

U.S. Department of
Transportation
Office of the Secretary
of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: Inaccurate Posting on FAA
Website, Re: 9/11/01 Chronology

Date: September 27, 2004

From: Kenneth M. Mead
Inspector General

Reply to

To: Marion C. Blakey
Federal Aviation Administrator

As you know, we are investigating a referral from the 9/11 Commission concerning certain inaccuracies in public statements and reports by DOD and FAA officials, involving communications and notifications between FAA and NORAD on September 11.

In the course of investigating, we discovered on Friday that the attached and highlighted Fact Sheet, posted on FAA's website and entitled "Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001 (August 2002)," contained information that the Commission found to be inaccurate. The subject information in this posting concerns FAA's notification to NORAD about the hijacking of AAL Flight 77, which is a central issue in the Commission's referral.

We notified Laura Brown, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, of this discrepancy on Friday, and the Fact Sheet has since been revised (see Attachment 2). One observation, however, is that the new entry is not identified as a recent revision and we believe such a notation, or errata, should be made given our ongoing investigation.

We have already contacted the individual responsible for preparing the original Fact Sheet and will be interviewing the FAA personnel who provided that source information. We will also determine the accuracy of the revised Fact Sheet entry.

Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at x61959, or my Deputy, Todd J. Zinser, at x66767.

Attachments (2)

Attachment 1

Fact Sheets

close window

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
 August 12, 2002
 Contact: William Shumann
 Phone: 202-267-3883

Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001 (August 2002)

0800. American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with 92 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles.
0814. United Air Lines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles.
0821. American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 people on board, takes off from Washington Dulles airport for Los Angeles.
0840. FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 11.
0841. United Air Lines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 people on board, takes off from Newark airport for San Francisco.
0843. FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of United Flight 175.
0846. (approx.). American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center.
0902. (approx.). United Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center.
0904. (approx.). The FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center stops all departures from airports in its jurisdiction (New England and eastern New York State).
0906. The FAA bans takeoffs of all flights bound to or through the airspace of New York Center from airports in that Center and the three adjacent Centers – Boston, Cleveland and Washington. This is referred to as a First Tier groundstop and covers the Northeast from North Carolina north and as far west as eastern Michigan.
0908. The FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace.
- * 0924. The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93.
0926. The FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination -- a national groundstop.
0940. (approx.). American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.
0945. In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, the FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as practical. At this time, there were more than 4,500 aircraft in the air on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans.

[Original Fact Sheet]

1007. (approx.) United Flight 93 crashes in Stony Creek Township, PA.

1039. Reaffirming the earlier order, the FAA issues a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that halts takeoffs and landings at all airports.

1215. (approx). The airspace over the 48 contiguous states is clear of all commercial and private flights.

Notes:

All times are Eastern Daylight. For UTC/Zulu/GMT, add four hours.

Flight departures are actual takeoff times, not scheduled or gate departure times.

[Questions About This Page](#)

Attachment 2

Fact Sheets

close window

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 12, 2002

Contact: William Shumann

Phone: 202-267-3883

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0840. FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 11.

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0908. The FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace.

* 0924. The FAA establishes an open phone line with other government agencies and the military to share information about missing or suspicious aircraft.

0926. The FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination -- a national groundstop.

0940. (approx.). American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.

0945. In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, the FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as practical. At this time, there were more than 4,500 aircraft in the air on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans.

[Revised Fact Sheet]

1007. (approx.) United Flight 93 crashes in Stony Creek Township, PA.

1039. Reaffirming the earlier order, the FAA issues a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that halts takeoffs and landings at all airports.

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Notes:

All times are Eastern Daylight. For UTC/Zulu/GMT, add four hours.

Flight departures are actual takeoff times, not scheduled or gate departure times.

[Questions About This Page](#)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 12:22 PM
To: Beitel, Rick
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Interviews

This week's schedule will include:

10/6 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
10/7 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
10/8 (b)(6), (b)(7)c

We are still trying to schedule (b)(6), (b)(7)c Tony Mello and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

All of the above named, with the exception of (b)(6), (b)(7)c participated in preparing the FAA's timelines following 9/11. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was (b)(6), (b)(7)c and was the one who circulated an FAA Public Affairs fact sheet among air traffic prior to final approval.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You are welcome to send someone to participate in the interviews this week. If you do not have something already set for (b)(6), (b)(7) to do on Friday of this week it would be great if he could help out with the interview(s). (b)(6), (b)(7) has a schedule conflict and can not participate.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 11:43 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: FW: Timeline



timeline-dotoig.x
1s (46 KB)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2004 5:17 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c 'OIG DoD'
Subject: Timeline

As we discussed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Friday, September 24, 2004 2:35 PM
To: Beitel, Rick
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Briefing Document



2004-09-24_brie
f.doc (35 KB)

Rick,

Attached is a summary of the information that has been gathered this week. The information for the DOD end of this investigation is likely more extensive than I currently have available. We can provide a more detailed briefing on that aspect early next week.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Friday, September 24, 2004 9:20 AM
To: Beitel, Rick
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: FAA Website



factsheets_2002
-08-12.pdf (26 ...

Rick,
Per our discussion

- As of 9-24-04, FAA has a fact sheet dated 8-12-02, titled Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001 on its website that contains the 9:24 entry regarding AA77. The time entry states: "The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93."
- The Commission concluded that "The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the [WTC] and was heading for Washington, D.C." Further, they determined that the teleconference set-up between FAA and the military at about 9:20 "...played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11..." based on the testimony of the FAA and military personnel monitoring the line. (See pages 34 & 36 of 9-11 Commission final report.)

Today I will bring this to the attention of (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2004 6:13 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c shirley.miller@faa.gov
Subject: Re: QFRs

(b)(6), (b)(7)

I talked to Lynne Osmus, who was the lead at that time and worked with Jane Garvey and others to draft the statement that was sent to the Commission -- i.e., the piece that Ms. Garvey indicates she thought she would be able to send to the staff the evening of the day of the hearing. Lynne believes that was the extent of providing anything for the record. At the time of the hearing, the Commission was just getting organized and they didn't really have a process that they followed for hearing follow up. As I recall it was quite some time before there was a transcript from the hearing.

We did submit the air traffic control chronology (Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events) as part of the document production to the Commission. We also spent time with the staff here going over what happened that day, viewing a powerpoint presentation that is consistent with the times in the Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events.

Shirley

----->
|
| Shirley Miller
|
| 09/27/2004 05:18
| PM
|
----->

----->
----->
|
|
| To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c <[redacted]@ig.dot.gov>
| cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c <[redacted]@ig.dot.gov>
| Subject: Re: QFRs (Document link: Shirley Miller)
|
----->
----->

I will double check with others who were involved. I know I did not handle anything for the record after the May 22 '03 hearing.

----->
|
| (b)(6), (b)(7)c
| g.dot.gov>
|
----->

09/27/2004 04:18
PM

To: Shirley Miller/AWA/FAA@FAA
cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: QFRs

Shirley,

As a follow-up to our discussion last week concerning questions for the record. During Jane Garvey's May 22, 2003, testimony before the 9-11 Commission she was asked to provide QFRs. The references to QFRs mentioned during the hearing are as follows:

On page 102 of the transcript there is a reference to a QFR but it is not clear what the question(s) is/are. (b)(6), (b)(7)c Thank you very much. We have some questions we'd like for you to submit for the record."

QFRs relating to American Airlines 77 (AA77)

Page 117,

"MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, I would like to go back and look at those records more carefully, because that is not consistent with my understanding of it and the timeline that I remember. The timeline that I have, that I remember, is one that had a notification of NORAD twice before the time that you mention, so that there had been three notifications. But, again, I would like to submit that specific timeline for the record, with the first notification being at 8:34."

Page 118,

"MS. GARVEY: My understanding, commissioner, was that the notification [for AA77] was earlier. But I would like to ask that the FAA air traffic control chronology be submitted for the record."

Pages 119-120,

"MS. GARVEY: Right, and I'd like -- I appreciate that. I'd like to submit for the record." (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, you will double-check it, and you will get back to us? MS. GARVEY: Certainly will. (b)(6), (b)(7)c It would be useful if you could get back to staff this evening. MS. GARVEY: I was thinking that we could probably get the answer this evening..."

Will you please check the FAA's records and provide a copy of what was submitted by or on behalf of Ms. Garvey as her response to the QFRs. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

9/17/04

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Below is our interview schedule for next week.
 All those listed below are current or former
 FAA employees.

9/22 @ 1000 Shirley Miller
 Senior Advisor to the Administrator
 She was the FAA's 9-11 Comm Liaison

9/22 @ 1530 Jeff Griffith
 ret. FAA
 he was Gen. Arnold's POSE @ FAA

9/23 @ 0830 Linda Schuessler
 VP for System Operations
 authored "FAA Communications
 w/ NORAD on 9-11-01"

9/23 @ 1500

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

9/24 @ 1000 Lynne Osmus
 Asst. Admin for Security & HM
 also authored "FAA Communications
 w/ NORAD on 9-11-01"

This is all we have scheduled thus far. Please advise if a DOD-IG representative will be participating in these interviews.

You may contact me at [REDACTED] or
by cell at [REDACTED]

Thank
Bill

- At this point, it appears that the FAA source for timelines concerning military notification is Air Traffic (AAT-20).
- We are in the process of determining who at FAA saw a copy of the NEADS log that is referenced in most, if not all, the known FAA timelines containing information about FAA military notice. Jeff GRIFFITH, advised that it is likely he may have seen it but he was not absolutely certain that was the document he received from the military.
- It appears that very early on that FAA noticed a problem with NORAD's 9:16 time entry regarding UN93. All but one FAA timeline seen thus far excludes that time entry. (FAA was not aware that UN93 was in distress until 9:24, see page 33 of Commission report.)
- FAA Public Affairs advised that NORAD floated a draft of their 9-17-01 press release by them and they pointed out the problem with the 9:16 entry. That entry was removed from subsequent versions.
- FAA has kept the 9:24 entry concerning AA77 in their timelines since air traffic's position is that there was an open line between FAA and the military. Air Traffic believed that information was transmitted to the military about AA77 during that open line. [Question: Ask AAT-20 if that was the case then why don't they believe that information concerning UN93 was also transmitted during this open line?]
- As of 9-24-04, FAA has a fact sheet dated 8-12-02, titled **Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001** on its website¹ that contains the 9:24 entry regarding AA77. The time entry states: "The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93."
- On April 14, 2004, a representative from the DOD-OSD sent a revised 9-11 Timeline to Shirley MILLER at the FAA. In the timeline, which purports to have been provided to the Commission, it indicates that from 9:16 – 9:20 "It is most likely that the first report of UAL93 came into the Battle cab via conference call ... that [was] established with the FAA that morning. ...[I]t is most likely that the UAL93 hijacking was originally discussed over the FAA conference line as a possibility sometime between 0916L and 0922L..." On May 27, 2004, MILLER sent the OSD representative an email expressing concern about the 9:16 – 9:22 [sic] time as notification for UN93. MILLER advised that "...our records indicate that the first sign that we could have possibly thought something was wrong with UN93 was at 0928L..."

¹ http://www.faa.gov/newsroom/factsheets/2002/factsheets_020812.htm

- Military interviews have focused on a March 2004 memo/letter bearing Gen EBERHART's signature addressed to the Commission wherein NORAD attempts to correct its timeline presented during the May 2003 Commission hearing. DOD-IG is still attempting to determine if that memo was actually sent to the Commission.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 7:56 AM
To: 'Dianna CAMPAGNA (dcampagn@9-11commission.gov)'
Cc: Beitel, Rick; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Material Request



9-11comm_inter 9-11Comm_tea
iews-tapes requ.} items requester

Ms. Campagna,

I am writing as a follow-up to our meeting on Sept. 10, 2004, that concerned obtaining materials from the 9-11 Commission. As you know, we are seeking information that might be helpful in the DOT and DOD, IGs' joint review of public statements made by NORAD and FAA officials at a Commission hearing on May 23, 2003, and elsewhere, regarding the actions of NORAD and FAA officials in responding to the 9-11 attacks that were not accurate. During the meeting you presented us with copies of various indexes and asked us to review the indexes to identify the items we were interested in receiving copies of.

In the attached documents we have identified the items that DOT-IG is interested in obtaining. The DOD-IG will present a separate request to you.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thanks,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Region 2
Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 12:19 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: Items to be Requested from 9-11 Commission

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

We will submit a separate request.

Also, we will not be able to sit in on any of the meetings next week. Please ask whom if anyone the individuals you interview exchanged info with any DoD personnel.

Will give you a call next week after we have returned to DC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c]
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2004 3:51 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Beitel, Rick; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Items to be Requested from 9-11 Commission

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached, are lists of interviews and documents that we plan to request from the 9-11 Commission. Please advise if you are interested in joining our request for information or if you prefer to submit a separate request.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

042R0122001

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 1:04 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: TAPE RECORDING YES OR NO
 (b)(5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I understand you got the taping issue resolved with (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Again, if there is anything I can do for you, please let me know.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Additional documentation we would like to review:

- (b)(6), (b)(7)c
-
-

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 11:10 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: TAPE RECORDING YES OR NO
 (b)(5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c give me a call (or have (b)(6), (b)(7)c give me a call) regarding the tape recording of the NORAD (DOD) personnel. (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (DOT) tape recording the interviews while we are at Colorado Springs. Here is the DOT IG position on this matter:

The decision to tape record the DOD personnel is solely up to the DOD IG which is the lead agency in dealing with the USAF/Civilian (NORAD) people.

So what ever (b)(6), (b)(7)c wants to do is OK with DOT. We just wanted to make sure that what DOT IG does when

interviewing DOT personnel is not taken by DOD IG as, "we (DOT) are required to tape record everyone". If you (DOD IG, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)) feel that the week would go better, smoother, by not attempting to tape record the interviews, then we can all take notes, compare and write the notes up later.

Just let me know ASAP what the decision is...I plan on leaving the office at 2PM today and take care of some non-work related business, so I need to know if I should be bringing along the tape recorder and blank tapes or not.

If you need to speak with me about this, give me a call at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and/or try my cell at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or emailing your decision will be fine.

Again...I want to make it clear that you all deal with DOD personnel more than we do and if this coming week will go smoother without the presence of tape recording, that is fine.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

U.S. Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
400 7th Street, S.W.
NASSIF Building, Room 7324
Washington, DC 20590-0001

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 7:28 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: DoD badge
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sounds good. If you need anything I am here until 4:00 today and all day tomorrow. See you Sunday.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 4:31 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: RE: DoD badge
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Let's wait until we get back from Colorado, I have some last minute "stuff" to take care of tomorrow, as I am sure we all have!

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

U.S. Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
400 7th Street, S.W.
NASSIF Building, Room 7324
Washington, DC 20590-0001

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 4:15 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: DoD badge
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thanks. Do you want to fit getting the badge in tomorrow or wait until we get back from Colorado?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: DoD badge
Sensitivity: Private

(b)(5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

U.S. Dept. of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
400 7th Street, S.W.
NASSIF Building, Room 7324
Washington, DC 20590-0001

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 3:35 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: DoD badge
(b)(5)

Hi (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 8:40 AM
To:
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: RE: Items to be Requested from 9-11 Commission

Thanks (b)(6), (b)(7)c will let you know later today if we want to piggy back on your request or put in separate one of our own.

See you in Colorado.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2004 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: Beitel, Rick; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Items to be Requested from 9-11 Commission

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached, are lists of interviews and documents that we plan to request from the 9-11 Commission. Please advise if you are interested in joining our request for information or if you prefer to submit a separate request.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2004 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: Beitel, Rick; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Items to be Requested from 9-11 Commission



9-11comm_inter 9-11Comm_tea
iews-tapes requ.} items requestec

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached, are lists of interviews and documents that we plan to request from the 9-11 Commission. Please advise if you are interested in joining our request for information or if you prefer to submit a separate request.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: Beitel, Rick
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 6:21 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: FW: Document and witness lists for matter referred to DoD and DoT
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c

-FYI.

-----Original Message-----

From: Zinser, Todd J.
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 3:11 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Beitel, Rick
Subject: FW: Document and witness lists for matter referred to DoD and DoT

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 3:08 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Re: Document and witness lists for matter referred to DoD and DoT



(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c ; todd.j.zinser@oig.dot.gov ; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 4:46 PM
Subject: RE: Document and witness lists for matter referred to DoD and DoT

thanks for the info

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 4:31 PM
To: todd.j.zinser@oig.dot.gov; (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Subject: Document and witness lists for matter referred to DoD and DoT

Dear Deputy Inspectors General Zinser and Gimble,

Attached are a list of documents you may want to review and a list of witnesses you may want to interview in connection with your investigation of the matter referred to you by the Commission. I apologize that we have not sent the lists to you sooner. Since our work for the Commission has ended many of our team members (including myself) have taken vacation time to spend with our family. We would have contacted you earlier but it took some time to coordinate everyone's schedule to get their collective input. I have copied Dan Marcus, General Counsel to the Commission, on this e-mail. Please feel free to contact anyone on our team to discuss this matter further. Thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Do you Yahoo!?

New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - 100MB free storage!

The following is a list of witnesses you and your staff may want to interview after you have reviewed all the relevant documents.

1. Public Affairs personnel from FAA (not interviewed by Commission staff and identities unknown), NEADS (b)(6), (b)(7)c CONR (b)(6), (b)(7)c NORAD (I don't recall his name but I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed him at NORAD), and the DoD (I don't recall the DoD PA names given to us by the NORAD public affairs office).

2. [Redacted]
3. [Redacted]
4. [Redacted]
5. [Redacted]
6. [Redacted]
7. [Redacted]
8. [Redacted]
9. [Redacted]

10. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

11. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[Redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

12. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

13. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

14. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

15. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

16. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

17. Linda Scheussler (FAA)

18. [Redacted]

19. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

20. [Redacted]

21. Dave Canoles (FAA)

22. Darlene Freeman (FAA)

23. Tony Ferrante (FAA)

24. Jeff Griffith (FAA)

25. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

26. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[Redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

27. Monte Belger

28. Doug Gould (FAA employee who helped reconstruct events of 9/11).

29. [Redacted]

30. [Redacted]

31. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

32. [Redacted]

33. [Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The following is a list of FAA and DoD documents and materials that we recommend you and your staff review in connection with the Commission's referral.

1. All drafts and final versions of FAA and DoD timelines, chronologies of events and press releases. (A copy of the NORAD draft press release prepared by NORAD's public affairs office was not provided to the Commission).
2. Logs from FAA Washington Operations Center, Command Center, New England Region, Eastern Region, Great Lakes Region, New York Center, New York Tracon, Boston Center, Cape Tracon, Washington Center, Dulles Tower, Reagan National Tower and Indianapolis Center.
3. Timelines and chronologies of events of 9/11 from Herndon Command Center.
4. All documents related to briefing book prepared by FAA working group (headed by Darlene Freeman) for Administrator Jane Garvey in preparation for her Congressional testimony. (Some but not all documents in this category were provided to the Commission).
5. All documents related to chronology of events, FAA awareness of hijacked aircraft and notifications to the military reviewed or prepared by Darlene Freeman and the employees that assisted her in creating an FAA chronology of events of 9/11.
6. Transcripts and tape recordings of all FAA facilities that interacted with the 4 hijacked aircraft on 9/11.
7. Transcripts and tapes of all communications to and from Herndon Command Center regarding the 4 hijacked aircraft.
8. All documents and e-mails related to the Commission's work including, but not limited to, the May 2003 testimony, FAA and DoD responses to subpoenas, and FAA and DoD responses to QFRs. (e-mails and correspondence not received by the Commission).
9. The FAA Summary of Hijack Events of September 11, 2001.
10. The NEADS MCC Tech Log.
11. All chat logs for 9/11 from NEADS, CONR and NORAD.
12. All transcripts (and tape recordings) for 9/11 from NEADS SOCC floor (especially the MCC Op Position (i.e., Channel 2) and the Identification Technician Positions (i.e., Channels 4, 5 and 7)).
13. All documents related to briefings of General Eberhart in preparation for Gen. Eberhart's testimony before Congress in October 2001. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category).

14. All documents related to answers provided by (b)(6), (b)(7)c in response to QFRs from Congress related to October 2001 testimony. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category).

15. All correspondence and e-mails (from 9/11/01 to 7/30/04) to or from NEADS, CONR, NORAD, DoD and FAA regarding chronology of events of 9/11 (particularly e-mails to and from (b)(6), (b)(7)c (NEADS), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (NEADS), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (NEADS), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (assigned to CONR after 9/11), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (CONR), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (NORAD), and NEADS', CONR's and NORAD's public affairs personnel. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

16. All correspondence and e-mails from DoD public affairs personnel related to the chronology of events on 9/11. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

17. All correspondence and e-mails from FAA public affairs personnel related to chronology of events on 9/11. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

18. All documents reviewed or created by FAA Headquarters personnel related to the chronology of events on 9/11 and FAA notifications to the military of hijackings.

19. All correspondence and e-mails related to (b)(6), (b)(7)c conversations with (b)(6), (b)(7)c concerning the events of 9/11 and to (b)(6), (b)(7)c media interviews concerning the events of 9/11. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

20. All correspondence and e-mails related to (b)(6), (b)(7)c presentation to the Air Staff concerning the events of 9/11 including a copy of the presentation (b)(6), (b)(7)c received from NEADS and/or (b)(6), (b)(7)c (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

21. All correspondence and e-mails from the Air Staff concerning any and all attempts to ascertain the 9/11 timeline of events by NEADS, CONR, NORAD, ANG, ACC and/or the Air Staff. (The Commission did not receive documents in this category. Given the relevant information in the two e-mails cited in the Commission's Memorandum, we suggest you obtain ALL e-mails in this category of documents).

INTERVIEW OF LARRY ARNOLD

On February 11, 2005, Larry ARNOLD, retired Major General, U.S. Air Force, was interviewed at the Office of the Department of Defense. Inspector General (DOD-OIG), 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington VA by (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c DOD-OIG and Investigator (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General (DOT-OIG). After being apprised of the identity of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, ARNOLD provided the following relevant information pertaining to his communications with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) following September 11, 2001:

ARNOLD did not recall tasking any of his staff to coordinate production of September 11th timelines with the FAA. Further, ARNOLD did not recall tasking any of his staff with obtaining information from the FAA for preparation of timelines.

Following September 11th, ARNOLD spoke with Jeff GRIFFITH, former Deputy Director Air Traffic, FAA, on nearly a daily basis, occasionally many times in a day. Their discussions pertained to daily operations and future events, not what had happened in the past. He could have had a discussion with GRIFFITH about the timelines but he did not have a specific recollection of such a discussion. ARNOLD did not recall having had a discussion with GRIFFITH concerning discrepancies in the military's and the FAA's timelines. He advised if any did take place he probably "blew them off" since he was more focused on daily operational issues.

The only "heated" discussion ARNOLD recalled having following September 11th was with General Donald COOK, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, who opined that the Air Force may have shot down UN93. ARNOLD and his staff looked at everything (e.g., radar data, and number of bullets and missiles) and found that the Air Force did not shoot down UN93. Furthermore, COOK had prepared a timeline that disagreed with ARNOLD's, the difference being that

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared:

FEB 14 2005 *AEY*

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INTERVIEW OF LARRY ARNOLD

COOK reported on when information was received by someone while ARNOLD's timeline depicted when events actually transpired, using radar data.

He observed discrepancies in NORAD's published account of 9/11 and what he understood to be the timeline. As examples, ARNOLD explained that he thought the Air Force had been tracking UN93 before it had crashed even though the Commission says they were not. Further, NORAD had indicated that Langley Air Force Base had scrambled their fighters in response to a notice about American Airlines Flight 77; however, ARNOLD knows that Langley had been responding to the false report about American Airlines Flight 11.

ARNOLD did not recall there being any controversy about FAA's notice to the military in the news media following September 11th.

GRIFFITH may have dealt directly with ARNOLD's operations desk, which was staffed by Brigadier General J.J.C. BOUCHARD, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c ARNOLD did not know if GRIFFITH made any requests for information from the aforementioned. He advised none of the aforementioned would have needed his permission to provide GRIFFITH with information. He did not recall entering into any agreements with GRIFFITH to use the military's times to report on when FAA notified the military.

Prior to the June 2004 hearings GRIFFITH had suggested to ARNOLD that they review their timelines. ARNOLD told GRIFFITH that they should just tell it like it is.

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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INTERVIEW OF JOHN AZZARELLO & JOHN FARMER

On September 29, 2004, John AZZARELLO, former Counsel Team 8, 9-11 Commission and John FARMER, former Senior Counsel and Team 8 Leader 9-11 Commission were interviewed at the U.S. Attorney's Office, Newark, NJ by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Special Agent-in-Charge (b)(6), (b)(7)c. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, AZZARELLO and FARMER provided the following relevant information:

The Commission looked at all public source materials and put together what they thought was the most accurate picture they could of what happened on September 11, 2001. When the Commission then looked at the official agency records they discovered that they were different from the Commission's findings. Up until that point the public story of what happened was completely wrong.

AZZARELLO acknowledged that in the end the military did cooperate with the Commission's probe but he described this as a "red herring."

AZZARELLO advised that the question that needs to be asked it at what level did the request to "fudge" the story occur. Further, was it coordinated between the FAA and the military?

The Commission found that if they could show the military something on paper or tape that they would concede. However, gaps exist that have caused a problem in fully recreating what happened that day.

There is a tape recorded conversation between (b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA Washington Operations Center and the FAA Aviation Command Center (ACC), wherein it can be heard that (b)(6), (b)(7)c is telling the ACC that AA11 is heading south. During an interview (b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled obtaining the aforementioned information from (b)(6), (b)(7)c (possibly (b)(6), (b)(7)c On 9-11 (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 11/17/04

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INTERVIEW OF JOHN AZZARELLO & JOHN FARMER

(b)(6), (b)(7)c did not recall telling (b)(6), (b)(7) the aforementioned. The Commission believes this event resulted in the false report that launched the Langley aircraft.

AZZARELLO advised that there are three key pieces of evidence that show that the story FAA and the military related are not true: First, the NEADS tape transcript clearly says AA11 at 9:20-9:21am. Second, the NEADS MCC/Tech log, which is hand printed by the technician. This log was shared with FAA after 9-11-01. CANOLES says that they had access to the military ops logs. CANOLES thought that the military had given it to GRIFFITH. FERRANTE told the Commission that he had not seen the log. FERRANTE is the primary author of the FAA's timelines. FERRANTE told the Commission that he was the sole author and that no one helped him pull together the information for the timeline. Third, FAA's timeline showed 8:40 notice for AA11, 9:05 notice for UN175 but there was no notice for UN175 and A77. The notice for UN93 came at 10:07 in the form of FAA relating to the military that a bomb was on board. This information is contained in the NEADS log. FERRANTE never looked at the NEADS log.

GRIFFITH told the Commission that he did not recall having the NEADS log in his possession but advised that they got what they needed from each other (military and FAA). Further, Gen. ARNOLD and GRIFFITH did a lot of finger pointing and had heating conversations about notice.

Shirley MILLER wanted to know if everyone was being cooperative with the Commission during their interviews. AZZARELLO told her, after the FERRANTE interview, that he seemed to have problems with the NEADS log. MILLER also asked what about the relevance of the 10:07 notice of UN93.

During interviews FAA asked to see the original copy of the NEADS log.

FAA did not offer any witnesses for any items that they did not have tapes for. At 9:24 the FAA did not know where AA77 was and therefore could not have provided notice to the military about that flight.

INTERVIEW OF JOHN AZZARELLO & JOHN FARMER

The FAA was supposed to have the primary net established and just assumed that it was set-up and included everyone. The primary net was not tape recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was sitting on the primary net and said that no information was passed and believed that the military went off the net after the Pentagon was hit.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was on the other end of the line and agreed that nothing was passed. (b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled BELGER asking at one point "where the hell is the military?" BELGER can be heard yelling at 10:15 with regard to UN93.

Some FAA facilities were on the tactical net that was set-up by (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The tac-net was not recorded out of DC but it was recorded in Herndon. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c listened to it. At 10:15 (b)(6), (b)(7)c can be heard asking if the military is on the line. The Commission concluded that he did this because someone high-level within the FAA was asking him to check. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not responsible for providing military notification.

The Commission determined that the only open communications that occurred between the FAA and the military did not occur until 10:30, after the fourth aircraft had crashed, which was between Herndon and NEADS.

While the FAA is reconstructing the events of 9/11, they assumed that someone had to have had the military on the primary net. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was at NORAD on 9/11 and the FAA wanted to rely on his recollection of having heard that UN93 crashed in PA. However, the Commission determined that he did not get involved until later in the morning.

AZZARELLO advised that the following items would be helpful to review, media interviews, newspaper accounts, FAA documents including the regional operations center logs and the accident packages. He advised that all the military logs are helpful, NEADS MCC/Tech log and intelligence chat logs.

Darlene FREEMAN told the Commission that BELGER wanted her to look at the military notification issue.

INTERVIEW OF JOHN AZZARELLO & JOHN FARMER

Brigadier General MOORE in CONR spoke to (b)(6), (b)(7)c at NEADS. This is referenced in the 9-16-01 email. General ARNOLD called MOORE to help with operations and to pull together documents for 9/11. An email is sent to (b)(6), (b)(7)c thanking him for getting the information on the 10:08 notice pinned down and wants to talk to the person that dug that up at FAA.

FREEMAN did not recall if she saw a copy of the draft NORAD press release. However, the Commission learned that BELGER had asked her to look at it. The FAA was taken off guard by the press release because at the time they were still working on putting their information together.

The Herndon Command Center was also asked to put together a timeline; an incomplete copy of which the Commission was provided. The Command Center was told to stop working on the timeline. Herndon opined that a good story at Herndon was a bad story in FAA HQ.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was the FAA official at the Command Center that initially ordered that all the aircraft on 9/11 land. (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the Command Center is on a NOM position that was recorded. Jeff GRIFFITH can be heard in the background ordering all the aircraft to land. (b)(6), (b)(7)c relates that it was already done, including a ground stop.

Linda SCHUSSLER took (b)(6), (b)(7)c to MINETTA's office (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

On 9/11 CANOLES had set-up a separate teleconference with the FAA regions on the 10th floor that also was not recorded. GRIFFITH was upset with the decision to do this. This telcon involved the regional operations centers and included (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The Commission believes this is where the rebirth of AA11 came

INTERVIEW OF JOHN AZZARELLO & JOHN FARMER

from, with the source being (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that the rebirth of AA11 came from the airlines.

In the book *Ground Stop* CANOLES is said to have created a timeline of events on his laptop computer. However, today only a print-out of the timeline is available. At one point MILLER was supposed to have a reconstruction of what occurred during this telcon. MILLER provided a list of those present on the telcon.

The Command center did not transcribe a lot of relevant tapes from 9/11.

With regard to a March 2004 memo (AGENT'S NOTE: DOT-OIG obtained a copy of this memo from Shirley MILLER) to the Commission from NORAD, AZZARELLO advised that at the end of the week, while at NORAD, NORAD showed them a copy of a document that looked very similar. In the last version of a similar document, NORAD had abandoned the open line idea. (b)(6), (b)(7)c DOD General Counsel, presented the "new correct" timeline to the Commission however, it still was not correct.

EBERHART told the Commission that he did not look back after 9-11. However, (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he worked on transcribing the 36 recorded positions in NEADS at the request of EBERHART. EBERHART specifically asked him if he was doing that. They stopped transcribing tapes and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Ostensibly the reason they stopped was because they were having mechanical problems with the tapes. This is covered in the response QFRs submitted by the military during an Armed Services Committee hearing.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On September 21, 2004, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c US DOT-OIG, spoke telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c cell phone: (b)(6), (b)(7)c) with John AZZARELLO. AZZARELLO provided the following relevant information:

FAA Command Center in Herndon became an issue because during the period 8:00-12:00 they had a lot of positions that were recorded but that had not been transcribed. One in particular had had communication with ZNY (POSITION 14) concerning AA11 and UN175 but primarily just because it was a line that communicated with ZNY, a key FAA center on 9-11. After the 9-11 Commission asked for all the tapes they heard information on position 14 and the NOM position. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was on the line and (b)(6), (b)(7)c can be heard in the background of this tape making statements that are relevant; namely concerning the "rebirth" of American Airlines 11.

He advised that in FAA Boston Center the traffic management unit (TMU) positions were recorded in Boston but had not been transcribed. In Boston Center (b)(6), (b)(7)c MOS, placed calls to NEADS at 9:20 saying that AA11 was still flying. The Commission first learned about this from NEADS, but did not receive the other end of the recording from FAA. They heard from (b)(6), (b)(7)c that "we just got off a teleconference and AA11 is still airborne." The aforementioned report caused the Langley aircraft to be launched. The Commission was never able to learn the origin of the rebirth of AA11.

FAA's notice to NEADS at 9:20 that AA11 was still airborne caused Langley to scramble jets. However, no one at FAA acknowledged that they made this notification.

There is a tape recorded conversation between (b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA Operations Center and the FAA Aviation Command Center (ACC), wherein it can be heard that (b)(6), (b)(7)c is telling the ACC that AA11 is heading south. During an interview

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 09/30/04

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

(b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled obtaining the aforementioned information from (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6) On 9/11 (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in New Orleans, LA.
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not recall telling (b)(6), (b)(7)c the aforementioned. This is
 the information that the Commission thinks resulted in the false report that
 launched the Langley aircraft.

None of the FAA timelines mentioned the false report of AA11. Commission Staff Statement 17 speaks to this issue.

Commissioner Bob KERREY asked why the military did not throw the FAA under the bus on the notification issue. The theory is that the FAA and the military put a lot of assets into reconstructing the events of 9-11, though they do not admit to having done so.

During a White House briefing on September 17, 2001, the FAA made a presentation. It was during preparation for this presentation that someone may have decided what to say about notification.

Deputy Secretary of Defense WOLFOWITZ made a statement to the press that the government knew of United 93's (UN93) being hijacked but in actuality they did not know that UN93 had been hijacked until after it had crashed.

FAA produced a document upon which was handwritten, "internal briefing document." The document contained a box and a timeline. The document was also titled "FAA Awareness" and listed times that they told the military about the hijackings. (**AGENT'S NOTE:** A document provided to OIG by MILLER was described to AZZARELLO. This contains a box on the top of the first page with various FAA military notification times. AZZARELLO indicated that this document sounded very similar to the document he described.)

With regard to United 93 the aforementioned document had the correct time that the FAA notified the military 10:08. However, the military press release says 9:24.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Flight UN93 was not even hijacked until 9:28 so the notice at 9:24 could not have happened.

AZZARELLO speculated that the aforementioned timeline came from Darlene FREEMAN as part of the after action group's (AAG) work product. Apparently, the AAG was put together to resolve discrepancies that Monte BELGER advised he was interested in knowing about.

Within six minutes of UN93 being hijacked, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the FAA Command Center in Herndon, told FAA HQ that a bomb was aboard UN93. Further, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c is told and by 9:34 he tells HQ there is a bomb onboard UN93. HQ sat on that information from 9:34 until past the time of the crash. The DOD HQ found out about UN93 when Cleveland Center called. Monte BELGER was in the Washington Operations Center at the time. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was speaking with BELGER about scrambling aircraft. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Jeff GRIFFITH were receiving updates on UN93 in HQ at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was on the primary net at HQ. BELGER was apparently very upset and wanted to know who had the military on the line during the hijackings. At about that time (b)(6), (b)(7)c also presently with TSA, was in Herndon, listening on the Tactical Net and asks if the military was on the line. The military was not on the line.

FREEMAN advised that she saw a draft of a NORAD timeline. She was shown the press release from NORAD. There were discrepancies between FAA's and NORAD's understanding as to when things happened. It caught the FAA off guard that NORAD had published their press release.

FREEMAN prepared the "FAA Military Notification" document; however, she did not perform a low level review of the document. She advised it was prepared by CANOLES and FERRANTE. They had picked apart the data to prepare the document.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

The first citation in the NEADS MCC logs that they received notice on UN93 was at 10:07 (approximately). No one at FAA wants to own up to having seen the NEADS log. A 9:16 entry in the NEADS log reflects the tail number for UN175. What happened was that ZNY had confirmed for NEADS that UN175 had crashed and NEADS asked ZNY for the tail number. (b)(6), (b)(7)c had given the tail number to the military.

After 9/11, the military claims that they had conferred with FAA. CANOLES says he thinks it was GRIFFITH that had access to the military information. GRIFFITH was the POC for Gen. ARNOLD. ARNOLD says that FAA did not tell them about UN93 until after it crashed.

The FAA "Summary of Hijack Events" was prepared by FERRANTE on 9/17/01. It makes various references to the NEADS logs. However, there are no notice times for UN93 in the document, why? FERRANTE claims that he did not see the log. He says that someone probably provided him with the military times. Shirley MILLER and (b)(6), (b)(7)c asked the Commission why would the FAA put information about military notice in their report after the aircraft crashed.

The Commission found that everyone tapped around the NEADS log and the issue of FAA notice to the military.

The Commission received a memo from NORAD that was sent to (b)(6), (b)(7)c with a proposed timeline that was different than was previously presented, however, the document had no signature. This was sometime before March 2004.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c showed a draft of another timeline and asked the Commission if they thought that was closer to what they were looking for. There were still parts of the timeline that were not accurate.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

AZZARELLO did not recall seeing any memos from Gen EBERHART that had been sent to the 9-11 Commission correcting the timelines. When the Commission was at NORAD there was a great deal of push-back. It was not until the end of the Commission's investigation that NORAD admitted there was a problem with their timeline.

AZZARELLO described the explanation that a corrected timeline was sent to the Commission as a "red herring." NORAD just wants to be able to say that they cooperated.

- # -

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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CONVERSATION RECORD

On January (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2005 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
 Washington DC (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interviewed at his place of business by
 Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of
 Transportation, Office of Inspector General. Also present was (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c Acting Director Terminal Safety and Operations Support, ATO, FAA,
 Washington DC (b)(6), (b)(7)c After being apprised of the identity of the
 interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the
 following relevant information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c started with the FAA on December 16, 1981, as an Air Traffic
 Controller in Burbank, CA. On September 11, 2001, he held the position of
 Program Director for Air Traffic Planning and Procedures. In February 2004,
 during reorganization, the title for that position changed to Director Terminal
 Safety and Operations Support. In November 2004 he assumed his current
 position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c started with the FAA on January 2, 1976, as a Flight Service Specialist
 at the Flight Service Station in Pittsburgh, PA. On September 11, 2001, he held
 the position of Assistant Manager for Enroute and Terminal Procedures Division.
 In February 2004, his title changed to Manager of Terminal Airspace and
 Procedures Division. In November 2004 he assumed his current position.

Air Traffic Planning and Procedures (ATPP) was an Air Traffic policy
 organization within the FAA. They were responsible for generating and
 maintaining the handbook and orders for Air Traffic that describe how controllers
 perform their functions within terminal, enroute and oceanic domains. ATPP also
 generated and maintained policy relating to how an air traffic facility functions,
 from the management perspective. Within ATPP was a group titled Special
 Operations that was responsible for interfacing with law enforcement and the

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 1/28/05



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CONVERSATION RECORD

military. Finally, ATP performed planning and system implementation functions and operational security for national security events, such as Presidential movements.

During the February 2004 FAA reorganization, the ATPP was broken into domains; one for enroute facilities, one for terminal facilities and one for flight service facilities. Enroute facilities handle air traffic that is enroute; terminal facilities handle flights' ingress and egress from airports, and flight service facilities handle, primarily for part 91 flights, pre-flight, weather briefings, and in-flight advisories.

Currently, when there is a need for new policy or a need for a change to existing policy, the domain will start the process and send the new or changed policy to System Operations Service for approval. Prior to any policy changes, including new policies, the following steps must be taken, a safety analysis conducted, the policy coordinated with the regulatory branch and the policy circulated to the industry for comment. These procedures are outlined in FAA's operating procedures.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to provide, with the help of (b)(6), (b)(7)c the following orders as they were on September 11, 2001 and as they are now.

7110.65	7210.3	7110.263
7210.149	7610.4	

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that order 7110.263 did not exist before September 11, 2001. Furthermore, prior to September 11th, there was no FAA order concerning reporting of suspicious aircraft and/or pilot activities. Order 7110.263 was replaced by order 7110.265 and then finally by 7110.306. The reporting agent was provided with a copy of 7110.306A, dated June 23, 2004, titled "Reporting of Suspicious Aircraft/Pilot Activities".

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c also agreed to provide a listing of those agencies that participate in the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), which is operated by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

The Washington Operations Center in the FAA Headquarters building is run by FAA Security. For further information on that organization (b)(6), (b)(7)c suggested that the reporting agent contact Lynne OSMUS.

The DEN (Domestic Events Network) is run by FAA Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that Systems Operations Services was responsible for investigating the incident involving the Kentucky Governor's aircraft last summer. He agreed to locate and provide copies of any investigative/after action reports and list improvements/changes implemented after the incident.

- # -

Interview with Doug Gould

September 30, 2004, FAA Bldg. 10A, Room 630 at 1430 hours

On September 11, 2001, Mr. Gould's title was Senior Air Traffic Investigator working in the Evaluation and Investigations (AAT 200). His duties were ensuring the safety of the National Air Space in light of an event.

Mr. Gould was working on the 4th floor (Rm. 429) on 9/11 when he received a page about the first hijacked aircraft (AA11 was in Albany at the time of the page). He passed the message to Tony Ferrante and Dave Canoles. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Dave Canoles went up to the War Room, adjacent to the Washington Operation Control Center (10th Floor), to set up the teleconference (TELCON), now referred to as the Domestic Events Network (DEN). Mr. Gould started the TELCON on the 4th floor while the others were setting up the 10th floor to take over the TELCON (all key members would eventually join). Mr. Gould opened the line with the Call Center and made sure that the TELCON could support more than 30 lines. Dave Canoles called New York and Boston Center to add them to the TELCON. Mr. Gould monitored the TELCON from the 4th floor as well as contacting (b)(6), (b)(7)c in Indianapolis, (b)(6), (b)(7) (not further identified) in Cleveland, and Tony Ferrante in Chicago to join the TELCON (the FAA thought a plane had gone down in Kentucky). Those participating in the TELCON were made aware of each aircraft that was hijacked.

Once the Pentagon was hit, the FAA building was evacuated except for those involved with the TELCON. Mr. Gould left the building around 12:30 am (9/12), but was back in the morning. The TELCON continued to be open for seven days. Mr. Gould and (b)(6), (b)(7) (b)(6), (b)(7) worked 16-hour shifts to cover the TELCON.

During this time Mr. Gould continued to monitor the TELCON and communicated with other key individuals at field facilities by paging messages, not broadcasting. The conversation line of the TELCON was not recorded. There was a line that could record, but it was used for recording the Boston Center replay of the hijack recording. This recording was put in a digital format using Cool Edit 2000 (3 days later they switched to the software that the FBI uses). Boston Center played the recording in an attempt to try and figure out who hijacked the plane.

After about an hour into the TELCON, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (on the 4th floor with Mr. Gould on 9/11) started to take notes on a legal pad to maintain a log. Those on the 10th floor used a laptop computer as a log (also about an hour into the TELCON). Since the laptop was being used, (b)(6), (b)(7) eventually stopped taking notes.

Mr. Gould did not believe that the military was involved with the TELCON. He knows that NORAD never joined the line. The Military Operations Specialist at New York Center was on the TELCON. Boston Center did contact Otis Air Force Base for assistance, but Mr. Gould did not know exactly what that meant because what he heard was (b)(6), (b)(7) reaching out to Otis." Mr. Gould also stated that the Military was communicating with the Herndon Command Center.

In regards to the misinformation of AA11 being in route to DC, Mr. Gould was paged by (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Boston Center) early on that AA11 was squawking hijack and heading to DC. It turned out that the plane was heading south towards the Hudson River. Mr. Gould knew that AA11 hit the WTC based on information coming from Newark during the TELCON.

Mr. Gould did work on after action reports/timeline information, which he had turned over to (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Litigation Office), the custodian of all the 9/11 files. Mr. Gould turned over six boxes of information before he left for a three month detail to Iraq in June 2003, which he received back once he returned. Then he turned the boxes over again to (b)(6), (b)(7)c in March 2004 when he went on another detail to Iraq. (b)(6), (b)(7)c still has the boxes. Mr. Gould also kept everything on his hard drive, which crashed a couple of weeks before the meeting (9/30/04).

Mr. Gould, along with (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c worked for about a week on putting the Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events together, which was issued on September 17, 2001. The information the Summary Team collected came from digital voice, radar data, hand notes (usually after the fact), date stamps (time on voice recorder). Some of the time stamps are digital (encrypted) and some are analog (reel to reel so it may be off by +/- 3 seconds).

The Summary Team started collecting data on September 11, 2001. When they requested information it was for specific information. They did not say "give us everything." The focus was on the aircraft activity, not on superficial data. That same evening the Summary Team realized that military notification was going to be an issue. They started with the Boston Center/Otis contact. They did not know who made what call (did not have any physical facts).

Around day 4 or 5 they were tasked with putting military notification into the summary. Mr. Gould does not remember seeing the NEADS log used to put the summary together. He stated that it may be downstairs with (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The Summary Team cross-checked the information for the summary. They pulled out documents, statements, and notes to try and validate the information with other sources. There are draft versions in the boxes Mr. Gould turned over to (b)(6), (b)(7)c

There were no transcripts available when the summary was put together because transcripts take too long.

Without the airlines flying right after 9/11, it was difficult to get data. They had to rely on information over the phone or by fax.

At some point (approximately 6 months) the Summary Team did review military material – RADES data to supplement FAA data. They (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c received the RADES data from a male sergeant at RADES (Hill AFB) who sent a CD to the FAA.

During the interview Mr. Gould was presented with chronologies, in table or grid format that pertained to the FAA's notification to the military concerning the hijacked aircraft on September 11, 2001. Mr. Gould advised that he and (b)(6), (b)(7)c participated in putting the information for the table together, but he did not format the information into the table.

There is a separate folder for each aircraft, as well as a fifth folder for miscellaneous data. As information would come in, it would be placed in the proper folder (i.e., logs, transcripts). There would be some indication as to whom or where the information came from (like a fax number). Everything that came in regarding 9/11 went to Mr. Gould (except for the classified information). Mr. Gould kept a list (index) of where he got the information and who he gave it to.

The 9/11 Commission had access to everything, but did not review everything. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not in the rest of the day (9/30/04). (b)(6), (b)(7)c is going digitize everything.

As for contact with NORAD now – Mr. Gould works with the FAA liaison at NORAD and is part of the Interagency Procedures Working Group, which includes CONR, NORAD and NEADS.

The meeting ended for the afternoon and scheduled for Friday morning when Mr. Gould could get access to the boxes.

This report was prepared by D00-016.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On December (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2004, Special Agents (SA) (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Office of Inspector General (OIG), (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Cleveland Center (ZOB), at ZOB's facility located at 326 E Loraine Street, Oberlin, Ohio, telephone number (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The purpose of the interview was to determine when ZOB provided copies of recordings and transcripts in rough and final form to FAA's Evaluations and Investigations Staff (AAT-20) for communications it had on September 11, 2001. FAA Quality Assurance Specialist (b)(6), (b)(7)c was also present during the interview. (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided substantially as follows:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (b)(6), (b)(7)c On September 11, 2001, (b)(6), (b)(7)c held the position of Support (b)(6), (b)(7)c On September 11, 2001, Quality Assurance Specialists (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c reported to (b)(6), (b)(7)c At the time, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was assigned to FAA Air Space and Procedures Division; he has been a Quality Assurance Specialist for the past one and one-half years. (b)(6), (b)(7)c currently oversees the September 11, 2001, United Airlines Flight 93 file (UAL 93). (b)(7)c advised the aircraft accident package for UAL 93 is no longer maintained in their office. FAA System Operations Litigation Manager (b)(6), (b)(7)c acknowledged the receipt of the accident package of UAL 93 on September 22, 2004 in an e-mail (electronic message) (Attachment 1).

(b)(6), (b)(7)c stated whenever an accident occurs, an FAA form 8020-3 must be completed, and within two hours, AAT-200 (Investigations) must be notified. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)c AAT-200 is usually notified through the regional operations center. (b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled that immediately after UAL 93 crashed, requests were made for a rough transcript of communications between ZOB and "Huntress" (a/k/a North East Air Defense Sector). On September 11, 2001, at 6:53 pm, (b)(6), (b)(7)c e-mailed a brief synopsis of the SATORI (systematic air traffic operational research initiative) replay to (b)(6), (b)(7)c Regional Quality Assurance (Attachment 2). (b)(7)f stated most likely (b)(6), (b)(7)c who is (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the FAA, created the rough draft transcript that was e-mailed to Douglas GOULD, an AAT-200 specialist, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c on September 15, 2001

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Handwritten signature and initials, possibly 'JW' and 'AMC', in the bottom right corner.

INTERVIEW OF (b)(6)

(Attachment 3). **AGENT'S NOTE:** On December 6, (b) 2004, in a follow-up email to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)c from (b)(6), (b)(7)c wrote, "The correspondence that is titled "**Rough Draft Transcript UAL93**" was prepared by (b)(6), (b)(7)c who was a Quality Assurance Specialist. His best recollection was that he prepared this as a DRAFT around September 15-17, 2004[2001], at the request of AAT-200, for himself and that it never left the building." (b)(6), (b)(7)c explained to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)c that (b)(6), (b)(7)c was unaware this transcript was emailed and believed the rough draft transcript did not leave ZOB.

AAT-20 Specialist (b)(6), (b)(7)c happened to be at ZOB on September 11, 2001 reviewing a matter unrelated to UAL 93. After UAL 93 crashed, (b)(6), (b)(7)c removed the relevant magnetic voice tapes from the building and took them to Washington D.C. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)c the magnetic voice tapes are not supposed to leave the building and ZOB should maintain them in a vault. However, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was instructed to allow (b)(6), (b)(7)c to remove the tapes. A memorandum dated September 12, 2001, lists the recordings and related documentation removed from ZOB by (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Attachment 4). According to an e-mail dated September 6, (b) 2001 sent by (b)(6), (b)(7)c planned to return the tapes to ZOB or around September 17, 2001 (Attachment 5). There is no documentation indicating when (b)(6), (b)(7)c actually returned the magnetic voice tapes to ZOB.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled that (b)(6), (b)(7)c created a wave file(s) of approximately 45 minutes of voice recordings from Lorain sector pertaining to UAL 93. (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that due to the amount of recordings, it is possible the wave file may have been broken up into separate files. (b)(6), (b)(7)c generated the wave file by making cassette tapes from the SATORI recordings. (b)(6), (b)(7)c then created the files on CD from the cassette tapes. These files were then e-mailed. However, there is no record when the CD was made, nor is there a record of when the e-mail was sent, or to whom. The computer used by (b)(6), (b)(7)c has since been replaced.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c also electronically transmitted voice and data files from the SATORI to AGL-505's SATORI on September 12, 2001 (Attachment 6). **AGENT'S NOTE:** Attachment 6 is not dated nor could a cover page be found.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

According to (b)(6), (b)(7)c, ZOB copied a certain amount of the magnetic voice tapes to cassette before (b)(6), (b)(7)c removed the tapes from ZOB. (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the rough transcript may have been created from the cassette tapes copied from the magnetic voice tapes. Recordings of the magnetic voice tapes were probably sent via Federal Express on or about September 25, 2001 (Attachment 7). (b)(6), (b)(7)c commented that items being sent from ZOB to FAA Headquarters did not utilize the services of the U.S. Postal Service. Additional voice tapes of UAL 93 were sent to (b)(6), (b)(7)c on or about September 27, 2001; however, which voice tapes were sent is unknown (Attachment 8).

To the best of (b)(6), (b)(7)c knowledge, (b)(6), (b)(7)c created the final partial transcript between ZOB and (b)(6), (b)(7)c that became part of the final accident package. (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated he does not know when AAT-20 received the final partial transcript, but it could have happened around September 13th or 14th, 2001. Doug GOULD sent an e-mail requesting all transcripts by September 19, 2001 (Attachment 9). **AGENT'S NOTE:** In a follow-up email dated December 15, 2004 to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)c from (b)(6), (b)(7)c wrote, "The memorandum titled **"Partial Transcript.....September 11, 200[2001]"** that was dated September 17, 2001 was also prepared by (b)(6), (b)(7)c His best recollection was that this was prepared from the above listed DRAFT, was e-mailed to AAT-200 on or about September 17, 2004[2001] and sent to (b)(6), (b)(7)c who worked in AAT-200 for Tony Mello in AAT-200."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c has no knowledge of any tapes being played over the telephone to personnel in Washington D.C.

On February 26, 2002, (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL-500, confirmed a request that an electronic transcript of the communications ZOB had with UAL 93 on September 11, 2001 be sent to Doug GOULD (See Attachment 10).

SA (b)(6), (b)(7)c asked (b)(6), (b)(7)c if any other contacts were made between ZOB and the United States military on September 11, 2001. (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated a telephone call from a land line at the ZOB, which was not recorded nor documented, to the Air

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042R0122001

INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Force was made to request aircraft be scrambled to ZOB. (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the aircraft that was scrambled was not armed.

Date Prepared: December 15, 2004

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
4/4

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REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE

Atch-1



(b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA
12/13/2004 11:58 AM

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA@FAA
cc
bcc
Subject: Fw: ORIGINAL AIR TRAFFIC AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGES

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
ZOB-505.1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
----- Forwarded by (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA on 12/13/2004 11:57 AM -----

(b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA
09/22/2004 05:24 PM

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA@FAA
cc
Subject: ORIGINAL AIR TRAFFIC AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGES

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
Support Manager, Quality Assurance

----- Forwarded by (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA on 09/22/2004 05:24 PM -----



(b)(6), (b)(7)c
09/22/2004 02:52 PM

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c /ANE/FAA@FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c AGL/FAA@FAA,
(b)(6), (b)(7)c AEA/FAA@FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c AEA/FAA@FAA
cc:
Subject: ORIGINAL AIR TRAFFIC AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGES

FYI

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

----- Forwarded by (b)(6), (b)(7)c ASO/FAA on 09/22/2004 02:51 PM -----



(b)(6), (b)(7)c
09/22/2004 11:03 AM

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c ASO/FAA@FAA
cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)c AWA/FAA@FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c AWA/FAA@FAA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c AWA/FAA@FAA
Subject: ORIGINAL AIR TRAFFIC AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGES

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

This is to acknowledge that our office has received the following original Air Traffic Aircraft Accident Packages:

ZNY-ARTCC-148, UAL175
ZOB-ARTCC-287, UAL93

ZBW-ARTCC-148, AAL11
ZDC-ARTCC-212, AAL77

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Atch-2

Date: 9/11/2001 6:53 PM

Sender: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

To:

Priority: Normal

Subject: UAL 93

Brief synopsis of SATORI replay.

1325:14 UAL 93 checks on LOR (49) sector frequency at FL 350, normal transmission.

1328:19 First audible transmission of a problem, noise, hollering, not understandable.

1328:28 Aircraft altitude FL 344

1328:44 FL 343

1328:53 Second transmission, not understandable

1329:20 FL347, controller ask pilot about altitude, no response.

1332:02 Third transmission, not understandable.

1333:00 AAL 1060 advises controller that the transmission sounded like a bomb.

1334:46 Aircraft starts climbing, FL 354, aircraft still on course.

1334:58 FL357, on course.

1335:07 FL 360, on course.

1335:19 FL 363, on course.

1335:33 FL 366, on course.

1335:55 FL 372, on course.

1336:16 FL 377, starts turn toward southeast.

1336:36 FL 380, in turn.

1336:49 FL 383, in turn.

1337:05 FL 389, in turn.

1337:19 FL 392, in turn.

1337:32 FL 395, in turn.

1337:32 FL 397, in turn.

1337:42 FL 397, stabilized on southeast heading, approximately 145 degrees.

1337:49 FL 399.

1338:01 FL 402.

1338:16 FL 406.

1338:35 FL 408.

1339:00 FL 407

Atch-3

1339:15 Fourth transmission. Readable, This is the Captain, remain in your seats, something about we have a bomb on board, we are returning to the airport, remain quiet.

1340:33 FL 397

1340:51 Lost transponder. Aircraft in coast track.

1341:31 Controller tracking primary target.

1342:32 Lost data block.

Other information. Approximately 1348, aircraft handed off from LOR (49) sector for IRL (67) sector. Aircraft continued tracking on a primary target southeast, altitude unknown. At 1356:32, IRL controller changed flight plan direct HGR to DCA so that ZDC would have strips and be able to accept hand-off. This was not a result of any communication with the pilot.

At approximately 1402, ZOB DART show two transponder hits. Fourth SATORI in preparation at this time.

Bob Herak

Date: 9/15/2001 9:05 PM

Sender:

To:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

cc:

Priority: Urgent

Receipt requested

Subject: Events of 9/11/01 and N8538Y on 9/15/01

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Attached are briefs you requested concerning UAL93 military interface and N8538Y. Also we can confirm we are showing UAL93 accident to occur at 1403Z. Please let us know if there is anything else we can do. I may be reached at (b)(6), (b)(7)c (H) (b)(6), (b)(7)c or (C) (b)(6), (b)(7)c



Briefing Sheet2.doc briefing sheet3.doc

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Briefing Sheet

Subject: N8583Y flight on 9/15/01

Background: Information requested by FAA HQ

Narrative: Timeline of events

Current Status: Times and information taken from ZOB NTAP Data

Prepared by: (b)(6), (b)(7)c AATM ZOB, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(0024Z) ZOB received flight plan information on N8583Y showing that he departed 68IS, Casa De Aero Park Airport, Hampshire, Illinois. The remarks section showed the pilot had received FDC Notam 1/9893.

(0033Z) ZOB received the handoff from ZID.

(0107Z) N8538Y flight plan destination was changed to Johnstown, Pa (JST).

(0120Z) N8538Y arrived JST.

(0226Z) N8538Y departed JST to 68IS. (Flight plan data; N8538Y PA30/I 170 JST D0226 080 JST..AIR.V214.ZZV.V144.CLEFT.V38.EON..JOT..68IS).

(0314Z) N8538Y handed off to sector 30 at ZID.

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT UAL93

CONVERSATION BETWEEN ZOB AND HUNTRESS MILITARY

1403:40 LINE ACTIVATED (RING LINE)
04:12 (HUNT) I NEED A NUMBER FOR THE CHICAGO SECTOR OR
SOMEONE DEALING WITH CHICAGO
:25 (ZOB) OK HOLD ON A QUICK SECOND
:35 (ZOB) OK YOU NEED A NUMBER FOR CHICAGO?
:45 (HUNT) OK THEY JUST GAVE IT TO US I'M SORRY
1406:38 LINE ACTIVATED
:48 LINE RINGING
:53 (HUNT) I BELIEVE I WAS THE ONE TALKING ABOUT
DAL1989
:58 (ZOB) FORGET ABOUT THAT..WE GOT A UAL93 ARE YOU
AWARE OF THAT? THAT HAS A BOMB ON BOARD
1407:05 (HUNT) A BOMB?
:30 (ZOB) DID YOU SCRAMBLE YET?
:35 (HUNT) YES , SELFRIDGE AND TOLEDO
:43 (ZOB) DID YOU REALLY?
:52 (HUNT) CAN YOU GIVE US THE LAT/LONG ?
:58 (ZOB) WESTMORELAND
1408:08 (HUNT) DO YOU HAVE THE LAT/LONG?
:21 (ZOB) I DON'T HAVE THEM RIGHT NOW
:27 (HUNT) DO YOU KNOW WHERE HE'S GOING TO OR COMING
FROM?
:32 (ZOB) ALL I KNOW IS UAL93 HAS A CONFIRMED BOMB ON
BOARD
1409:01 (HUNT) WAS THAT CONFIRMED BY THE PILOT?
:08 (ZOB) IT WAS CONFIRMED ON THE FREQUENCY
:19 (HUNT) DO YOU HAVE HIS MODE 3 OR LAST KNOWN MODE
THREE?
:39 (ZOB) HIS LAST MODE3 WAS ONE FIVE TWO SEVEN
(1527) AND I HAVE THE LAT LONGS...THREE NINER FIVE ONE
NORTH..ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX WEST..CAN YOU SCRAMBLE ON
IT?
1410:16 (HUNT) WE ARE WORKING IT AND WE WILL ..WHAT
CENTER IS THIS?
:38 (ZOB) CLEVELAND
:44 (HUNT) OK WE HAVE FOUR, TWO SELFREDGE AND TWO
TOLEDO, LET ME SEE WHERE THEY ARE HEADED, THEY ARE PROBABLY
GOING TO GO TOWARDS THE UAL93. I WILL CALL YOU BACK WITH
ANYTHING I HAVE
1411:30 (ZOB) OK
1413:32 (ZOB) HEY JOHNSTOWN TOWER YOU HAVE A NOVEMBER TWO
ZERO VICTOR FOXTROT INBOUND, I NEED HIM TO CALL THE OMIC @
440-774-0426

1413:40 (JST TOWER) OK
1422:12 (HUNT) HUNTRESS MILITARY
:15 (ZOB) ZOB MILITARY
:18 STAND BY SIR, GO AHEAD
:28 (ZOB) REFERENCE UNITED NINETY THREE
:35 (HUNT) YES UAL93 WE GOT CONFIRMATION THE AIRCRAFT
WENT DOWN NORTH EAST OF CAMP DAVID.. LAST KNOWN POSITION
WAS THREE NINER FIVE ONE NORTH BY ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX
WEST.. EXACTLY WHERE HE WENT DOWN
1423:14 (ZOB) OK THANK YOU
1426:22 (ZOB) STING ONE ONE AT TOLEDO ARE TNOSE THE ONES
YOU SCRAMBLED
:34 (HUNT) THEY ARE GOING UP ON THREE TWO EIGHT POINT
ZERO

SUBSEQUENT CONTACT INVOLVED FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE
FIGHTERS AND SOLICITATION OF ASSISTANCE TO INVESTIGATE MODE
C INTRUDERS AFTER THE ORDER TO LAND ALL AIRCRAFT. TWO
INTRUDERS WERE INVOLVED. ONE WAS FORCED TO LAND AND THE
SECOND HAD LANDED PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL.

Atch-4



U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Subject: ACTION: Chain of Custody of Official Government Records

Date: 9-12-01

From: Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations, AAT-20

Reply to Attn. of:

To: Manager

By direction of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, this document contains Chain of Custody for requested original recordings and related documentation from the parent facility. The individuals listed below shall document the transfer of this data from custodian to custodian.

ALL ORIGINAL VOICE RECORDINGS
REGARDING UAL 93E
4 ORIGINAL 60 channel
tapes;
DARTS
NEADS (PRINTED + FLOPPY)
1 re-recording re FRANKLIN sector
1 re-recording re LORANE SECTOR

ORIGINAL TAPES
4B, 0000-1333, 9/11
4A, 1332-1344, 9/11
4B, 1344-1650, 9/11
7B, 0000-1650, 9/11 (replacement for 1B)
Received 9/12/01, 0245

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AAT-202

for

Date: 9/17/2001 9:39 AM

Sender: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Priority: Normal

Receipt requested

Subject: Transcripts 9/11/01

I just spoke to AAT-200 and they advised that (b)(6), (b)(7)c is scheduled to depart DC via POV to ZOB to bring back the original reels. Upon receipt of the original reels, ZOB QA has been asked to make certified copies of the reels for (b)(6), (b)(7)c to take back to Washington. We have also been asked to prepare a certified transcript of all communications pertinent to the accident flight. The FBI has asked that all transcripts be completed by COB Wednesday 9/19/01.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c is scheduled to arrive ZOB at approximately 6P and will call the watch desk on (b)(6), (b)(7)c number. He will stay overnight and then return tomorrow.

I'll let the guards know that he is enroute.

Please call if you need any additional info.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Atch-5

The following ZOB TMU personnel have seen all or portions of the SATORI.
I am not sure how much of the SATORI they reviewed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

viewed on 9/1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c viewed on 9/13/01 at 0930L.

I have viewed all or portions of the SATORI's two or three. Because of problems with the "A" job I reloaded the SAR INFORMATION so data blocks could be displayed.

I also electronically transmitted the voice and data files on all four SATORI's on UAL93 to AGL-505's SATORI on 9/12/01.

The voice files sent were .pac & .pt files NOT .wav files.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Atch-6

Date: 9/25/2001 1:38 PM

Sender: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

To:

Priority: Urgent

Subject: Re:UAL 93

Bob

I just spoke to (b)(6), (b)(7)c in AAT-200. He said he did not need the data again of what you posted to the website but we do need the file name for the data you posted.

PLEASE send this to me and I will compile all the files from all facilities and send one ccMail to HQ.

Thanks

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
AGL-505.1

Reply Separator

Subject: UAL 93

Author: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date: 9/25/01 12:26 PM

1. ZOB has already sent all NTAP data web site STP//172.22.8.31. This was sent last week. If we need to send again, please advise.

2. ZOB will send the DART data today to the same web site address as we used for the NTAP.

3. ZOB AF has advised us that they did not record ERIT data on September 11, 2001.

4. The voice tapes that (b)(6), (b)(7)c requested for AGC (68) Radar associate for 1359-1400Z and the Huntress (MOS) position for 1403-1426 will be FEDEX today.

Please advise if this is sufficient data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
ZOB QA

Atch-7



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Memorandum

Subject: INFORMATION: Voice Tapes
UAL93

Date: September 27, 2001

From: Quality Assurance Manager,
ZOB-505

**Reply to
Attn. of:**

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

FAX

To: [REDACTED] AAT-200

The enclosed cassettes were requested for the investigation of Aircraft Accident involving UAL93 by Doug Gould.

If you have any questions contact [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Cleveland ARTCC Operations Support Specialist at

[REDACTED]
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Enclosure:2

Atch-8

Forward Header

Subject: Action items remaining open
Author: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Date: 9/17/01 8:32 AM

All, message below from AAT-20 with information needed yet by HQ.

ZID - Please listen to the tape of 121.32 between 8:15 and 8:30 for the "whisper" transmission. See if you can make out what was said. I believe that everything else has been covered but please check.

ZOB - Please forward partial transcripts w/ germane and pertinent transmissions re: UAL93. I believe that everything else has been covered but please check.

Thanks, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Forward Header

Subject: Action items remaining open
Author: Douglas Gould
Date: 9/17/01 8:27 AM

Good Morning all,

I have to thank all of you for the incredible dedication and work that you've all done this past week. I apologize that some items had to be duplicated, but we've had a lot of data coming in.... Unfortunately several more IOU's are still awaiting completion. Below you will find a list of items needed ASAP. Please review and forward either electronically, fax or overnight.

AEA The IAD wave files are up on ANE's site in a folder labeled IAD and DCA.

AAL11:

Transcript

I have LCE, ID, SL, ZBW TMU and K90/HST.

All other facilities that spoke with AAL11 and communication ref. Hijack/accident that is on a recorded line, including with the Military/NEOD/NORAD or any other agency.

Voice re-recording

Certified Cassettes of all communications with AAL11 and coordination of said aircraft

Wave recording of all pertinent transmission to or from AAL11

Flight Progress strip from all facilities

Employee Statements

UAL175

Transcript

I have BOS GC, LCW, ID, SL, ZBW 47R, 20R, ZNY R42 AND HUNTRESS.

All other facilities that spoke with UAL175 and communication ref. Hijack/accident that is on a recorded line, including with the Military/NEOD/NORAD or any other agency.

Voice re-recording

Certified Cassettes of all communications with UAL175 and coordination of said aircraft

Wave recording of all pertinent transmission to or from UAL175

Flight Progress strip from all facilities

Employee Statements

AAL77

Transcript

I have outbound IAD GC, LCW, ND, NH, ZDC R05 R03, ZID HNN R, HNN RA, DAC R, DAC RA. (need inbound from IAD and DCA)

All other facilities that spoke with AAL77 and communication ref. Hijack/accident that is on a recorded line, including with the Military/NEOD/NORAD or any other agency.

Voice re-recording

Certified Cassettes of all communications with AAL77 and coordination of said aircraft

Wave recording of all pertinent transmission to or from AAL77

Flight Progress strip from all facilities

Employee Statements

UAL93

Transcript

I have EWR GC2, GC, LC and ZOB R49 AND R67.

All other facilities that spoke with UAL93 and communication ref. Hijack/accident that is on a recorded line, including with the Military/NEOD/NORAD or any other agency.

Voice re-recording

Certified Cassettes of all communications with UAL93 and coordination of said aircraft

Wave recording of all pertinent transmission to or from UAL93

Flight Progress strip from all facilities

Employee Statements

Please forward partial pertinent transcripts and wave files NLT COB Wednesday 9/19th (deadline with FBI). Statements should be gathered and forwarded as the employee's return to work. All management shall do them today, no excuse. We understand, several facilities may not have logged all actions, so it is critical that this information is captured in statements with approximate times on each notification (very critical). It may be easier to complete a timeline with action/notification taken with time and by whom and have all sign to validate these actions.

Again I thank you all and apologize for being so demanding.. As you know this AM the Administrator will be standing in front of Congress explaining our actions vs. inaction's... Everyone did an exceptional job. Keep your heads up and ensure you all take care of yourselves and families.

To Better Times

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Atch-9

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

This is written confirmation. Please comply with the Regional Office request and e-mail the file to Doug Gould.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Forward Header

Subject: UAL93
Author: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Date: 2/26/2002 8:45 AM

Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Please send, via CC:mail, an electronic transcript of the communications that Cleveland Center received from UAL 93 on September 11, 2001. Please send this information Doug Gould.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Atch-10

February 26,

2002

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

In response to your request for the electronic transcript of UAL93, I have discussed the issue with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and we do have a copy. Before we send the data to AAT-200, I want to clarify several issues.

1. We will need a written request for the data (e-mail will suffice). This is a facility policy for security tracking and a record of request.
2. This data should be sent by certified mail to ensure that the data is not compromised. Sending by e-mail is not a secure method and could result in compromising the data.

Upon receipt of a written request, we will promptly send the data to AAT-200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On December (b)(6), (b)(7) 2004 (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts was interviewed at his place of employment by USDOT/OIG Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The interview had previously been arranged by telephone. The reporting agent identified himself and (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the following information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c as an Air Traffic Controller (ATC). He was assigned to Youngstown, Ohio until (b)(6), (b)(7)c. In (b)(6), (b)(7)c he transferred to an ATC position at Bradley Airport in Connecticut. He subsequently became a (b)(6), (b)(7)c in automation at Bradley Airport. He transferred to the NER office in Burlington, Massachusetts in (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He initially worked in the Air Traffic Requirements Branch and was the NER (b)(6), (b)(7)c. He has a strong radar automation background due to his education. He transferred to Quality Assurance in (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Resources Management in (b)(6), (b)(7)c. He has also had details as an assistant Air Traffic Manager at Bradley and a six month detail as the NER Quality Assurance Manager in 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c at FAA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Prior to an Air Traffic reorganization that occurred within the last 9-12 months, ATO-S was AAT-20.

He has not been involved in the preparation of any timelines, nor was he specifically aware that he was providing data for any timelines. He did have a role in gathering data, but it was related to radar information.

Prepared by: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c Date Prepared: 12/14/04

INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On the morning of September 11, 2001, he was working at the FAA NER office in Burlington. At a little after 8:30 a.m., NER personnel became aware that AMERICAN AIRLINES Flight 11 (AA 11) might have been hijacked. He was told by FAA/NER employee (b)(6), (b)(7)c that AA 11 had not responded to air traffic control commands at around 8:15 or 8:20 a.m. He telephoned Doug GOULD at AAT-20 to give him a heads-up that something was going on.

He was subsequently involved in a number of telephone calls. He spoke to GOULD, David CANOLES, Tony FERRANTE and Tony MELLO from AAT-20. He was asked to get the radar information the various FAA centers and towers that had been involved with AA 11. He was asked to put together travel time and flight path information. NER personnel asked him to go to Boston Center (the Air Route Traffic Control Center in Nashua, New Hampshire) and digitize the audio transmissions involving AA 11.

He headed up Route 3 to Nashua and while he was en route he was notified by cell phone of AA Flight 77. After he arrived in Nashua, he began working on digitizing the audio recordings when the notification about United Flight 93 (UN 93) crashing near Pittsburgh came through.

He converted the audio files to digital wave files and transmitted them by high speed via the secure FAA Intranet to AAT-20 in Washington, D.C. He also made the recordings available to two FBI agents, whose names he could not recall, so that they could listen as well. He took part in a telephone conference with people from NER and Eastern Region and let them know that the recordings were available.

There was a problem at the New York TRACON when they went to retrieve the radar data for AA 11. Something happened in the automation system that scrambled the data from UN 93. He subsequently spent three days unscrambling the data.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He summarized the data that he gathered and prepared a presentation for AAT-20 review. The FBI wanted him to look for a Lear Jet that may have served as command and control for the hijackers, but he could not locate anything. He also followed up on the hijackers turning off the airplane transponders on some flights while changing the transponder on another.

He was shown Outline Attachment 1 (Chronology of September 11, 2001) by the reporting agent, which he reviewed. He did not have any role in preparing the document. He did not receive any specific directions to put any timelines together. The document indicates that it was prepared by AAT-20, which makes sense, as AAT-20 would have been responsible for putting together the parts and pieces from various FAA facilities. Some of his work may have been used indirectly, such as transponder returns. He did no transcript work. This was handled at Boston Center by (b)(6), (b)(7)c who had been tasked by (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the point of contact for NER on 9/11 related issues.

He was shown ROI Attachment 2 (Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events), which he thought was prepared by (b)(6), (b)(7)c who worked for AAT-20 and is now with AAI. There should also be a version on compact disc with audio. The radar information that he put together may have had a secondary role in the diagrams.

He gathered radar data from all of the Air Route Traffic Control Centers involved, which was known as National Tracking Analysis Program (NTAP) data as well as terminal information from Regan National, Dulles, Bradley, Boston, New York, Albany, Providence, and Pittsburgh. He looked at the flight information from start to finish. He worked mostly independently, but he did need to interact with FAA regional personnel from each region where a facility was located as well as each facility. He also spoke to people at the FAA Technical Center to see if there was an automated method to unscramble the New York TRACON data, which there was not.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He was shown ROI Attachment 3 (an unlabeled chronology) and Outline Attachment 2 (another unlabeled chronology) and he advised that he had never seen these documents before.

As previously noted, the focus of his work was tracking the movement of the aircraft via the radar data. Some of the movements were anomalous to regular routes and he was trying to look at the data and assist the FBI to glean something to track back to the hijackers, including the transponder codes.

Although he began his work fairly immediately during the events of 9/11 and the majority of the work was done within a couple of days, the final work took 1-2 months.

He worked independently, but took direction from AAT-20. Things were a little squirrely after the second plane crash, dealing with two regions and Washington, but things did firm up. For him, things were pretty straightforward. He had an open line with AAT-20 from Boston Center and he knew his analytical capabilities. At various times he spoke with GOULD, MELLO, FERRANTE (b)(6), (b)(7)c and a guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the Indianapolis Center.

He began obtaining data from the centers and towers immediately. The towers and the centers were the only source of information. He did not receive any information from the military. The FAA had pretty good radar coverage. The only information the military would have had that the FAA did not have was altitude information on primary targets.

The radar data is in electronic form, but it is a closed system. He needed someone at each building to extract the information from the closed end system and go to another system to transmit the data to him. He made a lot of phone calls. His duties were known to the towers and centers; he was on a priority list.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He got the data and worked with another FAA employee, (b)(6), (b)(7)c with whom he had written a program called RAPTOR. RAPTOR reads electronic radar information and plays it back on a personal computer. He and (b)(6), (b)(7)c worked together on 9/11 to adapt the program to read radar information from the different systems that were being used by the various centers. It was done on the spot. He and (b)(6), (b)(7)c had actually worked together to develop RAPTOR. Previously, RAPTOR could read only ARTS 3A, which was in use at Boston, Bradley, and Albany. New York TRACON used ARTS 3E, so they had to make sure it worked.

He did not look at any data from outside the FAA. He did listen to the audio recordings with times and compared it to the radar information. He was not asked to alter, nor did he alter, any of the radar information, although it could be changed. It would not be easy. It would also be difficult to find, but it could be found as certain things are embedded into the file.

He did not coordinate specifically with anyone externally or internally. He did not know exactly what everyone, including the FBI, wanted so he did a number of things. He made a picture of the radar with a simulation of what the targets did, such as turns, speeds, and transponder activity. He superimposed the radar data onto topographical maps to see if the planes were following roads, rivers, highways, or flight paths as a way of ascertaining the hijackers' flying ability.

He did not coordinate his results with the military.

He transmitted data to AAT-20 in stages, beginning about one hour after AA 11 hit the World Trade Center. He would finish his analysis from one location and ship it off. He worked until about 1:00 a.m. on September 12, 2001 and took a few hours break.

As far as he knows, his work product all went to AAT-20. It could have gone higher, but he is not aware of that. At some point much later, he was told that AAT-20 needed his data for the 9/11 Commission.

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

He was not directed to include or not include any data from his work. The only request he received was to enable the maps to have a zoom-in feature, just like Mapquest. He did not change any data, just the viewing position.

He took direction from CANOLES, MELLO, and FERRANTE. He was not asked to change anything. He had worked with all three before and has a good relationship with each one.

He had nothing to do with including or not including any information in any FAA chronologies.

He has no knowledge of any false reports of AA 11 still being airborne after it had already crashed, in any form.

He did not participate in any briefings for the White House.

He did not receive any data or coordinate any information with the military. He was shown ROI Attachment 4 (Rough Draft Transcript UAL93) and Outline Attachment 3 (Notifications to Military) and advised that he had not seen them before.

SATORI is a system that plays back en-route Center radar information and audio. It is voice embedded.

RAPTOR plays back New York TRACON, Providence, Boston, and Albany towers as well as Regan National, Dulles, and Pittsburgh. RAPTOR could also have audio. Voice can be added to RAPTOR if you had audio by using an audio video capture program. This creates a movie file that can be played on a Windows media player.

He was shown ROI Attachment 6 (references wave files from Boston Center) and advised that he did not prepare the document. He digitized all of the AA 11 audio

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INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

clips from Boston Center from the start until AA 11 struck the WTC. There were 3-4 transmissions the hijackers made, possibly because they were not familiar with the plane's intercom system.

He spends time in Washington and had a lot of information on a computer down there, but the hard drive fried in 2003 or early 2004. The Information Resources people tried to restore it, but they could not. He has no idea what happened to the machine.

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INTERVIEW OF ROSALIND A. KNAPP

On December 8, 2004, Rosalind (Lindy) A. KNAPP, Deputy General Counsel, United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), Washington, D.C. was interviewed at USDOT Headquarters located at 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), USDOT. KNAPP was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004, referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission) to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, KNAPP provided the following relevant information:

KNAPP has worked for USDOT since 1973 and has held her current position since 1981.

KNAPP recalled participating in a May 21, 2003 meeting with USDOT Chief of Staff John FLAHERTY, in FLAHERTY's office, to discuss Secretary MINETA's upcoming testimony before the 9-11 Commission. The meeting was held at 5:30 p.m. She stated that during this meeting, FLAHERTY advised (b)(5)

(b)(5),

(b)(5)

On the following day, May 22, 2003, KNAPP attended a 4:00 p.m. meeting with Secretary MINETA to prepare the Secretary for his testimony. Also present at the meeting were: FLAHERTY; Shirley MILLER; and Linda SCHUESSLER. She did not recall if Lynne OSMUS or Tony FERRANTE were present. KNAPP recollected that sometime during this meeting, former FAA Administrator Jane GARVEY stopped by after having testified before the Commission that same day. GARVEY had related that Commissioner BEN-VENISTE had questioned her about information she was unable to provide and that she had referred BEN-VENISTE to KNAPP. KNAPP did not recall any specific discussion during

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 12/15/04

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INTERVIEW OF ROSALIND A. KNAPP

the meeting about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the FAA's timeline information regarding notification to the military on September 11, 2001. KNAPP did not know whether the Secretary's final briefing package for his testimony included any timeline information as mentioned above.

KNAPP discussed a third meeting that took place sometime between May 29, 2003 and June 13, 2003. She recalled that FLAHERTY had attended a meeting at the FAA during which he viewed a PowerPoint presentation/demonstration focusing on the four hijacked flights. The presentation included graphics and voice recordings. KNAPP stated that as a result of viewing this presentation, FLAHERTY expressed his desire for a consolidated timeline of the four flights. KNAPP did not recall FLAHERTY raising any particular concerns about the accuracy of the timeline information he had been presented thus far.

During KNAPP's interview, she provided a copy of an electronic message from MILLER to her, dated June 13, 2003. Attached to this message is a document titled, "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11th, 2001." KNAPP believes that this document was created in response to FLAHERTY's desire for a consolidated master chronology.

KNAPP was advised that following GARVEY's testimony before the Commission on May 22, 2003, she was presented with a question for the record (QFR) and was asked to follow up with the Commission the next day. KNAPP stated that she did not recall anything about the QFR.

KNAPP was asked hypothetically, however, to discuss how the FAA should correct the public record, if it is later discovered that the information presented in the QFR to the Commission is inaccurate. KNAPP stated that in the best of all possible worlds, the FAA should have told GARVEY that the information included in the QFR was inaccurate and subsequently asked her if she wanted to provide corrected information to the Commission. KNAPP does not think that the

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INTERVIEW OF ROSALIND A. KNAPP

FAA relying upon a subsequent staff interview is a valid and/or appropriate way of correcting the record.

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INTERVIEW OF TONY MELLO

On December 1, 2004, Tony MELLO, Director of Safety Investigations, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was re-interviewed at FAA Headquarters located at 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of Transportation (USDOT). MELLO was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004 referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, MELLO provided the following relevant information:

MELLO was shown a copy of a "MCC/T Log" with entries beginning September 10, 2001, and asked if this was the document he recalled reviewing in the days following September 11, 2001. MELLO indicated that he did not believe that this document was the one he reviewed. He recalled that while the log he looked at did begin on September 10, 2001, it was only one full page in length, was handwritten, and had no security classifications marked on it. He further stated that the log he reviewed had no information blacked out and did not reference any of the hijacked aircraft by tail number, only by call sign. He theorized that the log he reviewed was obtained through retired United States Air Force Colonel Sheryl ATKINS. He believes that either he or another of the then AAT-20 staff asked Dave CANOLES, Director of Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations, to retrieve the military log information and consequently, ATKINS retrieved the information.

MELLO stated that his first recollection of seeing tail numbers associated with the four hijacked aircraft may have been on the accident packages that were prepared. During the interview, the four accident packages were given a cursory review and it was noted that the accident package for UNITED AIRLINES Flight 93 was the only one that referenced a tail number (N591UA).

- # -

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 12/02/04

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INTERVIEW OF J. DAVID CANOLES

On September 30, 2004, J. David CANOLES, Director, Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service, AOV-1, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was interviewed in his office located at 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of Transportation (USDOT). CANOLES was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004 referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, CANOLES provided the following relevant information:¹

CANOLES has been in the Senior Executive Service (SES) since 1987. On September 11, 2001, he held the position of Director of Air Traffic and Air Safety Investigations, AAT-20, and reported directly to Jeff GRIFFITH.

CANOLES recalled that shortly after the events began occurring on September 11, 2001, GRIFFITH asked him if he was going to set up a "net," which CANOLES understood to be a conference call. Consequently, between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., he directed that a conference call be established in the AT-1 conference room on the 10th floor of the FAA headquarters building. CANOLES recalled contacting Tony MELLO and (b)(6), (b)(7)c from his staff to begin getting the line up and running. (b)(6), (b)(7)c from CANOLES' staff was also one of the early participants on the call. While CANOLES could not recall the names of all of the other participants on the call, as it went on throughout the day, he stated that Division Managers from the New England and Eastern Regions and the Herndon Command Center were brought in early. CANOLES further

¹ During the interview of CANOLES, S/A (b)(6), (b)(7) and the reporting agent believed that a tape recording of CANOLES' interview was being contemporaneously made, however, it was later determined that an equipment malfunction caused the interview not to be recorded. Consequently, this MOI was drafted based upon agents' notes that were taken.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 10/19/04

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INTERVIEW OF J. DAVID CANOLES

stated that at some point, FAA's liaison to the military, Sheryl ATKINS, joined in on the line. CANOLES stated that while ATKINS participated in the "net," he agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating notifications of the hijackings to the military. CANOLES never considered using the telecon for that purpose.

The "net"/telecon line was not recorded but at some point, (b)(6), (b)(7)c brought in his laptop computer and began a written log of information that was being exchanged and received.

CANOLES stated that MELLO, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Doug GOULD, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Tony FERRANTE were involved in compiling the information contained in the FAA publication, Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001. With respect to FAA notification of the hijackings to the military and references to North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs in the timelines of the publication, CANOLES explained that GRIFFITH had received these logs from General Ralph EBERHARDT of NORAD approximately 3-5 days after September 11th. CANOLES reviewed the information contained in the logs, made notes to himself, and presented his notes to his staff.

(AGENT'S NOTE): During the interview, CANOLES provided the interviewers with copies of various documents, including drafts and a final copy of a timeline titled "Notification Chronology." The final chronology contains a notation indicating that AAT-20 revised the document on September 18, 2001, at 14:00 hours. The first page of the "Notification Chronology" contains a grid with each of the four hijacked aircraft across the top row. Along the left side of the grid, the rows are labeled with the following headings: "First Sign," "Probable time flight was known to be in distress," "NORAD NEADS Notification," and "Estimated Crash time." Some of the drafts contain all the left hand row headings while others do not. One draft indicates that the FAA notified NORAD/NEADS about UN93 at 10:08. Under this typewritten time, it is handwritten "N/A." The final

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INTERVIEW OF J. DAVID CANOLES

version of this timeline indicates that the FAA notification time for UN93 was N/A.)

CANOLES advised that the handwriting is his. However, he did not recall why he had his staff change the UN93 notification time from 10:08 to N/A.

To CANOLES' recollection, FAA officials decided to use the NEADS log information as a reference for their notification to the military in the Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events because the NEADS log information shed a much more favorable light on the FAA than anything the FAA could find about their notification to the military. The discussion about using military times versus what the FAA could find about their notification to the military was discussed within the highest levels of the FAA, to include Monte BELGER.

CANOLES stated that his staff began listening to recordings of the air/ground communications with the hijacked aircraft very shortly after the events of September 11th, either by that evening or by the following day. GOULD and (b)(6), (b)(7)c listened to most of the transmissions.

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NOTE TO FILE

On December 20, 2004, during a DOT-OIG interview, John FLAHERTY, Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Transportation, was shown a copy of an FAA chronology attached to a June 13, 2003, email message from Shirley MILLER to Lindy KNAPP. The chronology is titled "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11th, 2001." FLAHERTY requested a copy of the chronology and offered to comment on it.

On December 21, 2004, the reporting agent provided (b)(6), (b)(7)c DOT-OIG, with two copies of the timeline to give to FLAHERTY during a scheduled meeting with him that afternoon.

- # -

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 12/28/04 

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INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)c

On October (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2004, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was interviewed at FAA Headquarters located at 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Senior Investigator (b)(6), (b)(7)c Office of Inspector General (OIG), United States Department of Transportation (USDOT). (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interviewed in conjunction with a July 29, 2004, referral from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to the Inspectors General for the Departments of Transportation and Defense. After being apprised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)c provided the following relevant information:

She has been with the FAA since December 1985. She is currently assigned to a project that includes working with (b)(6), (b)(7)c on September 11th data collection. This encompasses gathering all of the FAA's September 11th data, consolidating it, and scanning it for eventual publication on the FAA's website.

On September 11, 2001, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was assigned to the FAA's Air Traffic Evaluations Division Office (AAT-100), and reported to Tom CARMODY, who is now deceased. AAT-100 was an organization within the AAT-20 organization. AAT-200 was a separate organization within AAT-20 and was responsible for aircraft accident investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled that on September 11, 2001, AAT-200 was patched into a conference call that was being run from the 10th floor Command Center. This line went on for several days. (b)(6), (b)(7)c said that the volume on the phone was placed up high so that staff from AAT-200 could monitor the information being exchanged on the 10th floor.

AAT-200 also set up its own conference call with Cleveland and Indianapolis centers. (b)(6), (b)(7)c recalled periodically monitoring this call.

Prepared by: _____

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 10/19/04

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INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that she does not know whether military representatives participated on these teleconferences even though she recalled seeing some military representatives in the 10th floor Command Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c described her involvement in the drafting of the Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001 as very limited. She merely participated in typing the composite sequence that appears behind the last tab of the book. She was electronically sent word documents that included chronology information for each of the four hijacked flights and was asked to incorporate this information into an excel spreadsheet. As directed, she cut the information from the documents and pasted it into excel format. She developed none of the information herself and only copied what was given to her. Any references to Northeast Air Defense Sector logs in the composite sequence came from the word documents that were sent to her. Once she completed her spreadsheet, she gave it to either Tony FERRANTE or Doug GOULD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that radar and voice data from the four flights began to come into FAA headquarters as soon as the evening of September 11th. AAT-20 and AAT-200 employees like FERRANTE, Tony MELLO, GOULD, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mary STRAWBRIDGE, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Dave CANOLES were directing the various centers to get their data to them as quickly as possible.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION	INVESTIGATION NUMBER 042R0122001	DATE Dec. 6, 2004
TITLE FAA-NORAD Statements to 9-11 Commission Washington, DC False Statements	(b)(6), (b)(7)c	STATUS ACTION LEAD
		wlo
	DISTRIBUTION JRI-1 (1), JRI-5 (1) JRI-2 (1) ✓	APPROVED NES

ACTION LEADS

Contact the Quality Assurance managers at Boston (ZBW) and Cleveland (ZOB) Centers to determine when they provided FAA's Evaluations and Investigations Staff (AAT-20) a play back, copy of a recording and a transcript in rough and final form for any communications that its Center may have had with the military on September 11, 2001. Obtain any documentary evidence that supports when each Center transmitted the aforementioned to AAT-20.

We have found that most of the communications between the FAA's Centers and the military occurred between the FAA military operations positions and the North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) but this is not always the case. In transcripts that have been provided to AAT-20, NEADS is referenced as "Huntress."

JRI-1: ZBW's (b)(6), (b)(7)c is (b)(6), (b)(7)c telephone (b)(6), (b)(7)c. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)b may currently be acting for (b)(6), (b)(7)c

JRI-5: ZOB's (b)(6), (b)(7)c is (b)(6), (b)(7)c telephone number (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Conduct an interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)c an employee in the Air Traffic Organization's Resource Management Branch (ANE-540). Following September 11, 2001, (b)(6), (b)(7)c worked with AAT-20 in preparing the FAA's chronologies. Interview (b)(6), (b)(7)c to determine his role in the preparation of the FAA's chronologies. An outline for conducting the interview is attached (Attachment 1).

JRI-1: (b)(6), (b)(7)c Air Traffic Organization, Resource Management Branch, New England Regional Headquarters, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INFORMATION

This investigation was based on a referral from the 9-11 Commission that certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at Commission hearings and elsewhere were inaccurate. The questionable statements primarily concern when the FAA notified the military on September 11, 2001, about American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77) and United Airlines Flight 93 (UN93).

As is further elaborated in their referral, the Commission has concluded that at its May 23rd, hearing (b)(6), (b)(7)c 1st Air Force, presented a timeline of events from September 11th that contained inaccuracies. Specifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)c told the Commission that the FAA notified the military about UN93 at 9:16am¹. (b)(6), (b)(7)c testimony also indicated that the fighters from Langley Air Force Base, Langley, VA were scrambled as result of the aforementioned notice, that the military was tracking UN93 and that they intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached Washington, D.C. The Commission determined that there was no hijack report at 9:16am; UN93 was proceeding normally at that time. They further concluded that the military did not receive any notice that UN93 had a problem until ZOB called NEADS at 10:07am (EDT) and advised them that UN93 might have a bomb on board. UN93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c also testified that the FAA notified the military about AA77 at 9:24am, and that the Langley fighters were also scrambled in response to the hijacking of AA77. During its investigation, the Commission discovered that the notice NEADS received at 9:24am was that AA11 had not hit the World Trade Center. ZBW had contacted NEADS at 9:21am and reported that AA11 was still in the air and on its way toward Washington, DC.

The Commission concluded that at 9:34am, FAA's Washington Center informed NEADS that there was a problem with AA77 "We're looking [for]—we lost American 77." Then, at 9:36am, ZBW contacted NEADS and reported that an unidentified aircraft was closing in on Washington, D.C. AA77 was crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37am.

Witnesses have advised that AAT-20 prepared the bulk of the FAA's 9-11 chronologies. This effort began on or about September 11, 2001, and continued through the end of the month. All subsequent chronologies, which we have identified, that were produced by the FAA and that reference military notifications were based upon AAT-20's work products.

¹ All times referenced in this report, unless otherwise noted, are Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). FAA Air Traffic generally uses Universal Coordinated Time (UTC or ZULU). During the month of September EDT is four hours behind ZULU. Therefore, 12:00 ZULU is 8:00am EDT, 13:00 ZULU is 9:00am EDT, and 14:00 ZULU is 10:00am EDT.

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Of the work products produced during this period, there were two of significance; the first is titled *Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001*, and is dated September 17, 2001 (Attachment 2). The second work product has no title but its first page contains a grid with a chronology of four significant events associated with each of the hijacked aircraft, including when NORAD/NEADS was notified, and is dated September 18, 2001 (Attachment 3). Both of these documents indicate that FAA notified the military about AA77 at 9:24 and that FAA did not notify the military about UN93. Further, they use military logs as the source for these notifications. Neither chronology contained any information concerning the false report about AA11 at 9:24am or the actual notice the FAA provided for UN93 at 10:07am.

Witnesses indicate that AAT-20 had access to some information from the military, which they likely received sometime September 13 and 17, 2001. Some evidence and witnesses suggest that AAT-20 had information, from FAA and military sources, concerning the correct time that it notified the military about UN93 (10:08 [sic] EDT) but removed it from its final military notification chronology.

We are requesting that this action lead be accomplished, in part, to assist in determining what information AAT-20 obtained from the military. Further, we are trying to identify the extent of the internal information, which pertained to military notifications, AAT-20 had obtained by the time it completed its chronologies.

During our review of documents from AAT-20 we discovered an electronic copy of ZOB's rough transcript for a conversation between ZOB and NEADS (Huntress) concerning UN93 that had a last save date of September 15, 2001 (Attachment 4). Further, we discovered an electronic copy of an apparently final version of the aforementioned transcript with a last save date of September 18, 2001 (Attachment 5). These transcripts contain the 10:07am conversation that ZOB had with NEADS (Huntress) wherein they notified the military that UN93 might have a bomb on board.

Further, we have located, within AAT-20's records, copies of "wave" files (computerized recordings) for ZBW's military operations position that cover the period of time 8:37am through 8:38am, 8:39am through 8:42am and 8:52am through 8:53am. These files contain a last saved date of September 19, 2001 (Attachment 6). We have been unable to locate any other military operations positions transcripts or recordings from ZBW. We would like to know if this is the extent of the information that ZBW provided to AAT-20 from its military operations positions and if so why. ZBW's military operations position appears to have had the most communications on September 11, 2001 with NEADS (Huntress).

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Index of Attachments

<u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Interview question outline for interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)c
2	Partial copy of <i>Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001</i> , dated September 17, 2001
3	Grid Timeline, dated September 18, 2001.
4	Rough draft transcript UAL93, dated September 15, 2001.
5	Partial Transcript, Aircraft Accident; UAL93, dated September 17, 2001.
6	Copy of directory listing depicting ZBW wave files.

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Attachment 1

GENERAL QUESTION OUTLINE

Work history, duty stations, titles, grades, etc...

What, if any timelines/chronologies did you participate in preparing or providing data for? What aspect of the timeline were you responsible for? (Please see item 1 attached to these questions, along with ROI attachments 2 and 3.)

Were you involved in any other timelines that you have not been shown?

What was the focus of those timelines? (e.g.; military notification, ground stop, etc)

When did you prepare the timeline(s)?

Who did you work with on this? What was the chain-of-command for the group?

Where did you obtain the data to support the information in the chronology?

When did you start obtaining data from the facilities? In what form? How was it sent to AAT-20?

What did you do to validate the data in the timeline? (Esp. any information from outside sources, such as the military.)

If not, why not?

Did you coordinate your findings with anyone internally or externally?

With whom and when?

Did you coordinate with the military in any way?

With whom and when?

What happened to your work product?

Who was it prepared for?

Who wanted the chronologies prepared?

Who was the timeline and/or data provided to?

For what purpose?

How was it presented?

Who decided what should or should not be included in the timelines? (We have learned that (b)(6), (b)(7)c and John David CANOLES played a significant role in deciding what to include or not to include.)

Why wasn't the 10:07/10:08 FAA notification to the military for UN93 included in the chronologies? (See item 3 attached to these questions.)

Why weren't any of the false reports of AA11 still being airborne after it had crashed included in the chronologies?

Did you participate in preparing any briefings for the White House? When, for whom, etc...?

MILITARY

Did you obtain any supporting data from the military for your timelines?

What data?
From whom?

If you did obtain information from the military, did you look at their source material? If not why not?

Did you coordinate any of your timelines or public statements with the military?

Were you ever provided with copies of any military logs?

Have you seen the "MCC Tech" NEADS/NORAD log? (Please see item 4 attached to these questions.)

Where did you get it?

Did you provide any data to the military?

What data?
To whom?

Were any requests for information from the military refused?

Why and by whom?

Did the military coordinate any of their timelines or public statements with you?

Which timelines/statements
Whom?
When

Please ask (b)(6), (b)(7) to explain the different between SATORI and RAPTOR radar playbacks. Are any voices recordings embedded within either system?

**General Question Outline
Attachment 1**

Chronology of September 11, 2001

American Airlines Flight 11	(AAL11)	Boston – Los Angeles
United Airlines Flight 175	(UAL175)	Boston – Los Angeles
United Airlines Flight 93	(UAL93)	Newark – San Francisco
American Airlines Flight 77	(AAL77)	Washington Dulles - Los Angeles

All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

0756:27 Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (Boston Tower) issued taxi instructions to AAL11.

0800:00 AAL11 began takeoff roll, runway 4 Right, Boston Logan International Airport. All communications with Boston Tower and with Boston Departure Control were routine and normal.

0804:55 Boston Tower issued taxi instruction to UAL175.

0809:17 AAL11 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Boston Center). "Boston Center, good morning, American Eleven with you passing through one-nine-zero (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet)."

0809:18 Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower (Newark Tower) issued taxi instructions to UAL93.

0809:22 Boston Center acknowledged AAL11. From this time until 0813:31 all communications appear routine and normal. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including AAL11. The flight was instructed to climb to twenty-eight thousand feet, subsequently to twenty-nine thousand feet, and issued a twenty degree turn for traffic.

0812:29 Dulles Airport Traffic Control Tower (Dulles Tower) issued taxi instructions to AAL77.

0813:47 Boston Center instructs AAL11 " American Eleven, now, climb and maintain flight level three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no acknowledgement to this transmission. Boston Center made two subsequent transmissions to AAL11, neither of which were acknowledged. Between 0813:47 and 0824:53, Boston Center made several radio transmissions attempting to contact AAL11. None of the attempts were acknowledged.

0814:00 UAL175 began takeoff roll, runway 9, Boston Logan International Airport. All communications with Boston Tower and with Boston Departure Control were routine and normal.

0814:45 Boston Center, during intra-facility coordination recognized that AAL11 appeared to be turning right but had not acknowledged the climb clearance to thirty-five thousand feet and did not acknowledge any further radio transmissions.

0817:59 A brief unknown sound (possibly a scream) from an unknown origin was heard over the Boston Center radio.

0820:00 AAL77 began takeoff roll, runway 30, Washington Dulles International Airport. All communications with Dulles Tower and with Dulles Departure Control were routine and normal.

0820:48 AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information was lost on Boston Center radar displays. The aircraft was then observed as a primary radar target only.

0823:01 UAL175 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Boston Center)). "Boston, morning, United one-seven-five out of one-nine (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet)."

0823:06 Boston Center acknowledged UAL175. At this point the controller was busy due to the events surrounding AAL11. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including UAL175. All communications between Boston Center and UAL175 appear routine and normal. The flight was subsequently instructed to climb to flight level 310 (thirty-one thousand feet) and after radar handoff, was issued a frequency change to contact the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (New York Center).

0824:38 A radio transmission partially unintelligible stated, "we have some planes just stay quiet and you'll be ok we are returning to the airport" from an unknown origin was heard over the Boston Center radio.

0824:57 A second radio transmission partially unintelligible stated "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet" – from an unknown origin was heard over the Boston Center radio.

0825:00 Boston Center began notification based on radio transmissions that a suspected hijack was in progress. The New England Regional Operations Center (ROC), the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), and the Boston Center facility manager were notified. Additionally, controllers began inter-facility coordination with New York Center of the possible hijacking. Coordination describes the last known altitude as twenty-nine thousand feet.

0825:49 AAL77 established radio contact with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (Washington Center), "Center, American seventy-seven with you passing one-three decimal zero (thirteen thousand feet) for one-seven-thousand (seventeen thousand feet)." All communications between Washington Center and AAL77 appear routine and normal. AAL77 was subsequently handed off to the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (Indy Center).

0826:00 AAL11 began southbound turn over Albany, New York. The last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.

0833:59 A third radio transmission partially unintelligible stated "nobody move please we are going back to the airport don't try to make any stupid moves" – from an unknown origin was heard over the Boston Center radio. AAL11 primary radar track was still southbound, and the last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.

0834:00 Boston Center contacted Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (located on OTIS Air Force Base) and requested they notify the Military of the events regarding AAL11.

0835:00 New England Regional Operations Center advised Washington Operations Center of the suspected hijack of AAL11.

0836:00 Washington Operations Center (WOC) notified Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, and conferenced New England Regional Operations Center and the Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center (ATCSCC).

0838:00 Boston Center notified New York Center of possible hijacking of AAL11.

0840:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning AAL11.

0840:14 AAL established radio contact with Indy Center. "Center, American seventy-seven with you, level three thirty (thirty-three thousand feet).

0840:16 Indy Center acknowledged, "American seventy-seven, Indy center, roger, squawk three-seven-four-three." (Squawk is a control instruction to change the transponder setting within the aircraft). AAL77 was subsequently instructed to climb to thirty-five thousand feet and later cleared to navigate direct to the Falmouth navigational aid. When Indy Center acknowledged AAL77, the sector was responsible for fourteen aircraft; additionally four aircraft were in handoff status to this sector.

0840:32 UAL175 established radio contact with New York Center. "United one-seventy-five at flight level three-one-zero."

0840:37 New York Center acknowledged UAL 175. "United one-seventy-five, New York Center, roger."

0841:00 Military Command (VACAPES) issued scramble order on AAL11.

0841:32 UAL175 transmitted to New York Center, "We figured we'd wait to go to your center, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed the mike (initiated radio communications) and said everyone stay in your seats."

0841:51 New York Center replied, "okay, I'll pass that along." (The controller ensured UAL175's comments were forwarded to the Operations Manager.)

0842:00 UAL93 began takeoff roll, runway 4 left, Newark New Jersey International Airport. All communications with Newark Tower, with New York Departure Control, and with New York Center were routine and normal.

0844:00 New York Center facility manager notified New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (New York TRACON) of possible hijacking of AAL11. New York TRACON began internal coordination of the aircraft's last known altitude (twenty-nine thousand feet) and southbound course.

0844:05 US Air Flight 83 transmitted to New York Center "I just picked up an ELT (emergency locator transmitter) on 121.5 (emergency VHF frequency). It was brief, but it went off."

0844:09 New York Center acknowledged US Air Flight 83.

0846:31 Primary radar tracking of AAL11 was lost.

0846:35 Impact at World Trade Center.

0846:48 UAL175's assigned transponder code of 1470 changed, first indicating 3020, then changing again to 3321. New York Center air traffic computers do not correlate either of these codes with UAL175. Consequently, UAL175 secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return. *Note: The controller communicating with UAL175 was also monitoring the flight track of AAL11. Based on coordination received from Boston Center indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention had been focused on AAL11.*

0850:00 Washington Operations Center activated a Tactical Net at the request of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence).

0850:00 Newark Tower advised New York TRACON of possible aircraft crash into the World Trade Center.

- 0850:51 AAL77 acknowledged the clearance to Falmouth. This was the last radio communication with this flight.
- 0851:43 New York Center transmits to UAL175, "UAL175, recycle transponder, squawk code one four seven zero." No response was received from UAL175. The controller makes several attempts, repeatedly trying to contact UAL175 for the next four minutes. During this time, the aircraft is also observed making a left turn and descending.
- 0853:24 New York Center controller coordinated internally, asking other controllers if they saw UAL175, or if they knew who the unidentified radar target is on transponder code 3321. None of the other controllers replied in the affirmative. *Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be UAL175.*
- 0854:43 AAL77 began a left turn towards the south without air traffic authorization. The altitude indicated thirty-five thousand feet. Shortly after the turn, the aircraft was observed descending.
- 0855:00 New York Center controller was busy trying to turn other aircraft away from the aircraft believed to be UAL175. The flight track of this aircraft had changed and was now headed southeast bound.
- 0855:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York Center.* A controller-in-charge (CIC) advised the Operations Manager (OM) that she believed UAL175 was also hijacked. The OM advised the CIC that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. The CIC began coordinating with the controllers working position and one of the controllers stated that UAL175 appeared to heading "right towards the city." The CIC returned to the OM position and heard a request for military aircraft to scramble. UAL175 was observed in a rapid descent
- 0855:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York Center.* A controller working a different position within New York Center reported that two aircraft , a Delta Airlines flight was given instructions to avoid an unknown aircraft. At about the same time a US Airways flight reported taking evasive action from an unknown aircraft. The controller reported that the unknown aircraft was now headed towards New York City. This controller, along with other controllers speculated that the unknown aircraft was an emergency and was heading for an airport to land.

- 0856:19 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information is lost on Indy Center radar displays. There was no longer any radar return information (either primary or secondary) on AAL77 indicated at the Indy Center radar displays. *Note: The initial review of radar data, and controller personnel statements conducted by Indy Center did not indicate any primary or secondary radar returns were displayed.*
- 0856:32 Indy Center controller attempted to contact AAL77, "American seventy-seven, Indy." There was no acknowledgement. Indy Center also tried to communicate with AAL77 through American Airlines company radios.
- 0858:14 Indy Center also made several attempts to contact AAL77 through American Airlines company dispatch.
- 0859:00 Indy Center controllers began coordinating with other controllers to protect the airspace and altitude of AAL77's filed route of flight.
- 0900:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York TRACON.* Controller stated "at approximately 9:00, I observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center."
- 0903:14 Second Impact at World Trade Center.
- 0905:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning UAL175.
- 0905:00 New York TRACON received notification from the Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower of a second aircraft striking the World Trade Center.
- 0909:00 Indy Center notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AAL77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.
- 0915:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from Indy Center.* The Indy Center Operations Manager requested that the Traffic Management personnel notify Air Force Search and Rescue of the missing and possibly downed aircraft. The Operations Manager also contacted the West Virginia State Police advising them of a possible downed aircraft and asks if they have any reports of a downed aircraft.

- 0920:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from Indy Center . The Indy Center Operations Manager contacted the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (Chicago Center) and advised the Chicago Center Operations Manager of his concern that AAL77 may have been hijacked and that he (Chicago Center Operations Manager) should be on the look out (based on events occurring in New York)..*
- 0924:00 Great Lakes Regional Operations Notified Washington Operations Center of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.
- 0924:30 UAL93 established radio contact with Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (Cleveland Center), "Good morning Cleveland, United ninety-three, three-five-oh (thirty-five thousand feet), intermittent light chop." The controller was busy, the sector was responsible for sixteen aircraft. Of these, several aircraft were being issued new routes based on the events occurring on the east coast. The controller did not reply to this initial transmission.
- 0925:00 *Between 0925:00 and 0930:00, this time is approximate based on personnel statements from Dulles Tower. Several Dulles Tower controllers working radar positions in the facility observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed. Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be AAL77.*
- 0925:14 UAL93 again reported on Cleveland Center frequency, "United ninety-three checking three-five-oh (thirty-five thousand feet)." The controller replied, "United ninety-three, Cleveland, roger." *Note: This was the third radar sector within Cleveland Center to communicate with UAL93. The communications with the previous sectors were routine and normal.*
- 0928:19 A radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the Cleveland Center radio.
- 0928:54 A second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, "get out of here, get out of here" from an unknown origin was heard over the Cleveland Center radio. At about this same time, the Cleveland Center controller observed that UAL93 had descended, altitude indicated thirty-four thousand, three hundred feet.
- 0929:29 Cleveland Center controller asked UAL93, "United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no reply. The Cleveland Center controller made several attempts to contact UAL93 without receiving any acknowledgement.

- 0929:50 Cleveland Center controller began moving other aircraft away from UAL93 due to the lack of acknowledgement of any radio transmissions. Several other aircraft on the frequency confirmed unusual sounds of an unknown origin. The altitude of UAL93 again indicated thirty-five thousand feet.
- 0931:57 A third radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, may sound like an individual out of breath, more unintelligible words and what sounds like "bomb on board" from an unknown origin was heard over the Cleveland Center radio.
- 0932:31 A fourth radio transmission stated "did you hear that transmission that reported a bomb on board?" from an unknown origin was heard over the Cleveland Center radio.
- 0933:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from Dulles Tower.* An Operations Supervisor at Dulles Tower advised the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House, fast moving. Meanwhile, a controller was providing the same information to controllers working at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower (National Tower). The Dulles Tower Operations Supervisor also provided continuous updates on a critical event teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters building.
- 0933:00 *This time is approximate based on personnel statements from National Tower.* An Operations Supervisor at National Tower was advised by Dulles Tower of the unknown aircraft. The Operations Supervisor at National Tower immediately notified the White House Office of the United States Secret Service of the unknown aircraft's location and provided continuous updates.
- 0934:50 Cleveland Center controller observed that UAL93 was climbing without an air traffic control authorization. The aircraft had started a turn to the southeast, also without air traffic control authorization.
- 0936:00 Personnel at National Tower issued traffic advisories on the unknown aircraft to a military C130 aircraft that had departed Andrews Air Force Base. When the C130 aircraft (GOFER06) reported the unidentified aircraft in sight, the pilot was instructed to follow the unknown aircraft.
- 0938:00 GOFER06 reported that the unknown aircraft had crashed into the western side of the Pentagon.
- 0938:47 UAL93 altitude indicated forty-thousand seven hundred feet.
- 0939:12 A fifth radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, stated words that may sound like "captain, ...bomb on board, ...our demands, ...remain quiet" – from an unknown origin was heard over the Cleveland Center radio.

- 0939:59 Cleveland Center notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center of the screams and statements from unknown origin believed to be UAL93.
- 0941:00 UAL93 secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information becomes intermittent and eventually failed on Cleveland Center radar displays.
- 0944:31 Cleveland Center controller notified Pittsburgh Terminal Radar Approach Control (Pittsburgh Tower) North Arrival controller of the unanticipated turn, the loss of secondary radar return and lack of radio communications with UAL93. The Cleveland Center controller also stated that the projected flight path would result in UAL93 passing in close proximity if not directly overhead the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.
- 0945:00 PIT controller notified the Operations Supervisor of the events surrounding UAL93. The Pittsburgh Tower controller also manually initiated radar tracking of the primary radar target.
- 0951:00 After determination by the Pittsburgh Tower facility manager to evacuate, the controllers have completed coordination with adjacent facilities and the Pittsburgh Tower facility has been evacuated.
- 0956:56 A small contingency of controllers (volunteers) returned to the facility and coordination with adjacent facilities pertaining to return to operational status is completed. The track of UAL93 was no longer visible on the Pittsburgh Tower radar displays.
- 1000:00 *This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from Cleveland Center. A Cleveland Center controller's statement indicated that the pilot of a VFR aircraft reported sighting a United Airlines aircraft at approximately eight thousand feet in the vicinity of the Latrobe, Pennsylvania airport. The pilot also reported that the United Airlines aircraft's landing gear was down, the wings were rocking, and that the aircraft appeared to be in distress.*
- 1004:00 *This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from Cleveland Center. A Cleveland Center controller statement indicated that UAL93's primary radar target terminated in the vicinity of Somerset, Pennsylvania.*
- 1007:00 In response to a request from a Cleveland Center controller, N20VF, a Falcon Jet reported observing puffs of smoke in the vicinity of UAL93's last known position.

1041:00

After receiving a telephone call from the Somerset, Pennsylvania police department stating that several "911" telephone calls had been received reporting an aircraft accident, a Cleveland Center operations manager made official notification to, Great Lakes Regional Operations Center. *Note: Although this is the officially documented notification time, FAA officials were aware of the accident as these events were reported as they occurred on a critical event teleconference established at the Federal Aviation Administration headquarters building.*

AAT-20
September 18, 2001
7:30 AM

**General Question Outline
Attachment 2**

DRAFT

	AAL11	UAL175	AAL77	UAL93
First Critical Sign	08:20 ¹	08:46 ²	08:56 ³	09:28 ⁴
NORAD** NEADS*** Notification	08:40*	09:05*	09:24*	09:16*
Crash time	08:46	09:03	09:38	10:04
All times are Eastern Daylight Time				

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.
2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.
3. AAL77 secondary radar return (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.
4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds: possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and "get out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C for UAL93 has descended 700 feet from assigned altitude

*These times are derived from the review of the NEADS log.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

***Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

	AAL11	UAL175	AAL77	UAL93
First Critical Sign	08:20 ¹	08:46 ²	08:56 ³	09:28 ⁴
Probable time flight was known to be in distress <i>Cape Fear</i>	08:25 ⁵ 8:34	08:52 ⁶	08:56 ⁷	09:32 ⁸
NORAD** NEADS*** Notification	08:40*	09:05*	<i>NTFYR 0855 Use known</i> 09:24*	09:16*
Crash time	08:46	09:03	09:38	10:04
All times are Eastern Daylight Time				

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.
2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.
3. AAL77 secondary radar return (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.
4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds: possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and "get out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C for UAL93 has descended 700 feet from assigned altitude
5. A radio transmission is heard telling passengers "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet."
6. UAL175 has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.
7. Aircraft is presumed crashed over Pennsylvania.
8. UAL93 is unresponsive to multiple calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three transmissions indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft.

*These times are derived from the review of the NEADS log.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

***Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

	AAL11	UAL175	AAL77	UAL93
First Sign	08:20 ¹	08:46 ²	08:56 ³	09:28 ⁴
Probable time flight was known to be in distress	08:25 ⁵	08:52 ⁶	08:56 ⁷	09:32 ⁸
NORAD** NEADS*** Notification	08:38*	09:05*	09:24*	10:08*
Estimated Crash time	08:46	09:03	09:38	10:04
All times are Eastern Daylight Time				

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.
2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.
3. AAL77 secondary radar return (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.
4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds: possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and "get out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C for UAL93 has descended 700 feet from assigned altitude
5. A radio transmission is heard telling passengers "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet."
6. UAL175 has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.
7. Aircraft is presumed crashed over Pennsylvania.
8. UAL93 is unresponsive to multiple calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three transmissions indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft.

*These times are derived from the review of the NEADS log.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

***Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

	AAL11	UAL175	AAL77	UAL93
First Sign	08:20 ¹	08:46 ²	08:56 ³	09:28 ⁴
Probable time flight was known to be in distress	08:25 ⁵	08:52 ⁶	08:56 ⁷	09:32 ⁸
NORAD** NEADS*** Notification	08:38* 08:40	09:05*	09:24*	10:08* N/A
Estimated Crash time	08:46	09:03	09:38	10:04
All times are Eastern Daylight Time				

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.
2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.
3. AAL77 secondary radar return (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.
4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds: possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and "get out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C for UAL93 has descended 700 feet from assigned altitude
5. A radio transmission is heard telling passengers "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet."
6. UAL175 has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.
7. Aircraft is presumed crashed over Pennsylvania.
8. UAL93 is unresponsive to multiple calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three transmissions indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft.

*These times are derived from the review of the NEADS log.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

***Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

**General Question Outline
Attachment 3**

Notifications to Military

- 8:26am ATSCC informally notifies military representative there about AAL 11.
- 8:34am Boston Center asks Cape TRACON to notify Otis Air Force Base about AAL 11.
Cape TRACON notifies Otis Air Force Base.
Otis says needs authorization from North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS)
- 8:38am Traffic Management Specialist at Boston Center calls NEADS and Airspace Procedures Specialist at Boston Center calls NORAD. New York Center notification record indicates they notified the military regarding AAL 11.
- 8:40am NEADS logs indicate Boston Center notified them regarding AAL 11.
- 8:43am New York Center asks the military liaison specialist at NY Center to get military assistance. (We believe this is still related to AAL 11 but it may be the source of NORAD press release showing 8:43 am notification regarding UAL 175. NY Center was working UAL 175 at that time but everything was still normal.)
- 8:49-9:05am NY Center military liaison specialist contacts Huntress (military facility).
- 9:05am The NEADS logs show FAA notifying them regarding UAL 175.

(Note: This may be the call from the military liaison specialist at NY Center).
- 9:15am FAA Security Intelligence office contacts FBI, CIA, S-60, and state regarding AAL 11.
- 9:16-9:25am NOIWON (CIA network) convened by CIA. NOIWON normally includes the military.
- 9:20am Washington Ops. Center activates the primary net, which includes NMCC and Secret Service.
- 9:24am NEADS logs show FAA notifying them regarding AAL 77.
- 9:26am FAA net logs show discussion of two airplanes hitting WTC (both possibly AAL flights – one out of Boston; 1 out of Dulles). (Note: This may be the source of 9:24 NEADS entry). NMCC and Secret Service on the net.

AAII
Reading Station

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASS
~~REL CAN~~

SGT Bianchi

1332 call from
2DC (Shelly Watson)
IDOP CH 4.

SGT. PERRY

1325	u	H. JACK AA EST HEAD TO WASH DC. - Bianchi
1326	u	LFI SCRAMBLE ON PA FT @ 1324Z
1327	u	BOSTON FAP SAYS ANOTHER AP IS MISSING ✓
1334	u	AMERICAN 77 FLT TO LA LOST - unable to locate
1335	u	LFI AIRBORNE @ TT
1341	u	DELTA 89 POSSIBLE HIJACK BOS/4845
1345	u	BOB9 FORWARD TOLD
1347	u	DELTA 89 will Land in Cleveland (possible)
1351	u	103 ACS HAS RADAR @ TT for support if needed
1407	u	Bomb on ground VAL 93 over Pittsburgh 1527 M-3 3951N 07846W
1415	u	VAL 93 DOWN NORTH of CAMP DAVID (BOMB)
1421	u	B47E E-3 BOMBARDIER SENTRY 40 SD33 MISS-7777
1427	u	AF-1 IS A/B... 4 F-15's LFI GUINS IN ^{TO BE UNAT A/B} (AF) out of FLA 3771 MID (3) AFI
1430	u	B47E E-3 DIVERTED TO WASHINGTON DC
1433	u	1st FW on standby 574-5411 (EP) FOR 4 F-15's GUINS ONLY NEED DO/CL of HEADS TO CALL ACC TO RELEASE them to UNAD
1439	u	B475 ON STATION NEEDS TANKER by 1830Z
[REDACTED]		
DIRECTS ALL NYANG UNITS TO FORCE REITION under change		
1500	u	CLEVELAND CONTROL IS EVACUATING
[REDACTED]		
By CINC. NLRAD// AST. Computer SD		
1520	u	SD Computer for Defense CL-2
1530	u	Suspicious ship off ACY under observation
[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]		
1551	u	Schemately - Stewart - Synapse SKICA 01 0130 REQUESTS Permission to Fly this route DSN 484-4300.
[REDACTED]		
1558	u	ATTORNEY General Landis Safety @ DC, 8545
1611	u	Confidential British Canada 65 calling in with Distress call.
[REDACTED]		

~~SECRET~~
REL CAN UNCLASS

1936	u	ALPHA FLT SWINGS ON DUTY
		CC: CULMAN
		DO: LFL MCKENNA
		DOC: LTC SANDMAN
1944	u	FMH started 1940Z for 2 hrs
2400	u	Log Book closed for old zulu day 11 SEPT 01
0000	u	Log Book opened for new zulu day
0018	u	LFI lightning watch extended to 0300Z
0341	u	LFI LGT WATCH EXTENDED TO 0500Z
0355	u	LFI ADVISORY FOR T/S WITH 10 MIN
0830	u	Comsec inventory complete <i>J.F. Oates</i>
0832	u	Alpha flight swings off duty <i>Mack</i>
0832	u	Charlie flight ends on duty <i>J.F. Oates</i>
		CC: Col Moore
		DO: LTC Anderson
		DOC: LTC MCKENNA
		MCC: Capt Number
		MCC: Tech Oates
0848	u	OIF INVENTORY COMPLETE // Sandra <i>120511</i>
0410	u	LFI LIGHTENING WATCH CANX
1121	u	Comsec inventory complete for SMC <i>J.F. Oates</i>
		Alpha flt day on duty for SMC
		Charlie flt ends off duty <i>J.F. Oates</i>
		CC: Col Moore
		DO: LTC MCKENNA
		DOC: LTC SANDMAN
1201	u	LFI WX ADVISORY (FROM LFI CP) SFC WINDS > 25-434 KTS PEAK 30 KTS 1230Z-1400Z
1214	u	OIF inventory completed by <i>Staff</i>
1240	u	Possible Hijack AA 11 FLT
1246	u	FMH SCRIBBLED @ TT ON AA 11
1252	u	FMH M/B @ TT ON AA 11
1257	u	Boston FAA says Hijack A/C CRASHED INTO WORLD TRADE CENTER
1305	u	United 175 possible Hijack BOS-LAX
1307	u	UAL 175 ID as 767
1309	u	LFI ON G/S @ TT FOR HIJACK THREAT
1311	u	Both Hijacks UAL 175 AND AA 11 Hit WORLD TRADE CENTER
1316	u	United tail #N6124A 25 SOB
1324	u	American Airlines #N334AA Hijacked

UA 175!
NOT 93

AA 11!
NOT AA 77

scorpius call right before this

UNCLASSIFIED

Attachment 2




Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events

September 11, 2001



Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration


September 11, 2001





Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

September 11, 2001



0820:48
Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information was lost on ZBW radar displays. The aircraft was now observed as a primary radar target only.

0813:47
ZBW instructed AAL11 "American Eleven, now, climb and maintain flight level three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no acknowledgement to this transmission and one minute later AAL11 appeared to be turning to the right.

0809:17
AAL11 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW). "Boston Center, good morning, American Eleven with you passing through three-nine-zero (nineteen thousand feet) on two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet)." [Redacted]

0826:00
AAL11 began southward turn over Albany, New York. The last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.

0846:35
Impact at the World Trade Center.

0846:31
Primary radar tracking of AAL11 was lost.

AAL11

- 0824:57 A second radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet” – from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio.
- 0825:00 ZBW began notification based on radio transmissions that a suspected hijack was in progress. The New England Regional Operations Center (ROC), the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), and the ZBW facility manager were notified. Additionally, controllers began inter-facility coordination with New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of the possible hijacking. Coordination describes the last known altitude as twenty-nine thousand feet.
- 0826:00 AAL11 began southbound turn over Albany, New York. The last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.**
- 0833:59 A third radio transmission partially unintelligible stated “nobody move please we are going back to the airport don’t try to make any stupid moves” – from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio. AAL11 primary radar track was still southbound, and the last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.
- 0834:00 ZBW contacted Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (located on OTIS Air Force Base) and requested they notify the Military of the events regarding AAL11.
- 0835:00 New England Regional Operations Center advised Washington Operations Center (WOC) of the suspected hijack of AAL11.
- 0836:00 WOC notified Civil Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI), and conferenced New England Regional Operations Center and the Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center (ATCSCC).
- 0838:00 ZBW notified New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of possible hijacking of AAL11.
- 0840:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning AAL11.
- 0841:00 Military Command (VACAPES) issued scramble order on AAL11.
- 0844:00 ZNY facility manager notified New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (N90) of possible hijacking of AAL11. N90 began internal coordination of the aircraft’s last known altitude (twenty-nine thousand feet) and southbound course.
- 0846:31 Primary radar tracking of AAL11 was lost.**
- 0846:35 Impact at World Trade Center.**



Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

September 11, 2001


0851:43
ZNY transmitted to UAL175, "UAL175, recycle transponder, squawk code one four seven zero." No response was received from UAL175. The controller made several attempts, repeatedly trying to contact UAL175 for the next four minutes. During this time, the aircraft was also observed making a left turn and descending.

0846:48
UAL175's assigned transponder code of 1470 changed, first indicating 3020, then changing again to 3321. ZNY air traffic controllers do not correlate either of these codes with UAL175. Consequently, the secondary radar (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return. Note: The controller communicating with UAL175 was also monitoring the flight track of AAL11. Based on coordinates received from ZSRW indicating a possible impact, most of the controller's attention was focused on AAL11.

0823:01
UAL175 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZSRW). "Boston, morning, United one seven five out of one nine (nineteen thousand feet) for two three zero (twentythree thousand feet)."

0853:24
ZNY controller coordinated internally, asking other controllers if they saw UAL175, or if they knew who the unidentified radar target is on transponder code 3321. None of the other controllers replied in the affirmative. Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be UAL175.


United Airlines Flight 175, 4267
Boston - Los Angeles
Departed Boston 0811 A.M. EDT
World Trade Center 9-11 A.M. EDT



0900:00
This time is approximately based on passenger statements from New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRAC). TRAC controller stated at approximately 0900, observed an unknown aircraft south of the New York City-Teterboro Airport, northeast bound and descending out to twenty thousand five hundred feet at a speed rate of descent, the radar target indicated at the World Trade Center.




September 11, 2001





September 11, 2001



0854:43 **PIT**
 AAL77 Began a left turn towards the south without air traffic authorization. The altitude indicated thirty-five thousand feet. Shortly after the turn, the aircraft was observed responding.

0826:49
 AAL77 established radio contact with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC), "Center American seventy-seven with you passing one-three decimal zero (thirteen thousand feet) for one-seven-thousand (seventeen thousand feet)."
 All communications between ZDC and AAL77 appear routine and normal. AAL77 was subsequently handed off to the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (IAD).

0856:19
 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information was lost on ZDC radar displays. There was no longer any radar return information (either primary or secondary) on AAL77 indicated at the ZID radar displays. *Note: The initial review of radar data, and controller personnel statements conducted by ZID did not indicate any primary or secondary radar returns were displayed.*

0925:00
 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00, this time is based on personnel statements from Dufles Terminal Radar Approach Control (IAD). Several IAD controllers working radar positions in the facility observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed. *Note: The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be AAL77.*

0938:00
 ATIS reported that the unknown aircraft had crashed into the western side of the Pentagon.



Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

September 11, 2001

0828:29

ZOB controller asked UAL93, "United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet). There was no reply. The ZOB controller made several attempts to contact UAL93 without receiving any acknowledgment."

0828:50

ZOB controller began moving other aircraft away from UAL93 due to lack of acknowledgment of any radio transmissions. Several other aircraft on the frequency confirmed unusual sounds of an unknown origin. The altitude of UAL93 again indicated thirty-five thousand feet.

0846:48


UAL175's assigned transponder code of 1478 changed, first indicating 3028, then changing again to 3321. ZNY air traffic computers do not correlate either of these codes with UAL175. Consequently, the secondary radar (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and height information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return. Note: The controller communicating with UAL175 was 3150. The controller received from ZNY radio only a possible error because most of the controller's attention was on UAL175.

0813:47

ZBW instructed AAL11 "American Eleven, now, climb and maintain flight level three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no acknowledgment to this transmission and one minute later AAL11 appears to be turning to the right.

0854:43

AAL77 began a left turn towards the south without air traffic authorization. The altitude indicated thirty-five thousand feet. Shortly after the turn, the aircraft was observed descending.



Attachment 3

NOTIFICATION CHRONOLOGY

AAL 11

- 0824:57 Probable time flight was known to be in distress. (A partly unintelligible radio transmission from an unknown origin is heard telling passengers: "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet." This is the second suspicious radio transmission from an unknown origin after the secondary radar return (transponder) for AAL 11 has been lost).
- 0825:00 Boston Center begins notifications within FAA that a suspected hijack is in progress. New England Regional Operations Center is notified.
- 0826:00 AAL 11 begins southbound turn.
- 0833:59 Another suspicious radio transmission is heard.
- 0834:00 Boston Center asks Cape TRACON to notify the military at Otis Air Force Base, (where Cape TRACON is located.) Cape TRACON notifies the military and is advised that authorization to scramble must come from the North East Air Defense Sector.
- 0838:00 North East Air Defense Sector logs indicate that Boston Center notified them regarding AAL 11.
- 0840:00 Military Command (VA Capes) issues scramble order on AAL 11.
- 0845:05 Impact at World Trade Center.

UAL 175

- 0851:43 Probable time flight was known to be in distress. (UAL has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.
- 0855:00 New York Center controller is busy trying to turn other aircraft away from the aircraft believed to be UAL 175.
- 0905:00 North East Air Defense Sector logs show Boston Center notifying the military.
- 0905:00 Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower notifies New York TRACON of a second aircraft striking the World Trade Center. (Impact believed to have occurred at 0903:14).

AAAL 77

- 0856:19 Probable time flight was known to be in distress. (Loss of radar return information after aircraft turned south without air traffic authorization).
- 0856:32- Indianapolis Center makes several attempts to contact AAL 77 without
0858:14 receiving any acknowledgement. Indianapolis Center also tries to communicate with AAL 77 through American Airlines company dispatch.
- 0859:00 Indianapolis Center controllers coordinate with other controllers to protect the airspace and altitude of AAL 77's filed route of flight.
- 0909:00 Indianapolis Center notifies Great Lakes Regional Operations Center of possible aircraft accident. AAL 77 is presumed to have crashed due to simultaneous loss of radio communication and radar identification.
- 0924:00 North East Air Defense Sector logs show FAA notifying the military.
- 0925:00 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00 (time is approximate based on personnel statements) – Several controllers at Dulles TRACON observe a primary radar target (unidentified but later confirmed to be AAL 77).
- 0933:00 (Time is approximate based on personnel statements) – Dulles TRACON advises White House Office of the U.S. Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House. Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower also notifies Secret Service.
- 0936:00 Washington National Tower issues traffic advisories on the unknown aircraft to a military C130 aircraft that had departed Andrews Air Force Base.
- 0938:00 The C130 military aircraft reports that AAL 77 crashed into the Pentagon.

UAL 93

- 0931:00 Probable time flight was known to be in distress. (UAL 93 is unresponsive to calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three mostly unintelligible transmissions from an unknown origin indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft).
- 0916:00 North East Air Defense Sector logs show FAA notifying the military. (Note: We believe this time to be inaccurate since it precedes the indications that UAL 93 was in distress).
- 0939:59 Cleveland Center notifies Great Lakes Regional Operations Center.
- 0944:31 Cleveland Center notifies Pittsburgh TRACON of unauthorized turn by UAL 93 towards Pittsburgh, loss of transponder, and lack of radio communications.
- 1004:00 (This time is approximate). UAL 93 crashes in the vicinity of Somerset, Pennsylvania.

Attachment 4

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT UAL93

CONVERSATION BETWEEN ZOB AND HUNTRESS MILITARY

1403:40 LINE ACTIVATED (RING LINE)
04:12 (HUNT) I NEED A NUMBER FOR THE CHICAGO SECTOR OR
SOMEONE DEALING WITH CHICAGO
:25 (ZOB) OK HOLD ON A QUICK SECOND
:35 (ZOB) OK YOU NEED A NUMBER FOR CHICAGO?
:45 (HUNT) OK THEY JUST GAVE IT TO US I'M SORRY
1406:38 LINE ACTIVATED
:48 LINE RINGING
:53 (HUNT) I BELIEVE I WAS THE ONE TALKING ABOUT
DAL1989
:58 (ZOB) FORGET ABOUT THAT..WE GOT A UAL93 ARE YOU
AWARE OF THAT? THAT HAS A BOMB ON BOARD
1407:05 (HUNT) A BOMB?
:30 (ZOB) DID YOU SCRAMBLE YET?
:35 (HUNT) YES , SELFRIDGE AND TOLEDO
:43 (ZOB) DID YOU REALLY?
:52 (HUNT) CAN YOU GIVE US THE LAT/LONG ?
:58 (ZOB) WESTMORELAND
1408:08 (HUNT) DO YOU HAVE THE LAT/LONG?
:21 (ZOB) I DON'T HAVE THEM RIGHT NOW
:27 (HUNT) DO YOU KNOW WHERE HE'S GOING TO OR COMING
FROM?
:32 (ZOB) ALL I KNOW IS UAL93 HAS A CONFIRMED BOMB ON
BOARD
1409:01 (HUNT) WAS THAT CONFIRMED BY THE PILOT?
:08 (ZOB) IT WAS CONFIRMED ON THE FREQUENCY
:19 (HUNT) DO YOU HAVE HIS MODE 3 OR LAST KNOWN MODE
THREE?
:39 (ZOB) HIS LAST MODE3 WAS ONE FIVE TWO SEVEN
(1527) AND I HAVE THE LAT LONGS..THREE NINER FIVE ONE
NORTH..ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX WEST..CAN YOU SCRAMBLE ON
IT?
1410:16 (HUNT) WE ARE WORKING IT AND WE WILL ..WHAT
CENTER IS THIS?
:38 (ZOB) CLEVELAND
:44 (HUNT) OK WE HAVE FOUR, TWO SELFREDGE AND TWO
TOLEDO, LET ME SEE WHERE THEY ARE HEADED, THEY ARE PROBABLY
GOING TO GO TOWARDS THE UAL93. I WILL CALL YOU BACK WITH
ANYTHING I HAVE
1411:30 (ZOB) OK
1413:32 (ZOB) HEY JOHNSTOWN TOWER YOU HAVE A NOVEMBER TWO
ZERO VICTOR FOXTROT INBOUND, I NEED HIM TO CALL THE OMIC @
440-774-0426

1413:40 (JST TOWER) OK
1422:12 (HUNT) HUNTRESS MILITARY
:15 (ZOB) ZOB MILITARY
:18 STAND BY SIR, GO AHEAD
:28 (ZOB) REFERENCE UNITED NINTY THREE
:35 (HUNT) YES UAL93 WE GOT CONFIRMATION THE AIRCRAFT
WENT DOWN NORTH EAST OF CAMP DAVID.. LAST KNOWN POSITION
WAS THREE NINER FIVE ONE NORTH BY ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX
WEST.. EXACTLY WHERE HE WENT DOWN
1423:14 (ZOB) OK THANK YOU
1426:22 (ZOB) STING ONE ONE AT TOLEDO ARE TNOSE THE ONES
YOU SCRAMBLED
:34 (HUNT) THEY ARE GOING UP ON THREE TWO EIGHT POINT
ZERO

SUBSEQUENT CONTACT INVOLVED FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE
FIGHTERS AND SOLICITATION OF ASSISTANCE TO INVESTIGATE MODE
C INTRUDERS AFTER THE ORDER TO LAND ALL AIRCRAFT. TWO
INTRUDERS WERE INVOLVED. ONE WAS FORCED TO LAND AND THE
SECOND HAD LANDED PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL.

Type a question for help

80%

Title Courier New 12

1 2 3 4 5

200 Huntress, via Amperities

CONVERS
 9
 1403:40
 ..04:12
 SOMEONE
:25
:35
:45
 1406:38
:48
:53
 DAL1989
:58
 AWARE-01
 1407:05
:30
:35
:43
:52
:58
 1408:08
:21
:27
 FROM? 9
:32
 BOARD 9
 1409:01
:08
:19
:39
 (1527)
 NORTH

Pages:	2
Paragraphs:	40
Lines:	69
Words:	438
Characters:	1967
Characters (with spaces):	2523

R-OR-
 YOU-
 MING-
 DND-ON-

(ZOB) IT WAS CONFIRMED ON THE FREQUENCY
 (MWT) DO YOU HAVE HIS MODE 3 OR LAST KNOWN MODE
 THREE?
 (ZOB) HIS LAST MODE3 WAS ONE FIVE TWO SEVEN
 (1527) AND I HAVE THE LAT LONGS THREE NINE FIVE ONE
 NORTH ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX WEST CAN YOU SCRAMBLE ON

Type a question for help

80%

Title Courier New 12

1 2 3 4 5

ZOB (address) doc Properties

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT LIAISON

ZOB

AGL, FAA, DOT

CONVERS
 1
 1403:40
 ..04:12
 SOMEONE
:25
:35
:43
 1406:38
:48
:53
 DAL1989
:58
 AWARE OF
 1407:05
:30
:35
:43
:52
:58
 1408:08
:21
:27
 FROM? 1
:32
 BOARD? 1
 1409:01
:08
:19
:32
 (1527)
 NORTH, ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX WEST. CAN YOU SCRAMBLE ON.

OR

YOU

HE

ON

..08 (ZOB) IT WAS CONFIRMED ON THE FREQUENCY
:19 (MIET) DO YOU HAVE HIS MODE 3 OR LAST KNOWN MODE
 THREE? 1
:32 (ZOB) HIS LAST MODE3 WAS ONE FIVE TWO SEVEN
 (1527) AND I HAVE THE LAT LONGS THREE NINE FIVE ONE
 NORTH, ZERO SEVEN EIGHT FOUR SIX WEST. CAN YOU SCRAMBLE ON.

Attachment 5



U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

Memorandum

Cleveland ARTCC
326 East Lorain Street
Oberlin, Ohio 44074

Subject: INFORMATION: Partial Transcript;
Aircraft Accident; N591UA(UAL93); Somerset, PA
September 11, 2001

Date: September 17, 2001

From: Cleveland ARTCC

To: Aircraft Accident File ZOB-ARTCC-287

This transcription covers the Cleveland ARTCC, Military Operations Specialist position for the time period from September 11, 2001, 1401 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1440 UTC.

Agencies Making Transmissions

Abbreviations

Cleveland ARTCC, Military Operations Specialist
Huntress

MOS
HUN

I hereby certify that the following is a true transcription of the recorded conversation pertaining to the subject aircraft accident involving N591UA(UAL93):

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Operations Support Spec.
Cleveland ARTCC

1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406

1406:52 HUN huntress (unintelligible) go ahead

1406:55 MOS i believe i was the one talking about that delta nineteen eighty nine

1406:57 HUN go ahead

1406:58 MOS ok well ah disregard that um did you

1407:04 MOS what we found out was that he was not a confirmed hijack however

1407:07 MOS ok i i don't even wanna wouldn't even worry about that right now ah we've got a united ninety three out here are you aware of that

1407:10 HUN united ninety three

1407:13 MOS that has a bomb on board

1407:18 HUN a bomb on board

1407:20 HUN and this is confirmed do you have a mode c sir

1407:25 MOS no we lost his transponder um what we want to know is did you scramble airplanes for that delta eight nineteen eighty nine

1407:32 HUN yeah we did out of selfridge and toledo sir

1407:34 MOS did you did you are they in the air

1407:36 HUN yes they are

1407:37 MOS is there any way we can get them to where this united is

1407:41 HUN ok what i'm going to have you do uh can you give me a lat long on that aircraft

1407:47 MOS what was the last position of that united

1407:50 MOS westmoreland

1407:54 HUN whereabouts is he located sir

1407:56 MOS which is lima bravo echo

1407:59 HUN what is lima bravo echo sir

1408:01 MOS westmoreland

1408:03 HUN westmoreland is lima bravo echo right

1408:06 MOS yeah thats westmoreland airport yeah thats in the pittsburgh area

1408:10 HUN pittsburgh area

1408:11 MOS yes

1408:13 HUN do you have a lat long

1408:15 HUN we have no point for l b e sir do you have a lat long

1408:20 MOS uh no i don't got that available right now

1408:23 HUN do you know where he was going or coming from

1408:26 MOS he was uh ok all i know

1408:36 HUN whatever you have sir go ahead

1408:38 MOS all i know is united ninety three he's got a confirmed bomb on board is what and right now his last known position was in the westmoreland area

1408:51 HUN in pittsburgh pennsylvania

1408:53 MOS which is ah pittsburgh its in the pittsburgh pennsylvania area

1408:56 HUN alright sir no other information is this confirmation via talking to the pilot

1409:03 MOS how did we uh confirm thata the uniteds got the bomb on board

1409:06 MOS i heard it on the frequency

1409:08 MOS ok we heard it on the frequency yes

1409:10 MOS it came across on the frequency

1409:11 HUN which frequency sir

1409:12 MOS thats their confirmation of the bomb

14009:13 HUN which frequency

1409:14 MOS ok i've got two people talking

1409:18 MOS hello

1409:20 HUN hi they're just checking do you have a mode three squawk or anything or last known mode three squawk

1409:25 MOS his last known mode three hold on

1409:38 MOS his last known mode three was fifteen twenty seven

1409:43 HUN copy one five two seven

1409:45 MOS yeah but wait we've got lat longs if you need them

1409:47 HUN yes we have lat longs please lat long

1409:50 MOS three nine five one north zero seven eight four six west

1410:01 HUN ok three nine five one north zero seven eight four six west

1410:04 MOS yes

1410:06 Hun do you have any conformation of any hijackers on board at all

1410:09 MOS all we know is that we heard him say he's got a bomb on board

1410:12 HUN thank you sir alright

1410:14 HUN ok (get those) aircraft scramble towards him

1410:17 Hun sir we're working that right now we have probably six aircraft so far

1410:20 MOS ok

1410:21 HUN but we are working it and we will

1410:22 MOS ok alright can you get back with me

1410:24 HUN sir which center is this which center is this

1410:26 MOS this is cleveland center

1410:28 HUN let me just check stand by one

1410:34 HUN checking with (weapons) sir stand by

1410:36 MOS thank you

1410:51 HUN sir we've got four aircraft two out of selfridge two out of toledo let me see where they're heading currently at this position stand by

1410:58 MOS ok

1411:01 HUN ok currently they were following delta one nine eight nine they're probably going to go ahead and commit towards the bomb aircraft is what i'm being passed they're working on it sir

1411:10 MOS ok

1411:12 HUN they're working on the commitment of united ninety three

1411:16 MOS ok

1411:18 HUN the bomb on board

1411:19 MOS ok

1411:20 HUN i'll call you back with anything that i have

1411:21 MOS alright thank you

1411:22 HUN Thanks
End of Transcript

ZOB-ARTCC-287
NS91UA



- U.S. Department of Transportation
- Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Cleveland ARTCC
326 East Lorain Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44074

Subject: [Redacted] Pa
→ Aircraft Accident; N
→ September 11, 2001

September 17, 2001

From: Cleveland ARTCC

To: Aircraft Accident File

→ This transcription covers
period from [Redacted]

- Agencies Making
- Cleveland ARTCC
- Huntress

Pages:	7
Paragraphs:	265
Lines:	462
Words:	917
Characters:	4273
Characters (with spaces):	5340

position for the time

ions - Section Break (Continuous)


Attachment 6

UTC times of wave files for ZBW MOS Position.
The missing gaps of time are dead space on the
rerecording.


zbwmos1 1237:50
1238:15

zbwmos2 1239:00
1242:15

zbwmos3 1252:00
1253:05



UTC-tr
The mi
rerecor
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on the

(b)(6), (b)(7)

FAA

Volume in drive F has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 17EA-3758

Directory of F:\gould_hdd\9-11-01\AAL11\aal11 Wave

```
11/09/2004 03:03p      <DIR>          .
11/09/2004 03:03p      <DIR>          ..
09/14/2001 01:06p      18,766,930 A90 ID AAL11 AND UAL175.wav
09/14/2001 01:06p      6,273,634 A90 SL AAL11 AND UAL175.wav
10/19/2001 01:30p      13,240 AAL11 Badguy 1 .pk
09/15/2001 11:45a      842,988 AAL11 Badguy 1 .wav
09/13/2001 12:18p      7,561,336 Aal11 badguy 2.wav
10/19/2001 01:30p      269,416 AAL11 badguy.pk
09/11/2001 04:17p      17,237,810 AAL11 badguy.wav
09/15/2001 11:55a      1,691,888 aal11-1.wav
09/18/2001 12:35p      331,702 aal11-1a.wav
09/18/2001 11:33a      669,324 aal11-2.wav
09/15/2001 11:38a      766,144 aal11-3.wav
09/18/2001 11:35a      782,642 aal11-3b.wav
09/18/2001 11:55a      605,082 aal11-4.wav
09/12/2001 09:21a      125,174,810 AAL11-A.WAV
09/12/2001 09:41a      26,608,666 AAL11-B.WAV
09/13/2001 12:18p      128,548,984 AAL11-C.WAV
09/11/2001 01:37p      590,018 aal11.wav
09/14/2001 01:06p      7,518,610 BOS CD AAL11 and UAL175.wav
09/14/2001 01:06p      62,319,762 BOS GC AAL11 AND UAL175.wav
09/14/2001 01:07p      15,607,324 BOS LCE AAL11 AND UAL175.wav
09/14/2001 01:07p      9,101,518 BOS LCW AAL11 AND UAL175.wav
09/19/2001 03:14p      2,293,804 zbwmos1.wav
09/19/2001 03:14p      17,760,300 zbwmos2.wav
09/19/2001 03:11p      6,291,500 zbwmos3.wav
09/19/2001 03:15p      19,456 zbwwavtimes1.doc
11/09/2004 03:03p      <DIR>          TMU
                25 File(s)      457,646,888 bytes
                3 Dir(s)  54,910,320,640 bytes free
```

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On November (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2004, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. DOT-OIG, spoke telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c with William JOHNSTONE, former team 7 staff member, 9-11 Commission. JOHNSTONE advised that there were several pieces of evidence that allowed the Commission to arrive at the conclusion that at 9:05 am (EDT) on September 11, 2001, American Airlines (AA) headquarters was aware that AA Flight 77 (AA77) was hijacked. The more pertinent evidence came from AA's counsel in a letter dated July 7, 2004. The letter responded to questions for the record concerning AA's awareness about certain items. However,

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

There were some very minor discrepancies about events during the 9:00a.m. period between information that the Commission had collected. Further, during interviews of the principles at AA, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c the time that they were saying they were aware that AA11 and AA77 had each been hijacked kept getting later. However, JOHNSTONE added that the time did not change that much for AA77.

JOHNSTONE advised, based on his recollection and notes he referenced during the conversation, that at 8:56 the transponder for AA77 is turned off and the primary radar return is lost. At around 8:58-8:59 the FAA contacted AA and told them that FAA had lost contact with AA77 and asked them to try to contact AA77 via ACRS. At 9:00 (b)(6), (b)(7)c AA, decides, based on lost communication with AA77 and what he knew about AA11, that all AA flights that had not departed were to stay on the ground. At 9:02, AA is told by the FAA that they did not know the whereabouts of AA77. JOHNSTONE advised that his reference for this fact is FAA's Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation report for 2001, page 40.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 11/12/04

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

1/3

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

During the time frame 9:16-9:18 (b)(6), (b)(7)c, AA SOC, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA Command Center, had a recorded conversation. JOHNSTONE advised that this is the only conversation they could find where the possibility of AA77 being hijacked is discussed between AA and FAA. During this conversation, (b)(6), (b)(7)c tells (b)(6), (b)(7)c that AA thought that AA11 was the first aircraft to be flown into the WTC. During this conversation someone can be heard talking to (b)(6), (b)(7)c in the background, saying that AA77 might be the second aircraft flown into the WTC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c relates this to (b)(6), (b)(7)c responds to (b)(6), (b)(7)c by telling him that AA77 might not be the second aircraft to have been flown into the WTC.

Even during this time period, the FAA Command Center was still not certain of the identification of the first aircraft to have been flown into the WTC. AA also was not sure what had happened to its aircraft but knew then that something was wrong with AA77.

The Commission was able to piece together enough information to be comfortable in saying that AA was aware that AA77 was hijacked at 9:05 because that was when AA put into effect the lock-out procedures for the flight. JOHNSTONE did not recall who made the decision to put into effect the lock-out. JOHNSTONE opined that this act is pretty definitive evidence that AA is aware of AA77's status.

AA headquarters did not receive the same type of confirmation that they received from calls from individuals aboard AA77 as they had from those aboard AA Flight 11. From AA77 a flight attendant had called (b)(6), (b)(7)c at about 9:11, who in turn called AA at National. However, the airline staff member with whom (b)(6), (b)(7)c had spoken did not relay the information she received (because, she claimed, she was then being evacuated). Further, Barbara OLSON called her husband, Ted OLSON, former U.S. Solicitor General, who in turn reached out to DOJ. However, OLSON's information never made it to AA.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

During a time when AA already had one aircraft that was confirmed hijacked and a loss of contact with a second aircraft, AA headquarters had strong circumstantial evidence that AA77 was hijacked. However they lacked direct confirmation.

JOHNSTONE advised that AA had no information that FAA did not already have. AA headquarters did not know about the two calls from the flight.

AA did not communicate its suspicion about AA77 outside of AA with the exception of the call to (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Sometime during the period after the ground stop issued by ARPE but before AA77 crashed, the now deceased vice president for AA, Jim BAKER, spoke with either Monte BELGER or Jane GARVEY or both. JOHNSTONE did not recall if BAKER communicated anything about AA77 during this first call. JOHNSTONE knows about the call through his interviews of AA's personnel in the SOC, who overheard the call. This is documented in one of the memoranda for the record. BAKER's purpose for the call was to find out what the FAA knew. BAKER provided very limited information about AA11 and the FAA told BAKER what they knew about AA11 and United Airlines flight 175. The Commission did not include any of this in its report because they lacked good supporting evidence; there were no tapes of the call, BAKER is dead and BELGER and GARVEY did not have clear recollections of that morning.

- # -

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On November 6, (b) 2004, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c US DOT-OIG, spoke telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c with (b)(6), (b)(7)c attorney, CONDON & FORSYTH, 44th Street and 3rd Avenue, Manhattan, NY. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that his firm serves as outside counsel to AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA) and was AA's point of contact to the 9-11 Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he did not think that AA would agree with what the 9-11 Commission had written on page 33 of their report, which says that at 9:05am "AA headquarters aware that Flight 77 is hijacked." No one at AA had any confirmation that AA flight 77 (AA77) had been hijacked.

The 9:05 time referenced in the Commission's report comes from a specific data point in AA's records. At 9:05, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c on AA's System Operations Command (SOC) floor decided to lock out AA's computer system for AA77 so that only select individuals within AA could access the flight information for AA77. (b)(6), (b)(7)c made this decision based on the following facts:

- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Air Traffic Control, advised they had lost contact with AA77
- AA77 was not responding to ACRS messages from AA
- AA knew that AA flight 11 had been hijacked

(b)(6), (b)(7)c action was not necessarily for a hijacking; AA's emergency procedures require that access to the computerized flight data for an aircraft involved in an event, such as a hijacking, accident, or unruly passenger, be locked out. The information in the computer system primarily pertains to the passenger manifest.

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 11-12-2004



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

1/2

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 8:55 am (EDT), either (b)(6), (b)(7)c or (b)(6), (b)(7)c dispatchers and A/T specialist, SOC, AA, received a call from the FAA asking if AA would try to reach AA77.

At 8:59 (b)(6), (b)(7)c sent an ACRS message to AA77 instructing them to contact Indianapolis Center on a specific frequency. At 9:01, (b)(6), (b)(7)c dispatcher, SOC, AA, sent a second ACRS message. At 9:02 (b)(6), (b)(7)c sent a third and final ACRS message, worded the same as his first message. AA77 did not respond to any of the ACRS messages.

Sometime between 9:10 and 9:25, (b)(6), (b)(7)c contacted the FAA's Command Center in Herndon, VA in an attempt to get confirmation that AA11 was the flight that was flown into the World Trade Center (WTC). (b)(6), (b)(7)c also discussed AA's suspicion that AA77 was the second aircraft flown into the WTC. However, FAA did not confirm that for (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c is not aware of any other calls from AA to the FAA concerning AA77.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was not aware of anyone at AA that knew AA77's transponder had been turned off or that the flight had deviated from its course. (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that AA received no other information on AA77's whereabouts until after it had crashed into the Pentagon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that AA responded to the Commission through his law firm. All responses were covered with a letter. He advised that the letter which addresses the time questions from the Commission is dated July 7, 2004.

- # -

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On November (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2004, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c spoke telephonically (b)(6), (b)(7)c with John RAIDT, former Team Leader, Team 7, 9-11 Commission. RAIDT advised that his team determined that at 9:05am AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA) headquarters was aware that AA flight 77 (AA77) had been hijacked from interviews of managers on duty in AA's System Operations Command Center (SOCC) in Fort Worth, TX on September 11, 2001. They spoke with managers from the SOCC, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c among others.

It was RAIDT's recollection that AA SOCC concluded that AA77 had been hijacked based on the fact that it was no longer communicating with air traffic control, that it deviated from its course, and that it disappeared from radar. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c were the SOCC air traffic specialists and were the only two communicating with FAA. He did not recall that anyone else from the SOCC had communicated with the FAA prior to AA77 crashing.

RAIDT suggested that the reporting agent contact Bill JOHNSTON, former team member, 9-11 Commission, whom he felt might have a clearer recollection for the source of the 9:05 event referenced in the Commission's Report. RAIDT advised he would email (b)(6), (b)(7)c this evening and ask him to call me.

RAIDT was not aware of anyone from AA headquarters speaking with Jane GARVEY or Monte BELGER prior to the crash of AA77. RAIDT's team had spoken with (b)(6), (b)(7)c from AA.

Renee MAY, a flight attendant onboard AA77 called (b)(6), (b)(7)c to tell her what was going on. (b)(6), (b)(7)c in turn, called AA. (b)(6), (b)(7)c spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)c at AA at National Airport. Just as (b)(6), (b)(7)c hung-up the phone she was told to evacuate and just then heard the explosion at the Pentagon. (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not further act on the information she received from (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 11/8/04

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Barbara OLSON, a passenger aboard AA77 called her husband, Ted OLSON, then U.S. Solicitor General, who in turn called DOJ's emergency operations center. RAIDT did not recall that the information from OLSEN made it to AA.

RADIT did not recall that AA or FAA had received any communication from anyone aboard AA77 that directly indicated that the flight was hijacked.

The Commission also listened to tapes from the SOCC and heard (b)(6), (b)(7)c giving instructions [9:16-9:18 timeframe] to others in the SOCC to tell the FAA that they have confirmed a hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11. However, by the time AA called FAA, the FAA had already determined that AA11 was hijacked.

- # -

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

On November 6, 2004, Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)c US DOT-OIG, spoke with John AZZARELLO, former 9-11 Commission Staff member. AZZARELLO advised that the information in the timeline on page 33 of the Commission's report regarding American Airlines' (AA) awareness that AA flight 77 (AA77) had been hijacked came from John RAIDT's and John STONE's team. RAIDT's and STONE's team spoke with the airlines, while AZZARELLO's team spoke with the FAA. The Commission merged the information for the report.

AZZARELLO recalled that the information for 9:05 likely came from (b)(6), (b)(7)c at AA's operations center or SOC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c and others on the operations floor had concluded that since they lost communications with the aircraft and it was not following its flight path that it had been hijacked.

AZZARELLO also thought that the United States Solicitor General's wife was on this flight and that she had called her husband from the aircraft. He recalled that her husband then called AA.

AZZARELLO advised that (b)(6), (b)(7)c then contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)c at FAA's Herndon Command Center. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was on the NOM position at the time, which was between 9:00 and 9:20. (b)(6), (b)(7)c told (b)(6), (b)(7)c that AA believed that AA77 was flown into the WTC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c told (b)(6), (b)(7)c that it was probably not AA77 that went into the WTC but would not tell him which aircraft had.

Even though the time channel on the Command Center's tape was damaged, AZZARELLO advised they were able to determine the time by adding the length of the recording to its determined start time.

AZZARELLO advised that with regard to AA77, in fairness to the FAA, they were reluctant to call AA77 a hijack since they knew nothing about it. Some folks, even within the FAA, assumed it had been hijacked but they had no data to support that

Prepared by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Date Prepared: 11/3/04

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

aside from the aircraft having disappearing from radar. If FAA knew where the aircraft was then they probably could have concluded it was a hijack.

AZZARELLO opined that FAA did not send a bulletin right away to the other centers to look for AA77, but probably should have, especially given that other aircraft had already been hijacked.

With regard to UN93, everyone in FAA HQ knew about that aircraft at an early stage and yet did nothing about it. They all assumed that the military was aware of it, but it was not.

AZZARELLO advised that the reporting agent could obtain RAIDT's telephone number from (b)(6), (b)(7)c

- # -

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AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

12/29/04

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

12/29/09

MUS - points in TMA Trump says that

Rusty prepared "2" 9/15/01 "patrol" transcripts

went thru last week - looked via tel call
no e-mail regarding this.
DC - WER - Bo Ck

Reqs pol - Tom Brown - m. at R U
QA @ NER.

TB in pol

requests in for Cook, French the NER
a for the Tom B said to call BC. notes of report of

no record of telephone call

only transmission the pattern to last
"2" show weather possible in TMA

Call to Lape ^{to search} was made by Sever with in TMA
MUS was not there

Reason could be do it based on who talked to Lape appear
who they first met
CC ANG -

hard to run

"2" find who finished
but not prob involved

MOS - not routinely staffed, if not anyone is going to
will coordinate

TMA - daily staff request
they will say some to MOS people who
needed

staffed by a FAA ATC
not for his unit of work

Attempt accident package - has been controlled in DC
for FOIA purposes
of [redacted] in HQ

only transcript - cover - / AA 11 and UAC 175 days
of occurrence
trying to get on side of what on side of
coordinate with other ATC facilities

no meeting quite 1st of days

"1" done on 9/11/01

"3" with details about what AA 11 is but answer

By FAA order 8020-11
partly not the go to DC

the accident package has the transcripts, personal logs,
family record of op, weather info,
radio data not there

they did all the radio inputs
(b)(7)c did terminal / PAA/RA stuff
to fly but radio data

Probe viewpoint - not in accident package, not required
did not have mobility AIC
UAL 175 and AA 11

"4" radio viewpoint → points to AA 20

question re mobility and 9/11/01 - did not understand why they
were asking
not really that they did
d.r. who initiated the request

Partly built worst files of 9/11/01 that e-mail to Roman
(b)(6), (b)(7)c DC
got the files 9/11/01

9:24 am - Are still in the air? - ~~not~~ in the package
Bus the stuff per f no) - in the transcripts
John Scoggins what by 9/11

party

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

my he file to NEADS - my he party

usually "immed" hand off.

probably did a "partial trump" of mos part

around ATG 6 -

no add'l WAUF file exist

around 19th someone must be told of Hester case
= mos WAUF file

also get partial trump

anyth of mos was passed to WAT-20 via NER
fix + e-mail to Roman

family is resp that page 2020 it's answer

↑ AA 41

NY CA UAL 175 del party

AA 77 DC CA

Chm CA UN??

in
off
party

Huge loop you need 1" tape 27 hrs

put on small rough count

take count → then left → depth part
→ WAV

Concern don't only when asked for

duplex or tape to her right way
WAV not part of another package

"Critical re-recovery"

Kept whole month reel

5 m pin to 5 m eye - in count part

Make still in month reel

another look - All another package

12:24 / 8:34 - Ben Ctr to ~~Amc~~ Ctr and Thacker
wanted to talk to Otis first

no intent is to let Otis get Alk in
the air

needed NEADS authority

did talk to OC directly
then said "Why"

order of Ben Ctr
+ Houston

did only give that count with Ctr, etc
how come did not
do in counts
intended

Clifford Bond
Supp Spm = QA

83- 22 yrs
Supp Spm = AT report

ATC

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

QA folder

QA folder

16 w/ FAT

19 w/ Gwt.

