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Description of document: Reports from Sixty-Five (65) Selected General Services Administration (GSA) Inspector General (OIG) Investigations Closed in CY2020

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OIG FOIA Officer 1800 F Street, NW  
Room 5324  
Washington 20405  
Fax: 202-501-0414  
E-mail: [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov)  
[FOIAonline](#)

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U.S. General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General

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March 9, 2021

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request (OIG Tracking Number 21-018)

This letter represents our initial response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received by the General Services Administration Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG), FOIA Office on January 26, 2021, for a copy of the final report, report of investigation, closing memo, closing letter, referral memo, or referral letter: i.e., the conclusory document associated with approximately 70 GSA OIG Investigations.

Please note that we are still awaiting some responses to our requests for consultation, and will provide additional records once responses have been received. Portions of documents under consultation are being withheld under exemptions 3, 6, 7A, 7C, and 7E of the FOIA.

Upon review of the responsive material being provided along with this letter, I determined you are entitled to portions of the requested material under the FOIA. The bases for any redacted information are Exemptions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7C, and 7E of the FOIA.

Exemption 3(a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i), protects information specifically exempted from disclosure by a statute that requires that the information be withheld from public disclosure. Subsection (i) exempts information from release where a statute "requires" that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue."

Exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), protects from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that is privileged or confidential.

Additionally, Exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), protects information that is a pre-decisional part of the intra-agency deliberative process or is protected by the attorney-client privilege and would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.

Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), **requires** withholding of information that, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Similarly, Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), **requires** withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, where disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Also, Exemption 7(A) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(A), protects from disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.

Exemption 7(E) protects law enforcement records if their release would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigation or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

Finally, there were no responsive records responsive for case numbers H20H00077, I1505430, I20H00024, Z19H00109, and Z20C00004.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirement of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirement of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that this office provides to all our requesters. You should not take it as an indication that excluded records do, or do not exist.

As we have redacted and/or withheld information referenced in the above paragraph(s), with the aforementioned FOIA exemptions, this technically constitutes a partial denial of your FOIA request. You have the right to appeal the denial of the information being withheld within 90 days of the date of this letter. You may submit an appeal electronically at: [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov), or in writing to the following address:

Freedom of Information Act Officer  
Office of the Inspector General, General Services Administration  
1800 F Street, NW, Room 5332  
Washington, D.C. 20405

Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request. The appeal should include the GSA OIG FOIA Case Number (21-018). In addition, your appeal must contain a brief statement of the reasons why the requested information should be released. Please include a copy of your initial request and this response. Both the appeal letter and envelope or electronic appeal submission should be prominently marked, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Due to the COVID-19 situation, the GSA OIG is not receiving FOIA requests/appeals by standard mail. You may submit a FOIA request/appeal by email at [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov). Mailed FOIA requests/appeals will be processed after the GSA OIG returns to normal operations.


Should you have any questions, please contact Christopher Pehrson, GSA OIG's FOIA Public Liaison at (202) 501-1932 or via email at [oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov](mailto:oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov).

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College

Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free at (877) 684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769.

Sincerely,

EDWARD  
MARTIN

 Digitally signed by  
EDWARD MARTIN  
Date: 2021.03.09  
18:34:26 -05'00'

Edward J. Martin  
Counsel to the Inspector General  
(FOIA Officer)

Enclosure





U.S. General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General

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April 8 2021

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request (OIG Tracking Number 21-018)

This letter represents the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received by the General Services Administration Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG), FOIA Office on January 26, 2021, for a copy of the final report, report of investigation, closing memo, closing letter, referral memo, or referral letter: i.e., the conclusory document associated with approximately 70 GSA OIG Investigations.

Upon review of the responsive material being provided, I determined you are entitled to portions of the requested material under the FOIA. The bases for any redacted information are Exemptions 3, 6, 7A, 7C, and 7E of the FOIA.

Exemption 3(a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i), protects information specifically exempted from disclosure by a statute that requires that the information be withheld from public disclosure. Subsection (i) exempts information from release where a statute "requires" that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue." The information withheld falls under the Inspector General Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 8M, which protects the identity of individuals who file a hotline complaint; 31 U.S.C. § 5319, which prohibits disclosure of certain Internal Revenue Service information; and 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7), which prohibits disclosure of tax returns and return information.

Additionally, Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), **requires** withholding of information that, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Similarly, Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), **requires** withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, where disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Also, Exemption 7(A) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), protects from disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.

Exemption 7(E) protects law enforcement records if their release would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigation or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirement of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirement of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that this office provides to all our requesters. You should not take it as an indication that excluded records do, or do not exist.

As we have redacted and/or withheld information referenced in the above paragraph(s), with the aforementioned FOIA exemptions, this technically constitutes a partial denial of your FOIA request. You have the right to appeal the denial of the information being withheld within 90 days of the date of this letter. You may submit an appeal electronically at: [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov), or in writing to the following address:

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Should you have any questions, please contact Christopher Pehrson, GSA OIG's FOIA Public Liaison at (202) 501-1932 or via email at [oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov](mailto:oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov).

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Sincerely,

EDWARD  
MARTIN

Digitally signed by  
EDWARD MARTIN  
Date: 2021.04.08  
16:42:22 -04'00'

Edward J. Martin  
Counsel to the Inspector General  
(FOIA Officer)

Enclosure





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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June 18, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Abuse of Position/Conflict of Interest  
Case Number: C19H00138

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

GSA OIG received a hotline complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), alleging GSA contract specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has fraudulently used QuickPick4, to conduct business at an entertainment and sports arena located in Washington, D.C. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleges (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has cashed checks and conducted business without (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consent or approval.

Agents made several attempts to contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who declined to participate in an interview. On November 28, 2018, QuickPick4 registered in the System for Award Management with DUNS 116814439. Agents were unable to locate government contracts awarded to QuickPick4 and determined the alleged reported fraud to have no GSA nexus.

GSA OIG Office of Audits concurrently received information from GSA Program Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) improperly awarded a contract to Gotta Go Now!, LLC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to perform on a contract at FDA's White Oak facility wherein (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the Contracting Officer (CO) and received payment for services not rendered.

A review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employee file revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not report outside employment or affiliations on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annual Confidential Financial Disclosure Report. A review of publicly available information also revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mortell Industries, LLC, a portable toilet provider. Social media posts between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were present on LinkedIn and Facebook. Agents were unable to determine if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received anything of value from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). A review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emails between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not produce anything relevant to this investigation.

GSA, Public Buildings Service, Supervisory Contract Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware of errors made by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) role as a contracting specialist in mid-2019, specifically in regards to the White Oak Campus Wildlife Management contract, after receiving a report from the White

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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Oak Campus Program Management Office and CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PBS, GSA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) addressed concerns expressed by the White Oak Campus Program Office and concerns expressed by CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PBS, GSA with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in May 2019. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had appropriately handled performance concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that the issue did not require additional attention. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had voluntarily applied for a position with GSA Leasing and would be assuming the new position effective June 29, 2019. As a result of the change in employee status, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contracting officer warrant was terminated on June 14, 2019. In early 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned from GSA and accepted a position with the Architect of the Capitol.

As GSA no longer has any ties to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) this matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

April 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**New Fort Lauderdale Federal Courthouse**  
Case Number: **C20H00103**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based on a complaint alleging that the Fort Lauderdale Downtown Development Authority and the City of Fort Lauderdale were discussing the exchange of federal grant funding for cash.

On April 28, 2020, GSA OIG interviewed the complainant who explained the transaction never occurred and the issue resolved itself. The complainant felt no further investigation was necessary.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

December 7, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**Possible Contract Steering by GSA Project Manager**  
Case Number: C20M00071

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions are required for this matter.

This case was initiated based on a complaint alleging concerns that the Huntsville, Alabama courthouse Construction Manager as agent (CMA) contract was being steered to Jacobs Project Management Company (Jacobs) by GSA project manager, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and GSA Project Executive, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In particular, it was alleged that the project management team wanted a large business like Jacobs instead of awarding the contract to a small business.

On December 4, 2020, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed GSA employee emails which indicated the contract was awarded to a small business named APSI Construction Management, Inc. (APSI) on October 16, 2020.

On December 7, 2020, the complainant confirmed that Jacobs did not receive the award and that it was awarded to APSI.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

February 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
GREAT LAKES INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-5)

SUBJECT:

DAVID M. SYLVESTER  
Leavenworth, KS  
Possession of Child Pornography  
File No. C19600101

This is to advise you that we have completed our investigation of David M. Sylvester, Accountant, General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Acquisition Services (FAS), Kansas City, Missouri, regarding Possession of Child Pornography. On August 2, 2019, the GSA Midwest Investigations Division (JI-6) was notified by GSA, Legal Division, Kansas City, Missouri, that on April 17, 2019, Sylvester was arrested by the Leavenworth County Sheriff's Office, Leavenworth, Kansas, for violating Kansas Statute 21-5510(a)(2) (b)(1): Sexual Exploitation of a Child; Possession of Child Pornography, a Felony.

JI-6 was provided with information stating that in 2014 Sylvester was placed under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for accessing paid child pornography websites. At the time of his arrest Sylvester gave the FBI consent to search his personal computer and external hard drive, in which the FBI discovered large amounts of what appeared to be child pornography.

On October 4, 2019, Sylvester pleaded guilty to violating one count of Kansas Statute 21-5601(a): Endangering a Child; Class A Person Misdemeanor.

On November 12, 2019 a Letter Report was issued to Mary Ruwwe, Regional Commissioner, GSA, FAS, Kansas City, Missouri, in order to make Sylvester's supervisor's aware of his arrest, guilty plea, and forthcoming sentencing.

On December 13, 2019, in Leavenworth County District Court, Sylvester was sentenced to 12-months in jail, suspended, and placed on 12-months supervised probation.

Midwest Investigations Division (JI-6)  
2300 E. Main Street, Ste (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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On December 9, 2019, Digital Computer Forensic Unit (DCFU) personnel completed a preliminary forensic analysis of Sylvester's GSA issued Dell laptop computer. The final report was issued by the DCFU on February 24, 2020, revealing that there was no apparent evidence of child exploitative material.

On February 25, 2020, Dell laptop computer FB48WD2 was returned to Sylvester. Sylvester signed Evidence Custody Form I19600101-001 for final disposition indicating that the computer was released to owner.

The case was officially closed on February 25, 2020. All related documents have been transferred to this case file in IG-IDEAS.

If you have any questions, please call Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Midwest Regional Investigations Office at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Investigations Division

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

May 11, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), et al., - Major Fraud against the United States  
File No. C19700071

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date.

The General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Fort Worth, Texas, received allegations from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, San Antonio, Texas, alleging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Logistics Director; and Master Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Superintendent, Logistics Division, Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC), Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, directed requirements and contracts to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Quantico Tactical (Quantico); and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TYR Tactical (TYR). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly leaked confidential information to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); tailored contract requirements to Quantico; and used the Defense Logistics Agency, Health and Human Services, and GSA, to conceal (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrongdoing. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly tailored equipment requirements to ensure only Quantico could provide the items to be procured, and referenced TYR products in the requirements documents. It was also reported that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed a field unit to initiate a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) for TYR products fulfilled by Quantico, which were canceled by GSA due to improprieties.

GSA OIG initiated an investigation to determine if any MIPRs sent to GSA were the result of leaked information, or if procurement requirements were improperly directed to Quantico or TYR. In furtherance of the investigation, agents reviewed MIPRs, contract documents and audit reports; conducted interviews of organizational personnel, and interviewed contractors who were competitors of Quantico and TYR. GSA OIG concluded there was insufficient evidence to prove that the suspected contract requirements involving GSA were the result of leaked information. Additionally, the MIPRs to GSA were either cancelled by the AFSFC, or terminated by GSA upon notification of irregularities.

If you have any questions, please call Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Fort Worth, TX 76102 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST Investigations Division

September 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATION DIVISION (JI-6)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**

File Number: C20600047

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigations. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On March 24, 2020, VA-OIG contacted JI-6 regarding a hotline complaint it received from a confidential web submission, regarding the GSAXcess program. The complaint alleged that a Poplar Bluff, MO Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) inventory management specialist was selling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on Facebook Marketplace. GSAXcess data revealed since mid-2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has exceeded 73 items with a total acquisition cost of approximately \$238k. The Poplar Bluff VAMC has exceeded 100 items with a total acquisition cost of approximately \$524k since mid-2015. Hence, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is responsible for exceeding 73% of the Poplar Bluff VAMC items.

On July 31, 2020, JI-6 and VA-OIG conducted an onsite visit of the Missouri State Agency for Surplus Property (MOSASP) in Jefferson City, Missouri and spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed receiving 8 refrigerators from the Poplar Bluff VAMC in July 2019. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inventory system and advised 3 refrigerators were still onsite. JI-6 and VA-OIG visually confirmed the 3 refrigerators were onsite. The remaining 5 refrigerators were donated to local and/or state agencies.

On August 12, 2020, VA Police, Poplar Bluff Veterans Affairs Medical Center, spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the refrigerators (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purchased were a different lot from the ones transferred to MOSASP. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purchased the refrigerators on a GSA public auction and picked them up. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a receipt showing the purchase from GSA. VA Police also spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who contacted MOSASP regarding the transfer order. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told the refrigerators on the transfer order are accounted for.

Midwest Investigations Divisions (JI-6)  
2300 Main Street, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**From:** [FraudNet](#)  
**Sent By:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@gsa.gov](#)  
**Bcc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**Subject:** Hotline Case H17H00176 Referral - Response Required  
**Date:** 07/20/2017 10:10 AM  
**For Follow Up:** Normal Priority. Follow up on 08/21/2017  
**Attachments:** [H17H00176 to GSA 7-20-2017.pdf](#)

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The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the attached complaint. We are referring this for whatever action you deem appropriate.

When notifying us of the disposition of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference **Hotline Complaint Number H17H00176** in the subject line. We request that you provide us with a response no later than **August 21, 2017**.



Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

**WARNING:** This email and any attachments may contain legally privileged or sensitive information. The information is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction, or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this transmission, is strictly prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please notify the sender and delete the message and any attachments.



GSA Region 6 management has knowingly been ignoring the Architectural Barriers Act Accessibility Standards (ABAAS) in Region 6 for years. Because ABAAS requirements have been ignored by regional management, our federal facilities are not properly accessible by disabled individuals as required by law and it will cost millions of dollars to correct the deficiencies versus paying for them as part of the renovation and/or build out projects as they occur. Even though management has assigned a subject matter expert to review projects for compliance, his comments are often completely ignored. The following four recent examples are provided below:

**Bolling Federal Building** - The GSA Region 6 Design and Construction Division and/or the project Architecture & Engineering firm never incorporated ABAAS into the four phase project as required by contract and law. An ABAAS compliance study was completed for the Ground Floor before the fourth stage of the multi-year multimillion dollar renovation project was completed that showed approximately \$1 million of corrections are necessary for the building to comply with ABAAS. The deficiencies were brought to the attention of regional management, the Bolling project manager, and the Bolling project contracting officer before the completion of the project but the project was allowed to close out without taking any corrective action. GSA is now responsible for correcting the issues at additional cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

**GSA Region 6 Staff Offices at 2300 Main Street** – None of the men's restrooms in GSA occupied space meet ABAAS requirements. The urinals are too close together and do not offer privacy, the sinks are too high, the mirrors are too high, turnaround radiuses are incorrect, access is not correct, the electronic pads to reserve the conference rooms/huddle spaces are too high, etc. The subject matter expert commented on these deficiencies at each milestone in the design process only to be ignored. The project was allowed to close without taking any action to correct the deficiencies. A U.S. Access Board complaint is pending.

**Des Moines Neal Smith Federal Building** – The stairwell doors on each floor were replaced several years ago with non-ABAAS, non-fire rated, compliant doors. Because the region has not enforced ABAAS, the doors are part of a new project to replace them. This disregard has wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax payer dollars.

**Eagleton U.S. Courthouse** – A current project to correct a simple fire and life safety issue in the stairwell on the 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> floor of the Eagleton Courthouse that could have been corrected by a few thousand dollars has blossomed into a huge waste of money. According to the regional fire protection engineer and ABAAS subject matter expert, the regional project managers made made changes to the stairwell entrances that created additional ABAAS compliance and fire life safety issues when the issue could have been easily solved for much less. Because the ABAAS and Fire Protection subject matter experts were never consulted, the project will have to be completely redone wasting even more money.



**From:** [Kevin Rothmier - 6P](#)  
**To:** [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov)  
**Cc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**Subject:** Re: Follow up - Update Request - Hotline Case H17H00176  
**Date:** 10/30/2020 11:45 AM  
**Attachments:** [DOC103020.pdf](#)

---

The project to correct the stairwell doors on each floor of the Neal Smith Federal Building is complete. Please see the attached inspection report.

Thanks, Kevin

Kevin D. Rothmier  
Regional Commissioner (6P)  
Public Buildings Service  
General Services Administration  
2300 Main Street  
Kansas City, MO 64108  
Office Phone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 9:25 AM <[Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov)> wrote:  
Good morning,

Our office is in the process of reviewing cases and would like a status on this project. We received a voicemail from Kevin Rothmier on 11-21-2019 referencing that "an interim response was sent to PSB central office on November 6th stating that there was a delay in receiving the ordered doors from the manufactures and this project should be completed by the end of the calendar year". Could you please provide our office with information regarding this projects status and/or completion? Once this information is received we will close this hotline case out.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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---

**From:** FraudNet/GSAIG  
**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov  
**Date:** 08/14/2019 08:52 AM  
**Subject:** Second Update Request - Hotline Case H17H00176  
**Sent by:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

Please see the email below.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 08/14/2019 08:51 AM -----

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: "HL Referral" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
Date: 05/02/2019 09:52 AM  
Subject: Re: Update -- Hotline Case H17H00176  
Sent by: Deanna N. Guzeh

---

Good morning,

Our office is requesting a status update on the revised schedule for the project.

- Construction Contract Awarded: 9/18/18
- Estimated Construction NTP: 10/22/18
- Estimated Substantial Completion: 3/14/19

Could you please provide our office with a final report if this project is completed and we will close this hotline case out.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: "HL Referral" <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov>  
To: "GSA-OIG Fraudnet" <Fraudnet@gsaig.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov>, "HL Workflow Referral" <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov>  
Date: 10/15/2018 10:34 AM  
Subject: Update – Hotline Case H17H00176

---

Good Morning OIG Team,

Thanks for requesting an update on H17H00176. A follow-up memorandum is attached.

Sincerely,

HL-Referral Team  
Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 9:48 AM HL Referral [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov> wrote:  
Good Morning OIG Team,

Thank you for the follow-up question. We'll forward PBS's response as soon as it is available.

Thanks again,  
HL-Referral Team

Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:57 AM Fraudnet via HL Workflow Referral <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov> wrote:  
Good morning.

Our office is following up on the previous response. In the response you indicated that PBS is developing a project to correct these deficiencies and this work would be completed by August 2018. Could you please provide our office with a status once this is completed our office can close this case.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: "HL Referral" [REDACTED]@gsa.gov>  
To: "GSA-OIG Fraudnet" <fraudnet@gsaig.gov>  
Cc: "HL Workflow Referral" [REDACTED]@gsa.gov>, [REDACTED]@gsa.gov>  
Date: 01/22/2018 04:35 PM  
Subject: Response -- Hotline Case H17H00176

---

Good Afternoon OIG Team,

Please see the attached response to H17H00176. Thank you.

Sincerely,

HL-Referral Team  
Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

--

HL-Referral Team  
Executive Secretariat Division

[REDACTED]

---  
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "HL Workflow Referral" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

[REDACTED]@gsa.gov.

To post to this group, send email to [REDACTED]@gsa.gov.

To view this discussion on the web visit

<https://groups.google.com/a/gsa.gov/d/msgid/hl-referral/OF2C081F58.58F89EFA-ON852582F9.00464736-852582F9.004707A3%40gsaig.gov>.



**From:** [HL Referral](#)  
**To:** [GSA-OIG Fraudnet](#)  
**Cc:** [HL Workflow Referral](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Second Update Request - Hotline Case H17H00176  
**Date:** 08/14/2019 09:07 AM  
**Attachments:** [CC038072\\_OIG\\_H17H00176\\_Follow-Up\\_Response.pdf](#)

---

Good Morning OIG Team,

Thanks for checking. According to PBS's last update, the project should be substantially completed by October 28, 2019, and they expect to send another update at that time.

More details are in the attached memorandum. If you need additional information, please let us know.

Sincerely,

HL-Referral Team  
Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 8:53 AM Fraudnet via HL Workflow Referral <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov> wrote:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ee the email below.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 08/14/2019 08:51 AM -----

**From:** FraudNet/GSAIG  
**To:** "HL Referral" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
**Cc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
**Date:** 05/02/2019 09:52 AM  
**Subject:** Re: Update -- Hotline Case H17H00176  
**Sent by:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

Good morning,

Our office is requesting a status update on the revised schedule for the project.

