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Description of document: Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Reports from Various Closed Investigations 2018-2020

Requested date: 23-September-2022

Release date: 14-November-2022

Posted date: 27-March-2023

Source of document: Attention: FOIA Request
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street, N.W.
OPIM/FOIA Room 5H35
Washington, D.C. 20415-7900
Email: foia@opm.gov (preferred during COVID-19)

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UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Washington, DC 20415

Office of the
Inspector General

November 14, 2022

Sent via email

FOIA Request # 2022-OIG-0121-F

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made on September 23, 2022, to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In that request you asked for “A copy of records regarding these OPM OIG closed investigations: C-18-00034, C-19- 00180, C-19-00182, C-19-00183, C-19-00185, C-19-00186, C-19-00187, C-19-00188, C-19-00274, C-19-00484, C-19-00564, C-19-00594, C-19-00595, C-19-00596, C-19- 00597, C-19-00599, C-19-00600, C-19-00601, C-19-00602, C-19-00603, C-19-00604, C-19-00611, C-20-00003, C-20-00004, C-20-00005, C-20-00007, C-20-00008, C-20-00009, C-20-00010, C-20-00047, C-20-00169, C-20-00179, C-20-00244, and C-20- 00500.” On October 18, 2022, you clarified the scope of your request to seek only “the concluding written report” or, if that is not available, “a case summary” for the cases referenced above.

The OPM OIG conducted a thorough search for records and located 109 pages of responsive records. Twenty-one pages are being released to you in full and eighty-eight pages are being released to you in part. Certain information was withheld to avoid disclosure of techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecution, *see* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) and to avoid the unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, *see* 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

I trust that this information fully satisfies your request. If you need any further assistance or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please do not hesitate to contact me at opmoigfoia@opm.gov or (202)-606-1200.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS

2022-OIG-0121-F

College Park, Maryland 20740
Email: ogis@nara.gov
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Toll-free: 1-877-684-6448
Facsimile: 202-741-5769

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by emailing opmoigfoia@opm.gov.

Please include a copy of your initial request, a copy of this letter, and a statement explaining why you disagree with our decision. You should write "Freedom of Information Act Appeal" in the subject line of the email. Your appeal must be electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request.

Regards,

SARAH
WAHL

Digitally signed by
SARAH WAHL
Date: 2022.11.14
15:46:10 -05'00'

Sarah Wahl
Attorney-Advisor

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Other OPM Program Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Complaint

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above**Joint Agency Case** No**Grand Jury****Sensitive****Case Categorization** National Security**US State or Territory** California**Date Received** 01/17/2019**Date Investigation Opened** 01/17/2019**Date Closed** 01/21/2020**Assigned Field Region** Region 1 - DC**Assigned ASAC** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Staff Assigned** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Date Staff Assigned** 01/21/2020**Complainant is being Retaliated Against****Predication** CASE PREDICATION:

In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory California

Date Received 02/14/2018

Date Investigation Opened 02/14/2018

Date Closed 11/30/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 04/17/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:

On December 17, 2017, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Investigative Operations received a referral from the National Background Investigation Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA). It was alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted false and inaccurate reports of investigation (ROI) during his employment with Keypoint Government Solutions (KGS).

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB is an OPM Revolving Fund program that conducts background investigations on those individuals applying for or serving in positions of national security or public trust. The completed background investigations conducted by NBIB investigators are used to make adjudications determinations on those individuals.

Preliminary Inquiry revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted 20 falsified ROIs.

Statistics/Significant Events

STATS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the DCSA binders could not be obtained from DCSA offices located in Ft. Meade, Maryland. Therefore, no joint interviews by OPM-OIG and DCSA investigators were conducted.

On October 1, 2020, the funding OPM-OIG previously had to investigate DCSA cases ended. Therefore, OPM-OIG is closing our investigation.

Related Cases

Related Cases



United States
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-1400

March 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of the Inspector General
Office of Personnel Management

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of the Inspector General
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency

SUBJECT:

Falsification of Investigative Work Involving Former Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This forwards the falsification recovery project regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), former Contract Investigator, United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously employed by Keypoint, now known as Perspecta. Keypoint was retained by OPM to conduct background investigations on its behalf. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was suspended from the OPM contract by OPM due to falsification concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated by Keypoint on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work contained within the recovery period was conducted while a contract investigator employed by Keypoint under contract to OPM NBIB.

On October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869 the Office of Personnel Management, National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) was transferred to the Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). As part of this transition NBIB's Integrity Assurance, Compliance and Investigations Branch (IACI) became a part of DCSA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). OPM is referenced throughout this Executive Summary as all actions occurred under OPM. However, as of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the Department of Defense.

