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Description of document:	Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Reports from Various Closed Investigations 2018-2020
Requested date:	23-September-2022
Release date:	14-November-2022
Posted date:	27-March-2023
Source of document:	Attention: FOIA Request U.S. Office of Personnel Management 1900 E Street, N.W. OPIM/FOIA Room 5H35 Washington, D.C. 20415-7900 Email: <u>foia@opm.gov</u> (preferred during COVID-19)

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UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT Washington, DC 20415

Office of the Inspector General

November 14, 2022

<u>Sent via email</u>

FOIA Request # 2022-OIG-0121-F

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made on September 23, 2022, to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In that request you asked for "A copy of records regarding these OPM OIG closed investigations: C-18-00034, C-19- 00180, C-19-00182, C-19-00183, C-19-00185, C-19-00186, C-19-00187, C-19-00188, C-19-00274, C-19-00484, C-19-00564, C-19-00594, C-19-00595, C-19-00596, C-19- 00597, C-19-00599, C-19-00600, C-19-00601, C-19-00602, C-19-00603, C-19-00604, C-19-00611, C-20-00003, C-20-00004, C-20-00005, C-20-00007, C-20-00008, C-20-00009, C-20-00010, C-20-00047, C-20-00169, C-20-00179, C-20-00244, and C-20- 00500." On October 18, 2022, you clarified the scope of your request to seek only "the concluding written report" or, if that is not available, "a case summary" for the cases referenced above.

The OPM OIG conducted a thorough search for records and located 109 pages of responsive records. Twenty-one pages are being released to you in full and eighty-eight pages are being released to you in part. Certain information was withheld to avoid disclosure of techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecution, *see* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) and to avoid the unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, *see* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

I trust that this information fully satisfies your request. If you need any further assistance or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please do not hesitate to contact me at opmoigfoia@opm.gov or (202)-606-1200.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:

Office of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS

College Park, Maryland 20740				
Email:	ogis@nara.gov			
Telephone:	202-741-5770			
Toll-free:	1-877-684-6448			
Facsimile:	202-741-5769			

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by emailing opmoigfoia@opm.gov.

Please include a copy of your initial request, a copy of this letter, and a statement explaining why you disagree with our decision. You should write "Freedom of Information Act Appeal" in the subject line of the email. Your appeal must be electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request.

Regards,

SARAH WAHL Digitally signed by SARAH WAHL Date: 2022.11.14 15:46:10 -05'00'

Sarah Wahl Attorney-Advisor 10/19/22, 11:44 AM

Case

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(O)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Other OPM Program Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Complaint
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 11:44 AM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	01/17/2019
Date Investigation Opened	01/17/2019
Date Closed	01/21/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	01/21/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869,

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

OPM IG 1.0.4.0

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

10/20/22, 2:36 PM

Case

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/20/22, 2:36 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	02/14/2018
Date Investigation Opened	02/14/2018
Date Closed	11/30/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	04/17/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:
	On December 17, 2017, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Investigative Operations received
	a referral from the National Background Investigation Bureau (NBIB), Integrity
	Assurance (IA). It was alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted false and
	inaccurate reports of investigation (ROI) during his employment with Keypoint
	Government Solutions (KGS).

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

OPM IG 1.0.4.0

NBIB is an OPM Revolving Fund program that conducts background investigations on those individuals applying for or serving in positions of national security or public trust. The completed background investigations conducted by NBIB investigators are used to make adjudications determinations on those individuals.

Preliminary Inquiry revealed that by submitted 20 falsified ROIs.

Statistics/Significant Events

STATS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the DCSA binders could not be obtained from DCSA offices located in Ft. Meade, Maryland. Therefore, no joint interviews by OPM-OIG and DCSA investigators were conducted.

On October 1, 2020, the funding OPM-OIG previously had to investigate DCSA cases

ended. Therefore, OPM-OIG is closing our investigation.

Related Cases

Related Cases



United States Department of Defense Washington, DC 20301-1400

March 16, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office of the Inspector General Office of Personnel Management
FROM:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office of the Inspector General Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
SUBJECT:	Falsification of Investigative Work Involving Former Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This forwards the falsification recovery project regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . former Contract Investigator, United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). (b) (7)(C) was previously employed by Keypoint, now known as Perspecta. Keypoint was retained by OPM to conduct background investigations on its behalf. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was suspended from the OPM contract by (b), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work. OPM due to falsification concerns with was terminated by Keypoint on (b) (6), (b) completed investigative work (\mathbf{C}) contained within the recovery period was conducted while a contract investigator employed by Keypoint under contract to OPM NBIB.

On October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869 the Office of Personnel Management, National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) was transferred to the Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). As part of this transition NBIB's Integrity Assurance, Compliance and Investigations Branch (IACI) became a part of DCSA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). OPM is referenced throughout this Executive Summary as all actions occurred under OPM. However, as of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the Department of Defense.

I. Introduction

The suspected falsification triggered a full and comprehensive recovery project involving all cases (**D**(**6**), (**D**(**7**)) conducted and/or completed, during the recovery period. The recovery effort would be defined by the extent and scope of the identified instances of falsification, ghost writing, embellishment, and other anomalies. As evidenced in this document and attachments, it was determined that (**D**(**6**), (**D**(**7**)) (**C**), (**D**(**7**)

1001. In the event your office declines to pursue criminal action, please consider this a formal referral for suspension/debarment consideration.