- Construction Contract Awarded: 9/18/18
- Estimated Construction NTP: 10/22/18
- Estimated Substantial Completion: 3/14/19

Could you please provide our office with a final report if this project is completed and we will close this hotline case out.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: "HL Referral" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
To: "GSA-OIG Fraudnet" <Fraudnet@gsaig.gov>  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov, "HL Workflow Referral" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
Date: 10/15/2018 10:34 AM  
Subject: Update -- Hotline Case H17H00176

---

Good Morning OIG Team,

Thanks for requesting an update on H17H00176. A follow-up memorandum is attached.

Sincerely,

HL-Referral Team  
Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 9:48 AM HL Referral (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov wrote:  
Good Morning OIG Team,

Thank you for the follow-up question. We'll forward PBS's response as soon as it is available.

Thanks again,  
HL-Referral Team

Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management

U.S. General Services Administration

On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:57 AM Fraudnet via HL Workflow Referral <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov> wrote:  
[REDACTED]ing.

Our office is following up on the previous response. In the response you indicated that PBS is developing a project to correct these deficiencies and this work would be completed by August 2018. Could you please provide our office with a status once this is completed our office can close this case.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: "HL Referral" [REDACTED]@gsa.gov  
To: "GSA-OIG Fraudnet" <fraudnet@gsaig.gov>  
Cc: "HL Workflow Referral" <[REDACTED]@gsa.gov>, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]@gsa.gov  
Date: 01/22/2018 04:35 PM  
Subject: Response -- Hotline Case H17H00176

---

Good Afternoon OIG Team,

Please see the attached response to H17H00176. Thank you.

Sincerely,

HL-Referral Team  
Office of Executive Secretariat and Audit Management  
U.S. General Services Administration

--  
HL-Referral Team  
Executive Secretariat Division  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
---

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "HL



Workflow Referral" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov.

To post to this group, send email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov.

To view this discussion on the web visit

<https://groups.google.com/a/gsa.gov/d/msgid/hl-referral/OF2C081F58.58F89EFA-ON852582F9.00464736-852582F9.004707A3%40gsaig.gov>.

--

HL-Referral Team

Executive Secretariat Division

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

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To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov.

To view this discussion on the web visit

<https://groups.google.com/a/gsa.gov/d/msgid/hl-referral/OFACEB8140.8329C123-ON85258456.004697BB-85258456.0046BBD5%40gsaig.gov>.

October 30, 2020

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Boyd Jones Construction Company  
950 S. 10<sup>th</sup> Street, Ste. 100  
Omaha, NE 68108

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Intertek Project/Report Number: **G104484370**

Enclosed is a copy of the report issued on the following field inspection project:

**Jobsite:** Neal Smith Federal Building/Des Moines, IA

**DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:** Field Inspection of Fire Doors and/or Fire Door Frames - openings all compliant

**OPENING IDENTIFICATION(S):** **VARIOUS** - Please refer to enclosed report

**REQUIREMENTS (if any) FOR RE-INSPECTION BY INTERTEK AND/OR AUTHORITY HAVING JURISDICTION:** None

This report completes our work on this project. Please forward a copy of this report to the local authority having jurisdiction - if applicable.

Thank you for allowing Intertek to be of service. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions regarding this inspection, or if we can be of assistance on future projects.

Report Reviewed and Issued by:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)

Program Manager - Field Labeling

Enclosure(s): Field Inspection Report





Total Quality. Assured.

## CERTIFICATE OF ACCEPTANCE

*I/We certify that the following work conducted at the location described herein has been thoroughly & satisfactorily completed by Intertek Testing Services and is, therefore, accepted as complete.*

Client/Company (Project Sponsor) Boyd Jones Construction

Authorized Client Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Please Print Name: \_\_\_\_\_

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Title: Superintendant

Date: 10/29/2020

Project # G104484370

Check # /Amount(for COD): \_\_\_\_\_

Project Name/Jobsite: Neal Smith Federal Building

Address: 210 Walnut Street

City/State/Zip: Des Moines, IA

### Work description:

Re-inspect 11 H/M frames to assure repairs have been completed. All repairs have been completed satisfactorily and labeled.

Signature of WHI Representative: \_\_\_\_\_

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

### IMPORTANT - Please Read

This is a certificate acknowledging acceptance of work conducted by Intertek Testing Services for this project, or phase of project only. THIS IS **NOT** A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE FOR ANY INSPECTED OPENING(S).

Intertek Testing Services makes no guarantee expressed or implied as to acceptance of the report, data or findings by any Authority Having Jurisdiction.

Intertek Testing Services  
8431 Murphy Drive, Middleton, WI 53562  
Phone 608-836-4400 Fax 608-831-9279  
[www.etlsemko.com](http://www.etlsemko.com)



Jobsite:	Neal Smith Federal Building	Date:	10/29/2020
Address:	230 Walnut Street Des Moines, IA	WHI Inspector:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
		Project #:	G104484370

Deficiencies Noted? ☐ Yes ☒ No  
 Re-inspection Required? ☐ Yes ☒ No

### Authority Having Jurisdiction Information:

Name/Contact: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City/State/Zip: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ Fax: \_\_\_\_\_

### Client Information:

Contact: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Company: Boyd Jones Construction Co.

Address: 950 S. 10th Street, Suite 100

City/State/Zip: Omaha, NE, 65108

Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fax: \_\_\_\_\_

### Summary of Inspection:

Frame(s):	11 - 90 min H/M	Door(s):	
Latch(es):		Hinge(s):	
Closer(s):		Gasketing:	
Glazing:		Sill:	

### Comments:

Re-inspection of 11 H/M frames to assure repairs have been completed as requested.

Intertek Testing Services  
 8431 Murphy Drive, Middleton, WI  
 53562  
 Phone 608-836-4400 Fax 608-831-9279

☐ Re-inspection by ITS Required

☐ Re-inspection by AHJ Required

Date: 10/29/2020 Project #: G1044847370 Page: 1 of 1

Bldg: Neal Smith Federal Building Floor: B, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 Opening #: See list below

☐ Single Swing ☒ Stnd Pair ☐ Dbl Egress Pair ☐ Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Assembly Information:**

Door		VT	
Manufacturer:			
Rating:	90 min.	Serial #:	
Positive Pressure?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Positive Pressure Category:			
<input type="checkbox"/> "A - No Add'l Edge-Seal Required"			
<input type="checkbox"/> "B - Add'l Edge-Seal Required"			
Type: <input type="checkbox"/> Wood Core <input type="checkbox"/> Mineral Core			
<input type="checkbox"/> Hollow Metal <input type="checkbox"/> Steel-Stiffened			
<input type="checkbox"/> Foam-Filled <input type="checkbox"/> Temp Rise _____			
Frame		Unknown	
Manufacturer:			
Rating:	90 min.	Serial #:	See list
Positive Pressure?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Material: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Steel (16 Gage) <input type="checkbox"/> Aluminum			
<input type="checkbox"/> Composite <input type="checkbox"/> Wood			
Type: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3-Sided <input type="checkbox"/> Borrowed Light			
<input type="checkbox"/> Frame w/Sidelight, Sidepanel &/or Transom			
Light/Panel			

EB - WHI-025951  
E1 - WHI-025952  
E2 - WHI-025953  
E8 - WHI-025954  
E10 - WHI-025955

W6 - WHI-025956  
W5 - WHI-025957  
W4 - WHI-025958  
W3 - WHI-025959  
W2 - WHI-025960  
W1 - WHI-025961

**Additional Required Components:**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fire-Rated Latchset                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Door/Frame Strike            |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fire Exit Device                             | <input type="checkbox"/> Floor Strike                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flush/Surface Bolts                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Fire-Rated Light Kit         |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Closer <input type="checkbox"/> Throughbolts | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hinges (#3 _____) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Smoke Gaskng                                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proper Anchors    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Astragal <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinator           | <input type="checkbox"/> Metal Edge(s)                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Edge-Seal (Cat. G - Positive Pressure Only)             |   |

**Comments:**

All repairs were made and frames all now meet standards.

**Legend:**

C - Crack      D - Delaminated Area  
G - Gap      H - Hole  
MS - Missing Screws      R - Repair Noted  
L - Louver      LK - Light Kit  
MH - Magnetic Holder      ES - Electric Strike  
CVR - Concealed Vertical Rod  
SMVR - Surface-Mounted Vertical Rod  
CVR/LB - CVR Less Bottom Rod  
SMVR/LB - SMVR Less Bottom Rod      AFB  
- Automatic Flush Bolt  
MFB - Manual Flush Bolt  
SB - Surface Bolt  
KP - Kick Plate/Protection Plate

From: [James E. Adams](#)  
To: [FraudNet](#)  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Subject: Fw: Follow up on Hotline Case H18H00193 Referral - Response Required  
Date: 11/04/2020 03:38 PM  
Attachments: [attmo0ye.txt](#)  
[Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer.pdf](#)

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----- Forwarded by James E. Adams/JI/CO/GSAIG on 11/04/2020 03:38 PM -----

From: Robert C. Erickson Jr./JI/CO/GSAIG  
To: James E. Adams/JI/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, Jason M. Suffredini/JI/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 09/11/2020 10:51 PM  
Subject: Fw: Follow up on Hotline Case H18H00193 Referral - Response Required

---

Does this need to go to Carol? Let's talk when I get back.

Robert C. Erickson  
Deputy Inspector General  
General Services Administration  
1800 F Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20405  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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----- Forwarded by Robert C. Erickson Jr./JI/CO/GSAIG on 09/11/2020 10:50 PM -----

From: "Allison Brigati - AD" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>  
To: "Robert Erickson Jr." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov>  
Date: 09/11/2020 03:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Follow up on Hotline Case H18H00193 Referral - Response Required

---



Hi Bob--

This was sent to HL Referral (I guess that is in Exec. Sec) and they were pinged again today. Since I was copied on this request I'm responding directly to you.

It is my understanding that PBS obtained a contractor to conduct a Management Inquiry into the allegations in the Hotline complaint and a warning notice was prepared for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), then Deputy Commissioner, PBS, to issue to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) NCR, PBS. It's also my understanding that the former Deputy Commissioner did not issue the warning notice and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned from GSA. From what I understand, unconscious bias training was also conducted by the Office of Civil Rights for PBS NCR management officials.

Hope you have a great weekend.

Allison

---

U.S. General Services Administration

Allison Fahrenkopf Brigati  
Deputy Administrator  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: <[Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov)>

Date: Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 11:30 AM

Subject: Follow up on Hotline Case H18H00193 Referral - Response Required

To: <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>

Cc: <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov>

Good morning,

The previous referral was sent to Deputy Administrator Alisson Brigati with a copy to

the Hotline Office. Our office has no record of receiving a response to this referral. The original referral is attached for your convenience.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JII/CO/GSAIG on 08/27/2020 11:26 AM -----

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov, (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) @gsa.gov  
Date: 09/05/2018 11:53 AM  
Subject: Fw: Anonymous Complaint  
Sent by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

Good Afternoon,

Thank you for forwarding the below complaint. At this time, GSA OIG will not be taking any action and we are referring this back to you for whatever action you deem appropriate. Please advise GSA OIG of the results of the outside third party review.

When notifying us of the results of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference Hotline Complaint Number H18H00193 in the subject line.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: "Allison Brigati - AD" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov>

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov  
Date: 08/23/2018 02:16 PM  
Subject: Anonymous Complaint

---

Bob—

We are in receipt of an anonymous complaint alleging racism at NCR. I understand the IG's office already received this, but I wanted to confirm that fact. I have attached it just in case. We intend to conduct a management inquiry and will bring in a third party from outside the agency to conduct the review. Please let us know if your office has a problem with that approach or would rather take the lead and have us support your efforts.

Thank you.

Allison





Scott Anderson  
Regional Administrator, NCR  
General Services Administration

I am writing to express my muted concerns regarding management officials in PBS NCR. In this climate with all the horrible things going on throughout the world with our President being at the helm, the same culture exists with PBS NCR leadership. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have openly displayed their racism towards blacks. They only communicate with white employees and opportunities are created for whites although black employees are currently in the position doing the work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sent on a detail to a place within NCR where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not needed shortly after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came back to PBS NCR so that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could take over (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was temporarily promoted to a GS-14 position although (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is currently performing the duties of the role in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was promoted. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not even qualified for the position, but because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is white, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gets a pass and does not need qualifications. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) openly expressed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) excitement regarding promoting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in front of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff! An opportunity for advancement was also created for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who of course is white. Black employees have not had any such opportunities. The entire staff in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mainly communicate with, include in meetings and assign projects are comprised of white staff. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reasoning is because "they" can be counted on to get the job done.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has two black deputies, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have not been utilized since the unfortunate decision to bring (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to PBS NCR. They have been sat in the corner with menial tasks. What a waste of taxpayer dollars for hefty GS-15 salaries! When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is out of the office for any reason for any amount of time, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not leave either of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deputies to act on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) behalf in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) absence. Instead (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leaves (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acting, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who does not have the knowledge to get the job done. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is clueless and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff has informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of their fear of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not talk to them and how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disregards them. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) allows (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to mistreat (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff even after hearing their concerns and stating that changes would be made by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The racism (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) displays towards

staff is blatant. Shame on [REDACTED] for being complicit and allowing this go on and for also participating in such racist acts. As a top leader who was made aware of the problems created by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] chose to do nothing. [REDACTED] has afforded opportunities to [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], to receive preferential treatment because [REDACTED] works in the Small Projects Division in NCR. [REDACTED] should be excluded from being a part of decisions regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] because of [REDACTED] role as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. Another example of nepotism at its finest, which is prevalent in PBS NCR! This matter with [REDACTED] being involved in matters pertaining to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] has been brought to leadership's attention many times, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] and it continues to happen. [REDACTED] will make a point to circumvent black managers and supervisors and communicate with white subordinates of those leaders.

I ask that you look into this very serious matter. Tension in the workplace is at an all-time high. Employees have gone to [REDACTED] but to no avail. No solution...in fact it has gotten worse.

Please interview staff and those who provide services to PBS NCR. The Federal Government has no place for racism. We are all here to serve our taxpaying citizens.

**From:** [FraudNet](#)  
**Sent By:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov  
**Subject:** Follow up on Hotline Case H20H00007 Referral - Response Required  
**Date:** 11/21/2019 09:57 AM

---

**Via Electronic Mail**

This is a follow up as our office has no record of receiving a response pertaining to this referral. The original referral is attached for your convenience.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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▼ FraudNet---10/10/2019 09:59:08 AM---The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov  
Date: 10/10/2019 09:59 AM  
Subject: Hotline Case H20H00007 Referral - Response Required  
Sent by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the attached complaint. We are referring this for whatever action you deem appropriate.

When notifying us of the disposition of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference **Hotline Complaint Number H20H00007** in the subject line. We request that you provide us with a response no later than **November 12, 2019**.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 10/10/2019 09:45 AM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov>  
To: fraudnet@gsaig.gov  
Date: 10/09/2019 08:22 AM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov

---

Submitted on Wednesday, October 9, 2019 - 08:22  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** Anonymous source

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**

**State:**

**Zip Code:**

**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** On the 3rd floor of the Federal Courthouse in Nashville, Tennessee, there is a Ring Door Bell mounted in the hallway. The Ring Door Bell contains a camera that is not closed circuit and is accessible from the internet. The Ring Door Bell through the internet is accessible from outside the Federal Courthouse by Ring Door Bell customers, local law enforcement, and others. Please remove this Ring Door Bell from the hallway or please post signage in the hallway telling all that their image and conversations are being recorded by an outside party. The Ring Door Bell is a security threat to Federal workers.

**When did it happen?** The month of October 2019.

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** Federal Courthouse in Nashville, Tennessee,

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** See above.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?** Yes

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** Walk through the 3rd floor of the Federal Courthouse in Nashville, Tennessee.

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** Unknown.

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:** Not Applicable

**The results of this submission may be viewed at:** <https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3108>

**From:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**To:** GSA-OIG Fraudnet  
**Cc:** HL Workflow Referral (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**Subject:** Re: Hotline Case H20H00041 Referral - Response Required  
**Date:** 11/17/2020 07:57 AM

---

Good Morning.

According to our program office, water and electrical submeters were installed in all three locations on 7/22/20 by the outgoing O&M contractor (NTVI).

Please let me know if anything else is needed in order to close this out. Thank you.



**U.S. General Services Administration**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Office of Administrative Services  
1800 F Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20405  
Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
E-mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov  
[executive-secretariat@gsa.gov](#)  
[CDT Tip Sheets](#)

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 8:06 AM <[Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

In the previous response it was indicated that "PBS/NCR is currently anticipating that the electric and water sub-meters for all locations will be functional by August 2020". Could you please provide our office with a status on this and if has been completed this case will be closed.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov>  
To: "HL Workflow Referral" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov>  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov, Fraudnet@gsaig.gov, "GSA-OIG Fraudnet" <Fraudnet@gsaig.gov>, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsa.gov>  
Date: 05/08/2020 03:09 PM  
Subject: Re: Hotline Case H20H00041 Referral - Response Required

---

Good afternoon,

Attached is the response to Hotline Referral H20H00041.

If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to us. Thank you.

On Thursday, April 16, 2020 at 2:09:19 PM UTC-4, [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) wrote:  
The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the attached complaint. We are referring this for whatever action you deem appropriate. I have attached the IG Audit office review for your convenience.

When notifying us of the disposition of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference **Hotline Complaint Number H20H00041** in the subject line. We request that you provide us with a response no later than **May 18, 2020**.

#### Hotline Case H20H00041 Referral - Response Required

**FraudNet**

to: HL-referral

04/16/2020 02:08 PM

Sent  
by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the attached complaint. We are referring this for whatever action you deem appropriate. I have attached the IG Audit office review for your convenience.

When notifying us of the disposition of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference **Hotline Complaint Number H20H00041** in the subject line. We request that you provide us with a response no later than **May 18, 2020**.

Thank you,

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General

U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JII/CO/GSAIG on 04/16/2020 1:26 PM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <[OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)>  
To: [fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:fraudnet@gsaig.gov)  
Date: 02/06/2020 03:48 PM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: [OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)

---

Submitted on Thursday, February 6, 2020 - 15:48  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** No restriction

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**

**State:** District of Columbia

**Zip Code:**

**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** The three retail spaces at 1800 F Street have been in full operation for at least the last 5 years. The retail owners are not or have ever paid any of their electrical or water usage since day one. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one of the M.E.Techs at central office submitted a few procurement packages through out the years only to have them disapproved. As of today, the issue is still falling on deaf ears still.

**When did it happen?** 2015 as each store was completed and during the build-outs for each store

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** NCR Potomac Service Center

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** The three retail spaces at 1800 F Street have been in full operation for at least the last 5 years. The retail owners are not or have ever paid any of their electrical or water usage since day one. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one of the M.E.Techs at central office submitted a few

procurement packages through out the years only to have them disapproved. As of today, the issue is still falling on deaf ears still.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?**

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) project files and his emails. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has emails also

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** Central Office  
Building Management staff

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:**

**The results of this submission may be viewed at:**

<https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3164>

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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National Capital Region

MEMORANDUM FOR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (JII-1)

THROUGH: DANIEL W. MATHEWS  
COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE (P)

FROM: DARREN J. BLUE  
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE (WP)

SUBJECT: OIG Hotline Complaint Number H20H00041

This is in response to the above-referenced hotline complaint, dated, April 16, 2020, concerning utility payments from retail vendors located at 1800 F Street. The retail vendors are Greenberry's, California Tortilla, and Which Wich, and the utility payments are for electricity and water.

The retail vendors have been operational since 2015, and are responsible for utility reimbursement. Sub-meters for electricity and water were installed incorrectly. The GSA Building Manager's staff, located at 1800 F Street, entered procurement requests (PR) for new electric sub-meters and modifications for the water sub-meters on October 28, 2019. The PRs are funded and pending contract award. PBS/NCR is currently anticipating that the electric and water sub-meters for all locations will be functional by August 2020.

The senior lease contracting officer (LCO) has engaged in negotiations with representatives from Greenberry's, California Tortilla and Which Wich for reimbursement of electric and water usage. Since actuals were not available, usage estimates were negotiated using a combination of Government derived estimates and vendor franchise comparables. The LCO negotiated a lump sum payment for fiscal year (FY) 2019, and the same monthly estimates for FY 2020, until the sub-meters are available for actual readings and billing. As part of this settlement, the LCO relieved the three retail vendors from utility usage payments for prior years from FY 2016 through FY 2018, since sub-meters were not operational. GSA is currently tracking non-payment for estimated monthly utility usage.