I. Introduction

The suspected falsification triggered a full and comprehensive recovery project involving all cases (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted and/or completed, during the recovery period. The recovery effort would be defined by the extent and scope of the identified instances of falsification, ghost writing, embellishment, and other anomalies. As evidenced in this document and attachments, it was determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in executing her duties as a Contract Investigator for OPM-NBIB, engaged in numerous instances of falsification that may be in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 (Making Material False Statements and Concealing Material Information from Governmental Departments or Agencies), as defined. We respectfully request your full review and consideration of the facts presented here in the context of Title 18, Section

1001. In the event your office declines to pursue criminal action, please consider this a formal referral for suspension/debarment consideration.

II. OPM-NBIB

OPM's mission is to recruit, retain, and honor a world-class workforce to serve the American people. To help accomplish this mission, OPM, prior to October 1, 2019, was responsible for conducting over 95% of the background investigations for the Federal Government. OPM served over 100 agencies with over 1,000 security offices worldwide by providing background investigations on their Federal applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel. OPM-NBIB served as the primary executive branch service provider for background investigations for eligibility for access to classified information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a contractor employee; and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities and information systems.


The authority to conduct investigations is contained within various Executive Orders, Title 5 United States Code (5 USC), and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR). Specifically, but not exclusively, Executive Order 10450, as amended, requires agency heads to classify positions for sensitivity in relation to National Security. Executive Order 10450, as amended, further requires an investigation appropriate to the sensitivity level on each person in order to determine that the employment is consistent with the interests of National Security, and granted OPM Government-wide oversight responsibility of its implementation. OPM, under 5 CFR Part 5, was authorized to investigate and adjudicate the suitability of individuals entering the competitive Federal service.

Prior to October 1, 2019, OPM had an active investigator workforce of approximately 8,000 individuals, comprised of approximately 1,700 Federal agents employed by OPM and another 6,300 investigators employed by various companies under contract to conduct background investigations on behalf of OPM. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was part of the contract OPM workforce as an Investigator for OPM NBIB.

OPM-NBIB had a rigorous training and mentoring program and strictly enforced investigative standards with all investigators. OPM had to meet rigid national standards in all investigations they performed, as established in several executive orders and as outlined in OPM's Investigator Handbook, which was issued to every investigator. Quality control and assurance measures were designed to preserve the quality of the product and integrity of the investigations program. In fact, page 1-14 of the Handbook is entitled, "Standards of Conduct," and speaks to the critical elements of trust and ethics inherent with the Investigator position.

III. NBIB Quality and Integrity Assurance

OPM-NBIB quality control and assurance procedures were well-versed and time-tested. Cases underwent a thorough case review to determine whether standards had been met and whether the report is presented in a clear and complete manner before delivery to the requesting customer agency. (b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)

If a case fails to meet established investigative standards, the case was returned to the Investigator, via appropriate channels, for appropriate rework and corrections. Case review staff were trained and instructed to take notice of any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI that may call into question the authenticity of the information reported in the ROI. If an issue or anomaly was noticed in an investigator's ROI during case review, the case review staff were required to report their observations through the appropriate channels within OPM NBIB. OPM NBIB Field Staff also had a duty to report any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI through appropriate channels within OPM NBIB.

IV. Initial Concern and Administrative Inquiry

In May 29, 2018, NBIB-IACI was notified by Keypoint of a complaint (Attachment 1) on case (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), completed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another investigator had reported interviewing personal source (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) separately for case (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and reported differing information. When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted by Keypoint for clarification, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he could not recall whether he was interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also provided differing information regarding his association with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) foreign travel than what was included in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) report of investigation. As a result of the discrepant information, NBIB-IACI initiated a Targeted Review (TR) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work.

(b) (7)(E)

A TR is designed to specifically analyze individual reference testimony, reported by the identified investigator, and is an extension of the regular recontact letter program. On June 22, 2018, NBIB-IACI mailed 237 re-contact letters as part of the initiated TR. The TR closed on August 2, 2018. Subsequent to the closure of the TR, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned a recontact letter mailed to her as part of the TR. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was reported by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a personal source for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote on her recontact letter "I was not able to provide any information or interview. The person who was at my house was not sure about the name I gave her. I said I know (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); the result of this, the interview was never done." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted telephonically by NBIB-IACI and reiterated the information she provided on the recontact letter, adding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not ask any questions about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any information about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On September 7, 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed in person by an OPM NBIB Federal Agent and reiterated the information she provided on her recontact letter and during her telephonic contact with NBIB-IACI stating she was never interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On August 2, 2018 NBIB-IACI requested Keypoint conduct a 5 case sampling of Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work with a subsequent request for a 10 case sampling on September 5, 2018. The samplings identified no additional instances of falsification by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but found numerous instances of reporting inaccuracies. NBIB-IACI directed the suspension of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the OPM contract on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Keypoint terminated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employment with their company.