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

2/22 ÷ 23/05

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

etal

2/23/05

(b)(6)

mae Army - next to WOC

Comptech software -
NMCC in Pentagon

if person had hung up if ^{ops officer} specialist had
been looking at that portion of screen
(tactical net)

Could have had screen ~~partitioned~~ partitioned
to do other work

now

secure phones are not recorded

tie in to White House - not recorded

all main phone numbers are recorded

decision to record lines when did upgrade of
facility

on 9/11 - tactical net & primary net were
not recorded - did not have capability
at all - equipment did not exist in
the WOC

Guidelist was not available (aerial breach
notification) - must have been lost

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

came back to DOT from TSA -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

ago - left TSA -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

brought her on FAA roles for a while
before got on S-60 staff

Security Info. Circular - for general security
awareness - did not direct change
in security measures; info more
general - corporate security directors
of airlines; ^{(b)(6), (b)(7)c} Airport Law
network

enforcement agencies - would also get security directives

Office of CAS - in charge Aviation Command Center - on 9/11 - (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(hijack coordinator)

2/22/05

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Operations Center
Exec. Asst. Dir. of Field Operations
Acting Dir. of Field Operations

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

TSA - effective 2/17/02 - transfer of function
from Office of CAS

Info. Circulars - warning documents - went
to Intel. shop at TSA

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- S-60 } formerly of
Intel. office
here

received copy of 3rd monograph - DOJ provided
copy to (b)(6), (b)(7)c she provided it to them
for review

info. saw in report - originated by FAA, CIA
was not classified originally by FAA
in margins - parts knew were classified
marked that way

gave entire monograph - back to (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(only portions that pertained to FAA)
- FAA only got portions that pertained to
them

- (b)(6), (b)(7)c did review - 30-40 pages - 2-3
hrs. going ~~thru~~ through it
- recollection - early Fall 2004
- doesn't recall that it was redacted
when they got it

- 2001 - Office of Intelligence - prepared
DIS. - Classified based on originator's

Classification

- FAA or did not classify anything relating to 9-11 material (intell. area)
- did have org. class. authority - on couple of operational areas - nothing re: 3rd monograph
- summarize significant intell. reporting that came in during last 24-48 hrs.
- senior managers: Ofc. of Security
Office of Adm., Deputy Adm.
Dir. of Operations
copy to Office of Intell. & Security (S-60)
Secretary briefed

DIS

copies to Operations Center

normally Watch officer took copy up everyday to Adm. & Deputy Adm. placed in binder - read at their convenience

Classification level of DIS - based on source material

- produced version up to secret
- 2nd version to higher level

Classification Guide - based on sourcing source materials - have reasons
CIA responsible for guide

- we would ask for sanitized version if source material ~~is~~ is T.S. & want to bring down to secret

most agencies mark each #

NOFORN - cannot be released to foreign nationals

all derivative information

all intell. came from FBI

SSI / FOU - Info. Security Circulars - may have started as classified - but may have requested "tear line" - sensitive classified portions taken out
- would often consult w/ originating agency about what would like to use or the req. agency would come back w/ what could be used

owner of this material - TSA

(b)(6), (b)(7)c normally prepared at night
24 intell. watch - analysts
- heads up of most critical things - threat to aviation

- Aug. 01 - forward to Sept. 01
(b)(6), (b)(7)c in-charge of Office of Intell.
prior to Aug. 01 -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c - there since at least 1992

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

37-38 people - Office of Intell.
reported to Assoc. Adm. for CAS -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

has been there from beginning 2001

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

predecessor
since 1992/1993

14 CFR
107
108

Security Directives - SSI } regulatory
instruments
(Sensitive Security Info.)
order immediate change) - short-term
emergency fixes on air carrier side

when reviewing monograph - (b)(6), (b)(7)c also
for SSI looked

- review done in course of one day - given
to (b)(6), (b)(7)c was out
at time

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

her review entailed
- where she recalled where info came from;
up to TSA to determine currency of
classifications

- Intell. Operations - Watch Officer - when
(b)(6), (b)(7)c was at FAA

- Intell. Operations Specialist - at OST; S-60

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

S-60

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

manager
Div. ~~Man.~~ Intell Op. Division -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

owner of info.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Info. Circulars - from 2001
others produced prior to 2001 - still in
effect } SSI level

Intelligence case files - opened based on threats
would go back to originator for source info.
if got enough info - then would put
out Info. Circular or Security Directive
disseminate to airlines

to separate incidents in Crisis Management Handbook - all parts of FAA bound by handbook

ACC - Aviation Command Center - room no longer exists - was on 10th floor - part of Operations Center complex - set up only during crises

Comm. Protocol - part of former CAS operations manual
not a order - CAS Crisis Management Manual - set policy on air piracy & bombing - CAS wrote policy

- order to direct Air Traffic Management of what to do in hijack situation

pre-9-11

WOC - part of Deputy Adm.'s office
manager
Director of WOC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

ACI - Intelligence Watch - office - (24-hr. operations)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Air Piracy - out of Crisis Management Handbook

Air Traffic has written order that applies to DEN

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- detailed to do review of WOC (from N.Y.)

National Airport facility - made some changes
as a result of Kentucky governor incident
Changes at NRCC & TSOC

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

WOC - 2 pm

2/23/05

WOC

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

⊕ Conferenced Conference Bridge

has the ability to display info about person called or calling in. If FAA calls they can program in the name of the person called.

⊕ The person using the tool ~~not~~ could tell if they looked @ that portion of the screen.

⊕ NMCC was evacuated, which was in Pent
- the screens of conferenced can be resized.

↳ capability - ~~Secure phones~~ all operational has are recorded.

↳ SSSIF. - Redline

⊕ FAA did not have recording capability in WOC on 9-11

The guideline is not available for 9-11-01. don't know what happened to it.

④

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

came back to DOT March 2004 left TSA and came to
FAA prior to going ~~back~~ to DOT March 29, 2004

⑤

⑤

Security Information circulars:

SD and IC - general security measures that did not direct a change
↳ told airlines and a/p what measures to implement ⁱⁿ security
measures.

- corp security div of a/c
- a/p a line airport LEO's.

2/22/05

7211

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

crisis mgmt handbook, all parts are bound by the handbook.
the book contains 40 separate incidents

④ Aviation Command Center, part of ops center complex
setup during crisis.

SOP

④ Communication Protocol doc is part of 'Civil Aviation Security
operations manual' from a handbook

P

• ACI = Intelligence Division in Security

Air Traffic has an order re: DEN.

④ New Bomb threat from Crisis mgmt HB
ASN is responsible

④ (b)(6), (b)(7)c performed the review of WOC
the memo Restructuring Emergency Operations Personnel, 10/18/01

6/04.
- WOC after KY Gov. did not resist any changes.

TSOC Transportation Security Ops Center.

FAA Comments on the Four Planes Staff Monograph by Johnstone/Raidt

Page 26, first full paragraph

This paragraph refers to a footnote that cites the "FAA Operations Center Site Visit and Briefing, June 4, 2003". We cannot find records that indicate information was received at the FAA Headquarters at around 9:00am on 9/11 from a sheriff in Ashland, Kentucky about a commercial aircraft crash nearby. The information communicated to the Commission on June 4, 2003 included a powerpoint presentation that indicates that at 9:09am on 9/11, the Indianapolis Center contacted the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center to report a possible aircraft crash due to the simultaneous loss of radar and radio communications with American 77.

HIJACKER TACTICS

Page 39, Flight Selection

Monograph reads "...aboard large Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft *on which they had trained*. [emphasis added]" There is specific reference to several hijackers having trained on Boeing aircraft configured simulators, and at least one, Hani Hanjour, had been ground-trained and simulator-trained on a B-737. The FAA has no information that they trained *on* the make/model of aircraft used in the attack. In aviation parlance to train "on" a specific aircraft is to actually fly in that make/model aircraft. The FAA has no evidence that any of the hijackers actually flew the actual make/model aircraft used in the attacks but only availed themselves of simulator time.

Page 41, Pilot Training

First paragraph, last sentence

Monograph reads, "These tasks required extensive training and preparation." The information FAA provided Commission interviewers was that each of the pilots followed a typical, average progression in their flight training, which would have prepared them to fly, navigate, and reach an intended destination, i.e., that the exact nature of flight training enabled them to accomplish their mission, and that no "extensive" training or preparation was needed. By virtue of the fact that their training profiles were so typical, no "red flags" were apparent.

Page 41, Pilot Training

Third paragraph

Monograph refers to "...a proficiency rating in multi-engine aircraft operation." The FAA does not refer to any rating as a "proficiency rating" but rather simply as a "rating." Proficiency is something to be maintained on all pilot qualifications.

Page 41, Pilot Training

Third paragraph

The following sentence is problematic: "Atta took Boeing 757 and 767 flight simulator training sessions and received his commercial pilot certificate in December 2000." The sentence implies that the commercial pilot certificate followed the simulator training, but the commercial certificate was not contingent on simulator training. Atta had no type rating in the 757/767, so any simulator time taken before his commercial pilot certification was incidental, i.e., he didn't take the training to get his commercial certificate. This sentence would be more correct and less inferential if it were phrased as in the latter paragraph on Al Shehhi's training, i.e., "...[he] received his commercial pilot certificate....He also received Boeing flight simulator training."

Page 42, Flying the Aircraft

There are several references to the "Flight Management Computer." The correct nomenclature is "Flight Management System," which incorporates several computer systems and redundancy. The meaning is the same, but pilots refer to an FMS or an FMIS, not an FMC.

COPY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
SHIRLEY S. MILLER

BY

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, February 10, 2005

2:41 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today if February
(b)(6), (b)(7)c 2005. The time is 2:41. We're at FAA
headquarters--what's the building number here?

MS. MILLER: 10-A.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 10-A, Room 1015 in
Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also
present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of
the Inspector General, Department of
Transportation, and we're conducting a review of
issues involving certain public statements made by
military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission
hearing and elsewhere that are allegedly
inaccurate.

Today we're interviewing Shirley Miller.
Shirley, could you please acknowledge that you're
aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MS. MILLER: Yes, I'm aware of the
interview being recorded.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please
raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that
the testimony you're about to furnish will be the

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. MILLER: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give your full name, spelling the last for the record?

MS. MILLER: Shirley S. Miller,
M-I-L-L-E-R.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And I understand that you're kind of in position transition right now?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And in the near future, can you just describe what that position was again?

MS. MILLER: The paperwork hasn't been processed, but I'm going to be the head of the Administration--Executive Administration for the Air Traffic Organization.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we've interviewed you previously, I think in late September or early October of 2004.

MS. MILLER: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I think at that

time you had said that on September 11th you were a Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator.

MS. MILLER: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And at some point you became FAA's liaison to the 9/11 Commission. I think you had indicated that that was--

MS. MILLER: In early June of 2003.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Was there any paperwork generated?

MS. MILLER: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No 50 or anything like a memo?

MS. MILLER: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Presumably, the Deputy Administrator asked you to do that.

MS. MILLER: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a tad bit off topic of what we initially came here to talk to you about--

MS. MILLER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --but because this was in the newspaper, I just want to see if you

could point us kind of in the right direction, a couple of things. The New York Times reported, and I think AP picked up today some information and a yet-to-be publicly released report that the 9/11 Commission prepared about, I guess essentially intelligence information that FAA may or may not have had. And they make reference in the news article to--it says "52 warnings in six months."

These--and you can correct me if I'm wrong--these would be like intelligence briefings that FAA might have received. Is that what your understanding is they're referring to in these articles?

MS. MILLER: Well, if you're talking about 52 warnings. I think they're talking about--yeah, they're intelligence, some sort of intelligence reporting that came from the intelligence community prior to my knowledge.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And would those go to security? Would they be the ones responsible for the--

MS. MILLER: (Interposing) They were at

that time, yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At that time they were. Okay. And if we needed to review that information, who would we need to speak to?

MS. MILLER: Lynne Osmus.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Lynne Osmus. Are those still classified, do you know?

MS. MILLER: Yes. Much of that involvement today is classified information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Does FAA by chance have a copy of the redacted report that they reference in the newspaper article?

MS. MILLER: I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)c was trying to obtain a copy.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And that's all I got on that.

MS. MILLER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And one other thing, if I could. We had been provided with some reports that the FAA had generated that document the changes that the Agency implemented after 9/11, primarily concerning communication in coordination

with the military and that sort of thing. And I was wondering if you could tell us who, if there is a particular person, that--basically who the principal architect for a lot of those changes were. Like who would be the most knowledgeable person to kind of talk about those changes, especially with regard to the communication with the military.

MS. MILLER: Well, in the Air Traffic Organization under System Operations, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c is really the lead for the communications with the military. So that would be a person you could talk to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And would he have been the one who had worked on, initially, implementing the changes after 9/11?

MS. MILLER: At the time I believe he was still in our eastern region of New York, so the answer is locally he might have implemented, but it was a headquarters-driven thing. So you're hitting us at a time when we had a lot of retirements, and so--I mean the architect I'm not sure is even here.

You know, I mean it was a group effort really. So -- (indistinguishable). But you could--you could certainly work with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c who is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c to understand, you know, the changes that we made.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And within System Operations, that would include the Washington Operations Center or whatever?

MS. MILLER: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: No?

MS. MILLER: Washington Operations--well, the Air Traffic Organization "keyst" (ph) that the DEN, which is the Domestic Events Network, is housed in the WOC, but the WOC is not part of ATO. It actually reports to the security organization in that area.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So the WOC, W-O-C, the Washington Operations Center, is actually part of security which right now, that would be Lynne Osmus' shop, right?

MS. MILLER: That's right, mm-hmm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is DEN always run by Air Traffic?

MS. MILLER: ATO, right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c ATO. That's all I have on that.

MS. MILLER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Thank you. Shirley, I don't remember if we had gone over this with you or not, and I just wanted to kind of formally for the record show you a log that we had obtained and see if it looked familiar to you.

MS. MILLER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I realize this is a photocopy. It's--and it's--it might be missing a row of information over on the right-hand side.

MS. MILLER: I don't really recall ever seeing this before. It doesn't look familiar.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. This is a--it's purported to be the Needs Log--

MS. MILLER: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --that is referenced

in most of the FAA material. It's sort of the source for the military notification times.

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm, okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But this doesn't look familiar to you at all?

MS. MILLER: Huh-uh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In May--it was actually on May 22, 2003, Jane Garvey testified before the 9/11 Commission. And during the hearing--before we tape recorded we talked about this a little bit--but as you alluded to, during the hearing, Commissioner Ben-Veniste had some questions that Ms. Garvey just wasn't prepared to answer. And I think she came back to FAA and asked if they could help respond to the commissioners' questions.

And this document here entitled "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001" was prepared. What can you tell me about this? What do you remember?

MS. MILLER: Well, let's see. I remember that--I wasn't really involved in Commission work

until early June--but I do remember and recall that Jan testified at that hearing. And my recollection is that when she was asked to provide a something for the record to Chairman Ben-Veniste, I guess the night after that hearing she worked with--my understanding--with (b)(6), (b)(7)c Linda Schusseler, and Lynne Osmus to come up with a--you know, the answer that Ben-Veniste was looking for. So that's what I recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you--were you at the hearing?

MS. MILLER: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Indistinguishable)
--place with it?

MS. MILLER: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Had you worked with Lynne Osmus and Linda Schusseler and (b)(6), (b)(7)c on this at all?

MS. MILLER: No, huh-uh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we had--we had came back to talk to you about this in particular because we'd heard from some folks that you'd

actually been involved in preparing this.

MS. MILLER: Well, that's incorrect.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. MILLER: I think people, you know, they associate me with 9/11, and they assume I was working it from the very beginning, and that's just not the case.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you know who Cheryl Atkins (ph) is?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c After the May hearing, did you ever have any discussion with Cheryl about the content of this question for the record?

MS. MILLER: I think--I mean I'm not sure how--how to--you know, around that May hearing I had conversations with her. But I do know I had conversations with her, probably in the summertime of 2003 about her recollection of when she came to the building on 9/11, et cetera. And I recall having a conversation with her that she came in later than she originally thought she had, maybe

that she had communicated with, you know, Lynne and Linda, you know, because then when she really started thinking about it, she said she came in after--I think she said after the plane hit the Pentagon.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Cam into the building here?

MS. MILLER:

The--(indistinguishable)--Building.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. What was the context of the discussion? Why were you guys talking about that?

MS. MILLER: Well, I mean there was the recurring question, line of questioning from the Commission about, you know--he was talking to the military that, you know, on 9/11, and I was just trying to help facilitate discussions between the Commissioner and people could remember or recall what was going on that day.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c When you guys were talking about that, did the question for the record come up, or was that part of the reason for your

discussion preparing what she was recalling then versus what's in the question for the record there?

MS. MILLER: I don't really recall having conversations with her, specifically, about the question for the record.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember her saying that, you know, she was recollecting differently now? And we're talking about the time when you're talking to her in the summer about what happened versus what she had told Linda back in the spring.

MS. MILLER: No, not really. I mean I don't--I really don't remember exactly when I talked to her and exactly what the, you know, the context was. I don't recall that it was about the question for the record, though.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c How is it that you're aware of who was involved in putting the question for the record together?

MS. MILLER: Well, I worked on 9/11 Commission issues, and, I mean, when I started working on it this was, you know, something that

had just been done. So I mean I knew it existed, and I knew that there were some questions at the hearing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the lines of the question for the record starts right--the sentence in here. It says--it starts right there--"Though US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters home bridge and established contact with NORAD," on a separate line. And so in the summer you're talking to Cheryl Atkins, and she's telling you that she might not have arrived at the FAA until maybe after the 3rd airplane that morning, the one that hit the Pentagon. So at some point, presumably, you come to the realization that some of this information in this question for the record is not correct, is that the case?

MS. MILLER: Well, I mean there's nothing specific in here about what time or anything. So I mean, you know, she said she thought she was on the phone with the military commands. I don't---you know, I really didn't have a reason to question

what was--what was already said.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, it says "immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge," and it--when you say "immediately joined," and when we talk about what happened on September 11, it kind of leaves one with the impression that they might have been involved from the onset of the events that day. And from most of the country's recollection, it would be starting after the first plane hits the World Trade Center.

And what Cheryl has told you during your conversation is that she probably wasn't even in the building until after the Pentagon was hit. So that's at, you know, the second to last event of the day. That's not immediate. And so what I'm wondering is once you realize--once Cheryl has told you that, did you relay that to the Commission in any way?

MS. MILLER: I don't recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At the time that you were talking to Cheryl Atkins, was the Commission--I think they were doing interviews and

things like that at FAA and military employees.

Does that sound familiar?

MS. MILLER: They were interviewing quite a bit--I mean for over a year, so yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall having a discussion with her about her upcoming interview?

MS. MILLER: Well, I--I told her I thought they were going--I mean they had asked for a list of people that were in headquarters, and they wanted to interview both the FAA and military representatives. So she knew that they were coming. But in terms of preparing her, that was done by military people, not us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Could the context of your discussion with her have been with her mentioning that she had an interview scheduled, and she was going to be talking to the Commission?

MS. MILLER: I'm sorry, the context of what?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The context of your discussion where in the summer of 2003 she's talking to you about when she arrived at the FAA.

MS. MILLER: I don't--I--I really can't--I don't know what we talked about a year--over a year ago.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. If you provided the Commission with any clarification about what this question for the record says versus what Cheryl Atkins had told you, how would you have communicated that to them? Because you said you don't recall, so I'm just kind of trying to understand what your process would have been to communicate something like that to the Commission.

MS. MILLER: Well, there was no formal process, like a normal hearing, like we have with the Appropriations hearings, for example. I mean there was no follow-up from the Commission on the question for the record for any of the hearings that occurred. I mean very little follow-up. So it wasn't a normal--there was a hearing, there's a set of questions, there was a, you know, a process for making sure that got done.

I don't even know exactly how this was communicated to the Commission, if it was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It was, actually.
It was read into the record on the 23rd.

MS. MILLER: Okay. So--but, I--you know, I don't know how that was done. It was done, obviously, since it's in the record, but to follow up with the Commission on this, I don't recall doing that. If I had, it probably would have been through the staff. I mean it would have been through the staff, I'm sure.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would it have been verbal, or would you send it email, or--

MS. MILLER: Yeah. I mean there was a lot of email, a lot of verbal.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think that that point of clarification, you know, your discussion with Cheryl Atkins in the summer of 2003 was worthy of clarifying?

MS. MILLER: Well, I wasn't--not really. Because everyone at that point was pretty--I mean time had gone by and they couldn't really recall--she couldn't recall exactly when she came into the building. She really didn't know, she

thought. That's what I recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think because her recollection was sketchy it wasn't worth possibly mentioning to the Commission? I'm just trying to understand your last statement.

MS. MILLER: Yeah. I mean she didn't have any better time line. There wasn't really anything else to tell them as far as I was concerned. And she had her opportunity to talk to them anyway in--in her interview.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Can you think of anything, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c (No audible response.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there anything else you'd like to add along the line of what we were talking about today?

MS. MILLER: I can't think of anything.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Anything else, Dave?

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c I can't think of anything more.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. It's

3:06, and we going to go ahead and end the interview and stop the tape.

(Whereupon, at 3:06 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

- - -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

From: Beitel, Rick
Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 11:17 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)c
Subject: Doc

Thanks for your reminder, (b)(6), (b)(7) I secured it in the safe.

Rick

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

042R0122001



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of the Secretary of Transportation

Office of Inspector General
Washington, D.C.

February 1, 2005

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Dear Mr. Stern:

Pursuant to an investigation being conducted by this office, Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Supervisory Archivist (b)(6), (b)(7)c on January 29, 2005, I am requesting copies of the items listed below from the 9-11 Commission's archives. The items we are requesting are responses to questions for the record (QFR) raised during Commission hearings and a chart presented by a witness during a Commission hearing.

Hearing Date	Witness	Description
May 22, 2003	Jane Garvey	QFR, FAA Notification to the Military on American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77).
May 23, 2003	Hon. Norman Minetta	QFR, Division of responsibility between NORAD and FAA on 9/11/01.
May 23, 2003	Maj.Gen. Larry Arnold	QFR, Further information to shed light upon when the military first learned of the hijacking of AA77.
May 23, 2003	Col. Alan Scott	Matrix (chart) containing a chronology of the 9-11-01 attacks.

Thank you for your continued cooperation in this matter. If you require any additional information please feel free to contact (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Sincerely,

Charles H. Lee, Jr.
Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations

U.S. Department of Transportation-Office of Inspector General

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
(Public availability to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552)

REDACTED FOR DISCLOSURE

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Cinillo 1/27/05

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

1/27/05

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

①

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

* Special Operations

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

1/2/76

FSS Pittsburgh
ATC (Flight
Service
Specialist)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AIT Planning

Policy organization handbook and

order for AITC performs functions.
- Terminal and enroute and oceanic domains.
How a facility functions from management standpoint.

- Special Ops interface w/ C&C and MIL.
- Planning system implementation.
- Operational security on national security.

Use words in every unit through to its own AT.

when ATO come up there is an ~~error~~ Domain.

Enroute - Phase of flight

Terminal - TRACON, towers ingress or egress for a/p.

Flight Service - preflight, weather brief general aviation, inflight advisories

⊕ now any policy changes start @ Domain.
and the routes up to Sys Ops for approval

* will ensure that no cross domain conflict and approve and publish.

• prior to change

- Safety analysis

- coordinate w/ regulatory

- circulate to industry for consent send via email.

are laid out in Std Op. Procedures. AIT Planning Procedures. new SSP after review is still pending.

7110.65

① [- Squawk 7500 hijacked

② [- No radio } NORPO
No transponder }

track

* emergency procedures are general guidelines.

the procedure changes to handbook one pertains to how the pilot communicates a hijack.

⊕ FAA cultural changes to id odd behavior in the NAS.
Now require report immediately no interpret by AT.

- on 9-11
- Facility do
- Regional opr do
- Wash Opr Ctr do
- DoD

⊕ 7210.3R 2/24/00

↳ for security related notes @ A/P.
There should be a part that describes probably has facility develop a checklist.

* Flight Intercept operations

* Procedures talk about id as Hijack by 7500 squak.

* didn't immediately report.

⊕ 7610.4 is an a/t order

* 7110.265 has just been replaced by ^{7110.}306A.

⊕ 7110.306A → if a/c squats 7500 controller would

13C.2

- 1. a/t facility communicates to highest level Cntr
- 2. Cntr contacts DEN. and NORAD region via DEN or ext.

air traffic control
System Cntr Cntr

3) Cmd Cntr

• NCRCC is run by TSA.
inter agency will get info on who is there.

* WOC is run by security.



* DEN is run by AT

⊗ he will locate file on KY Gov. issue.

⊗ Pilot Common Strategy

7110.263 did not ~~belong~~ exist on 9-11.

.263 did not include the DEN

.265 reflects changes to include DEN

.306

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

started FAA

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- Burbank, CA

Air Traffic Control

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Pittsburgh Flight Service

Station

Air Traffic Planning & Procedures
Orchestration of facility - everything Air Traffic Controller does; sp. ops. Division interface w/ law enforcement & military operational security for presidential movements, major events - coordinated about airspace restrictions

ATD - parceled out into domains

Flight Service - primarily Part 91 & Part 135

- for general aviation
- if domain wants change in policy - they work it up & send it to Cerullo for review they publish
- need for change could come from anyone - funneled thru Air Traffic Planning & Procedures
- published in Air Traffic order - 7110.65 (procedures published)
- process - email to customers
- Standard Operating Procedure - under Air Traffic Planning Procedures
- 7110.65 - guidance for handling hijacked aircraft

AAT-20
now
under
ATO
safety
see

code 7500 - squawk if hijacked
no transponder, no radio - on Sept. 11th, 2001
separate set of procedures for NORDD
generally if can't talk to aircraft - clear
airspace, track them

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

was if flaps down - on ground - aircraft was hijacked - pilots didn't like because may have flaps down to put chutes down to get passengers out

on Sept.
11th

facility → ROC → Washington
(NY Center (obligated to report to Wash. Ops. Center)
decides
if anomaly if hijacking - report to DOD
to report)

on Sept. 11th - 7210.3 in place
Rev. R
2/24/00 } security activity at airport

- ~~did not have~~
- 7610.4J - in place on 9/11
- Flight Intercept Procedures

code 7500 - everything on 9/11 - ~~was~~ based
on pilot squawking 7500 code

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

now nothing assumed - if anomaly - report

- our documented procedure - was not to call military - right off the bat
- FAA does not determine threat, if appears odd, we report it

- 7110.306A - Reporting of suspicious
6/23/04 Aircraft / Pilot Activities

↓
- flow of communication

- Centers have direct access to DEN
- center has direct line to NORAD region
- ATCSCC - Herndon Command Center
Air Traffic Control Sys. Command Center
- vetted throughout entire community

CERAP - does center & terminal work

NCRCC - run by TSA - FAA there, Customs, TSA, SS, FBI - in Herndon, VA - specifically for Capital region

WOC procedures responsibility of security - Lynne Osmus

* (b)(6), (b)(7)c will check on ^{Kentucky} Governor incident

- Pilots Common strategy

- was no order for reporting suspicious aircraft before 9/11/01

~~before~~ ^a

on 9/11/01

- hijack

- NORDD

- emergency

- no order for suspicious aircraft

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 04220122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

1/3/05

[Redacted]

1/3/07

(*)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

10/10/04

GIUS ↓

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- 8/2/04
Col.

(*)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

@ Pent

\$25

X~~XX~~
issues

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(*)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AT-1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

and

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

* 30 people

* admn assist :

(*) Sp. Military rep.

89

(*)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Anser was Co.
btt step n 4th floor.

⊕ in route when 10th plane hit WTC
w/ in 5-10 minutes got to lobby.

⊕ before 2nd plane hit.

* went to her office watched events unfold.
my back @ first.

@ a certain point.

she went up stairs to 10th floor

they ~~put~~ they were putting together a situation

⊕

room a minute @ Peccorello conf. room

don't know who was there

⊕ Dave Canales had put together a special piece
of equipment.
Stayed from 1-3 AM on the 12th

⊕ initially did coordination w/ people @ NORAD
and anything else that needed being done.

⊕ worked a lot w/ people from FISA out there.
doesn't recall.


* no one asked her for any logs or summary reports.

*

up grades she was ~~not~~ involved in no grade.

⊕ ~~not~~ 12-20⁹

(b)(6), (b)(7)c



CONR SEAD always took people by to meet and greet

Not

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

she recognized. He looked up hi
and later a dir more moved up
a CAPT issues. about 2 years later.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

~~not~~ familiar to her.

⊕ should be the MCC/TECL. by.

* got 20 - 22 people aft 9-11.
60-90 dep follow.

⊕ NMCC

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

interview
12/13/04

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

un-
assured
specialists

Title
support st-
for air
phone #

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

12/13/04

12:05 pm (EST)

9/11 was Aircraft Accident package for 9/11 no longer

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

9/11 at
the way
Space
advers

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- FAA since 1985, when Gary
retired and other person left,
Tim came

came in after 9/11 incident - United 93
oversees file →
QAP - 8020-3 born - billed out
with 2 hours AAT-200 must be told accident
through regular operations center
AAT-200 Amk

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

After accident ~~report~~, they

st
(been
124ms)

immediately began compiling transcript.
rough transcript immediately -
wave file - Amk → sent via email on 9/15.

~~wave file reading to Laura sector, sent on 9/15, 15:00~~
They don't know who transcribed it -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

was a

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

may have done it - probably did it.

~~Don't recalc printouts of what transcript sent.~~ They wanted transcript best.

It doesn't have confirmation of when e-mail sent or received,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AAT-200 magnetic voice

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

took tapes, left bldg;

took to DC, they were brought back, when they wanted transcript, but Cleveland said they couldn't do one w/o the tapes, so tapes brought back

Tapes aren't supposed to leave facility supposed to be kept in a vault,

Certain amount of copies before he left

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

is it headquarters, was here reviewing something else,

A document that shows chain of custody for tapes - ~~the~~ took them on the 12th,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

The rough transcripts could have been from cassettes copied from 16 mm tapes.

16 mm tapes - stamp in locality

usually tapes started immediately.

- Cassette - 1 Official for legal trans
- 2
- 3

he doesn't know for sure, but rough transcript could have been made from cassettes made from 16 mm tapes before ~~he~~ left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AAT 200 - Specialist Regional Quality Assurance

42 mail attachments

- A TT 20
- 200
- AGL 505
- L 9 N 505

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Rough transcript sent to

to

voice
tape rough transcript
push transcript
mailed (not)
wave file

voice
tape rough transcript

The recording (cassette tape) was probably Fed fixed on 9/25

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

~~voice of recording~~
copied cassette ~~into~~ tape onto a CD, but no record when made or sent. - probably on 9/25
in a secret wave file

con

Final transcription (was partial) became part of accident package
memo dated on 9/17 - memo to accompany
not full 45 minutes
between military & FAA
MAY 20 was on personnel computer which was replaced

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

5 Sectors had to become transcribed military pos anything else taped transcription between other facil

Accident Package (someone went to hospital damage to aircraft loss of life or loss of aircraft - or could be on incident)
initially a 8020-3 Gilled Out, then they are to be incident or accident

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

(b)(6), (b)(7)c has e-mail saying (b)(6), (b)(7)c leaving on 9/18, FBI asking for copies of transmissins.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Some of documentation sent to ~~FAA-202~~ accident package, 9/22/04
accident file is left behind

Return of original needs -> e-mail dated 9/17/01 - said (b)(6), (b)(7)c leaving 9/18, scheduled to arrive 6:00 pm

Nothing played over phone to DC

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGL 505

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

don't know if recording, rough

On 2/26/02, clarifying request for electronic transcription of 93 to be sent via e-mail, on 2/26/01, cassette tapes of Lorain sent. (probably FedEx)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

6:53 pm
9/11/01 - Brief synopsis of what happened - 6:53 pm

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

POC - voice + picture
voice + picture + proba

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Systemic air traffic operations research initiative

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

All way vehicle is transported provided memo for chain of custody. ~~DART~~ ^{NTAP} is a way to load down to paper file
- DART - computer records everything an aircraft did. UA 93 - 600 pages long - will tell you every sector that was looking at it, ^{Dart Jan} ^{another Dart} was small

SATBRI - After 20 minutes, system 1 hour Sabri is in 20 minute ~~at~~ intervals.

- 1st Sabri - big content
- 2nd Sabri - "B" - Lorain Sector
- 3rd & 4th - C or D, deliberate sectors

when did AAT-20 get ^{official} partial
fired transcript-

They don't think they can pinpoint a
Indication something sent

but don't know what was ~~sent~~.

the ^{official} phases of incident -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

sent e-mail requesting all
transcripts 9/19. - probably happened

around 13th or 14th
- just voice - also Coroin sect

no record of when wave file sent or
received -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

created it from

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

- of
w/ voice + picture
sent ~~to~~ to
AGL 9/11 @ 6:53 pm
SOS.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

in
case
then
on
CD.

2:08 pm

AGENT'S NOTES

CASE # 042R0122001

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

12/14/04

7

(b)(6), (b)(7)c



Work: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

FAA Cell: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Skytel (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Home:

Email: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Email:

12/14/09

[Redacted]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Otag note autotank signal
BA in ATC

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

[Redacted]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

post of record in Recon Dept Spec
detail to Office of Safety in DC

at Fort Belvoir ATD-S

found AAT-20

ATC reorg for 9-12 m
Air Traffic organized

① not prepared by timeline
when 1st notice of AA11, called AAT-20 and
explore the over Albany (FBI) on 9/11 legal possible

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

plan not resp to AT commands 815, 820
he was notified by

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

AAT²⁰ asked him to get ready by for VOR Center + tower
to get together time and flight path what to do

NER asked him to go to Bush Ct to designate terminal for AA11

and

175 had not yet happened, while on way to
Nash, request of AA 77 'to party while in NADJ

in process of digitizing under a 11 with support of
USA in Pitt

computer under file to digital word file and
transmitted by he spent HTP in Internet to FBI in



(b)(6), (b)(7)c

tele NE + FM to tell the arch committee
work of FBI not see it more

at NY TRACON want to return data of AA 11
Completed data of United flight
society happened in customer system
scrambled the data
he spent 3 days unceremoniously into

prepared presentation of DC review, FBI wanted him
to look for Len got Conrad + Carter, of he couldn't
they highly check in front of other

175

about MO at the 1

Looks like someone took right out of document

He would not have had any role in
preparing that document

no open
check is to
withy take
together

prob + priv of ver for, prob some that
prob by AAT-20, probly used his work
voluntly, transport return

He did no transport work, (b)(6), (b)(7)c did
that
(Book etc)
(b)(6), (b)(7)c talked him

Re: ATT 2

that prob by (b)(6), (b)(7)c (AAT-20...
should be a CO w/ cert in AAI)

dragons, severely the bond a road w/ prob
MO control w/ electron data

has work on founded
all of the Cent NTAP data
NATH + not any prp
he can't handle it
Was DC R+Q

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

he had flight of st. to put it
93

93 stopped 40 mi
to Pitt
just a look over

would volunty

8

As soon as info of AA 11, split 2

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c need rule up

got to Rule the best ten 77 but Part 20 mi
93 needed

FBI was busy + unable to be

dash in election for

closed system - need to be some of the bldg
to detect up, go to end of
to transmit data.

make a lot of phone calls

his duties were known to some - program his
1st call to reg office, forward request to
one of the
contact

He got the data and it

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

write a paper called RAMPAR

read elec rule up w/ phy part
a PC

adopted the prog to read rule up if
Vance dept rule system
did it in the spur

could only read ARTS 3A data

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

NY TRACER ARTS 3E, make sure
it works.

8 (10)

AAT - 20 on internet with FAA possible
Court can order FAA

(9) list of to audit w/ the court
Court to review info, no attempt done
you could Δ the tax on the roads, not long
no one could be to Δ
difficult to put out but could be put
Certain things it can be embedded in fact

Some automatic system not hard to connect this some
Court sent
if you the 1 more interface
fact
no stand tax - may have a
AAT, STARS

State will be do the page - more do the global work

(10)

did not know exactly what FDE, etc. wanted
made a picture of road
similar to what target did, turn, speed
transmit

supposed road data on topographic map
follow road, river, highway, flight path
orientation flight stability

finally? point route not too long to land. vis marks
what day is not to expect also

Should when flights were getting close to parked plane

77 - got close about 10:00

for route back 175

AAT-20 transferred to the in steps, found on floor
steps not off

some close stuff after got up

some that day

just about 1h after 11
but WTC

what to 12m on 1st 9/11

NY Train 175 unscramble took a couple of days

175 executable files on videotapes will fail to jump
content in a log after stopped to DC

(10) some evidence on way / no record

(11) no money

(12) AAT-20

travel route info, in - route route had a better copy
check of work

could be gone by then, to not know

(13)

(14) files, etc AAT-20 / that guy to 2/11

620
ATT3 - met in

15

request for zoom in to a part over

got a feel

they could see whole picture

like Metzger

did not do data by, right Δ pointer

Consider on line w

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

yes, how often

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

worked with her

look die for all 3

good rec w/ cell 3, what says

unlike

not at the length w/ die

16

outside of his room

no idea

93 on GLR

Clear Ch

17

no copies in FAA as of a h. time

Ten Sit by on NYC

18

White House - met directly

19-22 NO

23

New seen

John Corbett

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

ply but to route ^{Re} (Ltr) a side of + and

RAPTOR - ply but TRACON, PROV BUD ALO from
NY TRACON, NAT'L, DUCLES
Pitts
prop does not
process dot mean
could be certain

all the content "to route envelope"

ARAT

ARTC - New York Boston Cent

TRACON -

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

try to integrate

very involved in special projects - due to

in the ^{and} date, ply sending w/ RAPTOR

used central node after page
over sign ten so they are
center

create a more of the for
st work make page

ATT 6 ?

he designed with AIA 11 under design

for (b)(6), (b)(7)c from sky full 11 to wtc

3-41 drawing higher make, more for w/water
he did not do the door.

MO has a hand down in US w/ a lot of work
you at to help. Rev. Myr people @ HQ

Could be in early '84 to try to
restore, not sure when last
of them

Back to - former data to be

and could be used of
trumps, sort of of
numbers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c - in the data of at the time

Not from when ART 2 will

042K012E001



Air War Over America

Sept. 11, 1995

Air War Over America

*Sept. 11 alters face
of air defense mission*

Leslie Filson

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIR FORCE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
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When 1st Air Force public affairs officer Maj. Don Arias approached me about writing a book on America's air sovereignty mission and how Sept. 11, 2001, changed everything, I was a little nervous.

How do you tell such a huge, multifaceted story in only a few short chapters? Can you ever give a story of this magnitude justice? I really don't know if you can. All you can do is write the stories you think the reader absolutely must know to get a clear picture of all the changes affecting the mission. Speaking of pictures, how do you gather those essential shots that tell a story all by themselves? Thankfully, Maj. Arias enlisted the help of New Mexico Air National Guardsman and historian Master Sgt. Rod Grunwald, a great photo editor, sounding board, copy editor, grammarian, and wordsmith who gathered countless photos for this project. Thank you for all your help, Rod.

Before I go down the professional list, there's many people I want to thank on a personal level. My biggest thank-you of all goes to my husband and on-site aviation consultant, Mike, who spent endless hours at the park with our daughter, Isabel, while I was sequestered in the office writing a book. There's no way I could have done it without Mike, who had to listen to every single detail about this book every single day for more than a year. Thanks for enduring it all, Mike. I also thank my mom, Paula; sisters Alyson and Betsy; and the rest of my family for helping me get through this as we were all trying to get through losing our dad and hero, John. A firefighter and U.S. Marine Corps Vietnam veteran, he would have loved this story of America's military protecting our homeland.

There are many others to thank for supporting this project. First, I thank retired Col. William A. Scott — an outstanding editor — for his sound

opinion, advice and valuable input. Col. Scott had the answers to any and all questions from, "What's a 'conehead'?" to "What's *Posse Comitatus*?" I truly appreciate all the time you gave, Col. Scott. I am also indebted to retired Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold, who wanted this story forever preserved in print. Thank you for your valuable time and many interviews. Special recognition also goes to Col. Bob Marr, commander of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, who gave freely of his time to help with the smallest of details about the air battle on Sept. 11, 2001. Thank you, Col. Marr.

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Finally, thank you to the men and women of 1st Air Force and CONR. We can all sleep better knowing you are guarding America's skies.

— Leslie Filson

Foreword

Most Americans remember where they were the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, and will probably never forget. I was in my command center watching live CNN coverage of smoke billowing from the north tower of the World Trade Center, having just scrambled F-15s out of Cape Cod, Mass., toward the possibly hijacked American Airlines Flight 11. When I saw United Airlines Flight 175 hit the south tower, I quickly began to realize this was not a coincidence, that our country was under attack and it was my job to defend against further attacks. Over the next several hours, the men and women of CONR — the Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region — quickly went about the business of securing America's skies. I am grateful for what they did that day.

We were able to respond quickly Sept. 11 because we had a robust command and control structure in place and some fighter aircraft on rapid reaction alert. The air defense mission, as reflected in the number of fighter aircraft and alert locations, had shrunk over the decades even in the face of the Cold War. To a point, this reduction was justified as the Soviet threat changed from bombers in the 1950s to primarily an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and submarine ballistic missile threat in the years to follow. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets flew repeated reconnaissance missions off the East Coast of the United States and also developed cruise missile capabilities that posed a threat to the United States. These two facts alone may have kept the air defense and air sovereignty missions alive against air-breathing targets.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, there was additional pressure to take down our alert aircraft and use that money for other



Photo by Eric Hehs, Code One magazine

Retired Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold was commander of 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region on Sept. 11, 2001.

Air Force priorities. Only through strong leadership and determination by Gen. Howell M. Estes III, then commander in chief of NORAD, was this country able to sustain any modicum of air sovereignty and air defense. It is important to note that Maj. Gen. Philip G. Killey, the Air National Guard general officer in command of 1st Air Force and CONR during those years, fueled the flame that helped focus Gen. Estes' determination.

When I became the 1st Air Force vice commander in January 1997, the Department of Defense had just released its Quadrennial Defense Review. This document indicated that the Air Force would provide only four fighter alert sites for a "four-corners defense." It was a familiar basketball strategy that had no place in the air sovereignty



U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Greg L. Davis

Aircraft maintenance personnel from Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., work on an F-16 late into the night of Sept. 11, 2001. Military personnel from throughout the country were called into action that day as the 14 fighter aircraft on alert exceeded 400 fighter, tanker and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft just hours after the attacks.

mission. The QDR also called for the reduction of several intermediate Air Force headquarters. Though none of the intermediate headquarters was specifically mentioned in the QDR, 1st Air Force was one of the headquarters on the chopping block. It was only through the actions of Gen. Estes and Maj. Gen. Killey that 1st Air Force continued to exist. Seven fighter alert sites were salvaged — down from 12 in 1993 and 19 in 1991. When Gen. Richard B. Myers became commander of NORAD in 1998, he told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he could provide air sovereignty in name only. He didn't get any more forces.

This was the situation in which we found ourselves on Sept. 11: We had a minimum number of fighters on alert scattered about the country but a well-trained and dedicated command and control system. We took our job seriously, and in briefing

after briefing, reiterated that we believed the greatest threat to the United States was an attack by terrorists, rogues or rogue nations.

In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attack, we were able to provide command and control of air power over the entire continental United States because the mission had been spared. In 18 hours, we surged from 14 aircraft on alert at seven locations to more than 400 fighter, tanker and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft on orbit and on alert at more than 60 locations. This was a remarkable job, performed by remarkable people at a remarkable time in our nation's history.

— **Retired Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold,**
1st Air Force commander,
December 1997 - July 2002

Introduction

On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, 14 U.S. Air Force fighters stood alert at seven locations in the Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region. Aircrews surveyed the glorious fall weather from their alert facilities, updated local airfield conditions, reviewed their Air Tasking Orders, preflighted their aircraft missiles, and maybe enjoyed their first cup of coffee.

In the region's three air defense sectors, air battle managers and technicians sat in darkened rooms, peering into radar scopes aglow with the pulsing green dots of radar returns from aircraft entering the continental United States Air Defense Identification Zone. Region Air Operations Center personnel surveyed sector and NORAD activities and monitored the status of regional radars and communications.

It was a typical morning all-around for a small, tight-knit group of people in a largely unknown and little-acknowledged air sovereignty community.

As this team quietly labored to protect the country from external airborne threats, many Americans cast a concerned but mostly disengaged eye on the Middle East and its spiraling cycle of *Intifada* violence. More laid an interested gaze on the sports page and the upcoming college football season. The country was at peace.

At 8:46 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, American Airlines Flight 11 was deliberately flown into the north tower of New York's famous World Trade Center, transforming it into a smoking black pyre. The gruesome scene was transmitted live by CNN reporting to a shocked America that "a light aircraft has hit the World Trade Center!" Americans gathered somberly in front of their televisions, watching in morbid curiosity as the tower burned in yet another version of "reality TV." At 9:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 speared through the



Two F-16A air defense fighters of the 178th Fighter Squadron, North Dakota Air National Guard, lead an F-15C assigned to the 27th Fighter Squadron, Langley Air Force Base, Va., in formation during a Combat Air Patrol mission on Nov. 17, 2001.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Greg L. Davis

south tower, bursting into an incandescent ball of burning jet fuel. Curiosity turned to horror, fascination to fear. Many Americans who witnessed the second strike will always remember thinking, "This is no accident, America is under attack!" As the terror mounted in Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, air defenders all over the country swung into action. The country was at war.

Out of a great American tragedy, comes a great American story, the epilogue yet to be written. On Sept. 11, heroic efforts were the order of the day both on the ground and in the air. Military commanders from the Air Force's "Total Force" and from all services ran to the sound of the guns — they were knocking down the Continental United States NORAD Region and air defense sector doors, willing to lend a hand. They came in the midst of war's fog and friction, amid the clamor and chaos of air attacks and reports of 21 additional hijackings that day. Against the backdrop of the second tower exploding again and again in replayed images on national television, they picked up telephones, wanting to know where to send their fighters. How many? How far? How soon?

At this writing, the United States continues to fight the war on terror around the world. The military heroes of Sept. 11 continue to serve in their vein of volunteerism, working hand in hand with CONR and the three air defense sectors: flying Combat Air Patrols, standing alert and doing whatever necessary to protect our vital interests. More than ever, the U.S. Air Force, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Customs, FBI, Federal Aviation Administration, and many more patriots are making America's skies safe and secure.

Since Sept. 11, the air sovereignty mission has grown tenfold and has evolved into a mission of full air defense. For months after the attacks, armed

fighters, aerial tankers and airborne early warning aircraft flew Combat Air Patrols over American cities and national events — 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Aircraft radar detection and command and control capabilities have been radically improved throughout the country through the Herculean labors of the FAA, civilian contractors, airmen, and soldiers.

The mission has come full circle. Before the Sept. 11 tragedy, air sovereignty was viewed by some as a "sunset mission" — an unnecessary relic of the Cold War. It was hard to envision a nightmare where commercial airliners would be used as fuel-air bombs flown by homicidal pilots. Never before were airline hijackings within the United States considered a military responsibility; they were considered a criminal act and a law enforcement issue. Many things changed that day.

One thing that did not change was the dedication of the men and women assigned and attached to 1st Air Force and CONR. Their loyalty to the mission and sense of responsibility to the country never wavered, even when the mission was ignored, under-resourced and unpopular. As the air defense mission vaulted to the forefront of Department of Defense operations, a spirit of cooperation arose among military and federal agencies to keep our country's skies free.

Our lives and our world changed Sept. 11.

Air sovereignty changed Sept. 11.

This book will chronicle that story.

— Retired Col.
William A. Scott,
1st Air Force
director of plans,
programs and
requirements



*This book is dedicated to the
thousands of innocent people
who lost their lives
Sept. 11, 2001.
We will never forget you
or your loved ones you
left behind.*




White House photo by Paul Morse

*This book is for the
men and women
fighting the war on terror
in Operation Noble Eagle.*

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ABOUT THE COVER: A Vermont Air National Guard F-16 assigned to the 158th Fighter Wing patrols the skies over New York City on Sept. 12, 2001. The photo was taken by Air Force Lt. Col. Terry Moultrup.



OPPOSITE PAGE: Firefighters unfurl the American flag at the Pentagon on Sept. 12, 2001.

CHAPTER 1

THE COLD WARRIORS: Ready, alert and willing

America's air defense mission changes with Soviet tide

The young airman at the Phoenix Air Defense Sector gazed at the radar screen in awe — there was nothing there. It was a surreal experience, “strange, really, watching all the planes disappearing from the scope,” Bill Johnson remembers. “It was weird to come to work before midnight and just watch the scope gradually go blank. I was stationed at Luke Air Force Base, (Ariz.), at the time, looking all the way from California to New Mexico, and there wasn’t anything in the sky.”

It was the ultimate Cold War challenge: For 12 hours on Oct. 14, 1961, virtually all North American civilian aviation was halted so the U.S. Air Force could determine its air defense readiness. Air Defense Command’s 41 interceptor squadrons, 25 Air National Guard squadrons and support aircraft from throughout the military — even the Royal Canadian Air Force — fought the simulated air war.

More than 1,000

fighter-interceptors were on full alert when the massive exercise began, and 400 Strategic Air Command bombers and tankers were deployed within 15 minutes to test the air defense ground environment.¹

The North American Air Defense Command exercise — Sky Shield II — was an impressive display of America’s air defense capabilities and the greatest war game of Johnson’s 30-year career. “During peacetime air defense is very difficult, because you’ve got a lot of friendly people flying around,” the retired Air Force chief master sergeant says. “During a ‘war’ it’s easy, because you know who the good guys are. Sky Shield II was a great exercise, because we really got to fight.”

But what really struck Johnson back then was the talk of Russian trawlers picked up by radar off the East and West coasts of the United States. “They weren’t fishing boats, really, but they were out there,” he recalls.

Spies or fishermen —





Photos courtesy of Marty Isham


who's to say? But that autumn of 1961, there was the pervading sense that *the Reds were out there*. It was the Cold War, after all, and the Soviet threat scared the hell out of men, women and children from Topeka to Tupelo. America was facing its fears head-on, using the most sophisticated air defense system ever built to thwart a Soviet bomber attack. Sky Shield II proved the system fairly effective, especially at medium and high altitudes. But it also confirmed a weakness: the hostile, low-altitude bomber plane using electronic countermeasures to jam America's radars.²

Above: A flight crew from the 83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif., scrambles to its F-101B "Voodoo" in 1961.

Left: A flight crew from the 27th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, March Air Force Base, Calif., scrambles to its F-86A "Sabrejets" in the spring of 1950.

"The threat was the bird with the red star."

— retired Air Force Col. Connie Mac Hostetler,
Cold War F-101 radar intercept officer



U.S. Air Force photo

Perched at the top of a 5,200-foot ridge southeast of Spokane in eastern Washington, Mica Peak Air Force Station definitely had four seasons, including rough winters which made crew changes difficult at times. The 823rd Radar Squadron operated the facility from 1955 through 1975. The facility continues to serve in the air defense role as a Joint Surveillance System site.




Photo from Marty Isham collection via Doug Barbler

Some F-104A “Starfighter” pilots get a bird’s-eye view of San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge. The airplanes were assigned to the 83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif., long since closed.

“The threat was the bird with the red star,” says retired Air Force Col. Connie Mac Hostetler, an F-101 radar intercept officer at Dover Air Force Base, Del., in the early 1960s. “I was in the 98th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and there were squadrons like ours all over the country and we all did the same thing. We had aircraft on alert, slept in alert hangars — right at the end of the runway in most cases — and if an ‘unknown’ popped up in the airspace, we were scrambled. The controller would send us out to the unknown, we’d fly up alongside it, take a look and report back what we saw.

“We could be awakened in the middle of the night, 1 in the morning, it didn’t make any difference. And we had to be airborne in five minutes.”

Soviet bombers were indeed a high priority for the binational NORAD and its forces. As the fighting command, NORAD had many support organizations at its disposal: Canadian Air Command, the U.S. Air Force’s ADC, Army Air Defense Command, and Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command/NORAD. At the time of Sky Shield II, a quarter of a million Canadians and Americans were operating a multilayered and interlocking system of sites, control centers, manned interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles to defend against a potential bomber attack.³

New enemy, new war

Forty years later, and for the second time in American history, civilian aviation was halted again. But this war was real. Sept. 11, 2001, was the deadliest terrorist attack the country had ever seen. Hijackers transformed airliners into weapons of war that day, striking America’s most revered symbols and murdering thousands of people in the grim process. A nation’s heart was broken.

The military action was swift: Air National Guard fighters were immediately scrambled in a desperate attempt to take back America’s skies. Amid the chaos, NORAD Commander Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart ordered a modified version of the Cold War plan SCATANA — Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids — to help the Federal Aviation Administration in its efforts to clear the skies. It was the first time it had happened since Sky Shield II.

A new enemy had emerged and spiraled out of control. Several years earlier America’s air defense mission had become one of “air sovereignty” — the protection of America’s air borders from terrorists, drug runners, rogue nations, and unknown threats. The Cold War was over and America’s perception

One thing was constant before, during and after the Cold War: The mission was always focused outward.




Photo courtesy of NORAD/USSPACECOM History Office

An airman inspects an AIR-2A “Genie” rocket on an F-101B “Voodoo.” When the Voodoo entered service in 1957, it was the heaviest single-seat fighter the Air Force had seen.

of the Soviet bomber threat had changed dramatically.

Seven Air National Guard squadrons were dedicated to the NORAD (since renamed North American *Aerospace* Defense Command) air sovereignty mission before that tragic September morning; 14 fighter jets were on 24-hour alert, ready to fly when called upon. Airmen at the nation’s three air defense sectors monitored the skies around the clock for any unknowns trying to enter sovereign American airspace.

The mission had changed: The last of the regular Air Force’s fighter-interceptor squadrons — the 48th at Langley Air Force Base, Va., — had closed

in 1991, ADC was long gone, Cold War radar sites had for years been abandoned. A few thousand people — a far cry from air defense forces of the 1950s and 1960s — were performing NORAD’s continental air sovereignty mission as members of 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region.

“Our emphasis on the air defense role started fading with the meltdown of the Soviet Union,” says retired Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold, 1st Air Force and CONR commander from December 1997 through July 2002. “However, we still maintained an air defense capability.”⁴

One thing was constant before, during and after

the Cold War: The mission was always focused outward. "We always viewed an attack from within our borders as a law enforcement issue, not as an air defense issue," Arnold explains. "The reality is that any attack within the United States by any type of weapon has become an air defense issue."⁵

Cold War frenzy

In the four decades between Sky Shield II and SCATANA, America's air defense operations had seen many changes and challenges.

The Cold War frenzy began the summer of 1949 when America learned the Soviets had detonated an atomic bomb. The North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, only made matters worse. The Air Force, fearful of an all-out war with the Soviets, put its air defense forces on special alert. Major weaknesses were discovered, leading to the development of a new air defense command and control structure and Air Defense Identification Zones along the nation's frontiers.⁶

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was dispatched, and began building radar sites for America's new permanent air defense network.⁷ By 1951, one of the first command and control stations was under construction at McChord Air Force Base, Wash. America's air defense mission was taking shape and the country was divided into 11 continental United States air defense regions.⁸

Searching for enemy planes wasn't left to the military alone — vigilance was the operative word for soldier and citizen alike. In 1952, the Air Force was actively recruiting for the Ground Observer Corps, civilian volunteers who would eye the skies for bombers penetrating American airspace.

In an era of McCarthyism and backyard bomb shelters, radio spots like this inspired 305,000 people to join: "*It may not be a very cheerful thought, but the Reds right now have about a thousand bombers that are quite capable of destroying at least 89 American cities in one*

raid. ... Won't you help protect your country, your town, your children? Call your local Civil Defense Office and join the Ground Observer Corps today."⁹

Air defense enthusiast Gene McManus was a member of the GOC unit "Hotel Kilo 25 Black" in the mid-1950s in Baltimore, Ohio.

"Back in those days, most of my friends and I were interested in the military and really wanted to be a part of it," McManus remembers. "I was in high school at the time ... we operated out of a small building with no facilities whatsoever, but it had windows you could take out and look through. If we heard an airplane, we'd rush out the door, find it in the air with our binoculars and try to identify it as best we could. We'd 'guesstimate' its altitude and heading and what kind of aircraft it was, and then we'd pick up the phone and call the operator at the filter center for an 'aircraft flash.' I think the whole thing was manned by high school kids. But we filled in the gaps until what became ADC radar sites were implemented."

The GOC performed its patriotic duty until its deactivation in early 1959 when short-range radars were deployed to detect low-flying airplanes.



As Hotel Kilo 25 Black searched for enemy bombers, an even scarier threat was emerging: the Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or ICBM. America became painfully aware of this new danger on Oct. 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik — man's first artificial satellite — into space. What frightened the most astute observer was how Sputnik was launched: by a ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear warhead.¹⁰ With Sputnik came the realization that the enemy could possibly circumvent continental air defenses.¹¹

The Soviet ICBM, heavy on the minds of the Cold Warriors, would ultimately change the nature of the mission. Not everyone agreed how the

Soviets would strike, but the Air Force believed an ICBM attack would be followed by waves of strategic bombers. ¹² The bomber threat alone was very real, but many Congressmen thought money spent on bomber defense was wasted because of the overwhelming ICBM capability. Budget cuts to radar sites and the new Semiautomatic Ground Environment—SAGE—command and control program followed. ¹³

Nevertheless, America's air defenses were mighty. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, nearly 100,000 people were assigned to ADC, the command that provided continental air defense resources for NORAD. ¹⁴ And several Air National Guard interceptor squadrons were participating successfully in the runway alert program. ¹⁵ By the end of 1961, NORAD controlled more than 100 fighter-interceptor squadrons, including some from the Canadian Forces; Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical Research Center, or "BOMARC," unmanned interceptor missiles; and "Nike" surface-to-air missiles. ¹⁶

The SAGE network was completed that year and tied into 78 radar sites on the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line, which stretched from Cape Lisburne, Alaska, to Cape Dyer, Canada. ¹⁷ The Mid-Canada Line, 1,000 miles south of the DEW Line, and the Pinetree Line on the American-Canadian border, bolstered the radar picture, potentially giving the countries a two- to three-hour warning of a bomber attack. ¹⁸ If the enemy was coming from either the Pacific or Atlantic, the Texas Tower radar platforms on the East Coast, Navy picket ships and dirigibles, and EC-121 early warning aircraft would act as offshore barriers. ¹⁹

Two F-4 "Phantoms" intercept and escort a Soviet "Bear" bomber, the airplane that tested America's air defense force throughout the Cold War. The first of the Air Force's F-4s were delivered to Air Defense Command on May 27, 1963.



Wise SAGE system

Donald Bunce was a weapons controller at the Grand Forks Air Defense Sector, N.D., those booming years. His job entailed the four basic air defense functions: detect, identify, intercept, and destroy, "though we never really got to the last function," the retired Air Force colonel remembers. "We would monitor inbound aircraft from the north, northwest and northeast into our sector and before they got far, we'd identify them as friendly or unknown. If they were unknown, we'd scramble Grand Forks F-101s or F-89s from Fargo, (N.D.), to intercept. We did this by monitoring a radar scope, but SAGE was very new technology then. It was the first automated air defense system ... we had a lot of kinks to work out."



Photo courtesy of NORAD/USSPACECOM History Office



Johnson, too, remembers those early days. A few years before participating in Sky Shield II, his first Air Force assignment was to the SAGE test team in Massachusetts. It was 1955, and he and his fellow airmen were helping develop the AN/FSQ-7, a computer specifically designed for the air defense battle.

“The FSQ-7 actually became the first SAGE,” Johnson says. “It did a great job, although it probably didn’t have one ‘meg’ of RAM. But with SAGE you didn’t have guys plotting airplanes on Plexiglas anymore. With that manual air defense system, you could only see about 200 miles from where you were located.”

In the early 1950s, when airmen charted aircraft positions with a grease pencil, Ground Control

By the end of 1961, NORAD controlled more than 100 fighter-interceptor squadrons, including some from the Canadian Forces.

Intercept sites consisted of a search radar, height-finder radar and devices for communicating with interceptor pilots.²⁰ The high-tech SAGE would use radar and computers to paint a clear picture of the speed, location and direction of all planes in radar range.²¹

“In retrospect ... it was really a phenomenal experience helping put this thing together,” Johnson says. “Most of us GIs were just GIs, we had an assignment and didn’t see ourselves in the same vein as astronauts or anything. But now I realize we were involved in something that had a big impact on the country.”

By 1962, after years of research and development, SAGE was operational at eight regional combat centers and 22 direction centers around the country.²² Each SAGE combat center had many radar sites sending data to its respective SAGE direction center. The SAGE direction center sent the data to its respective air division. The Phoenix Air Defense Sector, for instance, sent its radar data to the 28th Air Division commander at Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif.

As modern and thorough as it was, the Air Force was well aware that SAGE blockhouses were vulnerable to Soviet ICBM attack. In the summer of 1961, even before SAGE was fully operational, NORAD planned for the Backup Interceptor Control system. Studies for an Airborne Warning and Control System were already underway.²³ The command’s own control center at Ent Air Force Base, Colo., wouldn’t stand up to Soviet attack any better than the SAGE blockhouse. Construction of the “rock” — 170,000 square feet of man-made caverns within Colorado’s Cheyenne Mountain — began in 1961 and was completed by 1966.²⁴

Ready to scramble

As the SAGE era progressed through the 1960s, hundreds of fighter pilots continued to guard America's skies from their alert shacks, scrambling to planes like Voodoos and Delta Darts at the first shrill tone of the alarm. Air Force bases dotted the landscape like diners on Route 66. Perrin Air Force Base, Texas; K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Mich.; Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Mo.; and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.; were just a few ADC installations. Alert facilities were also found at many civil airports, from Atlantic City, N.J., to Walla Walla, Wash.

"There were so many bases in the interior of the country then," says retired Col. John D. Navin, former Vermont Air National Guard fighter-interceptor pilot. "And we had a number of fighter units across the northern tier, because it was popularly believed that a strike from the Soviet Union would come down over Canada. Early on, that's exactly what we were defending against—an attack over the poles."

When that unknown appeared and the alarm sounded, NORAD's fighter-interceptor pilots were ready, whether they encountered a lost civilian prop plane or a Soviet bomber off the coast of New England.

"Deterrence was the name of the game," says former fighter-interceptor pilot and retired Air Force Col. Harry Birkner. "We could not give someone the impression they could come over here and bomb us. That's what we wanted to portray, and that is what we did portray."

The training that pilots like Navin and Birkner received was intense and thorough. All-weather and instrument knowledge was crucial for air defense pilots who often flew their missions at night, when it would be easier for an unknown to enter American airspace.

That mission, in units like the 98th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, was written concisely to-the-

point: *"To provide active Air Defense for the area assigned by achieving and maintaining a high level of Operational Readiness which will enable the unit to detect, intercept, identify, and/or destroy any unknown or unfriendly forces, under all conditions of weather, daylight or darkness."* 25



Retired Air Force Col. Bill Stanfill remembers learning that very mission as a young lieutenant fresh out of flight school in 1966. "I entered Air Defense Command at Perrin Air Force Base, Sherman, Texas," he says. "It was the training base for ADC, and all ADC interceptor pilots went there first. We had six weeks of instrument training in the backseat of a T-33 under the hood. That made us all pretty darn good all-weather pilots.

"There were three interceptors then: the F-101, 102 and 106. Everyone trained on the F-102, then went on to their assignments from there."

Beyond the basics, the Air Force Interceptor Weapons School was the pinnacle of learning air defense for ground controller and flier alike. "I went twice to Interceptor Weapons School, once as a controller and once as a pilot," Birkner says. "It was one of the best schools for aviators I've ever been through. And for air defense, there was no better school and group of instructors anywhere. Controllers and pilots actually got to debrief the mission together, unlike in the real world where controllers are hundreds of miles away."

A former IWS commander, retired Air Force Col. Ron Stull, says the school "was the heart and soul of teaching air defense." Fourteen-hour training days were not uncommon, he says.

According to *SabreJet Classics* magazine, IWS instructors "considered themselves to be the 'elite' of the all-weather interceptor business, as they were always ready to try something new and different. The instructors developed tactics to counter the electronic countermeasures

NORAD'S FIGHTER FORCE

Through the years, NORAD has controlled the following approximate numbers of interceptor aircraft dedicated to its aerospace control mission, like this F-104A assigned to the 83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif.


1958	5,800 *
1959	750
1976	325
1990	200
1997	175
2001	20 **



U.S. Air Force photo

**Includes approximately 3,600 reserve aircraft (2,200 active U.S. and Canadian aircraft); **denotes the normal compliment of alert fighters arrayed at 10 bases in the U.S. and Canada*

SOURCE: NORAD PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE



U.S. Air Force photo

In early 1970, 13 radar sites upgraded to Backup Interceptor Control capability under the BUIC III program, enabling them to function as mini Semiautomatic Ground Environment direction centers in the event of an attack on the main SAGE command and control facilities. The 637th Air Defense Group operated this BUIC III at Othello Air Force Station, Wash.




Photo from Marty Isham collection via Doug Barbic

A formation of F-101 "Voodoos" assigned to the 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., flies through the clouds in this circa 1960 photo. Because of its weapons mix, speed and range, the Voodoo had no equal as an air defense interceptor.

*anticipated by the Soviet bomber forces, perfected night firing on multiple target situations and regularly flew (illegally) in weather without an available alternate whenever their area of operations was socked in. The IWS instructors literally pushed the envelope of all-weather tactics to the limit (and beyond) of safety."*²⁶

"The Russians knew they could destroy us, but we also could destroy them."

**— Dr. Rick Sturdevant,
deputy director,
Air Force Space Command History Office**

Dying mission

Between the nation's highly trained air defense pilots and controllers — all using state-of-the-art equipment — America's ability to fend off an air attack remained strong. Air defense, however, was not the Air Force's top priority, and never was. It went back to the days of the Army Air Forces, when in the mid-1940s, air power projection advocates such as generals Carl A. Spaatz and Curtis LeMay saw delivery of the atomic bomb as the primary mission.²⁷ The idea of offensive air power as the best method of defense dominated Air Force thinking for years to come; air defense planners began fighting the budget battle.²⁸

Years later, the fight was still on. In February 1966, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara put it this way to the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations: "The elaborate defenses which we erected against the

Flight crews from the Texas Air National Guard 147th Fighter Interceptor Group sit alert in this circa 1960 photo. In August 1960 the unit began flying the F-102A fighter-interceptor to guard the Texas Gulf coast.



Photo courtesy of 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard

Soviets' bomber threat during the 1960s no longer retain their original importance. Today, with no defense against the major threat, Soviet ICBMs, our anti-bomber defenses alone would contribute very little to our damage limiting objective ... for this reason we have been engaging in the past five years in a major restructuring of our defenses." ²⁹

McNamara was speaking at a tumultuous time for the United States military: the Vietnam War. A policy emerged during this era that had fateful consequences for air defense: "Mutual Assured Destruction," the idea that both superpowers would avoid war because a missile or bomber attack would lead to a devastating counterattack. ³⁰


"The MAD concept was employed to avoid nuclear war," explains Dr. Rick Sturdevant, deputy director of the Air Force Space Command History

Office. "The Russians knew they could destroy us, but we also could destroy them. Because each superpower had the capability to obliterate the other many times over, it would have been irrational to engage in direct, full-scale war. Mutual Assured Destruction, which often went by the less alarming euphemism 'nuclear deterrence,' was based on the belief that the Soviet Union would not be likely to launch a first strike if its leaders believed the U.S. would deliver an equally devastating retaliatory blow."

The era of MAD, the ICBM and Vietnam is characterized by many in the business as the end of the traditional air defense mission. "After Vietnam, air defense had really changed," Birkner says, who left the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Langley for Southeast Asia in 1970. "When there

Right: The U.S. Navy's Airship Airborne Early Warning Squadron One operated manned blimps that were an integral part of the contiguous NORAD radar barrier. The mission of the blimps was to provide warning of an air attack originating from over the North Atlantic in the late 1950s.

Below: The Texas Towers — three manned radar platforms operated in the late 1950s and early 1960s off the East Coast — served as a NORAD control and warning system of over-water attacks. Crews on the towers worked in a perilous environment; on Jan. 15, 1961, Texas Tower No. 4 was ripped apart during a fierce storm. None of the 28 people aboard — a caretaker crew there to renovate the structure that February — survived. The last of the towers, No. 3, was dismantled in March 1963.



Photos courtesy of Marty Isham



were multiple warheads on missiles, it made a little radar site sitting at the tip of Florida somewhere kind of insignificant, and we all accepted that as the mission drew down and went to the Guard.”

As all eyes turned toward Vietnam, 13 regular Air Force fighter-interceptor squadrons closed their hangar doors.³¹

By 1971 there were 12 regular Air Force fighter-interceptor squadrons left in operation; three in the Canadian Forces; and 15 in the Air National Guard.³² The Air Force ADC had been renamed Aerospace Defense Command, and the number of SAGE direction centers in the continental United States had been reduced to six.³³

Retired Air Force Col. Connie Mac Hostetler witnessed the ever-changing mission from an excellent vantage: ADC headquarters in late 1972, upon his return from two tours in Vietnam. Working in the Chidlaw Building, downtown Colorado Springs, Colo., he was responsible for writing operating plans for all air defense units.

“During the time I was in Vietnam, a lot of ADC went over to the Guard units,” he says. “Many of the fighter-interceptor assets went to the Guard and a lot of the fighter-interceptor squadrons folded. The perimeter air defense idea came in and a lot of the internal air defense squadrons closed down.

“The rationale was: ‘Who is going to attack us from the inside? Who is going to attack Kansas City; Lockbourne (Air Force Base), Ohio; or Big Spring, Texas?’ So as the restructuring of air defense began, everyone realized that the Guard

could do the same job as the active duty units and the active duty could be used for active duty needs.”

“I think some people wondered about the Guard,” he says. “But the Guard guys were sharp: their hangars were spotless, you could almost eat off the floor. Their aircraft were extremely good and their crews were good.”

Says retired Air Force Maj. Jim Stumpf, a former F-101 radar intercept officer, 13th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Glasgow Air Force Base, Mont.: “I got back from a tour in Vietnam and saw all these Guard units with 101s. As I kept watching this happen, the Guard units continued to do good work and take more and more of the mission.”



As America’s air defense posture drew down, one thing remained unchanged: the Soviet threat. The U.S.S.R. continued to develop and refine its bomber defense, even after agreeing to an antiballistic missile treaty in 1972.³⁴ United States policy makers continued to believe a bomber defense was meaningless without a missile defense.

“It was clear to many people in the military, at least in their own minds, that the need for a robust air sovereignty fighter force structure was not necessary,” says Navin, the former Vermont Guardsman and longtime air defense proponent.

“We didn’t all necessarily share that opinion, but there were enough people in the Department of Defense — at the decision-making level — who

***The mission was fading away.
Vietnam was ending, and — in the
military ranks anyway — talk was of
MiG kills and combat, not
continental air defense.***

didn't see it as necessary.”

Air defense did get a shot in the arm in October 1971, when a Cuban airplane landed in New Orleans after flying undetected through American airspace. A congressional inquiry into the incident revealed that the 1,500-mile southern border between California and Florida had become virtually defenseless. In May 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird established the Southern Air Defense Network, which consisted of a reopened radar network along the Gulf Coast and alert fighter-interceptors at four bases.³⁵

By sheer coincidence, the Louisiana Air National Guard 159th Tactical Fighter Group, based in New Orleans, had left the air defense business for a tactical role only months before the Cuban plane flew into the port city.

“It was a big surprise to everyone when that plane came in, but we were even more surprised that we were shutting down our alert mission,” says Chief Master Sgt. Brian Krail, a Louisiana Air National Guardsman since 1966. “We were transitioning from F-102 fighter-interceptors to F-100s at the time of that incident. The F-100s we got were coming out of Vietnam, and they were outdated. The unit was changing. We had gone from a straight air defense mission throughout the 1960s to an air-to-ground tactical mission.”

The Louisiana airmen had spent their Cold War days on alert with loaded F-102s ready to go at the end of the runway.

“We had, right on our ramp, two hangars with F-102s sitting there 24 hours a day, with pilots and crew, 365 days a year,” Krail says. “We practiced mass loads and turnaround loads and all the procedures that go along with air defense. We would load everything we possibly could to get airborne to protect the country. Then we did turnaround loads when they'd come back from the mission, which meant we would refuel and reload the airplanes and get ready to launch for a second attack. All of a sudden we had F-100s on the ramp ... it was a shock to all of us.”

**The sun sets on
Moriarty Air Force
Station, N.M., — long
since closed — which
was home to the 768th
Air Control and
Warning Squadron.**




Photo courtesy of Radomes, Inc., The Air Defense Radar Veterans' Association



Three F-106 "Delta Darts" assigned to the New Jersey Air National Guard soar through blue skies.

Photo courtesy of 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard



Two F-101B "Voodoos" from the 84th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif., fly a training mission in 1967.

U.S. Air Force photo by Kenneth Hackman, courtesy of Marty Isham

Peacetime protection

The mission was fading away. Vietnam was ending, and — in the military ranks anyway — talk was of MiG kills and combat, not continental air defense.

“All the heroes were those who fought the war in Vietnam,” says retired Brig. Gen. John Broman, who spent most of his 34-year career in air defense at the 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard.

“There is a tremendous society of brotherhood among fighter pilots, unequaled to anything I’ve ever seen. With air-to-air skills comes tremendous prestige. It’s very difficult to compete with that.

“There’s an old saying I find so true, that ‘generals like to train to fight the last war,’ so after Vietnam, we trained fighter-to-fighter,” the former fighter-interceptor pilot says. “Then the radar environment deteriorated so badly, it almost made no sense to have interceptors. The air defense community had totally given up on the mission, it had been relegated to the Guard.”

By 1976, 20 squadrons played an air defense role — 10 were from the Air National Guard. 36 Aerospace Defense Command — referred to as ADCOM by this time — was responsible for “peacetime protection of air sovereignty and early warning against bomber attack.”³⁷

Right: A Soviet “Bear” bomber as photographed from an F-4E.

Opposite page: Two F-15 “Eagles” from the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Langley Air Force Base, Va., intercept a Bear in this circa 1985 photo.



Photo by Marvin Cox, courtesy of Marty Isham

Only a few short years passed before ADCOM was disestablished — most of its assets absorbed into the Air Force Tactical Air Command. The new organization, Air Defense Tactical Air Command, or ADTAC, was established Oct. 1, 1979.³⁸ It was responsible for air defense under NORAD and reorganized as Headquarters 1st Air Force Dec. 6, 1985.³⁹

As America’s air defense operations were downsizing and reorganizing, Russian “Bear” bombers were frequent fliers in North American airspace, flying off the Canadian and Alaskan and East coasts of the United States. America’s air defenders — many flying F-15s and F-16s by then — were perfectly willing to “escort” them through. The Russians kept NORAD’s 18 fighter-interceptor squadrons fairly busy.⁴⁰

“It’s common knowledge that the Russians flew Tu-95 Bear aircraft off the East Coast of the United States on a fairly regular basis,” says Lt. Col. Mark Stuart, a Soviet strategic systems analyst for 1st Air Force in the mid- to late-1980s. “It was a very busy time for air defense. We took the threat of aircraft penetrating United States airspace very seriously, because the Tu-95 is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. They were flying two-ships (a pair of airplanes) of those ... then they’d deploy




Photo courtesy of Marty Isham

Naval assets, the Bear 'D' and 'F' models, into Cuba. And they were all very capable aircraft at the time."

The Russians were proving a point, says Col. Chip Cumm, commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard 102nd Fighter Wing alert detachment, Loring Air Force Base, Maine, in the late 1980s. "They wanted us to know they could do it and we wanted them to know we could get to them before they could hurt us," he says. "So our pilots picked them up way, way out over the water. Most of our intercepts were actually closer to Iceland than the United States."

"Those missions lasted five to eight hours, and we couldn't do it without a tanker for refueling," Cumm adds. "Once in awhile the AWACS

(Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft) was there, but other times we just went out and found them on our own. With an F-15 radar against a Bear bomber, it's not as hard as it sounds. You can cover a lot of airspace with an F-15 radar against a bomber-size target at 30,000 feet. You can see them a long way away."

The camaraderie in the detachment — about 25 people — was unbelievable, Cumm says. Like family. And like so many other air defense units before it, it would cease to exist. It was 1993. The Soviet Union was no more. The Berlin Wall had fallen. All regular Air Force fighter-interceptor squadrons had deactivated.

The Cold War was over.

But the professionalism and pride in the mission

would never die.

"Even after it was announced the unit would shut down, we had a no-notice NORAD alert force evaluation and got the first 'Outstanding' rating given to an alert detachment — and that was an Outstanding across the board," Cumm says. "Our people were so good, they could teach the inspectors how to do the business. Nobody did it better."

And when all that went away, "It was horrible ... gut-wrenching to see it close.

"It was the best job I ever had."



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31 Air Force Space Command, *NORAD Dedicated Interceptor Squadrons, 1957-85*, n.p., n.d., Doc. SDI-54A.

32 Ibid., n.p.

33 Winkler, *Searching the Skies*, 47.

34 Schaffel, *The Emerging Shield*, 272.

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36 *NORAD Dedicated Interceptor Squadrons, 1957-85*, n.d., n.p.


37 Winkler, *Searching the Skies*, 48.

38 Paul E. McAllister, *TAC Strategic Air Defense Reference Book: October 1979-December 1989* (Langley Air Force Base, Va.: Headquarters 1st Air Force, 1990), 4.

39 Ibid., 13.

40 *NORAD Dedicated Interceptor Squadrons, 1957-85*.

Four F-106A "Delta Darts" assigned to the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Wash., fly over Mount Rainier. The F-106 was similar in appearance to the F-102 with its delta-shaped wing and no tail plane, but had many improvements, most notably, speed. The 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard, was the last unit to fly the aircraft in an operational role.



U.S. Air Force photo

NEW ERA, NEW STRUGGLES: Surviving the post-Cold War



CHAPTER 2

**Air National Guard protects America's air borders
from the frightening, wily unknown**



An F-16 assigned to the North Dakota Air National Guard 119th Fighter Wing breaks from a fellow "Happy Hooligan" in blue November skies.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Greg L. Davis

It was an unusually cold Virginia afternoon, Dec. 6, 1985, the day 1st Air Force reactivated for the third time in history. A precise fingertip formation of four F-15 "Eagles" soared over Langley Air Force Base at the ceremony to celebrate the occasion. As the deafening roar of the jet fighters filled the winter air, Maj. Gen. Buford D. Lary couldn't help but be proud: it was a perfect fly-by and the pilots above were his own, members of the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and part of his new command. First Air Force was taking responsibility for America's air sovereignty and Lary

was becoming the leader of a more focused and — in his words — "cleaner" organization.

First Air Force was replacing Air Defense Tactical Air Command, a staff organization that had lived a strange, confusing existence since 1979. "Nobody even knew what ADTAC was," admits one insider. Although part of Tactical Air Command headquarters and technically in charge of TAC air defense forces, ADTAC was separate from TAC in both structure and operation and never really accepted into TAC's inner sanctum.¹ There was even a nickname for air defenders back then:


“Coneheads.” Just like the “Saturday Night Live” characters that share their name, the ADTAC folks were the weird neighbors next door.²

The rebirth of 1st Air Force was good for the mission, Lary says. “Morale went up,” the retired lieutenant general recalls. “We were now a command that had a peacetime role, a warfighting role, a command and control system right there at Langley, and our own command post. And we had some well-qualified people to do all this.”

The warfighting role was accomplished with the creation of the Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region — CONR — in February 1986.³ This ensured air sovereignty remained under NORAD direction; the CONR command structure would parallel that of the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD regions. “I was commander of 1st Air Force in peacetime and commander of the Continental NORAD Region in wartime,” Lary says. “You never are one or the other, you are sort of both, but become beholden to the commander in chief of NORAD in the warfighting role and the commander of TAC in peacetime.”

Air sovereignty had found its niche: Lary had direct lines of communication with NORAD’s four continental air division commanders; the commanders, each with their own geographical area to protect, could launch fighter jets at a moment’s notice. Command and control technicians at the nation’s air defense sectors were eyeing radar scopes for any “unknowns” approaching the borders. They were all working together under the prestige of a numbered air force, the “senior warfighting echelon of the United States Air Force.”⁴ But the years ahead would be challenging as old threats died and new threats emerged.

A pilot from the 120th Fighter Wing, Montana Air National Guard, prepares to lower the canopy of an F-16C prior to leaving on a training mission.



That old threat kept 1st Air Force busy during Lary’s tenure and was alive and well when he relinquished command to Maj. Gen. Jimmie V. Adams in July 1987.

“The Soviet ‘Bear’ bomber was the major threat we faced in sizable numbers, even then,” says retired Gen. Adams. “We were quite busy contending with active scrambles for that intrusion into our sovereign airspace.”

The Soviets deployed bombers to Cuba throughout the 1980s, flying too close to the United States for NORAD comfort. The cat-and-mouse game at 30,000 feet was a nuisance the Air Force



U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Master Sgt. Eric J. Peterson

could handle, but what about the new threat on the horizon? The fast and low-flying Soviet cruise missile could evade radar coverage and presented a new challenge for America's air sovereignty team.

"There was an evolving cruise missile threat associated with the bombers and growing concern about the manned bomber and cruise missile nuclear threat," Adams explains. "And the capability we had against cruise missiles was limited. It is a very small target and very difficult to detect on radar, so I was much more comfortable dealing with the bomber threat."

The American-Canadian partnership at NORAD worked to modernize the aging air defense system and improve the radar coverage the entire mission

relied upon. By the late 1980s the North Warning System was under construction to replace the Distant Early Warning Line arctic radar chain, but wouldn't achieve initial capability until 1995.⁵ The newly created United States Space Command, meanwhile, was charged with providing NORAD missile warning and space surveillance capability.⁶

But North America's strongest line of defense remained its most basic: 52 armed F-106s, F-15s and F-16s operated by both the regular Air Force and Air National Guard. A 1974 Department of Defense study had concluded that two fighters each on continuous alert at 26 sites was adequate to maintain peacetime air sovereignty — a standard that continued through the late 1980s.⁷

Mission impossible?

Despite modernization attempts and the relatively healthy fighter force, a crucial part of America's air defense structure was lost in the 1980s, says retired Brig. Gen. John Broman, former commander of the 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard. Between 1986 and 1988, 17 of 24 radar sites on the Pinetree Line on the U.S.-Canadian border were closed.⁸ Combined with the subsequent elimination of Canada's Air Defense Identification Zone — ADIZ — air defense on the northern tier was becoming "mission impossible," Broman says. With no ADIZ, all flights originating in Canada and crossing the U.S. border were presumed "friendly by origin."⁹

"When the radar sites closed down, there was a particularly interesting lack of capability," Broman explains. "Eventually there was also no radar coverage along the west coast of Canada. An airplane with enough range could enter Canada from the west and then just turn south to fly over the United States at any altitude below positive controlled airspace without any risk of detection by any air defense radar or any interest by Federal Aviation Administration radar."

For years fighter pilots had sat alert at places like Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mich.; Niagara Falls International Airport, N.Y.; and Hector Field, N.D. But with no way to identify an airborne threat, or "unknown rider," their very existence was called into question.

As 1st Air Force commander, Adams was faced with a dilemma. In 1988 he recommended NORAD close six alert sites near the U.S.-Canadian border — sites operated by the Air National Guard.¹⁰ "Once we took away the Pinetree Line and ADIZ, I had no way of picking up those unknowns because they were friendly by definition, and that was agreed to by the U.S. and Canadian governments as a way to pay for modernizing the DEW Line," Adams says. "The question I had when I came aboard was: 'If I can't identify these guys as unknowns, why would I want

airplanes on alert to go intercept them?' I had no procedures and no radar in place and no capability to exercise an ADIZ. ... It made no sense to spend all this money on 24-hour-a-day alert. But I was a little naïve about the powers of the Air National Guard, and naïve that it was 50 jobs per alert site. ... I created a real fire storm."

The idea didn't materialize right away, but was a sign of things to come. Peripheral defense

— fighter-interceptors at strategic locations on the rim of the continental United States — was the wave of the future.

By 1990 the Department of Defense called for eventual closure of the northern tier alert sites.¹¹ American and Canadian fighters, in smaller numbers but formidable foes nonetheless, were providing North America's air sovereignty: protection from drug-smuggling aircraft and other unknown airborne threats. But the glory days of air defense — when hundreds of NORAD fighters were ready to intercept and destroy fleets of Soviet bombers — were over.



Photo by Master Sgt. Don Taggart, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard




Photo by Master Sgt. Roger Tibbetts, 1st Air Force Public Affairs Office

Above: Staff Sgt. Timothy M. Jacobs, a tracking technician at the Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., keeps an eye on the Gulf of Mexico for airborne threats to the United States. The command and control aspect of the air sovereignty mission became an Air National Guard responsibility in the late 1990s.

Left: An F-16 from the New Jersey Air National Guard 177th Fighter Wing darts through blue skies, as seen through the canopy of the jet beneath it.



Photo courtesy of 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard

Fit for a militia

As the Soviet Union crumbled and the decade gave way to overseas operations like Desert Storm and Joint Endeavor, air defense requirements continued to change. America wasn't so worried about Soviet bombers anymore and an attack on U.S. soil seemed unlikely. Money was tight and the Air Force was downsizing and reorganizing. In the early 1990s the Air Force consolidated from 13 to eight major commands and inactivated many proud wings and squadrons; by 1998 it would cut

its 600,000-plus personnel almost in half.¹² As early as 1990, senior leaders were exploring ways to spare the air sovereignty mission from the budget ax.¹³

A smaller 1st Air Force staff moved its headquarters to Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., in late 1991. All air divisions had inactivated and the continental United States was divided into four air defense sectors. Several 1st Air Force duties had been reassigned elsewhere. By the end of the year, the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron — the last regular Air Force squadron of its kind — inactivated, leaving air defense flying to 11 Air

National Guard fighter wings. ¹⁴

With all air defense flying in Air Guard hands, it seemed natural to many that air defense sector operations — the command and control aspect of the mission involving aircraft surveillance and identification — also reside there.

A lead supporter of the idea was Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill A. McPeak. “The Air Guard had been performing the mission for many years,” says the retired general. “They understood it well. . . Why should they not command the numbered air force that stood at the top of this activity?” ¹⁵



Former Air National Guard director, retired Maj. Gen. Donald Shepperd, says McPeak’s proposal was right on target. “General McPeak felt the Air National Guard had been the guardian of air defense for years and therefore command and control of the mission belonged with the Guard,” Shepperd says. “He also saw great force structure and money problems coming and thought if you put air defense in the Guard it becomes a Guard responsibility. It was one more fight he didn’t have to fight.”

Saving the mission was paramount, Shepperd believes. “The transition of 1st Air Force was about preserving some type of infrastructure simply because it did not seem wise to leave our air borders open. . . At that point it wasn’t about a Soviet attack, but about our air borders and our air sovereignty.”

By 1994, Air National Guard Maj. Gen. Philip G. Killey was in command of the federal mission — unheard of for a militiaman. His organization would become a strange hybrid: subordinate to NORAD, part Air Combat Command (formerly TAC), part National Guard Bureau, and misunderstood by many.

Killey, a South Dakotan and longtime fighter pilot, was to reorganize the entire numbered air force — about 1,300 people — from a regular Air

“The transition of 1st Air Force was about preserving some type of infrastructure simply because it did not seem wise to leave our air borders open. . . At that point it wasn’t about a Soviet attack, but about our air borders and our air sovereignty.”

**— Retired Maj. Gen. Donald Shepperd,
former Air National Guard director**

Two F-16s assigned to the Minnesota Air National Guard 148th Fighter Wing, Duluth, fly across blue skies and light clouds. The 148th operates a 24-hour alert facility at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla.

Force to Air National Guard organization in less than three years. ¹⁶

The Air National Guard fighter wings of 1st Air Force wouldn't be affected. But the airmen at the Northeast, Southeast and Western air defense sectors; the headquarters staff; and two support squadrons; all had to be handled individually. A 1st Air Force transition team was formed to keep the evolving air sovereignty mission going as regular Air Force members were replaced by Guardsmen.



Retired Col. John D. Navin was Killey's right-hand man during the conversion. He emphasizes that the mission was foremost in their minds as they worked to take care of people first.

"We had to keep our people in focus as we turned an entire numbered air force over to Air National Guard command and control," the former Vermont Air National Guardsman says. "Even back then we kept an eye on Soviet long-range aviation capability, and no, didn't envision a wave of bombers coming over the poles like people thought in the 1950s and 1960s. However, we still believed the capability was there, maybe not the intent, but the capability. And we needed to have a capability to thwart that. The newer threat emerging was the rogue actor, the nation-state that had the capability and intent to use cruise missiles. We kept our eye on that threat as we made this transition."

Yes the Cold War was over, but "bottom line, air sovereignty means we need to know who's flying in our airspace," Killey said in a post-transition interview.

"We can't afford to have our skies, our borders

of our airspace, wide open to whoever wants to fly in. We need to know what that traffic is. And we need to have a system of identifying unknown aircraft." ¹⁷

Overshadowed by doubt

As Air Guard members joined 1st Air Force in the mid-to late-1990s, many signed waivers acknowledging their job would end if and when the mission did. Job security was no guarantee given the circumstances. ¹⁸

Historically, the mission had seen its share of struggles. "Air Force strategy through the years was one of forward engagement overseas," explains retired Col. William A. Scott, a former 1st Air Force vice commander with 30 years' Air Force experience in both air defense and tactical operations. "Back in the 1950s, '60s and '70s,

the Air Force world was split into two commands. Tactical Air Command fought wars 'over there,' and Aerospace Defense Command fought wars 'over here.' When ADCOM merged with TAC in 1979, the mission submerged into the 'over there' crowd who had

little time and little patience for homeland defense."

Was the transition of 1st Air Force even necessary? "There were people who did not believe there was any need for the transition of 1st Air Force and CONR simply because they did not see a need for the mission, period," Navin says.

Some believed air sovereignty was robbing from other areas in a time of Air Force-wide cutbacks, he says. Even some in the Air National Guard were reluctant to see money dedicated to homeland air defense, Navin concedes. "People did not see a need for that kind of Air National Guard manpower

"The newer threat emerging was the rogue actor, the nation-state that had the capability and intent to use cruise missiles."

**— Retired Col. John D. Navin,
1st Air Force adviser**



Florida Air National Guard photo by retired Lt. Col. Chris N. Michalakís



Photo courtesy of 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard

Above: An F-16 from the Florida Air National Guard 125th Fighter Interceptor Group escorts a Russian "Bear" bomber off the Florida coast in this Cold War-era photo. The 125th began flying F-15s in 1995 and was redesignated a fighter wing.

Left: The Cold War barely over, a New Jersey Air National Guard F-16 assigned to the 177th Fighter Group – now the 177th Fighter Wing – escorts a Russian MiG-29 to and from an air show in the early 1990s.

Staff Sgt. Sarah Davis gathers information on an unknown aircraft while "on scope" at the Western Air Defense Sector, McChord Air Force Base, Wash.

in air defense," he says. "People thought it was an absolute waste to put that manpower into a mission area that would totally go away anyway."

In the early post-Cold War years, the military at large believed the air defense threat nonexistent, Scott says. "There were many people in both the Air National Guard and active duty Air Force who didn't believe in the mission," says the former commandant of the Air Force's Squadron Officer School. "The threat at the time was perceived as nil.

"The vast majority of the hurdles 1st Air Force and CONR faced were at the mid-management staff level of colonels and below. The one common thread of responsibility could be found at the highest levels — once given the specific responsibility of air defense and air sovereignty through their positions as commander in chief of NORAD or Air Combat Command, they wouldn't let the mission die."



Washington Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Randy La Brune




Photo courtesy of Western Air Defense Sector

An Oregon Air National Guard member from the 142nd Fighter Wing prepares an F-15 “Eagle” for flight.

But Scott says the mission remained underfunded and unpopular. A monumental challenge for Navin, Killey and the transition staff was proving to doubting military minds that 1st Air Force was a legitimate organization performing a legitimate mission.

“Major General Killey and I spent more time in the Pentagon trying to convince general officers that the mission was not only viable, but absolutely necessary, than I care to think about,” Navin says. “Every single time, you’d walk away from there with that horrible feeling in the pit of your stomach and think, ‘We’re fighting a losing battle.’”

Shepperd says Air Force leaders may have lost interest in air defense. “We’ve seen this many times,”

he says. “When a mission is shed to the Guard, the Guard has to really fight for advocacy because there’s none left in the Air Force and that has implications for ... funding and political advocacy.”



Although the transition wasn’t easy and not everyone agreed necessary, Killey believes it was the perfect example of the Total Force concept — the unified powers of the Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.¹⁹ The Air National Guard was relieving the Air Force of an important task as airmen were deploying far and wide and doing much more with

much less. The Air Force didn't have time for the non-war at home; the Gulf War and monitoring no-fly zones in Southwest Asia was much hotter.

Air sovereignty would live by default, Scott says: "Most of what people talked about back then wasn't military action, but the threat of embarrassment to the United States. We didn't think Cuban MiGs would attack us, but they'd embarrass us. That potential for political embarrassment was a problem for us and NORAD."

The reality through the growing pains was the mission itself. Right during the transition, a highly publicized incident reminded people why they were there in the first place.

On Feb. 24, 1996, two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft flew near Cuban airspace and were shot down by Cuban MiG fighter jets. Four people from the Miami-based exile organization were killed.

"First Air Force had the only around-the-clock command and operation centers capable of responding with Combat Air Patrols," Killey said in a 1998 interview. "Our quick and certain response not only proved that we are an indispensable member of the aerospace defense team, but that America was serious about its air sovereignty."²⁰

That winter day was a lively one at Tyndall's Southeast Air Defense Sector. Command and control technicians scrambled F-16s from the alert detachment of the 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard. In only a few minutes, the pilots were over the blue Gulf waters assisting in the search-and-rescue operation. From monitoring radar scopes to launching airplanes, everyone did exactly what they were trained to do that day: protect America's air borders.²¹

"There was always a movement afoot to further shut down 1st Air Force, CONR and the NORAD mission in general to the point that I always thought I might be out of there."

**— Retired Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold,
former 1st Air Force commander**

The transition of 1st Air Force to Air National Guard command and control was nearly complete. Critical thinkers in headquarters briefing rooms were discussing the new threat on the horizon. Lurking in the shadows was a dangerous underworld of airborne drug-runners, terrorists and rogue nations with frightening capabilities.

"By about 1995, even before the Brothers to the Rescue incident, people at 1st Air Force were

talking about things like the rogue actors, the nation-states that had the capability and intent to use cruise missiles," Navin says. "We didn't use the word 'asymmetric' but began talking about terrorism."

"And by 1998, many people were talking about 1st Air Force and doing away with the

sectors and said we didn't need the mission," he continues. "That was only two years after the shoot-down of Brothers to the Rescue by the Cuban MiGs. Things fade into the recesses of peoples' minds rather rapidly."

Mission at risk

In December 1997, Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold assumed command of 1st Air Force, CONR and a dying mission. Earlier that year, the Department of Defense had released "The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review." The QDR outlined the conversion of six continental air defense squadrons to general purpose, training or other missions.²² This "four-corners defense" idea called for alert sites at Cape Cod, Mass.; Homestead, Fla.; Riverside, Calif.; and Portland, Ore.²³ The other six squadrons in 1st Air Force, as suggested in the QDR, would convert to a multirole mission.



Washington Air National Guard photo by Tech. Sgt. Randy LaBrune

Left: American and Canadian forces work together to accomplish the binational NORAD mission, monitoring the scopes at the Western Air Defense Sector, McChord Air Force Base, Wash.

Below: Maj. John Larson, an F-16 pilot with the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard, completes a mission.



Photo by Master Sgt. William Quinn, 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard

“When I first moved down to Tyndall as vice commander of 1st Air Force, the QDR had just been released,” Arnold, since retired, says. “I moved to Tyndall and thought, ‘well here I am in Florida, I ought to think about buying a boat.’ And I never bought a boat because there was always a movement afoot to further shut down 1st Air Force, CONR and the NORAD mission in general to the point that I always thought I might be out of there. So I never bought a boat the whole time I was there.

“The QDR didn’t make any sense at all,” Arnold continues. “Four-corners defense might be good for basketball, and that’s where the term comes from ... but it had absolutely no applicability to defending our country. It was ridiculous yet it became popular. So there was a fight just to maintain the number of alert sites that we had. We felt we could operate fairly reasonably with about 10 sites and thought eight was the absolute highest risk we could take. We ended up with seven. I didn’t feel particularly comfortable with seven because there are great large distances between the alert sites.”

The four-corners proposal was met with resistance from NORAD Commander in Chief Gen. Howell M. Estes III, who wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a minimum of seven alert sites were needed to maintain the nation’s air sovereignty.

In the end, Estes won the battle and alert sites were added at Hampton, Va.; Panama City, Fla.; and Houston, Texas; where all three multirole squadrons would support air sovereignty.²⁴ But Arnold believes the real issue was the move to close 1st Air Force completely “without any alternative way of doing the mission.” There was also pressure to close other numbered air forces, Arnold says, as Air Force leaders searched for better ways to fight wars, which is traditionally through numbered air forces.

As the QDR furor died down, the move to close 1st Air Force did not. By the summer of 1998, Air Combat Command, as the CONR force provider, would search for ways to organize its forces amid




Photo courtesy of 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard

In the Internet age, pride in the air sovereignty mission is displayed on the tail of an F-16 assigned to the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard.

personnel shortages and an increased operations tempo. “I got a call from General (Richard) Hawley, who was the commander of ACC, and he said: ‘My staff has given me a compelling argument as to why we should move all the forces out of 1st Air Force and move them into 8th, 9th and 12th air forces,’” Arnold recalls. “And he allowed me to respond to him. And when I did respond, he left all 10 units in 1st Air Force.”

In another phone call between the two generals, Hawley reiterated to Arnold that the ACC staff was still considering ways to reorganize its numbered air forces. “General Hawley gave them

a very short answer that was exactly the right answer," Arnold says. "It was really a question. He said to his staff: 'I have no position on whether we close 1st Air Force or not, but is there a better way to do the mission?'"

"And that stumped them. I think they thought there was no mission, but as a four-star general, he realized we had to protect our borders. That question alone: 'Is there a better way to do the mission?' put to bed the idea of closing 1st Air Force, at least for awhile."



Hawley says his command was faced with the challenge of best organizing its fighter force at a time of frequent deployments and a serious pilot shortage. "We were trying to figure out how to relieve the personnel tempo of people who were being pulled hither and yond to go cope with Northern Watch and so forth," the retired general says. "(The command needed) more general purpose fighters in the fighter rotation to support the overseas commitments and therefore spread the workload more evenly. ... Most of the 1st Air Force units were specialized solely in air defense, and in our rotations we needed people with a specialty in air superiority and dropping bombs."

"We had two problems," Hawley continues. "We had a lot of numbered air forces and not enough people to man them. The other problem was the operations tempo and personnel tempo and how to get the Air Force organized in a way that we could rotate forces in and out of the fights we had to man on a more rational basis ... to give people some predictability in their lives."

"The air defense issue was one of figuring out a way to absorb the air defense squadrons into the general purpose force structure so that we could use them ... and where that idea fell apart was, 'How do you do this and get the air defense mission accomplished?'"

Although the idea fizzled at Air Combat Command, Hawley says air sovereignty still remained a low Air Force priority. "Many people in the Air Force thought it was a waste of money and time to maintain a dedicated air defense force and the reason is not many people had thought about the basic, national responsibility to maintain sovereignty over our airspace, whether there's a threat to it or not," he says. "Among those who had given it some thought, air sovereignty was important."

A better way?

When the National Guard Bureau began studying 1st Air Force's closure in 1999, Arnold took action. ²⁵ He didn't think there was a better way to provide air sovereignty, but he wanted to prove that to himself and others. He looked toward written doctrine—the Bible of all things Air Force—and says he believed the organization was operating "in a very sound way." But Arnold wanted the issue examined. *Was there a better way to provide continental air sovereignty?*

"I wanted a study before the next QDR that said, 'Here's how we do the mission now, here's alternative ways we can do the mission,'" Arnold explains. "If there was a better way that was doctrinally sound, I was prepared to beat the drums and go do that."

"I wanted a team to talk to the commanders of NORAD and ACC and the leadership all over the Air Force and find out for me, find out if there's no mission," Arnold says. "And I said, 'If there's no mission, we'll shut down now.'"

With the backing of Air National Guard director Maj. Gen. Paul A. Weaver Jr., Arnold asked Maj. Gen. Paul Pochmara, a Michigan Air National Guardsman, to form a "Roles and Missions" team. Pochmara was the Air National Guard assistant to Air Force Materiel Command at the time and former commander of the 113th Tactical Fighter Wing,

District of Columbia Air National Guard.

"I was from outside the air defense world," Pochmara, since retired, says. "I flew fighters all my life and when Larry Arnold and Paul Weaver wanted someone to do the study, they wanted someone experienced in fighters with knowledge of air defense, but not a card-carrying air defender. I have sat air defense alert in Japan, but I was never a 1st Air Force-type of person and had never sat alert in the United States. ... I was close enough to the mission to have credibility but far enough away

1999, visiting other numbered air forces, NORAD, the National Guard Bureau, and Air Combat Command to find answers to the questions that kept Arnold guessing. The team was armed with a one-hour presentation that outlined the military's responsibility for protecting the nation's air sovereignty and supported its case with excerpts from the U.S. Constitution, Department of Defense policy and ACC directives.

"Universally, except for going up to NORAD, I think when we walked in the door we were




Photo by Eric Hehs,
Code One magazine

An F-16 from the Vermont Air National Guard 158th Fighter Wing takes off.

to have credibility. I would not be preaching to the choir."

Pochmara says he initially questioned the need for the study and wouldn't allow himself to be swayed by opinions on either side. "When we put together the team, 1st Air Force wanted me to be an honest broker and I was told to say it like it is," he says. "When I chose the members of this team, I chose some who did not see a need for air defense, some like myself who just didn't know and some from the 1st Air Force staff who were very zealous in their beliefs. ... I assembled people on this team who could balance each other out."

The 12-member "RAM" team set out in late

perceived with neither reticence nor support," Pochmara says. "They weren't necessarily hostile or against us, but we did not walk into friendly audiences either."

Maj. Gen. Mike Haugen, adjutant general of the North Dakota National Guard and RAM team member, says the group discussed everything from technology to the future of the air sovereignty mission to the terrorist threat. "We made some pretty bold predictions in our briefing," he says. "In fact, it included a photo of Osama bin Laden as the world's most dangerous terrorist. ... We didn't predict how the terrorists would strike but predicted they would strike."

Pochmara says the team wanted to convey the definition of air sovereignty. He puts it into basic terms. "You have your house in your neighborhood and you don't want anyone to break into it," he says. "But anyone, at will, can break into your house when you're not there or when you are there. And you can't really stop them. Do you leave your door open, do you unlock your doors because you can't stop somebody?"

"We're not going to do that as a nation; we're going to make some attempt to keep our doors locked and protect ourselves and that's what sovereignty means."

In the end of their year together, the RAM team wrote a report concluding, "there are no better ways, just other ways," to perform the mission. Air sovereignty, the team found, is a valid and necessary military responsibility. Team leader Pochmara found himself a bigger supporter of the mission than he'd realized and the hesitant audiences gained new perspectives. "The overall consensus from people was: 'I understand 1st Air Force is valuable and needs to continue doing the work it does,'" Pochmara says.

Threat of the day

As the RAM team was examining the need for continental air sovereignty, a comprehensive look at America's future was well underway at the highest levels. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, led by former Sens. Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, released its first of three reports in September 1999. "New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century," stated that "*America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us.*"²⁶

"We should expect conflicts in which adversaries, because of cultural affinities different from our own, will resort to forms and

"We made some pretty bold predictions in our briefing. In fact, it included a photo of Osama bin Laden as the world's most dangerous terrorist."

**— Maj. Gen. Mike Haugen,
adjutant general,
North Dakota National Guard**

levels of violence shocking to our sensibilities," reads an excerpt from the report.²⁷

Discussions of new threats were everywhere, Scott says, yet the move to kill air sovereignty remained. "At about the same time this was all happening, there was an emerging debate within military academic circles about the asymmetric threat to the United States," Scott says. "A number of papers were published as we were struggling to stay alive. People did studies, including the Hart-Rudman study, that said we would get hit by terrorism in the next five years.

"This debate was going on in the mainstream of the Department of Defense as we were struggling for survival. What we picked up from that debate was this: 'We need to define those asymmetric threats as they pertain to our mission.'"

"We thought the primary threat was some sort of poor-man's cruise missile or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle from a commercial ship off the coast, maybe some old rickety freighter out in the Gulf," Scott says. "And in one of our briefings, we pointed out that for \$83,000 you can buy an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle with GPS (Global Positioning System) navigation.

"These guys aren't looking for pinpoint accuracy. If you launch it into a metropolitan area, it's good enough. The objective is to kill Americans, as many as you can. That's what we were targeting."

The 1st Air Force mission brief — the basic presentation explaining what air sovereignty is



Photo by Lans Stout for Code One magazine

The mission of the 144th Fighter Wing, California Air National Guard, and nine other fighter units assigned to 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region, would be turned upside down Sept. 11, 2001.

about — spoke to this scary reality. “As we started talking about Osama bin Laden, the examples we gave in our mission brief were the first World Trade Center bombing, the Tokyo Subway, Oklahoma City bombing, and Atlanta Olympics,” Scott says. “What we did was connect those dots. The conclusion we drew was that we had a viable threat.”

The military buzzword, actually an acronym, defined the latest risk: CBRNE — Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced High Explosive — weapons, Navin says. “Ages ago, we knew who the enemy was,” he says. “Later, there was recognition on our part that terrorism was a threat, but we thought it was a cruise missile threat.”

How and where would the threat happen? Arnold

tried to get in the minds of the terrorists. His “El Paso example” spoke to the nation’s vulnerability. The geographical hole between alert sites in Houston and Riverside, Calif., was so large that he wouldn’t be able to protect El Paso, Texas, with fighter jets if the need immediately arose.

Adds Scott: “There was no military air threat from Mexico, but ... an asymmetric threat from Mexico. Our experience within Mexico with our counterdrug operation is that there are hundreds of unmanned little airfields you can get into and out of very easily.

“Major General Arnold believed that if a terrorist called and said in one hour he would overfly El Paso and spray deadly gas, we would watch it live on CNN because we could not get aircraft to that location in time to stop it.”



At times it seems like Arnold and his staff were gazing into a crystal ball. But, Arnold points out, “we thought the terrorist attack would come from outside the United States.”

Training exercises at 1st Air Force continued to that effect, and occasionally a serious incident would arise. With all eyes focused outside, a tragedy inside foreshadowed the massive coordination required to handle air operations over our own soil.

On Oct. 25, 1999, professional golfer Payne Stewart was killed in a plane crash two miles west of Mina, S.D. The Lear 35 jet, flying from Orlando, Fla., to Dallas, strayed off course over northern Florida and was heading northwest when it ran out of fuel. The plane, believed to have lost cabin pressure, was tracked by the Southeast Air Defense Sector and later the Western Air Defense Sector. Fighter pilots from the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard, were scrambled by the Northeast Air Defense Sector. But it wasn't just 1st Air Force involved that day: Regular Air Force pilots from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., and Guardsmen from Tulsa, Okla., helped escort the doomed airplane and assist the FAA, which had requested the military's help.

The day ended badly, Arnold says, but “the significant thing was we could not see that aircraft and the sectors worked with the FAA to track the airplane and feed information to us. Using the FAA radar and FAA positioning in order to use our fighters, we were able to divert them from training missions and get units like Fargo (119th Fighter Wing) to escort

the plane. What this proved to us is that we couldn't see and couldn't talk to each other over the central part of the United States.”

Had the incident happened over a weekend, chances are military fighters wouldn't have been able to assist, Scott says. “This happened on a normal workday,” he adds. “And the event led the public to believe we were much more ready than we were. This was a mini-scenario where we were garnering nontraditional 1st Air Force forces to execute an operational mission.”

Not two years later, an operational mission on a much larger scale would unfold over the continental United States. That day — Sept. 11, 2001 — would end horribly.

Terror's eve

The day before America was attacked, NORAD was ready for war. The command was participating in an annual exercise called “Vigilant Guardian.” It was practice. It was war games that would end with lessons on how to fight the better fight. This make-believe air war would happen off America's shores. This was not an air war over America.

“As much as you brief what could happen in the future, I think from an intellectual standpoint, we realized the greatest threat to the United States prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was going to be a terrorist attack,” Arnold reflects one year after the tragedy. “But I did not envision that it would be hijacked airplanes run into buildings like that. I thought maybe a plane would be stolen and come

“We thought the primary threat was some sort of poor-man's cruise missile or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle from a commercial ship off the coast, maybe some old rickety freighter out in the Gulf.”

**— Retired Col. William A. Scott,
former 1st Air Force vice commander**

from outside the United States and have a biological or chemical or nuclear weapon aboard. That was our thought. That is what our mission was about. Our mission was not about the internal threat. It was about the external threat.”

Hijackings were regarded as a law enforcement — not military — issue, and “in the NORAD business, we were looking outward at things coming into this country, and that is what we practiced in exercises,” Arnold says. “We practiced how to get that airplane to land or how to get approval to shoot it down. ... No, we did not envision people hijacking airplanes from within the United States, taking over those aircraft and using them as fuel-air bombs.”

But when the unforeseeable happened Sept. 11, America’s military was able to respond because the air sovereignty mission had been preserved, adds former Air National Guard director Shepperd. “The transition of 1st Air Force to Air National Guard control gave us the ability to maintain air sovereignty in our country,” Shepperd says. “Thank goodness we had the Air National Guard on Sept. 11. Had we taken down our entire air defense structure, we would never have been able to do what we did and wouldn’t have had command and control or liaison with the FAA.”

On that tragic day, America’s air defense forces in the air and on the ground worked closely with the FAA to clear the skies of terror. “In less than an hour ... the whole world changed,” says Col. Bob Marr, commander of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, who would watch young airmen at the radar scopes as they scrambled the fighters, hoping against hope they’d make it to the World Trade Center and Pentagon on time.

The air war over America had begun. The exercise was over.

Staff Sgt. Keith Driessen, crew chief, 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard, performs a preflight inspection on an F-16 “Fighting Falcon.”





Photo by Master Sgt. Wilkam Quinn, 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard



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2 William A. Scott, conversation with author, 31 July 2002.

3 McAllister, *TAC Strategic Air Defense Reference Book*, 14.

4 United States Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine* (Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1997), 69.

5 Thomas Fuller, "NORAD at 40: Historical Overview" (North American Aerospace Defense Command History Office, 1997), n.p.

6 *Ibid.*, n.p.

7 Paul Connors, "The Third Activation: First Air Force from 1985 to 1991" (monograph, 1st Air Force History Office, 1999), n.p.

8 Air Force Space Command, History of United States Space Command, Aerospace Defense Command: January-December 1985 (Air Force Space Command History Office), 212-213.

9 Connors, "The Third Activation: First Air Force from 1985 to 1991," n.p.

10 *Ibid.*, n.p.

11 *Ibid.*, n.p.

12 Lawrence R. Benson, "Golden Legacy, Boundless Future: A Brief History of the United States Air Force" (Air Force History Support Office), n.p., n.d.

13 Leslie Filson, *Sovereign Skies: Air National Guard Takes Command of 1st Air Force* (1st Air Force Public Affairs Office, 1999), 4.

14 *Ibid.*, 113.

15 *Ibid.*, 5-6.

16 *Ibid.*, 11.

17 *Ibid.*, 17.

18 Don Arias, Dan Navin and William A. Scott, conversation with author, 16 April 2002.

19 Filson, *Sovereign Skies*, 23.

20 *Ibid.*, 85.

21 *Ibid.*, 97.

22 William S. Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review" (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, May 1997), Section 5.

23 Scott, conversation with author.

24 *Ibid.*

25 Dan Navin and William A. Scott, interview with author, conference call, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., 15 July 2002.

26 Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, "New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century" (the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 1999), Phase 1.

27 *Ibid.*, Phase 1.



CHAPTER 3

9.11.01

Air war over America begins



Photo by Lt. Col. Bill Ramsay, 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard



U.S. Navy photo by Journalist 1st Class Preston Keres

DAY OF TERROR:

Nation's air controllers, military fliers and crews fight for America's skies


It should have been a perfect day. The skies were clear, blue and beautiful with miles and miles of visibility across the northeast. But what should have been was not. The day's beauty would become ugly and all clarity would fade to a murky fog of hatred, turmoil and terror.



Desperate plea

Massachusetts Air National Guard pilot Lt. Col. Tim Duffy remembers driving into work the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, disappointed he wasn't on the flying schedule. As he drove through the gate at Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, he admired the "clear-in-a-million" skies any pilot would crave. It was a pretty — even gorgeous — Tuesday, a great day to fly. Duffy never could have dreamed up the scenario that would unfold in only a few hours, never could have imagined what he'd see from his F-15 cockpit 5,000 feet above Manhattan that crisp fall morning.

Around 8:30 a.m., a Federal Aviation Administration controller in Boston phoned the control tower at Otis with a serious request: American Airlines Flight 11 had lost its identification signal and appeared headed toward Manhattan. It looked like a possible hijacking, and fighters were needed — fast.




The Associated Press

Above: A fiery image is caught on film at the World Trade Center Sept. 11, 2001.

Left: Firefighters walk past the American flag as they work their way toward the heart of the devastation that was once the World Trade Center, Sept. 14, 2001.

Previous page: A pair of F-15s assigned to the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard; F-16s from the 158th Fighter Wing, Vermont Air National Guard; and a KC-135 from the 101st Air Refueling Wing, Maine Air National Guard; fly a Combat Air Patrol mission over New York City.

The Pentagon in flames just minutes after a hijacked jetliner crashed into the building Sept. 11, 2001.



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U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jason Ingersoll

The 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis was one of seven alert sites in the continental United States, with two loaded airplanes ready for immediate take-off.

"It didn't happen the way it was supposed to or the way you would hope it would come down," Duffy says. "But the way it came down ... it really didn't hurt us at all. We were the ones who were contacted right away and knew about it before the air defense sector."

"About 8:30, 8:35 out by the ops (operations) desk, I got a phone call from one of the sergeants," he continues. "He said, 'Duffy, you have a phone call from tower. ... Something about a hijacking.' As soon as we heard there was something about a hijacking we got moving. That's not something we throw around lightly, that word. I had the radio with me; we call it the brick. ... So I called for 'Nasty' (Maj. Dan Nash) and I to suit up right away."

Lt. Col. Jon Treacy, commander of the wing's 101st Fighter Squadron, phoned NEADS — the Northeast Air Defense Sector — in Rome, N. Y., to report the FAA's request. The sector commander

would have authority to scramble the airplanes. But the FAA had already gotten through to a young tech sergeant at NEADS just reporting for duty that morning. Jeremy Powell answered a call he will never forget.

NEADS: *"Huntress Weapons, Sgt. Powell."*

FAA: *"All right, Boston Center, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble F-16s or something to help us out."*

NEADS: *"Is this real-world or an exercise?"*

FAA: *"No, this is real-world, this is not an exercise, not a test." 1*

"I think about that phone call constantly," Powell, since promoted to lieutenant, says. "I think about it all the time."



Photo by Scott A. Gwilt, Daily Sentinel, Rome, N.Y.



U.S. Navy photo by Journalist 1st Class Mark D. Faram



If normal procedures had taken place that morning, Powell probably wouldn't have taken that phone call. Normally, the FAA would have contacted officials at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center who would have contacted the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The secretary of defense would have had to approve the use of military assets to assist in a hijacking, always considered a law enforcement issue.² But nothing was normal on Sept. 11, 2001, and many say the traditional chain of command went by the wayside to get the job done.

Around the country that morning and many mornings before, 14 fighter jets were loaded and ready to intercept unidentified aircraft approaching the United States. Military controllers at three air defense sectors — in the northeast, southeast and

Above: Medical personnel and volunteers work the first medical triage area set up outside the Pentagon after American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest corner of the building Sept. 11, 2001.

Left: 2nd Lt. Jeremy Powell of the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, N.Y., — a technical sergeant at the time — took an unforgettable phone call from the Federal Aviation Administration Sept. 11, 2001. The FAA was requesting assistance in intercepting the hijackers.

west — were monitoring the air picture, only a hot line call away from pilots on immediate alert. First Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region had protected America's air borders for years. But the command hadn't trained for fighting enemies within, hadn't practiced for coordinated attacks in continental airspace — the radars were always looking outward.


When terrorists took over the skies on Sept. 11, 2001, America's military reacted swiftly. In the northeast, massive efforts began to get every fighter available into the air. Controllers at the Western Air Defense Sector in Washington and Southeast Air Defense Sector in Florida sent fighter pilots into their cockpits to await further orders. Military air controllers worked hand-in-hand with the FAA trying to find possibly hijacked airliners. Military tankers and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft provided crucial refueling and radar support throughout the day and beyond.



The military response was tremendous on Sept. 11, 2001, and everyone has a story to share of remarkable achievement amid terror and tragedy. But this story focuses mostly on the Air National Guard members who protected America's air borders before that defining autumn day.

That community grew to astonishing strengths in a matter of hours as the 14 aircraft on alert increased to more than 400 fighters, tankers and airborne early warning platforms.³ Naval warships reinforced that presence as they kept watch in the Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.

Armed with a sense of patriotism, pride and volunteerism, the military response was tremendous on Sept. 11, 2001, but with thousands of lives lost and ruined in a calculated terrorist attack, it was a bittersweet triumph.



Above: An F-15 "Eagle" assigned to the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard, departs the runway at Otis Air National Guard Base. The wing was the first to scramble and fly Combat Air Patrols over New York Sept. 11, 2001.

Right: A crew chief from the 102nd Fighter Wing maintenance squadron gives a pilot the signal to crank the engine before taxiing down the runway for takeoff.



Photos by Staff Sgt. Sandra Niedzwiecki, 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard

Lt. Col. Ian Sanderson, Northeast Air Defense Sector chief of operations control, says the Sept. 11 hijackings were unlike anything personnel there had trained for. The hijackings didn't fit the usual profile, he says.



Photo by Scott A. Gwilt, Daily Sentinel, Rome, N.Y.



Photo by Master Sgt. William Quinn, 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard

Senior Master Sgt. Robert Von Hagen attaches wings to an AIM-120/AMRAAM – Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile – loaded on a wingtip launcher Sept. 11, 2001, at the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard. Master Sgt. Bradley Johnson, 119th Logistics Group quality assurance inspector, observes. At far left is 119th Fighter Wing Vice Commander Col. Thomas E. Larson. The “Happy Hooligans” provided F-16 combat capability following the terrorist attacks.

Mad scramble

In a strange twist of fate, that very morning the command and control technicians at NEADS were beginning a 12-hour shift for the NORAD exercise "Vigilant Guardian." Across the command from Alaska to Canada and throughout the continental United States, battle staffs were poised to fight the simulated air war. The unusually high state of readiness was a sheer stroke of luck, many would say later, as commanders made unprecedented decisions with astonishing speed and airmen did everything they could to identify and intercept the hijackers.

"Around 8:40 there was a huddle of people around one of the scopes," says Col. Bob Marr, NEADS commander. "I've seen many exercises ... and as I saw that huddle I said, 'There's got to be something wrong, something is happening here.' You usually see that whenever they find a track on the scope that looks unusual; it's usually an indicator that something is getting ready to kick off."

From the battle cab — a glass-walled room overlooking the dimly lighted sector floor — Marr thought the hubbub was part of the exercise. He sent Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, mission crew commander, to check it out. She came running back, Marr says, with urgency in her voice: the FAA needed help with a possible hijacking; a civilian airliner had just disappeared from the scope and was headed toward New York.

"At this point our mind-set was the 1970s-vintage hijack," Deskins says. "We didn't have a huge concern this aircraft was going to crash. We were thinking, 'let's get some airplanes up to support it, escort it and figure out where it's going to land.'"

Marr ordered Otis F-15 pilots Duffy and Nash to battle stations — pilots in the cockpits with engines turned off. He says the fliers were halfway to their jets when he phoned his boss, Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold, 1st Air Force and CONR commander.

Arnold remembers the phone call well. "By the




Photo by Scott A. Gwit, Daily Sentinel, Rome, N.Y.

A tracker "on scope" in the darkened operations room at the Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, N.Y. Airmen at NEADS were doing all they could to track and intercept the hijackers on Sept. 11.

time I talked to Bob Marr, he said he had the jets on battle stations and would like to get them airborne," he recalls. "I said, 'Go ahead and scramble them and we'll get authorities later.' ... He scrambled them and in the meantime I picked up the phone and talked to the operations deputy up at NORAD and he said, 'Yeah, we'll work this with the National Military Command Center. Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.' "

It was unfamiliar territory, but Marr knew what he had to do. "My intent was to scramble Otis to military airspace while we found out what was going on," he says.




Somewhere on the radar scopes was American Airlines Flight 11, which had deviated from its Boston-Los Angeles flight plan and was not communicating with FAA ground controllers. Workers at the FAA Boston Center were baffled: The pilots weren't talking and a strange, possibly foreign, voice could be heard saying, "*We have some planes.*"⁴ It was fast becoming a frightening situation. The crew at NEADS was desperate to track and intercept the plane.

"When we received that call, all eyes were over New York looking for search tracks," says NEADS Staff Sgt. Larry Thornton, whose job until then had been searching for incoming flights over the ocean. Those "search tracks" can be tough to locate jumbled among hundreds of cooperative aircraft emitting electronic signatures to the radar scopes.

"Once we were called by the FAA, we could find split-second hits on what we thought we were looking for," Thornton says. "But the area was so congested and it was incredibly difficult to find. We were looking for little dash marks in a pile of clutter and a pile of aircraft on a two-dimensional scope."

Each fluorescent green pulsating dot on the scope represented an airplane, and there were thousands out there, especially over the busy north-



The Pentagon burns into the night of Sept. 11.

east United States. To complicate matters, the sector didn't share much of the FAA's interior radar data, especially at low altitudes, and had to piece together the incoming information. But Master Sgt. Joe McCain believes they saw Flight 11 disappear over New York that morning. "We picked up a search track going down the Hudson Valley, straight in from the north toward New York," he says. "It's very unusual to find a search target, which is a plane with its transponder turned off, in that area. This plane was headed toward New York going faster than the average Cessna and was no doubt a jet aircraft. We had many clues. The plane was fast and heading in an unusual direction with no bea-



U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Robert Houlihan

con. We had raw radar data only. Everything just kind of fit. We watched that track until it faded over New York City and right after that someone came out of the break room and said the World Trade Center had been hit.”

On Cape Cod, 160 miles to the northeast, the F-15 pilots were ordered to scramble. As the jets rolled down Runway 5 at Otis Air National Guard Base, American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with 92 people aboard, perished in the clear blue Manhattan sky. It was 8:46 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a tragic tick of the clock that forever seared itself into the American psyche. It was the unforgettable moment when the first of hundreds of in-

nocent victims were killed that day.

It was the moment the sleeping dragon of the world's most powerful military was awakened with a start — much as it was 60 years earlier on Dec. 7, 1941. As the scramble lights flashed green at Otis Air National Guard Base, a new kind of war was beginning. When the F-15s took off with fire igniting behind them, flight lead Duffy told his wingman they would fly supersonic. It wasn't standard procedure, but the Gulf War veteran was filled with an irresistible sense of urgency. “This is one of those things I can't really explain why I did it the way I did it,” Duffy says. “When we took off I left it in full afterburner the whole time. So we climbed up, we were supersonic going down to Long Island and ‘Nasty’ (Nash) called and said, ‘Hey Duff, you're super,’ and I said, ‘Yeah, I know, don't worry about it.’

“At the time I just wanted to get there ... we were high enough that we wouldn't blow out windows or do any damage to anything. I figured if anyone cared later I could probably take the heat for trying to get there quickly. Again, we have no idea what we are going toward. We are taking off to go help somebody and we needed to get there quickly to assess the situation.”

They didn't know American Airlines Flight 11 had just plunged into the twin towers.

Under attack

Could this be the airplane the NEADS controllers were so desperately tracking?

Deskins says they just couldn't be sure. “Our first question was, ‘Are we talking about this hijacked aircraft?’ ” she says. “Our identification section was asking what type of aircraft it was and Boston Center was reporting American 11 still airborne. So we thought it must have been a weird coincidence.”

But her gut told her differently: “I remember thinking, ‘Oh boy, this is starting to sound really



Photo by Tech. Sgt. Mark Oisen, New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs Public Affairs Office

The 1st Battalion, 150th Aviation, New Jersey Army National Guard, begins post-attack flight operations over New York in a UH-60A "Blackhawk" helicopter Sept. 11, 2001.

bad," Deskins continues. "I didn't want to jump to any conclusions but it seemed logical that the hijacked aircraft had hit the World Trade Center."

Without much to go on, the NEADS controllers continued to search in vain, struggling to lead the Massachusetts pilots toward the airliner. "I was fighting to get the (plane's) tail number," says Master Sgt. Maureen Dooley, noncommissioned officer in charge of identification technicians. "We were trying to grab at anything we could."

And when the FAA reported that Flight 11 had indeed crashed, Dooley says she felt helpless. "I think everybody did. We were doing everything in our power."⁵

Marr remembers thinking that it must have been a horrible accident. Maybe the pilot had flown too low and lost control upon descent into John F. Kennedy International Airport, N.Y., he reasoned. "I'm thinking this is probably an accident because

there's been a hijack," Marr says. "The guy is going to JFK and every hijack to this date has been an individual who wants to land an airplane somewhere other than where it's supposed to land. ... So we surmise there's been a terrible accident and there's not much we can do about it."

But uncertainty and doubt remained. Says NEADS chief of operations control Lt. Col. Ian Sanderson: "When we got word of the first crash, I heard it but I didn't believe it. I had to go down the hall and look at the TV. And what I remember most is that the hijacking didn't follow the expected profile. It wasn't the type of hijacking we'd trained for. I was thinking, 'this doesn't taste right, feel right or smell right.'"

With the Massachusetts F-15s still headed toward Manhattan, Marr notified New York Air National Guard headquarters to report what he knew. "Our jets are heading down south toward

Whiskey 105 and we don't really have a mission for them at this point, because we don't have any other problems in the air," Marr says.

Whiskey 105, the military training airspace southeast of Long Island, "would put them within a few minutes of New York City to 'CAP' (Combat Air Patrol), burn down gas and wait for further instructions," Marr says. "By this time we start getting CNN showing in the battle cab ... and as we're watching the television we see another aircraft come into view and hit the second tower of the World Trade Center."



Disbelief filled the room. Everyone was floored, Sanderson says: "We had to sort of wrest back control." ⁶

Adds Deskins: "That plane came out of nowhere ... we didn't even know there was a second hijack. Now we knew it was intentional."

From the CONR Air Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., Arnold and his staff were stunned as they watched the same live images. "When I saw the second plane hit, my thought at the time was, 'My God, was that a replay of the first one?'" Arnold says. "Then I realized there were two smoking holes and not one, and at that time, I think all of us thought it was beyond the realm of probability for two accidents to occur like that. We were under attack at this time."

United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. with 65 people aboard. Two 767s were gone and it was anyone's guess what might happen next.

"I thought it might be prudent to pull out of the exercise, which we did," Arnold says. "We called NORAD and they were well aware of what had happened obviously. ... As we pulled out of the exercise we were getting calls about United Flight 93 and we were worried about that. Then we had another call from Boston Center about a possible hijacking, but that turned out to be the airplane that had already hit the south tower but we didn't know

that at the time."

At the NORAD command center near Colorado Springs, Colo., an air threat conference call was beginning. Open communication lines were established between top U.S. and Canadian officials to eventually include President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. ⁷ Arnold would find himself on that call when the last suspicious airplane had landed. But that wouldn't be for hours.

In the darkened operations center at NEADS, Marr and the operations crew felt the gravity of



Photo by Scott A. Gwilt, Daily Sentinel, Rome, N.Y.

Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, Northeast Air Defense Sector mission crew commander, was tracking the movement of American Airlines Flight 77 on Sept. 11, 2001. She had six or seven radar hits before watching the plane's signal fade and disappear from the scope.

the situation. "We had both buildings hit and didn't have any other aircraft at this time except Otis, heading to the World Trade Center in a straight line," Marr says. "At Mach 1 it would take them 16 minutes to get there, that's 10 miles a minute."

Approaching Manhattan, Duffy and Nash were still pursuing Flight 11, trying to get information from NEADS on the plane's location. "I call for bogey dope (target information) and I don't realize American has already hit," Duffy says. "So I'm still chasing American and ... we're going right down Long Island and three or four minutes later I call for bogey dope again and right then they say the second aircraft just hit the World Trade Center. So, confusion in my cockpit: *The second aircraft?*

"I look up and we're about 60 or 70 miles outside Manhattan and I can see the towers burning. ... OK, obviously everything just changed from my personal mind-set. We take off to go help somebody, and now as I look up and can see the burning I say, 'OK, now people are dying.'

"It's kind of hard to explain, but basically you switch into a combat mode where you say, 'OK, this just got real serious real fast.' ... Now people are dying and you're thinking, 'OK, what do I have to do?' And you have to put emotion aside because you don't have time for it."

Hard to believe only a few hours earlier Duffy was thinking about the weather on his drive in to work. "It was one of the prettiest days I've ever flown, literally there was not a cloud in the sky and visibility was probably better than a hundred miles," Duffy says. "It was just crystal clear. When I was driving in that morning and knew I wasn't on the flying schedule I was thinking, 'Oh what a day, what a day to go flying.'"

Now the pilots were shocked and amazed as they watched the smoldering scene below. "We

were going as fast as the airplanes could go," Nash says, then hesitates. "We did everything we could but unfortunately couldn't stop anything."

The F-15s were loaded with extra weapons and fuel because of the exercise and "were ready to engage anything if they had to," Marr says. "But obviously this is peacetime and we have no authority to engage any targets ... but we're thinking New York City is under attack."

More jets would be needed. The NORAD "deep peace" stance meant only two East Coast fighters remained on alert. They were from a detachment of the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard. The alert facility at Langley Air Force Base, Va., is several hundred miles from Manhattan, but Marr directed the pilots to battle stations anyway. "The plan was to protect New York City," Marr says.

As tensions continued to build, the FAA took unprecedented measures to clear the skies of the northeast United States. "Air Traffic Control Zero" would soon follow across the nation.⁸

"Now our (Massachusetts) pilots are chasing down traffic that is trying to get on the ground or to Boston or New York," Marr says. "We

didn't know what could have been cruise-missile airliners.


"As the F-15s go over the city, now the fog of war is starting to set in."

On the cool sector floor at NEADS, that fog was thick with misinformation, fear and apprehen-

"As the F-15s go over the city, now the fog of war is starting to set in."

**— Col. Bob Marr, commander,
Northeast Air Defense Sector**

What is left of the south tower of the World Trade Center in New York City stands like a tombstone among the debris and devastation caused by the Sept. 11 terrorist attack.



U.S. Navy photo by Journalist 1st Class Preston Keres

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U.S. Army photos by Staff Sgt. John Valceanu



Family members visit the Pentagon Sept. 15, 2001, to pay respects to their loved ones who died in the Sept. 11 attack there.

sion. Many of the phone calls coming in were rumors and there was little way to confirm or deny them. The pilots above Manhattan, meanwhile, were wondering what would come next as they watched the devastation below.

“As soon as I saw the towers burning, I called up Huntress (NEADS) and said ‘Huntress, 4, 5, say mission,’” Duffy says. “‘What do you want me to do next? What do you need from me right this second?’ ... He didn’t know what to do.”

Huntress would soon have more information: “It only took a couple minutes of us in the area before they came back on and said ‘NORAD just took control of all the airspace in the country,’” Duffy says. “‘Proceed direct to Manhattan and set up Combat Air Patrol.’ I said, ‘OK, got that.’”

The pilots requested and were immediately given clearance from the FAA to fly at any altitude necessary. “They just gave us the airspace,” Duffy says.

FAA: “*We shut all traffic off at Boston Center, no one departing, and we’re rerouting all JFK arrivals and Newark Metro airport’s (N.J.).*”

NEADS: “*Copy sir.*”

FAA: “*I do have a question for you: In case we have any more aircraft that start deviating, we need to know, do you have anyone on alert or is that something that you can do just in case this happens to any more aircraft?*”

NEADS: “*... I’ve got fighters in Whiskey 105 right now, and I’ve got a tanker there as well, I’ve got other aircraft on alert at Langley as well, I’m getting ready to, I’ve got trackers over JFK, over Boston and that area, just looking for anything suspicious.*”

FAA: “*Anything suspicious, OK, and we’ll let you know about the internationals. We’re not sure what we’re doing about them yet.*” 9



With little time to grasp what had happened in New York, the FAA continued to report more shocking information to the Northeast sector: American Airlines Flight 77 and Delta Airlines Flight 1989, both 767s bound for Los Angeles, were possibly hijacked. Somewhere over Cleveland, United Airlines Flight 93 bound for San Francisco was still off course.

“The FAA is starting to report more aircraft not following their flight plans,” Marr says. “Now we are looking at a host of potential problems. Then we get another call from Boston Center that we have a problem near Washington and ‘you’d better check on it.’”

The North Dakota alert pilots were still in their cockpits at Langley Air Force Base. At the squadron operations desk, young F-16 pilot Capt. Craig Borgstrom took a terse phone call from NEADS. “The guy from the sector asked me, ‘How many can you get airborne right now?’” Borgstrom recalls. “I told him I had two on battle stations. He then said, ‘That’s not what I asked. How many total airplanes can you send up?’

“I said, ‘I’ll give you three.’

“And he said, ‘Then go!’”



Just as Borgstrom grabbed his gear to join the others, the Klaxon alarm sounded and the red lights turned green in the alert barn. The active air scramble order had been given. It was 9:24 a.m. and the planes were given highest priority over all other air traffic at Langley Air Force Base.¹⁰

“We crank and scramble ... we took off, the three of us, and basically the formation we always brief on alert, we’ll stay in a two- to three-mile trail from the guy in front,” Borgstrom says. “They (NEADS) were giving us the heading and altitude

Right: The Northeast Air Defense Sector called upon the Michigan Air National Guard 127th Wing on Sept. 11, 2001. Two pilots from the Selfridge unit were flying a training mission and would have been asked to intercept United Airlines Flight 93 had it not turned toward Pennsylvania. In this photo taken a few months later, 2nd Lt. Christopher Melka gives the "ready to roll" sign.

Below: An F-15 "Eagle" from the 125th Fighter Wing, Florida Air National Guard, refuels from a KC-135 "Stratotanker" on a Combat Air Patrol mission over central Florida on Dec. 5, 2001. The Jacksonville-based wing is one of 10 assigned to 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region.



U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Shaun Withers



U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Dale Atkins

of north-northeast up to 20,000 feet. Then shortly after takeoff they changed our heading more north-westerly and gave us max-subsonic.

“That’s as fast as you can go without breaking the sound barrier. I’ve never heard it before in my short career, but I don’t think anyone’s heard that order before.”

The F-16s were being vectored toward Washington, D.C., instead of New York. As they were scrambling, Deskins was watching a suspicious track on the radar scope. “I had the scope focused in on the D.C. area and got blips of this aircraft that appeared to be going in a turn around D.C.,” she says. “It was going fast for where it was located and I remember looking at the guy next to me and saying, ‘What is that?’”

“I probably got six or seven radar returns on it before it faded and was just gone. You’re thinking, ‘What just happened?’ I got this feeling in the pit of my stomach and said, ‘That’s another one.’”

Tech. Sgt. Ronald G. Belluscio, a NEADS se-

nior weapons director technician, sent the F-16s to Washington that morning. “When all of this was happening, we were giving directions as enlisted personnel,” he says. “We were empowered and entrusted to certain tasks that we aren’t normally accustomed to doing to get the job done. I jumped on a frequency, per the senior director, and was told to ask the Langley birds to vector over the Pentagon. I didn’t know it had been hit.”

Majs. Dean Eckmann, Brad Derrig and Borgstrom continued flying max-subsonic. “The sector gave us certain coordinates to CAP over a certain point,” Borgstrom says. “We all dialed in the coordinates to figure out exactly where we were going and we got to our point and we could see from ... maybe 40 miles out, smoke billowing. We started putting things together.

“OK, we’re going toward where that smoke is and as you get closer, you start thinking, ‘OK, maybe there’s some type of attack going on.’ You start correlating Washington, D.C., with New York.


We still have no 'intel' brief of what's going on ... and another building is on fire. ... We knew something terribly wrong was going on. Something severe had happened."

American Airlines Flight 77, with 64 people aboard, had crashed into the Pentagon at 9:38 a.m., but the pilots didn't know that. Borgstrom thought maybe a gas line had burst or a car bomb had exploded. But their mission, he says, was clear: keep all airplanes away from Washington, D.C.

The three pilots, all on different frequencies but sharing a common intra-flight channel, were hearing a lot of chatter but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings, Borgstrom says. "There was some confusion for us, this was very abnormal," he continues. "We were all three on different frequencies ... and were getting orders from a lot of different people."

Only a few minutes after reaching the Washington area, flight lead Eckmann was vectored toward two low-flying aircraft. It was around 9:45 a.m. ¹¹ "As we're coming in, I set up a Combat Air Patrol with air traffic controllers and they come back to me and say there are a couple unknowns heading north on the Potomac River toward the White House," Eckmann says. "We were up in the high 20s and I basically roll inverted and go straight down. It took no time to get there and I get a radar contact on one of them and end up identifying them. One is a military helicopter and the other is a law enforcement helicopter and they're obviously heading toward the Pentagon to aid."

Eckmann flew low over the Capitol and Mall area. "I wanted to clear the area and make sure nothing else was coming in," he says. "I was also looking on the ground for something suspicious and thought if I saw a big fuel tanker truck heading toward the White House I could possibly take him



Arkansas Air National Guard photo by Tech. Sgt. Randy L. Byrd

out with my gun. You have so many thoughts racing through your mind. ... While I'm doing this, Craig (Borgstrom) calls me and says Huntress wants to know the extent of the damage at the Pentagon.

"I fly by the Washington Monument and turn back down and fly over the Pentagon, just to the south of the Pentagon, and tell them the two outer rings have been damaged," Eckmann says. "They asked me if I knew what it was and I told them I guessed it was a ~~big fuel tanker truck~~ because of the amount of smoke and flames coming up and ~~nobody indicated anything about an airplane~~. And there was no airplane wreckage off to the side."

Eckmann says the scene below was shockingly surreal. "It was almost a feeling of disbelief," he says. "Kind of like watching a bad movie. You can't believe what you're seeing, but you're still watching it."

Eckmann would later hear that the presence of a fully loaded F-16 darting overhead was a great comfort to people below. "A lot of people said it made them feel safe," he says. "They looked up and saw an armed F-16 and I guess they started cheering. I heard stories that people went back in after seeing me fly over to help others out. What would have happened had I stayed up high? They wouldn't have seen me. Now they knew they were safe. It was pure luck that I happened to be down

Right: An F-15 assigned to the Massachusetts Air National Guard 102nd Fighter Wing flies a Combat Air Patrol mission over New York City.

Above: An AMRAAM missile is loaded on an F-16 assigned to the 188th Fighter Wing, Arkansas Air National Guard.



Photo by Lt. Col. Bill Ramsay, 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard

there and called on that initial intercept.”

Shortly, Eckmann would hear an extraordinary request: “*Protect the House.*” A Secret Service agent arrived at one of Washington’s Air Traffic Control towers and wanted to talk to the flight lead.

“I took it to mean protect the White House,” Eckmann says.

Clearance to kill

~~With all available alert fighters in the air, Marr and his crew were still faced with United Flight 93. The plane was headed west, so controllers began looking for any other fighter jets that might be nearby. “We don’t have fighters that way and we think he’s headed toward Detroit or Chicago,” Marr says. “I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base (Mich.) has F-16s in the air. We contacted them so they could head off 93 at the pass. The idea is to get in there, close in on him and convince him to turn. ... As United Airlines Flight 93 was going out, we received the clearance to kill if need be. In fact, Major General Arnold’s words almost verbatim were: ‘We will take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.’”~~

But the Selfridge pilots — not part of the NORAD air sovereignty force — were unarmed. Lt. Col. Tom Froling and Maj. Douglas Champagne of the 127th Wing had just fired the last of their 20mm cannon ammunition in routine training. They were oblivious to the events in New York and Washington but heard unusual conversation over their radio frequencies.

“Something strange was occurring and I couldn’t put my finger on what was happening,” Froling says.

A Vermont Air National Guard F-16 from the 158th Fighter Wing patrols the skies above New York City on Sept. 12, 2001.





U.S. Air Force photo by Lt. Col. Terry Moultrup

"Flying over Central Park at 1,000 feet and 500 knots ... trying to identify people, that's just wrong. You should never be doing this over downtown Manhattan, watching the towers burning."

**— Lt. Col. Tim Duffy, F-15 pilot;
Massachusetts Air National Guard**

"I could hear (the FAA) Cleveland Center talking to the airlines and I started putting things together and knew something was up. Then our commander wanted to know if we'd expended our training ordinance. The only thing that went through my mind was maybe there was a problem with our airplane, maybe we missed something and shouldn't have been shooting the gun."

Froling didn't know he was being considered to shoot down an airliner. ~~Without weapons and because United Flight 93 turned away from Chicago, he never faced that decision.~~ The Michigan pilots would safely return to their base. Champagne remembers a squadron buddy running toward his jet as he was taxiing in. "I'll never forget this, it is one of the things I'll remember, I think forever," he says. "I was in the cockpit and I remember him mouthing the words to me, 'It's bad. It's really, really bad.'"

Above Manhattan, Duffy and Nash were given clearance to kill over their radio frequencies, but to this day aren't sure who gave that order. Was it NEADS or a civilian air traffic controller? ¹² Uncertain, they continued to fly over the city.

"Flying over Central Park at 1,000 feet and 500 knots ... trying to identify people, that's just wrong. You should never be doing this over downtown Manhattan, watching the towers burning," Duffy says. "We're down over Newark getting people



U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson

Above: A weary New York City firefighter surveys the destruction as he departs the area on Sept. 13, 2001. Emergency personnel worked tirelessly for more than 24 hours immediately following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that brought down the World Trade Center.

Right: Days after the attacks, a volunteer steel worker cuts a large part of debris to make it easier to haul away from the former site of the World Trade Center.



U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer's Mate Eric J. Tilford

away from the airport, and of course we're trying to get them down on the ground, or identify them. As you're coming back, the Statue of Liberty with the towers burning behind it as we're flying around, you're saying to yourself, 'This is nuts.'"

Clearing the skies

"America was under attack," Marr says, and controllers were still grappling with two planes missing and frightening rumors of bomb threats and airplane crashes that really never happened. "In less than an hour here the whole world changed."

Amid the fog and madness, Arnold and his staff were on the phone with Marr; Col. John Cromwell, Western Air Defense Sector commander; and Col. Larry Kemp, Southeast Air Defense Sector commander. They were making fast decisions as the FAA reported more information. At one point during the four-hour ordeal, 21 planes were unaccounted for, Arnold says. "We were concerned about Flight 93 and this Delta aircraft (Flight 1989) and were trying to find aircraft in the vicinity to help out," Arnold recalls.

"We didn't know where it was going to go. We were concerned about Detroit ... and the fighters up there were out of gas with no armament. Then we called a Guard unit in Toledo, Ohio, because we thought 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago. Then NEADS called another Guard unit in Syracuse, New York, and eventually got them moving in the direction of getting airplanes airborne.

"Then we watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward D.C. By now the Pentagon has been hit and we have aircraft on orbit, the 'Happy Hooligans' of the 119th at Fargo, North Dakota, (from the Langley alert detachment). They are now orbiting over Washington, D.C., and have been for awhile. As United 93 headed toward D.C., the desire is to move the fighters toward those aircraft.




Photo by Staff Sgt. Sandra Niedzwiecki, 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard

Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Senior Airman Joel Milliken, 102nd Maintenance Weapons section, repairs an F-15 during Operation Noble Eagle.

But as we discussed it in the conference call, ~~we decided not to move fighters toward 93 until it was closer because there could have been other aircraft coming in.~~ By now a number of aircraft are being called possibly hijacked ... there was a lot of confusion, as you can imagine.”

Missing planes seemed to be everywhere. “There were a number of false reports out there,” Marr says. “What was valid? What was a guess? We just didn’t know. ... We were in foreign territory; we are used to protecting the shores, way out overseas. Our processes and procedures weren’t designed for this.”

An obscure military plan, “SCATANA” — Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids — would help the FAA in its efforts to clear the skies. The commander of NORAD, Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, ordered a limited version of the Cold War-era strategy, and allowed essential aircraft like rescue helicopters to fly. The decision was made during the air threat conference call and was backed by Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta.¹³ The SCATANA order had been implemented only once before, and only for war games in 1961.

Through the fray, ~~Marr remembers hearing that the FAA was evacuating its Cleveland Center. He didn’t know why at the time and focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.~~ The North Dakota F-16s were loaded with missiles and hot guns and Marr was thinking about what these pilots might be expected to do. **“United Airlines Flight 93 would not have hit Washington, D.C.”** Marr says emphatically. **“He would have been engaged and shot down before he got there.”**

Arnold concurs: **“Thad every intention of shooting down United 93 if it continued to progress toward Washington, D.C., and any other aircraft coming toward it that day, whether we had authority or not.”**

But as the story goes, the pilots were spared the unthinkable. With the now legendary “Let’s Roll” rallying cry, the heroic passengers aboard United



Department of Defense photo

Ray Gould, Military District of Washington Engineers, stands in front of the exit point of American Airlines Flight 77 where it stopped moving through the Pentagon. The hijacked airliner had 64 people aboard and crashed at 9:38 a.m.

Airline Flight 93, pushed the terrorists in the cockpit, bringing the airliner to the ground near Shanksville, Pa. at approximately 10:03 a.m. The Boeing 757, with 44 people aboard, reportedly dropped 1,200 feet in 12 seconds. ¹⁴ Lives were taken in the air to save lives on the ground.

The Langley-based pilots were 96 miles away, Marr says. In Cleveland, Delta Flight 1989 landed safely, but the NEADS crew wouldn't learn that until later.

What was going to happen next? Staff Sgt. Mark Jennings, NEADS tracking technician, remembers asking himself: "Was the fourth one the last one and would there be more? It made me sit back and say, 'Is the world falling apart on us?' It was scary and there was a real feeling of uncertainty."

Marr began thinking out loud: "I turned to the staff and said, 'What more can we do? Let's get everyone in the air and see what they can provide us.'"

They needed help and literally went down the list calling every regular Air Force and Air National Guard unit in the northeast. "We just started opening our phone rosters and were trying to figure out which different Air Force units there were in the interior of the United States," Deskins says. "And we called these units individually to see if they could get planes up."

And it wasn't happening like it normally would, she says. Enlisted personnel were calling colonels directly, asking for their help. Rank didn't matter and virtually everyone would commit to getting fighters airborne. "It was unbelievable," says Tech. Sgt. Michael Cavalier, NEADS senior director technician. "There were Guard units I'd never heard of calling us asking how they could help. And we said, 'Yes, take off.'"

Canadian Forces Capt. Brian Nagel, who was chief of NEADS live exercises, says "guys were getting airborne from a news report and phone call from us."

"I called up one unit and the guy says, 'Who are you and what do you want?'" Nagel recalls. "I

told him to go watch CNN and that I'd phone him back. So I phone him back and he says, 'Here's what we've got and here's what we can do for you.'"

As Col. Robert Knauff, commander of the 174th Fighter Wing in Syracuse, told Marr: "Give us 10 minutes, we can arm up guns; give us 30 minutes, we can put heat-seekers on the wings; give us an hour, and we'll put radar missiles on board." The first two Syracuse-based F-16s were up by 10:44 a.m. ¹⁵ Two more fighters were up a few minutes later, but there was no time to load missiles on any of them. The pilots' mission was vague, but they believed an airliner was heading toward Washington, D.C.

"Our pilots were told to get in the air and get



Photo by Master Sgt. Tom Louis, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard

Security Forces Senior Airman Raynaldo Baez of the New Jersey Air National Guard 177th Fighter Wing stands guard on the flight line Sept. 15, 2001.




Photo by Master Sgt. Don Taggart, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard

From left, New Jersey Air National Guardsmen Senior Airman James Keefe, Airman 1st Class Frank Dolcemascolo and Staff Sgt. Richard Johnson, 177th Fighter Wing weapons load crew members, raise an AIM-120A using an MJ1 bomb lift "Jammer." The missile was loaded onto an F-16 for an Operation Noble Eagle mission.

their tasking from NEADS once airborne," says Col. Tony Basile, 174th Fighter Wing vice commander. "The first two airborne were trying to intercept the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania but that airplane had actually hit the ground. ... There were several others NEADS wasn't sure of, so our mission was to intercept those airplanes."

The Ohio Air National Guard 180th Fighter Wing was the first unit outside the East Coast to answer the sector's plea. Controllers notified the wing at 10:01 a.m.; several armed F-16s departed Toledo Express Airport at 10:17 a.m., according to wing records.

Jets from the 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard, were airborne within an hour after the Pentagon attack, says Col. Mike Cosby, wing commander. And the F-16s were fully loaded.

"The mind-set a lot of old military guys have is

that the Guard is the standby force," Marr says. "But these Guard guys got up very, very quickly."



As pilots and aircrews throughout the country went to battle, historic events were taking place at the highest levels.

"As this is all transpiring extraordinarily rapidly ... some five minutes after United Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, President George W. Bush, through Vice President Dick Cheney, gave authority to shoot down civilian airplanes that looked like they were going to be used as fuel-air bombs," Arnold says. "I have the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition ... but it was comforting to know we legally had the authority

from the president of the United States.”

The order would go even further in Washington, D.C., where local airspace was declared a “weapons-free” zone.¹⁶ Fighter pilots were given unparalleled orders to fire upon anything around the nation’s capital that refused to respond to Air Traffic Control or NORAD direction.

“The president had declared Washington, D.C., and national capital region to be a free-fire zone,” Arnold says. “That is very unprecedented. It meant if a pilot saw an airplane within a 30-mile radius of Washington, D.C., and couldn’t determine if it was a doctor flying back to his hometown, that pilot was not only allowed to, but expected to shoot that airplane down.”

Some F-16 pilots from the 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, were prepared to do it. They weren’t in communication with NEADS that morning but knew their home city was in trouble. The wing, at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., is not part of the NORAD air sovereignty force and did not have an alert mission. But that did not stop pilots there from taking off to protect Washington, D.C., just miles from their own flight line.

Weapons-free zone

As the twin towers were burning live on CNN, weapons officer Maj. Dan Caine was worried. Not only was the country under terrorist attack, but three of the 113th Wing’s F-16 pilots had not returned from a training mission. As the “SOF” — Supervisor of Flying — that morning, Caine was responsible for seeing those jets return safely to base.

“I called the Andrews tower and asked them if any Air Traffic Control measures were starting to go into effect with an eye toward the recovery of our airplanes,” Caine says. “They indicated there was not and I called our contact at the Secret Service. He told me he wasn’t sure, but that things were happening and he’d call me back. It was a very quick, confusing conversation.”

Andrews is home to Air Force One, and 113th Wing pilots are used to working with the Secret Service, but “weren’t thinking about defending anything,” says Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville, commander of the wing’s 121st Fighter Squadron. “Our primary concern was what would happen with the air




Photo by Tech. Sgt. Corensa Brooks, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard



Photos by Tech. Sgt. Corensa Brooks, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard



Above: Weapons load crew members from the 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, work feverishly to arm an F-16 for a mission over Washington, D.C., on Sept. 11, 2001.

Left: District of Columbia Air National Guardsman Master Sgt. Steve Proctor, 113th Wing aircraft generation squadron, loads bullets onto an F-16.

Opposite page: The weapons are driven across Andrews Air Force Base, Md., for delivery to the flight line on Sept. 11.



Photos by Tech. Sgt. Corensa Brooks, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard

Above: District of Columbia Air National Guardsmen Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville, 113th Wing F-16 pilot, and Senior Master Sgt. Jackie Dade, 113th Wing aircraft generation squadron flight chief, discuss the mission prior to takeoff on Sept. 11, 2001.

Right: An F-16 maintainer from the 113th Wing directs a jet on the runway at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., on Sept. 11, 2001.

traffic system.”¹⁷

But the Secret Service would soon call back: “(The agent) asked, ‘Can you get airplanes up?’” Caine recalls. “Then he told us to stand by and that somebody else would call. When I heard the tone in his voice, I called our bomb dump and told them to uncrate our missiles.”

On the opposite side of Andrews Air Force Base, the 113th Wing munitions crew began unloading bullets and AIM-9 “Sidewinders” from storage sheds. “There were six of us there and we had 28 missiles to unload, and they each have three components” says Senior Master Sgt. David Bowman, 113th Wing munitions supervisor. “And if you

drop one, you can’t use it anymore. We were doing it as fast as we could, because for all we knew the terrorists were getting ready to hit us.”

As the crew carefully but quickly loaded the weapons onto a flatbed trailer, the phone was ringing again at the squadron operations desk. Caine answered a phone call from someone in the White House requesting armed fighters over Washington. “I could hear plain as day the vice president talking in the background,” Caine says. “That’s basically where we got the execute order. It was ‘VFR (Visual Flight Rules) direct.’”

“I handed the phone to my commander and said, ‘I’m going to go fly.’”

Brig. Gen. David Wherley Jr., 113th Wing commander, had just arrived at the operations desk. He would find himself on several phone calls that morning, desperately seeking airborne authorization for his fighters. "I dial the White House JOC (Joint Operations Center) and the news is showing the White House with people running out the front door," Wherley says. "And the phone rings about eight times before somebody picks up and ... they have nobody in uniform, it was all Secret Service people and a team communicating with the president."

A woman at the JOC — the Secret Service command and control center — answered the phone. "I'm thinking these are civilians and they don't deal in the language of the military, the rules of engagement, so I asked her, 'What do they want me to do?'" he recalls. "She was standing next to the vice president (Dick Cheney) and she said, 'They want you to put a CAP up.'"

"Basically what they told me, and this is another one of those things that's clear in my mind ... 'We want you to intercept any airplane that attempts to fly closer than 20 miles around any airport around the Washington area. ... Attempt to turn them away, do whatever you can to turn them away and if they won't turn away use whatever force is necessary ... to keep them from hitting a building downtown.'"

Everything was happening at once, says wing safety officer Lt. Col. Phil Thompson, who was now the acting SOF. "We were taking calls from the Secret Service and Washington Center," he recalls. "We have a special relationship with the Secret Service and know these guys by name and face. ... They were worried about Flight 93."

In the 113th Wing intelligence office, Maj. David

McNulty and Senior Airman Juan Garcia were hurriedly calling every agency from the CIA to FBI to FAA to authenticate the flood of information. "I even called the National Security Agency 24-hour information desk and they knew nothing more than I did," McNulty says. "We were all getting our information from CNN. But the White House JOC told me eight planes were unaccounted for."

Three wing F-16s, meanwhile, were still airborne. "We had gone up to (the gunnery range in) Dare County, North Carolina, to drop some bombs and hit a refueling tanker and come on back," says flight lead Maj. Billy Hutchison. "It was going to be an uneventful day. It was actually a beautiful day."


"We're about halfway back when I am able to talk to the SOF, Lt. Col. Phil Thompson, who is at the desk with Brigadier General Wherley," he says. "Because they've seen what has happened on TV, they tell me to return to base 'buster'; buster means as fast as the aircraft will fly. So we light afterburners and we are coming back at Mach as


quick as we can get back. ... As I get back, I cross the Potomac River on the south end of Maryland and Virginia, and I see a big column of smoke. It was so clear and there was no haze in the air. I tell the SOF, 'It looks like there's been an explosion near (Ronald Reagan Washington) National Airport. What's going on?'"

"He said, 'We know. Just keep coming.'"

As Hutchison approached the runway to touch down, Thompson and Wherley inquired over the radio about the trio's fuel status. Nobody had enough gas, but Hutchison had the most. Although he was at 2,800 pounds — like one-eighth a tank in your car — Wherley told him to take off again.







Department of Defense photo by Tech. Sgt. Cedric H. Rudisill

An aerial view Sept. 14, 2001, of the destruction caused when a hijacked commercial jetliner crashed into the Pentagon on Sept 11, 2001.

“I was given information to intercept an aircraft coming toward D.C. and prevent it from reaching D.C.,” Hutchison says.

“We had something coming down the Potomac at low altitude,” Thompson says. “Brigadier General Wherley is standing here and we’ve got the tower with the Secret Service agent and they want us to launch anything we’ve got. And the general said, ‘Do it.’”

Hutchison taxied at high speed down the runway and took off at 10:33 a.m. ~~18 “I was already cleared through tower, who is listening to Washington. Approach frantic with what they seem to think are aircraft coming their way. ... There is another aircraft, and it’s United Flight 93. They don’t know what’s going on, but only know the direction it’s coming and apparently have been given information that it’s coming their way.”~~

~~In reality, United Airlines Flight 93 had crashed 30 minutes earlier, but in the haze and fog of war that tragic day, that information was unavailable.~~ Hutchison continued looking for the plane. “I took off without afterburner to conserve fuel, go across the White House over the Georgetown area and continue northwest up the Potomac,” he says.

When Hutchison reached the northern part of the river near Frederick, Md., controllers at Washington Center asked him to change course. “They asked me to turn to D.C. and all the while my gas is depleting,” he says. “And I don’t have live bullets, just training rounds.”

“I terminate the intercept and come back to D.C.,” Hutchison says. “Washington Center is still vectoring me around trying to pick up potential threats to the area which happened to be helicopters actually responding to the Pentagon scene. All the while, when I took off from Andrews, I could see what was going on over the Pentagon because I was so low. But it wasn’t until I actually flew past it that I actually saw it was the Pentagon. I circled at a couple of hundred feet at the most just to, one, investigate, and two, give the people on the ground some semblance of security of an American fighter

coming by. And apparently it changed the mood for a lot of people when they saw that.

"After that point, I'm emergency fuel, the lowest I've ever been in an F-16, and tell Washington Center I must leave and they say I'm cleared to return to base and that two more aircraft are coming out of Andrews."



Sasseville and Capt. Heather Penney were on their way. Before they stepped to the jets, Wherley made very clear what they might have to do: "My translation of the rules to 'Sass' was, 'You have weapons-free flight-lead control,'" Wherley says. "I said, 'Do you understand what I'm asking you to do?'"

"And they both said: 'Yes.'"

"And I told them to be careful. It was important for them to understand that this was weapons-free."

Weapons loaders on the ramp were working feverishly to arm missiles, but there was no time. Sasseville and Penney took off from Andrews at 10:42 a.m.¹⁹ Their planes were loaded with 20mm training rounds, hardly enough to bring down an airliner, they concede. "Sass looked at me and his eyes were just burning," says Penney, a rookie pilot and lieutenant at the time. "We were running to the jets and jumped in our airplanes and we didn't even have a full load on the guns. I'd never scrambled before, I'd never done this."

"I was screaming to the maintainers to pull the chocks and the guys were pulling the pins to arm the guns," she recalls. "We were going without INS (Inertial Navigation System)."

The two were in their jets watching Hutchison take off before them and listening to scants of in-

Airplanes line the runway of Halifax International Airport, Nova Scotia, after being diverted there Sept. 11, 2001. More than 7,000 passengers were affected.

formation on their radio frequencies. "I don't have the whole picture, but have word from Washington National Approach that something is coming," Sasseville says. "We had hot guns, but only training bullets. ... I'm thinking, 'Wow, we're in a little trouble here.'"

Penney and Sasseville would fly at low altitudes over the capital, Pentagon burning in the distance, unaware the North Dakota pilots were hovering around 20,000 feet. The North Dakota pilots were communicating with controllers at NEADS; the Washington, D.C., pilots with civilian controllers at the FAA. The pilots were on different radio frequencies, but would all hear remarkable words on a shared channel: "*Attention all aircraft monitoring Andrews tower frequency. Andrews and Class Bravo airspace is closed. No general aviation aircraft are permitted to enter Class Bravo airspace. Any infractions will be shot down.*"²⁰

"When we took off I hadn't even thought about how I would down an airplane," Penney says. "Later I'm thinking, 'I only have 100 bullets. What am I going to do?'"

"I could make one pass with the gun, maybe I could scrape my gear on the wing, but it didn't hit me until two weeks later that's what they expected us to do. ... I was in war mode; the emotional element wasn't relevant to what I had to do."

Sasseville, an airline pilot on a military leave of absence, also thought about how he might bring down an airliner, and says it was a scary proposition. "We're talking about shooting down a U.S. air carrier with Americans on board, the whole gamut, women and children," he says. "We had no real weapons and we didn't have a whole lot of options. Once you make that decision, how are you going to do that with the limited ordnance you have? In combat, as long as you can disable an airplane, depending on your role, you've done your job."

"I was going into this moral or ethical justification of the needs of the many to the needs of the few," he says. "The passengers on United Flight 93 went through that same thing. They made the

"The events of 11 September were an imponderable, unknowable circumstance. We performed magnificently."

**— Gen. John Jumper,
Air Force chief of staff**

decision we didn't have to make."

With minds racing, Sasseville and Penney continued flying and say they found an aerial ghost town over the normally busy Washington, D.C. Two more 113th Wing F-16 pilots, Caine and Capt. Brandon Rasmussen, would take off a few minutes after them, but their jets would each be armed with hot guns and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.

Chief Master Sgt. Roy Belknap, 113th Wing production superintendent, watched in amazement as crews loaded live ordnance with pilots in the cockpits. "That's the first time that has ever happened here," the 33-year veteran says. "Our guys were hanging live AIM-9s with aircrews in airplanes waiting for us to get done so they could crank and go. What they did was unprecedented."

By the book, it takes three hours to bring weapons from storage sheds and load them on the jets, but on Sept. 11, 2001, it took the 113th Wing weapons crews 45 minutes, Belknap says.

Rasmussen says his adrenaline level was high as he took off toward the great unknown. "Once maintenance armed us up, we took off," he says. "I had never flown with real missiles and had never so much as seen them on the jet."

"We take to the air and are talking to Washington Center on the radio and we're used to working with AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) weapons controllers or GCI (Ground Control Intercept). ... We knew NORAD had implemented SCATANA and three things have already been hit when we get up in the air. So we're trying to identify people who are not talking to Air

Traffic Control. ... We probably intercepted five to 10 aircraft apiece."

Although they were in weapons-free airspace, none of the pilots believed anything they encountered was enough of a threat to actually shoot, but "quite a few people got scared out of the air," Rasmussen says. "On that day, we owned the universe over D.C. at any altitude, any location, as long as it was in the interest of protecting the capital."

Adds Caine, "Certainly there were times when rules of engagement triggers were met, but not executed and thankfully so. Cooler heads prevailed or it could have been an even uglier day than it was."