II. OPM-NBIB

OPM's mission is to recruit, retain, and honor a world-class workforce to serve the American people. To help accomplish this mission, OPM, prior to October 1, 2019, was responsible for conducting over 95% of the background investigations for the Federal Government. OPM served over 100 agencies with over 1,000 security offices worldwide by providing background investigations on their Federal applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel. OPM-NBIB served as the primary executive branch service provider for background investigations for eligibility for access to classified information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a contractor employee; and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities and information systems.

The authority to conduct investigations is contained within various Executive Orders, Title 5 United States Code (5 USC), and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR). Specifically, but not exclusively, Executive Order 10450, as amended, requires agency heads to classify positions for sensitivity in relation to National Security. Executive Order 10450, as amended, further requires an investigation appropriate to the sensitivity level on each person in order to determine that the employment is consistent with the interests of National Security, and granted OPM Government-wide oversight responsibility of its implementation. OPM, under 5 CFR Part 5, was authorized to investigate and adjudicate the suitability of individuals entering the competitive Federal service.

Prior to October 1, 2019, OPM had an active investigator workforce of approximately 8,000 individuals, comprised of approximately 1,700 Federal agents employed by OPM and another 6,300 investigators employed by various companies under contract to conduct background investigations on behalf of OPM. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was part of the contract OPM workforce as an Investigator for OPM NBIB.

OPM-NBIB had a rigorous training and mentoring program and strictly enforced investigative standards with all investigators. OPM had to meet rigid national standards in all investigations they performed, as established in several executive orders and as outlined in OPM's Investigator Handbook, which was issued to every investigator. Quality control and assurance measures were designed to preserve the quality of the product and integrity of the investigations program. In fact, page 1-14 of the Handbook is entitled, "Standards of Conduct," and speaks to the critical elements of trust and ethics inherent with the Investigator position.

III. NBIB Quality and Integrity Assurance

OPM-NBIB quality control and assurance procedures were well-versed and time-tested. Cases underwent a thorough case review to determine whether standards had been met and whether the report is presented in a clear and complete manner before delivery to the requesting customer agency. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

If a case fails to meet established investigative standards, the case was returned to the Investigator, via appropriate channels, for appropriate rework and corrections. Case review staff were trained and instructed to take notice of any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI that may call into question the authenticity of the information reported in the ROI. If an issue or anomaly was noticed in an investigator's ROI during case review, the case review staff were required to report their observations through the appropriate channels within OPM NBIB. OPM NBIB Field Staff also had a duty to report any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI through appropriate channels within OPM NBIB.

IV. Initial Concern and Administrative Inquiry

In May 29, 2018, NBIB-IACI was notified by Keypoint of a complaint (Attachment 1) on case **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**, completed by **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** and another investigator had reported interviewing personal source **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** separately for case **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** and another investigator and reported differing information. When **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** was contacted by Keypoint for clarification, **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** indicated he could not recall whether he was interviewed by **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** also provided differing information regarding his association with and **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** also provided differing information regarding his association with for investigation. As a result of the discrepant information, NBIB-IACI initiated a Targeted Review (TR) of **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** completed investigative work.

(b) (7)(E)

A TR is designed to specifically analyze individual reference testimony, reported by the identified investigator, and is an extension of the regular recontact letter program. On June 22, 2018, NBIB-IACI mailed 237 re-contact letters as part of the initiated TR. The TR closed on August 2, 2018. Subsequent to the closure of the TR, returned a recontact letter mailed to her as part of the TR. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was reported by as a personal source for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote on her recontact letter "I was not able to provide any information or interview. The person who was at my house was not sure about the name I gave her. I said I know (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; the result of this, the interview was never done." (7)(C) was contacted telephonically by NBIB-IACI and reiterated the information she did not ask any questions about provided on the recontact letter, adding (6) (6), (6) (7)(6 (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any information about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On September and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed in person by an OPM NBIB Federal Agent and reiterated 7, 2018, the information she provided on her recontact letter and during her telephonic contact with NBIB-IACI stating she was never interviewed by

On August 2, 2018 NBIB-IACI requested Keypoint conduct a 5 case sampling of Investigator completed investigative work with a subsequent request for a 10 case sampling on September 5, 2018. The samplings identified no additional instances of falsification by but found numerous instances of reporting inaccuracies. NBIB-IACI directed the suspension of ^{[D] (6), (b) (7)(C)} from the OPM contract on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Keypoint terminated ^{(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)} employment with their company. On October 18, 2018 NBIB-IACI conducted a rework of ^(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) investigative work completed between July 6, 2018 and September 6, 2018. As a result of this rework, six instances of falsification by ^(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were discovered. As a result of these falsifications, on December 13, 2018, NBIB-IACI initiated a recovery of ^(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work excluding investigative items covered during the aforementioned rework.

A copy of the Targeted Review Summary is included as Attachment 2. A copy of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned recontact letter, associated telephone memo and MFR is included as Attachment 3. A copy of the suspension request from the OPM contract and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) termination notice from Keypoint is included as Attachment 4.

V. Recovery Process

Based upon the aforementioned investigative findings, OPM-NBIB pursued a full recovery effort to insure the accuracy of information, previously reported and provided to the requesting agencies, within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ROIS. NBIB leadership was apprised of the situation and NBIB Integrity Assurance briefed affected components of OPM.

Without knowing the depth or scope of his falsification activities, the first objective involved identifying the sources reported on each case conducted by (D)(G), (D)(7)(C). Cases on which was involved as an OPM Contract Investigator were compiled, reviewed, and an analysis was conducted.