U.S. General Services Administration  
1800 F Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20405-0002

– 2 –

If you have any questions, please contact me or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Office of Facilities Management, at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: [HL Workflow Referral](#)  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov; [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Subject: Re: Hotline Case H20H00058 Referral - Response Required  
Date: 04/16/2020 11:31 AM  
Attachments: [H20H00058-AirQuality450GG.Draft Response.pdf](#)

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Good Morning,

Attached is the response to Hotline Referral H20H00058. Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you, and be safe.

On Wednesday, March 11, 2020 at 11:34:01 AM UTC-4, [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) wrote:

The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Fraud Hotline Office received the attached complaint. We are referring this for whatever action you deem appropriate.

When notifying us of the disposition of this matter, please respond to [Fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:Fraudnet@gsaig.gov) and reference **Hotline Complaint Number H20H00058** in the subject line. We request that you provide us with a response no later than **April 13, 2020**.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 03/11/2020 11:30 AM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <[OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)>  
To: [fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:fraudnet@gsaig.gov)  
Date: 03/09/2020 07:29 PM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: [OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)

---

Submitted on Monday, March 9, 2020 - 19:29  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** Anonymous source

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**



**State:**  
**Zip Code:**  
**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:**

**When did it happen?** From June 2019 through March 2020

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** Phillip Burton Federal Building  
GSA Facilities and Building Management

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** Multiple employees on the 12th, 13th, and 14th floor have reported poor air quality to building management at 450 Golden Gate Ave, but they are refusing to test the air. Multiple people are facing significant health challenges as a result of the poor air quality. Building maintenance has come up and performed cursory visual examinations of the ducts, but have not tested the air, despite numerous complaints and requests to do so.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?** Yes

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** Records should show multiple air quality complaints sent to building management at 450 Golden Gate Ave (Phillip Burton Federal Building) in San Francisco.

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** Employees on the 12th, 13th, and 14th floors facing medical issues

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:**

**The results of this submission may be viewed at:**  
<https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3180>



April 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (JII-1)

THROUGH: DANIEL W. MATHEWS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE (P)

FROM: DAN R. BROWN  
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, REGION 9 (9P)

SUBJECT: OIG Hotline Complaint Number H20H00058

This memorandum is in response to OIG Hotline Complaint Number H20H00058, regarding reported poor air quality at the Phillip Burton Federal Building and Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, CA.

The Hotline complainant stated the following for the period of June 2019 through March 2020:

Multiple employees on the 12th, 13th, and 14th floor have reported poor air quality to building management at 450 Golden Gate Ave, but they are refusing to test the air. Multiple people are facing significant health challenges as a result of the poor air quality. Building maintenance has come up and performed cursory visual examinations of the ducts, but have not tested the air, despite numerous complaints and requests to do so.

Records should show that multiple air quality complaints were sent to building management at 450 Golden Gate Ave. (Phillip Burton Federal Building) in San Francisco.

GSA has reviewed the requests from the tenant agencies involved. During our review, we found the four attached email communications received that related to possible air quality issues:



- **December 2019:** Agency (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]) requested that the air ducts be inspected and the metal vent covers cleaned on the 13th floor for the area around 13-6752 and 13-6740. Items were inspected and cleaned by the Operations & Maintenance contractor. The FBI acknowledged that the inspection and cleaning was done.
- **January 2020:** The FBI requested above standard carpet cleaning of an office area of the 13th floor. By GSA pricing policy, agencies fund above standard cleaning, and the FBI did not provide funding for this service. They instead had the Custodial contractor vacuum the carpet and dust the blinds in the office space.
- **February 2020:** FBI asked for ducts and vents at 13-5139, 13-5172, and 13-6896 to be looked at by GSA and to have an indoor air quality (IAQ) study done. Custodial contractor cleaned vents and did not notice dust/dirt build up. IAQ study is an above standard service and would need to be funded by the agency. Agency did not submit a work request/funding for the IAQ study to the Field Office.
- **February 2020:** The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) stated that there was a mold smell on the 14th floor by 14-5370 and they requested an IAQ study done. A work request was sent to the agency to complete to schedule action by the Operations & Maintenance but was never submitted or returned to the Field Office.

No email communications were received related to air complaints for the 12th floor.

The building manager also consulted the Region 9 Industrial Hygienist (IH) seeking their advice on the matter. Based on the emails and actions taken so far, the GSA IH determined that an IAQ issue has not been detected.

Per guidance from the GSA Regional IH, the Field Office contacted the FBI and NCRIC points of contact for the building on March 18, 2020, to inform them of the actions each agency needs to take before GSA would be able to test the IAQ. Those actions are for agency personnel to report any IAQ issues to agency management and then the agency management would need to have their agency IH initially look into the problem and determine if the building is the cause. Based on the agency IH review, information that is showing a potential source of the cause at the building would be provided to GSA to do any kind of follow-up investigation. The Field Office will follow up the week of March 30 with the agency points of contact on their actions taken.

Should you have any questions, please contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Senior Property Manager, at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), San Francisco Service Center Director, at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsa.gov.

Attachments (4)



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: FraudNet  
Subject: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00065  
Date: 04/09/2020 12:39 PM

---

Hello,

The complainant has spoken with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who has referred the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the Office of Special Counsel. JA will not pursue this matter further.

MaryAnn

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Management Analyst  
Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General, GSA  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG on 04/09/2020 12:37 PM -----

From: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-R/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 04/09/2020 11:29 AM  
Subject: Re: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00065

---

Hi (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

Please let JI know that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (JC) spoke with the whistleblower this morning and referred them to the Office of Special Counsel to file a complaint. Accordingly, we will not pursue this matter further.

Thanks.

Brian

Brian J. Gibson  
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Real Property Audits  
General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General  
Phone: (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Mobile: (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov



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▼ Rolando N. Goco---03/26/2020 11:10:09 AM---Brian, This is yours.

From: Rolando N. Goco/JA/CO/GSAIG  
To: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Barbara E. Bouldin/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 03/26/2020 11:10 AM  
Subject: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00065

---

Brian,

This is yours.

Nick

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----- Forwarded by Rolando N. Goco/JA/CO/GSAIG on 03/26/2020 11:09 AM -----

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: Rolando N. Goco/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, Barbara E. Bouldin/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, [REDACTED]  
Date: 03/26/2020 11:03 AM  
Subject: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00065  
Sent by: [REDACTED]

---

Hi Nick,

Please review the following complaint that is being referred to your office for review.

When responding to us of your decision reference case number H20H00065, please respond via FraudNet no later than Monday, April 27, 2020.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JII/CO/GSAIG on 03/26/2020 10:59 AM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov>  
To: fraudnet@gsaig.gov  
Date: 03/25/2020 10:41 AM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov

---

Submitted on Wednesday, March 25, 2020 - 10:41  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** Anonymous source

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**

**State:**

**Zip Code:**

**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** I would like to have an audit open up on the NCR, PBS, Office of Acquisitions to audit the recent FY realignment of the organization. It is my opinion that there has been a mismanagement of resources relating to recruitment and placement of new and existing employees in the realignment. Resources are not being shared across the organization when needed and there are not an adequate amount of Contracting Officers assigned to divisions where there is a greater need. There are also Contracting Officers that are carrying an extremely heavy and unrealistic workload and not only are these employees Contracting Officers, but they are also managers and have the responsibility of managing their assigned branches which may consist of the overseeing of other Contracting Officers and contract specialist while

carry their own workload. Some of these employees have open active contracts which consist of over two hundred or more contracts to their names. That is an unrealistic workload to manage and it leads to the question as to whether or not this practice of doing more with less when it comes to Contracting Officers servicing the Government is appropriate. I feel that it is not only putting the Government at risk, but the federal employee wellbeing at risk as well.

**When did it happen?** The realignment has been in the making for a long time now with the timeframe of 2017 to the present to have the organization realigned. With the change of various Directors over the organization over the past few years, one was permanently put in place and hired in September of 2018. The new director in October revised and aligned the current organization as it is today. Employees thought that it would bring some type of relief, especially for the individuals who had the fewer amounts of people supporting their teams, but contrary to the belief it did not. Currently there are recruitment opportunities that are still going on, but they are still being placed in the divisions that are heavily loaded with employees, but do not possess a heavy workload to support the need. Some of these recruits also have been placed in non-acquisitions teams such as training and policy teams, but not procurements.

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** NCR, PBS, Office of Acquisitions .

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** The issues with the resources was addressed to the Director and others in upper management, but there was not resolve and issues were ignored and passed off.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?** Yes

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** Access can be requested by tracking tools and google docs if needed.

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** Other Contracting Officers within the organization.

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:**

**The results of this submission may be viewed at:** <https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3186>

From: [FraudNet](#)  
Sent By: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: [Rolando N. Goco](#)  
Cc: [Barbara E. Bouldin](#); [Brian J. Gibson](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Bcc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Subject: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00076  
Date: 04/17/2020 01:39 PM

---

Hi Nick,

Please review the following complaint that is being referred to your office for review.

When responding to us of your decision reference case number H20H00076, please respond via FraudNet no later than Monday, May 18, 2020. **Note: The complainant has not waived confidentiality.**

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 04/17/2020 01:16 PM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov>  
To: [fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:fraudnet@gsaig.gov)  
Date: 04/17/2020 12:00 PM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: [OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)

---

Submitted on Friday, April 17, 2020 - 12:00  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** Confidential source

**Email:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**Name:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**Street Address:**

**State:** New Mexico

**Zip Code:**

**City:**



**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)  
a notice to proceed with construction had been issued in error without proper funds in place. I believe the Government is anti-deficient by allowing work to proceed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

**When did it happen?** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** Region 7 PBS, Leasing Division.

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?** Yes

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**The results of this submission may be viewed at:** <https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3194>

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: FraudNet  
Subject: Fw: Hotline Referral - H20H00076  
Date: 05/06/2020 02:27 PM

---

Good afternoon,

JA has been notified by the complainant that they wish to withdraw their complaint. The complainant's email is below in the email chain. Please let me know if you need further information.

Thank you.  
MaryAnn

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Management Analyst  
Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General, GSA  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(cell)

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG on 05/06/2020 02:23 PM -----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 04/27/2020 09:22 AM  
Subject: Re: Fw: Hotline Referral

---

Thanks (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CIA  
Regional Inspector General for Auditing  
GSA - Office of Inspector General  
Greater Southwest Region Audit Office (JA-7)

 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |  (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |  (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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▼ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ---04/24/2020 06:36:20 AM---Good morning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) I will notify JI of this complaint withdrawal and forward the information you

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 04/24/2020 06:36 AM  
Subject: Re: Fw: Hotline Referral

---

Good morning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I will notify JI of this complaint withdrawal and forward the information you provided.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Management Analyst  
Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General, GSA  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

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▼ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ---04/23/2020 04:04:30 PM---Hi Brian The person who submitted the subject hotline referral informed us that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is withdrawing h

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG  
To: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 04/23/2020 04:04 PM  
Subject: Re: Fw: Hotline Referral

---

Hi Brian

The person who submitted the subject hotline referral informed us that [REDACTED] is withdrawing [REDACTED] complaint. Is there a certain process that [REDACTED] needs to following to formally withdraw the complaint? Thanks

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CIA  
Regional Inspector General for Auditing  
GSA - Office of Inspector General  
Greater Southwest Region Audit Office (JA-7)

 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |  (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |  (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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▼ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ---04/23/2020 02:44:40 PM---FYI (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Auditor

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA-7/R07/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA-7/R07/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 04/23/2020 02:44 PM  
Subject: Fw: Hotline Referral

FYI

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Supervisory Auditor  
General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General  
Greater Southwest Region Audit Office (JA-7)  
(817) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - office  
(817) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - cell  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-7/R07/GSAIG on 04/23/2020 02:44 PM -----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@earthlink.net  
Date: 04/23/2020 01:34 PM  
Subject: Re: Hotline Referral

---

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I would like to withdraw my complaint. My supervisor discussed and reached an agreement.

Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

r  
US General Services Administration  
Public Buildings Service  
Greater Southwest Region  
Leasing Division

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 5:40 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)> wrote:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

I just wanted to provide this as background.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

US General Services Administration  
Public Buildings Service  
Greater Southwest Region  
Leasing Division

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 2:44 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

> wrote:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Here is the information you requested.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A)

Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

US General Services Administration  
Public Buildings Service  
Greater Southwest Region  
Leasing Division

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 12:07 PM <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov>  
wrote:

Good afternoon (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

I am an Auditor with General Services Administration Office of Inspector General located at our Fort Worth, Texas office. I have been assigned to review your Hotline submission from April 17, 2020. I am currently gathering information about your submission to determine my next course of action. First, I would like to obtain the evidence you mentioned in your submittal --- email correspondence between all parties involved and lease documents.

Please submit all relevant supporting documentation at your earliest convenience, but no later than Wednesday, April 22, 2020. I will review the documentation and reach out to you if more details are needed.

Feel free to call me if you have any questions.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Auditor



General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General  
Greater Southwest Region Audit Office (JA-7)  
(817) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - office  
(682) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - mobile  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @gsaig.gov

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From: [FraudNet](#)  
Sent By: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: [HL-referral@gsa.gov](mailto:HL-referral@gsa.gov)  
Bcc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Subject: Hotline Case H20H00088 Referral - FYI  
Date: 05/08/2020 03:12 PM

---

**Via Electronic Mail**

The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Fraud Hotline Office received the following complaint. We are referring this matter to you for your review and whatever action you deem appropriate. A response to us is not necessary.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 05/08/2020 02:53 PM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov>  
To: [fraudnet@gsaig.gov](mailto:fraudnet@gsaig.gov)  
Date: 05/01/2020 08:26 PM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: [OIG\\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIG_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov)

---

Submitted on Friday, May 1, 2020 - 20:26  
Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** No restriction

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**

**State:**

**Zip Code:**

**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include**

**names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** I am a U.S. public citizen who visits various state and federal government websites for a research. I was recently on the government of American Samoa website [www.americansamoa.gov](http://www.americansamoa.gov) and found some oddities that compelled me to look to see if they were compliant with U.S. federal policy. In my research I found that GSA is responsible for ensuring compliance with policies of standards for .gov top-level domain websites. I have found a few irregularities throughout the [www.americansamoa.gov](http://www.americansamoa.gov) website structure. 1. The mixed use of various email servers (e.g., both official .gov email servers and third-party commercial webmail servers, such as Yahoo! Mail and gmail (Google) are listed as email links for contact with various government officials (presumably for conduct of official government business). e.g. [www.americansamoa.gov](http://www.americansamoa.gov) office-of-the-governor multiple examples are present on the page. 2. The site background is not consistent between pages. The color palette and font used on some pages is also distracting or difficult to read. While I appreciate the cultural ties that may be present in some of the themes it is distracting and inconsistent, and probably would be even more so for someone who is visually impaired. (See also [www.americansamoa.gov](http://www.americansamoa.gov) visitors ). 3. The website contains links at the bottom of the webpage for wix.com (though this may be accidental). While it appears that third-party developers may be responsible for the creation and maintenance of a .gov registered domain, it seems somewhat unintuitive to me that there should be any sign that a third party was involved with the website. Several documents with links on the website (presumably which are taken to be official government publications) are hosted on a third-party server (filesusr.com). 4. Points 1 and 3 seem to violate at least the spirit of prohibition on certain types of content which may be viewed as endorsements (even if not explicitly stated as such) home.dotgov.gov registration requirements #general-requirements

**When did it happen?** I located the information May 1, 2020.

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** GSA Office of Government-wide Policy, Office of Information Access and Integrity, Dotgov Domain Management program

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** The website is not compliant with the standards detailed in home.dotgov.gov registration requirements #general-requirements Though I do not have any evidence to suggest any wrongdoing by anyone, the website is nonetheless cumbersome and confusing to use and warrants being properly updated for compliance and usability.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event?** No

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** visit websites listed

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** visit website listed

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) There is no need to contact me but if you feel that any additional input would be helpful for you please give me a call. As I said I have no reason to suspect any wrongdoing but I was unsure where else to report these discrepancies.

**The results of this submission may be viewed**

**at:** <https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3199>



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: FraudNet  
Subject: Re: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00093 - Audit Opened  
Date: 10/07/2020 04:04 PM

---

Good afternoon,

An audit was opened, A201046. Please let me know if you need further information.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Management Analyst  
Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General, GSA  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

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▼ FraudNet---05/19/2020 08:41:53 AM---Hi Nick, Please review the following complaint that is being referred to your office for review.

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: Rolando N. Goco/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Barbara E. Bouldin/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 05/19/2020 08:41 AM  
Subject: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00093  
Sent by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

Hi Nick,

Please review the following complaint that is being referred to your office for review.

When responding to us of your decision reference case number H20H00093, please respond via FraudNet no later than Friday, June 19, 2020.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 05/19/2020 08:39 AM -----

From: "GSA OIG website" <OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov>  
To: fraudnet@gsaig.gov  
Date: 05/17/2020 07:23 AM  
Subject: Hotline form submission from website  
Sent by: OIG\_PublicAffairs@gsaig.gov

---

Submitted on Sunday, May 17, 2020 - 07:24

Submitted by user: Anonymous

Submitted values are:

**How do you wish to be identified?** Anonymous source

**Email:**

**Name:**

**Street Address:**

**State:** New York

**Zip Code:**

**City:**

**Describe your complaint by answering the following questions: Who did it? Include names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals or GSA contractors involved.:** GSA is not effectively managing Operations and Maintenance Service Contracts in Manhattan and New Jersey. Monthly Quality control inspections by CORs are not being performed, Contracting Officers are not enforcing deductions for work not performed, PM records are not accurate, Field offices are not hold contractors responsible for equipment failures, inventories are not including all equipment, Operations and Maintenance contractors put GSA inspectors out of buildings, and PM guides are not being followed.

**When did it happen?** Ongoing Problems

**Which GSA program or office was involved?** PBS Field Offices and Contracting Sections

**What did they do that was wrong and how did they do it? Please describe the behavior or event in as much detail as possible.:** GSA is not effectively managing Operations and Maintenance Service Contracts in Manhattan and

New Jersey. Monthly Quality control inspections by CORs are not being performed, Contracting Officers are not enforcing deductions for work not performed, PM records are not accurate, Field offices are not hold contractors responsible for equipment failures, inventories are not including all equipment, Operations and Maintenance contractors put GSA inspectors out of buildings, and PM guides are not being followed. Major repairs are not inspected prior to final payment. Contractors submit bills without a final inspection. Even though GSA Form 220 days otherwise.

**Do you have first hand knowledge of the event? Yes**

**Where can we obtain evidence of this event?** Any GSA Field office or Building Management Office

**Who else knows about the event and how do they know?** Most People who deal with service contracts. These are ongoing issues.

**Please provide us with your telephone number and any special instructions about contacting you during the day or names and telephone numbers for anyone else who can corroborate the allegations.:**

**The results of this submission may be viewed  
at: <https://www.gsaig.gov/node/4/submission/3208>**

**From:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**To:** [FraudNet](#)  
**Cc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [Brian J. Gibson](#)  
**Subject:** GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H20H00093  
**Date:** 06/17/2020 12:11 PM

---

Good morning.

We have decided to assess the validity of this hotline complaint. We will begin work on it shortly. Thank you. If there is any additional information that was provided, such as potential contact info, please forward to us. Thank you.

**Best regards,**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
**Audit Manager**  
**U.S. General Services Administration**  
**Office of the Inspector General**  
**Northeast and Caribbean Region Audit Office**  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
To: FraudNet  
Subject: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H21H00010  
Date: 12/22/2020 03:38 PM

---

Good afternoon,

After reviewing complaint and meeting with several management officials, it has been determined that an audit will not be opened at this time. Please see write up in the email below.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Management Analyst  
Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General, GSA  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

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----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG on 12/22/2020 03:37 PM -----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-R/CO/GSAIG  
To: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA-R/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 12/01/2020 11:07 AM  
Subject: Re: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H21H00010

---

Good morning Brian and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

We met with the NCR Director of Portfolio Management and Real Estate, the Leasing Contracting Officer for the procurement, and the supervisory project program manager to discuss the FEMA lease replacement.

Their answers made a lot of sense to us and I don't think we'd take a different approach if we were in their shoes. The LCO said that they need a 7 year lease extension because that will maximize competition as many of the prospective bidders that they'd talk to would need to build the building. With zoning and design approvals, that just takes a lot of time. Given that it's a headquarters, the current market of buildings available at that size is limited and would restrict competition. The LCO said that if they tried a 5 year extension instead and had to then negotiate another shorter term extension after 5 years, the govt would get hammered on the price. Covid could also slow down the requirements process for the tenant as they re-

evaluate their space needs. But regardless of covid, this was probably going to take 7 years. [REDACTED] said the last 3 HQ projects in this area at this size averaged 7 years. So short of building a time machine to go back and give up on their St Es hopes sooner and just focus on a lease, there's nothing really that we'd want them to do differently. I don't recommend opening an audit to look into this.