In efforts to clear the skies above Washington, Happy Hooligan F-16 pilots Eckmann and Derrig were directed to intercept some low-altitude unknowns. Those "unknowns" were their military brethren from the District of Columbia Air National Guard.

"Air Traffic Control had started turning everyone away from Washington, D.C.," Eckmann says. "Normally it's a pretty busy area and we were getting vectored on people who weren't obeying that. We got vectored on the D.C. guys taking off out of Andrews ... the military knew they were taking off but Air Traffic Control didn't realize they were military."

The 113th Wing pilots "started in a low Combat Air Patrol and didn't even know we were there," Eckmann says. "They did a fantastic job getting there in the amount of time they did. That was great, considering they weren't on alert. I know how much time it takes to put missiles on planes, and they were fast."

Soon the pilots would all end up on the same frequency. "About halfway through our sortie, we learned about three other F-16s that had been airborne a lot longer than we had," Sasseville says. "We were all airborne at the same time but nobody knew it."

As Sasseville was commanding the low-altitude



Photo by Steve Emmons




Photo courtesy of Halifax International Airport Authority



U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conducts the first Pentagon briefing after the terrorist attack there Sept. 11, 2001. He is joined by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since retired, and Sen. John Warner, Virginia.

CAP, the Happy Hooligans commanded their own CAP several thousand feet above. "At first a low CAP and high-altitude CAP emerged," Eckmann says. "It took awhile before we were all talking on the same radio. We had two different units here and two different things going on. I had set up a racetrack CAP and he (Sasseville) had set up a tactical CAP.


"We eventually said, 'Here's what we're going to do, we'll take care of the high CAP and you guys take care of the low CAP.' As it progressed ... planes started moving up for fuel conservation and soon the lowest CAP altitude was 10,000 feet, but at that time we had everything cleared."

Essential AWACS and refueling aircraft would arrive sent by the CONR and NEADS leaders.

With a good radar picture and enough fuel, Sasseville and the other pilots used Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as their "bull's-eye." By dividing the airspace into four sections, they could better communicate with the FAA about the locations of unknown aircraft. Virtually every pilot who flew that day has nothing but praise for FAA controllers who quickly learned to speak the language of the military.

"Nobody had trained to do this," Sasseville says. "But everybody pitched in to make it happen. Everybody was doing smart, safe things, from operations crews to the maintainers setting up airplanes and loading live AMRAAMs (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles)."

Gen. John Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, would



White House photo by Eric Draper

After departing Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., President George W. Bush confers with Vice President Dick Cheney from Air Force One during his flight to Andrews Air Force Base, Md., Sept. 11, 2001. The president's aircraft was escorted by armed fighter jets, including F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard. The president was a member of the Houston-area unit in the early 1970s.

later reflect: "The events of 11 September were an imponderable, unknowable circumstance. We performed magnificently."²¹

Eberhart, NORAD commander, concurs: "I will always believe there would have been other attacks had we not grounded airplanes and got the fighters airborne."²²

Guarding the president

As Air National Guard pilots were flying CAPs above Washington, D.C., President Bush was departing Sarasota, Fla., on Air Force One. Arnold

and his staff at the CONR Air Operations Center were coordinating the president's movement and scrambling fighters to keep him safe. All the while, reported hijackings were rampant.

"An AWACS was flying a training mission off the coast of Florida," Arnold recalls. "President Bush was in Sarasota and we moved the AWACS toward the president. Then we received tasking from the Secret Service through the Joint Staff and NORAD to follow the president and protect him."²³

Months earlier, Arnold had made arrangements with Brig. Gen. Ben Robinson, then-commander of the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., for AWACS support during exercises

simulating attacks on the United States. Now the AWACS would be flown in a real-world scenario that only hours before was unimaginable.

"The AWACS pilot thought it was an exercise and we then told him what happened at the World Trade Center," Arnold says. "He realized his responsibility was to follow the president. We told him to follow Air Force One and he asked the question we all asked: 'Where is it going?' We said, 'We can't tell you. Just follow it.'"

The Southeast Air Defense Sector — SEADS — put pilots from the Minnesota Air National Guard 148th Fighter Wing at Tyndall Air Force Base on battle stations. Pilots sat in their cockpits awaiting word to go, but Air Force One moved so quickly they were never scrambled. Alert fighters from Ellington Field, Texas, were scrambled instead. Four F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard, escorted President Bush from the panhandle of Florida to Barksdale Air Force Base, La. The president was being escorted by some of his own — he flew F-102 interceptors for the Houston-area unit in the early 1970s.

By the time the president landed at Barksdale, the Louisiana Air National Guard 159th Fighter Wing, New Orleans, already had four of its F-15s loaded with live missiles. The unit, not normally part of the NORAD alert system, was scrambled by SEADS about the same time the president was leaving the base. "As we were all watching the news, the wing leadership decided to configure our jets and get ready," says Maj. Jeff Woelbling, 122nd Fighter Squadron weapons officer. "Our weapons guys were hustling to get missiles on the rails. When I got to the jet, the maintainer told me he needed five more minutes. I said, 'You've got three.' He did it in about a minute and a half."

Nobody knew where the president was headed. "When Air Force One took off out of Barksdale, we were scrambled because SEADS didn't know his route of flight," says Lt. Col. Randy Riccardi, who was the 122nd Fighter Squadron commander at the time. "We were in a four-ship and turned

north toward Barksdale and the president was already airborne. We were 300 miles behind him since SEADS didn't know where he was going."

"It wasn't until the president was near Offutt (Air Force Base, Neb.), that we turned around and came back," Riccardi says. "That was about a 90-minute mission and later, at about 5:15, we were scrambled again."

"We ended up flying a six-hour and 15-minute mission over Houston that night," Riccardi says.

The response in Louisiana that day was indicative of the quick reactions across the Air National Guard map. The military's homeland defense mission was just beginning.



Somewhere in the southern skies was Air Force One, having left Barksdale for an undisclosed location. "When we left Barksdale we didn't know where we were going," says Maj. Shane Brotherton, a Texas Air National Guard F-16 pilot who escorted the president's plane that morning. "We were actually about to run out of gas when a SEADS controller told us a tanker was on its way. We were flying north two miles directly behind Air Force One and didn't know where we'd be landing. They wouldn't tell us, so we just kept getting more gas."

By the time Air Force One landed at Offutt Air Force Base, the F-16s were so heavy from refueling that the pilots had to burn off gas before they could land, Brotherton says. Once on the ground, they had a meeting with the pilot of Air Force One, who asked them about the capabilities of the F-16. The Air Force One aircraft commander couldn't tell them where they were going next, so the F-16 pilots couldn't file a flight plan. They got a candy bar and soda instead.

As the pilots were waiting, President Bush and his team were joining the air threat conference call. By this time, Arnold and Marr were also on the line.

"We were watching potentially hijacked air-

craft," Arnold says. "I'm on the phone listening to the president talk to the secretary of defense and they were concerned about an aircraft that had taken off from Madrid and was going to land at John F. Kennedy International. ... We didn't know where that plane was. About that time, Bob Marr calls me, who was also on the conference call, but called me directly and said, 'We just talked to the airline and that aircraft is back on the ground in Madrid.' "

"I picked up the hot line and said, 'Mr. President, this is the CONR commander. ... No problem with Madrid.' It was valid information and the president said, 'OK, then I'm getting airborne.' "

The F-16 pilots there to escort the president were still waiting word to go. "The Air Force One pilot had gotten our cell phone numbers and said he'd call us when we'd be leaving," Brotherton says. "We were eating our snacks and heard jet noise. It was Air Force One and they'd never called us. We got to the jets and he's taxiing fast and never stopped. Now we're taxiing fast and we blast off. By the time we got airborne, he was 100 miles in front of us. ... Air Force One is fast but you wouldn't think so. But it can move. There were some Sioux City guys (Iowa Air National Guard) up there but the Air Force One pilot told them he'd had the Texas boys with him from the start. All across the country we were playing catch up, because he was moving. And we didn't catch up until we were nearing Washington."

As the president's 747 was approaching Andrews Air Force Base, the North Dakota and District of Columbia pilots were still flying CAPs over the city. A number of fighter jets from across the northeast had joined them. "It was like someone kicked a hornet's nest," one pilot remembers.

Soon the FAA would report an aircraft racing toward Air Force One. Fighter jets quickly intercepted the unknown, a Lear business jet in the wrong place at the wrong time. Air Force One touched down safely at Andrews, surrounded by



armed fighter escorts. The president boarded his Marine One helicopter and arrived at the White House around 7 p.m.

The airplane that had landed in Madrid was the last possible hijacking in the air that day.



From his radar scope, NEADS Master Sgt. Joe McCain believes he saw American Airlines Flight 11 disappear over New York on Sept. 11, 2001. It was 8:46 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a tragic tick of the clock that forever

Two F-16 fighters assigned to the Texas Air National Guard 147th Fighter Wing are armed and ready to respond to unknown threats. Pilots from the Houston-area unit escorted Air Force One across the country Sept. 11, 2001.



Photo by Lans Stout for Code One magazine

seared itself into the American psyche. It was the unforgettable moment when the first of hundreds of innocent victims were killed that day. Twelve hours later, after a day that seemed like an eternity yet flew by remarkably fast, Joe McCain was home with his family.

"I have three kids and my youngest is 8," McCain says. "I'm sitting there at the kitchen table taking off my boots. It's the worst day I've ever had in the service and my son asks, 'Daddy, are they going to get us?' I told him he was safe, but the next few days I'd be gone a lot.

"That's what brought it home for me."



1 Northeast Air Defense Sector, transcript of recorded phone conversations between the sector and Federal Aviation Administration, 11 September 2001, n.p.

2 Larry K. Arnold, telephone interview with author, 25 July 2002.

3 William A. Scott, 2001. *Operation Noble Eagle: September 11, 2001, Air War Over America*. Panama City, Fla.: Microsoft PowerPoint presentation.

4 H. Darr Beiser, "Amid terror, a drastic decision: Clear the skies," *USA Today* online, 16 August 2002, n.p.

5 Hart Seely, "They scrambled jets, but it was a race they could not win," *The (Syracuse, N.Y.) Post-Standard*, 20 January 2002, sec. 1A, p. 6.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

7 William B. Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, June 3, 2002, 48.

8 Beiser, n.p.

9 Northeast Air Defense Sector, transcript, n.p.

10 Robert Marr, 2001. *America Under Attack: 11 Sep 01*. Rome, N.Y.: Microsoft PowerPoint presentation; Dean Eckmann, telephone interview with author, 6 December 2002.

11 Eckmann, telephone interview with author.

12 Tim Duffy, telephone interview with author, 22 October 2002.

13 Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks," 48.

14 Robert Marr, interview with author, 25 June 2002.

15 Robert Marr, 2001. *America Under Attack: 11 Sep 01*.

16 Larry K. Arnold, telephone interview with author, 27 November 2002.

17 William B. Scott, "F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 9, 2002, 7.

18 David F. Wherley Jr., 113th Wing operations desk records of 11 September 2001.

19 *Ibid.*


20 Heather Penney, interview with author, 18 September 2002; recording from cockpit provided to William A. Scott by David F. Wherley Jr.

21 William A. Scott, conversation with author, 16 December 2002, said in a speech by Gen. John Jumper at 2002 CSAF Doctrine Summit, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 10 December 2002.

22 Ralph E. Eberhart, press conference at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., 1 August 2002.

23 Eric Hehs, "Major General Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida," *Code One, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company*, First Quarter 2002, 6.





With smoke still rising from Ground Zero, the Statue of Liberty was a warm sight for sailors aboard the USNS Comfort as they transited the Hudson for relief efforts.

U.S. Navy photo by PH2 Aaron Peterson

CHAPTER 4

THE NOBLE EAGLE FLIES: Threat suddenly changes



Air defense new priority as terrorists turn airliners into weapons of war

The images that kept Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold awake at night were like eerie plots in a sci-fi horror film: cruise missiles, nukes, biological warfare, chemicals, and airplanes in the hands of terrorists.

"I lie awake worrying," Arnold told The Associated Press in early 2000. "It is one thing to put a truck inside the twin trade towers and blow it up. It is quite another to be able to fly a weapon across our borders. That is an attack, a direct attack, an unambiguous attack from outside our country."¹

Then Sept. 11 happened, a twisted nightmare far scarier than Arnold ever could have imagined. With a Cold War mentality that the demons would come from outside America's shores, Arnold and his staff were blindsided when the fear struck from within. "No, we did not envision people hijacking airplanes from within the United States, taking over those aircraft and using them as fuel-air bombs," says the retired commander of 1st Air Force and the Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region. "As much as you brief what could happen in the future, I think from an intellectual standpoint, we realized the





**Minnesota Air National Guard F-16s
assigned to the 148th Fighter Wing fly
Combat Air Patrol missions over
Washington, D.C., in support of Operation
Noble Eagle.**



Photos by Master Sgt. Dean Kuhlman, 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard

greatest threat to the United States prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was going to be a terrorist attack. But I did not envision that it would be hijacked airplanes run into buildings like that.”

In the world before Sept. 11, Arnold had visions of light aircraft sneaking across America’s air borders to wage biological, chemical or nuclear attack. And he wasn’t convinced the NORAD alert fighter force was big enough to stop it. The asymmetric threat — the small, unknown enemy preying upon the behemoth United States — was a nagging, constant worry. “That was our thought,” Arnold says. “That is what our mission was about. Our mission was not about the internal threat.”

“We thought an attack in the United States was a law enforcement issue, and it was, right up until Sept. 11.”





The night of the attacks, 119th Fighter Wing pilot Capt. Craig Borgstrom descended his F-16 “Fighting Falcon” into Langley Air Force Base, Va., after hours of intercept missions over Washington, D.C. As he taxied his aircraft safely in, he still didn’t know all that had happened in his country that day. But the scene through the jet canopy told him everything had changed.

“When we recovered into our alert facility, there were more missiles on our ramp than my eyes have ever seen,” the North Dakota Air National Guardsman says. “At this point, I still had no idea about the airliners. I pulled into the alert barn and there were load teams with missiles and trailers everywhere. I talked to the crew chief and my first question was, ‘What else did they get?’ He wasn’t sure, but thought there were others at that point. I knew a really terrible thing had happened.”

There was a new threat now: It was on the inside and sent America’s air sovereignty mission reeling.

When Arnold went to sleep Sept. 10, 2001, he had 14 alert fighters on his watch, all dedicated to





protecting thousands of miles of American air borders. When Arnold finally went to sleep just before sunrise Sept. 12, America's air sovereignty force had been catapulted into a full-fledged air defense arsenal, with more than 400 alert fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft and tankers poised for battle.² The seven alert sites around the periphery of the continental United States grew ten times over to 69-plus sites scattered about the country.³ Not even the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 saw such a build up of raw air power.⁴ Within days, America's military had a new mission: Operation Noble Eagle. The Noble Eagle name encompasses U.S. military operations associated with homeland defense and civil support to federal, state and local agencies — air defense playing a major role.⁵ More than 30 Air National Guard fighter wings and nearly two dozen refueling wings were immediately mobilized; President George W. Bush, meanwhile, approved the call up of up to 50,000 military reservists.⁶

Long-standing principles succumbed to the rapid response. A Civil War-era military code, the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibits federal troops from performing civil law enforcement duties, was waived at the highest levels. "Operation Noble Eagle operations were cleared of Posse Comitatus issues by the National Command Authorities," says retired Col. William A. Scott, 1st Air Force director of plans, programs and requirements. "The NCA directed this response because law enforcement agencies don't have the capabilities we have to deal with a hijacked airborne threat."

As for formal deployment orders, initially there were none. "The kinds of missions our people were flying were the kinds of missions you'd fly in defense of counterair in any theater deployed to, like Southern Watch or Northern Watch," Arnold says. "But our people weren't deployed anywhere."

Instead of Baghdad, airmen found themselves flying defensive patterns over their own cities and homes like San Francisco and Dallas, a radically different concept for the NORAD

A New York City firefighter pauses amid the devastation of the World Trade Center Sept. 15, 2001.

U.S. Navy photo by Journalist 1st Class Preston Keres





U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class J. Scott Campbell

air sovereignty force. Suddenly, 1st Air Force and CONR were coordinating air defense operations within America and still maintaining the traditional look outward.

“Early on, which made things a lot simpler, Gen. (Ralph E.) Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, named me the Joint Force Air Component Commander,” Arnold explains. “Along with that title, I was the Area Air Defense Commander and along with that the air control authority for the continental United States. ... If someone wanted to fly a plane, they had to come through us, when we the military, still had control of the airspace.”

Essentially, Arnold was responsible for “anything that flew in the United States,” he says, and could order a civilian airliner shot down by one of his own. It was a tall order, but Arnold is a tall man.

Guarding the homeland

In the immediate wake of Sept. 11, civilian aviation was brought to a historic standstill. Hundreds of planes were packed like sardines on Canadian runways in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.

For several weeks, NORAD and the joint Department of Defense and Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Services Cell served as the hub of all government and civilian air traffic in the United States.⁷ In that dramatic twist to NORAD’s traditional mission, scores of fighters, tankers and surveillance aircraft were flying both planned and random Combat Air Patrols across the nation and

Petty Officer 3rd Class Edmond Scott directs an E-2C “Hawkeye” from Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125 into launch position on the flight deck of the USS George Washington (CVN 73), Sept. 13, 2001. The Norfolk, Va.-based ship was providing air defense to New York City while waiting for tasking from NORAD.




Photo by Senior Airman Brett R. Ewald, 149th Fighter Wing, Minnesota

round-the-clock sorties over New York and Washington, D.C. Instead of 14 jets, more than 100 fighters were on alert at 30 bases around the country.⁸ Just as many tankers and AWACS were available to counter the domestic air threat.⁹

For F-15 pilots Maj. Robert Martyn and Martin Richard, Operation Noble Eagle began the day they saw the World Trade Center burn. The Massachusetts Air National Guardsmen were some of the first scrambled when hijackers took over the skies Sept. 11. Running to their "Eagles," they were fixated on what they just heard from the 102nd Fighter Wing intelligence officer: *"There could be 20 more of these out there."*

The frantic scramble orders of Sept. 11 evolved into six months of nonstop patrols over cities; "National Special Security Events" like the 2002 Winter Olympics; and key infrastructure across the nation. Martyn, Richard and thousands of other airmen were suddenly and urgently defending their own country against an unknown, intangible aggressor. "We have basically drilled holes in the sky since that day," Martyn said a year after the attacks.

Operations at home bring a unique sense of responsibility. "On missions overseas, there's more of an individual, a personal threat to you," Martyn says. "If your motors quit, you're going to have a

tough life in Iraq. And it's a team burden to the Air Force. Over the States, there's more the feeling you're a policeman. I'm not the one being threatened here. ... The threat is much higher to civilians and everyone else than it is to us. I feel more like I'm protecting my kid than myself. Ultimately, there is no threat to me flying around in an F-15. It's safer than driving around in my car, but Southwest Asia is not like that."



Homeland air defense wouldn't come without costs and presented new challenges for NORAD and its forces. Round-the-clock sorties and the support needed to fly them was stressing the jets, robbing pilots of crucial training and working maintenance troops overtime.

"Right after Sept. 11, and what became very obvious, was the operations tempo of our flying units," Arnold says. "We would have to persuade Air Combat Command and the rest of the Air Force to put Operation Noble Eagle into the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces."

The AEF Center cycles Air Force units through deployments like operations Northern and Southern Watch. "Prior to Sept. 11, we'd been unsuccessful in getting the AEF Center to be responsible for relieving our air defense units when they went overseas," Arnold says. "In the aftermath of Sept. 11, it became critical that we become a part of the AEF system. But it took awhile ... until about November, when we were able to persuade the Air Force there had to be relief, that these people could not do this."

Within the first five months of the operation, Noble Eagle sorties exceeded those flown over Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom.¹⁰ According to NORAD records, from September to December 2001, the command responded to 214 domestic aviation events in response to FAA requests. In 88 of those instances, alert fighters were scrambled; 126 others were diverted from Com-



Photo by Eric Hehs, Code One magazine

Above: Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold was commander of 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region from December 1997 until August 2002. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, he directed Operation Noble Eagle forces and spearheaded major improvements in America's air defenses. He retired after 37 years of service.

Left: Senior Airman Adam Skadsberg, weapons loader, 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard, uploads 20mm ammunition into the F-16 gun system as Tech. Sgt. Kent Larson stands by. Both airmen and hundreds of others from the unit were activated in support of Operation Noble Eagle.



Photo by Master Sgt. Don Taggart, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard

Weapons load team members from the 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard, load an AIM-120 on an F-16 Oct. 4, 2001, in support of Operation Noble Eagle. Tech. Sgt. Wendell Hunte operates the MJ1 "Jammer" bomb lift; Master Sgt. Frank Buzby and Senior Airman James Keefer attach the AIM-120 to the aircraft; Senior Airman Neil March performs gun maintenance inside the access panel; and Senior Airman Tina Chaffins waits to install the control surfaces on the AIM-120.

bat Air Patrols. In the same period a year earlier, NORAD scrambled or diverted fighters 21 times.¹¹

The scrambles — and sometimes intercepts — have drawn their share of media attention. In the summer of 2002, controllers at the Western Air Defense Sector scrambled two Arizona Air National Guard F-16s toward a Cessna squawking a hijack frequency.¹² It turned out to be a rookie pilot who accidentally hit the wrong switch.

In another incident, the Washington-based sector scrambled Oregon Air National Guard F-15s when a pilot threatened to ram his small plane into the tallest building in Portland.¹³ It happened to be the same day a movie was being filmed nearby.

"We scrambled F-15s from the 142nd Fighter Wing in Portland and the pilot saw explosions on the ground," says WADS Commander Col. John Cromwell. "He had a sickening feeling that he failed until he found out the explosions were coming from a movie set."

Commercial flights have been under extreme scrutiny since Sept. 11. "There was a bomb scare on a flight from Honolulu to Seattle," Cromwell says. "We scrambled F-15s to escort the plane over the Pacific into Seattle and it was an uneventful landing. ... If an F-15 or F-16 is on your wing, it's not always a bad thing. Our job is to provide that emergency escort and assist if necessary."



Photo by Master Sgt. Tom Louis, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard

Senior Airman Daniel Hassler, left, and Airman 1st Class Edward Grandy, members of the New Jersey Air National Guard 177th Fighter Wing maintenance squadron, remove an oil filter from a jet engine Oct. 3, 2001. Extra maintenance was required after the Sept. 11 attacks.



An F-15 assigned to the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard, is refueled by a KC-135R assigned to the 157th Air Refueling Wing, New Hampshire Air National Guard, during an Operation Noble Eagle mission over New York in November 2001.

Photo by Tech. Sgt. Alan Beaulieu, 157th Air Refueling Wing, New Hampshire Air National Guard

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The air defense boom was hardest in the Northeast, Arnold says, where fighters were flying nonstop over New York and Washington, D.C. Maintenance troops were getting valuable operational training, but pilots were seeing their tactical skills wane.

"Training was just gone," says Massachusetts F-15 pilot Richard. "When you're flying the CAP (Combat Air Patrol), it's mostly flying circles and if you have an intercept there's about four minutes of adrenaline. ... This was a situation we certainly didn't anticipate. But we are a cohesive combat fighter squadron and that's how we made it work. We have maintenance guys who had to leave fairly lucrative civilian jobs in Boston and now have a two-hour commute to work. If people hadn't volunteered and seriously sacrificed, it never would have gotten done."

The sacrifices are felt military wide, but the reserve status of the National Guard means people leave their civilian jobs behind when called to duty. Throughout the ongoing operation, the military has provided assistance to federal agencies in many areas: medicine, engineering, security, military working dogs, logistics, and communications.¹⁴ Operation Noble Eagle is more than CAPs: Guardsmen have been dispatched to the nation's airports, nuclear power plants, international borders, national parks, bridges, and more. Security forces have shouldered a heavy burden. Some 70 percent of Guard members were partially mobilized; the call up can last two years.¹⁵

"Family is first, your civilian job is second and your military job is third," says Col. Mike Cosby, commander of the 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard. "People have sacrificed, not in the way the people in the World Trade Center or Pentagon did, but they have put their professional and personal lives on hold to come out here and serve the country and have done it with dis-

"People have sacrificed, not in the way the people in the World Trade Center or Pentagon did, but they have put their professional and personal lives on hold to come out here and serve the country and have done it with distinction."

***— Col. Mike Cosby, commander,
177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard***

tion. And the American people have recognized that."

In the days and months following the attacks, Atlantic City Air National Guard Base served as a home for several airmen protecting the Eastern skies.

"We hosted units from Houston, Albuquerque, (N.M.), Sioux City, (Iowa), and many more," Cosby says. "They bring pilots, airplanes and a limited number of maintainers and experts in the back shop (fighter wing repair facility), and we provide weather, base operations, intelligence, command post, and gas in the airplanes. They came right in here and rolled with the punches and did a fantastic job of supporting NORAD and the Noble Eagle mission."

Between Atlantic City's 177th Fighter Wing and other units deployed there, more than 1,200 sorties were flown from September 2001 until March 2002, for more than 4,480 hours of flying time, Cosby says. Atlantic City's fleet of F-16s, manufactured in 1983, saw a year's flying time in six months, he adds.

Across the alert force, the 24-hour combat sorties equated to crew rest and scheduling problems, no time for personal leave and 12-hour shifts. "There will be turbulent times between now and until we establish the new normal for America," Cosby said nine months into Operation Noble Eagle. "Everyone from the command posts, security forces to fire departments is doing a great job, but after awhile it has to get to you, working five to six days a week, 12 hours a day."

At various times during Noble Eagle, some 90

Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve wings have been under NORAD command and control.¹⁶ Canadian Forces and planes have provided assets for the operation along with U.S. Marine Corps flying squadrons and the U.S. Naval 3rd Fleet.¹⁷

That unwavering support began Sept. 11.

Col. Bob Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector commander, says 81 Air Force and Air National Guard units helped secure

the skies that day. "The Terre Haute guys (181st Fighter Wing, Ind.) locked down their base as soon as the towers were hit and started loading missiles, anticipating someone would be calling for help, which we did," he says. "The Burlington guys (158th Fighter Wing, Vt.) were some of the first in the air heading straight for New York as a unit that was familiar with the NORAD mission. People were launching jets in record time."

In the six days following the attacks, Air Guard pilots flew more than 600 fighter sorties.¹⁸ A number of the aircrews had never performed in an air defense capacity. And many of the fighters were parked on bases that weren't equipped to store munitions — one of many details that had to be addressed.

"Bottom line, people handled this very well," Arnold says. "People know how to fly CAPs. The biggest problem was somehow personalizing this thing. Some of these units did not know us personally and it's difficult to resolve that. One of the things we eventually did was send some of our people to all the units that were pulling alert and flying CAPs for us around the country. They were a sight for sore eyes for those units. Those units were des-




Photo by Tech. Sgt. Mark Olsen, New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

perate to talk to somebody at 1st Air Force. People had questions. Alert facilities needed work and we were able to help by being an advocate for that."

At Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mich., home of the 127th Wing, the local fire department vacated its building so F-16 aircrews had a place to sleep and work. Airmen had been sleeping in tents on the flight line for almost a month after Sept. 11.¹⁹

"We can solve the lack of crew quarters in many different ways," Arnold says.

"Some units have rented Winnebagos."²⁰

Housing alert aircraft posed yet another problem, especially in cities with harsh winters. "Before Sept. 11 our mission was to train, so we could afford to let the snow melt before we flew," says retired Brig. Gen. Wayne L. Schultz, former commander of the Colorado Air National Guard 140th Wing near Denver.²¹ An accelerated contract bid resulted in six temperature-moderated shelters to protect the F-16s and keep them in top shape for alert sorties. Even on the coldest days, deicing of aircraft will be unnecessary, improving response times.²² At Andrews Air Force Base, Md., home of the 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, five aircraft shelters were quickly built for the new F-16 alert commitment there.²³

Modernizing a mission

Generating thousands of unprecedented combat flights over the continental United States was going to be a feat in and of itself. Since NORAD



Photo by Master Sgt. Michael T. Smith, 109th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard



Photo by Tech. Sgt. Mark Olsen, New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs Public Affairs Office

Above: A chaplain counsels an Army National Guard member serving in New York City in late September 2001.

Left: Firefighters break from the destruction Sept. 14, 2001.

Opposite page: A brother reaches out through a dusty message as seen in this Sept. 14, 2001, photo. Firefighter Lt. Timothy Higgins, 43, was killed Sept. 11.

had always looked outward, its interior radar coverage was dismal. "Now we were suddenly looking in the interior of the country and didn't have the capability to do it," Arnold says.

Airborne surveillance was an immediate, yet partial, solution in the early days of the operation: Air Force E-3 AWACS, Navy E-2C "Hawkeyes" and U.S. Customs Service P-3s provided radar feeds to forces on the ground and in the air. ²⁴ Navy Aegis cruisers also contributed to the new view inward. ²⁵ But much more was needed to sustain effective 24-hour combat patrols over America. "We had three things to do," Arnold says. "We had to hook up radars so we could see the interior, had to have radios to talk to pilots and a command and control system capable of plugging in all those radars and radios ... so the air defense sectors could actually see and talk to our fighters."

The Air Force began revamping every facet of the mission as mandated at the highest levels of government and the Department of Defense. Air sovereignty fundamentals raced into the 21st century with Mach-like speed.

"We got better at everything we had to do, better at working with the Navy, better at scrambling and controlling airplanes and better with our radars," says Lt. Col. Clark "Buck" Rogers, deputy commander for operations at the Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. "The amount of change the air defense business went through is phenomenal. I don't think that in the history of the military you can find more rapid change in such a short period of time. It used to be months of funding and questions. We didn't have any of that. We said, 'You guys need to be on alert and the next thing you know, people are setting up tents and 'Winnebagos.'"

In the world before Sept. 11, America's long-range radars — Joint Surveillance System sites and tethered aerostats around the periphery of the country — were focused on planes coming toward the United States. Flights originating in the country and crossing the interior were automatically considered



U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Michelle Leonard



U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Michele G. Misiano

Above: Weapons loaders from the Virginia Air National Guard 192nd Fighter Wing perform end of runway procedures before an F-16 takes off in support of Operation Noble Eagle on Oct. 30, 2001.

Left: Smoldering fires at the World Trade Center are reflected in the visor of a United States Air Force MH-53M helicopter flight engineer days after the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the United States.

friendly.²⁶ And the dated NORAD Q-93 computers could not connect with the scores of FAA radars dotting the interior landscape.

“On Sept. 11, we were looking out — looking for the external threat,” NORAD Commander Eberhart said months after the attacks. “We assumed anything in the United States was authorized to be there and did not constitute a threat. Tragically, we were wrong.”²⁷

One of the greatest technological advances in NORAD’s 45-year history would come immediately on the heels of the terrorist attacks.²⁸ The “NORAD Contingency Suite,” a computer software program purchased with \$9 million in emergency response funds, would link NORAD with several interior FAA radars, giving controllers the capability to view more than 15,000 tracks at any moment per sector instead of 300 tracks before Sept. 11.²⁹

“The beautiful map on the NORAD Contingency Suite enables us to see everything,” says Maj. Sue Cheney, a WADS assistant flight commander. “We can see the airports, see where the planes take off and see the history of a track. We can look at a track and see if it took off in the United States.”

The sharper view — in color on a graphics-intensive flat panel screen — is especially important in the West, where controllers keep a watchful eye on the Mexican border, she adds.

Cheney marvels at how quickly NORAD acquired the new technology. “In only a couple of months we were getting a whole new system installed,” she says. “From the 11th of September, for the Air Force to buy and field a new system, that’s just unbelievably quick. We’d done modernization for the better part of the decade and spent

millions of dollars and got nothing. Two months after Sept. 11, we had a new system for a tiny fraction of that cost.”

That rapid capability arose from a cruise missile defense “Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration” 1st Air Force had been conducting for more than a year — a prescient stroke of luck for NORAD and the United States.


Planning for war

Better radar pictures are just part of the story of how a mission changed overnight. Within a few days of the Sept. 11 attacks, the CONR Air Operations Center, run by the 701st Air Defense Squadron, would become a bona fide war machine.

The heart of Noble Eagle beats at the CONR AOC, the combat center in the continental United States dedicated to its defense. Much like a movie theater, only colder, the AOC is a typical air defense facility: dim, drab and windowless. It’s where highly classified plans to protect the nation are born, approved and disseminated across NORAD. “Our command post, before Sept. 11, had 38 people that ran our AOC day to day,” Arnold explains. “We eventually had 500 people running it.” The first group of what would be more than 400 people arrived within nine days of the attacks, Scott says.

“The importance of the CONR Air Operations Center grew dramatically in the days following Sept. 11,” says retired Col. Joe Kahoe, former 1st

Two F-16s assigned to the North Dakota Air National Guard 119th Fighter Wing fly a Combat Air Patrol mission over Washington, D.C., in support of Operation Noble Eagle.



Air Force and CONR assistant chief of operations. “We always thought we had an important role to play in defense of the homeland. In a matter of days, 1st Air Force and CONR received hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of computers and communications equipment that we had been struggling to obtain for years.”

From the AOC comes the ATO — the Air Tasking Order — for a day’s worth of Noble Eagle sorties. “Combat plans became a huge function,” Arnold says. “We were used to writing a single ATO every week for all our alert prior to Sept. 11 and after Sept. 11, had to write an ATO every day that was larger than Northern Watch and Southern



Photo courtesy of 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard

Watch combined. This was not a small effort.

“Now you had combat plans people writing the ATO, had current operations people on the floor representing every specialty we had — command and control, AWACS, fighters, logistics. ... We had to have these people on duty. If there was a change to the ATO, we had to adjust the ATO and have the coordination for all of it to happen.”

It was a tough, but attainable task, Arnold says: “I had confidence in our people. We trained daily, we conducted exercises and were inspected so we already knew our people were capable of doing the job. We knew how to run an AOC and how to obtain, allocate and apportion resources.”

Grass roots efforts

High-visibility changes were everywhere as air defense was taking center stage across the terror-struck nation. The Department of Defense 2001 “Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review” would conclude: “*The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.*”³⁰ Grass roots efforts at the nation’s air defense sectors were true to the cause.

Master Sgt. Jon Smith is the noncommissioned officer in charge of radio maintenance support at the Southeast Air Defense Sector. His wife gave birth to their first child in an emergency delivery Sept. 7, 2001. When the phone rang Sept. 11, they’d been home from the hospital one night, sleepless and unaware of the unfolding catastrophe.

“Col. (Dave) Webster (SEADS chief of communications and computer systems) asked me what it would take for us to install radios,” Smith says. “I said, ‘Sir, we can install radios wherever we need to as long as we can get telephone circuits.’”

Just a few days after the attacks, Smith and Master Sgt. Bruce Griswold, chief of computer maintenance, loaded up their equipment and headed to Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia. Their mission: wire radios so ground controllers could communicate with fighter pilots flying over Atlanta.

“The point of the radios was to have connectivity,” Smith explains. “The voice circuit and data circuit were routed back to Tyndall over telephone lines so the SEADS operators would have remote control of the radio. Now they could talk to the fighters for Combat Air Patrol missions.”

Smith reported back to his boss. “I told Col. Webster we were looking good here and he said, ‘Good work. The bad news is, I need you to get back ASAP for your day off with your wife and baby. When you get back, I’ll tell you where you’re going next.’”

The next stop was Louisiana. Then Texas —

the president's ranch in Crawford needed protection. Then Arkansas. Another team installing the "radios on a stick," as crews dubbed them, went to North Carolina. Then Tennessee. Then Alabama.

"When you're in a crisis, you want people who can thrive without structure, who can just create it as they go along," says Col. Larry Kemp, SEADS commander.

For several weeks, Smith, Griswold and other SEADS specialists drove around the South, often getting supplies at the local Home Depot, so U.S. Air Force fighters could protect the country. "We had great support wherever we went," Smith says. "People bent over backward helping us out."



Hundreds of miles away at the Northeast Air Defense Sector, airspace specialists initiated an unprecedented 24-hour telephone bridge between the military and FAA. The crucial communication link began Sept. 11 and has been up ever since.

"It took about two seconds to realize that how we operated before Sept. 11 was not going to work," says Bill Ayers, Department of Defense airspace manager for NEADS. "We couldn't get the

Lisa Beamer, whose husband Todd Beamer was killed on United Airlines Flight 93, attends a dedication ceremony March 25, 2002, in Egg Harbor Township, N.J., headquarters of the New Jersey Air National Guard 177th Fighter Wing. A decal depicting Todd Beamer's inspiring words is displayed on Wing Commander Col. Mike Cosby's F-16. The phrase "Let's Roll" has come to represent the heroic spirit of those killed in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.







Photo by Senior Airman Andrew J. Merlock Jr., 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard





An F-15C from the 27th Fighter Squadron "Fightin' Eagles," 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Va., flies over the Washington, D.C., area during an early morning Combat Air Patrol mission Nov. 17, 2001.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Greg L. Davis



Photo by Tech. Sgt. Mark Moore, 138th Fighter Wing, Oklahoma Air National Guard

Above: Master Sgt. Patrick Owens looks across the runway of the 138th Fighter Wing, Oklahoma Air National Guard, while conducting countersniper operations. Owens is a member of the 138th Security Police Squadron participating in Operation Noble Eagle.

Right: Traditional Guardsmen, Senior Airman Darrell Webb and Staff Sgt. Denise Office of the 151st Services Flight, Utah Air National Guard, prepare "midnight chow" for personnel activated in support of Operation Noble Eagle, Oct. 3, 2001.

information fast enough."

"This phone bridge brought the command structure throughout the United States into one telephone call," he says.

With all eyes focused on the dense Northeast corridor, the open line has enabled NEADS controllers to assist the FAA numerous times since Sept. 11. "We had a Boston departure turning toward JFK (International Airport, N. Y.), and there was a horse in the cargo hold that was kicking and making a rather large disturbance," Ayers says. "The crew thought it was an unruly passenger."

On an international flight bound for Boston, a Russian passenger retrieved something from the overhead bin and got into a scuffle with a flight attendant. By the time word reached NEADS, controllers believed somebody was rushing the cockpit, Ayers says.

"Before Sept. 11, there were limited communications between the air defense sectors and FAA centers," says Steve Culbertson, FAA air defense

liaison officer for NEADS. "We had no way to talk. Now, we are hooked up to all the FAA centers and the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia."

Adds assistant airspace manager Master Sgt. Jerry Lee, a civilian activated on Sept. 11: "We are able to talk to the FAA in their language and relay that information to our command and control specialists in their language."

Their finest hour


Displays of volunteerism and patriotism were apparent not only across NORAD, but service-wide. "Sept. 11, 2001, was a horrible tragedy," Scott says. "But the great American story of Sept. 11, 2001, is that people were knocking down our air defense sector doors. Guard units everywhere wanted to help. We had every Air Force unit out there saying, 'What can I do?'"

More than 60,000 Guardsmen reported to their bases Sept. 11, says retired Air National Guard Brig. Gen. Paul S. Kimmel, former assistant for operational readiness to the director of the Air National Guard. "I think we did what Guardsmen always do," Kimmel says, "and that's respond and respond well when there's a need. ... The initiative people took on their own without direction was amazing and showed the real value of the Air National Guard."

"This was probably our finest hour since Bunker Hill, and that says a lot."

Guardsmen are tough and resilient, WADS Commander Cromwell says. "People were focused and because of the tragedies, the motivation was there. About 100 of our traditional Guardsmen at WADS were suddenly mobilized and pulled out of their civilian jobs without notice. Everyone, including their employers and families, made great sacrifices."

From the first days of the tragedy well into Noble Eagle, the Air National Guard has been deeply en-



Utah Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Mark Savage

In October, 2001, upon the United States' request, history was made when NATO deployed five of its E-3A AWACS aircraft to support America's homeland defense mission.

trenched in the operation, but “the commitment is to the Air Force,” Arnold says. The Air National Guard provides the majority of CAPs and fulfills most of the alert requirements because of the high number of its units in nearly every state, Arnold says.


That’s not to say the regular Air Force hasn’t done its share. The 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Va., for instance, provided F-15 Combat Air Patrol coverage over Washington, D.C., on Sept. 11, and continues to provide its resources. The 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., deployed some of its F-15s to Langley to help in the CAP efforts.³¹

The 366th Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, has employed three of its squadrons for Operation Noble Eagle: the 390th Fighter Squadron, the 22nd Air Refueling Squadron and the 726th Air Control Squadron.

“We’re a combat unit,” says Lt. Col. Kathy Stoddard, 726th Air Control Squadron commander. “We usually deploy into a battle theater and our team provides radar coverage of enemy territory. Guarding America through Operation Noble Eagle is something we never expected we would have to do.”

“All U.S. military operations require control of air, space and information,” she continues. “We find, fix, assess, track, target, and engage everything of military significance. Our contribution to aerospace power is vital to our forces’ effectiveness and our ability to fight and win with minimum loss of life — and that’s anywhere in the world, including over the skies of the United States.”

The 726th, known as “Hard Rock,” was in-



involved in round-the-clock Noble Eagle operations for 170 days.³² The unit maintained a 97-percent mission readiness rating after deploying members to other air control squadrons in Washington, New York and Nevada.³³ Hard Rock was released from its Noble Eagle tasking on Feb. 28, 2002.

The blood flows backward

The cooperative Noble Eagle spirit was coming from near and far. In October 2001, upon the United States’ request, history was made when NATO deployed five of its E-3A AWACS aircraft to support America’s homeland defense mission.³⁴ Nearly 200 troops from Geilenkirchen, Germany, landed at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., to assist



Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Greg L. Davis



Photo courtesy of 552nd Air Control Wing

the 552nd Air Control Wing with its new tasking. The deployment represents the first time NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter, which states a foreign attack on one member is an attack on all.³⁵

"Right now, we are engaged in four theaters of operation," Brig. Gen. Ben Robinson, 552nd Air Control Wing commander at the time, said in November 2001. "Having NATO here ... reduced the risk and reduced the cost of our training."³⁶

America welcomed the troops with open arms, says Col. Jim McNaughton, NATO detachment commander: "It is no longer we, they or a NATO force. We are one group here. ... We've taken these planes to a lot of places, but the reception here has been incredible."³⁷

The NATO aircrews flew more than 360 sorties and logged more than 4,300 flying hours. After more than seven months in the States, they finally got to go home.³⁸

"We are truly honored ... by the appreciation we have been given," says German Maj. Gen. Johann G. Dora, commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Command. "From a NATO perspective, this 'Operation Eagle Assist' has had a truly historic dimension. After more than 50 years of one-way traffic across the Atlantic, in military support terms, the European NATO member nations were able to return some of the overwhelming support provided by the United States ... to Europe after World War II."³⁹

Above: An F-16 from the 79th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., flies a Combat Air Patrol mission in support of Operation Noble Eagle.

Left: Secretary of the Air Force Dr. James G. Roche thanks NATO crews for their support of Operation Noble Eagle during his visit to Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., Feb. 22, 2002.



Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Eric Wedeking, National Guard Bureau

District of Columbia Air National Guard Maj. Billy Hutchison folds the American flag that he carried with him while flying in the 113th Wing formation over the Pentagon during a Sept. 11 memorial service one year after the attack. Hutchison had flown his F-16 over the Pentagon Sept. 11, 2001.

Eagle still soars

The NATO AWACS had gone home. The constant CAPs were slowing down. Pilots were flying tactical training maneuvers again. But the Noble Eagle was still soaring after logging 22,000 sorties over the United States and Canada between Sept. 11, 2001, and June 28, 2002.⁴⁰ And it may be soaring for awhile.

By early 2003, the Air Force had authorized the extension of more than 14,000 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members into a second year, as needed, because of continuing operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom requirements. Of those authorizations, 9,292 were from the Air National Guard.⁴¹

The total Air Force — active, Guard and Reserve — continues to assist federal agencies as needed in protecting the skies of America. “Adjustments in the NORAD air defense posture are driven by the potential threats to North American airspace,” explains Maj. Don Arias, 1st Air Force and CONR spokesman. “The threat assessment takes into account the overall security posture, including the many improvements in airspace security — in the air and on the ground — made since Sept. 11. The best air defense begins on the ground through the efforts of numerous local, state and federal agencies. NORAD and its continental region is integrated with — and will remain available to — civil authorities as a force of last resort.”

If the FAA calls, NORAD and its forces will be there and have responded to hundreds of domestic air security events since Sept. 11. The command still maintains its historic look outward, guarding America’s borders from unknown threats.

Arnold says America expects nothing less. “The public always assumed we could protect this country, and we have,” he says. “The continued vigil over our homeland’s skies is still saving lives and sending a clear message to those who would inflict harm on our citizenry: ‘Never again.’”

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10 Mary Lou Vocale, “Guard Tempo of Operation Noble Eagle,” *Code One, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company*, Fourth Quarter 2002, 11.

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26 Air Force Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center and Electronic Systems Center Public Affairs Office, "New Command and Control System Enables NORAD to Look In," n.d., n.p.

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33 *Ibid.*, n.p.

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35 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 4.


38 Darren D. Heusel, "Tinker Bids Farewell to NATO Crews," Oklahoma Air Logistics Center Public Affairs release, May 17, 2002, n.p.

39 *Ibid.*, n.p.

40 NORAD Public Affairs Office, public affairs statements, n.p.

41 *Ibid.*, n.p.

42 More information about the Sept. 11 commemorative artwork is available online at rickherter.com.



As part of its official art program, the Air Force selected artist Rick Herter to paint the arrival of the first fighters in New York and Washington Sept. 11, 2001. "Ground Zero, Eagles on Station," above, depicts the first Combat Air Patrol over Manhattan flown by F-15 pilot and Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Lt. Col. Tim Duffy of the 102nd Fighter Wing. "First Pass, Defenders over Washington," right, depicts the F-16 first flown over the Pentagon Sept. 11 by North Dakota Air National Guardsman Maj. Dean Eckmann of the 119th Fighter Wing. The paintings were unveiled Sept. 4, 2002, at the Pentagon. ⁴²



Artwork courtesy of Rick Herter



CHAPTER 5

AMERICAN STORIES: Sept. 11 brings new resolve

Air defenders steadfast amid terror and tragedy

Five months after America was attacked, armed fighter jets flew through frigid Utah skies to protect the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. By Sept. 11, 2002, live anti-aircraft missile batteries were deployed in the nation's capital. America's air defense mission had changed so much since that day and the change continues. These seven stories provide a glimpse into the mission on Sept. 11 and evolving operations beyond.



Family hoped against hope

Like bad news often does, it began with a phone call. This one was about a hijacking.

It was early in the morning Sept. 11, 2001, and the phone was ringing at the 1st Air Force public affairs office. Maj. Don Arias was preparing for the day when he took the call from the Northeast Air Defense Sector. There had been a hijacking on a flight out of Boston: American Airlines Flight 77 was presumably headed for John F. Kennedy International Airport, N. Y., and the sector might scramble some fighters. It was an odd coincidence:

across the North American Aerospace Defense Command, everyone was preparing for an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States. But this hijacking was no exercise — it was “real-world.”

Arias, the 1st Air Force and Continental United States NORAD Region public affairs officer, hung up the phone, grabbed his press kit and began working on a statement. He'd have to get something together before heading over to the CONR Air Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., where Commander Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold and his battle staff were entering an operational war mode.

“Maybe 15 minutes elapsed and I look up and see the tower smoking on CNN,” Arias says. “I had no confirmation, but knew that hijacked plane had hit the tower. That's when I called my brother.”



Adam P. Arias, a 37-year-old vice president for the trading company Eurobrokers, had been scheduled to attend a meeting uptown that morning. But he'd returned from Jamaica only three days earlier and was just too busy, sending an assistant instead. Now on the phone with his wife, the caller ID screen was displaying his older brother's number. Adam

YOUR GUARDIANS OF FREEDOM



AIR NATIONAL GUARD



"WE WILL NOT WAVER. WE WILL NOT TIRE. WE WILL NOT FALTER. WE WILL NOT FAIL."

President George W. Bush

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Artwork by Senior Airman Philip Speck, Kentucky Air National Guard

told Margit he loved her; Margit told Adam to come home. They'd just celebrated their three-year anniversary. They said their goodbyes.

Adam clicked over to his big brother. "Hey everybody, it's the Air Force!" Adam exclaimed to his colleagues in their 84th floor office in the World Trade Center's south tower. "He told me, 'You won't believe what I'm looking at,'" Arias says. "It was some horrendous stuff. He was watching the other tower burn and saw people falling through the air. He saw people jumping. I could hear a lot of commotion in the background and apparently everybody was at the window looking."


"I told him, 'Hey, we got this call, this could be the hijacked plane,'" Arias says. "He said to me, 'This is prime time. If this is an attack, they're doing it at the right time.'

"I told him to go home and that's the last words I said to him. I don't even know if he heard me because it was such a quick conversation."

Arias later heard what Adam did next. "He went around and told people that he'd talked to me and knew it was a hijacking, because people were content to sit there at their desks," Arias says. "I met a young woman a year later and she told me that Adam physically picked her up around her waist and threw her out of her office. She had wanted to stay because she had so much to do.

"More than a few people credit Adam with saving their lives by throwing them out of the office that day."

A fire engine is parked amid the crime scene at Ground Zero, Sept. 16, 2001. A lone firefighter can be seen in the distance.



As the horrific events continued to transpire in the northeast, Arias and his staff in Florida were on the phone with NORAD, trying to get statements out to the media. Struggling to maintain his professional composure, Arias was on a roller coaster ride of uncertainty. *Where was his brother?* He kept trying Adam's cell phone, leaving message upon message on his voice mailbox, but had to settle for only bits and pieces of information. "My whole family was on the phone and in the meantime, I'm trying to do my job here and popping off calls to my parents, sisters and brothers," Arias says. "One person said they saw Adam transferring elevators on about the 40th floor.



U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer's Mate Eric J. Tifford

Other people said they saw him in the street helping the firemen.

"I had a lump in my throat that whole day."

Finally, some good news: A message from their sister Lauren that Adam was spotted — alive. "*Your brother is OK. Your sister called and talked to someone who saw your brother boarding the ferry.*"

"We were totally relieved and I called my brother Tom, who was on his way to Manhattan to go look for Adam and Tom said, 'You know what? I'll believe he's OK when I talk to him,'" Arias says. "Tom knew it was ugly."

Arias, who grew up on Staten Island in the house where his parents still live, knows the city like only a native would. *Where was Adam? Could he have*

gotten out in time? He was picturing the scene in his mind. A proud New York City firefighter for seven years, Arias still wears a miniature of the gold Maltese cross badge of the FDNY around his neck — number 2105. The cross is a popular and time-honored symbol of the fire service, and represents St. Florian, the protector of firefighters. Now many of them were gone.



The day turned to night, and around 8 o'clock, Arias drove home, fearing the worst for Adam, the baby of six children. Mentally, physically and emotionally drained, he sat on the couch with his wife, Karen, also a New Yorker. They couldn't take their eyes off the news.

"I knew that night when I got home and Adam hadn't come home from work, that he was gone," Arias says. "Despite reports that people saw him, we knew. But we were all hoping against hope."

Rumors that emergency rooms were flooded with victims were unfounded. "You were either dead or you got away," Arias says. "There were lots of rumors flying, but I knew in my heart, as only a brother would know, that if he didn't make it home that night and didn't let anyone know where he was, that he couldn't."

Adam's family and friends were canvassing Manhattan, posting fliers and visiting every hospital in town. Arias and Karen, feeling helpless in Florida, stayed up late into the night, crying and watching news reports of people walking home over the familiar Brooklyn and Verrazano bridges, praying one of them was Adam.

Little did they know, Adam's remains were recovered hours earlier but not identified — a sad fact they'd learn days later. Adam P. Arias was the eighth person recovered at Ground Zero. Through peoples' stories and because his body was found near the base of the tower, the Arias family believes he got out alive and was helping firefighters in their rescue attempts.

"I'm not sure what he was doing or feeling or thinking, but I know his last minutes on earth were fulfilling his last act of Christian charity," Arias says. "The very last thing Adam was doing was helping other people. We should all go out that way. He is a true American hero."



On Sept. 13, Arias boarded a military flight to Pennsylvania, where an aunt picked him up and drove him to New York. He spent the day with his family, watching his broken parents cry like never before. The next day, Arias went to his former firehouse, Ladder 36, in the Inwood section of Manhattan, where two old friends just lost their own brothers, among the 343 firefighters killed.

"You got there and you could hear a pin drop," Arias says. "It was very quiet. Usually firehouses are loud, busy places, but this time they were just busy. There were a lot of people working. Even guys who had been retired for years were back to help."

Arias went to the firehouse for a reason — to somehow get closer to Adam, his fun-loving, witty brother, a talented singer who loved singing Frank Sinatra and Tony Bennett classics.

"I went to Ladder 36 to get down to Ground Zero," Arias says. "The truck officer got on the phone and called the police and we got back in the car and got right down to the command center. I hooked up with the New York National Guard once I got there and eventually got on a Humvee right to Ground Zero."

"We had to wear hard hats and breathing apparatus and you could just feel the grit in your teeth. I wanted to see if I could look around and was hoping against hope that I'd maybe find something out about my brother. But it was so immense it would be like looking for a needle in a haystack. People looked like little ants on this huge hill.



Photos courtesy of the Arias family



Top: Adam P. Arias on his wedding day. He and Margit had just celebrated their three-year anniversary when he was killed Sept. 11, 2001.

Above: Adam, left, at his wedding with brother Maj. Don Arias, will be remembered for his great sense of humor.

“Two 110-story buildings had telescoped down to seven stories of twisted steel and concrete. There was not one piece of office furniture, not one personal item you’d see in an office, that had survived. It was just huge pieces of steel, girders, concrete, and paper.”

Amid the six-acre war zone were American flags, stacks of pizza pies and cases of bottled water from all the New Yorkers who came to the rescue workers’ aid.

Arias stayed home with his family for three weeks. It was a tough time. “Staten Island, my home borough, has more cops and firemen than any other borough in New York,” he says.

“We took an extraordinary hit there. It was a depressing place to be. There were funerals and memorial services every single day. It was unbelievable.”



On Sept. 19, detectives knocked on Margit’s door with the official news; Adam’s funeral was Sept. 21 followed by his cremation. The family honored Adam a second time at a memorial service Oct. 13 in Panama City, Fla., where Arias is stationed at Tyndall Air Force Base.

Suddenly Arias found his professional and personal worlds colliding.

“There’s probably no place I’d rather be working right now than in continental air defense,” Arias says. “The first mushroom cloud of World War III will be in New York unless we stop that from happening.”

“I’m a real stakeholder in this mission. I always was, but more so now than ever. It is quite personal for me.”

Indeed, Adam’s death certificate reads: “*Cause of Death: Homicide.*”



In the months that followed the attacks, the Arias family found a special way to honor Adam’s memory. His little brother was a “self-starter,” Arias says, who worked his way up the corporate ladder without a college degree. Adam and Margit didn’t have children. They loved their nieces and nephews and had a special place in their heart for Vincent, Arias’ son, who is autistic. “Margit knew Adam was very concerned with Vincent and his situation,” Arias

“The very last thing Adam was doing was helping other people.”

— Maj. Don Arias, brother

says. “We’d had a lot of conversations about Vincent, and Margit thought a fitting way to honor Adam was through a scholarship.”

The family founded the Adam P. Arias Applied Behavior Analysis Scholarship for Autism at Florida State University, Panama City campus. The endowed scholarship is awarded to students based on community service, scholastic achievement and financial need.

The Arias family continued to grieve. One year after the attacks, they attended the Sept. 11 memorial service at Ground Zero that honored the approximately 2,800 people killed there. A bell was rung as each victim’s name was read. Margit was one of the readers.

“They started reading the names at the precise minute of the first impact,” Arias says. “As they rang that bell, the wind just started to whip up. It was a huge wind. The southern tip of lower Manhattan is known for being breezy, but this was extraordinary and it seemed like it was changing direction. It wasn’t just blowing in off the water, it was going up, down and in. It was as if the forces of nature were converging on this one spot to make a statement.”

With the graceful music of cellist Yo-Yo Ma filling the blustery air, the winds continued and the names were read, one by one. Including Adam’s.

Sector was 'fighting blind' Sept. 11

Amid missing airliners, bomb threats and a shockingly horrific terrorist attack, radar specialists at the Western Air Defense Sector, McChord Air Force Base, Wash., were "fighting blind" Sept. 11, 2001.

"There was no way we could see the interior of the United States on Sept. 11, 2001," says Maj. Sue Cheney, mission crew commander that day. "That would have required a whole new computer system. ... You know there's a threat coming in, but you can't see it. You're trying to get assets in places you can't see and if you had to scramble them, you'd never be able to talk to those fighters. You'd have to work through the Federal Aviation Administration to get any kind of message to them."

The WADS is responsible for protecting 1.9 million square miles of airspace, from Texas to the West Coast across to North Dakota, but the Q-93 — the huge computer installed in the 1980s with 1970s technology — could not display an interior air picture. With 63 percent of the continental airspace, the radar and radio links at WADS were weaker than those at air defense sectors in New York and Florida. Essentially, the radar scopes at the sector were showing flights inbound from overseas on Sept. 11 and very little over the vast western skies of the interior United States.

"The whole idea of an aircraft being hijacked in the middle of the United States and flown into a big target ... that was one we never really exercised," Cheney says. "It was one we were not really capable of dealing with. If you look at our old Q-93 scope, you've got this enormous hole in the interior of the country. ... We were fighting blind."

As WADS commander Col. John Cromwell

prepared to possibly scramble nearly every fighter west of the Mississippi, communications with the FAA were suddenly more important than ever. "We were told to put Combat Air Patrols up over numerous cities and metropolitan areas and key infrastructure in the western United States," Cromwell says. "Our plate was full in the West and when the FAA asked for assistance, the fighters would talk to FAA controllers. We had no pictures



and no radio. The FAA also did a great job in pointing out where situations were. Between the FAA and the flexibility of the pilots, our intercepts were successful."

In the days before Sept. 11, four fighter jets were on alert out West, ready to respond to unknowns approaching the borders. The F-15s and F-16s are from the 142nd Fighter Wing, Oregon Air National Guard, Portland; and the 144th Fighter Wing, California Air National Guard, Fresno, with an alert station at March Air Reserve Base in Riverside, Calif. But four jets would not be enough that tragic day. In only a few hours, the skies were



Washington Air National Guard photos by Tech. Sgt. Randy LaBrune

teeming with fighters and by the afternoon, more than 100 fighter jets were on alert, Cromwell says.

With initiative from civilian FAA air defense liaison Ed Enkerud, the sector tapped into FAA centers across the West as it guided fighter pilots to targets. Enkerud says an FAA “domestic event network” launched two hours after the initial attack was invaluable. “I got a call from my boss in Washington, D.C., and we all started dialing into one number and started instantaneous communication that is still ongoing,” Enkerud says. “Now we don’t have to dial different facilities. We can talk right now and the line is always open.”

Cromwell says he’s proud of the sector’s response Sept. 11: “People used their training in a brand new scenario. They were innovative, creative and under control.”

Above: Canadian Forces Warrant Officer Scott Budgell and Maj. Cecilia Nackowski monitor the radar scopes at the Western Air Defense Sector.

Left: Staff Sgt. Jill Lathrop on the job in the dim and windowless sector operations center.





Photo by Lar

A calm surrealism Sept. 11 at SEADS

Absolutely “unbelievable.” That’s how Lt. Col. Clark “Buck” Rogers describes Sept. 11, 2001.

The director of operations at the Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., says it all happened very fast. “I remember, vividly, turning to our commander (Col. Larry Kemp) and saying: ‘This is a coordinated attack. And it may not stop in the Northeast. We need to get our airplanes up because we don’t know what’s coming next.’

“And that’s exactly what we did.”

The sector put pilots from its three area air defense alert facilities on battle stations — in the cockpit ready to start at a moment’s notice. At Ellington Field, Texas; Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla.; and Tyndall Air Force Base; fliers were

suiting up and waiting for the Klaxon alarm to sound. The shrill tone would echo in Texas, as pilots were scrambled to escort Air Force One.

Help was coming from across the Southeast. “Fighter wings from across the Air Force — both active duty and Air National Guard — called to assist,” Rogers says. “We told them the country was under attack and the best they could do was load ammo on live airplanes. And that’s what they did. We asked units that already had airplanes on alert to bring up additional airplanes, bring up the spares and get four airplanes loaded and four guys in crew rest.

“There wasn’t a base out there that wasn’t on alert.”

They had to get in the minds of the terrorists. What would they hit? The SEADS area of

responsibility includes Atlanta, Dallas, Miami, nuclear sites, and military bases. "We immediately said, 'Our responsibility is not to protect New York City, but to protect the Southeast. What should we be concentrating on?'" Rogers says.

Rogers was scrambling fighters as the skies of America were being cleared of all civilian traffic. "All flights had to be approved by the appropriate air defense sector, even if it was a military flight," Rogers says. "We disapproved almost everything, but Life Flights got permission to fly."

Extra measures were taken to ensure the flights were legitimate. "We had to call a hospital and ask if they were really expecting a plane with a sick child from Mexico," Rogers says. "Just because it was painted like Life Flight doesn't mean it was Life Flight. Just because it was painted like American Airlines, doesn't mean it was."

Kemp was responsible for final approval of Southeast-area flights in the immediate post-attack

and even approved flights of the Federal Reserve to help get the economy moving again.

The commander says the day's events were surreal. But there was method to what should have been madness. "It was very methodical and structured," Kemp explains. "The training and proficiency kicked in. Everybody had a clear picture of what the big picture was and what they had to accomplish."

Rogers has one positive memory of the day: "I walked out of here at maybe 9:30 or 10 that night. I was pretty dismayed and could not believe what had happened. It was like the end of innocence. But the first thing I saw as I drove out the gate was all the houses on the base with American flags. There were flags in every neighborhood, on businesses, on car dealerships ... everything said 'God Bless America,' 'We Love Our Country,' and 'United We Stand.' It was an amazing outpouring of support."

Left: The Southeast Air Defense Sector area of responsibility includes the Gulf Coast, where F-16 fighter jets of the Texas Air National Guard fly Combat Air Patrol missions in support of Operation Noble Eagle.

Below: In a late 2001 visit to SEADS, Air National Guard Command Chief Master Sgt. Valerie D. Benton, top adviser for enlisted affairs, receives an update on the Straits of Florida from Tech. Sgt. Gerry Myers, a SEADS air surveillance technician.



Photo by Master Sgt. Roger Tibbetts, 1st Air Force Public Affairs Office


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An overall view of the Northeast Air Defense Sector operations center, a cool, dimly lighted room with no windows.



Photos by Scott A. Gwilt, Daily Signal, F

A NEADS technician peers into a colorful map of the regional air picture. The imagery is part of a computer software program NORAD installed after Sept. 11, 2001, that gives controllers the capability to view more than 15,000 tracks at any moment per air defense sector instead of the 300 tracks before Sept. 11.



Fear strikes NEADS Sept. 12; 'mole people' never rest

After Sept. 11, crews at the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, N.Y., didn't think things could get much worse. Helping secure America's skies amid a horrifying terrorist attack, they'd worked late into the evening, got minimal sleep and were back at it the next morning. Certainly Sept. 12 would be calmer — the attacks were over and the North American Aerospace Defense Command was guarding the skies like never before.

But as Tech. Sgt. Ronald G. Belluscio, a senior weapons director technician, peered into his radar scope, he knew something was wrong. "There was a plane, flying low and slow, headed right toward this building," he says. "My first thought was, 'Who is this?' Then it clicked. 'This isn't normal. Who is this guy and why is he headed toward us?'"

The Federal Aviation Administration had surrendered America's airspace to NORAD, all civilian aviation was grounded and the skies were free of anything other than military or emergency aircraft. But the unidentified airplane, headed toward Rome from the south-southeast, kept on coming.

"We thought anyone in the air was either a terrorist or a criminal and this aircraft was beelining straight at us," says Col. Bob Marr, NEADS commander. "We had some F-16s that had been flying Combat Air Patrol over New York City and were headed back to Burlington, (Vt.). We vectored them toward the plane."

Master Sgt. Joe McCain, mission crew commander technician, says Marr was very direct:

"He told the weapons section to get a hold of those aircraft to see if they had enough fuel to get to Rome. He said, 'I want those birds here and now. Light afterburner if you have to!'"

With the Vermont Air National Guard jets diverted their way, Marr ordered the evacuation of the building, leaving himself and a small crew in the operations center. "If we were attacked, the others would be able to come in and finish the mission," Marr says.

Meanwhile, Senior Master Sgt. Thomas Hayes, chief of NEADS Security Forces, directed his staff to hide the evacuees in the trees surrounding the building. From outside, Hayes stayed in radio contact with security forces member Staff Sgt. Mike Bates, the desk sergeant inside the building. Bates relayed the airplane's position to Hayes as security forces members lined up on a hill with guns aimed at the sky, hoping they could down the plane if it came to that.

Bates, a Syracuse, N.Y., police officer in his civilian life, admits he was scared. "It was nerve-racking," he says. "I'm not going to lie. I was nervous and thinking about my family. It still wasn't reality that Sept. 11 had happened. We thought we were under attack and when Col. Marr yelled for people to get out of the building, you could feel the sense of urgency. We knew airplanes weren't supposed to be in the air, yet this guy was coming at us and I was waiting inside the building expecting to hear the guns start firing."

Inside the operations center, Marr says people were shaking at the scopes as they watched on

Security forces members lined up on a hill with guns aimed at the sky, hoping they could down the plane if it came to that.




Photo courtesy of 127th Wing, Michigan Air National Guard

Above: Two F-16s sit armed and ready outside their new alert shelters at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mich. Air controllers at the Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, N.Y., have found themselves working with units like Michigan's 127th Wing more than ever since Sept. 11, 2001.

Right: Col. Bob Marr, commander of NEADS, evacuated the sector operations center on Sept. 12, 2001, when an unidentified airplane was heading straight for the building.

radar as the plane got closer and closer. McCain says he was more afraid on Sept. 12 than he was Sept. 11. "The 11th was horrible," he says. "But we had to do our jobs. The 12th was personal."

Adds Belluscio: "It was like slow motion. You could see the distance between the target and the fighters and we didn't think the fighters would make it. I was on the edge of my seat, rocking back and forth thinking it would make the fighters go faster."

But suddenly, the calmer day came when the airplane changed course only miles from the sector operations center. The F-16s were in close pursuit and forced the plane to land at nearby Hinckley Reservoir, Marr says.

From here, the story of that unknown plane becomes NEADS legend. "The word is, the police cut the wings off the plane and put it on a flatbed truck," says Belluscio.

Marr says he never found out who the culprit was, but heard he was a local pilot with a seaplane. Whoever he was, he was flying against all federal regulations in the early days after Sept. 11.

For months, the crews at NEADS worked 12-hour days, six days on, three days off. Days like Sept. 12 were especially difficult, says sector chaplain Maj. Timothy Bejian.

"The stress was enormous," Bejian says. "After Sept. 11, that's what it was like for days on end. As the days went by, I was watching the folks and seeing how they were dealing with the stress.

"People would go out at night and watch the flying squirrels jump from tree to tree. We called them the 'mole people.' It was September and people would arrive in the dark and leave in the dark and didn't see their families. As chaplain, you have to try to bring people back to a point where they can cope. The problem wasn't going to go away and some had a very difficult time."

Bejian puts things into perspective with "The Mole People and the Flying Squirrels," a story he wrote for those guarding the Northeastern skies.



Photo by Scott A. Gwilt, Daily Sentinel, Rome, N.Y.

'The Mole People and the Flying Squirrels'

"... If it weren't for the 'mole people,' the regular people of the world wouldn't be able to walk outside their homes in safety. The world is full of monsters and beasts and all kinds of nasty creatures that would freeze their blood and hurt their children. But the mole people are always watching. They watch by day while the regular people work and their children play. They watch at night while the regular people sleep in their cozy beds or read fairy tales to their children. Why, you ask, are these watchers called the mole people? Well, the answer is quite simple. They gather together in groups, in windowless places, usually arriving while it's dark and staying long hours only to leave while it's dark. Many times they can't tuck their own children into bed and read them fairy tales because they are watching. This bothers the mole people, but they know that it needs to be done. And if ever they see something or someone bad who wants to hurt the regular people, they send a message to their friends the Eagles who outrace the wind to pursue and drive off the beasts and monsters."

**— Maj. Timothy Bejian,
NEADS chaplain**

Air refuelers fly in face of terror

Only weeks after flying Combat Air Patrols over Washington, D.C., on Sept. 11, 2001, F-16 pilot Maj. Dan Caine was soaring high above the rugged terrain of Afghanistan.

It was the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom and an early winter evening when Caine, a member of the 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, heard familiar voices over his radio frequency. Turns out the same crew pumping 6,000 pounds of JP-8 into his F-16 was the very crew that refueled his fighter low over Washington, D.C., the day terrorists attacked America. It's a small Air Force, Caine reasons, and an even smaller Air National Guard.

America's refueling tanker crews are crucial to the fight against terrorism. From the 117th Air Refueling Wing in Birmingham, Ala., to the 161st Air Refueling Wing in Phoenix, Ariz., the tanker crews keep America's fighters airborne.


Scores of wings across the country have come under 1st Air Force and Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region command and control at various points since Sept. 11 — all in support of Operation Noble Eagle. The 101st Air Refueling Wing, Maine Air National Guard, is one. The "MAINEiacs" are proud to have refueled fighters over Manhattan the morning of Sept. 11. That day is a vivid memory for KC-135E boom operator Senior Master Sgt. Robert Phair, a 20-year Maine Air National Guard veteran.

"We were out on a local training mission when

all hell broke loose," Phair recalls. "We heard through the Federal Aviation Administration Boston Center that an aircraft had impacted one of the towers and we were completely amazed that something so horrific could happen."

Like many that morning, the crew assumed the crash was accidental. "When we heard that a second

plane had hit, we could detect in the voices of the controllers that it was more than coincidence. We got passed off to New York Center and the controllers' voices were elevated. They were very concerned and asked us to provide emergency air refueling coverage for fighters and we said, 'Absolutely.'"




The civilian FAA controllers requested the tanker's presence about 10 miles off New York City's coastline, Phair says. "We said, 'We can do better than that, we can fly right over Manhattan.'"

"They said, 'You guys are cleared Manhattan right now.'"

Back on the ground at Bangor International Airport, the MAINEiacs' home base, the scene was one of "mass controlled confusion," says Tech. Sgt. Philip Henderson, a KC-135E crew chief. Watching TV one moment in the break room, crews suddenly found themselves on the ramp preflighting and gassing up the tankers. Soon they'd find themselves airborne, witness to terror below.

"As we approached Long Island Sound, I could see Ground Zero and the smoke drifting eastward," Henderson says. "I went into the boom operator's compartment and went to the window. We were looking out and everybody was pretty silent looking

33 38



Photos by Master Sgt. Don Taggart, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard



The 916th Air Refueling Wing, flying the KC-135R, supports a Combat Air Patrol mission over the Northeast United States on Oct. 7, 2001. The 916th, an Air Force Reserve unit, is based at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C.

"At any one time, a third of military aircraft protecting the United States are tankers."

— Maj. Ian Gillis,
101st Air Refueling Wing,
Maine Air National Guard




Photo courtesy of 101st Air Refueling Wing, Maine Air National Guard

Above: A 101st Air Refueling Wing KC-135, Maine Air National Guard, provides in-flight refueling for a Canadian Forces F-18. The 101st regularly supports the Canadian Forces during Operation Noble Eagle Combat Air Patrol missions.

Right: Pilots from the 157th Air Refueling Wing, New Hampshire Air National Guard, fly their KC-135 during an Operation Noble Eagle mission over New York in November 2001.

at the smoke coming up but we couldn't get definite information on what was going on. It's burned into your memory, being up there and seeing the smoke from Ground Zero and seeing the live fighters coming up to you with missiles on them. It was unreal."



At the end of the day, the 101st had diverted two of its airborne aircraft to support East Coast fighters and brought three other KC-135s to cockpit alert within minutes, launching them all.

"It normally takes two hours to generate a sortie up until takeoff," says Maj. Ian Gillis, 101st Air Refueling Wing chief of aircrew scheduling. "That day, we briefed in about 10 minutes and had aircraft ready to launch in just about an hour."

Not one year had passed since that terror-filled

morning, and the wing had already flown more than 508 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle, for more than 2,800 hours of flying time. The Maine tankers had pumped more than 11.8 million pounds of fuel into nearly 1,500 fighter jets flying CAPs over the United States.

"At any one time, a third of military aircraft protecting the United States are tankers," Gillis explains. "When you see two fighters on a Noble Eagle CAP, there's always a tanker somewhere above them."



According to Air Force statistics, across America, more than 15,000 airmen from the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and regular Air Force flew more than 26,400 fighter, tanker and airborne early warning sorties in the 13 months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.



Photo by Tech. Sgt. Alan Beaulieu, 157th Air Refueling Wing, New Hampshire Air National Guard




Photo courtesy of 388th Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office

Olympics protection golden example of interagency cooperation

As international athletes were gliding down the powdery slopes below, armed jet fighters were soaring above Utah keeping the skies of the 2002 Winter Olympics safe.

Only weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, already tight security grew to include protection of Olympics airspace. As part of Joint Task Force-Olympics, soldiers and airmen supported federal, state and local agencies at the Hill Air Force Base, Utah, Air Security Operations Center. The ASOC, actually the corner of a hangar, brought civilian agencies

and military members together like never before, says Col. John E. Bonner, Western Air Defense Sector director of support. The sector, at McChord Air Force Base, Wash., is one of three continental air defense sectors in the North American Aerospace Defense Command and served as a lead air control agency for the Olympics.

“Before Sept. 11, a large national event was not a concern for NORAD,” says Bonner, who led a WADS contingency to Utah that February. “Never before Sept. 11 did we see internal matters as



Photo courtesy of Western Air Defense Sector

posing a threat. But the president declared the Olympics a 'National Special Security Event,' and we needed a significant presence to protect that airspace.

"The big story is the interagency cooperation and how everyone worked together to make it happen. The Secret Service was in charge of all security, both in the air and on the ground; U.S. Customs was the lead for air security; and the FBI was involved in ground security. The Army played a huge role and flew over 400 missions to support law enforcement and emergency services. ... Our piece was things in the air moving faster than helicopters."

Using an intricate network of radars, radios and sensors employed especially for the Olympics, NORAD, WADS and the Federal Aviation Administration could maintain constant contact and provide constant air coverage of the Games. "We grabbed data feeds from all the low-altitude and short-range radars and brought them back to WADS for display in the NORAD Contingency

Suite, our newest computer system," says Chief Master Sgt. James Hunter, WADS support superintendent. "We needed redundancy in our radar data and high-resolution in our radar picture."

Hunter and 25 other WADS members worked especially closely with the FAA as it imposed temporary flight restrictions around Olympics airspace. The FAA authenticated 6,630 different flights entering restricted areas during the Olympics, Bonner says. There were more than 20 violators, but armed F-16s from Hill's 388th Fighter Wing, on alert and flying random Combat Air Patrol missions over Salt Lake, were ready to intercept when necessary. They were supported by more than 100 NORAD fighters on alert at 30 bases across the country.

The military and other agencies involved logged 3,300 flying hours in support of Olympics air protection, Bonner says. "Those hours were accident-free," Bonner adds, "in some pretty lousy flying weather."

Above: Western Air Defense Sector personnel Col. John E. Bonner and Maj. Roger Hurd, foreground, monitor command and control data at the Air Security Operations Center during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City.

Left: Four 388th Fighter Wing F-16s from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, fly over the Olympics.

Multilayered air defenses protect nation's capital

Heat-seeking "Stinger" missiles mounted on Humvees ... jet fighters on constant prowl over the city ... airborne warning and control platforms eyeing the skies up high as sensors scan for threats down low. It may sound like a combat zone in a distant land, but this multilayered air defense system has become a familiar sight right in the nation's capital.

Throughout Operation Noble Eagle, a theme has emerged from the North American Aerospace Defense Command: the best air defense starts on the ground. Nowhere has this been more apparent than Washington, D.C., where live anti-aircraft missile batteries have been deployed during high-profile events like the Sept. 11 anniversary and January 2003 State of the Union address.

The joint efforts have brought together hundreds of people from NORAD and throughout the armed services, the U.S. Customs Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Secret Service. The air defense arsenal has included Air Force F-16s and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft; ground-based Army "Sentinel" radars and "Avenger" missile batteries; and U.S. Customs Service UH-60A "Black Hawk" helicopters.

"We employ air defense artillery for high-value assets, people, infrastructure, and national government," says Maj. Gen. Craig R. McKinley, commander of 1st Air Force and the Continental

United States NORAD Region and the Joint Air and Space Component Commander. "We provide a third layer of defense for targets that would possibly slip through the fighter Combat Air Patrols and the U.S. Customs and Secret Service barriers that are put in place.

"Air defense artillery is like a goalie in a hockey game. It is the last line of defense before a track of interest would actually make an impact with a


building, and in the national capital region, everyone knows where those buildings are. That is why we heavily defend our nation's capital and seat of government."


The command and control architecture of that robust air defense artillery includes a mobile system called the "Joint Based Expeditionary Connectivity Center," the "center of the wheel for command and control," on such operations, McKinley says.

"The JBECC is the fusion hub where all the data is

correlated and presented to me, the Joint Air and Space Component Commander, so I can present it to the decision-makers," he says. "It is extremely effective and we've had great success with it."

The JBECC was developed in the mid-1990s under the "Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration" program of the Office of Undersecretary of Defense, which explores opportunities to quickly get emerging technology into the hands of the warfighters. It was born as a "Cruise Missile Defense Initiative" and evolved into





Staff Sgt. Jarrett Jongema, Battery C, 4-5 ADA, 1st Cavalry Division, executes communications checks near the Pentagon during Operation Noble Eagle.

U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Erick Henson

the "Area Cruise Missile Defense."

The advanced programs branch of 1st Air Force began with a Humvee and added different types of radios and communications devices that would give NORAD the clear low-altitude air picture it had been missing.

"JBECC allows us to link into other sensors like Army Sentinel radars, Navy Aegis cruisers and Avenger missile systems," explains Lt. Col. Hutch Davis, 1st Air Force chief of operations integration for advanced programs. "It then correlates these radar inputs into one consolidated air picture."

The JBECC then sends the picture to one of three sector operations centers within CONR, allowing controllers to potentially deploy weapons against cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and other low-altitude threats.

The concept went "real-world" after the terrorist

attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, says Maj. John Ackermann, 1st Air Force chief of advanced programs demonstrations. On Sept. 12, a JBECC prototype being used by the Army was deployed to Naval Air Station Oceana, Va., and linked the CONR Air Operations Center into AWACS and other East Coast radars. "JBECC tied into the existing sensors that were there but not in the NORAD system," Ackermann explains. "NORAD now had an East Coast air picture it could utilize."

Since then, JBECC has been deployed in several operations, including airspace protection of the 2002 Winter Olympics Games. "The success of this experiment is a big step forward in the development of a single integrated air picture," Ackermann says. "The single picture will give all commanders a common view of the aerial battlefield."



CHAPTER 6

HOME THEATER: NORTHCOM guards air, land and sea

1st Air Force modernizing to defend skies of a new era

The world is a battleground. That post-Sept. 11 realization led to the most sweeping set of changes to U.S. military structure seen since 1946. ¹

Only eight months after the twin towers fell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced changes to the Unified Command Plan — the framework for military missions and geographic responsibilities for combatant commanders.

“The new commander will be responsible for land, aerospace and sea defense of the United States,” Rumsfeld explained at the April 17, 2002, announcement. “He will command U.S. forces that operate within the United States in support of civil authorities.” ²

Northern Command, with Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart at the controls, was established Oct. 1, 2002, at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. The NORTHCOM commander is responsible for homeland defense and still wears the blue Air Force uniform as commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the organization charged with aerospace warning and control for the United States and Canada.

An F-16 assigned to the California Air National Guard 144th Fighter Wing flies a Combat Air Patrol over San Francisco in support of Operation Noble Eagle.



Photo courtesy of 144th Fighter Wing, California Air National Guard

“Military forces will be used when and where needed to augment and assist first responders,” Eberhart explains. “The goal is to be proactive, not just reactive. Nothing is more important for a government to do than provide safety and security and improve the quality of life for its citizens.”³

“We are just like the other regional combatant commanders, with one important difference — the United States homeland is in our area of responsibility,” the general says.⁴

The reorganization shifts the U.S. Joint Forces Command geographic area of responsibility to NORTHCOM and U.S. European Command, enabling U.S. Joint Forces Command to focus on transforming U.S. military forces — another post-Sept. 11 theme of changing the way the military does business.⁵

The NORTHCOM area of operations is vast, and includes the United States, Canada, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and the contiguous waters

Airman 1st Class Brian Isaacson, munitions maintenance specialist, 148th Fighter Wing, Minnesota Air National Guard, checks a gantry support leg on a munitions assembly conveyer on Jan. 23, 2002. Isaacson was one of hundreds of traditional Guardsmen activated to maintain the unit's increased operations tempo while supporting Operation Noble Eagle. The 148th is one of 10 Air National Guard fighter wings assigned to 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region. Several other air wings are attached to the command for Operation Noble Eagle.


in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.⁶

The creation of NORTHCOM is historic, says Maj. Gen. Craig R. McKinley, commander of 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region. “Not since George Washington have we had a military commander in charge of U.S. forces in garrison at home to defend American citizens. It was a swift action by our government and president to guard our country from further terrorist attack.”

McKinley, who assumed command from Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold in August 2002, says 1st Air Force and CONR are working closely with NORTHCOM to counter air threats as his Army and Navy counterparts protect land and sea.

Eberhart calls NORTHCOM a true joint venture. “Our command is built upon a Total Force and total national team concept that includes members from all five services; the National Guard; the Reserves; Department of Defense civilians; and numerous federal, state and local agencies,” he says. “We believe we are redefining ‘jointness’ by forming new partnerships within the DOD and with numerous civilian agencies, as well as strengthening existing ones. Developing these strong relationships is key to our success.”⁷

Eberhart says NORTHCOM is committed to improving “situational awareness by developing a common operating picture for the air, land and maritime domains.”⁸ McKinley and his team at 1st Air Force and CONR share that commitment and are working toward better command and control, a bigger radar picture and enhanced sensor capabilities to counter airborne threats. The 21st century is here and McKinley is leading the charge to catapult the air defense mission out of the Cold War into a new era, where the war seems to be everywhere.





Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Daniel J. Schiles

Right: A New York National Guardsman patrols the devastation in New York City Sept. 14, 2001. Operation Noble Eagle has been characterized by a strong military presence in the United States since the earliest days of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Below: An F-15 pilot assigned to the Florida Air National Guard 125th Fighter Wing flies a Combat Air Patrol mission.




Photo by Tech. Sgt. Mark Olsen, New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs Public Affairs Office




Photo courtesy of 125th Fighter Wing, Florida Air National Guard

Charting the future

A few days before Sept. 11, 2001, the future of continental air sovereignty was in serious doubt. As late as Sept. 8, discussions at the Air Force's highest levels called for dismantling NORAD's seven alert sites and command and control structure — the heart of the air sovereignty mission.⁹

"Our leaders were seeking to optimize our force posture, and there was no perceived threat," McKinley says. "That rationale was changed dramatically by the events of Sept. 11, when the terrorists sent a message that we are no longer safe in our homes."

The air war over America has been fought ever since.¹⁰ The old days of continental air sovereignty — protecting America's air borders with jets on alert at a few strategic locations — are a distant memory. Operation Noble Eagle requires scores of military fighters on alert at several bases around the country. Radar and command and control capabilities have had to keep up with looking both inside and outside the United States as fighter jets patrol America's cities, key infrastructure and special security events. The mission has changed, and it appears the changes will continue indefinitely.

"We will take 1st Air Force from a 20th century organization designed to defend against a Cold War construct, to a 21st century organization that protects Americans, Canadians and possibly anybody in the Western Hemisphere," McKinley says. "We are charting what this organization is going to look like in 2008 while we continue to fight the air war over America."

"This vision began in late 2002 ... over the next five years we plan to implement change, develop doctrine

and concepts of operations and actually see those things come to fruition. We hope to put in place the means to fund the equipment and facilities that would enable us to carry out this strategy."

McKinley envisions an organization that blends seamlessly into the rest of the Air Force and falls strictly in line with Air Force doctrine, the book on how the "Air Force organizes and employs aerospace power throughout the spectrum of conflict at the operational level."¹¹ He sees the Northeast and Southeast air defense sectors consolidating into one. The Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force Base, Wash., and new Eastern Air Defense Sector, probably in Rome, N.Y., would employ the latest technology to view airspace over the contiguous 48 states and territories like the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.


"Technology will allow us to radically transform the way we see the air traffic over North America," McKinley says. "After Sept. 11, we received a new system that enables us to do a far more efficient



Photo courtesy of 144th Fighter Wing, California Air National Guard

A fighter pilot from the California Air National Guard 144th Fighter Wing is caught on camera. Air defense leaders are working to gain more jobs in America's fighter wings for those fighting the war on terror.

**High-Altitude
Airships are the
wave of the future.
The lighter-than-air
surveillance
platforms are in
production at
Lockheed Martin.**



Courtesy of Lockheed Martin

job controlling, monitoring and identifying traffic, not only outside our borders, but inside. Once that system is purchased en masse, we have the ability to reform, reengineer and reshape ourselves into a doctrinally correct numbered air force.”

“Our goal is to mirror our air forces in Europe and the Pacific,” McKinley says. “We will employ military members from the active duty Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and will present our forces the way the Air Force presents its forces everywhere.”

A crucial part of the strategy is a bigger and stronger Air Operations Center, McKinley says. The AOC is where war plans for Operation Noble Eagle are written. Planning for the war on terror would continue at this super AOC of the future slated for Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., operated by the 601st Air Operations Group. In the world of warfighting, Air Force doctrine calls for one AOC per theater, and since the first moments of Operation Noble Eagle, the United States has become its own theater of


war, McKinley says.

“The war on terror is a long haul,” he says. “It’s nothing short term. We’ll be facing this terrorist threat for our lives and the lives of our children. We’ll have to remain vigilant around the clock for many years and never get complacent and never believe we aren’t vulnerable.

“This reorganization allows us to be a numbered air force, air operations group and an Air Force forces staff,” McKinley says. “It means we can take good care of our people and design strategy and concepts of operation so we can prevent acts of terrorism rather than just respond to them. This vision allows us to present our force structure to the commander of Northern Air Forces the way combatant commanders present their forces

throughout the Air Force.

“This is a vectored evolution vision, it isn’t total transformation. We haven’t created anything new. It’s a more modern and efficient way of presenting forces to best meet the needs of the new century.”



Retired Col. William A. Scott, 1st Air Force director of plans, programs and requirements, says the mission is simply evolving with the changing times. "Now that NORTHCOM has stood up, our mission has been enlarged to include possible offensive operations and civil support missions," Scott says. "The 1st Air Force and CONR transformation is a continued evolution from our doctrinally correct organization today to a doctrinally correct organization of the future."

McKinley, meanwhile, wears more hats than ever. He serves as the Commander of Air Force Forces for the continental United States; the Area Air Defense Commander; and Joint Air and Space Component Commander, a title that captures the Air Force position that air and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through either power alone.

Technical edge

Building a modern, futuristic air defense mission means taking full advantage of the latest technology, from "High-Altitude Airships" to ground-based interceptors capable of destroying Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles mid-flight.

"Everything we see today is based on radars

From left, Tech. Sgts. Clayton Lemons and Leonard Mosley of the 147th Fighter Wing engine shop, Texas Air National Guard, make repairs while deployed to Egg Harbor Township, N.J., in support of Operation Noble Eagle.



U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Tom Louis

and those radars are mounted on the ground,” says Col. Mike Corbett, 1st Air Force and CONR vice commander. “But we can only see line of sight. The curvature of the earth keeps controllers from seeing low altitudes. So low-altitude threats like cruise missiles are not well detected by ground-based radars.”

The mission should someday employ High-Altitude Airships, solar-powered blimps cruising around the atmosphere and feeding air pictures back to earth. The airships, already being studied by the U.S. Army, are bigger than a football field and would stay airborne for up to a year at a time, Corbett says.


Eberhart spoke before the House Armed Services Committee about this exciting technology and what it means for homeland security.

“The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the United States Army, and NORAD are spearheading the effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an unmanned, untethered, long-duration HAA (High-Altitude Airship),” the general said in March 2003.

“The prototype airship will stay airborne for one month and carry a 4,000-pound payload. We expect the objective HAA to have the capability to stay airborne for up to a year and carry a payload greater than 4,000 pounds. A robust HAA capability would give warfighters persistent wide-area surveillance of the battle space against a full spectrum of air, land and sea threats.”

First Air Force and CONR hope to combine airship technology with enhanced command and control capabilities by 2004, Corbett says. That’s the same year the United States Missile Defense Agency and its counterparts hope to have a ballistic missile defense in place.¹²

Ground-based interceptors; sea-based interceptors; airborne laser aircraft; and land, sea and space-based sensors; are just part of the technology that will protect against ballistic missiles of all ranges, according to the Department of Defense.¹³



Above: Master Sgt. Jim Rice, 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard, signals that an AIM-120 missile is ready for the rack on Dec. 19, 2001. Rice and more than 60 other Texas Air Guard members were deployed to the 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard, Egg Harbor Township, in the early days of Operation Noble Eagle.

Right: Tech. Sgt. Wendell Hunte, 177th Fighter Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard aircraft generation squadron, performs a function check after installing an AIM-9 adapter and rail on an F-16 on Oct. 9, 2001. The aircraft was de-armed for maintenance after many Operation Noble Eagle flying hours.



U.S. Air Force photos by Master Sgt. Tom Louis



People first

Modern equipment may be critical in the war on terror, but it's the people performing the air defense mission who are most invaluable.

"The dedication, skill and patriotism of our people and the fact we've done this without a single mishap to date, is a remarkable testament to the great skill and loyalty of everyone out there doing this job," McKinley said in February 2003. "Since Sept. 11, they have done a remarkable job of securing our airspace against further attack."

By April 2003, American and Canadian military forces had flown more than 29,000 Operation Noble Eagle sorties in defense of critical infrastructure and population centers throughout North America.¹⁴

Many Operation Noble Eagle veterans are Air National Guardsmen who were recalled to active duty. "Operation Noble Eagle missions and aerospace warning and control takes people," Corbett said in March 2003. "To date those people have been mobilized and can only be mobilized for a two-year period."

"When it comes to command and control functions, through modernization, we think we can do it with the resources we had prior to Sept. 11," Corbett says. "But for the fighter wings out there doing the alert mission, that isn't the case. There is a real need for a significant number of additional people."

The command is working closely with the Air Staff and National Guard Bureau to create 900 more jobs in America's alert fighter wings, Corbett says.

But it isn't just the military fighting the war, McKinley says. "How we prosecute tracks of interest with our interagency partners is forever changed," the commander says. "We have become America's NATO. We are the centerpiece of that partnership and are working with agencies like the FBI and U.S. Customs just as our partners in

Europe work with various countries to defend NATO.”

“We can’t rest on our laurels,” he adds. “We’ll continue to be challenged. We haven’t suffered a reattack, but that doesn’t mean people aren’t out there planning, plotting and strategizing against us. We must stay vigilant and focused and support the president of the United States and secretary of defense in the war on terrorism.”

“Air sovereignty has changed forever,” McKinley concludes. “Not in my lifetime will we ever see an opportunity to turn the wick down a bit. This will be a very, very lengthy process.”



1 Jim Garamone, “Northern Command to Debut in October,” *American Forces Information Service*, 17 April 2002, n.p.

2 Ibid, n.p.

3 Ralph E. Eberhart, press conference at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., 1 August 2002.

4 Eberhart, speech before House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 13 March 2003.

5 Garamone, “Northern Command to Debut in October,” n.p.

6 Ibid., n.p.

7 Eberhart, before House Armed Services Committee, 13 March 2003.

8 Ibid.

9 Dan Navin and William A. Scott, conversation with author, 16 April 2002.

10 As of press time in late-2003.

11 United States Air Force, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power* (Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 2000), foreword.

12 Missile Defense Operations Announcement, *DOD News*, 17 December 2002, n.p.

13 Ibid., n.p.

14 NORAD statistics.

The “Tribute of Light” represents the fallen twin towers of the World Trade Center. The photograph was taken from Liberty State Park, N.J., March 14, 2002.





U.S. Air Force photo by Gary E

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
SHIRLEY S. MILLER

BY

AGENT WILLIAM (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

9:58 a.m. - 11:21 a.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It is 9:58 a.m., we're at --we're at FAA Building 10-A, Room 1010 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, my co-agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission Hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. And we're interviewing Shirley S. Miller today. It says here, please, acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MS. MILLER: Should I say my name?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure.

MS. MILLER: I'm Shirley S. Miller, FAA and I acknowledge that I'm being interviewed and tape recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth?

MS. MILLER: Yes, I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you please give your full name, spelling your last name?

MS. MILLER: Shirley S. Miller,
M-i-l-l-e-r.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current assignment, your current position?

MS. MILLER: I'm on the Air Traffic Organization Transition Team. And I'm just called a transition executive.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your grade?

MS. MILLER: It's Federal Executive Service [unintell.].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long have you been in your current position?

MS. MILLER: Well, I'm in a transition state, so it kind of complicated, I was the senior advisor to the Deputy Administrator, until recently, but I don't really even have paperwork that tells me exactly the date that I transferred to the ATO.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a ballpark?

MS. MILLER: Well, I think like for maybe the last month or so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. MILLER: Or couple of months maybe.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you just very briefly describe what your current duties are?

MS. MILLER: I'm assisting the Chief Operating Officer of the ATO and the Senior Vice President for Transition in essentially standing up the new organization and working through transition issues.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And ATO is?

MS. MILLER: Air Traffic Organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that how their routing symbol is, ATO and some numbers?

MS. MILLER: Yes, the FAA--the COO was hired a year ago and we are in the process of standing up a new organization which merges the former Air Traffic and Airway Facilities pieces of FAA and the acquisition organization into one organization to be more performance based and more businesslike.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see. When did you first start with the FAA?

MS. MILLER: In 1988.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was your position and duty location?

MS. MILLER: Budget analyst and I was in the FAA Budget Office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In D.C.?

MS. MILLER: Yes, here in this building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on September 11, what position were you in?

MS. MILLER: I was Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator of the FAA in this building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At that time, what grade were you?

MS. MILLER: It was a--we have a different pay system than the rest of DOT, it was called a J-Band in the Core Compensation System.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long had you held that position prior to the 11th?

MS. MILLER: About three years.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Three years?

MS. MILLER: Ninety-eight.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Ninety-eight?

MS. MILLER: In August of '98, I became the Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that continued up until about a month ago, is that?

MS. MILLER: No, From '98, until 2002, when that Deputy Administrator retired, the new Administrator and her Deputy or her team came in and they asked me to stay up here to help them, and so, I've been here. I was up here, essentially, from '98, until a couple of months ago working for the now Deputy Administrator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The reason that we're here to talk to you today is because, as I understand things, that you served as the FAA's liaison to the September 11 Commission, is that correct?

MS. MILLER: Yes, that's correct?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did that start?

MS. MILLER: In June of 2003.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And can you--in that position,

can you just very briefly describe what your responsibilities were?

MS. MILLER: Well, I was key point of contact for the agencies and my responsibility was to ensure that their document requests and all of the materials that the Commission asked for were provided. I was also responsible for addressing any questions they had and try to set them up with different places of expertise within the agency; work on their scheduling for getting interviews completed with our employees as part of their investigation, and, really, just be the go-to person.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At that time, who did you report to, who was your boss?

MS. MILLER: Well, Mr. Sturgell, who is the Deputy Administrator currently.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who did you primarily interact with at the Commission if you can pinpoint it down to one or two people?

MS. MILLER: Well, the team that I worked with, included (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], and they had one other person, an assistant, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also, there was another team that was working at primarily security and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], were two of those people that I worked with on that team. The Commission had several teams that were working with issues.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you spell (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. MILLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you involved in preparing documents for the Commission or collecting documents from within the FAA before they had issued the subpoena?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The, just to kind of give you a comparison, for instance, because I'm not exactly sure what format you guys submitted the documents to the 911 Commission, but the Department of Defense, for example, had prepared a massive computerized index listing all the documents and other materials and things like that that they had

turned over to the Commission. Did you guys do anything similar to that? Did you have, like, indexes?

MS. MILLER: We had indexes, but we don't have a massive computer document where everything's on one document. For example, the volume of documentation that was provided to the Commission. This is just a sample and this is all from Air Traffic facilities throughout the, you know, the facilities that were part of what happened that day. So, they all had indexes that they provided to me, but I mean, this was a massive undertaking. We didn't have time, you know, to put a computer listing together of everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So there are indexes at separate offices?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In Boston, whatever?

MS. MILLER: Yes, Boston, New York, Cleveland Center, Indianapolis Center. Anyone who was involved in either communications or tracking of the aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I should have asked you this earlier, did you have an assistant or anybody that worked directly with you on this project?

MS. MILLER: It was very ad hoc, most of the interaction--most of the documentation came, obviously, from our Air Traffic facilities, so my--I wouldn't call assistant, but I worked very closely with some folks here in the building and in the former Air Traffic Organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who were those people?

MS. MILLER: Well, Doug Gould, G-o-u-l-d, was one, and then he went to Iraq to help out over there, so he was early on, like I'd say last fall through [unintell.] that was October through about March and then he went to Iraq. And then when he left, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who was also in Air Traffic helped me out. But, you know, it was whoever was around, really.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Is Doug back from Iraq, now?

MS. MILLER: Yes, he's here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the indexes that you guys--did you provide copies of the indexes to the

Commission?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are those copies of all the indexes right there, or--

MS. MILLER: Not all of them, most of them are in here. But I also--the documents that I personally handled, I did my own index for those. So, like, that box there, is--there are some Air Traffic documents, but most of the actual facility documents were handled by Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before you guys out of headquarters turned over materials to the Commission did you guys make copies of those here?

MS. MILLER: We have copies here of what--I have copies of everything that, you know, that I did the index for. Now, when you talk about all the materials represented by this book? No, the originals would remain in the facilities.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, your facilities were turning over copies?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So they would transmit them up

to Washington. And then you would--

MS. MILLER: We'd hand them over to the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You guys didn't make copies before you--

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : FAA has a public affairs division, I'm not exactly sure if that's what they call them, but--

MS. MILLER: The Office of Public Affairs [unintell.] systems administrator [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who was in charge of that division on the 11th of September?

MS. MILLER: Yes, it was, I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c He's gone, that's a political position under another administration. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the head, I believe, but (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the Deputy, as she is today. She was here [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And she's still here today?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if the FAA issued any press releases concerning, you know, time lines?

MS. MILLER: Yes, I know that there was, I believe there was a press release issued. I don't know if there was right after 9/11 or in the days or weeks or whatever, I don't remember that. Public Affairs would have a copy of whatever we did release, if we did release anything. I do know that there was a release, I think, on the anniversary of, like in 2002, and I know that that's in our archives.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That press release would have been, like, a time line of events?

MS. MILLER: I don't recall exactly what it was, but I think it had time lines in it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Other than the possibility of this press release we just talked about, are you aware of other public statements or documents that the FAA had made concerning time lines for the hijackings and when it may have notified the

military?

MS. MILLER: Let me think. I don't, I know that both Jane Garvey, who was the Administrator, and Dick [unintell.] who was the acting deputy administrator who I worked for, I know they both testified sometime after 9/11, but I don't remember that they were--I don't remember that there were notification times in that testimony.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about other public documents?

MS. MILLER: Well, I mean, we have, you know, we get a lot of--not a lot of, but we have a document called "Summary of Hijack Events" that was done by our Air Traffic folks after 9/11 that had, I mean it was all time lines, basically.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like this?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm, but I'm not sure I would call that a public document. It was done, you know, internally, for our purposes, but I know it went a lot of places. I just don't know how public it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This document is titled "Summary of Air Traffic Events, September 11, 2001." It says on the bottom the source is AAT-20, what division is that?

MS. MILLER: Well, it's under the old organization, it's under the Air Traffic--the Director of Air Traffic there was a group called Investigations--I don't know, I'll have to look at it, AAT-20 was that group.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's where Doug Gould and Tony Ferrante--

MS. MILLER: Doug worked in there, mm-hmm, Tony Ferrante, at the time John or Dave Knoles. He was the head of that organization on 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mr. Knoles was?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know when this document came out?

MS. MILLER: It was done, like, within, I think a couple weeks, I want to say, but I'm not sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think I had heard that it

came out around September 17?

MS. MILLER: Well, there's a page in there that says September 17, but [unintell.] abbreviated version of it--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is just an abbreviated version?

MS. MILLER: I can't tell, but [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, it certainly doesn't.

MS. MILLER: I think yours might not have the graphics. But like, for example, you can see, here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MS. MILLER: I'm not sure if September 17 means that that's the day it was, you know, finalized or what, but [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah, right there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there a request [unintell.]

MS. MILLER: No, we do the internally, because after any--something as major as 9/11, you know, we need to understand what happened here and we were getting our, you know, the tapes and the

radar data in from our facilities and that's how we figured out, you know, certain transitions, certain things happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, this was primarily prepared as an internal briefing document, you would say?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just to try and kind of finish up the topic of public, are you aware of any other public time lines?

MS. MILLER: Not really, I mean, I don't recall how public, you know, I mean, I was not really involved in, you know, the compilation or anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. MILLER: I only got involved in this when I became the point of contact for 9/11. I mean, I was certainly here on 9/11 and I was certainly involved in a lot of things. But in actually compiling, you know, the time lines and working with the facilities, I had nothing to do with that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Aside from this summary of air traffic hijacking that we just talked about briefly, are you aware of any other internal briefing documents that the FAA may have prepared in sort of a time line format?

MS. MILLER: Well, Air Traffic produced, I would say several things, you know, they all had basically the same information. I mean, we had logs, you know, from the Ops Centers that indicated, you know, when they were hearing that certain things were happening that day.

I mean, Air Traffic had a situation room going all day that day. And they were trying to record things as they were happening, but it was not, I mean there was no atomic clock or anything like that, it was, like, people's recollection of what they were hearing. There were lots of things being, you know, developed or produced.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have read through a lot of materials that the Commission was provided and that I've seen elsewhere, like, in testimony and such. And I have a list of different items that I

understand that the FAA had produced. One was called "FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001," are you familiar with that one?

MS. MILLER: See, the problem with the Commission is, they titled things and I have no idea what they are referring to. I mean, we have [unintell.] requests in now--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a copy of that document.

MS. MILLER: Okay, but, sorry, they do have the right title on this one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They have one, yes.

MS. MILLER: This is something that we pulled together, last, essentially last summer, just to try to pull, you know, sort of all of the different versions of time lines into one master time line, so that we had a better understanding of, you know, the different pieces that were out there. So, it was, really, for internal purposes. We had a meeting here with the Deputy Chief Counsel from the department and, you know, all of the

people in the FAA who were still around or involved in, you know, 9/11 issues. And we decided it would be a good idea if we just incorporated the different chronologies that existed into one.

So, like, for example, in the Air Traffic piece, they didn't have some of the regional office notification time lines, so we incorporated those into this. They didn't have some of the--at the time FAA had security, and they had their own, you know, chronology going that day, so they had different entries that wouldn't have been in this piece, they were different parts of the FAA. So, this was an attempt to try to pull everything into one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who worked on that?

MS. MILLER: I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You did?

MS. MILLER: I did, along with, you know, I got pieces from Air Traffic and pieces from Security and pieces, you know pieces from AT security that we still had, because we have people

here today that were here on 9/11, that, you know remained in the area. And then pieces from our regional operations center and our operations center across the hall here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who worked on that with you or did you do it by yourself?

MS. MILLER: No, I worked with Lynne Osmus who's still head of security and her staff and Tony Ferrante and [unintell.] and the regional operations people. We have regional operations centers in every region. There's one in, you know, the ones that were impacted that day are part of it, one in Boston, New York, and the Great Lakes regional office in Chicago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said the reason that you guys put that together was to try to consolidate all the different time lines or--

MS. MILLER: Yeah, we just thought it would be a good idea, I mean, it really wasn't used for anything other than we had one piece--one document that had everything that we knew of.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was involved in the

decision to put that together?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, myself, Lynne Osmus, Lindy Knapp, I think was in part of the discussion.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She's from Counsel's Office?

MS. MILLER: Yes, I think [unintell.] was in the conversation, I'm trying to remember who else, Tony Ferrante. I mean nobody tasked us to do this we just thought it was a good idea. But it was taking pieces that already existed in different parts and pulling it into one document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Had anybody expressed some concern that such a document didn't exist?

MS. MILLER: No, not really, no, it was just--there had already been a hearing, in May of 2003--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MS. MILLER: --and former Administrator Garvey had been questioned about response or notification time to the military, particularly on American 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. And I know that I had heard indirectly that there was some concern in the Secretary's office about, you

know going back to 9/11 and the days after, there was some discrepancy between our time lines and DOD and NORAD's time lines and so on. I think John Flaherty [ph], particularly, was, he just wanted to make sure that we had all the information that we had done what we could do with the information that we had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Flaherty didn't task you with that.

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that was last summer?

MS. MILLER: That was, yeah, like, in June.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : June of 2003?

MS. MILLER: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Where did you obtain the data for that document?

MS. MILLER: From Air Traffic, from Security, from the Regional Operations Centers and our own operations centers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you rely on summary data that they had already put together?

MS. MILLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or did you actually go all the way back to the source?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you relied on summary data that those division had--

MS. MILLER: Yes, I used documents that already existed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so you used existing time lines of other--

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So did you do anything at all to validate the data that existed

MS. MILLER: No, other than just making sure that what was--ultimately in here reflected what had produced already, or what had been developed. But I didn't go back to any source data, I didn't go back and listen to air traffic control tapes, I didn't do anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Why not?

MS. MILLER: Because I didn't really, I mean, there was no need to do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what happened to that document?

MS. MILLER: Well, you know, I gave a copy to the Commission. I gave a copy to Lindy to give to John, I don't know if she ever did, I mean I assume that he got a copy of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You gave it to Lindy?

MS. MILLER: Lindy Knapp.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, I'm sorry, Lindy to give to Mr. Flaherty?

MS. MILLER: Right. And then, you know, everyone here who worked on it had a copy of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you were working on that document did you coordinate any of it with the military in any way?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have documents from the military that you used?

MS. MILLER: No, no, we did not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you need to take a break at any time.

MS. MILLER: No, no. Sorry about that.

[Break.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, I turned off the tape recorder for just, like one minute or so, it's 10:30 right now, just to make sure it was working. And to take a quick break, so the interview's going to proceed. So, you said that you hadn't coordinated with the military and that you hadn't, at least, as far as you are aware reviewed any material from the military to prepare that time line.

MS. MILLER: Absolutely, I never reviewed any material from the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you have that document, I--

MS. MILLER: Oh sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One question that had apparently come up from the Commission, was in time lines such as this and that other one that you have there that Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events--

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And this FAA communications regarding the hijacked aircraft?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Why didn't this time line or the other time line, why didn't they reflect such events, such as like 9:21, it says that Boston Center advised NEEDS that American 11 is airborne and heading for Washington. That particular time at 9:21 is the Commission refers to as one of the phantom hijackings because at 9:21 American 11 has already crashed. How come your time line doesn't reflect that?

MS. MILLER: You know, I didn't produce the source that I used, I didn't produce that so that's one of the questions that you need to ask Air Traffic, when you talk to Tony Ferrante and others, but I will say this, there was a lot of misinformation on 9/11. And so, to put a, we weren't going to record everything that we, you know, that happened that day in this, because we know that American 11 wasn't, couldn't possibly have been in the air now, so there was no point in putting that entry in here. This wasn't like every single, transition that occurred. This was--the

point was to try to, for each flight--I mean, I didn't produce this document.

But the point was to, after 9/11, after we'd gotten in the information that we got from our facilities was to the best of our knowledge based on the information we had and the coordination that Air Traffic had done with the military was to try to come up with a time line of what happened to each one. So, do you understand what I'm saying? There were lots of erroneous, bad reporting that day. Because there was a lot of confusion. So, we're not going to put a, I mean we're supposed to put the actual of what happened, not, you know, that American 11 was still in the air when it was after the fact. After that transition, we figured out that no it wasn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, well, who was going to be the consumer of that time line that you have over there just a summary of air traffic hijack events.

MS. MILLER: We were, we thought possibly, you know, others in the Administration, perhaps, even Congress. I don't know who, I mean, you'd

really have to ask Air Traffic the purpose of this, but I would assume that that's what the purpose was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then for this other one, "FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft," who--

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --who did you guys understand would be the consumers of this?

MS. MILLER: Well, they weren't sure, but we thought it was a good idea, to have, as I said, before a consolidated chronology that had the different pieces, it had the Air Traffic piece had, the Security people had; the operations people, and I didn't know where it would go. I thought the Commission might be interested in having a consolidated. I thought, you know people at OST would want it. I didn't know where it was going to go, but I thought it would be a good idea to have it on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which was produced first, which one--this was produced first?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?"

MS. MILLER: This was done last, in 2003.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did the FAA produce any time lines similar to these for purposes of kind of like lessons learned, to kind of look at what happened and then see where they could maybe make some changes to improve things or say, oh, everything worked perfectly?

MS. MILLER: We didn't produce time lines that led us in that search that could be done. I mean, we knew on 9/11 that we had some communications problems. We didn't need to do a time line to figure that out. So, we, I mean, we had --we didn't have any--there was no formal documents that reflect lessons learned from 9/11. [unintell.] lessons learned, but there's no, like big consolidated book that the FAA produced that said, you know, [unintell.] I mean, we just couldn't do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, if anybody ever

talked about doing that and the idea was turned down or it just never came up?

MS. MILLER: No, it, I mean, I believe it, I know it was talked about, but--there was an enormous amount of work going on after 9/11 in the days after, just to get the system going again, get the security measures in place and all those other things, but I don't think, I mean there wasn't enough time in the day to go off and do a lessons learned. Or a real-time lessons learned when we weren't reacting to that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever have a discussion about what events should or shouldn't be included in your FAA communications regarding hijacked aircraft time line? Like, how did you decide that the erroneous communications, for example, like the one, I think it was the 9:21 event where Boston tells NEEDS that American is still airborne, how did you guys decide not to include things like that? Was that a decision made by you or higher up or among the group?

MS. MILLER: Again, the summary that we

did in 2003, was based on the documents that already existed, okay, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Similar documents, basically?

MS. MILLER: --yes, the 9/21 entry is not in this book, okay, so, I used this and I used security's pieces, you know, because they had their own what we call the aviation [unintell.] that were going on 9/11 across the hall in the ops center and they had their own log entries. And then we had log entries from the operations centers in the field and in headquarters. So those were the sources that I used. I did not read, I didn't ask Air Traffic to go back and re-examine everything that happened that day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. So, you didn't look at, I think [unintell.] packages for each of the four hijacked aircraft have transcripts of communications, you didn't look at that sort of material?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have copies of the other source materials that you relied on to

prepare your time line?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have them here?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just, when we're done, I'd like to take a quick look at those if we could.

MS. MILLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any other questions?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Give me one second, I want to [unintell.]

MS. MILLER: Okay.

[Lengthy pause.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you, and I don't know if this is the exact title of the document or at least the way, I don't know if this is the title that FAA refers to this document, but are you familiar with a document, I have the title, "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001?"

MS. MILLER: Do you have a copy of it so I --

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't. I was hoping you could help me with that, too. I can tell you where I got that information from--

MS. MILLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --is during the May 23, Commission hearing, Commissioner Ben-Viniste--

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --says, he quotes from the document, he says that he was provided with a copy of a document, called "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001" and he says that it was produced by Schuessler and in the transcript it says Asmis, but I think it's Osmus.

MS. MILLER: Osmus, yeah, oh I know what that is, I don't have a copy of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: So, I believe, you're interviewing Lynne Osmus right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe she's on our list.

MS. MILLER: So, she and Linda Schuessler, the evening of the 23rd, I think it was, were trying to help Jane Garvey get a response back to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c . And they came up with a statement and I think that's what that's referring to, but I don't have a copy of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've heard reference to another document that--it's supposed to be a time line document and it's just called "Internal Briefing Document," it's handwritten, "Internal Briefing Document," it contains time lines. I don't

MS. MILLER: I know, that's the problem with the way that the Commission referred to documents, okay?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. MILLER: They didn't necessarily, I mean, if we didn't have a title on it or something, they would just call it something and I had no idea what they were talking about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I don't have all of the Commission's documents yet, we're still working on those.

MS. MILLER: You're getting all the Commission's documents?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, not all of them, I hope, but at least just the pertinent ones. If I had it, I'd show it to you. And there was another document I heard referenced as "FAA Military Notifications?"

MS. MILLER: I don't know what--I'm not sure what that might be, but I can show you what I think it might be.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Is it easily accessible?

MS. MILLER: I think, it should be. This might be it. I'm not sure if that is the document [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. This document's not titled, but it has in the footer, it says provided by AAT-20, revised on September 18, 2001, at 1400. So this would have been produced by Knoles group?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Could this be one of the source documents you used for your time line?

MS. MILLER: Mm-hmm, I think so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do you refer to this as?

MS. MILLER: I don't really refer to it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you know why they produced this?

MS. MILLER: I don't know for [unintell.] you can ask them when you interview them. I think it was an attempt to, in the early days, after to try to figure out where we might possibly--if we possibly could have known that there was something wrong, and then, how long did it take us to notify the military. But, as you can see in this, the notification time, I mean, they have an N/A, next to UAL-93 and then the 9:24 time according to the Commission and everything that they learned [unintell.] notified them about American 77, so, I mean, that's what we got at the time.

[Technical interruption.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there--is that document listed in one of the indexes?

MS. MILLER: Yes, I'm sure it is, I'd have to research which index it's in.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'd like to get a copy of that.

MS. MILLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in helping, like Jane Garvey or Monty Belcher or any of the other FAA or former FAA employees prepare for their testimony before the Commission?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know how that was handled?

MS. MILLER: Yeah, there was a group that was formed to get ready for hearings and Darlene Freeman, who was still with the FAA and sort of a leader and she pulled together people from the different parts of the FAA to work on questions and answers and, you know, that kind of thing. So, they worked, I mean, she had people from Traffic and Security and wherever else she needed them from. And she was the lead on getting them ready for them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was she in contact with you to get any documents or--

MS. MILLER: No, I mean, after 9/11, I'm really not involved in documents, you know, because of the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: The normal way that things go after an accident or an incident that affected Air Traffic Control facility, [unintell.] their radar data, their transmissions, their tapes, you know, all that becomes [unintell.] in a package. And that's what happened with the with the 9/11 materials. And so, you know, most of what Darlene was doing was just pulling together questions and answers on the hundreds of security issues you know, about, what kind of [unintell.] protection systems do we have, you know, [unintell.] all the myriad issues that would come up in a hearing after 9/11, obviously.

And, as I recall, there were very few air traffic control issues, it was mostly about security in those hearings.

We were following our normal process after an accident on the traffic control side, you know, pulling all that data together to hand over to the EGSC [ph], which we did, and then the FBI took over the investigation as a criminal investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've heard Darlene Freeman's group referred to as like an after action group?

MS. MILLER: I don't think I'd call it that, I think that's way too formal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. I understand that she started working on these issues not long after September 11--

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that sound right?

MS. MILLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And she would have continued all the way into '03?

MS. MILLER: Oh, no--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because the testimony before the Commission didn't start until--

MS. MILLER: May of 2003.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MS. MILLER: And I don't know how Jane Garvey, you can probably find out from [unintell.] how her testimony was developed. I don't know how it was developed, that was, actually before I was even involved in this with Commission work. But,

no, the Darlene Freeman piece was a very short-lived piece, I mean, it was the immediate hearings that occurred after 9/11, which was like a week or two after, maybe, I don't remember exactly.

And I believe there might have been one in November, but the effort that she extended, may be lasted two or three months, at the most, I believe.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you didn't assist in helping any FAA personnel prepare for testimony in any way?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about for any White House briefings?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if there were any White House briefings?

MS. MILLER: I don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who would be best situated to know that answer?

MS. MILLER: Well, I think Jeff Griffith is probably the most likely person that would have a feel for that, because he would be. He and

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who was the (b)(6), (b)(7)c on 9/11 were the two people that I remember being involved in any White House discussions. Possibly (b)(6), (b)(7)c who was the head of Air Traffic Services at the time, but I don't--as I recall, it was delegated down to Jeff, Jeff had all the technical expertise in Air Traffic to answer any questions and he worked real close to the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In your role as sort of a September 11 liaison, September 11 Commission liaison, did you have any interaction with the military at all?

MS. MILLER: With sort of my counterpart with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At OSD, you know, they have an office set up that [unintell.] intelligence or legal, I'm not sure which group, but anyway, they had a group set up to work the 9/11 issues in the document production and all that. There's a much bigger [unintell.] than ours so, I mean, they had a lot more people working it than we did, but, yes, I had contact with them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was that over there?

MS. MILLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and, (b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What sort of coordination would you guys need to do? Can you kind of give some examples?

MS. MILLER: It wasn't really coordination it was--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the reason for your interaction?

MS. MILLER: Well, let me think, the interaction, really, didn't really have much interaction until like the last few months, I guess, before the June hearings, you know, this year?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The June '04 hearings?

MS. MILLER: Yeah, and it wasn't to compare notes, really, it was just sort of to get feedback from them, you know, what they were hearing from the Commission versus what we were hearing from the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that time-line issues or--

MS. MILLER: We talked, you know, I went

over there in, sometime early this past summer, I can't remember when exactly. Sometime, maybe it was in the of spring, I don't remember exactly when it was.

And the purpose of that discussion was, just to try to understand what we had heard indirectly from one of the Commission staff, and that was that they said that NMCC, which is the National Military Command Center, or Control Center at the Pentagon was telling the Commission staff that we never notified them about, you know, almost anything, you know, that we never called them. I mean, that's part of our procedure, we have a hijack situation, we would have reached out to them and, in fact we did. But as I understand that what happened was they answered the phone, but it was a push to talk phone and they weren't monitoring it all the time and then, you know they were--they were seeing things differently than we were and they were setting up a different kind of teleconference that we were never part of on the air-threat telephone conference.

And eventually somebody out at our command center ended up on that conference. At least that's what the Commission report said. I have no reason to doubt that. It's just that, you know, we didn't know all that at the time. The air-threat conference call is not anything that would have ever been in our procedures to be part of, you know. So, I think things were happening ad hoc that day as the crisis was unfolding. And, you know, unfortunately, I think we missed each other, you know, in our communications efforts.

So, what I wanted to understand was did somebody really say to the Commission that we never notified NMCC? And, in fact, they told me that day when I met with them at the Pentagon, Tony Ferrante and I went over there. No, no, we told the Commission that you all called us, but that we weren't monitoring that conversation or that phone call, that particular line the entire morning. So, I just needed to understand, you know, that that was the one piece that I needed to understand from them, because all along, we thought we had reached

out to the military. You know, I don't know exactly what time, I'd have to look, but, you know, and then we're hearing from them that, no, we never did, from the Commission, not from the Pentagon, you know, directly. So, the purpose of the meeting that I had with them was to try to understand what had they said to the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think that might have been in--can you definitely say that was before that hearing in June?

MS. MILLER: Yes, definitely before the hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said it was you and Mr. Ferrante had gone over there?

MS. MILLER: Yes, and one of our attorneys who had been working closely with me, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did, when you went over to that meeting, did you guys bring any data with you, any of your time lines or any other--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I had, I had some information

with me, but we never got into that kind of level of discussion.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you provide them with a copy of it or--

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Did they show you any of their data or time lines or log books or anything like that?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they provide you with copies of anything?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At any point, did you share any data that you had with the military folks that you were working with?

MS. MILLER: I don't recall doing anything with them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they provide you with anything?

MS. MILLER: I think I got a copy of--I'm trying to remember, of a log, I don't remember exactly what it was. I'm sorry. Let's see, it was

a log that they sent me, but it was almost like it was a summary of different pieces that they pulled together. I don't know, I'd have to go back and look.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think you still have a copy of that?

MS. MILLER: Yeah, I think so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get anything else from them?

MS. MILLER: Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just that one--

MS. MILLER: Well, they gave me, they sent me a log and a copy of an e-mail that (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], you know, oh, I know, it was about year-end '03, and it was a copy of an e-mail of what he sent to the Commission or something like that. I can find it for you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was this meeting in general just to talk about the notification or were you talking about specific flights relating to the notification?

MS. MILLER: Well, what had gotten--I guess what had gotten me concerned was that in, I mean, the Commission staff was--they weren't leveling with any of us about what they were sort of figuring out, you know. So we were all trying to guess it, as to what they were coming up with.

And so, (b)(6), (b)(7)c one night, was in here and he told me that there was a major break down on 9/11, here in headquarters, particularly about United 93 and that we never notified the military about United 93. And I'm like, I don't understand that, you know, everything that I know about what happened that day, I thought we did. And he said, well, it didn't happen.

So, then I talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c and said, you know, maybe it would be useful if we came over there and we just, if I could hear it from you all, what did somebody at NMCC say to the Commission. [unintell.] that we hadn't made the outreach to the NMCC that day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In particular to 93?

MS. MILLER: Well, the point is that if

they had been on that conversation, they would have heard about United 93, at least that's what we all thought here. Because we all remember that by, I don't know, certainly before United 93, crashed, that there was an open line going between us and that's what we all remember. You can ask (b)(6), (b)(7)c you conversation ask Jeff, you can ask anybody who was here in headquarters that was involved in anything that day.

So that's what, I mean, none of us could understand how the Commission could be thinking that we weren't talking to the military by that time in the morning, okay, so it was, obviously, I mean, our controllers in Boston, did a great job of reaching out to the military quickly when they were figuring out what was happening.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was something [unintell.] as opposed to NMCC?

MS. MILLER: That's right. And, you know, I was shocked when I read in the report, you know, that we actually, didn't notify--didn't say anything to the military about American 77 until

whenever they say we did in their book. Because we always thought it was at 9:24. That's what our log said. So, that's when the two flights that were really of a concern to me were American 77 and United 93.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Your log, what log are you referring to for 9:24--

MS. MILLER: Any of our logs--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You're talking about your time lines?

MS. MILLER: --all [unintell.] say 9:22.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But your--and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think your time lines all reference a military log as the source--

MS. MILLER: Yes, that's right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --for that. Okay. Have you ever seen that log, do you know if anybody at FAA has that log?

MS. MILLER: I don't--when I tried to find that log, everyone who's still here today, you know, basically, the answer is, we don't have it. It would have been destroyed or, you know--I don't

mean destroyed, like, but after some period of time, things we, they are either sent back to the military or destroyed because my understanding is whatever the military sent us they were classified documents. And so there are, you know destruction parameters associated with that. That's what I understand. i never saw anything from the military, any source documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever see any public documents released by the military?

MS. MILLER: No, the only think I remember seeing was a--I think [unintell.] did a press release.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would this be the document?

MS. MILLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That looks like it?

MS. MILLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I didn't get that from the military, it came from some other source out on the Internet. But it claims to be authentic.

MS. MILLER: Well, I mean, okay, but the

one I remember seeing, it has that same information, it may not look exactly--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But it looks the same?

MS. MILLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would this have been one of the documents you used?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : To create--

MS. MILLER: Well, let me say, I don't know what they used to create this, okay? I mean, I don't know, you'd have to ask.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was this document provided to the Commission as part of the FAA's response?

MS. MILLER: No.

[Lengthy pause.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you guys have compiled a list of the tail numbers for each of the four flights?

MS. MILLER: A list?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have that information, you know I was looking in the [unintell.] reports, for like, 11 and 175 and I didn't see those,

they're not there, I might have just missed it.

MS. MILLER: I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The reason I was asking is because the Commission seems to contribute some of the confusion to the military's use of tail numbers versus FAA's use of flight numbers when referring to different aircraft.

MS. MILLER: But I think, I mean, I could be wrong, but I think when an accident happens the tail number's included.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember if I saw it or maybe I just missed it, interesting.

MS. MILLER: There's a lot of information in an accident package.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There sure is. Do you know, once the FAA started to find out that the Commission had some concerns or was just making some determination that some of the notification times, specifically, I think there's a time like at 9:16 or 9:24 that the times that had been put out in the public for those two events, might not necessarily be correct. Do you know what sort of

efforts the FAA had made internally to try to determine what had happened at those two times?

MS. MILLER: That's really not, I mean, if you're asking, maybe you should restate your question, I'm not sure if you're asking me now or when we started understanding that there was concern on the Commission's part, did we do anything, is that what you're asking me?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, once you started to determine that the Commission might be concerned about those events?

MS. MILLER: Well, I never knew about the 9:16 thing until the report came out, okay?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: So, on 9:24, again, I go back to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you talking about the formal report or--because I think they make reference to that in their staff statement--

MS. MILLER: Staff statement, is that what you mean, yeah, I mean I guess that's probably about the time that I knew that there was a 9:16

issue.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: So, with the 9:24, you know again, I go back to, I knew there was concern about notification on 77 and 93, and, you know, that's what I was trying to understand with the military, you know, before the June hearing, sometime before the June hearing, you know, kind of what they had told the Commission versus what our records showed.

But I didn't get, like, you know, specifics about what NORAD said to them, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: --I just sort of got general, you know, assurance from them, that, you know, we were sort of in synch, with what we were saying.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As far as kind of double checking FAA's records, did it go any further than looking at the time lines that had already been produced? Did you go, are you aware of anybody at FAA kind of drilling down on the issue and saying, well, let's look at our source material, let's check Boston's records; let's check the Command

Center; that sort of thing?

MS. MILLER: No, but you have to remember or keep this in mind, okay, the Commission got hundreds and hundreds of tapes and they had transcribed, hundreds of tapes, when they could be valid; tons of tapes, okay, that we never listened to, okay? We never went through the painstaking process that the Commission went through after 9/11 to get every piece of communication that happened all over the place. I mean, that's what they did. We never did that. We pulled, and you'll have to talk to Air Traffic about this, because they're the ones who can tell you exactly what they did, you know, in the aftermath, but we never went to the extent that the Commission did to understand what happened?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How come?

MS. MILLER: Well, the Commission they looked over a year, we don't have that kind of time, I mean, we just didn't do it. We didn't see a need to do it.

MR. OWENS: Okay.

MS. MILLER: We had no reason to believe that there was--we knew what happened, we knew what had to be fixed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. After the Staff Statement 17 came out, did anybody at FAA start to go back and try to look and find out if what the Commission was putting out was accurate or try to verify what the Commission was saying about those two events?

MS. MILLER: No, I mean, I know Air Traffic didn't, ATO, the Administrator did not direct anybody to do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] meeting when you went over to DOD to meet with your two counterparts that were there. [unintell.] at any time?

MS. MILLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You kind of walked away, then, reassured--

MS. MILLER: Yeah, I felt that the issue of the NMCC contact, I felt comfortable that we had at least tried to do what our procedures called for that day. You know, it didn't work, as designed,

but we did make the outreach to them, so I felt comfortable that what we had thought all along and said that we had done all along, that's what we did. And come to find it didn't work out the way it should have, but you know, a lot of things didn't work out that day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I recall reading in a couple of the transcripts for the hearings that like Jane Garvey testified at and I think, also, Monty Belcher, that there were some formal questions that they were going to respond to after the hearing. Do you guys have copies of those materials that they provided after those hearings?

MS. MILLER: [unintell.] questions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have final questions for the record of something like that is what they might be referred to?

MS. MILLER: There was never an QFR from [unintell.] hearings June 17 hearing, that I'm aware of. I might not be aware of it, but I don't recall anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think there was for Jane--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : For Jane--

MS. MILLER: I know there were a couple of things that were followed up on and I'd have to go back and see. I think they were security related, if I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'll have to look again myself so I can be more specific.

MS. MILLER: And, you know, I think [unintell.] would have a better recollection on that story, because she was actually, sort of in charge of all this when the May 23 hearing occurred.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: I think she got [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anymore questions on this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If it's okay, what I'd like to do is stop tape recording and can you see if you can find those time line--the other documents for, like Security and the Op Center and stuff that you

relied on to put yours together?

MS. MILLER: Yeah, I think I'm going to need a little bit of time, though.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, okay.

MS. MILLER: I mean, if you can--are you going to be back in the building later or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We can probably stop back after lunch, we've got another interview, like at 3 or something, but not here, it's back at our building, would that give you enough time, maybe by 1:00 or--

MS. MILLER: By when?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Maybe by 1:00, we probably need to be heading back at least by 2:00 I think. And we'll be back tomorrow two.

MS. MILLER: See, I'm not sure, I mean, I'm--there's stuff all over the place. So, I need to, I'm just not sure how long it's going to take me to look.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, will you call one of us when you--

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --we can come by and pick them up?

MS. MILLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. MILLER: I mean, you know I can give you a copy of this right now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah that would be great.

MS. MILLER: It might be helpful for you in another interview.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We'll conclude then, it's 11:21.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
JEFFREY GRIFFITH

BY

AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

[No start time provided] - 5:36 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --We're at 400 7th Street S.W. at DOT OIG's Office, Room 7324 Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c my co-agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at a September 11 Commission Hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. We're interviewing Jeff Griffith. If you could, please, acknowledge that the interview is being tape recorded?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes it is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth?

MR. GRIFFITH: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you, please, give your full name, spelling your last name for the record, please.

MR. GRIFFITH: Full name is Jeffrey Wynn

Griffith, G-r-i-f-f-i-t-h.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said you retired from the FAA in November '02?

MR. GRIFFITH: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what are you currently doing?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm working for a small company in Bethesda, Maryland, as a consultant.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was your last position at the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: Deputy Director of Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade was that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I was an SES. I can't remember the FAA equivalencies, I believe it was an FX-1.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sort of like an SES, was that Level 1, you think?

MR. GRIFFITH: A four--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A four.

MR. GRIFFITH: SES-4 or possibly a 3. I went into FAA under [unintell.] reform moved out of

OPM direction all our SES's combined into FX-1, 2 or 3. If 1 was the highest, that's what I was. If a 3 was the highest, then that's what it was, I can't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long had you been in that position?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think about a year and a half. I can't remember, I spent a total of six years in FAA headquarters as an SES.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you would have--you said you were a Deputy Director of Air Traffic?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you would have gotten that position in 2000 sometime?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think so, yeah. I'm sorry I'm not more clear on that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's all right, I just want to--

MR. GRIFFITH: I can go back on my SF-50s and tell you if you need it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I'm just trying to gauge, I was going to ask you what position you held on

the 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: That was it, Deputy
Director.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you start at the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: 1970.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In what position and what duty
station?

MR. GRIFFITH: I was an Air Traffic
Controller in Macon, Georgia.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think I remember you saying
on September 11, and you can correct me if I'm
wrong, but on September 11, you were--maybe I'm
thinking of somebody else--anyway where you on
September 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: I was at FAA headquarters,
my office was on the 10th floor. And that's where
I was that day, if you want to know where I was
when we had the first altercation, [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, why don't you go ahead
and if you can in a real synoptic format.

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, I was at FAA
headquarters and now know that I was in a meeting

in the Administrator's conference room and received a page that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And so, I went down to my suite where my office is on the 10th floor there and was met by--one of--I had 15 direct reports, 14 of them were SES, but this particular person was responsible for quality assurance, accident investigation--I was met by that individual. And turned on CNN, because our natural instinct was it had to be a smaller airplane, it couldn't have been an airliner kind of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that Knoles?

MR. GRIFFITH: Dave Knoles, yeah. And I was either met by him or talked to him on the phone, I don't know how much detail you want, because I've been through this so many times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, you're doing fine.

MR. GRIFFITH: I remember not mentioning my pager when they recorded me over at 9/11 Commission, so if I recall things that sound

different, I want to try and explain them. But, anyway, I talked to Knoles either by phone or in person. And shortly thereafter I went down to our operations center on the 10th floor in the FAA and we began dealing with the issue. At some point I was informed that a second airplane had hit the second tower. You know, and so, we were--the two things that I recall is, number one, I told Knoles to set up a situation line in our suite and get all of our direct reports on line from the regions, there were nine of them, and, you know start collecting information about what's going on in the system. We wanted to know that.

And the next thing I directed him to do was to immediately tell these people to start data collection, meaning radar tracking information; voice communications, and that sort of stuff for accident reporting, because our experience with TWA 800 and John F. Kennedy, Jr., et cetera, et cetera, was that, you know, the phone's going to ring, it's going to be the Hill and the White House or somebody and they're going to want to know

information.

So, you know, we put those two things process. We got in a direct communication with our regions and we began data collection.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then for me, I went to the--when I reached the Operations Center I talked directly to the person in the Command Center that worked for me. The guy who worked for me wasn't there, but his deputy was there, so I talked to that person, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. OWENS: That command center is in Herndon?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right. And what I told them was, you know, begin getting information on 88 and normal or unusual situation that occurs from all the centers, we've got 20 centers. And they began doing that. At some point the aircraft hit the Pentagon. And, of course, we were talking about a lot of things over the course of time, but you know, when the aircraft hit the Pentagon, we decided to shut the system down, which we did. And

worked from there. And then the last aircraft went into the field.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you, I'll probably come back to some questions about your activities on the 11th, first. But I want to try to cover some, I guess, some time-line issues associated with sort of post-event autopsy, I guess, for lack of a better term.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what public statement the FAA has made concerning it's notification of hijackings to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I know what was said in the 9/11 hearings because I was there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't say that I know what was said before then.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if any press releases were issued by the FAA?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't know that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you familiar with the NORAD press release, have you seen that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't recall seeing it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think we have a copy.

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm not sure I saw it as a press release, I did see this kind of information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Something similar to that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm not sure I saw it as a press release.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I should just point out that this press release purports to come from NORAD, though I didn't get it from a military source.

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, did the FAA issue anything similar to this in the form of, like, a press release or anything?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't remember if they did or not, to be honest with you. Just don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if the FAA issued any, like briefing documents that would have said, you know, became aware of, you know, hijacking of this flight at this time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. Here's what I

remember about that: There seemed to be some questions about what was reported when and, you know, the field people were saying, well, I said this and I said that. And the way the FAA attempted to reconcile that and it was by using a person named Darlene Freeman.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And Darlene was a senior executive with a law background, very credible individual. And so she was asked to collect information and put together the reporting times between the military and the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : About what time period would this have been?

MR. GRIFFITH: I believe it was, maybe, a couple weeks after 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who would have asked her to do that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know, Darlene didn't work for me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't want to surmise who

did it because, I mean, I worked at that level.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who did Darlene report to?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'll be honest with you, I don't know. Darlene used to be in my chain of command when she was Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services. And then she went on an overseas assignment and came back and I'm not sure what assignment she was on because it was, like, her husband was working and I think she actually took some kind of leave-of-absence or something, but anyway when that assignment was finished, Darlene came back as an SES. But she did not go back into that Deputy Associate because it had been filled. But I know that she was an SES working on the 10th floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. I should have asked you earlier, who did you work for, who was your boss?

MR. GRIFFITH: My boss was Bill Peacock. He was the Director and then we reported to Darlene's old position which was (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], now, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic, and then (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the Associate and

then Monty Belcher was the Acting Deputy and then Jane Garvey was the Administrator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. So, I'm sorry, I interrupted you in your--you were saying that Darlene was asked to put together a--try to reconcile--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --you said to reconcile some discrepancies, is that what you had said?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know if I said discrepancies, but there was--when the logs at the Air Defense Sectors and the logs at FAA were looked at, there were times that didn't match or, you know, there were log entries at one place and not at another. Those kinds of things. And so, and somebody--I don't recall who was asking the question--but somebody was asking the question and so the FAA's response to that was to get all the logs and look at them and write down what they say, you know. Because the law is the record. And, so, that's what we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I did, Knoles actually did all the--I assigned all the work to him. You know, for collecting the logs and, you know. And then I had a person I was working with at NORAD, Larry Arnold who was a two-star, and, you know, I contacted Larry Arnold and said, I don't know what's going on with this question about the logs, but, you know, he and i agreed that whatever they say, they say, you know, so, let's find out what they say and report it. And that's, essentially what we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What questions in the logs existed at that time? Because this would have been, we're talking about the time period within a couple of weeks of September 11, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it was a couple weeks later.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Roughly.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, you know. We had, at Air Traffic, we had done our normal process for investigating aircraft accidents and incidents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You guys had put together, I

think that you guys refer to them as Formal Accident Packages?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that's what you're referring to?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, we, for many years we've had procedures to do that and they're good procedures. And they involve getting controller statements, getting supervisor statements, listening to voice recordings; looking at radar tracking data; filling out various forms, writing transcripts, those kinds of things. Putting together a complete package.

In this particular case, the protocols for hijacking belonged to the FBI.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, our link in hijacks was always FBI. And we had no protocols with DOD for hijackings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you talking about

post-event or during?

MR. GRIFFITH: During 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I'm sorry, like while in progress or after the fact, like?

MR. GRIFFITH: While in progress. And our protocol was to report it to the FBI. So we put together a very detailed chronology of factual information about all four of the aircraft and where they received their clearances and when they went from one sector to another, one facility to another, time lines. So we had a very detailed chronology of the four aircraft involved in 9/11.

And we presented that to the FBI. Which was responsible for investigating hijackings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, that was the protocol for that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is not the whole thing, it's not in color.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, AT-20, this is--
yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Looking at the "Summary or Air

Traffic Hijack Events" September 11, 2001.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah this is what Knoles shop put together. And, like you said, it's probably about this thick.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's got a lot more graphics?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. And Tony Ferrante did most of the work on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

MR. GRIFFITH: That's what I'm talking about, right there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. So is this the document that Freeman participated in?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So she would have been working on something different? This is just what, because AAT-20 is within Air Traffic, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that's Knoles's group, is that correct?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they kind of do, like quality assurance and aircraft accident

investigations, that sort of thing. Strictly Air Traffic?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, that's it. I forgot, we had--I'm just remembering a series of briefings that were given to me before we took information to Darlene, but we actually went into a lot more detail and line-by-line transcriptions and those kinds of things for accident reporting and [unintell.] blankets the whole world just to report on an accident, you report on the people involved, the positions that, you know, the controllers that had talked to the airplanes and, you know.

What we tried to do, was, and again we didn't--you can imagine on 9/11, there were--they had thousands of people working in our organization of 24,000 and so we had thousands of people working on 9/11. Not 24,000, but, you know, in operational facilities, New York Center, you know, they had 500 controllers, and another 200 or 300 staff people there you know.

So, when you look at all those facilities and all the shutdown it did from coast-to-coast,

including oceanic, you know, we have huge oceanic sectors. There were thousands of pieces of information. So, we weren't interested in, you know, what everybody said to everyone else. We just--we tried to find pertinent information that dealt with the accident all four accidents.

And so, the result, that's the difference between what we did and what the 9/11 Commission did. I mean, the 9/11 Commission went out and interviewed many, many people, I don't know how many they interviewed, I mean they talked to air traffic controllers. We talked to the controllers that worked the airplanes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: But we didn't talk to every controller who was in that building that day, you know. And we didn't go into every facility and take every piece of paper that, you know, that was in their file. We didn't listen to days and days worth of tape recordings, you know. We listened to the one we thought was pertinent.

So we were in a mode on 9/11 thinking, we

did a pretty good darn good job. When you think you've got 4,500 airplanes up in the sky and you know at least four of them have been hijacked, and you don't know how many more will be or could be and you have to put 4,500 airplanes on the ground safely without running into each other, you know, that's a formidable task. And we were feeling pretty good about what we'd done on 9/11.

And then all of a sudden, you know, people started all this criticism and we participated and provided as much information as we knew that we had. But did we listen to every transmission with every airplane in the sky that day or every communication between every aircraft [unintell.] over 600 air traffic controller stations? No, we didn't do that. We looked for pertinent information and reported what had happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said Tony Ferrante is the one, the primary author of this, is that safe to say?

MR. GRIFFITH: I would say Tony had the most to do with that document. I mean, he had staff

working for him, but, you know, Knoles was an SES and so, he was letting his people do the work, you know, Tony was a division manager and, you know, sort of the higher level of responsibility you have in any organization, you know, you're working more and are more in an interactive mode with other organizations and with other people rather than spending your time listening to tapes and doing stuff like that.

So, Knoles was asking these people to do this work as I had directed him. So, most of the [unintell.] I got on that document were by Tony Ferrante and he had a guy working for him, his name was Jeff something, I can't remember his name now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The information that's contained in this document, looks like it came from primarily two places, the FAA and the military. Does that sound safe? See there's not every single of these items has sources, but a couple of them do, I think if you look at those ones that I highlighted there.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, those are--they had

gotten that information from this is Northeast Air Defense Sector, Griffiths Air Force Base, which is, I don't know if you've been briefed on how NORAD works, but they're Air Defense Sectors, they've got three of them and then they've got their base out in Cheyenne. But all of the things that happened on 9/11 took place in the Northeast Air Defense.

And we had a person stationed there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was that?

MR. GRIFFITH: (b)(6), (b)(7)c--can't think of his last name, but we had a liaison--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, that's the guy. We had a person that was in a liaison position at each one of the Air Defense Sectors and out at Cheyenne. The Cheyenne person would not have been there. I know that we had one, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was up in Northeast. And then we had (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] in Southeast. And we had another guy out in Seattle.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so this--like in this one entry here at 8:40 at Northeast Air Defense Sector Log indicate they were notified of the FAA

of the events concerning AAl-11. So how would you guys have gotten that information from NEEDS? Who would have gotten that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, there are a couple ways. Tony Ferrante's people could call them and ask them or, you know, actually call (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c and say, hey what's in your logs, and gotten their logs, which is one way.

Another way would be, I remember that when we had this fussing going on about who said what and at what time, that I did talk to Larry Arnold and I think one of his colonels may have faxed us some logs or something you know. I can remember seeing copies of their logs. I don't know whether Tony got them or whether they got faxed in.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What time period would that have been?

MR. GRIFFITH: Same time period that Darlene was doing her work.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is shortly after September 11, then.

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it would have been

within a couple week later or something like that. I mean I wish I could tell you more about the time, but you know, frankly I was busy doing a whole lot of things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, just to kind of help with our discussion, there's two or three different time periods that we're looking at is, you know, shortly after September 11; and again, you know, around May, '03, during those first September 11 hearings--

MR. GRIFFITH: I was gone then so I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and then periods of time afterwards.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you recall that you may have received a fax copy of the log from--

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, it seems to me, like, I may have gotten something from one of Larry Arnold's (b)(6), (b)(7)c or something. I mean, I can remember holding something in my hand and was a log, you know, I think it was a NEEDS log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who the colonel

would have been or who the colonels were that you were dealing with on Arnold's staff?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I mean I know them but I don't remember their names. When I left FAA, I left [unintell.] turned all my stuff in. So I didn't--I took one of those books--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Summary of the Air Traffic Hijack Events?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. I have a file with all my handwritten notes [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who'd you give that to when you left or did you just leave it in the drawer?

MR. GRIFFITH: Heaved it in the dumpster.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you threw it all out?

MR. GRIFFITH: Absolutely. Everything that was classified was turned back in and proper procedures were used to get rid of that and everything that was my personal notes, I just threw it all away.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The fax that you said you

think you had gotten, you said you think you gave it to Ferrante for use in preparing this document?

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't say that because Tony may have gotten information on his own, but I can remember when this whole thing was going on, you know. I mean, it appeared to be a significant event.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What, September 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, the inconsistencies--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, I'm sorry, okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean, Larry Arnold and I were trying to put the system back together and trying to get airplanes in the air and we had people stuck all over the world. And you know, somebody kept chipping at us about these entries in these logs, you know. And as far as I was concerned that, you know, okay, well, that, you know, that's not doing anything for me today.

So, I remember talking to Larry and saying, you know, let's get this fixed, you know, and let's get these people off our back, whatever I said, but, you know. And he said, yeah, we

gotta--somebody's interested in this for something, I can't speak for Larry. But I remember that we had a conversation that we said, let's get the logs and let's get them, you know, let's figure out who said what and move on. And to be honest with you, it was the least of my problems that I had to deal with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Reconciling the time differences?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I mean--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you working on priorities a couple weeks after?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, no, I mean, we were, I mean we were meeting with the airlines and they were saying you're driving us to bankruptcy, you know. And Reagan Airport was closed, nobody was taking off there. And we were prioritizing getting people in the air. We were putting in these massive flight restrictions over New York and over Washington and over Boston.

And the people at Nuclear Regulatory Commission were wanting to put these flight

restrictions around all their nuclear sites in the U.S., you know. I mean there were just things going on that had to be dealt with. So, you know, my focus was on--I was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the system. The airlines were saying we were driving them into bankruptcy. People that use aviation--aviation's a \$900 billion-a-year industry in the U.S. and people were on our backs to get it going.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And that's where my focus was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys, before you finalized this, did you provide any advance copies of this document to the military for them to review?

MR. GRIFFITH: You'll have to ask Tony that. Because our purpose in putting that together was, if my recollection is correct, we had to brief the FBI on hijackings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And I think that's the

title of it, doesn't it say hijackings on the front of it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, hijacking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, Summary of Air Traffic Hijacking.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes, so, you know, our protocol back then was FBI dealt with hijackings and so we had to provide them with the facts. And I remember Tony dropping in and Knoles and we went into the round-room up there on the 10th floor and I came in and made a cordial, hello. You know, we have our trusted agents here. They're going to give you the information. And I left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is to the FBI?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c :

MR. GRIFFITH: And I can remember that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, the focus of this document, really, is to give the FBI information?

MR. GRIFFITH: That's what I believe the focus was on, yeah, there was no intent for us to, we may have given the military a copy of that, but

that was not a DOD-driven document, you know. That was our job.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did the military float any time loans that they were preparing by you?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, not times they were preparing. Like I said, I can remember by some vehicle, and it looked like a fax getting one or two logs, you know, and I can remember going over them. I think I may even have discussed them with Darlene, you know. And our intent was to use Darlene as a senior executive and as a credible individual, you know, with a law degree, that had practiced law in the FAA and, you know, very credible individual that could stand by this document and we'd give her everything that we could. She would stand by the document and say these are the facts as we know them. And I had complete trust in Darlene as an outstanding individual.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anymore questions about this document?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Once you said that you thought Darlene might be working on a different time line, one that looked different than the one we just looked out?

MR. GRIFFITH: Tony's, yeah, Tony's, yeah. No, Darlene's was different. Seems to me like there were, you know, it just, the format of what we were doing and what Darlene was doing was different, was totally different from Tony had provided there, I mean, as I recall. At least at the briefings that I got, because I remember Tony would come up periodically and I remember they were always in folders, you know. You know these folders you open up and they have the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like this or?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, they have the little pocket, pocket folders, you know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: --the kind you find at Staples or whatever, but I can remember on the left side [unintell.], you know, and he would brief me on what was in there and so we're going to give this

to Darlene and, great, give it to Darlene.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How did you guys decide what to include or not include in here, in this document? And, what I guess, I'm specifically referring to is, I guess there were a couple of occasions where the FAA may have reported to the military that, like American 11 was still in the air, when, in fact, it had already crashed. And also I think in here, it doesn't say that for United 93 that the FAA actually called the military about four minutes after that plane had crashed, as well. How did you guys decide what to include and what not to include?

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't make any decision on what to include or not. When I [unintell.] open all of this to Dave [unintell.], he already had his direction on, you know, to do accident packages and how to do them.

This is a method that they chose to put together a summary. I don't know if you've seen accident packages or not, but they're pretty thick and then we were going to do four of them and, so,

what they were trying to do was, you know, and they're very good at it, was--towards the end you can open up and see what all four airplanes did with times and what was happening when they lost transponder and all that.

And it was a very good summary aid and provided the legal eagles information the FBI needed. And I'm sure that the FBI asked for our information and we gave it to them, I mean that's just the way those things go. But--

(b)(6) : You don't remember having any discussion about, should we include this and not include that?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I never micromanaged, you know, I had people who did a good job and believe me, Tony Ferrante knows a lot more about doing that stuff than I did at the time. Because even though I'd done that kind of work in my career, you know, it wasn't my skill set at that time. So, when you know you've got an ace like Tony Ferrante doing stuff for you, you don't worry about something like that.

I do want to comment on your statement that you made about American 11 where you said that we had reported that the flight was still airborne after it had crashed, something like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I could be wrong, but I think the Commission had reported in their report that there were some phantom reports and that they described American 11 still being airborne?

MR. GRIFFITH: Did you tape the hearing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pardon me?

MR. GRIFFITH: Did you tape our hearing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, it's, the transcripts are all available and such, so.

MR. GRIFFITH: What I recommend is you, you know, I know that CSPAN recorded the hearing. I think I'd maybe go and listen to [unintell.]--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which one, because there's a lot.

MR. GRIFFITH: No the hearing--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That you were in?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah we were there two and a half hours. But, you know, they played that recording of our individual, of an individual saying something to the effect that, you know, American 11 was still airborne and it was in a certain location, after the fact.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: After the aircraft had already crashed. And, you know, I thought that was a dirty trick. And is consistent of the methodology that the 9/11 Commission used in stating their case.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Everybody knows that was a mistake and to play that in a public forum, where many, many people were victims were in the audience. And if you could have seen the way those people reacted to that. I mean here was a person out in a field facility. That was doing their best--and I don't know if you've ever sat down in front of a radar display and worked 30 or 40 airplanes at a time or been in a center where you

had 300 airplanes under control at a time, but, you know, that's a pretty intense environment to work in.

And when the whole thing is falling apart in front of your eyes and your responsibility is to keep everybody safe and everybody separated and to react to what's going on around you. If one person, you know, who knows how many inputs of information this person has received in the last 10 minutes makes a phone call and says something like that it's obvious that it was a mistake. And then that is taken, you know, as this is one of the biggest screw ups of the FAA that you had ever seen and make public forum out of it, I think is just incredible.

And if they're sending you down that road, you're going down the wrong road.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : To be quite honest, I don't have the sense that that was what they were trying to communicate. What I had understood and what I think they thought was relevant about that particular communication was that that--I'm just

going to keep using their terminology--but that report of that phantom aircraft, they think actually caused the Langley fighters to be scrambled. And that if they hadn't gotten that report--if the military hadn't gotten that bank that Langley might have never scrambled any aircraft.

MR. GRIFFITH: May be.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So--

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean, we were at war.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know if you've ever been at war, I have. But, you know, have you ever been in air traffic control center and seen what's going on in those places?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've been in some centers and towers, like New York Center.

MR. GRIFFITH: You've been in New York Center? Plugged in and watched these people work and what they do?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've observed it.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I mean, you know,

this is, it doesn't get any more real time than a place like New York Center. And, you know, to go through 10,000 pieces of information where, maybe, 500 will be credible or useful, but just outside that window of 500, you know, to start picking up the pieces of what people are doing. And then trying to make it a cause or a reason for something, I think is incredible. And, I just have a great feeling of distrust for what the 9/11 Commission has done.

I've done this as a citizen, as an honest citizen.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And to support my country. I worked for my country for 36 years and if you check my record, I think it's very credible. And for someone to say that myself and Monty Belcher, you know, may have, I could get the letter out and check the verbiage again, but effectively that we purposely provided incorrect information to hide something, is incredible. And I challenge anybody that tries to nail me with that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't think that's the accusation.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, see, I believe it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You're talking about the letter from who?

MR. GRIFFITH: The letter from the 9/11 Commission to Ken Mead, isn't that the guy you work for?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, it is.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, let's go down and read it. I mean, if that's not what we're here about, maybe I'm wrong, maybe this should be over. Certain public statements made by lawyers and FAA officials in a commission hearing May 23, and elsewhere regarding--were not accurate. We did not investigate, however, whether these statements were knowingly false.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: It says we did not gather evidence that may bear on this issue we decided we'd refer the matter to each of you. Incredible, but go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In this Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, where you guys reference a military source for something that they attribute to you guys, like, for example, at 8:40 it says Northeast Air Defense Sector log indicates they were notified by FAA of the events concerning American 11. What did you guys do to look at FAA source material to verify that what the military is saying is correct? This is just one example. I mean, there's a couple other areas where--

MR. GRIFFITH: Have you talked to Tony yet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, not yet.

MR. GRIFFITH: No, well, he--well, this is just an assumption on my part, but I would assume that we would go look for that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In your records?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, we'd play the tapes that says that FAA notified NEEDS, so you know, we would, go to Boston Center or, you know, I mean we had our tapes. So, we would to into our tapes and, you know, try to find something that was consistent

with that. And if we found it, it seems to me like we would have put it in there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : To get a really firm answer, we should talk to Tony Ferrante, that would be your suggestion.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I'd talk to Tony about that. He may tell you, I mean, the more I look at this, he may tell you that he talked to me about putting some of this stuff in there and I told him, you know, I gave some opinions on it. And if he tells you that, I did. But, you know, I pretty much left this up to those guys. We had, I mean, we had this other thing going on where we were up in our Operations Center, which is what I was doing when I heard from them. I mean, we were doing SVTs, you know, with different people.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What's an SVT?

MR. GRIFFITH: Secure Video Telecons.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, this is on September 11?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And we were having report

insurance on secure video telecons frequently during the day and, I can't tell you how many, but gathering information. But we also, I mean, standard procedure for us on a hijack situation is for us to activate a network with the NMCC on that network.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then we pump information into the NMCC, that's the National Military Coordination Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And that's standard procedure for us. And we had people up there that, you know, we practice this in exercises and drills, you know, it's not something that we dust the cover off and open the book up, but we practice this at least annually, sometimes more, all these different situations that occur with us. And we practice the things that we do.

And one of the things that we always do is we open up this network, teleconference, if you want to call it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Something,

MR. GRIFFITH: But it's on a secure circuit, you know, it's not just a regular telecon. It's a secure circuit and the National Military Coordination Center is on there and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is in the Operations Center over at--but that's not--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, 10th floor at FAA headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And that becomes our primary source of information that we know to the military. We can't tell them what's going on blow-by-blow in our facilities because we don't have that information available. But, our managers and other people in the event of hijack are required to report up on certain information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, as we were doing that, we had a person sitting in our room that we believe was transmitting this information over this network and the NMCC was getting it. Well, we now know

what happened was NMCC logged in on that one, set the phone down and picked up another internal DOD secure telecon--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: --and did all the work on that one and while we were putting all this information out, it was just going out into the air. Because the phone or whatever mechanism they use to listen on was, not staffed. Even though they had voiced in on it and said NMCC here.

So when we were getting, when I was getting, you know, I don't know if you have the transcripts of the Command Center there or not, but, I suggest you read them. There was specific information going on about these airplanes that was coming through the Command Center from the centers and, you know, I initially was on the phone with John Raitt and I took another guy and sat him down and put the phone in his ear and said, you know, this is your job and don't leave it. But the idea was that that person was announcing to everybody in the room what was going on. And we had false

reports of hijackings, you know; and we had false reports of aircraft in situations; and we had false reports of other things, you know; a false report that someone reported that one of our Senators in an airplane had crashed in Kentucky, you know?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean, you have to treat all that stuff as real when you're working these things. And so, you know, working through the real information, the false reports and validating information. You know, all this information was broadcast and we had, I think nine people sitting there in positions with headsets on, each talking to different elements. And we, as sure as I'm sitting here, I believe that I had a guy sitting at a desk with a headset on, broadcasting information to NMCC that was being broadcast to all the nine people at the desks and then it was going out. And, you know, we found out that none of that information got to the NMCC, that, in fact, you know, they checked in and sat the phone down.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When is it that you all found

that that's what happened? I mean before this report came out? Before the 9/11 Commission Report or when is it that you realized that the military wasn't getting all the information you were transmitting? When I say, you, I mean the FAA, not you specifically.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, well, actually, Monty Belcher testified to that, I believe, in our hearing. So, if you get either a transcript of our hearing or if you listen to what people say in our hearing, you know, but that was part of our testimony.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you--

MR. GRIFFITH: It may not have been at that level of detail--but, you know, I mean, I believe it was brought out in testimony that, you know, our protocol is to hook up this secure event line and voice in at NMCC, are you there? Yes, we're there, you know. And that we believe that the information was going straight into their organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you or your group produce

any other time lines other than the ones we've already looked at, either for internal purposes or external or, maybe even just in draft that never got finalized?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, there certainly was, in each one of the accident reports, there's transcripts and other things that are required.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: But, as far as I know, outside of required reporting criteria, that Tony's document was a [unintell.] document and then Darlene's report--it wasn't really a report it was a--this time kind of thing, was a separate document, and those were the only two that I can think of.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know what the name of this one is, but this is another form of a time line, with--on the first page of the document I have here, it's got, I'm kind of describing it for the tape here--

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --a grid with the four

different aircraft and it says first sign, probable time flight was known to be in distress; NORAD NEEDS Notification estimated time of crash. And then at the bottom, in the footer, it says by AAT-20, revised on September 18, 2001 at 1400 hours.

[Lengthy pause.]

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean if you read this and see what people were doing, I mean, what kind of job could anyone have done, see [unintell.] call the White House [unintell.] Vice President [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall that?

MR. GRIFFITH: I can't say that I recall this [unintell.] if it says that, I mean, it is what it is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, that would be Knoles group again, though, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, this is Tony. I don't know what inspired them to do this. They might tell you that I asked for it. And I [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, that's, actually, I

think a day after this document, because there's a time reference in this Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events and it says AAT-20 September 17, 2001, at 6:30 a.m.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know if that's on all the pages in here, but on some of the pages.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. I wish [unintell.] September 18, I was doing a lot of stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This other time line says Chronology of Events, September 11, 2001. And it starts off 11 September 01 8:44 a.m., AAL-11 B767, BOS, LAX lost radar and communications by ZBW, which is Boston Center, right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you seen this?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh. Looks like a tighter--Boeing 747 reported by citizens flying up the Hudson.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What time was that?

MR. GRIFFITH: 1357.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It looks like that's a local

time records right? Because that document looks like it starts off Eastern Time.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, this is going [unintell.] a lot of this is after all the events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't remember seeing that before?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. This looks like something, I don't know, this has got information in it--this looks like a mixture of information, but what I--I don't know. I don't know if this was stuff Knoles was getting off of his, you know, when I told you I asked Knoles to set up all the direct reports on a telephone [unintell.]? I don't recognize this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a situation room log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The index that covered this document, said it was FAA HQ Air Traffic Situation Log--

MR. GRIFFITH: Okay, well that's what Knoles set up. I didn't read it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I had 15 SESS running that,

I didn't need to do that. No, I didn't read those.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The last one that we have to have a copy of, this at the top of it starts, "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001."

MR. GRIFFITH: I think this is one that was provided to the 9/11 Commission, from FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in preparing that at all?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, the only reason I know that is because I think somehow I had a copy of this--I went on network with the 9/11 Commission people, I think it was last summer, I mean I can get it off my calendar, [unintell.] but this is not from when I was working at FAA, I know that for sure, because we didn't have anything with these headers and footers on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: If I remember right, this is something that the 9/11 Commission had provided to them from FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. I think, since I don't

remember now. But you had said that Darlene Freeman worked on different time line than the one that your group had produced? And none of those that I've shown you?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, they don't look like the one that I saw [unintell.] It seemed to me that it wasn't on standard size paper. It seems to me like it was on what do you call it 11-by-17 or something like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 11-by-17? Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, maybe not 11-by-17.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You talking about 14?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Legal-size paper?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it was a little bigger than that, but, I mean, I can remember on Darlene's it seems to me that it was in color and, you know, as you went down this way, it seems to me that there were different pieces of information. I mean, it wasn't--it wasn't a standard what you would view as a transcript. It was something different than that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who worked with

her on preparing her--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, and maybe what I'm describing is what Tony put together for her from us, but you know, what I remember about Darlene's--about working with Darlene was that we would have these briefings and you know the papers were not standard size paper like we use, they were larger pieces of paper and they were in kind of like a horizontal format and, I don't know whether that's what Tony prepared to give it to Darlene or what she came up with. But I remember we got them folded like this, and you know, I told you about that pocket folder that they had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean, that's all I remember about that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said briefings. What kind of briefings are you referring to?

MR. GRIFFITH: When Tony would come up into my office, we had a round table like this one and, you know, I can remember having these pieces of paper.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You had briefings that your staff gave to you--

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and that's what you're referring to?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, yeah. I think that [unintell.] other meetings. But I think we had these with Darlene and we had a similar piece of paper, but that's all I remember about it. The thing I recall is it was not one of these--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not an 8 and 1/2-by-11?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you participate in helping the Administrator or the Deputy Administrator prepare for any congressional testimony or Senate testimony?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in preparing any briefings for the White House or participate in any briefings for the White House?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And when was that, roughly?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, there was one that was shortly after 9/11, I can't, I don't remember, when. Have you talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] at all?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, we're just getting started, so if you ask if we talked to somebody, we'll probably have to say, no.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mike was the guy in charge of security--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: --on 911 and he and I had to go brief (b)(6), (b)(7)c in a room full of people. It wasn't in the White House, it was in one of the adjacent buildings, not the OEB, but it was someplace across the street from the OEB that we went in. And there were a lot of people there, 25 people, maybe. And the whole issue was about security of the National Capital Region being, I guess from the White House to the Lincoln Memorial to the Capitol.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so it was about present and future issues, is that right? So, security today and into the future, how were you guys going

to secure the airspace?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. And there were all kinds of [unintell.] in the paper over time, you probably remember when the military brought in these, you know, antiaircraft launchers and put them around the District and--I mean, so it was all classified when we were talking about it, but then, you know, they decided to do public briefings on it when they got into it. But the whole intent was that if a stray airplane comes in here, you know, then we're going to be ready to shoot it down. So that's what that meeting was about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate or prepare any briefings for the White House about what happened on the 11th?