On October 18, 2018 NBIB-IACI conducted a rework of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) investigative work completed between July 6, 2018 and September 6, 2018. As a result of this rework, six instances of falsification by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were discovered. As a result of these falsifications, on December 13, 2018, NBIB-IACI initiated a recovery of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work excluding investigative items covered during the aforementioned rework.

A copy of the Targeted Review Summary is included as Attachment 2. A copy of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned recontact letter, associated telephone memo and MFR is included as Attachment 3. A copy of the suspension request from the OPM contract and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) termination notice from Keypoint is included as Attachment 4.

V. Recovery Process

Based upon the aforementioned investigative findings, OPM-NBIB pursued a full recovery effort to insure the accuracy of information, previously reported and provided to the requesting agencies, within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ROIs. NBIB leadership was apprised of the situation and NBIB Integrity Assurance briefed affected components of OPM.

Without knowing the depth or scope of his falsification activities, the first objective involved identifying the sources reported on each case conducted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Cases on which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved as an OPM Contract Investigator were compiled, reviewed, and an analysis was conducted.

The recovery process set out to meticulously and systematically identify, address, and correct any instances of falsification or material inaccuracy involving any single (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) case or source testimony. The attached matrix, Attachment 5, identifies the individual sources reported on each case conducted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and provides a snapshot of the activity involved during the recovery project on each and every source indicated in his ROIs. When initiating a full recovery effort, OPM defines a source as any investigative entry within an ROI, to include record providers, sources, subjects, and as appropriate, Investigator notes. The recovery period was defined to cover all cases completed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the period of August 28, 2017 through September 6, 2018. In addition to the initial recovery period, as defined, the recovery was expanded to include all cases that were currently open within OPM, which were previously completed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In instances where recontact was favorable, additional recovery work was not performed and is so noted on the matrix. In these instances, no revisions were made to the source testimonies as reported in the ROI. In instances where recontact reflected falsification indicators or anomalies, previously reported testimony was removed from the ROI(s) and OPM recovery agents attempted to conduct follow-up inquiries and interviews. Based upon recovery efforts, each source is ultimately categorized as validated, undetermined, or falsified; all results were tracked on the referenced matrix.

Open cases were corrected by NBIB to delete: 1) falsified information, 2) testimonies that were inaccurately reported and, 3) testimonies that could not be validated. The case was then processed via routine closing procedures.

Closed cases were reopened and corrected to delete and replace falsified information and testimonies that were either inaccurately reported or could not be validated, but contained certain indicators of possible falsification or otherwise materially inaccurate information. Additional corrective procedures were required in order to amend the imaged or microfilmed investigation

(this is a multi-step process). A complete copy of the corrected investigation was provided to the requesting agency to replace the original investigation.

- ▶ The following table represents a statistical summary of the recovery project (incorporating the rework statistics into the recovery statistics):

Recovery Project Statistics

Total Cases	175
Total Sources	463
Sources with confirmed falsification	12
Sources with falsification indicators or testimonies that could not be validated	143
% of sources with confirmed falsification, falsification indicators, or testimonies that could not be validated	33%

- ▶ The following table represents the 12 instances of confirmed falsification

Tab	OPM Case	Subject	Agency / Investigation Level	Item Name	Transmit Date	Comment
6	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (u) (u), (u) (u)(C)	11/19/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
7	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	11/29/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
8	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	12/17/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
9	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2/21/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
10	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Army/ Secret (Tier 3)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2/28/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
11	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (PPR)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	6/21/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
12	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	6/26/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

13	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	6/26/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
14	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	7/20/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
15	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	8/15/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
16	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	8/19/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
17	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Defense/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	8/19/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

VI. Cost Accounting

Special Agents and IA administrative personnel assigned to the recovery project tracked hours worked specifically on the recovery project and reported their time. Each employee's hourly rate, to include benefits, was subsequently determined and used in determining the overall cost of the project. Due to the location of the recovery project in relation to staffing and workload, OPM-NBIB required the use of temporary duty (TDY) assignments in order to complete this recovery project. The associated expenses are reflected below as travel costs.

The falsification of case work, by Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), resulted in expenses to the government of, at least, \$99,706.62, which includes \$91,158.59 in labor costs and \$8,548.03 for travel costs.

The cost matrix and associated documentation is reflected in Appendix 18.