The recovery process set out to meticulously and systematically identify, address, and correct any instances of falsification or material inaccuracy involving any single **biometries** case or source testimony. The attached matrix, Attachment 5, identifies the individual sources reported on each case conducted by **b** (**b** (**b**) (**b**) (**c**) (**c**) and provides a snapshot of the activity involved during the recovery project on each and every source indicated in his ROIs. When initiating a full recovery effort, OPM defines a source as any investigative entry within an ROI, to include record providers, sources, subjects, and as appropriate, Investigator notes. The recovery period was defined to cover all cases completed by **b** (**b** (**c**) (**c**

In instances where recontact was favorable, additional recovery work was not performed and is so noted on the matrix. In these instances, no revisions were made to the source testimonies as reported in the ROI. In instances where recontact reflected falsification indicators or anomalies, previously reported testimony was removed from the ROI(s) and OPM recovery agents attempted to conduct follow-up inquiries and interviews. Based upon recovery efforts, each source is ultimately categorized as validated, undetermined, or falsified; all results were tracked on the referenced matrix.

Open cases were corrected by NBIB to delete: 1) falsified information, 2) testimonies that were inaccurately reported and, 3) testimonies that could not be validated. The case was then processed via routine closing procedures.

Closed cases were reopened and corrected to delete and replace falsified information and testimonies that were either inaccurately reported or could not be validated, but contained certain indicators of possible falsification or otherwise materially inaccurate information. Additional corrective procedures were required in order to amend the imaged or microfilmed investigation

(this is a multi-step process). A complete copy of the corrected investigation was provided to the requesting agency to replace the original investigation.

► The following table represents a statistical summary of the recovery project (incorporating the rework statistics into the recovery statistics):

Total Cases	175
Total Sources	463
Sources with confirmed falsification	12
Sources with falsification indicators or testimonies that could not be validated	143
% of sources with confirmed falsification, falsification indicators, or testimonies that could not be validated	33%

• The following table represents the 12 instances of confirmed falsification

Tab	OPM Case	Subject	Agency / Investigation Level	Item Name	Transmit Date	Comment
6	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (b), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6); (b) (7)(C) (טין נטין נטין ניטין ניין דער)	11/19/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
7	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (b), (b) (7)(C) (0) (6), (b)	11/29/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
8	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	ы) (6), (b) (7)(С (b) (6), (b) (7)(С)	12/17/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
9	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	ю (6), (6) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2/21/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
10	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (c), (b) (c)(C)	Department of the Army/ Secret (Tier 3)	(b) (b) (b) (7)(C) (b) (b) (b) (b) (7)(C)	2/28/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
11	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(5) (5), (5) (7	Department of the Air Force/ Top Secret (PPR)	(b) (b), (b) (7), (b) (o), (b) (7)(6/21/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
12	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(C) (G), (C) (7)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	0)(0),(0)(7)(0)(0)(7)(0)	6/26/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

13	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (b), (b) (7)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (b), (b) (c), (b) (7)(C)	6/26/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
14	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ^{(b) (6), (b) (7)}	7/20/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
15	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	o) (o),1 (b) (b) (b) (r)(C	8/15/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
16	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	o) (o), 1 (b) (b) (b) (7)(C	8/19/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
17	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Defense/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	0 (0, 6, 0 (0, 0) (7).	8/19/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

VI. Cost Accounting

Special Agents and IA administrative personnel assigned to the recovery project tracked hours worked specifically on the recovery project and reported their time. Each employee's hourly rate, to include benefits, was subsequently determined and used in determining the overall cost of the project. Due to the location of the recovery project in relation to staffing and workload, OPM-NBIB required the use of temporary duty (TDY) assignments in order to complete this recovery project. The associated expenses are reflected below as travel costs.

The falsification of case work, by Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), resulted in expenses to the government of, at least, \$99,706.62, which includes \$91,158.59 in labor costs and \$8,548.03 for travel costs.

The cost matrix and associated documentation is reflected in Appendix 18.

10/20/22, 2:27 PM

Case

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

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GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	North Carolina
Date Received	01/17/2019
Date Investigation Opened	01/04/2019
Date Closed	01/22/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	01/21/2020
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	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
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Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

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Related Cases

Related Cases

Financial Information

Program Loss Status

Undetermined

OPM Program Loss

\$ Referred to DOJ

\$ Referred for Administrative Recovery

\$ Recovered

Created By

Created Date

01/17/2019 10:30 AM

Updated By

N (6) (b) (7)(C)

Updated Date

01/21/2020 05:52 PM

https://clear.oig.opm.gov/etk-opm-ig-prod/tracking.base.print.request.do

10/19/22, 12:20 PM

Case

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:20 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	01/17/2019
Date Investigation Opened	01/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former CACI background investigator ^{(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)} (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869,

the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

OPM IG 1.0.4.0

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (7) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases



United States Department of Defense Washington, DC 20301-1400

November 14, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office of the Inspector General Office of Personnel Management
FROM:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office of the Inspector General Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
SUBJECT:	Falsification of Investigative Work Involving Former Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This forwards the falsification recovery project regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) former Contract Investigator, United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously employed by CACI. CACI was retained by OPM to conduct background investigations on its behalf. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was suspended by CACI due to falsification concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work. (b) (6) (7)(C) was removed from the OPM contract by OPM on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after additional instances of falsification were discovered during a targeted review (TR) of (b) (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed investigative work contained within the recovery period was conducted while a contract investigator employed by CACI under contract to OPM NBIB.

On October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869 the Office of Personnel Management, National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) was transferred to the Department of Defense, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). As part of this transition NBIB's Integrity Assurance, Compliance and Investigations Branch (IACI) became a part of DCSA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). OPM is referenced throughout this Executive Summary as all actions occurred under OPM. However, as of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the Department of Defense.