MR. GRIFFITH: In the SVTs, yeah, the Secure Video Teleconferencing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So that's the SVTs you're referring to are on the 11th?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you would have briefed a White House staffer or somebody like that?

MR. GRIFFITH: We had a standard briefing that, you know, you'd go in this room, there'd be these TVs running, I mean, they were so small you couldn't tell who was on them, because they had them sectorized. But (b)(6), (b)(7)c was always there, you know, [unintell.] and then the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and FBI and Department of Energy, FEMA all kinds of people, Coast Guard and so we had these routine reports on the Secure Video Teleconferencing that were done on 9/11 and, gosh, a whole lot after that. They were ongoing. And so, you know, I would participate in them for our organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : For Air Traffic?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were there written documents, were there written briefing papers or time lines prepared for this briefings?

MR. GRIFFITH: For the SVTs? No. We took notes, they wanted to know, what's going on, you know, and okay, well, we've got all these airplanes on the ground, we're trying to figure out how to

get them going and we determined that, you know, we're going to have these huge flight-restricted areas in Boston, New York, and Washington.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So these SVT conference--video conferences or however you guys are communicating with each other, are basically to discuss present-day and future as opposed to, like, a historical discussion of what happened on September 11, is that--

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, yeah, they were shared it with INTEL, you know, CIA would do an INTEL, I mean you had to have an SCI to get in these things. So they started out with an INTEL Brief and go through that and then we would be just one segment, you know, okay, what about airspace?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in any briefings, historical briefings, where you guys talked about, you know, this happened on the 11th and this and this and this?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I delegated on that. My primary communication was with the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator, you know getting the

briefing done and we usually used Tony or Knoles or [unintell.] .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if any of your staff had to provide any historical briefings to the White House?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I think they did. Yeah, I think, you'll have to ask Tony or Knoles but, yeah, I believe that there were briefings provided to--now you say the White House, I mean there are a lot of people here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm referring to a generic like the Department of Transportation.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, because we, you know, we consistently maintained communications with, you know, the what do they call them situation room, I guess it was called, They had a situation room. I don't remember any of those things anymore. Where there was two or three people and I was working over there, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] was one of them. Of course, (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I believe that we were

asked to provide that kind of information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

On September 11, when you guys were communicating to outside organizations about the aircraft, you guys referred to them by their flight number is that correct?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In the, I had read that the military, when they were trying to follow the aircraft, were referring to them by tail number, is that your recollection?

MR. GRIFFITH: I recall something like that, yeah. The military had the flight plan information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: You know, filed by the airline, which includes the tail number or the end number of the airplane. I recall seeing some references to tail numbers, but we didn't have that information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You guys just had--FAA just

had flight numbers?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, we, you know when we got the flight plan, it was stored in our host, we had the plane number, but, you know, the flight progress strips that our controllers use, it's just pertinent information so it was call-sign type aircraft, ground speed, the altitude, the [unintell.] code to be in flight, you know [unintell.] fixes and that kind of stuff. For us the tail number is not pertinent.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember ever having a discussion with General Arnold or any of his staff after the fact about tail numbers versus flight numbers or anything like that?

MR. GRIFFITH: [NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember providing any material, like any time line source material that the FAA had generated to the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think I probably did, you know, I think when Larry Arnold and I got into this thing and I was working with his colonels and two of the guys they had working the desk, yeah, I feel

like I probably [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do you think you might have transmitted or provided to them?

MR. GRIFFITH: I think it would have been copies of logs, because that was really the subject of discussion was what was in the logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What sort of logs does FAA keep?

MR. GRIFFITH: They keep a log that's called a 7230-4 at every operational Air Traffic facility and it's kept at their watch desk. And events of the day are put in that log continuously and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does someone handwrite these events then or is it--

MR. GRIFFITH: It's pretty much automated now and you've got a PC sitting there and you just 1357 tab, entry.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it real time or is it after the fact, is it as it's going on or?

MR. GRIFFITH: It could be, whenever I did, I always kept a note pad next to the computer

and made my entries, because if you weren't sitting at the station, you were doing your job, so, write things down, answer phones, and then when you got a break in the action, you came back and transferred your entries into the log, that's the way I did it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So there would be a log for, like, New York and Boston the TRACON and the Towers, and so would there be a log for the Operations Center on the 10th floor at FAA headquarters?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They keep a log, but I'm not familiar with it because they didn't work for me they worked for the Deputy Administrator, so I couldn't tell you what was in their logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about the Command Center in Herndon?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, they keep a log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They would have a 7230 log?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were there any other types of logs that the Air Traffic folks were generating or just that one that you--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, you have position logs where you log in and log off; there are all kinds of logs, but as far as what was going on for the operation, the 7230-4 is called report of daily operations and that's where the information is kept.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you believe that these were transmitted to the military, these are what you would have given to General Arnold?

MR. GRIFFITH: If I gave them anything it would be log information, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think you did that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I think so, I'm trying to think back and think through that. And there were questions about the logs. I specifically remember seeing fax sheets of some logs from the military and I believe that, you know, I had somebody or I sent logs back to them. Now that may not be true, but my sense of what was going on at that particular time was that we were trying to get to the bottom of what's in the logs. And, so, you know, we were--Larry and I agreed that

we were going to share with each other. We were going to get to the bottom of what was in the logs. It was a very chaotic day and, you know, obviously, if you have people hundreds of miles apart recording what's going on as they see it, and you're going to get different stories.

And, as I said to you, you know, I mean, there may have been people putting stuff in these logs real time, but I doubt it, at least on the FAA side. The military might have an E-5 or something, you know, directed, ordered to put this in the log, put this in the log, but, you know, the way I did it was I kept accurate notes and then went back and put it in the log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was one of the issues that you and Arnold and were trying to get worked out the fact that Arnold's, this is in that letter that you've got a copy of, this paragraph right there.

MR. GRIFFITH: I've heard about this [unintell.] debate, often referred to as heated discussion before it picked up that terminology. See, I don't know where they got this information,

but it says Jeff Griffith, the senior air traffic manager on duty at FAA headquarters on September 11 recalled having heated discussions with General Arnold and others on the subject.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of military notification?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. [unintell.] told them that their position was that no notice had been passed regarding hijacking 93, this was true. [unintell.] But the way this was presented to me is, they asked me if I remembered, if I recalled heated discussions with Larry Arnold.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is the Commission asking you>?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, not the hearing but in my--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Interview.

MR. GRIFFITH: --interview. And I mean, it's on tape you can go back and listen, but, you know, and I think I said something like, I don't know that they were heated discussions, but, yeah, we had some pretty direct conversations on it. And then for them to say that, you know, recalled

having heated discussions, I mean, I'd recommend you go back and get those tapes and do a comparison. You know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, let's just take out the word heated. So, is it true that you and Arnold had some discussions about the subject of military notification?

MR. GRIFFITH: I recall that, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And do you recall that, presumably, it's going to be Arnold took the position that there was no notice, that FAA had passed concerning the hijacking of United 93 before it had crashed? [unintell.]

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know if that was Larry Arnold and I, it might have been one of his colonels.

(b)(5), (b)(7)c : Okay,

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean, Larry had his hands full.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, then you had a

discussion with somebody at the military concerning that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, Larry and I, I recall having a discussion with Larry.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : About?

MR. GRIFFITH: About the logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Whose logs or what logs?

MR. GRIFFITH: The logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The FAA and the military logs?

MR. GRIFFITH: It's what I told you earlier.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: When we were talking about, you know, all of a sudden, you know, these logs became important to somebody and so people kept coming to me and asking me about logs and you know, I finally, I remember talking to Larry Arnold and saying, look, I don't know what's wrong with these logs, but, you know, let's get to the bottom of it and, you know whatever we have to do, let's look at the logs and say what's in the logs. And he agreed to do that.

And over the course of time, you know, I remember talking to a colonel, I can't remember the colonel's name, but that's how it evolved.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't recall any disagreement that you and Arnold had about times identifications, what I'm getting from what you're saying, it was more, let's just gather information and put it together and see what it says?

MR. GRIFFITH: Sure, yeah. They had entries that we didn't have, we had entries that they didn't have. There was some, if I can remember correctly, there was some inconsistency of times and those kinds of things.

But you know we were going by operational logs that were being filled out by people that were in the heat of battle. And, you know, if you're walking down the street and, you know, somebody grabs you and starts beating your head in and, you know, and then somebody else walks up and starts beating your head in and you know, you go through this for 15 minutes, and you finally get away and go back and write down what you recall about that,

and somebody else is experiencing something 200 or 1,000 miles away and they go back and write down what they recall about a similar situation, you're going to get what they saw at the time and it was what it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But do you recall having a specific discussion with him about 93, flight 93 and the fax [unintell.] notification--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or any of his staff?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, I remember 93, 93 was something that somebody was digging into. And I don't know who it was or why, but I remember 93 was, for some reason there was something about 93.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your recollection about the issue at the time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, it had to do with whether information had been passed, you know, by the FAA to the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because it says here that at the time that you're talking to the military about this, which presumably is shortly after September 11, that the military's position is that you guys

didn't tell them about--I'm referring to the FAA didn't tell the military about United 93 before it had crashed?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did your records, at the time, indicate something different than that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess I want why are they bringing this up? Did you, meaning the FAA and the military disagree about notification about United 93?

MR. GRIFFITH: Because as I said earlier, we believe that we were given information real time to the NMCC on a secured circuit.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And we were getting information, you can check the Command Center Logs, I believe you should check the Command Center Logs, there was information coming to us about Flight 93, and, not their logs but their transcripts. Because there's a transcript floating around somewhere in somebody's package about what was being said

between the Command Center and first it was me and then I put Doug Davis in there, but, you know, when we got any information from the Command Center in the FAA Operations Center, about anything, it was broadcast in this room and it was my belief that a person was telling this information directly to the NMCC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you guys, does FAA have a transcript of that line, was that a recorded line?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, that's run by the Deputy Administrator and I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the Command Center, the Operations Center--

MR. GRIFFITH: The Operations Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In Herndon?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, in headquarters, 10th floor. And we believed that we were pumping information into the NMCC as we were getting it. We also believed that that room that Knoles had set up, the room right next to it or two doors down from there, we had congregated our military liaison people, we had five military liaison people at the

rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel and commander that were on my staff, you know, they were on the AAT staff and, you know, we put them in one of our offices in our suite there and put a stew [ph] phone in there and got them talking to people.

And then, at the Command Center, we have a unit at the Command Center of military people that are there all the time in the military--we call it the services cell. And it's run by a bird colonel and there are a bunch of majors and lieutenant colonels out there and they're always on duty, 24/7. It's called CARF Facility [ph]. But, it turns into what we call a cell, when we have events going on. And we had to believe that there were lieutenant colonels on the operational floor at the Command Center sucking in information reporting it to their people. So, I mean, there were any number of sources of information that we believed were going into the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, when were you first--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, remember before 9/11,

we had no protocols for [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: We had no protocols with them. We had the FAA Act. We had our Military Operations Handbook, we had a series of what were called Memorandums of Understanding between the FAA and certain elements of the military. And there were processes and procedures that were in place for Airspace Management and those kinds of things, exercises, supporting, you know, supporting, like, Desert Storm and those kinds of things. But there were no protocols to intercept and shoot down hijacked airplanes. There were no rules of engagement for that. The only rules of engagement we had were on drug interdiction airplanes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, I mean, for us at headquarters, you know, to pull out a checklist and say, okay, I'm going to call NORAD and tell them to start shooting down airplanes. I mean, these people that you read about in these logs that said, hey, call NORAD and tell them to scramble some

fighters, I mean, way to go. I mean, it wasn't in their job description. They had no procedures for it, but they said, hey, something's wrong here, I'm going to go out on a limb.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. I think I understand what you're saying and I'm just going to try summarize. With regard to this statement in the 9/11 Commission's referral letter where it says he, meaning Jeff Griffith, recalled being told by the military that their position was that no notice of impasse regarding the hijacking of United 93 before it crashed, it sounds like, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but it sounds like your position is, you guys had what you understood to be the open line with the NMCC at the time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so, if there were any disagreement between you and the military that would have been the source of it. The military might not have had it reflected in their logs--

MR. GRIFFITH: The NMCC log didn't have any of this stuff in it, as I understand it. I

haven't seen their log, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you guys understood that there was an open line?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that they should have gotten that information.

MR. GRIFFITH: That was the drill, if you had a hijack, the FBI was the lead; our job was to set up a secure number and the NMCC was one of the respondents on the secured network.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the name of that network again? Because I don't have a name.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't recall the name of it. And we have since fixed that, you know, we, in Air Traffic took on the responsibility to set up what we call a something event network which essentially became the telecon that Knoles set that up--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: --on 9/11, they'll tell you it's still running today, it was never shut down. It was, I mean we put it in a secure mode and we

did all the other things to it, but, you know, we have a continuous circuit that everybody's on, that if anything goes wrong anywhere, it's broadcast on that circuit and people react to it immediately. That's NORAD, that's FAA, that's elements of the military, security elements, everybody's on that line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, let me ask you. If the military's saying, well, you guys never told us about United 93, what did you do or ask your staff to do to try to refute that, if anything?

MR. GRIFFITH: Check the logs.

: Check those reports of daily operation?

MR. GRIFFITH: Sure, the Command Center logs, I keep thinking were there, they're not there, but they may be. But, you know, I mean, when you look at the transcript at the Command Center, you know, there's information in there on, I'm not going to try to quote it to you, but, you know, on the activities that were going on that were being reported real time to the Command

Center, real time to the Operations Center and being broadcast to all these people one of which was a person that we believe was hooked in directly with the NMCC. Because when we opened that circuit up, we said, NMCC are you there? And I think it took a period of time an NMCC came on said we are there. And I think somebody even after the fact, found a log entry at NMCC where, in fact, they said they were on with the FAA. And it was at a time that coincided where I think this flight 93, might have been at issue.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During your discussions with General Arnold, did you talk to him about the fact that there was this open line and you felt that the FAA was providing them that information?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That never came up?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think it did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about, like, with his staff?

MR. GRIFFITH: No, I don't think so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you would have directed

that these Command Center logs and these other logs be sent over to him so they could kind of see for themselves that that was what was going on at the time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Any log entries that we had, I think I'm remembering this right. We went through our logs and, of course, there's a stack of logs this big, because you know, if we have log entries that deal with notification of military or military notifying us, again, show them to General Arnold's people, you know, show them what we've got.

And, you know, I mean, I, see, now when we step back and look at this, I mean, I'm assuming that everything was working the way it should have and that this information, you know, through this secure line, through the military people that were at the Command Center through our military liaison people, you know, and the people in the field, I mean, you know, this was a situation where everybody rolled up their sleeves and jumped in the fight.

And I can remember interacting with these military liaison people, I can't remember at what point they came up to the 10th floor, but, you know, we engaged with those people 24/7 for many days after, just standing the system up and chasing down, you know, what appeared to be airplanes that nobody was talking to, and that kind of stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I guess upon reading that you think it's overstating what really went on between you and General Arnold? You don't believe there were heated discussions? More of let's just work it out, just--

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know whether someone was in my office and overheard a conversation Arnold, I don't know where it came from that we had this heated discussion, but it was all over the place. I have to admit, I'm a pretty tense individual and, you know, in the heat of battle, I'm going to be pretty direct about things. But, I mean, to say that, you know, I have heated discussions, I don't view them as that. So, when people tell me I had this heated conversation with

someone, I have to say, to me a heated conversation means profanity, inappropriate things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: And I'm not that, I don't do that. But, you know, I can get pretty direct and make sure the point is put across. So, I kind of divide the definition of heated discussion and when you see somebody lose their temper and say all kinds of stupid things. And if people are implying that, I never did that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. GRIFFITH: I made that clear when the people over at 9/11 said something to me about it. And I think I said something like, I wouldn't call it heated conversation, you know, I'm sure I was direct in intent, but I didn't get stupid on anybody.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before you testified before the Commission, how did you prepare for your testimony, because you were already retired at that time, correct?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. I was asked--well,

first of all, I went in for the interview, which was just across the street from here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember who interviewed you?

MR. GRIFFITH: John, John starts with an A--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Azarello [ph]?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah John, there was another John, there was a (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and there was a female named, I don't have it right, it starts with a D, sort of a Swedish name. And then there was a recorder named (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: So, it started with that. They asked me to provide written testimony for the Commission so I wrote up what it was, four pages something like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have to request any documents from the FAA or from the military to prepare?

MR. GRIFFITH: I didn't request anything from the military, but I think I did ask the FAA if

they could provide me anything that they had provided which is where that thing that had the headers and footers on it--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: --that I referred to earlier.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That other time lines?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. I'm, frankly, not sure how I got those, but I had some discussions with some people at FAA and said, you know, if you've got anything that you have given them, could I see it or something like that. So, I Washington given a couple of documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who would you have talked to over at FAA about that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Shirley Miller.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Then I wrote my--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Statement--

MR. GRIFFITH: --and gave it to them and then I got a letter saying they wanted me to appear, so I went.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Anything else, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The--this telephone line with the NMCC is in the Operation Center at FAA right?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you have gotten, have had access to the logs for that, you said that's run by somebody other than yourself?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, it's run by the Ops Center, which doesn't work for Air Traffic they work for the Deputy Administrator. And, then, of course, security was keeping their own logs, too. They handle the security on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have access to the other divisions' logs to provide--

MR. GRIFFITH: No, on those, I mean, I can remember I was included with security on all their briefings and stuff, you know. I can remember they had, like a daily sheet of stuff that, you know, was classified and that was [unintell.] real bright guy, can't remember his name, but--I can't tell you, turns out he was their number one INTEL guy.

And you know, he'd give me his, he'd go over his daily information sheets and stuff like that with me, but I'd never taken any of them because they were classified. I mean, I routinely didn't have access to any logs except the ones that belonged to my organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How did you come by a copy of that letter?

MR. GRIFFITH: This?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, the referral from the Commission?

MR. GRIFFITH: That's a good question. I got it faxed to me, it says right here, FAA--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : FAA Dep Admin.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah, OFC, so I must have, I don't know, I just have asked Shirley Miller to fax this to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What does that say, August 3, '04, the date?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm, August 3, 2004, 12:02 p.m.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : August 3?

MR. GRIFFITH: Mm-hmm. It was written on July 29 from General Counsel of the 9/11 Commission of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States I guess is what they're called.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I think that's their full length name.

MR. GRIFFITH: And since it had my name in it, I never did see it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What did you get a call about it or something?

MR. GRIFFITH: I'm trying to remember how I found out about it. I must have got a call. Shirley Miller is the appointed contact at FAA for this effort, at least I believe she is. I must have asked her if I could see it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't have any other questions, (b)(6), (b)(7)c doesn't either. Do you have any questions?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right we'll turn off the

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tape recorder at 1736.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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T5384

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

BY

SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

11:02 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --2004, the time is 11:02 in the morning, we are at Building 10-A, FAA Headquarters, 4th Floor. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, I'm with the Department of Transportation, Inspector General, my co-investigator is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c we are from the Office of Inspector General and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. We are interviewing Mary Kate Strawbridge. (b)(6), (b)(7)c, please acknowledge that you are aware that the interview is being tape recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, I am aware.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please give your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I'm

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

and the last name,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: What is your current

assignment--what's your current position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Investigator for Air

Traffic Accidents and Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: What's the routing symbol?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Well, we're not allowed

to use those anymore.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: So, it's ATO-S for

Safety, with (b)(6), (b)(7)c coming in, he doesn't like the routing symbols.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: And how long have you been an

investigator?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: For about four months,

but I've been in this office since March of 2001, I was working on severity index. And because I'm an air traffic controller, just used as a jack-of-all-trades type of thing, whenever anybody needed any help, I would just pitch in and that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, in March of 2001, you came to the Air Traffic--you came to headquarters for Air Traffic?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I've been in headquarters since January of 1995, and had several different jobs. And then when they had a new program that was instituted, the Severity Index Program, I came down to this organization to help start that. And it's a grading of air traffic errors, so it's like a--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Severity--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Index.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --Index?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Organization?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, it's a program.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Program.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c An indexing program.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you've been in that program since?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c March of 2001 and then, so, when they needed an investigator, a couple

months ago, I said that I would really like to get out of the Severity Index Program and start doing investigations. So, we don't have a person yet to take my place, so I'm doing both jobs. But as a 2152, that's how, you know, you just are used on anything that comes up with air traffic so that, it's just another person that was able to pitch in and help do stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. How long have you been with the FAA in total?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : August of 1982.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And your pay band?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is a J.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who is your direct supervisory currently?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tony Mello.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On September 11, 2001, what was your position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c E: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what was the routing symbol then, when you were--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c AAT-200, and I don't recall if we had, like, 202 and that sort of thing, but AAT-200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That would be, like, Tony Mello, that's the organization, but we were broken up into 203, 204, I never used it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, but you're part of the AAT-200 organization?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who did you report to then?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tony first-line and then Tony Ferrante, second-line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just briefly describe what your duties were on a daily basis in the Severity Index program.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Whenever a controller has an operational error that falls in the parameters of the program, which is a radar replayable one, that doesn't had anything to do with MBA, it may be controllers putting airplanes

together, what I do is I look at it to see how close did they get, how fast were they going, what was the closure rate, and the most important thing is whether the event was an uncontrolled event or a controlled event. And you take all that information, there's a pie chart that--it was made up by some scientists up on the 9th floor and a couple of controllers. And it responds to an IG request that we discover how severe the operational errors are. And what it does is it grades them into--it used to be three, moderate, low, or high severity. And then when the IG looked at it they thought that we needed another category, a fourth category.

So, what we did was, we broke up moderate into controlled and uncontrolled. But back then, we only had three, low, moderate, and high. And so what you would do is tell facility that the event that your controller had was low, moderate, or high and then that determined their training capabilities on how to retrain and get the person back to work. And anything that came about, like

letters, answering congressional letters or inquiries from the users, that sort of thing. Any time one of the investigators was buys, if they needed help, I would just pitch in and help with the air traffic aspect of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [off microphone]

[unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-hu, yes, yes, something like that. I did--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I do the--she's the special, we [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, and hotline reports, that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you working on September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you just describe, briefly, from the time you found out the events were occurring, what you did or what you were asked to do, what your participation was?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We were first told that a helicopter had hit the World Trade Center. And

then, of course, we were making telephone calls about that to see what was going on. Because, normally, we would get information from the region that something had happened. But I guess CNN had it first. And Dick Knoles walked through the area, got (b)(6), (b)(7)c and took him upstairs to the 10th floor. I guess he had more information than what we had at that time. We all went down to the end of the hall and that's where we saw the second one occur, like everyone else did. And then they evacuated the building and told everyone to go home.

But in our group, you're considered essential and, so, we didn't go home. What we started doing was calling facilities that were involved and asking them if they had their radar available to us, could we get some tapes, and things like that. So, it was like an accident investigation that was started. And I was real new to that portion of it.

The other thing that started was, they started a telecon on the 4th floor, in the AAT's

one office, the head of Air Traffic where they had open lines and they were trying to gather information that way.

I think that day, we got in on the open lines, so, we were able to listen to what was going on. In fact, it was that day, what was going on in the country, whenever reporting in, whenever facilities were reporting into the Center. So, I was trying to keep handwritten notes, I did have some handwritten notes that were turned in talking about what air traffic issues were going on. They were looking for a couple extra airplanes, you know, one of them that had been tagged had actually gone back to the gate, but he was tagged up and so we didn't know if he was airborne and that sort of thing.

Then we got some of the radar information in, some of the recordings in. I started making some rough transcripts by listening to the radar and the radio transmissions, making some rough transcripts as to what was going on in the air traffic portion of what was happening. All behind,

after the fact stuff.

Then, that continued for several days, where we kept that telephone and that telephone is still going on, actually, upstairs and has been, it turned out to be very valuable to have people listening in that had, you know, decision authority, that sort of thing. And so, it's still ongoing, it's actually a good thing.

Then say, two days into it, maybe, is when Tony Ferrante got back, he was out of town. Dick Knoles was here and Tony Mello were here in the beginning and then when Tony Ferrante got back in town was when things started to gel and taking shape that we needed to get a report out and send over to Congress, like the flight paths and the time line, that sort of thing. And, so, we were producing a lot of stuff for Congress immediately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Within two days?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, working on it.

Yeah, we got some rough things that we did and then one afternoon or morning, I actually took, can't remember his name right now, our group that we had

that puts together our, you know, like, if we had a presentation, those people were out of town, they were on their way back. And, so, but when we had to have these presentations put together, we started using Department of Justice to print some stuff up for us. And I can't remember the man's name, it escapes me. But anyway, I took him over to a building, dropped him off where he was going to have some of the big pictures made. And, then, I remember it clearly because I got stuck in all the traffic jam trying to get my way back. It took me longer to get back than I think it took him to walk. I mean, it was very--I mean, we were just all--Doug Gould and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were getting radar information from the military, probably (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] was in on that. And they were trying to match up, you know, because we lost radar with them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, this was that day or just within the first week?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Later on, yeah, later on in the first week. But that first day was mainly, like Wayne was at one of the facilities. I think

he was at Cleveland Center, and he was calling in with reports finding out, you know, anything that he could, he would call in and tell us. Just gathering information, basically. Very preliminary info.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let me go back to the open line that you were talking about. Do you recall, in that open line, that was, I guess, being headed out of the 10th floor whether there was any military participants on the open line or anybody that you spoke to from the military or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] might have been one of the people upstairs and she has the military background, she'd gone to the War College and I thought that they were using Anne Moore at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who is Anne--is she an FAA employee?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, she was an ATT-3 at that point, she was ATT-3 and she sits near Don. And then we have FAA military liaisons and those, oh, gosh, her name is, the names escape me right

now, but they would either, I don't know if they were called up there, but they would have been paged, at least. So, there's that military liaison that we had right in the building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c what was her, is she some type of liaison or what was that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA, she was ATT-3, but because of her military background, the FAA allowed her--I think it's a whole year's worth of work to go to the War College. And then came back to the FAA and she--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But she did not work for the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, no, no--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --she's an FAA person but with a military background.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, but you're not clear whether any--you're assuming that, perhaps, some of the FAA liaison people would have participated, but you're not sure?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Or gone up to the 10th

floor to help, yeah, I didn't see them up there, but it's just, my recall is that they used them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Those were FAA people or the Air Force liaisons?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c They, actually, they're liaisons, they wear the military uniforms.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, yes, okay. You can have an FAA person liaison to the Air Force, these were Air Force individuals were the liaison to the FAA?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, there's two of them, normally, and, if I can just remember her last name. She's since moved, or retired, but they actually?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c that's exactly right, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She an Air Force officer?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think so, yeah. And, so they would sit at the end of the 4th floor down here, and it would--I would only think that they would be up there on the 10th floor, later on, of

course, there were analysts definitely up there and (b)(6), (b)(7)c was up there, but on the first day, I'm not sure they called them right away, but I can't imagine that they didn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And the other person was a guy?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think so, I think it--yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall, did you sit in an actually listen--were you listening to the open lines?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, we had it down here, it was listen only.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And the volume was up, high?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, yeah, yeah, we were all listening to it, in fact, I started notes, not realizing that or not understanding that anyone upstairs was taking notes, but I thought what would be important is to have a time line of when things happened. Of course the times could be off because of what sockeye [ph] was using versus what they were using, but if something I thought was

important happened, I'd like to have a time in there, but it's all longhand and we still have a copy of it. And it's not a whole bunch of information there, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who got me here, she took over doing that for me for a little while, and then, I think we got involved in our activities and, so, that fell by the wayside.

Part of that office, my gosh, there was so much going on and I don't even know it wasn't recorded, but there was so much going on that it was hard to keep up and, so, it's very disjointed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you turn those notes over to the 9/11 Commission?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, mm-hmm, but we have them here, too, we have the originals if you want to see them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But they were your notes, in-between doing other things and also based on--the time was based on whatever clock was hanging on the wall up there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During the open line that you

were listening to, do you recall hearing any discussion about American 11 having still been airborne, even though it was later determined that that was the plane that hit the World Trade--the first tower of the World Trade Center, that whether confusion on the line that, perhaps, that plane was still airborne and headed southbound to Washington, do you recall that being an issue?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'd have to look at the notes. I know that it was just totally confusing. Because we had a Delta airplane that they thought was missing and holding somewhere and American, but American 11, specifically, I don't recall that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you mentioned earlier that you started getting radar and radio transmissions from the various air traffic centers?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How soon, I mean, on September 11, that night, that day, the next day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c They had, if we got it that day, I don't remember specifically, but I know that we got it pretty soon after, if it was the

next day, the next afternoon. But at, you know, for us the information, although you had some of the voice in the cockpit noises on one of them, the other one was totally blank and as soon as we lost radar there was nothing else to watch, there was no more transmission, there was no more radar, so it wasn't very useful. That was American 11. The one behind him had more information on it, you know, where you could tell that it was, like, a middle-eastern type accent, that sort of thing.

I don't recall getting any information on that day, but we stayed very late, but I don't remember if it was that night or the next day that we got it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You were getting what, specifically?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It's called a SATORI replay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Could you spell SATORI?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh, S-A-T-O-R-I.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-huh.

MS. STRAWBRIDGE: It's an acronym, I can

get the acronym for you, but what that--and that's what we used for the civilian base, that's the reason why (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I are really the only people who know how to transfer the files and load the files, so when we got them, I was able to do that, but that's what we use on the severity index, it's a voice and radar time, the timing is perfect on it, because you're just using the computer files. And all you have to do is press a play button after you've moved all the files, and you get to see exactly what the controller saw, 98 percent exactly what the controller saw. Every once in a while, you'll have something not quite perfect.

But because of my familiarity with that working with the severity index program, I went in there and started playing the tapes that we were getting from, like New York. I think New York was the first one to send us information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : New York Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c New York Center, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So they sent you the SATORI

tapes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's the SATORI, it's like a replay tool.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you think that might have been at least by the next day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah, oh, yeah. They can program immediately, there doesn't have to be any delay at all, it's some--I don't know what the mechanism is, but if I called them right now and said I needed something, I could, depending on their workload, if I needed a number one priority, I could have it within a half an hour.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it something that they electronically send you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah, it's on--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What type of file is it, are these the WAV files that I've heard about?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well WAV files are rarely with a terminal option, this is, I don't know if you would consider it a WAV file, it might be, but it's actually, the file comes back to us as

an MS DOS program, or a LENOX, maybe, so it comes as a dot-TT and a DOT-PAC file that's directly fed into this machine back there. And I can show you that. It might make it easier to understand. And so those files are all time coded, and so, when you make the file, you don't have to do anything except press play after you've made the file, because they're time coded right there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, basically, they were sent e-mail and were fed into a specific machine?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not really, e--I think it's probably an FTP, more like File Transfer--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But, I mean, over the computer?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, it's a computer FTP.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Based on--time, theoretically, you could have got some of them on 9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah, we could have gotten them a half hour after it started.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And the machine does

[unintelligible] and everything and gives you what you want off the computer line, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you believe that New York Center was the first to send in these types of--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who else--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We started getting them from Cleveland Center and much later Washington Center. And this was just the en-route side. Doug Gould is--and (b)(6), (b)(7)c are more of the experts on the RAPTOR program, which is another radar replay tool for the terminal side, and they used your actual PCs for that but it's not matched, the voices and the radars are automatically matched you have to do that yourself.

But what they were doing, when they were getting into their radar files, that's how they started putting together FAA radar and military radar to kind of getting a global picture of what was the path. Because the military has radar that we don't have. They have, their radar is for surveillance and so they can get lower-altitude

radar and primary radar.

But for us with air traffic, if it's nothing that, you know, if it's something that we don't need, we ex-it-out. If it's it a primary target below a certain altitude it's too cluttered, so we tell the computer, don't give me all that stuff, but the military radar picks it up. So, that's one reason why we're able to marry those files and find the flight path.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was from NEEDS?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Probably NEEDS, but, you know, NORAD, NEEDS, somebody gave Doug--Doug is your expert on that, he and (b)(6), (b)(7)c, but, mainly Doug on putting together those files.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And those files are called what, again?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : RAPTOR, R-A-P-T-O-R.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they are from the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They're from terminals.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : From terminals.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The RAPTORS would have been married with the NEEDS tapes--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --information?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm and I think they used some of the military information on the en-route event.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What [unintelligible] en-route?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, like American 11, anything in the Center, New York Center, Chicago, Cleveland Center--oh, Indianapolis sent tapes, too, Indianapolis Center sent some. There's were really pretty useless to us, though, because once, at that altitude when the airplane turns off its transponder, we don't get any radar because they mainly don't have primary turned on at that altitude. So, as soon as the transponders were cut off, from then on they're blind, we don't see anything, there's no way to tell what the airplanes were doing. That's when the Center radar comes in, they can match our radar up with whatever was going on in and the Center radar and the military radar could take over..

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would this information then used for the time line that they came up with?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not really--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the time lines, well, in a way, you know our pictures we put out where we said, we had a solid line where we had FAA radar and then we had a dash-line on what we thought was the flight path based on military radar and plotting. You know, if (b)(6), (b)(7)c was able to pull up something on our radar, they went out to the different sites and different sites will have different radar.

So, if, you know, Dulles was on site one, and we got that, but site two might have something different. I'm not using the right words, but they can tell better, but they would go out and say, well, let's pull this nine or let's pull this radar and see if it has some different information on it. And that's where they got that information from the proposed flight.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The dotted line--was that

where it said sometimes at the bottoms, you know, update from NEEDS tapes or NEEDS--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How soon was (b)(6), (b)(7)c and Doug Gould getting these RAPTOR files from the terminals?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm not sure, I don't know. I don't know if it would have been that day, it could have been the next day. But that's [unintelligible] back there, and then there stuff is there so we were separated, I just went back and did my thing and tried to get some rough transcripts going, so--I know that they were working on that, but they also considered it very privileged information and they were very secretive about what they were doing with me, probably not with Tony and Tony, but definitely with me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what you began to do once you began getting these SATORI replay files from New York, Cleveland, Washington and Indianapolis, you began making some transcripts--rough transcripts?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm, just typing up
some--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On your own?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --right, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you would go in there with
the take down a time, handwrite it and then go and
reproduce it in a typed form?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sure I didn't turn
those files in because I don't know that I saved
those, I don't know if they're in the box or not,
come to think of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what you're listening to,
then, is what's going on the on the air traffic
tapes what the controllers--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Only what the
controllers could hear, not--so the cockpit noises
that I heard were only because someone had keyed
their mike and kept it keyed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They thought that they
were on the intercom in the back but they weren't,
they were on the air traffic button and, so, that,

of course, the one mistake that was made, is the reason why they were able to get the middle-eastern voices right away because they thought that they were on the intercom in the back but they were actually transmitting on air traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then, one of those pilots, I can't remember which flight it is, when they came into the cockpit held down his mike key so you could actually hear the noises of the struggle, that sort of thing and that went out over the air. Even it went out over the air traffic airways is what I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What you were listening to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you began, were you typing these up into a word format?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just so you could say something like, at 9:28 United Airlines call attempted, no response, stuff like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, yeah, and then

so, you know, American was the first one, the controller times say 11 times to get hold of American with no response. So, what I did, I would back it up and say he told him to turn right at this time, response was normal, he told him to kind of maintain at this time, no response. And then I started trying to track down descended to this altitude and then the [unintelligible] disappears or the target disappears completely. Just trying to put together something so that you could look at it on the paper and kind of make sense of what was going on versus having to go in there and watch it all the time, just like a record.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you do separate documents for each of the separate centers or was it for each aircraft?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Each of the different centers, it was set up that way.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And, of course, any communication that was going on behind the scenes, any time that, you know, they were just talking to

the, you know, like, if they had called their supervisor over and said, hey, I need help here, that wasn't on anything that I was doing. Mine was just absolute radar and voice that went out over the airwaves.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have any--did you look at any military logs or any military transcripts or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : None.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You never saw any of those type of documents?

(b)(6) : No, not with the military, I know there's a controversy over that, but that was some of the stuff that I think (b)(6), (b)(7) and Doug kept as "hold close" and there were just certain things that they didn't share. And that was okay, it was just that they were working on stuff that I didn't even know they were working on till after the fact. But I don't remember seeing anything military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You would have known if it was military had you seen it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That it came from, yeah, something that wasn't an FAA facility.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you know when we started talking about when the military was called, those sorts of things, I know they had--somehow they were getting the information and to me, it was where is that information coming from, but I never really got a good answer on it. They said the military logs, it was veiled.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So some of the time line information that you were seeing have indications that they were referencing military logs or NEEDS logs?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you would ask questions as to where that information came from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they'd say, well, it came off a log and it would be some answer like that, it came off a log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who were you asking this questions to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, at one point, we all got together in a bay, there would have been, I don't know, maybe even six people or more in the bay and we were all trying to put the time lines together. That book--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This book here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --this Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, and at one point someone would do all the typing and then we'd and then we each had, like a specific area that we knew the best. And so if we knew something, we'd say, well this happened at this time, it either got put in or it didn't get put in to the official time line, depending on what they thought was important. Really Tony Ferrante was the leader of the information that got included in here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, when you asked where, like, where did this time come from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They would say, something off the wall, like, from the logs or

wherever they got the information from, but it was something that I don't ever recall seeing a document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The response was never anything similar to we got this from NORAD; we got this from the Air Force; we got this from NEEDS?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember it being that specific. Because I know, you know, the--later on, after I read things, the CAPE [ph], you know, they were talking about the CAPE, you know, and what time they notified that the times were estimated. And I understand that, you know, that things are going on so quickly that you go back and you add, thinking that you know the right time. And you say, well, I think they called at this time and you write it down. The time line for notifying CAPE, for CAPE TRACON calling whoever they called, didn't see to be important enough to be really, you know, like hammered right down to the second. It was, like, this is an estimated time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have here the "Summary of

Air Traffic Hijack Events," this is the group that you were talking about that your group had been putting together. Can you--what part of it did you have involvement in drafting?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I helped type and then helped to, you know, like, this page would have been done, say, by (b)(6), (b)(7)c --

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The graphics page?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --the graphics page. So, and then--so what they did was, they took the graphics and from here they would have matched up in here, you know, put the most important stuff or what they thought was important on this page, but from some of the rough transcripts that I did and from wherever we found that information is how this came about. So, when American 11 establishes radio contact with Boston, I had a rough transcript on there, but then the facilities started sending us their rough transcripts, so we would take the transcripts, kind of match both of them, see what we thought was important, especially when they started giving us better transcripts on what

happened on ground control, local control.

Because at first, you know, everything was radar. Then we got back into what happened on departure; what happened when he called clearance delivery and ground control and local control. Because that turned out to be important, too. So we would just take those, you know, like, say, what we did was, we were just going to concentrate on American 11, tell me everything you know about American 11, we'd right it down and then we'd say, okay, that's not important, that doesn't really get us any extra value added. And so we would take stuff out, filter it and then came up with document, of what we thought was the most important among--and pick this item.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who made the decisions as to, well, that's not important, take that out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mainly Tony Ferrante, he was--he was most instrumental in getting this put together. And you know, because there was a big rush to do it, it was--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. No, I understand, I mean these are questions that someone's going to ask [unintelligible] the situation was or whatever it was, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then, you have to understand, too, that four accidents all at once, that was way, oh, my gosh, we couldn't even keep the airplane type straight until we set up a board that told you. I mean it was just so much information at once.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like this--9:05 for American--9:05 a.m. for American or for United 175, excuse me, Northeast Air Defense Sector logs indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning 175.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I don't know where that came from. I know that we talked about it and that's where they would have said the logs, but I don't think that we ever saw the logs. Like they weren't put and you know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or that you ever saw the logs?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, that I didn't,

someone else, maybe Doug and (b)(6), (b)(7) and (b)(6), (b)(7). I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But they weren't specific in their reply saying logs, saying Air Force--just logs--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just the logs, that we got those from the logs, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Nobody asked them or did they just put a hush on everybody and say, don't go bother asking or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, no, no, it wasn't that. It was more like, I'm fairly new, Doug doesn't know my background, Tony Ferrante knows my background, but they didn't know that I had a secret clearance, that sort of thing and so, and I was only severity index, so, when the investigators do things, it was like a, you know, a clique sort of thing, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so Doug not knowing my background and they were a little weary of me put off by me, because I actually came down here as

a K-bank and, you know, that caused a little problem, until I said, I don't care about the K, you can take me back to a J, it doesn't bother me a bit, so that happened.

But there was a little, you know, exclusion, you know, I may be part of the group, I'm really not part of the group. It's very exclusionary. So, all of that rolled into it. I mean these thoughts were going through my head all the time. I was, like, where's all this, it was magical to me, where are they coming up with some of this information, it's just magical.

But that's because I don't think they included me in as one of the, you know, one of the close people. And then they didn't know that I had a secret clearance. I didn't think they had secret clearances, but it was, especially for b(6), b(7) and Doug a two-fold probably, that they had dealt with military before and that they were the radar experts in the RAPTOR area and, also, you know, the mistrust of hand-me-down information.

You know there was a big controversy over

how did the middle-eastern accent get put out on the air so fast? Well, what we understood was that Chicago, I mean, Cleveland Center people had a little press conference and said this what we know.

And then, later on, Doug said, well, the FBI wants to keep that under their hat because that was useful information they could have done more research or more investigation, but we kinda--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oops.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --yeah, we let them know that we know and, so therefore, they were--so I think it's all that folded into it. I don't think it was anything sinister, I think it was more being careful.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But ultimately, this is the answer here, at least [unintelligible] the NEEDS logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And, so, you know, wherever this time frame came from, I'm not real sure, because I wouldn't have had anything to do with that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Other than this

particular document, did you participate in any other time lines or any other chronologies that were created or is there something else in here you want to show me?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I know that what we did, early on, and we had to do it several times. We created stuff like this for Congress so they could see it right away. And there's a couple of really big pictures that are still saved back there, but it's just copies of this. So, I think what we were doing is, you know, we gave them pictures, but then that's when they wanted meat to it and they wanted to be able to understand and that's the reason why the time line came forward is that said that we need to get this in a time line that's more easily understood.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that's the reason why this was put together. But I don't think that there's any other effort that we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't recall anything else that you would have participated in creating other

than this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything that wasn't adjunct to this would be the pictures that went over to Congress. And I didn't really create them or anything, just picked the files and got that--I don't even remember his name, got that person off--I don't think so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] basically what she did, though, with the summary of events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who did you give those four documents to that you created?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I kept them on my desk and then, I started coming into work and they started disappearing off of my desk. I don't know who had access to the building, because for a long time the building was empty. I think, either they gave people the day off the next day or something, but anyway, it seemed like our building was empty for a while and then the weekend came around. But, still I had stuff that was missing off of my desk. So, I don't know who would have taken it.

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What kinds of things, you mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The transcript, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Your rough typewritten transcript?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like the SATORI?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, anything that I did after the SATORI, right, mm-hmm. And so I mean you just don't know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --if someone had access to the building, because--now some of these people did stay overnight. I left over night, I have a diabetic cat so I had to be home, I just said, I've got to get home, I could come back, but had to go give a shot and then I had to take the cat to the vet, so we put in some really long hours. But I never spent the night. I think (b)(6), (b)(7) and Doug did spend the night a couple of nights and that's when some stuff was done that, you know, I wouldn't have been part of and wouldn't have known about. So,

you know, all of a sudden, the next day I'd show up and there'd be stuff and I'd go, wow, hmm, how'd that happen. You know that sort of thing just taken aback by it, but I didn't realize that they were all spending the night and staying as late as they were after I left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Did you find, though, that the information that you had on those documents were compiled into this document?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah, mm-hmm, yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Into the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?"

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't recall anything being on the tapes that I listened to that would have been put in here if it needed to be. I think that everything that was pertinent was put in. Some of it, you know, was you heard screaming, of course those specific screams, of course, we didn't put out on line, we wanted to generalize it, you know, noises in the cockpit or sounds of a struggle. Some of it's much more graphic, but we

didn't--we just lightened that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But for the most part, you, were you ever left with the impression that something that was important that you heard about, that rang a bell, that, they was purposely left out of here to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --[unintelligible] what it is, purposely left out in order not to make the FAA look bad?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know. I know that there--there were some rumors about that. What I thought didn't happen that way. A lot of people thing that Tony Ferrante kind of, like, filtered information. And, but Tony's always been a target, he doesn't mince words, he's not sometimes the most likable person and he's a little strong. I happen to get along great with Tony, but I know there's a lot of arrows pointed right at him. And understanding that he would know with his experience and background what he highlights should

be.

So, if somebody would say, hey, let's include this, he went, no, I don't think so, he would have a reason why it wasn't included. I can't remember anything specifically, but--now we did work on that, too, that is something that we worked on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the time line with the grid on top?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, uh-huh, but I thought all that information came from here, but with a different presentation. That happened later on in the week, name escape me, I'm the worst [unintelligible] but names escape me, Darlene--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Freeman?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --uh-hu, when, it might have been the controversy over the military and when were they notified, that started to boil up. And of course, you know, the military and the FAA are fighting over who didn't give information, you know, there was a lot of finger-pointing going on. We had to put that together to kind of help get

that straightened out for the 10th floor to be able to explain.

(b)(6) : The document with the graph at the top?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, yes, uh-huh, yes. But all of that information should be in here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events." was the first--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was ongoing. So say that draft one of this was out, draft two, and then we had to do that and then we would come back to final--whatever the sequence was, it was, you know, this was an ongoing project for, like, at least two days. And then they would come down and say, we know you're working on that, but Tony would come down and say, but I absolutely have to have something like this done. And that's when the controversy was brewing over when did CAPE get notified.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Later in the week, do you recall that there was some controversy when the FAA notified the military and vice versa?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That doesn't have a print time on it does it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There's various iterations of this document, I've seen this one is revised on September 18.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that would have been way later than the first ones that we did and, so, that was still fine tuning. And putting in there information I guess and taking some out or just making it more clear.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you actually prepare this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have, I'm not real sure if I did that alone or not. I know I worked on one version of it--worked on one version

SIMULTANEOUS CONVERSATION

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who did it go to for finding out okay, this is good we can use it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Darlene Freeman, I think, was the final authority on that one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The document with the grid on top?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, mm-hmm, yes, that's what I understand.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the iterations of this document that we've seen, and I don't have it in front of me right now, but with respect to United Flight 93, the NORAD NEEDS notification, on this particular revision it says not applicable or N/A. On one of them that I've seen, it has that 10:08 time on there, 10:08 a.m.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which actually, the Commission determined that's when Cleveland Center called the military and notified them about the hijacking, which is actually after it crashed. However, it appeared that a decision was made not to keep that on the time line and then put this not applicable there as a notification. Do you recall that discussions or a decision being made to not include that time. Because there's a notification time for all of them, except for this one, and it has--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What does it say?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, it says these times are derived from the--well, this has one star and it says, these are the times that were derived from the review of the NEEDS log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know why that would have done that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Again, you weren't seeing any of these NEEDS logs, correct?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No. It sort of rings a bell, but then I don't remember why--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Why that notification time of United 93 was taken out?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. I recall some conversation back then that we couldn't prove it or that it doesn't match. Those conversations were going on a lot about the military and the FAA, that there was, like, an estimated where our time was probably estimated also, but whose estimated time was better. So there were a lot of conversations on the accuracy anything the time. Being at a facility, I can understand that, you know, when

things start happening, you just kind of jot things down and then go back to it. So whether you get an accurate time line or not is--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember, though, the controversy specifically, was this particular time that I'm talking about?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I mean, that was the controversy in general and that's the reason why there document was put together was because of the logs versus what was being said by the military, it was like trying to prove to the military this is the information that we have and so, I wasn't in on any of the tight conversations or the upper level conversations. It's just that would be like the atmosphere, kind of the sort of finger-pointing that was going on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Recognize this? This is called "Notifications to the Military," dated 9/20/01.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. I would either have helped type that or helped put it together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Again, it has these references to these NEEDS logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which you, again, did not see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember seeing the logs. Now, a lot of times what we'd get out in the bay what he just dictated, you know, Tony or someone would read something--Kevin and I did most of the typing, they would just dictate and we would type. But I don't recall, but I know that I probably helped put this together but where the information came from, I don't recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You authored a document but, as far--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or taking information from one, you know, from this and putting it on here, whatever happened here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It already existed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, Tony could well have been sitting there looking at something, but you had no idea where he was getting it from, he was just

saying, okay, at 9:38--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, yeah. I would think that Tony would have the those answers for you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. And Dave Knoles, I keep leaving (b)(6), (b)(7)c out, but Dave Knoles should be involved. And then, again, all these stemmed from information that we already had and it was just kind of compile it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is called "Notification to DOD Time-line," it begins, Boston Center asks TRACON to notify Otis Air Force Base.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes. I'm not real sure where this came from. I'm not real sure that our group did this one. I don't know where, I just don't think it was us. What I remember about some of this is I remember Darlene putting together some documents upstairs and then we would be, it would come downstairs to us and then we'd say okay, let's look at this and make sure everything's correct on it. But I don't know if this was one of those or not. But she was instrumental in the military

trying to clear up the controversy about the military, like that was one thing that she was assigned to do, you know, get this information under control or get it right or find out what's, you know, put together this kind of thing. Like Tony and (b)(6), (b)(7)c and she would have been working very closely together to come up with a product.

Even Tony might have been able to type that. It just doesn't look like something that we would do?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tony Ferrante or Mallo?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, Ferrante, yeah.

With the 8:34 a.m., that doesn't seem to me to be something that we would have done. Just the way it's presented there, it doesn't look like our stuff. Could have been, but I don't. This seems to be more--yeah because we do military time, you know, we mainly do military time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you ever seen this document before? This is a fax sheet chronology of events of September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is from the FAA's Website, created I think in anticipation of the anniversary of September 11, and it was published on the Website. Do you recall this being circulated to your staff to review or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Again, it has this notation about the NEEDS--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --notified NEEDS.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I wonder who did that.

Nope, I've never seen that before. Oh, wait, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, he's the Public Affairs individual, but he got that from somebody.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so, no, I hadn't seen it before.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are there any other documents that you helped create or really time lines-types of documents, chronologies, that's kind of what we're interested in. Anything else that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember--I know that we did this, this is, of course, the most important one we thought. And then we started working on--but it was, to me, information that was still taken out of the same--different presentation. And what we did do was go back and check time from one document to another to try and make sure, because you know how you get in trouble for numbers not matching. We went back and tried to match times up between all the documents so that everything would say the same thing. But this being the major production that we had and then everything else was, like, you know, a different version or different information condensed but the same information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct me if I'm wrong, when I say this, so the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" would you say that that is kind of the main time line or main chronology for which other chronologies and other time lines were created were based on?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I would think so, just

in my opinion, yes, because it's the most comprehensive. Now it was early on that it was created, so any information that came in new after that could have been, I mean, maybe it got different emphasis after that. But, at the time and what was going on for at least the first week, this was the product of every piece of information that we had at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was put in the production?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Anything else? Mary, what's your extension if I need to call you for some additional questions?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, it's on

(b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We're going to turn off the tape, it's 12:00 p.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

LAURA J. BROWN

BY

INVESTIGATOR [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, September 23, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 908 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c my co-agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c . And we're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission Hearings elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

We're interviewing Laura Brown. Laura, if you could please acknowledge that you're aware this interview is being tape recorded?

MS. BROWN: I am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. BROWN: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you please give your full name spelling your last name for the record?

MS. BROWN: Sure, it's Laura J. Brown,
B-r-o-w-n.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current position?

MS. BROWN: I'm the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you?

MS. BROWN: I'm SES.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you held that position?

MS. BROWN: Four years.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Four years, when did you start with the FAA?

MS. BROWN: In September of 2000.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you started with the FAA in your current position?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that you had said earlier that you dealt with the military a lot concerning post September 11 issues?

MS. BROWN: Right. We established contact with NORAD Public Affairs sometime after September 11 because both of us were getting calls [unintell.] that had to do with some of the same

issues. And so we started talking to each other. And since then we've developed a very close relationship with NORAD because we have a lot of operational issues that [unintell.].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was your primary contact at NORAD?

MS. BROWN: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] in Shiny Mountain in Colorado Springs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you said he's actually
(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. BROWN: He's (b)(6), (b)(7)c right, because NORAD is--it's the North American Aerospace Defense Command, so they have people from both the Canadian and U.S. military. I've dealt with a lot of other people there, too over the years, but he's been the primary contact.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Prior to starting the tape recorded interview, you had begun to talk about a NORAD press release or a military press release?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, this is just the press release that came out on September 17 of 2001. And it was, really, the first time I had seen an

attempt to capture all the times of when the four planes involved in September 11 had taken off; when there were--when NORAD said they were notified about the hijacking by the FAA. And then when fighters were scrambled to try and intercept the planes.

And that was sort of, you know, our initial take on this and was, kind of, I think, our kind of understanding of all these times that have been resolved over the past few years.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where did you actually get this copy of the press, release. I notice there's a number 30 at the bottom of the press release?

MS. BROWN: Thirty--that means that's an old wire recorder's code for the end of the story.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see.

MS. BROWN: And, so, whoever did this, obviously--there was kind of a tradition of press releases, too, where you put a 30 at the end just to show that was the end of the press release.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: So, this was either e-mailed

to me or I think it was probably e-mailed to me, but I could have gotten it from their Website, too, I don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who prepared this over at the military?

MS. BROWN: No. I don't know exactly who prepared it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: And, you know, I'm sure that Public Affairs needed to rely on a lot of these, you know, operational people to pull something like this together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they coordinate that release with you or anybody else here at FAA?

MS. BROWN: No, not really. I mean, they just put out the release and sort of said, hey, this is what we're putting out. Because--I think they may have said does this look right to you? But there are a lot of things in here that, for instance, the fighter scrambling and that kind of thing that I wasn't in a position to confirm. But I had a conversation with them about some of their

times that they were noting on here that the FAA notified them about the hijacking because, well flight 93, they didn't have a time and they were getting calls and we were getting calls from reporters saying, what was the time? And I handwrote in this 9:16, I think, based on conversations with people from Linda's office, you know, from our Air Traffic Office. And I think the confusion about this time goes back to the fact that we had an open phone-bridge [ph] operating at that point. And I think some of our--if not all of our Air Traffic people felt that at some point during that conversation, you know, the information had been passed to NORAD, but it was--nobody had taken a pen and written down in the log exactly what time the notification to NORAD was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. BROWN: So, it was an extremely confusing time and we had, at one point about 11 planes we were tracking that we thought might be hijacked. And, so there was just information coming in from everywhere, sort of in an avalanche.

So, I think people who normally would be writing things very meticulously in logs, weren't doing that that morning and the lines they were talking on weren't recorded.

So, I think one of the--and I have to say, we knew there were communications problems on September 11. And so, we [unintell.] to domestic events net, we did [unintell.] to try to fix the problem. We made some attempt to go back and reconstruct some of this with NORAD. But from our standpoint going back and reconstructing all the exact times that everything happened was just not the thing we were focused most on. We were trying to improve aviation security. We were trying to get things back in the air. So, we were kind of looking forward more than we were looking backward and trying to do a really time consuming elaborate reconstruction of exactly what happened when.

And it was, you know, it was harder because we didn't have the recorded lines to rely on. And I think we also thought that the FBI was doing the investigation, initially, and that we

just turned everything over to them and then they would come back and tell us, you know, what had happened when and, you know, so it would be kind of a duplicative effort to go back and try to reconstruct all that stuff ourselves.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said you think you got that 9:16 number from Linda Schussler's [ph] offices?

MS. BROWN: Well, Air Traffic from systems operations. Yeah, I'm not sure who I got--who, specifically I got that number from, but that was, I think, initially, was when we were told in public affairs that, you know, they had a phone-bridge operating. And, so, that was, you know, why we put that number in there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how did you find out about this? Did somebody from NORAD call you?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, NORAD called about it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said NORAD called you, so that would be (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. BROWN: I don't remember who, specifically, I spoke to about this, it was

probably (b)(6), (b)(7)c but I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who else did you deal with regularly over there.

MS. BROWN: There's a guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who I've spoken with, who is no longer in Public Affairs, but he's somehow still in communications, he may be doing internal communications or something else.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is he a civilian employee?

MS. BROWN: No, I think he's in the military, I believe. I just can't remember what his rank is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anybody else that you can think of?

MS. BROWN: There were a number of people, I mean, I could probably--they've got a different structure there now, and I guess I'm, you know, thinking of all the people I'm dealing with now. At the time they just had NORAD, now they have merged NORAD and NORTHCOM and so, I deal with a number of people in the same Public Affairs Office that supports NORTHCOM but they work side-by-side

with NORAD and their--the general who's in charge is in charge of both organizations.

The guy who is in Public Affairs who's I think kind of head of Public Affairs now is named (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], he's with NORTHCOM. And there's a woman named (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who I've dealt with, too. But I can't remember back around that time. I mean, I could probably look through notes and I might be able to figure out who I was talking to at that time, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did the FAA put out any press releases similar to this NORAD one?

MS. BROWN: We put together this time line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's titled Notification to DOD Time Line?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, and this was really early on. Oh, that's, I think that's my former boss's [unintell.]. And then there was--one of the things we did have good information about was when we had to close the air space, I mean, because that was all on record and all of those things, you

know, we had times for. And these things were done by us. But the things that, excuse me, we didn't always have good times for was when some of the NORAD things happened. And, so, I think, I don't know how we got--I'd have to figure out who put this time line together. There's another guy in the office here who deals with severe traffic issues who helped put together some of these time lines, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was that?

MS. BROWN: His name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. BROWN: Yes, he's in Public Affairs.

And so, I don't know how we knew that this was what the [unintell.] log was showing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you see any of the military source documents?

MS. BROWN: No, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever ask the military for any of the source documents to kind of verify some of the summary information they were presenting?

MS. BROWN: No, I mean, if I had asked for their source information it would be kind of--I guess professionally, I would be questioning how they put their information together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: Do you know what I mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In our news industry, it's not ethically correct to do that, I guess.

MS. BROWN: Well, I'm not in the news industry, I'm in the public affairs industry, so, you know, if I'm dealing with another public affairs professional, I have to, you know, I have to accept the fact that they've done their due diligence in collecting their information. Now, we've had conversations where I said, well, gee, I'm a little confused about how you guys could be saying this because we think this, you know? But I wasn't really in the position to ask if they had logs to verify what they had put together. I mean, that would be like me saying to you, look I don't really trust the way you put together your work product, here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that put out in any type of public document?

MS. BROWN: Actually we might have e-mailed it to reporters, we might have read it--I know we read it verbally to reporters that we dealt with, but I don't think we [unintell.] anywhere.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't know who created this document?

MS. BROWN: I think that (b)(6), (b)(7)c was involved in creating that and I can bring him in here if you want, but I don't--I think he worked with people in Air Traffic to put it together. It's got--see, it's got (b)(6), (b)(7)c handwriting, I think, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Yeah, I think he may have had some role in trying to put that together, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you know approximately when that would have been compiled?

MS. BROWN: Probably late September or mid-September of 2001, it could have been October, I don't know. A lot of my post-9/11 documents were on a hard drive that crashed-- [unintell.] months

after September 11, yeah. So, [unintell.] date on it, but I wasn't able to retrieve some of it. And I can't remember when they rebuilt my computer, but I did lose some of the original material on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let me see, you also had--

MS. BROWN: Yeah, that's when we put in the air space restrictions to basically close down the air space.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one's titled Ground Spot Decision International Air Space System September 11, 2001. But this doesn't look like it discusses military interaction at all.

MS. BROWN: No, that was purely just Air Traffic decisions, that wasn't intended to address the whole military notification issue. I mean, we got these questions about the military notification early on, but we then sort of, you know, the focus was on--it was all kind of concern about who actually crossed the air space. And so, some of the questions about military notification kind of died down in the immediate months after September 11. And really didn't sort of come up again, until

a couple of years later when the Commission started, you know, doing a lot of work looking into who said what to who when.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: And I think when the Commission had its first hearing and some of the NORAD people testified, some of the things they testified about were they were mentioning times we had never heard before and I think part of the problem with constructing this is neither NORAD nor the FAA had both pieces of the puzzle to put together. So, we had what we had, they had what they had, and we could each try to put together a time line, but I'm not sure--I know that nobody ever put together all the documents that the Commission then collected to look at them all together and say, oh, gee, your log says this, ours says this but we're missing a piece here because they had conversations--and I don't think any of the material from the National Military Command Center, their tapes, had ever been kind of referred to. They certainly hadn't been looked at by us, I

don't think. And I don't think they'd been looked at by NORAD, too. And to introduce that and they had some, you know, pieces of information in there, too. We started to bring together all these times, but none of us could reconstruct individually. And so, you know, I think we learned something from some of the lead tapes and the transcripts of tapes, that we didn't have any way to know because they were on their tapes and we didn't have it recorded. And people either didn't recollect things in their interview or it was never written down.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what sort of efforts were made within the FAA to try to resolve some questioned times? Like, for example, this time here on this Notification of DOD time line as 9:16 a.m., there's a parenthetical question mark that says [unintell.] log shows FAA reporting UA-93--I mean, I know, from reading the Commission Report that they have here and some other items, that FAA didn't even know that United was hijacked at that point, UA-93.

MS. BROWN: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, do you know what kinds of efforts were made by FAA to try to reconcile issues like that?

MS. BROWN: I think, in Public Affairs, we were trying to put together a good time line because we were trying to answer press questions about it. But we didn't have the information and a lot of the information, I think, was being treated at that point like it was very protected because it was considered part of an FBI investigation.

So, normally, in Public Affairs where we would actually be given some of the source material so that we could go through it ourselves, in this case, you know, we had to go to people and say, look, can you give us this time. And it wasn't--it wasn't, I think, as easy a process as it normally would be because a lot of the information about the time lines of what happened on the planes, neither the Air Traffic information about Air Traffic communication with each of the planes, was very, very closely guarded. I mean, Scott, my boss,

would go into meetings and, you know, they would share transcripts with him and ask him not to share them with anyone else. Or they would take them back, you know, at the end of the meeting.

And so we were, you know, we didn't always have all the direct material, so we were going to Air Traffic and saying, look, we're trying to resolve this question, can you help us with this and help us with the time. So, I think, as you can see, there was a lot of question about whether the times we were getting were accurate; where the information came from; whether the information was accurate and that kind of thing. So, I think, you know, I was never comfortable that we had a really accurate time line of who was notified when, because it never seemed like we could put all the pieces together of that. And it was kind of a moving target all the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who were you relying on, internally, for information concerning that?

MS. BROWN: We were relying on people in Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who, specifically?

MS. BROWN: A range of different people, I think, probably Jeff Griffith [ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], and (b)(6), (b)(7)c could probably help me out more with this because he was dealing directly with some of those people, too, but, you know, Linda, people from the Command Center, she was at the Command center at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. BROWN: And some of the information was coming from Shirley Miller, who was an assistant to Monty Belcher [ph]. So you know, I think we were really looking to fairly high-level people to try to give us the right information, because we wanted to get it right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you said that frequently you guys in Public Affairs would rely on some source material to help you prepare time lines like this or other--

MS. BROWN: Mm-hmm, anything we do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --I guess, briefing documents.

MS. BROWN: Right and when we're trying to

write a press release or do anything whether it has to do with Air Traffic or safety, you know, we try to get as much background as we can, briefing papers, that kind of thing. So that we sort of know what the context is when we're putting together whatever we're doing. So we like to have, I mean a lot of information about it. But this was kind of a different process.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, then, what were you guys--what did you have to rely on, then, in this event?

MS. BROWN: We had to rely on going and talking to people in Air Traffic and saying, look, can you help us try to put this time line together, you know, can you give us the times here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, did they give you any documentation in, like, even summary format to help you guys or?

MS. BROWN: I'd have to look through my files and look at, you know, what I have and, you know what we were looking at, but I don't remember seeing a lot of kind of logs and that kind of

thing. I don't remember that kind of thing ever being shared with us.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get involved in helping the Administrator or her Deputy prepare for any congressional or Commission hearings?

MS. BROWN: We are usually--Public Affairs is usually involved in any prep for a congressional hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: And I was involved in preparations to help prepare Jane Garvey's testimony for the Commission and Monty Belcher and a few other people who testified at the last hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: Either (b)(6), (b)(7)c or I would have been involved in anything immediately after September 11. And some of it he was involved in it and I wasn't involved in.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, if I'm not mistaken--I think and I don't remember the exact date, but in late September 2001, Ms. Garvey might

have testified before a Congressional or Senate hearing about historically what happened on the 11th?

MS. BROWN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you familiar with that?

MS. BROWN: It sounds familiar, but I can't remember the specific hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have, like, a file or something that would have you preparatory documents?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, yeah, I might.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you--would you also have a file, then, for those--the Commission hearing preparations?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, I have files on that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess we wouldn't mind taking a look at those if you can make them available.

MS. BROWN: Okay, I mean, yeah, you'd have to give me some time to pull them together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's fine, yeah, that's fine.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, any other files that you might have relating to any other interviews that were given relating to--

MS. BROWN: I've got a few, certainly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] a truck. Well, maybe when we're done we could just look at maybe turning over all what you've got and we can pare it down pretty quick.

MS. BROWN:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But I think our main focus is reconstruction of this time line.

MS. BROWN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You know, that's really what our focus is, I mean--

MS. BROWN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --there are other things that you were helping prepare that are related to more security-related issues or what we're going to do to fix it, you know, problems, [unintell.] those things.

MS. BROWN: But to get to go through my

stuff that's from right after September 11, it's just going to take me a little bit of time to do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure.

MS. BROWN: We can do that right after the interview.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Aside from the three documents that we just looked at, are there any other time line documents that you--let's see what I've got.

MS. BROWN: Well, that's really the initial ones that we were doing. We had sort of just basic kind of premise that were for communications with each of the flights, some of the radar plots for each of the hijacked flights. We had, these were printouts, but they were more for what was happening on the flights themselves, rather, than when the military was notified or anything like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This actually looks like an on going version of that.

MS. BROWN: It is, I think.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One on A-8.

MS. BROWN: I think it probably is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: Yeah, it probably similar, I notice there are various versions of this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: So, I just, yeah, I can look through, I have other files, I have a lot of files on this. So, I'll see, you know, if I can find any time lines, but this is really my time line sort of stuff.

When we went back, you mentioned the "U.S.A. Today" story. We had a--we had never done interviews with anybody after--with any of our Air Traffic people and the media after September 11 for a couple of reasons. One was we didn't want for [unintell.] to relive we knew that September 11 sort of endlessly by doing media interviews with them. Also, since the FBI had this investigation going, you know, we were sort of told well, this is the FBI investigation, so we shouldn't make these people available because the FBI is interviewing

them.

So, as it was coming up to the one-year anniversary date, we were getting a lot of requests to get into Air Traffic facilities and that kind of thing. So, we did a lot of preparatory work on all the Air Traffic issues and we did--we decided to do sort of the one-shot deal for the media where they would have one chance to interview all the Air Traffic people. So we did simultaneous press events in Boston, Washington, New York, and then the next day in Cleveland.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: And we did it, partly to coincide with the [unintell.] stories, but Allan Levin [ph] wrote, he did hundreds of interviews for it with our folks. And we focused on how we brought the air space down. And I don't think, at that time, we had a lot of questions about military notification. It was--but we prepared a lot of stuff for that that had to do with time lines, but it wasn't so much the military issue. And then, as I said, the military notification issue didn't

really start to come back again, until the Commission started having hearings and started, you know, asking questions about this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Immediately following September 11, what caused this military notification issue to rise to the surface?

MS. BROWN: Because we were getting questions from the media about, I mean, the family members were wanting to know and they were pressing the media to find out what the notification issues were. I mean, this is--the notification issues has always been driven by the families. And, you know, it's frustrating because--here, because I got when the military was notified, I think it's significant to the families to know about their families, but some of the military jets that responded were not armed, could not have shot down the civilian air planes. We knew that the authorization for the [unintell.] hadn't happened in time and so I guess it was [unintell.] for us to keep getting press about, you know, how soon was the military notified because in some ways it seems irrelevant or, it's

not irrelevant, I mean, I think there were very few of us thought that on September 11 the military would have actually shot down a civilian airplane in that time frame which was [unintell.] planes were being hijacked, that that kind of decision would be made [unintell.].

But the [unintell.] the press was quizzing us about it. And so we were, you know, trying to figure out the best we could when the notifications had happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was basically questions from the public-driven issue.

MS. BROWN: I think so that's my impression. There were certain family members who were very, very active and very aggressive with reporters and they felt like they wanted to know these things and that reporters were [unintell.] for finding out about it.

And another issue was this issue about whether a gun was on one of the planes or not. [unintell.] satisfied the next morning [unintell.] but that there was not a gun. But what happened

was there was a miscommunication between an airline dispatch person and one of our security people. And it was written in a log that someone had been shot, when, in fact, they hadn't been. And that document was constantly updated and so it was, you know, just, you know, updated to correct the original mistake and it developed this whole idea that there was this conspiracy that we were suppressing this document. Well, the document didn't exist like it had anymore, because it had been updated and overwritten, it wasn't like we kept every separate of every document.

So, I mean, I guess we struggled to get the best time line we could from our discussion with NORAD and Scott and I had a lot of conversations with NORAD about this. And I don't think either of us, really, ever felt like we had, you know, a completely accurate time line. But we kept going back to people and saying, look do you have a better time for this and they [unintell.] we don't have anything that, you know, that marks when we told them about this or when we told them about

that. And that was the answer we kept getting back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Internally?

MS. BROWN: Internally, yes, internally. And I know, we in Public Affairs grappled with this same think, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does Public Affairs get involved with, like White House briefings, as well?

MS. BROWN: Not generally, no. I mean, at least, I wouldn't get involved. The critical [unintell.] is involved, but I don't think Susan [ph] was generally involved in White House briefings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about, like, preparations for them?

MS. BROWN: Not really.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know--I'm pretty certain that Jane Garvey had to provide questions for the record after her Commission testimony?

MS. BROWN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you guys have gotten involved in that?

MS. BROWN: I was somewhat involved in the follow-up. We had an immediate [unintell.] to Mr. BenVeniste about, after I think it was the first thing, it might have been the second [unintell.] about who wanted the answer about this time line and I had put together a statement for him. He wanted it by that evening. And so, we put it together after we came back from the hearing. We sat down and put that together. And I think we e-mailed it to Jane who sent it to Mr. BenVeniste.

So, but the other--Shirley Miller is really the person I think--Shirley and [unintell.] who was our current head of security were two of the people, the three of us and Linda were probably the main people helping [unintell.] because we had all been here on September 11. Part of the problem is the Air Traffic organization has kind of turned over, some people have retired, some people have left.

And, so, we were kind of all here and all extremely involved in September 11 and the aftermath. And at the administrative level, then

Greg [ph], my current boss wasn't here then. So, I kind of [inaudible] was the person who was, you know, pulled into this. So, we--throughout the Commission hearings, helped prepare some of the materials and Shirley really has been the focal point for dealing with the Commission, collecting a lot of the information that they requested and faxing it to them, and, also, creating that source for testimony.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you still have a copy of that document?

MS. BROWN: Which document?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The CFR that you guys provided for Jane Garvey?

MS. BROWN: BenVeniste, yeah, I'm sure I have it somewhere, yes. Because sometime after we prepared it, Shirley said to me--I got a press call and I called Shirley about it and I said, look can I just give them the statement we gave to Benveniste? And she said, it probably would be better if you didn't do that, because we all know that part of that statement is not exactly

accurate.

But I felt--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Shirley said that to you?

MS. BROWN: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During your telephone conversation?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, or it might have been in person. So, I think, you now, I think when we sent it to him, we thought it was accurate. And something--I'd have to look at the statement. But I think something after that caused us to question whether something we had said in it was absolutely accurate or not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know how long that was after the statement was given to the Commission?

MS. BROWN: I think it was at least a couple of weeks, at least after that. It might have been longer than that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what efforts were made to try to verify the information that was provided to the Commission and make it correct that statement?

MS. BROWN: I don't know what we did to correct that statement. Shirley was really the person who was dealing with the Commission on a day-to-day basis.

But, you know, I don't think we ever gave anything to the Commission that we knew was wrong at the time we gave it to them. I mean, I think we were trying to put together the most accurate information we could.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you guys, if you put out something that was inaccurate and later found out, I'm sorry, if you put out something and then later found it was inaccurate, what sort of steps do you guys normally take to try to make a correction?

MS. BROWN: Well, in a situation where you're dealing with the Commission, I mean, Shirley would have--that would have been sort of in her purview, I don't know what she would have done in that case. I mean, if we--in Public Affairs, if we put out something that's not accurate, we try to immediately correct it. And an example would be, we had a press briefing recently with the head of

the [unintell.] safety program. And he was releasing a report that covered a period from the last fiscal year, 2003.

And we had a [unintell.] a serious [unintell.], you know, had dropped dramatically. So [unintell.] if we had any incidents any [unintell.] this year? And she said, no, and I knew that we had one and it happened, we had at least one if not more that had happened in the past month, but were under investigation. [unintell.] but the [unintell.] turned out to be an error, too.

And so, I had talked with him after the press briefing, and he went back and called every single reporter who had been at the press briefing and said, look, I know this is what was said at the press briefing, but what you have to understand is we have a month of data we haven't classified yet, and it's quite possible that there are--that there are increases in that [unintell.] that could end up being interviewed.

So, I mean, we try to correct even a statement like that. I wouldn't want him on the

record saying that we had no incursions and then have them be some classified as [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure. Do you remember who it was that was asking for the information that was provided to BenVeniste?

MS. BROWN: When?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, after the fact, you said that you asked Linda--why were you asking Linda if you could release that statement for that CFR.

MS. BROWN: Not Linda, Shirley.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, Shirley.

MS. BROWN: Because we were putting it together for the Commission, she was the focal point for the Commission, and I didn't know what the protocol was for a statement which is given a Commissioner, you know, whether that was considered ours to release or whether or whether I had to say to the reporter, well, if you want to [unintell.] for a copy of what we had provided Mr. BenVeniste, and so, I just needed to know whether it was ours to release or whether I had to refer the reporter

to BenVeniste or to the Commission to get it from them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. BROWN: Do you know what I mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who that report was?

MS. BROWN: No, but there were, it might have been, there were several reporters who maintained that site and they were basically pro-family. There was one guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c And there was another guy who called me regularly about this. And they were not reporters in the traditional sense. They pretty much exclusively covered the Commission and what the commissioners were doing [unintell.] and what put it on Websites about things related to the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sort of like (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. BROWN: Yeah, well, except--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Except (b)(6), (b)(7)c is a little bit more [unintell.]

MS. BROWN: No, this was very limited, and

these guys were, you know, basically when they were talking to you they were speaking for the families and you had to understand that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.]

MS. BROWN: Not really.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else?

What's (b)(6), (b)(7)c last name again?

MS. BROWN: It's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

it actually might help with to talk about this time line, if we brought him in, I mean, but I don't know what your protocol is on that is, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, we can jus bring him in real quick and--

MS. BROWN: I've actually got a staff meeting that's supposed that happen in this room in about five minutes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, maybe we could just come back then, because we were open from 1:00 to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Maybe later in the afternoon, when we have some time.

MS. BROWN: Okay. You want to come back in a little while?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, is that all right?

MS. BROWN: Yeah, that's fine. I'll see what I can pull together for you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What time is good for you guys in the early afternoon?

MS. BROWN: I've got, the staff meeting is at 11:00 and probably lasts about a half an hour, so I'm pretty free and open after that. Actually there's a ceremony over at the Secretary's Office I have to go to and I think that's at 2:00 o'clock.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm going to stop the tape here, it's at 10:55.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
LINDA M. SCHUESSLER

BY

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, September 23, 2004

8:51 a.m. - 9:45 a.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is September 23, 2004, the time is 8:51 in the morning. We are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 1002, Washington, D.C. My name is William Owens, my co-Agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c . We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. We're interviewing Linda M. Schuessler. Ms. Schuessler, if you could, please acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape rec

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I understand that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give your full name, spelling your last for the record, please?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Linda M. Schuessler,
S-c-h-u-e-s-s-l-e-r.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current
position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Vice President for System
Operations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's that routing symbol for
that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: We do not have routing
symbols per se, but if you were going to use a
shorthand, you could use ATO-R.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you,
currently?

MS. SCHUESSLER: An SES.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you held you
held your current position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, we've undergone
realignment, so I've been in this position for
almost one year.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you start with the
FAA?

MS. SCHUESSLER: In 1974.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In what position and what duty station?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Started in the Atlanta Center as an Air Traffic Control Specialist.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on September 11, what position did you hold?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I was the manager at the Command Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's in Herndon, Virginia?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, sir.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And at that time what grade were you in?

MS. SCHUESSLER: MSS-4. I know that's Air Traffic grade.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think I might have a table somewhere that converts that to FG and then I have another one that converts it to the regular.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably rough conversion would be FG-15.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And after September 11, how much longer were you in that position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Let's see, I came to FAA

headquarters, you know, I'd have to go back and double check this. I'm thinking I came to headquarters in May, but I don't remember now whether 200 and--I think it had to be 2002. It's either 2002 or 2003. I can check that for you, though.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when you came to Washington, D.C., what was the first position that you had taken?

MS. SCHUESSLER: When I first came to Washington, I came from the Atlanta Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, let's move up forward, when you went from Herndon to D.C., what--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, when I first came back from the Command Center, back into headquarters proper, I was the Manager for Investigations and Evaluation. And from that position, I was detailed into the Deputy for Air Traffic Services for a period of about four months. I went back to the Manager of Evaluations and Investigations, was selected permanently for the Deputy for Air Traffic Services and then from that

position to my current position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Accident and
Investigations Division, that's AAT-20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you were in that group,
were you working for or in the position that I
understand (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. SCHUESSLER: That was, when Knoles
left that position, I was his replacement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so you replaced him?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you were in AAT-20, who
was your boss at that time, who did you report to?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Initially, it was Jeff
Griffith.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Jeff Griffith.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And after, Jeff retired,
right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, Jeff retired and
that's when I was detailed into his position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And you can hold the detail for four months. After four months I went back to AAT-20; (b)(6), (b)(7)c came in and he was my boss at that point. That's the point to that Bill Peacock also retired. He was AAT-1. And (b)(6), (b)(7)c moved into Bill Peacock's position as AAT-1 and I moved into Jeff's position as AAT-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: I guess, just kind of cutting right to the chase, The primary issue that we were interested in speaking to you about, you said that you had an opportunity to look through that testimony from May 23, 2003, right?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: And I think Commissioner Ben-Viniste references a document title "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001," after you reviewed that are you familiar with that document?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Probably, I did not go get that document after we talked. But as I reconstruct this, I know Ms. Garvey testified and if I'm looking at the testimony correctly, she was

asked about some time frames and the following day is this question, I guess from Mr. Ben-Viniste. I do remember, after Ms. Garvey testified that day, there was some concern about making sure that we had the proper information to give to the Commission on when NORAD was notified.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, actually there were three of us, as I recall that were talking about this, after the fact. Lynne Osmus was one of them, myself and then Shirley Miller. Shirley Miller became the focal for the FAA for gathering the information and being the conduit between the Commission and the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, after trying to make sure we had accurate data, what I remember was, that evening, was calling (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c she was the, as cited here, the United States Air Force Liaison to the FAA. I called and talked to her that evening, you know, just to make sure, because they were-- (b)(6), (b)(7)c was

trying to prepare something for Ms. Garvey to give to the Commission.

And what (b)(6), (b)(7)c had indicated, that, yes, you know, shortly after the incident started occurring, she was notified and she was part of the telecon. And from there, you know she was also talking to some of her contacts in DOD.

And so, a statement was put together, based on that information, as well as, I guess what Lynne and Shirley gathered and I believe that's what this statement is here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And some type of briefing paper was--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't know whether it's a briefing paper, whether they just put a short paragraph together. You'd have to go to Shirley, again, she's the conduit between the FAA and the Commission. You know, for myself, I remember getting ahold of (b)(6), (b)(7)c validating with her that, yes, you know, she was part of the Telecon. And as you're sitting in these quarters here. This is where, and I was out at the Command

Center, so I'm telling you this second-hand, but the way I understand it, in this part of the building, this is where a lot of the telecons were set up.

So, again, Jeff Griffith was heading a lot of those telecons up in it may have been this room, I couldn't tell you. And getting phones and people in the headquarters proper, were part of this room and taking actions from Jeff and, perhaps, others. And (b)(6), (b)(7)c at one point, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at one point joined that group.

So, in going back to try and make sure that we had accurate information, after Ms. Garvey's testimony that evening, again, I got ahold of (b)(6), (b)(7)c to validate, you know, when did she become a part of that. Subsequent to, to us talking that evening, she did say, well, you know, Linda, I've thought about this. I want to make sure everybody understand that, yes, I was part of that, but I wasn't in the room, initially, let's, say after the first event.

To her recollection, she remembers being

part of that after the third, the third event.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So we should be able to get a copy of that document from Miller?

MS. SCHUESSLER: From Shirley, again, she's been the focal for all of this. I mean, this is in quotes, so I'm, you know, and it looks like it was testimony that's being read into the record, so I would imagine it's a written statement, but I have not seen the written statement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what that's referred to as, what that, the document or what, if we were to go to Ms. Miller and ask her for that particular information, do we refer to it as something in particular or some--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't think so, if you were to put down with Shirley, we have gathered boxes and boxes of information, and there's a lot of information, as far as I say, time lines. You know, we had a, and I'm making this up, but you know, just to elaborate a point. You've got a composite time line of all the events; and then there's another time line, for instance it will

say, you know, Notification to DOD; then there'll be another time line, where it's just Cleveland Center; there'll be another time line for New York Center; another line for New York TRACON. So, there are a lot of time lines in there, all of them were--had the same factual data in there, because those were based on recorded lines. Or if it wasn't a recorded line it would say approximate and that sort of thing.

So, I think probably if you were to go to Shirley and say, you know, after Ms. Garvey's testimony and that evening, you know, you tried to put a statement together for the Commission, somehow you'd have to refer to it along those lines.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This was, like, May 2003, at that time, what position was Lynne Osmus in, was she working for you or--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, she has never worked for me, she has always been in the FAA's security arena, but as far as title, you would have to validate with her what her specific title was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you actually gather the data to put together this statement that they're referencing in here or did you have your staff working on it?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, that evening, I did call Colonel Atkins just to verify because I think that was the concern as we understood it. You know when did DOD through (b)(6), (b)(7)c you know, become aware of some of these events.

So, I got ahold of (b)(6), (b)(7)c and talked to her to find out from her memory, you know, when did she think she joined the Telecon?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you then e-mail that or to Ms. Miller?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, it was all verbal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All verbal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess in our mind, you know that evening, when we found out we needed to get the information together, it was, you know, time critical to get the information. I called (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c and relayed that both to Lynne and to Shirley. Because as far as who put this complete

statement together, I do not know, but if I had to guess, I would say, Shirley, only because, again, she was the focal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The quote in the testimony, one of the sentences, says, NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. Do you recall reviewing NORAD logs, any military documents yourself to help you prepare this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, no, well, when you say that is that our statement or is that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the quote that was--it looks like that was the part that was read into the record now. How decent we don't have the benefit of having the document in front of us right now, but. Maybe we could call Shirley, you think she might have that handy?

MS. SCHUESSLER: She is not here, but I don't know whether she, if you want me to, I don't know whether she's off-site at a meeting or what. If You'd like, I can go check and see. And I guess your plans are, also to talk to Lynne, you know,

she may remember some of this, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, would you mind checking, I think it might help.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Here let me see what I can find out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 9:07, we're going to turn the tape off for a second.

[Break.]

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c : 9:09, we've turned the tape back on. When you were putting that testimony together, or that document together, what sort of source materials were you using, aside from your memory, if anything?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : For your discussion with the colonel.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I was that conduit, because, again, if you remember, I was out at the Command Center, during the events of September 11. So, I was not in headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, I was the conduit to try and find out from (b)(6), (b)(7)c from her

memory, you know, when did she join the FAA teleconference here in headquarters?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, part, I don't know all the people that the Commission actually talked to, but I would imagine that some of the people that were here in headquarters that were part of that teleconference, were, if not asked that same question, when did (b)(6), (b)(7)c join the group, I just would imagine that would be part of the conversation in the questioning to the people that were here in headquarters. That was not part of mine, because, again, I was not in the building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, I guess, because it looks like most of what's quoted in here, you could have gotten from memory, except for this part, maybe, here about the NORAD logs. Where would that information have come from?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, Shirley may have had access to the NORAD logs, I don't know that. Just to look and compare what their times were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so, but you didn't have

access to any military records to help you prepare this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I did not use any military records to prepare this, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right. Did you try to access any FAA records to verify what the military source would be saying? Like if NORAD--NORAD log says that FAA told them about American 77 at 9:24. Did you guys try to corroborate that with an FAA source, as well?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think early on, again, this has been an ongoing issue as far as the time that the military was notified. You know, so I know there have been several people that have looked at our logs, based on what we have been told. And, perhaps, they looked at DOD logs as well. And we know very clearly that they did not match up. And that's why I'm saying, you know, we, I say we, and I was not part of the reconstruction effort, but, typically, and I know this happened in this particular case. You would go back, you would look at the recorded lines. You would validate the times

that you could.

The written logs that we kept in each of the facilities had times written down, too. And they had times that you maybe called DOD to share information. some of that if it was on a recorded line, was ably right on, it's accurate. In others, it would be approximate times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, maybe it might help, if you had, maybe a couple of logs that you could just kind of look and see, you know, I don't know, again, whether you've had an opportunity to do that to try and help set things in your mind, you know you've got several different logs and how they matched or didn't match.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's what I'm getting--I understand that a lot of FAA, just in the general sense, personnel, were looking at time line issues and were trying to, for historical purposes reconstruct what happened at certain times during that day.

I guess what I'm wondering is just with regard to yourself , in preparation of this

testimony or the response, what do they call it, questions for the record or something like that? I think that's what this might be part of.

But in preparing this document that Ben-Viniste quotes in here, what did you, yourself do to try to verify, like the military against, like the FAA record? And if there was a dispute, why not point out well, NORAD says that we called them at 9:24, but we can't find a record of that in our logs. Our logs say we didn't call them until such a time or we called them before?

MS. SCHUESSLER: And you probably do need to talk to Shirley Miller. Again, she is the focal, so I know she has had numerous conversations with the staff people on the Commission, just to, I think, just for that very reason, to say, yes, they may have said this, but our logs do not substantiate it, nor do our phone records substantiate it. There was a difference and, as we talked earlier, the events of the day, as they unfolded, people were lacking in handling events and then after the fact, if it was a not a recorded

line, they had not way to accurately reflect the time frame, they would put down approximate time. So, those approximate times that we may have had in our logs wouldn't necessarily match with DOD.

But for this question, for the record, my tasking was to find out from (b)(6), (b)(7)c as a representative of DOD, when did she join the FAA telecon here at headquarters during that day? Because the lines up here were not recorded, there's no way to ascertain, you know, very succinctly the time that DOD was brought on the line. So, all we could do is go back to her memory to say, this is what I think. I joined the conference and then the ongoing discussion.

So, that evening, what I did was call (b)(6), (b)(7)c to say, okay, we're putting together a statement to respond to the Commission for Ms. Garvey. What is your memory as far as when did you join the conference.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you're--that was your I guess sole responsibility for that particular item?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right for this particular

question for the record, correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, then we should talk to either Shirley Miller or [unintelligible] about them and, I guess the other questions we've been asking you about that.

I'm just going to call this item that Mr. Ben-Viniste reference here as just a question for the record. Aside from this question for the record on this testimony, what other public statements are you aware of that the FAA has made concerning its notification to the military on September 11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: When you say public statements, would you be including all the information we gave the Commission?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I think so.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Again, we're talking boxes of information and tapes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, let me clarify that a little bit, because I understand that you guys gave them mountains of source material, tapes and reports and formal Accident Packages and things

like that that have some of that data. I guess, what we're more interested in sort of like summary documents. Yeah, like--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Press releases--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like this is an example of the sort of thing that we'd be looking at. This is the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I saw that after the fact, yeah, I saw that after the fact. Press releases, I don't know, you could check with our Public Affairs, (b)(6), (b)(7)c to gather that information. And, in fact, again, since Shirley was our focal, she may have that information, don't know that, readily available. I do know, within, I don't know several weeks a month and a half, two months, along those lines, I know I did talk to "Aviation Week" about the event; talked about it in very generic terms. I do believe that we gave the time lines to them. I do believe and (b)(6), (b)(7) may have this information, but I wouldn't. You know, "U.S.A.Today" ran an article. And I would imagine that we gave information and time lines to them, as

well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said for the "Aviation Week" article that you actually gave the interview?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember when that was?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was in the fall of 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a copy of that interview?

MS. SCHUESSLER: At home, probably I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Public Affairs would have that information?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I would think so. You know, if not, certainly we can get you a copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : For your interview with "Aviation Week," how did you prepare for that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Sat down with a Public Affairs person, I believe, I don't believe we did any corporate, you know let's sit down and figure out what we're going to say. They were looking from the vantage point, if I remember correctly,

from the Command Center proper.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember during that interview if you guys discussed military notification?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I would imagine there's a statement or two in there about military notification and we would have used the time frames that, you know, very early on. Again, we either had the actual time because of the recorded data or we put in approximate times. But I would imagine that's there, as well. I remember, too, but then, again, I don't know how much of this you've looked at. We have a lot of our FAA facilities that reached out to their contacts in DOT, you know, so we had some of that going on, as well as from the headquarters arena.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We talked about public statements. How about internal briefing documents that you're aware of that were prepared concerning military notification.

MS. SCHUESSLER: The only thing I'm aware of, again, I was out at the Command Center when all

this was transpiring. We gave our information that we had gathered to AAT-20, again it was Dave Knoles at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: They put together various source documents, you know, this, obviously, is one of those documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What types of things were you getting from Knoles, I mean--

MS. SCHUESSLER: For us, it would be just like all of the FAA facilities, were doing at the time. We would get transcripts of the states of various operational positions that had pertinent data in there about conversations that we out at the Command Center were have with either the airlines, FAA facilities or, in some cases, DOD. Those types of information. Then he took that from all the FAA facilities and if I can look at this one second?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: This is the kind of a document that he would put all the data together to tell the unfolding of the story. That's not to say that it's all inclusive of all the information that he received from all the facilities, but what he did was condense everything so you can see how each aircraft was handled.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This document I have here, it's titled, at the top it says Sensitive Security Information FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001. Are you familiar with that document?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I'm not sure the exact document, but, again, most of the information is information that, you know, I have seen in various other logs, but I don't remember this specific compilation of information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Since you were at the Command Center--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --presumably, very shortly

after the 11th you would have been gathering your logs and pulling your tapes and things like that. Do you recall how much, if any of that information you shared with the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: At that time, I would guess we didn't share any of that. I know from a manager perspective, I was never asked by the military for any information. I did not have any conversations with the military. Perhaps, that call could have come into our Quality Assurance Office, but I think, had that call come in, they would have advised me that they were being asked to provide information, so, no, I don't believe we ever got that request.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The, I know, for example, like the Centers have a Quality Assurance Office, did you have one, as well?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I also understand like the four centers that were involved with the hijacked aircraft, had prepared formal Accident Packages for that day

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did the Center prepare anything similar to that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: The Command Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No. No, we don't, you know, the Accident Packages, themselves, you know, there's very much a protocol and that is the facility that had the direct involvement and they would be the focal for that. The Command Center does not have any of that responsibility.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys prepare any just impromptu after-action reports or anything like that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I believe we started doing some of that and all of that was put on hold from a headquarters perspective, they were taking care of all the after-action items and compilations. So, at that point we just forwarded all our information to the AAT-20 office for them to put together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that would have been

Knoles?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was your Quality Assurance, who was the manager for Quality Assurance at Herndon.

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall if, while you were out at the Command Center, if you guys received any information from the military concerning when certain events occurred, any data, any of their logs or anything like that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, and, typically, you wouldn't find that out at the Command Center. Out at the Command Center, you do have what we call a Services Cell, and that is staffed by the military, as well as civilian and, you know, depending on the event that's transpiring. But even between the services Cell and the FAA at the Command Center, I don't remember sharing any information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After you came to AAT-20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall receiving any requests from the military or Department of Defense for information about different events from September 11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I don't, most of the work--preliminary work had been done and I think everybody thought, okay, we had gathered all the information that was necessary. And so, that was really kind of a lull. At that point, FAA, I think, we thought everything was completed and we were moving forward. We had all the data, we weren't destroying it then and that sort of thing. But I think that was that lull. And I don't think it really got resurrected again until the Commission came into existence and then they started requesting some data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Commission?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Once the Commission started requesting data, do you recall receiving any requests from the military for information?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't. At that point I was up here in this office rather than AAT-20.

So--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In like May '03 some of the hearings had started and I think you would have still been in AAT-20. The only reason I say that is because the testimony that you look like helped prepare, the Questions for the record--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --probably would have been in that role, no?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Not necessarily.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or you could have been in this position already.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I could have been up here already.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, I'm sorry, yeah.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah. And, again, we can get--we can get the dates for you and in my mind, I guess it really doesn't matter what position I was in, you know because there were a lot of people that were, well, probably focal points in the

organization, just because either of their history or because of their expertise. So, because of my history out at the Command Center, I know people came to me for inclusion on different things.

I know David Knoles, when he moved on to his next position for a period of time, they were still relying on him, but I think probably Tony Ferrante then became the main focal in AAT-20, because he was there with Dave Knoles when they were, initially, putting the information together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And he stayed in that position. And while I was here in the Acting Deputy Role, he became the Acting Manager for AAT-20.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember at any point ever requesting any information from the military?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I never did, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or your staff?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't remember if they went out and asked for any military logs. I don't remember whether Shirley did. I know, at some

point we have had to have compared notes, you know, just because of the questions that came up. As far as a log, I would imagine that we did, you know, either get a log or at least had conversations about what time frames that they had on their log. But, again, I go back to the beginning, I think both DOD and FAA felt comfortable that we were not going to what we would say tamper with our logs to show a good story or whatever story we wanted to tell.

You know, we felt like our logs were as valid as we could make them, and unless you had a recorded line saying otherwise, we were going to leave out time frames alone. We were not going to change them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the reason, I mean, I'm kind of focused on that issue is because I see in a couple of the summary time line documents that the FAA has prepared, they actually, they reference a military log. And I'm wondering how the FAA came to that or obtain that information, do you know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I would imagine, again,

either Shirley or Tony Ferrante requested the log. Again, because the question came up, you know, our story and time frame was a little bit different than DOD, you know, just to be able to make a comparison.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anymore questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, do you recall, other than the question being raised that FAA logs may not correspond with what the DOD logs--was there actually any argument over the times? Was there any dispute, more than just, it doesn't match? Was it more FAA, was there any issue about FAA saying that's not right, this is the right time or vice versa, the military saying, no, our time is right and--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, the fact, I know those discussions took place. As far as an argument that you need to change yours because our time is right. If, indeed, they had factual data, a tape that said this was the time frame, I think, probably, we would accept that. Now, we do

acknowledge, in some cases, if I remember correctly, there may be a difference of one minute and we based that on the fact that, you know, our time may be a minute off from theirs. But if you're talking 10, 15, 20 minutes, no. Unless you can show me and confirm for me that you've got a tape that indicates this is the time frame, you know, why would I accept your word against what our people are saying? It's that kind of thing.

So, we understand that, unless you've got conclusive proof, it's very difficult to make amendments to what we're showing in our logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I don't think, I mean, I don't think the issue that the Commission had raised concerns, you know, one-minute discrepancies or anything like that.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, the thing that they seemed to be concerned about and that we're kind of focused on is, you know, they had--the FAA doesn't seem to cite this in any of the documents I've seen thus far, but Elise and I are just getting started,

so we haven't seen everything yet.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But like the military says that they had a report from FAA that United 93 was hijacked at 9:16 in the morning, which, as I understand things isn't possible since FAA didn't even know it was hijacked at that point. And then there's another reference to the military receiving notice that American 77 was hijacked at 9:24 in the morning. And there are a couple of documents prepared or at least one document that FAA cites that particular time point.

So, that's the sort of thing we're really focused on. Not minute discrepancies or something like that.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And I can understand that, but you also have to recognize and you probably need to talk to Tony Ferrante, because he really was the gatherer of all this information. He can possibly give you a good validation of, you know, the discrepancies here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: But in a complete package, you have to remember that morning that on these open telecons and phone lines, there were more than just these four aircraft that people were talking about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, as you, if you have an opportunity to talk to people, what they will say is things were unfolding so rapidly and it's not just these four aircraft, there was others that are interspersed, so you're throwing out call signs and saying, we don't know where he is, or we think this has happened or that's happened. So, it very--and you hate to say very--easy, but it is quite easy to hear something and think it's maybe a United Aircraft that's in your mind, but, actually, it's another one they're talking about. Either the person verbally stated the incorrect call sign or you heard the incorrect call sign. And the problem is, again, you don't necessarily have he recorded data to be able to correct that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, again, I go back to the beginning and say, none of this, I don't believe is intentional. It's just, as the day unfolded and there's so much going on this open line and telecon and sharing information that people are people and they're making human errors; don't intend to, it's not purposeful. But unless you've got a recorded line to actually go back and correct it, you know, you're stuck with the log that you've got.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible]

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I know, this is all day long. Some of it's operational, some of it's security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. Did you participate or actually, did you participate in conducting or preparing for any White House Briefing?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, let me see, because I do security stuff, I'm trying to--when you say White House briefing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like on the historical event, because I understand there were some briefings on,

you know, what's happening today and what are we doing in the future, but more a focus on historical briefings like--

MS. SCHUESSLER: What happened?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --yeah.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I do know, no, the only thing that I can remember is somebody going up to the White House to brief and Jeff Griffith, I mean, that's the time frame I'm kind of gearing myself for, Jeff Griffith went up to the White House to do a briefing. But I don't, you know, I never did any briefing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: As far as gathering information, I, you know, I gathered information or, actually, the Quality Assurance out at the Command Center gathered information for headquarters. But I don't remember any while I was in headquarters, per se, other than routine gathering information I couldn't tell you whether it was the White House Commission or you know, who it was for, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in any, like, after-action, groups following September 11, kind of gathering information for the Administrator to kind of put together a historical picture?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I was, again, I was out at the Command Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: And we began some of that out at the Command Center to do some of that. And that's when we got, you know, the direction from headquarters not to do any of that; send all the data that we had to headquarters and they would put all that together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you guys gathered that data, I think you said, before, I just want to make sure, you sent it to AAT-20?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

[Lengthy pause.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall seeing any public statements that the military or the Department of Defense may have put out relating to

the time line of events?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, I'm sure they were in the newspaper and I read those, and you know, I think we very openly acknowledged the fact from early, you know, that our time frame didn't necessarily match their time frame.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall whether the military coordinated before putting out any of these press releases?

MS. SCHUESSLER: If they did, they would have coordinated that with (b)(6), (b)(7)c if they did. I think they're Public Affairs, well, unless he was, yeah, I was going to say (b)(6), (b)(7)c was probably not here, maybe (b)(6), (b)(7)c she would probably be the best person to talk to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Martin is the current Public Affairs?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, and Laura, I think, may be his Deputy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay, currently?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Currently.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else you can think of that could be relevant to what we're--

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, other than, you know, talk to, maybe, a few more people and get a more composite picture, obviously than I can give you. In all my dealings with all the FAA people and all the DOD people that I have talked to, you know, I don't, there is, in my opinion, no intent whatsoever to deceive mislead anybody.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, I don't have anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Thank you.

MS. SCHUESSLER: You're welcome.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : End the recording at 9:45.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

BY

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, September 23, 2004

1:11 p.m. - 2:07 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --1:11 p.m. we are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 908 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, my co-agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. We're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission Hearings elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

We're interviewing (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Would you please acknowledge for the record that this interview is being tape recorded?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, I so acknowledge.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you please raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you please state your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c My full name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

middle initial (b)(6), (b)(7) as in (b)(6), (b)(7)c which is (b)(6), (b)(7) in (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c at FAA headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you held that position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Since August of 1997.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that the position you held on September 11, 2001?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And were you also a (b)(6), (b)(7)c at that time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you describe very briefly what your duties are?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you said before we started the interview that you had done a little research concerning press releases that the FAA issued following September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what did you find?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I found that in looking at the press releases issued by the FAA, which are

available on the FAA Website, now, that there were 11 news releases issued by the FAA between September 12, 2001, and December 19, 2001. These dealt mostly with the resumption of flying after 9/11 or restrictions placed on flying after 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you find any that dealt with historical time line issues?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, not at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are there other press releases after December that might exist concerning time lines?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c There is an FAA fact sheet dated August 12, of 2002, which gives a brief chronology of events on 9/11 of 2001. This was prepared in anticipation of the first anniversary of 9/11. And that fact sheet is also available, now, on our Website.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who actually prepared this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You did?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c My name is, as you can see my name is on--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is an FAA News Release,
Fact Sheet --

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Technically speaking, it's a
fact sheet that's available for public
distribution, it's not considered a news release--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --because there's no news in
it, if you will.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It's merely a factual
listing of a chronology of certain events on that
day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I know it's a small
difference, but it's says FAA News, in that it
comes from the Office of Public Affairs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see, okay, yeah, because
across the top it says FAA News--Federal Aviation
Administration, Washington, D.C. and it's got the
ZIP Code. It says for immediate release. Date
August 12, 2002, it's got your name and then phone
number as a contact point and it says Fact Sheet,

Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001. I just want to get that in for the record so we know which document we're talking about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How did you prepare this?

What did you use to get all this information?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A variety of sources; the afternoon of 9/11/2001, I compiled--at the direction of the then Assistant Administrator of Public Affairs, Scott Brenner, a list of the flights and the actual information that we had at that time. In other words, the airline; the flight number; the number of people on-board; which airport it departed from; and where it crashed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was the beginning. And that was, again, based--because at the time on the afternoon of 9/11, there was still a lot of confusion, discussion about how many airplanes were, indeed, missing; what had happened; were there any unaccounted for; and at that time, we were trying to get together the basic information

that we knew.

And if it's undated, I can give you a copy of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, that would be great.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I actually have some corrections that were made in the Air Traffic organization to that and other things. I can show this to you, I can make copies, I'd like to keep that for myself.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This fact sheet and this other document these are your copies right now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the fact sheet, I mean, that's available on the Web.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's on the Internet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, it is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This other document, you've shown us, it says Flights in September 11 Incident.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. I have two copies of that; that's what I prepared at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then this third page that

you gave us has a bunch of handwritten notes on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And whose handwriting is this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. It's--these phone numbers on here, there's a (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No. Now--718 is a New York area number, I don't know specifically which one. Now, if you'll, I think--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be Eastern Region or some facility out in that region.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It could very well, be, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I think that's a New Jersey exchange.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Basically, what we have here is the handwritten notes, it says, please verify times, et cetera, prepared by APA Public Affairs headquarters, return to (b)(6), (b)(7)c ., that is

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who was and is a

special assistant in Air Traffic here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She's in AT-1--at the time that was Air Traffic on a fax number and a phone number for her. Now, whether that is her handwriting or not, I couldn't say. I think--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sir, you actually verified--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Basically the Air Traffic organization and the woman I dealt with frequently before and after is a (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You prepared this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Without the handwriting, this is what you saw earlier.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-huh, so then you sent--so this was then sent to Air Traffic--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --for verification?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who in that--to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, and then she sent it elsewhere and I don't know where.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] has her number

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was her number. That's not--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is she still in that division?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, there's been a re-org--in other words, we had, at that time, we had what we called Air Traffic--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --which was, basically, the organization that ran the air traffic with the controllers. And since then, we've split that into several different organizations. (b)(6), (b)(7)c is still an FAA employee, she works, now in what's called Terminal Operations part of the new Air Traffic organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So that might not be a good

number for her anymore?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I have a direct number
for her--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, do you, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --I do not know what it is,
but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, we can get it after.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, basically, for, you
know, to understand this. As I said, this earlier
one, the clean copy, if you will, I prepared the
afternoon of 9/11. In preparing the chronology 11
months later, I took that and sent it to Air
Traffic and said are these, based on what you know
now, is this accurate? And this is what I got
back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you sent it forward to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and then it came back--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --sometime around August 2002?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, mm-hmm, July or August of 2002.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just want to note that this chronology that you have here does not include any information about military notification?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It does not, that is correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that was not really an issue, or the main issue was, okay. The main issue was, okay, what happened after 9/11 at various times, there were different newspaper stories about what happened, when, where each airplane flew.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So this document here is one of the first documents that you used to prepare this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually the corrected--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The corrected flights of

September 11 incident is the first document that you used to prepare the FAA release?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you--do you have any other time lines that you had worked on?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I did, use this from NORAD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a copy of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, I think this is commonly referred to as their September 17, 2001 News Release, is that your understanding?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's certainly plausible or logical it would be referred to that way.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just generically, I think it's how people refer to that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. Now, I have, for example, a--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This news release or this document here that what has been called a news release from NORAD, this would have been a source document for your fact sheet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I also have a chronology--oh, a chronology on American Flight 77, which was prepared by the Air Traffic Investigations and Evaluations Office here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's the AAP20, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that is--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This says American Airlines Flight 77 AAL77 Washington/Dulles to Los Angeles, all times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time; it's two pages, on the bottom of the second page it says AAT 20, September 15, 2001, 7:00 p.m. Do you know who you would have gotten this from at AAT20, who you would be dealing with?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No and it probably didn't come directly from AAT20, but, rather, through the Air Traffic headquarters office here, which is where Patrice is at.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In other words, it would go from AAT-20 to AAT-1 and then to me. Now, I honestly don't recall who specifically gave that to me or exactly where I got it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were there specific documents relating to AA-77 at time that you were being asked about it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There probably were, I don't recall specific questions. There were specific questions about all of the flights. And along the lines of when did we know the flight was missing or in trouble and why didn't we track the flight and how did we lose it and a great number of questions of that nature.

And, of course, here in this area, there was, if you will, greater interest in American 77 than in the other three because it was local.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When would you have received this document on American 77? Would it have been when you were working on preparing the fact sheet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When, specifically, I don't

know. And it's probable but I don't recall the specifics that in preparing this, that somebody in Air Traffic gave me a copy of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. So you would have gotten it closer to the time that you prepared the Fact Sheet versus--because this document's dated 9/15/01?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. On the 15th I was not--the 15th of September '01, I was not in to the details of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Did you have any such documents for--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This I would say is not really a source document, it's rather a lengthy chronology that our then historian prepared and whether it was based on what I prepared, in part, went into that document, so that's not a source document, it's more a [unintell.] document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I didn't know FAA had a historian.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We did, until he retired, we had a historian.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Really? This document's titled Chronology of Attacks of September 11, 2001 and Subsequent Events Through April 30, 2002, Eastern Time [unintell.]. It says it's prepared by FAA Agency historian, [unintell.] as a reference tool. It does not represent an official position of the FAA. And it's many pages. I don't know how many. Who was the historian?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't recall his middle initial, Preston.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know when he retired?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, probably sometime in '02 or possible in the beginning of '03. We would have that here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He was an FAA employee?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. So, you're fact sheet actually would affect this document?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So your fact sheet would have been a source document for that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --document prepared by the historian?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He have like an archive or something like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He does or he (b)(6), (b)(7)c and when he retired most of that is still here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where was he situated in the structure?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He was in (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And he was, basically, I think he reported to the (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And there would be, obviously, in (b)(6), (b)(7)c chronology there are a lot of facts, incidents, whatever that I, you know,

really was interested in, but didn't apply.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I don't recall, without looking at it, what details he might have had on military notification. There's a lot in there [unintell.] presumptions [unintell.] that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know that you have some other documents here, I'll just ask you to go through them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, here are some briefing notes that I prepared on 9/11, as we went along. And you can certainly look at those, and I can give you copies.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is really early--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --12:45 and 2:45, it doesn't look like there's any information in here about military notification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, because, at that time, we were here in Public Affairs and some of us, at that time, were sitting in the Operations Center

upstairs. We had an open bridge for news medias calls.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : By an open bridge, I mean any reporter could dial a number in here, so there'd be an ongoing telephone news briefing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then after that, we came here and at a time we said, okay, where are we starting. And just as an aid to other--to my colleagues, other Public Affairs officers, okay, this is the situation now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The main points. For example, you know, the air space aviation and airport is shut down, it won't open till at least tomorrow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Basic report to reporters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions about that, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then I have this, for example, here's a "Washington Times" chronology, shortly after that is prepared by the Associated Press,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c "Chronology of Terror" is the title from the "Washington Times." It's not dated though, I don't see anything in her about military notice.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Probably not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's actually a copy of a "Washington Post" September 12, '01 article.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's just the back of the [unintell.] that doesn't have anything to do with 9/11 at all. That's out of our daily quick report--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, I see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --without even looking at it, I'd be willing to bet it's not related. When we do a photocopy, it's back and front and you're just looking, if you will, at the back of the page.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It doesn't seem to be. It's related to September 11, but it's not--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --so much focused on the hijacking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Again, other--that's really an aside, this is "U.S.A.Today" the next day showing graphics showing how the sky [unintell.] "Washington Post" on September 12 [unintell.] I do have here an AP story from September 19, which appears to be based on that--the NORAD release, if you will.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Yeah, that's I don't even know what to call this AP release. I don't understand their jargon here. I--it looks like just a bunch of, it looks like random letters to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This are probably some keys to--some coding to indicate the specific story.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Attacks fighter jet 0486 9/19 at 8:30 a.m.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then in there it's got a couple of references to some FAA notation of military time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the North American Aerospace Defense sending newly released data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now another very initial source, this is the FAA Military [unintell.] for the 12th which was before crashes and it's very basic information, when you were talking about possible sources for the fact sheet on the chronology, that's another one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It doesn't look like it has any information about--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, it would not have any information about military notification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Here's some other additional background. Again, that's focused more on the various actions the FAA took to limit flying on that day and when did we do it and who did it and what did it cover. I don't think there's anything in there about military notification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It looks like all this paperwork is focused on ground stop issues.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. At that time and after, you know, we got a number of questions when did you stop flying? And the answer, well, there is no one time, it was a gradual process, we did certain things at certain times that affected parts of the U.S.

My recollection, looking back, is that immediately after 9/11, at least when I was doing the questions, I was getting some news media who were not really focused on notification to the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else in your folder concerning military notification issues?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not that I found in this look, I'd have to look more thoroughly and it was just about 11:30 before [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c had given us a copy of a document she had found titled Notification to DOD Time Line?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And if I'm not mistaken she

thought that you had offered that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She mentioned that to me.

I, frankly, don't recall doing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does that look like your
handwriting?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No. She told me she thought
that handwriting is Scott Brenner who was the--he
was the head of Public Affairs, the Assistant
Administrator at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know if that's true
or not. I--she showed that document to me, it did
not ring a bell, I don't recall compiling that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. I guess that answers
that question, doesn't it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sorry about that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Could you make any guesses as
to where she might have gotten it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I wouldn't know where to start.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] you said it's on your Website, currently?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it immediately put on the Website?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On August 12 of 2002 and it's been up there since then.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As I mentioned earlier, we prepared this in an--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The anniversary--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --the anniversary coming up we were getting a lot of requests for interviews to go into in-depth reporting, who did what, when, taking to any number of people who were involved.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This fact sheet--did you prepare a draft and float that up to Air Traffic?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Absolutely.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have copies of that, do you think, anywhere?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't believe, though, I'd have to look.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you mind double checking that for us and you can get back to us?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure. I don't recall how many times--it was more than once--that this went through Air Traffic to be reviewed. And I don't know the details of how Air Traffic reviewed it or whatever [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would your point of contact on that have been (b)(6), (b)(7)c as well, or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She was one of them, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Is there anybody else that you think you might have dealt with on this fact sheet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, Mary Ellen Kruf, K-r-u-f, who at that time was the chief of staff in Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is she still over there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, she retired.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall exactly when she retired?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Roughly (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's very rough, don't hold me to it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At least it gives us an idea as to how far back in the record you gotta look.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions right now, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What would you have done, you would have e-mailed it to them for review and attached it? How would that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I would think, in that instance, I took hard copies rather than e-mail it as an attachment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get changes to it?

MR. SHUMANN: Oh, I did, but going back to the question you asked. You know, did I keep those earlier drafts? And I just don't remember that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you, I mean, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm just kinda looking at this and I just breezed through these potential

[unintell.] documents that you gave me, I notice it doesn't--the first documents don't have everything that your fact sheet has.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So presumably there should be some other items that you probably had to rely on to prepare this. Because the most-detailed document that you really have is--well, you've got the NORAD press release.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But is this American Airlines Flight 77 time line that AAT 20 prepared.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have something like this for all the other flights, as well, or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not similar to that. Now, there are various--there are some news accounts; major newspapers different from ours. I think I used [unintell.] there were was a number of different sources here. For example, the aircraft type, probably came out, I think that came out the first day. Yeah, mm-hmm, the aircraft type and the

route. I just don't recall what other documents, sources I might have used.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you--do you remember seeing any data from the military, other than that [unintell.] you were referring to, that NORAD press release?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Any [unintell.] logs or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, none, whatsoever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have any, like, raw source data from FAA that you relied on to create these or did you just have summaries?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In some cases, there were summaries in the history of the ground stop, for example, there was a copy of an advisory from the FAA's Air Traffic System Command Center, which says this is the Ground Stop all departures, which means, and this is as of, looks like 9:29 Eastern Time. That was the ground stop [unintell.] nobody takes off. Then there was a later one, which I have seen, I don't think I have--for example,

here's one, here's a case where a Command Center here with slightly revised times for the ground stops [unintell.] variety of--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever interact with the military at all?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not that I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the 9/11, itself, which probably predates what you're looking into somewhat. At various times, when I was sitting in the Op Center, they had a display there of messages that would have some messages to military from Secret Service on flight stuff, as well as from the FAA. But that's not a personal interaction.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have [unintell.] Public Affairs or a military [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not then, not on that day and, afterwards there was some contact with NORAD's Public Affairs. (b)(6), (b)(7)c did most of those, I did a few.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you had to deal with Public Affairs over at NORAD, do you remember who

it was you would talk to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There's a (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There was, I'd have to look at some of the lists--I can't remember if he was Army or Air Force, a (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I will check it, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever, like, double check with an FAA source, any of the times and events that were presented here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --beyond the, like summary source document where you were like, well this just doesn't seem right, now can you guys just double check or show me what you've got that supports this? Did you ever do that with any of these?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah with the entire document, went through the Air Traffic organization several, more than the one time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And ongoing. And in some

cases and it was to review the entire document, do you have any problems, questions, uncertainties about anything here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So they reviewed the entire document. Now, as I mentioned earlier, I don't know the exact desk or people or offices they used in doing that review.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything that you saw when you put this together that concerned you or that you had questions about as far as the times or anything?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not exactly. The only question that came up, you can see why in many cases, it gives the time of approximate?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that is either there would be, in the various published accounts, both internal from the FAA and what appeared in the news media, there were quite different times, 9:00 a.m. or 9:02, things like that. So this represented a compromise. And there's another question as to

whether--in people using different times--are the Washington clocks synchronized? And if they're not, you know that can be a difference of a minute to there.

In one instance with United-93, that Air Traffic taking was the time that the airplane disappeared from radar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's not necessarily the same time it hit the ground.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There can be a slight difference there, particularly considering where it was in Pennsylvania, as opposed to American 77 hitting the Pentagon or the other two in New York at the World Trade Center. You get the small differences like that.

What I was trying to avoid there is somebody coming back and saying, oh, the "New York Times" says it wasn't 9:15, it was actually 9:17, of course, and I didn't want to--I thought it was fruitless to get into that discussion and that's

why I, frankly, parsed it, if you will.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And put the approximate time in?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The approximate.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You basically relied on Air Traffic word, basically, that this information was correct?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, I did not do the original research of going to the different Air Traffic facilities, look at their logs, that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you don't know what Air Traffic did to verify it, though, you don't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct, I don't know. Because, as I said, they did come back and said, yes, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who would have come back to you and said yes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe it was Mary Ellen Kruf, she would.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So she ultimately came back with the final draft of it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, well, there was more than one draft and they would give me changes and I would make those and I don't recall the specifics of were there any other sources or updates or what not and then run it through Air Traffic again until we got, okay, this is it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did this have to get approved outside of Public Affairs and Air Traffic, before you guys could publish this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's the normal approval process?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The normal process on a news release would be that this would have gone through the Deputy Administrator's office and the Administrator's office. I, frankly, don't recall if it was done in this instance. Because it's a fact sheet, not a news release and it could be that, since it's only a fact sheet, well, Air Traffic could approve that this is all related to Air Traffic, that's enough. I mean, you know, there are no quotes or policy statements or

anything like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let me just ask you about this one specific time here, because I've been looking through this document, the fax sheet, I notice this 9:24 entry here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --it's only the--it's the only disputed time I see on here and it says, "The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then the next sentences says, "The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-mm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where did that language in that second sentence come from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because every other FAA document, I've see so far, just says, usually parenthetical or it'll say [unintell.] log reflects.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one doesn't say that and I was just wondering if you recall how you came up with this language?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you looked at the September 11 Report, because they still have some concern--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --about this particular entry or this particular time and what happened. This is still on the Internet, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. And the agency, obviously, still considers the stoppings to be valid? Presumably, if it's still on the Internet?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, yeah, mm-hmm. And I quite frankly don't recall--and my name's on it, that about came to me and said I really question this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or, you know, where did you

get that? I don't know if it was from within the agency or from anyone outside.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you have any questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever help prepare the Administrator or Deputy Administrator or any other FAA person or employee to testify before Congress or the Commission concerning September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, how about for, like White House briefings?

MR. SHUMANN: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Had you heard anything about, like, that former Administrator, Jane Garvey, had testified in May 2003, are you aware of that, before the Commission?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before the Commission, I was aware that she testified before the Commission, but it's been covered.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you help prepare any of the questions for the record after she had

testified?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you aware that after the questions for the record, as I understand, things were submitted that there was some concern that the information in them might not have been accurate?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was vaguely aware that there were questions, not so much as to the accuracy as to the completeness of the information. Did the FAA provide all the information that we had which is about the same to me as saying the information you provided was wrong.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I understand what you're saying. What information did you understand at the time that there was concern that was missing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know. Just, that, after months, oh, gee, we found something else and provided that to the Commission. But I have no--this is hearsay, absolutely, you know, 23-hand or what have you. And I never heard what the details were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And there was, if you will, a general knowledge that there was some dispute or discussion or discrepancy between what the military had supplied and what the FAA had supplied.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But, again, I don't know what those details were or what the differences were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who was working on that issue?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] (b)(6), (b)(7)c certainly much more than I from Public Affairs; Shirley Miller, who is now in the Air Traffic organization, was, I think a prime coordinator, if you will, of material going to the 9/11 Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anybody else that you're aware of?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not specifically. I'm sure there were people in Air Traffic who would be involved. I don't know who they were. Probably, I'm sure there were some in ATC, the General Counsel's Office who were involved. [unintell.] a

function from my part over at the--I'd be a little surprised if they weren't involved.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, Do you know, maybe I already asked this question, but I'll ask it again, just to make sure. Do you know what steps, within the FAA were taken to try to resolve that--I don't know how to describe it, conflict or discrepancy between the military and FAA information?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I'm not and wasn't aware of the specifics of the discrepancy or what the discrepancies or differences were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Just another question about your fact sheet here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have any entries on your--any time entries on your fact sheet here that you had on here and then Air Traffic removed or that you didn't have on here and Air Traffic added, that you can recall?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not that I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In either case?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I--they didn't delete something that I had, nor did they add something that I didn't have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who is the ADA-30?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be the Deputy Administrator's Office, might be Shirley Miller, who at the time was the Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator, but I don't know that for a fact.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You say you don't recall Air Traffic deleting anything you had on there or adding anything you didn't have, but you do recall that they made some changes to it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. They made specific changes to the listings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you don't recall the substance of what those changes were?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you asked earlier if I had any drafts, and I frankly don't recall if I do. And, obviously, if I do I will provide those.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One more question about the fact sheet and then I think we'll have pretty much beaten that one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys coordinate this, in any way, with the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you provide--show them--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, not that I--I didn't. I don't recall that we did in any way. In other words, this is an FAA document and we will stand by that. I don't recall. I certainly didn't or as far as I know the Public Affairs Office didn't coordinate this or show it to the military, by the military, I mean, either NORAD or the Department of Defense or anybody else.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. This was published on August 12, 2002, this hasn't changed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't think of anything else.

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll end the tape at 2:07

p.m.

[END OF TAPED RECORDING.]

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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T5337

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
DARLENE M. FREEMAN

BY

AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, September 23, 2004

[No start time provided] - 4:09 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --we're at FAA Building 10-A, Room 520 Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c my co-agents are (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission Hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today we're interviewing Darlene Freeman. Darlene, if you could, please, acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MS. OSMUS: I am aware.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you, please, raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. FREEMAN: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give your full name spelling your last name for the record.

MS. FREEMAN: Darlene M. Freeman,

F-r-e-e-m-a-n.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your current position?

MS. FREEMAN: Director of Corporate Training and Development, for the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's the routing symbol?

MS. FREEMAN: AHD1.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you right now?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm an FAA Executive ES, ES-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you been in your current position?

MS. FREEMAN: One year.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you started in September '03?

MS. FREEMAN: August of '03, in this position, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you first start with the FAA?

MS. FREEMAN: 1977.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In what position and where?

MS. FREEMAN: I started out as a staff

attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on, September 11, what position did you hold--2001?

MS. FREEMAN: On September 11, 2001, I was Director of Safety and Special Studies in the Office of Deputy the Administrator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was your routing symbol at that time, do you recall?

MS. FREEMAN: I'm not sure I had one, but, if I did, it may have been--I think it may have been ADA-4.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah it says that in here.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And just working from September 11 forward, how much longer after September 11 did you continue to hold that position?

MS. FREEMAN: Officially, on paper, I held that position until August of 2003, when I took this position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: But I spent the last nine

months of that, I spent on detail at the Department of Homeland Security. So, from about December of 2002 to August of 2003, I was on detail at DHS.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What were you doing over there.

MS. FREEMAN: Initially, I worked on the transition team for the, you know, creating the department. And eventually, I ended up as Acting Director for International Policy in the Bureau of [unintell.] and Transportation Security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you were in ADA before, what grade were you there?

MS. FREEMAN: Same as here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Same, okay. I understand, after September 11, you were asked to participate or lead--I think the 9/11 Commission calls it an After Action Group? I don't know exactly what you guys called it, internally. But could you talk about that for us?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I don't remember what we called it either, but it was essentially what it was was a group that the Administrator at the time,

Jane Garvey, put together and asked me to lead to help prepare for the upcoming congressional hearings. So, I put a group together of representatives from the various offices that I knew would have to do the Q's and A's for the book to prepare.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did that start? When did that group form?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember exactly when it was and if there was a date of it for that first hearing, congressional hearings, there's no date on here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it days or weeks or months or--

MS. FREEMAN: It was--I would say it was probably days or--probably days or maybe a week.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, the primary goal of the group was to help Jane Garvey prepare for anticipated congressional testimony?

MS. FREEMAN: That's correct. In addition to that and the initial date, after September 11, because I had had a background in aviation

security, I volunteered, I went up to Monty Belcher and you know I volunteered, is there anything I can do in the immediate days following September 11. So, it, my recollection is that, you know, I started putting some information together, you know, and then shortly after that, you know, it turned into a let's put a group together to help prepare for the congressional hearings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who worked with you on that group?

MS. FREEMAN: Somewhere there's probably a name--I may be able to retrieve the names, but it seems to me that there was somebody from AAT-20, I don't remember if it was Dave Knoles [ph] or Ton Ferrante, but somebody from that group--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: --AAT-20; there was somebody from Security, at least one person from Security I know, I remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] being on the group from security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, you aid Leo Boygan?

MS. FREEMAN: (b)(6), (b)(7)c There was somebody

from Aircraft Certification, I believe it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c There was somebody from Flight Standards, and I believe his name was Tom Tulah ph. There was somebody from the Washington Operations Center and it seems to me that it was two different people two different times. It seems to me that Dan Noelle [ph] and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], sort of took turns. I think there was somebody from the Chief Counsel's Office, their legislative section, Mary--I forget Mary's last name. Can't remember who else. It was a big group.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And when you offered your assistance to Monty Belcher, what was he focused on you helping him try to determine or put together?

MS. FREEMAN: What I remember most of all was notification to the military. When did FAA notify the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: That was the primary initial focus.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know why he was focused on that issue?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You know, I can only guess.

No, I really don't know--I don't know why. I think there--I don't know if there was anticipated media interest or there was actual media interest, but I seem to recall that something with the media.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so, what did you do to try to help him figure that out?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, actually, I mean, all I did was, I sort of--I was sort of acting as a staff person, so what I did was to try to make sure, it was almost like a conduit, a messenger between him and the people who had to put the information together. So, what I did is, I worked with Air Traffic mostly, the AT-20 staff. They were putting together a chronology to make sure that they, you know included in the chronology the notice to the military. They were already working on a chronology of the events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And for that particular request, who did you deal with at AAT-20 for that?

MS. FREEMAN: A couple of people and I just remembered somebody else who was on the group,

my group and it all kind of, you know, the group, it was right around the same time for the congressional hearings. (b)(6), (b)(7)c from National Airport from Air Traffic, you know, was on the group.

Initially, I was dealing with Dave Knoles, I think Tony Ferrante, possibly others from the AT-20 staff. And then, eventually, they--they were so busy putting together, they do the accidents investigations, so when there's an air traffic--an event involving air traffic, they were so busy that eventually, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and he was on my group for the congressional hearing kind of became my partner, you know, conduit to Air Traffic. So, I would, you know, he would go off and gather the information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys develop a work product to answer--

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --Monty Belcher's question or--

MS. FREEMAN: Well, yes, I mean, the main

work product was this binder here the congressional hearing binder to--it was tabbed, you know, it was designed as you would prepare for a witness at a congressional hearing. It was designed to help the witness answer the questions. And AT-20 put together a chronology, you know, of the events of 9/11 and that became--and that was inserted in this book. But they prepared that. They were going to prepare that anyway, they prepared that when [unintell.]. And that included the notification to the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there a separate military notification work product or--

MS. FREEMAN: There were several, there were several documents and there were several documents that were put together. There was the one that AT-20 was working on--several that they were working on. You know, and they would bring in something, a narrative, you know, and Monty Belcher would say, can you put that in a chart form or, you know, so there were several documents--excuse me--several documents like that. They would bring

it in and he would say, well, it doesn't have the notifications to the military or you didn't include, whatever. Okay, and then they would go back. So, there were several iterations.

And, in addition, it seems to me that at some point I took some of the--I put--took some of the stuff that they had provided and put it in a format or a shorter chronology that I thought, you know, would be helpful for him to see, just the notifications issues. So, there were several--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are those all in here?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, they, I think most of them are, but there's a tab in here called notifications and, for example, this chart here was prepared by AT-20. Notifications to military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This, I'm going to read off a little bit so we know on the recording what we're talking about later. This first chart that you've shown us, it's got--it doesn't have a title on it, but it's got a square block or a grid at the top with each of the four hijacked aircraft. And then along the left-hand side of the grid it says, first

sign, probable time flight was known to be in distress; NORAD NEEDS notification and estimated crash time. Then there's times, presumably for those events.

So, what was, this document you said was prepared by AAT-20?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So that would be Knole and Ferrante?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm, yes, and it's got a--it says so on the bottom and it has a date, September 18, 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, it says in a footer, provided AT-20, revised on September 18, 2001, at 1400.

MS. FREEMAN: Right. In addition, they had, you know, under Tab 1 of this hearing book, these were the chronologies that AT-20 had put together of the events, these weren't just the notification issues, these were the events, you know, for each of the aircraft. So, those, this, you know, they tried to include just about

everything in there that they had, you know, based on air traffic tapes and whatever else that they thought they could use.

And then they prepared this chart, this was at Monty Belcher's request, the one that you just referred to. In addition, and I believe that I prepared this, based on the information that Air Traffic had given me is a--it's several pages and it's entitled "Notifications to Military" and it's dated 9/20/01 and it's got dates.

And then we had "Notification Chronology," it's dated 9/18/01. We had one for each of the aircraft. And I believe I prepared these based on--everything was based on chronologies that Air Traffic had provided.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, yourself, review any source documents to prepare any of the chronologies that you actually, yourself, worked on?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember what I reviewed. I do remember--I remember seeing at one point some logs from some of the Air Traffic facilities that I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)c had,

specifically, I seem to recall that he had something from New York Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like the Rock Logs I think they refer to ?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, the Rock Logs are the Regional Operations Center Logs, that's different from the Air Traffic logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MS. FREEMAN: The ones that I'm referring to, the ones that the actual Air Traffic facility actually kept. The, I remember seeing some of those, you know, I think it was the Washington Operations Command Center--Washington Operations Center Logs. I may have seen some of the Regional Operations logs, but I don't remember really studying them in detail. But there were members on this group who had them.

Another woman who was on the group was Tracey, I don't remember her last name, but I can look it up and she, she sort of--she was overseeing the regional operations center, so she was the person on the group who was bringing that

information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you review any military logs or military source material?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember reviewing any military logs. But not to say that I didn't, so, I'm not trying to be--I just don't remember. Now if you showed me something, I might say, oh, yeah, I saw that, but I honestly don't remember. But I do remember seeing--I do remember seeing a press release that the military had put out. And there were--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MS. FREEMAN: Or a draft press release, I remember seeing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess on this Notifications to Military document dated 9/20/01--

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --on their page that starts AAL-77--

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --actually looks like it's

dated 9/18/01 at 5:30 p.m. This entry for 0924?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Says Northeast Air Defense
Sector Logs show--

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --where would you have gotten
that information from?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, it was either the--I
don't know if it's on the press release, it is on
the press release and, I believe it was on this
chart that Air Traffic prepared, 9:24 and they have
an asterisk, these times are derived from a review
of the NEEDS Log. So, my recollection is that or
at least my belief was that Air Traffic had access
to those logs. If they didn't have access, I know
they were talking to the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: And I do remember seeing
this press release from the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the, I guess that's the
NORAD September, what is that 18th, press release?

MS. WOODS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: There was also a draft and I think this may have been the final. And I believe there was a draft press release that we saw, initially.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That they had sent over here for what purpose?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know how--I don't know if they sent it over for coordination. I don't know. They didn't send it to me, I just remember seeing it. I just remember that somebody had a draft press release. I remember somebody, you know, walking into Monty Belcher's office with this draft press release from the military. So, Jeff Griffith, who was, he was the Deputy Director for Air Traffic. And he was, Monty Belcher tasked him with communicating with the military on the issue of the press release. So, he ended up, I have this association of the press release with Jeff Griffith. And I know that he ended up talking to somebody in the military and, you know, I wasn't privy to that conversation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have any discussion with the military, yourself?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I did not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember asking anybody if they could get some information from you or for you from the military?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't ever remember asking, no, at that point, Monty Belcher sort of inserted himself, I don't want to say taking over, but, I mean, he was the boss, so he was, at that point he was directing Jeff Griffith and, you know, to get--to talk to the military to get the information, talk to General So-and-So, it was sort of a--it was Monty Belcher and Jeff Griffith and, you know, at that point, I was working with the group. I had a whole congressional hearing to prepare the Administrator for and there were many, many, many issues that notification of the military, you know, was just one of them. But there were many, many issues I had to make sure to include in the book. So, I don't want to say that I sort of stepped aside on the notification issue, but Jeff

Griffith was handling it. He was working directly with Monty Belcher and I was just kind of trying to stay on top of what it was that was happening.

I think somewhere, initially, at the very beginning, you know, I said one of the things that Monty Belcher asked me to do was to, you know, get some information on when we notified the military. When the draft press release came in, and I believe that it was Air Traffic, perhaps, Jeff Griffith who brought it in to Monty Belcher. You know, at that point, then it became, you know became Air Traffic, primarily working this issue with Monty Belcher, and I was just sort of on the periphery, if you will.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have a question?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

MS. FREEMAN: And can I say something else--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure.

MS. FREEMAN: --just to make sure I don't mislead anybody. When I was interviewed by the Commission staff they showed me something that

looked like that chronology notification
chronology, Notification to Military--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: --they showed me a document,
initially they said, you know, they asked me, do
you recognize this, did you prepare this initially?
Initially, I thought, no, I--and then as I looked
at it some more, you know, during the course of the
interview, I told them, I said, I have to say,
again, my memory is faulty, but I have to say this
sounds like I would have written. And so I--and I
don't have a copy of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that this document? This
document is titled "Chronology of Events on
9/11/01" do you think that's it?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I don't believe this is
it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recognize that
document?

MS. FREEMAN: I think this was a document
that was--I think this may have been prepared by
somebody either in the Washington Ops Center or one

of the regional ops centers. It talks about the Net, so the Net was the Net that they activated. So, this was sort of a chronology, looks like it was a chronology from the perspective of the Net that they ran.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because we're led to believe that this was one of the--your group's work product?

MS. FREEMAN: Okay, there were lots of people on the group. And one of the people on the group, I mentioned Dan Noelle and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were there representing the Washington Operations Center. (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], I think that's her name, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think her position was, maybe still is, Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for the Region, basically, don't know what the exact title is, but that's where the Regional Operations Center report to.

So, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was on the group and she was sort of representing the Regional Operations Centers on the group. And I believe that I--at some point there were so many

chronologies going around, everybody had one. And, you know, Air Traffic seemed, because Air Traffic seemed, they had the discipline of reconstructing accidents, that was their job. They seemed to have the better, the more disciplined handle, I felt, you know putting together the chronology, they were used to doing this, you know, they seemed to be doing it in a scientific objective way.

And so, on this group, I seem to remember, you know, (b)(6), (b)(7)c coming in with chronologies that the Regional Operations Centers had put together, I can't remember if this was one of them. I remember the Washington Operations Center--well, this is what we did and I seem to recall asking Tracey, well, why don't you--this isn't really helpful, there are too many of these going around, why don't you take what the Washington Operations Center has, take what the regions, because there were several regions, take what they, and try to come up with a consolidated chronology from the perspective of the operations centers. You know, try to come up with just one chronology. That may be what this is.

But, to be perfectly honest with you, I didn't have as much confidence in this as I did in the stuff we got from [unintell.] Sorry, I've taken too long.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, no.

MS. FREEMAN: Because--and the reason I say I didn't have as much confidence is because the Operations Centers, they're sort of second-hand versions, I mean, they facilitate communications between facilities and they try to keep notes. But I have a lot more confidence in the first-hand, which is the facilities themselves, the Air Traffic facilities and their logs and what were they saying.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you remember, going back to this Notification to the Military document or I should, basically, say any of the other time lines that have been put together for military notification there being any discussion or conflict or concern about some of the times the military was showing for things versus what the FAA understood? I'm not just, because I understand that there were,

like, well, ours says, you know, 8:01 and their's shows 8:00 o'clock; I'm not talking about like little one- or two-minute discrepancies, we don't even have a record or I don't remember this, should we go back and check, that sort of thing?

MS. FREEMAN: I seem to have a recollection--recollections are dangerous things, but I have a recollection that the last press release had a time that the military's draft press release had a time on there that had a 9:16 time on there for one of the airplanes that we didn't have any corroboration for from our side. And it was one of those--I'm trying to remember which airplane that would have been. But I remember and this is where the--this is where that chronology that I told you the Commission asked me about, you know, did I prepare, I don't have a copy of, but obviously they got it from the FAA somewhere. In that chronology that they showed me, I included a note saying something like the military says FAA notified them at 9:16, on this particular aircraft, but that doesn't make sense because we didn't even

know it was in trouble or it hadn't even been hijacked at 9:16.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: So, I remembered that. I remember that was one, you know, it was almost like the military gave us credit for a notification that we couldn't corroborate.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, you would have been fortune tellers.

MS. FREEMAN: So, I don't know which one that was. I don't know if that was United 93, it may have been United 93, where, you know, the first sign was 9:28.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think this chronology of events has that time in it.

MS. FREEMAN: Oh, does, it, okay, there you go 9:16. Okay, it was, yeah, United 93. That didn't make sense at all. First sign of any distress with United 19 was at 9:28.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that brought up to the military?

MS. FREEMAN: Well, it was, that's where

Jeff Griffith steps in. And that's where--Jeff Griffith is now retired, would be your best source of information. Because when that last press release came out, he was tasked by Monty Belcher to go talk to the military about these times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what, because, I mean, obviously, you guys picked out the 9:16 time as an issue?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what the FAA did, internally, with the other times that the military was reporting to verify? Especially where their records where FAA says or FAA called?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't know, I mean, you'd have to talk to people at Air Traffic. I don't know, I think they went back and checked against their traffic tapes or logs or something.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there anybody direction given at, you know, your level or--

MS. FREEMAN: Certainly not at my level.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about higher or--

MS. FREEMAN: No, other than just, other

than, you know, go try to figure out, I mean, we had these times, this press release that came out, the last press release, and I don't remember what day they came out but it was fairly early, they came out with that draft press release and we were still--we, the FAA--were still trying to put the chronologies together and figure out who sent what to whom and when. So, when we got this draft press release, my recollection is that Monty Belcher said to Air Traffic, okay, now we have somebody, you know, obviously, the military, they've kept logs, you know, they seem to, I don't want to say, have their act together, but they seem to have gathered their information very quickly. And so, now we have something to work against. And my recollection is that Monty Belcher asked Air Traffic to, you know, try to figure out, see if any of their times match up to the times that you have. That sort of directions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So Monty directed some type of reconciliation from the FAA.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, but reconciliation

isn't quite the right word because that would suggest, you know change your times to reflect what they're saying. And it wasn't that at all, but it was sort of a, you know, that they hadn't, that the draft press release, and so they were getting ready to put out the press release. As soon as they put out the press release, the media was going to be all over the story.

And so, it was we need to get our information together and we need to, you know, we need to figure out, if they say that we told them--that we notified at a certain time, let's find out if our records show that we did. If our records don't show that, let's let the military know that. So maybe they can look at their records to make sure that they have it right. It was more that sort of thing, it wasn't to reconcile let's get it the same, but, you know, they have their records we have ours and we're talking about, you know, mutual conversations, so, you know, let's see what everybody has.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

And Jeff Griffith was tasked

specifically to work on that?

MS. FREEMAN: To talk to the military, to talk to it was a General, I can't remember his name. Specifically it [unintell.] the press release.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Aside from the time lines that you've already shown us, are there others that your group had created?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of this topic, would it include this Military Notification Topic?

MS. FREEMAN: Not that I remember, like I said, there were many drafts, you know, so this was sort of the final one, so there were drafts that were prepared.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a document called "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001." Was this something that your group had worked on or was this independent?

MS. FREEMAN: No, this was something that AT-20 did, and then--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's not the entire document, it's missing a lot of the graphics.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I know, but I think that this formed the basis for the chronologies that you see in Tab 1. So, I believe that--I don't think it's exactly the same, but it looks the same. So they put this together, this was their thing. This was sort of their reconstruction of the events. They put it together and then when--so when we were putting the book together for the congressional hearing my recollection is that we asked them okay, we need a Tab for the chronology, my recollection is that they used the chronology that they had put together for the book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, it has the same chronology, then.

MS. FREEMAN: I believe it's--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Here we're looking at chronologies previously, under her Tab 2 in her book and now she's referring to chronologies in Tab 1.

MS. FREEMAN: Tab 1, and, right, now the one from the book, oh there it is September 17, it will be interesting to see if this one's dated,

yes, September 17.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. This time right here is--the first page anyway--is looks like that same grid--

MS. FREEMAN: That does look like it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But then the subsequent pages look a little different than what you've got, it's more narrative, notification--did you see this before? I copied that a little--

MS. FREEMAN: Is that not the same as this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Notification Chronology--it sure--it sure does look like it.

MS. FREEMAN: Although the one you have doesn't have a date on it. But it looks a lot of what's in Tab 2 of my book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, it does.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay, the last one looks a little different and that's the 93.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, the one that I have for 93 has the 9:16 entry.

MS. FREEMAN: Oh, it has the 9:16.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The one that you have has a note at the bottom about the open line.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay, and this is the one that has-- this was the note that I was remembering: Note, we believe this time to be inaccurate because it precedes the indications that UL 93 was in distress, 9:16.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think this was an earlier draft of that?

MS. FREEMAN: I think so, that must have been, my guess that this one was prepared around the time that the draft press release came out which showed the 9:16 time. But, I'm really stretching my memory here. I may be totally wrong about the draft press release saying 9:16. Northeast Air Defense Sector Logs show FAA notifying the military 9:16; maybe I'm wrong, maybe it came out of the logs and not the draft press release. But I have this recollection about 9:16 and so, there it was.

And so, we believed, we included a note on here, we believed this time to be inaccurate. This

is the one where we would have to be fortune tellers as you said. And so my guess is that when we prepared the final one for the congressional hearing, since we believed that time to be inaccurate, that we didn't include it in, you know, the materials that Monty Belcher Jane Garvey were going to be testifying on. My guess is we probably didn't want them to use that time because we didn't think it was appropriate.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Probably a good guess, huh?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This binder, then, was given to the Administrator?

MS. FREEMAN: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is exactly what she had?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm, yes, exactly what she had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What congressional testimony did she have to give that would have included this information?

MS. FREEMAN: She testified before--she had a bunch of congressional hearings and, I'm sure

somebody could reconstruct what committees she testified before the House, the committees in the House and Senate. And I don't know, I can't tell you, that the notification issue was even asked. But when we were putting the book together--when you're putting a book together like this to prepare somebody for a congressional hearing, you try to anticipate what they might be asked about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: And I guess we must have figured that they might be asked about the military notification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would she have gotten anything ahead of time saying these are the topics we're going to discuss which means she would have known?

MS. FREEMAN: Sometimes we get that. I can't remember with this particular one we did. But the woman, I mentioned, [REDACTED] whose last name I can't remember, who was from the [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [REDACTED] and she was on my group. I seem to remember her coming in and saying, here are some of the things you might

anticipate being asked about or that the Administrator might be asked about and we used that as a starting point, you know, when the group first got together, okay, let's assign, you take that one, you take that one, as a starting point for the tabs. But I don't remember where she got that. I don't know if that was her, based on her experience, anticipating what the questions might be or if she had talked to some of the staff on the Hill.

But that's the way we prepare witnesses for congressional hearings. It's a mix of what so-called experts at the FAA guess that the questions might be from talking to staff people on the Hill.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Usually the hearings are topic-based, right? There will be a topic but there could be other issues that arise?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there, like, a Congressional Affairs Officer or office in FAA that might have a list of all her testimony?

MS. FREEMAN: You could either try the [unintell.] to answer your question. It's AGI [unintell.] government industry affairs and you could ask them, they probably have it, or if not them, the Chief Counsel's Office, the legislative staff, ADC-60, would have it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Did you work on helping Jane Garvey or Monty Belcher prepare for their hearings before the 9/11 Commission?

MS. FREEMAN: No. I was on detail, as I recall, I was on detail at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would have been, like, May 2003.

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah, I was on detail.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you help anybody at the FAA prepare for any White House briefings?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember specifically. I don't remember specifically. I was asked that by the Commission staff. And I don't specifically remember. I told you that they showed me, you know, some chronology with notes like I mentioned on there. And they asked me, did

you prepare this specifically for a meeting that Monty Belcher had [unintell.], but I can't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Going back to this Notification Chronology document, how did you guys decide which events to include in here and which events not to include.

MS. FREEMAN: Air Traffic, prepared the chronology. And so, I mean, they prepared the chronology and, then, you know there was a little back-and-forth. My recollection is that there was a little back-and-forth. You know, Monty Belcher saying, well, you know, have you got whatever information about something, you know, go ahead and use that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like for example, United 93 here this document in your binder which is dated 9/18, is that what that is--

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --doesn't show a time or anything that you guys actually notified the military other than to have that note at the

bottom. And I believe that the Commission determined that there actually was a notification to the military like at 10:07 or something like that.

MS. FREEMAN: 10:08 or something like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which was a few minutes after that plane had actually crashed. Did you guys have any discussion about that?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I didn't. My recollection was that from my--from what I knew, from what I was led to believe is that we didn't have any notification time for 93, it was one of those, gee, this was kind of this doesn't look so good, but it doesn't look like we ever notified the military. That's my recollection.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you don't have a recollection that you guys discussed excluding that 10:, I think it was 07?

MS. FREEMAN: No, no, my only recollection was thinking, gee, this doesn't look so good because we never notified them. That was my.

[REDACTED]: Yeah, it's 10:07 that Cleveland Center advised news of American 93 [sic] hijacked. The other thing that I was curious about is for American 11.

MS. FREEMAN: In fact, and I think that's a basis, again to go back to there press release that the military put out, they had an NA, Not Available, notification on 93, which is, you know, that's sort of what we assumed, or at least what I assumed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get a chance to look at this?

MS. FREEMAN: I do not have it, I'd love to one of these days, I just haven't had the time. I read some of the, you know, the newspaper coverage.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c For that American 11 chronology here?

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It, the chronology stops at 8:46 and some seconds saying impact at the World Trade Center.

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But the Commission, for example, had determined that FAA reported on a couple of occasions after the plane crashed, they reported to the military that this plane was still airborne, and that isn't reflected in this chronology. Do you remember having any discussion with anybody about that?

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember that at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, as far as you're aware, there was no discussion that that should be included or excluded.

MS. FREEMAN: Not that I was aware of.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are there any other time lines in here that reflect notification--

MS. FREEMAN: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --to the military at all?

MS. FREEMAN: No, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When do you think you got back from DHS?

MS. FREEMAN: It was August of 2003.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. When you got back from DHS, do you remember any discussion within FAA about concern on the FAA's part about the information it provided to the Commission concerning when they notified the military or anything like that?

MS. FREEMAN: No, I remember hearing that, you know, I guess it was in the papers and everything about, you know, that there was some concern that the Commission hadn't gotten everything or, you know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This was the subpoena issue, then?

MS. FREEMAN: Yeah the subpoena issue, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything about military notification by the FAA?

MS. FREEMAN: Not that I was made aware of, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you help, well, no, never mind, you were not here. It's hard to believe, but I think I'm running out of questions.

MS. FREEMAN: All right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you--aside from the stuff in the book here, were there any other, like, internal briefing documents along these lines with military notification that you might have helped prepare?

MS. FREEMAN: The only thing is that chronology that I mentioned to you that I wish I could have asked the Commission for a copy of, but it seemed to me that they had a copy of something and it's been several months since they interviewed me, but it seems to me that they had a copy that looked a lot like this but it had some notes, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Had some handwritten notes on it?

MS. FREEMAN: No, not handwritten. It looked a lot like this, but it pointed out, and in fact this does, too, but I don't, but it, you know, pointed out things like, we don't really believe, like the 9:16 time, we don't really believe that's really accurate because blah, blah, blah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. FREEMAN: Stuff like that. That's the only thing that I remember--you have the thing that Air Traffic put together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't recall any discussion, though, at the FAA about clarifying the record with respect to those questionable times? The 9:16 and--

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember other than--and that's why I said I was kind of on the periphery at some point, you know, it was--Jeff Griffith was getting directions from Monty Belcher and, you know, he was talking to somebody in the military and he was coming back and reporting to Monty and I wasn't always there when he came back. And so, I, at some point, you know, I was not primarily involved. I was putting together all these other tasks and it was, like, you know, my feeling was, fine, somebody else was working on that, Jeff Griffith was working on that. And he's dealing directly with Monty Belcher, so whether those discussions took place, I don't know. But I don't remember them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't think of anything else. I think we'd like to get a copy of this whole binder.

MS. FREEMAN: Mm-hmm

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Unless there's anything else you can think of (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wasn't there, didn't you just mentioned some whether the Commission said it, about some notifications after impact?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : American 11 yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, American 11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said there wasn't any discussion about whether to include or exclude, but--

MS. FREEMAN: I don't remember any discussions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Any discussion at all--

MS. FREEMAN: About after--I don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, was all the focus kind of being placed on every other thing that happened up until the crash?

MS. FREEMAN: In a way, yeah, but I do

think some of these notifications are placed after the impact. Let me see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But I think that one, I mean, it's after the fourth plane went down, right? So, maybe that's kind of. I mean, [unintell.] fourth plane crashed, was that the kind of the end of the chronology as far as the FAA was concerned.

MS. FREEMAN: It may be, I don't know.
It--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you understand?

MS. FREEMAN: Because the estimate for crash time was 10:04 for the last flight. No, I mean, so, for example, here was one, although it's only by two minutes, but the crash time for 175 was 9:03, we show it as 9:03 and the notification at 9:05, so that one was two minutes after.

So, I just, yeah, I can't answer that question, I don't know why the chronologies stopped when they did. I don't remember any discussion or that there was any story to be told or there was anything after. So, it's what we were given by Air Traffic and stuff we included.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you wouldn't mind giving us copies of those documents in that binder.

MS. FREEMAN: I can do that. How do I get those to you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, if--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do we want the entire binder or just want the stuff that relates to--

MS. FREEMAN: You can look there's a table of contents, if you'd like to see what the other tabs are.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Ground stop issues. Yeah, I think it's just 1 and 2. If you have a copy machine we can copy those.

MS. FREEMAN: Okay, sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, we're going to stop recording. It's 4:09.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

LYNNE OSMUS

BY

AGENT WILLIAM (b)(6), (b)(7)c

AGENT ELISE (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Friday, September 24, 2004

10:05 p.m. - 11:01 a.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --2004 and the time is 10:05 a.m. We're at FAA Building 10-A, Room 300-East, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, my co-agent is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. We're from the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission Hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today we're interviewing Lynne Osmus. Lynne, if you could, please, acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MS. OSMUS: I am aware, I'm with it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. OSMUS: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

MS. OSMUS: Yes, it's Lynne A. Osmus,

O-s-m, as in Mary-u-s.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current position? Assistant Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you currently?

MS. OSMUS: I'm an SES.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long have you held that position?

MS. OSMUS: Approximately 18 months.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Back, like, in the spring of '03?

MS. OSMUS: I think that would be right. I can actually check the records. The reason it's fuzzy is I was in a special assistant position before that working with the Deputy Administrator doing liaison items with TSA. And then [unintell.] organization, I was working so closely with them, I can't tell you the day I actually moved down here, but I can get that for the record, if you like, it's been roughly 18 months, though.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. When did you first

start with the FAA?

MS. OSMUS: 1979.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And in what position and what was your duty station?

MS. OSMUS: I was a GS-4 police officer, out at Dulles Airport when that was still owned by the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wasn't that part of, like, Treasury or something at one point, or did they transfer that function over there?

MS. OSMUS: I don't know what it was before FAA had it, but at that point Dulles and National were both AA properties and there were federal police departments at both of them, staffed by FAA employees.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on September 11, 2001, what position did you hold?

MS. OSMUS: I was the Deputy Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade were you in that position?

MS. OSMUS: [unintell.] position, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And after September 11, 2001, how much longer did you continue to hold that position?

MS. OSMUS: Until the President had responsibility for aviation security transferred to TSA in February of 2002. So, that concluded my actual job in the external aviation security program. That was when I started working for the Deputy Administrator as the special assistant. And the paperwork followed at some point after that. But once TSA assumed programmatic responsibility that was essentially the end of the function I had previously held.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you stayed at FAA?

MS. OSMUS: I did, yeah, I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then you held that special assistant position until you obtained your current position, is that right?

MS. OSMUS: Yes, right, uh-huh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that you had mentioned, before we formally started the interview, that initially you had been tapped to

provide some liaison for the Commission. Can you kind of describe what your responsibilities were there?

MS. OSMUS: Sure, I'm sure you have all these documents, but I wanted to refresh my memory a little bit in terms of some of the dates. We were first contacted at the department and FAA by the Commission staff in, let me think, I want to say April, but let me just verify that from my notes here. They had--the team that worked on the aviation security issues and air traffic issues contacted Lindy Knapp, how was the lead for the Commission at the department and set up the first meeting--no, I'm not finding it. I think it was April. It was not all that long before their first hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So around April 2003?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

MS. OSMUS: And they provided their first list of issues they wanted to talk about and they were primarily aviation security in nature--as soon as I get through paging through here, I'll try to

find that for you. And at that first meeting. Dana Hyde [ph], was there and I think another staff person along with her from the Commission staff. They explained to Lindy that there were different teams covering different subject matter areas and the two that would be primarily associated with the Department and FAA were the ones affecting aviation security and air traffic issues.

And we clarified for a little bit for her, or tried to, the programmatic issues between TSA and FAA. As an example, they were looking for copies of documents associated with new security measures put in effect after 9/11. And we explained, once TSA picked up that programmatic authority, all the files associated with those records went to TSA. We could help them try to figure out where in TSA they resided, but that needed to be a request of TSA at that point.

And then, let's see, so May 7, I think is the first request from the Commission and it's notification of a hearing on May 22 and 23. And it was Nation's Aviation Security Posture as of

September 11, what happened on September 11 relative to hijacking; what security improvements have and should be made to the aviation system in the aftermath of the attack.

So because those were largely--how did hijackers exploit the aviation security system; how did the security measures employed that day comply with applicable policies and regulations; and what were the [unintell.] issues that need to be answered to gain a definitive understanding of what took place on September 11.

So, because of the request so largely focused on aviation security, as was their specific requests in their first document request, I was kind of the lead at that point for FAA because that had been my programmatic responsibility earlier.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before we continue, I'm sorry to interrupt. Who is Lindy Knapp?

MS. OSMUS: Lindy Knapp is the Deputy General Counsel at the department and I think she was acting General Counsel at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, at OST?

MS. OSMUS: At OST, mm-hmm, yes. So, as you can see by just my handwritten notes, the first DOT document which was sent to the OT to answer, several of the items actually needed to be redirected to TSA. These are the kinds of discussions we were having with the staff to explain to them what currents currently resided in FAA and what were officially in the possession of TSA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, this list that you are referencing is from a May 7, 2003, letter addressed to Secretary Mineta from Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton.

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And the section we're talking about, it says DOT Document Request No. 1. And that looks, I guess, actually from Daniel Marcus at the Commission. But there's eight items in here. So, you guys would have assembled the items that FAA could still respond to?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then you directed the

Commission over to TSA--

MS. OSMUS: Exactly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --to obtain these other items.

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm, yes, exactly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, it looks like about half of them you guys still could have responded to and the other half, roughly--

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys prepare, like, a binder or something like that to respond or was this such a volume that it would have had to fit into boxes?

MS. OSMUS: I think this first one wasn't all that voluminous. Let me take just a quick look here. This first request wasn't all that voluminous, so it would have either been in a binder or a folder, I don't remember how we actually physically packaged it up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would that first request be with Shirley Miller, now?

MS. OSMUS: Yes, it will be, I turned over to her everything that we had maintained copies

once we handed over financial responsibility for liaison to her.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were Jane Garvey and Monty Belcher already retired at this time?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And now we're talking about, like April, May 2003?

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think one or both of them may have testified in May.

MS. OSMUS: Jane Garvey did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Jane did.

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm, she did, indeed, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And did you guys put together, like, a briefing book for her?

MS. OSMUS: We prepared her, we drafted the statement that she was--and then, of course, she personalized it, but we did--and we met with her--I met with her two or three times prior to the Commission hearing because she got specific questions to respond to. Have you seen those?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually I was going to ask

you.

MS. OSMUS: Let me see if I have them. I'm sure I have them in here. And then sat down with her and kind of refreshed her memory and ours going through some of the briefing documents that we had kept after 9/11. I think this is her letter of invitation; no. Dated May 8, that's Jane Garvey's invitation.

[Lengthy pause.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, her statement is available on the Commission's Website if I'm not mistaken.

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It says in the letter that the Commission will receive testimony from expert witnesses on three central aviation questions. The second of which says--the second item is "What happened on September 11 relevant to the hijackings?" Now, there--I recall, from reading her statement, that was formally submitted, that there wasn't a lot of detail concerning that particular topic in her statement. There was a

very short discussion in that area. But I was wondering, did you guys prepare some briefing documents for her concerning this second item that she would have been able to review or take with her to the testimony to ref if she had received questions?

MS. OSMUS: We prepared a series of briefing documents or copied ones that we prepared early after 9/11; just to refresh her memory. In her discussions with the Commission staff, which she had several of before the hearing. And then looking at this, she was anticipating questions to pertain very specifically to aviation security issues on 9/11: about how passengers were screened; what the hijackers did in going through screening, that sort of thing. She was not looking at the air traffic pieces on 9/11.

You know, in hindsight we should have looked at every issue we thought there was a possibility of the Commission raising with her. Because obviously, she was surprised by specific flight, air traffic questions that did come up in

the hearing. But that wasn't her sense at all.

And, in fact, I've got some notes in here at all, I think, while I was just jotting down in discussions with her as we were getting closer to the hearing in case we needed to augment her briefing materials or adjust her statement a little bit. And, you know, discussions with (b)(6), (b)(7)c where feedback was what was really good about the system and what wasn't and, I mean, but it was all aviation security focused.

And in the discussions I had with her did not include that they expected to get into the air traffic specifics. And, in fact, understanding that different teams were working different topics, we knew there would be a second hearing for us at some point focused on the air traffic piece, that was just another reason we didn't anticipate that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall at that time who you were primarily talking with anything the Commission?

MS. OSMUS: I wasn't talking with the Commission very directly. I think I had a

conversation, perhaps, with John Raitt. Jane was having discussions with him and, perhaps, others. Who else was I hearing from? Ken Mead was also testifying at that first hearing as I understand and he had a couple of conversations with me about what he was hearing and wanted to know what Jane's statement was and they were sharing statements and that sort of thing.

I don't remember if I heard from anybody else.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know where those briefing materials are now?

MS. OSMUS: The ones that she had?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

MS. OSMUS: I have no idea. I don't know whether she has them or if she tossed them or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys keep a copy yourselves?

MS. OSMUS: You know, I didn't keep a copy of everything I gave her. I've got a couple copies in here of things that were faxed to her just because I have the fax cover and I kept it. But

I've got my own personal copies of briefing documents we did after 9/11 that I'm keeping just as reference material and I pulled from them things that she had a particular interest in.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you provide her with any, like, time lines for her briefing?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember giving her time lines at all. I know she asked for JL and IT reports on things like effectiveness of EDS, access controls, screener performance, I don't remember giving her time line at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think after or during her testimony she was asked to respond to some formal questions. I think they refer to them in the Commission hearing as QFRs or questions for the record.

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in drafting those? MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm, I did prepare some of the answers, right, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have copies of that?

MS. OSMUS: I don't, I'm sure Shirley

does. Once--it was not long after the Commission that we shifted the focal point to Shirley and she kind of began a repository of the FAA copies of everything that was provided. So--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you prepare QFRs, specifically, for the topic of the air traffic, the timing of the--

MS. OSMUS: I wouldn't have, no, because that's not my background. The QFRs that pertained to aviation security, I would have been in on the development for those.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The--where we got your name, specifically, was from a transcript of the testimony--

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --from, it was May 23, and it had you and Ms. Schuessler had been credited with--

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --preparing a document--

MS. OSMUS: I recall that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --titled "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001."

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a copy of that document?

MS. OSMUS: I don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall who worked on that with you?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I do, if I can just give you a little background on how it occurred, too?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure.

MS. OSMUS: I wasn't at the hearing when Jane Garvey testified. But it was carried on CSPAN or something, we were watching it there. And saw the questioning at the specific air traffic; flight-specific data, which I knew she didn't have committed to memory.

And, as I recall, I think it was Mr. Ben-Viniste reverenced DOD testimony. Pardon me, and he read from a statement from DOD and DOD was testifying later in that same hearing. When I talked to Jane about it afterwards, she had not seen DOD's testimony that they were going to present at the hearing. When she heard what Mr.

Ben-Viniste was speaking about. It sounded to her like it was testimony yet to be given from DOD, but current testimony. When, in fact, as we kind of looked back, I believe he was actually referencing statements made by DOD at a different hearing within a couple of weeks of 9/11. At which time, there were still some discrepancies between FAA and DOD in terms of the time line as we knew it then.

When she heard it in the hearing, she thought, there's a current disagreement, which she wasn't aware of. Because she hadn't been in discussions about that. And so part of it was, you know, keying up issues for her a little bit out of context. When I talked to her after the hearing, she was very disappointed in herself in not having kind of anticipated things even beyond what the letter of invitation had been. And was anxious to get back to the Commissioners with a specific [unintell.].

And then later that evening, and I don't remember whether she called me or she called Linda Schuessler or (b)(6), (b)(7)c, but we knew that

Ben-Viniste had contacted her and indicated he wanted specific answers to this issue of when DOD connected to FAA shortly after the events of 9/11.

So, and he said she would either have to come in that night or the next day to answer the questions if she couldn't produce the answer.

So, Linda Schuessler, myself and Laura Brown, who's the deputy in Public Affairs, got together in Laura's office. Linda called,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --pardon me I'm having a senior moment, it'll come to me in a moment--it will come to me--the [unintell.] office- (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. OSMUS:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

at DOD who was the liaison with FAA. And, you know, quickly on the phone they had tried to- (b)(6), (b)(7)c had clearly been in the FAA building on 9/11. She was trying to figure out exactly what time that was. Her recollection, at the time, was fairly early in the morning. And so the statement that (b)(6), (b)(7)c put together based on that conversation was the one that went back to the Commission. And

the one that was referenced the following day at the hearing.