Let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Audit Manager

U.S. General Services Administration

Office of Inspector General (JA-R)

1800 F Street NW, Room [REDACTED]

Washington, DC 20405

Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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▼ Brian J. Gibson---11/23/2020 08:17:10 AM---[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Please take a look at the subject hotline complaint. Are you both available to discuss

From: Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG  
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA-R/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA-R/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 11/23/2020 08:17 AM  
Subject: Fw: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H21H00010

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Please take a look at the subject hotline complaint. Are you both available to discuss tomorrow morning at 9AM?

Thanks.

Brian J. Gibson

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Real Property Audits

General Services Administration

Office of Inspector General

Phone: (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Mobile: (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov



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----- Forwarded by Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG on 11/23/2020 08:15 AM -----

From: FraudNet/GSAIG  
To: Rolando N. Goco/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Cc: Barbara E. Bouldin/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, Brian J. Gibson/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JA/CO/GSAIG@GSAIG  
Date: 11/20/2020 03:49 PM  
Subject: GSA OIG Hotline Referral - H21H00010  
Sent by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

---

Hi Nick,

Please review the following complaint that is being referred to your office for review.

When responding to us of your decision reference case number H21H00010, please respond via FraudNet no later than Monday, December 21, 2020.

Thank you,

Hotline Division  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

WARNING: This email and any attachments may contain legally privileged or sensitive information. The information is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction, or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this transmission, is strictly prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please notify the sender and delete the message and any attachments.

----- Forwarded by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/JII/CO/GSAIG on 11/20/2020 03:32 PM -----

From:  
To: "fraudnet@gsaig.gov" <fraudnet@gsaig.gov>  
Date: 11/13/2020 11:20 AM  
Subject: Follow-up on complaint filed via hotline form

---

\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*

GSA OIG-

I am following up on a complaint I attempted to file (confidentially) via the hotline form on Monday 11/9 and on a voicemail I left this morning regarding the same. At the end of hotline form process, the website indicated that the submission was successfully received, but also said "an email could not be sent." In the event the complaint was not received properly through the web portal, I wanted to submit the information provided again hereto.

The complaint filed revolves around GSA's Public Building Service (Region 11/Washington, DC) potentially requesting an abnormally long extension term of 7-years from an incumbent Lessor in relation to the FEMA Headquarters leases currently located at 500 and 400 C Streets, SW. A 7-year extension would be highly irregular and inconsistent with GSA standard practice, which typically limits interim extensions to 3-4 years even in special situations. Additionally, a 7-year extension would go well beyond the intent of interim leasing authority provided in the Congressionally authorized prospectus, which is intended solely to "bridge the gap" between an existing lease and the new 20-year approved lease action provided for in the prospectus. Offering a 7-year extension to the incumbent Lessor gives the incumbent a distinct advantage in any future procurement action, likely results in reduced competition for the long term lease action and unnecessarily increases the cost to the Government.

Attached to this email you will find a summary paper (containing the same information submitted along with the complaint filed via the hotline) providing more detailed information on the complaint.

I named Darren Blue (Regional Commissioner/PBS) in the complaint as the party responsible – as [REDACTED] oversees this department. I further noted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Lease Contracting Officer) should also know about the issue.

While I am submitting this complaint again here via email, I do ask that it remain confidential. I am happy to discuss the complaint further and provide additional information with GSA OIG at your request.

Please confirm receipt and advise as to a time you would like to discuss as necessary.

Sincerely,

[attachment "FEMA Lease Extension -OIG Complaint Summary.docx" deleted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) JA-R/CO/GSAIG]



## FEMA Headquarters Lease Extension Talking Points

### Background

- The existing leases for the FEMA Headquarters facility at 500 and 400 C Street expire in August 2020 and January 2021, respectively. As these FEMA leases expire, GSA will need to extend the current leases to allow a full and open lease procurement and support the existing tenancy during the process.
- On October 20, 2020, GSA issued a Sources Sought Notification (Notice ID 9DC2719) seeking expressions of interest from sources of office and related space for up to 587,000 rentable square feet of space to accommodate the FEMA headquarters facility requirement. The notice requested evidence that the offered space can be delivered with tenant improvements completed no later than January 2027.
- (b) (3) (A)

***Extending the existing FEMA leases through January 2027 (with firm term extensions of 6-7 years) is highly irregular and inconsistent with GSA standard practice***

- GSA's standard practice is to limit the length of a firm term lease extensions to no more than two years.
- GSA will consider longer extensions between 3-4 years depending on the specifics of the tenancy and the project schedule.
- It is extremely uncommon for GSA to do firm term lease extensions beyond four years, and a seven-year extension is unheard of.

***The proposed lease extension through January 2027 is unwarranted and does not reflect the realities of the current and planned market inventory available to meet the FEMA lease requirement***

- There are a number planned and existing developments in the marketplace that could accommodate the agency tenancy by 2024-25, which is far earlier than the January 2027 timeline that GSA is considering.
- It is important to understand the spirit and intent of the interim leasing authority in the Congressionally authorized lease prospectus for the FEMA headquarters. "GSA will execute such interim leasing actions as are necessary to ensure continued housing of the tenant agency prior to the effective date of the new lease. It is in the best interest of the Government to avert the financial risk of holdover tenancy." The intent of this interim leasing authority is to bridge the gap between the expiration of the existing lease and the commencement of the new lease for a minimal period to avoid any disruption to the existing tenancy.
- By extending the firm term of the existing lease through January 2027, GSA is doing more than bridging the gap to avoid disruption to the existing FEMA tenancy.

***By extending the existing lease through January 2027, GSA is providing an economic and competitive advantage to the incumbent lessor.***

- Such an abnormally lengthy lease extension gives a competitive advantage to the incumbent in any future procurement because they will not have to “hold their offered terms” as long as they will be getting rent in the interim. In contrast, other interested developers would be forced to wait two additional years without rental income in order to compete for the FEMA procurement.
- A lease extension through January 2027 also runs the risk of reducing the competitive set as currently available properties may no longer be available down the road and the rising cost of construction, increased carry costs, etc. could drive new buildings to price above Prospectus cap and be non-responsive.
- GSA has long recognized that the government pays a rental premium (as much as 20 percent) during the lease extension period. If GSA were to artificially extend the firm term of the existing FEMA lease extension by 24-36 months, the government could be wasting several million dollars on a lease extension premium that is not warranted by the agency tenancy or lease procurement schedule and does nothing more than provide an economic windfall to the incumbent landlord.

***There are better more equitable and more effective options that GSA should consider***

- Schedule risk is often a potential issue for large lease procurements like the FEMA headquarters facility. If GSA is looking to mitigate the potential schedule risk for the follow-on lease procurement, there are more equitable and effective methods of managing schedule risk instead of providing a seven-year firm term extension.
- Given the number of options in the market that can deliver a leased facility within 4-5 years, GSA should set the extension term based on that timeline. To mitigate the uncertainty and risk of potential schedule overruns, GSA can also include renewal options in the lease extension agreement that could be exercised at a later date in the event of significant schedule delays. But GSA should not approach the FEMA lease procurement by automatically assuming that the schedule will slip.
- By calibrating the lease extension to the actual time required to accommodate the FEMA headquarters project, GSA can avoid disruption to the FEMA tenancy, ensure a fair and open lease procurement, and save millions of dollars in unnecessary lease expense.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

**SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE**

June 5, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JI-4)

SUBJECT:

Report of Investigation:  
**WASHINGTON GAS ENERGY SYSTEMS**

File Number: I10W0941

This case was initiated based on information obtained from GSA OIG JA-W Forensic Auditing Staff who discovered multiple 8(a) companies, Dae Sung Corporation (Dae Sung); Turtle Associates, LLC (Turtle); and Divco, Inc.'s, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) technical and price proposals having similarities, to include each 8(a) company teaming with Washington Gas Energy Systems (WGES).

The investigation revealed WGES prepared the bid proposals for each of the 8(a) companies to include pricing the cost of the entire project. Turtle Associates was awarded the first two ARRA contracts and was performing the required percentage of work required by the Small Business Administration (SBA). WGES attempted to take control of Turtle's contracts and was unsuccessful, which resulted in WGES personnel concluding they did not want to work with Turtle on any additional projects.

WGES personnel and Michelle Cho (Cho), former officer of Dae Sung, made an agreement that if Dae Sung was awarded a GSA ARRA contract, it would not be required to work on the contract and would simply be paid a guaranteed percentage of the contract simply for allowing its company name and 8(a) status to be connected to the bids. WGES began to manipulate the bidding process and modified the way it calculated Dae Sung's price mark-up. After the new "bidding strategy" was generated, Turtle never won another ARRA contract with WGES. Dae Sung won six ARRA contracts, consisting of 8 projects, with WGES. Dae Sung subcontracted these eight projects in their entirety to WGES, played no role in project delivery, and collected 5.8 percent guaranteed profit and overhead.

On November 19, 2014, a deferred prosecution agreement was filed against WGES for violating 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy) and 18 USC 1031 (Major Fraud). WGES agreed to pay a fine of \$1,560,000 and a monetary penalty of \$1,027,261 to the government.

Additionally, the investigation revealed Cho participated in a similar fraud scheme with MCC Construction Corporation (MCC) and Far East Construction (Far East). Far East was owned by Cho's father, Hyun Kang. From January 2008 through August 2013, MCC partnered Far East to gain access to government contracts that were awarded through the SBA's 8(a) program and HUBZone program. Without the partnership, MCC was ineligible to receive these contracts. Far East misrepresented that they were in compliance with the SBA regulations and performing the required percentage of the work although MCC exercised impermissible control over bidding

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite [REDACTED], Atlanta, GA 30308 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



and the performance of work on the contracts. Over \$70 million in government contracts were awarded to Far East.

The GSA Contracting Officer filed a protest with SBA related to one of the contracts claiming that one of the companies was not a small business due to its relationship with MCC. SBA opened a proceeding to determine whether MCC's bid on behalf of one of the companies violated SBA regulations. During this time, Thomas Harper (Harper), former officer and owner of MCC; Walter Crummy (Crummy), former officer and owner of MCC; and Cho took steps to obstruct the SBA size determination protest by knowingly making false statements to the SBA about the extent of the relationship between MCC and Far East.

On January 5, 2016, a criminal information was filed against MCC. On February 2, 2016, MCC Construction Corporation entered a guilty plea charging the company with conspiracy to commit major fraud on the United States (18 USC 1031) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 371). On March 15, 2016, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson sentenced MCC Construction Corporation to pay \$1,269,294 forfeiture; \$500,000 fine; and \$400 special assessment.

On June 22, 2016, Harper pled guilty to conspiring to obstruct justice against the SBA. On May 15, 2017, Harper was sentenced to 7 months incarceration, 2 years supervised release, \$165,711.06 restitution, and \$100 special assessment.

On July 22, 2016, a criminal information was filed against Crummy charging him with conspiracy (18 USC 371). On August 23, 2016, Crummy pled guilty. On April 11, 2017, Crummy was sentenced to 12 months probation with 2 months to be served in home confinement, \$105,618 forfeiture, 200 hours of community service, and \$100 special assessment.

On October 12, 2016, a criminal information was filed against Cho charging her with conspiracy (18 USC 371). On November 15, 2016, Cho pled guilty. On April 25, 2017, Cho was sentenced to 6 months incarceration, 2 years supervised release, \$169,166.52 forfeiture, \$35,000 fine, and \$100 special assessment.

On October 22, 2018, a civil complaint was filed against Far East, Hyun Kang, and Kyong Kang, for violations of the federal False Claims Act. On June 4 2019, a civil settlement agreement was filed wherein Kyong Kang agreed to pay \$100,000 to the government. The case against Hyun Kang was dropped due to him passing away during the investigation. After filing the complaint, it became known that Far East was a defunct company, so the Department of Justice decided not to continue pursuing Far East.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

If you have any questions, please call Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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December 14, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:

**ATLANTIC DIVING SUPPLY - Qui Tam (UNSEALED)**

Case Number: I12W3070

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The investigation began in 2012 based on information received from a complainant alleging Atlantic Diving Supply, Inc. (ADS) unlawfully gave bribes and gratuities to employees of Marine Corps System Command in connection with several purchases off of GSA schedule contracts. Investigative results did not substantiate the claims received but revealed ADS had ties with small businesses, to include MJL Enterprises LLC (MJL), SEK Solutions LLC (SEK), London Bridge Trading (LBT), and Karda Systems LLC (Karda).

In November 2013, a Qui Tam was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging ADS and allegedly ADS affiliated defendants violated the False Claims Act and other laws in connection with bidding for and performing under Federal contracts.

On August 4, 2017, ADS agreed to pay the government \$16 million plus interest to resolve government claims that ADS and its alleged affiliated companies falsely represented they qualified as a small businesses, improperly bid on and received certain set-aside contracts for which they were not eligible, and participated in illegal bid collusion or rigging schemes that inflated or distorted prices.

On October 5, 2017, Karda and its nominal owner, Samuel Caragan, agreed to pay the government \$80,000 plus interest to resolve government claims that Karda and Caragan violated laws related to bidding for and receiving certain set-aside contracts for which Karda was not eligible because of its affiliation with ADS and because competition on those contracts had been restricted to qualified small businesses.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite [REDACTED] Washington, DC 20024

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On December 20, 2017, SEK, its owner Edna Denis Naim, and Executive Vice President Kahlil Naim (K. Naim) agreed to pay the government \$140,000 plus interest to resolve government claims that SEK and the Naims violated laws related to bidding for and receiving certain set-aside contracts for which Karda was not eligible because of its affiliation with ADS and because competition on those contracts had been restricted to qualified small businesses.

On March 16, 2018, MJL and its owner, Marty Hierholzer, agreed to pay the government \$400,000 plus interest to resolve government claims that MJL and Hierholzer violated laws related to bidding for and receiving certain set-aside contracts for which MJL was not eligible because of its affiliation with ADS and because competition on those contracts had been restricted to qualified small businesses.

On May 24, 2018, Naim pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting a false statement. On June 22, 2018, the Department of the Navy (Navy) Suspending and Debaring Official (SDO) suspended SEK, the Naims, and SEK's Executive Vice President Ronald Villanueva from government contracting.

On June 28, 2019, Charles Salle, former general counsel and chief legal officer of ADS, agreed to pay the government \$225,000 plus interest to resolve government claims that he (among others) caused ADS to falsely represent that it qualified as a small business concern when ADS was allegedly not qualified as such, including due to alleged affiliation with a number of commonly controlled companies. Salle (among others) allegedly caused ADS to have bid on, received, and submitted claims for payment under its contracts when ADS allegedly was not eligible because competition on those contracts had been restricted to qualified small businesses.

On August 2, 2018, Caragan pleaded guilty to one count of making a false statement to the Small Business Administration. On August 21, 2018, the Navy SDO suspended Karda and Caragan from government contracting.

On August 5, 2019, Luke Hillier, owner and chairman of ADS, agreed to pay the government \$20 million plus interest to resolve government claims that Hillier (among others) caused ADS to falsely represent that it qualified as a small business concern when ADS was allegedly not qualified as such, including due to alleged affiliation with a number of commonly controlled companies. Hillier (among others) allegedly caused ADS to have bid on, received, and submitted claims for payment under small business set-aside contracts when ADS allegedly was not eligible because competition on those contracts had been restricted to qualified small businesses.

On January 9, 2019, Villanueva was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States, falsification of records, and aiding and abetting false written statements for his alleged conduct related to SEK Solutions, LLC and Karda Systems, LLC. On March 19, 2019, Villanueva pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. On July 2, 2019, Villanueva was sentenced to 30 months' confinement, three years' supervised release, and ordered to pay \$524,533 in restitution. On October 16, 2019, the Navy SDO debarred Villanueva for six years from the date of Villanueva's suspension.

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On July 11, 2019, Samuel Caragan, nominal owner of Karda Systems, was sentenced to six months' home confinement, followed by three and a half years of probation, and was ordered to pay \$242,035 in restitution for his role in the conspiracy. On December 3, 2019, the Navy SDO debarred Karda and Caragan for 18 months from the date of Karda's and Caragan's suspension.

On July 12, 2019, K. Naim, executive vice president of SEK Solutions, was sentenced to one month of incarceration and ordered to pay \$479,641 in restitution. On October 10, 2019, the Navy SDO debarred SEK and the Naims for four years from the date of SEK's and the Naims' suspension.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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January 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

ACTING SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, JI-W

SUBJECT:

**CLOSING MEMO**

**Re: I12W4013**

**ANDRE LIPFORD: BRIBERY**

This memorandum presents the findings of the investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter. This memorandum only presents a summary of key actions taken during the investigation and does not capture all aspects of the investigation.

In April, 2012, this case was opened to investigate allegations that Andre Lipford, owner of Sun Development (Sun) provided a GSA employee bribe payments in exchange for GSA work which was done at GSA facilities in Maryland. In October, 2012, following monitored and controlled payments to the GSA employee, Lipford was arrested and charged with bribery. In January, 2013, Lipford pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced in April, 2013 to 10 months incarceration followed by one year of supervised release and a \$100 court fee.

In May, 2013, GSA OIG sent GSA's Suspension and Debarment Official (SDO) a recommendation for consideration of debarment for Lipford and Sun. In March, 2017 the SDO sent show cause letters to Lipford and Sun. In June, 2017, the SDO sent Notices of Proposed Debarments to Lipford and Sun. In February, 2019, Lipford and Sun were both debarred from participating in federal procurement and nonprocurement programs. The debarments will expire on June 27, 2020.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Washington, DC 20024

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
Southeast and Caribbean Regional Office of Investigations

October 7, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)  
SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
**Moustafa Ibrahim- Bribery of a GSA Building Manager**  
Case Number: 113W4814

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was based on investigative activities for GSA OIG case number I10W0106 that indicated GSA Contractors Sayed Mohamed and Moustafa Ibrahim were involved in a conspiracy to bribe a GSA Building Manager.

The investigation discovered that Mohamed and Ibrahim were involved in an illegal scheme in which they paid kickbacks to a GSA Building Manager for GSA contracts. GSA OIG recorded conversations where Mohamed and Ibrahim offered cash to the GSA Building Manager for GSA contracts.

Mohamed and Ibrahim fled the United States and went to Cairo, Egypt before they could be arrested. Ibrahim was arrested when he returned to the United States. Mohamed did not return to the United States.

Ibrahim was sentenced to six months confinement, six months home detention, and ordered to pay a \$15,000 fine on October 26, 2016 for making cash payments to a GSA Building Manager in exchange for GSA service contracts on separate occasions from about October 2007 to about June 2009.

Ibrahim and his company, Union Inc., were debarred on April 12, 2018.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

May 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**Global Mail- Defective Pricing**  
**Case Number: I14M5174**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was predicated on a referral from the GSA Office of Audits, Southeast Sunbelt Regional Office, based on a post award examination of a multiple award schedule contract extension on Global Mail, Inc. The results of the audit disclosed

(b) (5), (b) (4)

In addition, (b) (5), (b) (4)

Further, Global Mail (b) (5), (b) (4)

AUSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Southern District of Florida, Civil Division was briefed on the matter and accepted the case. GSA OIG was able to locate the original contracting officer (CO) and interview the CO. Global Mail provided information to GSA Audits and as a result GSA Audit reduced the amount of findings.

As a result of matter being administratively resolved by the CO and there did not appear to be evidence of the requisite "Knowledge" element necessary to establish a False Claims Act case, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to decline the referral and let GSA handle matter administratively.

On June 14, 2018 GSA and Global Mail concluded negotiations and Global Mail agreed to refund GSA \$2,164,594.64 as a result of the GSA OIG Post Award Audit.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

June 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-5)  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**

File Number: I15h30053

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Midwest Investigations Division initiated an investigation after information was received that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Southern Ohio Contracting Branch, Acquisition Management Division, Public Buildings Service (, GSA; has been purchasing synthetic cannabinoid products utilizing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA.gov email account.

GSA OIG special agents analyzed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'s GSA emails and found numerous communications referencing the purchase of incense type products by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The emails did not appear to be related to GSA business, but more of a personal nature. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, were both consulted in the matter and declined to intervene.

On June 30, 2020, a Letterhead Report for Information Only was sent to the Regional Commissioner for PBS in Region 5.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chicago, IL 60604 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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September 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - Employee Misconduct  
Case Number: I15W5382

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based on information provided by a GSA employee, who alleged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), both supervisory elevator mechanics at the White House Service Center, claimed to have worked on some Alternative Work Schedules days off and overtime when they did not work those hours. The conduct allegedly took place between 2012 and May 2014.

JI-W agents interviewed the complainant and conducted surveillance on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). JI-W agents attempted to obtain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'s cell phones, but were unable to do so, as the phones had been recycled. JI-W agents obtained Electronic Time & Attendance Management System, Authorized Leave & Overtime Help Application, and badge records for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). GSA's key card access records could not be used as a method to verify time and attendance records, as the practice of one employee entering or exiting the space holding the door for another employee and transmission of records issues make access determination solely based on this analysis unreliable. JI-W agents did not substantiate the allegation received. The Department of Justice declined to accept the case for prosecution.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

February 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - Conflict of Interest  
Case Number: I16H00090

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated after GSA notified the GSA OIG that Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a former U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) employee, was identified in a lawsuit as improperly accepting gifts, entertainment, and airfare as a USMS employee. The allegations included that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of Identiv, had an improper relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was an influential person in assisting Identiv to obtain government contracts worth millions of dollars; and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a regular at Identiv events, dinners, and parties in Las Vegas, NV.