I. Introduction

The suspected falsification triggered a full and comprehensive recovery project involving all cases [0] (6), (0) (7) (C) conducted and/or completed, during the recovery period. The recovery effort would be defined by the extent and scope of the identified instances of falsification, ghost writing, embellishment, and other anomalies. As evidenced in this document and attachments, it was determined that [0) (6), (0) (7) (C), in executing his duties as a Contract Investigator for OPM-NBIB, engaged in numerous instances of falsification that may be in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 (Making Material False Statements and Concealing Material Information from Governmental Departments or Agencies), as defined. We respectfully request

your full review and consideration of the facts presented here in the context of Title 18, Section 1001. In the event your office declines to pursue criminal action, please consider this a formal referral for suspension/debarment consideration.

II. OPM-NBIB

OPM's mission is to recruit, retain, and honor a world-class workforce to serve the American people. To help accomplish this mission, OPM, prior to October 1, 2019, was responsible for conducting over 95% of the background investigations for the Federal Government. OPM served over 100 agencies with over 1,000 security offices worldwide by providing background investigations on their Federal applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel. OPM-NBIB served as the primary executive branch service provider for background investigations for eligibility for access to classified information; eligibility to hold a sensitive position; suitability or, for employees in positions not subject to suitability, fitness for Government employment; fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government as a contractor employee; and authorization to be issued a Federal credential for logical and physical access to federally controlled facilities and information systems.

The authority to conduct investigations is contained within various Executive Orders, Title 5 United States Code (5 USC), and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR). Specifically, but not exclusively, Executive Order 10450, as amended, requires agency heads to classify positions for sensitivity in relation to National Security. Executive Order 10450, as amended, further requires an investigation appropriate to the sensitivity level on each person in order to determine that the employment is consistent with the interests of National Security, and granted OPM Government-wide oversight responsibility of its implementation. OPM, under 5 CFR Part 5, was authorized to investigate and adjudicate the suitability of individuals entering the competitive Federal service.

Prior to October 1, 2019, OPM had an active investigator workforce of approximately 8,000 individuals, comprised of approximately 1,700 Federal agents employed by OPM and another 6,300 investigators employed by various companies under contract to conduct background investigations on behalf of OPM.

OPM-NBIB had a rigorous training and mentoring program and strictly enforced investigative standards with all investigators. OPM had to meet rigid national standards in all investigations they performed, as established in several executive orders and as outlined in OPM's Investigator Handbook, which was issued to every investigator. Quality control and assurance measures were designed to preserve the quality of the product and integrity of the investigations program. In fact, page 1-14 of the Handbook is entitled, "Standards of Conduct," and speaks to the critical elements of trust and ethics inherent with the Investigator position.

III. NBIB Quality and Integrity Assurance

OPM-NBIB quality control and assurance procedures were well-versed and time-tested. Cases underwent a thorough case review to determine whether standards had been met and whether the report is presented in a clear and complete manner before delivery to the requesting customer agency. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

If a case fails to meet established investigative standards, the case was returned to the Investigator, via appropriate channels, for appropriate rework and corrections. Case review staff were trained and instructed to take notice of any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI that may call into question the authenticity of the information reported in the ROI. If an issue or anomaly was noticed in an investigator's ROI during case review, the case review staff were required to report their observations through the appropriate channels within OPM NBIB. OPM NBIB Field Staff also had a duty to report any apparent issues or anomalies within an Investigator's ROI through appropriate channels within OPM NBIB.

IV. Initial Concern and Administrative Inquiry

On July 12, 2018, NBIB-IACI was notified via email by CACI of a potential falsification concern involving ^(b) ⁽⁶⁾, ^(b) ⁽⁷⁾ (C) reporting of personal source ^(b) ⁽⁶⁾, ^(b) ⁽⁷⁾ (C) for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CACI had contacted (b) (to resolve an OPM re-contact letter they received back as undeliverable that was mailed to was mailed a re-contact letter as a result of ^(b) ⁽⁶⁾, ^(b) ⁽⁷⁾(C) reported interview of for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). When contacted by CACI, b) (6), (b) indicated he had not been interviewed by (b) (6), (b) (7) for (b) (6), (b) (7) background investigation as reported. On July 17, 2018, a CACI investigator interviewed in (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he had not been interviewed by person. During this in-person interview for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) background investigation. A copy of the notification from CACI and an MFR from CACI's investigator that interviewed is included as Attachment 1. As a result of CACI's interview with ^(b) (, CACI suspended on July 18, 2018. A copy of CACI's suspension memorandum is included as Attachment 2.

A Targeted Review is designed to specifically analyze individual reference testimony, reported by the identified agent, and is an extension of the regular recontact letter program. On July 31, 2018, NBIB-IACI mailed 349 recontact letters as part of the initiated Targeted Review (TR).

As a result of the Targeted Review, NBIB-IACI identified two additional instances of reported sources indicating they had not been interviewed by (b) (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned a re-contact letter as part of the Targeted Review indicating that he was not interviewed by ^(b)(6), (b) (7)(C) or anyone for the background investigation of ^(b)(6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote on his re-contact letter (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not one of my associates and doesn't even work at my site. I was never interviewed pertaining him." ^(b) (c), (b) (7)(C) wrote on his re-contact letter (b) (c), (b) (7)(C) is not one of my associates and doesn't even work at my site. I was never interviewed pertaining him." ^(b) (c), (b) (7)(C) stated he was interviewed only once on February 28, 2018 (the reported date of interview by ^(b) (c), (b) (7)(C), but the interview was for the background investigation of ^(b) (c) (7)(C).

returned a re-contact letter as part of the Targeted Review indicating that she was not interviewed by or anyone for the background investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7) wrote on her re-contact letter "I have never been contacted by anyone from OPM regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)." reported interviewing on July 5, 2018 as a personal source for the background investigation of . was telephonically contacted by NBIB-IACI in follow up to her returned letter. stated during that telephonic contact she was certain she had never been interviewed regarding (b) (7)(C) also stated it would have been impossible for her to be interviewed on July 5, 2018 at the Y-12 facility, Oak Ridge, TN (the reported date and location of interview in (b) (7)(C) report of investigation) as she had taken leave from work that day. (b) (6), (b) (7) was then interviewed in person by an OPM NBIB Federal Agent. (b) (c) (c) (c) reiterated during this interview she had not been interviewed or contacted regarding (6) (6) (7)(, either in person or by telephone; on July 5, 2018 or at any other time.