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory North Carolina

Date Received 01/17/2019

Date Investigation Opened 01/04/2019

Date Closed 01/22/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 01/21/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

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As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

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Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (2) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Financial Information

Program Loss Status

Undetermined

OPM Program Loss

\$ Referred to DOJ

\$ Referred for Administrative Recovery

\$ Recovered

Created By	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Created Date	01/17/2019 10:30 AM
Updated By	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Updated Date	01/21/2020 05:52 PM

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory California

Date Received 01/17/2019

Date Investigation Opened 01/04/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former CACI background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (7) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**



United States
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-1400

November 14, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of the Inspector General
Office of Personnel Management

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of the Inspector General
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency

SUBJECT:

Falsification of Investigative Work Involving Former Contract
Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This forwards the falsification recovery project regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) former Contract Investigator, United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously employed by CACI. CACI was retained by OPM to conduct background investigations on its behalf. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was suspended by CACI due to falsification concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), completed investigative work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was removed from the OPM contract by OPM on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after additional instances of falsification were discovered during a targeted review (TR) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work contained within the recovery period was conducted while a contract investigator employed by CACI under contract to OPM NBIB.

On October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869 the Office of Personnel Management, National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) was transferred to the Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). As part of this transition NBIB's Integrity Assurance, Compliance and Investigations Branch (IACI) became a part of DCSA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). OPM is referenced throughout this Executive Summary as all actions occurred under OPM. However, as of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the Department of Defense.

I. Introduction

The suspected falsification triggered a full and comprehensive recovery project involving all cases (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted and/or completed, during the recovery period. The recovery effort would be defined by the extent and scope of the identified instances of falsification, ghost writing, embellishment, and other anomalies. As evidenced in this document and attachments, it was determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in executing his duties as a Contract Investigator for OPM-NBIB, engaged in numerous instances of falsification that may be in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 (Making Material False Statements and Concealing Material Information from Governmental Departments or Agencies), as defined. We respectfully request

your full review and consideration of the facts presented here in the context of Title 18, Section 1001. In the event your office declines to pursue criminal action, please consider this a formal referral for suspension/debarment consideration.

II. OPM-NBIB

OPM's mission is to recruit, retain, and honor a world-class workforce to serve the American people. To help accomplish this mission, OPM, prior to October 1, 2019, was responsible for conducting over 95% of the background investigations for the Federal Government. OPM served over 100 agencies with over 1,000 security offices worldwide by providing background investigations on their Federal applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel. OPM-NBIB served as the primary executive branch service provider for background investigations for eligibility for access to classified information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a contractor employee; and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities and information systems.


The authority to conduct investigations is contained within various Executive Orders, Title 5 United States Code (5 USC), and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR). Specifically, but not exclusively, Executive Order 10450, as amended, requires agency heads to classify positions for sensitivity in relation to National Security. Executive Order 10450, as amended, further requires an investigation appropriate to the sensitivity level on each person in order to determine that the employment is consistent with the interests of National Security, and granted OPM Government-wide oversight responsibility of its implementation. OPM, under 5 CFR Part 5, was authorized to investigate and adjudicate the suitability of individuals entering the competitive Federal service.

Prior to October 1, 2019, OPM had an active investigator workforce of approximately 8,000 individuals, comprised of approximately 1,700 Federal agents employed by OPM and another 6,300 investigators employed by various companies under contract to conduct background investigations on behalf of OPM. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was part of the contract OPM workforce as an Investigator for OPM NBIB.

OPM-NBIB had a rigorous training and mentoring program and strictly enforced investigative standards with all investigators. OPM had to meet rigid national standards in all investigations they performed, as established in several executive orders and as outlined in OPM's Investigator Handbook, which was issued to every investigator. Quality control and assurance measures were designed to preserve the quality of the product and integrity of the investigations program. In fact, page 1-14 of the Handbook is entitled, "Standards of Conduct," and speaks to the critical elements of trust and ethics inherent with the Investigator position.

III. NBIB Quality and Integrity Assurance

OPM-NBIB quality control and assurance procedures were well-versed and time-tested. Cases underwent a thorough case review to determine whether standards had been met and whether the report is presented in a clear and complete manner before delivery to the requesting customer agency. (b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)

If a case fails to meet established investigative standards, the case was returned to the Investigator, via appropriate channels, for appropriate rework and corrections. Case review staff were trained and instructed to take notice of any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI that may call into question the authenticity of the information reported in the ROI. If an issue or anomaly was noticed in an investigator's ROI during case review, the case review staff were required to report their observations through the appropriate channels within OPM NBIB. OPM NBIB Field Staff also had a duty to report any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI through appropriate channels within OPM NBIB.

IV. Initial Concern and Administrative Inquiry

On July 12, 2018, NBIB-IACI was notified via email by CACI of a potential falsification concern involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reporting of personal source (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). CACI had contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resolve an OPM re-contact letter they received back as undeliverable that was mailed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was mailed a re-contact letter as a result of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). When contacted by CACI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he had not been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation as reported. On July 17, 2018, a CACI investigator interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in person. During this in-person interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he had not been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation. A copy of the notification from CACI and an MFR from CACI's investigator that interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is included as Attachment 1. As a result of CACI's interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CACI suspended (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on July 18, 2018. A copy of CACI's suspension memorandum is included as Attachment 2.