GSA OIG and DOJ OIG conducted an investigation. During the investigation, GSA OIG obtained and reviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email records, personnel records, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OGE 450s; and agents reviewed contracting documents and interviewed witnesses. The investigation determined that the alleged activity occurred when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was employed by USMS. As the case developed, GSA OIG participated in an assist role since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was employed at GSA. The case was worked with DOJ Civil Division and DOJ Criminal Division Fraud Section, and DOJ OIG was the lead investigative agency on both cases. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transferred from GSA to the Department of the Navy in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In February 2020, DOJ OIG advised that the cases were ultimately declined and DOJ OIG had closed their cases.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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April 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, JI-W

SUBJECT:

**CLOSING MEMO**

Re: **I16W00035**

**BBG National Control Center (Cohen Bldg) - Possible  
Bribery/Procurement Fraud**

This memorandum presents the findings of the investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On March 14, 2016, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, National Capital Region, was informed by Department of State (DOS) OIG that they had received an anonymous complaint alleging that Hanson Professional Services, Inc. (Hanson), an architectural and engineering (A&E) contractor at the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) Headquarters in Washington, D.C., had performed inadequate work on a renovation project located at the BBG Network Control Center. (Attachment 1)

Additionally, it was alleged that BBG employees (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received gifts and favors from Hanson in exchange for the promise of future A&E work with the BBG.

On May 31, 2016, this investigation was presented to Assistant U.S. Attorney (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia and was declined for prosecution in lieu of administrative action.

On December 12, 2016, DOS OIG submitted a Report of Investigation (ROI) to BBG Leadership indicating the following: (Attachment 2)

1. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed Hanson to order supplies outside the scope of Hanson's contracts with BBG and to have the supplies delivered to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal residence and then approved invoices requesting payment for the out-of-scope supplies.
2. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor at the time, was aware of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct.
3. Among the items ordered were two laptops, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) each converted to their personal use, knowing both laptops were paid for with government funds.

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4. At (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request, Hanson staff purchased and provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with safety equipment, among other items, for which Hanson did not seek or receive reimbursement. In accepting these items, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accepted gifts or gratuities from the contractor. In addition, Hanson's staff provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with job references and pay-for subscription engineering periodicals.

On April 28, 2017, BBG provided a response to DOS OIG's ROI indicating they would take the following response: (Attachment 3)

1. BBG's Office of Human Resources, Labor and Employee Relations Division recommended removing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from Federal Service.
2. The Office of Contracts planned to remove (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from BBG's list of certified and eligible Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR) and to terminate any COR designation for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).
3. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) separated from BBG and the agency was unable to take administrative action with respect to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).
4. Office of Contracts would attempt to recover from Hanson the value of all out-of-scope equipment for which Hanson billed BBG (Approximately \$33,960.00).
5. The Office of Contracts would note the issues with Hanson's conduct in its Contractor Performance Assessment Report (CPARS) and intend to take Hanson's actions into account regarding their past performance responsibility if Hanson sought future business with the BBG.
6. With respect to suspension or debarment, the Office of Contracts would refer the matter to the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee for lead agency coordination in case another agency considered suspending or debarring Hanson. BBG's Senior Procurement Executive decided not to pursue suspension or debarment.

On November 19, 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed a Settlement Agreement, Waiver, and Release (Agreement) indicating that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would not be removed from federal employment and would serve a 30 calendar days suspension. The agreement stipulated that the signature acknowledgement of the agreement itself should not be construed as an admission.

DOS OIG indicated that, because BBG is a separate entity from DOS, they would not track the remittance of monies owed to BBG by Hanson.

No GSA employees were involved in the matter. GSA had delegated contracting authority to BBG for modifications within the BBG Network Control Center and no GSA monies were utilized in the fulfillment of their contracts.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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December 2, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (ACTING) (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Report of Investigation re:  
**Aaron C. Davis – Possible Child Pornography**

Case Number: I17W00009

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions are required for this matter.

This case was initiated from (b) (7)(E). A JI-W review revealed that a source internet protocol address associated with the home address of a GSA employee was identified by the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force as trafficking in child exploitative material using peer to peer software.

This office, the FBI, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Maryland State Police executed a search warrant at the residence on December 20, 2016. While the warrant was being executed, the occupants of the residence were interviewed. Aaron C. Davis, one of the residents, confessed to utilizing peer to peer software to receive and share child pornography. Initial review of electronic media and devices controlled by Davis revealed numerous known child pornographic files. Davis was taken into custody by Maryland State Police and charged with one count of violating Maryland Code Section 11-207: Production or Distribution of Child Pornography and four counts of violating Maryland Code Section 11-208: Possession of Child Pornography.

As a result of the investigation, on October 16, 2017, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, Davis pleaded guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography, in violation of Maryland Code Section 11-208.

On April 13, 2018, Davis was sentenced to 10 years of incarceration. Eight and a half of those years were suspended and the remaining 18 months were to be served through home detention followed by five years of probation.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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October 8, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
**GSA HOTD Complex**  
Case Number: I18H00004

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based upon receipt of an anonymous hotline complaint alleging GSA Heating Operations and Transportation District (HOTD) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was drinking alcohol and providing alcohol to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employees while on government time at HOTD. Additionally, the complainant alleged GSA employees had been using government computers to view sexually explicit websites during work hours.

On the evening of December 14, 2017, GSA OIG special agents and Federal Protective Service (FPS) officers and agents conducted an administrative search of the boiler control room at the HOTD Central Heating Plant. A search of cabinets and drawers in the boiler control room that had been identified as common access areas by employees was conducted. Two Ball canning jars containing amber liquid were found in a drawer in the boiler control room. An odor of alcohol was detected upon the opening of the jars. All boiler room employees were interviewed and none admitted to consuming alcohol at HOTD.

After repeated denials during an interview with GSA OIG agents, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted bringing the two jars containing alcoholic beverages to work on the morning of December 14, 2017. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that one jar was an apple pie gin drink and the other was a lemon flavored gin drink.

On April 5, 2018, GSA OIG issued a Report of Investigation to GSA Public Buildings Service (PBS) leadership detailing the search at HOTD and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequent confession. On June 1, 2018, GSA suspended (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for five days for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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Three government desktop computers in the boiler control room were seized by GSA OIG Digital Crimes Forensics Unit (DCFU) during the search of HOTD on December 14, 2017. The computers are used by all boiler control room employees. On March 26, 2019, DCFU provided its analysis of the computers from the HOTD boiler control room.

Because the computers in question were shared computers, in an open workspace where users are not physically in front of the computers for the duration of their logins, we were unable to definitively attribute pornography access to any one user. JI-W leadership discussed the matter with PBS Regional Commissioner Darren Blue. Blue stated he would take action, to include further education of HOTD employees, on the proper usage of GSA computer systems.pers

This matter is closed.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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September 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Anthony "Tony" Ng**  
Case Number: I18W00066

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on information provided by a GSA's Director of Physical Security, who indicated a GSA employee and a Health and Human Services employee received unsolicited greetings cards or birthday cards that contained various Victoria's Secret coupons. The handwriting on the cards matched the handwriting in cards collected from two additional GSA OIG employees in the course of a prior GSA OIG investigation that had been closed due to a lack of viable investigative leads and GSA OIG's inability to identify the sender of the unsolicited cards.

GSA OIG conducted numerous interviews, reviewed GSA records, analyzed Ng's GSA Laptop, GSA Cellphone, and GSA email account. During interviews, Ng admitted to sending unsolicited mailings to numerous females over a period of approximately 10 years and to removing used underwear from restrooms and locker rooms located in a federal building in New York. During the course of the investigation, Ng voluntarily retired from GSA.

The United States U.S. Attorney's Offices in the Southern District of New York and the District of New Jersey declined to prosecute the matter and this was presented to local prosecutors for consideration.

Ng was arrested by New Jersey State Police and charged by complaint with one count of Stalking in the Fourth Degree. Ng entered a plea of 'not -guilty' in Essex County Superior Court (New Jersey), after which his case was remanded to Bloomfield Township Municipal Court (New Jersey) for one count of harassment. Ng pleaded guilty to harassment. The court granted Ng a conditional dismissal. Ng was placed under probation, monitored status, for a period of one year and was fined \$430.



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The GSA Suspension and Debarment official issued a notice of debarment to Ng effective on September 3, 2020.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

December 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JI-6)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING  
FILE NUMBER: I19H00030

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary.

This case was initiated on July 17, 2019, based on a Hotline complaint regarding several alleged instances of time and attendance abuse on the part of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Heartland Region, Kansas City, Missouri, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Heartland Region, Kansas City, Missouri. JI-6 notified the FBI of case opening.

Interviews of the complainant revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not take Annual Leave for a tour of Air Force Two, despite it being during the work day and not representing GSA at the event. Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on telework for long stretches of time, including during the holidays, and did not take Annual Leave.

A review was conducted of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) timecards, electronic calendars, cell phone records, location data, and social media accounts. This review revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) calendar reflected dates (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on Annual Leave, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not request Annual Leave through the timekeeping system. It also revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was frequently on telework during holidays or days connected to weekends for long stretches of time, and did not request Annual Leave from February 20, 2018 to August 18, 2019.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA Administrator Emily Murphy sent an email notification that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On October 13, 2020, GSA OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in person at the GSA OIG office, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the following information. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made up the hours spent at non-GSA events after the workday ended. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) telework agreement (approved by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) reflected a routine telework schedule in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could telework ten

Midwest Investigations Division (JI-6)  
2300 Main Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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days per pay period, and it did not list a specific alternate work site. A review of [REDACTED] telework agreement supports these statements.

A review of [REDACTED] GSA email revealed communication with a possible prohibited source, but a referral to the Office of General Counsel revealed that not to be true.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
**Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations**

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

May 1, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
CASE TITLE: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – CONFLICT OF INTEREST-GSA  
AUCTIONS  
CASE NUMBER: I19S00093

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On August 28, 2019, a GSA Property Disposal Specialist (PDS), reported to JI-9 that while [REDACTED] was processing the GSA Auction sale of two vessels and two trailers in the amounts of \$24,006 and \$11,960, [REDACTED] suspected that the purchaser, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), may be a GSA employee and ineligible to make purchases on GSA Auction. Using the information provided on the sales receipt, JI-9 was able to confirm that [REDACTED] was a GS-13 Contract Specialist in Honolulu, Hawaii.

On August 29, 2019, the PDS cancelled the sale with an email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicating that GSA employees may not bid on GSA Auctions. [REDACTED] responded that [REDACTED] was unaware of the prohibition. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had already incurred costs for storage and parts. In multiple communications, [REDACTED] requested that [REDACTED] account be suspended “going forward” indicating [REDACTED] wanted to proceed with the current purchase.

From the first date [REDACTED] was directed to return the vessels until the actual return which occurred approximately a month later (during September 24 – 26, 2019), [REDACTED] engaged in ongoing communications with the PDS urging [REDACTED] to work out an arrangement that would allow [REDACTED] to keep the vessels. [REDACTED] arguments focused on the assertion that [REDACTED] had invested substantial time and money into refurbishing the vessels.

During the period September 24 – 26, 2019, [REDACTED] returned to GSA two vessels purchased on August 27, 2019. [REDACTED] also returned another vessel that had been previously purchased in February 12, 2019. GSA had also identified trailers that were previously purchased, but [REDACTED] was unable to return those because [REDACTED] had already sold them.

When [REDACTED] returned the vessels, the accepting individual noted that it appeared a great deal of equipment, including motors, had been removed. When [REDACTED] was questioned about the missing equipment, [REDACTED] responded that the PDS knew.

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Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
2800 Cottage Way, [REDACTED]  
Sacramento, CA 95828

(b) (5), (b) (7)(C) was advised that (b) (5) would receive a refund in the amount determined to be the fair market value of the vessels upon return. If the vessels eventually sold for more, (b) (5) would receive the excess at that time as well. During the time that GSA Auction was attempting to determine an appropriate refund, (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) initiated a dispute with (b) (5) credit card in an attempt to have the full purchase price returned. The dispute was eventually withdrawn when (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) received (b) (5) refund.

On October 3, 2019, the case was presented to the United States Attorney's Office in Hawaii. They declined due to low dollar amount of loss.

In an interview that was conducted on October 8, 2019, (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) admitted that most of the work, including the removal and selling of engines, occurred after (b) (5) initial notification to return the boats. Had (b) (5) returned the boats when first directed, there would have been a minimal decrease in value to the vessels.

The case was also presented to Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, on October 21, 2019. They also declined due to the low loss amount.

The Report of Investigation was submitted to relevant GSA management for administrative action on November 27, 2019.

On April 29, 2020, JI-9 received a copy of the final Disposition Report stating that effective April 16, 2020, (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) was relieved of (b) (5) Intermediate Acquisition Level III Contract Warrant in the amount of \$10,000,000. (b) (5) was also downgraded from a GS 13-4 Contracting Specialist to a GS 12 step 2 Contracting Specialist.

This investigation is now closed.





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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**NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION**  
**OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

August 20, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
**POSSIBLE PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIAL ON AN EMPLOYEE'S GSA LAPTOP  
COMPUTER**  
Case Number: I19W00022

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based on information provided by GSA's Office of the Chief Information Officer indicating that potentially pornographic material was found on GSA Central Office employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). GSA issued laptop computer.

On December 18, 2018 and December 12, 2019, JI-W agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who admitted to using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA issued laptop computer to view pornographic material during duty hours while teleworking.

On January 2, 2020, the report of investigation was forwarded to GSA's Director of Fleet Management and GSA's Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of Human Resources.

On June 1, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a final agency decision to suspend him from duty and pay for 14 calendar days and receive a demotion by one grade as a result of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unauthorized use of government resources. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was suspended from duty and pay between June 7, 2020 until June, 20, 2020.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

April 2, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**GOV MISUSE – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - JACKSONVILLE**  
Case Number: 120M00073

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was predicated based on a referral from the Office of Human Resources Management, GSA, regarding an allegation that a GSA Employee, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Lease Contracting Officer, Public Buildings Service, was driving assigned Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) while on medical leave.

During the investigation, GSA OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, GSA Fleet representatives, and a GSA Human Resources Specialist, as well as reviewed Wright Express Inc. (WEX) records.

The investigation revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the GOV on March 9, 2018, while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on Leave without Pay (LWOP) status. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never requested and was never given authorization to drive (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) medical leave or any other requested leave for any purpose. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make correct odometer entries when using the WEX Card to fuel the GOV and only used the WEX card on three occasions to fuel the GOV in the time period that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove it 3,789 miles.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) own credit card on several occasions to fuel the GOV. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not report mechanical issues with the GOV to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, to the GSA Fleet Rep or Fleet Management Center (FMC), or to the Maintenance Control Center (MCC). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not take the GOV to the nearest authorized dealer or the nearest repair shop, garage, or service station. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statements regarding the odometer entries are inconsistent with the spreadsheet (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travel.

On January 30, 2019, GSA OIG referred this matter to GSA for administrative action.

On November 21, 2019, GSA issued a Notice of Decision on Proposed Suspension. The Notice stated that GSA decided to suspend (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from duty and pay for 30 calendar days. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) served (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) suspension during January 2020.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

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May 20, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: GERARD BADORREK  
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (B)  
U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

CC: JOYCE HAAS  
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR  
MID-ATLANTIC REGION (3A)

MERRICK E. KRAUSE  
ACTING CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER (C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation: Re:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Financial Management Analyst  
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)  
Case Number: I20W00070

This memorandum presents our Report of Investigation concerning the captioned matter. We request that a written response, including but not limited to the attached Disposition Report, be returned within 30 days of final action on this matter.

Attachments - Report of Investigation and Exhibits  
Disposition Report

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
U. S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION





# WARNING!

THE REPORT SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED TO PREVENT IMPROPER DISCLOSURE AT ALL TIMES. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS GOVERNED BY THE PRIVACY ACT, AND ANY DISCLOSURE MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT ACT. PERSONS DISCLOSING THIS INFORMATION PUBLICLY OR TO OTHERS NOT HAVING AN OFFICIAL NEED TO KNOW ARE SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES.

AGENCY OFFICIALS WHO RECEIVE REQUESTS FOR THE REPORT FROM THE PUBLIC SHOULD REFER THE REQUESTOR TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF COUNSEL – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OFFICER.

## **BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION**

On May 24, 2019, a GSA employee discovered sexually explicit material on a GSA shared drive associated with GSA Enterprise user (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a Financial Management Analyst with the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) 1800 F Street, Washington, D.C. The employee reported the matter to their supervisors and the GSA Information Technology (IT) Service Desk. The GSA IT Incident Response Team retrieved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) browser search history and discovered search queries related to child pornography. The Incident Response Team then referred the matter to GSA OIG.

## **POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE STANDARDS**

5 C.F.R § 2635.704: Use of Government Property:

“(a) *Standard.* An employee has a duty to protect and conserve Government property and shall not use such property, or allow its use, for other than authorized purposes.

HRM 9751.1 – SUBJECT: Maintaining Discipline – Appendix A

Table 2 - Penalty Guide Violations:

#1. Unauthorized use of Government property.

#8. Misconduct whether or not in violation of a criminal statute, which impairs job performance or trustworthiness of the employee or otherwise affects the ability of a part of GSA to perform its mission.

CIO 2104.1A CHGE 1, dated May 3, 2016. Paragraph 9 – IT General Rules of Behavior, Category – “Prohibited usage”

(2) Never convey any material that is sexually explicit, offensive, abusive, discriminatory or objectionable or browse sexually explicit or hate-based web sites.

GSA Order 7800.11A ADM – SUBJECT: Personal Use of Agency Office Equipment

Paragraph (4)g – Policy

While the occasional use of agency office equipment in moderation is acceptable, uses not conforming with this order are strictly prohibited. Also, employees are expected to conduct themselves professionally in the workplace and to refrain from using agency office equipment for activities that are inappropriate or offensive to co-workers or the public, such as the use of sexually explicit materials or materials or remarks that ridicule others on the basis of race, creed, religion, color, sex, handicap, national origin or sexual orientation.

## **SUMMARY**

The investigation determined:

- 1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stored a sexually explicit image on the GSA network shared drive.
- 2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued laptop to query the Internet using terms associated with child pornography.

3) On multiple occasions (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued laptop to search for and visit a known pedophilia virtual chat forum.

The conduct identified above violates 5.C.F.R § 2635.704: Use of Government Property; GSA Order CIO 2104.1A CHGE 1, IT General Rules of Behavior; and GSA Order 7800.11A ADM Personal Use of Agency Office Equipment, and GSA Order HRM 9751.1, Table 2 Penalty Guide #1, Unauthorized use of Government property. Additionally, Bauer's conduct may have violated GSA Order HRM 9751.1, Penalty Guide Table 2, #8, Misconduct whether or not in violation of a criminal statute.

### **PROSECUTORIAL CONSIDERATION**

This matter was declined for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South Carolina.

### **DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a Financial Management Analyst, assigned to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) at the Central Office in Washington, D.C. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a virtual employee who works from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first and second line supervisors are assigned to Region 3, Financial Services Division. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is employed at the GS-13 grade level **(Exhibit A)**.

On or about May 22, 2019, a GSA OCFO employee identified a sexually explicit image of an adult on the GSA shared network drive (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). "The employee immediately reported the discovery to Region 3 leadership and then contacted the GSA IT Service Desk to report the unauthorized material. IT generated incident ticket (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) **(Exhibit B)**.

The GSA Office of the Chief of Information Security Officer (OCISO) received the report from IT and generated incident report (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) **(Exhibit C)**.

The GSA IT Enterprise Server, Storage, Identity Management Division received the incident ticket (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In response, GSA IT obtained screen captures of a single sexually explicit image of an adult, which was the image the OCFO employee reported **(Exhibit D)**. The image properties were archived for further analysis **(Exhibit E)**. The image properties revealed that on July 12, 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saved the file, titled "2805478\_200x150.jpg," to the network drive.

An OCISO Incident Response team analyst obtained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) browser history in an effort to locate the web browser occurrence to determine if the image had been downloaded. The analyst was unable to identify the origin of the sexually explicit image. The analyst captured (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) browser history from March 9, 2017 through May 23, 2019, which revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued Dell Latitude E7450 laptop to query the Internet for terms associated with child pornography on January 11, March 23, March 24, April 6, and July 24, 2018. Following the discovery of the above material, OCISO performed an out-of-cycle equipment exchange and coordinated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to retrieve (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued laptop and replace it with a new one.