A copy of the Targeted Review Summary, to include related documentation regarding the additional instances of falsification, is included as Attachment 3. Based on the results of the Targeted Review ^(b) ^(b) ^(c) ^(c) (c)</sup> was removed by OPM from the OPM contract on ^(b) ^(c) ^(c)

V. Recovery Process

Based upon the aforementioned investigative findings, OPM-NBIB pursued a full recovery effort to insure the accuracy of information, previously reported and provided to the requesting agencies, within (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ROIS. NBIB leadership was apprised of the situation and NBIB Integrity Assurance briefed affected components of OPM.

Without knowing the depth or scope of his falsification activities, the first objective involved identifying the sources reported on each case conducted by (()(()(()(()(())(C)))). Cases on which ((()(()(()(())(C))))) was involved as an OPM Contract Investigator were compiled, reviewed, and an analysis was conducted.

The recovery process set out to meticulously and systematically identify, address, and correct any instances of falsification or material inaccuracy involving any single case or source testimony. The attached matrix, Attachment 5, identifies the individual sources reported on each case conducted by (0)(6)(0)(7)(6) and provides a snapshot of the activity involved during the recovery project on each and every source indicated in his ROIs. When initiating a full recovery effort, OPM defines a source as any investigative entry within an ROI, to include record providers, sources, subjects, and as appropriate, Investigator notes. The recovery period was defined to cover all cases completed by (0)(6)(0)(7)(6) for the period of October 10, 2017 through July 18, 2018. In addition to the initial recovery period, as defined, the recovery was expanded to include all cases that were currently open within OPM, which were previously completed by (0)(6)(7)(6)

In instances where recontact was favorable, additional recovery work was not performed and is so noted on the matrix. In these instances, no revisions were made to the source testimonies as reported in the ROI. In instances where recontact reflected falsification indicators or anomalies, previously reported testimony was removed from the ROI(s) and OPM recovery agents attempted to conduct follow-up inquiries and interviews. Based upon recovery efforts, each source is ultimately categorized as validated, undetermined, or falsified; all results were tracked on the referenced matrix.

Open cases were corrected by NBIB to delete: 1) falsified information, 2) testimonies that were inaccurately reported and, 3) testimonies that could not be validated. The case was then processed via routine closing procedures.

Closed cases were reopened and corrected to delete and replace falsified information and testimonies that were either inaccurately reported or could not be validated, but contained certain indicators of possible falsification or otherwise materially inaccurate information. Additional corrective procedures were required in order to amend the imaged or microfilmed investigation (this is a multi-step process). A complete copy of the corrected investigation was provided to the requesting agency to replace the original investigation.

The following table represents a statistical summary of the recovery project:

Total Cases	157
Total Sources	729
Sources with confirmed falsification	11
Sources with falsification indicators or	154
testimonies that could not be validated	134
% of sources with confirmed falsification,	
falsification indicators, or testimonies that	23%
could not be validated	

Recovery Project Statistics

► The following table represents the 11 instances of confirmed falsification

Tab	OPM Case	Subject	Agency / Investigation Level	Item Name	Transmit Date	Comment
6	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)	Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C (b) (6), (b) (6), (b)	8/9/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
7	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (10/23/2017	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
8	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	Marshall Electric; Employment Record/ ^{1016),101(0)(0)}	2/7/2018	Source did not provide a record. ROI reflects record testimony.
9	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (b) (7)(Department of Energy / Top Secret (Tier 5R)	b) (b) (b) (7)(c) (b) (b) (b) (b)	2/7/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

10	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (b), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (c), (b) (7)(C (b) (6), (c) (7)(4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
11	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	0) (6), (b) (7)(C b) (6), (b) (7	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
12	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (5), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	b) (b), b) (7),c, b) (b), b) (7),	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
13	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (b), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (b), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	4/30/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
14	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (8), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5)	(b) (b), (b) (7), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	5/4/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
15	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Department of Army/ Secret (Tier 3)	(b) (6), (b) (7), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	5/15/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.
16	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7) (Department of Energy/ Top Secret (Tier 5R)	(b) (c); (b) (b) (b) (b) (7)(C)	7/9/2018	Source was not interviewed. ROI reflects testimony.

VI. Cost Accounting

Special Agents and IA administrative personnel assigned to the recovery project tracked hours worked specifically on the recovery project and reported their time. Each employee's hourly rate, to include benefits, was subsequently determined and used in determining the overall cost of the project. Due to the location of the recovery project in relation to staffing and workload, OPM-NBIB required the use of temporary duty (TDY) assignments in order to complete this recovery project. The associated expenses are reflected below as travel costs.

The falsification of case work, by Contract Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), resulted in expenses to the government of, at least, \$150,006.64, which includes \$122,358.03 in labor costs and \$27,648.61 for travel costs.