Sometime later, and I want to say, a couple of weeks later, perhaps, but (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in the building on other business and I was talking to Shirley Miller about something and she came into the office and was relating to us she knew that she would be interviewed by the Commission at some point and had been, again, going back through her notes and her recollection and that sort of thing about where she had been on that day and realized that she had actually come to the FAA building later in the day than she had realized.

So, we knew there needed to be some correction there and knowing that she was going to be interviewed, we thought that was the way to clarify the record for that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Clarify the record for?

MS. OSMUS: The fact that (b)(6), (b)(7)c recollection, after she gave it more thought, was that she arrived at the FAA building later in the

day on 9/11 than she had originally thought when talking to Linda Schuessler by phone on May 22.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, she arrived later in the building at FAA on 9/11?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, this document, that's referenced in the testimony, is something that you and Linda and Laura had worked on together or--

MS. OSMUS: The document was, literally, a one- or two-sentence statement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Laura typed it on her computer, Linda was standing behind her telling her what the conversation was with (b)(6), (b)(7)c and we were just trying to keep it very simple and straightforward, so it was, literally, a sentence or two, as I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so it was in narrative format--

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --as opposed to time-line format?

MS. OSMUS: No, it was literally, I don't know whether Laura still has a copy of that or not, but it was very brief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before your interview today, did you get a chance to look at the testimony from May 23?

MS. OSMUS: No, I haven't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I didn't bring my copy of that, do you have that one MOI?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was, like, a 9-page one. Thank you. This, we've gone through reviewing transcripts and seen who said what and this item in this report that we have here is supposed to be, it's a quote from the actual transcript, itself, which on May 23, 2003. And on page 78 of the transcript that we have, this is the item from Mr. Ben-Viniste--

MS. OSMUS: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and in there he reads into the record, I guess, this document that you guys had submitted. Could you just take a look at this?

MS. OSMUS: Sure. Oh, I'm actually Mr. Osmus.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. Which made it even more difficult trying to find you.

MS. OSMUS: Actually more sentences than I would have remembered it being. Okay, that's helpful.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What he read into the record, do you think that's the entirety of that document or do you think there was more?

MS. OSMUS: It's actually longer than I remember it being, so I'm sure it's the entirety of it yeah, I shouldn't say I'm sure, since I, you know, but my recollection was it was much shorter, I'd be surprised if it was any longer than that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In the quote in the transcript, like, second-to-last sentence, says, "NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone-bridge before the formal notification." This reference to the logs?

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where did you guys get that information?

MS. OSMUS: Those were logs or time lines that Linda had, I don't know what the origin was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you review any NORAD logs, yourself?

MS. OSMUS: I have subsequently, I'm just looking, when Shirley was working with the Commission, I don't know that I had looked at any prior to the hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, subsequent to--when do you think that you had a chance to actually review some logs?

MS. OSMUS: From time to time as Shirley got additional requests from the Commission, and a comprehensive time line was put together for all the flights?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. OSMUS: Shirley and Linda Schuessler and a couple of Linda's folks and I sat down and just went over it--not for accuracy, because I

didn't have the basis for where the numbers were coming from, but things like spelling out acronyms and making sure that to a non-FAA reader it made sense to most. So, I mean, that sort of thing. I've not done any scrubbing of one long against another to analyze time or anything like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, when this was prepared, back in May 2003, you hadn't actually reviewed any logs yourself?

MS. OSMUS: No, I don't recall seeing any logs up until that point.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know where this reference would have come from?

MS. OSMUS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: I mean, you know, I think as Shirley probably mentioned to you, folks were keeping notes about time from various perspectives, just recognizing what a momentous event had occurred on 9/11. But I don't know what particular source that came from.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would (b)(6), (b)(7)c have

provided that kind of information to you during that, when you were asking her about that during that evening when--

MS. OSMUS: I don't know what she and Linda talked about specifically. It could be, I don't know, they were on, I think Linda called her from her cellphone and they talked for some minutes, but I don't know what the, you know, what the details were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you involved in preparing any time lines for either publication to the public or Commission or anybody, or even internal briefings that would have discussed military notification--

MS. OSMUS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --aside that item right there that we just talked about?

MS. OSMUS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you kind of pass the torch on the federal liaison position?

MS. OSMUS: It was after this hearing and I think it was probably around the time we got the

second document request, let me take a look, because, as I recall, that was one that was starting to get voluminous in areas outside of my own organization's record keeping. And it was really, what Shirley and I talked about was how to make it sort of a corporate undertaking because it really touched various parts of FAA. I don't remember what date it was, specifically, though. I probably should have jotted it down because it was a good date for me. But, let me see if I've got anything in here that might reflect that. Few more notes I just found, in case it's of interest to you, as confirmed by the Commission staff, wonder where this came from--this must have come from Lindy Knapp, it's talking about the Commission staff. Again, just continual focus on the aviation security topics for former Administrator Garvey. That's all I have in this folder. I can look elsewhere, if it's of interest to you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, just ballpark, sometime after--

MS. OSMUS: --I would guess, yeah, within

a couple weeks after this hearing, I would guess.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because the hearing was, like, May 22 and 23rd, so it was probably early June--

MS. OSMUS: Early June, yeah, I think that's a good ballpark date.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c from--

MS. OSMUS: Uh-huh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She's actually an employee of DOD?

MS. OSMUS: That's right, I think she's actually retired now, but she was at the time. I believe she retired just a month or two ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And she was stationed where?

MS. OSMUS: She had an office in the Pentagon and I think she also had an office here in this building, because she was here so often.

MS. OSMUS: So she was, like, a DOD liaison to the FAA?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was she--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before September 11--I'm sorry, or after September 11?

MS. OSMUS: Both

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Both?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, she would be, like, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, something like that do you think?

MS. OSMUS: You know, I've known her for years, I actually don't know where she resided in the hierarchy at DOD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were there any other DOD folks that you had dealt with post-9/11?

MS. OSMUS: No, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This--I'm just going to call it a question for the record item that was read into the record on May 23, did you coordinate this at all with the military or do you know if anybody had?

MS. OSMUS: Well, the coordination was the conversation that Linda Schuessler had with (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean, that was the discussion which led to this answer. There wasn't any formal coordination done if that's what you're asking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Other than just a discussion?

MS. OSMUS: Right, by phone, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so then, that discussion would have been, like, on the 22nd or something like that?

MS. OSMUS: Evening of the 22nd.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It says, "The U.S. Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone-bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line." Is that the item that you needed to coordinate with her?

MS. OSMUS: No, that was the information that I believe Linda asked her, you did come, didn't you, and when did you come, that kind of thing. That reference to the liaison is to Cheryl.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: And, again, what was different when we talked a few weeks later was that when she did come and she did sit in on telecons, it was quite a bit later on 9/11 than she had originally

recalled.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys--I think you had said earlier that you had some discussion about making a correction?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I mean, we knew after we talked to her again that her recollection was different, therefore, this wasn't accurate as presented. We also knew that she was on the list of folks to be interviewed by the Commission, so we knew that staff would hear it from her and she would make the point about when she, you know, when she came and what she participated on and what she knew firsthand in terms of FAA and DOD communications.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, as far as correcting the record, then, you guys were going to rely on her interview with the Commission?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I don't remember, I don't know if Shirley did anything beyond that. It wouldn't have occurred to me to suggest she did, because I figured bringing a person in from-- (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the most direct way for the Commission to get

the info.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the item that really needed correcting here, I'm just trying to be exact so I understand--is it says, immediately joined, and so, when we're talking about immediately, it says here, within minutes after the World Trade Center--

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --so that, immediately, really should have been later in the day?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The phone-bridge was still in existence, is that correct? Or would that have not be present without her?

MS. OSMUS: No, it would have been. There were several communications lines set up. I think this one particularly references one that was set up in the air traffic conference room, which was on the 10th floor, kind of down the hall from where Shirley's office is, where Linda Schuessler sits now. And that was--that would have been in existence whether or not (b)(6), (b)(7)c was there or not. It was set up just between our air traffic folks

and major facilities talking about who was doing what kind of information sharing, that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, have you had a chance to look at the September 11 report--

MS. OSMUS: Parts of it, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --by the Commission? Did you--I guess the Commission has some concerns about some time references and DOD time lines, primarily. And there's two of them, one is 9:16 a.m., the other is this 9:24 reference. And the--I think they had said in their report, and I'm really kind of summarizing it now--

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --is that the 9:24 reference for American Flight 77 was really a discussion about American 11. And they say, though there was a phone-bridge between FAA and NORAD at the time both the military representative and the FAA representative--and I wish, I knew I should have brought the book with me--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have the--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, but I need the footnote because it names two people. But they said both of those folks indicated that no substantive notification issues were going back and forth. Is that--would that be the phone-bridge they're talking about?

MS. OSMUS: I don't--I can't answer that without looking at it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Again, there was, you know, a phone-bridge in the conference room; there was a telecon set up in the Aviation Command Center; so, I'm not sure which one they were talking about?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have access to the Internet?

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you mind if we look something up real quickly?

MS. OSMUS: Help yourself.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just logged in--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because one of the things I was curious about is--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, you know what?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, there you've got it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] I didn't notice it was there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Excellent. Well, it's not quite--otherwise I would have told you these names that are in the footnote here. Okay. Michael Wickert [ph].

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm. I know him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is he the one who was on that conference call in the air traffic conference room?

MS. OSMUS: No, he would have been in the Aviation Command Center, where they have the primary net set up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In Herndon?

MS. OSMUS: No, here. The Aviation Command Center is on the 10th floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, because I've heard it referenced as the Operations Center.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah. And it does get confusing. The Operations Center and now, of course, it's physically different than it was on

9/11, which makes it even more confusing. On 9/11, there was an Operations Center, which is staffed 24-hours-a-day by communicators, essentially. Now, they report to me, but they set up telecons for people.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Adjacent to it was another room that, typically, was empty. It had work stations around it. That was the Aviation Command Center. And when there was an incident, that would be stood up by folks in the Aviation Security Organization. Mike Wickert was one of the people in the division that was one of the first-responders in that situation. And that's where the primary net would be set up with a pre-identified list of people to participate in the event of a hijacking, traditional hijacking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Such a net was set up on 9/11 and one of the groups always plugged into that net was, I think it was, then NMCC from the military at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm. Is that a recorded line?

MS. OSMUS: It wasn't at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, it was not.

MS. OSMUS: Hu-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was the other person, you were saying?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the military side? It says, NMCC Officer (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, he was the pre-identified person at NMCC?

MS. OSMUS: It wouldn't have been a name, it would have been NMCC and a contact phone number for them, and then depending on when the call went out would depend on who would, actually, you know, staffing that position for the NMCC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was on the 11th and who would have been on that conference call in Air Traffic's conference room.

MS. OSMUS: I was never in the room when it was on, so this is not firsthand. I understand that--and I really like him, too--Jeff Griffith,

who officially had Linda's job prior to his retirement, was there among others.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there some pre-identified person at the military that they would have had to contact on that conference call?

MS. OSMUS: My understanding is that was a conference call that was kind of set up in the moment because they knew they needed to talk to their facilities. I'm not aware that they had an SOP in any kind of standard way. It was something, you know, they knew they needed to have discussions among key facilities and set it up, but I think it was an ad hoc teleconference. I mean, obviously, something it was something, you can confirm with the air traffic folks were actually on it, but that's my understanding.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Traditionally, telephone lines in those conference rooms are not recorded, as well, right?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who's the person in the operations center that set up, who was the person

on the staff out there who set up the phone-bridge, who was the person responsible for linking all the numbers together.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, which operations officer, I don't know off the top of my head. I'm sure that's in the records because Shirley had to track that down in order to have the Commission staff talk with them, but I don't remember who it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the only coordination that you participated in with the military was the one involving (b)(6), (b)(7)c and that was, actually, Linda Schuessler who did that, right?

MS. OSMUS: Right, Linda talked to Cheryl, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So that would be the extent of your involvement in military coordination?

MS. OSMUS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As far as your reviewing, like, military supporting documentation, for any, like summary time lines, after the fact, you had subsequently seen some logs--

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that Shirley Miller has?

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I think it was actually--what I had seen is the, what we called the comprehensive time line, that tracked all the flights. And I reviewed that before it was sent to the Commission staff. Again, not for accuracy of the substantive information from air traffic, but just to make sure that it was understandable to folks that weren't air traffic technical folks. Because I'm not, and if I didn't get it, then we knew we had to make it a clarification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that document something that the military was submitting to the Commission?

MS. OSMUS: No, this was one that FAA developed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Got so many different time lines here.

MS. OSMUS: I know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I'll just show you a couple and see if maybe one of these, if you can remember. This first one is titled "Chronology of

Attacks of September 11, 2001 and Subsequent Events Through April 30, 2002. And then parenthetically, it says (Eastern Time was used). That's probably the thickest time line that we've obtained.

MS. OSMUS: Prepared by the FAA's agency historian this time line is a reference tool. Yeah, the one that I looked at, didn't have that little lead in sentence.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, this has more in it than the one that I looked at. The one that I looked at had the particulars of the four flights, including communication between FAA facilities that was of relevance. And, obviously, focusing a lot on anything that could be documented about coordination and communication with DOD. This one has a lot more in it than the one that I looked at.

MR. OWENS: Another one, I have here is just titled, simply, "Chronology of September 11, 2001." And it starts off with, you know, American Air Lines Flight 11 AAL-11 Boston to Las Angeles. And it does the same thing for the other three

flights. Unfortunately, I don't see a date or anything on it, but it's 11 pages.

MS. OSMUS: This looks more similar to the one I looked at. I can't tell you if this is, definitively, the final one that was prepared, because I know there were different iterations as we were making clarifications and so forth, but this is the type of time line that I looked at, this type of data.

MR. OWENS: Do you think that would have been in 2003, sometime?

MS. OSMUS: When I looked at it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. I don't think so, I think it was in 2004, because my recollection--we were trying to scrub that prior to, obviously, prior to the hearing with the air traffic pieces were discussed, which was what, in --was that in June?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : June of 2004.

MS. OSMUS: So, I'm thinking this would have been a month or two prior to that. Shirley can tell you when it was actually delivered to the

Commission, it would have been just prior to that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have one more document that might fit what you described. And it's heading says "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001." It's like, it's 15 pages. Flip through a couple of pages. It kind of starts and looks very similar to this--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --chronology that I showed you.

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, I see what you mean, yeah. I don't know if I've seen this before or not. Although, I'm sure either myself or one of my staff would have reviewed or contributed to part of this stuff that talks about [unintell.] overseeing the staff which would assemble on the Aviation Command Center and that sort of thing. But, you know, off the top of my head, I can't tell you whether I've seen this exact document or not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do recall any discussions within the FAA wherein folks within the FAA

expressed some concern about the time lines that were in existence that there might be some inaccuracies or maybe the military's reference to notification was questionable?[inaudible]

MS. OSMUS: No, I mean, you know, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, I knew from being in discussions with the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator and others, the air traffic side of the house was looking at that issue. But I was up to my ears in our own programmatic responsibilities, so, you know, I knew there were discussions going on.

My understanding was that we--that that had been sorted out and the time line agreed to between the two agencies. And then the next steps to make more robust that communication contact, which air traffic and DOD did. Beyond that, I hadn't heard any concern about time lines or anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about externally, like at the Secretary's office level?

MS. OSMUS: No.

[Lengthy pause.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Other than helping prepare Ms. Garvey for her testimony, did you help prepare any types of briefings for other entities, such as, you know, White House briefing or any type of secretarial briefing or anything like that?

MS. OSMUS: Besides the Commission work, you mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. OSMUS: Not for the White House, I attended a meeting with Secretary Mineta, let me think when this was, prior to his interview by the Commission, I don't think it was--it was prior to his being interviewed by the Commission. And really hadn't prepared any briefing documentation, he was there with some of his staff, the Deputy Secretary was there and the Chief of Staff and Lindy Knapp from the General Counsel's office. And there was a briefing book which his staff had put together. I don't believe I input to it. And it was largely kind of refreshing his memory about what happened, what the sequence of events were

after 9/11; how long the air space was shut down and all that sort of thing. And that was a couple of hours, I think with him. And I think that's all in terms of briefing interactions with the department that I had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did the Secretary's briefing book have any information relating to this military notification issue?

MS. OSMUS: I don't know, I actually never saw the contents of it. It was a thick book but I can't tell you what was in it. I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who was Joe [unintell.] secretary was or Lindy were involved in putting the book together, they were both at the meeting.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We had asked earlier about, after the Commission hearing and then a couple of weeks later--

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When there was discussions with (b)(6), (b)(7)c about the fact that she hadn't come to headquarters until later in the day. It was understood that she would then testify or DOD

representatives would testify and then that would be clarified for the record then--

MS. OSMUS: We expected her to be interviewed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --you expected her to be interviewed?

MS. OSMUS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there any discussion of recontacting the Commission to clarify Ms. Garvey's previous statements or anything like that?

MS. OSMUS: I don't remember having that discussion. I mean the discussion was as busy as that day was after 9/11, and as busy as people were, it's hard to account for every, even ours, what we were doing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MS. OSMUS: And I think that's what (b)(6), (b)(7)c was kind of struggling with, as well. Time was compressed and that was the discussion, you know, as memorable a time that that was in its totality, I remember here, busier than I'd ever been in my life, and I can't tell you how I spent next 16

hours. You know, and not truly account for every hour of it. I don't recall that we had a discussion about any kind of formal clarification for the record.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, is it fair to say that there really wasn't that concern to do it because--

MS. OSMUS: Yeah, that's exactly right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --there was--you understood that it would be clarified from the military?

MS. OSMUS: Right. And at the time, too, whatever the final big chronology had not been completed. So whatever clarification of time could be woven into that as well. So, I mean, there wasn't anything we thought warranted a particular, separate action, we didn't discuss such a thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't really think of anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

MR. (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Is there anything else that you would like to add or?

MS. OSMUS: Not that I can think of.

MR. (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Well, we'll go ahead and end

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the interview. It's 11:01 a.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DANIEL P. DIGGINS

BY

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, DOD, OIG

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

11:21 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is October 6, 2004, the time is 11:21 a.m., we are at FAA Building 10-A, Conference Room 840 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, also present today are (b)(6), (b)(7)c with the Department of Transportation, IG and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c, with the DOD IG. We are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at 9/11 a Commission hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today, we're interviewing Dan Diggins. Mr. Diggins, please, acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, I am.

(b)(7)c : Would you, please, raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. DIGGINS: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give us your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

MR. DIGGINS: Daniel P. Diggins,
D-i-g-g-i-n-s.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current
position?

MR. DIGGINS: I'm an Air Safety
Investigator.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What division is that?

MR. DIGGINS: It's the Division of AVR.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your routing symbol?

MR. DIGGINS: AAI-100.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What is your current grade?

MR. DIGGINS: GS-15.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You're an equivalent right,
because you guys are under, like, an FG?

MR. DIGGINS: FG, I'm sorry, it's an FG,
FG-15, I forgot.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long have you been in your
current position?

MR. DIGGINS: Three years.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on September 11, 2001,
what position did you hold?

MR. DIGGINS: I was an Air Traffic

Investigator in the Air Traffic Division.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's in AAT-20?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long had you held that position?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, off and on for 10 years.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, in October 2001, you assumed your current position?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct, October 1.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you describe for, briefly, what your current duties are?

MR. DIGGINS: I represent the FAA on major aircraft accidents. So, whatever FAA requirements need to be addressed, then I'm responsible to make sure they're addressed when an aircraft accident occurs. Usually, I handle major accidents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who is your current supervisor?

MR. DIGGINS: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who does Lyle report to?

MR. DIGGINS: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's (b)(6), (b)(7)c position?

MR. DIGGINS: He's the Director of Accident Investigation for the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then who does (b)(6), (b)(7)c report to?

MR. DIGGINS: (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What (b)(6), (b)(7)c position right now?

MR. DIGGINS: He's the Associate Administrator for Aircraft Certification and Regulation, should have brought my org chart with me, I guess.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a staff?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you were in AAT-20, on September 11, who was your supervisor then?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think it was Tony Ferrante, I think, either Tony Ferrante or Tony Mello, I'm not sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you working on September 11, were you on duty?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you describe briefly, your

day for us from when you first find out about the hijackings?

MR. DIGGINS: Briefly?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If it's possible, the "Reader's Digest" version.

MR. DIGGINS: I was looking over the previous day's events, pilot deviations, accidents, routine things in the morning. And Dave Knoles and Tony Mello came by my office and they said, come with us. I said okay, what's going on? They said an aircraft just hit the Trade Center.

So, I immediately thought it was a small airplane. And on the way up the elevator I asked Dave what happened, what's going on? He says it was an air carrier. I said what's the weather. He says, it clear. And I says, what's really going on here. so we went up to the 10th floor and we started a conference call, some people were already on the bridge on the conference call, some of the New York facilities, I think the military was on the conference call, the Command Center and I'm not sure who else was on there, because it was already

in progress by the time we keyed into it up in the conference room up on the 10th floor.

And we were starting to get organized trying to understand what's going on and we had a white board similar to that. And we were trying to get information and trying to understand the developing events. And somebody's writing whatever they're hearing on this speaker phone up on the white-board there and we're still trying to gain an understanding of what's happening what we should do next.

And we were in a conference room, but there was a TV in the adjoining office, so I tried to go get the TV and to bring it in and run a cable in there so we could actually see the events on CNN and while I was doing that, the second one hit the Trade Center. And while I'm actually moving the TV, the TV's still on, it on a roller thing and all of a sudden the second one hits. And then it was apparent something bad seems to be happening here.

So, I went back downstairs and got my laptop and brought my laptop back up because I

could tell right away the white-board wasn't going to handle things. And, again, I don't know the exact order of things and time was kind of a relative thing at that moment.

So, I started just a Word document and started typing everything I heard in the room, everything I could type and everything I could hear and understand. And I'm the go that started the log. And that went on for probably an hour, an hour and a half or so.

Well, prior to that, probably, within about a half hour or an hour into the log, there was an Air Force lieutenant colonel, I think, I'm not quite sure of her rank. But she came into the room and offered to help. And I don't recall her name at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. DIGGINS: It wasn't (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know (b)(6), (b)(7)c it was somebody else and I don't know who she was. I'd never met her prior and I don't remember ever seeing her after, so I don't know who this individual was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did she come in?

MR. DIGGINS: She came into the room, I don't know, sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning, I don't know, really, that's a guess on my part.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And it was a female?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a female, I think it was Air Force, I'm pretty sure it was Air Force. And she asked me if she could help and I says can you type? And she says a little bit. And I said well, you're probably better than me, sit down and start typing. She says what do I type. I says everything you hear in this room. So, she took over my typing duties from that point.

And I spent most of the rest of the daylight hours in that conference room with Dave Knoles and company trying to assess, fielding phone calls, I remember fielding a phone call from Anchorage, calling Anchorage trying to understand what's happening with a Korean Air, I think it was, or a Japan Air Lines, I don't know.

And things such as that and handling phone

calls for various events that seemed to be lost; aircraft that weren't lost; aircraft that just, I don't even remember there were so many things going on during the day.

Probably later on in the day, around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, I went back downstairs to my office and tried to get ahold of the facilities that actually had the ATC radar and the ATC voice tapes and started telling them what I wanted and when I wanted it. And I was talking to the FBI, I mean, the FBI was calling. This conference call that we had going was, I put it on downstairs so I could always hear it in the background and I could monitor it and could speak up when I needed to, the same conference call that was going on upstairs.

So, I was in the process of processing the radar and voice tapes and getting as much information about all the events. By that time we knew there were four different events and try to put it together.

And about midnight, somewhere between 4:00

or 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and midnight, I actually, we got some of the voice tapes; they were WAV files, digital files at that point and they were e-mailed to me or posted on an FTP site, I don't remember which. But I got digital copies of the voice communication. And, in particular, United 93's communication with Cleveland Center. And I burned a CD of that and took it up to the 10th floor to play it for the Associate Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, actually, and head of FAA security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which position did you have, or positions from Cleveland?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember the position, but basically, it was the segment of the voice where you could actually hear the distress of the pilots in the cockpit. So [unintell.] what position that was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was their radar position known?

MR. DIGGINS: It was a radar, well it was the radar, it was the position they talked from the

airplanes, so I don't know, if was, using it as a radar, but it could have been some other position. It recorded the actual air-to-ground communication.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now you said that you had--that you think you joined the conference call while it was ongoing?

MR. DIGGINS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Based on what you kind of described, it would have been after the first plane had hit the World Trade Center, but before the second plane had hit?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you said that you thought that the military might have been on the conference call, why do you think that?

MR. DIGGINS: Can't give you a solid reason and I don't know if I thought that at the time or looking back I believe that's so, but I can't give you a real reason why I would have been, but somehow I just felt it after the fact, I don't know if I believed it during--some, I can't tell you why, but I just did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that line being recorded?

MR. DIGGINS: I have no idea, it was going through the Com Center upstairs so, we weren't recording it so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You guys weren't recording it?

MR. DIGGINS: No, it was just one of those speaker phones that you put in the middle of the table and I had never--I didn't see a recorder in the room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Female from the military that showed up, did she do anything other than helping you make log entries?

MR. DIGGINS: That's all I asked her to do and that's all I saw her do, but I didn't pay much attention to her after that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Had you ever seen her before?

MR. DIGGINS: No, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, who, did someone contact her to come in or--

MR. DIGGINS: Have no idea, she just walked into the room, I had no idea what her position was, I had no idea where she was. She had

a uniform on, no question she had a uniform on. And it just strikes me as a lieutenant colonel-type uniform I don't, I can't tell you why, I just.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you haven't seen her since?

MR. DIGGINS: No. Don't know what her job was, have no idea who she was or where she came from. She offered to help and I said, okay, sit down and type.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who do you recall participating with you on the conference call here?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, Dave Knoles, Dave Knoles was running it, basically, Dave Knoles and Tony Mello, these are people that are in the room, the conference room. Saber [ph], and I can't remember her last name, she was there part of the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was that?

MR. DIGGINS: There was a woman, but I can't remember whether it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c or (b)(6), (b)(7)c but I don't know either one of them very well, but they--I can't remember who it was; I'm not sure who somebody, that I vaguely knew, but I can't remember

which one it was.

And there were people coming in and out of the room constantly. Jeff Griffith came in and out of the room a couple times. I don't know if you know these names--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I do.

MR. DIGGINS: --I'm sure some folks do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was in the room. In fact (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I spent September 11 here the first night, he and I were on duty the entire night, I didn't leave for two days. (b)(6), (b)(7)c is our gee-whiz guy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.]

MR. DIGGINS: He's the guy who does all our computer stuff, if you got a problem he's the guy to see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anybody else you can think of?

MR. DIGGINS: There were other people in the room, but it's a kind of a blur, I don't really remember, and I didn't know some of the people that came in and out of the room. And there were other people I recognized but I don't remember who they

are.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said Knoles was running the conference call, basically?

MR. DIGGINS: From our room, he was running the call from the headquarters position, but I don't know if that's fair to say he was running the entire conference call, he was doing the communication from that conference room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it fair to say that he's probably the one who set that up?

MR. DIGGINS: I have no idea, you'd have to ask him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said Griffith had come into the room at one point, Jeff Griffith?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did he express when he came in any displeasure that this conference was taking place or any pleasure that it was taking place?

MR. DIGGINS: The one time I remember him coming into the room, he asked for Dave and they went out of the room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: So, whatever that conversation was, I have no idea.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You haven't heard what happened with their conversation?

MR. DIGGINS: I wasn't party to their conversation and I didn't ask and nobody told me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall what facilities were participating in that conference call?

MR. DIGGINS: I remember New York Center, definitely; the Eastern Region Division, Frank Hatfield [ph], I remember him, I can't remember the New York Center Manager's name, but I remember him and Frank Hatfield talking. I think the New York TRACON was on there, too, but I don't remember a specific comment from the TRACON, but I believe they were there. I think there were a couple of New York facilities other than that, But that was initially, but then I remember hearing information from the Central Region and Great Lakes Region, but I can't tell you who was on from those regions, whether they were facility people or regional staff people, I don't know, because there was quite a

conversation about American 77 that disappeared on radar and whether it crashed out in Kentucky somewhere and things like that. And we were getting direct, well, direct, information about that it was lost on radar and things like that. But how many layers that went to prior to us hearing it on the phone, I don't know. So, there were people that had direct with those ATC facilities in those regions.

I remember talking about a Delta 1898 of Delta, I don't know, some Delta that departed Boston headed to the West Coast and up in Cleveland Center's airspace there was some big confusion whether he was squawking hijack or whether, because he fit the profile, I guess.

There was kind of confusion the ATC system, this is my guess of what happened--the ATC system was asking him if he was okay, covertly, I guess and there was a question whether he was another airplane being hijacked and it finally got through that the pilot reported everything is fine, but I guess they ended up landing someplace, I

think it was Cleveland or someplace, I don't remember.

And there was some confusion about whether there was some activity going on in this airplane or what. And it turned out to be no activity, but I guess he did a precautionary landing somewhere. And all that the conversation was back and forth.

A lot of it was trying to figure out where American 77 was. What United 93 was doing and what this Delta was doing, because the first two had already hit the Trade Center and that all bang, bang, bang, and then after that I was trying to figure out what else we had going on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During that conference call, do you remember if there was any--ever any confusion as to the status of American 11?

MR. DIGGINS: Any confusion?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like, especially after it was thought to have hit the World Trade Center. Do you remember a discussion during the conference call that maybe it hadn't hit the Trade Center and it was still en route south-bound?

MR. DIGGINS: No, because I think what was, at that particular moment in time, I was retrieving the TV from the other room. So, I don't think I was very attentive to what was going on at that particular time. So, I don't really remember. I do remember--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This probably would have been after both towers had been impacted.

MR. DIGGINS: See my problem is now, because I was immersed in this data for so long afterwards, I can't remember what the differences of what I remember of real time at that time and what I learned since. So, in the early stages it gets a little fuzzy. So I really can't answer that question, because I don't know. It's not clear in my mind.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anymore questions about the conference call?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall any other, you left off at the Central Region, and Great Lakes Region, and New York Center, Eastern Region Division and the New York TRACON. Any other--

MR. DIGGINS: I think the Command Center was on there, too, yeah, definitely Command Center, I remember--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In Herndon?

MR. DIGGINS: --yeah Herndon, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After September 11, what sort of, you know, like briefings or after-action reports, or time lines did you participate in preparing?

MR. DIGGINS: A lot. I participated in making detailed packages of each aircraft; radar, all the things that were given to the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because you guys normally prepare, like, I think they're called formal Accident Packages for accidents, and that's what happened and for the four aircraft that were hijacked in--

MR. DIGGINS: Little more extensive than that, yes, but that was kind of our guideline to start out with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, that was--

MR. DIGGINS: I participated in preparing

all those.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, aside from the formal Accident Packages, what other sorts of documents did you work on preparing or participate in preparing?

MR. DIGGINS: A PowerPoint presentation that showed the positions of all the airplanes relative to each other. And I put voice clips in each one of them, I guess it was shown up on the Hill at some point. But I spent probably four or five days working on that. That actually had a map of the history of the United States and showed all the relative positions so you could kind of get an understanding, but I did all that pretty much by myself. Took the voice clips of all four airplanes and put them in at certain times so they could see the relationship.

I remember talking with the FBI. It's funny, you start talking, things start popping into my memory. Talking with the FBI. I don't remember who it was, but there was an FBI. FBI was on that ongoing conference call, but I had no idea when

they got in there, whether they were in there from moment one, I don't know.

But I remember talking with the FBI on the conference call and then on commercial telephone elsewhere. During, probably the next day, probably September 12, let's say. And they were interested in seeing if there was a command airplane, a command and control airplane flying in the New York area.

So, I spent a great deal of time screening radar data with Doug Gould, I don't know if you're talked to Doug yet or not. But Doug and I spent a whole lot of time screening data looking for a command and control airplane. And we were searching for the needle in the big, big haystack, I guess. And spend quite a bit of time doing that.

Prepared radar down, radar replays.
Prepared snapshots of radar replays, showing, you know, moments in time. Doug and I did most of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember how soon after the 11th you had that PowerPoint presentation

completed?

MR. DIGGINS: I think the Administrator had to go on the Hill, I think, I think I had it done the following weekend, something like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because the 11th was, like a Tuesday, so you mean that Saturday and Sunday immediately following?

MR. DIGGINS: I believe so, I believe I was here all weekend, like I never left here. I believe I finished it up probably that Sunday night of Monday morning. Something like that. That's just, I'm about 60 percent sure that's the right answer.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I have seen that PowerPoint and it graphically depicts the Northeastern part of the United States and it shows a plane kind of moving along and tracks it and there are like little bubbles with time and a description pop up.

MR. DIGGINS: That's it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then at certain points you, like you indicated you have the WAV file

interspersed where you can here, I guess the tape from the radar positions involved or--

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Where were you getting the data for that PowerPoint presentation?

MR. DIGGINS: From the WAV files and the radar data from the respective facilities. I had to synchronize the radar times with the voice times and then I had to put it on a map so it made some sense, take the relative positions. It was a high-work endeavor, looks petty simple but it was hard to get it to match up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did anybody else work on that with you?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you work on any other, like, time line products during that week?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, basically a time line of all four airplanes. We knew exactly when they took off we know when they called for clearance, taxi clearance, basic time line of the ATC services and anything else that we had a record of or we can

make a record of, anything documented. Radar was documented, data; somebody made a record of conversation or something like that from the facility we would try to include that in there also.

MR. DIGGINS: And I had to throw out my glasses on that one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is this--

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, that's it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's called the--the official one, I think is a little thicker than this and it's in color and it's called "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001"

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah that's it. Yeah this is the time line we worked on, mm-hmm. We had facility logs that we had copies of all the facility logs and we put things in with voice communications and we tried to generalize.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that document says, on some of the text pages, which as opposed to those graphics pages. If I can find one, here, like it says at the bottom of this one page, it says,

AAT-20 September 17, 2001. Does that sound like, when you guys probably had this done?

MR. DIGGINS: That's when that iteration was done, I don't know if that's the final, but I know it went through several iterations, I can tell you that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I didn't bring the color one, because it's just too thick for me to carry around all the time.

This section here for United Airlines Flight 175; the text section where it shows the different times and has a description of the event. At 9:05 it says Northeast Air Defense Section Logs indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning UAL 175. Do you know where you guys got that information from?

MR. DIGGINS: Somebody's asked me this question before. I think it was 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it.

MR. DIGGINS: Probably why you're here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pretty good guess.

MR. DIGGINS: I can't tell you where that

came from. What I can tell you, in general terms, if I say, if I wrote this, and I don't know if I did, because it sounds like something I would write, if I would write logs indicate or notify of that, then somehow I had something in writing from them and they were sending, faxing us things, sent us things in e-mail. And I remember reading somebody's handwriting, I remember it was handwriting, from the military. and I can't tell you if it was from NEEDS or not. But I remember reading it, but I don't remember if this item came from what I read, but I just remember reading something that somebody sent me from the military and it was a handwritten time line. Now, I don't know if it was created real time or after the fact or, I don't know. I don't know, but I remember somebody sending me something and I remember reading it. And if I said logs indicate, I would have gotten that from someplace in writing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think it was a handwritten log or a handwritten notes that somebody made from a log?

MR. DIGGINS: It looked like handwritten notes that somebody made from the log, but it was prepared in log format, you know, chronological order, but it didn't look like an official. From what I remember, it didn't look like an official log, but things were happening so quickly. I mean, I wasn't paying much attention to official logs at that point. Because I started a log and it wasn't official either. Just for documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who worked on creating this time line with you?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, a bunch of us. Doug Gould and I did most of it, I'd say. And Tony Ferrante, kind of oversaw that operation. You know, he was going back and forth to meetings and things. But Doug and I were the guys that did most of the work.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, yourself, have any contacts over at the military in order to get information, like was there a point of contact that you had, like if you had a question or that you actually interfaced with concerning time lines?

MR. DIGGINS: Post-9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MR. DIGGINS: No. I did have two contacts in the FBI that I had, but I don't remember such contact in the military.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall anything the time this was being created whether the notification information, like the NEEDS information, whether it was a hot topic, was something that was being discussed, you know they needed this information or--

MR. DIGGINS: I recall that it was not a topic, it was just more information of what seemed like billions of bits of information. It didn't have any different level than any other bit of information from my point of view. Things were pouring in; documents were pouring in. People's written notes were pouring in. We had to--Doug and I had to sort through it trying to figure out, well, is there anything here we can use, I mean, from all different people from ends of conversations, you know, and it's funny how people

have conversations and they write personal notes of what they remember from the conversation and some of those personal notes got to us. I think we kept most of them, they'd be in the file, you folks have probably been through them.

But we just tried to reconcile it to see if it made any sense.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys, in order to put this information together, did you make specific requests that the facilities turn over certain things?

MR. DIGGINS: Yes, oh, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what were you guys primarily focused on obtaining from them?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't think that's a description that I would used, we weren't primarily focused on anything other than send us everything you have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so it was a very broad request?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah, I mean, we asked for the routine things for an accident, which we talked

about with Accident Packages, the -4s and the daily records of some of the operations and logs, and anything, but I think we just said, send us everything you have. I'm sure I typed out some e-mails, too, just detailing what I want in addition things like that. This was all real time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you still have any of your e-mails from that period?

MR. DIGGINS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you still have any of these files in electronic format on your computer?

MR. DIGGINS: No, none. I changed jobs, so I don't have the same work station, I even have a different laptops. I left September 30, for my new job, in another part of the building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The wouldn't let you take it with you, huh?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall anything this point, for example, when Doug was helping you prepare this. Did Doug have a contact with the military that he was dealing with?

MR. DIGGINS: You'd have to ask Doug.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : you don't know if Doug had one?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know, but you'll have to ask Doug if he did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, you had mentioned you knew the name (b)(6), (b)(7)c, when did you begin interacting with here?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, probably a year before on some routine military events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about with respect to 9/11?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't remember having any interactions with her with 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. OWENS: I've got some draft time lines here that are the format on the pages has kind of got a grid, with the four aircraft across the top and then on the left side, it has different, like, events and then it lists the time for each of the aircraft. Do these look familiar?

MR. DIGGINS: The times or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the documents, does that look like anything you might have participated in preparing?

MR. DIGGINS: No, I didn't do that. First time I've seen that. I've never seen that. Where'd it come from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pardon me?

MR. DIGGINS: Where did that come from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's an AAT document.

MR. DIGGINS: No, kidding.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At least that's our understanding. This time line here says "Notification to DOD Time Line," that's the title of it.

MR. DIGGINS: I didn't do that and I don't remember ever seeing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one says across the top: Sensitive Security Information and it's titled "FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001."

MR. DIGGINS: I remember reading this just about the way I'm reading it now. I do not know who

prepared it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember when you saw it?

MR. DIGGINS: It was sometime after I left AT-20, I know that. And I cannot remember what occasion I saw it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think you could have looked at it within the summer of '03?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, I know I didn't look at it in the summer of '03.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you think it was before that?

MR. DIGGINS: Well, yeah, definitely, but, you know, again, it looks like something I remember reading, but I don't remember where it came from or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or why you were--

MR. DIGGINS: --it may be something just like that, I don't know. You know, all these documents tend to look alike after a while, because they all have the same information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's true.

MR. DIGGINS: You guys probably know that better than I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, they just have different titles. Here's another one that's just titled, simply, "Chronology of September 11, 2001." And right after that it says American Airlines Flight 11 AAL-11, Boston to Los Angeles and it lists out the other three flights similarly.

MR. DIGGINS: You see the thing is, what this document concludes is a lot of things that I typed, but I don't remember ever seeing anything listed like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Nothing formatted that way?

MR. DIGGINS: That way, this is what Doug and I spent our time doing, but somebody can clip and put it in a different format, but I don't remember typing that. But a lot of those words in there are the words that I typed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We only have a couple more, so, this one's just titled "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01" and the reason for that sticky is because when the copy was made, we kind of lost, it said

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and then a phone number, so--

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know who Tracy is. I don't know what this is, I don't believe I've seen this before. It looks like they have plenty of chronologies there, huh?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A lot. That's a fact sheet, it's dated October or August 12, 2002.

MR. DIGGINS: I remember seeing a fact sheet in this type of format.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. DIGGINS: I remember seeing it quite a long time after September 11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's our understanding is that was prepared for the one-year anniversary. Do you remember if they ran it by you or you just happened to run across it?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't specifically remember it, but somebody asked me to look at it, but I can't remember who or why or when, but I remember this and I remember it was going to go public. It was going to be a public document or something or the facts on it were going to be

public. So, I'm sorry, I can't remember anymore than that. But I remember seeing that format.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a recollection of what you were asked to look at specifically? Or were you asked to kind of make sure you agreed with what it said, or was it just kind of F.Y.I., this is going out?

MR. DIGGINS: I'm sorry I don't remember, but I--it was prior to release. Somebody asked me to look at it prior to release, but I'm sure not remembering why they asked me to look at it. I can make a guess but I know that's not helpful to you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On this time line, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" September 11, 2001 that you said you helped work on?

MR. DIGGINS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, who decided what information to include in here or to not include?

MR. DIGGINS: I think it was sort of a joint effort, Doug and I, Doug Gould and I tried to get a start, we started putting things down and I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the final veto power and,

perhaps, (b)(6), (b)(7)c but I remember Tony saying take this out, make this say this and do the, you know, things like that, so to say who is, probably Tony Ferrante had more influence in what was included and what was not included, but that was based upon what Doug and I had already put in to begin with. So, you know, if we chose not to put something in, Tony wouldn't know it wasn't in there, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The time line that we're looking at here is for United 93. And for United 93, there is no military notification time listed in this time line, I believe. And I was wondering if you knew why that was the case?

MR. DIGGINS: Knowing how we were preparing this and the procedure we were using to prepare it, we probably didn't have any written documentation to indicate the military was notified.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's out understanding that Cleveland Center had called NEEDS at, roughly, 10:07 that morning.

MR. DIGGINS: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that's some, this time line here that you said that you hadn't prepared, which is the one with the grid on the front of it. There's early drafts of this document that list 10:08 as the notification time. And I was just wondering if you could explain why you guys didn't incorporate that into that document.

MR. DIGGINS: Probably because I didn't have anything written, anything in writing or oversight. This thing was never designed to be an absolute legal document. It was designed to give a synopsis of what's gone on in a very short time frame and with gobs of information, lots of information, we tried to be as concise as possible with what we had. If we dropped something out, we wouldn't necessarily know we dropped it out. Because it was just oversight. Or if we didn't have one piece of paper that indicated a log entry with a notification. If we didn't have that, that could explain it. But I can't give you a specific reason why it's not in here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't remember a discussion about including or not including that particular time or any other times?

MR. DIGGINS: I'm not sure what you're asking me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, in general, do you remember having any discussion with the folks you were working with on that, about a time event to include or to not include?

MR. DIGGINS: Oh, yeah. We had discussion, you know, but I can't tell you what the subject matter was or what the event was or what the, you know, the time line was, we were trying to make sure the times were right; consolidate it with radar; coordinate it radar, voice, because they're not necessarily the same times, clock times, so you have to-we had people telling us that this is what happened and if they just told us we didn't know whether we should put it in or not because it's based on somebody's telling us, you know. We tried to be as factual as possible.

Sometimes, there's lots of voice

communications in here we decided, well, should we include that one, do we think that helps tell the story of what happened here or was that just a routine call and we dropped that one off. so, those are the type of things that went into editing this document. But I don't recall any of them specifically. Good grief, it was three years ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The entries that are in here that reflect a military log as the source. This one here at 9:05 for United 175, it says NEEDS log reflects. Did you guys try to go back to an FAA source document to verify or confirm what the military record is saying?

MR. DIGGINS: That's a tough question to answer, because I, if it we had documents available from two different sources, we tried to make sure that the times reconciled. Did we do that in every instance? No, absolutely, not. But I remember doing that on some issues, but I can't tell you what the issues are, I can't tell you what the documents are, but it was basically a common-sense check, does this make sense, if we're going to

write this down as a fact does it make sense. But I can't tell you if that's what was done here.

For instance if we get a log from New York Center that says this, this is what happened to United 93 and then we had a log from Cleveland Center that said this is what happened to 93 or something like that, we'd make sure that the times made some sense. Because people in the heat of battle, when I started my log up on the conference call, I made a mistake by an hour, early in the log. So somebody can make an entry error very easily, which I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But a lot of these entries were coming off of radar position tapes and things like that--

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and they have times embedded in there, right. And all those times should be pretty accurate.

MR. DIGGINS: Pretty accurate, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you would have had for the entries where there is a need for a log or a

military document reference, if you would have had some type of FAA source documents, would you have included that in the chronology?

MR. DIGGINS: I'd like to think I would. You folks have no idea what it was like during that time to try to figure out what's going on. We were just trying to take a gob of information and try to make sense of it so, did we make some mistakes documenting it? I'm sure. I know some of the mistakes I made. But I don't know if we went out and checked other things to see if it reconciled.

If we had things, we tried to reconcile them. If we didn't have them, I don't know what we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After you guys had published this document, the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," when you started to get additional information in, that might have changed these time lines, what did you guys do to amend that at all?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know--I don't remember working on too much after this document was published, I really don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it safe to say that this is sort of the baseline for all future time lines, concerning 9/11? That the FAA put together--

MR. DIGGINS: I'm not going to say that. How would I know that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know when in October you went over to AAI?

MR. DIGGINS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember when?

MR. DIGGINS: It was September 30 something like that, or something however the days shook out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, right at the end, okay.

MR. DIGGINS: And I went up to Ground Zero.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What were you doing up there?

MR. DIGGINS: Working with the FBI on the Terrorism Task Force, the FAA liaison. Still am, still tracking bad guys for the FBI.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember a request from the FAA Administrator or her deputy for time line information? Do you remember if you got a

specific request from them? Maybe it wouldn't have come directly to you, it would have gone through the chain of command.

MR. DIGGINS: It would get through Dave Knoles and Dave would come in and say why don't we do this, or, I don't, there was interaction, constantly, around the clock, about trying to get time lines here, but I can't tell you the genesis of that interaction was--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if the Administrator or her Deputy had specifically asked for a time line?

MR. DIGGINS: I think I remember Dave Knoles once saying Monty wants this, Monty Belcher. That's about the limit of my recollection, I'm sorry.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wants this, do you know what this mean?

MR. DIGGINS: Nope.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what happened to the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"?

MR. DIGGINS: What happened to it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who were the consumers of this?

MR. DIGGINS: I don't know, I was assuming that the Hill.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall if you participated in preparing any briefings for the White House? Or that would be used by somebody for a White House briefing?

MR. DIGGINS: I think that that PowerPoint that I prepared was eventually going to get over there, too. I think I heard something like that was going to be used for some of the staffers over at the White House.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the PowerPoint that you prepared would have been used for a briefing on the Hill?

MR. DIGGINS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And also, possibly, some White House staffers.

MR. DIGGINS: Right, but I heard that after I prepared it for the Hill. So, I mean, when I was preparing it it was for the Hill and then I

heard, eventually it was going to be used for that, I didn't. I gave people my final product and then I checked out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who would have used your PowerPoint to present to the Hill, would it have been the Administrator or--

MR. DIGGINS: I believe so, that's what I heard, but that's second- and third-hand so I don't have any direct knowledge.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who would have been involved in the White House briefings?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get involved in pulling together any data for the September 11, Commission?

MR. DIGGINS: No, other than just asked me if I had any personal notes, that was easy to answer.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then you were interviewed by them?

MR. DIGGINS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you heard the name Sherry

Gott [ph]?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about Doug Davis?

MR. DIGGINS: That sounds familiar, but I--it does sound familiar but I can't tell you how or why.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else, Phil.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just a couple things. Were you contacted by your public information people, or Public Affairs for any releases to the press regarding the events of 9/11?

MR. DIGGINS: Was I personally contacted?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, any of your information time line come back?

MR. DIGGINS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And subsequent, is there anyone in DOD that you had contact or might have?

MR. DIGGINS: In DOD?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In DOD?

MR. DIGGINS: Nothing comes to mind.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else that

you'd like to add that you think might be helpful to us?

MR. DIGGINS: I'm still not sure what the issue is. If you'd tell me what you're looking for, maybe I could--shed some light on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Trying to understand where the information came from for these time lines and where, who decided what to include or not to include in here. And I guess what we're most curious about are these military logs that are referenced in these time lines, as to who saw them and where they're at now and--

MR. DIGGINS: The only thing I remember. I remember handwritten, somebody hand wrote something and I can't tell you who, where or how I got it, but I believe it was faxed to me. But it was hand and it was from some military somewhere, but i can't tell you where or who, if I remember at the time, it was handwritten what went on. And I remember looking at that but I can't tell you if I took data and entered it, I cannot tell you that I don't know. But if I thought it was useful

information and I trusted the source at the time, then I would have included it. I know that's not real helpful to you, but that's what happens.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, if that's what happened, that's what happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall if you kept it or shredded it, did it have any instructions with it or--

MR. DIGGINS: Meaning

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Those handwritten notes, like burn before reading, something like that.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIGGINS: No, I didn't shred it, I don't recall any instructions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you moved, did you leave a file cabinet behind for your--

MR. DIGGINS: On these events?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MR. DIGGINS: Boxes of stuff, yes. I wouldn't say I left it, it was in our area. I mean Doug and I were just, Doug and I were really working our fannies off trying to make sense of

this stuff. We had duplicate data, we had all kinds of stuff. We had more stuff and probably about 50 percent of it was duplicated. So we had to first try to figure out what the hell we had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you ever heard of a book called "Air War Over America?"

MR. DIGGINS: No. Is that the 9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The official First Air Force Account.

MR. DIGGINS: Recommended reading?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No. I'm not recommending it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll end the interview. It's

12:25 p.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
PATRICE ALLEN-GIFFORD

BY

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

1:40 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is October 6, 2004, the time is 1:40 p.m., we are at FAA Building 10-B, FAA Headquarters, Fifth Floor. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c with the Department of Transportation, Inspector General, by co-investigator is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. We are here to conduct a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 a Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. We are interviewing Patrice Allen-Gifford. Ms. Gifford, please, acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, it is and my last name is actually Mrs. Allen-Gifford.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, raise your right hand, do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: My full name is Patrice Allen-Gifford, A-l-l-e-n-G-i-f-f-o-r-d.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what is your current assignment and current position?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: My current position is Executive Officer for Terminal Services in the Air Traffic Organization of the Federal Aviation Administration.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what is that routing symbol within the FAA?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: The Air Traffic Organization has tried to move away from routing symbols but the Terminal Services, as a whole, which is a very large organization, can be referred to as ATO-T, but there are no further routing symbols below the Terminal Services level.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: So, my position as Executive Officer working almost 100 percent for the Vice President of Terminal Services.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which is who?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

And what is your grade level?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I'm a GS-15.

(b)(6)

: And how many--how long have you been with the FAA?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Eleven years and today's the sixth, three days/four days.

(b)(6): Could you just briefly describe what your duties are in your current position as the Executive Assistant--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Executive Officer--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: --Executive Officer.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: --which is a different position than I had on September 11, 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I can best explain it by the fact that Terminal Services is now an organization that constitutes over 500 air traffic operating terminals, that means towers and terminal radar fix controls, over 500 facilities across the country and a significant number of personnel here in headquarters.

In the ATO, the structure's a little different than we used to be over when we were Air Traffic. And we're broken out now by options, which is why we're terminals. I support the Vice President. I'm basically handling a lot of hot issues, as they would say colloquially; anything coming from the OIG's office, the Secretary's office; the Executive Administrator, on down till it reaches my level.

I review the correspondence before it's to be signed. I handle briefing papers. I assign and receive, edit, review, briefing papers that are to go above our level. And handle a lot of external coordination for him. I may return some of his phone calls, try and make sure that his day is flowing well, and just provide general support on anything that's asked through him of the ATO Terminal Organization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you assume this position?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: February 9 of 2004 is when the ATO was coordinated, I'm sorry, was

established as an organization. And that is headed by (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who is our Chief Operating Officer.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: You say that was February of this year?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: February 9 of 2004. So, officially that's when I assumed this position. Of course, things have has evolved with time as we determined what our organization is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: On September 11, 2001, what was your position?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Special Assistant to the Director of Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: And who was that, who was the Director of Air Traffic?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: At the time, it was William G. Peacock, known as Bill Peacock. Actually, I'm not sure if it's William, sorry. I think it's just Bill G. Peacock, pardon me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c: Is he retired?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Affirmative. I was one of two special assistants and other members of the front office support staff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what would you do--what were your daily responsibilities when you were in that position as the Special Assistant?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Almost anything, each director of air traffic used the staff slightly differently. My focus was primarily on communications, meaning writing letters for the Director; writing all of the employee letters. I was the liaison, the single point-of-contact liaison for Public Affairs, FAA Public Affairs.

Let's say a reporter came to them and said they wanted to do a story on a day in the life at Dulles Tower. So, that's considered a national story, Public Affairs would call me, tell me what they wanted to do. I would work through the then Eastern Region and the facility to coordinate what time we could do that that was operationally convenient or as best possible and put together all kinds of small pieces to make sure that we could get both the best message out, as well as not negatively impact the operation, because safety is always our first priority.

I did that, I did more coordinating, if he was doing a presentation somewhere, all kinds of things relating to any kind of external and internal communication, as well as general special assistant duties.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On September 11, were you working that day?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, ma'am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If it's possible, could you kind of briefly describe what you did that day on a starting from when you learned about the events just beginning to happen?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I'll do my best. I have to tell you that by a week later, some of it, there are days at that point, just melded together. I did work in the front office, that's on the 10th floor, in FOB-10A, that's in suite 1002. Bill Peacock was at a conference, out of town.

The Chief of Staff, at the time, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], stopped in my office early in the morning, I don't remember the exact time to say that we had a flight that had gone NORDO, that

means no radio, and had gone off course.

In whatever way she described that to me, the NORDO is not uncommon, flight off course, slightly, it could have been a lot of explanations, but those two things together and the gravity in her voice made me say, Mary Ellen, this sounds like it could be a hijacking. And she said we just don't know anything yet, that's all the information we have.

I don't remember whether my TV was on at the time. I don't remember how I found out, but we learned that the situation was graver. But, still, there was a lot of possibilities, there was a lot of--so I remember that the acting person was Dave Knoles. At some point he came upstairs, his office was not within our suite.

At some point we established a telephone connection with the air traffic control system Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, in our conference room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let me just interrupt you for a second.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We've heard this net or this conference call that was established is that what you're referring to?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, ma'am. Initially it was, I think and I might be fuzzy on this, I think, initially, it was to connect to the Command Center and after that it became a bridge to the affected facilities, which would have meant Eastern Region first and then at some point and I Dave Knoles would know this better than I, so I would defer, if my statements don't match his, I would defer to his recollection better than mine.

But at some point it became all on route centers and probably some other facilities connected to the Command Center and that was being operated out of the conference room in room 1002. If you've gone there and you've seen the suite, then you can picture the suite, then you can picture this better.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you involved in actually assisting Mr. Knoles set up this conference--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, ma'am, I was not. There was support staff who would have known better than I how you establish a bridge or something like that, I didn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate, actually in the conference?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I sat in the room for much of it, certainly initially, but I was also in and out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you kind of recall what time you might have entered that conference call, was it--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I can't speculate, I really, really can't. I remember going back and forth so the television at the time, the only television--I had one in my office, but it didn't have a cable, that's it. It still didn't have a cable at that point. So, I only had rabbit ears on my TV. So, I only got fuzzy reception on my TV, you can see it over here is a 13-inch, little unit.

The director's office had a very large television that was cabled through DOT cable. And

so, if we wanted to see what was going on CNN, we had to walk in and out of the directors office. So, I remember being back and forth between the two, between watching the TV.

At some point later in the morning, we recognized that we needed to put a TV in the conference room because at that point the conference room was our operations focal. And so we took my television which didn't have a cable. They unhooked the cable from Mr. Peacock's TV because it was in a different room and wasn't of any use to the people in the conference room. They hooked my--they kind of jury-rigged it and got my TV in there so they got benefit of having the news on while they were on the conference.

At some point, I did take notes in there, not handwritten notes, but there was a laptop, you know, immediately someone brought up a laptop and they started taking notes on things. Various people sat there and took the notes at some point. I only did it for a few minutes.

Since I was sitting there, whoever was

taking notes, if they said, what just got said, once or twice I was able to say, okay, that was that, you know, here's what just got said or Eastern Region reported this or something like that. Minor, I had a very minor role. I did stay until 10:00 o'clock at night to be generally at--at some point the FAA made the decision, you know, at the Administrator's level to allow employees to go home if they wished. You probably have that on record. A number of employees did. Key personnel stayed, key personnel needed support. I stayed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So at the time that you went into the room the conference call was kind of already going on?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: There would have been no reason to be in the room until after our--whoever was acting for Mr. Peacock and my recollection is that Dave Knoles must have been acting, because, but he was also in charge of quality assurance. It would have been natural, regardless of who was acting, the managers spaces, the directors, what's their title? Program directors,

came upstairs. Being air traffic controllers, they understood that immediately you have to establish some kind of communications link.

But I was probably in the room when that got established or, you know, in and out. But as people came, they gathered; the senior-most people came, they gathered, they established this conference bridge. They had me take you over and show you the room; it's a small conference room which allows eight to ten people to sit at the table and there's chairs around the periphery, but not a whole lot.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall anybody--anyone from the military being present during this?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, yes, people came in and out, so whether it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c in particular, I don't remember, I know that there was staff, (b)(6), (b)(7)c there would have been members of her staff, so there was a military detail that was located on--their offices were on the fourth floor, but they were attached to the AT-1, the Director of Air Traffic Office. And so,

don't ask me specifically who, I really just don't remember, but members of that staff were in and out of the room. Probably someone stayed there at all times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The military was on the fourth floor, you said.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, their offices were located on the fourth floor, but it was the military detail--it was the military liaison office. And that reported to and AT-2 is the colloquial way we refer back in the old days of routing symbols, AAT-1 was the Director of Air Traffic's routing symbol. And that's to make sure that this is not confused with the Associate Administrator of Air Traffic Services which was the level above us. Because often people would say AT-1 was the Director of Air Traffic Services, that is inaccurate. It is the Director of Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, you said the military liaison reported to whom?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: To the Director of Air Traffic, I don't know if--my sense, my

understanding is that that's the official reporting line that they are a liaison from the Pentagon to the old AT-1 position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At that time that was Jeff Griffith, is that right?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Jeff Griffith was AT-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Two, I'm sorry.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: AT-1 was Bill Peacock, Jeff Griffith was the Deputy Director of Air Traffic colloquially known as AT-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So your understanding is that this military--

[Interruption.]

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Gosh, you know, I'd have to go back and look at my records, I believe he was AT-2, I don't remember him being, see there must have been a reason, though that Dave Knoles had to establish the telecon, so, Jeff--I remember Jeff being down in the sort of sound-proof room that I'm not supposed to know it exists, you know, what I mean. There's a room there--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A secret room.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: --yeah, you just don't know about it, it's, you know, top secret. And that's where certain other communications were taking place of which I have no knowledge.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just so I'm clear, this military detail that you're talking about, the military liaison--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: A number of people.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --you understood they reported to Bill Peacock, then, correct?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Mm-hmm, on paper, yeah, but the coordinated with everyone, whatever needed to happen. You're probably aware that the FAA unlike many countries of the world has a very close coordination in terms of airspace use with the military. And thanks, in part, to that military liaison issues get worked out at very low levels. It's a wonderful relationship. Not that there aren't differences but it's--from everything I've seen in seven years doing Air Traffic work, I think it's an extraordinary relationship that

benefits our country.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was Jeff Griffith a part of this conference call?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: That's what I'm not remembering why Dave set it up if Jeff was AT-2, so I think Jeff must have been in a meeting somewhere and to the best of my recollection, Jeff would have been involved in the other communications that were going on, that were probably with the Deputy Administrator and others at much higher levels.

My recollection is not that Jeff was in the room on this bridge, not most of the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During the time you were there?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: In and out maybe, but he was not a person leading it initially. And I just would have to go back and look at files to see if that jogs my memory about; but I remember Dave Knoles setting it up; I remember one of our program directors, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], helping out and taking over when Knoles had to leave, I mean we ran that for 24/7 for a while and it eventually evolved

into the what's now known as, gosh what is the actual title of that? The Domestic Events Network.

But it was run, initially, 24/7, right out of that conference room. People were--the first week after September 11, people just voluntarily brought food into the AT-1 suite, it was just, it was constantly people, it was a different kind of effort. There were no office hours, there was just work, Saturday, Sunday, you just came in whenever you could to be of whatever help you could, even if it meant answering the phones; making coffee, anything, just, if your hands--if there was--you'd come in and say, what can I do?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any other questions about that conference call?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you, I was going to ask about American 11--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --unless you were going to cover that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember, during that conference call if there was ever any discussion of American 11 still being in the air after it had crashed into the World Trade Center, like there might have been some confusion as to whether 11 had actually crashed or if it was still south-bound?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Eleven was the first aircraft?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe so.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, there was, but I don't want to call it confusion, though, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We can use a different adjective.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: That's what I'm saying, I want to nuance that differently for you. This was a very, very difficult thing to get their hands around.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: What I saw were people trying to establish precisely what had happened in an environment where it, you couldn't be entirely certain. We had--we had a number of planes that

were, for want of a better term, not exactly accounted for. And so. At some point they put it on the white board, but it wasn't, at the time we didn't over there a white board that made copies or anything. We just had a plain old eraser white board. And they put down the numbers of any flight that the Command Center was telling us was unaccounted for.

And I remember just saying, well is this one this or is this one the one that did this, but I can't tell you that it was American 11, specifically, it might have been the second aircraft to go into the Trade Center. There was speculation, initially, the first aircraft to go into the Trade Center, it looked like the whole, you know, we were just looking at TV, we were just like you guys at that point.

Given our best, though, everybody's looking at it and saying, you know, that must have been a small plane, it doesn't look like a big plane would have, you know. No one--so there's no way to imagine what, at that point, what a

commercial airliner of that size would have looked like going into the World Trade Center. It seemed impossible to imagine.

So, your mind is racing for all kinds of explanations. And, of course, your first thought is always to look for the most benign and to say, you know, guy off course, lost his way, didn't see the Trade Center, how could that be? You know, you want to look for the most plausible explanation given your life experience to that point.

I happen to have worked at the World Trade Center for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey for eight years. I worked for the person, you know, three levels, the person whose department who led the creation of the World Trade Center. I had information in the back of my mind about how structurally sound that place was. I've been in the World Trade Center at 10:00 o'clock at night when the wind is howling on the 67th floor and you hear the building creaking. Why? Because it was designed to sway 12 inches in every single direction. It was not designed to snap, it wasn't

designed to break. You could not have. There's no way to initially to have ascribed what truly happened to what you saw on the TV in inches. And that's the best I can give you for everything I knew, saw, heard. So, was there confusion? There was uncertainty. There was a lack of ability to be precise. There was a searching for answers because everyone knew how important it was.

But the air traffic way is not to give a definitive answer until you have the data that backs that up. That is just controller mentality, you don't speculate. You deal in facts. I've come to really respect how controllers do what they do, all their interactions. They don't speculate they deal in data points. And then they come to a conclusion and that's irrefutable? Is this helpful?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, but one of the things that we had come to understand, and you can help clarify it for us, if you can, is that at some point you may have left the meeting?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: In and out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, in a few--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Back to my office, it was all in one suite, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that you, right and that you may have heard when you left and then came back and reported during the conference call that 11 might still be airborne and heading south-bound towards Washington, D.C., do you remember anything like that?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, sir, I have no recollection of the specific words that you're using.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything similarly?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: It's way too fuzzy in my mind.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let's move away from the conference call to something else now. Were you involved in--and I think you may have mentioned this to me on the phone, but I'll ask you anyway, just for the benefit of our tape--were you involved in preparing any time line types of information,

briefing papers, you know, post-9/11 to kind of capture what had happened on that day? You want to talk about that a little bit?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yes, I've been involved over a period of over maybe weeks or months in pulling data from various directions in my role as lead connection to Public Affairs. But, also, in my role just as a special assistant. If somebody said go right back down, here's some data, go type this up and get it to the Administrator, I would have done that. Do I remember specifically, whether I did something for the Administrator? No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Do I know that at some point I had a chronology, I mean we did our best to put things together drawing data from the facilities that had been affected and mostly from the air traffic control system Command Center because their work is often taped A, and B, they keep logs, that's part of their standard operating procedure. I would have assembled information rather than creating information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Meaning you were given information by other people in air traffic?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: That's a correct statement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We have some different, just kind of flip through it maybe. We have some different time lines that we have been collecting throughout this review.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you kind of look through them and maybe see which ones maybe you were involved in assembling or--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And I might remember, I might not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: But it's okay if something looks like something I might have typed, I will tell you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --Yeah, something that you do--just kind of stop when you. This is a "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Which was not put

together but this cover sheet, for example, wasn't put together by me, but I may have purchased it or something like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you were--do you believe you were involved in assembling some of this?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I may have been involved in assembling some of the data that later was comprised in this together. I did work closely with the Quality Assurance Office and they were pretty much on point for developing this. But there were multiple uses. There were quality assurance uses; and there were also house uses. There was White House information uses.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't believe you were actually involved in actually drafting any of the information that's contained in here?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: May I take a closer look at all this? So the fact that there are seconds given on this tells me that it must have come from the Command Center, ultimately. There are lots of iteration of the information, of course. I did not, to best of my recollection, I

do not believe that I typed this. Might I have typed information that was used in creating this, yes, probably. It seems like Tony Mello and I sat down and put something together. There were lots of different pieces of paper but I don't remember where they all came from. I mean the Command Center was my primary source, but there may have been other things that came out of facilities where the planes took off from.

So, at some point, I'd have to talk to the person that I think I worked with. I might have had some participation in some version of this. I cannot certify to you that it was this version.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Everything was iterative. Again, because there were so many different offices requesting information, what we find out now is, you end up writing pretty much the same stuff but adding and subtracting based on who's asking and what you're providing what their focus is.

Let me say I am giving you my very, very

best recollection.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's fine, that's fine.

Would you look at this entry here, this is relating to the first flight. American 11. It talks about Northeast Air Defense Sector log indicates, blah, blah, blah. Do you recall or have any information about how that information would have made it's way into the time line or--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --do you recall looking at any--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, somebody could have given me--during those weeks, I mean, there was so much going on. On September 11 and in the days following, we were called on first to provide so much information to so many different sources. Somebody could have handed me something off a piece of paper; somebody could have e-mailed me their part and then I put it together with somebody else's part. I don't recall this specific data, nor would I have had any personal knowledge of when that took place.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, I guess, just so I'm clear, your function then with respect to this document would have been to kind of to gather information that different people in air traffic or that some other sources would give you?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: That's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you might have participated in actually typing it up?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Exactly, especially on September 11, they didn't have any secretaries around, the AT-1 secretary whose title is, really, staff assistant, stayed. But there wasn't a lot of, you know, support was coming in the form of managers at that point. My computer was there in the suite. I'm a communications person, I deal with the press. Somebody would have--Public Affairs [unintell.]. And that is not a function that I have now, not primarily, but I still end up because of my years of doing this I still end up involved. I am a compiler of information at this point. I am a carrier outer of duties that anyone would have asked me to do. Can you type this up?

Can you e-mail this, to; can you print this out and get it down the hall to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you still have on your computer any of the work product that you generated back then?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I should, I moved here eight months ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: So, should they changed my operating system, not operating--I don't know the right terms, I don't know much about computers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It looks fancier--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: They changed out my actual hard--they gave me a new computer since September 11, even when I was over there, but it should have transmitted all the data. I moved over here to a temporary location in a cubicle over here until I get an office. In the move, I just can't swear to you whether everything's preserved.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, would you mind after

we're done talking if we could go down--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Not at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and take a look and see what you have?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yep.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything that you have that is similar to what we're showing you here, we'd like to get.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And let me say, it is my belief that I don't have anything original. I don't have anything that didn't originate in some other office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, you might even that said, we might be able to tell by looking at a document where it came from.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: You are, I doubt that, but you're welcome to, you're welcome to look at anything. This is very important to me to give you the best I can.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you interviewed by the Commission? Were you interviewed by the 9/11

Commission?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, ma'am, I was not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you turn over any of your materials that you were talking about?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I did not have anything that didn't come out of somewhere else.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you didn't have any, like, original material.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Original work product. Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, and anything I typed on behalf of someone else, it was really theirs not mine.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is called "Notification to DOD Time Line."

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, I really, no, I don't remember that. That one isn't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You can take it out, do you want to me to take it out?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: No, that's not going to change anything, I don't have a very good memory to begin with but, I mean, my boss can tell me that I wrote something [unintell.] forms [unintell.]

just to remind myself, just because we deal in so much information here. I'd have to look but that doesn't look like something that I would have done.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just for the record, this is titled "Sensitive Security Information FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001." This is called "Chronology of September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, AAL-11 Boston/Los Angeles."

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I might have typed some part of that, but, again, I'm speculating really wildly for you, I just don't know. And I did not look back at my stuff since I was on call. I did not, the only thing that I did was look at the press release that Public Affairs told me they have on their Website, not a press release but a--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Their fact sheet.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: --fact sheet, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's in there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you need to take a break?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is your antenna missing?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does it still work?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: It still works, it's not the greatest thing. Darn. But I've already ordered a new one, but it still works, you know this is Nextel service and that never works very well in tunnels and Metros and it doesn't work at all in the Metro. That doesn't look familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That one with the grid?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: This one with the grid does not, this graph at the top does not look familiar to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about this one, "Chronology of the Tasks of September 11, 2001, and Subsequent Events through April 30, 2002?"

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Does not look familiar to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I need to put numbers on those, it would be easier to take notes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Somebody else would have created that and I might have transmitted the data to them or other people might have transmitted

the data to them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That is titled "Fact Sheet Chronology of Events of September 11, 2001."

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And it's issued by the Office of Public Affairs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess what we've learned in talking to different folks is that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is the new one, this one here is the--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And I wouldn't remember specific times to be able to say, oh, I gave them that line, but not that line--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I really can't tell you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If Public Affairs told us that they drafted this document and--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And ran it past us?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And run it past Air Traffic to make sure that the information contained was accurate. So they released it. Do you recall that happening?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: There's so much that they give us.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And this was released in August of 2002, our understanding is that it was the anniversary, the anniversary of September 11.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: So, I would say to you that is something that they would have done and it would have been through me. Specifically, do I remember, the power of suggestion you having raised it would make me say, oh, yeah, I--but I'm not certain that I remember it, you know, it's been suggested. And it is the likely thing that it would have come to me, had I. If I was there, if I wasn't at a conference or whatever I would have been the person to receive it and put it in front of other people.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who would you have put it in front of.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Okay, I can only tell you theoretically, who I would have put it in front of. And that would have been, most likely, ATO Vice President Linda Schuessler, who was at the

Command Center, I don't mean just physically, I mean, her post was one of the bosses at the Command Center, on September 11. So, did I run it past her, I can't swear to it. Maybe I just gave it to Jeff Griffith, who was AT-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now this would have been a year after--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: And Jeff would have been AT-2, at that time. That would have been prior to his retirement. So, I'm just telling you likelihood, not certainty.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know we're going back. Let me just ask you this. Do you recall there being any having to give Public Affairs any changes to this document or any red flags that were brought up or anything like that?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I have no recollection that I could point to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anybody else other than Linda Schuessler and someone in Air Traffic, like Jeff Griffith, anybody else you may, anybody else you think you would have circulated this document to?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Well, it's possible that I would have put it in front of Bill Peacock, but, you know, Bill Peacock was out of town at a conference so I wouldn't have shown it to him; might have put it in front of Mary Ellen Crause, the Chief of Staff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Don't know. You know, try and follow the chain-of-command. Maybe it went downstairs, and I doubt that it went downstairs to the Quality Assurance Office, but I just, you know, lots and lots and lots of different--and lots of different assignments. And, at some point, even September 11 became basically days that we did and they're over and that's it.

And let me say about my computer, it is my belief, I mean, I was not asked to be interviewed by the Commission, it's my belief that nothing that I had was original enough to stand up and go, hey, you need to look at me. The Chief of Staff told me she was interviewed by the Commission and that sufficed because it was on behalf of all of us.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was Ms. Crouse, right?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Affirmative.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions relative to the time line? Did you assist in preparing any briefing documents for White House briefings or any types of departmental briefings relating to the events of September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This would have come out, like, chronologies, like this, this, this and this?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: The main think I regret that I didn't go, like deep into my files and looking, but I didn't think that's what you wanted me to do. I felt that I should just hear your questions and then, say, I can go look and I'll tell you if there's anything that I've left out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Entirely possible; entirely possible. You know, people send me stuff and they say put this together with this document, reformat it and send it to. That's a lot of what I do on a lot of different issues. I mean, it's not

that I don't think that this is one of the most significant things in our history, it's just that the days are long, the amount of information is huge and I did stuff and moved on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything?

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: Yeah, a couple of things. First of all, there were a lot of people involved, so everybody got to see little pieces. I mean, sometimes I was just running downstairs for sandwiches or something. There were a lot of people milling around in our suite. So, I really can't recall. I didn't, to the best of my knowledge, I didn't make any notes on any of that. There were so many people who were contributing.

And I guess I want to talk to you, if I may, if this is not inconsistent with what your expectation is, about my perception of activities on that day and in the days followed. So, as an American citizen, I was nothing, never not completely awed by the dedication and the skills that people around me brought to this effort.

There was, like, with a flip of a light

switch people turned immediately into, okay, we need to do this, this is what happens next. There was some tension, occasionally. There were people who stayed 24 hours that day. Went home showered, came back maybe 6 hours later. The air traffic controllers in the management positions that I work with up at the Command Center and I had a lot of interaction with the Command Center on a lot of, you know, very little things and very big things.

It was one of the proudest days of my life to be associated with those people. It is my very strong belief that there is no possibility that anyone would ever give misinformation. If someone wasn't sure wasn't sure of something they went back to a record and looked it up.

Are people human and are there errors that can occur in spite of their best efforts? I'm sure. But there is just no doubt in my mind that the people who were leading the communications effort and the recovery, you know, bringing the system back up, landing the aircraft. Those people are amazing and they worked so hard. I mean, Linda

Schuessler, the people who were in that room, I remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c, I remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], there were people there who just immediately turned into, how would you say it, operationally extraordinary people.

People that, you know, normally would just be kidding around with you in the hall, knew exactly what needed to be done to the very best of their ability. So I want to speak to you about people's intentions and strengths. It was an amazing time. And I just wanted that on the record.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's fine, is there anything else or anything else we didn't ask you about that you think we should know about or.

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: You can look at my computer, you can look--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you keep any personal files, you know with your notes or maybe your notes that you kept--

MS. ALLEN-GIFFORD: I kept copies of things that were issued, I don't have them

immediately at hand, again, I've moved. I kept photocopies in case I had to look back, but, for example, I didn't even keep newspaper articles that I recall, maybe one or two. I haven't even used them, you know, nothing I--so in October, I guess, I suggested because this was a natural part of my [unintell.] to Bill Peacock that he really needed to go and thank people in the facilities that were affected. That he, you know, you needed the big guy to go into the facility and say, I'm really proud of what you did.

Because people were terribly emotionally upset. I mean, we even had a controller who lost his wife, as you know. So I made a proposal, I wrote up a proposal. The kind of, you know, hoping from one place to another. He had to use the agency aircraft to get from one place to another. He and the head of Airway Facilities, which also had a role, took two, one-day trips no overnights or anything, went and thanked people. That's the kind of thing I was involved in.

It's already on the record that I was

involved in coordinating, facilitating he interviews by reporters, you know. What other, oh, we created a pin for all of air traffic. The Director told me he wanted a pin to commemorate Air Traffic's role on September 11. We created one.

And we asked people to send in designs, we kind of said, I like this, I like this, it's basically of the American flag and an airplane and it says FAA Air Traffic September 11 and may say something like, we will remember or something. He also then, instantaneously told me he wanted a poem to provide context to go with this. I said, what am I Elizabeth Barrett Browning? And I went and created a poem to go with it. Those were my kinds of duties.

So, can I at some point maybe I could find you a pin and a poem, because I think there are leftovers. But, you know, that's the kind of thing that I did and, oh, wow, that meant so much to people.

Let me tell you that various divisions, every facility in the Southern Region they wanted

to, they had created their own pin and they wanted to use my poem as a context. And I was, like, go create your own poem. Do something that's meaningful to your people. And they said, no, we want to use yours. And I went to the director and he said, just be flattered and let them do it.

You know, that's the kind of thing where I have some original thought. But not in anything operational.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The time is 2:30.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

BY

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Friday, October 8, 2004

9:39 a.m. - 11:14 a.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is October 8, 2004, the time is 9:39 a.m., we are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 428 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c my co-investigator is (b)(6), (b)(7)c we are from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today, we're interviewing (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c please, acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I am aware of that, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pease, raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, give us your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c last name
is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current
position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm currently the manager of
System Operations Litigation, Federal Aviation
Administration.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : System what?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c System Operations Litigation,
I didn't make up the title.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's the routing symbol for
that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We don't have routing symbols
anymore.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was a lot easier than
saying System whatever

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : System Operations Litigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c System Operations Litigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you
presently?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know. I'm either a J

or K, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you, like, in transition?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You will be a K eventually,
then?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, sir.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you had your
current position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : July 1, 2004.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And prior to that what
position did you hold?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was a Safety Investigator
for the Investigations Division.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that AAT-20?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : AAT-20 was Evaluations and
Investigations Staff. AAT-200 was Investigations
Division, I work directly for AAT-200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long did you hold that
position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Under different titles and
names, since September 25, 1999.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Quite a while.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, it's, you know how things reorganize?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Same thing, same duty, same responsibilities, different boss, different title.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He wanted to call it something different?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Basically.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you were an investigator for the ST Division?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Investigations Division. I was an Air Traffic Safety Investigator for the Investigations Division.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you start with the FAA?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c July 25, 1982.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In what position and where?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Air Traffic Control Specialist, started at Cleveland Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Then I transferred to Indianapolis Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, on September 11, what--you were the Air Traffic Investigator that position--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c On September 11, I was an Air Traffic Safety Investigator for AAT-200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was your boss at that time, who did you report to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Tony Ferrante.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then who did Tony report to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Dave Knoles.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And Knoles to Jeff Griffith?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Either Jeff Griffith or Bill Peacock, I'm not really sure. Bill Peacock was the Director of Air Traffic, Jeff Griffith was the Deputy Director of Air Traffic. I'm not sure--we were staff to those two individuals. and I'm not sure if Dave Reported to Jeff or to Bill.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have a staff of your own, or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Then, no. Do you mean, Jeff, me, have a staff of my own?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I was just a low-level person.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As an Air Traffic Safety Investigator, can you just describe briefly what your duties were?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like on or around September 11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sort of like expert witness for the government?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Expert, consultant, liaison, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you on duty on the 11th of September?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And where were you at that day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Indianapolis Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you get back to Washington?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The next day, the 12th.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have to get--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We drove back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, you drove. Okay. A lot of people drove back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Lot of people drove back. I arrived, it was just about midnight he 12th going on to the 13th.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : My neighbors were at Disney World.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Wow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they hitched a ride with some strangers.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just to get.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just to get home, yeah, because they couldn't get a rental car. Do you

need to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, she'll [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's a good drive to, because I used to be stationed out in St. Louis and Indianapolis was about, we'd get about there from here and make an overnight.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm originally from Indianapolis and so, we make it in about 10, 10 1/2, and traffic was moving pretty good, police weren't bothering us. We made pretty good time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, after September 11, once you got back to Washington, did you participate in preparing any, like, after action reports or time lines that kind of chronicled what had happened on the 11th? And I'm not so focused on, like the formal accident packages for the four aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, I've got a whole bunch of different time lines that we've collected. And the one that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Maybe

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We're talking about the
"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The whole book, it's a whole
book, it's one of the projects I worked on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You did work on this, the
book, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right. We just--within
our organization we just refer to this as the grid
time line on Military Notification chronology. Did
you work on that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who worked on
that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because it says AAT-20 at the
bottom.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about this fact sheet.
This was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've never seen that before.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, this is a fact sheet

"Chronology of Events on September 11" dated August 2002. What about this FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001? It's sort of a narrative in paragraph format?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've never seen that before. Not, wait a minute. Yeah, I've never seen that before.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about this one that's just simply titled "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01?" You can take it out of the sleeve if that'll be helpful.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't recall seeing this before, and I do distinguish between I don't recall and I don't I never have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, when you're saying you don't recall that means you may have but you just don't

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I have no recollection of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about this one that's titled "Chronology of September 11" it's got a listing of the four aircraft and their flight weights.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

This looks familiar and I have no idea, I have no recollection of working on it. To help you, when I came back, I was at Indianapolis Center. When we came back, pretty much, we were assigned airplanes. And for the most part, I took American 77, because American 77 was lost to Indy when it, you know turned around and headed back and I worked Indianapolis Center and I was the most familiar, I was just there, I mean, obviously working airplanes I was there at the time. And, so, it was just natural for me to take that one. So, I worked an awful lot of American 77. I worked on that booklet and you had mentioned about the Accident Packages, you're right, I did and didn't work directly on the Accident Packages, my involvement would have been I write the order of how to investigate an aircraft accident for Air Traffic and I write the order how to put together the packages. I determined which facility was going to do what. So I had, you know, I did have some input in that. And the packages were not released until they got my approval. And I know

you see that in there about the AT packages, and technically your question was correct or your statement was correct, that just to let you know there's just a little bit more to it than that. But, so when it comes to American 77, this does look familiar. And I worked on American 77 to a large degree. But, if you don't ask me about content, I'm not going to know everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one, entitled "Sensitive Security Information FAA Communications Regarding High-tech Aircraft on September 11, 2001,"

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've never seen this before. You guys like some coffee, I've got--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This was a chronology that was--actually, it was in a folder, each flight. The copy we have is a black pages with two white labels and one of the labels lists each of the four flights. But the package was put together so that each of the--information about each of the four flights was kind of stapled together separately, as opposed to in one big book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This looks familiar. Let me

see something. I've seen this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What in there is making you think that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's just familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just overall it looks familiar, it wasn't some event or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I saw American 77, again, that was my plane. I don't, I didn't put it together, I have no recollection--I didn't put it together, but I've seen it and I may have provided or obtained some of the information that went into this. And it's pretty big [unintelligible], but I have see this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall who worked on this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" aside from yourself?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pretty much everybody.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : From AAT-20 at the time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's a good question, that

answers your question. Specifically, in one aspect or form it would have been Dave Knoles, Tony Ferrante, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Doug Gould, Mary Kate Strawbridge, myself, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not here, she was on a boat. (b)(6), (b)(7)c. And you know, guys, this is going to sound crazy, I'm sure Tony Mello was there, but right now I just don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I was going to ask you about him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm sure he was there, I just don't remember, and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've heard the name, like (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I was jus thinking of him. I have no specific recollection, but it would shock and appall me if he wasn't part of this. Tom Carmody [ph], Tom Carmody was there, to a lesser degree, but he was there. That's all, I think that's it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You know, I, it's kind of a different subject, I think you know, I remember talking to you about this 872811B or something

(b)(6), (b)(7)c 8020.11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 8020 something yeah, the information you gave me in this other investigation concerning--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c New York.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --was exceedingly helpful.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c R2, you I talked to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, they didn't like me too well, because they said, who said that. I said I said it it's true. Matter of fact we just went out with--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I think I think I left out some of the choice words you had

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think I was in Houston when we talked.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, I think you wee.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And we just, the IG came out and Senator McCain came out with, you know, okay,

what are you going to do now? Fix this. So, we just, I just, fell a little bit behind. I mean, I have a staff of basically me, right now. But a couple of the IOUs, one of them was to have put out a guidance or a policy saying, okay, you're not supposed create things, you're not supposed to crate, but if you do, but God, don't destroy them, you know, basically that.

So, we just, a memo's gone out now, it's been prepared and circulating, matter of fact Tuesday, I'm supposed to, it's supposed to be signed off, and we'll circulate it fixing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm going to say, it had to do with that discussion, it's going to say, listen, this has come to our attention, if you collect something inadvertently, you are not authorized to destroy it unless you check with our office or AEI, who runs Office of Accident Investigation. Only two people that can say, yeah, you can destroy that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you guys actually

finalize that memo, can you send me a copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I've got your address, I've got your card out there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That'll be great.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Does that have your fax number on it? I'm sorry her name was on top, but that's got the (b)(6), (b)(7)c ?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I can do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] Belcher, Monty and all those people about all this stuff?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, right, they covered some of the local leads on that case for us. But most of the work, you're talking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You want a draft, I can give you a draft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure. Except for the folks we needed to talk to you your old shop, the AT-20 folks. Almost all the work was out in Long Island, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So you were the bad man today, huh?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, they called me and they said we can't believe anybody from your shop would take something like this and I said, well, why not, it's absolutely correct and I'm the idiot. You--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It came down to questions of interpreting the policy so it was figuring out who, basically understood the policy the best and since he authored most of the policy for Air Traffic, you [unintelligible] can't get any better than the actual author.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Because I remember telling you that you know, did it happen, yeah, at the lower level, but the stuff wasn't important. And we do have things in there, for example, personnel statements. If you create a personnel statement and you go back and you want to change it, all previous statements are no longer the original and they shall be destroyed. I mean, there's specific guidance for that. But on something like this, if asked, you say no you can't do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But what you said about destroying the previous ones pertains to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Personnel statements only.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --but for, like, near, mid-air collisions that sort of thing as opposed to accidents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, no, accidents are part of that, too. That's a personnel statement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c A lot of it has to do--not a lot of it, some of it has to do with the union. And when you get conflicting reports, you sit here and think oh, I know he didn't mean that. Or, I reject your statement, saying wait a minute this isn't within the guidelines, you know, you didn't fill this in, you didn't fill that. Now, if it's weird, because if it's of substance, you don't change it, you're right, you're right, you do an amendment, you know. He has on a blue shirt, and then three days later, I said, no, it was white. You change it, I mean, you make an amendment to it. If it's something simple, like a date's wrong, you just put a line through it and put in a new date.

But if you screw it up, say you handwrite

it when you're supposed to print it, then you just go back and reprint it, hand print it. And you would destroy, does that make it--that's the difference.

But in this case here, what you were talking about, if they would have said, Jeff, can we tape these things, the answer would be flat out, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just flat out, no. You can't do that. Jeff, we taped them, now what do we do? Well, now that's evidence. Because, just because you put it to writing who says it's not different. And to me anything else would have been an amended statement of what was said to begin with and [unintelligible]. Hold on a second, I'm sorry.

But anyway, I didn't remember you. But I remember talking to you--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, we talked over the phone, I think a couple of times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But, yeah, the information you

provided was extremely helpful.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c They were wrong.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, they definitely, especially in hindsight should have definitely [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The real book is much thicker.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It is. This one, it doesn't have everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's missing quite a few--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I didn't realize that yesterday till (b)(6), (b)(7)c pulled the book and [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've got enough to carry around, so this one just has the most relevant information that we'll be looking at, so. Where were you guys getting the information for these various events that are chronicled in here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c From various sources. The way it traditionally works, but this wasn't a traditional situation. If we wanted to know something of that detail, we would go to what was then the regional office. I would call and say,

hey, give me the stuff on American 77, they would call the facilities and get the staff and then relay it back. Under these circumstances, a lot of the rules were broken and what we did was, we'd call and say we need a chronology of events on American 77 from Indianapolis in our Washington Center, Dull, National. They would type something up and ship it to us.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We put it all together and this was like 14,000 versions, because it was gone through, because we didn't know where it was going to end up, all although we expected about five blocks that's in both directions, six blocks both directions, the White House and the one with the pretty dome on top. So, we went through and I remember poor Dave Knoles going upstairs and then coming back down. I mean, this went on for, God, forever, days, days. They'd send us home to take showers and we'd come back. Days, days, but because you know the times didn't match up, it was just impossible. There's a tendency, especially

in a situation like this, but in any major accident or catastrophe, you know, people aren't real, you know, this is minutes, seconds, days after an accident, and investigations go on forever so people aren't really as accurate, oh, if these morons in Washington want something just put down a time.

But then when you go back and take a closer look, you realize you're seconds off or maybe a minute off. Well, normally, we would just say okay, what's a minute, what's a second, you know we'll work it out later, but we needed it because we knew this was going to be an important document, so the revisions, because the times didn't always match up, to answer your question, from many, many sources.

We cross-referenced documents, we cross-referenced, you know, tapes, transcripts, the -4s, notification, the logs they kept with notification to the military or to the ROCs or to the WOC, the ROC being the Regional Operations Center, the WOC being the Washington Operations

Center, upstairs, and we'd cross--plus our own notes that we kept from various places. We happened to have a guy in Cleveland. I just happened to be in Indianapolis there that set up, not command posts, but we down and stuck our nose into it and said, okay, what's going on. So, we got it from every imaginable source.

Cross-checked them, and came up with times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Some of the data you guys got, especially when you had that much stuff coming in--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --would it be fair to say that some of it was probably, like on tapes and all really accurate, you know, you get your tapes and your times on there and other things were people writing things down trying to keep track of it that way, looking at a clock and one clock may be off from the other?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's fair, absolutely fair, plus, remember there's really two parts to this answer. Some of this had to be recreated, you had to go back and recreated, you know. David, you

wtk

know, yesterday when all this happened, where were you. Sit down, now and write down everything you did and every minute you did it. Duh, I mean, come on.

Plus, I want to use this little analogy here on the board. You have, and you were talking about time. You have all these different facilities, you know, throughout the country. Okay, all type of air traffic facilities and military, so anybody who kept time they could be FAA, they could be military, they could be DEA, CIA, FBI and just then imagine within each one of those acronyms having a whole bunch of little buildings. Now I could take your watch, my watch, this watch, his watch and it's all going to be different. I'm telling you it's going to be different.

Some watches are accurate and some facilities being military and/or FA, they set their clock--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : By Zulu time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --not only Zulu time, but I'm

going to set the clock in my car off my watch. I'm going to set my watch off of my pager. I'm going to set my pager off my cellphone. Now, not only are you going to lose time but the human factor of putting it in. You take that combined with some of these facilities are hard-wired to time, there two types of time the FAA uses: WWV out of Fort Collins and DPS. They're both within nanoseconds of each other so in a legal sense they're the same time. But they could be a nano of a nanosecond off. Those are true times.

September of '01. Duled would have had DVRS, which is visual voice recording system. Okay, their time would have been directly wired to the DPS time or true time. That is true time for government, I mean that is the time [unintelligible] although the government is really WWV, we're switching to DPS, like I said, nano to nano, makes no difference.

Indianapolis Center is, they call somebody on the phone and the time is now 1006, okay, 1006, you know, and that's how it works. So, we're

trying to recreate something--never anticipating something like this happening--where, you know, we really need to get down to seconds here because seconds make a difference. That's not going to happen because Indianapolis Center could be 30 or 40 seconds behind Washington Tower and you would think they'd be the same time, but it's not true.

And then I'd like to go in, guys, to redundancy, ARTS, ARTS is a radar for a terminal, like Dulled or National.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The moment you set ARTS, automatically, it's wrong time. Taken in any factor if it's hard-wired, which many of them were not at the time, directly to WWV for true time, every shift, somebody had to go in and reset the clock. The moment you set it it would automatically be wrong, it actually would not keep true time depending on how busy the facility was, time was one of those things that was automatically slowed down.

At the end of a 24-hour shift, it only

would be 7 seconds, it may be 24 seconds, it could be 2 minutes. But we're talking about an environment now, where seconds matter.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, Washington Center could be 7 seconds off Washington National who could be 2 seconds off from Indianapolis Center who could be 30 seconds off for the true time is Dulled and there's no way, it's just impossible to know. So, remember you're not only having to keep that in your factoring, too, but, you know,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't, I mean, I think for the grand scheme of things for what we're looking at, we're not splitting hairs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, you're not going into that detail. A minute or two off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, the only point I was making is like if you are over in your area right outside this office and you have just the standard government from the handicaps, you know the wall clock that everybody gets issued, it runs off batteries and you set it by hand. So, if someone's

there and you're duffed someone take this down.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the clock you're going to look at.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, that's true, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, that's what I'm saying.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You're writing it down, but when you get to your radar data and voice tapes, you may write down I did this at 10:46, but the voice tapes said, no, it's 10:47. After a while it does add up, I mean it could add up, but yeah, you're right, the wall clock. I have a couple of atomic clocks at home, only because I think it's cool, but how many people have those?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've got one on my wrist.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, wow,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, but I just in my previous life of military school, Cost Guard, search and rescue, we called in and everything was on the tape and you could hear the beep, but it was also timed. And that was WWV, Greenwich Mean Time blah, blah, blah, blah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, you know what WWV is,

okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And we keyed the mike call so and so and they're drowning whatever, whatever call, everything was all timed because it was a historical record.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But I also know there's times when you just look up at the clock and you go, oh okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Because you never envision in a million years that something like this, hey, is going to happen. And it's just not at the top of your list to make sure you're dead-on accurate.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the things I've noticed is, we were given a copy of, which I think you may have sent us, as well, for that other investigation. But there is this log that your old shop kept and it said something about NTSB across the top and it'll have like the different aircraft listed out and then there will be grids and it will sort of an item and then when you guys got it or received it from the facilities and the it will

show when you guys transmit it over to the NTSB, does that sound familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It's something I wouldn't, I stopped doing that kind of stuff years ago after TWA 800, that was the last major accident I did till 9/11. Yeah, in a way it does, and more so, I guess I mean, it wouldn't surprise me that would be something Doug would keep.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I think Doug said you all kept it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean, it's more of a record than what we've already given them, so if they ask for us, we can say we gave it to you once, we're not going to mess with this, we don't have time, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the, I think that was Gould. I think that was what I had understand the intend was. But also, what was relayed to us that it was sort of a record of when you all were receiving items from the facilities.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Now are we talking about to give to the Commission later on? Are we talking

about--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, this was immediate aftermath.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's possible, I don't recall that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, well, one of the things I notice, like for this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" at the bottom of some of the text pages on here, it's got a date of September 17, 2001, so presumably that's a production date or the last run.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Last version date.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The last version date.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the things I do recall, now, you're probably right there, we burned through three or four shredders. We, you know, as we replaced something, we wanted to make sure, you know, how, things, you make 15 versions of the same thing. We shredded the old copies, one, because we didn't want things floating around, because they were inaccurate; and we wanted to keep only the most-current copy. Plus, after, a while, you

know, you've seen our little pit over there, it got pretty bad. And, at first, we had so many people here that as time went on, more and the investigations group was the group, everybody, you know, people started hanging around, what's going on, they were curious. Not many, but some.

And we didn't want things walking off. We're very conscientious about things walking off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, one of the things I noticed, if you'd look, if we assume the date on the bottom of this is correct, it's the 17th of September, is that some of the items, like, from Cleveland and Indianapolis, which would include some of the tapes and transcriptions weren't received into AAT-20, until, like the 20th of September or even later. And so, what I'm wondering if the information in that one log, which I appreciate that you indicated that you weren't really involved with that log, but if the information in that log is accurate as far as when AAT-20 was receiving it, how were you guys getting this information, were you getting like advanced

drafts of things?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It takes a long time to prepare a transcript when you have to pull together information. And then the transcript has to be correct or it won't get released. They do working copies and stuff like that. A lot of that information was available, you know, within hours, days, depending on what we were asking for. I mean, it really was as easy as picking up the phone and saying, after a while protocol got kind of old, plus there was all these open lines. There was a big one upstairs and we had, which we were monitoring down here and I think we had a second one going, with, you know, you have all the bosses and all they do is boss stuff. And you had all the worker bees. So we were monitoring the bosses, but realistically, we were dealing with the worker bees. Because things had to get done because the bosses would say they want something and we had to go do it. But, yeah, you just ask for it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. How, like if you guys were being sent, I understand that some of the voice tapes were transmitted earlier to you guys, like, in a WAV file format, electronically over the computer, does that sound familiar?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Possible, because I think a few facilities have that technology. The most common way of doing it is just copying it over the telephone.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So they would play it back for you over the phone? You would tape it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c They'd play it over the phone and we had a Moranz [ph] that we could plug in and it would direct copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think in some cases, it wasn't Federal Express. I know that (b)(6), (b)(7)c brought down some original tapes from Cleveland, be he was in Cleveland.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I remember him bringing down some stuff, but I don't remember him being around 9/11. He may have stayed up there a little bit, I mean the immediate aftermath, eventually he would pitch in and then he turned around and took the tapes back. And at the time, I think we had the equipment here to be able to play those big magazine tapes, but I don't know if they made copies off those or not, I have no idea.

My, and I don't want to say guess, but I don't guess, but from my experience and my training, WAV files, yeah some of the facilities have that because they would have computer geeks. The majority of them probably would have been taped over the telephone. Eventually, we [unintelligible] with cassette tapes. But in the immediate they would have been done over the telephone. There was just no other way to get it here. Maybe the closer, facilities, you know, Washington Center, Dulled, they could have driven them in.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would that have been that

SATORI?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : SATORI is different, SATORI is a reply on, for the--off the host for en-route facilities. The radar cannon, is always, as far as I know, posted on an FTP site, a Website. The radar is then extracted into SATORI and recreated. The voice, which is different, the voice would probably have been taken over the telephone and then they sync the two together. And that's--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : but SATORI was basically plotting the Radar plots.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c A little bit better, it's a picture.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, it's a picture, but it's not the voice.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, no, they sync the voice, when they download it, usually the tapes come in from over the telephone. In today's environment, if you want a SATORI, they would download it and either create a WAV file or they would just Federal Express us a tape and then we would sync them and then send it back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you guys did, received a voice tape over the telephone, would it have the time stamps on it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Maybe, sometimes yes, sometimes, no. Generally not. Because we'd be receiving it in monotone, we didn't have the capability of receiving it in stereo, doesn't mean the only one they had, they played it and we received it, it would have the time stamps but there would be no way of split them. And if we were creating a SATORI, we don't want the time stamp because we'll sync it ourselves or a RAPTOR, we'd sync it ourselves.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you guys received draft transcripts from a facility, how would they normally transmit them to you guys?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Fax.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They would fax them to you? Would you ever get them, like, e-mailed or.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Some.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you guys had received the actual original tapes for Cleveland immediately

thereafter, would you guys have made the transcripts yourself here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --or would you have waited for them to do it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We don't, we may help to do a draft working copy, just to get it to the suits, but we don't do transcripts. One, we don't have the people power and, two, I really frown upon it because I don't want to put my--I mean I don't want to certify something that doesn't belong to me, it belongs to the facility. I don't like vouching for them. I'll vouch for my work, which is really okay, but I'm not going to vouch for the facility. And, of course, our job is to be investigators and put together the pieces.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you still have any of your e-mails from that period of time? Did you keep a directory on your computer where you kept all the files that you were working on associated with these time lines and stuff following 9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't ever remember using my

computer for anything to be honest about it. I know that's stupid and it's probably not true. Would I have kept something, I keep everything. That's what I do for a living. I didn't keep any of the e-mails, because I didn't have any. What I've got now has to do with the Commission stuff and the project, you were in the room the other day, that I'm working on. I didn't, no, let me rephrase that. Yeah, I probably would have, because I was the one, I would have sent out the e-mails saying, New York, you're going to do this; Cleveland, you're going to do this; Indy, you're going to do this, Wash--so, yeah, for that, but as far as requesting stuff, I didn't do anything like that, so, yes, I would have kept my e-mails. I probably still have them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'd like to get copies of any archives like that that you still have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of everything? From when to when?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, we're looking at two periods, I think, essentially. Immediately

following 9/11 and preparation of time lines and chronologies and after-action reports that would kind of show when FAA did certain things.

And then, also, other time period we're looking at is connected with the 9/11 Commission, preparing, you know, the Administrator and I guess it would be the former Administrator and her former Deputy, you know, for hearings and things like that. And I had just--I put a request in to the IT folks at FAA and they're going to be coming out to different people to help pull these things off, so I'm pretty sure your name was on that list.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Let me show you what I've got here. The Commission that's a whole different story, let's see what I've got here. 9/11 and this is my favorite from a long time ago. Let's just go back September 13, I think it starts, it's as far as I have, can you see it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So this would have been, well you can see the dates, I have no idea who that is, I do remember who that guy was, he was some guy

over here, he was helping [unintelligible] ended up couldn't. That's from the Department of Justice. That's (b)(6), (b)(7)c that has to do with; I'm not sure what that has to do with; this is probably, yeah, this is where I was saying, you remember I told you about facilities, going to do with that. You just tell me what you want, it'll take a couple days to print it all out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I'd like, the IT guys, I asked them to grab these and archive them electronically.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then we can just not waste as much paper, because there's probably only a handful that we really need.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And then, just [unintelligible] from different dates. Let me spin this around for him. Now see a lot of this is Department of Justice. Some of these are in the wrong place, some of these are jokes. I have one called jokes. You'll find air traffic controllers are a pretty morbid group. Some of these, yeah some

of these are jokes. And then, as you can tell, for example, yeah this is the end of the year, so I really don't have that many, not like Doug and all them would have but yeah you can take what you want.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you also have some folders for, like, there's American 11, there's 777

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Those have to do with Accident Packages, I'm sure that's all, yeah, and these were how to do the packages, which these are part of United's, too. The packages and you can have a pretty of the packages and 93, I don't see 93, do you see it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c There's one more place, I didn't spell it out, I guess I didn't do anything in 93, yeah, if you guys want this that's fine. Yeah it has to do with the packages, because we were trying to get them released.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would these be with copies of the packages attached?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I don't know, let's find

out. What this is in the process of getting the package correct, because it had to be perfect. these are the mistakes they made, so they have to go back and fix them, that's what that's a copy of, seven pages worth.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Man.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c If you want to know a part of history, up there on that shelf, those are the original packages.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All four of them?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Those are the originals. No, those are the originals, not copies.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh the originals, before you went back and said, you guys are---

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, those are the final products. I ordered them here, no I'll show you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, in those folders up there, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm sure you got copies of these, but these are the originals, because this project I'm under these are--these are them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think the only one I have a complete copy of is 175, because that was the one, New York had done.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'd got them all. I have copies scanned in, I don't have the originals scanned in yet. This is what we're doing for that big project. Those are the originals.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, if you have those already scanned in--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, and you asked about, I swear to God, that'll be easy, I don't have a whole lot, you can tell I don't have a whole lot because the file is only 735 megs of which most of it is going to be these four things.

This is a copy of everything that was on the S-drive, as of September 4 and the S-drive is a big shared drive. This is a copy of a folder that was on the S-drive, this has to do with Payne Stuart. This was radar provided to the NTSB. This is my project I'm working on now, my files there. Some WAV clips, Smithsonian stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I guess.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c My responses to the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess what would be helpful is if we could just get a copy of that folder, we can just go through it and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and let me just check one more thing. This should have, I can do that for you in a heartbeat. Here's the Accident Package for American.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay, you've got it scanned in and everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I scanned in a copy, there's a difference between, the only difference really from this point would be a label. Yeah, I can do it, that's okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They can all fit on, like one CD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c 700, what I'd say 730 some megabytes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you guys were working on putting this together, do you recall seeing any or obtaining any data from the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. I'm listening, go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what it was that you saw, where you guys got it from?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Specifically, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There's just, maybe this will refresh your recollection a little, what are we talking, American 111, I think, there's this 8:40 event, and it says here Northeast Air Defense Sector Log indicate and it's got, it says they were notified by FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Asking me if I saw the logs?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've never seen the logs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Matter of fact, I don't remember seeing any of the military logs. Doesn't mean I didn't there's all kinds of paper out there and if we put that thing together, they would have been there to be seen, I just don't remember seeing them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you interact with the military at all?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The only thing I remember, let me get this started.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually it's going to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's going to overflow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It may overflow, let me see how big this is, it is going to overflow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Break at 40 megabytes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We can fix that. Let's do that, let's take that off. That should do it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that an 800 meg CD

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I'm pretty sure it is, and then I can just put the, if you really want this stuff for this project, you can have it. Yeah it's big enough.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you already have, for that project, do you have stuff in that directory that's scanned already?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Very little, the packages, very little. We haven't, really started it yet,

nothing officially the packages, you know, the copies of the packages [unintelligible] unofficial but, I mean they're official copies, but they're not the official-official.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the things I was interested in being able to take a look at were the copies of packages, so if that's not going to be included in--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I'll give them to you. I just have to do two CDs, that's all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [SIMULTANEOUS CONVERSATION UNINTELLIGIBLE]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c One thing I remember is that there is a, now you're going to ask me for the site, it was a radar site, from some private corporation. No, disregard that, that was TWA-800, I don't think I had any dealings with the military.

The only thing I could imagine would have been putting together those things or things, because the military is supposed to investigate the same way the FAA does. So questions may have come down the pipeline. And they would have come to me or

someone I work with, but I don't recall, I don't remember anything like that. It wouldn't surprise me, though.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you said you didn't see any of the military data that you recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was there to be seen, which means I probably did, I just have no specific memory.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You also said you didn't recall where it may have come from? One of the things, I know you said that you don't recall preparing this or working on this grid military notification time line, but this military notification time line, appears, because of the date in the footer that it was prepared, or finalized more or less around the 18th of September, which was like a day after this---

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The reason I know I've never seen this is I know nothing about the context. I never saw anything [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It would seem that this document may have been prepared kind of parallel to

or maybe even the grid time line may have even used the data from the summary.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Could have don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And one of the things that we have seen, there's an entry in this grid time line for like United 93.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That says that FAA notified the military at 10:08 and that time was taken out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know. That was an earlier version, I don't know, I could guess, the guess is it was taken out because we discovered it was wrong.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the things the 9/11 Commission had concluded when they, I guess pulled together the time lines for their report was that this, it's about a minute off, this one here, but this is actually a good time for notification. I guess one of the things I'm wondering is who decided what to include or not to include in these time lines.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do you mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, like somebody concluded that we were not going to include this 10:08 reference because it was marked N/A, and then the final one has N/A in it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I remember there was a big thing that we had to be accurate and if we couldn't validate it, we were, you know, not to put in BS stuff, if we couldn't validate it, we couldn't validate it.

Now, I'm guessing, but it's probably a pretty good guess. Let me rephrase that, I'm estimating that the reason that it would have been deleted was because we couldn't validate it because as I told you before, we would take a draft copy of the booklet upstairs or Dave Knoles would take a draft copy of the booklet upstairs and come back down and say these times don't match, we found this and we'd have to go back through and we did it again. I remember we went and we got, actually (b)(6), (b)(7)c was there. He set up this, we set up this back of a map or something a light board or something like, it wasn't a screen but it was like

a screen. And Jeff took a computer and hooked it up to one of our projectors and we flashed it up on this board, every piece of paper that was in that book, well, not every piece of paper, everything with time lines, that was in that book and we had to go through every one and validate every time. And I remember Tom saying something. And we would sit there and as we went around a time would be flashed up there for something for some time line and we all had to have that time. And if there was a disagreement, we had to resolve that disagreement before it stayed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tom who?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Tom Carmody, he's dead now.

But, and I remember the times got changed and as weird and because we worked on this thing forever. And even then, it was really, really frustrating for us, you know, tempers were pretty high. But I remember going through that and it was, like, well, who in the hell put that thing in there? And where did it come from when everybody else had something different? But, you know, mistakes were made.

But I remember going through that exercise.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember who was involved in that with you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Everybody.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Basically the team for lack of a better description of those putting those together from AAT-20?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, absolutely, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] would come and go, but Tony Ferrante was heading it up and, you know, everybody was sitting there and everybody had their notes especially the four people, the ones who owned airplanes. And everybody else was just pitching in, too. And it was just, you'd have to understand the kind of organization we are, where it was almost like a free-for-all, you know, we just all talk at the same time, we're controllers, we still hear everybody at the same time. So to anybody who wasn't part of us it was just blah, blah, blah, blah. But it sounds kind of weird, but that's the way we did it. But I remember doing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So what would it take to
validate a time period?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Agreement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Agreement amongst the group?

So, you guys might have three different sources for
an event that you guys would have to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Resolve that, we'd have to go
back and make some more phone calls.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you guys would, essentially
have to have like a footnote source for each event.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What do you mean?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, like you'd have to have
a source, like--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We had to have something.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You had to have something, you
couldn't just say, well, you know, I seem to
remember somebody typed this up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, we had to have
something.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like this here says American
11 began south-bound turn over Albany New York.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Radar data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Presumably you got radar data?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right that would be a good example.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : ZBW notified New York or New York ARTC of possible hijacking.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Could do that through voice, they could do that through their own -4, their personnel--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Air log?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Administrative log, I mean something. Obviously we can't just make it up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So with this one here you might have something from ZBW, which is Boston, right? And New York Center, so you might have a log from Boston and because it says ZNY---

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be New York.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That you tried to make sure the two matched or come to some conclusion.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah we had to come to some conclusion, and something like that probably would be tapes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] or

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Whoever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As long as we're having this kind of meeting, one of you would say this came from the tapes and everybody would say----

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. I've got American 77, this is what my notes show. But other people had other notes, too. Well, that's not what I show. then we'd go back and resolve it. And depending on what the context was, we could have it resolved.

But you know when I mentioned, you know, we'd been here for a long time, everybody was tired. If we saw one more pizza or one more box of donuts, somebody was going to be murdered. And we had our comic-relief times, too, but it was--we were all trying to do what was right. This is my

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'll stop the tape. It's
10:38

[BREAK]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll start the interview
back, it's 10:39.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We had to resolve it somehow,

and it would depend on what needed and what the situation was, how we did it. And sometimes it was this data's more reliable than that data. It would be that simple and so we're going to go with this. But when Dave, what I'm trying to remember, when Dave would come down from taking the drafts up there. And would control the number that we printed of everything, and in the morning he would go back and collect them all, and we would shred them and come out with a new draft. I don't know what he did once he got upstairs. He would come back and say, no, these times are incorrect. And we're sitting there looking at our pieces of paper, thinking, okay, that's not what we have. And we--what information did you have, Dave and I remember conversations like that. That he had information that we didn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, he was dealing with other organizations, too, so that it's possible it makes sense.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who he was dealing

with?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What up in that room?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : With regard to who was he presenting the time lines to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Bill Peacock, Jeff Griffith, Trevor Rand [ph], you know the Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, Trevor Rand, Accident Legislation, Legal, the Union was up there. And I'm sure probably a cast of thousands--okay, dozens.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But the bosses as you referred to them

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The suits.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The suits.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, what data might he have access to that you guys did not?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We're only Air Traffic, we only deal with Air Traffic, you know, the FAA's made up of, you know, many, many organizations that aren't Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Airway Facilities, which are the techies, you know, they own the equipment; automation, which owns the software; the Office of Accident and Investigation, who runs all the accident investigation for FAA,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Flight Standards

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c crew, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and all them, who (b)(6), (b)(7)c now works for. He had access to the FBI, the military, the CIA, the White House, Congress, obviously, W, by the time he gets to his go cart, oh it was W, he didn't really call me much lately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He didn't call you much lately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And so, you know, he'd have access that we didn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did he ever come down, I mean, and say, you know we've got some information up there, we're going to some of the Air Force's data, and it doesn't match this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Dave Knoles is one of the best

guys in the FAA. I love him dearly, he's been my boss until just a few months ago. And do I remember that, does it make sense he would do that? Absolutely. He would do it to us, I mean, he would do it, I mean, he was part of us and you know, we were frustrated because he was the guy bringing the bad news. We have to do this again, and we were frustrated because he was bringing, as I said, but he was one of us. And, but yeah, that would make sense. But do I remember that specifically? Yeah, that would make sense.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember any requests for FAA's information from the military, like maybe assembling some stuff that somebody said, hey, you know?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You mean, immediately afterward?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That's a good question, it's going to be one of those things, do I have any specific memory? No. Did it probably happen? Yes. They would have to have called us to get

permission to release it. Because immediately we'd clamp down on everything, seize, immediately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you guys have been the ones that he would called directly or it was passed by as a liaison, you know the FAA's got Cheyenne Mountain [unintelligible] I was up there for a week with the DOD people. [unintelligible] mountain and while I'm sitting on the base would they have called you if somebody had approached them, somebody wanting information?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c If the military calls Washington Center and says we want this done. And there's going to be two parts to this answer in the immediate aftermath, which could have been a day, a day and a half, Washington Center says, well, that's nice, I'll get back to you. They would have hung up and they would have called their Region. Their Region would have called us. At some point being realistic, when, who knows, but at some point the order would have been given out giving military copies, but not originals of anything they want. Now when that happened?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You don't remember that happening.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, but I don't remember that happening, but that happened. Obviously, I mean, you've had a national crisis here. And so that would have [unintelligible] no, you're going to give it to him, we'll give them copies, no originals. No originals leave your building without our permission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But, initially, within the first two days anyway there was a clamp down on everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, really, you guys are the IG, so you understand, it's not one government. And everybody gets territorial and, okay, and that's the way it works, and because you get burned, so you always go to a higher authority.

But initially, for Air Traffic and the radar, that comes out of the 8020. And so they would come to our office. And that could have all taken place while I was still in Indianapolis. I mean. I remember the order going out: Seize,

seize everything and lock it up. I remember that because I was in Indy when I came out. And I know that transition would have happened, to give them anything--copies of anything they want we're not going to hold back we're going to be full cooperative, which is the right thing to do. I could see that happening.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, who, if that happened, who would have been involved in something like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It could have been one of many people. It could have been as simple as a regional specialist, calling someone like me and me making that decision. Or it could be the White House telling the Administrator. It could happen. And again because of what we were talking about.

The other day, you were down here with Doug and you guys wanted copies of stuff. I love you guys, right? I checked with the boss before I released it. I knew what the answer was, but it's still a CYA government. And, I mean, I knew what the answer was going to be, but just to let them

know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, because you didn't want your boss to come back after us and saying, what?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you're thinking, oh, I thought it was okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've been there before, I've done that before. So, and I knew what the answer was going to be. I released--I had tapes released on that Senator from Missouri, Calahan, I believe it was, I can't remember, that died right before the election in 2000?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And I released the tapes without thinking. And--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Heard about it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --the Administrator, you know, had, I lost about five pounds that day in the backside. And I was wrong and I knew, Duh. Of course you check with Public Affairs on something like that. And I just didn't think about that. It was an accident like any other accident. September

11 wasn't. And so anybody at that level said we're not going to play this game, guys, let it go. And all they would have been seeking for is someone from headquarters to give that permission. No different from a couple days ago. And as I said, it could have been the White House calling Jane, I think it was Jane, or it could have been Garvey. Or it could have been a regional specialist calling somebody in the bay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you mentioned earlier, I just want to make sure we understand, do you know who the consumer of this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" time line booklet was?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Define consumer.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, where did it go?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We made only, under orders from Dave Knoles, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --we only made, we started out to make three copies. Only made three copies, destroyed all, everything after that. Of course we're not stupid, because three quickly became

five, which quickly became ten. But I think there were only. When you meet with (b)(6), (b)(7)c she has a memory like a steel trap. Between 35 and 42 copies, something like that, that was all that were ever made.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And we accounted for every one of them. Now, when I say account or every one of them, which means, here's 10, Dave. And then what was left was locked up. And then it was, then Dave would come back down, okay we need three more. Here's three more, Dave.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you would take them out of the original, you would go make more copies.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, initially we only made three copies and then we went upstairs to Graphics on the fifth floor and we'd have them run a few more and we had a priority. And then we ran a few more and then at some point, I remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I looking at each other thinking okay this is stupid, just run 30 of them, something like that. And they just, okay, fine, no problem, because it

was a waste of time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And, you know, the writing was on the wall, yeah, we know what's going to happen. So, we didn't make all that many copies.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you end up distributing them all out of the safe or wherever you were keeping them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a log of who you gave them to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I didn't keep a log, I doubt if a log was kept. Maybe Dave Knoles did. And then over the years, of course, then, you know, then it goes out. And, again, although it took days to prepare this, you know, the investigation, obviously you're here it's still going on. I mean to some degree we knew there was going to be some inaccuracies. There's just no way you're going to take something that massive, no way and make it perfect, unless you're going to get into the Times, it's just not going to happen. But you know, it's good enough for the White House, good enough for

Congress, good enough for the Administrator and the Secretary of Transportation, for the time being. Knowing that something's going to happen down the line, going to be a better investigation, more thorough.

But when they were done handing them out. There was 12 left, guessing, estimating, and we were told to destroy them. They just didn't want extra copies floating around because they are going to be inaccurate after a while. And we were told to destroy them. They weren't because we knew they would want more copies. And they were just secured. And over the years, they every now and then, you know the question would be, does anybody know where we can get an extra copy of those things? You told us to destroy them. Well, yeah, I know, but we also worked with you guys for 200 years. Does anybody have an extra copy?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, one of those copies, yeah sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know but if you have to go down and get a smoke, I'm sure that when you

come back there will be one on your desk. And I think there may be only three copies left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So from the original--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Batch--there was only one batch.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --batch 30 or something, okay that was what I was going to ask.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c There was only three or four copies left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because I think at the at the IG shop, we ended up with three copies of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Have no idea how you got them. Did you go out for a smoke?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I don't smoke.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It wouldn't surprise me if you didn't get them you know from Tony Ferrante or somebody, but I know the Commission got one or two.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't recall exactly what we made copies of for you the other day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That wasn't one of them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, of the stuff, in there

some place because there isn't a file of this, there was a little file here a little file here the cover sheet was put together and things like that. It' not like you click on something and have one of these things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, it's a compilation of different electronic documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I probably should scan one of those babies in, if I could find an extra copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll all go out for a smoke.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, if you can't find one, let me know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, we'll have to because it's part of a FOIA request, I'm going to have to produce it. It's not classified, so we're going to have to do it anyway. I think there's only maybe three copies left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you'll probably need to ask those above you what happened to the copies they got?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The copies that would have been in my control, custody, and are, I either--I

only gave them to one of two people. Dave Knoles or Tony Ferrante. And I controlled them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the only real--is it safe to say, and you can correct me if I'm wrong. Is it safe to say the only external party you are aware of having received a copy of that document is the Commission?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Good point, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then us I just told you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Only because you told me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Did you get involved in helping Jane Garvey or Monty Belcher or any of the other FAA personnel that had to testify before the Commission prepare for their testimony?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get involved in, and I guess, I'm trying to think let's just say from 2003 till present, did you get involved in preparing any time lines or revising any time lines since that period kind of in connection with the Commission's work?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I can find out. And by the

way, I'm going to show you what I have on the computer--your CDs right there. I'll make it easy, there are going to be two documents on there and they're going to be titled National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States dated 7/15/03 and one with the same name dated 8/11/03.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I created those documents and those are in the responses and if there are time lines in any of those responses, then I would have created them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This one just seems to be a list of things I produced.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's pretty long.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, well, it wasn't good enough for the Commission, so the subpoenaed the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, so this is post--pre-subpoena.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wow.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, you found one of the two people that caused all that. So, anyway it doesn't look like there's a time line there. Now, if there was a time line as part of that result, it would have just been that somebody provided me. So, unless it's on one of two documents, for the Commission, I would not have created any time line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did about in that particular time, in the area of 2003 up to now, do you have any recollection of, again, receiving any phone calls or have about tell you that they had a phone call come in from the FAA liaison at Peterson Air Force Base, which is NORAD, Colorado Springs, that the Air Force was reviving their or having to revive their time line for something and were looking for some more FAA information during the time lines?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, no. Do I recall? Yes, I recall, did that happen? Not with me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, you recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I recall that nobody called me or talked to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay. Yeah that's about when 2003 was when the did the NEEDS tapes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember exactly, that's why I was saying, let's just, we'll look from January 1, '03. I know the Commission's well they might have headquartered a hearing in January '03, I just don't recall. I know that the hearing that resulted in our presence here today was in May of '03, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I at some point became aware before the end of the--before the Commission came out with its report, there was a controversy with the WatchFox News [ph]. And for a short time, initially, I was involved in preparing--collecting and preparing documents to give to the Commission, and then there was stretch where I wasn't going to have anything to do with it. And then, somehow I got suckered back into it in the latter stages.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After the subpoena?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, the subpoena came out, there Washington a time period where, you know, fine the Commission, you know, is way off base here

and this is politics, I'm out of it, plus Tony Ferrante and I sort of caused the thing to begin with, that's probably good internal politics, to be honest.

And then something happened, it could have been as simple as I was the one standing outside the door, who knows, and I got suckered back into it. Collecting and preparing stuff to turn over and but I'm aware of the controversy involved in it. Never received a phone call through Fox News.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of the Air Force's [unintelligible] or the time line?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There is a discrepancy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

MR. MYERS: Or that is an issue.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Two out of 13

[unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have no idea.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the one that's pretty glaring, I think the military had said at 9:16 the FAA made them aware of United 93--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have no comment, don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that airplane hadn't even been hijacked at 9:16, so you know, we're pretty good.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" was published, if you guys had gotten information that was different than what was in here, what sort of revisions of this sort.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Once it was created, there were no revisions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay so that was it. Were there revised time lines then that were different that you guys work on or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : None that I worked on. Because what I do for a living litigation, I do background for all this stuff. I went over to help, because everybody helped and tghen who knows for how long, a week, two weeks later, that I slowly got back out of it and got back into my things relatively slowed down a little bit. But like I said everybody will, as much as we did try, we did everything to make those things accurate, we all knew that it wasn't accurate/accurate that

would come way down the road. But it was something happens, everybody, you know, wants to know what's going on, get me what you got now. I want it accurate, but you know we want to give it to the Administrator, you know, talk to the Secretary who's going to go down to the White House, it's going to be on CNN and so, you know, that's the goal. Is it going to change with time?

[unintelligible] but, anyway, no revisions. Any other time lines come up, don't know. Wouldn't surprise me. That was a snapshot.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What you guys knew at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the day it was finalized, that was a snapshot of that moment, this is as correct as we can make it, let's go forward.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Date of what the 18th of September?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 17th.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 17 September, so

[unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The moment we did it we didn't

change any data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember that ever being a request from Monty Belcher about when the FAA notified the military about the various aircraft? Did you ever--do you remember a request, this would be after, you know, this would be probably I think in '03, sometime, a request from the Secretary's office about the time line and it's accuracy and having to go and scrub the data that you got?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Don't know anything about that. The issue, when it comes to the time line is when people started asking for tapes from the military. The coordination between the FAA and the military because it had to do with the Commission request. I got involved in that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pulling tapes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)b Yeah, m having people pull tapes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Making more summary, basically summary

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But I don't know about that,

but I don't recall that part. So, I don't want to go as far as saying no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But it's possible if there would have been any summary it would have come off the tapes. And, you know, the Commission goes along with this thing but there is this controversy so the Commission asked for tapes, voice tapes, it could be as broad, we could go through the requests, as road as give us all the tapes of any and all communication between the FAA and any military and that's the request I would have made if I was the Commission and maybe they did and I just don't remember.

But for your purposes something along this lines, it would have been my job, I was back in it by them, to write all these people and say, give me all the tapes. They would have sent us in the tapes, we would have packaged them up and shipped them up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you send three-year directly to the Commission or did they make a stop

along the way?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Shirley Miller.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Shirley Miller?

MR. MYERS: Yeah. Anything I dealt with went directly to Shirley Miller. I think Doug and them may have let her know the stuff was in and that military would let her know the stuff was in and she may have said, fine, go ahead and ship it over. Only, now that I remember that that I remember a billion boxes on carts going from here down the street on these carts. And that didn't go through Shirley's office. But anything I did, went to Shirley Miller.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then from there on?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, let me back, I'm being factual guys, that's what I do guys, I'm sorry. There would be one or two things I would have given to Tony Ferrante. Tony Ferrante would have given it to Shirley Miller. But after a while he got busy, so he removed himself from [unintelligible] and Shirley and I just did this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So she was the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA Liaison.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Senior advisor to the Deputy Administrator and she was the point of contact for the FAA. And after a while as of trust, time whatever, she would, you know, tell Doug, her and Doug got along really good, just give it to him.

There was a woman working for the Commission, I actually met her, she was kind of cute. No, so I can describe her, petite blonde, or dishwasher blonde hair. There had been a couple times when she would ask for something and Shirley was out of pocket, so, actually one time in particular, I, you know, I met her downstairs and I gave it to her, but then gave Shirley a copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She was with FAA?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She was with the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c She was working with the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She was working--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c She may have been FBI.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Working with the Commission,
don't hold me to that either.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And I know at some point I've
got her name, I know I got her name. And so, there
were a couple of times when Shirley would say send
it to what's his face this stupid guy over there.
They're not going to hear this part. At the
Commission, so I would e-mail both out at the same
time. In my mind, that's going through Shirley,
but technically, I guess it's not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. On the 11th of
September do you remember who the manager of
Quality Assurance was at Cleveland Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No. I want to say Ken Myers
[ph], but I don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who the manager is
now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about Indianapolis?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I think he

still is security manager. You're talking about Quality Assurance?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know that, and I think he still is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Indianapolis is the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : CID.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --CID and Cleveland was the OB, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Affirmative.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about Washington Center>

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Don't remember, but it's ZDC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know New York. How about Boston? ZBO, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Boston is ZBW, it may have been (b)(6), (b)(7)c he's now the current manager, it may have been (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I recognize that name.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right. Do you know who the QA manger is now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who at the Command Center Herndon?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and it still is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's SQA?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, I know it's (b)(6), (b)(7)c now I'm 90 percent certain it was then.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they have a symbol like the Z-symbols or

(b)(6), (b)(7)c ATSCC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't think of anything else can you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just sort of a side question, the formal Accident Packages, do they include the tail numbers of the aircraft?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Should. This is 1977, 6, well this one didn't. Let's see for American 77, now this is for the Air Traffic Package, understand, it won't be an FAA file, American 77, there's no requirement, but usually they do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Which one is that you just looked at? Eleven?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Ninety-three [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's on that title page,
right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, like the third or fourth
page back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] going to have
another Accident Package?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c They'll have a file--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A file?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --of their own.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Let's see, 93, no, 93 no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The way it works, let me--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which one is that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Flight Standards will, no
doubt about that. the way it works, the Office of
Accident Investigation which is really AAI, AAI is
over Flight Standards in the hierarchy of things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And [unintelligible] AAI, they
would have done an FAA file, and they have forms

they have to fill out for this accident because by law there are nine points we have to cover and the FAA's [unintelligible] investigation. We're Air Traffic, all we do is provide evidence or documentation to support their investigation. We don't do our own investigation other than a cursory review of our services to see if we are in compliance with our own directives. But we provide this package and the file that would go with it. This package goes in an Air Traffic--this is an Air Traffic file, the stuff in the Air traffic file, not all of it, but most of it, would be provided to the IIC, FAA IIC, upon request the NTSB, IIC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What does IIC stand for?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Investigator In Charge.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c In a situation like this where there is a criminal act, the NTSB is pretty much out of it, the FBI takes over. So, upon request to the FBI, ICC, FBI though is designated, we would turn the copies over to them, they would include it in their files. So, we're just helping with the

investigation and that's our pretty much limited role, helping those who do the investigation by providing evidence, documentation, data and whatever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, in this case, did the NTSB actually do a report for these aircraft? I'd heard somebody saying--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I have no clue.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --they couldn't because they knew what caused the crash.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Because it's a criminal investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And a criminal investigation the NTSB has no authority. The easiest way they could find out is go to NTSB.gov to find out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I could find nothing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Then they would have nothing because they post everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Correct because these we help up when we talked to Shirley Miller on the tape thing and she was saying the only issue they had

the Commission demanding these and her saying you'll get them when the FBI says I can give them to you, because they classified them initially, for a short period of time .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : /MR. MYERS [SIMULTANEOUS CONVERSATION UNINTELLIGIBLE]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The few years the airplane that flew the White House 1 Arrival, as we jokingly called it and flew into the side of the White House was an FBI Secret Service investigation and it was a big turf war. And then, you know, the guy [unintelligible] and the NTSB went packing. But the interesting thing is the FAA under the law can [unintelligible] we still run our own investigation. So, in September 11, the FAA still ran an independent investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they recover the flight recorders from all the flights do you know?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Don't remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c would know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c would, it's just a kind of curious thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [SIMULTANEOUS
CONVERSATION UNINTELLIGIBLE]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintelligible] with that one
far away [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The what

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Parts, body parts.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When an airplane crashes, you
melt.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When an airplane crashes,
you're the best evidence, because your impact, your
body fluids will impact upon the gauges and it
leaves shadow and imprints, which will tell us
everything about the--not everything but many
things about the airplane. You can always tell who
was flying the airplane because the thumbs are
broken and the ankles. Because you tense up, they
snap off. And that's the person flying the
airplane, if you can find the hands.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, that's kind of morbid

isn't it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The ones in the Towers, there
wasn't much left of anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It all melted away.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Have you guys heard the tapes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which ones?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : "The" tapes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The hijackers?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They're pretty--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's chilling.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It is, especially in the days
afterward. I remember and you'll meet her later,
Cathrine, she'd go off and she'd cry for a while,
then she came back and said, guys, I can't do it.
And it is pretty--we knew what was going on. It
surprised me when the Commission played the tapes
on TV. Because we would never have released it.
There's a precedent for that an the Challenger,
there was a jet on the West Coast, we would never

have released them, but since they did, we have to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't think of anymore questions can you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I gave you those CDs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I've got them right here. Is there anything else that you think would be helpful or

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll end the interview at 11:14.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
LYLE A. [TONY] MELLO

BY

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

INVESTIGATOR (b)(3), (b)(7)a

Friday, October 8, 2004

11:36 a.m. - 12:43 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is October 8, 2004, the time is 11:36 in the morning, we are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 428 in Washington D.C. My name is William Owens, my co-investigator is David Hooper. We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 a Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today we're interviewing Tony Mello. Mr. Mello, please, acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. MELLO: Yes, I am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. MELLO: Yes, I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you, please, give your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

MR. MELLO: Lyle is my first name, A. that's where Tony comes from, last name Mello, M-e-l-l-o and I go by Tony.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your current position?

MR. MELLO: Current position, there's been a big shift in air traffic, we're now in ATO and my current position is Director of Safety Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what grade are you, presently?

MR. MELLO: I'm L band, when we're in full comp, it's an L band.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you held your current position?

MR. MELLO: Well, since the establishment of the ATO, which was about six months ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: the job is the same as it was back on 9/11, just a different reporting official and a different organization behind him, but my duties and stuff are the same as they were back then.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the old organization?

MR. MELLO: It was called AAT-20 is the umbrella we were under, my personal position was AAT-201, which was Assistant Division Manager for Investigations, air traffic investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you--how long had you held that position prior to September 11?

MR. MELLO: I'd say about a year and a half, I forget the--about a year, actually, it was about a year as of that time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As of September 2000?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, that's fair to say.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so, essentially, other than an organizational change, you've held that position since September 2000?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I'm not a deputy anymore, I'm a director, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A director.

MR. MELLO: --equivalent in the old organization, would have been a division manager, back then I was assistant division, I had someone above me, which was Tony Ferrante, I don't know if

you've heard that name come up. Probably have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I was going to ask you who you reported to?

MR. MELLO: That was my immediate supervisor, Tony Ferrante.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that was on the 11 of September, Tony was your boss?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who did Tony report to?

MR. MELLO: We all, we reported to Dave Knoles, which was AAT-20--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. MELLO: He was the manager of that and we were one division inside of that 200, which was Accident and Incident Investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today, who do you report to?

MR. MELLO: I report to an actor who's name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c he's acting Vice President of Safety, that's because (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the formal manager and he resigned and went back to U.S.Air. He was from U.S.Air, manager or something, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c yeah. You'll find

me checking this.

MR. MELLO: Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We did a couple of really long interviews and for some reason, I had some technical problems and now I'm paranoid. Do you have a staff then?

MR. MELLO: I have a staff, yes, I mean, it's almost down to nothing, but it's getting ready to come back. What they tried to was take our old function, what we did in AAT and move it into Safety, but now we have this ATO, people started going everywhere. But back in the days of 9/11, we had five investigators, an analyst, staff person. I'm down to one analyst and one staff person right now. But we're going to bid four positions, I'm getting a couple from in-house, so we should be back up hill within two months, hopefully.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, on 9/11 who was on your staff?

MR. MELLO: Let's see, Tony was the division manager, I was assistant division manager; we had Dan Diggins, and he was in the process of

the transition to move, but he's still on paper, belonged to us. (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], Mary Strawbridge, Doug Gould, and, I don't know if Bing, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c was with us yet, I don't thing so. That was the investigation side, okay? People that I supervised also was (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], and they were on the litigation side but it all came under us at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you describe for us, synoptically, kind of what your duties are?

MR. MELLO: Sure, basically for Air Traffic, we are the quality assurance side of them, we're the internal affairs of them. We basically are the--we keep our hands on the pulse of air traffic. We're reporters, investigators, to accidents and incidents in the system and we report on them daily. We do that from some offices, we do that on-site, we participate with the NTSB on majors; representing air traffic, again. We don't get into the wreckage part of it, we get into the facility part. Whether the controllers do their

job; were the procedures correct. You know, we sit with the lawyers that are helping us get through depositions; helping us get through investigations and interviews like this with the Safety Board.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] the TSB?

MR. MELLO: Yes. Any complaints, anything, you know, that comes in through a third-party, something we'd look into it. We're not tied to a region; we're not tied to a facility; we're not tied to either terminal, we kind of can free-flow, so we can go wherever we want. I guess that's why I say internal affairs, you know, they answer to someone outside of the organization, we can look at anything we want.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you first start with the FAA?

MR. MELLO: Oh, in 1981, right after the strike.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What position and where?

MR. MELLO: I was an air traffic controller at La Guardia in New York, La Guardia Airport.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you're from New York?

MR. MELLO: New England.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : New England?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, Rhode Island, I was born.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Somebody said that I was with earlier in the week when we met you in the hallway they said, sounds like he has a New York accent. And I didn't hear it.

MR. MELLO: Do you hear it now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I don't because I'm not--I've been living there for a while now, so I don't even--

MR. MELLO: New York?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --pick up the accents anymore.

MR. MELLO: I did my three years there and I left, too much, not the facility, just hectic. I was born in a small town, I lived on an island actually.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where at in Rhode Island?

MR. MELLO: Newport?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Newport. Yeah that's lovely.

MR. MELLO: Naval base there, War College.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We had an in-service up there last summer that was real nice.

MR. MELLO: That's as far north as I want to go.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They still have winter here, so.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, but it's shorter than New England.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you on duty on September 11?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And where were you at on that day?

MR. MELLO: Basically a couple offices down, my old office was where you were sitting the other day in that room where all the computers?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MR. MELLO: Used to be two offices I was on the left side, I was the assistant division manager. Yeah, normally a 5:30 in the morning type guy, we do reports and stuff, so I'm in real early.

It's ahead of the traffic, too. But I'm here till 4:00, 4:30, so work on the other end.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was going to say, now that you [unintelligible] 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, no matter what time you come in.

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Following September 11, did you, I mean, like immediately following, did you participate in preparing, like, any after-action reports or time lines or anything like that to kind of chronicle what was happening that day?

MR. MELLO: Yes, well, I as involved that day with the initial group that was, basically, we put a telecon together and had facilities, mainly the East at first, but finally, the rest of the country on real time working the issues.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that the teleconference on the 10th floor, was in one of the conference rooms, right?

MR. MELLO: Dave Knoles, which was my boss; Tony Ferrante wasn't here the 11th, he was in Chicago doing some EEO thing, or something, I

think, a hearing or something. So, Dave walked by and this was about--then comes back and I think either reported the first hit at the World Trade or reported a possible hijacking. He said come on, and when we got up there you could just tell, you know the 10th floor was abuzz in the conference room, very hectic. So we started off by just getting a telecon together to start talking to facilities.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was that line recorded?

MR. MELLO: A lot of people asked that. We assumed it was recorded from the WOC. The WOC, Washington Operations Center, actually own the net we were using, we were just utilizing it. So, we thought it was, we found out later that it wasn't and we tried going to the people that were on it, because you know if they recorded it, we could hear everything anyway. But I mean we had lost it listening to tapes and stuff and who had a recording of that actual line, last I knew, from the 9/11 Commission, I don't think they ever found what they were looking for. And we did the Command

Center side of the facilities, now, since then, I know that we have the whole WOC all new equipment and there's the capability there now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What I had heard from some of the folks in the FAA is that, if I understood correctly, that nothing in WOC was recorded.

MR. MELLO: Well, advance, I understand was, that if they said we want this recorded, they had the means to do that, but it would have to be preempted, if I, you know, because they did it with TV and stuff like that, you know, they'd say, yeah, let's record this or, but I don't think that just, yesterday or, hey, let's go grab that, I don't think they had the capability at the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, it wasn't like SOP at the time?

MR. MELLO: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, did--do you know if the Center, when they patched in other facilities, would there be a record to show the phone numbers or?

MR. MELLO: You'd have to check with the

WOC. No, these facilities would be calling into a number we gave them, because they'd be calling into this WOC. They maybe went through their region, I don't know, but I would imagine a bill or something would show that, I mean, that would be my guess.

Now, we knew who was on, just by New York Center, Washington Center, Command Center, that kind of thing. We were kind of keeping a dib on the Board. You know, we used a white board that filled up real quick. Double the size of those. And we asked someone to start taking notes try to keep up with what was being said. Hadn't done that kind of thing before, you know learn as you go.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you were up on the 10th floor or your guys were down here doing this because you they had to patch down to a speaker down here.

MR. MELLO: Doug Gould was down here, I went up with Dave, Doug here, he patched in. He basically did what all the facilities are doing, he just called and got on it, it's an open line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember if the

military was on the line?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I heard military coordination on the line, sometime during that and I can't say it was right at the beginning, I know at least it was within an hour, whereas there was military. I heard military-type coordination, targets 30-miles out, you know stuff that it wasn't a controller of a facility saying. Don't know if that was just someone near a speaker or, you know, were they physically on, I can't say that, but definitely heard communications from the military on that. Now, we had Colonel Atkins who was up there, and I don't know if she was on a separate, but whether it was a secure line or something like that in the next room, kept coming back and forth with different information that was being passed to people above me, you know. Probably sensitive stuff, you know, that I wasn't privy to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know which military unit she was speaking with, like, was it NORAD or NEEDS or--

MR. MELLO: I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --air force base on the phone?

MR. MELLO: I don't know. And we had, oh, what's his name, he's out at NORAD now, Doug Davis? He was doing some coordination, military stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, he's not anymore, he's back here.

MR. MELLO: Is he?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As of three or four months ago, I was just out there for the DOD team, they got somebody out of the mountains sitting in a spot right now while they announce the job again. He wasn't out there at the time with liaison.

MR. MELLO: Not September 11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No. He went out there after that.

MR. MELLO: He was here that day, I mean, here at the Command Center, but I mean, I could hear his voice so he was dialed into it somewhere.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After the 11th, AAT-20 put together some time lines, some documents. I'm going to show you some documents that we've collected from the FAA. The book, the

infamous--you've got your copy here, you've got the color one.

MR. MELLO: You can use it if you guys want it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We have a little thinner version, it doesn't have all the graphics that yours does. So, this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," dated September 11, 2001, which there are some pages, some text pages in here that look like AAT-20, September 17, 2001, so it looks like that's when you guys probably finalized this thing. That's on--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I mean, don't forget it was an ongoing product. We kept putting out drafts, during the--between the, say the 12th actually, probably, 12th and then when we finally got someone to makes us copies and all that, yeah, the 17th sounds pretty--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You worked on this?

MR. MELLO: Yeah. Didn't do a lot of the stuff, I did more, you know, I was the supervisor so I was called in, get this, I was more or less

one of the leaders in the group. And Tony Ferrante had come back, he drove from Chicago--I think he must have got in, it was late on the 11th, early on the 12th, so he came in. And he assumed the manager again, I assumed the deputy, and, but I mean, we work very well together, so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've got some questions specifically about this, but I just want to show you some others. Do you recognize, this is, we just refer to this as the grid time line. The second page says "Notification Chronology" and then there's, like, a page for each of the four aircraft. The bottom of the first pages says by AAT-20, revised on September 18, '01 at 1400.

MR. MELLO: Am I specifically familiar, no, but I mean it's our document and we had to, you know, we had to [unintelligible] on these no doubt about that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you don't have a specific recollection on this one?

MR. MELLO: No. I mean, you know, I was involved with it, but who actually did that one

page or, you know, I know how everything came together, we tried to find times of everything from--you know we were the collectors, we weren't the authors of the stuff that gave us this information so we'd reach out to this person or that person to put all this together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is just a one-page one, it says "Notification to DOD Time Line."

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does that look--

MR. MELLO: Yep.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --this looks familiar to you?

MR. MELLO: Yep.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you work on this one or--

MR. MELLO: I'm going to say I worked on everything, I didn't physically type any of this. I was the one probably saying did, you know, did we check with--did we get the tapes we needed from CAPE or did we get the transcript from here or, you know, I'm more or less orchestrating it, I'm not--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who was physically working on putting this document together?

MR. MELLO: Ferrante did some, I know that, I think Cathrine Myers did some typing and Mary Strawbridge did some typing. Typing, I'm talking a book, this specific one, I can't say who. I'm talking they did a lot of the typing out the time based on this information that we gave them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you remember seeing this one before?

MR. MELLO: Yes, mm-hmm. And I'll go back to the other one, I remember seeing that one before, but the specifics of how it got generated, I don't recall who did it, but I've seen everything in this book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one here is "Chronology of the Attacks of September 11, 2001 and Subsequent Events through April 30, 2002," I think this was put together by the FAA historian.

MR. MELLO: Is that the lady who wrote the book?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have no idea, I don't even know who the historian was.

MR. MELLO: I know that lady wrote a book

about that, I thought she was the historian or she was working for the historian, she was trying to capture this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That one on America?

MR. MELLO: No, there's another book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have a copy of the book?

MR. MELLO: I have one at home, because she sent me one, she signed it for me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I meant to go by GPO and see if I could find a copy of it. Because I've heard it referenced a few times.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, no, but I'm thinking I could get you a copy, while I was here, it's just about that thick and it's soft cover, thought.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, if you have your copy, you could bring it in, I'm going to be around for the next few weeks, I wouldn't mind just taking a quick look through there.

MR. MELLO: Okay, yeah. But I do have it, it's at home.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now that you've said that,

you're, like, oh, man, where is that thing.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, I know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember seeing this at any time?

MR. MELLO: No, that's not the format we were using.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. How about, there's this fact sheet, this chronology of events on September 11, 2001 and this is document was supposed to have been created in August 2002.

MR. MELLO: It doesn't look familiar to me, it looks like, I mean, it could have been based on information either we provided, but it doesn't look like any of the stuff that we actually created.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Now, would, because this came from Public Affairs, would they have run something like this by you, or would it be a higher level or--

MR. MELLO: We would have and we still do this today--they tell us what they need--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: --we give them the information, verify cross-checks, make sure we know where we got it. Then we get it to them, and it could be anything from an e-mail to just a Word document, they take it and put it in whatever format, take out what they don't want to say. You know, they're Public Affairs, you know, they do it from their angle. And that looks like what the finished product was, what we gave them, you know, I can't say right now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about this document right here, it says "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001" and it's in, it's two paragraphs and it's in narrative format. What this is, is it's basically a response to a question for the record from the 9/11 Commission that Administrator Garvey, or former Administrator Garvey had provided.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does that look familiar to you at all?

MR. MELLO: That document doesn't look

familiar, the content, I know there was an angst to find out notification times and stuff, you know, following 9/11. So, the content of it yes, but that particular document, no, I haven't seen that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one is "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01.

MR. MELLO: Okay, it looks like it's yeah, I don't know whose it is, but it looks familiar. It looks like it was part of documents we received to verify things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one's "Chronology of September 11, 2001," and it lists each of the four flights--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and their intended routes and then it's a chronology after that.

MR. MELLO: Yes, that looks familiar, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do you remember about this, if anything?

MR. MELLO: It looks like it may have come out of here or it looks very similar to a time line

that we helped create.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you say out of here, you mean, you're talking it may have come out of that "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?"

MR. MELLO: Yeah, it may have come out of the book you know. I don't know if it's the exact same transcript we have in here or the same summary we have, but it looks very familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one says at the top, "Sensitive Security Information, FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001."

MR. MELLO: That filtered around sometime during the investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The 9/11 Commission investigation?

MR. MELLO: No, no, sometime during our early thing about security information, so, I did see it before.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a copy of a folder--

MR. MELLO: Accident Package?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --no, actually, it's not.

MR. MELLO: No?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, it was a blue folder and inside the blue folder were, like this, for 175, all the information for that flight would have been stapled together in a separate group.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the four flights were in this folder. My understanding was it was a briefing of some kind.

MR. MELLO: Okay, I could just say the documents came from an Accident Package, just because I can tell, that's we used to own the packages, so I can just tell by things like this, the format, that's ours, so I know, they pulled things out of an Accident Package, probably to create a briefing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see, okay.

MR. MELLO: I've see these.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How, we're looking at the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," with regard to this document here, and I guess, just in general for the other time lines, that AAT-20 was involved in preparing, how did you guys decide what invents

to include or not to include?

MR. MELLO: We tried to include everything that was either documented or could be verified by a log or had some noteworthy importance to either the flight or the whole incident. We went from a white-board to a laptop computer, some without times, you know, people just started jotting things down. So, we some are like this, some are like that and then, over the next week or two we were trying to reach out somewhere, what time was that said? Well, the log at Boston Center says they said it at that time. Well, that's, then we started putting times with it, I mean, that thing grew over and got probably cleaned up and verified over--between the 11th and the 17th, I think.

And we were getting direction as this thing's going. Spit them out in flights; we want one together; you know, and then the issue came out about the military notification, so there was, then, again, an angst to reach out in all the logs and see what times we did what, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What did this, I think you

were using the term angst, about military notification, where does that come from?

MR. MELLO: Well, there was, it came from the 10th floor, which, you know, I got it from my boss, Dave, but it's probably through the Administrator or some down. There was some talk of we didn't notify the military or the military wasn't notified in a timely manner. So we were, to a point, doing damage control, like, yes, we did or here's what we thought we did it, that type of thing, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So what did you guys do to try to show when or if you had contacted the military about the various aircraft--what did you guys do to try to determine that?

MR. MELLO: Well, we reviewed facility logs; or listened to, like the CAPE TRACON is one of them where the controller reached out, locally, to Otis. Command Center, we talked with them, interviewed people out there that they had a military liaison person there that they heard the same thing that our people heard out there. And,

you know, at that time, we would assume and that may be the wrong word, that they're notifying their people, that we're notifying our people, you know, as far as notification.

So, it was just an ongoing verification of any piece of document tape or knowledge anyone had, that, you know, that people were called or notified. A lot of them weren't. I think there was one we could not verify. Everyone said, yeah, they were there, we heard them. But did someone reach out and say, hey, I don't think we can verify that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that was 93, that last one.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys have access to information from the military when you were putting that together?

MR. MELLO: We, I remember, and I don't know if it was me, personally, but we had gotten a log from NORAD, and it may have come through Doug Davis, you know, but I remember having a military

log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You remember seeing it
yourself?

MR. MELLO: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what it looked
like, can you describe it?

MR. MELLO: A chronology-type log, you
know, daily log I'm talking, like a, you know, one
specific day, you know, not an ongoing thing like
we had, like we created. Well, like more or less
this is our situation room log upstairs from
yesterday, something like this. A military log
with chronological times of that day and incidents
that were going on on the military side.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it handwritten or typed?

MR. MELLO: Handwritten, the one that I
remember seeing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did it look like it had been
faxed in or mailed--

MR. MELLO: Yes, faxed, it looked like
something we were getting faxed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Faxed?

MR. MELLO: In fact we burned out a couple of fax machines in there that week.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you ever have access to any other military information to pull this together?

MR. MELLO: No, not military information on an FAA document, like, Washington talking about NORAD or the Command Center talking about military. You know, I could see coordination with military, but it was on our logs, the only log I talk about seeing was that handwritten faxed--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just one page, one or two pages, it wasn't--

MR. MELLO: It wasn't, no more than two pages.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You thought it was NORAD, you're not sure did it say anything at the top?

MR. MELLO: It was NORAD or Northeast Air Defense, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: So, we weren't dealing much with Southeast at the time, it was Northeast and

NORAD, and back then, believe it or not, I didn't know all the little divisions and all that, I learned all that stuff after 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what happened to that document, the log that you're referencing?

MR. MELLO: Is it missing, because I, like--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like, do you know who you gave it to or--

MR. MELLO: --no, I mean, we cataloged everything, we put everything in an index, my assumption is it's in that, it's still in that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You think it's still in one of those boxes down--

MR. MELLO: Boxes, we made some binders, right, we did, like an index to what's in the boxes and, I mean, I would think that if it's not physically in the binder, there's something in the binder references that it's in a box.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, would you mind, after the interview, either yourself or having somebody look to see if you can find a copy of that in your records.

MR. MELLO: Okay, I have nothing to do with that stuff anymore, I'd probably go to [unintelligible] because it's in litigation, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you want us to ask Jeff, then?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, Jeff or Doug, Doug's, you know, familiar. I've been hands-off that stuff because it's mostly like--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Jeff doesn't have a recollection of that document, so, I just, since you do, I thought maybe it would be easier if you--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, but you were upon the 10th floor, right?

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But Jeff wasn't, I mean, he was up down, up and down, back and forth.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because they're planning to come to you about it would be my guess, with is this what you're talking about?

MR. MELLO: So you still want us to go to Jeff or--

MR. MELLO: Well, I can ask him it's not a problem, I don't know where everything is, I know they kind of kept it because they're doing FOIA requests and stuff like that now, I mean, he's handling all that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintelligible] try to scan everything--

MR. MELLO: Yeah

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that's a really great idea, you guys won't have to worry about processing a gazillion FOIAs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, when somebody calls up, we can say, yeah WWW, there it is, go find it yourself.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I had, I noticed that a lot of certified copies of transcripts weren't received by AAT-20 until after the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" was prepared, what sort of data were you guys getting that allowed you to prepare?

MR. MELLO: We'd get either what we called a working transcript or a draft copy. Until the person who created the document, usually the

facility or quality assurance, until they say we've checked and rechecked and rechecked and to the best of our ability, this is what was said, and they certify it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: Sometimes that waits for the Accident Package to come, which can be months.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. MELLO: We need to get things to work on to do this so we will, I am almost 100 percent positive results say that's what we were working off. We were working off either a working draft or a, I should say a working copy or a draft transcript and faith.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How were the facilities transmitting that information to you guys?

MR. MELLO: Fax and paper, transcripts would be faxed. I know we did some voice tapes over the phone and recorded it here. But things were coming in every day FedEx, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you aware if any of those files were being sent over the e-mail, those draft

transcripts and such?

MR. MELLO: Yeah, oh, yeah, definitely, yeah, e-mail and I'm trying to think if we did WAV files back then. WAV files for the voice we do that nowadays, I don't recall if we were doing it then. A lot of the radar data, all those, you know, the index of how the planes were doing and stuff, that was e-mailed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you keep an archive of your e-mail messages from that period of time?

MR. MELLO: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You did not?

MR. MELLO: Um-hmm, no, because I wasn't in he doing it. We were out there, in the "bay" as we call it, you know, those cubicles, there's four of them. We actually pushed everything, that was like our work area for this. We set up screens and, you know, two extra fax machines, extra phones we put in there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you keep an archive of any of the electronic files that might have been used for this or any other time lines on your computer?

MR. MELLO: I didn't keep anything.

Again, there was a file 9/11 file on the machine out there, you know, I know there was, like,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c had this document ongoing on--a, I think it was a ZIP drive, and he kept going to the graphics people who were going to produce this to update it, because when, it finally got printed, it was actually, on a disc so, that, and I'm pretty sure that's part of the archives.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We have a draft of this grid time line, which I realize that you didn't seem to be all that familiar with, but it does say it was prepared by AAT-20, so presumably you guys had this data in some form or another available to you to review. And, for example, this one flight here, United 93, it has a time for military notification as 10:08.

MR. MELLO: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know how the decision was to whether to include the 10:08 and another one that says 9:16 and another one that says N/A, how decisions were arrived at to include

MR. MELLO: So it's the same aircraft, they're talking three different time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, there's three different times for that one aircraft. Do you specifically remember any discussions about that aircraft or another aircraft?

MR. MELLO: Again, I remember the--let me think, before would just be the, I don't know what the right word is. There was an importance getting military times located.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: And that went on for a day or two, maybe three days. You know, trying to verify and, again, this was just from whatever was documented already and it wasn't documented here, it was documented somewhere else, we were give us this log, give us this log, this says this time, that says that says that time. Maybe the third thing we look at, you know, don't forget, we don't synchronize and I'm not saying that we should laugh that off, but, you know, facility A's time clocks, facility B's time clocks they can be minutes off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, we're not talking, like, a minute or two, we're talking we're talking about--

MR. MELLO: Yeah, and if it was anything like what it was upstairs, you know, we started off not even taking times, you know. Then we started some times, and the time we heard something over the telecon, you know, we heard New York Center say another one hit the World Trade. Well, that's the time we heard it, so we put that time down. That's not the time the plane hit the building. Because, you know, it hit 10 minutes ago, through this, through that, you know, Things were recreated, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the thing that's interesting about this one particular time, for United 93 is that, you know the Commission who, I know, doesn't necessarily leave a good taste in the FAA's mouth, but the Commission had concluded that 10:07. I'm not going to argue about a minute, but 10:07 was the actual time that FAA first notified the military about United 93, which is roughly

three or four minutes after the plane crashed. And you guys have on this time line here, what the FAA had concluded was the correct notification time, but it got removed. And so, I'm wondering did somebody say, well, we couldn't have notified them after, I mean, do you remember any discussion about this.

MR. MELLO: I remember in the 9/11 command, in my interview that question coming up, said how could you notify them after it. And I think my answer to them, more or less, was I don't think we did notify them after it, but if our document says it, I mean, you know, we did, but I wasn't involved in the notification, one, was involved in trying to recreate through existing documents when it happened, but I didn't know anything about it being changed or removed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, because this is what I don't understand the final it says nothing. Do you remember any discussion if somebody--anybody saying well, we can't have this in there, that looks really, that's embarrassing.

MR. MELLO: I don't remember that. What I remember is, times changing, I'm talking prior to the document going out, the book going out, because, you know, it couldn't have happened then, it happened here, look at this log. You know, that, I'm talking anything, numbers, times were changing, you know. But that specific one the military notification of '93, no. And if we didn't which if that's what it's indicating, it's probably because we couldn't find documentation to support it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I guess, I mean you guys had it right, but you took it off. I guess I'm trying to figure out why?

MR. MELLO: I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" references the NEEDS log or a NEEDS log, which may or may not be what you thought you may have seen.

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Here, this is for American 11, it says at 8:40 the NEEDS log indicate they were

notified by FAA. What did you guys do internally to try to verify what apparently this military record was saying with what your records said, because there should be, you know a mate within FAA's records for this event.

MR. MELLO: If you're looking at logs somewhere, there wouldn't be, I mean, we may have just had a one sided, you know, time frame. If something wasn't done on a recorded line or if it wasn't logged by, you know, the people that said it would be maybe that was New York Center, I don't know what it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe it was Boston.

MR. MELLO: Okay, Boston. If Boston didn't put it in their log, NORAD notified us 09/11 and then we get the NEEDS log and NEEDS verified these lines, you know, as we found out weren't recorded, those type of phone lines, well, you couldn't go back to the tape, so we, you know we take the best that we could. Last time I remember about Boston, Boston did have something in their log, I thought, I don't know if it was that

aircraft, but there was something in there about notification. So, that would be our side of it, you know?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But am I understanding it correctly, that it just, would any of these if you had no FAA documentation, because it wasn't logged, but the Air Force came up with a document like this one that you said you know the two-pager, you all might--quite possibly would have looked at it and said, yeah, they're saying this here so I mean, you know it's accurate, we're using it, and then you make the note at the bottom that this was drawn from the NEEDS document.

MR. MELLO: That's what I--yeah, that would have been my understanding, we would have done, if we had no documentation and we did see something, we would indicate where the information had come from. But we were trying to use our side of everything, you know. Because I remember, you know, I think something went out in the media about notification. And our relationship for getting information from the military dried up real quick.

You know, we were trying to get, you know, could you tell us the time, and I know they got tough after that to get documents. They probably were trying to do the same thing we were, trying to get all our ducks in order and one we did, when we did it, you know.

Everything went through--had to go through the military people in the building, which was Doug Davis and that shop to get the info.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, all of your--the references you guys cite in your time line for military notification, come from the military, you guys don't source for any of the notifications in FAA. Like, this one here, 8:38?

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was actually 8:40, this document says it came from the NEEDS log. This one here, 9:05, for United 175, if you go to your document here, it says it came from a NEEDS log. This one here, 9:24, for 77, not even in this time line, but I've seen this one here, even the source is NEEDS log.

MR. MELLO: Well, if it's in there and we were, either through verification of our stuff comfortable that their time from their log was, I mean, we put it in, I mean, you know, it was verification, I don't know if we would have separated whose it was, if it was both, well, we agreed on the time. I think that's probably what the problem was there, was a disagreement in the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who the point of contact was for the military for that log that you had, you had seen?

MR. MELLO: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, yourself, have any contact with the military after, you know the 11th and working off to preparing these items or any other after-action reports?

MR. MELLO: Me, personally, no. We worked through, either (b)(6), (b)(7)c or (b)(6), (b)(7)c to get something answered or follow-up, that was our field POCs and they, I would hope, would have the name you're looking for.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember Monty Belcher expressing an interest specifically requesting some information on military notifications?

MR. MELLO: Didn't know it was him, but, again, that comes back to my--there was an urgency, there was a--we needed to get military time notification, and I think that was that media thing I was talking about. Whether something came out or the military said we didn't notify them, something came down to verify your notification times. I mean, that became the big issue in a few days after.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what your work product was to answer that request?

MR. MELLO: Well, the final work product was this, this was this, is this, I imagine things went between our military liaison and stuff up to our bosses and eventually to Monty and stuff. Would not have been in the format like this, but just says, hey, American 77 NORAD notified it, you know, I imagine it was just the down-and-dirty, short-and-sweet of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember ever getting--and this probably, as I understand things, would have been a year or so after the 11th, maybe even in 2003, ever getting a request that originated from the Secretary's Office about your time lines and verifying their accuracy or anything like that?

MR. MELLO: A year or so after?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm?

MR. MELLO: No, no, the only thing I remember, you know, I guess, that would be about Commission time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, roughly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, was check your hard-drives for e-mails and retain everything. There was, something came out when they started going around or when they thought, there may be more documents, they told everyone to inventory everything you have and notify, forget who it was, I think it was Bill Peacock [ph] or someone at the time, that you know, you've given him everything or you have additional, but nothing about the time

line again.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember ever getting a request that you understood originated from the military for FAA's information?

MR. MELLO: I remember, I thought we had a very open exchange at the beginning, I think it, again, got tight-lipped after that because we were both, you know, trying to verify in-house stuff, but I remember, I mean, we were given Colonel Atkins to share with her people, tapes; we were giving her plots of the planes and stuff like that. I don't recall if we actually gave them a log or something like that, but we were kind of open at the beginning.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know, but when, roughly, do you think that stopped?

MR. MELLO: By the time that book came out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which book is this?

MR. MELLO: The Summary.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So within a couple two or three weeks of that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, this is was from the Summary, two or three almost a week later, not even a week.

MR. MELLO: Yeah, from whether they were not requesting it anymore or I don't remember a direction not to do it, but, you know, that stuff happened early on, but I don't know, maybe we ran out of stuff to give them or there wasn't anything else, but there wasn't no request. They got more into the FBI side of it. They wanted everything and t's--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Bureau did?

MR. MELLO: Oh, God, yes. Joint carriers and task force, we worked with them, that was our big customer, just the entire, you know, after this date, that thing went over there and we were--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who got copies of this?

MR. MELLO: Um--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You know, outside of the folks that you work with, but, like, much higher up?

MR. MELLO: No, we, and I don't know, Jeff

actually had it made--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. MELLO: --he took the discs to graphics, I don't know how many were made, I mean I've seen a couple stacks, maybe 100 and I know we had to keep giving them to, you know the Administrator, give four copies of three copies, where they went, I don't know. We were told it goes no further than your desk, like to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So this--

MR. MELLO: But I couldn't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We're talking about the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?"

MR. MELLO: Yeah. But I know there was a bunch of copies made, don't know where they are, though.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was your involvement in the 9/11 Commission, just in general.

MR. MELLO: Initially, I was going to be the--since I started for AAT-20, Dave Knoles and myself, since I started it, I was going to be the lead to interface with them. It got up to a high

level very quick, Shirley Miller got involved and then they wanted the division versus the assistant division, so Tony Ferrante did a lot of that you know, the interface with Shirley of what we need. After that, I filled in a couple days, you know, if he wasn't here actually I would meet with Shirley, they want this today or they want to go to that facility. Other than that, just my personal interview was the only connection, I had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember preparing any other time lines specifically for or connected with the 9/11 Commission?

MR. MELLO: We prepared a lot of time lines, the end result is in the Summary book. And so it may have been a draft, that got, you know, updated, verified, but I don't remember any other time lines--I don't remember any time lines past the book. Right after this we had the 587 crash, so our focus went somewhere else real quick.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything else, Dave?