On July 24, 2018 NBIB-IACI initiated a Targeted Review (TR) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work as a result of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirming he had not been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (7)(E)

A Targeted Review is designed to specifically analyze individual reference testimony, reported by the identified agent, and is an extension of the regular recontact letter program. On July 31, 2018, NBIB-IACI mailed 349 re-contact letters as part of the initiated Targeted Review (TR).

As a result of the Targeted Review, NBIB-IACI identified two additional instances of reported sources indicating they had not been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned a re-contact letter as part of the Targeted Review indicating that he was not interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or anyone for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote on his re-contact letter "(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not one of my associates and doesn't even work at my site. I was never interviewed pertaining him." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then telephonically contacted by NBIB-IACI in follow up to his returned re-contact letter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was interviewed only once on February 28, 2018 (the reported date of interview by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)), but the interview was for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again asserted he was not interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then interviewed in person by an OPM NBIB Federal Agent. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again stated to the OPM NBIB Federal Agent that he had never been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or any investigator regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated to the OPM NBIB Federal Agent that he would have directed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) elsewhere if questioned for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never worked with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was not in his chain of command.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned a re-contact letter as part of the Targeted Review indicating that she was not interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or anyone for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote on her re-contact letter "I have never been contacted by anyone from OPM regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported interviewing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on July 5, 2018 as a personal source for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was telephonically contacted by NBIB-IACI in follow up to her returned letter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated during that telephonic contact she was certain she had never been interviewed regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated it would have been impossible for her to be interviewed on July 5, 2018 at the Y-12 facility, Oak Ridge, TN (the reported date and location of interview in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) report of investigation) as she had taken leave from work that day. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then interviewed in person by an OPM NBIB Federal Agent. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated during this interview she had not been interviewed or contacted regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), either in person or by telephone; on July 5, 2018 or at any other time.

A copy of the Targeted Review Summary, to include related documentation regarding the additional instances of falsification, is included as Attachment 3. Based on the results of the Targeted Review (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was removed by OPM from the OPM contract on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). A copy of the removal documentation is included as Attachment 4.

V. Recovery Process

Based upon the aforementioned investigative findings, OPM-NBIB pursued a full recovery effort to insure the accuracy of information, previously reported and provided to the requesting agencies, within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ROIs. NBIB leadership was apprised of the situation and NBIB Integrity Assurance briefed affected components of OPM.

Without knowing the depth or scope of his falsification activities, the first objective involved identifying the sources reported on each case conducted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Cases on which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved as an OPM Contract Investigator were compiled, reviewed, and an analysis was conducted.

The recovery process set out to meticulously and systematically identify, address, and correct any instances of falsification or material inaccuracy involving any single (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) case or source testimony. The attached matrix, Attachment 5, identifies the individual sources reported on each case conducted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and provides a snapshot of the activity involved during the recovery project on each and every source indicated in his ROIs. When initiating a full recovery effort, OPM defines a source as any investigative entry within an ROI, to include record providers, sources, subjects, and as appropriate, Investigator notes. The recovery period was defined to cover all cases completed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the period of October 10, 2017 through July 18, 2018. In addition to the initial recovery period, as defined, the recovery was expanded to include all cases that were currently open within OPM, which were previously completed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In instances where recontact was favorable, additional recovery work was not performed and is so noted on the matrix. In these instances, no revisions were made to the source testimonies as reported in the ROI. In instances where recontact reflected falsification indicators or anomalies, previously reported testimony was removed from the ROI(s) and OPM recovery agents attempted to conduct follow-up inquiries and interviews. Based upon recovery efforts, each source is ultimately categorized as validated, undetermined, or falsified; all results were tracked on the referenced matrix.

Open cases were corrected by NBIB to delete: 1) falsified information, 2) testimonies that were inaccurately reported and, 3) testimonies that could not be validated. The case was then processed via routine closing procedures.

Closed cases were reopened and corrected to delete and replace falsified information and testimonies that were either inaccurately reported or could not be validated, but contained certain indicators of possible falsification or otherwise materially inaccurate information. Additional corrective procedures were required in order to amend the imaged or microfilmed investigation (this is a multi-step process). A complete copy of the corrected investigation was provided to the requesting agency to replace the original investigation.