OCISO sent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government issued laptop to the GSA OIG Digital Crimes and Forensics Unit (DCFU) for analysis. DCFU received the laptop on May 30, 2019.

The DCFU conducted a complete analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA laptop, described as a Dell Latitude E7450 laptop with Service Tag#: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The analysis confirmed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted various searches on March 23, 2018, including searches for “young love,” “baby vaginal,” “baby anus,” and “how to find child porn.” (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) combined the term “young love” with the term “8Chan.”<sup>1</sup> On July 24, 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) visited the URL “https://8ch.net/younglove/index.html” approximately 263 times (**Exhibit F**). In addition, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the Bing Internet browser to search “young love 8chan”, “young love 8ch”, and “young love 8chanb” an additional 32 times between January and March, 2018. The URL “https://8ch.net/younglove/” is a virtual discussion forum where pedophiles gather to discuss their urges, lament what they perceive as their persecution, and ask about how others interact with children.<sup>2</sup> The forum does not feature photos of children.

The keyword search determined that a folder named “baby anal – Google Search\_Files” was created under the user name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). This folder contained a web page with images from the web search “baby anal.” The images consisted of various infants clothed and in diapers. The analysis could not conclusively determine whether any relevant videos were accessed or viewed on the laptop, but web content did provide evidence of potential media activity. The web activity revealed images of pre-pubescent girls and multiple images of a sex product sold by AliExpress titled “3D 100% Silicone LifeLike Loli Small Love Doll”. A complete report of DCFU findings was provided to OIG agents (**Exhibit F**).

On February 5, 2020, GSA OIG agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Agents identified themselves and provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a *Garrity* warning statement advising (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rights (**Exhibit G**). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) voluntarily signed the *Garrity* warning statement and agreed to answer agents’ questions. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence and rarely traveled for official business (**Exhibit H**). GSA provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) all electronic equipment necessary to perform (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties. When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did travel, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used a personally owned Wi-Fi device to connect to the GSA network if a public network was not available. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported having no concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home Internet security protocols, no reported instances of external penetration of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) network, and further confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued equipment is password protected, and access to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued equipment is restricted to only (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was familiar with GSA’s Limited Personal Use policy, 7800.11A, and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew where the policy was located. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA equipment to attempt to access either adult or child pornographic sites (**Exhibit I**).

Prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview, GSA OIG agents coordinated with the Mount Pleasant Police Department (MPPD) regarding the child pornography allegation. Following the interview, MPPD executed a search warrant of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence. MPPD detectives seized numerous electronic

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<sup>1</sup> 8chan, now called 8kun, Infinitetechan or Infinitychan, is a website composed of user-created images and message boards. The site has been linked to white supremacism, neo-Nazism, the alt-right, racism and anti-Semitism, hate crimes, and multiple mass shootings. The site is also known for its role as a forum for child pornography; as a result, it was filtered out from Google Search in August 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Dale, Brady. *8Chan Kicked Out of Google Search Results*. 14 August 2015.  
<https://observer.com/2015/08/google-blocks-8chan-from-search/>

devices, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued laptop and cellular phone. MPPD subsequently reported that their analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) electronic devices and media did not reveal any illegal images or activity. MPPD has not provided a report of their findings to the OIG.

On February 6, 2020, MPPD provided GSA OIG agents with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued mobile phone and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replacement laptop computer. DCFU analysts processed the seized equipment, described as a Samsung Galaxy S7 and Dell Latitude – Model 7490 laptop, Service Tag#: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DCFU's forensic analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replacement laptop concluded that Windows was installed and configured on May 28, 2019, and it appeared that the user folders for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were copied onto the replacement laptop from the laptop that GSA IT had previously retrieved from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DCFU found no additional evidence of images or search terms related to adult or child pornography on the replacement laptop besides the materials they had already discovered in their previous analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) original laptop. Additionally, analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued mobile phone did not identify any material relevant to this investigation. A complete report of DCFU findings was provided to GSA OIG agents (**Exhibit J**).

On May 6, 2020, OIG agents conducted a video conferencing/telephonic interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (**Exhibit J**). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed the network shared drive file path (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a drive (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) created and used to save work product and back-up work files. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the sexually explicit image identified in Exhibit E, nor did (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) know how the image ended up on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) network drive. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accepted responsibility and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember searching for or saving the sexually explicit image. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated it was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responsibility to ensure (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) equipment was not used improperly, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) fiduciary duty. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the only user who had access to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued equipment and said if the material was associated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) profile, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) must have performed the actions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall searching the terms associated with child pornography. Agents asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to explain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) use of the search query "8chan" in addition to the term "young love." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated 8chan hosted conspiracy theory material and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did visit the site in search of conspiracy related material. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) insisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember typing in the terms associated with child pornography and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) apologized.

Agents showed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the images recovered from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deleted files cache of two pre-pubescent girls and a sex product (**Exhibit J**). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall seeing the images and did not know how they ended up on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued equipment. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) insisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recognize the young girls and did not know how they ended up on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued equipment. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again accepted responsibility stating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was negligent and failed in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responsibility as a government employee.

Agents asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to report (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) questionable Internet activity when interviewed on February 5, 2020, at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence by SA's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) apologized and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was distracted with month-end responsibilities and other work related things. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have been upfront and honest when asked about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Internet activity.

Based on the above, our investigation determined that [REDACTED] stored a sexually explicit image on the GSA network shared drive, and on multiple occasions, [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] government-issued equipment to query the Internet using terms associated with child pornography. In doing so, [REDACTED] violated GSA Order 2104.1A CIO, IT Rules of Behavior, GSA Order 7800.11A ADM, Personal Use of Agency Office Equipment, and 5 C.F.R § 2635.704, Use of Government Property. Additionally, [REDACTED] actions may have violated GSA Order HRM 9751.1, Penalty Guide Table 2, #8, Misconduct whether or not in violation of a criminal statute.

### **PERMISSIBLE USE**

You are advised that this report is from a system of records known as GSA/ADM 24, Investigation Case Files, which is subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974. Consequently, this report must be handled in accordance with the **WARNING!** page behind the cover.

**We request you furnish the results of your final action in this matter by executing the attached Disposition Report. Please return the Disposition Report within 30 days of management's final action.**

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please telephone me at (202) [REDACTED].

### **EXHIBITS**

- A. [REDACTED] SF-50
- B. GSA IT Incident # [REDACTED]
- C. GSA OCISO [REDACTED]
- D. Image "2805478\_200x150.jpg"
- E. Image Properties
- F. DCFU Report, dated June 19, 2019
- G. *Garrity* Warning Statement
- H. [REDACTED] Memorandum of Interview – February 5, 2020
- I. DCFU Report, dated March 12, 2020
- J. [REDACTED] Memorandum of Interview - May 6, 2020





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

**GREAT LAKES REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE**

July 23, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING

File Number: I040032

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In December 2003, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG) opened this case based on information from a Relator alleging that from at least 1998 to April 2004, Second Chance, Thomas Bachner (Bachner), Richard Davis (Davis), others manufactured and sold bullet proof vests containing the material Zylon. The bullet proof vests containing Zylon, and manufactured by Second Chance, were sold to the United States government under direct contracts and the GSA Master Supply Schedule, as well as to various state, local, and Indian law enforcement agencies, who were partially reimbursed by the United States pursuant to the Bullet Proof vest Grant Partnership Act.

It was alleged that Second Chance, Bachner, Davis, and others, made or caused to be made, false statements and false claims in connection with the sale of the Zylon bullet proof vests. The Zylon vests sold to the United States, and other agencies, were defective due to the Zylon material degrading at a faster rate than represented and was not appropriate material for use in ballistic vests. It was alleged that Bachner, Davis, and others, either knew, or failed to determine, the defective nature of the Zylon material.

On February 14, 2018, Bachner entered into an agreement with the United States of America in which Bachner agreed to pay \$50,000.

On July 16, 2018, entered into an agreement with the United States of America in which Davis agreed to relinquish \$1.2 million in assets previously frozen by the Department of Justice, and agreed to pay an additional \$125,000.

These settlement agreements were the result of an ongoing investigation by the Justice Department's Civil Division, GSA OIG, DHS OIG, TIGTA, DOC OIG, DOE OIG, Army CID and the FBI.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite [REDACTED] Chicago, IL 60604 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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January 2, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JI-10)  
NORTHWEST / ARCTIC REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
  
PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS – WPA Recovery  
  
File Number: I16000053

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

Based on an investigative lead provided by JI-9, JI-10 identified 12 pieces of art, believed to have been commissioned by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), were located at the Portland Public Schools in Portland, OR. JI-10 obtained and provided the GSA Fine Arts Program with photographs of the paintings and identifiers associated with the paintings. On April 4, 2016, the GSA Fine Arts Program confirmed the art pieces were WPA works. On May 6, 2016, JI-10 recovered the 12 pieces of WPA art on behalf of GSA.

According to the GSA Fine Arts Program, the recovered pieces have an estimated value of \$24,000. The art pieces are currently on display at several Portland school buildings.

This office is now closing this investigation.

Office of Investigations (JI-10)  
400 15<sup>th</sup> Street SW, Room [REDACTED] Auburn, WA 98001

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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November 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA Region 2 – Suspicious Financial  
Transactions / Undeclared Business Interest

File Number: I18200064

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (JI), New York Field Office (JI-2), received information, developed from a confidential source, regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Associate Assistant Commissioner, GSA, Public Building Services, a senior GSA Headquarters employee who worked virtually from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence located in New York, NY. According to the information received, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had engaged in numerous suspicious financial transactions among several institutions indicative of money laundering. A subsequent investigation found that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was operating a very active and potentially illegal online poker business, called Busted Straight Blues (BSB), while employed virtually with GSA. Additionally, it was determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) omitted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involvement with BSB on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 2018 OGE Form 450 filed with GSA on February 27, 2018, as well as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) most recent SF-85P – Questionnaire for Public Trust Position form, certified to on August 20, 2018, pursuant to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA background reinvestigation.

On July 9, 2018, Homeland Security Investigations, El Dorado Task Force/Digital illicit Finance Group, joined the case.

On September 6, 2018, the case was accepted by United State Attorney's Office, Southern Districts of New York (USAO/SDNY) for criminal prosecution. During the course of the investigation, the investigative team (b) (7)(E)

The evidence gathered identified over a dozen Google email addresses that were used by

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to further enable electronic money transfers to and communicate with conspirators, associates, and customers of the business.

On September 15, 2018 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unexpectedly resigned from GSA. USAO/SDNY was notified of this information and decided to keep their investigation open, despite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) no longer being a federal employee.

On July 24, 2019, JI-2 executed an email search warrant of multiple Google email addresses controlled by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The warrants returned a trove of information regarding the business, as well as potential conspirators including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), an Assistant District Attorney in New York City.

On August 29, 2019, JI-2 participated in a conference call with USAO/SDNY, USAO/Western District of Missouri (WDMO), and IRS-CID, Springfield MO. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(A), (b) (3) (A)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(A)

After consultation, USAO/SDNY declined the opportunity and decided to close their investigation to deconflict due to: (1) waning interest since (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) was no longer a government employee; (2) USAO/WDMO was interested in (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(A), (b) (6), (b) (3) (A) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(A) . USAO/WDMO recommended that JI-2 keep the investigation open at the time since JI-2's work product was being used as core evidence to (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(A), (b) (3) (A).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(A)

Due to current JI-2 staffing levels and minimal nexus considerations, the case will be closed, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(A)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
**Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations**

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

December 10, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
CASE TITLE: JOHN BERTS, PBS EMPLOYEE  
CASE NUMBER: I18900017

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

In November 2017, the GSA Region 9 (R9) Human Resources (HR) Division requested JI-9's assistance in authenticating military and medical records for Jon Berts, Building Manager, Ronald Dellums Federal Building, Oakland, CA and U.S. Navy Reservist. Berts had previously been removed from employment for suspected time and attendance fraud. Additionally, R9 HR requested JI-9's assistance in recovering a GSA computer that Berts did not return when he left employment, claiming that it had been stolen in Mexico.

GSA OIG Digital Crimes and Forensics Unit was able to trace the computer to be in Berts' possession after the date Berts stated it had been stolen.

During a review of Berts' archived GSA emails, JI-9 discovered what appeared to be fraudulent documents submitted to a U.S. Naval medical unit in Alameda, CA. for the purpose of claiming sick leave. The investigation also determined that Berts filed an Office of Workers' Compensation Program traumatic injury claim, alleging GSA management engaged in a hostile and discriminatory work environment that caused a mental health condition.

On April 26, 2018, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Berts for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) - False statements and 18 U.S.C. § 641 - Theft of Government Property.

On May 1, 2018, GSA OIG and VA OIG executed a federal arrest warrant on Berts. During a search incident to arrest, GSA OIG recovered the stolen GSA laptop and HSPD-12 ID card.

On December 14, 2018, Berts pleaded guilty to the charges. During the change of plea, Berts also admitted authoring three VA medical letters, forging military letters purporting to be from U.S. Navy for military drills, and lying to GSA OIG special agents regarding the claimed, lost government property.

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Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
24000 Avila Road, Suite # [REDACTED]  
Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

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On May 3, 2019, Berts was sentenced to five-years' probation with special warrantless search provisions, and ordered to pay \$1,303 in restitution (or return outstanding government property in-lieu of payment).

On May 6, 2019, GSA OIG referred the matter to the U.S. Navy for administrative action. In October 2019, a separation board hearing was conducted.

In September 2020, Merit Service Protection Board upheld Berts' termination.

On December 12, 2020, the Navy removed Berts (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This investigation is now closed.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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January 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
NORTHWEST / ARCTIC REGION (JI-10)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

HIGHLINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS – WPA RECOVERY

File Number: I19000044

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

Based on an investigative lead provided by the GSA OIG Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations, the GSA OIG Northwest / Arctic Regional Office of Investigations (JI-10) identified a piece of art believed to have been commissioned by the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The painting was located at Highline High School, Burien, WA, and JI-10 provided the GSA Fine Arts Program with photographs of the painting and its identifiers. On September 5, 2018, the GSA Fine Arts Program confirmed the painting was a WPA work; the painting was identified as *Government Locks Looking North*, by Jacob Elshin. On January 28, 2019, a loan agreement was finalized between the GSA Fine Arts Program and Highline Public Schools.

According to the GSA Fine Arts Program, the recovered painting has an estimated value of \$3,000. The art piece is currently on display at Highline High School.

This office is now closing this investigation.

Office of Investigations (JI-10)  
400 15<sup>th</sup> Street SW, Room [REDACTED] Auburn, WA 98001

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

**GREAT LAKES REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE**

October 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING  
File Number: I20500112

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On September 4, 2019 and June 4, 2020, the GSA Incident Response Team alleged the government computer assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Realty Specialist, 230 S. Dearborn, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Chicago, Illinois had requested sexually suggestive internet domains. As a result, OCISO staff obtained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) internet traffic history and identified domain names indicative of sexually explicit content which had been visited on multiple dates.

The investigation used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) VPN logs and H.R. Links records to verify (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working and logged into the GSA network on each occasion the inappropriate domains were visited. The Digital Crimes and Forensics Unit obtained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned government computer and conducted a forensic analysis. No illegal content was found on the assigned government computer during the analysis.

On October 9, 2020 the allegations were referred to the GSA Regional Administrator for information only.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Investigations Division

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

November 5, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-7)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Inappropriate Use of Government Computer

File No. I20700087

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On August 2, 2019, the General Services Administration (GSA), Office of the Chief Information Security Officer (OCISO), informed GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) of potentially inappropriate activity on a government-issued computer assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Construction Control Representative, Public Buildings Service, GSA, Brownsville, TX. More specifically, a review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA network activity history revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) user profile, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accessed internet domains commonly known to host pornographic material.

GSA OIG's Digital Crimes and Forensic Unit performed a forensic analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA-issued computer and identified over 60 sexually explicit images, and additional evidence of pornographic website activity. During an interview with GSA OIG special agents, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA-issued computer to search the internet for sexually explicit material, view sexually explicit material, and transmit sexually explicit material to colleagues through GSA's messenger application.

On September 4, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was proposed for removal for violations of GSA's standards of conduct after it was determined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-issued computer to access, download, view, and transmit sexually explicit material. GSA immediately removed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to GSA facilities, and placed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on notice leave through October 5, 2020. In lieu of removal, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retired effective September 30, 2020, before the expiration of the notice period.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or me at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
**Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations**

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November 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

CASE TITLE: ALLEGED WPA ARTWORK – SAN FRANCISCO  
HOUSING AUTHORITY

CASE NUMBER: I20900102

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On September 23, 2019, an anonymous complainant informed GSA OIG that numerous pieces of WPA artwork were on display at the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA). The complainant stated that the building was scheduled to be vacated and they feared the artwork would become missing, stolen, and/or destroyed.

In collaboration with the GSA Fine Arts Department (GSA/FAD), JI-9 confirmed that the SFHA was in possession of 10 pieces of WPA art valued at \$80,000. The paintings identified were:

1. The Nets, 1942
2. The Bay Overlooking Golden Gate Park, 1941
3. Waterfront Dumps, 1935-1942
4. Sacramento Boats, 1935-1942
5. Boats and Rocks, 1938
6. Golden Gate Park Lake, 1941
7. View of Golden Gate Park, 1941
8. Unknown [Boats and Water], 1935-1942
9. Unknown [Aquatic Park, San Francisco], 1935-1942
10. Unknown [Group of People by the Water], 1935-1942

GSA/FAD attempted to facilitate a loan agreement with SFHA, but they could not agree on terms. On November 3, 2020, JI-9 took possession of the WPA artwork and will maintain custody until the GSA/FAD can make arrangements to return the artwork to the National Capital Region.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
24000 Avila Road, Suite # [REDACTED]  
Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

This investigation is closed.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
New England Regional Investigations Office

October 5, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-2)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
Operation Renovation JI-1

Case Number: V1415281

This investigation was initiated on May 21, 2014, after the GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, New England Regional Investigations Office (JI-1), sought to identify individuals in positions of public trust who have the opportunity to influence and/or award contracts of large dollar amounts. This investigation was focused on GSA contracting officers and specialists with warrants assigned to the New England Region.

In a six year period, only one case has been opened and referred for prosecution as a result of this proactive investigation. On September 28, 2018, as part of this proactive investigation, a GSA Civil Engineer assigned to Region 1 was identified as possibly performing outside employment during GSA core hours. Although the investigation corroborated the potential for time and attendance abuse, and other criminal activity, several factors including the COVID pandemic hampered a successful criminal prosecution.

Aside from the aforementioned investigation, the proactive resulted in no additional cases.

No further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JI-1.

This case is being closed at the direction of management.

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10 Causeway Street, Room [REDACTED]  
Boston, MA 02222





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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**NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION**  
**OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

July 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Chimes District of Columbia, Inc.**  
Case Number: Z17W00011

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

GSA OIG initiated a joint investigation with Department of Commerce OIG and Department of Justice OIG at the request of AUSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Criminal Division, Baltimore, Maryland, to determine if Chimes District of Columbia (Chimes) violated Ability One rules and regulations.

GSA OIG conducted an investigation of the request by reviewing documentation and conducting interviews regarding the matter.

As a result of the investigation, it was determined the evidence did not substantiate the allegations. Further action has been declined by Department of Justice Trial Attorney (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

This matter does not require any further investigation.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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July 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Possible Bribery/Conflict of Interest  
Case Number: Z17W00093

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by National Capital Region, Office of Investigations. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In June, 2017, this case was initiated based on information received from a contract specialist who thought there was favoritism shown towards Prosource Consulting (Prosource) during a procurement. Specifically, the contract specialist thought the procurement look biased with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Electrical Engineer, GSA, recommendation to award to Prosource without a source evaluation board.

GSA OIG conducted an investigation of the allegations by reviewing emails and conducting interviews of individuals associated with the procurement. The investigation did not reveal any inappropriate relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Prosource, though instances of improper actions taken by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may were noted.

In March, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retired from GSA; therefore, no administrative action relating to any potential improper actions taken by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is possible.

This matter does not require any further investigation.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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December 17, 2020

**CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

**FROM:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Director, Intelligence Division (JI-I)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memo to File  
NCR PBS Use of Schedule A Hiring Authority  
Case Number: Z18H00195

In August 2017, JI-I received an email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Washington Area Operations Center, Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) with an attached management inquiry report on Schedule A hiring authority practices within the Public Building Service (PBS) National Capital Region (NCR). Schedule A streamlines the hiring process for persons with disabilities and the authority can be utilized to noncompetitively appoint people with disabilities to federal jobs. The report stated PBS NCR hired 21 individuals using the Schedule A appointment authority since FY15, and there were several irregularities and concerns with family members being hired.

JI-I reviewed information and created an organization chart that highlighted potential relatives among staff.

JE initiated an evaluation of PBS NCR hiring practices in December 2017. JI-I kept this Z-case open to provide any assistance.