MR. HOOPER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who the quality

assurance manager at Cleveland Center was on 9/11?

MR. MELLO: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who it is now?

MR. MELLO: No, I mean, if the name was said on 9/11, I'd recognize it, you know, I deal with all of the facilities quality assurance [unintelligible] from time to time on incidents and stuff, but the name doesn't come to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have some way you can look it up?

MR. MELLO: Let's see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm having a painfully difficult time finding a good up-to-date FAA directory. They've got the Web one, but it's really, really badly out of date.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah the phone numbers are all old phone numbers and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : People like you who haven't moved around too much within the organization--

MR. MELLO: I might have new exchanges somebody has moved their exchanges.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, it's really, really,

it's frustrating. Indiana?

MR. MELLO: How about Indy Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Boston.

MR. MELLO: Boston, I'll get that from the East.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And Washington.

MR. MELLO: Washington, okay, okay, thank you. Okay, for Cleveland Center and I can tell you that guy I'm giving you wasn't there on 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c that's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c ? Do you know their number?

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c :

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : -- okay.

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right.

MR. MELLO: And at Indy--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: -- it's (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]

and the number's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. MELLO: - (b)(6), (b)(7)c . Indy 95 percent
sure that (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the manager

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

at 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, actually both those
names look familiar to me.

MR. MELLO: And, let's see [Dials phone
and requests information] Washington Center--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: (b)(6), (b)(7)c , he was not there
9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Cleveland not at Great
Lakes?

MR. MELLO: Yes. [Dials phone and requests
information] The person on record is (b)(6), (b)(7)c at
Boston Center, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess. He's actually

acting as the Deputy for the facility now, so there's an actor acting as QA manager.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: But the number is

(b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. MELLO: The Actor is (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think his name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c and none of those people were there at 9/11. You got some contact I can get to you that book one and.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, you were going to see if you could bring that in so we could look at it and then I think you said you were going to try to coordinate with Jeff--

MR. MELLO: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --see if you guys could find that log or record.

MR. MELLO: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that's it, I can't think of any more questions, unless you have anything to add that you think might be helpful.

MR. MELLO: No, that's about it, really.

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(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We'll go ahead and end the
interview, it's 12:43 p.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

- - -

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
ANTHONY STEPHEN FERRANTE

BY

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, DOD, IG

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

1:32 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is October 13, 2004, the time is 1:32 p.m. We are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 800-B, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c my co-Investigators are (b)(6), (b)(7)c with DOT IG and (b)(6), (b)(7)c with Department of Defense, Inspector General. We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we are conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by the military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today, we're interviewing Tony Ferrante. Mr. Ferrante, please acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. FERRANTE: I am aware.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you, please, raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. FERRANTE: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you, please, give your

full name, spelling your last name for the record.

MR. FERRANTE: Anthony Stephen Ferrante,
F-as in Frank-e-r-r-a-n-t-e.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current
position?

MR. FERRANTE: Current position is manager
of the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Division, AOV-
100.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you assume that
position?

MR. FERRANTE: July 26, 2004.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current grade?

MR. FERRANTE: EV-2.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that like an SES
equivalent?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you start with
the FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: I started on with the FAA,
June 19, 1982.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what position and where?

MR. FERRANTE: I was an Air Traffic

Control Specialist, hired in at Pittsburgh Air Traffic Control Tower. And I stayed there through 1985 and in November of 1985, I transferred to the Miami Air Traffic Control Tower. I held a variety of different jobs, while in Miami. And I transferred to Washington headquarters, December 3 or 4, right about there, in 1993.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On September 11, what position did you hold?

MR. FERRANTE: I was the manager of the Air Traffic Investigations Division, that was AAT-200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: It was an organization within AAT-20, which was the Evaluations and Investigation staff that reported to the Director of Air Traffic.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said you were a manager, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you assume that position?

MR. FERRANTE: October of 1998.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long did you continue to stay in that position after September 11, '01.

MR. FERRANTE: Until July 25, of 2004. My routing symbol may have changed somewhat because of the ATO alignment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: It went from being the Air Traffic Organization, to the ATO. And, of course, AAT-200 no longer existed, but I did the same function within ATO until I left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On September 11, who did you report to?

MR. FERRANTE: Dave Knoles.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you had a staff?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How many people would you say you had here in the District?

MR. FERRANTE: Approximately 18.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Eighteen?

MR. FERRANTE: The number has fluctuated over the years, based on budgetary constraints.

But the 18 number I think was the highest headquarters staff we ever had in 200.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you had said before we started the interview, formally, that your group or you had helped work on this FAA time line or booklet called "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," is that correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, this is a smaller version in black and white, it's missing a lot of the graphics.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who worked on that with you?

MR. FERRANTE: There were several people. In any investigation we have a lot of different information that comes in. This particular case, we had a ton of information that was coming in. So the primary people who were involved in the investigative review, report, and development of this book would have been (b)(6), (b)(7)c Doug Gould, Mary Strawbridge, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c All of them played different roles. Some of it, you know, was collating information; some of it was gathering information; some of it was reviewing radar data.

But those were the people who were here, basically, you know, around the clock, almost.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In this document, there's a couple of references, it says, like, AAT-20 September 17, '01, 6:30 a.m.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that, probably a good date for when this was finalized?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. And, in fact, I remember that the book was actually produced, printed, I think it was the Monday following September 11. So, that makes sense that that's the 17th. I know we worked on it. We started, probably Friday afternoon and we worked through the weekend to develop it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it produced in response to questions in particular or what was kind of the rationale behind it or the reasoning for putting it

together?

MR. FERRANTE: In any accident that occurs within the national airspace system, we did an investigation and a review of the air traffic services that were provided in that event. In this particular case, we treated it as if we had four separate accidents.

Normally, anytime we had an accident, we would generate an Alert Bulletin, and that would go a distribution through some of the Accident Investigation offices; through the Director of Air Traffic; and, occasionally, they even went to the Administrator's level.

In this case, because there was so much information and there were so many requests of information; we had a number of requests from the FBI; we had requests from the NTSB; we put this together, really, as a chronology of what transpired in each of the four flights.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, if I understand what you said, it wasn't necessarily in response to any one
[Simultaneous inaudible conversation.]

MR. FERRANTE: No, it wasn't in response to any specific request, it was designed, we knew we were going to get more and more requests for what took place. So, we started out, writing individual flights. Like we went through American 11; we went through United 175; and I think we did a master chronology of all of them to show the associated time lines when certain things transpired.

For example, when they, you know, left the gates at each individual airport; you know, when they received their air traffic clearances; what time we had the last known ATC communications with them. We did it broken out for each specific flight and then we did a chronology of everything so you could see how things were unfolding throughout the system.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have another question? What were you guys relying on to develop each of these events? What was sort of your source data?

MR. FERRANTE: The primary source data were logs from the air traffic facilities that

provided services to the four aircraft. So, we had logs; we had personnel statements, from either the controllers who had communications with the aircraft; or from the management supervisory people who were on duty when it transpired.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you guys looking at transcripts at that point, yet or--

MR. FERRANTE: We had watch transcripts. I don't think we had any final transcripts at that point. Watch transcripts to us is just the pertinent transmissions to a particular aircraft, whereas, a formal transcript has all the transmissions that are made on that ATC frequency.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Normally, we would do five minutes before first contact until five minutes after last contact, which is the standard format we follow for all accidents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've seen reference in this time line and some others that FAA has generated, it says, like in this instance here when you're talking about United 175. It says 9:05 and then it

says Northeast Air Defense Sector, NEEDS log indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning American Airlines 175. Do you remember seeing any documents that the military might have provided?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I didn't, in fact, the first time I actually saw the NEEDS logs was during an interview with the 9/11 Commission and a gentleman named John Azarello, handed me a handwritten copy of an E-plug, and that was the first time I had actually seen their log.

I believe, at the time of the incident, most of the NEEDS--most of the military logs were classified at that time. And just to correct, that was United 175 and I think you read it as American 175.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, I'm sorry. United 175, it is, it's UAL 175.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When were you interviewed by Mr. Azarello by the Commission?

MR. FERRANTE: It would have been probably in June, may have been late May?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of this year?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of this year of '04?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, 2004.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MR. FERRANTE: I have worked with the 9/11 Commission since they formed. But when they finally got to the headquarters interview, that was when the final interview was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That was the first time you actually saw, you feel that you saw the NEEDS log?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, because he showed me, it was a handwritten log and, if I remember correctly, it had--it had been written Top Secret or either classified--to some extent it had a classification level at the top and then it was crossed out and apparently, now, it was unclassified. But that was the first time that I had seen that log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if anybody else on your staff had seen that log?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't believe so, I think they were very closely held. See, when we put

together the chronology?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: We put together based on what facility logs indicated or what personnel statements indicated. We footnoted a lot of things, for example, in the personnel statements, we didn't think the times were all that accurate in a lot of them. So, words to the effect that time approximate based on personnel statement concerning such and such.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Here's an example, it says at 9:00 o'clock, this is approximate based on personnel statements from New York Terminal Radar Approach Control.

MR. FERRANTE: Right. We tried to be as accurate as we could in that, but recognized that we didn't have all of the information, especially considering this was done within a week of the event taking place.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, it's how would this have gotten in here as a source if nobody had seen the NEEDS information?

MR. FERRANTE: I think we got some of the time from the NEEDS information from Dave Knoles. I think he's the only one that saw any of the NEEDS information

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Dave, of course ran a telecon up on the 10th floor of this building, and that went for days. In fact, that telecon is still going today.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'd hate to get that phone bill.

MR. FERRANTE: It involved into a 24-hour-a-day and it's now called the Domestic Event Network.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: And it's just, you know, all the appropriate people are on there. All the different Air Defense Commands, NORAD, law enforcement, transportation security. So, it's a real-time sharing of what's taking place throughout the NASS, National Airspace System.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would Mr. Knoles have shown

your staff any documents with this information or do you think he just gave you this information verbally or what do you recall about that?

MR. FERRANTE: I recall Dave was somewhat frustrated because it was taking longer than he had hoped for us to put this together. A lot of it was, we didn't have access to a lot of the information we were looking for.

When we started the process of trying to-- who we notified, when we notified them? I mean there were a lot of blanks that we had in terms of the air traffic logs or the personnel statements. Some of it we could get, like on voice tapes, for example, I know that we had the one from Boston Center, where we had a pretty good idea of what transpired, but we didn't have certified tapes yet, which had a time channel on them, because we had a machine that we could read the time channel and when it took place. And we were working off of WAV files, which were the only ones that could be transmitted electronically. Otherwise, the certified tapes had to come through the mail and

that was weeks. Because, if you will recall, right about the same time, we had the anthrax scare.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Mail coming to this building would arrive in Washington, go on a truck to Ohio and be irradiated and come back on a truck. And trucks were often destroyed before that happened.

The only other way we had to get them in here was through Federal Express and, of course, in the initial days, there was nothing flying, so there wasn't any overnight delivery.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So, fax machines went the lot; e-mail went the lot. But what we couldn't derive from tapes where we had an accurate reference to it, we would use that. I know that some of the information never got, I know, I asked Dave, or I believe I asked Dave, well, we don't have a time for this and he provided some of the times that we--he carried a portfolio with him for a couple of days as we were developing this and if

we had a specific question, there were times when he was able to answer it and times when he wasn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How would he transmit that information to you guys, was it verbal or--

MR. FERRANTE: When we were putting this book together, what we did was we set up a laptop computer and we had a PowerPoint projector, we were shining it on actually, I think it was a piece of cardboard, so we could read it. So as we were going through the chronology, I think I relied mostly on either Cathrine Myers or Mary Strawbridge who did the actual typing for me.

And, you know, I had a whole group of people and I would ask for, what do we have on American 11? And we'd produce whatever information we could. And from that I would try to derive what we thought was most important in chronology sequence-wise and we would add that in. And, of course, it was on the board so there were three or four different people who were able to look at, no I think that's wrong; no, I think that's right. And, in some of the cases, you know, again, Dave

was trying to have this report done.

He had two or three meetings over the course of the weekend with the Administrator and he would come by and he would ask for certain things and, you know, that would sometimes slow down the process in developing this book.

But at the same time, we would ask Dave, well, we don't have anything on this and what do we know about this? Some of the information I think came from Jeff Griffith, who, of course was Dave's immediate supervisor, at the time. But I don't know exactly where it came from.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you had no communication with anyone from the military?

MR. FERRANTE: None.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And did anyone on your staff have any communication?

MR. FERRANTE: Not that I'm aware of. Most of our initial--and I'm trying to put my head back into, like, the first week of the event. The majority of our work was with the FBI. Because I know we had FBI agents here, like, the day after it

occurred. In fact, I think one time we had the FBI we even had to ask for some linguists to come with them, because we couldn't decipher some of the things that were being said on the tape, only to have them point out that it was in English.

[Laughter.]

MR. FERRANTE: But you know, we're listening and the voice, it sounded like it was foreign and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think it was foreign wasn't it?

MR. FERRANTE: --these were tapes that we recorded over the telephone--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. FERRANTE: --so they weren't of the best quality.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They were foreign, right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, they were. In the weeks that followed, yeah, we had a lot of contact with the military.

[Simultaneous unintell. conversation.]

MR. FERRANTE: With respect to that book,

I don't think we had anybody from the military at that point. Not in the circle of people we had actually operating.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, I cut you off, you brought up--

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah, remember, I said Neil Polancer [ph] came over and he had someone in uniform that had come with him. And they wanted to watch a replay of some of the radar data that we had. But that's the only recollection I have of anybody from the military at that point. There was a (b)(6), (b)(7)c colonel in the Air Force and (b)(6), (b)(7) was a liaison assigned to this building and I'm sure I probably saw her two or three times during the week. I wouldn't swear to it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything?.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.] it wasn't (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c but it was somebody else?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Male, female?

MR. FERRANTE: Male.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Anything on where they were from?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What service?

MR. FERRANTE: No, don't recall. The reason I recall it is, initially, everything was done through the FBI. And so, anything that we did, we coordinated with the FBI before anybody could see it. So, when (b)(6), (b)(7)c made a request as he came over to see, of course, (b)(6), (b)(7)c former FAA, we all knew Neil, but we still had to coordinate it with the FBI. Now, Doug Gould was the primary contact person I had coordinating things with the FBI, but I do remember (b)(6), (b)(7)c and a military officer, because they were sitting at a computer. The computer was in that same bay that we had set up where we were doing office work.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you started to describe what I kind of see as, like a validation process for the events that you put into your time lines, where you guys were projecting things onto the cardboard?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that what you would--how you would describe that process or what would you call that?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, validation's a fine word for it. We wanted to be as accurate as we could, we wanted it to be in chronological sequence. So, what we were trying to do is, we were looking for certain things, like we knew that there was a sound of interruption in the cockpit. And we had to figure out where that fit in the sequence of things, because you know, we knew what time they taxied out and we knew what time we had our last ATC communications, for example. So as we went through this, we wanted to make sure that the times lined up as we developed our chronology.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what sort of factors would cause you guys to keep a time in? What were some of the elements you guys were looking for in order for an event to remain in this time line, like, you know, like this 9:05 thing where we talk about in the NEEDS log, like, what would you guys need to

make sure that you felt comfortable to keep that in there?

MR. FERRANTE: We would have had to have some verification or validation that we had a time that was either from an FAA source or, in this particular case, NEEDS log indicates. Now, with that statement NEEDS log indicates, leads me to believe that we probably got that time from Dave.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : and what sort of factors would make you guys decide to pull something out of the time line?

MR. FERRANTE: If it had no significance to what had transpired.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you guys get any direction from those above you as to what should or shouldn't be included in the this time line?

MR. FERRANTE: None whatsoever. Again, nobody specifically asked us to produce this book in this form.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: We kind of went our on in trying to put everything together so that it would

answer any question that anybody could come up with in the first few days. Now, I know Dave had some requests for information. Dave was primarily the one who asked us to start putting together the chronologies of what took place. But, to my knowledge, nobody told us what form to put it in. You know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What to include or what not to include?

MR. FERRANTE: We had to beg borrow and steal to get things like this done. We went to a graphics group Monday morning and told them we needed 20 copies of this by 10:00 and they produced it. So there were a lot of people that did a lot of things trying to get things done.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have a different time line that we kind of refer to as the Grid Time Line, because it's got the four aircraft listed across the top of a grid and then some events and then times for each of these aircraft for this event, like, say American 11, United 175, American 77 and United 93. And it says first sign probable time

flight was known to be in distress; NORAD NEEDS notification; estimated time of crash. And then on the second page it starts notification chronology, lists American 11 and it does the same thing for each of the other aircraft. Have you seen this before?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I have. And looking at this one it says it says we revised this at 2:00 o'clock on the first.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the what?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm sorry, on the 18th, 2001, that's where I got the first. And I vaguely remember us developing this because there were specific questions that dealt with notification issues, who we notified and when did we notify them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And I think this was our attempt to chronologize or develop a chronology of who we told what, when.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : More specific.

MR. FERRANTE: More specific

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know where those questions were coming from?

MR. FERRANTE: Everything would have come back to us through Dave. We sort of lived in a cave, I mean, we basically lived here and we ordered food in and we almost never left.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We were provided with some earlier drafts of, at least that grid portion of the time line. And one of the earlier drafts of that Grid Time Line has a NORAD NEEDS notification time of 10:08 for United 93.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then somebody, it looks like they pen-and-inked N/A there. Do you know whose handwriting that is?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I don't. You know, if you had asked me this just a couple of months ago, I would have told you that we notified them at 10:07 because that's what I recall reading. And I believe that's what our summary book show. When John Azarello shows me the actual handwritten NEEDS log, I would tell you that we never notified

anybody on United 93. Doesn't show?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not in here, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," there's a 10:07 event for United 93, but it says in response to a request from a ZOB, which is Boston controller.

MR. FERRANTE: Actually ZOB's Cleveland.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, Cleveland. Is it ZBW?

MR. FERRANTE: ZBW, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sorry.

MR. FERRANTE: That's okay--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Cleveland controller--

MR. FERRANTE: --took me years to learn that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --a Falcon jet reported observing puffs of smoke in the vicinity of United Airlines.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, so that's what we used as a probable crash time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But not as a notification time?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know why that 10:08 was removed as a notification time?

MR. FERRANTE: I would guess this now. And this is only having seen the handwritten note that John Azarello showed me. That when I read his notes or the log that he had from NEEDS notifications, I would suggest to you that we never notified the military on United 93, at all. Now, I don't know if we knew that when we put this together. Again, my primary focus was, on that, I know this was taking place. I think that most of this was done by (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c I believe. Because I don't think we ever had this one projected on the board. But we were all working towards the same things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is (b)(6), (b)(7)c still with the FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, he is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We found a--it says a partial transcript. It's for a Cleveland Center and it's the military operations specialist position. And it looks like, according to this document, which is dated September 17, '01, which I guess would have

been, like, a day before--

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that Grid Time Line was produced, there is indications in here that Cleveland Center had given some notice to the military about United 93.

MR. FERRANTE: I know we had to have looked at this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: We probably would have looked at this first either on an e-mail version or on a fax copy of it. So, this appears that the military operations specialist is talking to Huntress?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which is, I think NEEDS.

MR. FERRANTE: Huntress, that's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they're talking about United 93, and I think they report, if you read through there it looks like Cleveland's reporting that they understand that somebody claims there's a bomb on United 93 and that's what gets reported to the military.

MR. FERRANTE: And this could have been how I came up with that 14:04 time frame, that would have been 10:07 in the morning. Because here, the subject is on United 93. But again, the handwritten version that John showed me didn't look like we had notified them at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That--

MR. FERRANTE: That was from the NEEDS log that he had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That Mr. Azarello showed you?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess we're just trying to figure out why it is that you guys took that 10:07 reference off of your time lines, because it doesn't really show up anywhere. And at some point, somebody at AAT-20 had it in a draft. And 10:07 is actually after that plane crashed.

MR. FERRANTE: That may have been why it came out. I'm speculating, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you remember being in the decision or discussion about that?

MR. FERRANTE: You know, there was so much

that was happening and it was happening so fast, I don't have a recall of taking a time line out. It would seem to me that if the airplane had already crashed, we probably would have taken it out because of that. If we confirmed, which I think that the "puff of smoke" that we got from Cleveland Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, did that constitute notification to the military when we had a conversation going on an airplane that had already crashed? And I'm just trying to guess on my part now, you know, it's three years ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I understand. Did you guys have, like, an FTP repository?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Has that been referred to as, like the S-drive? What is the S-drive, I've see a reference to that.

MR. FERRANTE: The S-drive is a shared drive.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So, in other words if we're all on the same network and if I save it on the S-drive, you both have access to it, as well as I have access to it. Which is not the Website. The FTP site is a Website and what we would do with that primarily is we upload radar data because those--the files are very large and can't be e-mailed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: The FAA has a restriction, I think it's 5 megabytes is the largest e-mail file that they're allow in because it bogs down the system.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, that's big enough, yeah.

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. And radar files are significantly bigger than that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do the Centers have access to the S-drive, as well.

MR. FERRANTE: No, no, you have to be on the local network that we have here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In the building?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. And, even, you have

to be mapped to that drive, so, for example, on the S-drive, there were probably a couple of dozen people within Air Traffic who were all mapped to that drive.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: So, for example, I used to work in Air Traffic Procedures and the shared drive they used was the U-drive.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And then, when I moved into Investigations, we used the shared-drive. But because I had so many of my old files, I was still mapped and had access to the U-drive from where I was. It's just a shared, primarily, you keep Microsoft Word documents; PowerPoint files. But it--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But it's not the same as the FTP repository?

MR. FERRANTE: No. The FTP repository is basically an address on the Web that anybody, as long as you have that address, you can post information to it or download information from it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And that was the fastest way to facilitate those large files that we had coming in. You know Boston Center could upload radar data; we could download radar data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think the FAA had made a couple of notifications to the military on September 11 concerning--that were erroneous, concerning, like, for instance like American 11. After American 11 had crashed, there was some notice that I think it was Boston Center had made to NEEDS saying that they had understood that aircraft was still airborne and on it's way to Washington. I noticed none of that information had made it into any of your time lines.

MR. FERRANTE: I learned that recently. I learned that while working with the 9/11 Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And I'm not exactly sure what they're referring to because, unfortunately, they didn't know all the particulars to some of the

information they were developing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: So, for example, there used to be--well, there still is--a system called the Enhanced Traffic Management System. And, basically, there's one in Dave's office. It shows you the United States and it shows you every airplane that's flying.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. FERRANTE: So, what happens is, all of these different radar sources get sent to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where they get mixed and put out on this display. And they primarily use it for traffic management purposes. In the old days, it used to update every five minutes. I think it's faster than that now, but it used to be five minutes. And it was based on flight plan information. So, once your flight plan information was in there, all right, it wasn't worried about receiving your secondary return or [unintell.]. Because I also heard stories in the early days, specific to American 77, that even after the

aircraft had turned around and had hit the Pentagon, the ETMS display still showed them over Kansas, still flying westbound, because it was based on the flight plan information that was not stored in the computer--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, ETMS--

MR. FERRANTE: --not an actual flight.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --ETMS doesn't do any checking on transcounter signals or anything like that?

MR. FERRANTE: No, it gets its information from the host computers in all the different centers. How it works, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you suggesting--did Boston have this system?

MR. FERRANTE: Every one of the centers have it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So, it could have been that someone in Boston Center still saw the airplane flying, right, when, in fact, in Boston Center, we knew that they had lost his transponder before he got to Albany and had turned south-bound. So,

somewhere they were getting some information that said he was still flying.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, yeah, it did. The Commission, as I understand things concluded that that was the case, that they had had this information about American 11 and had passed it on. I guess what I'm wondering is why that never made it into any of your time lines?

MR. FERRANTE: Because I don't think we knew of it, when it occurred.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, all right.

MR. FERRANTE: You know, when we put this together, recognize, first off, I wasn't even here on September 11. I was in Chicago. So, I made it back to the D.C. area, probably 2:00 o'clock in the morning.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You drove back?

MR. FERRANTE: I drove back.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I borrowed a van from our regional office there and made my way back. So, I came in here, now this would have been September 12. And at that point there was what we called

the--at that point we called it the never-ending telecon. That telecon was going and they were working on restoring the system and how to get airplanes flying again.

So, I asked Dave what time he wanted me to come in. He said, well, you know, get a little bit of sleep and then show up in the morning. I think I came in around 8:00 o'clock in the morning. And that was the first contact I had with the FBI, because they were already here when I came in.

So, between the 12th and the 17th, is when we were trying to gather all the information for that book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And there's probably hundreds of things that lot of us have learned in the months that followed or the time that followed. And even more things that we learned when the 9/11 Commission started some of their working.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it safe to say that after the 17th or in the case of that cleared-time line, the 18th, did that end your group's involvement in

creating time lines--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --or exploring that--

MR. FERRANTE: It ended the bulk of it, because at that point, you know, the FAA is required to develop an Accident Package.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: I mean, it's part of the charter; the Act of '58, the relationship we have with the NTSB. So, a lot of our focus turned towards developing those accident packages because these were going to be some of the most complicated ones in history. For example, an Accident Package has to list the names of every fatality. And when you're talking about the World Trade Center, we had no way of getting a lot of that information.

So, we had a lot of those issues that we worked through for several weeks. An that' pretty much what our focus was. And then, unfortunately, as luck would have it, you know, the nation's air commerce was flying again and Veteran's Day we had an American 587 crash in New York. And now, we're

on to a different investigation.

So, in terms of the group that we had responsible for this, they had a lot of responsibilities day-to-day. When these four accidents happened, I mean, we were inundated with things. But, although, those day-to-day responsibilities were still there. For example, the group was on-call 24-hours-a-day for anything that happens in NASS. And if you get a pilot deviation, or a runway incursion, or a loss or separation in Los Angeles, at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, we still got those calls and we still had to develop those reports and briefing items, each morning, as soon as airplanes started flying again.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess you had said, you came to a lot of the realizations that some of the times may not have been right at the time the Commission interviewed you. How about before that, were there times when you were beginning to realize that maybe some of the times that you had put into that book in, perhaps, the Grid Time Line, weren't accurate and, if so, was there any thought of attempting to

revise these documents or anything like that?

MR. FERRANTE: No, there was never an attempt to revise these documents. We put that book together, and I just remembered another point. There's a woman named Darlene Freeman, who, and I don't know what her specific role was at the time, she worked on Monty Belcher's staff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: There were so many activities that started taking place over what transpired on September 11. For example, there was a guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], who was off and trying to determine how we're going to secure cockpit doors. He's formerly from the Air Traffic group, as well.

But I know that Darlene pretty much had that responsibility. And then there was an effort to work through the Washington Operation Center upstairs and improve them. And then, of course, Dave Knoles transferred to that organization, himself, in late October of that year.

So there were other groups that had that.

And, again, our responsibility or our role, primarily is we tried to provide the information to people who would request it. Once we had produced that, unless we had a specific request from somebody, we probably wouldn't have gone and done much more with it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in preparing any briefings for the White House?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't think we directly did anything for the White House?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or maybe staffers over there?

MR. FERRANTE: The only way we might have done that is if the FBI had been tasked with some of that. Again, 90 percent of our initial work was with the FBI. In fact this was kind of interesting, because the relationship between the FBI and the NTSB was a little bit strained and this goes all the way back to TWA-800, when it was a criminal investigation or it was an accident investigation, because. Because if it's a criminal investigation, of course, the FBI has authority over it. Whereas, if it's an accident, the NTSB

does. So, I think there were some bruised feelings there, because we were doing all our work with the FBI. The NTSB wanted information, as well. We had to coordinate with the FBI in order to release things to the NTSB, which, by statute that's primarily who we dealt with on everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: So, it was kind of strange. So, directly, I don't believe we did any reports for anybody outside those groups.

One other point that's kind of interest: We developed a PowerPoint presentation and this is some of our interest in the times and the chronology that we developed. Because when we started looking at some of the things that had taken place by what time American 11 taxied out and what time United 93 taxied out, an so forth, when we started looking at it, it almost gave you that eerie feeling that this event was choreographed.

So, then what we did was, we put all of it onto a PowerPoint presentation. And you could see, like 8:00 a.m., American 11 begins take-off roll in

Boston. And then when you see, you know, I don't know specific times, but 8:10, for example, United 93, begins take-off role at Newark. But it was really kind of weird because you saw all of this, like, unfolding at the same time. And to us, this was just our in-the-group observation, it was like it was choreographed.

So, we had put together this PowerPoint presentation. I know we shared that at the military at one point, but it was well after, probably three or four weeks after the event when we had that piece concluded. Because we also saw one that they had put together where they actually took the flight paths of the aircraft and did it over digital mapping that you could really read the street names that they were flying over.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That 3-D one?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah. That PowerPoint presentation that you guys put together, was that the one that had the voices interspersed?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, it is. Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This time line, this is a copy of folder, that's what this is the cover to a folder. And, so it's just got like a little label, with the different, the four different flights on it. And then, inside each one, it'll have the information about the flight and then some different time events. Do you remember seeing that before?

MR. FERRANTE: Not with this cover, but, yes, I do. If you look, this is how we initially started, I think on all of this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: We were doing individual chronologies on what took place. So, this is United Flight 175 and here's a picture of what the controller saw when the transponder changed. And then we did the same, basically, for each flight as we went through.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And then it was after that when we put the master chronology together and tried to show, time-by-time what transpired

throughout the NASS. So, this was our first attempt--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see.

MR. FERRANTE: --at developing that book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, developing the summary?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you know if that document that you're looking at right now, which I think at the bottom is dated September 14--

MR. FERRANTE: September 14.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --'01. Do you know if that was used for any White House or Hill briefings or anything?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: The normal flow of information would have been us giving this to Dave Knoles. And Dave Knoles giving it, through his superior, who at that point was Jeff Griffith and Bill Peacock.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: And, you know, Dave went to

some of the meetings, I know, in the Administrator's conference room. So, this may have been used there. I think we also provided this type of material to the group that Darlene Freeman led because her effort was up and running within a day or two of September 11, as well. And I know I stepped into a conference room where they were meeting one time, bringing them this type of information, I don't know if it was this specific.

So this is specific to the type of work we did in reviewing voice data. Again, we were trained investigators in determining how the air traffic performed when an event took place. But that was the limit of our investigative abilities.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get involved in helping preparing any briefing packages for, like, Jane Garvey or Monty Belcher to testify before the Hill immediately following, like, September 11?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm sure that some of those packages were probably the basis of some of that testimony.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember specifically?

MR. FERRANTE: The only specific thing that I recall that involved Jane's testimony was probably a week or more, because I'm thinking it was, like a Tuesday or a Wednesday after September 11. And that was when we received a copy of the, not necessarily a speech, but it was going to be her opening remarks before Congress.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And we were looking through to determine if there was anything that was inaccurate in what she was going to say. And we did that in looking through the book we prepared and what her prepared testimony was, I guess that's what they call it. But we did that with--it seems to me that (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] would have been the one that put that together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A briefing package for testimony?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. FERRANTE: I think she was a speech writer at--she may be an attorney. I think she's

still here in FAA. But there's only three or four times in my career where I have been asked to review an Administrator's testimony, so I remember the name (b)(6), (b)(7)c because that's generally where they came from.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get involved in helping any of the FAA personnel who had to testify before the 9/11 Commission?

MR. FERRANTE: No. I did go on a couple of the interviews of people, well, this wasn't testimony, this was people being interviewed by the 9/11 Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay. Whose interviews did you go to?

MR. FERRANTE: I went to a group in Hyannis, Massachusetts. It was, well, now, I'm drawing a mental blank. Otis Air Force Base.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

MR. FERRANTE: There's an FAA facility on Otis Air Force Base. And that was the group, if you'll recall in reading through this, there was conversation in Boston Center and Otis trying to

arrange for a scramble because Otis was an FAA facility that was co-located with the military base. So, when the 9/11 Commission first formed, they came over and I spent days with them going through the materials that we had, what we had produced; of course the PowerPoint presentations. And we have a lot of files that we refer to as SATORI, that's the ability to replay radar data, along with voice data from host computers, which are the 20 centers that we have in the U.S. So we did a lot of that type of review. And then when they got in the process where they were going to conduct interviews, what we had tried to do was to send an FAA person with them during those interviews to help them understand the jargon and what meant what.

And I'll give you a for example: They went up to New York Center and they interviewed controllers. And I think this is what precipitated all of this. They learned that there was something called an Accident File and an Accident Package.

Well, the Accident Package is the actual

transmittal that we send to the NTSB. And it has a cover kind of like that black one with just the label on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. FERRANTE: Now, that's an Accident Package. And in that will be transcripts and there will be radar data and, you know, statements, facility logs and so forth. But the Accident File, I mean it could fill two good-sized paper boxes. Because when you print out radar data, you know, we store it mostly on discs, but when you print it out, it's hundreds of thousands of pages. So, we don't print that out and put it in a book. We'll put what we think is appropriate.

So they went to New York Center and they accused us of withholding information because we had released Accident Packages and not Accident Files. So, we said, okay, great give them everything that's in the file.

So then they came over here and they had these square tapes about this big around. And this is Dana, I don't remember her last name.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Hyde.

MR. FERRANTE: Hyde, thank you, from the Commission. She came over and she had this tape and she says, how do I open this? I said, you don't. She said, excuse me? I said you have to have a host computer to be able to play that. She says well, you sent this to us, why do we have it. I said because that's the kind of information that we keep in an Accident file. She well, how do you access it? I said, we don't. She says, you guys don't use these either. I said you have to have a host computer in order to be able to read that. So then she pulled out what's called an ORB. Our centers record on these square tapes. I had a gentleman who even knew what, you know the model number and the name of it, he told me what it was. So, she pulled out an ORB. She said, well what about this? I said, that's an ORB, which is an Optical something disc. She said, well, how do I access this? I said you don't. She said, well why do I have it? I said because you told us we withheld information and that's what we keep in an

accident file. But I have no ability read them, you have to have those computer sources to do it.

So, at that point, because there was all this conjecture that we may have withheld information, they made some arrangements that we would go with them on these interviews. So, I went to Otis Air Force Base. And I think John Azarello might have been in that one. I don't recall who was in the interviews. But when we went there, after we were done, the Commission concluded that having an FAA management official there probably withheld some of their testimony but that they didn't want to appear that they didn't know what they were doing in front of FAA superiors. So we didn't go anymore.

Because I remember being in this interview. This individual made some comments what would have been in my statement. And they said you filled out a statement? He said, yeah, I think so. And I said, now, do you know if you filled out a personal statement or do you think you did. So, he

said, well, I'm not sure. So, I brought the Quality Assurance Officer in. I said did you gather personnel statements after September 11? He said, no. I said okay, then. So, that stopped it right there, it was that simple. Because not everybody's required to give a statement. It's when you have pertinent information that you can lead towards the investigation. But we didn't go on anymore after that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember if any requests for information had come down to your level that had come from the military, immediately following September 11, when the military was looking for such and such because they needed to prepare a time line of their own or something like that?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't recall any coordination with the military on that. However, if we did, it probably would have gone through Doug.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Doug Gould?

MR. FERRANTE: Doug Gould. But I don't

recall any of that happening?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Why do you think it would go through Doug.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, he was my primary contact in dealing with outside of the agency in coordinating the release of information. Again, we had to coordinate with the FBI everything, that was an edict that we got from Monty Belcher, nothing gets released unless the FBI agrees to it. So, Doug, was who I tried to funnel most of that stuff through. Because Doug had the contacts with the FBI.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember getting any questions about notification that had come from Monty Belcher, specifically?

MR. FERRANTE: Again, because of the structure of the organization, those questions would have more than likely come to me from Dave Knoles.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But wouldn't he say, well, you know, Monty's looking for such and such or--

MR. FERRANTE: He probably would have come

in and said, I need to have this or see if we can get this or do we know anything about this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He wouldn't drop names?

MR. FERRANTE: Probably not. You know, we looked at ourselves as we were supporting the 10th floor. And the 10th floor, of course, was Monty and Jane and Bill Peacock and (b)(6), (b)(7)c And that's still true to this day, most often than not, that the 10th floor is looking for it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's why somebody asks you a question?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So nobody needs to drop any names, you just know.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When the September 11 Commission started looking into things, do you remember getting any requests for information about military notification from the Secretary's Office?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember preparing anything--

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --at their request?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you one of the initial liaisons to the 9/11 Commission, was that your role or--

MR. FERRANTE: I guess you could say that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After this accident file misunderstanding issue came up with--

MR. FERRANTE: Before that--before that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you left?

MR. FERRANTE: No, before that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: The very first time, I think, they came over to the FAA, I was involved from the start.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, and because I think at some point Shirley Miller kinda--

MR. FERRANTE: Shirley Miller was the FAA's liaison, so 98 percent of what I did, I provided to Shirley who provided it to the Commission. But you know, after time went by, for

example, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], was one of the ones that they used for doing a lot of the radar analysis. And we had started to build a relationship. And (b)(6), (b)(7)c would call me and I would call Shirley and say, hey, (b)(6), (b)(7)c is going to come over, he wants to listen to a tape, whatever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: She'd say, okay, thanks. So, we generally informed her of when things were happening. But not everything went in and out through her.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember reviewing anything that Public Affairs had put together concerning a chronology from September 11?

MR. FERRANTE: No. Yes, and, no. Yes, I did, but that was during the time frame that we were providing information to the 9/11 Commission, not before we produced any of what we did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's from August '02--

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --I guess that was prepared for the anniversary?

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm. And I'm willing to be that we did see this or someone on my staff saw it, because almost everything in there, I can tell you came from time lines that we had developed, like the book or the earlier versions of the time lines that you saw.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, if you guys were asked to review that you just sort of compared it against the time lines--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --you already had in production?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You guys have any questions?

MR. LASSARD: Do you know what the source of this right here was--that's highlighted, 9/24?

MR. FERRANTE: I mentioned we had what we called the never-ending telecon. So, in probably the last three of four aircraft accidents that had taken place, prior to September 11, Dave Knoles or myself would set up a telecon with the facility and the region. And that was because it was a real

fast way to get information, if we got a question from, like, a director's office, we were able to ask and get an answer to that right away.

And as we learned more about these, like, who the NTSB investigators were, we'd share that type of information. So, that line took place. And this probably, there was a discussion about, you know, keeping a log about everything that took place in that room. And I know that Tony Mello and (b)(6), (b)(7)c who were both on my staff, that were here in the building that day. And I know that they were upstairs trying to capture, you know, what was said and so forth. So, I would think that this probably came about as a result of that open line being built.

I've also heard and this is through the 9/11 Commission in a meeting I went to at the Pentagon with Shirley Miller, that apparently, there were some other links set up between FAA security and the DOD.

Now, prior to the 9/11 Commission coming into existence, I never participated in any of

those lines. And, apparently, it was common practice that we had a hijacking, FAA security would set up a net and they had all these entities on it.

So, I think it was probably a combination of those events that took place.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you think this is just something that somebody logged as a, okay overhearing the conversation type of thing?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because this is the same kind of thing that shows up in NORAD's time line, as well, you know the 9:24 time.

MR. FERRANTE: I guess I'd have to ask the question, I know at one point, and this was, you know, after-the-fact information, I know that that there was a net set up between the FAA and elements of NORAD, KONAR, I believe it is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. FERRANTE: And I don't remember all the particulars of this conversation, but I believe we went to a meeting at the Pentagon and,

apparently, somebody who had answered that phone, you know, a DOD official, who had answered that phone had, like three different phones going at the same time. So, I think that in some cases, information was being shared on one end but may not have been heard on the other end. And I think there was also, because of the never-ending conference that was going on the 10th floor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c eventually joined that, and she was, quote, you know a "DOD Representative to the FAA."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think that the 9--we were talking about open lines and military communications, I think the 9/11 Commission had concluded that based on their investigation that they couldn't find a line where information was being passed back and forth in any substantive way.

MR. FERRANTE: I agree.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And this was, what I learned in that same time line, and I don't know if their report went into much detail about this, but, apparently, there was a line that was established

between FAA security and the DOD. I believe it was KONAR, I don't know the exact names of it, but a DOD official. And this individual had, like three lines that were going at the same time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which, the DOD person?

MR. FERRANTE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So, there were times when information was being discussed on this line that, and I don't know all the other parties that were on it, but it would have been multiple parties to this same line then people made assumptions that because the DOD was on the Net that they were getting the same information, as well. Where, in fact, nobody from the DOD was monitoring the line because they had other priorities going on at the same time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Your staff would not have been the source of this time line, would it?

MR. FERRANTE: This 09/24/ time line?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, because it's not in the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" that I could

find.

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it, that particular statement?

MR. FERRANTE: See this was done August 12 of 2002, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. FERRANTE: And so there was the time line that we tried to develop. And what we tried to do is we tried to be as accurate as we could based on information we had received from other FAA facilities. In other words it was on a tape and the tape said it took place at this time, now our tapes could be off by 20 seconds, but, generally they're very accurate, most of them are on the atomic clock now. Or there were personnel statements that we tried to footnote that this time was approximate. So, without having access to the NORAD logs when we developed that, we wouldn't have known that.

Now, in the subsequent months that followed September 11, security probably had logs

that they had generated when they had their net set up in the operations center. So some of this information could have come from those sources, as well.

Now, because remember this was put together by (b)(6), (b)(7)c who is the Public Affairs Specialist. So, no, he might have interwove two or three different sources to come up with this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, there's the possibility that he got the NORAD's PA release--

MR. FERRANTE: Very possible.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --their time line and could have just kind of filled out the time line--

MR. FERRANTE: Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --as a possibility there. The, you know, LOIS [ph] time line hit the press on the 18th of September did you see that?

MR. FERRANTE: I remember watching it on TV. Parts of it, I didn't particularly like it. No, I never saw this. But I would suggest to you that some of this information would have come from us going to NORAD. And it could have come from

facilities where they might have made inquiry as to what time they took off. It could have come from those first sheets that we put together when we did individual flight segments. Because we had put that together before we came up with the master chronology. And, again, I know I brought information to the group that Darlene was leading one time. And I don't remember exactly what it was. But those were dated on the 14th, which, you know, could have correlated to some of these.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was just curious as to whether you had seen, you know, in the press, the times that NORAD published--

MR. FERRANTE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --at any point in time and maybe compared with what you had or that the FAA had to see if they were the same or different or what.

MR. FERRANTE: The only recollection that I have to any of the military time or what NORAD put together is I remember seeing it on, I think it was CSPAN, and this was a little window that was on

somebody's computer display and there was a general who was pointing at charts and that were set up on an easel and there were times on there. And the only thing that struck me, that I recall that the time that their chart said that he crashed and the times that we had thought he had crashed. Now, they relied on, apparently, there was a camera that filmed the impact at the Pentagon? Whereas we were relying on when we lost radar contact.

So, I do remember that I thought there was a difference in the time when we thought he crashed to when NORAD thought he crashed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was it a difference in minutes or seconds or--

MR. FERRANTE: I think it was about two minutes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And again, what I've learned, you know, this one shows FAA notification at 9:16, and I don't know what that's derived from.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's someone's recollection, you know, it was not a, you know, it

was going back and trying to reconstruct the stuff, because we were, quote/unquote, you know the [unintell.] they were [unintell.] they weren't logging the calls and making annotations or anything like that and they all went back to try to reconstruct to their best understanding of what [unintell.] you know what the times were and stuff like that.

MR. FERRANTE: Right. That sounds similar to what we had going on the 10th floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh yeah.

MR. FERRANTE: Because they started writing it on the white board and then of course the white board was going to be filled in no time at all. So, then someone said, hey, let's get a laptop computer and then they tried to transcribe what was on the white board into the laptop while they were still getting inputs. Because I remember reading a draft of that and we had a crash time that was at least an hour off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think we have a copy of that log from that room.

MR. FERRANTE: I was fortunate, I pretty much escaped that room. Of course being in Chicago helped that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Driving back from Chicago, 13 hours, that's about how long it takes isn't it?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. That was an eerie drive, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There weren't too many people on the highway were there?

MR. FERRANTE: No, actually it was very, very quiet on every highway I went through. And, you know, it had been a while since I used a government vehicle, and they changed the charge card process. I had to call on how to use the charge card. I'm at a gas station, and I was about to buy gas myself. All I knew was I needed to get back to Washington. Had no idea what's going on except what's on the news.

I tried to make calls here several times, 202 Area Code cell phone didn't work real well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I can't think of any other questions, do you have any other questions?

MR. LASSARD: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : D you Elise?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else you'd like to add that you think might be relevant to what we've talked about today?

MR. FERRANTE: Not that I can think of. I would like to say that I think in the initial days following what took place on September 11, I think there was a valiant effort of the people within the FAA and, certainly, within NORAD, as well, to reconstruct what took place. So I was kind of disappointed by some of the statements that I read in the 9/11 Commission. I don't think they gave any credit to the after event activities that took place.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: I was very proud of my group. If you consider from the time they came to work on September 11, which is generally, I had a full staff in by 6:30 in the morning. Most of them worked until midnight, and they worked 7:00 to

12:00 for the next 15 days.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So your group concluded around the 26th or so of September?

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah, by the end of September we were pretty much back to our normal operation, which was, you know, we were still 24-hour-a-day coverage that we provide to the air traffic system using five air traffic investigators. I mean, on a good day we were busy. When this happened, we were just inundated.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where is Wayne Pierce working now?

MR. FERRANTE: He still works on the fourth floor as part of the litigation support group.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's where Jeff Myers is, right.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. Now, in the structure, you know you asked about some of the names that we had in there. We had AAT-100 and AAT-200 both sister organizations that were part of AAT-20. AAT-100 had a very, very small

headquarters staff; so that would have been Cathrine Myers and (b)(6), (b)(7)c In fact that would have been their entire headquarters staff, because the manager was a man name Tom Carmody who was stuck in Colorado someplace.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He is--

MR. FERRANTE: He has since passed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --deceased right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. And then in terms of how 200 was structured, we had five air traffic controllers who we considered air traffic investigators. And that included myself and Tony Mello, Doug Gould, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c happened to be sailing and she missed the entire event. And the rest of them were there all the time.

Now, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was an analyst who did, we brought her on to be a staff person because, you know the staff work that we had to do was always piling up. And when we assigned it to an investigator who had been on the road for two weeks, we issued too many deadlines. So, we

brought one person in as a dedicated staff specialist that wasn't going to travel. That was Mary Bradley, I'm sorry (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we had a couple of staff assistants that were very concerned in the initial days and kind of stayed with family members, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was one of those. We had a secretary named (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], she's still in the organization. And I don't think she had, really, any role or involvement in doing this, because she was working with Dave at that point.

And then, the other folks that we had, because we also had a litigation support group and that would have been (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the same time, they both reported to me the same way, as they air traffic investigators did, but their focus is whenever there's an airplane accident, there's going to be a lawsuit against the United States government. Right or wrong, I mean, there always will be. So, they generally take the accident packages and they work with the FAA attorneys and Department of Justice attorneys and try to represent the United States in those

matters. So, they go to depositions and they go to trials.

As luck would have it, on September 11, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in Cleveland, and I think (b)(6), (b)(7) was in Indianapolis. They were both in centers on different depositions that were taking place. Wayne got copies of the original recordings from Cleveland Center and drove back to Washington with them. And I remember when he showed up with those we made him rent a car and turn around and drive them back to Cleveland Center. I mean it was a real nice gesture on his part, to bring back the originals. But, you know, from Wayne's point of view, Wayne was in the Organization when TWA 800 happened. And, of course, TWA 800, since that started out as a criminal investigation with the FBI, the focus was on chain of custody. So, all Wayne was thinking was chain of custody, I've got to bring these tapes back and secure them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Whereas we didn't have the ability to produce certified re-recordings.

Because in order to do that, you have to have the time-channel reader that takes it off the master reel. Now we have them that take them off of cassette tapes. But we didn't have the ability to do that off the master reel. And, then, of course from that certified re-recording you make your certified transcripts, which is what the facilities do, which is why we had Wayne take them back out to Cleveland.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you guys make the copies of those large reel-to-reel onto the cassette tapes the time channel gets recorded on there, as well?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: In order for a tape to be certified, and you'll hear that in anything that we do that we produce that's going to be made public, someone will come on there and they will say, my name is so-and-so and I'm employed by the Federal Aviation ASH [ph] and I hereby certify this to be a true, re-recording of the original reels concerning whatever the incident is and they'll tell you the

time the tape begins and the time the tape stops.

And we have lots of problems in this building with that, because Public Affairs, wants you to do these big media releases, so they would you know ask us for copies of the tapes that they could release. And then they would say, you know it's got that terrible noise in it this boom, boom, boom all the time and we can't clear that out. I said you have to play them in a stereo system, all you gotta do is play them in the right channel.

Because what it does is it records in stereo. It records in the left channel, I believe it's left channel is the audio portion and the right channel is the time channel at the same time. So, when you play it back then the time reader will tell you what time everything's taking place. But unfortunately, you can't do those over the Internet yet, because you can't record stereo and upload it and download it. Nor can you record stereo over the telephone.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you guys haven't figured out how to do that in the WAV files yet, huh?

MR. FERRANTE: Right. So, we use WAV files, we call them working drafts, they're not certified, but the only thing that's missing is the time channel and the--someone who does the certification.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, have you kept copies of all your e-mail messages from September 11 and following?

MR. FERRANTE: I kept a lot of them, probably most of them. I had a computer that crashed probably three years ago and I lost a lot of material in there and I have since changed. I used to be in Air Traffic and I was on the Air Traffic server now I work in AVR which is the Aviation which is the Regulation and Certification, and I've been changed to a new server. I can check and see what I still have. Be happy to do that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be great. We had, we put in a request, just to kind of centralize our requests to the IT folks.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And they're supposed to be

going around to the units, IT folks and pulling some e-mail messages, and I think yours was on the list. So, they're be coming by to see you if they haven't done so, already.

MR. FERRANTE: I remember that I started a folder called September 11--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, a lot of people did. Did you also keep copies of like electronic chronologies and things like that on your computer's hard drive?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'd like to get a copy of that folder onto like a CD if you can. We can stop by tomorrow and pick that up.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, that's fine. In fact I kept a copy of that book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The hard copy or the soft?

MR. FERRANTE: Hard copy. You know what? I may have an electronic copy, I may, because I think we put that onto a CD. No, we couldn't have because it had the files in, so it wouldn't have had the radar pictures in it. But I do know that

on my hard drive right now, I have the initial chronologies that you'll see individual flights and I have the master chronology.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What we'd like to do is just get the whole folder that you've got with all your September 11 stuff in it.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And kind of go from there.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay. and I'll search through my e-mail archives, when my computer crashed and I don't remember exactly when this was, sometime in '02, they tried to replicate all of my e-mails and what it did was, I have two different archives now one's called old archives and one's my current archives. So, if I can access the old archive, I may have all of the original September 11 documents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay. Like I said, there should be some IT guys coming around to take a look at that so maybe they'll be able to help you with that.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, thank you very much,
I'll go ahead and stop the tape. It's 2:55.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

BY

SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, October 14, 2004

9:36 a.m. - 10:09 a.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

[REDACTED]: Today is October 14, 2004, the time is 9:36 in the morning, we are at FAA Building 10-A, Room 421-B, Washington D.C. My name is [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and I am conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at 9/11 Commission hearings and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today I am interviewing [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c could you, please, acknowledge that you are aware that the interview is being tape recorded.

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, I am.

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you raise your right hand, please? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c I do.

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you give your full name, spelling your last for the record?

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c Last name is spelled [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c first name (b)(6), (b)(7)c middle initial L.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you want to close the door or leave it open, it's up to you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's okay, we can leave it open, that way (b)(6), (b)(7)c can find us if she gets here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right. What's our current position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Technically, I am an air traffic safety evaluation specialist.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what division are you working in right now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's Air Traffic Operations ATO-S, Safety Evaluations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Air Traffic Safety Evaluations Specialist?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm, yes, although that's not what I'm functioning as, but that's what my position-of-record is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And can you tell me what the division is again? ATO-S--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : ATO-S is the generic line of business, and then the division is Safety

Evaluation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your present grade level?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : J.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : J band?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, there you are. How are you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Good morning, how are you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c just joined us. I guess you got here a little earlier than you thought, huh?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said that's what your position is on paper, so what are you actually doing right now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm working on a training program for air traffic controllers for awareness training focus enhancement, it's called NATPRO, N-A-T-P-R-O. I think now that you're here, we will shut the door, thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What is NATPRO?

MS. MYERS: It stands for National Air Traffic Professionalism, NATPRO's the acronym, it's a lot easier to say. It's how we pay attention to paying attention. It's a performance enhancement-based training that focuses on cognitive skills, memory skills, prioritizing, judgment, that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When did you start with the FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : July, 25, 1990.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In what position and where was your duty station?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : My first duty station after being trained at the Academy was New Orleans, Lake Front Air Traffic Control Tower.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You were an Air Traffic Control Specialist?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long were you down there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Two years, roughly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I used to be stationed in New

Orleans.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, what did you do there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Same thing, just--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, the OIG?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --yeah, the same with the IG, yeah. That airport is actually right on Lake Pontchartrain, isn't it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, it is, it's outside of the sea-wall system, the levy system, the levy system.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, that's comforting isn't it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They are nine feet above seal level.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually, it's eleven and Moiresant [ph] was only nine feet above sea level. So, that was a tall spot.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We lived, like, for a while right on the border of Metairie and New Orleans, right on a canal. And I presume we were above sea level there because there was no level or anything

that we were sitting underneath, so I wasn't so worried about the rain there.

On September 11, what position did you hold?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I worked for Air Traffic Evaluations Division and the acronym, at the time, was AAT-100, as a specialist.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when did you assume that position with AAT-100?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : September 10, 2000.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, it was my one-year one-day anniversary.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was your supervisor?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : My manager was Tom Carnady [ph], who is deceased now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who did Tom report to?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Dave Knoles.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, yourself have a staff

or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what were your general duties in that position?

MS. MYERS: I helped to oversee the evaluations program; helped the branch offices, the evaluators that actually conducted the evaluations of Air Traffic Control facilities; I would give guidance, direction, look at trends about the problems that were being found; coordinate with other headquarters elements up here for interpretations or new procedures going into effect, giving them, you know, just coordinate with them give them our opinions about the safety aspect of it. Would make sure that all of the--we had four evaluations branches. That they were all doing things the same way--they'd look at the same things when they'd go into different places and just review what they found, that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After September 11, how long did you continue to hold that position or are you, essentially, in the same job?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm still in the same position, it transferred over to ATO-S, safety ATO reorganization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As I kind of understand

things, I think that you and a lot of other folks that worked in AAT-20, AAT-200, -100 groups, had participated in preparing in what is essentially this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events." Can you just explain for us, generally, what your role in working on this document was?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : First of all as I understand the structure of the organization AAT-20 was Dave Knoles, that was it, and I think he had a secretary. I knew that AAT-100, my boss, Tom Carnady and myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)c were the only employees at headquarters of that organization. The rest of our employees were the branches. AAT-200 was our sister organization. They were down the hall from us. That was Tony Ferrante was the manager and then a specialist and his group. They did investigations and litigation.

We were sister organizations, but we didn't work closely together all the time on the types of things that they did. I was familiar with what they do as investigators and investigating operational errors and helping to coordinate with

accidents and that stuff with the NTSB and so forth.

So, on September 11, when that happened, my role to help in assembling the book was mainly clerical, mainly administrative; helping just to keep all of the documents sorted and filed and I did typing, I made copies. I collated the books; when into publications and go them bound and did the, you know, the cover, and that sort of thing.

We sort of focused on one aircraft at a time. I worked on United 93. I didn't create anything on my own or anything like that because that's not my normal mode of operation, but I assembled all of the information and did go through that. Looked at the transcript and helped to do some of the summary work on that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, did you--like, since you did 93, we'll just flip to the 93 section.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So for this, chronology, your time line that was put together here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So what would you actually, let's just pick this 9:24 and 30 seconds event here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you have available to you source documents or was somebody else kind of give you a log?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We had, it was very much a group effort and it took several days. I don't remember how long, but it seemed like forever to go through this process. We had some, I don't think they were completely official transcripts from the facilities, but we had some transcript type things. I know Mary Strawbridge worked with me on that and she was in that area and we actually listened to tapes and we jotted down notes of what we felt like--for example, this United 93 established radio contact with--that would have been when we listened to the tapes, we would have jotted down that that's when it occurred. And so the things that were in quotations, that was what we actually heard from the tape or what we actually saw on the transcript.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And then we put the other words around it. After we went through the process many times from different sources and got all of this information together as much as we could per aircraft.

Then we all sat around as a group and made sure that it made sense that it, you know, that there weren't any typos, that we were saying what we meant to say and that sort of thing. And I can remember sitting there at the computer, you know, with the projector up and I was the typist for most of them, of the four aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When, like, let's say, for example, you guys had a event in here. What sort of things would cause the group to decide to take it out or to not include an event that you guys might have initially in--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I don't know that we would have taken out an event per se or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just to kind of clarify, like, each of these time--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You mean like when--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --like each of these times and events--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, like, let's say you had something squeezed in here between, you know, this 9:29 and the 9:31.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't remember, you know, not including something because--I'm not exactly sure what you're getting at. But I believe that our thought process, when we were going through this, is that this was, you know, we're preparing this for our bosses, i.e., mainly the Administrator type kind of thing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And, as you know, managers don't read through everything, they want the key points, the highlights, the important things; here is when things started to go sour; here's what the controller said; here's what we know; these are the facts. So, for example, if you've got this 31 seconds in here, if nothing happened that pertained

to what was going on, then there was no need to include it. If that's what you're--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I think that's--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you did an actual transcript, line-by-line of every transmission that occurred, that would be a huge document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, yeah, I've seen some of the partial transcripts for some of the radar positions that were involved in September 11 and even some of those documents, which I think they tried to boil right down to the point are pretty long. Do you have any other questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We found this other time line or chronology, which we kind of generically call a grid time line. And it looks like it focuses on, like, military notification. And it says that it was prepared by AAT-20 on September 18 at 1400 hours. Does this look familiar to you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't recognize this top sheet at all. No, I don't recognize that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about the sheets

underneath?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's, I'm not sure, but I definitely don't recognize the top sheet. I don't remember, really, in the stuff that I helped with and looked at, I don't really remember any military stuff at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Military notification or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get any documents from military or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, or any--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --any source--you don't recall seeing any source documents from the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, no, just strictly what we got from the control towers. And, because I wasn't an investigator like the people at 200, I wasn't here the whole entire time. On the 11th, itself, I was here until the guards went through and said mandatory evacuation and all of that stuff. So, I'm thinking I left about 1:00 o'clock, maybe on that day, because it took forever to get home and I

went and got my kids from school. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was out of town. So, I didn't stay on the 11th afternoon, like a lot of people did.

And then the following Sunday, I didn't come in that day, but the rest of the time I was here, until, I don't know, I guess for that whole week, until, like, Monday or Tuesday of the following week, I continued to help. You know, assemble things, assemble all the information, proof read and that sort of stuff. But there may have been some other--obviously, there may have been other documents that came in because I wasn't here the whole time, like the others were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you work on preparing any other time lines, other than this "Summary of Hijack Events" that you can recall?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, not really--just things that were in that book, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who did this one, this grid time line?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : ONE of the things that has

come up associated with this grid time line is that there's some earlier drafts of this document that show the military notification time for United 93 as 10:08, which, I don't know if you've looked at the 9/11 Commission Report, I know a lot of FAA people haven't for some reason--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I did--I did look at it.

Their findings that came out, was it in July, I think.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : July or August.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I did read it and I read what I've already talked about the military, you know, that there wasn't good notification and that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Commission had concluded-- had noticed that the FAA was able to give to the military was that United 93 was at 10:08, and like I said that was on an earlier draft of that document and it was removed. And I was wondering if you could tell us anything about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't recall, I know I haven't seen this, I don't recall it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Any discussion about--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --anything particular about military notification, I really don't. But I remember the portions that I worked on, was mainly administrative clerical, typing, proof reading and that sort of stuff on the actual times and the summary that you see in that book that dealt with United 93 that I worked on that came from voice recordings from the facilities, from the air traffic facilities or transcripts or notes where we would compare several of us listened to the different tapes and you know, and write notes down and that sort of thing.

So, I don't recall ever hearing any military--anything that the military would have supplied to us or DOD facilities or anything like that, just what the air traffic facilities were, and, again, that was all pretty quick stuff that they sent to us as soon as possible.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about during that meeting where you guys are projecting presumably these time lines up on the screen and kind of, I guess kind of

finalizing and validating the information in them.
Do you remember any discussion about military notification during that meeting?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I don't, I just don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what air traffic facility transcripts you were looking into or that you had--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The only one that sticks in my mind was Cleveland Center because it was gruesome.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All of their transcripts.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pittsburgh, we had some stuff from Pittsburgh, that's what sticks in my mind, when we were going through it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall, this is one of--this is a partial transcript, correct? Right here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This is a partial transcript from Cleveland Center that was sent into headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right, it's from the military operations specialist position in Cleveland.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall reading that or having access to that when you putting this chronology together for 93 or helping to put it together?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just remember from the-- well, when I say the facility--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You mean the cockpit recording?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --the air traffic frequency, the Center Control that United 93 was on. This doesn't look familiar to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's not a radar position, so--that's not a part of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They compared this on the 17th? And then who knows where they got it, I may not have been involved anymore at that time, when subsequent documentation came in, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you familiar with a network drive called the "S"-drive?

MS. MYERS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what is that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's a shared local--it's a shared drive in the room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who has access to the S-drive? Do the Centers have access or just the people in Washington.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The people in this building, like any of the other buildings they would not. And that's one of the two, I don't know exactly which organizations at the time I believe AAT-30 was on and AAT-20 and AAT-10 and perhaps some others, I don't know exactly which organizations, but it was [unintelligible] make it reasonable. I'm talking about the computer people, so that was not overloaded I guess.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, in order for an item to get onto the S-drive, it would have to be put there by somebody within the Washington office, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Someone in this building that had access to it, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who (b)(6), (b)(7)c is? It's a person, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know what the first name

is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How do you spell it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6) : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]?

MS. MYERS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know any of the QA folks out at the Cleveland Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because ZOB is Cleveland, right?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, wait, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I knew him through other things, I think he was there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c ?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay. Do you have any other questions? Do you remember getting any specific requests from Monty Belcher immediately following September 11 for information about chronologies?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Not him specifically, I was way down on the totem pole, I don't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Maybe it would have filtered down and somebody would have said you know, we need to get this for Monty or can you help me put this together Monty's really asking?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As I said, this wasn't my normal thing, so I was just helping, so they would have probably given that to Doug or (b)(6), (b)(7)c or one of those people that do this all the time. All I know is the 10th floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But not individuals' specific names.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, I guess, you wouldn't know then, as well, if like Jane Garvey was asking for something specifically, either.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, not specifics, just that they were all, everyone was very concerned and Dave Knoles spent a lot of time up on the 10th floor, I'm not even sure exactly where, but he would come down and he would talk to Tony or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tony Ferrante?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --Tony Ferrante or

[unintelligible]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember having to assemble any of FAA's information to provide to the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember if you guys coordinated any of the chronologies that you prepared, including this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" with the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I don't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate in working with Ms. Darlene Freeman--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and she had, I guess worked on some after action groups and this like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who Darlene is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Vaguely.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Do you remember if you had helped or participated in preparing any briefing packages for the Administrator or about to testify before Congress or maybe do some White

House briefings?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I didn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about for the 9/11

Commission hearings, do you remember helping to put anything together for anybody that had to testify for those?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, nothing like that. All I did was help document information that came in when we responded to 9/11 the boxes, the boxes and boxes and boxes and boxes of paper. And other than that, just, again, on the periphery and fringes of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you keep a copy of this time line or any of the other materials you were working on post-9/11 on your computer, do you still have those?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about your e-mail messages and such?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have one still from (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], was our branch manager our evaluations branch manager that was located at Dulles. And he was asked by the FBI to or the FBI

wanted to interview the controllers out at Dulles and he went along and sat in on those. And he just wrote me an e-mail saying this is what it was like in here, the controllers said go ask the IF [ph] these kinds of questions and that's it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So that's the only, like, 9/11 e-mail you have left?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, yeah. I do, it doesn't have anything to do with the military but way after, like a month or longer after 9/11, my boss at the time, Tom Carnady, was doing some coordination effort with I think it was the FBI for example and he had me help him with that. The FBI wanted to know--they wanted the telephone logs for 1-800 weather briefs for pilots that would have called in to get weather briefings and that was a huge--huge thing. And he needed a database of all the pilot schools, training schools or something like that in certain areas, Florida or whatever, and so I helped Tom with that a little bit, but that's the only follow-up activity I can remember. And those files are huge so I didn't keep them on

my computer, I just turned them over.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else that you can think about along the lines that we were talking about, the time lines that might be helpful that we haven't asked you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, sorry.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I wish I knew the answers and I could say this is what we did, but.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, we'll go ahead and end the interview, it's 10:09.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
KENNETH DOUGLAS DAVIS

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is December 7, 2004, the time is 10:05 a.m. We're at DOT NASIF Building in Room 7324, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today, we're re-interviewing Doug Davis. Mr. Davis, will you please acknowledge that you are aware the interview is being tape recorded?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, I am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you please raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. DAVIS: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you give us your full name, spelling your last name for the record?

MR. DAVIS: Kenneth Douglas Davis,
D-a-v-i-s.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current
position?

MR. DAVIS: I'm Assistant Branch Manager,
Avionics Systems AIR-130, A-I-R-130.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Assistant Branch Manager with
Avionic--

MR. DAVIS: Avionics Systems.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And--

MR. DAVIS: And it's AIR-130 is the office
signature.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A-I-R?

MR. DAVIS: A-I-R-130, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's with the Federal
Aviation Administration, right?

MR. DAVIS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is that part of Flight
Standards or is that still on the Air Traffic side?

MR. DAVIS: It is part of Aircraft
Engineering, it's, Flight Standards is AFS and we
are AIR, but there all under Aircraft Certification

and Regulation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what's your current grade?

MR. DAVIS: I am a K-band, equivalent to a 15.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you been in your current position?

MR. DAVIS: Since August 23. So, that's almost four months four months, three and a half months.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And prior to that, what position did you hold?

MR. DAVIS: Prior to that, I was the FAA liaison to headquarters NORAD in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long had you held that position?

MR. DAVIS: Since October 5, 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : D.C.'s a lot different than Colorado Springs, isn't it?

MR. DAVIS: It is a lot different, yeah, that's why I came--I was here in D.C. before I went there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, were you? Did you like it out there?

MR. DAVIS: I liked some of it, yeah, it's not bad. It's the West.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. DAVIS: And I'm an Easterner, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, I see.

MR. DAVIS: Good to be out there, though, it was a good time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : While you were out there, what grade were you?

MR. DAVIS: A J-Band, 14.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : A J-Band?

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And can you just briefly describe what your duties were as a liaison out there?

MR. DAVIS: Well, obviously, I got out there shortly after 9/11, so my duties as I saw it were to improve the integration of data and communications between the FAA and NORAD and to fix what was broke on 9/11 and that is getting

airplanes on targets, trying to work out ways to improve response times, improve coordination within facilities and headquarters, and to do exercises, conduct training, facilitate all of that stuff, real, live fly exercises, that kind thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you replace somebody or was that a new billet?

MR. DAVIS: No, I replaced somebody, but the person that I replaced had retired in February of '01, so the position was--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, there was no one there until September 11?

MR. DAVIS: Well, there was someone there, his name was (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]. And he was there because NORAD was conducting its annual major exercise and FAA headquarters sent a person to observe/participate from headquarters and that was (b)(6), (b)(7)c so he was in Cheyenne Mountain on 9/11, when things happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Where is (b)(6), (b)(7)c usually stationed?

MR. DAVIS: Well, at that time, he was a

military reimbursable to the FAA. We do about ten of those, I think on a routine basis. So, he was a Major, an active-duty Major in the Air Force, but he was working for the FAA, loaned to us from the DOD. Currently, he is retired from the Air Force. He retired, I think, in '03. And he is currently working as a contractor and contracts support to the FAA. So, he's in the district area.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But he was out there on 9/11 to participate in some real-life exercise that they were doing?

MR. DAVIS: Right, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, he wasn't--he didn't have any of your functions that you--

MR. DAVIS: No, he did not. He was there only as an FAA participant/liaison for the exercise.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And what time of exercise was it, again?

MR. DAVIS: I'm not sure if it was an amalgam Virgo, NORAD does an annual exercise that involves live flights and training scenarios and I

don't know what the scenario was and I don't know what the name of it Washington, but it was that one.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Essentially a large-scale training?

MR. DAVIS: Large-scale training exercise.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like of a hijacking, of a training exercise to resemble a hijacking?

MR. DAVIS: I don't believe that that one was focused on hijacking. NORAD's mission is not just to protect the continent from hijacking. They do a lot of exercising around the traditional NORAD mission, which is Russians coming over the pole and that kind of thing. So, there's a lot of that kind of stuff. It's their air defense mission. And so, I don't know what the training scenario was for that exercise.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see.

MR. DAVIS: There's been a lot of--there was a lot of speculation of it in the papers after 9/11 and after I got there. In 2002, we did a hijack exercise. We, actually NORAD, I said we,

NORAD leased a Delta 757 and flew it and they flew targets on it and that kind of thing. So, they actually went through that. But I don't believe that was being conducted--that type of exercise in 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : While you were at NORAD, who did you report to within the FAA.

MR. DAVIS: Alton Scott [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Alton Scott?

MR. DAVIS: Mm-hmm, he was the Manager for Special Operations, located here on the sixth floor. And all that has been changed now. All the structure's been changed, the organization's been changed. The last four months of my position, I began to report to Cliff Armstrong [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what Scott's routing symbol was?

MR. DAVIS: Uh--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I know you guy aren't really using those anymore, but--

MR. DAVIS: --he was ATP-200. Yeah, the ATO doesn't use routing symbols anymore, so its

ATR--ATO-R and that's as far as the routing symbol goes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you said for the last four months you reported to who again?

MR. DAVIS: Cliff Armstrong.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, roughly from, like, April, through August approximately?

MR. DAVIS: Somewhere in there, plus-or-minus a month or two.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who Cliff would report to?

MR. DAVIS: Frank Hatfield.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Frank Hatfield?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you the only FAA liaison person out there at the time or was there someone--

MR. DAVIS: Well, I was the only one assigned at NORAD headquarters. There are a couple of folks now that work in Cheyenne Mountain. You know, that's not NORAD headquarters, that is like an air defense sector component of NORAD. NORAD headquarters is at Peterson Air Force Base, which

is about 15 miles away from the mountain.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you were actually at Peterson?

MR. DAVIS: Right, but I spent a lot of time in Cheyenne Mountain, particularly after I got out there because we were staffing up what we called the Domestic Event Net. And I was learning my job. So, I spent the first 60/70-percent of my time in Cheyenne Mountain, pulling shifts and getting acquainted with that before I actually, before I reported, almost totally, to Peterson Air Force Base.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you have--did anybody report to you?

MR. DAVIS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was Hatfield's position?

MR. DAVIS: Hatfield is the Director of System Operations, I believe--Operations Security.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, it's Director of Operations Security?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, I believe that's--I believe that's his title.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How does Doug Gould fit into that structure there?

MR. DAVIS: I honestly could not tell you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Don't know?

MR. DAVIS: I thought he was a Manager, when (b)(6), (b)(7)c retired, there were about five managers under Frank and I thought Doug Gould became one of those manages, which was, in fact, out in Scott's old position, but the responsibility for the liaisons in the field had moved to Cliff Armstrong and he was one of the managers. So, to my mind he was a manager subordinate to mine.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you're not real certain?

MR. DAVIS: No, I'm not, I don't know what he does today?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At NORAD, was there somebody at the Air Force that you reported to or that you had some responsibility--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was a liaison to the four-star general. So, I didn't report to anybody,

I was on my own, self-supervised out there, for the most part. But, so, the commander's staff, the four-star commander, has, obviously, a lot of different segments in there but there's intelligence, there's operations, there's logistics. All of them have two-star general over them and I interacted a lot with them.

And then, also below them, obviously, they could kind of branch out more and they have O-6 or full colonel levels down there. Most of my day-to-day interaction was with the O-6 level. Weekly interaction with the two-star and I would, say, bimonthly to every quarter interaction with the four-star.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was the four-star?

MR. DAVIS: Eberhart [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Eberhart and who were the two-stars that you routinely interacted with, if there were a couple?

MR. DAVIS: In the beginning, it was with Eric Findlay, Canadian two-star, who is now a three-star and the deputy commander at NORAD, And

it's Findlay, F-i-n-d-l-a-y. And then he was replaced by Angus Watt, W-a-t-t, also a two-start Canadian, he is the NORAD J-3. I interacted quite a bit with a two-star at CONR, Craig McKinley [ph],

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : CONR?, that's C-O-N-R, right?

MR. DAVIS: CONR, right. Conus [ph] Region Commander.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was his name?

MR. DAVIS: Craig McKinley, he was not on duty on 9/11, Larry Arnold was on duty on 9/11, and he retired shortly after my activity [unintelligible]. So of the two-starts, General Watt is the one that I interacted the most with?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you interact with anybody at NEADS?

MR. DAVIS: No, that's not my job.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The acronym NEADS is N-E-A-D-S?

MR. DAVIS: Correct, Northeast Air Defense Sector.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who were the 0-6s that you generally dealt with?

MR. DAVIS: First one was Colonel Marke Gibson, who is now Brigidere General Marke Gibson, M-a-r-k-e Gibson. And then, it's been a--that position in NORAD, it changes very frequently. The other 0-6s that I interacted with frequently were

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and then, before I left, it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, questions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I understand in the spring of 2003, that the military, I think it was NORAD, specifically, had hired a contractor to help them prepare for some of the upcoming requests from the Commission, the September 11 Commission? And I was wondering if you had dealt with any of those individuals--

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and do you recall what their names are?

MR. DAVIS: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] as one of them, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c oh, I'm having a hard time

remembering his last name. And my interaction with them was getting any or all available FAA time lines and information that we had. And I think this was prior the Commission hearings, which is why it was ramping up, because the commander was preparing for his interrogatory, I'm a little fuzzy on the time line.

But, yes, some of my interaction with them was getting any available FAA documents that I could surrounding 9/11. But more in line with translating what they were getting into what they were putting together. Because DOD doesn't speak FAA and they have a hard time understanding what departures and holding and all that other kind of stuff is. So, my job is to make it elementary for them so that they will understand no, it doesn't mean an aggressive-type thing, it means, you know, the opposite type thing. So, that's what I spent my time doing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you, I think one of the folks that was working on that went by the nickname of Ski? Does that sound familiar?

MR. DAVIS: Oh, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph],
yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]. Yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was a part of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did somebody come to you and
make a specific request for information from the
FAA?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, they've asked me for
specific information that I could provide.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like?

MR. DAVIS: Like time lines.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Like time lines?

MR. DAVIS: --that we had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of what, time lines of what?

MR. DAVIS: Time lines of the four events
that happened on 9/11. When we had articulated a
coordination and, you know, what our logs showed
for coordinating and what we showed for impact and
everything else that went along with that, when we
made the call to put airplanes down; when we did
all that kind of thing. So, it was, basically, the
general overview time line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was making that

request to you?

MR. DAVIS: That guys that you mentioned.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One or all three of them?

MR. DAVIS: All three of them. It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c that was his name, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I believe is his last name. So, all three of them--I was working with them--I was working them in two areas: One was to put together or to provide for them the time line. What we were putting together was a notional time line on what the scenarios would look like if we had in place then what we have in place today, in terms of the coordination, communication architecture.

So, that's what I spent most of my time doing, was trying to give them my expertise and, you know, whether there's any kind of BS-factor in kind of the numbers they're coming up with in the scenario that's trying to be applied to today's--so, I spent most of my time working with them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did they--the requests that they were making of you, did they provide those to

you in writing, like, in e-mail or a memo--

MR. DAVIS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --or was it verbal?

MR. DAVIS: It was verbal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And do you know who they were working for or on behalf of--was it the commander out there or--

MR. DAVIS: Well, it was, everything they were doing is on behalf of the commander.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. I guess, maybe, let me narrow it a little bit. Do you know who the contractors were directly reporting to?

MR. DAVIS: No, well, I think they were reporting to NORAD J33.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which is?

MR. DAVIS: Which is Operations, which was, at time, was (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. DAVIS: But I don't know, I didn't hire them, obviously--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I understand.

MR. DAVIS: --I didn't even know what

company they worked for.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I understand.

MR. DAVIS: I only knew they were
contractors.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, then, submit your
request up the chain of command?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, I called Alton Scott.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you get approval or were
you provided with information to provide to the
military?

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And did you give them
something?

MR. DAVIS: Uh, yeah, on a few occasions,
I gave them time lines. Now I would receive them,
generally, by fax--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. DAVIS: --because it wasn't available
in electronic format.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If I showed you a couple, do
you think you might recognize?

MR. DAVIS: Maybe. I'm trying to think of

specifically what they were.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't know if you would have gotten a cover sheet.

MR. DAVIS: No, I've never seen that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Maybe you could flip through there, this is the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001" from AAT-20.

MR. DAVIS: These look familiar from a textual standpoint, the graphs you have do not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But the text time line?

MR. DAVIS: Well, I can't tell you if the time lines exact to what I provided, but that's the type of thing that I provided to NORAD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's looks similar?

MR. DAVIS: Right. I do remember providing graphics, but they weren't, they weren't as clean as these. But, also, keep in mind, when we were looking at this, (b)(6), (b)(7) and his group, we were finding some of this even on-line. Because some of this stuff, FAA had posted on their Webpage, like some of the time line stuff.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You mean, like this? This is--

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, exactly right--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --a fact sheet--

MR. DAVIS: --that's exactly what they--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --dated August 12, 2002.

MR. DAVIS: That's exactly what it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you guys pulled that?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, we did pull that. Now I do not recall supplying them with time lines for every flight like this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which flights did they seem most interested in?

MR. DAVIS: As far as the pure data context goes, there was no specific flight we were focused on, that I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. DAVIS: In developing the today's scenario, we were trying to get our hands around the first one that went in, because that's the one that's the most critical from the NORAD perspective in response times. Because that's hard given their intercept locations and that kind of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, then you've mentioned a

couple of times what seems to me to be a development of, basically, training scenarios for NORAD. Were the--that's kind what it sounds like you're describing to me that these guys are working on, the contractors.

MR. DAVIS: No, uh=uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No?

MR. DAVIS: No, they're not--what they're trying to do is put together for the commander a no-kidding time line based on what FAA is going to put together. Because they want to know what FAA's time line reads, not so they can match up, because they understood that--they think there might be some disconnects by a few minutes here and there. And they just wanted to be aware of them.

So, we didn't have any issue with them. When I talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c, I don't think there was any issue in providing NORAD with what the Administrator plans on putting forward as the official FAA time line, which there's no reason to hide that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. DAVIS: It is what it is [unintelligible]. And it's the same way with NORAD's, just that, you know, obviously, we're the two key agencies involved on 9/11, if there's any disconnects, it's just an awareness issue. It's, not, you know, oops, it's now, okay, how'd this happen? How did we say this and you say this? There needs to be a coordinated issue to fix those kinds of things.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what were they doing, like a compare-and contrast? Is that what they were doing?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, because, see they--DOD does what they do very well, but they do it in a box. And any time you get inputs from outside, it's slanted their way because of how they do their business. It's very effective, but it's hard to translate. And it's hard to break down because they practice it routinely over and over and over again, so it seems there's things that they do very well. And that's one of them, practicing

[unintelligible] practicing [unintelligible].

So, from that perspective, it's, they never envisioned a scenario like this where they would have to have so much interaction with--as quickly like this. Because prior to 9/11, any hijack that they conducted was a monitor, only, follow to destination. That's all this was, it was never a potential for shoot-down or any other aggressive, hostile action. So, it was never envisioned that we were going to have to take kind of action and be as aggressive as we were, so, I don't believe that the structure for the communication links--well, I know they weren't, that's why I went out there, because they weren't established to be able to deal with the communication issues that we would have in these kinds of events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Here's another time line, it's in grid format.

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, this looks familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That' looks familiar? You think, so that might have been something that you

might have provided?

MR. DAVIS: Might have been.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There's also, behind this, some more kind of textual formatted chronologies.

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, I don't, I'm not certain about these--possible.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But the grid--the grid time line looks familiar to you?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, the grid--the table looks familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there anything that the military had asked you to try to get that you weren't able to provide because somebody in your chain said, no?

MR. DAVIS: Not that I'm aware of. I don't recall anything that the boss said they can't have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were they looking for anything more substantive than prepared chronologies? Were they looking for, like, source material, such as logs or transcripts of radar positions, that sort of thing? Or did they seem to be satisfied--

MR. DAVIS: They--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --did they seem to be satisfied with the summary documents?

MR. DAVIS: --they have access to all of those, because of the '84 RADES, and I'll spell that for you, R-A-D-E-S, they worked for the Air Force at, I think Tindle, but you know, they have access to all radar data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : To Miller and Egland?

MR. DAVIS: Tingle Air Force Base, I believe, Tingle Air Force Base in Florida.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, Egland is in Florida, as well, right?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, it's their main folks that have a lot of radar expertise. The radar structure in the U.S.--FAA and DOD kind of own and share the external radars. They're called JSS Radars, Joint Surveillance System Radars. And, so, because we do, then the DOD has access to ongoing radar information. So, they never asked for radar tapes or voice tapes, those types of things from me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about logs?

MR. DAVIS: No logs, either.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, it is fair to say, in summary, that the bulk of what you were asked for and what you were providing were basically these summary time lines that we've--

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --or something similar to what we've seen--

MR. DAVIS: Well, I think something that was open to the public, nothing that, to my knowledge, that we couldn't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And this was around the time frame of them getting ready for the Commission hearing? What time frame was this, again?

MR. DAVIS: Well, it had kind of been going on--it was--it seemed to me like we had this ongoing thing for a few months. And I don't recall--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, was it immediately, when you got out there, you got out there in October?

MR. DAVIS: No, it was--there was a sunshine period there, when we weren't so much interested about all the time lines yet. But that doesn't mean they weren't, they just didn't bring me into it until later in the period.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

And you think that was when, again?

MR. DAVIS: You know, I don't know, I don't know exactly. There were a couple things going on: One was the 9/11 Commission staffers coming. But before that, there was--it seemed like--it seems like their preparation was geared actually on some Senate staffers or somebody else coming.

And that's what the presentations were being kind of geared up for. Not necessarily for the commander's deposition or his appearance at the 9/11 Commission, but for other things. Yeah, that seems like that was right, there was somebody coming to Colorado Springs, and I thought it was either the Senate or House of Representatives people and it was part of why things were being

developed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there anything that the contractors or the military had asked you for that you had decided, on your own, that you weren't going to go ask those in your chain for?

MR. DAVIS: No, I can't think of what that would be.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there any reason why the military would say that they had asked you for some information in this effort and that you had come back and told them that you wouldn't be able to provide that to them?

MR. DAVIS: Maybe, but I don't recall doing that. I mean, if it was--the only reason that I could think of going back and saying I can't get it is because the person who has it wasn't available or something like that. But I don't recall--or, unless they were asking for something that we just didn't keep, in terms of a way that we didn't keep things. You know, a different log or different data, you know, we record our data in our logs a certain way. So they may have asked for

something from their military standpoint that I may have told them I can't get that because I don't think we record that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have any questions about? Do you know who (b)(6), (b)(7)c is? I think he was a lieutenant commander at NORAD and J-5, maybe?

MR. DAVIS: J-5 is plans. No, I don't know who he is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No? How about (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]?

MR. DAVIS: Yep, I know (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. DAVIS: He is a retired lieutenant colonel, real smart guy in radars and then went into contract for radar stuff with NORAD. So, he's a contractor out there at NORAD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would he have been a contractor in, like October of '01?

MR. DAVIS: Mmm, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He still would have been--

MR. DAVIS: Active duty.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --active duty? Do you know

what position he held then?

MR. DAVIS: He was J-33W, I think is what they called themselves, he was the chief of the Aerospace Warning Branch, something like that, I think is what they called it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you interact with him at all?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, in fact, the first six or seven months that I was there, we shared an office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you?

MR. DAVIS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember if he was putting together any post-event time-line information or gathering data for the command during the October 2001 time period?

MR. DAVIS: I do recall seeing some files that he was putting together on all four events that were time-line constructions, but nothing else and I didn't know why. But just, in fact, I think he shared them with me, they still might be on the computer back at NORAD at the FAA, I might have

saved those files.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He may have e-mailed them to you?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, he did e-mail them to me, I kept them in storage. So, I saved them, I have to call a guy who's acting in that position now to see if they're still on the hard drive. But they were still very--they were very high-level that I recall and immature in terms of, you know, the development of the whole scenario.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did he ask you to help provide any--

MR. DAVIS: No, he just provided them to me as F.Y.I. He [unintelligible] guys were doing this kind of thing, you know, just for me to keep in touch with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who he--if he was getting any information from the FAA to help him?

MR. DAVIS: Do not know who he was getting that from, if he was getting it from the FAA at all, I don't know who he was getting it from.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, would you mind

checking--

MR. DAVIS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --on that item we just talked about?

MR. DAVIS: Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And, further, if you don't mind, if you have any other e-mail communications where you might have forwarded the request from the contractors up your chain of command for information, maybe you would have gotten e-mailed something? Because I know, because we've been looking at this for a little while, and all of the materials that we've seen, we've seen in electronic format, as well. And so, they may very well have been available electronically and somebody may have, they could have attached them to an e-mail message, as well. So, if you don't mind--

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --checking that, as well.

MR. DAVIS: --can check that, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you ever asked, from the FAA side, to try to obtain any information from

NORAD or any military unit?

MR. DAVIS: No, not that I recall, but, you know, as NORAD developed their scenarios and developed their briefings for the big thing that they were putting together with these contractors, I would fax it back. If it was classified briefs, I would fax them, possibly. But, no, other than that, no, I kept my bosses informed of what I knew what was going on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you would be provided with a copy of what the contractors were working on?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, like I said, I helped--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, you would provide it up to Mr. Scott, right?

MR. DAVIS: --right. I assisted them in doing a sanity check and a translation check on the things that they were doing. And time-line check with the new scenario, okay, not the old one. They ran with their time lines that they had established for 9/11 and we were doing a comparison with how much time would be saved given the new communication and coordination of all the other

infrastructure stuff. So, that's what I was working on, mostly, with them--the contractors doing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Planning for future event issues?

MR. DAVIS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As opposed to preparing briefings for--

MR. DAVIS: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and that sort of thing?

MR. DAVIS: Right, I was not involved with that. I was not asked to comment on anything the commander was specifically going to be presenting to the 9/11 Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, they didn't provide you with a copy of that?

MR. DAVIS: Not that I remember. I don't recall being given anything from the commander or from the staff as a lead-up to his testimony. I don't recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about after the testimony?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, afterwards--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, we all know, right,
the--

MR. DAVIS: --that's right, after the
testimony, it was public knowledge and it was put
on the Website and somebody had it by then. I saw
it after the fact.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you interact at all with,
I'm confused as to what the gentleman's proper name
is, it's either, like, Allan Scott or William Scott
[ph]? I think he was stationed up at CONR? He may
have been a colonel, do you know who I'm speaking
of?

MR. DAVIS: I do know who you're speaking
of. No, I did not interact at all with him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe he presented a time
line during that Commission hearing.

MR. DAVIS: He was also, the guy that said
that Andrews Air Force Base broadcast all this kind
of stuff. At least our guys in the tower
during--he made some remarks. And I saw his
presentation on 9/11, before the 9/11 Commission, I

disagreed with some things that he was talking about. So, yeah, I never interacted with him in any way shape or form. I met him, but there was no interaction.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is it William or Allan?

MR. DAVIS: I think it's Scotty Scott is what they call him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

MR. DAVIS: He's a contractor--no, he's not a contractor, he's a GS-15 at CONR, now.

MR. DAVIS: Right. Is it William?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All I know is Scotty Scott, so I don't know what his first name is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you privy to his time line before it was presented?

MR. DAVIS: I was not, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What is it that you disagreed with specifically in his--

MR. DAVIS: I don't recall Andrews Air Force Base making--Andrews Air Force Base Tower is operated by the FAA. So there was an FAA controller out there and he claims that somebody

made a transmission that morning, on 9/11 that would indicate something different than what was being talked about in terms of who knew when, that kind of thing.

And to my knowledge that's never been validated. To me, when he made the statement, it was hearsay, it wasn't an accurate, factual statement and it pissed me off. And you know, that kind of hearsay statement to that board, the Commission, like that was what he was doing, that's what it was

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else? I can't think of anything, else. Is there anything else that you would like to add along the lines that we've talked about?

MR. DAVIS: Well, what's the basis for this? What, why am I here, I guess and what's going on in terms of--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the broad issue, obviously, is what I talked about at the beginning for the tapes, which was some allegations that the Commission had raised, I should say concern about

potential inaccurate statements--

MR. DAVIS: By who, though--by--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --by NORAD and/or the FAA.

MR. FARMER: --okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Primarily about when the military was notified with regard to the four hijacked aircraft, because, if you've taken a look at their report; in Chapter 1, they go into a fair amount of detail--

MR. DAVIS: NORAD does?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Commission goes into a lot of detail about this issue, especially towards the latter end of the chapter, going forward with all the details. You can grab it off the Internet if you don't have the book and read all about it.

But we were interested in your interaction with the contractors out at NORAD, because your name had come up, specifically, with regard to what we asked you about, which was--

MR. DAVIS: Developing whatever--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --pulling information from the FAA for that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mean, DOD, IG, this was also referred to DOD IG and they're out there interviewing many people from--

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --side, and we are tasked with interviewing, you know, our mission is the DOT side of it and so, we're kind of interacting with that, getting information from them and then have to go on the other side to verify it to the national Commission.

MR. DAVIS: So, to that extent, then somebody thinks there's a different time line out there is what you're saying?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, the Commission developed a different time line than what was presented to them.

MR. DAVIS: I haven't read it so I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah--

MR. DAVIS: --I haven't read the report.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's pretty--it's very

detailed, in the report, as to what they think the problems are. So, yeah, we just needed to, essentially cover a base with regard to your interaction with NORAD and then providing information from the FAA and vice versa.

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Unless you have anything else to add?

MR. DAVIS: Well, that's it, I've got two IOU's for you and I'll see if I can get those for you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you just give us your office phone number, real quick?

MR. DAVIS: Yeah, I can give you my card.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'll give you my card, as well.

MR. DAVIS: If I have these, electronically, I'll send them to you. I think they are still existing, hope they are.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's just william.owens is the e-mail.

MR. DAVIS: Okay, well, we'll go ahead and

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end the interview. It is 10:51.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JANE GARVEY

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is December 7, 2004, the time is 1:13 p.m. We're at 1615 L Street on the Ninth Floor, in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c, also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today, we're interviewing Jane Garvey. Ms. Garvey, will you please acknowledge that you are aware this interview's being tape recorded?

MS. GARVEY: I am aware it's being tape recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you, please, raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. GARVEY: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you, please, give your

full name, spelling your last for the record.

MS. GARVEY: Jane Garvey, G-a-r-v-e-y.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On September 11, 2001, you were the FAA Administrator?

MS. GARVEY: That is correct, Federal Aviation Administrator, yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long did you continue to hold that position after 9/11?

MS. GARVEY: Until August 4 of 2002.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As we've spoken before, I think now you're teaching up at MIT?

MS. GARVEY: And I'm doing some consulting and I'm on some boards, yes, that's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's the name of the company we're at right now?

MS. GARVEY: The company is APCO Worldwide, A-P-C-O, it actually stands for Arnold Porter Company.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I had read a sign out front it says they do media communications and some lobbying?

MS. GARVEY: Well, not lobbying, though,

but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. GARVEY: --much more strategic communication and work with corporations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You, I don't want to spend a lot of time on this, but, on September 11, you were at FAA headquarters, is that correct?

MS. GARVEY: No, On September 11, I was--when the planes first hit, I was with Secretary Mineta in the Department of Transportation on the 10th floor in his office as we were meeting with a European official on an upcoming conference that was to be held in Montreal later on that month.

When the planes did hit, though, within a very short period of time, I was back over to the FAA headquarters where I remained, obviously, not only that day, but for the subsequent days to 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall what time you may have gotten back over to FAA headquarters?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I'm sort of the specific time I can tell you, was probably within a 15- to 20-minute time period from the time of the

first plane and when John Flaherty came in to inform the Secretary and inform me went back into the Secretary's office, I watched the television that was on at the time. I went and called the Operations Center to see what was going on; to see what they had to report and then, in a very short period of time, after that conversation, returned to the FAA building.

By the time I returned to the FAA building, the second plane had hit, so that gives you, perhaps, some sense of the time period.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So sometime between when the second plane hit and then the third plane, obviously?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, that's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During the morning of September 11, before, I think it was American 77 had hit the Pentagon; I think, at the time, nobody really knew what that plane was, but by the time the Pentagon had been hit, do you recall if you had had any conversations with any of the airlines?

MS. GARVEY: There were several

conversations during the course of that morning. I won't be able to give you the exact time, but there certainly were conversations with Mr. Don Cardy from American; with Mr. Goodwin from United; and Mr. Leo Mullen from Delta. One point, we weren't exactly sure about the location of some of the Delta planes and were in conversation with Mr. Mullen. So, those conversations, at my level, took place, as I said, throughout the morning. And, clearly, our own Herndon, the Operations Center--were in direct communications through dispatchers throughout the morning. And dispatchers of the airlines, that is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : After the hijackings and things started to settle down, if they ever really did. But, after the hijackings, what sort of information were you requesting from within the FAA about what had happened that day? Did you give instruction to any of the divisions within FAA to prepare anything for you for--I'm sure you were probably anticipating or your staff was anticipating that you were going to have to provide

some testimony of things like that?

MS. GARVEY: Well, quite honestly, during 9/11, that was the furthest thing from my mind. And I suspect it was the furthest thing from Monte Belger's mind. Our major and our primary concern during those immediate hours was, of course, the safety of the people who were in the air. I mean, you will remember that there were in excess of about 4,000 planes in the air that day. I'm not going to remember, again, the exact number, but about 4,900 planes that were in the air when the first airplane hit.

It was a beautiful clear day for flying, so those planes were all airborne. So, our immediate issue for those first hours was, really, the safety of those airplanes. There was a great deal of confusion, I thin, that we had certainly seen the President and Condee Rice refer to it as the fog of war and heard that term many times. There was a great deal of confusion on that day as to exactly what was really happening.

We knew that we were in an unprecedented

attack; we knew that it was something quite extraordinary, quite different from what had been--what we had experienced in the past. So, our immediate issue, obviously, during those hours was to locate the planes that were in the air to make sure that we got everyone to a safe harbor.

And I can remember very distinctly and very clearly in the hour or so after that order was given to bring the planes down, watching that map in the Operations room and finally receiving the call from the Operations Center in Herndon saying that all of the planes were within about a 40- to 60-mile radius of a safe destination.

But there were operational concerns at that time. Can we get the planes down safely? First where are the planes? Is there anything else that's happening in the system that we don't know about? Is there--and then how do we get the planes down? And remember that, in the case--in some cases, we were bringing planes down in places that were used to having three or four planes in a day; several planes in a week; small remote airports.

But we had to bring people down very quickly and we had some towers and some facilities that were handling a rate that they had never handled before. They did a remarkable job, obviously, and I think that has been noted many times by other people. So, that was really the focus at that time, in the immediate morning hours of 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At some point, did you make any requests within the FAA for them to start compiling information for you and what did those requests comprise?

MS. GARVEY: Certainly, I think the immediate request that we made was to our field people at the individual airports, particularly the airports where we knew that the planes had originated was to gather as much information as they could and to get that information to the appropriate FBI. And by this time, the FBI was, clearly, the lead agency and our field people and, certainly, our people in headquarters had worked with the FBI in the past and pull as much

information as--answer any questions that they needed to have answered; provide them with the kind of information that they requested.

While that was going on, we were, obviously, very focused with how do we get the system back up and operating again? What do we need to do? What are the safety requirements that we need to put in place to make sure that we can operate and open the system once again. And the President was very clear, I think, in his immediate days to say, we do not want to become such a victim of the attacks that the terrorists have won. We want to show that we can get our system back up and operating.

So, we spent a great deal of time at the close of that day and into the wee hours of that morning and the next several days thinking how can we get the system up again? What security measures do we need to put in place. What additional steps do we need to take? We clearly knew we had to take some additional steps, what do we need to do? So, our focus was, really, pushing ahead and trying to

think of how we get the system back up and operating.

And, tangentially, or at the same time, rather, sequentially, simultaneously--I'm sorry our field offices were providing the FBI with specific information that they were asking for in order for them to do the kind of investigative work that was necessary.

As the days went on and this is more what we're getting to--as the weeks went on, as the days went on, clearly, there was the pulling together of as much information as we could, both for the Secretary's office-- for ourselves, for the Secretary's office and, clearly, for hearings that we would be facing. And it really ran the gamut from what were Security directives? What was the posture of Security pre-9/11? How did we train crew, for example, to the actual events of that day, including, you know, the sequence of events, where was I; where was the Secretary; where were our key people.

I should also mention, I don't mean to be

giving you too much here, but I should also mention that on the day, one of the other concerns that we had was how do we--do we need to prepare for evacuating our senior leadership team to a remote location? Who was going to be put in charge of that? Where were people going to go? And when were they going to go, so that at a certain time, we had to be ready for that. We brought people together and said we have to be, you know, prepared for this and we assigned someone, obviously, you know, to take the lead and they would be the lead person if the President or National Security gave us the go ahead to, you know, to begin the evacuation process.

An issue that I was very concerned with during that day, were the employees, themselves. We had a number of people--step back and put yourself in the context of that workday, we had a number of people whose spouses and family members were working at the Pentagon. We had a couple of controllers, we had one controller whose wife was on one of those airplanes. You know we had a number

of sort of human issues that we were dealing with even within the building.

I went down at one point to make sure that the children in the day care center--we weren't sure what was going on with the--to make sure that the children in the day care center were being evacuated calmly and rationally and safely. So there were a number of issues going on.

I think, given the extraordinary measures and knowing what I know about some of the employees, that is, where their families were on that day, including the Pentagon, I thought people behaved remarkably professionally. They were extraordinarily calm. There was never hysteria in the--certainly, in the administrative offices or in the FAA. People behaved extraordinarily professionally and calmly in the right under anything but ordinary conditions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, there were a number of folks in the, I guess the Evaluations and Investigations, as AAT-20, who were working on, you know, reconstructing the events of the day. And

they prepared some time lines, just want to show you a couple of these. This first document is titled "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001." And this is just an excerpt, it's about yeah, thick and it's in color.

MS. GARVEY: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does that look familiar to you?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, there were a number of these that were put in place. And as we learned more, I mean, one of the questions that both of--if I can speak for Monte, both of asked at that point, certainly, I was asking, is: You almost had to divide issues into three categories. You know, one category is what do we need to do differently. You know, in other words, what do we need to--in the area of Security in order to get the system up and operating again?

The second is, what did we learn from yesterday? We got through, you know, I think people performed remarkably, in some cases, miraculously--in the case of some of the

controllers and so forth--having said that, it was unprecedented--what do we need to do in terms of media changes? And then the third are sort of the more longer-term issues that you always--and to some degree, some of the information we were pulling together for hearings that might fall into that category.

But, certainly, in terms of the second category: What did we learn? One of the things that became very clear to us is that the communications screen and communication mechanisms that we had in place that had served us very well, I might add, in times of traditional hijacking; in times of, certainly, a kind of the emergency situations that we had set in place in anticipation of Y-2-K, for example. That those were not going to serve us in a time of war as the President had described it, in a time of war.

So, I almost, hesitate to even use the word almost, because it was, virtually, immediately, that is the next day, we began to look at what are some communication challenges that we

had and what did we need to change? And one, obviously, was the kind of notification.

We had a very aggressive and a very proactive controller who kind of jumped a little bit of the chain of command on the notification of that first airplane and we said, well, he did a great job. But how do we--what do we need to do? We had a chain of command that, again, in a time of war is not going to work. We've got to think of something much more immediate. And I know that you probably know about the DEN and the kinds of changes that have been made subsequent to that. So, those sorts of changes were being made, you know, almost immediately post-9/11. But the kind of time line that you were showing me and I'm sure I saw it, there were many of these time lines, they might, each one might be slightly different. Perhaps, with a little bit of additional information or something that is new. But I'm sure, though I don't remember it specifically, I'm sure I did see it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall if anybody

consulted or discussed with you to include or exclude in any of the time lines that would be similar to this, and, especially because this is what the Commission was focused on when they made the referral, which is military notifications. So, especially with regard to military notification--did anybody consult with you about that aspect of inclusion or exclusion in these documents?

MS. GARVEY: I don't remember it being an explicit conversation. It doesn't mean that we didn't talk about, you know, what do we want to put in there? We obviously want to put in there, you know the specific plane. We, obviously, want to put in, you know, whatever we had in our files. And there may have been a reference to the military notification. You know, I'm not sure I can tell you that, yes, I specifically mentioned that. I think when you say to someone, put together a time line, you're assuming all of the notifications, the DOT notification maybe a communication that you might have had with an airline or a communication

that you might have had, you know, with NORAD or whatever, I would assume that that would, really, be part of it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall if you had given specific, maybe, like you or Monte Belger had given specific instructions to, you know, the AAT folks who were pulling this data together to include military information--military notification information?

MS. GARVEY: I can't tell you whether I explicitly said that, I just don't recall. I wouldn't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Based on what you said previously, thought that would be something you would have expected to see anyway?

MS. GARVEY: I would assume that you would see it in there. I will tell you, the reason that I think we talked about it is because it did become clear, that some of our communication with military that we felt--and Monte can give you much more on this, I'm sure--but we did, again, the process that we had in the past, which had served us well, we

felt we needed to make some changes.

I mean, I give that controller in Otis, you know, a lot of credit, because if he didn't necessarily go through the chain of command, which one would--one might have expected. But he did the right thing and we said what do we need to do, what do we need to learn from that? How can we make changes that really reflect the period that we were in?

So, that's why I would assume that there would have been, you know, we certainly did discuss the military principles.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you recall at some point, where you were getting specific questions, though, about military notification? Was it becoming an issue from--

MS. GARVEY: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --the White House or some other--

MS. GARVEY: No none at all. In fact, I will tell you my recollection is, that the time--the one time I remember being concerned about

it was, frankly, reading a Washington Post article where NORAD had put a time line in and Monte and I both looked at it and said, wait a minute, this looks slightly different from our time line. And I want to back up for a minute and say something that I think is very important. I think one of the things that has been missed is, we simply must learn from it. But I don't want to suggest at all that had the military been notified a minute earlier or two minutes earlier or whatever, or whether there's some relationship between that and whether or not the plane could have been saved or whether somebody actually would have shot down the plane. That is not what I had suggested.

So, I remember reading that article and saying that there seems to be a slight inconsistency. And, in fact, it may have been something that somebody may have even pointed out to me. Maybe it was Monte or, perhaps, one of my senior staff. And we said to Jeff Griffith, look, get with NORAD--Jeff Griffith had a great relationship with NORAD--we'd worked with them, I

mean, this is not a confrontational, you know, relationship. We had been--we had worked with them, we said, look, make sure that we're not at odds here, make sure that we both understand what we're communicating. Make sure the FBI is satisfied with what we're giving them and I would assume that the military is just as concerned about whether the FIB is concerned about it.

And my understanding when I--by the time I had left in August, I mean, all of those issues had been resolved. That the FBI didn't have questions about it. That I had never--I certainly never heard from anyone at DOD that they were dissatisfied or weren't, you know, weren't--if there was any problem or whatever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what it was about the information that NORAD had put out at that time that concerned you guys?

MS. GARVEY: Well, it's interesting, because they actually may have had--in their first notification, they may have had a time line for us, that is the FAA, a time that may have been earlier

than what we had down in our notes. But that's the other thing that's very important to know. IS that we knew, because of the unprecedented nature--we did not think it would have been unusual for someone to notified and then made a note of it a minute and a half, two minutes, even five minutes later, just because of the--because of the, you know, the complexity of the issue and the drama of what was happening. And, you know, the intensity that someone may have. So, we said, well, you know, it may be just that people have reported things, just actually made the physical note at a different time.

And, again, that's a change we needed to make. We knew we had to have an institutional way to make sure that people were, even in a time of grave crisis were, you know, were writing it down correctly and were recording it correctly. So, it wasn't anything was like I remember at the time being horrified about, or it being, saying, you know, saying this is something we've got to double check on.

Then again, remember let's go back to the context of the time--my assumption at the time and I believe Monte Belger's assumption at the time was that we had some very serious issues. We still did not know at that time, we are now getting CIA briefings every morning. We are now getting information that is not information that we had always been privy to. We were trying to make decisions going forward.

My view was the FBI was going to take care of piecing together what happened. We've got to learn from it, make sure we've got all the right changes in place--and we thought we had and I believe we did--we've got to think about where we're headed, you know, in the next several days and what does this information mean.

If I had to choose between piecing together a time line that the FBI was focusing on or looking at the CIA information and determining what security directive I was going to put out that day, you can well imagine where my priority would be. And I say that not to minimize it, but to say

that I knew that there were people looking at that, like the FBI and that they would be--if there were problems and anything that they needed, they would certainly ask.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, I guess a potential concern that the Commission had when they had found--when they had pulled together their investigation and looked at what had been presented to them--

MS. GARVEY: In May--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --essentially in May--

MS. GARVEY: --or in June, rather or May, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --it was in May of '03, yeah. And then, you know, by the time they got to June of '04 and they really had an opportunity to really cull through all of the data, is I think that they had some concern about, essentially, a cover-up to make the FAA and/or the military look better on that day. And so--

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --so I suspect that's part of

the reason that they had made the referral to us and to the DOD to explore that issue. So, you know, that's part of the reason why we're out here--

MS. GARVEY: Right and I guess--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --so we can talk about that.

MS. GARVEY: --I find it extraordinarily frustrating. I can only speak from the FAA, but I felt, you know, I felt that--and I was not at the FAA when they, really, were doing the bulk of their interviewing and so forth. So, I suppose I should reserve the judgment to some degree. But, certainly, my experience at the FAA during that period, those days and those months afterward, no one was trying to hide anything.

I mean this was a time of war; people were trying to provide as much information as they possibly could and there was a tremendous sense of trying to set up the TSA and make sure we had the right structure in place. You know, we knew that what had served us before 9/11 was not going to serve us. And one simple, small example is how the

crew were trained.

If you look at the regulations for crew training pre-9/11, it is all about negotiation and collaboration, in a sense, with the hijackers. Negotiate--your job is to get the plane on the ground. Your job is to get the passengers back safely. And, you know, if you look at the ten years pre-9/11, that served the country very, very well. And hijackers at that point were always--were much more concerned with the political agenda and the release of political prisoners. I mean, that had to be turned on its head.

Everything--every assumption that we had was really turned on its head, post-9/11. So that became, frankly, much the focus. And it certainly was not trying to cover up.

For me, one of the frustrations is I had looked at some of the testimony in the hearings and so forth, is that during that day, after the second plane hit, it just seemed to me that everything was very open. I mean, we had a net set up where everybody was in.

So some of the issues about when was the official notification to the military seems somewhat--it's hard for me to understand that anybody could think after that second lane hit that there wasn't just full communication among and between agencies and the government. I mean, you know, we were in communication with the White House.

The net was set up, we didn't know what we were dealing with, but we knew it was not a traditional hijacking. So some of what I saw. But, again, I haven't been privy to everything that the 9/11 Commission was able to see. But I can certainly speak for those few months that I was at the FAA. There was never intention--in fact, I thought all of the issues had been resolved by the time I left in August. And, again, the Commission had not moved into gear and they may have been able to look at things that were subsequent.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just kind of going back to the briefing. This is the press release or it might even be a draft, but I think that's pretty much the

final of that NORAD press release that I think is what you referred to--

MS. GARVEY: That may have been what I referred to in the paper?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --yes. But going back--

MS. GARVEY: I understand, by the way, that there was a great deal of concern by the FBI at the time because they did not want that information to be public. So, I remember that was, certainly, a piece of the puzzle.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But going back to these briefings. I just got a couple of issues that I just need to kind of cover concerning, you know, the cover-up aspect. Did you instruct or recommend or suggest to anyone at the FAA to include information in a briefing similar to this, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" that was less accurate in order to cast a more favorable light on the FAA?

MS. GARVEY: Absolutely not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Along the same vain as that one, did you instruct or recommend or suggest to

anyone at FAA to revise any of the briefings that they had put together and presented to you to include information that was less accurate to cast a more favorable light on FAA?

MS. GARVEY: No, absolutely not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The--

MS. GARVEY: By the way, can I just say--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --sure.

MS. GARVEY: --it would never have occurred to me, even at that time that anyone would even think that they needed to. Everybody was interested in getting at the truth. It would be astonishing to me that anyone would even think that you needed to hide anything or whatever. We weren't thinking like that. We weren't--it was--I mean, even the hearings were not--I saw them as a way to sort of try to figure out together how do we make this--how do we make our system safe? How do we make this--how do we position ourselves in a world that's very different from the world we had known before 9/11.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Since you brought up hearings,

when you testified in--before the Commission in May of 2003, you weren't at the FAA any more?

MS. GARVEY: Right and had not been since August of 2002.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : August of '02.

MS. GARVEY: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did anybody at the FAA provide you with, like a briefing package to assist you or did you request that and--

MS. GARVEY: I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --who did you deal with over there.

MS. GARVEY: I have to say that was one of the more frustrating, most, you know, one of, I will say it was the most frustrating hearing in my many years of testifying that I had.

There were, I think, a couple of issues with that. One is that it was very difficult to get information from DOT at that time. The FAA tried very hard. But you may remember, that was a time when there was a lot of concern in the Administration about whether or not they even

wanted to cooperate with the hearing, with the Commission. So, there were issues that were way beyond me, certainly way beyond me. And I suspect, way beyond the FAA about how much information the Administration, at that point, was even willing to share with the Commission. Remember we had a very different posture and this was the very first hearing on it.

Number two, it was my understanding and I remember being astonished that the staff had not talked to anyone at the FAA of its staff. They were going right for the, you know, Administrator, [unintell.], they were going right--so, even the kind of, you know, usual, sort of pre-work that you do where you get sort of a sense of what their greatest concerns are so you can be prepared for it, none of that had happened.

I was told by the Commission that they were going to meet with the Inspector General and with me, which was true and that they were going to cover and what I should cover was what was the state of Security? In other words, what's the

difference between a Security directive and an information circular? You know, what were the regulations? What was the posture of Security at that time? What was our philosophy?

But the next day, the next day the Secretary was going to be testifying would cover the events of the day. So, I would do the sort of--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Before?

MS. GARVEY: --yeah, the pre-9/11 and from a Security perspective. And they asked the Secretary about the events of that day, where he was, a little bit about the sequence of things and so forth.

And I was very appreciative of that information because it had been two years since 9/11. I had, while I had not--had been out of the FAA since August. I was going to be limited as to the amount of material I was going to be able to get. And not because they were not being helpful, but there was a larger Administration issue. And, frankly, they've got a lot of things to do jus

every day and here's an outsider trying to prepare for, you know, testimony.

So, I never even--while they gave me a lot of material, the material that they gave me before that hearing was principally, some of the Security directives we had put out and those sorts of things. I don't believe I even brought a time line in that first--if I did, I certainly didn't look at it, because and I don't believe I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You just answered my next question and I was going to ask you about--

MS. GARVEY: When, by the way, when Commissioner Ben-Veniste, which was the very last question asked me and I don't remember, did he ask me about Flight Number 3, I confused it

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Flight 77.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He asked you about 11--no, I'm sorry that was Mr. [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The last question.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Ben-Veniste, yeah, I think it was 77 and, yeah it was 77.

MS. GARVEY: Well, you know, I simply

confused it in my mind, I thought he was talking about--first I was stunned to get the question because it was, I thought, they were going to cover that the next day. And I can even remember looking at the staff and the staff kind of looking a little surprised, themselves.

So I answered for when the controller in Otis, which is really what I was talking about. And I realized after I left the hearing that I had, you know, not given him the right information. He and I actually spoke by phone that evening. I was concerned about it. And he told me his great frustration was that he specifically had given that question to DOT and he said to the FAA, but I think it only reached DOT. And that no one had answered it. And you know, it was, again, I did not know that. Not being there, not knowing, you know, it was a source of great frustration. I felt I was not as prepared as I like to be for a hearing. And I felt that was, to some degree, I had been a victim of being the first hearing. But then, also, having this sort of tug-of-war between

the Administration and the Commission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think, I don't remember the sequence of events, but essentially the Commissioner allowed you to provide a question for the record to kind of respond to that time question--

MS. GARVEY: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --about 77. And I was hoping you could tell us who. I know four people were involved in pulling--

MS. GARVEY: That together--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that information together for you. Do you remember who it was you got in touch with over there?

MS. GARVEY: Well, I called--two things happened: One is I called the FAA and said, I may have called Lynne Osmus, I'm not sure. And I said, I mean this, we've got a commissioner who is not very happy. He has sent this over--this question over and the FAA has not responded. I didn't even know it was a question and I need to get out of this. I am not a--I am being asked to provide

information that I am not in a position to give.

I would have given Ben-Veniste whatever he wanted, but I was not in a position to do it. I have to say to the Commission that if there are FAA questions, DOT questions, they must direct it to the agency. I am not there. So, that was number one and that was one of the reasons I wanted to talk to him.

I said, you know, we've got to set up a right chain of command here. I think, again, because it was the first one, people weren't really clear about what the chain was. It was extraordinarily frustrating to me and you can probably hear it in my voice to be put in a position to try to answer questions when you don't have access to the material. You cannot imagine anything that is worse or being in a position where I cannot, you know, couldn't direct people to provide it.

So, number one was, you've got to funnel everything through the FAA and through DOT. And, apparently, at that point, I think Lindy Knapp's

office was the point--became the point for DOT.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : At OST?

MS. GARVEY: At OST, but I think they had to go through OST in the beginning, at least in those first few hearings to get to the FAA, I believe, that was what the Administration and what Justice said.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. GARVEY: And DOT, then, was responsible Lindy, in talking to Justice, this is what they're asking, this is what we provide.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was wondering and this inside information why Justice was involved at such an early stage was--

MS. GARVEY: I think Justice was because there was this terrible controversy about how much the Administration wanted to provide. I could not have testified at a worse hearing, because the ground rules were not clear. And, frankly, the staff had not done its homework of really talking to the people ahead of time so that they were familiar with the questions in their own heads.

I had not been privy to that information for two years. And I was relying on people, you know, in a way that was probably unfair to them. They've got a new Administrator, they've got jobs that they have to do.

This, I understand oh, because I said, but I will tell you, you have to provide something to Ben-Veniste this evening. I have talked to him on the phone. I think he's being, you know, he was frustrated at the hearing. I now understand why his frustration was at the level it was. We sent, you know, you can't leave somebody hanging like that. You owe him something tonight. And I believe Linda Schuessler, who at the time of 9/11 was in the Command Center, I believe she and Laura Brown in the Public Affairs were the ones who actually put it together. But, again, I don't think they did in isolation. I think they talked to people at the FAA. I don't know who they talked to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, this, the next day, the 23rd, because I believe you testified on the 22nd.

MS. GARVEY: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the 23rd, the Commissioner actually read this into the record.

MS. GARVEY: Right, I remember that, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : As we've come to understand things, the on the 22nd the folks who worked on pulling this information together for the Commission, had understood that everything was correct in here. But a couple of weeks later, they found out that--especially with regard to one of the sentences in here that it was not correct.

MS. GARVEY: I understand that, yes, I understood that subsequent to that, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : With regard to the Air Force liaison, was that your understanding, as well?

MS. GARVEY: That she was not so sure about that time and so forth, yeah. But, again, that was not, I don't think anyone was doing anything intentional. I think they were doing, you know, going on the best information that they had at the time, but, again, you'd have to ask them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How did you find out about

that?

MS. GARVEY: You know, it may actually have been from the Inspector General. It may have been actually in a conversation. I'm not exactly sure. It was in a conversation with someone from DOT at one point and I think I may have, once again, expressed my frustration about trying to, at that point, just trying to get information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is this recent or is this--

MS. GARVEY: It may have been before my last testimony, so that was last January, a year ago. It's recent, like recent-recent, no. I mean, it would be--it might have been before-- I had to testify again last January and I wasn't sure. I went in much better prepared the second time because I--and I'll tell you what I ended up doing. I mean, I actually ended up just going through reams and reams of old testimonies and so forth and just, you know, frankly, worked on a lot of it myself.

But, also, I think I had, with the FAA, had been through it. But the ground rules had

changed, the Administration was cooperating with the Commission, so it was a little bit easier to get information. But I think it was in preparation for that, so that would have been a year ago. So, it may have been in just a conversation. Because I remember referring to this. And someone said, well, the one problem is that, you know, the liaison had, wasn't sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : About when she arrived?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah. There is a frustration, I think and I had hoped--and, again, I'm on the outside but--when the Inspector General and I testified at that May hearing, we went back I believe either that day or a couple of days later and debriefed the Secretary just to let him know about the testimony. And I was there, as well. And I remember both the Inspector General and myself saying, you know, you may want to go back to the time line, to the NORAD time line with the military. Just, you know, go through that once again. I remember saying to the Secretary, I think both Monte and I thought, and I think everyone at

the FAA thought, that had been resolved, you know, in the few months in the fall following post-9/11, but clearly, there are some issues.

And, again, maybe as people learned more information maybe as the FBI has learned more, and it may be worth going back and trying to reconstruct it. I don't know if the FAA ever really did that before that next round of hearings.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know, did the FAA send this direct to the commissioner or did it go through you.

MS. GARVEY: Oh, it didn't go through me, I believe it went right to the commissioner. No, because at that point, I said, you have to--somehow, DOT has to set up some line of communication, because the problem with the Administration, that has to be resolved. I cannot be resolving it and I cannot be responsible for answering questions, that I simply do not have access to the information.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you--

MS. GARVEY: But I did ask for a copy of

it, so I know somewhere I've probably got a copy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, do you know what steps the FAA took to correct that record with regard to when the liaison arrived?

MS. GARVEY: I do not know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did anybody consult with you about that that you--

MS. GARVEY: Oh, no, you mean, post-the hearing? No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When they discovered it was inaccurate? What do you think--how do you think something like that should be resolved? Is it--I'm sure--I mean, I could be wrong, but I'm sure things like that happen infrequently, but once in a while--

MS. GARVEY: Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --when folks testify before the Congress and things like that. How would one normally resolve something like that?

MS. GARVEY: And, again, I don't know whether they, it only got resolved once the Commission started getting into it more. They may

have thought this was resolved and the way I look--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess what I'm asking you is, what's your opinion--

MS. GARVEY: What's the lesson learned on that or something?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --if something, like, let's say I was involved in this I came to you and said, Ms. Garvey, how do you think we should resolve this?

MS. GARVEY: Well, I'll tell you what I would do. I would let the Commission know immediately. You know, suppose you--I mean, again, I don't know when they found out or what the circumstances were, but let's assume that you found out, even three months later, the Commission is still--I'd let either the Commission--I'd let the Commission know directly.

The other thing that I always thought and I would go back to the time line--I think it would have been and it's always to do hindsight, and it's easy to do it from the outside. But I think it would have been good, perhaps, even with the

Commission. Because I don't--I could be wrong, I don't believe anyone at DOD would not in a knowing way try to manipulate the times and so forth.

There's--it would be a terrible thing. I think I might have been a little more proactive and said let's get the folks from DOD, let's get the folks in the FAA, let's get somebody from the Commission, let's sit down and try to work this out. Let's try to figure this out, not work it out.

[Technical interruption.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 2:03 p.m.

MS. GARVEY: And maybe in line with that, you do lessons learned.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. GARVEY: And they may have. I, you know, I simply don't know, they may have corrected it as soon as they were made aware of it with the Commission, I just don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : 2:04, we're going to stop the tape and move locations.

[Change of location.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We moved locations, it's 2:08

p.m. I think that you had mentioned that after your hearing in May of '03, that you had a meeting with the Secretary or a debrief with the Secretary of Transportation and our Inspector General may have been there, as well?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, he was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that you had said that you had made a suggestion that maybe they would want to--the Department wants to go back and look at the time line? Is that right?

MS. GARVEY: Yeah, well, we made a suggestion and I don't want to, you know, it wasn't--it wasn't made forcefully. But one of the things that we said was sort left was that there were questions about this notion of the time line. And, well, you know, certainly, Commissioner Ben-Veniste had raised issues that what he had was not consistent. and it seemed as though that was an area where people ought to at least be prepared to answer the Commission's questions on it.

And, in fairness, the FAA may believe that

they did answer those questions through the summer months and that they did answer those questions as the Commission moved forward. I think what is sometimes difficult in those sort of investigative or certainly very comprehensive kind of reviews is when the Commission was involved is they get so much data. I remember at one point thinking, you know, probably from the FAA's perspective, the ones that they feel are the most important that they just want to pull out those key pieces and say, you know, you've got two tons of material but here are the four or five pieces or the ten pieces that are most pertinent to these questions that you can submit, you have to ask for a continuance.

And, certainly that whole issue at the time was [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the things that the Commission had concluded in its investigation was that the notification time that the military had presented in the May 23rd hearing with regard to when the FAA notified the military about American 77 and United 83, which were the last two aircraft

in the sequence of four. That the times that the military presented in the hearing was more inaccurate. The military [unintell.] I think it said for American--well, I don't know which it was, but for one of the aircraft they said that the FAA notified them 9:16.

MS. GARVEY: [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, and then for American 77 it was at 9:24. The briefings that the FAA had put together, none of them that we can see reference that 9:16 time frame, but some of them reference the 9:24 time frame [unintell.]. The Commission had determined that the notification for 77 didn't come at 9:24, it came five minutes later but it didn't--

MS. GARVEY: It didn't come at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --it didn't come at all and that the notification that the FAA provided for United 93, came at about 10:07 in the morning, these are the times [unintell.], which is actually a few minutes after that plane crashed.

But, again, the time lines that the FAA

has put together in the briefings don't reference that time, either. The Commission had concluded that the 9:24 reference that they were seeing a lot of, actually pertained to a notification that the FAA had been providing concerning American 11, and that the FAA, on the morning of September 11, had believed that American 11 may still, actually, be airborne that late in the morning. And that that information got passed on to the military. And so, I was--one of the questions we have here is, were you aware that the information that the FAA had about American 77 and United 93 was [unintell.] wasn't accurate?

MS. GARVEY: Well, at's assuming--that's assuming that it is inaccurate, no, I certainly was not. And, certainly, when I left, again, when I left in August of 2002, it had been many, many months since we had discussed the time line or the chronology of events and that there had been very limited questions and it was really just around that press release that there had been any questions about and nothing--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When is it that you saw that press release [unintell.] began to have those questions?

MS. GARVEY: Well, actually it was the day that it appeared. I didn't see the press release before it was released, it was actually the day--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The Post article.

MS. GARVEY: --in the Post article and I'm not going to remember whether I actually looked at it or I suspect it was probably a staff person who said, wait a minute, this may be different from something that we had. And, again, I think our initial reaction--certainly, my initial reaction--is that nothing nefarious, but just given the sort of confusion of that day someone may have written a time down a little bit later or a little bit after the fact. That perhaps this is more accurate, get with Defense, get with FBI, talk it out see where we are.

There was, at that time, no sense that A) anyone had any desire to do anything inappropriate, or B) had any reason to. I mean that just wasn't

the mind set at the time. Mind set at the time was, really, so much [unintell.] mind set at the time was, really, [unintell.] figure out how we can move forward and how we were going to position ourselves in the country, particularly [unintell.] It was really that day that we sort of looked at that [unintell.] discussions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you participate or are you aware of anybody within the FAA having participated providing any White House briefings relatively shortly after September 11, concerning--sort of providing historical recon of what had happened on that morning? The reason we're asking is because we--the Commission kept hearing that the FAA had some White House briefings, there were a couple of e-mails from the DOD that referenced White House briefings that the FAA had to do with?

MS. GARVEY: I'm not aware of any briefings in terms of the chronology, that sort of thing. I do know that I accompanied Michael Jackson to a couple of briefings where I think the Deputy Chief of Staff David Cardy was at, but they

were much more, then, focused on where do we go from here? What are some of the issues that are [unintell.] actions that we're contemplating--it may have been discussions of the TSA [unintell.] what Congress was looking at in terms of the new agency [unintell.] in terms of Homeland Security [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Nothing historical, so to speak?

MS. GARVEY: No, no, not that I, certainly, not that I can remember. And if I think of anything, something in the middle of the night, I will let you know. But, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I mentioned on the phone to you when we had talked to set this up is, we were interested in seeing if you still had any of these items or any of the briefing packages that you may have gotten for your testimony?

MS. GARVEY: I don't have any of those. The ones that I--I will double check whether they were even stored away. I actually, frankly, after the last hearing, threw a lot of stuff out that was

just, really packed away and is in storage. But is there anything, in particular, that I should be looking for?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I mean, what we're primarily interested in is seeing what sorts of chronologies the FAA might have provided to you in preparation for your hearing.

MS. GARVEY: Okay. I did not get any, I'm quite sure, again, I don't want to say it without [unintell.] definition, but I certainly don't remember getting any before the May hearing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. GARVEY: I did get some post before the January hearing last year, because I remember at that time, thinking it might be a little bit [unintell.] I didn't remember, I don't recall [unintell.] I'll check it, if I do have it, I'll get back to you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be great, thank you.

MS. GARVEY: The FAA has probably kept a copy, because I suspect they also provided some to

Monte, as well. I [unintell.] stuff [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you, yourself, have any interaction with the military following September 11, kind of at or along the lines of requesting information from them to help you guys prepare for briefings or things like that?

MS. GARVEY: No, any of that was done at the staff level. Again, the relationship that we had had with DOD has always been a very professional and a very productive one. So, as far as--I was certainly not aware of any difficulties or any problems and there was no reason to communicate. We heavily relied on staff to pull things together and we also relied on staff to let me know if there was a problem. Not [unintell.] directly.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you had said earlier today that Jeff Griffith, you relied on him for that?

MS. GARVEY: Jeff had a very close working relationship with the military. We also had a fellow by the name of, that was at the time (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and (b)(6), (b)(7)c and it was somebody who was our DOD liaison, Cheryl, Colonel Atkins was somebody who was at either DOT or FAA offices quite a bit. So, those are people you would see sort of on the way to the bases. We had DOD people in Herndon who were part of the Herndon team. So, no, the relationship with DOD was pretty--was a very good one. We had worked with them on sharing air spaces issues and [unintell.] before, so it was a very close--a professional relationship with DOD. One that had been pretty productive in the past.

Not one that, you know, necessarily, not one that was a direct line of communication. Certainly, the sort of direct lines in terms of, you know, the Secretary of Defense or anything like that would have been much more at the Secretary's level.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anymore on this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is there anything else that you would like to add along the lines that we've talked about?

MS. GARVEY: No, I hope I've been able to convey that at least in terms of the time line--the period that I was there from September through that following August. And, again, not to belabor it too many times, but our whole focus was, really, to think about what could we do--what were we going to do from a Security perspective; from a new agency perspective; what were we going to do to really position ourselves, given the kinds of information we were getting from the CIA. That much of the sort of history of the chronology [unintell.] was information that we passed on to the FBI who, then actually pieced together and put together and, certainly, at least in those periods when I was there at the FAA, my understanding was that those issues had really been resolved. And it was a disappointment to me, certainly, personally to hear in May of that following year that some of those issues were not yet resolved. I hope they can be resolved and also that they can be resolved in a way that really takes into account the [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : End the interview, thank you.

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It's 2:24.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
JEFFREY WAYNE LOAGUE

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is December 7, 2004, the time is 11:10 a.m. We're at the DOT NASIF Building in Room 7324, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We are from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today, we are interviewing Jeff Loague. Mr. Logue, please acknowledge that you are aware the interview is being tape recorded.

MR. LOAGUE: Yes, I am aware.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would you just raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

MR. LOAGUE: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Please give your full name and spell your last name.

MR. LOAGUE: Jeffrey Wayne Loague,
L-o-a-g-u-e.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What is your current position?

MR. LOAGUE: I am the manager for the Risk
Reduction Information Group within the Air Traffic
Organization Safety Office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does that have any type of
routing symbol associated with it?

MR. LOAGUE: Under the ATO, I'm sorry,
they've eliminated them so all of it's under the
heading of ATO-S for Safety. And as I understand
it, eventually that's going to go away, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you been in
position?

MR. LOAGUE: Since April, officially.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And on 9/11, what was your
position on 9/11?

MR. LOAGUE: I was a computer specialist
within the Office of Air Traffic Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the routing symbol
then?

MR. LOAGUE: AAT-20.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long did you hold that position after 9/11.

MR. LOAGUE: Up until April of this year.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your current grade?

MR. LOAGUE: I'm a K-band.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In your prior position, what was your grade?

MR. LOAGUE: K-band.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, were you on duty on 9/11--

MR. LOAGUE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --were you working that day? Okay. And who did you work for, who was your direct supervisor?

MR. LOAGUE: Anthony Ferrante.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do you recall getting involved in on 9/11 as the events started taking place, do you recall--there were different, I know there were teleconferences that were taking place. Do you--

MR. LOAGUE: During the--after the initial impact of the first aircraft that hit the Twin Towers, I became of the incident by my second-level

supervisor which was Dave Cannoles; also the one that established the telecon on 9/11 in the Air Traffic AT-1's office, his conference room.

And he had called down and told us of an incident. So, as part of what we would normally do in investigations, the investigators, Tony Ferrante and the other Air Traffic Investigators had gone up to the telecon to start gathering information as to what was going on.

And, I, as a computer specialist and, generally, the operation or data person, tracking of data. At that point, we had not idea; I didn't have any idea as to the extent of what was happening. All I knew at that point was that an aircraft had impacted a tower. I was on the 10th floor at the time to check an aircraft that had impacted. The sense that I had was that there were things already going around that there may some sort of terror incident or involvement in terms of what was happening. But, early on, I had no indication that that was the case.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Were you asked to keep any

type of log information or notes as to what the events?

MR. LOAGUE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you do any of that on your own, I mean.

MR. LOAGUE: No, I did not. The only information I obtained was following the incident, which would have been later that evening, we started the processing after all aircraft were accounted for in terms of, and this is through the time lining. They started to identify which aircraft were among the talk at ATC. Once all the aircraft were identified in terms of when they were tracking, that's when American 77, we became aware of that and United 93, the last two.

When, after the--I was on the tenth floor when American 77 had turned. I was, at that time, I was in Bill Peacock's Office--are you familiar with the building? That's on the tenth, the northeast corner--west--I'm sorry, northwest corner of the building. So you can see back towards the water, towards the Pentagon and I could see the

smoke coming up from the impact of American 77. American--United 93, had not crashed at that point.

We were already starting to position ourselves for what type of information we were going to start requesting. At that point, we could not request a lot, simply because all the facilities were working as hard as they could to get the aircraft they had in the airspace on the ground.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. LOAGUE: Diverted to some airport and on the ground. Following those instances, and United 93 crashing, we started making requests: tape requests; radar data requests; those types of thing. What we normally do if this was a regular accident. Never having been involved in a terrorist event, security type, wasn't really sure of what to ask for. So, we relied upon what we normally do for an accident package.

But in terms of taking logs or notes, during there--the process had started of somebody writing stuff down. It started down on a

whiteboard, writing notes and the problem is the whiteboard filled very rapidly--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. LOAGUE: --with notes and then so that transitioned with somebody taking those notes on the whiteboard and putting them on a piece of paper, which then transitioned over many hours to a laptop being set up in place and somebody starting the take logs there.

So, the information was coming in, but there was no focal, because data was coming in and because of the telecon at various points on the line in one office, there wasn't a source for the information. Information would come in and it would get added to the log, not necessarily--you may find several incidents and the same information being put in there, I recall there may have been two entries in there with two different times. And if the only difference was somebody would be sitting at the computer typing notes, another person would come on to take over relieve that person typing notes, the same information would

come back in and it would just get logged a second time.

So, instead of it being misinformation, it was almost like the person before didn't have time to go back to review the log to see if the entry existed. We didn't have--it wasn't an application, it was a Word document. So it was just a running Word document we were just keeping this log and making the time entries. Part of when we compiled the book was to go back and reference each one of those time entries and decide which one of these two was the correct entry. And that required calling the facility to gain that information. That's the book.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is this the book that you were involved in preparing?

MR. LOAGUE: Involved to the extent of helping to gather together the replay. One of the things as my job was the what we call SATORI. It was a radar replay tool for the en-route environment. And that allowed us to tack the aircraft. So, partly what I was doing was doing

was trying to go into the radar data that we received a few days, a couple of days after the events and track where the aircraft were at that time, in terms of where did we know they were so we could identify time lines, because every radar sweep has date/time associated with it. So that allowed us to build time lines of where the aircraft were.

You've probably seen some of the PowerPoint presentations we put together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. LOAGUE: Those time lines came out of those radar data and the voice data, in terms of where they were and what was said and those types of--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : SATORI is an acronym, isn't it?

MR. LOAGUE: An acronym yeah, Situation--it was, you've probably heard two of them. It started out as Situation Assessment Through the Recreation of Incidents.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: And then it became a--the latest one had to do with the briefing and a research tool. And I'm drawing a blank on it right now. But it's an acronym for a replay tool that was developed by CAMY [ph]. It's an FAA-developed--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : From the results of Oklahoma City?

MR. LOAGUE: Oklahoma City, yeah, Center for Aeromedical Research.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : SATORI, the acronym is SATORI?

MR. LOAGUE: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I've also, I've heard of--

MR. LOAGUE: RAPTOR:

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : RAPTOR:

MR. LOAGUE: That's the terminal version of a replay tool. One is P.C.-based; one is UNIX-based.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Which is which?

MR. LOAGUE: RAPTOR is a PC-based product--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: --works on a computer, but that's because terminal data is much less, there's fewer targets, fewer data elements, so it was actually able to be developed on a PC platform. SATORI, because of all the data, tracking multiple targets within a center, you have to realize the center radar is MOSAIC because you have a radar sensor here, a sensor here and a sensor here. And the processor at the controller's position has to determine, you know, the information as it comes in the source box says which one of these targets--which one of the--it's in overlapping arcs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. LOAGUE: Which arc best represents the location of that aircraft. And so, you may have three hits of the same aircraft. The source box determines which hits to present and then that's what's presented to the controller. So, since we get data from multiple sources, you can see the volume of data associated with each radar file. We would end up having to use SATORI to do extractions

would allow us to view those plots so we could see data tabs that the controllers were looking at.

But, you know, we have an advantage. We can back the data up and play it again. The controller gets one chance to look at it, he doesn't get a replay button for himself.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : RAPTOR is also--it's an acronym, it's RAPTOR?

MR. LOAGUE: O-R, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what that stands for?

MR. LOAGUE: Radar Approach Terminal, I'm sorry, I'm drawing a blank here, too, but it has--I can get both, I call it up and get you the actual, what the acronyms stand for.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just--I've heard the two terms and I've heard both types of radar system used, don't know if radar systems is appropriate terminology, but, I've heard RAPTOR and SATORI having been reviewed for preparing these time lines.

MR. LOAGUE: That's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And I just--

MR. LOAGUE: RAPTOR is a, you have to look at it, RAPTOR gives you an offline means of viewing the data. Meaning, RAPTOR's not creating it, SATORI's not creating the data, the host, in the en-rout environment, that would be the centers, all right has various reports that it runs. And NTAP is National Track Analysis Program. DART--draw a blank on that one, too, but--

[Simultaneous conversation.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It becomes the name?

MR. LOAGUE: It becomes the name, Xerox. So, you, the data is run--processed on the host, so basically, the presentation that was given to the controller, is the same process that we run again. Instead of the data being live and fed to the controller for separating traffic, it's run as a secondary process against recorded data.

So, basically, think of a host as being split in half, one part of the host is live, running operational traffic. The other side of the host is sort of the backup or the maintenance side

of the host so that they can update the programs, off load the data, run these track reports, maintenance reports, those kinds of things. Computer operators do that in the facility.

So they run a report, the same report that creates the position information for the controller so you can see those tracks. So, that process is run against that data again and spit out. Well, if we split that out on the computer paper, right, for like an hour of it, you would have a volume of paper about this tall because it's very difficult to view and the NTAP program was designed back before we had PCs available to use.

So that a maintenance person or an investigator or quality assurance person could look at it and actually see tracks on this paper.

SATORI is just an automated replay of that tabular data. So, all it does, it takes what's already been processed by that, it doesn't create anything. It just reads all the data and displays it on the X/Y coordinates that the information contained in that data tells it to. So, it says,

at this coordinate place this dot. To the right of this coordinate place this data tag. That information is what is contained in that volume. So it just reads all that and displays it on the scope. Now this scale's much smaller than what I'm using, [unintell.] screens are much smaller than what the controller would use.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the SATORI is used to replay radar data that a center would get.

MR. LOAGUE: That's correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And the RAPTOR is used to replay radar data that--

MR. LOAGUE: Of a terminal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --of the TRACON?

MR. LOAGUE: TRACON, Tower TRACON, any tower facility that has radar fed to it that records it. For instance Dulles has radar feeds on it right now, but they don't record it because that is coming from Potomac. Potomac is providing the radar services and the [unintell.] services for that. Does that make sense?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MR. LOAGUE: So, if I'm a facility and I have a bright and I can see tracks coming in because I can't see 50 miles from here, but I can see tracks starting to come in, I can look to see aircraft. But that's not my data, that data is being provided to me by another TRACON facility or larger tower with a TRACON environment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does the SATORI or RAPTOR, do either of those contain a voice--

MR. LOAGUE: The voice is not part of the data, the two have to be merged or are brought together. There is a time code on the voice channel, they're separate systems, right? So and then that's part of the problem. Prior to a SATORI or RAPTOR replay, you had printed--you had the printouts and you had the audio tapes. So, you could flip through the printouts and you could fast forward the audio tapes of the section you wanted.

There's time coding--there's a time stamp on the data and there's a time stamp associated with the voice recording, but the two weren't melded together so that you could actually sit over

the shoulder of the controller and kind of figure out what was going on.

SATORI was the first effort to do just that, taking the time code and synchronizing that with the date time code in the data so that when you would play, the voice was playing in synchronization with the data. That synchronization is not a digital synchronization because we're coming from an analog source, audio tape, it's an analog source to us, so it doesn't have it, although the tape has a time code that the data, once we redigitize it back to the machine, is not embedded in it. So, basically what we create is a one-to-one replay of an audio recording that is synchronized in time to the beginning of the time file for the voice. And then the beginning of the data--let's see how to explain this.

Say I have one more minute of data than I have voice. And my voice starts a minute after the data. Then my time file is going to stay that this starts a minute after, if I hit play right now, this should be no voice for this 60 seconds. But

once this data time matches this voice time, start playing voice in a one-to-one relationship, so we can synchronize the voice to within about 1-thousandth, 1-hundredth of a second. So the margin is real close in terms of for investigation purposes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : With the SATORI?

MR. LOAGUE: With the SATORI. Or RAPTOR, I mean it's--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Both of them can do the same, RAPTOR's a little different. RAPTOR's a PC-based product, so UNIX-based hardware and PC-based hardware have different capabilities in terms of how much data they can handle, how many processes they can run. It's the difference between windows and UNIX.

RAPTOR, to create a voice-enabled RAPTOR, it has to be combined with a secondary product. RAPTOR records or RAPTOR replays the data. You use a separate voice process, MP3 player some other tool to play the voice and then we use a product called Camtazia [ph] to capture them both. It's

basically a PC recording of the voice and the data that's playing simultaneously on the PC. So, basically, you're playing the RAPTOR, you're playing the voice. You're running almost like a video camera, but it's capturing those digital images right off the screen, anything that's going to the screen is being recorded.

And that gets recorded into a file, that's essentially a video tape because you can't zoom into data targets, you can't do the things that you can in SATORI. But then, in SATORI, I can back up and go forward; I can zoom in; I can look at different views; I can remove or filter by optics anything I don't want. Zero to 10, I want 10 and higher. Whatever you produce in RAPTOR with voice integrated is the view you get. You see you don't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Unless you start it all over again?

MR. LOAGUE: Unless you start it all over again and record a different scenario with the different parameter selected, in terms of altitude

filters. It's an over-simplified way of describing it, but it's just a matter of the PC's version has not gotten to the point where voice can be directly integrated with the data. SATORI's got it; RAPTOR doesn't. We hope to have another product that's being developed now where both will have the same capabilities. One product servicing all our radar systems.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: That's out in the tech center now, the other guy's doing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sorry about that.

MR. LOAGUE: I hope it's relevant, I hope it helps.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I mean, I've heard those two items mentioned a lot and just appreciate you explaining what--

MR. LOAGUE: It's the best--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --they mean, because I didn't have a great understanding, so.

MR. LOAGUE: It's the best capability we had, right, I mean, if you wanted to go back to

some of the other investigations, we had TWA-800. I mean, that was at the beginning of us ever having SATORI. When that first started, the data that was collected from Boston Center, was shipped to the technical center. The technical center had a host, that host computer was about half this room size. That data was fed back into that host computer, because it has a model of what all the centers have. And it piped it out to a display, you see what I mean?

So, you were simulating live traffic with this recorded data. It required, SATORI required you to have a host to do it. Facilities couldn't do that because the host didn't allow them to use it just for the purposes of that, replaying data through it. It was just too difficult and you run the risk of shutting the system down.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That would be bad.

MR. LOAGUE: That would be bad considering you know all the other positions that are still controlling traffic. So, SATORI was a means of us first being able to review the data, back in '93 in

an offline system. So, essentially it's a way of taking what already exists and presenting it in a visual picture with movement so you can actually see the targets move. And hear the voice associated with it. It became a better quality assurance tool. It became a better training tool for us.

In this particular instance, it also allowed us to develop a lot of the time lines that you have in there, in terms of those time lines associated with aircraft movement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How long have you been with the FAA?

MR. LOAGUE: Since '92, '91, October '91.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, with respect to this book, then, what specific input did you have into this? Did you create any of the graphics or--

MR. LOAGUE: No, most of the graphics came to us from other sources. The compilation in here came from multiple sources. You've heard of the Air Force Unit Air Force RADES, That's an Air Force Radar unit, they provided some of the graphic

information that we had had that they collected. We share, the agency, this is something I learned then, we share radar sensors with a lot of the Air Force. Our parameter sensors. Some of our internal sensors we share, as well.

So, the 84th RADE was also putting together some information associated with these incidents. And they had some graphics that they had already created, so some of those were included. These were all created by the graphics department up in Air Traffic, some graphics were.

Most of the information that I would have helped provide--there were several people doing it. I, basically, collected the information from the facilities and created the presentations that we have, the stored presentations. So, have you been in to see the presentations?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Would that be the PowerPoint that we--

MR. LOAGUE: No, this would be the actual SATORI replay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The NTAG or something like

that?

MR. LOAGUE: No, we did create some of those, but this would have been a radar replay of the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, we haven't seen them. There's a PowerPoint that we've seen.

MR. LOAGUE: Mm-hmm, that was Dan Diggins and I had put together some of that. Some of that data and the voice in that data came from our SATORI replays, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We haven't seen SATORI replays, at least I don't think we have.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you were contacting the facilities, like, Boston Center and--

MR. LOAGUE: No, we were dealing, we were working through the Regions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Through the Regions.

MR. LOAGUE: We worked through the Regions would contact the facilities to get the information. We have an FTP site on our SATORI machine and the facilities would upload the data, into that machine.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, how soon after 9/11 were you getting that data?

MR. LOAGUE: We had, probably--I wanted to say our first replay was the 11th, September 11 was the first replay we had received. And it was on American 77 out of Washington Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who were you working with on this?

MR. LOAGUE: With Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We're talking about the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001" this is the book that you referenced?

MR. LOAGUE: That's correct. That's the Office of Air Traffic Investigations AAT-20 and it's Investigations Group AAT-200 prepared this. So, it's from the notes that they had taken and compiled, some of the log entries that were available to fill in the blanks, so it was multiple sources, feeding this to kind of fill in the blanks.

For instance, the American 11 established contact with Boston, well, you wouldn't know that

unless you heard the voice and seen the data. And you got this time down to the seconds because on the SATORI right at the very top, it displays the time of the data. That's how it knows that at this time display this information here.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, who all within AAT-200 was working on this with you?

MR. LOAGUE: Oh, man, there was--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You mentioned Dan Diggins.

MR. LOAGUE: Dan Diggins was there; Mary Strawbridge was part of it; (b)(6), (b)(7)c was part of it; Jeff Meyers [ph] who worked in litigation. As a matter of fact you may have heard his name because he has a lot to do with it. He's working with, still, the 9/11 today. (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] was working data; (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]. Although (b)(6), (b)(7)c may not have been on during that time, I don't think (b)(6), (b)(7)c was on. I don't think he joined the group then. No, he hadn't. And myself, Tony Mello, Anthony--Tony Ferrante. And then Dave Cannoles, of course, he was the director.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LOAGUE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c works in Accident Investigations now, she was an air traffic investigator at the time of the incidents. So, she was in the office, she changed offices probably more than a year ago, now. She got hired up into AAI, Accident Investigations. Also, that's where Dan Diggins is located Accident Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How do you spell (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LOAGUE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about Doug Gould?

MR. LOAGUE: Gould, yes, Doug Gould, Doug Gould was with the group, thank you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c How about, is (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] does that sound familiar?

MR. LOAGUE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c in the New England Region and part or half the team of the developer of RAPTOR. He's half the group that helped, the two people that actually started developing and writing the code to develop RAPTOR at the beginning.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He's a programming person?

MR. LOAGUE: He's a programming person;

he's also got a traffic background;, he's worked in Air Traffic Quality Assurance; he's part of the Investigation staff now. So, he's a very intelligent person and he's very well rounded, because he has both sides of the house. Both data and active ATC control.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did he work on this project that developed this book, as you recall?

MR. LOAGUE: He didn't work on the direct input, but he indirectly worked on it in terms of creating the RAPTORS, getting the data. The first, some of the first radar pieces, since he was working in the New England Region, he was closer to the data sources than we were. So, he helped direct some of the efforts out there in terms of the data collection as a point of contact, you know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]?

MR. LOAGUE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and she worked in our Evaluations Group also here at headquarters and she assisted in the creation. There were several people--there

weren't a lot of people who were deciding what to say in the book, but there were a lot of people trying to get the book together because, if you recall, things were moving very quickly.

And so, I remember sitting in the--in my office looking out and they had a projector up on a cubicle wall going down a document and just going over each line item to make sure that they accounted for the right times and that the wording in there was right, there were no misspellings and, you know, because we were trying to get out as quickly as we could. There were multiple sources that we coordinated from; the FBI was constantly calling to get information. Several three-letter agencies were part of coming in to get information surrounding the events.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, who would you say were the main players in deciding what was put into the book?

MR. LOAGUE: Tony Ferrante, he was the Division Manager, so he pretty much directed the flow of the document. Tony Mello, he was the Deputy

and he assisted in the operations side, you know, part of the Investigations; (b)(6), (b)(7)c I remember typing directly on the document, mostly editing versus choosing the words. We, I worked with Mary in getting some of the time frames, the time lines in terms of what the data indicated.

We were looking for, what was the last hit, known hit of the aircraft prior to turning the beacon off, the transponder? All right so within the aircraft and not in every flight, did we hear audio from the pilots. I mean, did we hear transmissions. You're aware that there were some transmissions [unintell.] or after the fact, if you will. Where they were asking--they were asking when did we last know, and, again, we talked about this from the perspective of the controller. The controller's not looking at jus one target, he may have 20 targets or 10 to 20 targets on his scope that he's working.

One target would, basically have just changed color. All right, from a light green to a different color green or from a slash to a dot.

That may not be intuitive, but the data tag would still be there, but what would happen is they refer to that target going into coast. The host has predicted because it gets two sources of information. Primarily radar which is just energy being reflected off the aircraft; secondary radar, which is the transponder information. The two pieces of information are correlated, put together, it says this data tag goes with this primary tag and it puts it together and we get a correlated target.

When they turned the transponder off, the host doesn't want to drop the tag, doesn't want to tell, I mean, the idea is that we don't want it to go blank because then you don't know where the aircraft is, the controller wouldn't have any reference for it. So, they do, they put the tag into coast, which means, it's predictive, it would be the last heading and the last speed it was traveling and it continues to project that for several sweeps later. And then it switches the data tag to tell the controller that the target is

in coast. So, that you know, easier to locate, so as he's doing his scanning of the scope, because he's working this traffic, then he would come back around and see the tag and see that something happened there.

So, what we were looking for was when did that occur? When did the target go into coast? When did we get the last data hit?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When the target goes into coast, is the computer still looking at the primary radar return?

MR. LOAGUE: It's doing both, the data or the primary is pinging, the target, the secondary is not receiving, so it's not making the correlation anymore. You see what I mean, so that basically instead of a slash, you end up with a dot on the screen.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I forget if it was Indianapolis or Cleveland--

MR. LOAGUE: Indie Center that lost?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, how did that happen?

MR. LOAGUE: There was a--in the area of

coverage that they had, as I understand it, and we later found out that there was a space or a piece of airspace where primary radar was limited. I think of it, I guess, I think of it in terms like a black hole. It was there, it was a space, so something could have turned in that space and it wouldn't have really been known to the controller. He could have reached over and turned primaries on, but because

of whatever the lack of coverage was, it's like radar hits and it just skips this section, this space, there's just nothing coming back. Whether it be because they were false targets or something else, I'm not sure what the trouble was. But we knew that this wasn't recorded.

So, the controller, again, earlier, this coast target says it's going this way, but if somebody would turn around in that space and not know it, you're projecting, you're thinking, you don't know that he's turning around. You don't expect him to turn around. And all of a sudden you see a primary target down here. Well, turns out,

there's some clutter primaries, that's one of the reasons why en-route controllers because of high altitude, don't use primaries is because when you're in mountainous regions and those things you get some false returns. You get returns from hillsides and buildings and things like that. And so, to reduce that clutter, they'll try to filter that out. Because they're only trying to track aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They don't only want to look at the secondary returns?

MR. LOAGUE: They're probably looking at the secondary because that secondary return is the only return that gives them information as to the relative position of the aircraft, altitude, those things; air speed; or ground speed, I should say. So, when the aircraft turned around in there, when it came out, it actually appeared out here somewhere, where the controller's looking for it to go this way, it started going that way.

We didn't find it until we backed into the data, played it over and over and over and started

seeing a track going out the other way. We basically, isolated the track and when it got into Washington Center's airspace, back to here. So, we backed to the point, instead of finding it, because it just, we were trying to isolate a bunch of dots and which one is the track of our aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about as far as, in this book here, as far as notification information, FAA notifying the military about any events, were you involved in gathering any of that information?

MR. LOAGUE: Not at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who was working on that aspect?

MR. LOAGUE: You know, there were a lot of people involved in the telecon that was going on. I don't know who, in terms of was required, responsible, first accident, terror incident, I should say, where it required notification outside normal FAA, looking at it from my perspective, it's an accident. In an accident, you don't really get involved with other groups, unless it's identified later on that it's necessary.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Going back to the telecon, you actually sat in on the telecon on the tenth floor or?

MR. LOAGUE: I was in the conference room at the time it was established.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : On the tenth floor?

MR. LOAGUE: On the tenth floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who else was there at that time, if you recall?

MR. LOAGUE: There were several of the directors that were there. I know, Jeff Griffith, Bill Peacock, Dave Cannoles, Monte Belger had been in and out, at some point, no that was much later, not when it was first established, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was part of it, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, so different individuals from different parts of Air Traffic all headquarters staff, that were in and out of the telecon room. The initial telecon was about the impact of the first tower. Following that, you had the second impact, you know, it became a different telecon at that time.

Instead of bringing other facilities up on

the telecon, that's when it became the national telecon in terms of what was going on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You said Peacock, I don't--

MR. LOAGUE: Bill Peacock.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --I think he was in New Orleans that morning, wasn't he?

MR. LOAGUE: Was he in New Orleans, it's been so long, I don't remember if he was actually in the room. You know what, you're right he was in New Orleans because later at his retirement party, it was brought up in terms of him coming back.

He--I don't know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You all were joking about it, right?

MR. LOAGUE: Yeah, we were joking about him being in New Orleans because when he had gotten back, he participated in a CFC, much, much later in a CFC fund-raiser, which he got a pie in the face. If you get a pie in the face, you put on a white painter's suit, with full hood and everything and glasses. So there was a photo of that. And so there was some poking of fun at retirement in terms

of that business when he got back from New Orleans.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who the fixtures were in that telecon, like, who the people who seemed to be--

MR. LOAGUE: The primaries?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

MR. LOAGUE: Dave Cannoles, Jeff Griffith, they tended to be the ones, I know (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] from the Command Center, Frank Hatfield from up at Eastern, those were the primary people that were on in terms of what was going on at that time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How about any military people or--

MR. LOAGUE: You know, I don't recall military personnel in terms--I know there are liaisons in the building, and I know there were several of them that were in and out of there I know. But timewise I don't recall. I wasn't there all the time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But at the outset, like when it first was stood up?

MR. LOAGUE: When they first, no I don't

recall the military being up there at first, I mean, not when it first turned--when they first turned it on. I do recall them being in there later, but I just don't know what the time period would be.

And, again, you know, it was several days. I recall, no I was on the first shift at night, that evening when they continued, decided to continue the telecon and go on much later. It's now the DEN, the Domestic Events Network that we have. Being part of that 24-hour-shift in terms of going up and getting information or whatever request there may be. Again, very little up front, because everybody was still trying to recover from what had happened. The ATCs our own airspace was shut down for three days.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you had no involvement in gathering any information from the military or any log information from any military group?

MR. LOAGUE: No, 84th RADES--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : [unintell.]

MR. LOAGUE: --84th RADES was the only

group, it wasn't collecting information, it was we deal with them because 84th RADES does some of our search-and-rescue tracking. And so we knew they had some radar capability and worked on it, so they provided some of our early PowerPoints that we had seen. Those actually might be the Mpegs you're talking about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: So--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you can see in the text that some of the time lines where there's references to--

MR. LOAGUE: Oh, NEADS, yea.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : NEADS logs indicate such and such an incident?

MR. LOAGUE: We, I didn't collect that, but I know that they did get information--remember I said this was compiled from multiple sources.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. LOAGUE: In Air Traffic at AT-20 was the Investigations Group, the Air Traffic Investigations, but because of the function of

their mission, they were involved in this, they had--the investigators that did go out on accident investigations when accidents occurred. So, they tended to be the group that got called upon to kind of put this together. So, the information, they wouldn't have written it in there. They didn't get a page. But I didn't collect it. I'm not sure who collected that. But I know this was compiled from multiple sources, not just the logs we were keeping upstairs in Air Traffic, but from other sources. In terms of filling in the gaps here in terms of the time line.

(b)(6) : So you don't recall having looked at any--

MR. LOAGUE: Any of those logs? No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --NEADS logs or any--

MR. LOAGUE: Again, my primarily I dealt with the radar data, the voice data, making sure that we got the synchronizations; that the facilities were able to get the data to us so we could get those replays as quickly as we could.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What happened to that book

once it was finalized and put together?

MR. LOAGUE: When it was finalized, it was actually printed by the Air Traffic Graphics Office upstairs. So when they put it in final, they took it upstairs and they made color copies of it. This is a color with a, I don't know a press-on binder or something to make it look like, you know a presentation. I remember it being thicker than this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, we have a--I have a completed binder.

MR. LOAGUE: Okay, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who was it prepared for, though, who was the--

MR. LOAGUE: It was prepared for AT-1, it was prepared for Air Traffic to provide the information to the Administrator or the information that we collected at the time. And well, you can see here, that it was put out, you know, from the ninth, here that's what eight days, to get all that together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We pulled that date we wrote

down there on the cover. I don't know what page that is, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Once this book was finalized--

MR. LOAGUE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --were there any further efforts to establish other time lines or revise this time line in any way or was this kind of the final--

MR. LOAGUE: I don't recall there being any other efforts to do that. They may have done some improvements or their office may have, but I don't recall our office doing that. Then, again, I was more or less inundated with just the data requests. By the time this was created, every agency that was doing something that was related to this, was calling, from the FBI, CIA, you name it, they were coming in, they wanted to see the data. So, my time was spent, primarily in ensuring that we had the videos for the presentations to show these, to continue getting better voice data, other samples. There are multiple channels within each facility. One of the things that they're doing now

and had done then was they had to sample each of those channels to see if there were other communications on those other channels.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if a copy of this "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" was run by the military before you guys finalized it?

MR. LOAGUE: I don't recall if it was run by them, but I want to say that they provided input into it. In terms of, I know that the military liaison because he was a Marine liaison and I can't say for sure that it was but I recall having given them a copy of some data, replay data, courtesy copy of a--we took some of the RAPTOR replays and put them on a CD so that you could play it. Monte Belger wanted to see one of our presentations so we had a way of getting it off, just move the SATORI equipment to his office. So we had to put it on a CD. So, we had made some courtesy copies of that so that they could see a presentation. And I remember them getting a copy of it. I don't know if this document was actually run through them or cleared through them.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

MR. LOAGUE: I mean that was a different person handling that, that was Tony and Mary Strawbridge, herself, with that piece of it. I'm not sure who was routing this around for comment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did you have any participation in preparing any briefing packages for either the White House or at the Secretary's level or anything related to--

MR. LOAGUE: No, that's part of the reason why that document was created was to do just that is to use that as a source document for answering a lot of the questions that came up. So, after that was created, I thin a lot of people deferred to that package. But I didn't create any other presentations. Other than the initial presentations that I helped (b)(6), (b)(7)c with in the PowerPoint slides, where you would see targets, or you would see the path and then you'd hear some audio and you'd see some pop-up boxes, in terms of things that were going on at that time.

So that was the presentations we created,

but nothing for the White House. At that time, most of those requests that were coming out were high-level. I mean we're talking about it--that's always done at the Administrator's level. None of that really got down to us. I mean, if we got it, they weren't saying it was the White House, they were, like, hey, I need this data or hey, I need that data.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just going to flip through a couple of other time lines real quick and see if you recognize any. This one here is a grid time line, which primarily focuses, obviously, on military notification. That's--do you recognize this?

MR. LOAGUE: Not at all. I know the information that's on there, but I don't recall seeing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one here, it says "Notification of DOD Time Line?"

MR. LOAGUE: Again, I wasn't involved in creating any of the documents that went out. So, primarily, I want to say it was Tony Ferrante led

most of that in terms of our office, he was our division manager. So, he would, have, any requests coming down for information would have gone through him and then those would have been assigned to one of the specialists, Doug Gould, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, Dan Diggins.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Does (b)(6), (b)(7)c still work for the FAA?

MR. LOAGUE: She's in AAI, she's in Accident Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LOAGUE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c he's also--he works in the litigation group within the ATO, he and (b)(6), (b)(7)c still work together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What about this Fact Sheet, it's dated August 12, 2002, does that look familiar to you?

MR. LOAGUE: Mm-hmm. (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], did he put that out?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

MR. LOAGUE: Okay,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LOAGUE: Yeah, I know Bill. Is it a press release?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, they don't call it a press release, but--

MR. LOAGUE: I mean, it's almost like what.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It looks like a press release doesn't it?

MR. LOAGUE: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was published on the Website, though.

MR. LOAGUE: I don't remember ever seeing that either. But if you, I would imagine that some of those line entries came off of that book, I mean, because they would have gotten a copy of it, too. Or would have, could have gotten a hold of a copy of it, because there were several copies that were made.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : This one here, it's "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01?"

MR. LOAGUE: No, I mean, it has no headings other than that title I'm not sure what

that is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess I'm just interested in kind of like do these look familiar to you? And then you can tell us--

MR. LOAGUE: The only one that I recall looking at is the book, I mean--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The "Summary of Air Traffic--

MR. LOAGUE: --the summary of the hijacking because I actually have a copy of it. And in the office I have a copy of it as well. I don't remember any of the other chronologies, but they appear a lot of them, extractions from the same thing. So--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Probably. This one here's "Chronology of September 11, 2001."

MR. LOAGUE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It lists the four flights and their--

MR. LOAGUE: Call signs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --call signs and then their departure and where they were supposed to have landed.

MR. LOAGUE: A lot of what, you know, somebody requests and we get it, still, today, too, is that a request will come down. And two people will hear the request. Well, those two people will start a different track of getting the information, so I can only imagine in that type of process that we have in the FAA is that more than one office could have been putting this together. Or two people within the same office could have been doing it. And they put slightly different looks on the output. But I remember a lot of requests coming in. A lot of it duplicate, look, we just gave you that. Yeah, but it doesn't say this, can it say that. I mean, could you include this piece of information with it, because it wasn't in that one that you gave. So, I just know that there was a lot of paper moving up.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, does this "Chronology of September 11, 2001" that--

MR. LOAGUE: No, I don't recall seeing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And this one here, it says

"Sensitive Security Information--

MR. LOAGUE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --FAA Communications regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001?"

MR. LOAGUE: No, that could have been from Mill Ops or something, that kind of looks like their format.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And this one starts off, "Classification Unclassified"

[Technical interruption.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We just flipped the tape, it's 12:03 p.m.