- The following table represents a statistical summary of the recovery project:

Recovery Project Statistics

Total Cases	157
Total Sources	729
Sources with confirmed falsification	11
Sources with falsification indicators or testimonies that could not be validated	154
% of sources with confirmed falsification, falsification indicators, or testimonies that could not be validated	23%

- The following table represents the 11 instances of confirmed falsification

Tab	OPM Case	Subject	Agency / Investigation Level	Item Name	Transmit Date	Comment
6	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)	Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)	8/9/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
7	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)	Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)	10/23/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
8	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	Marshall Electric; Employment Record/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2/7/2018	Source did not provide a record. ROI reflects record testimony.
9	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)	Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)	2/7/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

10	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
11	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
12	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
13	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
14	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	5/4/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
15	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Army/ Secret (Tier 3)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	5/15/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
16	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	7/9/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

VI. Cost Accounting

Special Agents and IA administrative personnel assigned to the recovery project tracked hours worked specifically on the recovery project and reported their time. Each employee's hourly rate, to include benefits, was subsequently determined and used in determining the overall cost of the project. Due to the location of the recovery project in relation to staffing and workload, OPM-NBIB required the use of temporary duty (TDY) assignments in order to complete this recovery project. The associated expenses are reflected below as travel costs.

The falsification of case work, by Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), resulted in expenses to the government of, at least, \$150,006.64, which includes \$122,358.03 in labor costs and \$27,648.61 for travel costs.

The cost matrix and associated documentation is reflected in Appendix 17.

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory California

Date Received 01/17/2019

Date Investigation Opened 01/04/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

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Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (1) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory California

Date Received 01/17/2019

Date Investigation Opened 01/04/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

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Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Employee

OPM Organization

Human Resources Solutions

Program

Other

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

OPM Employee

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Employee Integrity

US State or Territory Pennsylvania

Date Received 03/08/2019

Date Investigation Opened 03/08/2019

Date Closed 01/21/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 03/08/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Case Predication: In December 2018, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Investigative Operations received an allegation concerning possible nepotism and abuse of authority occurring in the San Antonio Services Center. It was alleged that a person was selected for the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position that was minimally qualified and selected as a result of a previous working relationship with someone within the department.

Program Impact Program Impact: There is no impact to OPM's programs as the allegations were not substantiated.

Statistics/Significant Events

Stats/Significant Events: On January 21, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the complaint. Multiple interviews were conducted which did not support the allegation, therefore this complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

SJ Technologies

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Organization

Office of Procurement Operations

Program

Allegation Type

Other OPM Program Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Complaint

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Georgia

Date Received 06/19/2019

Date Investigation Opened 06/19/2019

Date Closed 03/17/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 01/22/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a referral from the Small Business Administration, OIG regarding implications of an alleged risk to national security.

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT:

An anonymous complainant, apparently a current employee of SJ Technologies, Inc., alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hired (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employees who have ties to terrorist organizations. The anonymous complainant did not provide further details.

As background, SJ Technologies, Inc. currently works on the case management system for the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, formerly the National Background Investigations Bureau. The contract falls under OPM's Office of the Chief Information Officer.

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On March 6, 2019, OPM's Office of Personnel Security confirmed that all SJ Technologies, Inc. employees working on OPM systems provided valid proof of U.S. citizenship and/or permanent legal residence. In addition, the OPM contract with SJ Technologies, Inc., in Section 1752.209-72 (c), states in part the following information: "Each employee of the Contractor shall be a citizen of the United States of America, or an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as evidenced by Alien Registration Receipt Card Form I-151, or, who presents other evidence from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that employment will not affect his immigration status."

On March 11, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Crime Unit declined to investigate further due to vague details relating to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) terrorist organization. Therefore, based on the aforementioned information, no further action will occur and this matter is now closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Allegation(s) Not Substantiated

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Contractor

OPM Organization

Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO)

Program

Enterprise Solutions

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

OPM Employee

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Other

US State or Territory District of Columbia

Date Received 08/12/2019

Date Investigation Opened 08/12/2019

Date Closed 03/05/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 08/12/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a former employee of Dynanet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retaliated against him after he acted as a whistleblower and brought to her attention unlawful actions that reduced team productivity and wasted taxpayer money.

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that his rights were violated under 41 U.S.C. Section 4712 "Enhancement of contractor protection from reprisal for disclosure of certain

information".

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In October 2019, OIG investigators interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No violations that would be investigated by the OIG were identified. Further, OIG investigators reviewed the contract between OPM and Dynanet and determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisors acted within the guidelines of the contract when they requested (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) be removed from the contract. Under section 1752.209-73 of Contract number 243226-19-F-0046 : Standards of Conduct, "Personnel assigned by the contractor to the performance of work under this order must be acceptable to the Government in terms of personal and professional conduct."