The cost matrix and associated documentation is reflected in Appendix 17.

10/19/22, 12:35 PM

Case

Case	
-	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:35 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	No
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	01/17/2019
Date Investigation Opened	01/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former CACI background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background on October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order (EQ) 13869

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order (EO) 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

OPM IG 1.0.4.0

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (1) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

10/19/22, 12:38 PM

Case

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (5), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:38 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	01/17/2019
Date Investigation Opened	01/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In January 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

OPM IG 1.0.4.0

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

Related Cases

10/19/22, 12:44 PM

Case

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Employee
OPM Organization	Human Resources Solutions
Program	Other
Allegation Type	Misconduct by OPM Employee
Allegation Subtype	OPM Employee
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:44 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Employee Integrity
US State or Territory	Pennsylvania
Date Received	03/08/2019
Date Investigation Opened	03/08/2019
Date Closed	01/21/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	03/08/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Case Predication: In December 2018, the U.S. Office of
	Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of
	Investigations (OI), Investigative Operations received an allegation concerning possible
	nepotism and abuse of authority occurring in the San Antonio Services Center. It was
	alleged that a person was selected for the (b) (6). (b) (7)(C) position that was minimally
	qualified and selected as a result of a previous working relationship with someone
	within the department.
Program Impact	Program Impact: There is no impact to OPM's programs as the allegations were not

substantiated.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 12:47 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	SJ Technologies
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	
OPM Organization	Office of Procurement Operations
Program	
Allegation Type	Other OPM Program Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Complaint
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:47 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Georgia
Date Received	06/19/2019
Date Investigation Opened	06/19/2019
Date Closed	03/17/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	01/22/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:
	On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General, Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a referral
	from the Small Business Administration, OIG regarding implications of an alleged risk
	to national security.
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT:
	An anonymous complainant, apparently a current employee of SJ Technologies, Inc.,
	alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hired big (0, b) (7)(C) employees who have
	ties to terrorist organizations. The anonymous complainant did not provide further
	details.

As background, SJ Technologies, Inc. currently works on the case management system for the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, formerly the National Background Investigations Bureau. The contract falls under OPM's Office of the Chief Information Officer.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On March 6, 2019, OPM's Office of Personnel Security confirmed that all SJ Technologies, Inc. employees working on OPM systems provided valid proof of U.S. citizenship and/or permanent legal residence. In addition, the OPM contract with SJ Technologies, Inc., in Section 1752.209-72 (c), states in part the following information: "Each employee of the Contractor shall be a citizen of the United States of America, or an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as evidenced by Alien Registration Receipt Card Form I-151, or, who presents other evidence from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that employment will not affect his immigration status."

On March 11, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Crime Unit declined to investigate further due to vague details relating to a **prenotice** terrorist organization. Therefore, based on the aforementioned information, no further action will occur and this matter is now closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 12:51 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	Allegation(s) Not Substantiated
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Contractor
OPM Organization	Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO)
Program	Enterprise Solutions
Allegation Type	Misconduct by OPM Employee
Allegation Subtype	OPM Employee
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 12:51 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Other
US State or Territory	District of Columbia
Date Received	08/12/2019
Date Investigation Opened	08/12/2019
Date Closed	03/05/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	08/12/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:
	On <mark>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</mark> , the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General, Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a former employee of Dynanet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged that
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	retaliated against him after he acted as a whistleblower and brought to her attention
	unlawful actions that reduced team productivity and wasted taxpayer money.
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT:
	(b)(6)(()(())) reported that his rights were violated under 41 U.S.C. Section 4712

"Enhancement of contractor protection from reprisal for disclosure of certain

information".

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In October 2019, OIG investigators interviewed [1016], (1017)(11). No violations that would be investigated by the OIG were identified. Further, OIG investigators reviewed the contract between OPM and Dynanet and determined that [1016], (1017)(12) supervisors acted within the guidelines of the contract when they requested [1016], (1017)(12) be removed from the contract. Under section 1752.209-73 of Contract number 243226-19-F-0046 : Standards of Conduct, "Personnel assigned by the contractor to the performance of work under this order must be acceptable to the Government in terms of personal and professional conduct."

No further investigation is required and this complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/20/22, 2:29 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Targeted Review)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/20/22, 2:29 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Virginia
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former CSRA background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thereafter, DCSA,
	OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background on October 1, 2019 under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact PROGRAM IMPACT: NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust. Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: In or about March 2020, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (0) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed. **Related Cases Related Cases Financial Information Program Loss Status** Undetermined **OPM Program Loss** \$ Referred to DOJ \$ Referred for Administrative Recovery \$ Recovered

Created By

Created Date

Updated By

Updated Date

09/04/2019 10:22 PM

(b) (6), (b) (

05/07/2020 10:54 AM

10/19/22, 1:06 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Targeted Review)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:06 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Employee Integrity
US State or Territory	Tennessee
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	07/30/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former Securitas background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:08 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(6) (6), (6) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Contractor
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:08 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Texas
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former Contract Background Investigator (6)(6)(7)(6), (7)(6), with KeyPoint
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (2) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:20 PM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Closed
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Preliminary
OPM Contractor
National Background Investigations Bureau
Background Investigations
Fabrication (Recovery)
OPM Contractor
No
Νο

10/19/22, 1:20 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	lowa
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	07/30/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:23 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:23 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Wisconsin
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	05/12/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of
	the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received
	a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), KeyPoint,
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background on October 1, 2010, under the direction of Executive Order 13860, the

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (3) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:23 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:23 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	South Carolina
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	07/30/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:26 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) $(7)(\mathbb{C})$
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:26 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Florida
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of
	the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received
	a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	(DIGNO (2)(C)). Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (5) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:34 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:34 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Virginia
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	07/30/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The anomalies and/or falsifications identified during the investigative review process were less than twenty and do not meet the threshold for potential criminal, civil, or administrative remedy consideration. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:35 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:35 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	West Virginia
Date Received	09/04/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/04/2019
Date Closed	09/10/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about September 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of
	the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received
	a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	. Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

NBIB's investigative review identified less than twenty falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:37 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	Excela Health
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	Department of Justice - Qui tam
OPM Organization	Healthcare and Insurance
Program	Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP)
FEHBP Member Number	
Allegation Type	False Claim
Allegation Subtype	Provider
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Yes
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No

10/19/22, 1:37 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
Headquarters Interest	
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	No
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Improper Payments
US State or Territory	Pennsylvania
Date Received	09/05/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/05/2019
Date Closed	01/28/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	09/05/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Case Predication: On July 25, 2019, the U.S. Office of
	Personnel Management (OPM)/ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received a qui
	tam filed by relator, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
	PA regarding Excela Health. According to the relator, the hospital was billing for
	services rendered at a facility owned by Excela but not officially enrolled in
	Medicare/Medicaid.
Program Impact	Program Impact: Based on the nature of the allegations, there is minimal impact to the
	FEHBP Program. The FEHBP program relies on the networks of contracted carriers

Medicare regulation that would not apply to the FEHBP.

Statistics/Significant Events

Case Activity/Stats: The allegations in the qui tam would likely have little to no impact on the FEHBP. Our program relies on the network contracts of our carriers and not the enrollment status with Medicare. This complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:39 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Employee
OPM Organization	Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO)
Program	Other
Allegation Type	Misconduct by OPM Employee
Allegation Subtype	
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:39 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	No
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Employee Integrity
US State or Territory	District of Columbia
Date Received	09/05/2019
Date Investigation Opened	09/05/2019
Date Closed	05/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	09/05/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	On August 20, 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint from ^{(b) (b) (7)(G)} , an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the Office of the Chief
	Information Officer (OCIO), OPM. [0] (0) (0) (2) (0) alleged she felt her career was threatened
	because of a(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT:
	expressed that she was concerned her employment in the federal
	government may be in jeopardy because of the alleged rumor of a violation of ethical
	standards; regarding Prohibited Personnel Practices under 5 C.F.R. Section 2635.101
	(b).
Statistics/Significant Events	STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:
	In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed a complaint with the Office of Equal Employment
	Opportunity at OPM.
	In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG criminal investigators confirmed ^{(b) (b) (b) (7)(C)} was recently
	placed on administrative leave. In or about ^(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG criminal investigators
	confirmed that (0)(6),(0)(7)(6) was terminated from her employment at OPM as a
	probationary employee, due to performance and/or conduct. No violations that would
	be investigated by the OIG were identified. Therefore, no further investigation is
	required and this complaint is closed.
Related Cases	

10/19/22, 1:44 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:44 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Virginia
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	09/10/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about April 2020, NBIB completed an investigative review and approximately (20) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:47 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:47 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	New Jersey
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about April 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint contract background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a Targeted Review and (0) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:49 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:49 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Texas
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector
	General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint
	referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity
	Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
	(DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by
	former CSRA background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Thereafter,
	DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The NBIB investigative review identified less than 20 falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/20/22, 2:31 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/20/22, 2:31 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	California
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(O)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about February 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of
	the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received
	a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (2) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:52 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:52 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Georgia
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about May 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former Securitas contract background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about January 2020, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (5) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:53 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:53 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	District of Columbia
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	09/10/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about February 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of
	the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received
	a complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former KeyPoint background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In or about March 2020, NBIB completed an investigative review and (18) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:55 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Recovery)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Contractor
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:55 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	Michigan
Date Received	10/01/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/01/2019
Date Closed	10/01/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In or about April 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a
	complaint referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB),
	Integrity Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
	Agency (DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation
	falsifications by former CACI background investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as NBIB.
	As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the

OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The NBIB investigative review identified less than twenty falsifications and/or anomalies. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 1:58 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Employee
OPM Organization	Human Resources Solutions
Program	Program Office Employee
Allegation Type	Whistleblower Retaliation
Allegation Subtype	
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 1:58 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Other
US State or Territory	District of Columbia
Date Received	10/25/2019
Date Investigation Opened	10/25/2019
Date Closed	03/17/2020
Assigned Field Region	Headquarter Operations
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	10/25/2019
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:
	On October 2, 2019, the OPM OIG Office of Investigations received a complaint
	regarding the hiring practices within the OPM Human Resources Solutions (HRS)
	USAJobs group. The complainant alleged that three General Schedule (GS) 14
	positions were pre-selected and that the complainant was told not to apply for the
	positions.
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT:
	In an interview with the complainant on October 29, 2019, the complainant explained
	that in or around November 2017, the USAJobs group had three openings at the GS-14

level. In a meeting around that time, the complainant alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

indicated that individuals have already been selected for each of the positions. The complainant provided the names of the individuals selected.

Further investigation revealed that three GS-14 positions were not open during the timeframe provided by the complainant. Rather, one GS-14 selection took place in

and the selected individual had extensive Human Resources experience in the private sector and federal government. In addition, the selected individual was hired directly from the private sector but had previously been a GS-14 with another federal agency.

The second named individual was hired as a GS-14 in broken to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. The selected individual was hired from the private sector and

had specialized experience in Information Technology (IT).

The third named individual was hired as a GS-14 in **Constant**. The selected individual transferred from another federal agency and was a GS-14 at the previous agency. In addition, the selected individual had extensive experience working on a program that transferred from the prior agency to the USAJobs group at OPM.

Statistics/Significant Events

STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

No violation occurred. Therefore, no further action is required and this complaint is now closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 2:12 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	Administrative Action
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Employee
OPM Organization	Office of the Inspector General
Program	Investigations
Allegation Type Allegation Subtype	Misconduct by OPM Employee OPM Employee
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	Νο
AKS	
Congressional Interest	Νο
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22,	2:12 PM
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GS 15 or Above

Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	Yes
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Other
US State or Territory	Pennsylvania
Date Received	01/17/2020
Date Investigation Opened	01/09/2020
Date Closed	06/12/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	
Date Staff Assigned	01/17/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the reporting agent received a notification of a complaint from OIG
	OI senior management and OIG legal that occurred on (b) (6) , (b) $(7)(C)$
Program Impact	
Statistics/Significant Events	
Related Cases	
Related Cases	

10/19/22, 2:21 PM

Case	
Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6). (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Program Office
OPM Organization	National Background Investigations Bureau
Program	Background Investigations
Allegation Type	Fabrication (Targeted Review)
Allegation Subtype	OPM Employee
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	

10/19/22, 2:21 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	No
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	National Security
US State or Territory	New York
Date Received	01/24/2020
Date Investigation Opened	11/19/2019
Date Closed	05/11/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	05/07/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION:
	In June 2019, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the Inspector
	General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Investigative Operations, received a complaint
	referral from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Integrity
	Assurance (IA), now known as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
	(DCSA), OIG. The complaint referenced alleged report of investigation falsifications by
	NBIB background investigator (D) (G). (D) (7)(G) . Thereafter, DCSA, OIG is referenced as
	NBIB.

As background, on October 1, 2019, under the direction of Executive Order 13869, the OPM, NBIB transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD), DCSA. As part of this

transition NBIB-IA, Compliance and Inspections integrated within DCSA's OIG. As of September 30, 2019, the referenced mission(s) and personnel are part of the DoD.

Program Impact

PROGRAM IMPACT:

NBIB background investigations is an OPM Revolving Fund program. The completed background investigations on Federal job applicants, employees, military members, and contractor personnel, are utilized and relied upon by the agencies requesting the background investigations to determine whether the subjects were suitable for positions having access to classified information, for positions impacting national security, or for receiving or retaining security clearances, or for positions of public trust.

Statistics/Significant Events STATISTICS/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In November 2019, NBIB completed a review/recovery and (6) falsifications and/or anomalies were identified. Based on this information, our office will not pursue this matter further. NBIB will proceed with administrative action deemed appropriate and the complaint is closed.

Related Cases

10/19/22, 2:25 PM

Case		
Case Information		
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Status	Closed	
Referral Contact		
Reason for Closeout		
Action		
Outside Referral		
Date Referred		
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Case Туре	Preliminary	
Record Origin		
Complaint Method		
Complaint Source	Other	
OPM Organization	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Program	Other	
Allegation Type	Misconduct by OPM Employee	
Allegation Subtype		
Entered by LSU		
Qui Tam	No	
AKS		
Congressional Interest	Νο	
Headquarters Interest		

10/19/22, 2:25 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Employee Integrity
US State or Territory	Maryland
Date Received	02/25/2020
Date Investigation Opened	02/25/2020
Date Closed	07/15/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	02/27/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CASE PREDICATION:
	On February 24, 2020, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the
	Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Investigative Support Operations
	(ISO), received a hotline complaint from ^{(Crecencencencencencencencencencencencencen}
	, misused both the <mark>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</mark>
	and her position. Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleges a gross mismanagement complaint
	on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT:
	N/A

Related Cases

10/19/22, 2:29 PM

Case Information	
Case Number	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Status	Closed
Referral Contact	
Reason for Closeout	
Action	
Outside Referral	
Date Referred	
Case Name	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Type	Preliminary
Record Origin	
Complaint Method	
Complaint Source	OPM Employee
OPM Organization	Office of Procurement Operations
Program	Contracting
Allegation Type	Misconduct by OPM Employee
Allegation Subtype	
Entered by LSU	
Qui Tam	No
AKS	
Congressional Interest	No
Headquarters Interest	


10/19/22, 2:29 PM	OPM IG 1.0.4.0
GS 15 or Above	
Joint Agency Case	Νο
Grand Jury	
Sensitive	
Case Categorization	Employee Integrity
US State or Territory	District of Columbia
Date Received	08/31/2020
Date Investigation Opened	08/31/2020
Date Closed	10/23/2020
Assigned Field Region	Region 1 - DC
Assigned ASAC	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Staff Assigned	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Staff Assigned	08/31/2020
Complainant is being Retaliated Against	
Predication	CASE PREDICATION: On August 26, 2020, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
	(OPM), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, received a referral
	from Facilities, Security and Emergency Management in reference to OPM employee
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	was arrested by the FBI (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Program Impact	PROGRAM IMPACT: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an OPM employee.
Statistics/Significant Events	Significant Events: Subsequent to his arrest, (0)(6)((b)(7)(6) was held in jail in Washington
	DC. Beginning around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was considered as being in AWOL status.

On August 31, 2020, OPM OIG obtained the arrest information from an Law

Enforcement Database called Sector confirming the charges.

On September 2, 2020, OPM-OIG spoke to the FBI Special Agent assigned to



Due to the death of $(\mathbf{b})(\mathbf{G}), (\mathbf{b})(\mathbf{T})(\mathbf{G})$, this matter is now

closed.

Related Cases