That's all the time lines. Just a bit.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think you had before that, again, who were the main people from that AAT-20 group and AAT-200 who were deciding what information to go into the time line?

MR. LOAGUE: Oh, Tony Ferrante was the division manger, so he played a big part in terms of how that document ended up--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, what to include and what not to include?

MR. LOAGUE: I don't know if it was--to my recollection it was include everything we had, you know, to, if you had two pieces of the same information, put the information in there at the appropriate time. So, I know that they were trying to track down, like, I had said before. There may have been two log entries at two different times with the same piece of information.

But because of the way that the logs were being created, another person may have made the same entry at a different time. And so, they were having to track those things down. So, you know, doing follow-up with the Region; doing follow-up with the facilities to make sure that these--the times matched up. So, I know the investigators were doing that piece of it.

So, in terms of what to include what not to include, I can't say that he was deciding what not to include. I thought he was trying to include everything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, one of the things that we've been looking into is that or something

that the Commission pointed out in their report was about United 93, the last flight. That they determined that the FAA's notification to the military about that particular flight was at 10:07, which was, really after the impact of the--after the plane had crashed. And on one draft of that grid time line that we showed you, on an early draft of that, we had seen where that actual notification time had been put in at one point, the 10:07 time. But--

MR. LOAGUE: But was that UTC or local?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : These are all Eastern times that we're dealing with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Eastern times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think on all your chronologies--

MR. LOAGUE: They tried to convert to Eastern time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Right.

MR. LOAGUE: But when they--depending on the source of the data, then they could have gotten

UTC, I don't know if it would have matched up to that, I'm not sure how it happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's what I'm trying to point out so that the final iteration of this document doesn't include that 10:07 time it says not applicable.

MR. LOAGUE: Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, this is right, 10:08 is correct, roughly, I think it was very, very late in the 10:07 time period, so it might have been rounded up to 10:08 here. But this is correct. But somebody made the change to N/A and that's what made it into the final--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The final version.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember any discussion at all--

MR. LOAGUE: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --about that?

MR. LOAGUE: I--I

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or any of the other military notifications?

MR. LOAGUE: The only thing would be, again, when there was something in conflict. I mean, they didn't want to include something we could not. Remember, this document, a lot of this stuff came out within a few days of the events occurring, the events of that day. So, the only thing I can think of is it was one of those conflicts, where, one said we did and one said we didn't. Well, if we didn't have something that actually said this is the time or they couldn't lay their hands on it. There was a lot of information coming in, they were using multiple sources.

So, if they couldn't confirm it, then it probably wasn't included.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you don't have a specific recollection about that?

MR. LOAGUE: No, I don't have a specific recollection. That would be my impression, it's not unlike what we would do for a normal accident investigation. We don't necessarily include something that we can't confirm. Because that just leads the investigation in the wrong direction.

So, we want to give accurate information, we want to give the most information we can. But we don't want to give something that could be misleading.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just one last thing: The Commission had also reported out in the report that there were some false reports about American 11 still being airborne--at least one false report that it was airborne.

MR. LOAGUE: There were some American 77--11 or 77?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, there's was confusion that the report was about American 77, but it turned out that the controller who made the notification was really talking about American 11.

MR. LOAGUE: Or vice versa. See, American 77 is the Pentagon--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Is the Pentagon, that's right.

MR. LOAGUE: The only reports--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's the one that disappeared.

MR. LOAGUE: That's correct, but I remember, they--there were some early reports that

I recall coming in from local sheriffs that thought that 77 was down before it hit the Pentagon. The only think I recall is that there were some local sheriff's report or local police that said that there was an aircraft down. And in an areas between Indianapolis and here. And there were some assumptions at that time maybe that that was American 77, if that possibly could have been. I don't remember the--because 77 and 11, you know, you're talking two different areas, one coming out of Boston and going in to the New York area. And one going completely West, so I don't remember that mix-up, I don't recall that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There were, because 11 was the first aircraft involved, and it hit the Trade Center about 8:46 or so in the morning, might be off by a few minutes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually it says 8:46 right here on this time line. So, but after, almost a half an hour later, there's discussion within the FAA about American 11 still being in the air and on

its way to D.C. Do you recall anything about that? It might even have come up during the telecon.

MR. LOAGUE: You know, I don't--I honestly don't recall that conversation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: But I can't imagine that it would, unless, again, it's a target that's in coast and somehow it stayed on the scope, the data tag didn't drop.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: But, even a half hour, within a half hour it would have been out of the airspace and a coast target wouldn't hand off to another adjacent facility. So, I don't recall that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There are--if you could explain what these are, I hope, but I've been in New York Center and some of the other centers. I think on the tenth floor, there are, like radar situational displays and it graphically depicts the United States and it's got all these little blips on it.

MR. LOAGUE: The TSD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, what does that stand for?

MR. LOAGUE: Traffic Situation Display.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : My understanding is that Traffic Situation Display takes data which is, essentially comes from the flight plans that the aircraft filed--the flight plans for each of the flights--

MR. LOAGUE: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and it pretty much just tracks that information as opposed to radar.

MR. LOAGUE: It is projected.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LOAGUE: It's projected because it doesn't--although they have a feed, it uses I can't think what the data source, ETMS or some datafeed into the TSD, but it's basically it's what flow control on traffic management group to determine how many aircraft we're going to have in a certain airspace, because it's giving ETAs, you know, based on the information they're getting. And I know there is information that's close to real time, but

most of the information that we see on the TSDs has lapsed a minute or so.

I think there are some offline sites that offer it, I mean, some Websites that offer it that's a minute or two minutes delayed. But that information is--we'd track that. I don't know if that--I'm not sure, if the flight plan data would be removed from that and it still be projecting an arrival on what the routing would have been for it. I mean, that's really a possibility, but I'm not certain.

I would think that if the radar--if the host feeding that system said the target wasn't available, I would have thought it would have been dropped. I'm not sure, I'm not positive. I mean, if you're alluding to the fact that could have been a reason why they thought it was still airborne, if the TSD said it was up, somebody could have said, hey, listen, I've got American 11 right, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you don't recall this coming up as--

MR. LOAGUE: I don't recall it being said,
no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --a part of your review of all
this material?

MR. LOAGUE: Not at all. I mean, the
information that we had was that an aircraft hit,
all right. And early on, it was identified, you
know, shortly after that it was American 11, right?
And then they had the other aircraft, too, you
know, the United flight.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's all I have. Is there
anything else that--

MR. LOAGUE: No, I don't know if it was
useful or not, but it was a good hour.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, it was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess we'll turn the tape
off, it's 12:12.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

BROOKE LEWIS

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Wednesday, March 8, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You are going to tape record this, as well?

MR. LEWIS: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is December 8, 2004, the time is 10:10. We're at 600 Independence Avenue, FAA Building, FOB 10-B, second floor, Washington D.C.

My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation. We're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials in a 9/11 Commission and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate. Today, we're interviewing Brooke Lewis. Mr. Lewis, will you please acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. LEWIS: I am.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I should also note that Mr. Lewis is making his own tape of this interview. Mr. Lewis, will you please raise your right hand?

MR. LEWIS: All right-- (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing by the truth?

MR. LEWIS: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Will you please give your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

MR. LEWIS: my name is Robert Brooke Lewis, and the last name is L-e-w-i-s.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your current position?

MR. LEWIS: I'm a senior attorney at the Federal Aviation Administration in the litigation division.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's the routing symbol?

MR. LEWIS: AGC-400.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's your current grade?

MR. LEWIS: GS-15, as of--I'm not sure

it's actually just happened, it was keyed to the Appropriations Bill, so I assume that it just happened.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Are you actually on General Schedule or in the FG?

MR. LEWIS: I am, I'm not sure what you're asking, I am a GS--I'm not accepted service.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You're a GS?

MR. LEWIS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how long have you held your current position?

MR. LEWIS: Since, well, the senior attorney position since very recently, but I've been a trial attorney here at the FAA since 1984.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : One of the reasons that we came here today to talk to you is we understand that in roughly around June of 2004 that you had participated in a meeting with some FAA officials and some officials at the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense's Office.

MR. LEWIS: My calendar says that it was May 27. Now--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Of 2004?

MR. LEWIS: --yeah, and I'm not sure that that's correct because sometimes the meetings get changed and I may or may not have made the change appropriately on the calendar, but I think it probably was on the 27th, it was a Thursday.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Can you tell us about the meeting; who attended and what the purpose of the meeting was.

MR. LEWIS: I looked to see if I have the sign-up sheet. I don't know if you have it. We passed around a sign-up sheet. I can't find mine. I may have been that mine got picked up by somebody else. Shirley Miller may have it. She and I traveled from the FAA Building down there to the Pentagon. And I, frankly cannot remember, because it's been so long, the names of the other people who participated in the meeting. There were a bunch of people from the military and there was a military attorney there. I can't tell you exactly how many people; I would guess about eight to ten. And what are you asking about the meeting?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the purpose of the meeting?

MR. LEWIS: The purpose--I'm not sure whether I was the cause of that meeting or just one of the causes. I came very late to the 9/11 Commission meetings. My predecessors handled a bunch of interviews before that. But soon after I began to participate by accompanying witnesses to their meetings, John Azzarello, who was one of the 9/11 team members, pulled me aside after an interview and told me that several people at the military had told him that the military had never received any notification of the last two flights, 77 and 93. And that we had better both get our act together or something.

And, actually, I think--you have my notes--that may be in those notes, because it was my habit to take time during breaks and interviews to record some things that happened so that I could bring Shirley up to date as to where things were going, because [unintell.]--

Anyway, because I did not know that before

you told me and because I didn't have any way of knowing whether it is correct or incorrect, I suggested to Shirley at some point that people at FAA and at the military get together and run to ground, whether or not there really was such communication done. Because there were quite a number of recorded telephone conversations between the military and the FAA people that day, I understand, but I also know that a lot of people because of the telephone problems that they were having that day, people used other means than a recording means of communication.

And, so, I was as curious as to what people might have remembered, people who had not yet been interviewed. So, that was the purpose of the interview. At least, so far as I know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What was the outcome?

MR. LEWIS: The outcome was there was much guessing, theorizing as to how means of communication might have taken place between the military and the FAA that might not have been recorded. Where we might look through and I talked

to to find out how some of these avenues of communication might have occurred. And so, we pretty much left the meeting, as I recall, with people resolving we're going to check over here and you're going to check over there and that sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So the outcome was, essentially--if I can kind of digest it here--that both parties--and when I say parties I'm referring to FAA and DOD, we're going to go back and double check their records, essentially?

MR. LEWIS: That's basically my understanding of it. There was no resolution, we did not--there was no eureka moment at which we decided, oh, okay, now we know how this happened.

The other thing was that the other things discussed at the meeting was, which was the basis for this whole thing, is that there were some public statements that were made by the military and the FAA, to my understanding, that were differing in terms of when notifications occurred for the first two flights. And people were curious

as to how--why they were different, why they were being logged differently by the military and here our purpose was to find out that, also.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You were talking with regards to difference to the first two planes, like a minute or two or--

MR. LEWIS: You know, it's been long enough, I don't really remember what exactly. I recall that there was one notification that was listed for one airplane that may have been for another. Again, a lot of this went on before I ever got involved. By the time I got involved, we were talking about some of the or the clean-up people and administrators [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know what the FAA ended up doing--

MR. LEWIS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --in that effort?

MR. LEWIS: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who was responsible for performing that at the FAA?

MR. LEWIS: I don't know who was

responsible for actually running these issues to ground and getting the answers, since Shirley and I were the only two people from, you know, if anybody else came there separately, I don't know. She and I went together. My understanding, she was kind of the point person for the 9/11 Commission. And I would assume that, probably, she told other people, but I don't know. I mean, I know that wasn't my function.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : How soon did--backup, when did Mr. Azzarello make those comments to you and how shortly after those comments from him did you get the meeting calls?

MR. LEWIS: I really don't know that. I don't know. I may even mis-remember whether or not, I'm pretty sure the Azzarello thing occurred first, because I had a notion that, I can open my notes and see if I can find the comment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If you could do that, that might help.

MR. LEWIS: You want to pause the tape a moment while I do this, or do you want to leave it

run?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : We can leave it running.

[Pause.]

MR. LEWIS: The problem is, as you know, I use these notes--I put these notes all in one great big document because I didn't want to be opening different ones and taking--

[Pause.]

MR. LEWIS: You have a paper copy, I might look through for several numbered--I think there were numbered paragraphs or I may have numbered them later.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : With regard to that meeting the other folks that might have been present, do you think it's possible that Tony Ferrante may have come with you guys? Do you know who Tony is?

MR. LEWIS: I do know him--I know he went to the [unintell.] meeting. Tony very well might have been there. The best way to find out is to look at that sign-up sheet--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sign-up sheet?

MR. LEWIS: --yeah, do you have it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't have it with me, no.

MR. LEWIS: I mean, do you have it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Actually, I don't know that we even have that.

MR. LEWIS: I see there was one passed around, so you should--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, we'll check on that.

MR. LEWIS: All right. If this is the correct entry, it was after Darlene Freeman's interview [unintell.]. Yeah, on the 8th of April, we had Darlene Freeman's interview. And my recollection is that afterwards, they were walking back to their office and I was walking back to mine.

And John and I were on the street corner had this conversation which I told Shirley about, so that we could kind of get to the bottom of it. And if you look in my notes, at the end of the Darlene Freeman interview, there was an entry, 5:15, Darlene has to leave to pick up her daughter. And then I put, comments to RVL by JA, who is John Azzarello, after Freeman interview paraphrased, so,

those couple of paragraphs, show you why I was concerned that we get the answers to this.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What do they say?

MR. LEWIS: You've got them, but you want me to read them?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure, go ahead and, if they're not too long.

MR. LEWIS: It's a couple long paragraphs, but, I put comments to RVL by JA after Freeman interview, paraphrased, (b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Find the source of the erroneous information. Shirley and the Administrator are going to testify before Congress and there was late notification in one case or notification to the military. She would want to know it and not be set up. "The military is laying the blame on the FAA: in quotes,

so if you have people--me, if I have people--who have notes and other information, I suggest you come up with it or disprove them--to disprove them. We have a recording of every line at the Operations Floor, at NORAD and your times are not matching up. There was one flight they are saying there was no notification for; no tape has anything and no action was taken by them. What would you think? Again, this is all Azzarello to me.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

However, I do not think it does any good to be secretive about the disparities, they are what they are and are now immutable, since the paperwork says what it does and the tapes are readily available. I suggested, strongly, that his team let us know what the disparities, I'm sorry, what disparities they see and let us--and ask us in time for Darlene to run them down if she is going

to be asked about them. It does no good to surprise her with them next week, since she will simply have to say that she did not know and will have to run down the issue. Whether or not he will do this, I do not know. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Last paragraph, frankly, I do not see what they're talking about. I sat there as Darlene explained why her language in the chronology was what it was. Where there was FAA documentation, she cited it; where it came from somewhere else, she cited that, also. If anyone at FAA is privy to what the Commission thinks one or more of our employees made up, altered, et cetera, with regard to the military, let's get the issue out in the open and flush out the truth.

And the purpose of my writing those paragraphs was to brief Shirley so that we could flush these out. The last paragraph, I take it, you understand is me talking, rather than Azzarello talking. Actually, pardon me, the last two paragraphs are me talking, rather than Azzarello

talking. The first one is a paraphrase of what Azzarello said.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, as a result of that conversation with Azzarello, then, you all set up a meeting with--

MR. LEWIS: I don't know who set it up. My involvement in this process was not so intimate as you might think. When people requested interviews, I went with the interviewee and briefed the person on his rights and duties with regard to the investigation and I sat through the interviews.

I told Shirley that this had come up because Azzarello was communicating to all of us when he's talking to me. And what exactly she did with that information, whether she went to the Administrator, I don't know. I mean, I do know that after that time I was told that there was going to be a meeting at the Pentagon and I was invited to come. And my purpose was learning, rather than contributing. Because the people who were at the meeting, knew a lot more about the workings of their offices and, you know, what went

on 9/11 than I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : During the meeting, do you recall, did the Department of Defense relay that their position was that they had told the Commission that FAA had, in fact, made notifications?

MR. LEWIS: I don't recall that being said. I don't recall the opposite being said, either. But then, you know, not everybody and perhaps not anybody who was at the meeting was privy to all of the interviews or what had come out of those interviews.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's interesting.

MR. LEWIS: Let me add one thing, just for clarification: As I said in these paragraphs that I just read to you, the problem that we were faced

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

WE were

being told that these things were being said, but we were not able to focus our efforts to try to

find out the answer.

So, on the one hand, he's asking us to prove or disprove this point, but he wasn't offering us, in the way of guidance in terms of who had told them what. They had the interviews and, you know, they had all the tapes. Various people from FAA and the military went into these interviews, so not everybody took notes the way I did. I know what my people said, but I don't know what all the other ones said.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have here, like, a chain of e-mail messages and--

MR. LEWIS: Mine or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I don't know, you're on the Distribution list for two of the message here. Both of which are from Shirley Miller and they're dated June 20 and 21, 2004. So, I'll just let you look at that real quick.

MR. LEWIS: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And there's an attachment to the message, if you kind of flip through there, I highlighted a section that appears to pertain to

you. So, if you could review that.

[Pause.]

MR. LEWIS: Actually there's several, at least three I see here, comments that the meeting put to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : These are the most interesting, the area that's highlighted there.

MR. LEWIS: Okay, and your question is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The item that says, in addition, a staff statement is critical that the FAA person who monitored the air threat conference call knew nothing about what was going on. And, parenthetically, it says, need input from Brooke on interview of Command Center employee who monitored the air threat conference call.

MR. LEWIS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, did you provide for this?

MR. LEWIS: I probably did, I don't specifically remember doing that. But I do remember helping with, you know, when I was asked questions about who said what with regard to some of these issues. I'm sure I did because I was

asked for it. And what I provided would have come out of the notes that you have. Because I sat in on that interview [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what the result of the interview would have been?

MR. LEWIS: There were a couple of people--this is, the person who was interviewed--there was somebody, if I recall, who was asked to monitor the call in a sequestered office out there at the Command Center and at some point, I think, the call got disconnected. I'd really have to look at my notes because there are so many things--I'm fine, thank you. I can go back and look. Do you know the name of that person, because I can search for it?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I think the Commission used, I think it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c as the point of reference.

MR. LEWIS: That was the interviewee?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's who they reference in their report as having said, well--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He played no role.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Exactly.

MR. LEWIS: It doesn't come up under

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I thought it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LEWIS: K?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LEWIS: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LEWIS: Let's try (b)(6), (b)(7)c first and if it doesn't like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But I'm not sure (b)(6), (b)(7)c was at the Command Center, I think he was at the Operations Center in D.C.

MR. LEWIS: See some of this nomenclature was new to me, during this process. You know, that I do, primarily air crash litigation. This is a completely new kind of event for me, so I--a lot of this, the workings of NORAD; the workings of our Command Center, the workings of the different people who were--I'm sorry I'm not very good at the terminology. But, I recall that there was a person

out at the Command Center who was asked to listen to a call by somebody else, I think it was by the Air Force, is that what you're talking about? That's the one I was thinking about.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when you're referring to the Command Center, you're referring to the place down in Herndon, Virginia?

MR. LEWIS: Correct. No spelling of Weikert is coming up, so--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, I don't know, because the FAA has used the term Command Center interchangeably between the Center on the tenth floor in the headquarters building--

MR. LEWIS: I know that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and Herndon--

MR. LEWIS: [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --because they changed their name.

MR. LEWIS: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And so, now, essentially both of them have the name Command Center, unless they've changed the one in the District here,

again.

MR. LEWIS: I'm not sure what it is. I've been here long enough that I habitually call the center out in Herndon CF-squared, which is Central Flow Control Facility, CFCF or CF-squared. And it changed between the Command Center, so, you're right. But if you can give me a name, I can go to that interview.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The only name I can give you is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LEWIS: Well, if these, if (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c is the person and he doesn't come up in my notes, it may be that we're talking about a completely different person.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So you wouldn't remember what the result of your input would have been here without having to spend quite a bit of time there reviewing your notes, is that correct?

MR. LEWIS: No, I sat in on a bunch of these interviews. And the one that comes to mind is some person out at the Command Center who was asked to monitor a telephone call. Somehow that

call got terminated and he was concerned about it, but by that point most of the action was over with anyway and I--I could probably find that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was this an FAA employee or, like a liaison?

MR. LEWIS: I believe it was an FAA employee.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Out at the Herndon--

MR. LEWIS: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --out at Herndon?

MR. LEWIS: Right. See there were military people out there, as well, But I did not sit in on any of the military interviews. So, any interview that I sat in on were with the FAA--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just the FAA employee.

MS. WOODS: Well, this is specifically talking about an FAA person.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I guess one of the things I'm curious about is this, these sets of e-mails, the June 2000 time frame, I believe--yes, 2004, time frame is when Staff Statement 17 came out because there were a series of hearings during

that month. And Staff Statement 17 turned into the latter part of Chapter 1 of their final report. Have you had a chance to look at their report?

MR. LEWIS: I haven't read it recently. I thumbed through it, but I haven't read the whole thing.

(b)(6). (b)(7)c : Wherein, for lack of a better description, they were very critical of FAA and NORAD communications on the 11th and their reconstruction efforts after the fact.

And one of the things they had been critical of is the fact that FAA had set up a teleconference with NMCC and when they had spoken with Michael Wikert, he had told them, essentially that no--that telephone call didn't really play a role in coordinating military activities. What I'm wondering is, if you are aware that the FAA--aware if the FAA had done any of it's own research after that had come out to try to--

MR. LEWIS: Thank you for pausing, I just turned the tape over and there's been no conversation while it was off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --to refute the Commission's assertion of the fact or issue or item.

MR. LEWIS: If that research was done, it would not have involved me at all, so I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, all right. And this other item, as I'm looking at it again, it says here, the person who monitored the air threat conference call knew nothing about what was going on. And now that I look at that again, I think what that might be a reference to is, there was phone calls coming into the Command Center from, I think it was some of the other centers at the FAA and they were saying, well, what do we need to do? And the Commission alleged that this individual had said, well, I don't know, everybody just left the room or something like that. I don't know if that helps refresh your recollection at all.

MR. LEWIS: That conversation, I understand was on the tenth floor at the building in the FAA building, and not at Herndon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MR. LEWIS: By using the word monitor as a

search term, I went through my notes while you were talking and I have come up with the person that was interviewed I, had remembered, And that person is

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

was asked, let's see,

the--he was an FAA employee and he was asked to monitor a telecon by the CARF, the--which is the military unit out at the Command Center. So, I think this may not have anything to do with the interview that you're talking about. He didn't have any input, my understanding is he just monitored this phone. Then you've got those notes, just look for (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There's just one last thing on this rebuttal. now, concerning the Staff Statement for the Commission. The items that it says that they need input from you on? Do you recall if you had provided the input in writing or if you guys would have had a meeting and you would have just verbalized what they were looking for?

MR. LEWIS: I might have done any or all of those. We had telephone calls back and forth about certain things and I might have said, you know, check this or I may have read from my notes to educate Shirley as to what the correct thing was or identified a person to talk to.

I recall working--putting input a type of input into a draft of that and I think I did it at home and I think I e-mailed it. So, if you know, any e-mails that I provided, should have that with it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you still have those e-mail messages, do you think?

MR. LEWIS: Probably so, you know, the computer stores them for a certain length of time, I don't know how long that is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When we're done here, would you mind looking and seeing if you could find that and provide it to us?

MR. LEWIS: Do you know about when that was?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, this, it says June 20

2004.

MR. LEWIS: All right, I'll look and see if I have any e-mails that would have provided that. I don't know whether--all of what I, you know, we were all trying to get it, the accurate version. So, various people were feeding information into Shirley and mine would have been mostly from this end under my notes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. When did you first get involved with the 9/11 Commission issues?

MR. LEWIS: Let me go through my notes here. The first interview that I have notes for is on April 5, '04.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, that would have, essentially, started your involvement in that?

MR. LEWIS: Pretty much. I mean, I had, until I went into that first interview, I had no involvement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Except for your supervisor saying [unintell.]

MR. LEWIS: [REDACTED] had been handling this matter and he got overloaded with some other

stuff and, basically, gave it to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. LEWIS: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else that you'd like to add?

MR. LEWIS: My notes probably said it better than I can extemporize, but as I put, when I turned over the notes, I put a paragraph in bold at the beginning of it. I am very concerned, having been a trial lawyer for 20 years with this agency, that we not jump to the conclusion that because people remembered things differently from that day, that they are somehow being untruthful. I think that wrongs them.

I remember that day very clearly, I was at Indianapolis Center, Air Traffic Control Center, because we were taking a set of depositions in an air-crash case. And I remember the confusion, even at that outlying facility. And I can't tell you the order in which things happened that day. Even though, I was, of course, very interested and I was not going to be doing the depositions that day,

that was clear.

But I can't, except for the fact that I got to the gate at something like 9:00, I can't really remember the sequence of things. And I'm not surprised that a bunch of good people trying to extemporize, doing the best they could, mis-remembered exactly what they did and when they did it. The other thing that I am not surprised about is that once the lines of communication were open between the FAA and the military, there were myriad ways in which information might have been passed.

Just to give you one personal example. We have a friend who was at the Pentagon. Her brother was concerned about her safety. He couldn't get through to her line at the Pentagon. He called my wife at home here in Arlington, over the river in Arlington, and she was able to get through. And there were many, many communications like that. And so, I think that we should not take the position, the Commission should not take the position that if it was not recorded it didn't

happen.

People made use of ever possible means of communication. So, my take on these interviews is that the witnesses were being as truthful as they could possibly be. The fact that they didn't remember something perfectly, yea those many months after the facts, is not surprising to me. I see it all the time. See it in cases when I really wish they would remember and they don't. So, that's my take on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I don't have anything else. It's 10:50, we're going to go ahead and stop the tape.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
DOUGLAS GOULD

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

DOD AUDITOR, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

2:39 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Today is November 9, 2004. The time is 2:39 p.m. We're at FAA Building 10A, Room 632, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Also present are (b)(6), (b)(7)c with the Department of Transportation Inspector General and (b)(6), (b)(7)c with the Department of Defense Inspector General.

We're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we're interviewing Doug Gould. Mr. Gould, will you please acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MR. GOULD: I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Will you please raise your right hand?

MR. GOULD: I will.

Whereupon,

DOUGLAS GOULD

was called as a witness and, after being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Will you please give us your full name and spell your last name for the record?

MR. GOULD: Sure. Douglas Brian Gould,
G-o-u-l-d.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: And what is your current position?

MR. GOULD: Presently I am the manager of Strategic Operations Security under the Systems Operations Office.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: What's your routing symbol?

MR. GOULD: ATO-R.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: And how long have you been in your current position?

MR. GOULD: Since early July of this year.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Right during the reorganization? Is that about when it happened?

MR. GOULD: Yes. During the reorg I was actually in Iraq. So [inaudible] reassignment.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Okay. Hopefully you knew that.

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: And I think we had interviewed you previously, on September 30th, 2004. It's just that tape didn't turn out unfortunately.

MR. GOULD: I understand.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I think you had said that on September 11th at that time you were a senior air traffic investigator working in the Evaluations and Investigations Branch, AAT-200?

MR. GOULD: 200. Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I'm just going to do some--I had a couple follow-up questions, and then we'll go ahead and go through some of those, the documents that you had given to us.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Had provided for us. I think it was like on October 1st, I guess.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I think you had

indicated that on the 11th of September 2001, during the infamous teleconference that Mary Kate Strawbridge was taking some notes with a legal pad? That kind of started the log for that tele-conference.

MR. GOULD: There were actually two logs going on. So downstairs on the fourth floor, in the [inaudible] Mary Strawbridge started a log from our perspective. However, there was another log, the official log that has been released, the telcom log. That was generated on the tenth floor, and it probably didn't start for a couple of hours into the sequence of events. But that is the one that was the predominant log that you [inaudible] referring to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Okay.

MR. GOULD: Now, that one that Mary and then I and a few other people created downstairs, that was, you know, just from our perspective what we heard.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: How soon after things started going did Mary--

MR. GOULD: Did we create--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. Start creating that log?

MR. GOULD: It had to be fairly quickly. I would say within the first hour she came up with that idea, that we started doing it. And then I know upstairs eventually we got word up there that they [inaudible]. So that was discussed. And I know that [inaudible] sent a laptop and started the log [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that when Mary Kate then stopped---

MR. GOULD: No. We [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: Just so we had a cross-reference because, you know, we were doing a lot of things that I'm not sure what they were doing at this point, other than [inaudible] we would know specifically.

So we were doing our thing in coordination basically. We were [inaudible] so we were just trying to keep a record of our activity.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: That was a handwritten--

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Do you guys still have that?

MR. GOULD: Yeah. It's downstairs in the archives.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Is it? Okay.

MR. GOULD: Yes. [inaudible] suspect that log probably went for [inaudible]. Eventually it was consolidated into the log upstairs [inaudible] still retained it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: And I noticed, I think that the tenth floor log, the one that was typed into the laptop--

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: It looks like it's off by like an hour or so. I don't know if that rings any bells with you. I don't think I have a copy of it with me; otherwise, I'd show it to you.

MR. GOULD: [Inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: During the previous

interview, I think you essentially related to us that you guys started collecting data to put together some of the time lines on September 11th and that your request for information from the field offices was very specific. I think that's how you described it to us. You didn't want them to give you everything right away.

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you said that your focus was on aircraft activity, not superficial data, or words to that effect. And I was wondering if you could kind of just define what you mean by "superficial"?

MR. GOULD: Okay. The data that I would have--that I did, in fact, go immediately after would have been rough transcripts of voice communications [inaudible] aircraft or between facilities or in a facility [inaudible] military.

We requested specific radar data on the individual aircraft that we were concerned about. [Inaudible] probably six that would be [inaudible] five specifics. But there might have been one

other one that we [inaudible].

Then eventually we would have turned to statements [inaudible] give an aircraft [inaudible] adjacent positions that they reached out to, coordinate the movement of the aircraft, operation managers, supervisors, and anybody else that was involved in [inaudible]. And then we have the coordination. There were requests that were generated directly at the command center for very specific logs and/or communications that they had since they were recording [inaudible] as well. So we got their logs [inaudible]. I guess--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible]
paraphrase the term--

MR. GOULD: [Inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I wish I--

MR. GOULD: To put it in context--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I'm sorry. I should have brought up to you, (b)(6), (b)(7)c . I was going to--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You know, I had them with me until he grabbed them yesterday to go through. Because I have all my notes from every meeting

[inaudible].

MR. GOULD: It more than likely was a comment regarding the initial investigation was very preliminary and it was based--we were looking for specific sets of information so we could do time lines and provide appropriate information to the bosses to go do their briefing. So it wouldn't have been [inaudible] thorough or a pointed investigation as we [inaudible] similar type of incident other than a hijacking.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: When we last talked to you as well, I think you had mentioned we were talking about you guys trying to start collecting information, but you said that that same evening that you guys realized--meaning on September 11th, you guys realized that military notification was going to be an issue. Why do you say that?

MR. GOULD: This mind-set would have been getting the military's response and the overall perception of their ability to [inaudible] the country and the location of a given aircraft, you know, certain segments of the events. Common sense

told me that, okay, where was the notification [inaudible] who were they notifying, and was their response time appropriate and did they use the appropriate assets to respond and what was--the way I was looking at it is what was air traffic's [inaudible] obligation to provide assistance to the military so they could actually do what they needed to do. Did we tell them in a timely manner that we needed their assistance? What was it? You know, go up and take a look at this airplane [inaudible] see anything? Or was it after [inaudible] looking at the aircraft coming into D.C. [inaudible] version of D.C. trying to find this airplane, did we help them locate that aircraft in a timely manner. So those that knew where the guy was, were they talking to the controller [inaudible] and helping them.

The only reason that comes to my mind is military [inaudible] they'll never even put that together because it's not in their job description, they've never been asked to do such a thing [inaudible] intercept, never have.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Is that something that you guys kind of concluded would be of interest on your own, or were you guys already starting to get requests from above or somewhere in your chain of command?

MR. GOULD: I suspect early on that, if I remember correctly, we kind of put it together that that would be an issue just because, you know, our own perception of the timeliness of, you know, getting aircraft [inaudible] or in the area to do something. And then the issue at that point was United 93 [inaudible] a lot of feedback or discussions over that particular item. That was very early on. After that, of course, there was conversation [inaudible]. Documents were generated to address those issues, but that was something early on [inaudible] we discussed [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Going through some of the materials that you provided to us after we last spoke, I ran across a couple of names and just want to run them by you and see if you could explain to us their significance, if you can

remember.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I saw--it looked like some communication with a gentleman named (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c who's a lieutenant commander out at NORAD.

Do you know who--do you remember why he would be--

MR. GOULD: At NORAD? The name rings a bell. During that early phase, the majority of my communications with the military would have been [inaudible] getting radar data, [inaudible] data, and exchange of data. We provided them some; they provided us some. [inaudible] maybe an exchange of chronologies. There were some conversations early on [inaudible] staff and they were looking for some of our data [inaudible] what our time lines were so they could [inaudible]. Then I assume [inaudible] cross type of question and answer [inaudible] their notification [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: I saw a--you had shared some chronologies and other materials. I think there might have been four items and some e-mails that you sent to a guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

Does that name ring a bell?

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c ?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

MS. : [inaudible]. I don't know if we spoke with him or if he--we have something [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: I don't--that name doesn't--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: It doesn't ring a bell?

[No audible answer.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Unfortunately, I couldn't see what the chronologies were because I only had, you know, the paper copies of your messages [inaudible] the attachments--

MR. GOULD: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Well, the attachments are listed in the e-mail message. It's got a little icon and the name of the file. But a printout of the attachments was not behind your--

MR. GOULD: Did you search the hard drive for that attachment? Was it [inaudible]?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: There's nothing.

Like I said, there was nothing on your hard drive for September 11th, so that's why I'm [inaudible] to get a copy of those files from you today. So hopefully I'll be able to match up with--the files that you have with the names in your e-mail attachments.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: So (b)(6), (b)(7)c doesn't ring a bell. How about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: It was just like a little handwritten note or a note that you had a name listed and a phone number, and it said Cheyenne. But I don't know if that was for Cheyenne Mountain or Cheyenne, Wyoming. It was a 719 area code.

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] Cheyenne Mountain, but I don't recall the conversation.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Do you remember Tony Mello (ph) asking you for any information to provide to the military for a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing? Do you remember anything specifically?

This would have been within about a month or so of September 11th.

MR. GOULD: I recall conversations and the request for time lines, and I distinctly recall them wanting a PowerPoint presentation that we created.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Okay.

MR. GOULD: That's pretty much it. I don't think we provided [inaudible] anything specific other than chronologies and the presentation.

MS. : This is for the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

MR. GOULD: Yes. I do specifically recall the conversation that a request was made for somebody to do a presentation to the Joint Chief.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Do you remember who that came down from to you?

MR. GOULD: I'm thinking maybe that's what I talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c about.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Okay.

MR. GOULD: That he had called me

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[inaudible]. I don't remember. But I specifically remember getting a call directly over that, and then there was another request that came down through--it probably came through Mello [inaudible]. The first one came directly to my telephone [inaudible].

[Laughter.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just lucky, I guess.

MR. GOULD: Right.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: Now, the conversation that I recall was that the Joint Chiefs was mentioned in the conversation. You know, that could have been just a ruse to get me to provide the data in a more timely manner. I don't know whether they thought I may have been--you know, chain of command or I didn't realize that it was a hot item and that I wasn't going to sit on it, but I just remember I received a call and they asked the general question and I gave them what I had.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] could have been just throwing titles around?

MR. GOULD: They could have been, absolutely. You know, I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Did they copy all the files off of the [inaudible] for you?

MR. GOULD: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you just want to drag that 9/11 folder onto this [inaudible] my drive, that would be fine.

[Pause.]

[Inaudible comments.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

[Inaudible comments.]

MR. GOULD: Forty gigabytes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c How much?

MR. GOULD: Forty. Which is pretty similar to what you said the other one was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What other one?

MR. GOULD: You said my original had about 40--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's the size of your other hard drive, yeah.

MR. GOULD: This one was 37. It changed.

[inaudible]. Now you've got 68 [inaudible] 42.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you guys have any other questions?

MS. : Not so far.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's my understanding that on September 11th, there were more than just what we now know were the four hijacked aircraft that had kind of come onto FAA's proverbial radar screen.

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you guys--have you guys documented that?

MR. GOULD: The other aircraft?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, that you guys were following [inaudible]--

MR. GOULD: We did the four, and then the fifth one, which was a Delta aircraft, I did an informal file on that one. That's downstairs in Mr. Myers' (?) archives.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that the 1989--

MR. GOULD: Yes, the 1989, so we did work that one. There was a lot of [inaudible] to that

one initially so I could probably have 30 or 40 pages of information in that little folder.

Now, the other ones, I know we've worked-- there was a Northwest aircraft [inaudible] diverted to Canada. There was a Korean Air--a number of other ones that we probably had conversations over that we may have requested information on. I don't recall ever creating any briefing items on any given aircraft. I know we worked it, and there may have been just notes, a Word document that was just [inaudible] format type of a reference [inaudible] verbally. And whether or not he took them [inaudible] with it, I don't know. But, yeah, there were a number of other aircraft that were involved that we [inaudible] receive information that highlighted the aircraft or, you know, somebody wanted information [inaudible] FBI, NTSB [inaudible]. But there were other aircraft, other than the--

MS. : But you don't recall any briefing paper--any briefing documents, right?

MR. GOULD: I do not.

MS. : Other than the four--

MR. GOULD: No, I did not ever do any other formal briefing on any of the other aircraft. The Delta and the Korean Air were pretty significant, so there may have been early on a small briefing paper on one of those two. But I'd have to go back and look through the files. I honestly don't remember. I know I did verbals of what we had with the information that was off my notes, from memory, from conversations that I had with the appropriate [inaudible] facilities. I honestly don't recall specifically what was on [inaudible] provided the information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you were interested in trying to determine what other aircraft you guys were looking at at a given time, you know, in addition to the four hijacked aircraft, what do you think the easiest way to--

MR. GOULD: To determine that?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: To re-create it, I would go to the log from the [inaudible]. I would go to Mary's

handwritten log. And then [inaudible] my e-mail would have been the best source. The majority of all my requests went out via e-mail [inaudible] fire off 20 requests. That would have been the best way for me to re-create [inaudible] that e-mail [inaudible], you know, as the sequence of events [inaudible] pick up the phone, call the specific region that was working that aircraft and give them the call sign and tell them to [inaudible] whatever they need out of it. [inaudible] Air was a big one. I know we did a lot of conversations with them, Delta we did [inaudible] two airplanes.

The other ones, I think predominantly we probably just passed information about where the aircraft was, what communications were--whether or not cockpit doors were secure, and ETAs, once they got on the ramp, when we put them, whether the aircraft was in a secure location, and then, you know, [inaudible] the aircraft. There wasn't a lot of other details that [inaudible]. We were basically just facilitating information for the FBI

or whatever law enforcement wanted that information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I've spoken with the--a few different times with some folks from the 9/11 Commission, and they had indicated that they were able to get some wave files from recordings at the Command Center. Do you guys still have that information?

MR. GOULD: Wave files from--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Command Center, yeah. They're--

MR. GOULD: More than likely I'm the one that created the wave files because a lot of facilities didn't have the software and the expertise of how to do it. So a lot of times they either, you know, sent me a tape and I digitized it or I recorded it on the telephone--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess in particular what I'm interested--I think it's Alan King's position which--LOM or something like that. Is that something that we might be able to get from you guys?

MR. GOULD: Those tapes?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That wave file.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I'll be able to tell you whether I've got them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's being copied to my drive right now?

MR. GOULD: Yes, sir.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. : It's done. It [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: There's two Command Center folders here for whatever reason. This one is just logs. Command Center [inaudible] documents. Those are logs, too. [inaudible] those reference specific aircraft.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: There's some [inaudible] facility [inaudible] where it came from. You see how the structure is on this, individual aircraft, I tried to isolate it a little bit. [inaudible] wave files and then just [inaudible] transcripts [inaudible].

More than likely, you know, immediately following I would not have had a wave file from the Command Center. Even when we went to creating transcripts, which the Command Center did not actually do, they sent us these certified voice tapes, and we sent them to our evaluators to create. So the evaluators maybe created some wave files afterwards. I mean, is there a specific file you're looking for?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, there is, and it's for...

MR. GOULD: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c position and it starts at, I think, like--is it 8:15 or 8:45?--and runs for a couple of hours. I don't know how many wave files it is. I just know--I have--not with me, but a transcript and I can send you an e-mail.

MR. GOULD: It may [inaudible] Commission or--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think it had been because even the transcript has a very late date on

it, like '03 maybe.

MR. GOULD: The transcripts weren't created until the Commission. They were specifically created for the Commission.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: The Command Center did not post-event do any transcripts. They just provided us [inaudible] provided chronologies for us. They just never [inaudible] involvement that we needed transcripts, so that's kind of a new thing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, if it's all right, I'll send you an e-mail with--I think Alan King, and there was [inaudible] different position down there.

MR. GOULD: Right click on the wave file, properties, typically that will tell you who created each PC, if it's a registered PC, who created the wave file. That may help us find out [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I don't have the wave files. I have the memo transcript form that you guys put together for the positions. It's

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just that the--Alan King's position, I guess there was something wrong with the time channel on the tape.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So in order to re-create the time for a couple of events on there, I've got to actually have the wave file and run it through and then add that [inaudible] time to whatever the start time is to kind of figure that out.

[Phone interruption.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So is the heat in here like a ploy to keep you out of your office?

[Laughter.]

MR. GOULD: It's terrible, isn't it? It's so inconsistent. Yesterday I froze. Today I'm dying.

MS. : [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c My office is the exact same way. In the summer it's freezing and in the winter it's boiling.

All right. I think during the last

interview that we had with you, you had indicated that you, Dan Diggins, Mary Kate Strawbridge, Katherine Myers, Jeff Myers, and Molly Boyne worked on putting together the summary of air traffic hijack [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The information you collected--that you used to put this together came from digital voice tapes, radar data, notes, date-time stamps on the voice recordings, and things like that.

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This time line or chronology here is--it's got the grid. We just call it the grid time line. It's got the four flights and then different events and then a time for each of the flights. It says, "First sign probable time flight was known to be in distress. NORAD needs notification, estimated crash time." And the next page starts, "Notification chronology," and then it has American 11, the next page is 175, et cetera.

If I remember correctly, last time you said--I think that you said that you and Diggins had worked on this document.

MR. GOULD: We worked on it when it was in this type of format. I don't recall it evolving into this format.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You don't recall it evolving into that grid format?

MR. GOULD: Yeah. I don't. But I do recall putting a number of--I mean, we did these hourly. We did updates on individual chronologies of each aircraft, and then I do recall seeing this but I specifically don't recall working on the physical grid. I just--it's just not a format that, you know, I'm accustomed to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who did that?

MR. GOULD: This is the one I looked up on the PC to determine the properties, and it came up with [inaudible] as a signature stamp, which just tells me which PC it was generated from.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: And at that time that was a floater. There was no personnel specifically assigned there, so I--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That computer?

MR. GOULD: That computer, right. So that workstation. I know a couple people were--we all worked in this bay, you know, so like Katherine's workstation is normally down the other side of the hallway, so she could have been working on it. It all depends--you know, if I can find it in here, I believe we called it a specific name. I'm thinking it was Darlene.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The document's name was Darlene?

MR. GOULD: We named it, which tells me-- from Darlene Fieldman (ph).

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. : Freeman.

MR. GOULD: Freeman, thank you. She was probably the requester or the purpose of the document being generated. It was Darlene notification, and it tells me that it was created

[inaudible] title, Notification Chronology, date modified September 17, 2001, 10:20 a.m., and the size. And there's one--a couple or three versions. I only see one here.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, the version I have here is--it says revised on September 18, 2001, at 1400.

MR. GOULD: That was the stamp. Let me open it and see what it says on [inaudible]. This one doesn't have that stamp [inaudible], and it's a different format, too. So I can go back and look-- I know I've seen it. Grid of events, there it is. This [inaudible]. It's called Darlene Notification, grid of events, grid of events three, grid of events two. So there's quite a few [inaudible] it says September 18th, 1400.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What's the name of that file?

MR. GOULD: Grid events-- gridofeventsthree, no spaces, gridofeventsthree, and properties are (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph), title, American 11, September 18th at 3 o'clock in the afternoon

straight up. Oh, I'm sorry. It says created Friday, July 23, 2004, at 10:55, last modified Tuesday, September 18, '01, at 3:00.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Does that have a DOT extension?

MR. GOULD: No. It's a Word document.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c DOC extension?

MR. GOULD: It's DOC. That's strange. I think [inaudible]. It's on your hard drive. That is under the miscellaneous folder.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We had seen a couple earlier versions of the document with that grid time line, and the earlier version, like the--what I believe looks like the final version here has no notification time for United 93. It just says NA. And then for American 77, it says 9:24. And I have an earlier version of this grid time line, and it shows a notification time for United 93 at 10:08. And it's got Dave Canoles' handwriting here. It says NA. And the reason we know it's Dave's, because he told us that was his handwriting.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember any discussion about changing that time or--

MR. GOULD: I recall during those events we had conversations reference on time because at that point we were--because of the level the documents were going to, we were kind of determining how credible some of our times were depending on what source. There was the conversation whether it was validated via automation, either a digital clock, time stamp on the voice tape, or radar data, or was it physical, a handwritten note that someone was keeping. So as we gathered the information, we may have acquired a time and then later on gone back and said, okay, what was the source. And if it was not a digital stamp, we may have tossed it aside and determined that it was not a formal or official time because we didn't have that stamp. And I don't recall specifically with that document that we did that, but I do recall [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Your process.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, that during the

briefings that we created, we did go back and change some documents because we either invalidated a time, corrected it, or determined that it was not necessarily a valid time because we didn't have the new mechanism to do it other than a handwritten note.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Well, the reason that we're asking about this is because the Commission's investigation determined essentially that the FAA's notification on United 93 didn't come until, like, 10:07 and a bunch of seconds.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So it would average out to about 10:08. And so you--

MR. : It looked initially--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It looked like you guys had it right initially and you took it off. And I had--based--working off of the process that you and other folks in your group had described for us, we had gone through some of the other files that had been provided to us, including he has a copy of your S drive.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And on the S drive, we found a partial transcript from Cleveland Center's military operations specialist. And this document has got a date in the memo of September 17, '01. And it looks like a valid source for that time. I've got some notes on there that I handwrote so I knew when I got the thing from.

MR. GOULD: Sure. Now, this would have been a valid time that would have been utilized. Now, I guess as you go through the thick of the battle, you may pull a time, and the time gets jotted down but may not recall the source immediately [inaudible] discussion, if you can't recall where it came from, drop it off, go back to research it. But this would have been a valid source.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I looked at the document properties, too, and they correspond with the date on that memo.

[Pause.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember

anything further about that?

MR. GOULD: No, not specifically. That would have been a logical source for the time. It really would have. So I can't imagine why we would have taken it off other than, you know, not recalling where it came from and thinking it was a verbal, from a statement, or office manager's notes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: If you're asking if we changed it for any other reason, the answer from me is absolutely not. My, you know, [inaudible] the relationship I had with [inaudible] and Canoles is it is what it is. That was our mentality. [inaudible] whatever. We just report what we know. Occasionally we'll put in an opinion. Typically, it's just the facts or our best interpretation of the data on what we know the facts are. You know, we had no drive to spin anything or to change, so under the heat of battle, we created what we did based on the information we had at hand, most of it preliminary. It took us a long time to get the

hard-core data where actually we could formulate answers. But that came later on, and most of the time [inaudible] generated [inaudible] to reflect or to, you know, go back with lessons learned, say we got this one wrong, and [inaudible]. We just didn't do that. We briefed it up [inaudible] went back and re-created any documents and said, no, our time [inaudible]. But, you know, the documents are just based on what we knew at the time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This 10:07 or 10:08 is a few minutes after that plane -- [tape ends].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Actually, we had gotten--somebody had a back-up of the S drive on their computer, and that's where we had gotten that. I guess they, like I do at work, [inaudible] get destroyed.

I forget what we were talking about.

MR. : 10:07, 10:08.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, right.

MS. : [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: None of the investigators did. [inaudible] conversations about that. That was

something that we [inaudible] thought about it. There was a lot of conversation surrounding it. Nobody asked Dave Canoles [inaudible] the investigators [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This document is titled "Notification of DOD Time Line." Does that look familiar?

MR. GOULD: No, it does not. [inaudible].
[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I do remember seeing this. We did not--I did not generate it. I don't [inaudible] but I do recall seeing this [inaudible] handwritten notes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What do you recall about it?

MR. GOULD: I just--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The format and everything looks--

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] recall seeing it [inaudible]. I don't recall working on it or creating it. I just recall seeing it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. This is a

document entitled "Chronology of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent events through April 30, 2002." It was created by the historian that used to be in Public Affairs.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you--

MR. GOULD: See that?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: I remember--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You can pull it out of the sleeve if you want.

MR. GOULD: A number of folks that came down and wanted to capture events. We gave them access to our files. We did some interviews. I've never seen it before. I knew they created it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So the folks that came down to look through your files and talk to some of your folks, you think this is what they were working on or--

MR. GOULD: Yeah. I specifically recall Tony Ferrante (ph) coming to us and saying that, you know, the historians are coming to conduct some

interviews and they want to look at some of our chronologies to capture and historically document the events. And also, I believe Mitre CASSD was involved in that [inaudible]. Mitre CASSD, it's a contractor that we have.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What do they do?

MR. GOULD: They're basically, I think, [inaudible], if you will. They're a contractor that we often hire to put together presentations or assessment of evaluations of given programs [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mitre, like in M-i-t-r-e?

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, that Mitre.

MR. GOULD: C-A-S-S-D, Mitre CASSD. I just recall--I think it was (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I recall him coming in. I'm almost positive it was in reference to this.

MR. : [inaudible]?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: Anytime, 11:00 and 2 o'clock.

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: Okay. I just recall (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c coming in. I was in (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) office
[inaudible] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and somebody else.

MS. : Does he work for Mitre
CASSD?

MR. GOULD: Yes, he does. I'm almost
positive that's [inaudible] to capture this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Do you know who
(b)(6), (b)(7)c is? (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: Yeah, she's an author. Did
she not write a book?

MR. : Yeah, I have that book.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You have the book?

MR. GOULD: Yes, I do.

MS. : Do you know where she is?

MR. GOULD: Do I know where--yeah. She's
in Baltimore. She lives in Baltimore.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Isn't she a
contractor for the FAA as well? She shows up on
your phone directory as a contractor?

MR. GOULD: Does she? I recall in the book it lists her relationship with FAA. I think she was retired FAA and joined some other [inaudible] contractor [inaudible]. They retire from us--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Retire for five years and come back.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, come back as a consultant or some other [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who she's working for in particular?

MR. GOULD: Right now?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: You looked her up in the directory?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, that doesn't-- it just lists her routing symbol.

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: No, I don't. You know, in the back of my mind, I'm thinking maybe she was with (b)(6), (b)(7)c doing the interviews, but she may have been another interviewer. I think I did three of them.

I know (b)(6), (b)(7)c was there. For some reason (b)(6), (b)(7)c actually bought the book and sent it to me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c When you were in Iraq?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

MR. : "Here, you may want to read this."

MR. GOULD: And she looked familiar, so I'm thinking she may have been one of the ones that came--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] third interview.

MR. GOULD: I think I did her, I did (b)(6), (b)(7)c and somebody was with (b)(6), (b)(7)c And then the third one was somebody else within the agency. [inaudible] the face, but I know there was a third interview.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you ever see the Mitre CASSD product?

MR. GOULD: No. The only product I ever saw was the book.

MS. : Oh, you mean Mitre CASSD

wasn't working with the historian to produce that--

MR. GOULD: I believe they were. But I don't know because I've never seen what either Mitre did or what--I've never seen that box. I'm not sure whether Mitre participated with the agency's historian to come up with this document or they created something on their own.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible]

MR. GOULD: How do you spell her last name?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think it's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just i.

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible]

programming and financial management, ASD-310, physical address is 1250 [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I actually have it. I just didn't bring it with me.

MR. : [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: I know I saw her before when she came in to do the interview. The interview was basically [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: Basically told spill your beans.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There's a website that FAA has set up called FAA Response. Have you seen that?

MR. GOULD: That's in regard to 9/11.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It is.

MR. GOULD: I have not seen it, but I've heard a lot about it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Could it be maybe Mitre worked on that?

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No?

MR. GOULD: No. What I recall Mitre--I just recall (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewing me, and the historical documentation was what was standing out in my mind when I referred to it. I actually know (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the new job, and that's--you know, he actually was in the office last week, and it just totally came back: Hey, I know you. You interviewed me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have a number for (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: Sure. (b)(6), (b)(7)c
(b)(6), (b)(7)c dot, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at Mitre, M-i-t-r-e, dot-com. Work phone is (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: Yeah- (b)(6), (b)(7)c . He's actually working aerospace programs. He's a very knowledgeable man.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a fact sheet that Public Affairs put together, and I guess they published it initially like in August of 2002. It's a chronology of events for September 11th.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember if they had run that by you before they put it out or you provided them with any materials to put that together?

MR. GOULD: We provided them a lot of initial information on [inaudible]. After Tony Ferrante returned from Chicago, he predominantly became the focal for sharing information with

Public Affairs. So they'll send a request to him, and either he'll dig it up himself or he'll come to us and just ask for generalized information, but may not tell us it's for Public Affairs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: So I don't recall specifically any given request that came down from them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a document titled "FAA Communication with NORAD on September 11, 2001." When were you in Iraq, again?

MR. GOULD: I was in--I went twice. I went last year from June to the end of August, early September, and then again this year, March through the end of July.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So June of '03 through August.

MR. GOULD: Basically right in the middle of the 9/11 Commission.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Maybe that was lucky. Does that look familiar to you at all?

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. Do you--

Jane Garvey testified in May of '03 before the Commission. Do you remember having to help prepare any briefing packages for her, anything like that?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I remember the fire drills before that, yes. Predominantly what we did was just go in and dust off our old briefings and, again, gave them to Tony Ferrante. He put out [inaudible] put them in the format and sent them up through the director's office.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The Director of Air Traffic?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, Air Traffic, whoever that was [inaudible] '03, [inaudible] Peacock still. We dug out [inaudible] updated and corrected them, but I don't have any recollection whether we did or did not. He may have just taken the documents as they were.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a document titled "Chronology of Events 9-11-01."

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: Okay. Looking at--what do I know about it? I've seen it. It looks like--it's

like a master log [inaudible]. The part that confuses me is the CIA comment. That would have been...

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Was that for the video conference?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, it...

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: To me it looks like it's the Washington op center log. That's where the majority of these are coming from. But it could be, you know, just a consolidated list. I don't specifically recall. [inaudible] the difference, and that would have been [inaudible]. So that would have been, you know, Canoles and that group. And you've got information from the Washington op center, their log. They've got regional ROC log entries in here, so it's--to me it looks like somebody put this together. [inaudible] utilized all the logs we had at the time. But I would assume this is a document that was created a couple days after the event because we wouldn't have had this information [inaudible] that day or

immediately following. Those logs would have been [inaudible] days.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who created that document?

MR. GOULD: No. You may be able to do a search on the hard drive, and it may be in there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] find properties, but I don't recall. I didn't create it [inaudible] acronyms.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think it's a relatively fair statement to say that the stuff that you and your group that put together--you put that little footnote at the bottom that says "By AAT-20," and revision date and time?

MR. GOULD: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT OWENS: That's what you guys were trying to do?

MR. GOULD: Yeah. I specifically recall that first day--or maybe it was the second evening that Canoles came in and just reiterated make sure you put a stamp at the bottom, and the phrase was

"so we get the credit" to know the source.

MR. : If you want to call it credit.

MR. GOULD: I just--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Or blame, right?

MR. GOULD: That's right. Exactly.

[Laughter.]

MR. GOULD: But that was a pretty standard format, just so it was identified so that later on we could go back and [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This next document is titled "Chronology of September 11, 2001," and then it lists out each of the four hijacked flights and their--where they came from and where they were supposed to go to. Does that look familiar to you? And if it does, if you could just tell us what you know about it.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: I would say initially it looks vaguely familiar, but the data in it [inaudible] the format that I recall using a couple days after the event for a briefing we had to prepare. It was

pretty thorough.

This one looks like a consolidated--I'm trying to recall how we did this. Initially, we broke it down into the four--a chronology based on individual aircraft, there were four separate. But at some point we had a briefing that was requested that we put together for all of them, and it was surrounding the PowerPoint [inaudible] the PowerPoint was created that we consolidated and came up with a stand-alone document that covered all four aircraft in a time line. And then Dave and I discussed the PowerPoint. Dan said [inaudible] graphical presentation of a very abbreviated version of this to give, you know--but this was the initial document that we created as a complete [inaudible]. I know you've got the individual ones.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MR. GOULD: If you look at those and then you--all we did was cut and paste to create this, so it came from--generated from the same actual data.

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SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know what the briefing was for that you were having to put that together?

MR. GOULD: At some point around that time frame, we created a briefing for the Secretary's office and it was going to go to the White House.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You said "at that time frame." What--

MR. GOULD: Right around the time that we were creating that in the PowerPoint, but I don't recall whether--that was created just prior to our completion of the PowerPoint. You know, that was pretty easy to put together. But it took us a little while to do the PowerPoint. At that point that was a new technology to us. The way we-- through the radar data and the voice tapes and embedded it, that was something--it was really the first time we ever [inaudible]. So that took us a little while to prepare it. In the back of my mind, I'm thinking that we did that and we provided it to Canoles, went all the way up to the tenth floor to the director's office, to the

administrator to be utilized in a briefing I believe at the Secretary's level, and then the PowerPoint was created and they all [inaudible] to the chief of staff at the White House. I know we provided something over there and it was a consolidated briefing. Whether it was just the PowerPoint or a combination or just that, I just don't recall. Make sense?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It does.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that PowerPoint on your hard drive there?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Can you look and see what time period roughly that was created?

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] July [inaudible].
Let's see here.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] says June 9th,
this one.

September 21, 2001, 1:04 p.m. I was

thinking it was the 17th or 18th. But that may be when we first created the chronology of [inaudible] zip version of that date stamp.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c September 21, '01?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: Here's one that's got a date stamp which is the basic--doesn't have the [inaudible] attachment, September 18th. There's one, two, three, four of them, various dates. One was the 18th and two were the 21st.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You said September what?

MR. GOULD: 21st, there's two, and then there's one on the 18th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: I was thinking the 17th, 18th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you think that PowerPoint was a product that you and Diggins had pulled together to be used over at the Secretary's office--

MR. GOULD: Diggins did all the work, so--

[Simultaneous conversation.]

MR. GOULD: I just pointed him in the direction of how to use it, PowerPoint and what provided in the map--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: --sent him down that road, gave him the wave files, I gave him the pieces and he put it together. But, yeah, it was--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you seem to recall, though, that it was put together to provide for a briefing at the Secretary's office and maybe even the chief of staff at the White House.

MR. GOULD: Yeah. You know, at that point we were trying to refine and use some of our tools that we had, you know, because it became evidently clear that a lot of people didn't understand air traffic and they couldn't--they couldn't read a piece of paper and put it together about actually how this all could have happened. So that's where we came up, well, let's give them a graphical presentation. We [inaudible] some of the voice tapes and the geographic size of the country to

help them understand, you know, you had a controller here in Boston and you've got a controller here in Indie(?). They're separated by a number of miles. They are not sitting side by side listening to each other, so there's no way they know what's going on.

So we came up with the idea, let's give them a graphical picture and maybe that will help put it into context. So that's why we came up with that. I think at that point it was because they were going to that level and we knew they wouldn't understand. We couldn't [inaudible] people within the building to understand.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This next item is a copy--this is the copy of a folder that you actually gave to us from the boxes of records downstairs.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I think--I believe--

MR. GOULD: [inaudible]. Was it a blue--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't remember

what color it was. It might be.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I think it was a document folder.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But I seem to recall that you described this as a package that you guys put together specifically for a White House briefing. Maybe you can clarify for me or just describe what you remember about that. And those were, you know, packages that were put together, and it was kind of stapled together, one for each flight, and putting the different sides of it.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, it was two on one and two on the other.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I recall those. September 14th. This would have been an early one. I think the chronology and the PowerPoint came afterwards. So this was probably--I remember spending--we did this late one evening, putting that together, broke actually--I can't say broke into, but we went to an adjoining organization's supply cabinet to find the blue folders.

[inaudible] yet, but I believe...I said this was the White House?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I thought so. Is that what you remember? And that's like a Post-it note that was--yeah, that was a Post-it note at the bottom. It looks like you guys wanted it back.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I think there's a number of them that--we gave them out. Our concern was because they were preliminary.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: They may fall into the wrong hands. At that point we were getting concerned about some of the information finding its way to the press or some other unauthorized--and Bill in particular had a tendency of taking things and leaving them on a table and walking out.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Bill Peacock?

MR. GOULD: Yeah. So, you know, one of the directions of Mr. (?) 's was [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, this says Bill AAT-1. That would be Bill Peacock, right?

MR. GOULD: Bill Peacock, AAT-1 is his

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routing, September 17th. So that would have been probably the date that he did it. So maybe that-- maybe what we did was we prepared that for the White House and it didn't go over very well, and then that's when we came back and did the chronology. That actually falls in the perspective in my mind that the call came--you know, we did the briefing in that format. Then we did get a positive reception of our understanding of the events and created a consolidated chronology and then the PowerPoint and then went back over. Maybe he just took that portion to the Secretary's office and that's when [inaudible]--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, okay.

MR. GOULD: --table and created the consolidated memo to the White House. It could have been that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who specifically was involved in briefing the White House?

MR. GOULD: I just recall Dave Canoles, you know, requesting the information in a limited

time he gave us to put it together that was for a White House briefing. I distinctly recall him going up--actually, Bill actually came down, too, you know, to get a verbal briefing of where we are and help him understand [inaudible] and that it was for a White House briefing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that--I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. GOULD: Whether or not, you know, they actually did the briefing or they briefed, you know, each--you know how that works. You brief your boss, then your boss briefs [inaudible]--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MR. GOULD: It eventually gets to the White House, or whether or not they brief the White House [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Around September 17, '01, does that sound like the right time period?

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I just have a couple more things. I know I told you this wouldn't take but an hour. Now I'm already two hours--sorry.

MR. GOULD: [inaudible] okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The new overview
MPEG--which I guess is like a movie?

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Where did that come
from?

MR. GOULD: The overview MPEG?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: Is that the 3-D graphical
presentation?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think so. It's
the only--the only MPEG I've seen is the 3-D
graphical one. I don't know if FAA prepared one
or--

MR. GOULD: We didn't prepare a 3-D.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That was the
military, right?

MR. GOULD: NORAD--yeah. I got a courtesy
copy of a NORAD version. I don't know if NTSD
created it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: Depending on which one you

have, but it was not us. Our office didn't have the technology to do that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Well, I have--basically it looks like--sort of like a cheat sheet somebody would use to kind of do a briefing on that new overview MPEG. I was wondering if you could tell me anything about that. And then, in particular, the thing I was obviously curious about because I highlighted it is it says here at the bottom that 924--the 924 event on this document says, "FAA reports possible hijack of American 77. Wash FAA label appears in pulse beam flash between Wash FAA and NEADS"--or NEADS, I guess they like to call it. And then there's a note, and it says, "Our analysts called NEADS to find out which FAA center made the call. NEADS recollected that it was most likely the Wash FAA that made the call. However, there were many players on the line by that time."

Do you know who--if this is somebody from FAA, if there's somebody from FAA that's dealing--having a conversation with NEADS about that

PowerPoint--or that MPEG?

MR. GOULD: Because it's got the classification mark on it, it didn't come from our office [inaudible]. Everything that we handled did not [inaudible] classification on it because we deal--dealt strictly with unclassified information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: Very rarely did we get anything that was classified. To me, just by seeing that alone, I know it didn't come from our office. Now--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's marked unclassified. I just--

MR. GOULD: But it's got the classification, so, you know--

MS. : For the tape.

[Laughter.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I just want to make sure that transcribers aren't worried that this is a classified interview.

MR. GOULD: Unclassified. The unclassified document classification statement

leads me to believe that it came from either the military or our security office.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: At that point our security office wouldn't have created anything MPEG. It would have--it would come to us to do it. So that would make me--lead me to believe this was a military document. So it's probably their [inaudible]. When I got the MPEG, I didn't get this document. This is the first I've seen this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Have you seen this before?

MS. : No, I have not.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're still working on coordinating--she has a lot more boxes than I do.

Do you remember doing any coordination or having any discussions with the folks at NEADS? Which is in upstate New York, right? Yeah.

MR. GOULD: I [inaudible] liaison. They work for me now. At that point, no. I recall the conversation over the log issue and the notifica-

tion to NEADS, but at that point I went through either the facility--the center and their MOS to get the information. I came to the guy that used to be here because this is a military ops [inaudible] used to sit at this desk, and he was our liaison with all the military [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do we have that [inaudible] there?

MR. GOULD: No. It's Alton Scott.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Who?

MR. GOULD: Alton Scott, who is the manager of military operations. So within each sector, which is NEADS, SEEDS, WADS, NORAD, the whole alphabet soup, we had an air traffic control specialist in each one of those as a liaison with [inaudible] commands. And Alton was the manager of those individuals. And so if we had a request, we would send it up to--Alton would have gone to the center responsible for the air space in question, and they would have reached out.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c On September 11th, did you have a clearance?

MR. GOULD: Security clearance?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GOULD: I had one just because I was previously at Washington National. So I had a secret. I did not have--my top secret expired when I left the military. So I did have a secret. That's it. And Alton retired [inaudible]. He's still around.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In the D.C. area?

MR. GOULD: Mm-hmm. He was a contractor.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The FAA?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you happen to have a phone number for him? We won't tell him who gave us the number.

MR. GOULD: I have a home number. It is 571--that doesn't sound right-- (b)(6), (b)(7)c That does not sound right. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In AAT-20, did you guys have the ability to store classified material?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You did.

MR. GOULD: I had a safe that was initially signed out to Mr. Ferrante. We may have actually moved the entire 9/11 file into that safe the days following after we felt we had--after that voice [inaudible], we had a voice [inaudible] that came up on national news of the events. A couple days afterwards.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, that must have been the impetus behind the "don't say anything" memos. I remember seeing something--

MR. GOULD: Yeah, we had to tape that [inaudible] to some reporter who broadcast it in the Chicago area [inaudible] into lockdown. We moved all our stuff off our desks and locked it into a four-drawer safe. It's still down there [inaudible] but it's empty. That's what [inaudible] so, yes, we did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I can give you a copy of that.

[Inaudible comments.]

MR. GOULD: Home number is (b)(6), (b)(7)c .
And the other number must have been a cell phone

because 3000 doesn't really sound [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I just have one last thing.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: All right. [inaudible] classified document.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, it is.

MR. GOULD: It's looks like--

MS. : [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At least, yeah, where I got it.

MR. GOULD: I've never seen this one.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. You don't ever recall seeing that?

MR. GOULD: Never.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: It looks like it's a photocopy.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It is a photocopy.

MR. GOULD: I just recognize formats [inaudible].

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: No, I don't recognize it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. There's many references to NEADS log in the time lines. Where were you guys getting that information from that you end up--

MR. GOULD: In the back of my mind, I know I had the NEADS log, and I received a fax copy of it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: How I got it I don't recall. Where it is today I don't know. We went and looked for it but I couldn't find it. But I know I had it in my hands. I know it was down there in that archive. It may be in there, but it may have just been--you know, now it's shuffled in with something else, you know, and it's really--I would reach out to Jeff Myers and ask him to physically go through page by page of all his documents. It's got to be in there.

MS. : But it's not this document that you just [inaudible]--

MR. GOULD: That is not, no. It is not

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you remember something different than this.

MR. GOULD: I remember a typed log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Typed log.

MR. GOULD: Yes. Not a handwritten one.

MS. : Did it have that information though? Did it have those entries?

MR. GOULD: Not all of these. This looks like it's got a lot of other information that's going on during the day that I don't [inaudible]. The log I saw had specific information regarding the events, notification, reactions.

MS. : [inaudible]. Was this shortly after [inaudible] or was this [inaudible] if you remember?

MR. GOULD: I don't honestly remember. I recall seeing some of the documents you have that refers to the NEADS log early on. So I would have to say it had to have been early on.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, we had spoken--I don't remember if you were there, Bridget, but when you were pulling documents for us--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, I was not there that day.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. We had spoken, Doug, and you were looking at some of the documents that you guys generated that had references to the NEADS log, and there were some that didn't.

MR. GOULD: Had references.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did not, yeah, but the ones that did not were earlier.

MR. GOULD: Yeah. You know, I'm thinking it would probably be [inaudible] just in context probably day two or day three that we would have gotten that because it would have taken the military that long to get the clearance to send the log to us. That's just--this is off the top of my head.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Because this document that we've kind of called the White House briefing, the one from the folder had a September 14th date with no NEADS references. And then your September 17th and subsequent documents referenced the NEADS log, so you were surmising, I guess, for

lack of a better term, that you probably got that-- you got access to the NEADS information sometime between the 14th and the 17th.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I don't recall having it immediately. It was two or three days into it, is what I recall. I just--you know, and then I was surprised when I saw it, when I actually got it. I didn't suspect that we would get it. I figured we'd just get the verbal time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you remember seeing, you think, something typed?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I do recall something typed.

MS. : And faxed over here?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I recall--more than likely, again, it was faxed to probably (b)(6), (b)(7)c because he had a secure fax. So they would have gotten stuff directly from me since I work with NEADS every day.

MS. : (b)(6), (b)(7)c was what, again.

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c He was the manager of military operations. He used to be APT-

200. So he worked for [inaudible] Jeff Griffith, APT-1, and all the military liaisons that we called them, each in a sector who have [inaudible] the sectors [inaudible].

MS. : You reported to him? All the liaisons reported to--

MR. GOULD: Yeah, they reported to him.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And now they all report to you, right?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: He would have been the interface to reach out [inaudible] investigation office [inaudible] come to him. I didn't do it. I don't know whether Dan or Tony or even [inaudible]. It may have been, you know, a request that was made from Peacock to Jeff to [inaudible] just a courtesy copy.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The other things, I guess we just--there's a couple of documents that I want to try -- [tape ends].

-- 17 p.m. I was going to say, if I can

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just go to (b)(6), (b)(7)c , I guess, who's your [inaudible]--

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --for these materials, because one of the things I was curious about trying to find out is if the security had to set up this primary net, which is the telephone line that the military and some other organizations were supposed to be on, were supposed to have started like around 9/20 or something like that. Does that sound familiar? There was a log for that, right?

MR. GOULD: That conference, that net?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, there would have been a log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: I don't have--you know, I've seen so many logs, I'd have to [inaudible] if I've seen it. But, yes, that was done [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That AOC, is that--

MR. GOULD: The security group?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: ASH. That's what they are today.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I've seen reference to AOC. I think it's AOC.

MR. GOULD: I don't recognize that [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I'll just get with Jeff on that.

MR. GOULD: He's got them all down.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm sure he'll be happy to--

MR. GOULD: He's presently digitizing all of them [inaudible] piece by piece, scanning the net and getting [inaudible] names so he can quickly identify the documents.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Putting them all in PDF--no, they were using a different format, weren't they?

MR. GOULD: No. I think he was doing PDF.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, it was the sound files he was using wave instead of MP3.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, that I didn't
[inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] big
files.

MR. GOULD: Maybe it's his way of, you
know, keeping the common folks from [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All the AOL'ers.
[Simultaneous conversation.]

MR. GOULD: But, you know, once he does
that, well, he can [inaudible] a CD direct
[inaudible]. You've got his name and number?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I've got all
that. All right. Well, thank you and I apologize.
This ran much, much longer than I had anticipated.

We're going to end the interview. It's
4:20.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JOHN DAVID CANOLES

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

1:11 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is November 10, 2004. The time is 1:11 p.m. We're at FAA Building 10A, Room 1015, in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Transportation, and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials, at a 9-11 Commission hearing, and elsewhere, that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we're re-interviewing John David Canoles. Mr. Canoles, could you please acknowledge that you are aware that the interview is being tape-recorded?

MR. CANOLES: Yes. I'm aware it's being taped.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please raise your right hand?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I will.

Whereupon,

JOHN DAVID CANOLES

was called as a witness and, after being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give your full name, spelling your last for the record?

MR. CANOLES: John David Canoles,
C-A-N-O-L-E-S.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And you're currently the director for Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service?

MR. CANOLES: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And your routing symbol is AOV-1?

MR. CANOLES: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And on September 11th, you were the Director of Air Traffic and Air Safety Investigations?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I believe the correct title was Director of Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And that routing symbol at the time was AAT-20.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And how long had you held that position before 9-11?

MR. CANOLES: With a couple of interruptions, essentially since about 1991.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c '91. And then how long after did you continue to hold that job?

MR. CANOLES: I left in November of '01 to take over the Director of Emergency Operations.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's the Washington Operations Center?

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

We had previously interviewed you on September 30th, 2004. And we're interviewing you today because we had some technical problems with the tape recording, and we didn't get down everything we needed to on your notes.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So, one of the things that we wanted to do was go over some of the documents that you had provided for us during the last interview.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And (b)(6), (b)(7)c do you have the summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're familiar with that document? The summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events?

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's that color-bound book--

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Book that's about a 1/4" thick or so.

MR. CANOLES: Right. Right. It's tabbed with [inaudible] with and so and so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. It looks like that.

MR. CANOLES: That's it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

This document was prepared by your staff. And I think the last time that you had mentioned that Tony Mellow[ph], and Dan Diggins[ph], Doug

Gould, Jeff Logue[ph], and Tony Ferrante[ph] had participated in putting this together primarily.

MR. CANOLES: Yes. I believe so, as individuals, and probably more. But those are members of my immediate staff.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And what was the reason that you guys put this together?

MR. CANOLES: This started out as, this would have been a synopsis that we would have prepared in the event of any aircraft accident.

Umm, following any fairly major accident, we would many times be roused from bed at 2:00 a.m. and come into the headquarters building, and begin building briefing books and papers for the administrator and others at the head of Air Traffic.

And it would contain similar information as to what this has. You know, a summary of salient events, issues that were pertinent, that might bring the Agency to criticism. Issues that could be systemic in nature that we needed to bring to management's attention, in order that they could

be corrected.

For example, if we found a flaw in a procedure, typically a transcript of voice recordings, or so on and so forth. This document was prepared much along those lines, but of course much broader and much more encompassing, to support the four accidents that occurred that day.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And I may, because we're reviewing, as you might know, some e-mails and other communications between, you know, AT-20 and some of the headquarters staff.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I have seen a couple of like little short briefings, maybe a paragraph or so in length at the most, about incidents that have occurred around the country.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is it fair to say that most of the documents that you have just described for us involving other accidents would be similar to that? Maybe a paragraph or so? Or relatively a page or less?

MR. CANOLES: Yes. Probably a page. We termed them "alert bulletins" specifically.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And again the purpose was to give upper management something they could throw in their portfolio and refer to during the day if they get press inquiries, or whatever. And again, just a bare summary of the facts.

This became more elaborate for a number of reasons. You know, specifically you know, we knew it was a document that was going to be referred to in the future; certainly given the magnitude of this collection of a events, versus a simple aircraft accident, we knew this was something people would study for years, and we wanted to build something as comprehensive and correct as we could.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And so then the consumer of this document would primarily be who?

MR. CANOLES: Primarily it was entities within FAA, and the Department of Transportation.

However, I know that we provided copies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and perhaps other government agencies. But I couldn't swear to that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know if this was used for any briefings at the Secretary's office?

MR. CANOLES: That was not built on, on September the 12th I accompanied the administrator and the deputy administrator and briefed the Secretary on recorded radar data, and recorded voice tapes that we had collected on September the 11th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. CANOLES: I don't believe that book was built at that time. And that's the only briefing that I was present at with the Secretary. So, while some of the content in that book was certainly shown to the Secretary, I don't think the book had been constructed at that point. Pieces of it, but not the collection.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I think, you know, based on some date stamps within the

document, which say like "AAT-20, September 17th," '01, and there's a 6:30 a.m. time stamp.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Two or three days into this bill, you know, as soon as we had enough information to provide our leadership, we'd sit down and bang out an article [inaudible]. Okay. So six hours later, some other snippet would show up, which would not necessarily invalidate the previous bulletin, but it would provide updated information or more information.

And quickly, relatively quickly, within the first couple of days, we realized that it wasn't sufficient to stamp this stuff with the date that it was produced. And we actually started putting times on it.

I don't know how good we were at that discipline, but that was the conscious decision we made, so that we could try to hopefully collect out-dated information and destroy it as we produced the new stuff.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So that was something that you added to try to basically track

what you were producing?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. Because it became a monumental task.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you said, again on the 12th you went over with whom?

MR. CANOLES: It was the 12th or the 13th. It was with Monty[ph] Belger[ph], the Acting Deputy Administrator, and Jane Garvey[ph], the Administrator. And it seems to me, I did the first briefing for the FBI, and I think that was the morning of the 12th.

So it may have been the next day. I'm not sure which day was which. But I know we briefed the FBI quite early, I think on the morning of the 12th. We might have briefed the Secretary the same morning.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So that around the 12th or the 13th, within a day or two.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You went over with Monty Belger and Jane Garvey to brief the Secretary, and presumably he had some of his staff

there.

MR. CANOLES: Umm, you know actually I that the four of us were alone when I did the briefing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So John Flaherty and--

MR. CANOLES: I don't remember John being there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

Did you particular in any White House briefings?

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Were you aware of any White House briefings that the FAA had done concerning 9-11?

MR. CANOLES: Not specifically. I mean I'm sure they were done. They would have been done. But our focal in Air Traffic that did all that contact was Jeff Griffith.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Jeff had done, in the military and White House liaison in his previous

position, and when he was elevated to the deputy position he [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would you remember if you guys had gone over to the Secretary's office to help brief them for a White House briefing?

MR. CANOLES: No. The only briefing that I did for the Secretary was the one that I mentioned earlier. I don't ever remember going back to either department or the White House.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And I had briefed at the White House for other events, and I recall those vividly. But we didn't on this one. Or I didn't. None of my staff did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall when you had gone over for the secretarial briefing, if you had been giving any taskings during that?

MR. CANOLES: No. My part of that briefing consisted of taking over CD ROMS on which we had recorded radar presentations and voice presentations. And I took those over and actually loaded them onto the Secretary's machine, his

personal computer, and then replayed the events for [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did Monty or Jane get any taskings, that you can recall?

MR. CANOLES: Not that I recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I've got the documents that you had given us the last time. So I'll just try to flip through these real quick.

This first one just looks like some notes. What can you add?

MR. CANOLES: To the best of my recollection, this was a piece of paper that I picked up someplace on September 11th. And it was probably in that conference room in which I conducted the telecom that we've discussed.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's the one in the Air Traffic Conference Room?

MR. CANOLES: Yes. And this page starts out with some writing that is not mine, down to about the first half of the front page. Everything that follows on the bottom and on the reverse is my writing. And this appeared to be, as I was on

speaker phone talking to various entities up in the Northeast, these were my notes for myself that I was taking, trying to keep up with things as they unfolded.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So, when we're looking at this document, just for the point of reference in the future, there is a phone number. It looks like (b)(6), (b)(7)c .

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So everything below that would be your handwriting?

MR. CANOLES: Right. That phone number is my handwriting too.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What about this (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. CANOLES: (b)(6), (b)(7)c is my handwriting. The Services Cell is my handwriting. This little cut-out over here was [inaudible] (b)(6), (b)(7)c DECON[ph], and (b)(6), (b)(7)c . And the phone number is my writing too.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And all of this below and on the back--

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I notice on here there's a reference to another aircraft, not one of the four. Or, I think that's Delta Airlines 1989.

MR. CANOLES: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There were, other than, you know, American 11 and 77, United 93 and United[ph] 175, there were other aircraft that you guys were trying to--

MR. CANOLES: Right. A tremendous amount of confusion. Confusion is a bad word. Umm, there were a lot of suspect aircraft. Umm, you know, once these events became known and once the controllers became aware of them, and once management became aware of it, I think everybody was being overly vigilant, if you could have been overly vigilant that day. Perhaps it's a misnomer.

But anything that looked slightly out of the norm suddenly became suspect. So, for example--and I don't know if this is the one--but there was a Delta aircraft somewhere in the vicinity of Cleveland that we were attempting to

have land at Cleveland, or Cincinnati, or someplace like that.

And the pilot was giving the controller a bit of argument about it. You know, "I don't want to go there, I want to go someplace else."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: And so, you know, I don't know. I didn't hear it all, and I didn't invest[ph] to all of it. But you know, there's a question of you know, "This guy's being uncooperative; maybe he's being hijacked too." So there was a lot of stuff like that going on.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There was a [inaudible] United 947 [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: That would have been Air Canada Coast Guard. This was a note, and as I recall it, the Coast Guard had reported to someone that they had heard calls from three aircraft: A United 947, an Air Canada 065, and a Continental 57, somewhere in the vicinity of Malcolm[ph] or Gander[ph], you know, and reported some type of anomaly with them. Which didn't pan out either.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you guys put anything together after September 11th that kind of summarized the other aircraft that you guys were tracking in addition to the four hijacked airplanes?

MR. CANOLES: I don't think we ever did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: It was so sporadic, and I mean, and this record-keeping, by my own admission stinks. We did a lousy job with it. But under the circumstances, it's kind of understandable. But I don't think we ever had a comprehensive enough record that we felt that it would have really been of use to [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

The next document that we have here from you is just titled, "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01."

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And it has in the top left hand corner, I think it says (b)(6), (b)(7)c and then it's got a phone extension.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Like 78315. What can you tell us about this document?

MR. CANOLES: The handwriting is not mine. This refers to the tactical net; it refers to the primary net. So my assumption is that this was either put together by the Operations Center, or perhaps by Security. I don't recognize it.

This makes reference to the ACI watch, which was aviation security. So I assume that was theirs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And somebody obviously gave me a copy of it at some point along the way.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

And this document doesn't, like many of the others that were produced by your staff, it does not have an AAT-20--

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Reference or time stamp, or time and date stamp on it.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. We typically were

pretty good about that. I wouldn't say we did it 100 percent of the time. But it was unusual for us not to put that on production.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

And the next document we have here is titled "Chronology of September 11th, 2001."

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And it lists the four aircraft, and abbreviations for them, and then their origination and destination points, where they were supposed to have gone.

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And it says "All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time." What do you recall about that time element?

[Pause.]

MR. CANOLES: No. This, well, first of all I don't know where it came from, or who did it. It could have been prepared by my staff. But it doesn't fit the format of what we would have done. But I would at least suggest that much of what is contained in here is derived from work that my

staff did. If my staff didn't put it together. I can't say with authority.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The last page has a stamp on it that says, at the bottom left hand corner--

MR. CANOLES: AAT-20, September the--okay, then that was produced by my staff.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6) What was the date on that?

MR. CANOLES: September 18th at 7:30 a.m. And this I suspect--can I see the--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The book?

MR. CANOLES: The book. This must have been an earlier iteration of--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The date in book is actually I think a day earlier.

MR. CANOLES: Oh, really?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. These times appear to line up pretty good.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall some

requests that might have come in about integrating all of the information together, instead of keeping each aircraft separate? You know, a chronology of each aircraft separate? A request to kind of put it all together, so you could see what was going on, all of the same time? You know, you could see what was going on with the four planes all at the same time?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. We tried, you know, just for our own purposes, we tried to number it different ways, kind of mixing the data, so that it could be shown to a lay person, so that they could see the whole thing developing at one time.

And I'm sure there were requests. I don't recall any specifically. But I know as we supported the development of information for the hearings, that yeah, I'm sure we were asked to, you know, hey instead of, you know, "Break this out by each airplane so it's an easier reference, or whatever," I don't recall it specifically, but I'm sure that that applies.

And that looks like it was a lift out of

the book. So it looks like pretty much the same date, except the heading's been changed to reflect the four airplanes. It looks like everything was consolidated.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember who that consumer of this would have been, or why you guys would have reformatted it this way?

MR. CANOLES: Shirley Miller was involved in hearing preps, as was Darlene Freeman. Monty--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This was for the 9-11 Commission. Right? Or was this for Jane Garvey's--

MR. CANOLES: This was for Jane Garvey's hearing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: The one that took place on what?, the 15th of September, or the 20th. Something like that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: I didn't get involved other than, you know, we supplied date to the people who were putting our briefing books together.

So again, that was Darlene and Shirley. There may have been some other people, but I remember dealing with them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That testimony was like on September 15th?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. That's my guess. But don't hold me to the date.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

MR. CANOLES: I know it was, you know, pretty close after the 11th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just have one more question to ask.

The next document in here is yet another time line.

MR. CANOLES: Yes. It is.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this one, we call it the grid time line. But the first page has a grid with the four aircraft, and then some events, and then some time notations. The first event says "First sign, probable time flight was known to be in distress. NORAD needs notification. Estimated crash time."

And the second page it starts more in a narrative time line format. It says "Notifications to Military."

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What do you recall about this document?

MR. CANOLES: Okay. As I recall, this was prepared by my staff. And as I recall, this was my attempt, if you remember, or I remember correctly, in the first few days following September the 11th, the media became critical of FAA. And I can't remember the genesis. I don't know if the military complained that we were too late in notifying them, or what the deal was.

But the question of timely notification from FAA to DOT came up. And as I recall, and I think I developed these words, like "First sign," was developed, to say, okay, "This was the first time that any abnormality showed up with this flight."

And then the next category I had was, "Probable time flight was known to be in distress."

So in the case of American 11, the first sign, as I had it tabulated, was at 8:20 a.m. Probable time the flight was known to be in distress was 8:25, meaning that based on the technical review we did of that data, the controller wouldn't have suspected anything wrong with the airplane at 20 minutes after 8:00.

And it wasn't until five minutes later, when a series of other things had occurred, that the controller then might have prudently said, "Something's wrong with the airplane."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: Somebody sees that it has a mechanical problem [inaudible].

And this was an effort to kind of illustrate that we didn't have from 8:20 to make notification to the military; we had from 8:25 to in this case 8:40 to make notification. Because that's the only reasonable amount of time we had to understand that there was in fact an unlawful interference, or whatever the case.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Who was the consumer

of that? The customer for that document?

MR. CANOLES: This was internal FAA.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: I don't think it was produced, you know, I think it was produced pretty much a part of the routine, trying to explain it to FAA, and for FAA to explain to others how we did and did not act on [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So who would you have given this to?

MR. CANOLES: This would have gone up my management chain, through Jeff Griffith, to Bill Peacock. It would have been used internally in Air Traffic. It probably would have been given to Accident Investigation. They may or may not have shared it with The National Transportation Safety Board.

Air Traffic would have shared it with the Air Traffic Services Office, and up to and including perhaps [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Can you remind us who your boss was at the time?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I reported directly to Jeff Griffith, and then ultimately to Bill Peacock.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you reported to Jeff, and then Jeff would report to Mr. Peacock?

MR. CANOLES: Right. And the way would did business, you know, I would relate with both of them on a routine basis. If Jeff wasn't around, obviously I went and worked with Bill.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: So if I prepared a piece of paper like this, and I don't know if they requested it, or we dreamed this thought up on our own, but you know I would have taken it up and given it to Jeff and let him give it to his boss. Or I might have given it to Bill directly.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c When we were out to see you on the 30th of September, you also had provided for us, and they're not in this stack, but you gave them to us right then at that interview, some earlier iterations of this document.

And one of the earlier iterations had a

military notification time for United 93 of 10:08.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I think you had said that the handwriting on this document was yours.

MR. CANOLES: It's mine.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And you guys had changed 10:08 to 'NA."

MR. CANOLES: What did we show on the--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you said NA.

MR. CANOLES: Assuming this was, footnoted. [inaudible] I guess, I don't know. I can't remember why we did that. I didn't cross out the time, but I did put NA underneath it. So to me that means Not Applicable, which was not the correct term to have used. Ummm, I don't know.

And I corrected this one over here from 8:38 to 8:40. Did that show up in the final iteration, 8:40?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think it's 8:40.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Because this

document that we're looking at here looks the most like the final. It's got the same events--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That you guys were trying to track. As opposed to this other one, which it looks like you guys were still working on putting the grid together.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I don't know. Maybe, you know, we footnoted those as coming from the military's logs. Maybe we went back and on reflection couldn't find it or couldn't prove it, or whatever. So we elected to take that out.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, you know, we've been collecting a lot of materials from the FAA. And one of the things that we had come up with or found was a transcript from Cleveland Center's military operations specialist.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Which covered this period of time for United 93. And it actually could be a source document to validate the 10:08 or 10:07 period of time, where the military operations

specialist is in touch with Huntress, which is NEADS [ph].

MR. CANOLES: Huntress. Yeah. Umm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So I wonder if this might refresh your recollection at all. And in the date on this transcript is actually September 17th, 2001. And the date on the grid time line is September 18th of 2001. And actually the narrative even has a later date, which is 9/20 up in that top right hand corner.

MR. CANOLES: This would have been put together as part of an accident package. And I can't even begin to guess when we might have received this particular document at headquarters. If you remember, you know, UPS and Fed-Ex, and all those people weren't operating for a period of several days.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That we got electronically and it had been stored on the network drive here in this building.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c On the S drive. So

--

MR. CANOLES: Do you know when you got it?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, that we're still trying to validate.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c My impression from talking to your former staff downstairs that folks were sending stuff to you as soon as it was available.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. This is from a military operates specialist position in the Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: And our focus, while yes, we would have collected this later on in the process and used it to bolster, you know, whatever the accident package looked like, we would have focused on the operational positions more so than this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: And you know, remember we were looking at the air traffic handling, what the airplanes and didn't say, more than this. So we

would have collected this, and we would have asked for this. But it's my sense that we probably wouldn't have reviewed this, you know, if this came in with five other things, this would have been the last thing to be reviewed.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Even if, because the focus of this document is military notification.

MR. CANOLES: Yes. I can't tell you with certainty. I suspect again that this was just a part of the routine dump everything you have for the accident package. We might have at some point gone out with a special request that, "Hey, if you got anything specific to notification of the military, let us know."

But if we had had this, I mean this time is more favorable than that one, we've shown from the military, I believe, isn't it?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, that one I think might, the local time is, the discussion starts at 10:07.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess the rub, so

to speak, is that the notification on this one doesn't come until after the plane had crashed into the ground in Pennsylvania.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. Which is most likely the reason they took it out. Because it didn't make sense.

Now, remember we had lost radar identity with that particular airplane. That's--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 93?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I'm pretty--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Because 93 is the one that had crashed in Shanksburg, PA.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 77 is the one that went into the Pentagon.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And that one I know for sure you all lost.

MR. CANOLES: I think we lost both of them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And it seems to me, if I

recall this correctly, that 93 was suspected to have crashed. Wasn't that the one where the state police called us and said they had to report--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. 77.

MR. CANOLES: Is it 77?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. Then disregard what I said.

But we know sure that the identity on one or both of these airplanes was lost for some period of time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess the question that I need to ask on this, because of the variation and the times here, is: In the decision-making process to remove 10:08 from the notification time for 93, was a consideration that it would make that FAA look bad that they weren't able to get a hold of--

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Or they didn't contact the military until after the plane had crashed?

MR. CANOLES: No. Uh-uh. And I'm only speculating at this point in time. If I made the decision, and presumably I did, because I wrote the "NA" on there, it would have been because I questioned the validity of the data, based on crash time. There was never any appearance, not to make ourselves look stupid--God knows we looked bad enough as it was--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So are you suggesting that the reason to put the "NA" was because if the notification time had been after the plane crash, it wouldn't have really made a difference? Is that why it's not applicable? The plane was down, to notify the military after it wouldn't have made a difference?

MR. CANOLES: No. And again, realize that I'm just speculating, because I don't remember the precise decision, but it seems more likely, given the way I think, that if I saw that time after the crash, I would have said, "This is stupid. This either represents a mistake in our data," I would have said "It represents a mistake in our data."

And that's the reason I would have
[inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this is not from
your records. I have a handwritten log.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I just want to
show it to you and see if it looks familiar to you.
And realize it's photocopy.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. No. I don't, I don't
recall ever seeing this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know that--

MR. CANOLES: Is this the DODO lab?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This first page
here, I know the writing is very faint. But you
see--

MR. CANOLES: Alpha Flight something.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It says MCCT log.

MR. CANOLES: Okay..

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is the NEADS
[ph] log.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. Okay. [inaudible]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know this starts here as September 10.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But it moves into the 11th on that page there.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. [inaudible]
"Possible hijack American 11 flight. [inaudible] scrambling at, on American 11."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know what's [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Something on American 11. [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And you're saying this doesn't look familiar to you at all?

MR. CANOLES: Uh-uh. Nope. Nope.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c When we had spoken with you last time.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Because your time lines for the military notification for all four flights when they actually list a notification

time, always use as their point of reference the NEADS [ph] log.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Are these times the same, I hope?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We'll, yes.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. Good. That's good then. I think I told you before, but I was either shown a log by Jeff Griffith, and this might have been it, but I don't recall if it was, but Jeff either showed me a log, or gave me times off a log that he had gotten from General Eberhart [ph] I believe.

Jeff did all that liaison, so he was the middle man on all this stuff. So I don't remember if he gave me a list of four times, and said, "Here, use these," or if he showed me this and I copied them off. I think he showed a log. And again I can't guarantee it was this one, but it probably was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you don't have a specific recollection?

MR. CANOLES: You know, I think I do. And

I think I met Jeff in the Washington Ops Center, and I think he showed me a piece of paper. And if I were a betting man, I would say that he showed me a piece of paper, and I jotted down times off of it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: But I can't swear to it. We were pretty sleep deprived by then. So perhaps that helped my lack of recollection. But that's probably the way it came down.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, one of the things we've been trying to obtain from the records in FAA is either a copy of this, or a copy of the notes that you might have made and provided to your staff.

And thus far nobody has been able to provide that. And it's really, as I'm sure you can imagine, based on the referral that the Commission made to us, it's really an important aspect to what we're trying to do.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I know there are

volumes of records down on the fourth floor.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Well, this may help concerning that document. If that is the document I was shown, I believe it was classified, or I was told it was classified at the time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: With the indication being: "You can't copy this, and you can't have it." So, you know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But we haven't even been able to find the handwritten notes, or at least nobody's found a sense of urgency to do that yet.

And I think, you know, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I were talking about this earlier this afternoon. I mean it would be really helpful if you could come up with that source material for all your, the time lines essentially, that the AAT-20 group put together.

MR. CANOLES: I wish I had it. But most likely, I had, you know, something like this piece of paper in my hand, and I would have jotted down

those times. If that's exactly how it took place. And I would have walked downstairs and said, "Here, these are off the [inaudible] logs. Go ahead and put them."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh. Is that group still in chain of command?

MR. CANOLES: No. Uh-uh. Tony Ferrante[ph] works for me now in my new position, and he was in the chain of command then. Which Tom Mellow and Doug Gould and all the rest of those folks are still in Air Traffic, and I'm outside of it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Linda Schussler [ph] used to be. She just retired. Right?

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And she used to be in, I guess their boss?

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Until she retired?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [Off mike.] When did retire?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [Off mike.]

[Inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. She was at the Command Center on 9-11, and then she came in ultimately to replace Jeff Griffith.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And who is acting for her right now? Or haven't they appointed somebody?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Here's what I'm getting it. It would be really nice if somebody from FAA would be able to spend some time going through those boxes downstairs and at least say they've done due diligence. You know, like the Oklahoma City will do for the airmen records?

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c They'll come back and they'll give you a certificate that says, "We searched all our files. We can find nothing related to Airman So and So." Or we can give you those nice blue ribbon copies [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: We could certainly get that done.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's something that you could help us facilitate.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That could be very helpful for, you know, both of us, I think.

MR. CANOLES: All right. Let me have Doug Gould, he doesn't work for me, but I think Doug's still the keeper of that material.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Actually I think it's Jeff McNair's [ph].

MR. CANOLES: Is it?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. CANOLES: All right. So I'll get in touch with Jeff or Doug and ask them to get in touch with you and find out specifically what you need in the way of certification, and have them do that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. We just believe it would be really helpful, because the majority of the time lines reference that information. And if we can show that, if you find

that document and say that we you had that in your possession and this is what you referred to, I think we could kind of move on [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Okay. Oh, again--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean and if they can't find it, they can't.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But--

MR. CANOLES: You can blame me. If this thing went the way I think it went, that's exactly what I would have done. I have jotted down the numbers, the call signs, gone downstairs, and handed it to somebody, and left.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. I don't want this to come across the wrong way. I mean everybody that we've talked to in FAA, especially down in AAT, the old AAT-20 group has been very, very helpful.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So it's just, you

know, everybody has got a lot of other things they'd much rather be doing than talking to us, and looking for things for us. But--

MR. CANOLES: What did you call that? A certification search?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just let me get with Ok City and see what it is they call their record searches when they come up with nothing.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And just so we're kind of consistent there.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm hopefully there's something--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean we're looking for [inaudible] logs.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So that's what they're referred to in all of these time lines. We understand that. They say logs. I mean maybe there is more than one out there. We don't know. We don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But this is the infamous log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At least that's what the Commission refers to it as, that's the one the Commission refers to--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. And NEADS, this is NEADS log. I mean this is a photocopy of their log book. And they've got one of those bound books. And this is it, the MCC Tech Log. And it's got, you know, this is in ZULU time, but they've got their 9:16 reference.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And 9:24. And as you go onto the next page, we've got the 10:07, or 10:08. I guess it depends on how you would look at it. But you go back to I think it was Cleveland's Military Ops Specialist that it all matches up.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But clearly the thing that doesn't match, which this all in the Commission's report--

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that tail number that's referenced at 9:16?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is United 175's tail number. Not, now I forget what that craft is [inaudible]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 77?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. Not 77. And this one here. Or 93 I think it was. This was referenced in some, like DOD documents as United 93. And this is 175's tail number.

MR. CANOLES: Oh, okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There's even a little 75 there.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this one here is American 11. That's 11's tail number, not 77.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So.

MR. CANOLES: Hmm. Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And the transcripts for NEADS from their operational positions support

what they have in their log. They match.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So.

MR. CANOLES: So then we think that the times that we used in FAA from those logs related to the wrong airplane? Is that what you're saying?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I mean the question really is: Well, what did you guys rely on? I mean did you all have, did you get this?

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you get a copy of this? Did Jeff have this?, or did he have something else that the military provided to him?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know if Jeff had it. Well, Jeff obviously had it at some point, if my recollection is correct. But I can tell you unequivocally, I've never had a copy of it. And so therefore, I'm pretty sure [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know. Just at this point, maybe the military typed it up and

sent you guys something. But they misinterpreted the tail number.

MR. CANOLES: I don't think they did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So that's why it's so important to try to pin this down. And this one I know is stamped "unclassified," but I believe this. Because this is from the Commission's records. They had obtained an unclassified [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: It looks like there's been a lot of stuff redacted in it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. On the second page I guess there were some classified entries, and they were unclassified. They crossed those out so they could [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh [inaudible].

Did you have anything else on that?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No. I don't think so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. Well, we'll just quickly turn the tape over. [audio break]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The tape over, flip sides. It's 2:00, 2:01 actually.

All right. Actually this next document looks like, I think these are from the grid time line.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It looks like the narrative portion of this. So we've already talked about that. So I think [inaudible].

The next document in here is titled "Chronology of Events September the 11th, 2001." I think there may be some duplicates in here, though.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. This looks like something my staff probably put together. Again, if they didn't do it, you know, much of the information that developed, it looks like is in here.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There is also a part of this package that looks like something else.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And it starts "Classification, Unclassified." And it says "These

are notes for the new overview impag[ph] or MPG."

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. This appears to be a script that would accompany a computer file. And it says, "Here's a list of actions which will take place in the video, corresponding to the NORAD time line of events."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So their stuff is actually part of our chronology. Yeah. It just is kind of all mixed up.

MR. CANOLES: Mixed together. But whatever this is appears to have been prepared by the military. I may have seen that video. I think it shows the flight tracks of the four target aircraft as well as the military's response.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that that three-dimensional representation, do you think?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I think it was.
Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

In this document that you think is from the military, it says "Our analyst called NEADS to find out which FAA center made the call." Do you

know if they're talking about FAA analysts, or if this is a reference to the military? This is for the 9:24 event for 77.

MR. CANOLES: I don't know.

Do you have another meeting today that you need to--

MR. CANOLES: I'm good until about 2:30.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I'll try not to be long.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. And this, yeah, you're right. This looks like a continuation. And this is probably an earlier iteration of the book.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The summary of hijack events?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

I think these next groups are just logs. So like this is ADA-30.

MR. CANOLES: That's Ops Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So the ADA-30 is the Washington Ops Center here on the 10th floor?

MR. CANOLES: It was at that time, yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Make another copy of the Ops Center log.

This document is titled "Chronology of Events September the 11th, 2001." Ah, yes. Okay. See, it says, "First impact World Trade Center." It says 9:47 a.m.?

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's an hour off.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I think this is the one that was, I think this is the one that was prepared off the telecom that I was running.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Because I remember there was an hour discrepancy. This started out with, I think it was Dan Biggins keeping notes in long hand, and somebody slid a lap top in front of him, and we were capturing stuff on a white board, and he was copying stuff down off of that, and trying to keep up. And this log was pretty poor. It still is pretty poor.

But I'm pretty sure that's where it came from.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This next item looked like some handwritten notes.

MR. CANOLES: Yep. That's my writing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] I don't remember why he was involved in this. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was brought over by (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] to kind of help out (b)(6), (b)(7)c after 9-11.

And I've got a phone number up there. I don't know whose that is. United 193, DOD notification, Great Lakes Regional Ops Center at 0939 and 59 seconds. Great Lakes ROC again at 0909. Don't know what [inaudible].

Indianapolis at 0915 Air Force Search and Rescue, West Virginia [inaudible]. That had to do with the suspected crash, I'm sure.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Does that look like 77 right there? American Airlines?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. But somebody wrote that on there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's not your handwriting?

MR. CANOLES: I don't think so. No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

Cincinnati?

MR. CANOLES: No. It's Boston.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Boston?

MR. CANOLES: Boston, ZBW. Needs TMS traffic management supervisor at NORAD APS. I don't know what that is.

And then 12:37 and 52 seconds Huntress. So these were notes I was taking. I was asking somebody, or perhaps (b)(6), (b)(7)c called and gave me this information for our chronologies. But these were notification times that somehow we put together.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And who was Jim Slate again?

MR. CANOLES: (b)(6), (b)(7)c of Washington National Control Tower. And he came over at the request of (b)(6), (b)(7)c. And (b)(6), (b)(7)c was ATS-2. And he came over and worked pretty much

directly for (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think, following 9-11.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what is ATS-2?

MR. CANOLES: ATS was the parent organization of Air Traffic. So Bill Peacock reported to ATS-2.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, okay. There is another page behind that note. Is this your handwriting as well?

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No. Do you know who (b)(6), (b)(7)c is?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. (b)(6), (b)(7)c I forgot what capacity he was in at this point in time, but he was working for Bill Peacock.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And it says at 1333 EDT on 9/11. So that would be Eastern Daylight Time.

MR. CANOLES: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c On 9-11 military, physical joint situation room. And this situation at Washington Ops Center?

MR. CANOLES: It could refer to the telcon

[ph] I was running. Situation Room got pretty wide reviews after 9-11. It could have been the security net. I wouldn't even hazard a guess.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And I'm not even sure that note is to me. There was also a [REDACTED] in Air Traffic. So it could have been either one of us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Even though your first name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c you go by (b)(6), (b)(7)c So most people know you by (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

This looks like a daily record or facility operations for Boston TRACON?

MR. CANOLES: Correct. You're getting good at this stuff. It shows you're spending too much time on it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Apparently. This Boston Center here?

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Daily Record of

Facility Operations, ZBW ARTCC.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Daily Record of Facility Operations. I don't know what ISP means.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. That's Islip.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And they are an international flight service station.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: IFSS. We've only got a couple of them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are there in the same between as New York Center?

MR. CANOLES: No. No. Different building.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Same neighborhood, different building.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This Daily Record of Facility Operations, is this--

MR. CANOLES: New York TRACON.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. This is Daily Record of Recall Operations for--

MR. CANOLES: Pittsburgh [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. It's another

--

MR. CANOLES: Dallas [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] IAE.

MR. CANOLES: Yes. All of our facilities are required to do those.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Washington National [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c DCA.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It looks like a position log for the TRACON? New York TRACON?

MR. CANOLES: Umm, [inaudible]. Yeah. That must be a computerized version of a facility log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And it looks like it deals primarily with traffic management restrictions. Restrictions for [inaudible] over those intersections. Yeah. That's got to from a traffic

management [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And these times on here are going to be ZULU times. Right?

MR. CANOLES: Yes. Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Here is a record of facility operations for Newark. Right?

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is EWR, that's Newark Airport.

MR. CANOLES: Right. I used to be manager there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, did you?

MR. CANOLES: Yes. Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c How long were you manager out there?

MR. CANOLES: Ohh, 2-1/2 years.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Where did you live when you were out there?

MR. CANOLES: Hitestown [ph].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Hitestown.

MR. CANOLES: Exit 33 of the Jersey Turnpike, as I recall. No. Exit 8A. 8A?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's down there a long ways. Wait, is that on the shore?

MR. CANOLES: No. Uh-uh. That was the first place I could afford.

[Laughter.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's expensive there.

MR. CANOLES: It is.

SPECIAL AGENT OWENS: This is another operations log for?

MR. CANOLES: Washington Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. For--

MR. CANOLES: New York Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c New York Center is ZNY.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Washington Center again.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c ZDC.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. New York Center again.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Notification record for New York Center. Facility Ops Log for New York Center, ZNY.

Facility Operations Log for--

MR. CANOLES: Indianapolis.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Indy Center is EID.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [Inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Some of the facilities had multiple logs at different areas of operation. So they might have a north and south area, and they might or might not have separate logs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And some of them, again, will, you know, like a military specialist desk will have one, or a traffic management unit, and they all get merged [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is an accident incident preliminary notice for Cleveland Center, ZOBART CC.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. And [inaudible] 93. [inaudible] log from Indianapolis Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c EID. And--

MR. CANOLES: Accident report, probably from Indy Center on--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 93.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Something for ZOB.

MR. CANOLES: This is from the DART. DART is a computer replay of the radar.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: 91 in the coast at that time, the controller at Sector R49 updated the tract, or the primary tract. 247 [inaudible] lost [inaudible] at 2 minutes and 49 seconds.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What's Mode C?

MR. CANOLES: That's the feature of the transponder that tells the controller what the altitude of the airplane is.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: So we lost it, and Mode C indicates axis which is consistent with our automation program. [inaudible] because of the loss of transponder.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. This is Cleveland Center ZOB?

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Log from Cleveland. And that's it.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Okay.

The thought occurs to me on that needs log, if you haven't done this. You need to ask Tony Ferrante if he's ever seen that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: And Tony and I work together, and we see each other every 15 minutes. But you might want to officially ask him.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Because it's possible, I don't think so, but it's possible that at some point later down the road, Jeff Griffith might have given him a copy of it. So he might be able to short-cut the process, if one exists.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. He's [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: No. He's right across the

[inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Maybe we'll get luck and run into him. He's not in your 2:30, is he?

MR. CANOLES: No. No. But I can find him for you.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You were interviewed by the 9-11 Commission, and I just have a couple of real quick questions for you from that.

MR. CANOLES: Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This shouldn't take more than like five minutes.

MR. CANOLES: Okay..

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You had indicated to the Commission, which is consistent with what you told us as well, when you said that you personally communicate with NORAD, but you thought that Jeff Griffith had.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you do recall that Griffith showed you a copy of NORAD's logs, is what you had told them.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Another thing that you had mentioned to them was that it says here in their summary of the interview, it says, "Canoles commented that there was a 'debate,'" and it's in quotes," over the timeliness of FAA notification to the military of the flights involved in the attacks as being either confirmed or suspected as being hijacked."

But it doesn't really elaborate on what you are referring to or what you meant--

MR. CANOLES: I think what I meant was a public debate. You know, the media.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Because I do remember the agency coming out under pretty heavy attack in the first few days. And I don't remember if it was an Air Force pilot or somebody in DOD saying, "Well, if the FAA would have told us sooner, we could have done something."

I forget what the charges were, but I know that became the issue to that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you

remember any debate or disagreement between the FAA and DOD as far as the notifications, or that being communicated to you?

MR. CANOLES: No. Not at all.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Of course, you know, again realize I had very little contact with the military. Most of that was done by others. So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I just thought maybe, because your group was kind of pulling all this date together, that maybe that would have been--

MR. CANOLES: You know, I'm sure the data we put together was shared with the military. But, you know, I'm sure Jeff gave them copies of it or something. He would have done that just out of professional courtesy.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just one last thing here. Maybe this will help refresh some of your recollection. Because I think it looks like you did this interview in the spring of '04. So, I guess it's not that long ago.

So anyway it says here, "Canoles recalls seeing the log from NORAD that was reviewed by Jeff Griffith. He recalls discussing the log with Griffith. And he recalls that he and Griffith noticed that there were some ambiguities between the timing of events understood at the FAA and the reflections of events displayed in the log."

Can you provide any clarification on--I guess what I'm most curious about is 'ambiguities.'

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Like the tail numbers? Maybe. Do you recall noticing?

MR. CANOLES: No. I really don't. Most likely, I don't know if I would have used the word, 'ambiguity.'

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think this might have been typed up by lawyers. So--

MR. CANOLES: Oh, my God.

[Laughter.]

MR. CANOLES: Most likely--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [Inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is the

memorandum for the record. We have the tape as well, which we're going to listen to. Maybe that will help.

MR. CANOLES: Most likely from the vantage that I was working this thing, if I detected a difference, it would have been, "Look, their time is different than our time was." That's the best I can think of.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

Do you remember ever getting a very specific request from the Secretary's office? Maybe like even at Flaherty's level, asking for the FAA to put something together concerning military notification.

MR. CANOLES: No. I wouldn't get that anyway. He would have communicated that to Monty or Shirley.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you remember that kind of flowing down [inaudible] OST means to

--

MR. CANOLES: You know, I'm sure we put stuff together like that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. CANOLES: At Shirley's request, or Monty's request. But I don't remember anybody saying "The Secretary wants this." He would have been, you know, they take your chronology and pull these pieces out of it. And we shape the stuff, like I said, dozens of different ways for different purposes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In the spring of '03, like late spring, like in May and June, you were already at the Washington Ops Center. Right?

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And so then Linda Schussler would have been in your old position. Right?

MR. CANOLES: Actually I think a guy named (b)(6), (b)(7)c was. And (b)(6), (b)(7)c didn't stay there too long, and then he went to work for [inaudible] the organization transitioned over to [inaudible].

We're not always in the state of flux. We're just doing this gigantic reorganization in Air Traffic right now. So it's pretty goofy over

there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is (b)(6), (b)(7)c still around?

MR. CANOLES: No. He just retired.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know the
name, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What was his
position?

MR. CANOLES: (b)(6), (b)(7)c worked for Jeff
Griffith, and did a lot of military liaison work,
back and forth.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would he have been
the one who may have interacted with NEADS, to get
the log?

MR. CANOLES: He could have. But I don't
know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess my
understanding is all the military liaison personnel
reported to him.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. In Air Traffic.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In Air Traffic.

MR. CANOLES: That's true. Yeah. But Jeff kept that side of the operation very close to him. So--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: [Inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We don't have anything else right now. So we appreciate your time.

MR. CANOLES: Happy to do it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It is 2:24, end of interview.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

JEFFREY GRIFFITH

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c SPECIAL AGENT

Friday, November 19, 2004

1:14 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is November 19, 2004. The time is 1:14 p.m. We are at Room 7324, DOT Headquarters, 400 Seventh Street, S.W. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c My co-investigator is

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

We are from the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Transportation. And we are conducting a review of the issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at 9-11 Commission hearings and elsewhere, that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we are re-interviewing Jeff Griffith. Mr. Griffith, please acknowledge that you are aware that this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. GRIFFITH: I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Please raise your right hand.

Whereupon,

JEFFREY LYNN GRIFFITH

was called as a witness and, after being first duly

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Please give your full name, spelling your last name for the record.

MR. GRIFFITH: Jeffrey Lynn Griffith,
G-R-I-F-F-I-T-H.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mr. Griffith, I know you are retired from the FAA. At the time of your retirement, what was your current assignment?

MR. GRIFFITH: Deputy Director of Air Traffic.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And how long were you in that position?

MR. GRIFFITH: About two years.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And on September 11, 2001, was that the position you were holding?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Now, Mr. Griffith, I've already spoken to you once before, but I want to begin by showing you what's been represented to us as being something called a MEAZ[ph] log, an NCC[ph] tech log, that was the source of some of the time line information that the FAA put

together. I just want to ask you if you recognize that document. Is that the document that you would have obtained from the military shortly after September 11th?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I can't say for sure. This is two pages. The document that I recall was one page. It was handwritten, as this document is handwritten. But it was, this document is about 2/3 of a page wide. The one that I recall was about four pages wide. And I don't recall the entries that are on either one of these pages.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just to go over it again, why don't you just discuss how you would have obtained the information from the military. I think you had told us previously that shortly after September 11th, 2001, there were questions raised relating to military notification times.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Can you kind of go over that again, just for the benefit of the record?, and maybe describe how you would have attempted to obtain that type of information from

the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, as you said, questions were being asked about coordination between the FAA the military and the times that different notifications were made. In my role I had been working with Larry Arnold at Tindall Air Force Base in the Southeast Air Defense Sector.

And Larry and I talked about the questions that were being raised, and I said to Larry something to the effect of: "We need to know what was said, and we need to report what was said. It doesn't matter to me who was right or who was wrong, if anybody was right or wrong. But, you know, let's you and I agree to get information and put it together."

And he said, "Yes." And at some point after that conversation, I did receive a, I believe it was a single-page document with handwriting on it. And I reviewed it, and then I provided that information to other people at FAA that were assembling a time line.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c How soon after

September 11th were these questions being raised about military notification by the FAA? Was it more than a day?, a couple days?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. I don't think it was within a day or two. I think it was maybe a week later, or something like that. It seems to me like some period of time had gone by. But then questions were asked. But I don't think it was a day or two, if I remember correctly.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know where the questions were coming from? Do you recall?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. I don't. Because, you know, in my job I was focused on getting the system up and running.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH: And you know, people asking questions and making such a big deal out of who said what and when. You know. I believe that everybody worked hard on 9-11 and did an outstanding job. And a lot of tough decisions were made in an environment that had been experienced before, nor anticipated that it would be

experienced.

And, you know, our job was the safety of the flying public, getting the airplanes on the ground, and responding to these hijack situations. And that's what we were all focused on. We never had a Defense roll at FAA. It was never our job to provide intercepts or coordinate shoot-down of aircraft, or anything like that.

Our job was the safety of the flying public. And all of these things that had to be done because of the situation on 9-11 were things were done for the first time by people that had to think on their feet and make decisions. And that's exactly what was done.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you do recall that there were some questions being raised while you were dealing with all these other things?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure. Yeah. You know, we're trying to get the system up and running again.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: And you know, someone

somewhere, and I don't remember who it was, was calling, and trying to make a big deal out of, you know, what somebody said, and the coordination effort. And you know, we never had a protocol to do the things that I said. Shoot down airplanes, and vector airplanes for intercepts, and those kinds of things.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH: There were no rules of engagement for it. My office did have people assigned to the Northeast Air Defense Sector and the Southeast Air Defense Sector, and the Western Air Defense Sector in a liaison role, and also at NORAD Headquarters.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Once these questions were being raised, and you talked about contacting General Arnold, and he's with CONAR? He was with CONAR?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. He was CONAR. And he was Commander of First Air Force and CONAR. So he was in charge of all the air defense.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Were you tasked with

contacting General Arnold, or did someone at FAA direct you to contact the military to get this things resolved, to get these discrepancies resolved?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. Nobody. That was my job. My job was as Deputy Director of Air Traffic, my job was to run the air traffic system.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And any issues as a result of that, you know, I took my own actions and reported to my superiors.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So you called General Arnold? You called him?

MR. GRIFFITH: I called the Air Defense Sector and spoke with General Arnold.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And you said, "Let's get this resolved? Let's get this worked out."

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. And he was just as busy as I was. And so you know, he had a group of colonels working for him. And I talked to one or two or his colonels as well, because he didn't have

time to go look at logs and do those kinds of things. He was trying to protect the nation from a defense point of view.

So, you know, I talked to a couple of his colonels.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think we had asked you before if you recalled their names. And I don't think you recalled them last time. You still don't recall who they were?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. I don't.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And so what happened after you spoke with them?

MR. GRIFFITH: They provided information. I mean they provided information to us. We had a person, Darlene Freeman, that, she was a senior executive. And she was assigned the task of putting the time line together. And you know, she's an attorney, a very bright individual.

So I provided all the information that I had to her, and then she put the time line together. And you know, I recall it, I reviewed it a couple times along the way. And then I had my

staff review it, who had time to listen to tapes and do all that kind of stuff.

You know, we were making an effort to report as accurately as possible. But we were still trying to stand the system up. You know, the economy was being severely impacted by no airplanes flying, and the secretary was receiving calls from all the CEOs of the airlines and other people that were losing money. And my job was to get this thing running again.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH: So that was my focus.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So you recall receiving a one-page, handwritten fax? That's your recollection?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what was the type of information that was in that fax that you received from the military?

MR. GRIFFITH: Umm, it was information similar to what's in this document that you're showing me today. Umm, but it was one piece of

paper and it didn't look the same as this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And what--

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean it was a log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I remember it being a log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And what was of particular interest in that document that you received? What was it that you were trying to glean from that document?

MR. GRIFFITH: People were questioning the times of notification between the FAA and DOD. And so in particular I was looking for log entries that would clarify when notifications were made about airplanes being hijacked.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And the FAA didn't have that type of information? Had you tried to obtain that information from FAA sources before you went and contacted General Arnold?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, my staff had all the logs from all the air traffic facilities from the centers that were involved, because their job is to keep a similar log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH: And so whenever there is an aircraft incident, including hijackings or anything else, their job is to make an entry in that log. And so we had, as part of the investigation, we had collected all of the logs from all of the facilities, and had reviewed them all, and my staff had briefed me on them.

And of course we provided all of that information to people that needed it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But there were certain times that were missing? Were there certain entries that were missing?, and as a result we had to get that information from another source?

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think information was missing. I think the questions were about the specific times that the information was accomplished. And I've been in those facilities, a and completed those logs, you know, as a first-line supervisor, as a second-level manager, and as a facility manager.

And you know, when you have airplanes

being hijacked, and crashing, you know, you take the actions that as necessary, and then you go back and fill out your log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GRIFFITH: And I can't speak for the people that were filling those logs out. But I can sure tell you that, you know, having worked in those positions, that they were doing a lot of things.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall entry section [inaudible], like for example, this, what's this, ZULU time? I guess?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right. Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c ZULU time?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh. It's UCT, Universal Coordinated Time. Referred to as UCT.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So this is 9:16, and 9:24 in the morning?

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall entries such as these? When you may have had to verify a tail number, or something like that? Do

you recall doing that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, we don't use tail numbers on commercial aircraft. The reason the military uses them is because they look at the tail number on the airplane; if they're going to shoot it down, they make sure they got the right one.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MR. GRIFFITH: But we don't use tail numbers. We use the company call sign.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: We have no knowledge, you know, outside of what the airline filed in their flight plan. But the information that the controller sees on commercial aircraft is not tail numbers. On civil aircraft that are non-commercial of course we use the tail numbers as their call sign.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall having to decipher that, though?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess what I mean is, you know, getting this information from the

military, and saying, "Okay, is this tail number, you know, American 77?, or is it American 11? Or do you recall having anybody you or anybody at the FAA, anybody from your staff?"

MR. GRIFFITH: The staff may have. I'm sorry. I just don't remember that little detail.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: I mean--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, let me go back to something for a second. When you got the one-page fax, or what you recall as the one-page fax, you said you reviewed it?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would you have taken notes from it?

MR. GRIFFITH: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. I mean I remember, I reviewed it. And I called my staff and said, "Okay, here is the information. We need to provide this to Darlene." And that's my recall of how I did that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Who did you call?

Who on your staff would you have called?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, we have quality assurance staff. And there were several people working there. Primarily I was working, the guy running it was Dave Kanols[ph], but the person doing most of the work was Tony Ferrante[ph]. And you know, Tony is the guy that I did most of my work with.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So, is it your recollection that you called one of those and gave them the information verbally off of what you received? Or did you give them a copy of what you had gotten? Can you recall?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I'm those guys were constantly in my office. Because we were preparing, you know, the incident reports. So, I mean I was seeing them for a large portion of every day.

The only thing I remember about the paper is that while on 9-11 I kept my own logs, a tad[ph] with my here, line to tad with their[ph], that I

carried with me the whole time. And every time that I did something, I made a time entry and wrote down my notes.

And I had a file that I kept all this information in that got to be pretty thick. And I remember that I would have put this in there. So the information I gave to the QA staff had to be copied, or something like that.

But originally the information was faxed to us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then, of course when I retired I destroyed all the information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So your file that you had where you would have put like a copy of what you had received, and your handwritten notes?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You got rid of that when you retired?

MR. GRIFFITH: When I retired, yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You threw it away?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah. I sent a whole bunch

of stuff to be shredded. So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So you think that whatever you had gotten from--

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, it's gone.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's gone?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Could another copy have been somewhere else?

MR. GRIFFITH: Oh, sure. Yes. Staff had it. And--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you recall actually giving a copy of whatever you received to the AAT 20 group?

MR. GRIFFITH: Sure. Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. But you don't recall who specifically?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. There were like four of those guys that were constantly working with us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall showing it specifically to Dave Kanols?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. No. Dave was, he was

busy, you know, briefing the FBI and everybody else.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. Do you recall Dave perhaps taking notes, you know, kind of sitting at a table or standing together, and he taking notes from whatever you showed him? You don't recall that?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. It's not Dave's style.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c To take notes from something you would show you?

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, he always had two or three people with him. He made sure the work was done. But you know, he was doing other things.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

I was reviewing your transcript from the last time we spoke.

MR. GRIFFITH: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I think we talked about--correct me if I'm wrong--that you and General Arnold discussed the question about the FAA's notification to the military, and you both agreed that whatever the log said is what you'll

report?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh. Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Was there an agreement to use? Whatever the military showed, was there an agreement to just use what the military showed?, to use their logs as the--

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, because we had two sets of logs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Was there an agreement to use the military's logs as the main source of notification information, though?

MR. GRIFFITH: Not by me. No. You know, our task was to reconcile the information and report. And there is no one that could say one was right and the other one was wrong. So my intent was to report what was in the logs.

It didn't matter to me if the times were different, because people were doing different things.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. Like the one

time line, the summary of their traffic hijack events, I think we showed that to you last time.

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a summary of air traffic hijack events, September 11th, 2001.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall looking at that?

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh. I do. Yes. But this isn't what was used to reconcile the logs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No. I understand. But you know, there's entries in the time line where it's like at 8:40 a.m. they say, "Northeast Air Defense Sector logs indicate that they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning American 11."

MR. GRIFFITH: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You know, references in the MEAZ[ph] log.

MR. GRIFFITH: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would that have been because there wasn't some FAA? I mean that was

because we had to reference MEAZ log because there was no FAA document that gave us that particular information? Do you understand my question?

MR. GRIFFITH: Yes. But this document was never intended to provide that level of detail. This initially was the document that was used to brief the FBI.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then it was kept as a source document. So you know, the document that was used to reconcile the logs was the one that Darlene Freeman did. And Tony may have taken some of this information and put it in this report.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: But this was the initial document that was used to brief the FBI and others. I only have about five minutes left.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. We're almost done.

So you don't recall any type of agreement?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c With them, with the

military about using their times over the FAA times?

MR. GRIFFITH: No. I never made that agreement with anyone. And I was the one doing this. And I couldn't, I can't speak for anyone else. I can speak for myself. And no, I never made that agreement with anyone.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just one more concerning that topic, because I know you've got to get going.

Do you remember seeing this press release that NORAD put out? Do you recall seeing that document?, with the information?

MR. GRIFFITH: Did you show this to me last time?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think we asked you if you had seen it, and I think what I recall you saying is that you might not have seen that information in the form of a press release, but you recall seeing the information or the times in it.

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, I am familiar with some of the information, not all of it in here.

But I don't know that I've seen this press release.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you recall seeing this information in some--

MR. GRIFFITH: Well, some of that information. Yeah. I mean I can't say, you know, I saw it all. But--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think that was put out September 17th, '01.

MR. GRIFFITH: Was it?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. By NORAD.

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't know, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I have to tell that this, to me this, it was in the noise. You know, I was so focused on getting this system running, and you know, making sure that we had procedures out there where 9-11 would never happen again.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And you know, every day I came to working, working to get through that day without another problem. So, you know, people arguing about logs and who said what, it just wasn't a big deal to me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And it's still not. You know? My focus was standing up this system. We had flight restrictions all over the country. We had fighter jets intercepting airplanes every day, many times during the day. And we had erroneous reports of incidents.

And you know, my job was to make sure we made it through every day where this wouldn't happen again. And that's where I was focused. You know. I wasn't focused in people pointing fingers and making noise, because I didn't care. And I still don't.

I'm very disappointed in the 9-11 Commission, in you know what's going on here, in that they would advise the Inspector General that I and others provided information, you know, that was inconsistent. It's just amazing to me.

I spent 36 years in the government. I was in Vietnam. I did a lot of things, and I was always a first-line troop. You know?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And then, you know, to have somebody--last week I got the Secretary's 9-11 Award. I've been gone for two years. You know?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: And this has gone on. And people that I worked for, that I admired, are being drug into the thing. And it just stinks.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean what we're trying to do and what I'm trying to do is really just try to understand where the information came from in the time lines.

MR. GRIFFITH: My guess is--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You know, I'm not trying to point fingers at anybody, or--

MR. GRIFFITH: I don't think you'll ever find that out. Because--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. We may not. That's the problem.

MR. GRIFFITH: Because our people, we had thousands of people taking actions, making decisions. Thousands of people.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: I had 24,000 people in my organization. And when 9-11 happened, all the people that were on my management team, you know, it was early in the morning on the west coast, but when 9-11 happened, my team went to work, and didn't go home for a week.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know.

MR. GRIFFITH: You know? So it's like who cares? I don't care. I mean just glad it hasn't happened again.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MR. GRIFFITH: So I don't think I can do anything else meaningful for you. I'm sorry.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. All right. Well, thank you for coming in.

MR. GRIFFITH: You're welcome.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we'll just end the interview. It's 1:40.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
LINDA M. SCHEUSSLER

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, December 9, 2004

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
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I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Today is December 9, 2004, the time is 9:59 a.m. We're at DOT NASIF Building in Room 7324, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today, we're re-interviewing Linda Scheussler. Ms. Schuessler, if you could just acknowledge for us that you know this interview is being tape recorded.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes, I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Would you please raise your right hand?. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give us your

full name, spelling your last for the record?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Linda M. Schuessler,
S-c-h-u-e-s-s-l-e-r.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I believe you recently retired
from FAA?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When was that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: November the 3rd.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Currently working for?

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. (b)(6), (b)(7)c: And what position do you hold
over there?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Don't hold me to the
exact title--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay

MS. WOODS: [unintell.]

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c something along those lines.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think last time we talked
you kind of gave us your work history--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --so we're not going to go

over that again, save some time. The one thing I just would like some, if you could clarify for us. In May of '03 time period, what position did you hold during that--sorry.

MS. SCHUESSLER: In May of '03--some time frames now for me just to, let's see--I was either--I was either back as the Manager for Evaluation and Investigations or in the role of the Deputy Air Traffic--Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And that was the position you last held before you retired, the Deputy Director position?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, we restructured the organization so the correct title of the last position I held was Vice President of System Operations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the things that we had talked about the last time we spoke was, I think, your role in helping to prepare this Question for the Record--

MS. SCHUESSLER: MM-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --that was submitted, I think it was May 22, 2003, after former Administrator Garvey had testified before the 9/11 Commission. And I just was hoping that you could give us a little more detail about your role in preparing this. I think you had said previously that you and Lynne Osmus and Shirley Miller had worked on gathering up some information to prepare this QFR?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, and in part of--part of gathering information, I talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c to try and get a little bit more information from her vantage point, when she joined the telecons. And, if I remember correctly, she gave me some information and I shared that with Shirley and Lynne and they compiled the statement and then, I think, maybe the following day, that's when (b)(6), (b)(7)c said, oh, I'm not quite sure that that's accurate.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Because I think the part of the statement that applies to your discussion with (b)(6), (b)(7)c it says the U.S. Air Force Liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters

phone bridge--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --and established a contact with NORAD on a separate line.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You think maybe as soon as the day after, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had said that that might not be exactly correct? What--can you just tell us as much as you can about that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, I mean, if I remember correctly, it was, I don't know late afternoon, early evening when we were trying to pull the information together. And so when I did get ahold of (b)(6), (b)(7)c you know, she shared what she remembered. And, again, you know, it was late in the day, early in the evening. And then upon reflection, I guess, that evening, she came back in and she said, you know, she says, I think, and don't hold me to the exact word that she said, you know, because I don't remember that--you know, but she indicated something to the effect that she was--she remembers she was either on the bridge or

something when something happened. So, that indicated to here that, well, yes, I joined immediately when I got into headquarters but it wasn't immediately when the situation was unfolding.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did she relay this to you or was it to somebody else?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I know, I heard the information, so I would imagine, again, you know, memory is vague, but I would think that she probably advised all of us of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You think you actually had a conversation with her about that or that you heard it from somebody else?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I think I probably did, only because I was the one that called her.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you mean would she have come back into the building the next day and had this discussion--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --with you that she recalled?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, you know, and you see each other in the halls and, you know, she said, you know, I'm thinking about--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She said, you know, I'm thinking about what I talked--

MS. SCHUESSLER: --yeah--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --about last night and--

MS. SCHUESSLER: --right, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --I don't think that's exactly right--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --is that something like that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, you know more informal than, you know, a formal statement or anything along those lines.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Was she still the liaison at that time?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So how did you guys handle a correction for that, because that kind of changes, you know, what was presented to the Commission?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, again, I was not

the focus for this, you know, so, you know, I had the information, I think, you know, Shirley and Lynne were aware of the information and, you know, they were more the leads on preparing the statement more so than I.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, Shirley and Lynne were kind of the ones in charge of this effort, so--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I was part of it, but, yeah, I was not the focus of saying, okay, let's put, you know, let's get the statement together and send it over to whoever it got sent to.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, you don't recall how making the correction was handled?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, nothing further after that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you guys were working on putting this together?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Did anybody try to contact anybody in AAT-20--the--I understand that maybe you might have been, I guess sitting in the disk that

Dave Cannoles had sat in at one point--so I was wondering, did anybody try to reach out to Dave Cannoles or for Ferrante or Mr. Mello about that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I--no, I don't believe so, you know, I couldn't, again, I couldn't swear to it, but I don't believe so. But one of the issues here is the fact that this line was not recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: So, the AT-20 group what they had was the recordings and they had the time frames of all the recordings and the statements and that sort of thing. They would not have the time frame of when something like this occurred, because nothing was recorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The reason that I'm asking that question--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --is because it's our understanding that Dave Cannoles was responsible for having established that teleconference and kind of seeing that it stay aloft, for lack of a better

term.

MS. SCHUESSLER: That, again, I wasn't at headquarters at the time, so I don't know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --certainly, I know he was involved. I know Jeff Griffith was involved and many, many others, but I don't know the protocol and who did what.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Because I think, on 9/11, you were in--you were the manager for the Herndon Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know who got the phone call from Jane Garvey about putting that together?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If it was you, would you, was it you?

MS. SCHUESSLER: It was not me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It was not you? Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: I do know that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. This--once the--you guys found out about this statement here that

it--essentially that it--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --this immediately joined aspect wasn't necessarily correct, how do you think that should have been resolved with the Commission?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think, well, you know, as far as the formal statement, I do not know how it was resolved, if it was resolved, along those lines, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Somebody consulted with you and said, you know, Linda, hey, we've got this--this issue's come up?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You know, what we had sent up to the Commission, and this was read into the record--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --that this QFR, you know, this aspect right here about immediately joined, you know, that's not exactly what Cheryl's remembering now, how do you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, right--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --think we should resolve this?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, you know, certainly, you need to call the Commission back and say, okay, this is what we have found. And I do know that Shirley Miller did that on several different occasions on different things that when they asked for either statements or recordings or whatever and she thought it was one way, yes, we had it, or no we didn't and then we found out otherwise. I know she was talking to them daily during periods of time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Anything else, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When you talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)c maybe the next day--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --when she mentioned that she hadn't been--her memory hadn't been correct the night before, did she--was she more specific as to what time she thought that she had joined the con-bridge in relation to the events, maybe? Because I thought in the--when I was reading your

interview from last time, I thought maybe you had recalled that she had [unintell.] coming in, maybe after the start of that and how--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, that's why I'm saying, you'd have to go back to her because I don't remember all the specifics.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: But in her mind, she remembers, no, no, no, she says, I was crossing the bridge when something happened. So, it may have been the third event, it may, you know, I don't know if she was listening to the radio, but I do remember that being the correction on her part.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, when you say crossing the bridge, driving in--that's what--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, she's driving in, what bridge, I don't know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You say you understood?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, yeah. So she joined when she got into headquarters, but she was not immediately on the bridge as soon as it was set up, I mean, that was my understanding in talking to

them the following morning.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you had, subsequently, then, contacted Shirley or Lynne to advise them of what she had said or was this a meeting where you were all in the hall together or--what do you remember about that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I think probably in this particular case, if I remember, I don't remember whether Cheryl contacted me on one, but let's say, she did, you know, we all made sure the information was shared with Shirley and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c At about this same time period--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --in May of '03, it was on May 23, the Secretary had testified before the Commission, as well, were you involved in any of the briefings for the--like, I believe, like a day or two before this, there may have been a briefing for John Flaherty, as Chief of Staff, to help prepare the Secretary's testimony and, then, even

on the 22nd of May, I believe there was another briefing, actually for the Secretary. Did you participate in any of those?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I couldn't tell you dates, but, yes, I do remember being involved in more than one, I would like to think two, but, again, don't hold me to that number. What we were calling prep sessions for the Secretary. And there were a number of us in there. Again, I was not the focal, you know, I was there just when various questions came up. But, yes, I was there on more than one prep session.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But this was for the Secretary--was this for Chief of Staff or was this do you recall--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, it was for the Secretary, whether John Flaherty was there, I would be guessing. I would guess, yes, but--but, again, I don't specifically recall whether he was there or not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was time line information being discussed at these, you know, military

notification--was that being discussed at those prep sessions?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I know in the package that was prepared for him, he did have time lines in there. But most of the prep session was more along the lines of, high-level, generic information, rather than, let's walk through the time line. You know, he did have a book with the time line, but I don't remember us talking very specifically through that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I have an e-mail message here from Denise Daniels--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --who I understand is a policy advisor in OST and it's one of the recipients of the e-mail messages got--has your name on here. And it's titled Heads Up and dated May 29, 2003, and I'm just going to read some of this just for our record here.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It says here, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'll let you look at this when we're done. It says (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c was asked by the Chief of Staff to set up a meeting early next week to get the time line of FAA Air Traffic Communications with NORAD set. He wants to walk through the time line on all four aircraft involved in the attacks. Now, it was mentioned, previously, that this may be difficult because FBI/DOJ have the AT tapes from that day. If that's the case, that will be an issue in the meeting. Evidence given to DOJ without keeping a copy will be a problem for John. And that would seem to elevate the critical importance of any written logs that were created either contemporaneously or subsequently.

We also should be prepared to correlate the information with the time line presented by NORAD at the hearing. And then, parenthetically, it says, including their charts. The next paragraph says, John wants to be able to submit something to the Commission that clarifies that issue and clarifies other issues arising out of the Secretary's statement while the record is open for 14 days.

And, again, parenthetically, it says, I believe that's 14 days from the second date of the hearing. And the last line is, anyway, for those who don't know (b)(6), (b)(7)c I didn't want to be surprised at his call. I didn't want you to be surprised at his call. And it's signed (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

MS. SCHUESSLER: That was (b)(6), (b)(7) who?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm not clear on who the Jeff is?

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. SCHUESSLER: I couldn't tell you whether a meeting was set up or not. Let's see, I know we had conversations about the time lines, you know, because our time line was different than NORAD's. We acknowledged that and recognized that. But we also were going by our recordings, you know, so we were looking at the time frames on our time hacks on the recordings and that's what we were using as our official records. So, NORAD, I'm sure, did the same thing. And some things in our logs, as in their logs, indicated actions that were

taken and they're approximate times because people were all doing other things--but could not be confirmed on a recorded line.

So, when we found differences that we could not confirm because of the time hacks on the lines, I think everyone left their time frames the same. You know, as their own agency, rather than change.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Based on this message, do you know what instruction Flaherty was giving to the FAA with regard to working on their time lines here?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, if it's after--if you're looking at May time frame--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This would be after both Ms. Garvey and Mr. Mineta had testified.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm, yeah, because I remember there was still some concern as far as the differences as to what the time line on all four--information of the time line presented by NORAD, I don't remember, I know I don't remember that, did we submit something? I don't know

whether we did or not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Submit something to who?

MS. SCHUESSLER: When he says John wanted to submit something within 14 days.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm not sure about that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, because I don't--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This is, I'll just relay a couple of--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --things that we have learned and maybe it will refresh--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --your recollection is, it's our understanding that this e-mail, and maybe some of the meetings that you guys had--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --prepping the Secretary had resulted in Mr. Flaherty and some other folks coming over to the FAA for, like, a demonstration, so to speak where the FAA presented some of the pictorial time lines that you guys had created.

MS. SCHUESSLER: If it was John coming

over to the FAA, I do know I was not involved in any of those. I do not remember having any meetings over in the FAA with that group, none of them. That's not to say that he didn't come in, you know, in our SATORI--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --and watch that, he may have done that. You would need, probably Tony Ferrante or, maybe, Tony Mello, Doug Gould, one of those three gentlemen would probably be the people that sat with him, if he did that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So you're saying that it's your recollection that you didn't participate in any meeting like that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Especially, if you're saying it was over in the FAA building, I do not remember meeting with John in the FAA building at all.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you recall if you had learned that he had been over to look at that sort of thing?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I couldn't tell you

that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --I mean that's, we had so many people coming in and out looking at the SATORI and trying to get acquainted what it was, I couldn't tell you that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess, based on that meeting--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --and probably, in part, this e-mail message that we've been talking about, a time line was put together.

MS. SCHUESSLER: A revised time line? I mean because we had a time line, you know, Cannoles and group is that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events and--

MS. SCHUESSLER: And did it have--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --was sort of a bound and it was color.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --right, okay, and I know Dave Cannoles and group, again, I was out at the

Command Center, so I did not even, quite honestly, I did not even see this until after I got back into headquarters and all the Commission started again. But did they change this based on that e-mail?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, I'm not sure what--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay--because I--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --precipitated a change, but this time line, here is the, what we've come to understand sort of the result of the meeting and this e-mail message and--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Because there were several documents that had been prepared and, again, not being at headquarters, I saw everything after the fact. But I do know there were several documents that were prepared in response to various questions, where they came from I don't know. But I know--I found out this, you know, Cannoles and group did this very--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --yeah, very, very soon after things occurred.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And this other document just for, just need to put it on the record so we know about it later--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --it's titled "Sensitive Security Information FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft on September 11, 2001." And this is an e-mail from Shirley Miller to Linde Knapp and it attaches, it's dated June 13, 2003 and it attaches the document that we just referenced.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, so that's probably, after all this is said and done, you know, again, Shirley was the focal who put all this together. That's not to say that I didn't look at it and review it. I would imagine I did, but I couldn't tell you that I did. Just comparing previous time lines and putting it down in this kind of a document.

This doesn't jump out as real familiar to me, but I think what she did was put everything together, I mean. that's what it looks like.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if the FAA had

gotten some instruction from the Secretary's office--and our understanding is it may have come from John Flaherty to go look at their time lines and look at your source material and verify the info--do you know if any instruction like that came out?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I don't, you'd have to find out from Shirley, you know, but in most cases, what she was doing was gathering information and putting it together in response, either to the Department's request to do so or the Commission's request to do so. So, you know, as far, especially in this time frame, so I don't know who made the request for that document.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c For the FAA Communications
Regarding Hijacked Aircraft?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you have any other questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there anything else you recall about--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, let me look at it. Okay, so this document--this statement here, too, sometime after it was established is a little bit different than there, as far as immediately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I guess, the one thing that stands out if I can--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --point you to it--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --is when--and I realize, I think maybe two years have passed, roughly at this point--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --but when we look at the Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001, that booklet, which I think was created on or about September 17, 2001--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --for American 11 and Amer--or United 175, it has some notification times. It says 8:40 for American 11, NEADS, N-E-A-D-S logs indicate they were notified by the FAA concerning

American 11. And there's a similar entry in here for United 175 at 9:05--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --however, there are no entries like that for United 93, if you kind of scroll through here--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --there's nothing in there for that. Nor are there any entries in there, in the summary document for American 77. However, in this document--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --and some of the other time lines--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Page 12.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --it's page 12, there is an entry of 9:24 and it says NEADS log shows FAA notified them of the possible hijacking of American 77. Now, it's our understanding that FAA headquarters, the AAT-20 folks, had the information off those logs, yet didn't include it in this document but did in that.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember any discussions about that or--

MS. SCHUESSLER: --no, I don't, but, you know, I'm going by my history and my background and any time you're gathering preliminary information, you do your darndest to put it together the best you can. But, inevitably, there's mistakes in it. You go back and correct them as necessary or if necessary. I don't know, you know, did the NEADS log, indeed show that, and it just wasn't captured here or is this a false statement? I mean, that's, in my mind, that's where you'd need to look.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well the NEADS log does not reflect that entry, at least the actual log.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay, so, then, I would go to, if the logs don't reflect it, then what does the re--are there any recordings of notification? If not, then there's no way to validate that that transmission occurred. The only other, well, no, that's not necessarily--were people using unrecorded lines? Because I know out at the

Command Center we had some lines that were unrecorded.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think--you can correct me if I'm wrong--I think, the Operations Center in the headquarters building, at that time, many of the lines were not recorded either.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Right, correct, right, right. I mean, so for me--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So you don't recall any discussion about?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, no, no, and I don't, quite honestly, I don't know how much Shirley used this as a source document to put some of this together, you know, whether she used this as a source document, whether she had, you know, I know we had another draft or two of various time lines and I have seen this--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That's we refer to that as the grid time line.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's our understanding, just to help you refresh your recollection--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --that Darlene Freeman had been involved in the preparation of that. It actually came out of, and you can see in the footer, if it's not covered by a Post-It Note that it came out of AAT-20, but it was used for some of the briefing books for the--no for the Administrator for her testimony and things like that.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, okay, and I was not part of the effort to, you know, put a book together. But, again, I, you know, I hate to say this, but, in fact, when you are gathering information, you've got so many documents, you know, you think you have the most current. But, in fact, this document, obviously, from what you're telling me contradicts this one. Did anybody see that? Did anybody correct that? Did anybody flag it and say, oh, you know, we'd better slow down or look into it or mark something to let people know.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know if contradict is, I mean, I don't want to split hairs--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --but the summary just doesn't contain--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The 9:24 entry for American 77.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What were you going to say about the grid time line?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I remember seeing this somehow in some--something, but, again, I was not in headquarters when any of this was prepared, nor was I part of putting a book together for the Administrator to testify with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We had been told that, I guess, one of the reasons for the development of this, the time line that starts Accident Security Information--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --was that there was a desire by the Chief of Staff to consolidate, instead of listing the chronologies of the four flights by

themselves but to consolidate it also as one continuous time line, do you remember that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Now that you say that, I vaguely remember somebody talking about trying to consolidate everything into a document. I also remember a discussion as far as, and without looking through all of this specifically, Another request came in to put a document together just with the military notification and nothing else in there. So, yeah, you know, you get various requests from the Commission and from the Department and we would respond. We would react to it. Again, Shirley was the focal for putting that information together in most cases.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just to go back, again, you don't recall any specific discussion from the Chief of Staff's Office that there was a, I mean, a concern that the time line with respect to the military notification was inaccurate or that he wanted it to be re-evaluated or looked at again to make sure that everything was--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I, again, I would not be

the person receiving that phone call. But in all this information and documentation, you know, we were going back through and providing more and different and a little bit different, you know, only military or to put all four aircraft together. You know, so it was just--it was an ongoing effort to put things together as far as the specific threat requesting it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

In the spring of 2004, the--

MS. SCHUESSLER: I've got my mind set here of here I am and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Yeah, use our time machines and try to transport our memories anyway--the Commission is just, I think, starting to gear up towards doing some interviews, they may have already started or initiated interviews of some of the FAA employees around the country. The--it's our understanding that the Commission, through one of its staff members, had relayed to the FAA that they had some serious concerns about some of the time line information that the FAA has presented. Do you recall receiving any information like that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, again, you know, the Commission was working directly with Shirley, Shirley was the focal, so any concerns and issues they had would come to her. And then she would, if we needed to do additional work, she would kind of farm it out to us and say, okay, I need for you to do whatever. So, as far as the specific request from the Commission coming in, I don't recall that. And if it was, again, if it was to re-listen to tapes or logs that probably came out of the AT-20 organization and they would have to go back and review that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We had seen some reference in, you know, all of the material that we were looking at that may have come up in some of the interviews of some of the FAA employees by the Commission, that following September 11, out at the Command Center in Herndon, you guys had, initially worked on starting to develop a time line yourself, can you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --tell us about that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Yeah when everything was unfolding, of course you had (b)(6), (b)(7) [unintell.] who was the operations manager, but not on that day, now he's the manager. So, what I did was tap a person to go follow one of the managers or first-line supervisors around with a pad and pencil to record things. And I said, okay, you go follow that person and, you know, you're hooked by the hips and document everything. So, that's what we used out anything the Command Center in addition to the people keeping their own logs, I mean, like they typically would do. So the handwritten logs went back to Quality Assurance. And, like in any event, you know, we began the process, maybe, I don't, you know, I can't, don't hold me to time frames, it certainly wasn't the next day, because we were still dealing with a lot of things, but all the primary players, we did gather and then the Quality Assurance Office, just to say, okay, let's reconstruct this thing so we can come up with a consolidated Command Center time line because we know they're going to want that at headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right the Quality Assurance Office, you're talking about the one at the Command Center?

MS. SCHUESSLER: At the Command Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Who was the QA manager out there at the time?

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c all right.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm--and so we started that effort, I mean, we didn't even, gosh, I think we spent maybe an hour and hour and a half, you know, because we had several logs just trying to say okay what have you got in your log and how are we going to pull all this together. And I guess (b)(6), (b)(7)c in talking to Dave Cannoles the next couple of days, the next couple of weeks--anyway, she was given the direction, the logs that we had that we had already, the written logs, that we had already submitted were sufficient what he was looking for. That and the tapes that we had.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So that caused you guys to stop whatever, I don't know if it's the right

terminology, but the reconstruction or--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --developing your own time
line--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --that was what caused you
guys to stop?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So once all that information
was submitted to Cannoles' group, as far as you--

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, they never got, I
don't know that he ever got the handwritten, you
know, he knew that they existed, because he and
Ellen had conversations about that, but as far as
the--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The tapes?

MS. SCHUESSLER: --well, I know we gave
some of the tapes to headquarters and the
Commission subsequent to all of that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That' was all within the first
couple of days or in the first week?

MS. SCHUESSLER: At least the first month,

you know, I don't, again, couldn't tell you exact time frame but very early on.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c How long did you remain at the Command Center after September 11?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I left in May.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So after that--

MS. SCHUESSLER: --and went to headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --initial work of putting that reconstruction together, that was you don't recall ever going back and having to try to reconstruct any of the events of the day?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But you guys didn't complete that, either, you stopped because Cannoles said your logs were sufficient?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, correct.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't believe, you know, from what we've read that you guys did any transcripts immediately after 9/11.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Correct, yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know why that is?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, you'd have to really talk to (b)(6), (b)(7)c but I think that was also, part and parcel to some of the discussions--again, I don't think, and, again, this is my personal opinion, I don't believe that people in headquarters thought the Command Center played much of a significant role in the operation of the aircraft, so they were more concerned about the controllers talking to the pilots more so than the Command Center.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Because we're more of a coordination link, so they were more concerned with the pilot/controller interaction and what occurred with the aircraft.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c After the Commission kind of stood up and they started doing some work I think the Command Center did end up doing some transcripts at that point, do you know?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Oh, yeah, there was a lot that I think the Commission requested. I know, initially, they had requested transcripts for all

of the positions which, and I think they did that with the other air traffic facilities, as well, and I think Shirley working, with maybe Tony Ferrante worked with the Commission to, you know reduce the number of transcripts, how many were actually produced, I don't know at this point.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have anything else?

MS. WOODS: Uh-uh.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just trying to make sure to try and cover all the loose ends so we don't have to bother you.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Okay. So, when do you have to be finished with all your findings?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We don't really have a date yet.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have a work phone number if I [unintell.]

MS. SCHUESSLER: I can give you, let's see--202--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MS. SCHUESSLER: --785-2600 is the main number.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. Are you at, is it a five-day-a-week thing or?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know where (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c is now, do you have her contact number?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, but I'm sure you can get it from, let's say, her replacement, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], is in FAA headquarters, I don't know what his number is, either, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What's his name?

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember, you were referring to the FAA Communications Regarding Hijacked Aircraft Chronology, do you remember actually working on this yourself or maybe having some of your staff work on that?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, I'm sure, as the Deputy Director, some of my staff was working on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Would Ferrante be included as one of your staff members at that time?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm. I'm just

thinking, there was one document, I remember getting in a small circle and I started with the group and then had to leave, I'm wondering whether this was the one. If this is the one, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in there. But, I mean, I couldn't tell whether that was the document--this was the document that the people were going over or not.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember what time period that would be?

MS. SCHUESSLER: I mean, it was later, rather than earlier, so, it could have been this time frame, but, again, I couldn't tell you, for sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember why you were working on this document, did you get some instruction from above?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Well, if this is the one that there was one document I remember, you know, I'm just thinking numbers now. Shirley and Lynne and (b)(6), (b)(7)c and myself, and I'm thinking there might have been one or two others in there, but I couldn't tell you who they are. To review a

document--a document, again, I, but that may have been early on with the Commission, I don't know, couldn't tell you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who is--is it Mike Scirillo?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And who is he?

MS. SCHUESSLER: He is now the Vice President for System Operations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. SCHUESSLER: Trying to think, on September 11, I don't know his position.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I've seen a name (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. SCHUESSLER: (b)(6), (b)(7)c is in security, he works for Lynne Osmus.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Is he still at FAA or did he go over to TSA?

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, he's FAA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c FAA?

MS. SCHUESSLER: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I can't think of anything else, unless there's something else that you'd like

to add along the lines of what we've talked about today.

MS. SCHUESSLER: No, I don't think so, probably reiterate the statement I made when we first talked. I do not believe there was any intentional effort going on to mislead anybody on time frames. I just think this is a massive amount of data and trying to put it together, every time you pick up one rock you see something else that's there and has an impact on something else. And it's just very, very difficult to put all the pieces together.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Do you have anything else,

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c :

No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

It's 10:47 we'll go ahead and stop the tape.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case # 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

BY

AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

DOD/OIG

Tuesday, January 3, 2005

No start time provided - 3:04 p.m.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

I N T E R V I E W

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Today is January 3, 2005.

Today we're interviewing (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also, present today is (b)(6), (b)(7)c with the Department of Defense Inspector General. We're conducting a review involving issues of certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

And I should have said earlier that we're at the Department of Transportation Inspector General's Office in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which, I think it's 55 Broadway, and we're in the 10th floor conference room.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

if you could, please, just acknowledge that you are aware this interview is being tape recorded?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Yes, I am aware.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Would you, please, raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I do.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Would you, please, give your full name, spelling your last, for the record?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I think before we got started here this afternoon, you had indicated you had

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And how do you spell (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c as in (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When did you retire from the Air Force?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I left Washington, D.C., I think 2 August, I believe it was.

MR. OWENS: Of?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c '04.

MR. OWENS: '04?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MR. OWENS: And what was the last position that you held there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)b I was the Air Force
Representative at Federal Aviation headquarters.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What rank did you hold?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Colonel.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And who was your direct report
at the Air Force?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Where was he stationed at?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c At the Pentagon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did he hold a rank or was that
a civilian--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c He was I OCS.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So he was a civilian position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, he's assigned to Air
Force?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm, he is XO [ph], he is
assigned to Air Force XO Off, he's the Air Force
Associate Director for Civil Aviation issues. He
also has a purple hat for DUD, Director of the
Policy Board on Federal Aviation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c A purple hat?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm sorry that means--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's a term used to where people work for all the services. Army is green, Air Force is blue, Navy is dark blue; so when they're working on joint issues they say they're doing purple.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I see, it's a good thing you're here (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'll interpret.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I may get lost in these--it's amazing how each little agency has their own little language.1

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Bureaucracy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And within the FAA, who would you normally report to--that's not the correct word, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, we had administrative support from the ATO--to the ATO, it was under I guess the V.P. for Operations was the or the title. Prior to that, it was AT-1, the Director of Air Traffic Services.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And when you retired in

August, who was the V.P. for Ops at that time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Linda Schuessler.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

On September 11, who held the equivalent position?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

There was--that position didn't exist, it was AT-1 and AT-2 back then. So, it was Mr. Bill Peacock and Mr. Jeff Griffith, both since retired. And, as I said, we didn't report to them, they provided our administrative support, the context we worked a lot of issues because I worked with many of the different people all over the building at senior levels, depending on what the issue was.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

: At the FAA, did you have a staff of Air Force personnel or FAA personnel that reported to you or?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I had a liaison unit, of, I think it was 32 people when I left. But they were not all there in D.C., they were spread out over about 8 or 9 geographic locations. So, there in D.C., there was just myself, an administrative assistant, and a contractor for the Air Force side.

Then the Army, the Navy, the Marines, has a representative in the office, as well.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you were only responsible for Air Force?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, I was the senior military rep and we all worked together as a team, but strict chain-of-command rules, I just had the Air Force piece and I was the senior personnel.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Purple-hat stuff or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, tech--you're learning--technically, it was not a purple office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We all reported back to our individual chain-of-command at the Pentagon. It was not a joint or purple office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, when you say you were senior what was that--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I was (b)(6), (b)(7)c of everyone there, right, so when things happened and we were working joint purple issues, there were a lot of times I would end up more in that role.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have any other

background questions for her?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not as far as background.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just have some, I guess, if you can give us just a real quick recap on your day on September 11. Then we've got some specific issues that we want to cover that are going to be more current than September 11. So, on September 11, were you working that day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And we're talking about 2001.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What time did you report for duty that day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I was en route to the building when the first plane hit the World Trade Center. I was on the bridge, kind of almost a view of the Pentagon, so probably five, ten minutes after that, I got to the building.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think that you got to the building before the second--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, I did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --you did? Okay. And what

happened after you reported to the FAA? What did you do or where did you go?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I went to my office.

Everybody was there around the TV. We watched the events unfold. At first, we were kind of hanging back and saying, you know, there's something awful going on with the air traffic system, but it's not a military issue. You know, we know from our own experience being air traffic control officers that when there's mayhem going on, people running around just being nosey asking questions; or sometimes even just going, can I help?. So we kind of hung back at first, waiting to see how it unfolded. But at a certain point, not too long after that, it became obvious that, you know, something really strange is going on and so we--I relocated.

I went upstairs to the 10th floor, I guess it's 10 floors, yeah, 10th floor and what they were putting together at that time an FAA situation room. And, actually, now that I think about it, I had actually gone next door to the SES office, next door, to say, you know, what are we doing here,

what's going on? And what she was doing, and she had, I guess, left and was on her way upstairs, too.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Who is that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Do you know how to spell that

last name?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

And what office was she in?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

She's he Director of the

Airspace, she's just the closest senior person in that office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

About what time do you think

that you had gone up there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

It was right after the

airplane hit the Pentagon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

It was, like, right there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Where was your office at in

the building?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Fourth floor.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Fourth floor? So you actually

got up to the 10th floor about the time that the Pentagon was hit or after--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, the Pentagon was hit, there was a small delay because our main office is over there, like, tech-sergeant, NCO, admin support, so it'd be like a secretary and civilian equipment, we [unintell.] phone to call the front office to see if they were okay, then I went upstairs. I was, like, grabbing things and getting ready to go. So there was a slight delay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And when you went upstairs, you said that they were putting together a situation room or something to that effect?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, they were putting together what the military would call a mini-command post only they called it the Air Traffic Situation Room in Mr. Peacock's office area. They set up, like, a mini-command post. phenomenal job of putting together the right people, the technology, support and everything. It just was growing right there, quick.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So this was in the Air Traffic

Manager's conference room or something like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, right next to his office.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who was in charge of assembling that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember who you saw there? It's all right if you can recall names.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c The second I walked in the room, I have no idea who was there and who wasn't there. The only person I really remember seeing because he was putting a specific piece of equipment in place was Dave Canoles. Other than that, people came and went all during the next, you know, minutes and hours and we were there until, like 1:00, 3:00 in the morning, something like that. So, it's all together. And I can't say who was right there at that minute.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, once you joined the Situation Room, you stayed there for pretty much the remainder of the day?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Pretty much, mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c For, I think you said you were--until 1:00 in the morning?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, 1:00, 3:00 in the morning something like that, I don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c While you were in the room what were you doing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Initially, we were doing coordination with some of the people back at NORAD, but, you know, I don't really remember the specifics now of what we were doing and, you know, it could have been that first hour; it could have been eight hours later. We were answering questions and just, you know, helping any way we could, from moving chairs to whatever.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Now, when you said NORAD, you talked to Peterson or were you talking Cheyenne Mountain? Or did you make the distinction?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I have no idea where the guy's office is that we talked to. And like I said, I know we talked to them a lot about what was going on and answering questions and coordinating on things, but exact time frame? I don't know.

Worked a lot with their--the FAA people who were out there, because as you know, that was an exercise going on that day [unintell.], but, you know, I don't remember now, who exactly we were talking to; what exactly the specific issues were.

As I told the Commission, we all wish we took notes. It was a hectic day and everybody did a lot of good work, but no one took notes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wasn't somebody keeping it on, like a computer log in there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm, they were, but that was in one room and a lot of the work was going on in many rooms. So, main events were captured on that log, I'm sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You're primarily an air traffic control background as opposed to [unintell.]?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, yeah, we're 100 percent traffic control.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you think that you had started communicating with the folks at NORAD before or after the last plane had crashed?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Probably after, but I cannot

honestly say anything about the time frame that day I have confidence in because a good friend of mine called me from New York to make sure I was okay. Weeks, maybe days later, I don't know, he was saying something about his phone call to me and I said, blah, blah, when you called me that afternoon, (b)(6), (b)(7)c And he said, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I didn't call you the afternoon, it was around midnight by the time I finally got through to you. So my who personal frame work of time that day was off. I know that, because I would have bet money that (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I talked in the afternoon and he said, (b)(6), (b)(7)c it was midnight. So, I don't feel very confident about my sense of time. Everything moved very quickly that day. I thought he called me in the afternoon, so, I'm not a good judge of being able to give you any accurate time frames.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But you feel pretty confident about the timing of events, as far as the Pentagon got hit, you made it--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, that, I know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c You, and your staff made a

couple of phone calls and then you all went upstairs?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --yes, that I know that's that first little beginning before I really started working, I mean, I know that. I know. I know exactly when I was. When the one hit the Pentagon, I became real personal. I remember who I was standing next to; I remember every detail, yeah, a woman putting her arm around me, yeah. I know, I did not go upstairs until it hit the Pentagon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have any other questions about that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, you going to jump forward now?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Not too far forward yet.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I was going to cover some initial coordination.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, because I have some questions about that. So, go ahead, then I'll.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : In the immediate period of time following September 11, just to kind of put,

like, a time frame on it, I would say within the first couple of weeks?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did anybody from the FAA make a request to you to help them obtain any military information, like logs or summary reports about what happened or anything like that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No one asked me for any logs or summary reports.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was anybody from DOD in contact with you? One of the first briefings about--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c About logs and summary reports?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Or any reconstructions, like, one of the first things that happened was there was a briefing given to the White House regarding the crash of 93, the one up in Pennsylvania, because there were some allegations that DOD had shot it down. So that information apparently was passed from DOD to FAA. Did that flow through you?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I do not recall seeing

anything like that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you obtain any logs or anything like that and provide them to FAA proactively?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know if FAA obtained any on their own, logs from the military?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Within that first few weeks?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Within the first couple of weeks?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I don't know. I don't remember. I mean, I know, afterwards, obviously, there was a lot, but that was way after. There was a lot of exchange of information, I think, trying to recreate things, probably, but--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you ask, on behalf of the Air Force or the military, the FAA for any information to provide to the Department of Defense?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Logs and summary events? No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Was there anybody new following the attacks during that first week or so,

other than your normal chain of command that within DOD that you were interacting with regrading background information, observations, increased hot washes?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, there was, XO did a hot wash, but that's my normal chain of command. And I don't remember the time frame, but it was relatively soon.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : So, XO did a hot wash?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, they did.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I'm sorry, I don't know--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's like an after-action--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It's like a debriefing--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Oh, okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : XO did one relatively quick.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Who would have that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, it was run out of the vice chief of staff's office, I don't have any other details on it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right, is (b)(6), (b)(7)c still there, since he was the civilian?

MS. WALSH: Yes, he is, but he was not

there on the 11th of September.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : The gentleman that was there then is gone, he retired. But Air Force XO did something with them. I don't even know what they did, but they did collect information from us, trying to do it while people's memories were fresh. But it wasn't about logs or timing of events or anything.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just what happened?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, just--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Tell me if I went too far ahead--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, go ahead.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Immediately after, you were there since--until 2004--

MS. WALSH: Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : There were a number of upgrades done connecting NORAD into the FAA's--NORAD CONR NEADS the three sectors into the radars, [unintell.] communications and so on. Were you involved in that or did someone else coordinate

that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, we were not directly involved in any of that. Let me explain my office and our function--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --because I think that'll put it in context and be helpful for you. We were a liaison office. And I used to tell everyone our mission statement was call 911 call 411, if you needed help or information about the Air Force, FAA, you can come to us; Air Force, if you needed help or information about the FAA, you could come to us. But if there were normal procedures and normal processes you already had established lines of communications and knew your way around the buildings and the issues, they would never come to our office.

So, there was, I mean, we could not, our little, there was just me and these people throughout the FAA, we couldn't handle all the interface that takes place between the FAA and the FAA and the Air force. So, only, like, initial set

up of things, unique things. So, sometimes we would, you know, set up--well, let me tell you the right office to find something for you; let me introduce you to the guy, let me give you a phone number. I don't even think that we did that. When they started to get into really working the acquisition and those kinds of procedures, you know, they were already established connections and using normal processes and procedures.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I can toss out some names to you, if now's a good time.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure, whatever works for you.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c General Arnold?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, yes, I know who he is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you interact with him immediately after--do you recall--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Define immediately.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, through the 20th?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Not that I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But sometime after that?

MS. WALSH: Yeah, we would go to meetings, I had gone back and forth, I had met him several

times.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay, so you attended some meetings with him--

MS. WALSH: Right, or trips down there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. WALSH: We were more like, trying to think if he was at any specific meetings. We would go by, as the liaison, his office as a courtesy call when we took people for orientation and through CONR and SEEDS [ph] the offices Air Defense piece down there and always do a courtesy call with General Arnold and his successor, but a specific meeting, I don't recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No issue meetings?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Nothing [unintell.] this is the guy that was the battle commander, that type of thing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. WALSH: (b)(6), (b)(7)c the FAA (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, (b)(6), (b)(7)c the retired

colonel, (b)(6), (b)(7)c he was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and at the time he was a contractor?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Is his first name (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Wasn't that, no, that's not the name of the guy I used to talk to. That name does not mean anything to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Okay. What about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : What, the individual (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : No, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph], (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No. don't recall his name.

Doesn't mean I never met him, I don't remember details--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c What about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Doesn't sound familiar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : He would be out of NORAD

[unintell.]

MS. WALSH: No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. WALSH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MS. WALSH: Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Just, again, as a courtesy
or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, actually, I worked with
(b)(6), (b)(7)c much, much later on, way into the more
normal Ops peacetime, you know, airspace issues
over locations of CAPS, problems he was having, in
some coordination with FAA. But I believe we're
talking, like, two years ago.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c All right this is was like
after setting up CAPS and--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This is, like, two years
later, and, like, you know, I don't know it could
have been 12 months later, 18 months, but not
during the heat-of-battle time frame.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Any contact with anybody in
Public Affairs at DOD or the FAA, again, during
that initial time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Not that I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't have any names to toss
out. What about (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c That's not a familiar
name, doesn't ring a bell. Unless he says he

talked to me.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, he didn't

(b)(6), (b)(7)c He could have, but I'm sorry,
my memory's not what it used to be.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm done.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I just want to show you this
log and see if it looks familiar to you. I know
it's a photocopy and I think a little piece of it
might have been chopped off.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I can tell you, it doesn't
look familiar at all, the fact that it's
handwritten, doesn't look familiar at all. I
fairly certain this is the first time I've seen it.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : I just wanted--for the record,
that's supposed to be the NEADS NMCC tech log.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Within the first couple of
weeks following September 11, FAA worked on sort of
putting together some time lines to reconstruct the
events of 9/11. And one of the things that they
had done, at least, from what we understand, is
obtained some information from the Department of

Defense. Some folks had mentioned your name a few times and said, well, you know, I think we got that information from Cheryl Atkins. Do you think, is it possible that maybe you could have gotten some information? Really, primarily the information that we're focused on trying to get pinned down was when did the FAA on 911 call the military, tell the military that, you know, American 11 was in distress or United 93, that sort of thing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Now, x-amount of years later, however many years it is, I don't remember that. I don't. And I can tell you, too, there were 22 people working in that military office because they beefed up the staff, so the phone could have rang and Captain So-and-so answered it and some FAA GS-12, could have said, hey, NORAD had a briefing, we saw it at a meeting, could you get us a copy of that unclassified NORAD briefing? And that Captain said sure, and gave them a copy this item. I don't know. Because that's what our office did, help facilitate, pass information, you know, he would have got permission and I'm--this is hypothetical,

that could have happened. I wouldn't know about that kind of routine information. But I, certainly, personally, don't remember doing that.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c When you were saying that you had, like, 30 people, is that at the point when you retired or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, the 32 people is day-to-day, let's call it peacetime operations, spread out all over the country.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Two or three at each of the regions; people at Atlantic City Tech Center; couple at Oklahoma City, that were in my personal FAA/Air Force Liaison detachment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, they're spread out all over the--of that 32 peacetime, normal, routine, call 911/call 411 mission, only three of those were physically in that 4th-floor office. Some of them four or five, were in other parts of the FAA building working other things for the FAA.

When 11 September hit, we pulled them out

of their routine peacetime, you know, coordinating on future acquisitions or whatever they did that was not important; we pulled those bodies into my staff; we, you now, called up my reserves, stuff like that to supplement our staff. So, that's where we got, like 20, 22 people, something like that helping, because we had to staff that FAA Situation Room, as well as the Department of Transportation Crisis Management Center, 24/7. So, we pulled in reservists and people like that to help staff.

And they were there--that number went up and down, it fluctuated, depending on what the mission needs were and what hours they needed military there. I think it--maybe in November it had all calmed down, September, October, we probably did that for 60, 90 days, I don't know, don't remember now.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, following September 11, you beefed up the staff in the District--?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --essentially?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c In my office, yeah. Yeah, I brought in--the guys were sitting in Atlanta, I brought them in on travel; I pulled in the guy from the New England office on travel so we could supplement the staff so they could be there to help answer questions and interpret, much the same stuff we did every day, but all surrounding the air defenses.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Who was your--the administrative assistant--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Mine?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --that you had, yeah, on September 11, who was that?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know if she's still in the Air Force?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, she is.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you know where she is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c She's still there.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : She's still there?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : And you also said you had a civilian or a contractor?

(b)(6) Contractor, he's gone, he left the company, left the area.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And who was that at the time?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Who did he work for?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c ANSER.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c A-N-S-E-R?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c A-N-S-E-R. And neither one of them left that room and came up to the 10th floor that I remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c So, they stayed on the 4th floor?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, we heard a couple of people had mentioned that you may have been able to, during the hijack crisis provide some military coordination between FAA headquarters and the Air

Force and, I'm just going to take a little leap here--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But based on the timing of when you were able to get upstairs and really get involved it doesn't sound like that would have been possible. Is that a fair statement or--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, it's physically impossible. I wasn't there. And even if I was there, I would have had to go, like I did, find phone books and phone numbers. I'm a liaison, I didn't have links to operational mission command posts and stuff. Could I have found the numbers and called them and everything? Yes, eventually, but they already had the numbers elsewhere. They had direct hotlines to them from other facilities. So--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think the FAA was aware of what you were supposed to be doing there and sort of those limitations, for lack of a better term could serve as somebody who could coordinate military efforts, so to speak?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Well, see, define coordinate.

I routinely coordinated military efforts for them; coordinating policy documents; coordinating to have informational briefings given; you know, so I routinely facilitated and coordinated for them, provided them lots of assistance. Could I have picked up the phone and notified someone about a hijack? Eventually, 20 minutes, 30 minutes of going through phone books and phones?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

I guess, coordinate a response to a hijack.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

No, I'm not an operational--if you look in the procedures and the regulations, there was, you know, phone numbers and guidance, I'm sure in there, but they worked direct facility to facility. I'm sure people could have made assumptions about my abilities, but I was not physically there, so--and if they were anything like me, though, they'd have a hard time remembering who was where, when, what.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Very stressful, very hard to

recall even immediately afterwards.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. Do you have anymore questions about that period of time, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, then we'll follow up on that in the future, unless there's anything else you want to add.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I'm good.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c In the--we're going to move to the point where the 9/11 Commission is formed. And they started to have hearings in early 2003.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c In May of 2003, I think it was on the 22nd and 23rd, maybe, toward the latter part of the month, Department of Defense testified and FAA, the Administrator, Jane Garvey, had testified. And following Jane Garvey's testimony or during Jane Garvey's testimony, some questions arose about timing of military notification, especially with regard to a particular flight. And do you remember anything about that or?

Because what we had come to understand is

that somebody, following Jane Garvey's testimony somebody had contacted you and asked you some questions to help Jane Garvey respond to the question that the Commission had proposed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't recall that. That was a long time ago. I don't recall anyone specifically doing that. That was my job, people called and asked for information. I don't recall that, I don't remember.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : But it wouldn't be out of the ordinary for somebody like (b)(6), (b)(7)c to call you up and ask you a question about this or that? Like, specifically, you know, what were you doing on 9/11? That sort of thing.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : It wouldn't be out of the ordinary?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm not sure what you mean, Unless, you mean, for her to say what were you doing on 9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah, I mean, I guess, Well, to stop beating around the bush--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean it wouldn't be strange for them to say to me, Cheryl, we saw a briefing or do you remember, back in September there was some guy here from the Pentagon, he was a pilot, he had a flight suit, he gave us a briefing? Do you remember him? Were you in that room? Could you get us a copy of that briefing. That would be something they would ask or do you have a copy of such-and-such report or, you know. By that point, they had worked so much directly with NORAD and had established so many, you know, lines of communications between the staffs at all levels, I don't recall a lot of those kinds of requests.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Well, this is pretty specific. And it actually involves your actions. And what we had--what we've come to learn is following Jane Garvey's testimony, a question came up or, actually, I should say, during her testimony, a question came up about notification with regard to American Airlines Flight 77 and that (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c had given you a call to kind of help you prepare this item here. And I'll let you go ahead

and take a look at it real quick.

And this is titled "FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11, 2001."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, so, you have a question about this?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I'm wondering if you remember getting a phone call?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember getting a phone call in May and I know--in 2003 this would have been after the Commission hearings, it probably would have been, my guess would be in the early evening, and it would have been kind of a frantic, we gotta get this together, the Commission needs this information--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't remember anything specific like that. I couldn't, I couldn't remember back that far, something that specific.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a year and a half ago.

MS. WALSH: Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I thought maybe that might

help.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I'm trying. The Commission had already started meeting?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : They started, actually, I think they might have had their first hearing in January of that year. And this is, this took place during--these were some of the most substantive hearings up to that point, where they were kinda starting to piece together what was happening that day. And the FAA, former Administrator, Jane Garvey, testified, I think it was on the 22nd. Then DOD came in and testified the next day--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Somebody--somebody coordinated or talked to me about something, because I remember, at some point, I can't tell you when--this could have been before the 9/11 Commission, it could have been after that May 2003, you're talking about. Somebody at some point talked to me about me being notified or something that made me clarify to them that couldn't have happened, I wasn't up there yet. And I don't remember who it was or the timing, but I remember

going, I wasn't there. It could have even been the 9/11 interview guys, but I remember somebody talking to me about something and it was, like, you know, people were really hectic that day.

I remember saying to them, it was a crazy morning, I don't remember who was there and who wasn't and what time they got there and what time they didn't, but I can tell you, for sure, I wasn't there until after because I remember a whole bunch of people went, you weren't? And I remember the reaction of, you're kidding, you weren't? No, I wasn't there. But I don't remember the context. This could have been just a personal over the water fountain discussion, you know, recreating the morning, but I remember clarifying, I wasn't up there then. But the context and who it was, because I remember they were surprised.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, let me just focus on this one sentence here, couple of sentences in this FAA communication with NORAD.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c And it says the U.S. Air Force

Liaison to the FAA, immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think that's a fair assessment of your actions on 9/11?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I think it's misleading.

Because it says established contact with NORAD on a separate line. I remember making phone calls to NORAD from a phone outside of the conference room because we were all running to use whatever phones we could, it was not a command post where everybody had phones and everything. So, I made phone calls, but I did not do it--this almost looks like I had some kind of hotline or something going with them, and it was not immediately by any way shape or form. I know I didn't talk to them immediately.

Now, was it within two hours, three hours, five hours, but--I may have picked up the phone and started collecting phone numbers, I don't, I did a

lot that day.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you talk to anybody at the National Military Control Center?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c At some point, I don't remember when, but, yeah, I worked with the NMCC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [unintell.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't remember names.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph]?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I couldn't.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c General Sipe [ph]?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c General Sipe was over there?

[Cell phone interruption.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know General Sipe?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes, I know General Sipe.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : You haven't talked to these gentlemen for a while?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I don't even remember him being involved. I know General Sipe because he eventually took over as the deputy XO0, so he was in my chain or command.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c He was in charge of NIMIC [ph]?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh, was he?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yeah.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who Shirley Miller
is?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : When you said that you had
this discussion with clarifying when you got
involved on 9/11--

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : --do you think it could have
been with here?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c But you don't know?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No, I don't remember, but I do
remember having a clarification discussion and, you
know, and I don't remember if it was over formal or
informal, I do remember clarifying and people
going--so, it's probably happened more than once.

[Cell phone interruption.]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember if anybody at
the FAA may have asked you to clarify that point
specifically with the Commission during your

interview?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c No one talked to me about clarifying that point with them. I would remember that, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you remember when you were interviewed? We can look it up. Do you know, remember?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't recall that, it was early '04, that's all I recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c How would you characterize your interview, friendly, argumentative?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c It was fine, it was formal. There was one person, in particular, I thought had some--displayed some emotion at a couple of points, but they did a good job, the team. There was some misunderstandings about roles and things I was saying, but somebody was prior military in the group who did an excellent job of clarifying, as well, so it was good--there was some emotion.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Do you have anything else? Is there anything else that you would like to add--

MS. WALSH: Nothing that I can think of.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c --along the lines that we were talking about?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Just one quick question, again, on the build-up afterwards, who--were you--was there any discussion ever about how DOD and FAA would keep track of the events that occurred if it ever had to be reconstructed again?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c In other words, the documentation, the logs, the tapings or anything?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Yes, has anybody ever said, hey, we need a to do a better job--we need to put something on the red switches or whatever? That's an Air Force command and control network.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't remember that being in any of the lessons learned discussions I was in, but I was not in all of them, at all, So, I don't remember that, no.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : That's your answer.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : If we need can we get in touch with you for a follow-up, that sort of thing?

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : Sure.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c : All right, we'll go ahead and
stop the tape. It's 3:04 p.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
ANTHONY STEPHEN FERRANTE

BY

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Thursday, February 24, 2005

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
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I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is February 24, 2005. The time is 11:03 a.m. We're at FAA Building 10-A, Room 1028 in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Transportation, and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we're interviewing Anthony Ferrante. Mr. Ferrante, will you please acknowledge that you're aware that this interview is being tape recorded?

MR. FERRANTE: I am aware.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. FERRANTE: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give

your full name, spelling your last for the record?

MR. FERRANTE: Anthony Stephen Ferrante,
F-as in Frank, -E-R-R-A-N-T-E.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is a follow-up
to, initially, a couple of previous meetings we've
had with you. I guess the most substantive
discussion we had was back in October of 2004. And
I think since we had spoken to you last, you may
have gotten a different position?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I have--well, when you
spoke to me last, I had just moved into this new
position. And, you know, my position now is the
Manager and Traffic Safety Oversight. It's a new
service that was created in response to the
establishment of the ATO. So we are the
independent safety oversight service for the air
traffic Organization.

Prior to that I was the manager of the Air
Traffic Investigations Division, and the routing
was AAT-200.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And
currently, whom do you report to?

MR. FERRANTE: Dave Canoles.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what's his current title?

MR. FERRANTE: David is the Director of Air Traffic Safety Oversight.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And how many folks report to you?

MR. FERRANTE: Here?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. FERRANTE: Seven.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Seven? And who do those include right now.

MR. FERRANTE: Right now it includes (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

and (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

When the Air Traffic Investigations Division was still around, what policy or handbook did you guys rely on to conduct your investigations?

MR. FERRANTE: We relied on two, primarily: The overall governing handbook, the FAA Order 802011--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: --which deals with aircraft accident and incident investigation. And in turn, we had an Air Traffic Quality Assurance order that was FAA Order 7210.56. Both of those were distributed to us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And again, just to kind of confirm. on September 11th you were the manager of the AAT-200?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, I was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And on that day, who did you report to?

MR. FERRANTE: Dave Canoles.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And at that time he was?

MR. FERRANTE: He was the Manager of the Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations staff, and that was AAT-20.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The 911 Commission, I believe, had interviewed you in April of 2004, does that sound about right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And during that interview, I believe that you indicated that you oversaw the production of the book which is titled "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events of June 11, 2001;" is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: We have a copy of some excerpts from that. Is that--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That is the book. I think you also indicated Dave Canoles was the manager of AAT-20 had--which is the parent of AAT-200, right?--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --gave you direction in the preparation of this document, is that correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. Ordinarily, our office would always prepare an alert bulletin any time there was a major accident or incident within the National Air Space System. So this was really--it was our version, almost of an alert bulletin. It was to try to document all the facts, all the details, all of the information that we had

and make it available to the Senior FAA-- (off mike) --

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Now, you can correct me if I'm wrong, because I think I've seen a couple of alert bulletins before. They're usually just like a paragraph or so in length, is that--

MR. FERRANTE: Generally, ours were usually a page and a half to sometimes two pages.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Because we talked about the specifics, you know. We would try to get the weather conditions, what the flight conditions were. Our alert bulletins followed a format in which you had a number of injuries or fatalities in an aircraft accident, and then a brief narrative of what took place. And then we often had additional actions or follow-up actions that needed to take place, because often with an aircraft accident there are things like drug test determination that has to be made, and whether or not we felt, you know, the air traffic system had performed correctly, and what those determinations were.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is the creation of the alert bulletins covered in 802011 or the 7210.56 orders?

MR. FERRANTE: No. That was just an office policy that we had, sort of like an ad hoc report. It was a quick--it was designed to be a quick briefing item. The distribution that I recall, it seemed we went to the Director of Air Traffic; we went to the Office of Aircraft--or Accident Investigation, which is a part of the flight standards organization. They're the ones who actually went and with the FTHBN (ph) determined the probable cause.

Our role in AAT-20 to explain (ph) AAT-200 was to try and determine how the air traffic system performed in any of those incidents or accidents that occurred. Not particularly why the airplane crashed, if there was a flaw with the aircraft. It was how the air traffic system performed.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. With regard to the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," I believe that you had indicated to the Commission

during your interview with them that you and your staff had begun production of this document on Thursday, the 13th, and kind of worked through the weekend. And I guess according to the--some of the dates in here that you guys concluded the preparation of this, or finished it on the 17th of September. Is that about right?

MR. FERRANTE: That is--let's see. September 11th--it's unfortunate that we'll always remember that it was a Tuesday.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. FERRANTE: And the following Monday is when it went to the final printing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So that would be correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you also indicated that you and your staff played a role in preparing this--this I just called it grid time line that specifically deals with military notification issues.

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, we did. And I don't remember exactly what our role was in that, but I

do know it was prepared by the AAT-20 staff, as it so indicated on the bottom. I seem to recall that a gentleman named (b)(6), (b)(7)c and a program analyst we had named (b)(6), (b)(7)c were primarily involved in putting that together. At the time that this was going on, we had--let me see, who was primarily here?--Doug Gould, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mary Strauberg (ph), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c. And I think that's primarily who from the staff we had in attendance.

And everyone kind of had like a different function. Doug's primary role was he was working mostly with law enforcement entities, primarily with the FBI, because we had to get a release from them for anything that we were letting go outside of the agency. And that included releasing information to the NPSB (ph), which was a normal protocol for us. His actual forte in this incident was radar data analysis along with Dan Diggans. They're the ones who actually looked through the play tracks (ph). They put together what you see in there. There are some pictures that were taken

from radar displays that show the aircraft routes.

Kathryn and Mary Strauberg primarily, you know, sat at a computer and at typing and trying to follow everything that was occurring. And I can't pinpoint what the others do, but I believe that Wayne and Molly worked on this type of a chart.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the things that Elise and I had done was, you know, went through the different time lines that we could find that the FAA had created and kind of looked at which contained what bits of information and such. And one of the things that became apparent in the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," is that it only lists notification times for American 11, which it says happened at 8:40, and United 175, which it says happened at 9:05. However, there's no notification time for American 77.

MR. FERRANTE: And notification to?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The military. However, this grid time line does contain a notification time for American 77, which it says happened at 9:24. And both of these documents use

sa their source for military notification the NEADS log. I was wondering if you could explain why the 9:24 notification was not included in the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"?

MR. FERRANTE: I have to think about it for a minute. When we started--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're welcome to look through it here. You're more than welcome to.

MR. FERRANTE: When we started putting this together, everything that went into this initially was something that we could take from either voice recordings or from radar data, which has a time imbedded into it, which was really to see, you know, what time the radar saw a target, or because all of our facilities had voice recorders that have a time channel imbedded in those, you could read out the time that those transmissions were made.

So the idea was to try to be as accurate and as factual as we could. I think along the way we started getting some more bits of information that went into this. For example, the NEADS

notification for American 11 was probably the simplest because we were able to get most of that off of Boston Center voice recordings. We know what time they contacted Otis Air Force Base, for example, and started that process that was arranging to get a scramble. Where some of the other times came from and how they got mixed in, I don't recall exactly how that took place.

I think at one point there was some efforts by Public Affairs to put together a time line of certain things that took place, and I remember reviewing one down the hall in the A-Traffic offices, and that's kind of why we ended up putting all four of the chronologies together because when we started this effort, we had a separate chronology for each flight. Before we finished this effort, we did put all of it together into one format.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And the effort you're talking about is the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" book?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. The intent would have

been, normally, we would have done one of those briefing sheets, and it would have been probably three or four pages with all the information and a picture of the radar tracks and the flights and so forth for each one of the flights. But then it grew into, okay, let's put everything together; let's make one summary that shows all of it. And that's actually how the book came about.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Let me put this down--(off mike).

MR. FERRANTE: Has your stomach gone numb from that thing yet?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you specifically recollect seeing that 9:24 time at any point when you were putting the book together?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, there's a footnote that you have on the 9:24 time, and I don't remember what--so--this--after--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this was prepared within a grid time line.

MR. FERRANTE: --throughout a summary review of needs log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The grid time line was prepared a day later.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So it really, within one day--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. I guess this is the concern, Tony, is this--the earliest document that you guys prepared, the "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events," especially with regard to military notification, looks like, according to the findings of the Commission, the most accurate document. But as time kind of progresses, other notifications come in that the Commission has determined are inaccurate. And we're wondering what--why did you guys make the decision on the 17th not to include from the needs log which you guys apparently had-- because you make reference to it in the summary--why on the 17th you decided not to include 9:24 in the summary, but the next day you decided to include it in the grid time line?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know. I can tell you there were a lot of inaccurate times that were

associated with that. And I think some of the times came from a laptop computer that was being used down in the conference room when they had initially set up what we call the "never-ending tell time (ph)." I don't know what the actually name for it was. But some of those times were off, I know, for more than an hour.

I think if you read through our summary, you will find in there that we had some notifications on United, the second--93. I think our report indicated that we made notifications concerning United 93. But I can tell you when I met with (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph), being interviewed by the Commission, he asked me certain questions, and then he showed me a needs log, which I had never seen before, and he said, "Find that time on this log for me," which I couldn't because it wasn't on any needs log.

The summary actually doesn't contain any notification time for United 93.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So--there was one

notification time that I recall he asked me about in my interview, and then handed me a log. It was a handwritten log, and he asked--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: May I see it right there? (Pause.) I'm not sure what document they were asking you to compare against this log, because this, the NEADS log, says at 12:40 Zulu (ph), which would be 8:40 Eastern Time--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MR. FERRANTE: --in September. It says, "Possible hijack of American 11." Then at 13:05 Zulu, which would be 9:05 local time in September, it says, "United 175 possible hijack. Boston to--", I think was LAX.

And then if you go down here to 13:24, which would be 9:24, it says, "American Airlines," and then it gives the tail number which is "N-334AA hijacked." I think many FAA documents refer to this 9:24 entry as being American 77, but--I'm sure the Commission pointed out there that that tail number belongs to 11, not 77. They did point that

out.

Now, ordinarily, I would never see the tail number of a US--(indistinguishable)--because this only dealt with a flight number as far as, you know, American 77 and so forth. So that's probably how someone translated that into being the time now as 9:24. The first American aircraft, to our knowledge, has already crashed into the Trade Center. So this must be when we notified them on the second aircraft. That's just conjecture on my part as to how that time may have been put in there as far as 77 notification.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know what division within the FAA handles recordation of the N numbers?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm sure when you file your flight plan, which airlines have a different ability to file flight plans than your average general aviation pilot does. And, of course, if you're filing, generally, the A (ph) incidents in November registry anyway, there is a registration office in Oklahoma City that knows the--who the

registered owners are. But as far as which particular airline flight is which particular registration number for that airline, only the airline knows that. Once they included it in the flight plans.

Now, airlines when they file flight plans, use a process that we call "bulk store" (ph), where they just put a whole bunch of flight plans into the FAA computer office at any time. I've never seen how that process works, so I don't know if it's contained in that or not.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, as part of your office's investigative process, you know, and putting together these time lines, did it include going back to the airlines and talking to them about anything?

MR. FERRANTE: No, because, generally, when we did an alert bulletin, we did like American 77, we do an alert bulletin, and within sometimes hours or at least certainly within days the Office of Accident Investigation, which is AAI, actually put out a booklet, and part of our alert bulletin

would make it into their booklet. But their booklet would say American Flight 77, and it would also have a registration number in there as well.

So they had that ability to go back and work with the airlines and determine which aircraft was on which segment. But I don't know that anyone in air traffic ever did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What's the name for AAI?

MR. FERRANTE: Accident Investigation. They're part of the AVS (ph) organization. And, remember, we changed all the times, so--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I know.

MR. FERRANTE: It used to be AVR was the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, AVR, which has now become AVS, which--and so the Associated Administrator for Aviation Safety. It was and is still "NIX ABAKEEN" (ph).

Now, within AVS there are various lines like flight standards is AFS, FS certification is AIR, accident investigation is AAI. So they were

AAI on September 11, they're still AAI today, and they're the group that actually goes to aircraft wreckage sites and work with the NTSB in trying to determine probable cause of why the aircraft--but they don't do that on all of them, they do it on the major accidents.

We would often accompany the NTSB and AAI as part of the initial go team, but our role from the AAT-20 or 200 staff was strictly the performance of the air traffic system. So we would not go with them to a craft site; we would go to the air traffic facility that had communications or contact with them and start doing the review if radar data voice tapes and so forth.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know, did the AAI prepare anything for September 11?

MR. FERRANTE: I would have to believe that AAI prepared the normal types of accident notifications that they would. Generally speaking, when an accident occurs that either a lost an air carrier, or if a significant or has prominent persons on board, they generate their own version

of an alert bulletin, which you can always tell the different between ours and theirs. They use color printing; we never did. But--and it says "Office of Aircraft Accident Investigation."

And generally, within hours they had a bulletin, and theirs would have a lot more information about the flight crew, the aircraft itself, who owned it, how many cycles it had, you know, the crew's rating and experience and so forth. So they had access to all those databases that had that information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is (b)(6), (b)(7)c will in charge of that group?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. But on September 11th he wasn't there. I don't know what--what his position was on September the 11th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Was he still at the Eastern Region, maybe?

MR. FERRANTE: He may have been.

(Both speaking simultaneously.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --standards on Eastern Region, wasn't he?

MR. FERRANTE: He was, indeed, and I think that he spent several months in headquarters as the manager or the Director of Flight Standards Service before he became the Associate Administrator. But I don't know when those moves took place. I first met him Veterans Day 2001. That was when American 587 crashed. It was about two months after the September 11th incident, the crash that occurred in New York, which, of course, prompted a big turnout of the FAA, and that was the very first time I had met him.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And who's in charge of the AAI right now?

MR. FERRANTE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I think he was there as well. Our primary focal point is (b)(6), (b)(7)c was there prior to September 11th. (b)(6), (b)(7)c is still there today, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c was really the link between the air traffic side and the accident investigation side. Most of our coordination came through him setting up controller interviews and so forth, filling Board requests.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You said you didn't know why the summary didn't include the 9:24.

MR. FERRANTE: We may not have had it when this went to--you know, remember, we came in here. I was in Chicago when the incident actually occurred, so I got back sometime on Wednesday morning. We immediately were on like, you know, 14-16-hour shifts. So Thursdays when I recall we started really getting to putting the chronology together and so forth, and the idea was to have it for Saturday, have it for Sunday. Because I can remember Dave coming down several times and being somewhat frustrated that we weren't done yet, because there was just so much information that we were trying to go through. And we finally got it like 8 o'clock or so on Monday morning. In fact, (b)(6), (b)(7)c I remember, carried it up to our graphics unit and had it printed.

So we may not have had those times available at then. They may have come in later on Monday and then put together on Tuesday. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You had indicated to the Commission and to us when we had spoken to you that you had not seen the needs log until your interview with the Commission.

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c provided a copy of it, and again it was the same handwritten version you have now, because I remember thinking or seeing that it had either "Top Secret" or "Classified" written on the top, and it had been crossed out. And he asked me if I had ever seen that before, and that was the first time I'd ever seen that log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You also indicated to the Commission when you were interviewed that you weren't even sure where you obtained the information concerning the needs log that was incorporated into there. Does that sound accurate?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. Now, some of it I think came from Boston Center. And these sheets were, of course--was American 11 because Boston Center reached out, and they made notification to Otis Air Force Base trying to arrange for a

scramble. It was outside of the protocols of how the FAA normally treated a hijacking event, but in any event those times were available through Boston Center's logs, through Boston Center's voice recordings.

The other times, I don't know how we got each of the different notification times. Some of it, I thought, came from the log that they had developed, and they had it in the room where they were running this outcome from. It was the old director of air traffic process. I still recall that some of it we did not know, and, like they would come down and ask where we were, what we were working. And I'd say, "We don't have the time for this," or, "We don't know what time this occurred."

But if I can--I can remember him, you know--I mean I'll even show you: It was kind of like he had to put his foot up like this, and he opened a portfolio up, and he said, well, "That was that flight," whatever time. What he was reading from I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, the--for

American 11 the entry for the military notification says it's at 8:40, and it says here, "Northeast Air Defense Sector (needs--in parentheses--logs) indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning American, AAL 11."

Presumably, what you're saying here is that somebody saw the needs log, and that's the source for that entry. Does that sound right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you didn't see it?

MR. FERRANTE: No, I never saw it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And then also for United 175, the entry in your "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events" says--at 9:05 it says, "Northeast Air Defense Sector (needs--in parentheses--logs) indicate they were notified by the Federal Aviation Administration the events concerning UAL 175." So again, that would tend to indicate that the source for that entry is the

needs log. Does that sound right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I guess kind of one of the things that you had told both us and the Commission is that you guys wanted to, or you tried to have a piece of paper to support all the entries that were in your different time lines, is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what we heard from you and some other folks is that you guys didn't--at least at your level--have a piece of paper for this needs log entry.

MR. FERRANTE: Right. When we--when we try to have a piece of paper that we could, you know, actually hold onto something that says "here's when we did that," that's--we relied primarily on those facility logs. Some of the things that we had to rely on were personnel statements, and we put a caveat in there that, you know, the time is approximate based on what we could read from the statement.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But that's-- a statement is still a piece of paper. It's a supporting document.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess what we're wondering is sort of, given the lack of real strong support for these need log entries, I was wondering what steps you guys took to go back to FAA's records and tried to--

[END OF SIDE A, TAPE 1, BEGIN SIDE B.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I've turned the tape over. It's 11:33.

It's like I was saying, what sort of steps did you guys take to look at the FAA, or look within the FAA's own records to kind of double-check or verify these entries that you're reporting with regard to the needs logs?

MR. FERRANTE: In the first week that--following September 11th, there wasn't any way for us to do that, because again we relied on facility logs. If there was a log entry that indicated they made a notification, then that was a

piece of paper we could hold onto and say that. If it was on a voice tape we could do that.

But a lot of the facilities made notifications done on either unrecorded lines or on lines that, you know, were so far removed from the operation that people didn't realize it was something that was critical to have in the days and hours that followed. Because some of the material that came out was actually months after the occurrence took place.

And when we used--when we did a normal alert bulletin, we didn't focus on what time we made notifications. Occasionally, we would look for things in a facility log like what time we notified Search and Rescue, or what time we notified, you know, the Crash Fire Rescue Service on an airport, because there were oftentimes when, you know, if you had somebody that was in a survival accident overnight, the, obviously, there's a liability concern that if we didn't make notification until the following morning that we were even missing an aircraft.

So that was really the extent of our involvement in ever using notification times when we made those briefings.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think, if I recall from either the Commission's interview or our interview with you, that the reason that the notification times were eventually included in these documents that your group had put together was because the higher-ups within the FAA asking you that.

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely. Absolutely. And I can't tell you who told us to do that, but we were told to get the notification times in the chronologies. But left to our own devices and how we investigated aircraft accidents, that was nothing we would have ever picked up on.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So that was not something that would have been normal for you to seek out.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct. Except in the case of whether or not we had notified Fire Rescue Services at an airport, or if we had gone through

Search and Rescue procedures for an overview of-- (indistinguishable).

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think it's fair to say that you guys were comfortable as long as you had a source for your entries?

MR. FERRANTE: I think that's fair to say. But I don't think we had--it is fair to say that, but when you consider a source, we got our direction either through Dave--I know (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) was in the area a couple of times. I don't think I saw (b)(6), (b)(7)c other than perhaps on the 10th floor when we went (ph) to him.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. FERRANTE: (b)(6), (b)(7)c But primarily, our information flow was coming in from (b)(6), (b)(7)c or from (b)(6), (b)(7)c It wasn't just, you know, somebody walking down the hall. But, yes, we're comfortable in saying that as long as we got it from another source.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you weren't just talking to somebody in the street--

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --I guess is what you're trying to say.

MR. FERRANTE: That's what I'm trying to say, yeah. The cleaning crew didn't come by and say, "Put this time in."

(Pause.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c During one of our previous interviews with you, you had indicated that there were some items--that's as far as it was defined as some items--that you guys were asked to incorporate into the summary that you felt you didn't have enough supporting material for. What sort of things were you trying to describe?

MR. FERRANTE: Probably the times when we made certain notifications.

MR. FERRANTE: Can I look at this for just a second?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure.

MR. FERRANTE: Because when I talked to you, you know, part of my discomfort was the conversation that I had with (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the Commission. And I don't remember exactly what that

was, but there was a particular time he pointed to in one of these chronologies, and he asked me about it, and I read it. And then he showed me the needs log. That was when I first saw that needs log, and there was no such notification in the needs log, because he asked me to find it and I couldn't.

And I don't recall exactly what that was related to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That 9/16 notification--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, 9/16 (ph) was on the needs log which just has the tail number issue. Just like 9:24 is the tail number issue. I thought it was with the United 93, but I could be mistaken. But I definitely remember that conversation with (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewing me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, unless there's another time line that we haven't discovered yet, I don't think your group put together any time lines that have a notification time for United 93 except in the drafts of this grid time line. You guys did have a notification time for United 93. It was

10:08.

MR. FERRANTE: And that could have been--that could have been what he was referring to. I thought it was 10:07, but--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Seven or eight.

MR. FERRANTE: --that may have been. But there was one particular entry that he pointed to and said, "Show me this in the needs log," and I couldn't because it wasn't there. So he may have had a draft copy. I don't remember exactly what he showed me, but I really believe it was referenced to United 93 in a notification.

(Pause.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So when we spoke to you previously, the items that you guys were asked to incorporate that you guys didn't think you had enough supporting material for, do you think those were the military notification times?

MR. FERRANTE: I think most of the times on where we made notifications were sketchy at best. And I recall, specifically, that there was a log that was kept from this "tell time" (ph), and I

specifically recall that the crash time for one of the aircraft was off by more than an hour. So I didn't know that all of this was--and I attributed that to, you know, first they're capturing stuff on white board, and then someone's trying to read what's on the white board and capture it not a laptop. Then someone else is erasing something to write something new on the white board, and I wasn't comfortable with some of this. It's a lot cleaner when you've got a radar picture, something you can say, "Here it is. Its time span is incorporated into it."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think a lot of this might have been a little more clear if WOC had recording capability on 9/11.

MR. FERRANTE: I agree. But they didn't.

You know, when I think if you had asked us on September 10th, we all thought they did, at least the group in AAT-200. We all thought they did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm surprised they didn't. I never really gave it much thought before

this came up, so--

MR. FERRANTE: Right. I think a lot of people didn't give it much thought before this came up.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't know that I ever even heard of a WOC before all this, so--

MR. FERRANTE: Well, we--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We'll give you until yesterday.

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. We love our acronyms, you know. We just couldn't live without them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. FERRANTE: So we also have ROCS. Those are Regional Op Centers."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, yeah, as opposed to the Washington Operation Center.

MR. FERRANTE: And in terms of air traffic we had RATS and HATS, because you had Headquarters Air Traffic and Regional Air Traffic.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Going back to this grid time line--

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --you know one of the drafts of this time line has a notification time for United 93 as 10:08. And Mr. Canoles indicated that this was his handwriting on here, and it was changed. And I was wondering if you could recall what sorts of discussions you guys had concerning this modification of this time line, because the final version, you know, indicates N/A.

MR. FERRANTE: I can't recall a specific conversion on this, but if I remember some of the chronology involving that flight, there was another aircraft that we had reported to us that they observed a puff of smoke. I think 10:08, in the initial time frame we were putting together, was what we were using as a probable crash time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And that's just--you know, that's memory coming out of that. I don't know if that's the case or not.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, it--

MR. FERRANTE: But how that got translated

into a notification time, I don't know. How it came out--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So what you're thinking is that 10:08 is actually a crash time?

MR. FERRANTE: I think that if you look at the chronology for that flight, there was, you know, there's some discussion that after he comes back into radar coverage of Pittsburgh, we lose radar with him again. And then there's another aircraft that reports a puff of smoke. And I think that that's right about that time frame.

So, to me, I think that could have been translated into that, as far as when that occurred.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I discovered the source of that entry in going through the various records that your group had asked the centers to put together. And on September 15th Cleveland Center had sent an email to Doug Gould and (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph), and a bunch of other folks. I don't recognize their names.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was a Regional Quality Assurance Specialist. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) was the--I think the Assistant Manager of Cleveland Center. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) was the manager. I'm not sure who (b)(6), (b)(7)c was. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) I think was the Quality Assurance manager at Cleveland Center. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph), of course, is here in this building now. He did work in the Great Lakes regional office at the time, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c also worked in the Great Lakes regional office at the time. I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the acting Quality Assurance or was the Quality Assurance manager, and (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the Procedures manager.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is at the--

MR. FERRANTE: Within the Great Lakes regional office.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At the regional level, okay. So this--this email has two attachments to it, one of which is a rough draft transcript for United 93, and it says a conversation between ZOB, which is Cleveland Center--

MR. FERRANTE: Cleveland Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right--and Huntress
Military, which is Northeast Air Defense Sectors--

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --code name. And we
can see here they've got their discussion at 10:07,
and this thing is indicating 14:070 returning late.
So I mean it looks like you guys had information
about when--and notice about that aircraft was
passed onto needs, and you have recorded it, but
you took it out. I was just kind of curious, and I
was hoping you could shed some light on that.

MR. FERRANTE: No, and, in fact, if we had
looked at that, we probably would have started from
a different time, you know, line-activated
line-ringing. I believe I was talking about DUB
(ph), the 1989? I don't remember what that flight
was on that day. Forget about that, we got to get
United 93, so in reality you can technically say
notification occurred at 14:06 that something was
wrong with United 93, but somehow we got it in here
as 14:08, and 14:08 was really what we're saying is
wrong. We don't have--we don't have them right

now. We don't know if calling through--(indistinguishable)--or coming from.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The needs log that you guys also reference in all your documents as to where you got military notification times also contains--it says, "14:07 bomb on board UAL 93 over in Pittsburgh." But you guys didn't include that reference in the documents either.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, again, having never seen this until the Commission started looking at it, and I don't think I ever saw this. It would be interesting if we could go back and--we probably can't at this point--to see when Doug actually opened it, because the flood of information that was coming in, you know, he may have looked at this and may not have even thought it was important when he initially looked at it. Because I didn't recall this being in our archives or our inventory of information.

(Pause.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you're thinking that you guys might not have had a chance to review

this before you prepared your document?

MR. FERRANTE: Again, Doug's primary role when we were doing this was the interface with the --with the FBI. He was making wave files from the voice recordings. He generated a lot of the pictures that were in here. I don't think Doug had much of a role in the actual text that was going into it. But it was kind of like an open environment, because what we did was we had a big piece of cardboard, because we didn't have a screen or anything. And we projected it up on a wall so that, hopefully, you know, all of us could see it as we're going and try to keep this going right.

So if Doug noticed it, I don't know. But I think if we'd had something like that, we'd have been very comfortable in attaching that and using an actually time in the notification process.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you're thinking if you guys reviewed the rough draft transcript that we just talked about, would you guys have been comfortable--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --with that affirmation.

MR. FERRANTE: Again that goes back to we got the actual voice recordings of the sectors for the control positions that were in radio communication with the aircraft. It was months before all of the voice recordings were here from all of the different positions, because it got--you know, in any center you may have 150 or 200 positions that are being recorded at any one time. The one we wanted was the one that had the recordings with aircraft--(indistinguishable)--so that was our first priority.

And again, that was based on our instinctive reaction to an aircraft accident. That's how we normally function.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You guys asked the centers to pull their voice recordings. Was there a time limit as to how long before and after an event that they are supposed to hold that data and then start the transcription process?

MR. FERRANTE: Generally speaking, it's

five minutes for first contact until five minutes after last contact. Now, because some of the ways that our voice recordings work, it could be eight minutes before and nine minutes after. But, generally, that's the standard, and that's outlined in FAA order 802011. Five minutes before first contact until five minutes after last contact.

And so, for example, a flight that departed from Boston yet crashed in Los Angeles, we have six hours' worth of recording, because we would have had five minutes before first contact in Boston, and five minutes after last contact on the West Coast. So we would have had all of those radio communications with the aircraft into Cleveland.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So Boston would be required to produce six hours' worth of recordings?

MR. FERRANTE: Boston wouldn't have six hours' worth of recordings because--now, Boston--let's just for example say that the aircraft took off at 8:00 a.m. Boston would start their recording at 7:55. Now, if they issued a

frequency change for Boston to New York at 7:30, at 7:35 Boston would stop their recording, but at 7:30 we would have picked up that recording from New York five minutes before contact from New York until five minutes after New York no longer had contact with them. And we'd have done that across the country. So the aircraft actually goes through seven, eight, ten different--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Not always from Boston Centers.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So last contact for Boston would be five minutes after they passed it off to the next center.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct. And every facility would do the same thing. They would do five minutes before their first contact until five minutes after their last contact. And from that we're able to construct, you know, that flight across the country.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Now, 11 stopped responding to controllers within Boston Center's air space, but then continued on into New York

still not communicating. How would you guys--if Boston Center said, "Well, Tony, how shall we handle this? What period of time do you guys want us to produce for you guys?"

MR. FERRANTE: We would have said until five minutes after their last contact with New York Center that had anything to do with American Flight 11. So again, let's assume for a minute that at 8:20 we stopped getting any radio communications at all from American 11, but if at 8:45 Boston Center is still trying to see whether New York Center has established communications with them, we would go until 8:50 with Boston Center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So that plane crashed about 8:45, I think, is what most documents said.

MR. FERRANTE: So at a very minimum, he would have recordings up until 8:51. In all likelihood we have recordings that go for 15 or 20 minutes beyond that, as it's being discussed on different lines from different facilities.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So that's all

you guys would have expected each of the centers to produce is what the order--

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --required.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Was there--at any time did you guys ask the centers to go beyond what the orders were asking or required?

MR. FERRANTE: Within two or three--to actually provide to us?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Not until the Commission asked for, like, I think 8 o'clock in the morning until 11:30 in the morning. The Commission asked for a very wide window of times of all positions. But we had done is within two or three days of the event, we sent out a message to retain all data referenced to September 11th, and we did that for every facility in the country even though, you know, most of the facilities had no involvement at all. We wanted everything secured for that day.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So for your office's

investigation, you guys didn't ask them to go beyond the time periods that were required in the order.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So it wasn't until the Commission came into play, which I think was in '03--

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --that you guys asked the centers to produce something beyond what the Board had called for.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Again, consider what our role was. You know, we're not an element of law enforcement. Our role was strictly in trying to look at how the air traffic system performed in a particular incident or accident, and I don't know that we would have done much more based on what actually occurred with those flights, because you

really couldn't say that the air traffic system didn't perform or find fault with the system for what we did there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you guys conduct any interviews for your investigation?

MR. FERRANTE: We ordinarily would, but in this particular case the FBI wanted to do interviews. The FBI interviewed many of our controllers without two or three days after the event.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And under what circumstances would you guys normally interview people? Because I know you require statements to be provided by the controllers who are involved. What else would you guys normally take a look at aside from issuing those statements?

MR. FERRANTE: When an incident or an accident occurs that generates the interest of the NPSB, and the NPSB often goes beyond what the FAA traditionally requires, so, for example, I had a statement that was trying to tell me what the settings were, or whether I saw, you know, weather

radar was painting any precipitation or so forth, the NPSB will often go and ask a lot of probing questions such as: Were you ever trained in the appropriate minimum safe altitude warnings? Did you hear this alarm? When you heard this alarm, did you talk to any other sectors?

So those are primarily when we do interviews. We generally did not do them as a, you know, air traffic investigation all by itself; it was done in conjunction with the Safety Board.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

MR. FERRANTE: But in this particular case, the FBI held, I guess, all jurisdiction initially, and they wouldn't even let us release information to the NPSB in the first couple of days/

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you guys--did any of your staff accompany the Bureau during any of their interviews?

MR. FERRANTE: No. But we did have a gentleman named Tom Commity (ph). He passed away about two years ago; he was the one who initially

was trying to help set up where they were going to be and who they wanted to interview. But again, Tom did that from here, and that was--it was kind of like the protocol of calling Cleveland Center, for example, and saying, "The FBI wants to interview the controllers who had any direct contact with Flight 93, and can they be available," on such and such a date? And I don't believe that the FAA had anybody present during those interviews.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you aware of any interviews being conducted of staff from the Washington Operations Center or the, I think it's the Aviation Command Center?

MR. FERRANTE: The Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center? Is that the--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Interposing) No, the one right here in this building.

MR. FERRANTE: The Aviation System Command Center?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I know the acronym's ACC. I forget what A stands for, but I think it's

Crisis, or Command Center.

MR. FERRANTE: That's an element of Civil Aviation Security, or was at that point. No, we wouldn't have been involved in any of that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So there's a bright line there.

MR. FERRANTE: Absolutely. In fact, the only time I have ever had any involvement with Civil Aviation Security, we had an aircraft that erroneously squawked the hijack code, and it was on its way to London. And, of course, he's out of radio contact with any of the FA facilities, so we can only relay information--((indistinguishable)). This goes all the way back to when (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph) (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the Director of Security. I, of course, was working in 200 at the time. I got the phone call about midnight, and got to spend the evening here until we actually had actual voice coordination with the event, when they would reach London.

But unless they needed something from air traffic, they would never involve us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there any single unit within the FAA that would have the ability to kind of collect and collate all the information from the different units into one product or package?

MR. FERRANTE: I think that they were trying to do that in the early days following 9/11. In fact, Darlene Freeman was--put together some sort of a group. I know we gave her a copy of the book that we prepared, and I thought that that was a part of their task to try to bring all the different things from different organizations and to make one big master collection of everything that occurred on that day.

But it--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Simultaneously speaking.)

MR. FERRANTE: I never a product. No, there is no unit in a Disaster Investigations Unit to look at how all the elements interacted with each other, because, really, you have a couple--a few different elements within the FAA that had to

interact with each other on 9/11. But what I keep hearing is, "Well, we didn't look over there because that wasn't our unit. It was somebody else's unit and somebody else's responsibility."

Well, there were also a lot of issues associated with clearance levels. Most of the folks that worked in security dealt with, you know, highly classified information, and most of the people in air traffic didn't have the clearances that were appropriate to be there. So, for example, when you mentioned ACC, I know they used to set up the ACC across the hall in the WOC.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hmm.

MR. FERRANTE: Before they did this modernization of it, they used to have--I don't know, nine of twelve computer terminals that were vacant 99 percent of the year. But when a crisis occurred, you know, security would be there en masse, and they would man those. And we didn't even get to go through there when they actually kind of took over at that.

So unless they needed information from air

traffic, we would not be part of their process. Now, that has gotten much better today in terms of --there's probably still some, you know, raw edges around it now and then. Shortly after the what we called "the never ending tell com (ph)" evolved into the Domestic Event Network, which I believe has now changed names again, the Air Traffic System whatever Center, but it's the same group of people.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's news to us.

Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So what we did is we had this "tell comment" started that we're getting all this information from, right? Around November/December of 2001 the--(indistinguishable) -- asked me, "We're putting together a 24-hour operation so that we could have this Domestic Event Network to capture all of these things that took place in the system." So, for example, if you had an aircraft that was out of radio contact for 15 or 20 minutes, we never knew it. Never. Because in many cases the Center would find out about it, and then they would treat it as a No Radio Aircraft,

and the coordination would go from center to center. It may get elevated to somebody in the Regional Op Center, but it never got elevated to anybody who was actually trying to bring everything together.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Even at the Command Center level, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (ph)?

MR. FERRANTE: The Command Center's primary role is traffic flow management. It's not incidents that occur in the net (ph). Although they do dabble in it, it's really not what their area of focus is. So this Domestic Event Network we set up we ran 24 hours a day, it's still in existence. Initially, when Transportation Security Agency was formed, we sat side by side with the TSA people. And it was probably the best sharing of information that's taken place between these elements for a while.

It's changed somewhat with the Department of Homeland Security. You know, they've moved a lot of their assets out of here, and they brought them into their own building now out in Herndon.

We also had people in that building now--that's called the National Capitol Region and Coordination Center, NCRCC--I believe that's what they call it. But we still have the Domestic Event Network that operates 24 hours a day across the hall, and that is staffed by air traffic people. They put out policy statements--

[END TAPE 1, BEGIN TAPE 2]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --five. We just went to Tape Number 2.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay, so I was talking a little bit about the role of the Domestic Event Network and how things have changed. And the example I would offer is, is an aircraft that now is out of radio contact for five minutes. A field facility--say, for example, Cleveland Center--is required to report that information over what we call the DEN. Those lines are open and staffed 24 hours a day.

So somebody in Cleveland has either got that speaker in front of them or that answer it up to their ear all day long. And somebody in here's

got that speaker turned up in case of something. And on that line you've got NEADS, and you've got Secret Service, and Customs, and--I mean all the elements of law enforcement you can imagine.

So the sharing of information is greater than it's ever been before, but I still don't think the answer to your question is one central office that correlates all this information after an event. I don't think that exists yet.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know, is that something that you guys talked about outside of the Darlene Freeman--

MR. FERRANTE: I wasn't part of the Darlene Freeman group, you know, but there's so many things happened that caused the FA to look at what we could have done differently or changed. I know they had a group. In fact, Frank Hatfield was the one who led this effort on how we could restructure the WOC. Frank's the one whose now responsible, or the official in charge of this Domestic Event Network.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: So you might get that person to talk to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure. What sort of training does your staff go through outside of--'cause I think a few of them have controller backgrounds--but outside of--

MR. FERRANTE: Well, my staff here, this is the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service, so it's--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c AAT-200.

MR. FERRANTE: --so it's the AAT-200 staff. Primarily, I had five air traffic investigators, which is what their title was, and they were all by background air traffic control specialists. So they have either been in the terminal option or in the en route option, Center towers and so forth. We tried to get them all through academy training. There's a quality assurance course that's taught for FAA people in Oklahoma City. That was one of the courses that was always mandatory for them to go to.

There's another course called accident

investigation course that's run by the Transportation Safety Institute, which is a part of Oklahoma City campus but not necessarily attached to the FAA's Academy there. So they would go to that course as well, and then they would receive on-the-job instruction. So, you know, before they ever went to their first facility running an accident investigation by themselves, they have been on two or three others with somebody else as the lead.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: And, of course, the guidance that we followed comes from the 802011, which is the--the office of primary interest, that is still AAI, accident investigation program. It is their directive, so we just followed, and we had our role in air traffic on what we had to do, what information we had to provide. A lot of it's covered under the statute they created, both the NPSB and the FAA and that relationship.

I think we have a pretty good process, but our focus was not in this type of an event. Our

focus was, obviously, how the air traffic system performed in an accident. And we give them a lot of information and so forth.

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] (Indistinguishable.)

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c My only question was on the orders, the 802011 and the 7210.56. Post 9/11 had there been any major changes to those orders?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, the 8020--both of those orders have changed post 9/11. I don't know that necessarily anything has changed due to 9/11. Jeff Meiers would be the perfect one to talk to. In terms of the 801011, about a year or so ago AAI finally gave their traffic the authorization to make changes to the air traffic portion of that handbook. So Jeff--the used to be done by general notice, what we called GNOT, and we had pen and ink changes, and we knew it was really a mess. We would refer this paragraph back to this paragraph.

Jeff went through and cleaned the whole thing up and really made it so that it was one understandable guide. So, but I don't think

anything was changed, specifically, because of 9/11. Some of the things like retention of information may have changed that kind of was prompted by that, but not solely prompted by that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's a GNOT still, is it not? I think it was a memo that went out on retention of information?

MR. FERRANTE: That's been a permanent change.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is it permanent now?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: No, normally, what we do, because it takes a while to get things printed, published, and distributed to a field, if we want to put something into effect tomorrow, we send out a GNOT, which is a great way to cascade information out, but it's a horrible way to manage the system, because you have all of these GNOTs that are, you know, they're there, and you're waiting for it to be incorporated into an order. Most of the orders are printed on a predetermined schedule every six

months. So there will be six months before that's going to be incorporated unless, you know, so if today's the cutoff for the August publication, and you turned it in tomorrow, it's not going to be published in the manual until next February. So that it takes that much lead time to get all of this done, back, proofread, and back out to the distribution process. So hence we manage by GNOT order (ph).

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have anything?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Huh-uh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have anything else you'd like to add?

MR. FERRANTE: Not that I can think of. I certainly wish you success in this, and we'll offer again, anything I can do to help, please call any time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right, thank you.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm going to stop

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the tape. It's 12:11.

[END OF INTERVIEW.]

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, hereby certify that the tape recording represented by the foregoing pages were transcribed by me; that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case 031H-199-H001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF
JOHN DAVID CANOLES

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

Wednesday, August 31, 2005

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is August 31st, 2005. The time is 1:15 p.m. We are at FAA headquarters building 10A, we're in suite 1024. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Also present is Elise Woods. We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 commission hearing, and elsewhere, that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we're interviewing John David Canoles. Mr. Canoles, will you please acknowledge that you're aware this interview is being tape recorded.

MR. CANOLES: Yes, I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please raise your right hand.

MR. CANOLES: I will.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

the truth?

MR. CANOLES: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Can you please give us your full name, spelling your last for the record.

MR. CANOLES: Sure. It's John David Canoles, C-a-n-o-l-e-s.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what's your current position?

MR. CANOLES: I'm the director of air traffic safety oversight. The routing symbol is AOV1, and I work under the associate administrator for aviation safety, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And that's a new position since we spoke with you last; is that right?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I've been in this about, I think a year and three months now.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Well, like I mentioned before we started the interview, we had some questions that we needed to do a little bit of follow-up on and we also had some things we just

weren't quite understanding, that we hope that you can help us out with.

So the first thing, when we had previously spoken--I forget during which interview, we talked to you a couple times previously--you had indicated that you thought that it was likely that Jeff Griffith, who was your boss around the September 11th timeframe, had shown you a copy of the NEADS log and that from the log you had copied some entries down and then provided that information to your staff, is that--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah, that's--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So roughly your recollection?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. I'm not sure it was NEADS log but it was presented to me as military information that was classified, and it was, as I recall, in a format that looked like a log. So I'm not sure if Jeff ever told me precisely what it was or what the source was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c We had shown you this before but I'll show it to you again.

MR. CANOLES: General Eberhart was at NEADS then? Do you guys know? Cause I seem to recall his name being flashed through it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today, I don't remember, off the top of my head.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. I can't recall if this is exactly what I saw. It's certainly possible.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Does it look similar, do you think, in format to the document you might have reviewed?

MR. CANOLES: Possibly, yeah. I really don't--I've got a very vague recollection of Jeff showing me something and I can't, for the life of me, remember exactly what it looked like. But this could have been, and it certainly has--I don't know if the times are consistent with what we later reported as having been derived from military logs or not. I mean if the times are consistent, then in all likelihood this is what I reviewed.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Well, this is--it's kind of hard to read on this copy here but

it says MCCT log, which is the NEADS military, I think it's Command and Control Tech Log--that's what that stands for. So this is the infamous log and the times do comport with what you guys had reported out on some a your documentation.

One thing that we had noticed was that these times here, they're in Zulu or Greenwich Mean Time, so this 1316 entry here would relate to, at that time of the year, I think 9:16 Eastern time.

And we notice that none of the documents that you guys have, that end up like in a final format, contain this 9:16 entry for United 93.

So presumably you guys looked at the NEADS log or the data that you derived from the NEADS log and realized it was inaccurate. Is that--

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. That looks like--well, that entry says United tail number, November 6-1-2 Uniform alpha, slant, 75, I believe. No. 75SOB. So 75 souls on board. So I don't know--I wouldn't--I mean, that's a subsequent entry obviously. It follows to previous entries, one at 1305 and one at 1307, that talks about the airplane

being possibly hijacked, if that's the same flight.

So if that's the case, and if all we were trying to highlight was when we notified the military, if I were doing it today, I would view that as a subsequent entry and therefore not pertinent. So I would just the first times that we had discussed, if that's what I was trying to articulate.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, maybe to help refresh your recollection about that, that 9:16 entry for some folks, like Department of Defense, and even within the FAA, was thought to belong to United 93.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And 9:16 had made it into a draft of NORAD's press release as notification time for United 93. At some point FAA realized that that was not a good notification for United 93. The reason we know that is because it's mentioned in some of the chronologies, especially the ones that Darlene Freeman played a role in tailoring or kind of editing.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And so what we're trying to do is find out when FAA recognized that 9:16 was not a valid notification time for United 93, and then how you came to know that.

MR. CANOLES: I'm sorry, I can't help you. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. CANOLES: Again, my recollection is very, very fuzzy about this whole event with Jeff. But I recall meeting Jeff, and I think it might have even been in the Washington operations center.

I recall meeting Jeff, him showing me a piece or two of paper, may or may not have been this, and he either said, you know, let's use these times or hey, get the times off a this and let's use 'em to make sure we're consistent with what the OD [ph] says. A very short meeting, two-three minutes. There was certainly no substantive discussion about, you know, What do you think this means? or anything like that.

It was more of a here, take this, get what

you need, and then I gave it back to him and left.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall having to interpret tail numbers from the document that he was giving you or--

MR. CANOLES: No; not right offhand. And I'm not sure we ever did that in any of the materials we prepared. There wasn't a necessity to. I mean, we were more concerned with the flight numbers. That's what air traffic control deals with typically.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you don't remember copying down a tail number and then having to go back and figure out who that belonged to, anything like that?

MR. CANOLES: No. We might have done that. I mean, if that were the only information available to us, yeah, we would have, but I'm not sure we did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there any reason to believe in your mind that maybe there is another NEADS log out there?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know if there is. I would not be surprised. I mean, there's gotta be a number of documents, you know, relative to the events that day. I know there were a number of FAA documents, certainly military [inaudible]. Jeff worked closer with the military infrastructure than I did.

So I know what NEADS does, broadly, but I'm not aware of their, you know, their precise setup and how they're substructured, and so on and so forth. But realizing there are various elements of NEADS out there, I wouldn't be surprised if they all didn't have duplicates of this information in one form or another.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think it's possible that you guys could have actually used NORAD's press release for--

MR. CANOLES: I don't think so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --your source?

MR. CANOLES: I don't think so.

I remember specifically, whatever I was shown was presented to me that, hey, this is

classified, so can't give it to you, but look at it and get what you need, or here's what you need off of it. I'm not sure exactly which it was.

But, no, I would a remembered if it'd been a press release.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If, in air traffic, you needed to find out which flight a tail number belongs to, how would you guys do that?

MR. CANOLES: I could do it a number of ways. FAA logs should readily have that available, because, for example, the security people, once they began working a hijack would have the tail number from their communications with the company.

So that should have been readily accessible here within our assets. Failing that, I could have contacted the company directly and said, hey, what as the tail number of this specific flight on that day and their dispatch office could tell me that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is the tail number included in the automated flight plan information that the airlines upload to FAA?

MR. CANOLES: It's not transmitted to air traffic facilities that way but it could be in the flight plans filed in the NAS [ph]. I don't know for sure.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This was the summary of air traffic hijack events, September 11th, 2001, was created on September 17th, 2001, by your organization. It says here, Source, AAT20.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is one a the first published timelines that we could find within FAA, that contains military notification information in it.

There are notification times in the summary for American 11 and United 175, but there are not notification times in here for United 93 or American 77. I was wondering if you could tell us what you recall about that.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. 8:40. Northeast Air Defense Sector NEADS logs indicated they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning American 11. [inaudible] scrambled. 9:05 NEADS

indicate they were notified by FAA, the events concerning United 175.

[Examining documents.]

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. I don't know. From simply a format standpoint, we certainly identified it in the two cases. So I don't know why we did not in these, because if memory serves me correctly, we had times from the NEADS log that we could have put in here. I don't know why we wouldn't have done that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, the very next day, on the 18th, you guys, AAT20, prepares this, we call it the Brit [?] timeline, which we talked about during one of our prior interviews.

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You do include notification time for American 77 and you source it back to the NEADS log.

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And then you have "not applicable" for United 93 but you did have in a prior version of this, 10:08 listed as a

notification time but you took that out and put N/A.

MR. CANOLES: Maybe we--I was just wondering what, I guess emboldened you to choose the time, just a day later, for American 77?

MR. CANOLES: The only thing I can suspect is that--well, is--the 9:24's consistent with the NEADS log?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Somewhat?

MR. CANOLES: Somewhat? Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There's a 9:24 entry. It says American Airlines N334 double A hijacked.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c NORAD says this entry belongs to American 77. That's in their press release.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But that tail number actually belongs to American 11.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. All right. Well, that's probably where we derived it from.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But I guess, for some reason, on the 17th, you guys have a question about that entry.

MR. CANOLES: Uh-huh. Well--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c About a day later--

MR. CANOLES: We'd had a question, or we omitted it, and I'm not sure which. The other possibility is that different members of the staff prepared this and prepared this, and I probably, at that point in time, if I reviewed it--I don't even think this was signed out. I'm sure I reviewed it before we passed it upstairs. But I'm not sure I would have gone through and said, okay, do we have four times when we notified the military?

This was certainly generated in response to interest for that, and I believe this was put together at (b)(6), (b)(7)c direction.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The grid?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. And I don't know if (b)(6), (b)(7)c put that in there, or told me to put that in there, or if I--you know--one, a member of my staff pulled it outta log or if information I derived

from the log and took downstairs.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think it's possible, when you were reviewing this log--because we don't have flight numbers here--

MR. CANOLES: I could have misread it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --that it's possible--well, the timing--that could be, cause we've already mentioned 11 and 175 up here.

MR. CANOLES: It's very, very possible.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That this is probably 77, and--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and that's--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. That's very likely.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --93.

MR. CANOLES: That's very likely.

That's the way my mind works, and that's either a plus or a minus, but I would a gone down and said, okay, American, United, American, United. I could have very well done that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the entries in the NEADS log is 10:07. It's 1407 in here,

that's Zulu time. It says: Bomb on board, UAL 93 over Pittsburgh. I don't know what this 152703 means but that's on that earlier line as well. But it says: Bomb on board UAL 93. That's the first actual reference in here to 93.

MR. CANOLES: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we're wondering why you guys omitted that time in your summary.

MR. CANOLES: Well, the summary was to identify the time that we notified the military, that initial notification was made.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is the summary, right here.

MR. CANOLES: Okay. This is the summary--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The FAA summary.
That this--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. This is just--well, first of all, the fact that the airplane--or the statement that the airplane had a bomb on board is probably erroneous.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Why do you think that?

MR. CANOLES: I don't think we ever proved that in any a the cases. At least to my knowledge we didn't. And there was--and I think I mentioned before that there was--you know, by this time the volume of communications had increased to the point where there was a lotta miscommunications about airplanes with bombs on board and facilities having bomb threats, and Pittsburgh tower was preparing to evacuate because they thought the airplane had reversed course to come back and strike the tower, crash into the tower, and all this kind a stuff.

Had I seen that, I would have viewed that as a extemporaneous piece of trash that was floating around about that time, just a miscommunication.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That actually is what the air traffic controllers told the Department of Defense, was that there was a bomb on board, because that's what's in FAA's transcript for that position.

MR. CANOLES: And that was from where?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c From Cleveland.

MR. CANOLES: Cleveland Center?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh. This is something we had talked about during our prior interview. You guys had, at the time you were preparing your grid timeline, this transcript and other documents from Cleveland.

MR. CANOLES: [inaudible]. This is on the--September the 15th. Hmm. Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you have two different sources for that entry. We'd like to try to figure out if we can learn why it is you guys didn't include it.

MR. CANOLES: [inaudible]. I don't know. This, if this time is accurate, he's making this communication about the time the airplane crashed. This was at 14:06. And we lost the target on the airplane at about 10:04. So maybe it was considered after the fact, so it wasn't considered germane. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I think that's basically what you told us during prior interviews. And why would you guys think it

wouldn't be germane because it happened after the crash?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. I'm trying to reconstruct what the thought process would have been. I don't know. I don't know. You know, it appears to me that we very subjectively picked what we thought to be the most important communications. These aren't all-inclusive, so it looks to me like we kind a picked and chose what we thought was germane, significant, to put into this executive summary type document that we prepared, you know, rather than burden it with a whole lot of extraneous information. Maybe that's what we viewed it as. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Wouldn't it be relevant to let folks know, even internally, cause I think that's what you had told us the summary which you're holding your hand right now was prepared for, basically internal use.

Wouldn't it be relevant for those in your chain of command to know, well, we were late in letting DOD know about United 93?

MR. CANOLES: See, I'm not--well, that entry doesn't tell me that. That entry would have been useful to tell management that, hey, we were screwed up and we gave the military bad information, or perhaps we gave the military bad information. But I was pretty convinced that once the hijack net started--once the first couple of notifications were made, I was convinced, even though I wasn't there to see it personally, that the military was on board with the events as they were unfolding.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What made you convinced of that?

MR. CANOLES: It's just my knowledge of how the system worked in a hijack, that the hijack net was convened, law enforcement, DOD, all the parties were convened, and they began a tactical rapid-fire sharing of evolving information.

So I was pretty sure that once the first one was made known, that they were getting timely updates on everything else.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're basing that

knowledge on your understanding of procedures or because somebody had told you that a net had been established on 9/11?

MR. CANOLES: No. It's just my knowledge of how nets worked.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess just one of the--this is a follow-up on that last notification time, though. Do you recall any thought pattern, being either by you or others, that we shouldn't use that time because it may look bad, reflect badly upon the FAA--

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --or that it was embarrassing to put in a time that--

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --was after the fact?

Could that have been part of your thought process?

MR. CANOLES: No; no. And, you know, that may have existed at levels higher than me. The

only embarrassment I felt, you know, organizationally and personally, you know, was that our laws were haphazard and that it was so difficult, you know, after the fact when you create this stuff, and, you know, I viewed that as, you know, it was a byproduct of the moment. You know, we were busy doing others things and nobody was paying as particular attention as they should have been at compiling this stuff.

But that's the only embarrassment I felt, and again, it was my feel that once the military got engaged on the first hijack, that they knew about the other events transpiring about as quickly as we did, because that would have been relayed over that net.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But that's based on your understanding of procedures as opposed to what actually happened on that day.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah; yeah. Again, I wasn't there, so I don't know; but that's my assumption.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You mean as you were putting these documents together, that was in your

mind, that was kind--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --in your mind
that--

MR. CANOLES: Very definitely. That hey, this is an academic exercise because we all know that once everybody was convened on that circuit and they start talking about this, then all the other events became known, and while, you know, unfortunately, that wasn't captured because it wasn't reported, to my knowledge. You know, if I were a betting man, I'd bet you a paycheck that if I had tapes of those discussions that day, I could go back and put together a much better story of what actually happened.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What steps did you guys take to try to find out if the net was set up and what time it was?

MR. CANOLES: We didn't. That was a security function, it wasn't air traffic function, so we didn't make any attempts to do that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I've heard a few

people just say that before. Is it fair to characterize the situation, that there was a bright line between the divisions and you guys didn't necessarily cross over--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --at least at your level?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah, but it was a matter of, you know, need to know versus--you know, what I was concerned with was performance of air traffic. So, you know, I stayed in my compartment, did that. My superiors, including the deputy administrator, had been involved in--had been in the operations center during the time when the hijack net was set up and in operation. So, you know, as far as I was concerned, I had every assurance, not firsthand, but, you know, hey, the boss is in there so this stuff's being taken care of.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just a couple more questions on the 10:08 time--

MR. CANOLES: Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --or 10:07 time

reference. In one of our prior interviews with you, you said that you felt that 10:08, that 10:08 time was a mistake in your data. Do you know why you feel that way, or felt that way?

MR. CANOLES: It must have been something you showed me and I looked at it at that time and said I thought it was a mistake. I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did Griffith, Jeff Griffith or anybody above him give you any direction about what to include or not to include in these briefing documents? I'm talking about just specifically the chronologies, just to kind a try to narrow things down.

MR. CANOLES: I would have interfaced with three or four people. We were doing a lot of work directly with Monte Belger, a lot of work directly with Shirley Miller, and we were doing some work directly with Darlene Freeman, and I think Tony Ferrante was doing mostly interface with Darlene, because that was two or three days after 9/11. By that time I was working almost exclusively with the FBI on stuff.

It is possible that any of those people said, hey, this reads better if you do this, or why don't you take this out--it's confusing. That probably happened. I don't remember anybody saying take this out, it's unfavorable to the agency, because I think personally, I would have kind of revolted at that. So I would have remembered it. But, yeah, it's quite possible we were told to edit things or edits were suggested or whatever.

And I'm sure--at least I think I'm sure. I think I was told, or it was suggested that I get--I think it was suggested, and it probably would have come from Monte, that Jeff go to the military and get their logs and see if they were more consistent than ours, because ours, as I've acknowledged, were haphazard. We missed times.

We had times that were an hour off, and so on and so forth. So, yeah, that strong likelihood [?].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You think that log that was classified or that document that was classified was sort of the result of that direction

from Mr. Belger?

MR. CANOLES: If it was. Again, I'm reaching here, but--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Had you seen any drafts of NORAD's first press release which was basically their timeline of events from 9/11?

MR. CANOLES: I might have but I don't recall if I did. I recall, at some point, and it seems to me it was something I heard or read in the media, that I recall being surprised that they had better information than we had or their information actually made us look better than our own information did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Look better in the notification realm or--

MR. CANOLES: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You said you don't remember if you saw any drafts of the press release--

[Simultaneous conversation.]

MR. CANOLES: I don't think I did.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you have any--I

think you said that you didn't have any direct interaction with Department of Defense. is that correct?

MR. CANOLES: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

MR. CANOLES: With one caveat. There was a DOD--there was an officer assigned to the Air Force who was on loan to FAA, that came up during the telephone conference I was running. That was the only interface I had.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. CANOLES: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c After the commission was formed, they started having hearings. If I'm not mistaken, I think their second set of hearings was in May of 2003. Did you attend any of their hearings?

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know if anybody from FAA attended any of the hearings?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. I was interviewed a time or two.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c By the commission?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. By the staff that supported the commission.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you testify--you didn't testify in the hearings.

MR. CANOLES: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you watch any of the hearings on TV?

MR. CANOLES: I probably did but I--I'm trying to recall any specifics I might have seen. If I didn't watch 'em, I at least saw 'em on the news. I certainly had an interest in them.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the (b)(6), (b)(7)c testified at the May 23rd, 2003 hearing, and during the hearing he testified that FAA provided notice to the Department of Defense about United 93 at 9:16.

Were you aware of that?

MR. CANOLES: I may have been but--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At the time, do you remember if you were aware of that?

MR. CANOLES: No. I don't remember.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you said you couldn't remember why or how you guys learned this but the 9/16 entry for United 93, from what we've heard from other folks, the reason you guys omit it from your timelines is because it's before the aircraft is even in distress. It's still flying normally. I think if you look at your summary there, it sort of indicates that.

MR. CANOLES: Yeah; clearly.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you had heard (b)(6), (b)(7)c testimony, or were aware of it during the commission hearing, would you have taken any steps to make sure that what was being relayed to the commission was correct, to kind of make a clarification or correction, maybe even to make Department of Defense know, hey, you know, what (b)(6), (b)(7)c just said's not right?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah, I think lacking a direct interface with somebody in DOD at that point in time, I'm--I probably would have reported to my superiors that hey, what (b)(6), (b)(7)c said yesterday was inaccurate, and spell it out. I

don't know if I didn't see it, wasn't made aware of it, what the deal was. But I think, yeah, I would have done that if I'd a thought it was significant.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you ever recall becoming aware that he testified inaccurately? Do you ever recall that coming to your attention, or anyone in your staff, that being discussed?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] got a handful of questions about American 77 basically.

Outside of a log or a document with some times on it, are you aware if FAA reviewed any other documents from the Department of Defense, or listened to any tapes, of transcripts of tapes?

MR. CANOLES: I'm not aware of it and I probably would have been, so, to my knowledge, no.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In this NEADS log, the first reference to American 77 as a flight number is actually not until 13:34, or 9:34 Eastern time.

MR. CANOLES: Right. Well, I see it there. Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And that time isn't

included in any of the summary documents, the timelines or chronologies that you guys put together. We were wondering why that is.

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. Now is that the one we didn't have any time for? So we used 9:24--9:24, not 9:34. Okay. This may have been my error. I may have assumed that this was American 77 or someone else may have assumed that and given me that data.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The 9:24 entry?

MR. CANOLES: Yeah. Again, I--and I'm saying this in my own defense, I didn't have the luxury of taking these with me some place and studying them in depth, or having somebody else look at 'em for me. What I recall is a very brief meeting where I scratched down some numbers off a this thing and, you know, it's very possible I misread it. Or again, somebody could a handed me four numbers and said these are the times. But I simply don't recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you work with Darlene Freeman in sort of preparing some of the

briefing packages that she was working on for anticipated testimony?

MR. CANOLES: I did, to a small extent. I think Tony did most of it. I was aware that she was doing it. Darlene and I were engaged to be married at this point in time. We've since parted ways. But I was certainly aware that she was working on it. I remember, early on, you know, giving her information. In all likelihood, I gave her a copy of this but I think Tony did most of the follow-on work with her as I recall, and again, that's because I was outta here a lot and tied up with other things.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is it safe to say that you guys then determined from the paperwork that you looked at, that FAA notified Department of Defense earlier than 9:34 then? It was your belief that it actually happened at 9:24 versus 9:34?

MR. CANOLES: I must--

[Start tape side B.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c on May 23rd, 2003, also testified that FAA notified

Department of Defense about American 77 at 9:24.

Is it your recollection that at that time you guys would have believed that that was the correct time for American 77? That's what you have in all your timelines.

MR. CANOLES: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Why wouldn't you guys include a reference to the 9:34 entry about letting DOD know that American 77 was lost?

MR. CANOLES: I don't know. Again, my suspicion is if we mistakenly thought that the 24 was the correct time of notification, that's what we were focused on, not the subsequent--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Conversations?

MR. CANOLES: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the things that we were curious about is there's an entry here that folks believe, at 9:16, is for United 93, and FAA even, you know, internally, began to suspect that that's not correct and they make reference to that in some of these summary chronologies.

I don't know if I'm going to find them

real quickly, but there's references to that. You know, NEADS log reflects 9:16 but we not necessarily believe that's true. So you guys suspect, that some of this data even in the NEADS log, might not be correct, and sort of given that, at the time, we're wondering why you guys didn't take some more steps to look further into like this 9:24 entry and such.

MR. CANOLES: Well, first of all, I haven't seen the document you're talking about where we raise that concern. I don't know who generated that. Is that--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It was a part of Freeman's [inaudible].

MR. CANOLES: Okay. I don't know. This could a been, you know--again, I don't really this specific example but this could have been part of Tony's follow-up work with her. It could have been something, that during a later review after that timeline was prepared, somebody looked at it and said, "Wait a minute, this can't be right." I don't remember ever being made aware of it or

challenged to go back and run it down.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Within the FAA, the best we can kind a piece back together from our investigation is that there were essentially two people who have any recollection specifically about seeing a log that is similar to this NEADS log. That's you and Mr. Griffith.

And you even indicated today, and in a prior interview, that you reviewed this or something similar to what we've shown you here today and copied down some times from it.

And one of the things we're wondering is that if you intentionally misinterpreted any of these times on here to FAA's favor?

MR. CANOLES: Absolutely not. I would never have done that. And understand, my discipline is in accident investigations and my training by the agency and my own personal standards are that I owe my leadership, as bad as the story might be, into every case, so I've got a lotta years of experience of going in and saying, We really screwed this up because--and I would have

had no hesitation whatsoever to [inaudible].

You kind a get used to being a bearer of bad news after a while.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there anything else that you'd like to add along the lines of what we're talking about today, that you think is relevant?

MR. CANOLES: I'm sorry I can't be more helpful. I wish my recollection were better. These are very small points during a very busy time, I might say. I wish I could be more helpful.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, thank you. It's 2:09. We're going to go ahead and turn the tape off.

[Whereupon, at 2:09 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case No. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

STEVEN FERRANTE

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c SPECIAL AGENT

Wednesday, August 31, 2005

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is August 31st, 2005. The time is 3:07 p.m. We're at FAA headquarters building 10A, room 1024, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere, that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today, we're interviewing Tony Ferrante. Mr. Ferrante, will you please acknowledge you're aware this interview's being tape recorded.

MR. FERRANTE: I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you raise your right hand.

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

MR. FERRANTE: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give

your full name, spelling your last for the record.

MR. FERRANTE: Full name is Anthony Steven Ferrante, F as in Frank, e-r-r-a-n-t-e.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what's your current position?

MR. FERRANTE: I'm the manager of the Air Traffic Oversight Division. Excuse me. Safety Oversight Division.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is Dave Canoles your boss then?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes; he is.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c As I mentioned prior to starting the tape recording, that we're just doing some follow-up, because we've interviewed you, I think a couple a times previously. We still had a couple a questions about certain things and we're kind a confused about some stuff, so we're hoping you can help us out with some of that.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Now I know you said previously, I think a couple a times, that you had not seen the NEADS log.

MR. FERRANTE: Is that the handwritten log?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you also mentioned that you had gotten the Department of Defense notification numbers from Dave Canoles. Is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: What we did was we went through primarily FAA sources whenever we could. For example, with American 11 we had pretty good times that were on our recorded lines, FAA recorded lines, with the efforts that were taking place at Otis Air Force Base to scramble fighters, and so forth.

So we tried to use times that we could validate using FAA sources, and for certain things that we didn't have times, then my recollection is that we got those from Dave. In fact I have this vision in my head--and excuse me for one second.

I remember, we had a conversation and Dave had a portfolio, and he had to put his foot up like

this cause he's looking at his portfolio and he was reading from that portfolio some a the times that we had in there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I think one of the times that may have been initially presented as a notification time for United 93 was 9:16.

Does that sound familiar to you at all?

MR. FERRANTE: No. If I saw it again, then perhaps I would recognize it, but--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, see, United 93 was the one in Somerset, Pennsylvania?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Correct. I think one a the time--9:16 is listed as a log entry and it had been portrayed as being a notification time for United 93.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you guys didn't include it in the summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11th, 2001, which I understand you were sort of the principal architect for.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you know why you didn't include that?

MR. FERRANTE: I was probably not aware of it at the time that we developed this. We worked--let's see. On September 11th itself, I was in Chicago. I got back on the 12th at probably around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, 4:00 o'clock in the morning. I was here about 8:00 o'clock in the morning on that day and I think that we started in in real earnest, in putting together a chronology of all the events, some time Wednesday afternoon or perhaps Thursday morning, and we worked on it through the weekend, and I think that we printed that edition of it on the Monday following September 11th.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Was this September 17th? I don't know if that's--

MR. FERRANTE: That--yes. That would make--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is that Monday?

MR. FERRANTE: -- [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know if Dave Canoles presented 9/16 to you as a time in the NEADS log and that you guys determined it was inaccurate? Do you know if that was the case?

MR. FERRANTE: No. I don't. A lotta the times were estimated times that were based on personnel statements. Some a the times we didn't have at all.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, we're just kind a focusing on FAA notification to the Department of Defense times.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's all we're kind of--that's what we're kind a narrowed down to at this point, so--and the point of reference that you guys use and cite in all of your chronologies is the Northeast Air Defense Sector Log. NEADS log. Just to kind a help you.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Does that sound familiar or--

MR. FERRANTE: That is--yeah. I remember

those times in Northeast Air Defense Sector logs that indicated--and I think what the word is that we used in the report. So those times would have had to have come from Dave, with the exception that perhaps with American 11, we used it from an FAA source as well, or that we had it from Boston Center, the time that NEADS said that they were notified. Okay. We are on United 93.

And a quick scan through here, it doesn't appear that we made any notifications other than to the Great Lakes Regional Office, and that was at 9:39, and according to what I'm reading through here, 9/16 would have been impossible for us to have notified the military because I don't think we knew of it.

In fact at 9:25, United checked in on Cleveland Center frequency indicating, you know, it was normal. That was the third radar sector to communicate with them and it was routine.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So that document is prepared on September 17th. I think there's some date references in the footers, a couple places.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So it would be fair to say that on September 17th, at least, you guys would have recognized that 9:16 was not a good time as noticed for United 93.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Cause it's still a routine flight basically at that point--

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --as far as you guys could determine.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there any reason why you guys would find any--

[Pause.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Any reason we would find that any of the other entries in the Department of Defense NEADS log would be suspect as the 9/16 entry was?

MR. FERRANTE: If we used their times, that we couldn't validate with this record, then we would have--caused us to say, okay, something's

wrong here, and either our records indicate what somebody else's records indicate. But I had never seen the NEADS logs and so it was impossible for us to make that correlation.

Now I don't know where 9/16 would have come from, or where 9/16 was briefed as having been notification, but in my estimation, we'd a flagged that and said it couldn't have happened, because at 9:25 communications [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. You would have known that on September 17th--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --the date of that summary of air traffic hijacking notes.

MR. FERRANTE: We tried to be as factual as we could and as accurate as we could in this development and, in fact, in many cases we have to use times that were estimated, because certain things we had to take from what a supervisor in a personnel statement wrote, for example, or in the case of United 93, I think that it was some time after 10:00 o'clock in the morning where we had

another aircraft report a puff of smoke, and we used that as an approximate crash site [?], because we didn't have radar tracking on [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you don't recall any specific discussion about the 9/16 time?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Whether it was accurate, inaccurate. You don't recall that at all?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I recognize that you didn't see the NEADS log but you were presented with data--correct?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That purported to have come from the NEADS log, because the two flights that you do reference a notification time for in the summary of air traffick hijack events, you source back to the NEADS log; is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct. So, for example, this is a--back to American 11, and according to our record, at 0840, straight up, it

says Northeast Air Defense Sector NEADS logs indicate they were notified by the FAA of the events concerning American 11.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think there's a similar entry but a different time for United 175 in there.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct. It says at 0905 Northeast Air Defense logs indicate they were notified, and unfortunately, that was about two minutes after the impact had occurred.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you recall anybody being tasked with cross-referencing tail numbers from any logs--

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --in connection with the tasking, of putting the timelines together?

MR. FERRANTE: No. In fact the first time I--and I didn't even think of it, to be honest with you. In our business, we did the air traffic investigation of events. Another organization called AAI, which is the Accident Investigation Group, generally referenced flights based on tail

numbers. But all of our reported referenced flights based on flight numbers.

So an accident occurs today, the old air traffic group I was with would generate an alert bulletin and we would say United 93, whereas AAI may come out and say UA 411, UA--whatever the registration number was, and in parentheses they would indicate United 93.

So they did the only cross-referencing that I was aware of then, looking at what a registration number was. The records I had access to at that point generally would not have included any tail numbers. It would have been in the original flight plan that was filed, that would have been in what we called our bulk store systems, that the airlines filed in themselves. But it wouldn't have shown up, like, for example, on the flight strips from New York Center or any other air traffic [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Would you have had access to the bulk flight data to retrieve the flight numbers--or tail numbers for each of the

flights?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes, but we would have had to have done that through a field facility or through a flight service station.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Do you have any recollection of tasking anybody with that?

MR. FERRANTE: To my knowledge, we never did that in any of the accident investigations I worked through.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In the summary document there, why was United 93's notification time omitted from the summary?

MR. FERRANTE: Well, in reading through this--I mean, there's no time indicated at all, which would indicate to me that we just weren't aware of any notifications that took place for the aircraft.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And certainly after September 11th, Doug Gould, I think he worked on your staff--is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I show you this

e-mail [?] [inaudible].

MR. FERRANTE: I'm not sure what the first one is in reference to, November 8-5-8-3 (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. The second document is a draft transcript from Cleveland.

MR. FERRANTE: Rough draft of United 93.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Jump down to 10:07 Eastern on there.

MR. FERRANTE: Let's see. At 14:07--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible].

MR. FERRANTE: --it says that it's a conversation between G-O-B [ph] and Huntress [ph] Military. The line was activated at 14:03 but at 14:07 they're talking about a bomb.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Which air traffic?

MR. FERRANTE: United 93.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: You know, the conversation goes: Did you scramble yet? Yes. [inaudible] and Toledo. Did you really? Could you give us the lat/lon.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And who's Huntress?

MR. FERRANTE: Huntress is a military facility that I believe operated off the coast of the United States, primarily in the New York area.

There are two terms that I've heard many times in my career, in doing the--on the East Coast. One is called Giant Killer. The other is Huntress. I'm not sure if they're one and the same. I think that they're all part of what's also referred to as Baykate [?]. We didn't have a lot of interaction with the military in the role that--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What is the date of that e-mail there?

MR. FERRANTE: 9-15-2001, 9:05 p.m.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And that's addressed to Doug Gould; right?

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this is a copy of--and I know you said you didn't see it--but this is a copy of the Northeast Air Defense Sector log. Look at that entry right there, at 14:07.

MR. FERRANTE: Bomb onboard United 93 over Pittsburgh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I wonder why you guys didn't include that information in your summary.

MR. FERRANTE: I couldn't tell you when Doug actually opened this e-mail or was aware of it. Doug primarily was working on radar, recreations of what had taken place. Let's see. 9/15 would have been four days after, so that would have been Friday, I believe. Friday or Saturday.

On Saturday, I distinctly recall we had a projector set up with a laptop computer, and we were trying to go through each one of the flights, in chronological order, and there was myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] did a lot of the actual typing on this.

Doug was there, he was still primarily working with radar replay, and--I'm sorry-- (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] was also there. He was working on a PowerPoint presentation that showed the sketches of the four flights as they went across.

So I don't know if Doug was even aware he had this or was aware that what we were doing at

the time, even though we were right next to him.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It looks like Doug actually asked for the information from the e-mail. It says this is the information you requested.

MR. FERRANTE: Attached a brief you requested concerning United 93 military interface and November 853 Yankee.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Unrelated aircraft.

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. That call sign doesn't ring a bell at all.

Also, we can confirm we're showing United 93 accident to occur at 14:03, and I think when we printed this book, what did we use for a time?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 10:04 probably, or maybe 10:03 and a lotta seconds, or something like that.

MR. FERRANTE: 10:04, time approximate, primary radar terminated 10:07 in response to a request from Cleveland controller, November two Victor Foxtrot, reported observing puffs of smoke in the vicinity of United 93 last known position.

So I would suggest that if we knew this

was the time, we'd have changed this entry to match what Cleveland Center was telling us because now we have an official FAA record indicating it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I mean, we have a very strong belief that you guys did know and the reason we think that is threefold. Number one, the e-mail message and the date of the e-mail message, we found a copy of that draft transcript on the S drive, or--

MR. FERRANTE: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --which reported to us as having come from the S drive, with a date on it, roughly, I think it was September 17th or so. So that puts it sort of in the time period that you guys are working on that.

Also this is the grid chronology which we've talked about before at prior interviews. But a draft of the grid chronology contains 10:08 as the notification time for United 93, but it was taken off, and the final version has N/A.

I think during prior interviews you had indicated to us, as long as you had a source for

some information you guys felt comfortable with it, and in the case of United 93 you actually had two different sources. You had the NEADS log Canoles [?] reviewed and provided information to you guys on.

You also had your own transcript of what happened. And we're really trying to understand exactly why it is that you guys elected not to use that information when you had not just one but two different sources for it.

MR. FERRANTE: Well, this is the first time I can recall ever knowing this e-mail existed. So I don't think I've ever seen this before, although I did have access to the share drive, I mean, I was part of that same organization. I wouldn't purport to tell you half of what was on there at that point.

My recollection is that we had (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] were developing this part of it, and are either of those dated as far as when we created them?

MR. FERRANTE: September 18th; a day later.

MR. FERRANTE: A day later.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c A day later from the summary document.

MR. FERRANTE: The only thing I can think of, why that time's not in there, is we didn't have it at that time or it was an oversight on our part, because if we're trying to show notification times, if we had one it would certainly, should have gone in here.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What about the fact that the time is after the plane crashed? Would that have played a role in it?

MR. FERRANTE: No, because we show--we acknowledge in here that with United 175, we notified the military after the airplane impacted the trade center.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you don't think that played any role in the--that wasn't one of the--a reason?

MR. FERRANTE: No. If we were doing that, I would suggest to you that we would have eliminated this other one as well. At 9:03 is when

we show second impact at the World Trade Center. At 9:05 is when the NEADS logs indicate they were notified [inaudible]. Yeah, we put that in the log, in our record of the events. So if we knew of it, I would suggest it was an oversight. I don't think we knew of it at the time.

[Simultaneous conversation.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --cause you have 10:08, though--

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --but on a draft, the very next day, for a document that was finalized the very next day. So I'm just, I guess I'm just confused. I'm really trying to see if you can help us understand.

MR. FERRANTE: Now this, we would have probably have been finished with this when we left here Sunday evening, which would have been-- September 17th? If we printed it on the 18th. Saturday, September 17th at 6:30 p.m.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, Saturday's the 15th, I think.

MR. FERRANTE: Oh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So the 16th would be Sunday. The 17th would be Monday.

MR. FERRANTE: Right. I could tell you by noon, Monday, we'd already gotten copies back from the printer, because (b)(6), (b)(7)c had the whole package on his desk, he brought it to a gentleman named (b)(6), (b)(7)c who worked in a graphics group that's still located on the sixth floor of this building and has been published, you know, printed, so that they were in color and looked at it, because the very first time I saw one, I commented on the fact that it said Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, indicating it's air traffic hijack for these aircraft. I think I would have changed that wording, had I known that was going on the cover, but it was already printed at that point.

And that was, you know, probably [inaudible] but by noon, on Monday, I know that they were done.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So you're thinking that the reason United 93, the

notification time is omitted from the summary, and then ultimately from this grid timeline as well is an oversight?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also--

MR. FERRANTE: I don't think any of us would have intentionally overlooked that. It's just not in our character and what we were trying to do. Now--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There wasn't any discussion that you participated in or you were told about where folks were directed or thought to omit the time because it would be embarrassing to the FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: No; no.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There's another one that's after the crash.

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Another one.

MR. FERRANTE: You know, the original discussion I heard about notifications to the military was something along the lines of, you

know, they started this telcon that they had down in the other corner of the tenth floor, and they were trying to keep a log of all these things in there, and there was a (b)(6), (b)(7)c named (b)(6), (b)(7)c and there were some people who said, well, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in the room, so that would constitute notification to the military.

We didn't use that as an argument that [inaudible] the military was present during the discussions, so--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You don't have to hold all these things; just hold the summary.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In the summary of air traffic hijack events, there's also not a notification time for American 77.

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But in your, in this grid timeline, you know, which is dated the next day, there is a notification time for American 77. It says 9:24. And it's also sourced back to the NEADS log. For that one as well, we're wondering

why you didn't include that time in the summary document.

MR. FERRANTE: The only thing I can think is that at the time that we were finalizing and printing this, the group that was doing this, which was primarily myself, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and

(b)(6), (b)(7)c other people were working on this and we may have not communicated amongst ourselves that we had this kind of a timely note [?].

You know, in terms of American 77, up until probably--I don't know, maybe months after the event, is when I learned that we knew more information about that radar source that had been out of service, because I think this says that, you know, we didn't have any tracking at all.

But, in reality, we did have tracking in Indianapolis Center, and which that's from a different, what we call sort box [?].

And the way the sequence of events that I recall is, you know, the controller was making routine transmissions, so everything was fine, and then he had a simultaneous loss of radar and radio

contact, which by our own definition leads to the grounds of an accident and requires notification.

So notification was made to the Great Lakes Regional Office, which is the normal flow of it.

Now somehow, that information from Great Lakes was transmitted either electronically or via voice to all of their facilities, and then sometime after that they got a call from a sheriff's office or a police office reporting an aircraft that had been down, and in our minds that like confirmed the fact that the airplane had crashed.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c On the 17th, when you're putting the summary together, you have the NEADS log, you're citing it and you're sourcing it for two of the aircraft. But you're not using the 9:24 entry for American 77, for some reason.

MR. FERRANTE: I didn't have a NEADS log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you had information that--

MR. FERRANTE: Right. We had times that I believe we got from (b)(6), (b)(7) on when notifications were

made on certain aircraft. But I don't think we had a complete picture at that point, not the group that was actually preparing the summary of events.

But it's apparent to me, looking at this, that our office had the information but I don't know that it was shared amongst the right people.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible] had a partial picture of the data from the NEADS log when you're putting together the summary, if I understand you correctly?

MR. FERRANTE: I think we had the times that Dave was aware of from the NEADS log, because I remember distinctly that he was--he had a portfolio and he gave us some of the times that were based on the NEADS log. So I think that while we were typing this, if we had had that, we'd a put that in there.

Now if you look--let me give you this back--these sections on the individual aircraft, not in book form but like on each individual one, these were being sent upstairs almost as fast as we can develop them. I can tell you (b)(6), (b)(7)c at several

points, was nearly exasperated with us because--How much longer? How much longer? because the administrator wanted information and we were trying to be as factual as we could and yet produce these as quick as we could.

So that's why there's a disconnect between who's doing what activities cause there was an awful lot of stuff to gather in those initial days.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So the information might not a necessarily been collated.

MR. FERRANTE: We may have had it but we didn't have it in the right place.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And you were rushed to put it together.

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. This was the kind a stuff (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] was doing. This is the PowerPoint presentation I referred to.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Radar depictions.

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. Well, it's the flight plan [?] depiction in PowerPoint. It's not a radar. And I know it's in that book somewhere, but there are actual photos or green shots of what

the radar showed at the time. That was the kind a stuff that Doug was doing, and of course he was also working with the FBI and other elements, you know, in providing information. The NTSB was chomping to get information and at one point the FBI told us we couldn't release it until we had their approval.

But meanwhile, we had all of these summaries that we were being, we were using, and we did them one summary at a time. So if we look at American 11, for example, that was the first one. We would go through and we would finish everything we had with American 11, and then the next one we would have worked on was United 175, and what time we finished which one, I don't know, but I know Dave came by several times and needed information on this, or needed a package on this or needed a screen shot from this one.

Because I know we had a couple of, not really heated conversations, but they were tense because of the pressure we were under at the time in terms of, you know, I've got to have this known

[?] and we just didn't have the information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In one of our prior interviews with you about the 10:08 timeframe, or time, notification time for United 93, you had indicated that it might have been taken out of these grid timelines because it was past the point when United 93 had already crashed, and that you guys might have taken it out because of that. Why would that have been, when you kept the notification time in for United 175, when that was past the crash time?

MR. FERRANTE: I don't know.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you have any--I think you already said that you did not have any direct interaction with the Department of Defense after 9/11. Is that correct?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct. I had one conversation with (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] and it was only because he was making arrangements to get somebody to come over to actually watch a replay of an event. (b)(6), (b)(7)c was--at that point, I don't know if he had left the FAA and was working for the Department

of Defense or not. But (b)(6), (b)(7)c has been a long-time FAA employee that I have known.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c He was like a liaison at the--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --Department of Defense for FAA?

MR. FERRANTE: He may have been at that point; yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c On September 18th, NORAD issued a press release with a timeline of September 11th. Are you aware of that? Did you see any drafts of that press release?

MR. FERRANTE: No. The only press releases I saw, or drafts of is I had a copy of the administrator's draft testimony, that I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)c had put together and sent to us to review, and we did a review of that and I recall that because there was information in there that she had ordered the shutdown of the air traffic system, and shortly after that we got a copy of Secretary Minetta's remarks, whereas he had ordered

the shutdown of the air traffic system.

So we went back to (b)(6), (b)(7)c and said the secretary's going to say that he did this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you guys find out who really did it?

MR. FERRANTE: In my mind, Dave Canoles did it along with a gentleman named (b)(6), (b)(7)c and that today, if you ask me the question, I would tell you that it was done almost simultaneously by a number of individuals, including the airlines themselves, because at the time they had what we called the never-ending telcon at that point, where (b)(6), (b)(7)c who was the division manager in the Eastern region was coordinating for a ground stop and asking Dave to do that, and Dave gave him the go-ahead to shut down the arrivals and departures, basically, throughout the Eastern region or all of the New York area.

I know at that point, now, American Airlines had already stopped their own and they were trying to land their flights. United Airlines had already stopped their departures and were

trying to land flights.

So I think, collectively, though, there's a lotta people who were in the process of, or thought they were in the process of shutting down the nets. So although, initially, I would have told you, Dave Canoles, hands down, was the first person to shut down the nets, I think a lot of it happened simultaneously and I think a lotta people believed that they were the catalyst for the closure of nets.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you hadn't seen the press release or a draft, or anything to that effect. Did you attend any of the 9/11 Commission hearings?

MR. FERRANTE: I attended the first one that was conducted at Otis Air Force Base. I'm sorry. The hearings?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes; the hearings.

MR. FERRANTE: No. I attended an interview at Otis Air Force Base when the 9/11 Commission was interviewing [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Did you watch

any of the hearings on television?

MR. FERRANTE: No. I might have seen snippets of it in the news.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In May 2003, the Department of Defense testified or some former officials from the Department of Defense testified at the hearing and presented a timeline of events from 9/11. Are you aware of that testimony?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you aware of the Department of Defense inaccurately testifying about FAA providing notice for United 93 at 9:16 during any of their testimony?

MR. FERRANTE: No. The only inaccuracy in any of the times that I know of is in the crash time of American 77, the Pentagon, because we had one time of what we called the crash time, which was the loss of radar returns we had from the aircraft, and there was a different time that was being used, that was based on surveillance cameras that were available, some time after the fact, parking lot cameras.

So my thought at that point was, well, the FAA radars are synchronized to the atomic clock. I couldn't tell you where the parking lot cameras are or not. But that was when we lost radar footage [?].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think FAA's time clocks were a little more [inaudible]

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know if anybody at FAA, that was working on putting together the chronologies of September 11th, if they reviewed any tapes or transcripts from the Department of Defense?

MR. FERRANTE: None that I know of.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you participate in preparing briefing packages, along with Darlene Freeman, after 9/11?

MR. FERRANTE: I had one meeting with Darlene--not really a meeting. I didn't really even know Darlene up to that point. She had formerly been like ATS 2 but had been gone for some time. I know I had to bring her a package of

information. I think I brought her these books when she was in a conference room, it used to be the old ARA conference room, I think that were [inaudible] morning meetings now, so it's probably called something different. But that was the only interaction I had with her during this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you provide her with some information--

[Simultaneous conversation.]

MR. FERRANTE: I think it was--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and you think you probably provided her--

MR. FERRANTE: --probably these books. I think it was Monday and, you know, because I walked in, there was a room full of people in there, I couldn't tell you who they were, but I think Dave asked me to bring her, you know, a copy of this or maybe even multiple copies of this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you aware that there is a NEADS log entry at 9:34 Eastern time, that indicates FAA provided them with information that American 37 was lost at that time?

MR. FERRANTE: Let me look that up in the book. That doesn't ring a bell with me. But did it make it into our summary?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't think so. I was going to ask why.

MR. FERRANTE: What time was that?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 9:34 Eastern. 1334 Zulu.

MR. FERRANTE: I think from our summary, at that point we were pretty much convinced that the aircraft had crashed, we, and I think the FAA, because at 9:15 it says, This time approximate based on personal statements from GIB of Indianapolis Center. The ops manager--

[Start tape side 1B.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --54. We just turned the tape over. So you were reading from--

MR. FERRANTE: This is reading from the 9:15 entry in the summary we prepared, and it's with Indianapolis Center operations manager requested the traffic management personnel notify Air Force search and rescue of the missing and

possibly downed aircraft, relating to American 77.

The ops manager also contacted West Virginia state police, advising them of a possible downed aircraft, and asked if they had any reports of a downed aircraft.

And if NEADS has information that at 9:34 Eastern--we notified them. By that point we're already in process of notifying the ops supervisor of, for the White House and the U.S. Secret Service on an unknown aircraft location. And from what others have told me of this event, and this is told me like right after the event of September 11th, they were using a system called a Traffic Situational Display.

They had big screens out at our command center in Herndon, and according to that display, the flight of American 77 continued westbound for like an hour after it had already impacted the Pentagon.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What is that traffic system display pulling data from?

MR. FERRANTE: What it does is it gets its

information from host computers throughout the system and it generates flight plans, and then it goes to a site in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where it's all mixed together because it's twenty different centers of it that are feeding this information and it shows active and proposed tracks.

So if the track had been active, they're gonna continue it, because it knows it's gone to Los Angeles or San Francisco, somewhere on the West Coast, where that flight was headed to. And it's just gonna continue to depict him on its last known route of flight.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c With regards to the information that Dave Canoles provided to you from the NEADS log, did he provide it to you in bulk, meaning like, oh, here's the information I've gotten from the NEADS log? Or was it piecemeal, like you would go up there and say, hey, do you have some times for American 11 or--

MR. FERRANTE: Actually, I think it was more that Dave came downstairs to where we were.

Dave had a series of meetings throughout, you know, the first few days after those events, where he was gone most of the time.

But he would come down when he needed a copy of something or how we're doing with something, and, you know, I would say, well, we don't have a time for this or we don't know when this occurred, and we don't have a record of it, and that's what I recall as he looked into his portfolio and he gave us a time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It would be specific to an aircraft?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c He didn't provide you with here's a sheet of paper with all the times I've gotten from that?

MR. FERRANTE: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c In our second interview with you, you had indicated that there was no way for you to verify with FAA's records what the NEADS logs were depicting. I wonder if you could explain why you think that's the case.

MR. FERRANTE: Because in some a the cases where, for example, with American 11, we had time from FAA time source material, Boston Center, that they were on the phone with Otis Air Force Base requesting a scramble. So that was an easy time that we could say, okay, we've notified the military at this point.

But without access to the NEADS logs, we had no way to do any comparisons of what, you know, our material said or their material said. So when we put this together, we tried to base this on whether we had an FAA source that indicated this information, i.e., our voice tapes, radar data, supervisory statements based on their recollections, and so forth.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You did have access to the NEADS log. You keep saying you don't have access to the NEADS log but you guys did.

MR. FERRANTE: I did not have access to the NEADS log when we put this together. The first time I actually saw the NEADS log was when John Azarella [ph] showed it to me during the 9/11

Commission meeting.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. But you sourced the NEADS log in your document twice.

MR. FERRANTE: And I'm sure that we had to get those times from Dave, and we did that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's how you would have done it. But you could have verified the times that Dave gave you with your own records. No?

MR. FERRANTE: We tried.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you saying that when you could verify them, then you felt good about them and you would use them, or--

MR. FERRANTE: I think that if our logs and the NEADS log showed the same thing, then we probably wouldn't have referenced NEADS log indicate, because we would have had an FAA source that said what we did, we, the FAA, based on our information. But what we didn't have, time-sourced information that was ours, we tried to annotate where that information came from, i.e., it came from a NEADS log, it came from a personnel

statement. It didn't come from an official FAA source that I could play back a rerecording of that event and let you listen.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. And you also said that the support that you guys had for the notification times, meaning FAA's notification of DOD times were sketchy at best, why were you describing them that way?

MR. FERRANTE: Because I don't think we had--at least I had access to any of those times that were in there while this was under development. Even though our office may have, i'm not aware of having those as we create this.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c "Those" meaning--

MR. FERRANTE: Meaning the chart that you have there with those times. So the times that we were getting--now remember, all of this information that we're first gathering is the actual voice recordings of the controllers who are, either have United on frequency or are trying to initiate, you know, communications with United, or any of the other aircraft. None of those rerecordings that we

went through, and there were hours and hours and hours of them, had any kind of notifications of anybody, with the exception of Boston Central.

So our information on notification was sketchy at best. It was taken from, you know, personnel statements, or what Dave told us on a time [?], with the exception of American 11.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what about Cleveland Center? You're thinking the guys just didn't--even though they sent that over, you guys didn't review it in time to include it?

MR. FERRANTE: I know I didn't review it in time to include it. I don't know that we, as a collective group, I could say that for all of them, because Doug may have very well opened it that evening but may not have thought it was pertinent to what we were doing at the time. He might have been using it for something he was doing.

Or he could have got it at the time and handed it direct to (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who I believe was working on this chart, that we didn't reconcile with this at that time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This chart. You're talking about the grid timeline--

MR. FERRANTE: The grid time.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and this is the summary of hijack events?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you could do it all over, what would you do differently?

MR. FERRANTE: A lotta things. First off, if I could do it all over, I know now that there was a tactical net that was set up between FAA security, and I don't know exactly who's on there, but other elements of the military. That was located up here on the 10th floor of what we now refer to as the Washington Operations Center.

I'd put somebody in there, because it was a way to get realtime information of what was taking place and what was going through.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're talking about while the event's unfolding?

MR. FERRANTE: While the events were unfolding.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Let's focus on like after, like reconstruction, just kind a what you're doing now in some respects; is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes. I think that if we could have done it all over again, we'd have selected the questions. But I would tell you, at the time, I don't know that we knew to do anything different, because our job was air traffic investigation. We didn't focus on ever looking at a crash site. We looked at how the air traffic system performed in any given accident or operational error between a controller.

So that was our focus, was to listen to voice tapes and look at radar data, because that was really our universe. We had the ability to play back radar and the ability to play back voice, and we had the ability to merge them together. We didn't think to go out and see if supervisory communications had been reported as well, because in our line a work they generally weren't pertinent to an event.

If a controller is talking with an

aircraft that crashes, on September 10th of 2001, I would never have considered pulling a supervisory or traffic management position rerecording to see what took place there, because I was only focusing on those communications between the pilot and the controller and the radar data that [inaudible].

And I think we did a really good job at that. I don't think we were equipped or had the skills that were necessary in what we ended up going into in this investigation.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Just a little beyond what you guys were normally used to trying to accomplish.

MR. FERRANTE: Very much so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So like a military operations specialist position recording wouldn't have been something you would have ever listened to prior to--

MR. FERRANTE: Would have never listened to 'em. Wouldn't have even though to have listened to 'em, unless I had some information that I had to have that because there was a critical piece of

communication on it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So based on that e-mail, somebody in your group did think that that was a critical piece of information but whether it was listened to, or who listened to it--

MR. FERRANTE: Right. I would have really liked to see the message from Doug to (b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] that prompted the request, because in reading what came back, per your request, I don't know what Doug asked him for. Or what prompted Doug to think like that. Except that the question was, you know, go through and see what time you made any notifications to the military.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, wasn't the front office asking that question--what time did he call?

MR. FERRANTE: Not initially. Not initially. That's probably the first request we have, was probably late Friday or early Saturday.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c About that. About military notification.

MR. FERRANTE: About military

notifications.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That would have been before like the grid timeline is put together--

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and before you guys finalized the summary; right?

MR. FERRANTE: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So it could be Doug's asking the question cause the front office prompted it.

MR. FERRANTE: Very well could be. We got requests for information from basically everybody that was here at the time. A lot of our requests for information during that whole event came from a

(b)(6), (b)(7)c [ph] who used to be a special assistant. So she used to work in the front office with Bill, and, you know, where the request came from, often didn't know. But from our fourth floor vantage point, we seldom, if ever, had interactions with the tenth floor, except through

(b)(6), (b)(7)c and the air traffic organization.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh. Anything

else?

MR. FERRANTE: I think also, if we had it to do over again, I'd a said we can't do it in this short a time, because I can tell you that time constraints that we worked under to produce a lotta this were just incredible. I had people here between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock every morning, up until 10:30, 11:00 o'clock every night, and they were just exhausted.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you had said in a prior interview, that you guys followed the procedures in the BE20.11 order--

MR. FERRANTE: That was our--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(5), (b)(7)c --for pulling this stuff together; is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Sort of your "bible," so to speak.

MR. FERRANTE: That's correct. BE20.11 is--I don't remember exactly what it's called, but it deals with aircraft accident incident investigation. Now an air traffic incident, it's

like a pilot deviation or somebody broke an altitude, it isn't an event, such as this, that we would ever fallen into. And that deals with what information is required for [inaudible]. For example, we used the standard protocol of using five minutes before a first contact until five minute after last contact, because that's pretty much what we've been trained in forever.

Now if we had stayed with five minutes before first and last, and never broadened out, then I'd suggest this book would look a lot different then. So a lot of it was just trying to come up with it "on the fly."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You needed a guide to work from and that's what you guys followed, your standard procedure.

MR. FERRANTE: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I can't think of anything else right now.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So unless you have anything else that you'd like to add?

MR. FERRANTE: I have a question and you may have to refresh me with some of the material. We talked about United 93 and the NEADS log that shows a notification at, I think it was 9:34?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's American 77.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay. I got the times messed up in my head, then.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You had a question about that or--

MR. FERRANTE: Yeah. United 93 and the NEADS log were--and in fact you showed me the transcript that was done by Cleveland Center and the military--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Oh. That's the 10:08 notification time for United 93.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay. That was the one that referenced to a bomb [?].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's the most troubling for us, Tony, cause we're not getting--

MR. FERRANTE: I understand.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --any real clear explanations. You guys--I mean, within FAA and within AAT20, we can show that you guys had information to indicate a notification time from two separate sources, but--and even at one point you guys decide that, you know, hey, we have a time, and you put 10:08 in the grid timeline, and it's taken out and not used, and I don't know if anybody's really given us a very good explanation as to why that is. It just--it's not a good unanswered question.

MR. FERRANTE: I can tell you that the people who worked at AT20 at the time took an awful lotta pride in what they did and that's why they came out and they spent their entire days and nights here for basically two weeks following out of that, because we wanted to find out every bit of information we could to prevent this from ever happening again.

So one a the questions you had asked me was if this would be more favorable to the FAA.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you didn't

include.

MR. FERRANTE: If we didn't include it. And I think that if you look through--and I don't even know if these exists anymore. But if you look through the reports that we generated from AT20, in the years prior to September 11th, based on normal aircraft accidents, we didn't learn about how favorable it was gonna look to the FAA. There were times when we looked at accident cases and we would tell the Department of Justice write the check because we screwed up.

So it wasn't a thought we ever had--Is this gonna make us look bad, or is this gonna make us look good? We tried to be factual. And the only thing I can think is if we may have had an oversight, we might have had a piece of paper in that we didn't know we had. At least I didn't know we had. Because I would think that--and you can probably get this from a lotta different sources in here. The AT20 organization was probably more critical of the FAA and the air traffic organization than all of the air traffic

organization combined, because we really looked at we screwed up in some of these cases.

And this deals with accidents prior to. I mean, there were times when we would have almost shouting matches with some of our air traffic divisions, saying that they needed to drug test employees because they hadn't done their jobs correctly.

So we didn't look at this meaning favorable to all of us.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What AT20 was, essentially, the internal affairs for air traffic; is that right?

MR. FERRANTE: Correct; yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c From an operational standpoint.

MR. FERRANTE: And part of our role was getting the bad news. There were times when the FAA did wonderful things and there were times when the FAA screwed up, and I think we called it pretty accurate.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. I

appreciate your time.

MR. FERRANTE: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Thank you.

MR. FERRANTE: You know where to reach me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c: Go ahead and turn off the tape recorder. It's 4:16.

[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Case 031H-199-H001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

LAURA BROWN

BY

(b)(6), (b)(7)c, SPECIAL AGENT

(b)(6), (b)(7)c SPECIAL AGENT

Wednesday, August 31, 2005

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is August 31st, 2005. The time is 2:20 p.m. We're at FAA headquarters building 10A, suite 908, in Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c Also present is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. We're from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation and we're conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing, and elsewhere, that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today we're interviewing Laura Brown. Please acknowledge that you're aware this interview is being tape recorded.

MS. BROWN: Yes. I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Could you please raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

MS. BROWN: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Will you please give us your full name, spelling your last for the

record.

MS. BROWN: Laura J. Brown, B-r-o-w-n.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what's your current position?

MS. BROWN: Deputy assistant administrator for external communications.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c As I mentioned before we started the tape, that we just had a few more follow-up questions as we're kind a trying to get things wrapped up and we're hoping you can help us out with.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the documents that you had given us was a draft of a North American Air Defense Command press release.

MS. BROWN: Right. NORAD sent that to us, e-mailed it to me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c They e-mailed it to you?

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember who it was that sent that to you?

MS. BROWN: It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[inaudible] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

[Background noise.]

MS. BROWN: [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: He has since gone back to Canada, the Canadian Air Force is not working in towers [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

When we talked to you previously, you were one of the very first people we interviewed, so we didn't have as much information to ask questions about at the time so--but I think that you had indicated that you had handwritten, next to this, on this draft of the press release, it says United Flight 93, and then it says FAA notification to NEADS--

MS. BROWN: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and it says N/A. I think you had said that you--

MS. BROWN: At the time that, you know, I

went, since we didn't have any numbers in that space, I went to our air traffic folks and said do you know what time this happened, and that was the time they gave me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you think they gave you the 9:16? That's what you wrote on there.

MS. BROWN: Right. That's my handwriting.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Would you have communicated that information back to your point of contact at NORAD?

MS. BROWN: We were having--we had a lot of phone conversations at the time and I can't remember exactly but I--we discussed this timeline a number of times, and I think I probably told him look, you know, I went back and got, you know, the number I got was 9:16. I don't know what you have, but, you know, if asked, that's the number I'm going to use.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Their final version of the press release actually came out the next day and it stuck with, they stuck with N/A.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember anything about that?

MS. BROWN: I remember he said look, we don't have, you know, we don't have any record of that, or we're not--that record--but he said I can't get anybody to give me a time for that, and, you know, so we're just gonna go with that. I said fine, you know, cause we--it was a NORAD document, it wasn't an FAA document, and he wasn't asking me for, you know, my input in terms of changing the numbers. He was asking just--he was sharing it with me because it was what they were going to be giving out to the press.

And (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I had a relationship where we would try to--I mean, we had never spoken to each other before September 11th, we didn't know each other, I didn't know NORAD's phone number, I barely knew they existed, and after 9/11, partly because of this timeline sheet, we started calling each other and saying look, we don't want--because it was a situation where if NORAD had put something out or had started telling people something, and

then--and it was different from the numbers I had, and so I called them and said look, where are you guys getting these numbers? These aren't consistent with what we have.

And so he start--he and I started sharing things with each other, just so we'd know what the other one was saying, so--and we were also getting a lot of operational calls at that point. It was every night, there would be some incident where NORAD would scramble fighters or, you know, we would put up a temporary flight restriction somewhere and we--and for years, you know, until he left, and I continued this with other NORAD people, we tried to coordinate so that we're not pointing fingers at each other and not saying--because it was partly just because they have a lag time in getting operational information usually from the people who are deploying the fighter jets and we have a pretty direct and quick access to our operational air traffic people.

So sometimes he would call me and say hey, you know, did we scramble jets? and I said, well,

yeah, I'm hearing you did; you know. It was that kind a thing.

And so we were--initially, though, NORAD, other people at NORAD were out there saying, well, the FAA told us to do this or the FAA said do that, and, you know, I would calmly say we didn't ask you to do anything--stop saying that!

You know, so we tried to just increase the coordination, so that we weren't two agencies of the Federal Government out there saying different things and pointing a finger at each other, and that was sort of the goal Doug and I had in terms of the communication part of it.

So I mean, we shared stuff but, you know, he wasn't going to try to change anything that was an FAA product and I wasn't in a position to change anything that was a NORAD product, so--you know--nor did I want to. So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Who would you have spoken with at air traffic, that would have given you that information, the 9:16 information?

MS. BROWN: I don't remember. I mean, I

just don't remember. There were a lot of timelines that were being put out. We, you know, made efforts to get the best information and it seemed to change. I mean, over the course of several years it changed several times.

But I mean that's common when we get initial information. I call the ops center, I mean, I'm on call during the evening, every night of the week, and so I get press calls in the evening a lot, and a lotta times it's about an operation which, whether it's, you know, a security issue or some other issue with the plane, and I can tell you almost every incident I deal with, the initial information is wrong, and I tell that to reporters. They understand that, and I, you know, have accepted that over the years, is just--you know--even for major accidents, the information [inaudible].

It's happening during the hurricane right now where, you know, somebody'll say Jackson, Alabama when they meant Jackson, Mississippi, or, you know, I mean it's sometimes small things but

it's sometimes bigger things, too. So, you know, I wasn't surprised that initially, in the first few days after 9/11, we got information, the information changed, and was, you know, as they went through the data, it would change again, and, you know, as you get better information and the investigation progresses, you usually get more precise information.

So, I mean, I wasn't surprised when he changed it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What sort of information were you sharing with Mr. Martin?

MS. BROWN: Just, I mean, op--just basic information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Were you providing him with logs or--

MS. BROWN: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --anything like that? Or was it--

MS. BROWN: I didn't have logs; no. I mean, no, I--it would be just something like this, you know, any kind of thing would have been put out

to the press. You know, I wouldn't share anything internal with him. But if we were gonna do a press release, if we were gonna do, you know, anything that we would give out to the press, that would be the type of thing that I'd run by him, just--you know--in some cases if we were saying anything that had to do with NORAD, just wanted to make sure that was accurate, they would sometimes put out statements about, that said, it would refer to some air traffic thing in their statement and they would send it to me and say, Is this right? you know, and that's the kind of thing we would share.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This is just an excerpt from a larger document, it's titled Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11th, 2001.

Do you know if that would have been something you would have shared with Mr. Martin?

MS. BROWN: No. I don't think I even had this. Let me look at it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It was color too.

MS. BROWN: Oh, yeah, I have some of this. I don't know if I have all of this. No, this would

not be the kind a thing I would share with him.
No. This is an internal product. This was very
closely held. In fact--yeah. No; this was very
closely held. I don't even think this is the
original draft of this. I could be wrong. Yeah.

No, this, when they initially handed this
out at a meeting, they only gave it to--I was in a
meeting with (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the time--I
don't know if you've interviewed him. But he had a
copy of it and he had the only copy for, you know,
Public Affairs, and then he later made a copy for
me, but that was only--that was weeks after he got
his initial copy. I mean, it was very closely
held. That would not have been something I would
have shared.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

What about this chronology? This is--we
refer to it as the grid chronology.

MS. BROWN: I don't think I've ever seen
this. You know, I wish I--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you aware--

MS. BROWN: I wish I had this but I

didn't.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Are you aware of any chronologies similar to what we've already shown you, that you would have shared with Mr. Martin?

MS. BROWN: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Outside of the press release, were there any other documents that he shared with you?

MS. BROWN: Well, he maintained the NORAD Santa Web site, so he would share links to NORAD Santa with me. NORAD tracks Santa.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MS. BROWN: But I can't remember other things that he would share with me. I mean, I didn't even have electronic copies of that. Most of the communication I had with him was by phone or by e-mail. So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did he provide you with any logs?

MS. BROWN: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Were you aware that with regard to United 93, that at some point shortly after September 17th, or right around that date, that air traffic had determined that 9:16 was not a good time for notification?

MS. BROWN: I knew there was an issue about the notification time and I think we sort of stopped talking to reporters about the notification time because it became clear that there was an issue about it.

So--and I'm not sure, frankly, if I ever used that number with reporters or whether I just jotted it down on that sheet, you know, when I got it from somebody. So.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c When you would have learned that that was not a good time for United 93 would you have shared that information with Doug Martin?

MS. BROWN: I might have talked to him about it, I mean, because we were getting--I guess we were both very frustrated because we were getting, you know, phone calls from the press about

it and we were a little bit confused about why the exact time was such a crucial issue, because of all the circumstances and all. I mean, you know, we, as I think other people at the FAA have probably told you, we were focused on moving forward and trying to, you know, improve communications, and in fact, you know, my office had improved communications with NORAD a 100 percent.

I mean, I don't believe I'd ever even talked to them before 9/11. So we weren't--you know--nobody in the organization I think was focused on trying to take apart exactly what time anything happened because we were trying to just move ahead and, you know, fix the communications, going forward.

I mean, it was not--I understand that some people believed that the notification issue was of vital importance to learn the exact precise moment that happened but we had no operational reason to understand that number. Do you know what I mean?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh.

MS. BROWN: I mean, it would not help us

in any way, moving forward, to understand exactly what the number was, and, you know, I think of it--I was thinking of this meeting with you guys, thinking of this issue. It's kind of like Egypt Air 990, the flight that crashed near Rhode Island, that, you know, that they determined that the pilot deliberately, you know, crashed the plane.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right.

MS. BROWN: Well, the NTSB didn't do a full-scale investigation to find out what the mechanical causes of that accident were because it was pretty clear that the pilot had crashed the plane.

So they didn't go back and determine all the details because they--it wouldn't be useful to spend all the money to do that type of investigation, because it wouldn't help us in any way. Do you understand what I mean?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I do. After the commission was formed and started getting itself up off the ground, they started to have some hearings.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If I'm not mistaken, I think their second, or very close to second hearing was held in May of 2003.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I was wondering: Did you attend the hearings? I think it was May 22nd, and then there was another one on the 23rd.

MS. BROWN: I attended--if Administrator Garvey was at the hearing, I probably attended it. I mean, I'd have to look up exactly. But I think I went to all the hearings that FAA people testified at. I didn't go to the hearings that FAA people weren't testifying at.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: And I think there were two hearings I went--that I remember going to. One was when Administrator Garvey went up for the first time. I can't remember if Secretary Minetta was also at that one.

And then the second one I remember is when there's a panel of four people, Monte Belger, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

and Jeff Griffith

testified at. Those are the two hearings I remember. There may have been a third.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That you physically attended.

MS. BROWN: That I physically attended. I don't know, I mean I don't know what information you have about when, what the dates FAA people testified on.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't have them right at my fingertips. They're easy to get off their Web site.

MS. BROWN: Yeah; right. Well, one was--I think you're right--one was in May, one was in July?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Uh-huh. I think so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c June 2004.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c July.

MS. BROWN: Yeah; yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At the hearing that Jane Garvey testified at, that was in May of 2003.

Do you remember that some officials or former officials from Department of Defense also

testified?

MS. BROWN: Yes; yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And one of them was

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Does that sound familiar?

MS. BROWN: I remember a general. Was there a general there too? Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And (b)(6), (b)(7)c

presented a timeline.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh. And I was really upset. I recall trying to grab one a the NORAD guys afterwards, NORAD public affairs guys, and talking to him about the timeline. I don't remember all the specifics but I just remember, from the testimony, I was surprised by the timeline that they presented, and when I tried to talk to the NORAD guy about it, he just kind a "blew me off."

He was one a the people from NORAD, from Department of Defense public affairs in Washington, and I used to deal with Colorado Springs most of the time, where NORAD headquarters was. So--and I just remember trying to grab him, and he completely

"blew me off," and I just wanted to talk about the timeline issue cause I recall that the numbers that they gave in their testimony were different than what I had seen previously.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember which numbers were standing out for you?

MS. BROWN: No; no. I just remember that it was an issue. That was the main issue I remember from that hearing.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember who it was you were trying to talk to?

MS. BROWN: No. I don't think it was Rob Garza. The guy was very obnoxious to me and I remember saying something about, to one of the other NORAD guys afterwards about it, and he said, oh, don't feel bad, he's like that to everybody.

But I don't remember which public affairs guy it was.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c After sort of being, for lack of a better term, "blown off" by the DOD public affairs person, did you try to talk to anybody else at Department of Defense or NORAD

about that?

MS. BROWN: Well, I just have because--I must have talked to somebody else because I said--I probably have this guy's card somewhere. But, no, I said look, you know, I must have talked to somebody at NORAD, it's probably (b)(6), (b)(7)c and said look, you know, this guy, you know, I wanted to talk to him about this and he blew me off. But I can't remember the specifics of any conversations after that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember if any particular flight was at issue? Was there times concerning any particular flight? Or you're not sure?

MS. BROWN: It would probably have been flight 77 or flight 93, I can't remember, though, because, you know, I think most of what--I've never remembered the first two flights being--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c An issue.

MS. BROWN: --an issue, so--this is [inaudible] must have intercepted somebody.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This "closely held,"

as you describe it, summary of air traffic hijack events, do you know if this was used in the briefing package for any White House briefings that anybody might have attended?

MS. BROWN: I don't know. There were briefings at so many different levels, that I couldn't say with any certainty that--I mean, I have a briefing book that was prepared for the White House but--and I don't recall that being part of it. But there were briefings at a lotta different levels. I mean, they had classified briefings, they had briefings with, you know, bigger groups, they had briefings with smaller groups.

I just--I wasn't dealing directly with the White House, so that the person who prepared all the White House briefing materials would have been Mike Morris, and he would have been the person to talk to about that. He's in our security office.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Anything else on the chronologies?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm looking at something else, it was actually May 22nd that Jane Garvey testified before the commission.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And one of the things I think you had mentioned to us is that at the commission she was asked some questions about some things and she couldn't really recall very well, so she agreed to provide a--

MS. BROWN: A statement to Member Ben-Veniste afterwards; right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. And that you worked with, I believe it was Linda Schusseler and Lynne Osmus in typing something up.

MS. BROWN: Right. Uh-huh.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you--do you know, did you send that over to Jane Garvey or direct to the commission?

MS. BROWN: No. I gave it to Jane. She wanted to provide it to Member Ben-Veniste herself, because he had asked her for it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I think what

we've learned from some folks is shortly after that little statement was prepared, which is just like a paragraph or so, that some of the information contained in it about basically Sheryl Atkins's activities on that date, that some folks in FAA had learned that that wasn't necessarily accurate?

MS. BROWN: Well, I think--my understanding of the situation was that people either observed Sheryl or talked to her right after 9/11, and she said one thing, and then when we went and interviewed her--or maybe [inaudible], I don't know how it came out--but when she was talked to subsequently, she said she didn't remember being on the telcons that other people thought she had been on when that statement was prepared.

So I mean, I was under the impression, when we did that statement, that she had been on telcons--I mean, the people I talked to said she was on these telcons, she was in direct communication with DOD, and apparently when she was introduced in some capacity after that--I don't know if it was our interview or somebody else's

interview--she said she didn't remember. That's my understanding of what happened.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c How long after that statement was presented to the commission do you think it was before Sheryl was interviewed by somebody, that that came out?

MS. BROWN: I don't know. I have no idea. I wasn't involved in that part of it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: I mean, I wasn't involved directly. I didn't deal with the commission directly at all, except--no, I don't think I dealt--they put me on their, you know, e-mail mailing list with the rest of the press but I didn't have any direct communications with the commission.

One direct communication I had was, I did all the press for the special investigation, the Columbia accident investigation board, I was detailed over to the board to do all the press for them during that, and that was in--the accident happened February 1st, 2003. So one, commission

members had heard--not members--one of the commission staff, she's a lawyer from New York or Connecticut, a female lawyer, had heard that I had done a great job on the press for the special investigation, so she called me to advise them on how to do the press for the commission's rollout report, cause the way I designed the Columbia accident board report to be released, the reporters were very happy with, and they were looking at the way different big reports had been rolled out.

And so I gave her my best advice and I said to her, look, I really don't think you want me to be advising you about this because I work at the FAA and, you're--you know, you haven't had very good things to say about us. I never heard back from her after that. But that's really the only--I didn't--and that's an aside, I'm sorry. But I just didn't--Shirley was the main liaison between the FAA and the commission, and so I didn't even know who else was being interviewed by the commission or, you know, who they were talking to.

I mean, I knew generally, you know,

sometimes, who, you know, who they had talked to, but I wasn't involved in doing that. I was still very actively involved in the Columbia press stuff when they were doing some of this, so--even though I was back here.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Once you were detailed to the board. Are you talking about the National Transportation Safety Board?

MS. BROWN: No, they--no. The Columbia accident investigation board.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: It was originally a product--it was originally set up to be a--it was a NASA standing board but then Admiral Gehman changed the charter so that it became more independent than it had originally been designed to do, because we had been criticized for not being independent of NASA, so--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c After FAA found out that what was in the statement that was presented to Ben-Veniste wasn't correct, do you know what steps were taken to correct the record for that?

MS. BROWN: Shirley handled all that. Shirley was the one who had the direct communication with the commission and I don't know, you know, what her communication with the commission was on that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That's Shirley Miller?

MS. BROWN: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

So after you sent that statement to Jane Garvey, that was the end of your involvement in that?

MS. BROWN: Right, and I heard some time after that, and, you know, my recollection is it was a while after that. It was not shortly after that. It was weeks after that, I said something to Shirley about it, and she said, oh, and then she told me that Sheryl had said that she couldn't remember the things that we thought that she had been involved in so--but that was weeks later.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c After the hearing where you noted some of what the military folks

were testifying to about the timelines, you had some concern about, did you express that concern to anybody internally within the FAA?

MS. BROWN: I think I probably talked to the people who went over to the hearing and I can't remember all the people who were over at the hearing, but I know that--I mean, Jane obviously was there and I came back with her. I don't know if I actually came back with her or not. We came back to the building, and we were doing that statement for Ben-Veniste, it must have been 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. It might have even been later than that. It might have been--I remember it was late. It could have been 9:00 o'clock, I mean, but she had promised to give it to him that evening and wanted to get it done.

So--but I prob--I'm sure I talked to Lynne and Linda Schusseler about it. But I don't--I really have no memory, at all, of what, you know, what I said to her.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MS. BROWN: I can't even remember the

specifics of what I was so upset about.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you have anything else on this?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c [inaudible].

MS. BROWN: I'm not sure that the thing I was upset about had to do with the specific times in the chronology. It may have been the way one of the NORAD guys characterized the communication with the FAA, and I don't remember, but that's the, sort of trying to think about what I was upset about. That's the thing I'm--that's kind of coming back to me but--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What do you mean?

MS. BROWN: That somehow, the way they had talked about their communication with the FAA didn't seem accurate to me.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You mean like the detail or the conversation or--

MS. BROWN: No. How it was communicated or whether it was communicated, or, you know, I don't--I haven't looked at his testimony, you know, since then, so I don't remember, but if I saw his

testimony I would probably, you know, have the same reaction. I don't know!

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I can't think of anything else.

Is there anything that you'd like to add along the lines of what we've talked about?

MS. BROWN: I don't think so.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. Well, thanks for your time again.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's 2:53. We're going to turn off the tape recorder.

[Whereupon, at 2:53 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CASE NO. 042R0122001

SWORN INTERVIEW OF

DOUGLAS GOULD

BY

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c

DOT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Thursday, September 1, 2005

Federal Aviation Administration
Building 10-A, Room 301 West
Washington, D.C.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

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I N T E R V I E W

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Today is September 1, 2005. The time is 3:01 p.m. We're at FAA Headquarters Building 10-A, Room 301 West, Washington, D.C. My name is (b)(6), (b)(7)c. I'm from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation, and I'm conducting a review of issues involving certain public statements made by military and FAA officials at a 9/11 Commission hearing and elsewhere that were allegedly inaccurate.

Today I am interviewing Doug Gould. Mr. Gould, will you please acknowledge you're aware this interview is being tape recorded?

MR. GOULD: I am.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. Will you please raise your right hand?

Do you swear or affirm the testimony you are about to furnish will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. GOULD: I do.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Can you please give

us your full name, spelling your last, for the record?

MR. GOULD: Sure. It's Douglas B. Gould, G-o-u-l-d.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What is your current title?

MR. GOULD: My current title is Acting Director, Systems Operations Security.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And what division is that in?

MR. GOULD: That's under Air Traffic Systems Operations, ATOR.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c As I mentioned to you before we started tape recording that we're working on kind of trying to tie up some loose ends, and there were a couple of things we just were hoping that you could shed some light on for us with regard to FAA's reconstruction efforts following 9/11.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the things that we noted is FAA had received what purported to

be a copy of the Northeast Air Defense Sector log, NEADS.

MR. GOULD: Yes, sir.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And one of the times that was on the document that FAA received, as far as notification, was 9:16 for United 93. Let me just show you this document here.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c This just a single-page narrative chronology. It starts off "UAL 93"-- this is from--Shirley Miller gave it to us, but it was supposed to be a product from Darlene Freeman.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And it says, "At 9:16, Northeast Air Defense Sector log shows FAA notifying the military." And then parenthetically it says, "No. We believe this time to be inaccurate since it precedes the indications that UAL 93 was in distress."

Do you know how you guys determined that this was not a good time for notification?

MR. GOULD: More than likely, the initial

notification of this time was verbal communication that occurred shortly afterwards when we were compiling information, and we more than likely made an inquiry to NEADS and asked them specifically what time, and they gave us the reference. Sometime afterwards I do recall receiving the NEADS log via fax, and I believe when we created these timelines that's what we utilized, is the physical log. Now, the parentheses comment, more than likely that was inserted by Darlene or somebody else beyond my office that put the document together, because I don't recall making that comment, actually, from there. I would have deleted it. You know, if I didn't have valid information, I would have taken it out. Or the information would have been in parentheses that it was believed or rumored or some type of qualifier that the information was not wholly accurate or was questionable. That was just the way the documents were put together.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So you would not have included the 9:16 entry if you found it

suspect?

MR. GOULD: If I did not have a second validation of the source, I would not have included it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right.

MR. GOULD: So that leads me to believe that somebody else put that qualifier on it.

If you want, I can muddy the water a little more. The notification in NEADS, does it specifically say we notified NEADS on United? See, that could be--you know, even though it's under the United 93 file, that could be--that could possibly be misrepresented. That could be the time that we notified NEADS on "something"--it may not just be United 93, it may have been, you know, all the events or one other event. Without looking into it, it's kind of hard to say what the context that is used. Since we handed electronic copy over to, say, Darlene's organization, they could have added it, that something had fallen out. So I'd have to look at the other documents to clarify that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, this is the

Summary of Air Traffic Highjack Events, September 11, 2001, that I think you played a role in--

MR. GOULD: Yes, sir.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And this is--we're just here looking at the summary--

MR. GOULD: That's just under United?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right. --for United 93.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'd just like you to look at that real quick to kind of refresh your recollections.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The summary of Air Traffic Highjack Events doesn't contain a notification time for United 93.

MR. GOULD: Reference to NEADS.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Correct.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess what we're trying to figure out is when, within the FAA, it's likely that you guys determined that 9:16 was not a

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good notification time for United 93.

MR. GOULD: Well, by looking at this, I would say it's not. Did you guys go through the other logs to see if there was another 9:16 entry on any of the other aircraft?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c There is not.

MR. GOULD: There is not. So it's just 93.

At 9:15, on American 77, is when there's a request for somebody to reach out for search and rescue and other things reference American 97--77.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Seventy-seven.

MR. GOULD: Seventy-seven. So that may have been, when that report was being put together for Darlene, someone may have cut-and-paste on the wrong aircraft file. One of the things I can do is go down and look at the blue folders that we put together that Jeff has.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Which blue folders?

MR. GOULD: There were--there was--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c They were like this?

MR. GOULD: No. No, that's the accident

package. No, that's a--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No, this is not.

This is actually--

MR. GOULD: Oh, you're right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --a blue folder.

MR. GOULD: That was a blue folder, right.

Or a black folder with a sticky on it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Something like that.

MR. GOULD: The document I'm talking about was a tri-folder--it was actually brown--that we put together. One side had transcripts, one side had radar data, and the other side had transcripts and a bunch of other miscellaneous documents. And in there is--and that's how we kept them apart. So, you know, the first thing that comes to my mind is maybe that 93 element was part of this 77 package, because it fit. That had communication with--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Actually, it's not.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 9:16 is an actual entry in the NEADS log.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And--

MR. GOULD: It is.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah. I think initially many folks believed it belonged to United 93--

MR. GOULD: Which doesn't make sense.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c No.

MR. GOULD: It may have been for American 77.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And I guess, according to this note, it says--

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --"we believe this time to be inaccurate since it precedes indications" that they were in distress.

MR. GOULD: Right. So that it-- qualifiers. Yeah. Which makes sense. We wouldn't notify them until afterwards unless there was something amiss. So--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I guess we're trying to find out when it is you guys would have known

that. This summary is prepared on September 17th. There are some dates on the footers.

MR. GOULD: Yes. Yes, I recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: The notification, American 77-
-I'm sorry, United 93 checked on with INDI. Shortly thereafter there was some garbled transmission. The aircraft deviated altitude-wise, started a slight turn, I believe, and then turned its transponder off. It wasn't until after the aircraft turned significantly, based on the primary radar, that--and we pieced that together with physical voice tapes, were we able to determine that the patrol really didn't realize the airplane disappeared for quite a while and the aircraft was already 180 degrees back the other way--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're talking about 77 right now, is that right?

MR. GOULD: I am, that's right. I'm messing up the numbers. Let me think. 93.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c 93's the one that crashed in Pennsylvania.

MR. GOULD: That's right. [Inaudible.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, I'm talking about during reconstruction efforts.

MR. GOULD: Yup. Yup.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I don't want you to guess--

MR. GOULD: I don't know, I'd have to--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --you know, if you're having a hard time recalling.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, that doesn't make sense, but I don't recall.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: No, I don't recall the circumstances of making that entry.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. Is it safe to say you don't have a recollection about how you guys would have determined it was inaccurate?

MR. GOULD: The speculation would have been after physically listening to the tapes, because the tapes clearly indicate that we were not made aware that there was an issue until well after that time frame.

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SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c With the United 93?

MR. GOULD: Correct. So just based on reviewing the tapes and the transcripts, we would have easily made that ascertainment. That doesn't make sense, because it fell out of order.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The other thing we're wondering about is that your records here, the FAA's records, are indicating that 9:16 has come from a NEADS log.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm.

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SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And if there's a potentially inaccurate reference to a notification time in the NEADS log, and you guys were able to determine that based on--you know, your records are indicating that the flight is not in distress yet.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think that's what the Summary of Air Traffic Highjack Events depicts.

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c As well as, you know, your voice recordings and transcripts and such.

MR. GOULD: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If that's the case, did you guys treat the other entries that you're pulling out of the NEADS log to record in your summary as--

MR. GOULD: Inaccurate?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --notification times, you know, as suspect? Because you've got here, one entry here is--you guys have determined isn't correct.

MR. GOULD: Correct.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So we're kind of wondering what your thought process is there.

MR. GOULD: I don't recall even after--I simply don't recall that entry and seeing that it was out of order to make that connotation. So I don't recall. When we were going through the documents and putting up the transcripts and the chronological order, I don't ever recall not putting an entry down. So that we got from--again, my cutoff was two sources. So, you know, no, I don't recall ever suspecting that information,

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because typically it would have been two sources. So either one would have been an employee statement saying I called; a second, it would have been backed up by a log or a voice, unless we qualified it. But I don't--you know. But it's a valid point. It shouldn't lead the entire log to suspect.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Mm-hm.

MR. GOULD: But knowing how most of those logs were put together, one incorrect entry, you know, it could have been a typo in the log, because a lot of logs were kept originally as handwritten notes and then compiled after the fact. And a lot of [inaudible] were actually typing up their logs as the sequence of events occurred. They just kept notes and then later transposed. So that time, you know, it could have been a 2-6 or 3-6 or--you know, that would be, you know, my initial impression, is that somebody wrote down the wrong time. But again, I have no way to validate it at this stage.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The log, the NEADS log that you said that you think you saw, can you

describe it?

MR. GOULD: The log I recall seeing was handwritten, that--I remember seeing two. Early on, the one I recalled initially was a handwritten, with times on the side. And then I recall seeing, I think, at some point, maybe it was after the commission investigation that I saw a typed version. But the first one I remember seeing was actually handwritten.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. I'm just going to show you this again. I know we went over this during one of our prior interviews with you.

MR. GOULD: This is what NEADS provided?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c That is the NEADS log.

MR. GOULD: You don't have the typed one?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm not aware there is a typed one. I don't think the commission is either.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c At least they didn't talk about it.

MR. GOULD: Right. I recall--at some point I remember seeing a typed log. It was a formal--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Could you be thinking of this, just a NORAD press release from-- that one's actually dated the 17th. The final, I think, went out on the 18th.

MR. GOULD: Well, the document that I'm thinking of actually had--it was a formal document that had columns up the top, it identified the facility on the lower left-hand side, and the left-hand column there was times in the log. And so, I mean, it was very similar to this but it was physically typed out and it had a formal header. And I remember it having "Classified" stamped on it. That's probably why Jeff doesn't have it and I'm just thinking about it, because I do remember it being, I think, stamped "Secret" or something at that time [inaudible].

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did the handwritten log you saw, do you recall seeing tail numbers in it versus flight numbers?

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MR. GOULD: I simply don't recall the details.

If you look at--tail number--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --9:16, there's 1316 Zulu. And then they had 9:24 Eastern time, 1324 UTC.

Do you remember anybody being assigned the task of cross-referencing tail numbers?

MR. GOULD: No, I do not. And I don't think our office was even consider--concerned about tail numbers until we started to put the accident package together. At that time, we just didn't deal with tail numbers [inaudible] until, you know, almost it was an accident, at which point it wasn't, you know, into the event that we would actually look for tail number. That was just for recognizing it. You know, it's to provide a flight standard so there can be certification information. But during the event, I don't recall ever--anybody asking for tail numbers.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c If you guys needed to find out what tail number belonged to a

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particular flight, how in Air Traffic could you go about doing that?

MR. GOULD: The primary function would be call the command center. They would call the company directly.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Command center down there in Herndon?

MR. GOULD: Yes. Air Traffic Systems Command Center in Herndon. Today we'd call the airlines directly, but back then the protocol was the Herndon office would call every airlines' ops office on speed dial. We only talked with our [inaudible], so that would have been the protocol.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember anybody getting that tasking?

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

On that log, if you can kind of move towards 10:07, 10:08 Eastern time, I guess 1407--

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm. "10:07. Found on board United 93 over Pittsburgh, 1527 M3."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's actually, in

the NEADS log, the first reference to that flight. It's not in any of the FAA's chronologies that they put together for September 11th. Do you know why that is?

MR. GOULD: The--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Look through your summary here.

MR. GOULD: Yeah. When we put the summary together, I don't recall including any non-FAA information.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You guys actually did for 11 and 175.

MR. GOULD: Oh, because we used the notification to--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, for 11.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And [inaudible].

MR. GOULD: But that was through that Boston--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Well, I think you source it back to the NEADS log.

For 11, it would be 8:40. For 175, it's

at 9:05, if you want to look at it in the same read.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: It's interesting. So all the other times are correct except for that one entry, United--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Interestingly, the Air Traffic Highjack Events Summary contains notification times only for American 11 and 175. The next day--and we talked about this a little bit last time we met--this grid timeline is published in file format September 18th--

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and it's got notification times which it sources back to NEADS log--

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --down here at the bottom, the footnote. And it's got notification times for 11, 175, but now all of a sudden it's got 77 and then--but it still shows N/A for United 93. And then a draft of this document is actually, it

lists 10:08.

MR. GOULD: The way this book was put together as the flights were broken up to specialists. So not one specialist did all of them. All the information would have been provided, and I thought we set up a Q&A to make sure they were all consistent with the types of information provided. So I'm speculating that possibly one of the specialists, and one of them and not the other, or two of two of the specialists, didn't get the work that they wanted, and those times were important. Or maybe in their stack of documents they figured they didn't have the NEADS log and therefore didn't [inaudible]. I'm surprised we didn't catch that when we were putting it together, because that seems strange.

Just thinking out loud, you know, trying to recollect why that would have been. It doesn't make sense.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Let me show you another document here. It's an e-mail dated 9/15, 2001, from (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember who he

is?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c He was out at--

MR. GOULD: Cleveland?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --QA in Cleveland,
right?

MR. GOULD: Yes. He was at QA.

SPECIAL AGENT OWENS: The first one isn't necessarily relevant to the discussion. It's that second one.

MR. GOULD: "Rough draft. Conversations between Cleveland and Huntress."

[Pause.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The entry in there, like 10:07, right, in the rough draft? Or 10:08?

MR. GOULD: This one?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, 10:07.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c "Forget about that. We got a UAL 93. Are you-- that has a bomb on board."

"A bomb?"

[Inaudible.]

[Pause.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What we're trying to understand is if you guys had two sources. Because you guys cite the NEADS log. So--

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --you had the data from there.

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And then you also have--

MR. GOULD: This document.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --this document, which you received on e-mail 9/15.

MR. GOULD: On the 15th, so we would have had it, yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And we also, we got copies of files that were related to us as having come from the S drive, which is your shared network drive, right?

MR. GOULD: Yes, sir.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And there was a copy

of this transcript--

MR. GOULD: We could have saved it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --on the S drive as well.

MR. GOULD: I recall seeing this document. I was surprised when I saw it they actually had the name "Huntress" on there. That's just the reason why it stood out, because we barely talk in documents the name of that. For whatever reason, we never refer to it as "Huntress" very often.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c What is Huntress? It's NEADS, right?

MR. GOULD: Back then, Huntress was the tactical call sign, the command and control center that controlled the physical airspace. So they were an element of NEADS, but they weren't physically NEADS as we know NEADS today. There was a different--today, you know, like VACASE [ph] and we have, like, there's three of them. And, you know, they're tactical CMC, so if you put up an AWACS, that's who that is. Otherwise, it's just radar control, VACASE, and there's a couple of

them. So depending on the mission.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay. So if you guys had two sources, why wouldn't you include them?

MR. GOULD: We should have. You know, I'm surprised if we didn't. We may have, depending on how they referenced it, we may have taken NEADS as the gospel, because NEADS is the parent to Huntress. I don't know why that wouldn't have been done.

The number of documents that we had, you know, that doesn't surprise me that one may not have been referenced, so we used another--whether or not there was a conscious decision [inaudible] overlook not to put two entries. I would have personally put two entries, put them both in.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay.

MR. GOULD: So I would have said Huntress at such-and-such a time, NEADS log indicates that's--you know--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall if there was any discussion among the group that was

working on this, including those supervising it, to not include it for a specific reason, such as it would be embarrassing because it came after the crash time?

MR. GOULD: What I recall is that the individual in [inaudible] were giving taskers to put the base documents together on each one, at which point the entire group sat together in front of a projector. It was Mr. Ferrante predominantly, but occasionally Dave Canoles. And we sat down and built some of the various chronologies and discussed it. I don't ever recall anything that, you know, any discussion about anything being embarrassing. We may have questioned the validity of certain entries and wordsmithed them more appropriately, but I don't recall ever deleting something or something being questioned whether or not we wanted to say that because it, you know--I don't recall anything about that. You know, my view when we were putting it together, it is what it is. You know, it's going to come out in the investigation after the event, after we turn it

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over to whoever, you know. I had no idea it would get to commission level, but I knew somebody would be looking at it. I was thinking the FSB. So I don't recall that. That would have stood out in my mind, but I don't recall any type of comment at my level.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall any discussion about questioning the validity of that entry, the 10:07 or 10:08 notification time for United 93?

MR. GOULD: Oh, for the Huntress log?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)d Sure.

MR. GOULD: No. No. I think at that point we were taking all the logs at face value. This one we gave more credence because it had seconds, so we assumed that it was off of a timed recording type of a recording device.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're talking about your transcript?

MR. GOULD: Yes, the transcript for United 93. So that, you know, that would have gotten more credence. With this one handwritten, you know, we

would have taken it at face value: this one's handwritten. And unless we had a secondary source to validate it, that's just the, you know, the technique that we used. So without knowing who specifically put the entry in the document, I can only speculate. If that makes sense.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I think you said it earlier that it had to have been an oversight.

MR. GOULD: It could have been. It could have been an oversight. You know, we were pulling 20-hour days back then, you know, getting punchy going over the documents over and over and over again. And we could have easily, you know, failed to catch it. That's very plausible. Even with all the people that were working. So I think that it's very possible.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Had you ever seen--I showed you that press release from NORAD earlier.

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Had you seen that before it was finalized by NORAD?

MR. GOULD: No. Typically NORAD or any of

the military commands, whenever they did a press release or a major briefing, they called and we had verbal conversations. Or they asked for copies of documents, either one of our chronologies or a transcript or something. But I never saw the very little information they did beforehand to proofread it. No, I don't recall ever-- Other offices may have, but I never recall seeing it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall if anybody else might have? The reason I'm asking is there was a draft issued on 9/16 and it actually contained the 9:16 notification time for United 93.

MR. GOULD: Their--?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Their draft did, but the final, they ended up taking that out.

MR. GOULD: Corrected. They changed it. You know, initially my gut would be is if NORAD was doing a press release, they may have called our office to get information. Typically, if they were going to do a press release and wanted it previewed, the protocol back then is it would have gone to the military ops office and they would have

done the proofreading. So that office may have, you know, got documents from us and used them, because when we provided them, we distributed them to that office. So they may have, but I don't recall ever seeing any draft, anything from NORAD. I just remember receiving calls asking questions.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember seeing it in file form?

MR. GOULD: No, I do not recall.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Or published in the papers or anything?

MR. GOULD: I don't even recall reading the paper back then. Too busy doing it every day.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It would have been the 18th.

MR. GOULD: Yeah, no. No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you attend any of the 9/11 Commission hearings?

MR. GOULD: No. The only--it wasn't even a hearing. No, I did not attend any of the hearings. I attended an FBI briefing to victims. That was really the only involvement I had for that

entire--outside the agency. That was it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did you watch any of the hearings on television as they progressed?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, I did, but not a lot of it. Maybe an hour here or there.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c One of the very first hearings was held in May of 2003, where Jane Garvey actually testified.

MR. GOULD: Yes. I remember that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c And the next day, the Department of Defense had some current and former department officials testifying and they provided a timeline of events from that--

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember that?

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember hearing them testify that FAA provided notice to the Department of Defense about United 93 at 9:16?

MR. GOULD: In the testimony? I don't-- no, I don't recall that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall that there were parts of a timeline that were inaccurate, in your view or the FAA's view, where you might have discussed it with somebody?

MR. GOULD: During the testimony?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c During or immediately thereafter?

MR. GOULD: If I had any conversations about what I saw in a testimony, it would have been probably strictly only with Dan Diggins [ph]. I don't recall talking to anybody else about the commission's interviews at all. I do recall talking to him about Ms. Garvey's testimony. The NORAD piece, I don't think so. I may not have watched all of it, but I don't recall talking to anybody about it. But the one person I did talk to I remember specifically, the Garvey's piece, which was Dan.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c About her--

MR. GOULD: Yes, about her piece. But nothing about the military testified about?

MR. GOULD: No. I wasn't really that

concerned with the military's version of the facts.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you remember anybody talking to you about it--Hey, you know, these guys, they got it all wrong? Anything like that?

MR. GOULD: No. As a matter of fact, I think I was surprised when the initial accusations came up, and I don't remember the circumstances when I heard that. But I did hear about it, and I'm almost positive, is when your office was tasked to start its investigation. I don't recall hearing about it before.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It was about a year ago, as I recall.

MR. GOULD: Well--was it a year or two years ago?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It was a while ago [inaudible] one.

MR. GOULD: Okay. That's when--I remember because--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It just feels like two.

MR. GOULD: When I heard that, that surprised me, that there was reported inaccuracies.

[Inaudible.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Shall we turn off the tape for a minute?

MR. GOULD: Yeah, can we do that?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yeah, it's 3:41 p.m. We're going to stop the tape for a moment while Mr. Gould takes a phone call.

[Off the record.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Okay, we're reconvening the interview. It's 3:50 p.m.

Doug, I wanted to show you another set of documents here.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c They're part of the e-mail that you sent on October 19, 2001, to (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you know who he is?

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'll just show this to you.

[Pause.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You're sending him
in these e-mails some files--

MR. GOULD: Wav clips?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Wav clips and--

[Inaudible comments.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm sorry. Let's
look at this one here, October 31st, to Steve
Ruggles.

MR. GOULD: Yup. Yup.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You sent him seven
different files, one of which is this--

MR. GOULD: [Inaudible.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Right, is this
American -- chronology brief 3.doc.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Which is this. And
then also, you sent him different files,
essentially the same thing, for all the different
aircraft.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But these files that
you sent him, these briefings--or they're

basically, one of the files is a chronology.

MR. GOULD: Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But I went back and I kind of looked at this, compared this chronology to all the chronologies that we had gathered up from you guys--

MR. GOULD: Mm-hm.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --and this is basically one of the first chronologies that you guys prepared.

MR. GOULD: Right.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Very, very similar, if not exactly the same as the one that was in the folders.

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Which is from--this [inaudible] you had the 13th.

MR. GOULD: Thirteenth, or the 17th?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Fourteenth.

MR. GOULD: Fourteenth. Okay. Not the updated one.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c So I'm wondering why

you guys sent the old document at such a--because this you're sending at the end of October.

MR. GOULD: Right. The chronology that was put together in the summary was put together and stored, I believe, initially on a Zip drive that (b)(6), (b)(7)c kept, because we sent it to graphics. And I don't know if it ever made it to the S drive until later, or at what point it did physically make it to the S drive. There's only two things that come to mind why I would have sent versus this, that he either specifically asked for the black folder--

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)b (b)(6), (b)(7)c

MR. GOULD: (b)(6), (b)(7)c or whoever made the request.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Is there a physical e-mail request from him? Because--

MR. GOULD: I may have gotten the request verbally and told to send it to somebody, and I just sent it to him. And then this other commander may have been--heard of it and I sent it to him. Looks like he got the [inaudible].

So depending on what he physically asked for, I would have gone to the S drive and pulled out. So, you know, I can't really say why I didn't send him the summary version versus the black book, unless he physically asked for it. He may have just asked for this. Because when we did the--we provided them to a number of individuals, and I believe DOD was involved in some of those, so he may have physically asked: "My general attended a briefing on such-and-such a date. Can you send that document?" So I would have gone to the folder, grabbed it, and sent it. If he asked for the current one, I would have gone through the S drive and looked for the most current pieces [?]. You know, when you saw the S drive, they were pretty clearly documented plus they were time-stamped. So I could have easily--I wouldn't have intentionally picked an old one versus a new one.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c But you don't have a specific recollection, is what you're saying?

MR. GOULD: Yeah. Correct. I don't.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall if

anybody in the FAA, including yourself, reviewed any Department of Defense tape recordings or transcripts similar to like an operational position at an air traffic control center?

MR. GOULD: Not in my office. I don't recall any of the investigators listening to recordings. The elements that we got from the military that we utilized, they were radar data, a few logs. That's really all I recall. Chronologies. I don't remember seeing any or listening to tapes or anything like that.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Let me show you the NEADS log again.

MR. GOULD: Yeah.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Look at this 9:34 entry, Eastern time. Zulu. It says 1334.

MR. GOULD: Yup.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It says "American 77 flight to L.A. lost, unable to locate."

MR. GOULD: "Unable to locate."

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c None of your timelines make reference to that time period, for

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this entry. I just wanted to let you--do you have a recollection about that?

MR. GOULD: Of notification to them reference American 77?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Correct. That it was lost. If you look through the log prior to that, that's actually the first real formal notification about 77.

[Flip tape.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c The time is 3:57 p.m. We've just turned the tape over.

[Pause.]

MR. GOULD: When we put the summary together on the majority of the previous chronologies, we were doing that based on FAA documentation, initially. We were going through that, grabbed all the transcripts and facility logs, air traffic facility logs; put the chronology together. Then we did our roundtable, at which point the NEADS log was presented, and got direction from I believe it was Ferrante to include non-FAA sources into the documentation, the

chronology. Because initially the scope was strictly our stuff. We wanted to use ACARS [ph] or any other type of source for information. But I do recall at some point we did change and start including other things, and went back and added those. But again, it was modified halfway through the process of documentation.

So really, the only explanation I can offer is that the additional logs were really an afterthought per se, because initially they weren't part of our chronology because that wasn't an aspect we were looking at. We were looking at the physical sequence of events for air traffic, then at some point I recall Ferrante bringing in the fact that notification was an issue and that we needed to start including our notification in it because it wasn't in there, other than the [inaudible]. For some reason, we initially put that in, and then didn't put any more notification.

That's what I recall. So the only thing I can offer is initially it wasn't part of our mission in putting the documents together to put

the Cleveland entries or data from the NEADS log into the chronology, because those were additional coordinations [?]. Because I didn't go by the 8020-3s, which is the notification documents that a facility puts together and add all the notifications, because I knew that would be included in the accident [inaudible]. It wasn't a detail that typically senior executives wanted to know. But then at some point that changed, when somebody physically asked -- what time did you notify the military. [Inaudible.] So we kind of changed wheels a little bit and started including it. So we probably went back--detail wanted to go back and replug in all those. That's the only logical explanation I can come up with.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Do you recall specifically a discussion about 9:34, excluding it?

MR. GOULD: No; no. Again, you know, my discussions with everybody, that I was involved in during the documentation phase, and the investigation phase, there was no covert, or discussion that I was privy to, of anybody saying,

you know, or indicating or alluding to the fact that we needed to be, you know, evasive about any of the documentation. Personally, I don't think the management team dissented.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c You said, again, just so I'm clear, you said that this, what is the NEADS log, doesn't look familiar to you. Other than, you know, I showed it to--

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --you, I'm not sure if--

MR. GOULD: No.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --the Commission showed it to you, or--

MR. GOULD: I remember seeing a handwritten log.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Did it have that many entries?

MR. GOULD: No. In my mind, I only recall seeing a one-pager. I don't recall seeing anything blacked out, or seeing this. The handwritten log I saw, you know, this was a full page. The lined

portion was a full page, there was no--and it was a one-pager, what I recall. Then I saw a typed-up version, one-pager.

[Phone rings.]

MR. GOULD: Can I take this real quick?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Sure.

MR. GOULD: Want to stop the tape?

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c Yes. 4:02.

[Break.]

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c It's 4:04 p.m. We turned the tape back on. I really can't think of anything else--

MR. GOULD: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c --to ask you. Is there anything else you'd like to add along the lines of what we've talked about today, or--

MR. GOULD: No. Again, all I can say is, you know, it was--we had tons and tons of documents coming in, and I guess there was really five of us putting most of the documentation together. I'll tell you, from my perspective, there was no intent, in any way, on anybody of that group to withhold

any information, mislead any of the documentation.

That the group has a core set of values. I can honestly tell you that they provided whatever they thought was appropriate based on the circumstances and the normal way we operated at that time. The facts are the facts. We're not hiding anything to delude [?], you know. Our information is public record, and in time, somebody would be reviewing it.

So I'll tell you that, from that core group, there's never any intent to do anything like that. So if there was mistakes, typically, it was "heat of the battle," oversight, that type a thing, coordination with DOD. A lotta that was new for our office, so it was strange. That there was another office, military office that traditionally handled that. So the papers were flying through, so it could have come from a number of sources. Our documents were filed electronically, a number of people edited them for their own use. One of the things we learned, post event, is you gotta find a source on each entry, and if you add, you

identify that--we changed a lotta our protocols,
Dick's [?] issues that, you know, we discovered.
But it is what it is. That's really it.

SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)c All right. It's
4:06 p.m. and I'm turning off the tape recorder.

[END OF RECORDED SEGMENT.]