On December 17, 2020, JE sent a memorandum to Darren Blue, Regional Commissioner, PBS NCR stating they were terminating their evaluation since OHRM has conducted internal reviews and implemented corrective actions to address their findings, most of which were initiated after the evaluation commenced. Therefore, this case is being closed.

Office of Investigations (JI-I)  
1800 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20405

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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May 6, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JI-10)  
NORTHWEST / ARCTIC REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

File Number: Z18H00210

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In October 2017, JI-10 received a hotline complaint, which alleged there was an inflated cost estimate created for a construction project at the McClure Federal Building, Boise, ID. The project was for the wall repair and the painting of the Military Entrance Processing Station at the McClure Federal Building. The complainant alleged the initial estimate for the project was around \$7,000, which exceeded the single purchase limit on a purchase card, so the project was taken to GSA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a GSA project manager, was assigned the project and subsequently estimated the cost of the project at \$28,000; a 300 percent increase over the initial estimate. The complainant also alleged possible collusion between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the painting company Pacific Source Electric, LLC (PSE), Kuna, ID.

In July 2018, JI-10 coordinated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Contracting Officer, GSA Southeast Service Center, who provided copies of contracts awarded to PSE. A review of the contracts did not identify anything suspect or relevant to the investigation.

In January 2020, JI-10 coordinated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Design and Construction Cost Management Expert, Public Buildings Service, in order to obtain an opinion as to the reasonableness of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Independent Government Estimate (IGE). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that based on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) review of a redacted version of the IGE, as well as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) own cost estimate, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) IGE was reasonable for the scope of work.

Office of Investigations (JI-10)  
400 15<sup>th</sup> Street SW, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Auburn, WA 98001

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In January 2020, JI-10 completed a review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA emails; the review did not identify any communications suggesting collusion, nor did it identify an issues related to the IGE. Of note, an email related to the project and cost estimate was identified, wherein (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimate to a senior estimator for peer review; the senior estimator suggested (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) estimate of \$28,000 was on the low side and provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) justification.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST REGIONAL AND CARIBBEAN INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

January 30, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN "JD" DENNIS  
ACTING REGIONAL COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE (4P1)

CC: BRIAN STERN  
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR (4A)

CC: ANITA WHITE  
ACTING DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (CPB)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation re:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Leasing Contract Officer, GS-12  
Case Number: Z18M00073

This memorandum is furnished to you for any action you may deem appropriate.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), initiated an investigation of GSA employee, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Lease Contracting Officer, Public Buildings Service, on an allegation that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was driving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) while on medical leave based on a referral from the GSA Office of Human Resources Management.

During the investigation, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed (Exhibit 1), Wright Express Inc. (WEX) records were reviewed, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, GSA Fleet representative and a GSA Human Resources Specialist were interviewed.

GSA OIG also discovered that the Wright Express Inc. (WEX) card, for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned GOV, had only been used to purchase gasoline three times from October 2016 to May 2018, a period of 20 months, wherein the GOV was driven over 3,000 miles, and also that there were incorrect odometer entries in WEX.

The investigation did not disclose any indication that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the GOV for personal use or used the WEX card for personal use. The evidence developed during the investigation confirmed that:

1. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the GOV on March 9, 2018, while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on Leave without Pay (LWOP) status.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)

299 E. Broward Blvd., Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



2. [REDACTED] never requested and was never given authorization to drive [REDACTED] GOV during [REDACTED] medical leave or any other requested leave for any purpose, to, include making sure it was in good working order.
3. [REDACTED] drove the GOV 3,789 miles since it was assigned to [REDACTED] in October 2016. GOV had less than 20 miles when it was assigned to [REDACTED].
4. [REDACTED] did not make correct odometer entries when using the WEX Card to fuel the GOV and only used the WEX card on three occasions to fuel the GOV in the time period that [REDACTED] drove it 3,789 miles.
5. [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] personal credit card on several occasions to fuel the GOV.
6. [REDACTED] did not report mechanical issues with the GOV to [REDACTED] supervisor, to the GSA Fleet Rep or Fleet Management Center (FMC), or to the Maintenance Control Center (MCC).
7. [REDACTED] did not take the GOV to the nearest authorized dealer or the nearest repair shop, garage, or service station.
8. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] believed the WEX card was only for purchasing fuel, not for GOV maintenance.
9. GSA Fleet does not receive mileage reading from the associated WEX card for months at a time and had issues with [REDACTED] not getting oil changes on [REDACTED] previous GOV.
10. [REDACTED] statements regarding the odometer entries are inconsistent with the information [REDACTED] provided regarding [REDACTED] travel.

The investigation revealed that [REDACTED] drove the GOV on March 9, 2018, while [REDACTED] was on Leave without Pay (LWOP) status. [REDACTED] never requested and was never given authorization to drive [REDACTED] GOV during [REDACTED] medical leave or any other requested leave for any purpose, to, include making sure it was in good working order. [REDACTED] did not make correct odometer entries when using the WEX Card to fuel the GOV and only used the WEX card on three occasions to fuel the GOV in the time period that [REDACTED] drove it 3,789 miles. [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] own credit card on several occasions to fuel the GOV. [REDACTED] did not report mechanical issues with the GOV to [REDACTED] supervisor, to the GSA Fleet Rep or Fleet Management Center (FMC), or to the Maintenance Control Center (MCC). [REDACTED] did not take the GOV to the nearest authorized dealer or the nearest repair shop, garage, or service station. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] believed the WEX card was only for purchasing fuel, not for GOV maintenance. [REDACTED] statements regarding the odometer entries are inconsistent with the spreadsheet [REDACTED] provided regarding [REDACTED] travel.

I have reviewed the complaint and determined it is a management issue that falls under the purview of your office. Consequently, I am referring this matter to you for management review and action, as appropriate. Please advise me of any management action taken in this matter within 30 days of this report.

You are advised that this report is from a system of records known as GSA/ADM 24, Investigation Case Files, which is subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974. Consequently, this report may be disclosed to appropriate GSA officials who have a need for it in the performance of their duties pursuant to a routine use. Person disclosing this information publicly or to others not having an official need to know are subject to possible administrative, civil and criminal penalties.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please telephone me or Special Agent [REDACTED] at [REDACTED].

EXHIBITS

- 1) MOI- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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November 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Review of GSA's decision regarding new FBI Headquarters**  
Case Number: Z18W00051

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by this office. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On February 28, 2018 Congressman Gerald E. Connolly, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations requested GSA OIG to look into GSA's decision to abandon longstanding plans to move the FBI into a new headquarters in the National Capital Region. To look into this matter, a multi-disciplinary team from the Office of Investigations (JI), Office of Audits (JA), Office of Inspections and Evaluations (JE), and Office of General Counsel (JC) worked together to answer the following questions posed by Connolly: 1) To what extent were communications from outside sources considered, including but not limited to the FBI, the Department of Justice, GAO, the White House, the Office of Management and Budget, state or local officials, or private sector entities? 2) Does the current GSA proposal properly account for the full costs of the project, including rental payments and other expenses?

On August 27, 2018, the OIG issued a report to GSA titled, "Review of GSA's Revised Plan for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters Consolidation Project". This report details the findings of the multi-disciplinary team and is the only report issued on this matter. A copy of the redacted and un-redacted report are contained in the electronic case management system.

The investigation did not reveal potential violations of criminal statutes, and the case was not presented for criminal prosecution. This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite [REDACTED] Washington, DC 20024

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

March 27, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT  
Case Number: Z19H00093

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was predicated on information developed from a complaint by a General Services Administration (GSA) employee. The complainant alleged that a GSA building manager, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obligated funds without a warrant for two repair projects completed under the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contract (GS-04P-13-EW-D-0033) for the Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center (AFC) building. This action potentially violates 31 U.S.C. 1341, The Anti-Deficiency Act.

Kherimba Facility Service is the O&M contractor for the AFC building. Two task orders were generated for the AFC building:

Project #1: Pedestrian Tunnel Doors to Loading Dock, Estimate # NUNN-200001-749, dated July 11, 2017 in the amount of \$5194.80. The work was performed on July 27, 2017. The invoice was paid on June 13, 2018.

Project #2: MARTA Tunnel Revolving Door, Estimate # NUNN-200001-755, dated July 19, 2017 in the amount of \$4287.60. The work was performed on September 20, 2017. The invoice was paid on June 13, 2018.

Investigative efforts by the GSA OIG, subject and witness interviews, a review of the contract file and tasking documents revealed the building manager may have abused (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position, but the act was not criminal in nature.

On March 1, 2019, the GSA OIG presented this case to the Northern District of Georgia (NDGA) for criminal prosecution. The NDGA declined prosecution.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308





U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Investigations Division

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December 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-7)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

Employee Misconduct (Public Office for Private Gain) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA R7

File No. Z19H00104

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received an anonymous complaint alleging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Realty Specialist, Region 7, GSA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Realty Specialist, Region 7, GSA, abused their telework agreements. The complaint alleged both employees violated sections of GSA Order HRM 9751.1, Maintaining Discipline, by working full-time hours as independent realtors during their respective official duty hours, without taking official leave.

Agents conducted interviews, reviewed documents, and reviewed GSA emails. Investigative efforts revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took continuing education courses related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment during official time, without approval. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA-issued email address to send and receive emails related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment. During a voluntary interview with agents, and subsequent to the required Non-Custodial Warning and Assurance to Employee (Garrity), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) refused to answer questions regarding the alleged conduct.

On September 18, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned from federal service.

Investigative efforts did not reveal derogatory information related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or me at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Investigations Division

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

February 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT: Allegations of Employee Misconduct - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

File No. Z19H00161

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date.

On August 28, 2019, the General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Fort Worth, TX, received an anonymous, telephonic allegation that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Austin, TX, was caught having sexual intercourse in the historical LBJ Presidential Suite of the J.J. Pickle Federal Building, 300 E. 8th St., Austin, TX, with an attorney, who was also a government employee, assigned to an organization within the building.

Previously, on August 8, 2019, the GSA OIG was contacted by the GSA Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM), Western Service Center, Fort Worth, TX, regarding the allegations surrounding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Specifically, it was alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) engaged in sexual intercourse with another federal employee who also worked at the federal building of which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Human Resources Specialist, GSA, indicated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with PBS upper management and it was determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) management team intended to propose removal since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) probationary period.

On August 27, 2019, the GSA OIG was contacted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wherein (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) management team decided they were not going proceed with a proposal to terminate (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) based on a complete review of the allegations and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responses to HR related to the incident in question. All related documentation and correspondence regarding the allegation was requested by the GSA OIG and archived for future reference and retrieval.

Based on the determinations of the GSA's HR division, and its decision to not take action against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the allegations related to engaging in sexual acts while on duty, no further investigative efforts were planned.

If you have any questions, please call Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102





**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
**Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations**

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

November 19, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT in CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: Case Closing Memorandum

Case Title – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Hotline Complaint – Reno, NV  
Case File Number – Z20H00004

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On October 9, 2020, the GSA Hotline received a complaint that GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directing the award of contracts to Green Diamond Landscaping. The complainant advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract was cancelled and replaced by Green Diamond Landscaping based on false allegations of poor work performance.

On October 19, 2020 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was interviewed via telephone. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a landscape business that had been providing snow removal and landscape maintenance at three federal buildings (DEA, VA, and Social Security) in Reno, Nevada as a subcontractor of VRG Management Services for approximately 8-10 years. VRG Management Services operates out of Colorado and recently hired MTM Reno as a subcontractor to manage the federal buildings previously mentioned. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MTM Reno sent on email to VRG Management Services stating that a GSA employee complained about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) work performance. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the GSA building manager about the allegation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was polite but denied making the allegation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encouraged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not to pursue holding onto the contract. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that many of the tenants were upset with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) termination because they were happy with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encouraged the tenants to write emails to VRG Management Services. Green Diamond Landscaping was subsequently hired to replace (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On November 9, 2020 the Reporting Agent interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via telephone pursuant to information obtained from the Hotline Complaint. The purpose of the interview was to discuss the allegations regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) company being replaced based on false allegations of poor work performance. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Social Security Office in Reno, NV became unhappy with the landscape maintenance work performed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) company. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the other facilities (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) company also provided landscape maintenance work were not great either. There were a lot of grass areas and plants dying. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took pictures and decided to change companies. The decision to change landscape companies was nothing personal against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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On November 16, 2020 the Reporting Agent interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA Building Manager in Reno, NV. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complained to MTM Reno about the dying lawn at the Social Security Building. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised that they were already aware of the issues and were going to replace the current landscaping company, Hess Family Landscaping. Green Diamond Landscaping was brought in to replace Hess. The decision to use Green Diamond Landscaping came from either VRG or MTM Reno. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes that Green Diamond Landscaping was already doing work at the federal courthouse and that may have been why VRG or MTM Reno decided to use them.

The Reporting Agent requested and received (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email from January 1, 2020 through October 20, 2020. A review of the emails by the Reporting Agent revealed no evidence to substantiate the complainant's allegations.

Reporting Agent did not identify any evidence to support the hotline complaint. This investigation is closed.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

August 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Number: **Z20H00069**

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation. No further actions are required for this matter.

This case was initiated based on a complaint alleging GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been fraudulently using the checking account of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) business account. Complaint was made by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any information behind the allegation.

GSA OIG left over ten messages on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) voice mail asking for a return call to get more information. GSA OIG advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on last voice mail message left for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to contact the local law enforcement agency in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) jurisdiction on this matter. Allegation is a matter for a local law enforcement agency to investigate or for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to handle in civil court.

Complainant was not responsive and was directed where to take the complaint. This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)  
401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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November 13, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
PACIFIC RIM REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
File Number: Z20H00077

This memorandum presents the findings of this investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On April 24, 2020, the U.S. General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (OIG), Pacific Rim Regional Investigations Office (JI-9) initiated an investigation pursuant to a qui tam complaint (under seal), in which the Relators, Charlotte Bevilaqua (Bevilaqua) and Mark Gist (Gist), alleged General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., Linden P. Blue, and Roger Duke (collectively, "Defendants"), misrepresented the commerciality of its material handling services and improperly incorporated non-commercial marketing costs into general and administrative rates for commercial items, as a prime contractor for the U.S. Army's MQ-1C Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System contract. The Relators further alleged the Defendants improperly passed along inter-affiliate work at price instead of cost; improperly classified inter-affiliate transactions as commercial when they were not, and then improperly included the costs in rates for commercial items; charged unreasonable and unjustifiable rates for parts and services; failed to ensure their affiliate implemented adequate cost accounting and timekeeping systems; failed to properly audit the rates charged by their affiliate; and charged the U.S. Government for expressly unallowable expenses. According to the Relators, the Defendants committed similar fraud in other prime contracts with the following U.S. agencies: the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Federal Acquisition Service, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

This case was jointly handled by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division (DoJ) and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California (USAO-SDCA).

In addition to JI-9, the investigative participants for this case were the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Major Procurement Fraud Unit, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the NASA OIG, and the Department of Homeland Security OIG (collectively, "Investigative Team"). Due to a limited nexus, JI-9 joined the case in a supportive role.

Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
24000 Avila Road, Suite # [REDACTED]  
Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

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On April 21, 2020, prior to JI-9 joining the investigation, members of the DOJ, USAO-SDCA and the Investigative Team, telephonically interviewed Bevilaqua. On April 22, 2020, prior to JI-9 joining the case, members of the DOJ, USAO-SDCA and the Investigative Team, telephonically interviewed Gist. During both interviews, Bevilaqua and Gist discussed their history with the Defendants, and also elaborated on the allegations in their qui tam complaint.

The USAO-SDCA declined the case because the allegations did not reach the level of fraud and they were expected to be resolved administratively. On November 10, 2020, the U.S. District Court Southern District of California issued a court order of the U.S.' notice of election to decline intervention.

No further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JI-9, and the case will be closed.





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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July 12, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JI-10)

NORTHWEST / ARCTIC REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

File Number: Z20H00109

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In June 2019, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint that alleged GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Federal Acquisition Service, Auburn, WA, had sent inappropriate text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA issued cell phone.

OIG special agents interviewed the complainant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the special agents access to the cell phone on which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received the inappropriate text messages that were the subject of the complaint. Special agents reviewed four text messages sent on June 1, 2019; the messages were sent around 1:00 a.m., were harassing in nature, and contained lewd language. The complainant stated it was not (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) intention to get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in trouble with GSA; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) just wanted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stop contacting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) family.

OIG special agents obtained records for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA issued cell phone, assigned number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for the period of January 28, 2018, to June 27, 2019. A review of the records revealed eight messages were sent from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the complainant's phone number, which included the four messages described above.

On August 14, 2019, OIG special agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the use of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA issued cell phone. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to sending the inappropriate text messages on June 1, 2019.

Office of Investigations (JI-10)  
400 15<sup>th</sup> Street SW, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Auburn, WA 98001

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the messages related to a family matter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged it was a violation of the GSA Information Technology General Rules of Behavior to send messages of this nature. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is no longer in communication with the individual and there has been no communication between them since June 1, 2019. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed remorse throughout the interview and stated multiple times that nothing like this would ever happen again.

On January 15, 2020, this matter was referred to the Office of the Regional Commissioner, Federal Acquisition Service, Region 10, for any action deemed appropriate.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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October 15, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Number: Z20H00166

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by this office. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On September 5, 2019, GSA-OIG, National Capital Region, Office of Investigations received information from the GSA Personnel Security Branch that GSA Central Office employee, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the subject of an OPM investigation, may have an outstanding warrant in California for child pornography. This information was uncovered during an OPM background check of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Agents verified the warrant with California authorities, however the State of California would not extradite from Washington, DC. Agents notified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the warrant. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travelled back home to California to answer the warrant. On July 13, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered a no contest plea to the Misdemeanor charge of Possess/Etc Obscene Material: Minor in Sexual Act

On October 15, 2020, SAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received notice from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA Personal Security Branch, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been terminated from GSA.

This matter does not require any further investigative actions and is closed.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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October 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
DIRECTOR  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (JI-I)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

RELEASE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT LICENSE PLATE INFORMATION  
File Number: Z20I-00083

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On June 19, 2020, the Digital Crimes and Forensics Unit, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received an alert, Report Number SEC0009516, via email from GSA's Office of the Chief Information Officer, reporting the inadvertent release of law enforcement vehicle information sent by email to an unintended recipient. According to the report, the unintended recipient of the email was a U.S. Secret Service (USSS) employee and received the email at a Gmail email address, registered with GSA, which GSA's Fleet Management Division used to send GSA Fleet related business information. The law enforcement vehicle information consisted of customer names, agency, license plates, undercover plate information, and the state within which the vehicles operated. The list included 2,990 vehicles assigned to 605 individual customers. The report was also forwarded to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report Number INC000010296231.

During the course of the investigation several GSA Fleet employees were interviewed, to include the sender of the email, the sender's supervisor, and the Fleet Service Representative who handles USSS and other sensitive agencies. From those interviews it was determined the law enforcement vehicle information was not sent to a USSS employee, but to an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. As it was determined the information was confirmed to have been sent to a government employee, this matter does not warrant any further investigation.

Office of Investigations (JI-F)  
William J. Green Federal Office Building  
600 Arch Street, Room [REDACTED] Philadelphia, PA 19106

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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September 15, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - Potential Employee Contractor Relations  
Case Number: Z20W00028

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated after GSA OIG received a complaint alleging the GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Identity Management Solutions, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), did not take corrective action towards a contractor when it was allegedly not performing to set standards. Additionally, the complainant alleged the former GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the USAccess program, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), received a sofa from a contractor.

GSA OIG conducted an investigation in which agents conducted interviews of GSA officials and reviewed pertinent documents.

The investigation did not substantiate allegations against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The investigation determined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was performing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties as directed and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positive working relationship with GSA contractors allowed GSA to meet its customer agencies' needs. The investigation found no evidence that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acted inappropriately towards GSA employees, contractors, or customer agencies.

The investigation also determined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) compensated the GSA contractor for the receipt of the sofa. The investigation found no evidence that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acted inappropriately within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position at GSA.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)  
409 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
Southeast and Caribbean Regional Office of Investigations

November 6, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Number: **Z1545469**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based on information provided by Army CID that GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Equipment Specialist, used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government computer equipment during duty hours to assist an individual named (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Army, with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) private business operations to include the solicitation of federal government contracts.

Army CID investigated and disciplined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for operating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleaning business while on duty status for the Army; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also used government resources for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) business. The investigation showed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interacting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email address.

GSA OIG investigated matter and did not find any evidence (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government equipment to assist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleaning business. Emails between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated an intimate relationship including concerns about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hiding their relationship from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
Southeast and Caribbean Regional Office of Investigations

September 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: Case Closing  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Contract Fraud  
Case Number: Z16400075

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was predicated based on a Suspicion of Irregularity (SOI) provided by the General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, Southeast Sunbelt Region Audit Office. The SOI identified three possible irregularities involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), an employee of the Northern District of Florida, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). First, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) possibly solicited employment with the company awarded a contract in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved in the selection. Second, a company bidding on a lease proposal was allegedly going to hire (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Third, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have influenced the award of another contract because a company did not employ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a subcontractor.

GSA OIG investigated the allegations listed in the SOI and obtained the following information related to each allegation:

GSA OIG conducted interviews to determine the validity of the first allegation, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) possibly solicited employment with a company awarded a contract in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved in the selection. Through these interviews, GSA OIG obtained information from the company awarded the contract. The company representative advised of conversations with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not solicit the company to work as a subcontractor. Further, the company representative stated there was no pressure extended on the company to change the report findings. Lastly, the company representative advised that, based on mutual membership of an organization, it was not unusual for the company representative and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to come in contact with each other.

GSA OIG obtained records related to the second allegation, that a company bidding on a lease proposal would hire (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if awarded the contract. The records show that the company involved in this allegation was never awarded the contract. Specifically, the company rescinded its proposal for procurement before ever being awarded the contract.

GSA OIG conducted interviews and obtained other information related to the third allegation, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have influenced the award of another contract based on a company not hiring (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a subcontractor. Specifically, GSA OIG conducted interviews of

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government employees involved in awarding the contract, interviewed a representative from the company allegedly suffering from this allegation, and reviewed employment records for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

During the interviews of government employees involved in awarding the contract, no employee reported that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to influence the awarding of the contract improperly. Further, GSA OIG was advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not act inappropriately and had no more input on the award of the contract than anyone else involved in the process. GSA OIG was advised that no one involved in the contract exerted any improper influence favoring one contractor.

During the interview with the representative of the company allegedly harmed, the representative stated the company did submit a proposal to bid on a solicitation, and the company was not awarded that contract. The representative noted the company requested that GSA debrief the company on why the company was not selected. After reviewing the technical reasons for not being awarded the procurement, the company felt GSA's evaluation was legitimate.

Lastly, GSA OIG reviewed employment records for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and found no improper link between the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and companies working on this contract.

Based on the information obtained by GSA OIG, no information validated the allegations listed in the SOI.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

March 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - Architect, GSA, PBS, Region 2

Case Number: Z17200002

On September 29, 2016, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Supervisory General Engineer and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Program Manager, both U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Public Building Service (PBS), Northeast & Caribbean Region (Region 2), New York, NY, based in New York, NY, related concerns to JI-2 that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Architect, in GSA, PBS Region 2, may have exploited (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) extended sick leave (S/L) status and subsequent full-time reasonable telework (T/W) accommodations, while purportedly recovering from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), to pursue outside work opportunities, including operating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) own architectural firm.

Specifically, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went on S/L on February 23, 2016, after informing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief Regional Architect, GSA, PBS, New York, NY, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had sustained a major (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that ultimately required surgery. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on S/L until June 16, 2016, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked to return to work on a temporary full-time T/W schedule, at the recommendation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) doctor. GSA subsequently granted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a Reasonable Accommodation which allowed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to temporarily T/W on a full-time basis during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recovery; and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ultimately remained on that schedule until October 18, 2016. During that period, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted multiple doctors' notes to support (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claim that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should not physically return to the office during recovery. However, in September 2016, just prior to the complaint being made, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Supervisory Regional Historic Preservation Officer, GSA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had recently missed an important deadline and was unresponsive while on T/W status. Additionally, due to the circumstances, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performed an open source internet search of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and found websites indicating that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a partner in a recently-formed New York-based start-up architectural firm, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); and believed such to be suspicious.

From October 2016 to September 2017, JI-2 conducted multiple GSA employee interviews including a subject interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on September 13, 2017. During that time period, JI-2 also reviewed various internal GSA records including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email communications, personnel files, attendance records, VPN logs, and general GSA work product. Additionally, JI-2 reviewed external records received from the New York City Department of Buildings (NYC/DOB), as well as various open source resources regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment activity.



The evidence developed from the aforementioned investigative activities confirmed that [REDACTED] performed outside work activities associated with [REDACTED] personal architectural business [REDACTED] while on S/L and during [REDACTED] GSA scheduled T/W hours that were granted as a Reasonable Accommodation to recover from a legitimate major [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Specifically, the investigation revealed that between February 2016 and October 2016, [REDACTED] had filed 11 applications relating to eight New York City based properties, as well as other documents including work plans, drawings, certifications etc., with the NYC/DOB, for client renovation projects. [REDACTED] was listed as the applicant of record with signature for all of the aforementioned filings and [REDACTED] official State of NY seal was stamped on several of the documents. The investigation also disclosed that during the above time frame, [REDACTED] made at least 18 physical trips to the New York City, Department of Buildings. Nine of those trips took place between February 23, 2016 and June 15, 2016, on days when [REDACTED] was scheduled for S/L; and eight trips took place between June 16, 2016, and October 17, 2016, on days when [REDACTED] was on scheduled T/W. When interviewed by OIG agents, [REDACTED] confirmed the above information and further explained that most, if not all, of [REDACTED] client engagements were initiated prior to [REDACTED] injury and [REDACTED] felt obligated to perform the remainder of [REDACTED] client obligations to avoid a breach of contract.

The investigation also determined that [REDACTED] violated GSA's Mobility and Telework Policy (HRM 6040.1A), which allows tethering to their GSA issued cell phone on an occasional, ad-hoc basis, but prohibits its use as a daily/regular means of accessing the internet, and thereby requires employees to personally provide internet service for T/W. An analysis of [REDACTED] VPN activity records from February 2016 to October 2016 disclosed that [REDACTED] only logged into GSA's systems by utilizing [REDACTED] GSA issued AT&T cell phone as a hotspot. Furthermore, when interviewed by OIG agents, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] does not have a personal hard line internet service provider subscription at home; and for T/W purposes, [REDACTED] always connects to the internet and GSA server by way of his GSA-issued cell phone.

Additionally, the investigation determined that [REDACTED] violated GSA's policy on Personal Use of Agency Office Equipment, (ADM 7800.11A), which prohibits employees from using agency equipment to earn outside income or for their own private gain. A review of VPN records indicates between February 23, 2016, and June 15, 2016, while on sick leave for the entire period, [REDACTED] connected to GSA systems via VPN, on 21 occasions, for a total of 178 hours and 53 minutes, including nights and weekends, via tethering to [REDACTED] GSA issued AT&T cell phone for the entire 178 hours and 53 minutes. When interviewed, [REDACTED] confirmed that while on S/L, [REDACTED] utilized [REDACTED] government laptop, to VPN into GSA system, via tethering to [REDACTED] GSA issued cell phone, to access GSA-licensed architecture software to complete projects for [REDACTED] personal business, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

Lastly, an analysis of [REDACTED] ETAMS records revealed that [REDACTED] was not charged leave for four days, when [REDACTED] was not present in the office or authorized to T/W. Furthermore, the investigation found that ETAMS does not reflect [REDACTED] was granted a full-time T/W schedule from June 16, 2016 to October 17, 2016, was not reflected in ETAMS records.

On September 6, 2019, JI-2 issued a GSA OIG Memo to John Sarcone, GSA, Regional Administrator, Region 2, and Michael Gelber, GSA, Regional Commissioner, PBS, Region 2, outlining investigative findings.

On January 9, 2020, the GSA Region 2 Human Resources department advised they terminated [REDACTED] on December 10, 2019, based in the results of the JI-2 investigation.

Therefore, no further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JI-2, and the case will be closed.





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

August 26, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Region 2

File Number: Z19200056

On April 25, 2018, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JI-2), received information from GSA, OIG, Washington DC Field Investigations Office (JI-1), regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Asset Analysis Branch (2PTM), New York, NY. According to information developed from a source known to JI, between February 2, 2017, and March 14, 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved in several financial transactions totaling approximately \$175,000, and was in utilizing several personal and business related accounts. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) allegedly has a business, Mod-A-Vie, an alleged clothing wholesaler with no internet presence, based out of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence. The transactions exceed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA salary and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regular monthly deposits from the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (formerly in the U.S. Navy).

Between April and November 2018, JI-2 requested documents from JI-1, and conducted preliminary analysis to determine validity.

On November 29, 2018, a JI-2 special agent contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA, PBS, WTC, New York, NY. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) second line supervisor and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA, PBS, WTC, New York, NY, was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediate supervisor. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never received any bad reports concerning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The same day, a JI-2 special agent contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was very reliable, dedicated, diligent, and required minimal supervision. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no issues with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performance. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was from a wealthy family in Haiti. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) family owned a business in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know any details about the business.

Between November 2018 and March 2019, JI-2 requested, received, and analyzed more documents from JI-1.

In July 2019, an OIG Subpoena was issued to the Department of Labor (DOL) for all reports filed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) associated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) business. On October 8, 2019, DOL responded that a diligent search from January 2017 to July 2019, revealed they had no records to report.

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In November, JI-2 contacted the Internal Revenue Services, Criminal Investigations (IRS-CI) office, to review (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) business. IRS-CI responded that (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) was up to date filing tax returns on (b) (5) business, and no noted they suspected no nefarious activity.

On August 25, 2020, a JI-2 special agent telephonically interviewed (b) (5), (b) (7)(C). (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) has a LLC business purchasing and selling garments and accessories. (b) (5) stated (b) (5) does not have a website because most of (b) (5) clients are outside the country. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) has a partner that is not a GSA employee and owns twenty percent (20%) of the business. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) is eighty percent (80%) owner. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) work schedule with GSA is between 7am and 5:30 pm, and (b) (5) online business with China does not start until late at night because of the twelve (12) hour time zone difference. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) is a redistributor online, and (b) (5) online business hours does not conflict with (b) (5) work hours with GSA. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) did (b) (5) homework and understands that (b) (5) work with GSA cannot conflict with outside employment. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (5) works in the real estate division of GSA, and (b) (5) business is in clothing, so there is no conflict.

The investigation is complete and no further action is required. Therefore, JI-2 will close case.





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

July 11, 2019

MEMORANDUM: FOR FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CARE FOR AFRICA IN NEED  
FOUNDATION- COMPUTERS FOR LEARNING PROGRAM FRAUD  
File No. Z19400052

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation is being officially closed.

This investigation was predicated on a review of the General Services Administration (GSA), Computers for Learning (CFL) program through (b) (7)(E). A program review indicated that the address for the educational non-profit Care for Africa in Need (CFA) is also the business address of Dynamic Information Technology Computer Services (DIT) and is located in a small business park. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is listed as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of DIT and is also the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of CFA. Additionally, based on a review of the CFA website, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may be sending the surplus computers to educational institutions in Africa in violation of CFL program requirements. The CFL program mandates that surplus government computers and associated equipment are for domestic educational use only.

The GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the requirements for an educational non-profit to participate in the GSA CFL program, consulted with CFL program personnel, performed a site visit to the CFA business location, and conducted interviews with witnesses and the subject. Our investigation determined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) violated the requirements of the CFL program by shipping computers and associated equipment (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained through (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) participation in the CFL program to multiple countries in Africa. This act is prohibited by the CFL's program requirement; stating that computers and any associated equipment is for domestic educational use only.

On May 17, 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Property Disposal Specialist, Utilization & Donation Program, Office of Personal Property Management, GSA, advised that based on the GSA OIG's investigation, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CFL account has been deactivated for violating the terms of CFL program participation.

If you have any questions, please call Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). This matter does not require any further investigation of action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)  
401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Atlanta, GA 30308 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

March 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(F)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Region 2, Employee Misconduct

File Number: Z20200040

On January 22, 2020, the GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JI-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, was informed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Public Building Service (PBS), Northeast & Caribbean Region (Region 2), Acquisition Management Division (2PQBS), One World Trade, New York, NY, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Contract Specialist (CS), GSA, PBS, Region 2, 2PQBS, One World Trade, New York, NY, attempted to gain access to a contract file and modification, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no legitimate purpose to view. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested access (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and when denied, directly reached out to the vendor, FEDCAP Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (FRS), for a copy of the contract. FRS denied (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request and subsequently reported such to GSA. The modification, MOD PS11, was the result of a Department of Labor Audit, which the vendor and GSA were liable to pay additional wages due to a misinterpretation of fringe benefits by both GSA and the contractor. When questioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to learn from the matter to create a best practice. However, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the employee was not a party to the matter; had no similar matter; had no legitimate business need for the documents; and had violated rules, policies, and laws by contacting the vendor as a GSA employee. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered the employee additional resources and training about the underlying facts and circumstances but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) insisted on accessing the contract file directly. When denied, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the contract file and reported the matter to GSA OIG.

On February 3, 2020, JI-2 special agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transferred to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) team three months ago, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) team needed more CS's. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on December 12, 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA, PBS, One World Trade, New York, NY, stating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by FRS, via email, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Contract Administration, FRS, wanting a copy of the DOL Audit. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated contract files are access protected and can only be accessed by the assigned CS, Contracting Officer (CO), and immediate supervisory chain of command. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware of the DOL Audit of the contract file in question. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that it is not uncommon for DOL to conduct random audits of contracts, however, there are audits that are conducted based on complaints. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not sure whether this was a random audit

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or not, as [REDACTED] acquired this contract file. [REDACTED] stated the DOL audit revealed that FRS and GSA owed employees \$2.3 million in fringe benefits. [REDACTED] stated it was a mistake on behalf of FRS and GSA, as they reduced the working hours of employees from forty (40) hours to thirty-six (36) hours and also thought they could reduce FRS employees' fringe benefits. [REDACTED] stated after [REDACTED] received the email from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] wanted the documents on the FRS contract file, a service contract file, to educate [REDACTED] and prevent the same mistakes with the contracts assigned to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not have service contract files assigned to [REDACTED] only construction contract files. Moreover, [REDACTED] has been with the agency for [REDACTED] years, and [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] had a nefarious motive requesting such documents, and when [REDACTED] refused to provide them, [REDACTED] filed a FOIA. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not think [REDACTED] violated any policy or regulation other than [REDACTED] action contacting a vendor without the knowledge of the CS assigned the contract file was inappropriate. [REDACTED] stated the contract is a set-aside for the disabled and as a result, there would be no bidding process documents in the contract file that [REDACTED] could be interested in.

On February 3, 2020, JI-2 special agents interviewed [REDACTED] supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], GSA, PBS, 2PQBS, One World Trade, New York, NY. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not recall details of the matter but knows that [REDACTED] sent out an email to managers informing them of a request made by [REDACTED] to FRS. [REDACTED] stated when [REDACTED] saw the email, [REDACTED] felt it was inappropriate of [REDACTED] to have contacted FRS. GSA managers do not have CS's contacting contractors for documents that are in the GSA contract file. [REDACTED] stated that the manner of acquiring such document was troubling and goes against established protocol. Moreover, [REDACTED] did not have any bona fide reason to need the document. [REDACTED] stated that in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) years with GSA, [REDACTED] has never heard of a CS or CO doing such. [REDACTED] stated when [REDACTED] received the email, [REDACTED] immediately informed [REDACTED] to contact Regional Counsel for legal advice. [REDACTED] stated that needing a document in a contract file, would not justify going directly to the vendor to obtain such. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] circumventing the CS assigned the FRS contract file, and going directly to FRS, attempting to obtain the DOL audit document, gives a wrong appearance. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was not sure whether [REDACTED] violated any policy or regulations by contacting FRS directly, but it was inappropriate and it goes against established protocol.

On February 3, 2020, a JI-2 special agent interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Attorney, GSA, Office of Regional Counsel, One World Trade, New York, NY. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated what stood out from what [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED] contacted FRS directly for contractual documents without first contacting the CS assigned the contract file. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated [REDACTED] was informed by [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was not assigned contracts that were similar in nature to the FRS contract, so [REDACTED] did not understand what [REDACTED] intentions were for needing documents relating to the DOL Audit. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated [REDACTED] did not know whether [REDACTED] action was in violation of any policy or regulations, but opined the optics of [REDACTED] action was not appropriate.

On February 6, 2020, a JI-2 special agent interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Contract Administration, FEDCAP Rehabilitation Services Inc. (FRS), 501 Madison Avenue, New York, NY. [REDACTED] stated FRS provides an array of services to their customers through the employment of people with disabilities. [REDACTED] stated that through the FRS contract in question, they provide janitorial services at the federal buildings in New York. [REDACTED] stated that FRS used to have 25 government contracts that were consolidated into seven for simplicity. [REDACTED] point of contact at GSA was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Program Officer, PBS, GSA, One World Trade, New York, NY, until 2016 when the contract was re-assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Contract Specialist, GSA, PBS, One World Trade, New York, NY. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] never dealt with [REDACTED] on any GSA contract before. [REDACTED] stated that on December 10, 2019, [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] telephonically, and requested a document in their contract with GSA. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] telephonically, and informed [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] request.



The same day, a JI-2 special agent interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FRS, 501 Madison Avenue, New York, NY. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the email (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know details of the request. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that around 2017, instead of laying off employees, in conjunction with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to reduce employee work hours from 40 to 35, and to reduce their fringe benefits also. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they did not know until after the DOL Audit, that they could not reduce fringe benefits as long as employees were working at least 20 hours. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a FRS employee filed a complaint, which triggered the DOL Audit.

On February 14, 2020, JI-2 special agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that each GSA building used to have separate FRS contracts until about 2016, when GSA decided to consolidate all FRS contracts into one contract file with a single CO assigned. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the CO on the FRS contract file until September 2019, when the contract file was reassigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the CS on the FRS contract file, even though (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a Supervisor CS, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the GSA Point of Contact (POC). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when the consolidation happened, GSA buildings then had service orders under the main contract, and these service orders were assigned to different CSs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has two services orders under the FRS contract: 1) 47PC0219F0098 - Metal Restoration for the Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY, and Federal Building, 290 Broadway, New York, NY; and 2) EP-47PC0220F0011 - Shampoo Carpet for US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not want to approach (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the FRS contract, but felt more comfortable contacting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on several previous occasions relating to the two FRS service orders assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had access to the FRS contract file in the Electronic Acquisition System Integration (EASI) database, as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has two FRS service orders and should be able to access all uploaded documents in the contract file. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned about the DOL Audit through a co-worker. The outcome of the audit was published and accessible to the public; however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to know the details of the audit, being that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had two FRS service orders (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned and working on. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to open the MOD PS11 document in the EASI database but it did not open. As a CS assigned to a service order under the main contract, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have access to all the documents in the contract file. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not make it a habit to go around opening documents that are not directly related to service orders assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to know what GSA did wrong that would warrant a \$2.8 million payment in fringe benefits to FRS employees. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt there was something suspicious about the blocking of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to the document and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew, based on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previous experience with management, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would not grant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to the document if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had asked directly.

As a result, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the related documents on December 10, 2019, but was told to send (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an email, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did on December 11, 2019. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied by asking what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed the documents for and also informed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) copied the CS, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on the matter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that thereafter, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got an email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requesting to know why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed the documents. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that as a CS assigned service orders under the FRS contract file, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to know what went wrong in the DOL Audit and to learn from it. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not need to see the document and if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed training, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), will provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with training related to DOL Audits. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not understand what the big deal was with accessing this document. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could have brought together all the CSs working on the FRS contract and trained them on best practices so as to not repeat the mistakes (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made on the FRS contract. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made a blunder on the FRS contract but was promoted. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that the complaint against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was retaliation because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed a Freedom of Information Act to access MOD PS11. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



On February 18, 2019, a JI-2 special agent met with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed regulations and could not find where it was stated that a CS or a CO could not contact a vendor directly for contractual documents on a contract not assigned to them. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that it is an unwritten rule that CSs or COs cannot contact vendors for contractual documents on contracts not assigned to them. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed each GSA building used to have separate FRS contracts until GSA consolidated all FRS contracts into one contract file with a CO assigned. And that GSA buildings now have service orders under the main contract, assigned to different CSs, to which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has two (2) assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which gives (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to the FRS contract file in the Electronic Acquisition System Integration database. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not inform (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of such and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be curious to know of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) response to this discovery. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that the issue could have been resolved and did not need to escalate to this level but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed a Freedom of Information Act request, and will get the documents (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted.

On February 21, 2020, JI-2 special agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). When confronted with facts of the case, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) apologized for not clearly explaining. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) misspoke and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did have service contracts, and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did have legitimate access to the file. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the CS on the main FRS contract and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has two (2) service orders under the main contract. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated having the service orders gives (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to the FRS contract file in EASI. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is able to see all uploaded documents in the FRS contract file but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have access to view contractual documents such as the MOD PS11, the DOL Audit report in question. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated only (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have access to all documents in the FRS contract file; and all CSs with service orders, not just (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only have access to documents related to the service orders. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated that all CSs are limited from accessing contractual documents, not just (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

JI-2 identified no violations of policy or law. Therefore, no further investigation of this matter will be conducted and the case will be closed.