No further investigation is required and this complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Targeted Review)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Virginia

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former CSRA background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about March 2020, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (0) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Financial Information

Program Loss Status

Undetermined

OPM Program Loss

\$ Referred to DOJ

\$ Referred for Administrative Recovery

\$ Recovered

Created By	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Created Date	09/04/2019 10:22 PM
Updated By	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Updated Date	05/07/2020 10:54 AM

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Targeted Review)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Employee Integrity

US State or Territory Tennessee

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 10/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 07/30/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former Securitas background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Contractor

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above**Joint Agency Case** No**Grand Jury****Sensitive****Case Categorization** National Security**US State or Territory** Texas**Date Received** 09/04/2019**Date Investigation Opened** 09/04/2019**Date Closed** 05/11/2020**Assigned Field Region** Region 1 - DC**Assigned ASAC** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Staff Assigned** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Date Staff Assigned** 05/07/2020**Complainant is being Retaliated Against****Predication** CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former Contract Background Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with KeyPoint (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (2) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Contractor

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above**Joint Agency Case** No**Grand Jury****Sensitive****Case Categorization** National Security**US State or Territory** Iowa**Date Received** 09/04/2019**Date Investigation Opened** 09/04/2019**Date Closed** 10/01/2020**Assigned Field Region** Region 1 - DC**Assigned ASAC** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Staff Assigned** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Date Staff Assigned** 07/30/2020**Complainant is being Retaliated Against****Predication** CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above**Joint Agency Case** No**Grand Jury****Sensitive****Case Categorization** National Security**US State or Territory** Wisconsin**Date Received** 09/04/2019**Date Investigation Opened** 09/04/2019**Date Closed** 05/12/2020**Assigned Field Region** Region 1 - DC**Assigned ASAC** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Staff Assigned** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Date Staff Assigned** 05/07/2020**Complainant is being Retaliated Against****Predication** CASE PREDICATION:

In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), KeyPoint, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory South Carolina

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 10/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 07/30/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Florida

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (5) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Virginia

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 10/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 07/30/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory West Virginia

Date Received 09/04/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/04/2019

Date Closed 09/10/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

NBIB's investigative review identified less than twenty falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

Excela Health

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

Department of Justice - Qui tam

OPM Organization

Healthcare and Insurance

Program

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP)

FEHBP Member Number

Allegation Type

False Claim

Allegation Subtype

Provider

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

Yes

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Improper Payments

US State or Territory Pennsylvania

Date Received 09/05/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/05/2019

Date Closed 01/28/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 09/05/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Case Predication: On July 25, 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)/ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received a qui tam filed by relator, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of PA regarding Excela Health. According to the relator, the hospital was billing for services rendered at a facility owned by Excela but not officially enrolled in Medicare/Medicaid.

Program Impact Program Impact: Based on the nature of the allegations, there is minimal impact to the FEHBP Program. The FEHBP program relies on the networks of contracted carriers and not Medicare enrollment for reimbursement. The issue of enrollment is a

Medicare regulation that would not apply to the FEHBP.

Statistics/Significant Events

Case Activity/Stats: The allegations in the qui tam would likely have little to no impact on the FEHBP. Our program relies on the network contracts of our carriers and not the enrollment status with Medicare. This complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Employee

OPM Organization

Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO)

Program

Other

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Employee Integrity

US State or Territory District of Columbia

Date Received 09/05/2019

Date Investigation Opened 09/05/2019

Date Closed 05/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 09/05/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

On August 20, 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), OPM. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged she felt her career was threatened because of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed that she was concerned her employment in the federal government may be in jeopardy because of the alleged rumor of a violation of ethical standards; regarding Prohibited Personnel Practices under 5 C.F.R. Section 2635.101 (b).

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed a complaint with the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity at OPM.

In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG criminal investigators confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was recently placed on administrative leave. In or about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG criminal investigators confirmed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated from her employment at OPM as a probationary employee, due to performance and/or conduct. No violations that would be investigated by the OIG were identified. Therefore, no further investigation is required and this complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact**Reason for Closeout****Action****Outside Referral****Date Referred****Case Name**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin**Complaint Method****Complaint Source**

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU**Qui Tam**

No

AKS**Congressional Interest**

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Virginia

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 09/10/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about April 2020, NBIB completed an investigative review and approximately (20) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory New Jersey

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about April 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint contract background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (0) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Texas

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 10/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former CSRA background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The NBIB investigative review identified less than 20 falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory California

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about February 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (2) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Georgia

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former Securitas contract background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (5) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory District of Columbia

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 09/10/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about February 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In or about March 2020, NBIB completed an investigative review and (18) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Recovery)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Contractor

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory Michigan

Date Received 10/01/2019

Date Investigation Opened 10/01/2019

Date Closed 10/01/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In or about April 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by former CACI background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

The NBIB investigative review identified less than twenty falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Employee

OPM Organization

Human Resources Solutions

Program

Program Office Employee

Allegation Type

Whistleblower Retaliation

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case

No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization

Other

US State or Territory

District of Columbia

Date Received

10/25/2019

Date Investigation Opened

10/25/2019

Date Closed

03/17/2020

Assigned Field Region

Headquarter Operations

Assigned ASAC

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned

10/25/2019

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:

On October 2, 2019, the OPM OIG Office of Investigations received a complaint regarding the hiring practices within the OPM Human Resources Solutions (HRS) USAJobs group. The complainant alleged that three General Schedule (GS) 14 positions were pre-selected and that the complainant was told not to apply for the positions.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

In an interview with the complainant on October 29, 2019, the complainant explained that in or around November 2017, the USAJobs group had three openings at the GS-14 level. In a meeting around that time, the complainant alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

indicated that individuals have already been selected for each of the positions. The complainant provided the names of the individuals selected.

Further investigation revealed that three GS-14 positions were not open during the timeframe provided by the complainant. Rather, one GS-14 selection took place in [REDACTED] and the selected individual had extensive Human Resources experience in the private sector and federal government. In addition, the selected individual was hired directly from the private sector but had previously been a GS-14 with another federal agency.

The second named individual was hired as a GS-14 in [REDACTED] to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. The selected individual was hired from the private sector and had specialized experience in Information Technology (IT).

The third named individual was hired as a GS-14 in [REDACTED]. The selected individual transferred from another federal agency and was a GS-14 at the previous agency. In addition, the selected individual had extensive experience working on a program that transferred from the prior agency to the USAJobs group at OPM.

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

No violation occurred. Therefore, no further action is required and this complaint is now closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Administrative Action

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

[REDACTED]

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Employee

OPM Organization

Office of the Inspector General

Program

Investigations

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

OPM Employee

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury Yes

Sensitive

Case Categorization Other

US State or Territory Pennsylvania

Date Received 01/17/2020

Date Investigation Opened 01/09/2020

Date Closed 06/12/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned

Date Staff Assigned 01/17/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the reporting agent received a notification of a complaint from OIG OI senior management and OIG legal that occurred on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

Program Impact

Statistics/Significant Events

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Program Office

OPM Organization

National Background Investigations Bureau

Program

Background Investigations

Allegation Type

Fabrication (Targeted Review)

Allegation Subtype

OPM Employee

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization National Security

US State or Territory New York

Date Received 01/24/2020

Date Investigation Opened 11/19/2019

Date Closed 05/11/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 05/07/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION:

In June 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by NBIB background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact**PROGRAM IMPACT:**

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events**STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:**

In November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (6) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further. NBIB will proceed with administrative action deemed appropriate and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases**Related Cases**

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

Other

OPM Organization

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Program

Other

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Employee Integrity

US State or Territory Maryland

Date Received 02/25/2020

Date Investigation Opened 02/25/2020

Date Closed 07/15/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 02/27/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:

On February 24, 2020, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Investigative Support Operations (ISO), received a hotline complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), misused both the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and her position. Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleges a gross mismanagement complaint on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT:

N/A

Statistics/Significant Events

STATS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to OPM as a rehired annuitant to fill the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position.

On June 11, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted by OIG criminal investigators and she rescinded her complaint. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, the matter has been resolved and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are both no longer working at OPM. Therefore, no further action is required and this complaint is now closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

Case

Case Information

Case Number

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Status

Closed

Referral Contact

Reason for Closeout

Action

Outside Referral

Date Referred

Case Name

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case Type

Preliminary

Record Origin

Complaint Method

Complaint Source

OPM Employee

OPM Organization

Office of Procurement Operations

Program

Contracting

Allegation Type

Misconduct by OPM Employee

Allegation Subtype

Entered by LSU

Qui Tam

No

AKS

Congressional Interest

No

Headquarters Interest

GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case No

Grand Jury

Sensitive

Case Categorization Employee Integrity

US State or Territory District of Columbia

Date Received 08/31/2020

Date Investigation Opened 08/31/2020

Date Closed 10/23/2020

Assigned Field Region Region 1 - DC

Assigned ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Staff Assigned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date Staff Assigned 08/31/2020

Complainant is being Retaliated Against

Predication CASE PREDICATION: On August 26, 2020, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, received a referral from Facilities, Security and Emergency Management in reference to OPM employee

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

was arrested by the FBI (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an OPM employee.

Statistics/Significant Events Significant Events: Subsequent to his arrest, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was held in jail in Washington DC. Beginning around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OPM,

stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was considered as being in AWOL status.

On August 31, 2020, OPM OIG obtained the arrest information from an Law Enforcement Database called Sector confirming the charges.

On September 2, 2020, OPM-OIG spoke to the FBI Special Agent assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) investigation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the FBI notified OPM-OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Due to the death of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), this matter is now closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases