Description of document:	Three US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) "Lessons Learned" reports for the period of the surge of forces in or about 2007 for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Requested date:	28-August-2010
Released date:	01-November-2010
Posted date:	29-November-2010
Titles of documents:	Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2007 to December 2008 - The Comprehensive Approach: an Iraq Case Study, 16 February 2010 Joint Tactical Environment: An Analysis of Urban Operations in Iraq, 2008 (undated) Operation Iraqi Freedom October to December 2007 - Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (25 March 2008)
Source of document:	U.S. Joint Forces Command FOIA Requestor Service Center (J00L) 1562 Mitscher Avenue, Ste 200 Norfolk, VA 23551-2488 Fax: (757) 836-0058

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE, SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:
J02
1 NOV 2010

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) received your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 28 August 2010, for copies of "Lessons Learned" reports prepared by USJFCOM with regard to Operation Iraqi Freedom. On 8 September, you clarified your request to include unclassified reports and unclassified sections of classified "Lessons Learned" reports for the period of the surge of forces in or about 2007 for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, on 16 September you authorized an extension until 22 October for USJFCOM to respond to your request. (See Attachments 1 through 3.)

USJFCOM performed a search and discovered three (3) records responsive to your request. Two (2) of the records are released in their entirety (Attachments 4 and 5). As discussed between you and LTC Paul Brandau on 8 October (Attachment 6), the third record indicates that some information is withheld but specific exemptions under the FOIA are not indicated, and no classification review was conducted of this record (Attachment 7).

This is USJFCOM's final response to your request and any information withheld on Attachment 7 is made as you authorized. I understand that you will submit a new FOIA request if you desire to have a classification review conducted of the third record.

In this instance, no fees are assessed. Please be advised, however, that fee categories, fee waivers, and fee determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, and previous determinations are not considered when making future determinations.

Please contact Lieutenant Colonel Paul Brandau at (757) 836-6415 if you have any questions regarding this response. Your request was assigned case number JFCOMFOIA 62-10.

Sincerely,

D. W. DAVENPORT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff

Attachments:
1. Original Request dated 28 August 2010
2. E-mail message dated 8 September 2010
3. Email message dated 16 September 2010
4. Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2007 to December 2008 - The Comprehensive Approach: an Iraq Case Study (24 pages)
5. Joint Tactical Environment: An Analysis of Urban Operations in Iraq, 2008 (11 pages)
6. Email message dated 8 October 2010
7. Operation Iraqi Freedom October to December 2007 – Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (148 pages) (Redacted)

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, January 2007 to December 2008

The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study

Executive Summary

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
US Joint Forces Command Norfolk, Virginia 16 February 2010

Attachment 4

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Foreword

In August 2008, GEN David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), requested that we outline what had worked with the integrated counterinsurgency approach taken against al-Qaeda in Iraq during 2007-2008. When GEN Raymond Odierno took command of MNF-I in September 2008, he and AMB Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq, further focused the study on identifying and documenting best practices, highlighting the civil-military partnering in a comprehensive approach.

In response to these requests, the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) team in Baghdad commenced data collection with GEN (R) Leon LaPorte as senior mentor. GEN Petraeus, GEN Odierno, and AMB Crocker gave the study team unrestricted access to key leaders and their staffs. The team visited organizations ranging from brigades and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to MNF-I headquarters and the US Embassy in Baghdad. Team members conducted interviews, observed current operations, and collected data to capture best practices and lessons learned.[1] The study results were briefed to MNF-I and the US Embassy on 3 March 2009, and were approved by GEN Petraeus on 1 April 2009.

This report summarizes the best practices, challenges, and key recommendations of the study. The detailed findings are published in four companion reports entitled *Unifying Efforts, Focusing on the Population, Attacking Insurgent Networks*, and *Building Government of Iraq Legitimacy.*



J. N. Mattis
General, U.S. Marines
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

[1] A December 2008 collection team included twelve analysts from JCOA, one analyst from the US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), and two analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). A January 2009 collection team included six Department of State representatives, one British Army officer, and five JCOA analysts. Both teams were supported by reach-back analysts in Suffolk, Virginia. This study, focused on best practices, examines what went right and what innovations could serve in future comprehensive civil-military efforts.

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Synopsis

By the end of 2006, security in Iraq had significantly deteriorated. Sectarian violence raged in Baghdad. Many talented and educated Iraqi citizens had emigrated, creating a long-term threat to economic recovery and growth. Faith in the government of Iraq had nearly vanished. Iranian and other external influences had reached clearly unacceptable levels. US forces were showing signs of long-term overextension, and the will of the US populace to continue the effort was precipitously low. Many US national security experts considered the consequences of disengagement or complete withdrawal intolerable. In short, the US was not only losing the war, but did not have an accepted way forward.

Into this breach stepped a new team of people—GEN David Petraeus, AMB Ryan Crocker, and GEN Raymond Odierno. This team worked with a group of Coalition military and civilian leaders who, through experience, had learned what worked and what did not. Just killing the enemy had not worked; just spending money on reconstruction projects had not worked; and just putting the Iraqis in charge had not worked. The civil-military partners, working with unprecedented cooperation, implemented a new strategy based upon the following principles:

- Make the population and its security the centerpiece of the effort, allowing time for economic and political progress.
- Establish a detailed understanding of the operational environment.
- Engage in and win the battle of ideas. Help the population see that supporting the government of Iraq was the best way forward.
- Walk the walk. Acknowledge that actions speak louder than words. Require every Coalition civilian and soldier to become a counterinsurgency (COIN) warrior.

Following these principles, the team began to turn the situation around. By the end of 2008, dramatic progress had been made. Attack levels were the lowest since the summer of 2003, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were increasingly effective and less sectarian, and the Iraqi government had taken significant steps toward legitimacy. Iraq was still a fragile state, with its ultimate success dependent upon the will and competence of the government and its people, but remarkable progress had been made to provide an opportunity for success that was simply not there in 2006.

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The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study

Background

In 2006, the Coalition military strategy in Iraq was two-fold. The main military effort was focused on transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In addition, since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was part of the Global War on Terror, the military had a counter-terror mission to kill or capture terrorists and extremists. However, the transition strategy did not square with conditions on the ground—and counter-terror operations could not, in and of themselves, defeat the insurgency.

On 22 February 2006, Sunni al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) executed an attack on the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shia sites in the country. This attack, which destroyed the golden dome of the mosque, exacerbated an escalating cycle of sectarian violence spreading throughout Iraq.[2] By fall 2006, sectarian violence in Baghdad was out of control, with AQI conducting high-profile attacks on Shia targets, and Shia Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) conducting extrajudicial killings of Sunnis.

The ISF were not effective at stopping the escalating violence. Because of the existing Coalition strategy to place the ISF in the lead for security, Coalition forces left forward operating bases to patrol for only hours a day. Areas cleared by Coalition forces were often not effectively held by the ISF, resulting in repeated efforts to clear the same areas. The local population was intimidated and, either actively or passively, supported the insurgents. The ISF were unable and/or unwilling to take the lead.

New Strategy Announced

On 10 January 2007, US President George Bush announced a change in strategy to focus our efforts on protecting and securing the Iraqi population, coupled with a concurrent surge of civilian and military resources to accomplish the strategy.[3] The President also announced changes in US senior leadership in Iraq, nominating GEN David Petraeus as the Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and AMB Ryan Crocker as the US Chief of Mission in Baghdad.

General Petraeus, who assumed command of MNF-I in February 2007, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who became the US Ambassador to Iraq in March 2007, subsequently vowed to unite the civilian and military efforts in a comprehensive approach to protect

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[2] The attack on the al-Askari Mosque and destruction of its golden dome further galvanized sectarian strife that had been brewing, in part, as a result of the 2005 Iraq elections

[3] In his "Address to the Nation" on 10 January 2007, President George Bush announced the new strategy for Iraq and stated: "Our troops [the five brigades to be deployed to Baghdad] will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs." This mission, as well as other portions of his address, required the application of the principles of counterinsurgency.

the population, attack insurgent networks, and build the legitimacy of the government of Iraq (GOI).

The new approach implemented in 2007-2008 was based on several "big ideas"[4] that together addressed the root causes of the lack of progress in security and Iraqi governance capacity. Experience, preparation, and historical lessons provided the foundation for these ideas.[5] Although most of these big ideas were fully envisioned as the new strategy was put into place in early 2007, some were realized and institutionalized as knowledge of the environment increased and as opportunities presented themselves. These ideas were not just top-down directives; many were a fusion of top-down guidance and lower echelon experience.

Unifying Efforts

One of the key "big ideas" was the alignment of civilian and military efforts in a coordinated approach to combating the insurgency. The improved civil-military partnership brought all elements of national power to the tasks of protecting the population, attacking insurgent networks, and building the legitimacy of the GOI.

In the 2003-2004 timeframe, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) operated without effectively consulting Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7)[6] and failed to provide an overarching strategy to which CJTF-7 could align.[7] Additionally, elements of the military under CJTF-7 sometimes acted independently, at cross-purposes with CPA goals. The situation improved somewhat in 2004 with the formation of MNF-I under command of GEN George Casey and the establishment of the US Embassy in Baghdad led by AMB John Negroponte. The two leaders had adjoining offices in the Presidential Palace in the International Zone. The improved relationship continued between GEN Casey and the succeeding ambassador, AMB Zalmay Khalilzad. But challenges still remained in integrating and coordinating civil-military efforts among their staffs and at lower echelons.

In 2007, both AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus approached their tasks with the knowledge that success in Iraq could only be achieved through intense and pervasive civil-military cooperation, not only between themselves but also among military and civilians up and down the chain of command. AMB Crooker and GEN Petraeus developed a level of cooperation that their predecessors had not.

Senior leadership was a forcing function for civil-military integration. While previous civilian and military senior leaders in Iraq had demonstrated personal cooperation, this cooperation and integration did not necessarily extend to their respective staffs.

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[4] GEN Petraeus used the term "big ideas" to refer to the key concepts employed in the new approach to the conflict in Iraq in 2007-2008

[5] The ideas and their practical implementation were captured by III Corps as it prepared for its role as the core staff for MNC-I, and by MNC-I after LTG Odierno became commander

[6] JCOA interview with former Executive Officer to the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 30 January 2009

[7] JCOA interview with Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs, conducted 15 January 2009

GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker determined from the beginning that they would lead an integrated effort in Iraq and that they would expect civil-military integration at MNF-I and the Embassy to be accepted as the standard.[8] AMB Crocker described this deliberate effort: "[W]e both knew at the outset that coordination—and the relationship we were able to forge—would set the tone for both of our organizations, top to bottom. We worked on getting that in synch literally from the beginning."[9] GEN Petraeus similarly described their determination to establish civil-military cooperation that would permeate the respective organizations: "Cooperation was not optional. We were going to work together. Ryan Crocker and I sat down and committed to that and whenever anybody tried not to do that, it was made known that was unacceptable."[10]

The integration of civilian and military staffs could not be achieved simply by setting a policy and assuming that integration would take place. Because the staffs had markedly different cultures and approaches, relationships between the staffs sometimes showed obvious tension. Integration therefore took an active and constant effort to ensure that organizational frictions were overcome. Senior leaders provided their guidance through formal and informal means, both written and oral. For example, COIN guidance issued on 15 June 2007 directed forces to "integrate civilian and military efforts—this is an interagency, combined arms fight. This requires fully integrating our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations—from inception through execution."[11]

In addition to making cooperation a matter of personal leadership, AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus also demonstrated a willingness to combine resources and take on a supporting role, when appropriate. Cooperative partnering took on many forms, including a joint planning process, the establishment of integrated civil-military organizations to address specific counterinsurgency (COIN) requirements, and improved information and intelligence sharing between civilian and military organizations. Partnering occurred at all levels from senior leaders down to brigade combat team (BCT) and PRT personnel. Through this close coordination, the elements of US national power were aligned to achieve a common purpose.

GEN Petraeus, AMB Crocker, and LTG Odierno were "out and about," making use of battlefield circulation to observe operations in different areas and to visit PRTs to see what approaches were working and glean insights from personnel on the ground. These visits were opportunities to provide guidance and direction to—and to solicit ideas and suggestions from—lower echelon leaders. While visits to the field were of great value to the senior leaders, it was difficult for them to devote large amounts of time to this in light of their many other responsibilities. As a result, they, at times, employed surrogates (such as the MNF-I Counterinsurgency Advisor for GEN Petraeus and the Director of the Office of Provincial Affairs for AMB Crocker) to conduct the circulation and provide summaries and insights back to them. The improved situational awareness gained from

[8] This same determination continued when GEN Odierno replaced GEN Petraeus as Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq in September 2008

[9] JCOA interview with AMB Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq, conducted 11 January 2009

[10] JCOA interview with GEN David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, conducted 28 January 2009

[11] Multi-National Corps-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 15 June 2007

battlefield circulation led to increased opportunities, as local successes were folded into the Coalition's overall strategic approach.

Senior leadership worked to bring highly-qualified individuals into Iraq to promote success in the complex and demanding environment. Military and civilian leaders aggressively recruited individuals and created a team that brought expertise and experience to the table. The group of military officers that GEN Petraeus brought with him to Iraq was termed the "brain trust" because of the number of doctorates from top-flight universities and the level of previous Iraq combat experience. AMB Crocker succeeded in temporarily modifying State Department assignment policy to place priority on Iraq assignments. He was also able to recruit multiple ambassadors, some of whom were serving as Chiefs of Mission in other Embassies when they were recruited. Lower military echelons and Embassy offices also recruited for specific skills needed in the COIN environment. The combination of experienced, senior leaders with seasoned, empowered lower-echelon commanders and civilians created a synergistic blend that led to success.

Senior leaders also led efforts to obtain additional resources and needed authorities. Examples included the surge of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and the authority to conduct expanded information operations. Leaders actively pushed down authorities and resources to improve the ability of lower-echelon forces to execute their missions.

Senior leadership worked to present a united front whenever possible. For example, AMB Crocker and GEN Petraeus met jointly with the US National Security Council, the White House Situation Room, US Congressional delegations, the media, and GOI officials. These jointly conducted meetings promoted the two senior leaders' partnership, helping them to be fully informed of each other's efforts and avoiding the exploitation of potential seams between them. Subordinate leaders followed their example by making joint appearances and public statements, enabling a coordinated position on both political and security issues.

The planning process helped to integrate civil-military efforts. In 2007, the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, composed of a diverse group of approximately 20 military and civilian advisors, developed an assessment of challenges in Iraq and possible approaches for dealing with those challenges. The recommended approach became the nucleus of the Joint Campaign Plan. The fact that the planning process was born out of an integrated civil-military effort helped set the tone for further collaboration between a broader set of civilian and military staffs. It was also another way to reinforce senior leadership expectations of civil-military cooperation. The result was a shared plan that articulated the current situation, provided a set of well-defined campaign milestones, and described ways in which to accomplish these milestones as a team.

At the tactical level, BCTs and their embedded PRTs also conducted integrated planning. Nested within the context of the Joint Campaign Plan, they developed Unified Common Plans with agreed-upon objectives and tasks for their local environments.

A disconnect was noted at the operational level. The Corps and divisions did not always have a civilian counterpart with whom to partner because the civilian organizations were flatter in nature. Several work-arounds were developed to mitigate this gap. MNC-I and the Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs developed a Unified Common Plan detailing objectives and responsibilities at the operational level. Additionally, liaison officers and political advisors helped inject civilian input at the Corps and divisions.

In addition to civil-military planning, more integrated military planning occurred between special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF). Liaison officers, regular video teleconferences, and intelligence fusion cells facilitated coordination between military organizations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Organizational structures, both formal and ad hoc, were adapted to meet emerging requirements and facilitate improved cooperation. Often, organizations and positions were created or modified for unique and specific needs. The Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), which worked to identify reconciliation opportunities and conduct strategic engagement, was an example of an organization created to meet emerging COIN requirements. The Ministerial Engagement Coordination Cell (MECC) facilitated civil-military cooperation by coordinating ministerial contacts and increasing civil-military synergy in advising the GOI ministries. A third example, the Medical Fusion Cell, was formed as part of an effort to "thicken" limited Embassy resources; MNF-I provided military personnel to augment the Embassy's Health Attaché in order to support efforts to improve health care in Iraq.

While cooperation and integration between the military and the Embassy improved, there were still challenges. Institutional barriers that impeded partnering between civilian and military agencies and departments included differing tour lengths, challenges staffing nonstandard organizational structures, manning shortages of civilian agencies, cumbersome funding policies, and differing organizational cultures. Despite these institutional barriers, the civil-military team in Iraq in 2007-2008 worked to overcome friction and build strong personal relationships. Key imperatives were identified:

- Know the respective cultures of the players on the team
- Embrace all team members
- Be inclusive (cast the net widely, whenever possible)
- Be complementary versus competitive (focus on each others' strengths)[12]

[12] JCOA interview with MNF-I Chief of Staff, conducted 14 January 2009

Focusing on the Population

As he arrived in Iraq, GEN Petraeus stated that his primary "big idea" was to secure the population: "The shift in focus was going to be on securing and serving the population with an explicit recognition that you can only serve the population if you live with it...So, I put transition [to the ISF] on hold."[13]

Measures to protect the population were rapidly implemented. Protection measures included establishment of joint security stations (JSS) and combat outposts (COPs) among the population, use of T-walls to protect markets and neighborhoods, construction of a biometric database to identify individuals, and use of checkpoints to screen for movement of "accelerants of violence" such as car bombs. The capabilities of the ISF were increased through partnership with Coalition units. The use of neighborhood watches manned by security volunteers and Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), later called Sons of Iraq (SOI), proved critical in holding the ground and maintaining security in cleared areas.

However, it was not sufficient to just secure the population; it was necessary to address the root causes that allowed the insurgency to thrive. Security became the foundation that allowed improvements in other areas such as the provision of essential services and the restoration of a functioning economy. Polling showed that as security was established, the top concern of the population became jobs. Thus, the guidance issued by MNF-I was to use "money as a weapon system." Coalition units and PRTs applied Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to local projects to help sustain security gains through the creation of jobs. In addition to sustaining gains in one local area, funds were used as a means to incentivize the population in nearby areas to stop supporting the insurgency.

With security, the population's desire for essential services such as electricity, water, and sewage increased. While local units could not fix national-level infrastructure problems, they could and did make local-level improvements. The establishment or improvement of essential services signified to the population a return to normalcy and fostered confidence that the government would provide for them. The improvements in security, economic opportunities, and essential services resulted in a growing hope that supporting the GOI instead of the insurgency could lead to a better future.

Concurrently, Coalition forces decided to reconcile with as many insurgents as possible in order to splinter the insurgency and isolate the remaining hard-core "irreconcilables." A policy of reconciliation and accommodation was adopted and aggressively pursued, as described in MNF-I's counterinsurgency guidance:

> Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, population control measures,

[13] JCOA interview with GEN David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, conducted 28 January 2009

> information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.[14]

The approach taken with the Sunni population was a bottom-up effort. Prior attempts at bottom-up reconciliation demonstrated the opportunity that reconciliation presented, but were limited in time, area, and resources. In the summer and fall of 2006, a Sunni grassroots movement began in Ramadi in al-Anbar province. AQI had attempted to gain control of the region through a murder and intimidation campaign, but local sheikhs formed a tribal alliance and began to attack foreign fighters and radicals operating in their province. The sheikhs decided that cooperation with the Coalition provided a better path toward achieving their goals, and Coalition forces, recognizing an opportunity, positioned themselves to take advantage of it. The success in Ramadi spread to other areas of al Anbar province, and higher headquarters (divisions, Corps, and Force) set the policy and provided the resources that facilitated the spread of related best practices to additional areas in Iraq.

At this time, LTG Raymond Odierno, then the Commanding General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), was informed by lower-echelon commanders of a nascent change in attitude among the Sunni population. He made the decision to allow Coalition forces to "reach out to some of these people and see if we can help them come across and put their arms down and, instead of pointing weapons at us, point weapons at al-Qaeda. So we started to work that—a bottom-up approach."[15] While it was recognized that the GOI was not yet ready to reconcile with these former Sunni insurgents, Coalition leadership believed that, "If we were able to do this properly, we could then [encourage] the Government of Iraq to realize that, in fact, it is important to reconcile with these groups."[16]

While the Corps, divisions, brigades, and PRTs facilitated the bottom-up efforts at reconciliation, MNF-I realized that it needed to work the top-down efforts with the GOI and conduct strategic reconciliation engagements. As reconciliation efforts expanded, MNF-I quickly recognized that the size and complexity of the situation required a formal organization dedicated to the effort. The Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), led by a UK two-star general and a US Department of State Foreign Service Officer, was created in May 2007 to "facilitate and catalyze Government of Iraq reconciliation with entities involved in armed opposition outside the mainstream political process through discrete strategic engagement."[17]

The Corps also realized that each region would require a tailored approach and that the local commanders, who knew the area best, would need the flexibility to determine what would work for their area. However, general guidance had to clearly define the "left and right limits," specifying what was and was not permissible. In June and July 2007,

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[14] Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 21 June 2008
[15] JCOA interview with GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 6 December 2008
[16] Ibid
[17] JCOA interview with Chief of Staff, Force Strategic Engagement Cell, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 10 November 2008

MNC-I, in concert with MNF-I's Counterinsurgency Advisor, developed policy and issued fragmentary orders to lower-echelon commanders with specific reconciliation guidance. Commanders down to the company level were encouraged to engage with insurgent groups, local government, tribal, and ISF leaders. A "toolbox" was developed to assist with negotiations and included "tools" such as CERP funding and authorities to release certain detainees.

The reconciliation efforts generated a very strong response from the Sunni population. The Sons of Iraq (SOI) grew in number to 103,000 individuals, most of whom were Sunni. Through key leader engagements, the Coalition and Embassy worked to mitigate the Shia-led government leaders' concerns and influence them to reach out to the Sunni groups willing to become part of the political process.

Shia reconciliation efforts were a bit more nuanced. The GOI was eager to reconcile with many of the Shia, but did not necessarily know how best to do so. This uncertainty allowed the Coalition an opportunity to shape GOI actions. Coalition efforts included attempts to splinter the Shia militias, separating the extremists from the more moderate elements. As security improved, the population became less dependent upon militias for protection. Additionally, by focusing on specific areas for aid and development, the Coalition and GOI began offering the Shia population a better alternative to the militias. A good example of this was the reconstruction and development work done in Sadr City following the spring 2008 fighting.

In 2007, MNF-I and TF-134, which operated Coalition detention operations in Iraq, transformed detention operations, incorporating rehabilitation and reconciliation options for the more moderate detainees.[18] In previous years, time spent in detention often added numbers to the insurgency as radical elements in the detainee population actively recruited more moderate detainees. "COIN Inside the Wire" identified reconcilable detainees (both Sunni and Shia), reinforced moderate tendencies, provided educational opportunities, and enabled successful reintegration into society.

Prior to 2007, much of the information domain had been ceded to the insurgents. The Coalition made changes to its strategic communications strategy to become first with the truth and relentlessly fight the information war, using strategic communications to inform the general population and to drive wedges between the population and the extremists.[19]

As part of the enhanced communications strategy, all echelons of the Coalition publicly emphasized positive trends and worked to mitigate negative events as they occurred. Often the Iraqi populace would expect improvements more quickly than was possible, so the Coalition also worked to manage Iraqi expectations. By consistently promulgating truthful messages and by matching actions with words, the Coalition built trust with the population. Extremist activities and atrocities against cultural norms were also highlighted. The MNF-I "Counterinsurgency Guidance" advised: "Turn our enemies'

[18] Task Force 134, "Detention Operations Information Booklet," 2008

[19] For a detailed description of best practices, please see JCOA paper, *Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008*, 10 March 2009

bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them."[20]

While the Coalition told the truth in order to build trust with the populace, the extremists frequently did not. The enemy would purposefully circulate an untrue story to play upon the population's fears or discontent and to make the GOI and Coalition look bad. This misinformation had to be aggressively challenged. Speed of response was important in order to try to keep that misinformation from settling in people's minds and then spreading widely by means of the "rumor mill." The Coalition could best counter the enemy's lies by "beating them to the punch" with truthful and timely accounts of events.

A variety of spokespeople and venues were used in order to most effectively communicate the Coalition message. As stated by GEN Odierno, Commanding General of MNF-I, "We are very sophisticated now in conducting information operations and understanding how we can utilize the various tools available to us in order to influence ... from a strategic standpoint, an operational standpoint, and a tactical standpoint."[21] The brigades, being close to the population, were often able to determine what message medium had the best results for their area, recognizing that face-to-face engagements between the Iraqi population and Coalition representatives produced effective results. Iraqis speaking to Iraqis on behalf of the GOI and the Coalition was the ultimate goal. Therefore, the Coalition and Embassy worked with Iraqi spokespeople to develop their strategic communications capabilities. Press briefings and engagements would often be conducted jointly with Iraqi and Coalition representatives.

In 2007, subordinate commanders were given greater authority to develop and pass messages. To get an accurate message out quickly, streamlined procedures were needed, as well as close coordination among different echelons and between special operations and general-purpose forces.

Attacking Insurgent Networks

Another "big idea" in Iraq was focused on improving coordination between the counter-terror mission (primarily conducted by special operations forces) and the COIN mission (primarily conducted by general purpose forces and civilians). To accomplish this improved coordination, targeting processes and procedures needed to be reviewed in the context of the broader mission. Five targeting principles emerged from the synthesis:

- Persistent pressure had to be applied against the insurgents
- Understanding of the environment had to be significantly improved
- Coordination of effort was essential
- Command and control had to be modified to support the tactical commander
- Target definitions had to be broadened

[20] Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Counterinsurgency Guidance," 21 June 2008

[21] JCOA interview with GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 6 December 2008

Persistent Pressure

By 2007, leaders in Iraq had come to understand that success would be dependent upon the application of persistent pressure on insurgents and their networks. This knowledge was born, in part, from experiences gained in 2004-2006, when the Coalition had not consistently applied pressure on insurgents, affording them the opportunity to create sanctuaries within the population.

As LTG Odierno assumed command in late 2006, MNC-I began to develop and implement a new offensive strategy. The goal of the strategy was to "take the fight to the enemy and defeat its will," by applying persistent pressure.[22] As a result of this shift in mind-set, Coalition forces moved off the large bases where they had consolidated. Instead, they operated from Joint Security Stations (JSS) and Combat Outposts (COP) located among the people. One commander noted, "We stopped commuting to the fight."[23] Additionally, MNC-I planned and executed a series of named operations (including PHANTOM THUNDER, PHANTOM STRIKE, and PHANTOM PHOENIX) to aggressively pursue the enemy and deny them sanctuary in the areas surrounding Baghdad (the "Baghdad belts").

A key aspect of the new 2007 strategy was the surge of needed resources, including forces on the ground. Based on an understanding of the threat, the decision was made to place the equivalent of three of the surge brigades in Baghdad to help secure the population, and to place the remaining equivalent of two brigades in the Baghdad belts to prevent the movement of "accelerants of violence" into the city.[24] The surge of forces allowed the Coalition to employ an "oil spot" approach, where one area was brought under control, and then when it was stabilized and could be entrusted to the ISF, Coalition forces would move to the next area, gradually expanding areas of stability. Simultaneous offensive operations in the surrounding areas kept pressure on the enemy, putting them off balance and limiting their freedom of movement to and from the city.[25]

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[22] JCOA interview with former Senior Intelligence Advisor to Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, conducted 22 January 2009

[23] JCOA interview with former Commander, 1/1 Armor Division Brigade Combat Team, conducted 21 January 2009

[24] While the surge of forces announced by President Bush in January 2007 was the equivalent of five brigades worth of combat power, the physical movement of forces was accomplished by the addition of individual battalions. The movement of battalions resulted in an increase in combat power equivalent to three brigades in Baghdad and two brigades in the surrounding belts.

[25] Multi-National Corps-Iraq/III Corps briefing, "Operation Iraqi Freedom December 2006-February 2008," 3 April 2008

Understanding the Environment

The information needed to target in a COIN environment is more temporal, more complex, and more difficult to collect than the information needed for purely counter-terror missions. While understanding the threat was still important, a threat-focused approach was insufficient to understand how the insurgent network was intrinsically tied into the general population. Military forces thus changed from a threat-focused approach to one in which they sought a broader understanding that included the population and associated factors such as economic conditions, social and tribal relationships, use of the media, and political issues. This understanding was necessary to provide security, pursue reconciliation, mentor and vet community leaders, influence the population to reduce its support for insurgents, and identify and target insurgent networks.

A detailed understanding of the environment was promoted through the creation of fusion cells, cells that were designed to establish dialogue between the disparate intelligence organizations and to partner them with operators who provided real time insights and operational requirements. Fusion cells were created at multiple echelons, from brigade up to MNF-I, and crossed civil-military boundaries to facilitate information sharing and collaboration between different organizations.

The 2007 surge of additional ISR assets provided forces with more capabilities for understanding the environment and targeting insurgents. These resources included full-motion video platforms, signals intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, and communications infrastructure to support intelligence and analysis sharing. The result was that, in 2007-2008, operations in Iraq were supported by the highest density of ISR capability anywhere in the world.

Coordination of Effort

Forces conducting counter-terror operations (primarily SOF) and those conducting COIN missions (primarily GPF) must work together closely to prevent interference and counterproductive actions.

From 2003 through 2006, SOF operated in Iraq in a counter-terror mission, conducting kill/capture operations against top-tier targets. During that period, SOF operations were often not well coordinated with conventional forces, resulting in an uneven approach where both SOF and conventional forces could unknowingly interfere with counterpart efforts. Lack of coordination also left conventional force battlespace owners with the responsibility of dealing with the after effects of SOF raids.

In 2007, fusion cells allowed a synergy to develop between SOF and GPF, where each was focused on different elements of insurgent networks, contributing to the other's targeting efforts. The overall result was "two elements going after the whole network together, but

with each employing his unique capabilities... that's a big lesson learned for high-end counter-terror forces that used to be fairly separated and kept in a narrow sphere."[26]

A former high-placed staff member of MNF-I described the synergistic effect: "What we learned in 2007-2008 is that it was impossible to destroy a terrorist network that had created a safe haven for itself with pinpoint strikes. You can never get enough of them. It cannot be done. But when you put conventional forces in those areas and you deny the enemy the safe haven that he enjoyed, it forces the terrorist to move and communicate. When they move and communicate they can then be targeted and killed. So the synergy you see with conventional forces getting out of the forward operating bases, more conventional forces coming in, standing up more Iraqi forces and denying the safe havens—that is what happened and that is the synergy you need."[27]

Command and Control

In 2007, with each BCT facing a unique and challenging security environment, MNC-I focused on empowering lower echelons. In COIN, insurgents engage in an asymmetric fashion, often consciously avoiding direct confrontation with the counterinsurgent's military power. Insurgents can be difficult to target, tending to seek sanctuary in the population. Because of the fleeting nature and difficulty of identifying insurgents, counterinsurgents can be more successful by decentralizing planning and execution of operations to lower-echelon forces, which often have a better grasp of their immediate environment. However, for decentralization to be effective, lower echelons need to confidently incorporate ISR assets into planning and operations. MNC-I supported this effort with resources and through strategic overwatch, reorganizing control of ISR capability so that that capability directly supported engaged tactical commanders at lower echelons.

As the security environment improved into 2008, MNC-I shifted its focus to delivering decisive knockout blows. Resources could be consolidated and applied *en masse* to the highest priorities, often the remaining hot spots. The fielding of additional ISR assets into theater enabled massing of ISR to support these priorities. In the urban COIN fight, success was neither a product of straightforward decentralization to the lowest echelon nor complete centralization, but rather decentralization of command and control to the lowest echelon capable of exercising that command and control for a specific operation. This "focused decentralization" had advantages of both centralized and decentralized control: centralization allowed the higher-level unit to prioritize, synchronize, and mass resources to best overall effect. At the same time, decentralization allowed command and control to be exercised by a unit closer to the specific fight, so that situational awareness was maximized and the feedback loop between planning, operations, and assessment was compressed. This allowed rapid adaptation and optimization of tactics, techniques, and procedures. [28]

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[26] JCOA interview with LTG Stanley McChrystal, conducted 22 February 2009

[27] JCOA interview with a highly-placed staff member of Multinational Force-Iraq, conducted 30 January 2009

[28] For detailed descriptions of centralized and decentralized command and control of ISR assets, please see JCOA reports *Counterinsurgency Targeting and ISR (CTI)*, 25 March 2008, and *Joint Tactical Environment (JTE)*, 15 December 2008

Target Definition

In a counterinsurgency, targets can be friendly, hostile, neutral, or unknown—and the targeting operation can be lethal or non-lethal. Because of these complexities, a more comprehensive approach to targeting was needed and developed.[29] Targeting of high-value individuals became closely integrated with targeting of the broader facilitation networks (i.e. finance, recruitment, training, logistics, media, and command and control). This required an interagency approach, synchronizing kill/capture operations with initiatives by other USG departments and agencies.

Leaders at all levels placed increasing importance on disrupting enemy activities both inside and outside of Iraq's borders. As one officer noted, "There has to be a public diplomacy effort that makes the cultural attitude in which jihad and that type of activity is revered—it's got to counter that. And right now, we've got some programs that are working towards that end."[30] Diplomatic engagement encouraged regional governments to work within their own countries to reduce the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The US Embassy Baghdad and Coalition leadership also encouraged GOI leaders to engage with regional governments, emphasizing that terrorism posed a threat to all the governments in the region.

Threat financiers and networks were attacked using a variety of means. The US Department of Treasury was authorized, through a series of Executive Orders, to target individuals and companies that funded terrorist organizations.[31] Diplomatic engagement encouraged regional governments to crack down on financial facilitators operating from countries outside Iraq.

Within Iraq, it was often difficult to determine exactly how the insurgency was extracting funding from various enterprises, due to the nature of the cash economy and the complex interactions with corrupt officials and criminal networks. Operations to counter threat finance internal to Iraq included:

- Analyzing information and intelligence to try to identify key network nodes
- Obtaining and executing Iraqi arrest warrants on individuals identified as financial facilitators
- Encouraging anticorruption (including US Agency for International Development [USAID] efforts to promote better business practices)
- Protecting key officials willing to institute better business practices

The enemy used cyberspace to generate funding, coordinate logistics, recruit new members, coordinate operations, and influence the general population. The global communications revolution gave insurgents an "electronic sanctuary" in which actions

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[29] "Targeting" refers to a broad spectrum of activities ranging from kinetic kill/capture operations against enemies to nonkinetic activities focused on influencing and informing the general population

[30] JCOA interview with Multi-National Force-Iraq CJ3 Joint Interagency Task Force, Foreign Terrorists and Facilitators Team Lead, conducted 4 November 2008

[31] Under the authorities of Executive Order 13224, *Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism*, 23 September 2001 and Executive Order 13438, *Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq*, 17 July 2007

could be hidden among the daily cell phone and internet traffic.[32] Recognizing that "regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success,"[33] the Coalition used a variety of means to contest the enemy's use of cyberspace.

Strategic communications, in conjunction with other activities, highlighted individuals and groups with a "flashlight effect." Leaflets, "most wanted" posters, handouts, text messages, and hotline tip numbers were used as "nonlethal area denial" to push insurgents out of an area or make it difficult for them to return once they did leave. Information activities were also used to expose individuals' bad actions. As an example, US Treasury designations were followed up with public disclosure to highlight the criminal nature of the designated organization's or individual's financial support to terrorism.

Building Government of Iraq Legitimacy

Counterinsurgency states that, "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."[34] In the Joint Campaign Plan of 2007, the political line of operation was given primacy, with all other lines of operation supporting. The US Embassy Baghdad led the political line of operation, with the Coalition in support; together they worked to strengthen the GOI and establish it as the legitimate authority in Iraq.

Prior to 2007, Coalition efforts to build a functioning and legitimate government had produced slow and uneven results. In 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) began operations in Iraq in a vastly different environment from that which had been anticipated during ORHA planning sessions. Infrastructure in the country was in significant disrepair due to years of neglect and internationally-imposed sanctions. Combat operations, sabotage, and looting had further damaged the existing infrastructure. Experienced Iraqi government and security force personnel were dismissed in May 2003 by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Orders 1 and 2, which removed Ba'ath Party officials from their government positions, banned them from future employment in the public sector, and dissolved the military and security-related ministries.

Reconstruction progress was slowed by unforeseen security challenges, poor organization, and limitations in planning and execution. Numerous attacks on civilians working for nongovernmental and international organizations, such as the UN and CARE International, caused withdrawal of these and other personnel from Iraq. Reconstruction project costs increased due to additional security requirements.

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[32] Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L Cantrell, "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 50, July 2008

[33] GEN David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," 10-11 September 2007

[34] US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

Other initiatives intended to improve the legitimacy of the GOI were slow to show results. By June 2005, Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) and Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDCs) had been established in all non-Kurdish provinces. Efforts met with varied success, but they were generally unable to accomplish all of their mandated actions. As a result of a 2005 review, joint civil-military PRTs were formed to promote economic development at the provincial level, as well as increase the governance capacity and legitimacy of provincial governments.

In 2007, the overall change in military strategy was accompanied by renewed efforts to foster the population's confidence in the GOI and provincial governments. By this time, most of the large reconstruction funds had been obligated. The focus of Coalition and Embassy personnel therefore turned to partnering, mentoring, and influencing the GOI and ISF, providing enablers to fill capability gaps, and implementing policies and procedures to reduce corruption, sectarianism, and malign influences.

Coalition and Embassy assistance was provided to all levels of government from national through provincial and local. At the national level, regular engagements with senior GOI leadership built relationships and encouraged adoption of policies consistent with Coalition goals. Advisors were provided to the various Iraqi ministries to mentor the staff and assist in the development of a functional Iraqi bureaucracy. For example, USAID's Tatweer Project employed a train-the-trainer approach and worked with ministries to set up and improve their internal civil service training programs.

Coalition and Embassy personnel recognized that their initiatives needed the support of the Iraqi government in order to be sustainable; thus, Iraqi representatives were actively engaged to determine priorities and integrate efforts. As Iraqi governance capabilities improved, Coalition and Embassy personnel gradually began to shift their focus to assist Iraqi officials in doing what had previously been done by the Coalition. Extensive efforts were made to assist the government in expending its budget and to strengthen ties between national government and provincial entities.

The effective provision of essential services was a key factor in how the population viewed the legitimacy of its political leadership. Coalition organizations such as the Energy Fusion Cell and the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center synchronized military and civilian efforts to assist the GOI in providing essential services in a fair and balanced manner to the population, fostering their confidence and establishing credibility.

Economic development was further addressed through job creation programs, small business development efforts, foreign and domestic investment, improved access to credit and banking services, and creation of economic development zones. Both near- and long-term employment opportunities were pursued to counter the insurgency and generate economic growth in local areas.

Through key leader engagement, Coalition leaders also attempted to foster an environment with reduced sectarianism, corruption, and malign influences. The Joint Campaign Plan recognized that:

> Transparent, effective, and uncorrupted governance is necessary to sustain confidence in and respect for the rule of law. Accordingly, [the plan] focuses ongoing anticorruption and other efforts at the national level to improve the overall governance and specific lawmaking abilities of GOI institutions. [35]

Anticorruption efforts were promoted within the provinces as political and security conditions permitted. Special emphasis was given to "investigation and prosecution of corrupt government officials, members of organized crime syndicates, and other malign actors who use revenue acquired through oil theft, smuggling, black market fuel sales, and other corruption schemes, to fund attacks against the Coalition, legitimate GOI officials, and civilians."[36]

In addition to work with the various ministries, Embassy and Coalition personnel engaged with members of the Council of Representatives to encourage passage of key legislation. While legislative progress was slow, several important laws were passed in 2008, including the Accountability and Justice Law, 2008 Budget, Amnesty Law, and Provincial Powers Law.

The PRTs and brigades similarly engaged with and mentored provincial and local government entities. USAID's Local Governance Program provided training for a variety of local officials and staff, civil service organizations, business leaders, and nongovernmental organizations.

Enabling capabilities provided to provincial and local governments varied depending on the environment. Some examples included providing temporary military bridges while bridges damaged by insurgents were repaired, providing detailed provincial maps to provincial councils, and bringing in experts (e.g., Team Borlaug, an agricultural team of experts from Texas A&M) to provide recommendations for development.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) continued to man, train, and equip the Iraqi forces, while MNC-I and subordinate commands partnered with and mentored Iraqi units, providing them with valuable operational experience. Coalition and Iraqi units lived, worked, and fought together in a combined effort to protect the population. Using a teach-coach-mentor approach, partnered units, together with US transition teams, enforced ISF standards, enabled performance, and monitored for abuses and inefficiencies.

When capable, ISF units began to take the lead in operations—with enabling capabilities such as ISR, logistics, and aviation provided by the Coalition. ISF-led operations conducted in spring 2008, including Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS in Basra, greatly increased confidence in ISF tactical capabilities, both within the ISF and in the eyes of the population. Increasingly over time, Coalition GPF operations were conducted

[35] Multi-National Force-Iraq and US Embassy Baghdad, "Joint Campaign Plan Update," 27 November 2007
[36] Ibid

"by, with, and through" the ISF in preparation for the requirements established by the Security Agreement implemented in January 2009.[37]

In 2007, the change in strategy to focus on securing the population was intended to buy time for Iraqi political and economic progress. Improved security created a more stable environment that facilitated Iraqi reconciliation, opened communication between the people and the government, allowed for training and mentoring at provincial and local levels, accelerated reconstruction progress, increased attractiveness for foreign investment, encouraged the return of displaced persons (including professionals who had fled the violence), and accelerated growth and training of the ISF. Economic and social progress, which was enabled by security gains, reinforced both security and GOI legitimacy.

GEN Odierno stated, "Generally speaking, when security conditions improve, a narrow focus on survival opens up and makes room for hope. Hope provides an opportunity to pursue improvements in quality of life. Along these lines, the surge helped set the stage for progress in governance and economic development. In a very real way, and at the local level, this subtle shift in attitude reinforced our security gains—allowing Coalition and Iraqi forces to hold the hard-earned ground we had wrested from the enemy while continuing to pursue extremists as they struggled to regroup elsewhere."[38]

Conclusion

By the end of 2008, a combination of strategy, leadership, and unprecedented civil-military partnership had created dramatic progress in Iraq. Attack levels were the lowest since the summer of 2003, the ISF were increasingly effective and less sectarian, and the Iraqi government had taken significant steps toward legitimacy. Iraq was still a fragile state, with its ultimate success dependent upon the will and competence of the government and its people, but remarkable progress had been made to provide an opportunity for success that was simply not there in 2006.

The comprehensive approach undertaken by GEN Petraeus, GEN Odierno, AMB Crocker, and their staffs validated the established principles of COIN through their successful application to the Iraq counterinsurgency.[39] These principles include the requirement to:

- Secure the population as the foundation for success. A "clear, hold, and build" approach is key to achieving public rejection of the insurgency.

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[37] *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, signed 17 November 2008, effective 1 January 2009

[38] The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures, "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later," LTG Raymond T. Odierno, delivered 5 March 2008, published 13 March 2008

[39] The principles of COIN are described in multiple documents. Principally, we refer to US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

- Use money as a means to sustain tactical security gains. Balance long-term development plans with efforts to support short-term security needs.

- Understand the environment. All aspects of the operational environment must be considered in decision-making. All plans must be tailored accordingly.

- Build the civil-military team. Aggressively recruit highly-qualified professionals (the "A-team").

- Emphasize a comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation to establish unity of effort. Civil-military partnering brings together organizations with complementary strengths, enhancing all lines of operation.

- Empower subordinates and incorporate local success back into higher-level approaches and policies.

- Maintain an offensive mind-set within a COIN framework. Both kinetic and non-kinetic targeting of insurgents must be placed into an overall comprehensive COIN approach.

- Strengthen host-nation government legitimacy and capacity through mentoring, partnering, and providing key enablers. These efforts set the conditions for the host nation to be able to operate in the lead.

- Foster reconciliation and accommodation. This splinters the insurgency, thickens security forces, and improves available intelligence.

- Fight the information war. Effective strategic communication contributes to driving a wedge between the population and the insurgents, often providing a "spotlight" effect on insurgents.

This report is a summary of the best practices and lessons learned from the *Comprehensive Approach in Iraq* study. The detailed findings of the study are published in four companion reports entitled *Unifying Efforts, Focusing on the Population, Attacking Insurgent Networks*, and *Building Government of Iraq Legitimacy*. While the specific lessons learned and best practices observed and detailed in this study may not apply "lock, stock, and barrel" to other situations, they could very well serve as a framework for future comprehensive approaches to COIN.

Joint Tactical Environment:
An Analysis of Urban Operations in Iraq, 2008




Attachment 5

JCOA's Mission

Background: GEN Petraeus requested JFCOM capture best practices and lessons learned from recent joint tactical operations (Sadr City Air Weapons Teams / UAV integration and other urban operations).

Problem: How do Coalition forces successfully command and control (C2) ISR, airspace management, and fires in a joint tactical environment?

Mission: **Document successful integration** of C2, ISR operations, airspace management, and fires in tactical environments in order to provide MNF-I and JFCOM leadership the basis for **near and long term improvement of joint capabilities.**

Snapshot of the JTE Collection, 2008



Team Composition

10 Deployed Collectors / 15 Reach-back Analysts (~50% JCOA)

Units Represented: JFCOM, JUAS CoE, JFIIT, ACC, USSOCOM, ARCIC, AFISRA CALL, USA Intelligence Center

Where we went:

MNF-I	MND-B/C/SE/N	ASOG	3/4 BCT	MNC-I
MNF-W	CACE	4/10 BCT	CAOC	CRC
CJSOTF	ACCE	332 AEW	CIOC	Fusion Cells
CABs	432 WOC	3 SOS	11 IS	30 IS/DGS-1
TF Odin	BCD	DASC (ASE)	15 RS	2/101 BCT
3 ACR	1/101 BCT	3 Sq/3 ACR	1 Sq/3 ACR	1-8 Inf Bn
4-6 Air Cav Sq				

Who we talked to:

CGs	Fires/Effects Coordinators	PED LNOs
Commanders	Staffs	Collection Managers
G/S2s and 3s	ALOs/JTACS	Plans Officers
Fusion Cell LNOs	Targeting Officers	ISR LNOs
AH-64 Crews	UAV Crews	CAS Pilots/Crews
MiTTs	Airspace Managers	

~140 interviews conducted*
~700 documents collected and reviewed*

***As of 15 August 2008**

Enabling Capabilities



Best Practices

- Fires
- Airspace Management
- ISR Operations



"Effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their level."

FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006

Specific Best Practices

Fires

- BP 1 Precision Fires, applied with persistent, massed, and dedicated assets in specific targeted areas, provided the ground commander overwhelming force to prosecute targets

- BP 2 The synergistic blend of a wide array of assets optimized the strengths of each to effectively mass fires and reduce sensor to shooter timelines

- BP 3 Preapproved weaponeering options and rehearsed battle drills shortened engagement timelines in dense urban environments

Battlefield effect: Blending of assets, situational awareness, and low collateral damage weapons allowed the commander to quickly identify the enemy and prosecute targets with minimal impact on Iraqi civilians.

Specific Best Practices

Airspace Management

- BP 1 Flexible application of control measures and procedures allowed for more effective use of congested airspace and timely joint fires support to the ground commander

- BP 2 Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE) successfully managed and deconflicted BCT airspace and controlled assets for effective engagements

Battlefield effect: The right combination of control measures (positive / procedural), paired with well trained airspace experts, allowed commanders tactical flexibility and rapid response to attack with a multitude of platforms.

Specific Best Practices

ISR Operations

- BP 1 Massed full motion video (FMV) assets, synchronized with other Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities, provided near continuous surveillance of decisive areas

- BP 2 Visibility of sensor data, enabled by distributed processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination operations across multiple echelons, improved the development of actionable targeting and the rapid allocation of assets

Battlefield effect: Massed, redundant full motion video, paired with airborne fires, allowed units to rapidly engage a fleeting enemy in a dense urban environment and helped to eliminate in-direct fire attacks.

How Can You Prepare (Military)

What needs to be done?

- Understand the capabilities and limitations of UAS technology
- Understand how to fight in a joint environment
- ***APPLY*** what has been done in the past (NO lessons RE-Learned)
- Never forget: the enemy watches, listens and learns You and Your Unit TOO!!!

How Can Industry Help?

What can be done?

- Design video downlink capability (e.g. ROVER) for AWT (AH-64).
- Create systems architecture that allows both a TOC and DGS to view and exploit AWT video
- Ensure new systems and communications gear are compatible across all Services and close gaps between existing communications media (e.g. Link 16, FMV, SINGARS, FM, SIPR, mIRC)
- Develop mIRC systems INCONUS for home station training

Joint Tactical Environment (JTE)

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
US Joint Forces Command




UNCLASSIFIED

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
October to December 2007

Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
US Joint Forces Command
25 March 2008

Derived from: Multiple sources
Declassify on: [redacted]

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Foreword (~~FOUO~~)

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) The deployed collection team consisted of 24 personnel, of which 17 were from Service and joint commands outside JCOA. After a review of previous studies, development of a collection plan, and conduct of required training, the team deployed to Iraq in mid-October 2007. The deployed team was supported by approximately 30 analysts operating from JCOA offices in Suffolk, Virginia, who communicated with the team via online collaborative tools.

(~~FOUO~~) At General Petraeus' direction, team members enjoyed unrestricted access to leaders and organizations in Iraq. Traveling in five groups, the teams visited almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. The team gave an "initial impressions" brief to General Petraeus in early November 2007, and then returned to Suffolk to continue analysis and prepare the final brief and report. The final brief was given to General Petraeus on 19 January 2008, followed by briefings to senior leaders at Service headquarters and the Joint Staff. This report describes in detail the observed "best practices" delineated in the brief and provides preliminary recommendations for institutionalizing these best practices.

(~~FOUO~~) This study was informed by JCOA methods from previous studies. First, a deliberate effort was made to collect enduring lessons that will help the Nation conduct COIN operations. The data collection was active, as opposed to a static post-mortem analysis. Second, the insights developed were not "stove-piped" or "monocular." They were informed by the perspectives of each of the stakeholder headquarters, agencies, and organizations, and contain rich context informed by extensive data and interviews. In addition, the report provides background material, a description of what happened, and a discussion of key players and events. Finally, the report develops a series of preliminary recommendations intended to address remaining challenges in ISR support to COIN targeting. The goal is to give readers enough of the story to begin to draw their own conclusions.

(~~FOUO~~) This report is only a first step in providing a foundation to assist commanders in the use of ISR in COIN targeting.

JAMES O. BARCLAY, III
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

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Table of Contents (~~FOUO~~)

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Executive Summary (~~FOUO~~)

Counterinsurgency Targeting and ISR Study History (~~FOUO~~)

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) JCOA collected CTI data in Iraq during late October and early November of 2007. This report is the culmination of the analysis and study development conducted both in theater and through reach-back to JCOA in Suffolk, Virginia.

Insights from the Report (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) In early 2007, MNF-I introduced a modified counterinsurgency strategy which included a surge in the numbers of US conventional forces in Iraq and an increased role for these forces in securing population centers. Additionally, the surge in forces was accompanied by a surge in ISR support. This came as the United States aligned strategy, operational approaches, and tactics to fight the insurgency.

(~~FOUO~~) Conducting successful counterinsurgency operations required the establishment of security and governance, setting the conditions for reconciliation. At the same time, there were some elements of the society that could not be reconciled but had to be neutralized to achieve overall security.

(~~FOUO~~) In examining COIN targeting and ISR operations across Iraq, the following insights emerged:

1. (~~FOUO~~) The detailed understanding of the operating environment needed for successful COIN could only be gained through sustained local engagement.

(~~FOUO~~) Achieving an understanding of the operating environment was critical to the COIN targeting process. As brigades worked to provide security and promote reconciliation, they recognized another key aspect to intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB)—achieving an understanding of the local human terrain. To this end, intelligence assets were devoted not only to collection on insurgents and sympathizers, but also to gathering information that helped leaders understand the environment as a whole.

[1] (~~FOUO~~) The "unblinking eye" refers to the focused, unbroken attention that can be provided by ISR assets or capabilities

2. (~~FOUO~~) Close coupling of intelligence with operations allowed more effective use of ISR in COIN targeting.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

3. (~~FOUO~~) Effective ISR supported the local, tactical commander by building understanding of the human terrain and allowing commanders to appreciate the consequences of actions across lines of operation. Successful commanders tailored targeting approaches to their unique operating environments and the resources on hand.

(~~FOUO~~) The nature of the operating environment strongly influenced specific ISR requirements and desired targeting effects. It was critical to ascertain and tailor approaches based upon the level of permissiveness and the geographic setting, whether urban or rural. Additionally, the availability of ISR assets suitable for each operating environment drove specific targeting approaches.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) During the time of this study, more than half of the brigade and regimental commanders had served previous tours in Iraq; almost half of those were on their third tour. That operational experience provided background knowledge and fostered confidence that enhanced leaders'

[2] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

[3] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

ability to innovate, adapt, and develop solutions to meet the challenges of a varied operational environment.

4. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

5. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Summary (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) Aggressive counterinsurgency operations by both conventional and special operations forces appeared to begin to have impact over the course of 2007. By the end of 2007, the security environment in Iraq showed an improving trend. Reconciliation of segments of the

population was gaining momentum, and insurgent sanctuaries were significantly reduced—all leading to degraded insurgent operational capabilities.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Chapter 1: Overview (~~FOUO~~)

Background (~~FOUO~~)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Study Development and Team Composition.** In the fall of 2007, JCOA conducted background research,[6] developed a data collection plan, and assembled a collection team of 24 analysts from multiple commands and Services who deployed to Iraq for 30 days.[7] While in theater, the JCOA team collected data at various commands and units.[8] Additionally, a reachback team of approximately 30 analysts remained in the JCOA offices in Suffolk, Virginia. This reachback team supported the deployed collection team, participated in daily IWS (collaborative communications suite) sessions with deployed team members, answered requests for information (RFIs), reviewed and categorized initial quantitative and qualitative data (including over 400 interviews, 1000 briefings, story boards, databases, and other products), and began the process of product development (brief and report). After the deployed team returned from theater, a smaller group of analysts worked to complete the brief and report. The final brief was given to MNF-I and MNC-I commanders on 19 January 2008; this report describes in greater detail the findings and recommendations of that brief.

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[4] (~~FOUO~~) The "unblinking eye" refers to the focused, unbroken attention that can be provided by ISR assets or capabilities

[5] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[6] (~~FOUO~~) Background research conducted in CONUS before deployment included interviews and data collection from Air Combat Command, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Special Operation Forces, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence, TRADOC, and various other commands

[7] (~~FOUO~~) The team was composed of members from all Services and a number of organizations, including TRADOC, Air Combat Command, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Joint UAS Center of Excellence, Navy Strike and Air Warfare Center, [redacted], MARFORCOM, SOCJFCOM, SOCOM, CENTCOM, and STRATCOM

[8] (~~FOUO~~) MNF-I, MNC-I, CFACC/CAOC, TF 714, CJSOTF-AP, MND headquarters, Regional Fusion Cells, CASE, COIC, MNF/C-I Collection Managers, TF Troy, TF Odin, 332nd AEW, ACCE, ASOG, 18 brigades, and 9 battalions

Report Purpose and Scope (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this study was to capture, document, and validate ISR best practices and lessons learned to improve ISR employment in support of COIN targeting in Iraq. While conducting this study, it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. See Figure 1.



(~~FOUO~~) Figure 1: Study Scope and Purpose

(~~FOUO~~) To prevent confusion, key terms used in this report are clarified below:

- ISR is more than unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or collection assets
  - ISR is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.[9]
- The targeting concept used by conventional force commanders depended on resources, the culture of the unit, and the operational environment. One might ask whether COIN targeting was "Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate" (F3EAD) or "Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess" (D3A) or any number of other shorthand terms used to describe a particular targeting cycle. For the purposes of this study, the observations and

[9] (~~FOUO~~) Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 October 2007)

conclusions are made independently of the targeting concept or cycle used. This is explained in greater detail within the "Environment-Tailored Targeting" chapter of this report

- Personality targeting can include friendly, neutral, and hostile people. Thus, high value individual (HVI) targeting is not just a tool leading to capture/kill. It can also include prohibition of strikes (e.g., "no strike"), typically used for neutral personalities. Additionally, HVI targeting can include information operations
- It is also important to distinguish between HVIs and high value targets (HVTs)—they are different. Although HVIs are individuals, HVTs are enemy targets that may or may not be individuals

Context (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) The US military, designed to conduct full-spectrum operations, was successful in its conduct of major combat operations (MCO) in DESERT STORM in 1991 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. But some capabilities, systems, and processes used successfully in MCO were not specifically optimized for irregular warfare, including COIN.[10]

(~~FOUO~~) In MCO, theater and national ISR assets supported decisions made by the joint force commander, decisions that were often based on the expected activities of forces up to several days out. But in COIN the joint force commander was engaged politically to try to reinforce, exploit, and sustain gains mostly achieved at brigade and below, often requiring response within hours, not days. It makes sense in COIN to use ISR—ISR that in MCO would support maneuver and strike at the operational level—to support the lower echelon commander's need for understanding local issues like governance, economics, social relationships, pattern of life analysis, and other areas typically not given high priority in conventional MCO.

(~~FOUO~~) For a COIN effort to be successful, the nexus of critical decision-making must move from the joint force commander to lower echelons, often company and battalion commanders. LTG Odierno, MNC-I CG, commented:

> What the commander must do in COIN is to establish left and right limits and let junior leaders operate. This entails risk, and senior leaders must underwrite that risk.[11]

Figure 2 illustrates the shift of ISR resources needed in a COIN environment.

[10] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[11] (~~FOUO~~) Comment made during review of briefing, 19 January 2008

(~~FOUO~~) Figure 2: ISR Needs Gap

(~~FOUO~~) While ISR capabilities to support conventional MCO must persist, action can be taken to improve ISR support to COIN. This includes both adapting ISR systems and processes and specifically building new ISR capabilities.

Report Findings (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) This report identifies best practices that, if institutionalized, would improve US military use of ISR in support of COIN targeting. These best practices are discussed in the six findings, summarized below.

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 2: Understanding**. Understanding the COIN operational environment required understanding the human terrain.

(~~FOUO~~) Human terrain has been defined as:

> ...The human population and society in the operational environment...characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society... It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual.[12]

[12] (~~FOUO~~) Jacob Kipp, et al., "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century," *Military Review*, September-October 2006, 15. While there is no doctrinal definition of the term human terrain (it is not included in

(~~FOUO~~) In the Iraqi COIN environment, local commanders had to develop knowledge of this human terrain, which often included learning about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, and political/economic structures. This knowledge was obtained through a variety of means, including direct interaction with the local population, enabled in part by the surge in numbers of forces and ISR assets; the creation of fusion cells at multiple echelons to meld operational and intelligence data; and the use of that fused data to create all-source intelligence network nodal analysis that yielded insights into local and regional human terrain issues.

(~~FOUO~~) Counterinsurgency experts generally agree that nuanced understanding of the environment is best achieved locally.[13] Academic study and intelligence summaries cannot provide sufficient detail to prepare the commander with the required level of understanding, and should always be augmented by local, first-hand, or on-the-ground engagement.

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 3: Environment-Tailored Targeting**. Commanders tailored their targeting approach to their unique operating environment and available resources. The targeting approach drove specific ISR requirements.

the Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 12 April 2001 [as amended through 17 October 2007] or elsewhere), we have chosen the definition above for the purposes of this study

[13] (~~FOUO~~) Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 31-32; and Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc), 1990, 59-67, 135-136

[14] (~~FOUO~~) *Panel Discussion on the New Counterinsurgency Manual*, Center for New American Security, 13 November 2007, 29

[15] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[16] (~~FOUO~~) The Biometric Assessment Toolset System (BATS) provided a capability to search a database of fingerprints and other biometrics to verify the identity of individuals as well as match individuals to past activities

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 4: Decentralized Capabilities.** ISR capabilities were decentralized to improve COIN targeting.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 5: Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR.** Organizational structures, approaches, and processes were adapted to support more effective use of ISR capabilities.

(~~FOUO~~) In the preceding chapter, "Decentralized Capabilities," we discussed pushing ISR capabilities to lower echelons. Pushing ISR assets down, however, was not always desirable or even possible. This chapter describes how organizational structures, approaches, and processes were adapted to support more effective use of ISR capabilities at all levels.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 6: Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination.** To compensate for shortfalls, tactical units developed *ad hoc* exploitation, analysis, and dissemination capabilities.

[17] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], Targeting, 2/3 ID, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Chapter 7: Agile Leadership.** Leaders at brigade level and below who were successful in COIN targeting proved to be innovative, adaptive, and agile.

(~~FOUO~~) FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, states:

> Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many leaders do not understand it, and some who do cannot execute it. COIN operations are difficult and anyone can learn the basics. However, people able to intuitively grasp, master, and execute COIN techniques are rare.[18]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Conclusion (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) Each of the six chapters summarized above concludes with a section entitled "Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations." In order to further describe these challenges and recommendations, we have included several appendices to this report. Appendix A is a compilation of Best Practices observed in theater during the study collection timeframe. Appendix B describes preliminary recommendations for change in ISR support to COIN targeting, and begins the process of delineating doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions to these challenges.

[18] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, A-3

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Chapter 2: Understanding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding.** Understanding the COIN operational environment required understanding the human terrain.

(~~FOUO~~) **Context.** Defeating an insurgency is not simply a matter of neutralizing insurgents. Considering the typical numbers of insurgents,[19] along with their relative levels of training and equipment, a conventional military has a distinct advantage in a straightforward fight. But insurgents rarely fight a counterinsurgent force directly; instead, they use asymmetric means to reduce the legitimacy of the host government while maintaining sanctuary in the general population. While writing of the relationship that exists between the local populace and its guerilla fighters, Mao Tse-tung noted, "The former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish that inhabit it."[20]

(~~FOUO~~) Human terrain, or "the water in which the fish swim," has been defined as "the human population and society in the operational environment...characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human

[19] (~~FOUO~~) Typically, insurgents make up a very small part of the total population. One estimate for Iraq was 0.5% of the population. Estimate by LTC John Nagl, *Panel Discussion on the New Counterinsurgency Manual*, Center for New American Security, 13 November 2007, 30

[20] (~~FOUO~~) "On Guerilla Warfare," from *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume IX, 1937

population and society.... It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual."[21]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Counterinsurgency experts generally agree that nuanced understanding of the environment is best achieved locally.[23] Academic study and intelligence summaries can not provide sufficient detail to prepare the commander with the required level of understanding, and should always be augmented by local, first-hand, or on-the-ground engagement.

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Knowledge of the human terrain was an essential first step to understanding the operational environment, allowing local commanders to take advantage of emerging opportunities.**

(~~FOUO~~) Units recognized the importance of understanding the operational environment, especially the human terrain. Knowledge of the local culture was considered by some to be the essential first step in COIN targeting. One important subtlety was that the Iraqi Arab environment was not as black and white as "enemy, friendly, unknown." Understanding the power base of the tribe, and the influences and rules that governed people's behaviors, allowed unit commanders to align operations with local mores to gain the greatest outcome. For example, an observation was made in Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) that the focus of tribal law was to bring peace to the tribe. Conventional forces adjusted their approach to bring visible security to the tribe in order to gain favor with the populace.[24]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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[21] (~~FOUO~~) Jacob Kipp, et al., "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century," *Military Review*, September-October 2006, 15. While there is no doctrinal definition of the term human terrain (it is not included in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 12 April 2001 [as amended through 17 October 2007] or elsewhere), we have chosen the definition above for the purposes of this study.

[22] (~~FOUO~~) Based on personal correspondence from a battalion commander received by [redacted], JCOA, September 2007 (b)(6)

[23] (~~FOUO~~) Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 31-32; and Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc), 1990, 59-67, 135-136

[24] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Cultural Advisor, MNF-W, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Persistent presence also had other benefits. Conventional forces often included infrastructure development in their set of missions. This created an opportunity to engage local citizens through the development and improvement of basic services; one unit observed that enabling basic services led to more HUMINT.[28]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Fusion cells were created at multiple echelons to connect and fuse operations and intelligence.

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[25] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, BG McDonald, Effects Coordinator, MNC-I, 1 November 2007

[26] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 7-2

[27] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted], S35, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)

[28] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Information Operations and Non-Lethal Effects Chief, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[29] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Cultural Advisor, MNF-W, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)

[30] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[31] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted] Cultural Advisor, MNF-W, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Units influenced existing insurgent networks using *ad hoc* planning, coordination, and team work.**

(~~FOUO~~) Although units were successful in gaining the required understanding for success in COIN targeting, much of this success was due to *ad hoc* procedures and on the job training, not established processes or pre-deployment preparation.[39] Pre-deployment training did not always address key enablers in support of understanding the human environment: conducting network

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[32] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 3-25

[33] (~~FOUO~~) Understanding is not just about data and information. It is about analysis with the following key points. The focus of analysis was now at brigade level, not at traditionally higher echelons. Brigades had more capability with additional assets and analysts, even if many were non-organic. Higher headquarters were often not responsive and in some cases provided no added value analysis. Analysis had to occur close to action units to take advantage of fleeting targets (both kinetic and non-kinetic) in a dynamic environment

[34] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[35] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[36] (~~FOUO~~) It is important to remember that analysis of the environment included many non-traditional sources of intelligence which became critical to the analysis process: patrol reports, engineer and medical engagement summaries, local engagement, etc. All of these "non-intelligence" entities allowed a more complete understanding of the operational environment

[37] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[38] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[39] (~~FOUO~~) Some units benefited from pre-deployment preparation. For example, during its pre-deployment preparations, 4 ID came to Baghdad and were linked into the 1 CAV analyses, gaining a good idea of what to expect upon their return to theater. This was partially enabled by the relationship that existed between 4 ID and 1 CAV that had been established in Fort Hood

analysis (see below),[40] interfacing with in-theater organizations and fusion cells,[41] managing echelon above division ISR collection assets, and working with exploitation and analysis cells.[42]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Units leveraged all-source intelligence to produce network nodal analysis.**

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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[40] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[41] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[42] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager, 1/101 ABN(AASLT), 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[43] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[44] (~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(2) High
[45] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interviews, [redacted], G3, 1 AD, 28 October 2007 and [redacted], Deputy Collection Manager, 1 AD, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[46] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 3-2
[47] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[48] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA notes from 2/1 CAV Fusion Working Group Meeting, 29 October 2007
[49] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USMC, S3, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, RCT-6, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[50] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Units adapted TTP to meet challenges of their dynamic operational environments by leveraging and integrating human terrain knowledge.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***The military was neither well structured nor prepared to develop the necessary understanding of the human terrain.***

What Should Be Done:

- Restructure tactical unit capabilities to better support development of human terrain knowledge (e.g., institutionalize law enforcement approach to COIN)
- Develop Service and joint case studies on understanding human terrain
- Incorporate case studies, articles, and other lessons into Service and joint TTP
- Create electronic library of case study material for research, doctrine development, and training
- Use mobile teams (e.g., human terrain teams and Asymmetric Warfare Group) to advise tactical units
- Reshape Department of Defense (DOD) research and development to strengthen approaches to understanding the human terrain

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[51] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[52] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO and Night Operations Manager for Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[53] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Cultural Advisor, MNF-W, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)

[54] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Information Operations and Non-Lethal Effects Chief, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[55] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

(~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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

Chapter 3: Environment-Tailored Targeting (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding.** **Commanders tailored their targeting approach to their unique operating environment and available resources. The targeting approach drove specific ISR requirements.**

(~~FOUO~~) **Context.** Between 2004 and 2006, much of the effort to improve security in Iraq focused on enabling host nation security forces. In early 2007, MNF-I instituted a modified strategy (enabled by the surge in forces) that shifted the focus more toward the sharing of responsibility for security in population centers, specifically targeting areas where insurgents had established strongholds.[56]

(~~S~~)

[56] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Commander, Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC), MNC-I, 6 November 2007 (b)(6)

[57] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 1-2: "Insurgents succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere"

[redacted]



(~~FOUO~~) Figure 3: The Two-pronged Nature of COIN Operations[58]

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Dr. Conrad Crane, an editor of FM 3-24, described the patchwork nature of the counterinsurgency environment—where operations must at times be tailored down to individual city blocks—with the term "mosaic war."[59] Across Iraq, brigades operated in widely differing operating environments. As an example, Figure 4 reveals the granularity of the environment in the Baghdad area.

[58] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[59] (~~FOUO~~) *Panel Discussion on the New Counterinsurgency Manual*, Center for New American Security, 13 November 2007, 29



(~~FOUO~~) Figure 4: An Example of Different Operating Environments: Baghdad[60]

(~~S~~)

[60] (~~FOUO~~) MNF-I, "BUA" brief, 20 October 2007, slide 32
[61] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[62] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , USMC, S2, RCT-6, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[63] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , S2, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)



(~~FOUO~~) Figure 5: Different Approaches to COIN Targeting

(~~FOUO~~) The effects of the operational environment on various aspects of COIN targeting are discussed below.

(~~FOUO~~) ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace***

(~~S~~)

(~~S~~)

[64] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 3-2: "The purpose of planning and IPB before deployment is to develop an understanding of the operational environment. This understanding drives planning and pre-deployment training."
[65] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Figure 6: Fusion of Intelligence and Operations[67]

(~~FOUO~~) Intelligence and operations are intrinsically connected: "Intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence."[68] To connect and fuse operations and intelligence, fusion cells were created at multiple echelons, from battalion up to MNF-I level. Brigade fusion cells were particularly important in targeting, as they flattened the organization and ensured that everyone in the intelligence and operations shops knew the mission and worked together.

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[66] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[67] (~~FOUO~~) 2/1 CAV, "BJ6 Targeting Decision" brief, 24 October 2007, slide 55
[68] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 3-25
[69] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Finishing and Exploiting Enemy Targets***

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[70] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[71] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[72] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA Report, *Transition to Sovereignty*, March 2007, 18
[73] (~~FOUO~~) The law enforcement approach to evidence gathering is discussed in detail in the "Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR" chapter of this report
[74] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/2 ID, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[75] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[76] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, RCT-6, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[77] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO and Night Ops for Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[78] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[79] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[80] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], SIGINT Platoon Leader, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[81] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[82] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Fires and Effects Coordinator, and LTC Steve North, G2, 1 CAV, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[83] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Commander, 1/101 BSTB, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[84] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[85] (~~FOUO~~) 2/2 ID, "Joint Center for Operational Analysis Visit" brief, 29 October 2007, slide 56
[86] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[87] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[88] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[89] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[90] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 4/1 CAV, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[91] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Figure 7: Illustrative ISR Platforms and Capabilities for Different Operating Environments

(~~FOUO~~) Units arrived in theater with different abilities to use ISR assets.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[92] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted], Targeting, 2/3 ID, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Although doctrine discussed environmental conditions as an influence on COIN targeting, it was not sufficiently detailed to support practical application.***

What Should Be Done:
- Develop Service and joint environment-tailored targeting case studies and best practices
- Develop procedures for flexible use of ISR capabilities in different operational environments
- Create electronic library of case study material for research, doctrine development, and training

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Forces and headquarters were not organized to easily support environment-tailored targeting in COIN.***

What Should Be Done:
- Use mobile teams (e.g., human terrain teams and Asymmetric Warfare Group) to advise tactical units until adaptation to COIN is institutionalized
- Institutionalize selected types of operations/intelligence fusion cells

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[93] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted] Commander, 1 CAB, 1 ID, 27 October 2007, and comments made during report review (b)(6)
[94] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/2 ID, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[95] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager, 1/101 ABN(AASLT), 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[96] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Targeting Officer, II MEF, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[97] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[98] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Analysis and Control Team NCOIC, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 29 October 2007 (b)(6)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Knowledge-sharing networks were often ineffective and slow in supporting the development of understanding of the environment.***

What Should Be Done:

- Create a distributed knowledge network(~~S~~) encompassing databases, information feeds, and reach-back capabilities accessible to deployed forces
- Continue to develop systems/communications/databases to more effectively access and share information at the tactical level
- Provide easier, faster access to near real-time (NRT) compartmented SIGINT for battalion and company level users

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Leader understanding of network design principles, material capabilities, and operational tradeoffs was not sufficient to advantageously cobble together C2 networks in support of environment-tailored targeting.***

What Should Be Done:

- Conduct Service and joint pre-deployment training to provide leaders with an understanding of ISR communication architecture, network capacity, systems capabilities, and information characteristics
- Develop Service and joint ISR knowledge management/communication planning case studies and best practices
- Create electronic library of case study material for research, doctrine development, and training
- Simplify and standardize systems and user interfaces

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

Chapter 4: Decentralized Capabilities (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding.** ISR capabilities were decentralized to improve COIN targeting.

(~~FOUO~~) **Context.** What follows is a discussion on how ISR capabilities can be provided to the lower echelon commander.

- This chapter discusses decentralization or "pushing down" ISR assets and resources. Decentralization is usually accomplished through an "attached" or "direct support" command relationship[99]
- The next chapter, "Flexible and Adaptive ISR," describes ways in which ISR, whether decentralized or centrally controlled, can be creatively adapted for COIN

(~~FOUO~~) Higher echelon commanders must determine when to decentralize control of ISR assets in order to optimally provide lower level units the needed ISR support.[100] Although

[99] (~~FOUO~~) Attach: 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. Direct Support: A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 October 2007)

[100] (~~FOUO~~) During discussion of the CTI brief in January 2008, LTG Odierno, MNC-I, commented that, "We want flexibility; [we] sometimes need centralized ISR capabilities, sometimes decentralized; the decision on this rests

decentralization was an important tool in moving ISR capability to the brigade and below, it was not always appropriate. Considerations as to whether decentralization was appropriate follow:

- Factors favoring decentralization:
  - Needed frequent platform revisits or continuous surveillance
  - Needed tight and continuing integration with other forces and units under that commander's control
  - Anticipated immediate need for asset availability
  - Convenient use by tactical units
- Factors favoring centralization:
  - Asset was high demand/low density
  - Asset overhead and maintenance costs
  - Asset served many customers simultaneously

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) Tactical units first met the ISR collection requirements by using their internally controlled capabilities.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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with the commander on the ground. As Corps commander, [I] have huge decisions on weighing the battlefield, [determining] priorities for ISR, HUMINT, UAV, etc."

[101] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], C2 OPS, MNC-I, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)

[102] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[103] (~~FOUO~~) Correspondence with [redacted], USAF, MNF-I Collections Manager, 6 December 2007 (b)(6)

[104] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, Collections Manager, MNF-I, 20 October 2007 (b)(6)

[105] (~~FOUO~~) Ibid

[106] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **To meet the increased tactical demands of COIN, additional capabilities were pushed down.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]



(~~FOUO~~) ***Theater and Corps FMV assets were made available to division level for planning and use***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[107] (~~S~~) [redacted]
[108] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[109] (~~S~~) [redacted]
[110] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[111] (~~FOUO~~) Derived from MNF-I "Optimized ISR Status" briefs for June 2006 and July 2007
[112] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "Offensive Operations ISR Decision Brief," June 2007
[113] (~~FOUO~~) Comments made by MNF-I Collection Manager during review of this report, February 2008

(~~FOUO~~) ***ISR analysis capabilities were established at echelons below division***

(~~S~~)

(~~S~~)

[114] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[115] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[116] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[117] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007, 15
[118] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], HUMINT Officer, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[119] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[120] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[121] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[122] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[123] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], S35, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)

tactical units, including building intelligence target packets and case files to maximize criminal convictions[124]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***HUMINT assets were pushed down as far as company level; however, units became dependent upon echelon above division assets to sustain their added HUMINT capabilities***

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[124](~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Law Enforcement Program Officer, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[125] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], SIGINT Platoon Leader, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[126] (~~FOUO~~) MNF/C-I ISR Assessments, "Status of ISR Forces Deployed in Support of OIF" brief, June 2007, slide 86
[127] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 4/1 CAV, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[128] (~~FOUO~~) Patrol bases from which Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqi Army and Police) operate, usually located in neighborhoods to increase presence and facilitate security
[129] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[130] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007, 15
[131] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3-509 IN (4/25 ID), 4 November 2007 (b)(6)
[132] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007, 15

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Lower echelon unit manning and training did not support convenient use of higher echelon ISR collection assets.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Doctrine recognized the need for decentralization of ISR capabilities, but supporting documentation and TTPs did not facilitate practical application.***

What Should Be Done:

- Develop ISR collection management procedures that allow the joint force commander to control distribution of ISR capabilities in a way consistent with command objectives
- Develop case studies that examine decentralization and flexible use of ISR

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[133] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, OPORD 07-1 FRAGO 060, MNC-I EAD HUMINT Support Relationships Directive, 21 June 2007

[134] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], MARFORCOM G2, January 2008 (b)(6)

[135] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[136] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, S2, 29 October 2007

[137] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, Battalion S2, 27 October 2007

[138] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, Brigade Collection Manager, 25 October 2007

- Create electronic library of case study material for research, doctrine development, and training

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Service and joint force systems did not always support a joint force commander's decision to decentralize ISR assets.***

What Should Be Done:
- Improve acquisition guidance to include support of decentralization in system design
- Highlight decentralization capabilities in demonstrations and experiments

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Joint training did not support operations/intelligence integrated team training for decentralized use of ISR.***

What Should Be Done:
- Improve individual augmentee assignment and deployment to provide an opportunity for team training on joint tactical skills
- Ensure pre-deployment training includes employment of ISR capabilities, emphasizing tight integration of operations and intelligence
- Provide more flexible ranges and customized field training facilities for team training
- Use mobile teams (e.g., human terrain teams and Asymmetric Warfare Group) to advise tactical units

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***A concept of operations and supporting plan for use of ISR to support COIN was not developed. Assessment of ISR effectiveness fell short.***

What Should Be Done:
- Revisit and refine command and control (C2) and supporting ISR requirements for each phase of the higher headquarters' campaign plan
- Use joint force concept development and experimentation to develop a concept of operations for employment of ISR in COIN
- Develop measures of effectiveness for ISR in COIN

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

Chapter 5: Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding.** Organizational structures, approaches, and processes were adapted to support more effective use of ISR capabilities.

(~~S~~)

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Prior to changes in ISR management, lower echelons sometimes had little visibility and influence on how ISR assets above brigade were used.**

(~~S~~)

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Uneven Use of Echelon above Division ISR Assets: Lack of Confidence in Availability***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Uneven Use of Echelon above Division ISR Assets: Lack of Training and Experience***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[139] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Army Effects NCO, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 27 Oct 2007 (b)(6)
[140] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 1/1 CAV, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[141] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], C2 OPS, MNC-I, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[142] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collections Manager, 1 CAV, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[143] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, S2, 29 October 2007
[144] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, (different) S2, (different unit), 27 October 2007
[145] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, Brigade Collection Manager, 25 October 2007
[146] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Where possible, tactical units adjusted processes for the employment of ISR assets to achieve more effective use in COIN targeting.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Units Employed Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS)/Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted System (JLENS) and Persistent Surveillance Dissemination Systems of Systems (PSDS 2) as a Substitute for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Assets***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[147] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager, TF 714, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[148] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[149] (~~S~~) [redacted]
[150] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[151] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Units Benefited from the Use of the Law Enforcement Program***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[152] (~~FOUO~~) 2/2 ID, "Joint Center for Operational Analysis Visit" brief, 29 October 2007, slide 56
[153] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Science and Technology Officer, II MEF, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[154] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], SIGINT Platoon Leader, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[155] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Commanding Officer, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[156] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[157] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Commanding Officer, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[158] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collections Officer, II MEF, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Flexible and Adaptive Use of HUMINT***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[159] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[160] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 4/25 ID, 4 November 2007 (b)(6)
[161] (~~FOUO~~) MNF/C-I ISR Assessments, "Status of ISR Forces Deployed In Support of OIF" brief, June 2007, slide 86
[162] (~~FOUO~~) For a more detailed description of various capabilities provided to lower echelon forces, see the chapter in this report titled "Decentralized Capabilities"
[163] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 4/1 CAV, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[164] (~~FOUO~~) Patrol bases where Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqi Army and Police) operated from, usually located in neighborhoods to increase presence and facilitate security
[165] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[166] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007, 15
[167] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3-509 IN (4/25 ID), 4 November 2007 (b)(6)
[168] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[169] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[170] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[171] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007
[172] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Units Effectively Employed Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) in the Tactical Operations Center***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***MASINT Procedures Were Modified to Increase Tactical Unit Access***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[173] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[174] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Air Officer, 3-3 Battalion, RCT-6, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[175] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Air Officer, RCT-2, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[176] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], MASINT Collection Manager, MNC-I, 20 October 2007 (b)(6)
[177] (~~FOUO~~) Ibid

(~~FOUO~~) **Collection management processes were eventually modified, minimizing the impact of re-tasking on lower echelon planning and moving the decision-maker closer to the end-user.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Multiple organizations, each acting separately as a provider of ISR assets, complicated conventional force use of these assets.***

What Should Be Done:

- Standardize employment of collections assets, as applicable, through the creation of joint publications and TTP
- Create simple, automated, and standardized data transfer requests[183]

[178] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "Offensive Operations ISR Decision Brief," June 2007
[179] (~~FOUO~~) Comments made by MNF-I Collection Manager during review of this report, February 2008
[180] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "Partial Apportionment Decision Brief," September 2007, slide 9
[181] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], C2 OPS, MNC-I, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[182] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 1/101 ABN(AASLT), 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

- Develop joint means to improve shared picture of collection asset availability, tasking, and projected coverage to facilitate dynamic re-tasking
- Standardize Service and joint PED equipment and processes to the extent practicable

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Airspace control and de-confliction measures over urban areas limited the effectiveness of aerial collection.***

What Should Be Done:
- Address frequency spectrum management issues that limit ISR usage in urban environments
- Through concept development, experimentation, and prototyping, develop a new concept for airspace deconfliction that allows for more effective use of aerial ISR assets in urban environments

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***National-to-tactical linkages for intelligence collection often do not support the user at brigade or below.***

What Should Be Done:
- Strengthen tactical unit intelligence collection management and processing capabilities to reduce external augmentation required (e.g., SIGINT from NSA, and geospatial intelligence [GEOINT]/Imagery from National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA])
- Revisit National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) concept of employment to compensate for Service shortfalls at the tactical level
- Create DOD-wide distributed knowledge networks to enhance reach-back capabilities for deployed forces
- Develop non-scripted ISR employment training and exercises that include the Services, joint forces, DOD, and national intelligence communities

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Conventional force manning and training did not adequately address dynamic employment of ISR collection assets for COIN targeting.***

What Should Be Done:
- Address manpower requirements and shortfalls in collection requirements management (CRM) and collection operations management (COM) at brigade, battalion, and company
- Develop case studies, practical applications, and training scenarios that include the dynamic employment of ISR assets
- Review and revise joint and Service training to enable on-scene collections controllers to better direct collection platform assets
- Use mobile teams (e.g., human terrain teams and Asymmetric Warfare Group) to advise tactical units

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Knowledge-sharing networks were often ineffective and slow in supporting the flexible and adaptive use of ISR assets.***

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[183] (~~FOUO~~) From tactical request for information-collection requests (RFI-CR) and joint tactical air requests-surveillance/reconnaissance forms to collection requirements management (CRM) systems to collection operations management (COM) systems

What Should Be Done:
- Continue to develop systems/communications/databases to more effectively access and share information
    - Include reach-back capabilities for deployed forces
- Develop means to provide easier, faster access to near real-time (NRT) compartmented SIGINT for battalion and company level users

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Integration of law enforcement approaches into COIN operations has not been institutionalized.***

What Should Be Done:
- Integrate forensic analysis and criminal intelligence techniques as part of company, battalion, and brigade capabilities
- Incorporate evidence handling procedures during SSE to facilitate successful criminal prosecutions and strengthen rule of law

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

Chapter 6: Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding.** **In order to compensate for shortfalls, tactical units developed *ad hoc* exploitation, analysis, and dissemination capabilities.**

(~~FOUO~~) **Context.** Exploitation, analysis, and dissemination capabilities were limiting factors in the targeting processes for conventional forces. While increases in ISR collection assets were commonly requested, the value of these additional assets was not fully realized due to shortages in analysts, exploitation capabilities, and challenges in dissemination of intelligence.

(~~S~~)

(~~S~~)

(~~FOUO~~) Intelligence gained through Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) also helped units to better focus detainee interrogations in order to obtain more information.[187]

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) Brigade and below needed strong exploitation, analysis, and dissemination capabilities in COIN.

(~~S~~)

(~~S~~)

[184] (~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM ATO, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Annex, 160300ZDEC07 – 170259ZDEC07, Change 0

[185] (~~FOUO~~) 25th Infantry Division, ACE Target Development Cell, "ACE Target Development Cell (G2T) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Division Targeting in Full Spectrum Effects-Based Operations and Office Standard Operating Procedures," 1 July 2007, 40-41

[186] (~~FOUO~~) 25th Infantry Division, ACE Target Development Cell, "ACE Target Development Cell (G2T) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Division Targeting in Full Spectrum Effects-Based Operations and Office Standard Operating Procedures," 1 July 2007, 42

[187] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

[188] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[189] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[190] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], HUMINT Operations Chief, 4/2 ID, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)
[191] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[192] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[193] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and CPT Schachtler, ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[194] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Although improved since 2003, shortages remained in the numbers of intelligence analysts, interrogators, and interpreters.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[195] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[196] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[197] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X Operational Management Team Chief, 1/1 CAV, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[198] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 2/82 ABN, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[199] (~~S~~) [redacted]
[200] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[201] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted] Targeting, 2/3 ID, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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[202] (~~FOUO~~) CENTCOM, "ISR Assessments Working Group" brief, 3 May 2007, slide 16
[203] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "ISR Review" brief, 27 January 2007, slide 31
[204] (~~FOUO~~) Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, "Intelligence Enhancements in the Infantry Battalion: Producing Actionable Tactical Information Lessons and Observations Quick Look Report," 21 May 2007, 2
[205] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interviews, [redacted], S2X, and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[206] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[207] (~~FOUO~~) Category II linguists are US citizens with Secret clearances who are fluent in the target language and proficient in English. Category III linguists are US citizens with TS-SCI clearances who are proficient in target language and fluent in English. Source: MNF-I, *Linguist User Handbook for the Iraq Theater of Operations*, 22 August 2005
[208] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], G2X, 1 CAV, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[209] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "ISR Review" brief, 27 January 2007, slide 16
[210] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 2/82 ABN, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[211] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], G2X HUMINT Operations Chief, 1 AD, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[212] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], HOC Chief/Detainee OPS, 4/1 CAV, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[213] (~~FOUO~~) Ibid
[214] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted] S3 Plans Officer, 4-9 IN (4/2 ID), 1 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Analysis personnel often had insufficient HUMINT/SIGINT training.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[215] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I, "ISR Review" brief, 27 January 2007, slide 31

[216] (~~FOUO~~) [redacted], accessed 16 January 2008

[217] (~~FOUO~~) Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, "Counter-Insurgency Infantry Battalion Operations, Lessons and Observations from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, OIF 05-07, Quick Look Report," 31 July 07, 4

[218] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[219] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)

[220] (~~FOUO~~) Christopher Chester, "Female Suicide Bomber Kills 9 in Iraq," *Miami Herald* online, 16 January 2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/AP/story/380419.html accessed 17 January 2008

[221] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted], S2X, 2/3 ID, 4 November 2007 (b)(6)

[222] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2 and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[223] (~~FOUO~~) Asymmetric Warfare Group, "Tactical Advisory Mission Report, MND-C & MND-B, Mission Dates: 23 September - 06 October 2007," 10 October 2007, 3

[224] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **PED procedures were not tailored for use at echelons below division.**

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[225] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3-509 IN (4/25 ID), 4 November 2007 (b)(6)
[226] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Law Enforcement Program Officer, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[227] ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[228] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], G2X HUMINT Operations Chief, 1 AD, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[229] (~~FOUO~~) MNC-I comments on draft report, 15 March 2008
[230] (~~FOUO~~) Air Force Doctrine Document 2-9, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations," 17 July 2007, 20
[231] (~~FOUO~~) XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery brief, "How We Fight Deep," 13 January 1997

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Full Motion Video Challenges***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[232] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, 11 IS PED LNO, TF JOC, 23 October 2007 (b)(6)
[233] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA meeting with USAF CAOC ISR LNOs ([redacted] [497 IG], [redacted] [MND-B], [redacted] [MND-C], and [redacted] [DGS LNO to MNF-I]), 20 October 2007 (b)(6)
[234] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, 11 IS PED LNO, TF JOC, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[235] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], FMV Collection Manager, 2/2 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[236] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted] USAF, 11 IS PED LNO, TF JOC, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[237] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], CJSOTF Commander, 24 October 2007 (b)(6)
[238] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, CAOC ISR LNO, 1 CAV, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[239] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA meeting with USAF CAOC ISR LNOs ([redacted] [497 IG], [redacted] [MND-B], [redacted] [MND-C], and [redacted] [DGS LNO to MNF-I]), 20 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Dissemination challenges***

(~~FOUO~~) With many pieces of intelligence generated at many different echelons, by multiple platforms and organizations, available information was not always disseminated effectively. As stated by BG Keller, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "We need access to the data. We need an integrated approach to get to the data we may not know existed or that was available."[241] [redacted]. (b)(2) High

(~~FOUO~~) One dissemination challenge was the lack of bandwidth, especially at battalion and below. Bandwidth was especially problematic for certain kinds of products like FMV and high resolution imagery.[242] In an effort to mitigate this challenge, brigades created web portals that the battalions could access in order to provide them with essential information.

(~~FOUO~~) As an example, 2/1 CAV designed a web portal to support its battalions. This web portal was developed around five lines of operations (LOOs). Each LOO was assigned a team chief, who provided focus and direction for intelligence collection efforts and analysis. The web portal became an effective tool for sharing information and analysis with lower echelons.[243]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Although brigades developed individual web portals, they did so in spite of the fact that there was no standardized portal format or development methodology. In addition, each portal was hosted on a local network with no overall directory of individual portals. Thus, web portals enabled internal collaboration, but did not facilitate external collaboration.

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[240] (~~FOUO~~) Communications with [redacted], A2XD, Air Combat Command, 14 December 2007 (b)(6)
[241] (~~FOUO~~) BG Keller, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, [redacted], C2 OPS, MNC-I, in Study Group notes dated 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[242] (~~FOUO~~) 4/25 ABCT, "Building a Secure Iraq, Pattern Analysis and Final AAR," 18 November 2007, slide 117
[243] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[244] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], G2X, 1 CAV, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[245] (~~FOUO~~) Consisted of a detainee's background and specific intelligence requirements in order to focus questioning and exploitation
[246] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 2/82 ABN, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[247] (~~S~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) An additional complication in establishing the JNN during the RIP/TOA was that units generally did not train in CONUS to set up their JNN—their first attempt would be in Iraq. Even if units had deployed to Iraq before, they were often unfamiliar with new capabilities added.[255]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[248] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[249] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, DGS LNOs, MNF-I CM&D, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)
[250] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 1/101 BSTB, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[251] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, Brigade Targeting Officer and TF LNO, 1/101 ABN(AASLT), 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[252] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Effects Coordinator, 1 CAB, 1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[253] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S6, 4/2 ID, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)
[254] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 1/101 BSTB, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[255] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S6, 4/2 ID, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Classification and Security Clearance Challenges***

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[256] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, Brigade Targeting Officer and TF LNO, 1/101 ABN(AASLT), 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[257] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3/3 ID, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[258] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], HUMINT Officer, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[259] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA group meeting with 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007
[260] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[261] (~~S~~) [redacted]
[262] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[263] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/3 ID, 3 November 2007 (b)(6)
[264] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, Squadron Leader Lloyd, RAF, ISR Division Collections Manager, CAOC, 6 November 2007
[265] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Innovative solutions, mostly *ad hoc*, were found to mitigate these challenges.**

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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[266] (~~FOUO~~) MNF-I C2, "Theater Data Exploitation Issue" draft brief, 20 April 2007, slide 4
[267] (~~FOUO~~) Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Initial Impressions Report (IIR), 4th Infantry Division (4ID), Observations from a Modular Force Division in Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF)," February 2007, 59
[268] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[269] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], C3 Battle Captain (Days), MNC-I, 2 November 2007 (b)(6)
[270] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, ISR Division/DO, CAOC, 17 October 2007 (b)(6)
[271] (~~FOUO~~) 11 IS was reconstituted 1 August 2006 to perform PED for special operations
[272] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, 11 IS PED LNO, TF JOC, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)
[273] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA meeting with TF, 25 October 2007

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Units below division level had insufficient organic exploitation and analysis capabilities for COIN. Although numbers have improved since 2003, shortages remained in intelligence analysts, interrogators, and interpreters.***

What Should Be Done:

- Structure units to have adequate exploitation, analysis, and dissemination capabilities

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[274] (~~FOUO~~) Air Combat Command/A2YD, "Bullet Background Paper on DCGS Analysis and Reporting Teams (DART) Intelligence Fusion," 20 July 2007, 1

[275] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, 11 IS PED LNO, TF JOC, 25 October 2007 (b)(6)

[276] (~~FOUO~~) ISR cells embedded at the brigade level, especially if the ISR cell personnel had DGS experience, could leverage the DART teams and aid in PED coordination

[277] (~~FOUO~~) The LNOs worked directly with other DGS LNOs at the CAOC and ultimately reported back to the 480th Intelligence Wing

[278] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USAF, DGS LNOs, MNF-I CM&D, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)

[279] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 4/1 ID, 31 October 2007 (b)(6)

[280] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)

[281] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, 4/1 ID, 31 October 2007 (b)(6)

- Assess and resource manpower requirements for intelligence analysts, interrogators, and interpreters
- Broaden HUMINT training to include those outside the CI/HUMINT field
- Revisit National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) concept of employment to compensate for organic exploitation and analysis shortfalls

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Integration of law enforcement approaches into sensitive site exploitation and analysis had not been institutionalized.***

What Should Be Done:
- Integrate forensic analysis and criminal intelligence techniques as part of company, battalion, and brigade capabilities
- Incorporate evidence handling procedures during SSE to facilitate successful criminal prosecutions and strengthen rule of law

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) procedures for many collections assets were not optimized for convenient use by echelons below division.***

What Should Be Done:
- Organize PED processes to more conveniently support brigade and below
- Document and disseminate PED best practices
- Revisit National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) concept of employment to compensate for organic exploitation and analysis shortfalls
- Improve distributed knowledge networks to strengthen reach-back capabilities for deployed forces

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Service and joint force materiel systems and knowledge-sharing networks did not always support adaptive exploitation, analysis, and dissemination.***

What Should Be Done:
- Continue to develop systems/communications/databases to more effectively access and share information
- Provide easier, faster access to near real-time (NRT) compartmented SIGINT for battalion and company level users
- Create DOD-wide distributed knowledge networks to enhance access to available exploitation and analysis products

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Conventional force training and education did not keep pace with dynamic exploitation, analysis, and dissemination in support of COIN targeting.***

What Should Be Done:
- Develop exploitation, analysis, and dissemination curricula in parallel with the Services, joint force, DOD, and the national intelligence communities
- Develop case studies, practical applications, and modeling/simulation training scenarios
- Use mobile teams (e.g., human terrain teams and Asymmetric Warfare Group) to advise tactical units

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Lack of specific case study material and TTP hindered practical application.***

What Should Be Done:

- Develop Service and joint exploitation, analysis, and dissemination case studies and TTP
- Create electronic library of case study material for research, doctrine development, and training



Chapter 7: Agile Leadership (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Finding. Leaders at brigade level and below who were successful in COIN targeting proved to be innovative, adaptive, and agile.**

(~~FOUO~~) **Context.** Counterinsurgency forces support reconstruction efforts, provide security, neutralize insurgents, and encourage the population to support the government. Despite recent efforts to align pre-deployment training more closely with the operational environment, conventional force unit training and education typically did not provide the needed foundation to execute along all of these lines. As a consequence, success in COIN operations was frequently a function of leaders' agile adaptation and innovation in theater.

(~~FOUO~~) FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency,* states:

> Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many leaders do not understand it, and some who do cannot execute it. COIN operations are difficult and anyone can learn the basics. However, people able to intuitively grasp, master, and execute COIN techniques are rare. Learn how to spot these people and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank may not indicate the required talent. In COIN operations, a few good

> Soldiers and Marines under a smart junior noncommissioned officer doing the right things can succeed, while a large force doing the wrong things will fail.[282]

(~~FOUO~~) Because COIN targeting is an intelligence-intensive endeavor, a significant part of leader adaptation involved learning to effectively use ISR. These leaders leveraged previous experiences and developed creative ways of using available capabilities to understand the environment, degrade insurgent networks, positively influence the general population, and succeed in COIN operations.

Discussion in Support of the Finding (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Brigades and below had multiple mission sets and rapidly changing priorities.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) **Legacy ISR coordination procedures complicated agile use of resources.**

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[282] (~~FOUO~~) US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, A-3
[283] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 1/1 CAV, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[284] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[285] (~~FOUO~~) Ibid
[286] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[287] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], USMC, Effects Officer, RCT-2, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) Finally, personnel at brigade level and below were often unfamiliar with capabilities of echelon above division ISR assets. With limited experience or training with these assets, they often did not have the expertise to know when cross-cueing would be possible or advantageous.

(~~FOUO~~) **Successful leaders learned the principles of COIN quickly and leveraged their experiences to develop effective responses. Senior leaders underwrote the risk of providing subordinates with the necessary freedom of action.**

(~~FOUO~~) Leaders in COIN adapted and developed innovative ways to promote success in targeting. Key aspects to this adaptation were decentralization of ISR collection and analysis, and creative use of organic ISR capabilities. As stated by a BCT LNO to the Baghdad fusion cell, "Commanders drive ISR and aggressive commanders drive ISR aggressively."[289]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Leaders Developed Company Intelligence Cells***

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[288] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Chief IMINT Section, 1 CAV ACE, 4 December 2007 (b)(6)
[289] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[290] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2X, and [redacted], Detainee Ops NCOIC, 2/1 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[291] (~~FOUO~~) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, "Operation Iraqi Freedom II 06-08 After Action Report," 12 October 2007
[292] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Collection Manager and LNO to Baghdad Fusion Cell, 2/1 ID, 26 October 2007 (b)(6)
[293] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 3-509 IN (4/25 ID), 4 November 2007 (b)(6)

(~~FOUO~~) *Leaders Used a Law Enforcement Approach to the Insurgency*

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) *Leaders Engaged the Local Population*

(~~S~~) [redacted]

(~~S~~) [redacted]

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[294] (~~FOUO~~) Many brigades combined exploitation capabilities, both organic and direct support, into a single element or facility for better synchronization and more complete analysis
[295] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, 2-7 CAV (4/1 CAV), 30 October 2007 (b)(6)
[296] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) Chief/Detainee Operations, 4/1 CAV, 29 October 2007 (b)(6)
[297] (~~FOUO~~) The Biometric Assessment Toolset System (BATS) provides a capability to search a database of fingerprints and other biometrics to verify the identity of individuals as well as match individuals to past activities
[298] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and [redacted], ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[299] (~~FOUO~~) After this report was written, the CLC has been changed to "Sons of Iraq"
[300] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Commander, 1/101 BSTB, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[301] (~~FOUO~~) Ibid
[302] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Brigade Fire Support Officer, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

(~~S~~)

(~~FOUO~~) ***Leaders Strengthened Engagement with Iraqi Females***

(~~S~~)

(~~S~~)

(~~FOUO~~) ***Leaders Learned the Advantages of Dedicated Finishing Forces***

(~~S~~)

[303] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, Brigade Fire Support Officer, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[304] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, BG McDonald, Effects Coordinator, MNC-I, 1 November 2007
[305] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , S2, RCT-2, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[306] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , HUMINT Officer, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[307] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , and S2X, 2/3 ID, 4 November 2007 (b)(6)
[308] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , S2, and , ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)
[309] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , SIGINT Platoon Leader, 2/1 ID, 28 October 2007 (b)(6)
[310] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , Fusion Cell OIC and ISR Analysis Platoon Leader, 4/2 ID, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)
[311] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, , S3, 4/25 ID, 4 November 2007 (b)(6)

[redacted]

(~~FOUO~~) ***Leaders Benefited from Experience and Training***

(~~FOUO~~) Experience and training contributed to success.[314] For instance, one commander ensured that subordinate leaders received training and education in HUMINT, civil affairs, information operations, and psychological operations.[315] Previous operational and intelligence experience was particularly helpful, because it made leaders ISR literate. One brigade operations officer emphasized the importance of ISR literacy: "The [operations officer] needs to be intel-savvy."[316] This literacy helped them to tailor their collection plans to meet operational requirements.

(~~FOUO~~) In the end, successful leadership at echelons below division required boldness by senior leaders. LTG Odierno, MNC-I commander, stated:

> We must teach senior leaders, they must be able to underwrite risk. Leaders must be able to [empower their subordinates] in this environment—the days of micromanagement are over.[317]

Challenges Believed Remaining and Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Education and training for conventional force leaders did not adequately address agile, adaptive leadership.***

What Should Be Done:

- Reinforce existing Service, joint, and DOD initiatives and programs that stress the need for agile and adaptive leadership in a COIN environment
- Strengthen existing formal school, mobile training team, managed on the job training (OJT), and field exercise curricula to promote adaptive behavior (e.g., case methods, tactical decision games, war-gaming, and change-of-mission drills)
- Leverage non-traditional learning venues (e.g., computer games, interactive fiction, live-action role playing groups, unit sporting events) to develop mental agility, adaptability, improvisation, and collaboration

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[312] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], Fusion cell OIC and ISR Analysis Platoon Leader, 4/2 ID, 1 November 2007 (b)(6)

[313] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[314] (~~FOUO~~) Estimates provided by MNCI to JCOA team lead in February 2008 indicated that in 2007 and early 2008, 30 brigade commanders had served in Iraq, only 2 of whom had no prior experience in Desert Storm, OEF, or OIF. Of the 28 who had served, 21 had served previously in OIF, and another 4 had served in OEF in leadership capacities

[315] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S2, and CPT Schachtler, ISR Manager, 1/3 ID, 27 October 2007 (b)(6)

[316] (~~FOUO~~) JCOA interview, [redacted], S3, 2/1 CAV, 30 October 2007 (b)(6)

[317] (~~FOUO~~) Comment made during review of CTI brief, 19 January 2008

(~~FOUO~~) **Challenge.** ***Force personnel policies do not necessarily include the development and empowerment of agile leaders, especially in non-command billets.***

What Should Be Done:

- Provide additional incentives for those officers or enlisted personnel who exhibit superlative skills in agile leadership (e.g., temporary brevetting, frocking, permanent meritorious promotion, special skill pay, battlefield promotions)
- Develop assignment procedures to better capture and leverage special skills and experience that support agile and independent leadership, especially for non-command billets
- Improve award systems to provide greater focus on recognition of flexibility and adaptability in support of the COIN mission

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Appendix A: Best Practices Catalog (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) This appendix catalogs best practices in ISR support to COIN targeting. Although best practices were discussed briefly in each of the preceding chapters of this report, they are discussed in more depth in this appendix. Best practices are grouped by the six major study findings and their respective sub-findings. Reference diagrams for each of the best practices, as well as supporting interviews and data, are included.

(~~FOUO~~) ***How to Read Accompanying Best Practice Reference Diagrams***

(~~FOUO~~) Each best practice reference diagram contains four elements:
- A box labeled "How" which provides a brief description of the best practice
- A box labeled "Effect" which describes the result the best practice had on COIN targeting
- A map with colored MND areas which shows where this best practice was observed[318]
- A small rectangular box above the map which delineates the level of command at which the best practice was observed

(~~FOUO~~) ***Caveats Concerning Best Practice Selection and Adoption***

(~~FOUO~~) Best practices shown in this catalog represent a snapshot in time and held true for the observed unit working in the observed area of operation. Unit capabilities changed from rotation to rotation and the operating environment changed continuously. What worked for a unit in one area at one time, may not work for that same unit in the same or different area later. Selection, adoption, and modification of these best practices will therefore require a commander's discretion. Footnotes provide additional context, clarification, and detail to assist the user in this process.

(~~FOUO~~) Master Listing of Best Practices

(~~FOUO~~) The best practices associated with the six CTI findings and their related sub-findings are listed below:

1.0 *Understanding*

1.1 Knowledge of the human terrain was improved
1.2 Operations and intelligence were integrated through fusion cells
1.3 SOF and conventional force collaborated effectively

2.0 *Environment-Tailored Targeting*

2.1 Brigades leveraged regional fusion cells, thus increasing situational awareness
2.2 Brigades and below established TST forces

[318] (~~FOUO~~) The reader should note that a geographic area that is not colored does not mean that the best practice would not work there—it simply means that it was not observed in that area. For example, data was not collected in MND-S and MND-SE, and therefore no best practices are presented for those areas.

2.3 Brigades targeted mid-level insurgents to activate high-level leader reactions
2.4 Law enforcement tactics were used to target networks
2.5 MNF-W leveraged Iraqi Police (IP)/Iraqi Army (IA)/CJSOTF to "finish" based on organic ISR and target development
2.6 Means to influence networks were developed

3.0 *Decentralized ISR Capabilities*

3.1 Full Motion Video (FMV) was provided to lower echelon decision-makers
3.2 Cryptologic Support Teams and SIGINT Terminal Guidance Teams were embedded into brigades
3.3 ISR LNOs were provided to division headquarters
3.4 Company level intelligence capabilities were established
3.5 Tactical HUMINT Teams/HUMINT Exploitation Teams were pushed below brigade level

4.0 *Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR*

4.1 To diminish reliance on FMV, units used non-FMV ISR assets innovatively in "finish" operations
4.2 Theater and tactical units developed innovative organizational and procedural solutions
4.3 Brigade and below units accessed theater and national ISR via changes in architecture
4.4 Armed MQ-1 Predator UASs used as shooters were tasked and managed solely through the ATO process
4.5 Operations-intelligence fusion activities were improved
4.6 ISR synchronization meetings were conducted at division and below levels

5.0 *Highly Developed Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination*

5.1 Collaboration between conventional and special operations forces, and other governmental agencies (OGA) improved analysis and sharing of critical information and expertise at multiple echelons
5.2 Site exploitation facilitated rapid network analysis to better support follow-on actions
5.3 Biometric Automated Toolset (BATS) proved effective
5.4 Detailed nodal and network analyses were valuable

6.0 *Agile Leadership*

6.1 Leaders created innovative solutions to fill gaps in ISR
6.2 Leaders leveraged personal relationships and LNOs widely

1.0 Understanding (~~FOUO~~)

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1.0 Understanding (~~FOUO~~)

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1.0 Understanding (~~FOUO~~)



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2.0 Environment-Tailored Targeting (~~FOUO~~)



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

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





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2.0 Environment-Tailored Targeting (~~FOUO~~)

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

3.0 Decentralized ISR Capabilities (~~FOUO~~)

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3.0 Decentralized ISR Capabilities (~~FOUO~~)

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

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3.0 Decentralized ISR Capabilities (~~FOUO~~)

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4.0 Flexible and Adaptive ISR (~~FOUO~~)



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4.0 Flexible and Adaptive ISR (~~FOUO~~)

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4.0 Flexible and Adaptive ISR (~~FOUO~~)

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

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

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4.0 Flexible and Adaptive ISR (~~FOUO~~)

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

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5.0 Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination (~~FOUO~~)

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[70](~~FOUO~~) ASAS [All Source Analysis System] was abandoned for commercial applications such as Excel spreadsheets, MS PowerPoint, and CrimeLink. *Center for Army Lessons Learned, "3rd ACR OIF Post Deployment AAR Process IIR (Analysts Version 06-25)," Analyst's Version, dated June 2006*

6.0 Agile Leadership (~~FOUO~~)



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6.0 Agile Leadership (~~FOUO~~)

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Appendix B: Preliminary Recommendations (~~FOUO~~)

(~~FOUO~~) The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) *Counterinsurgency Targeting and ISR* (CTI) study revealed six key findings that were discussed in the main body of this report. Analysis of each finding identified a series of specific challenges believed remaining, and a corresponding series of preliminary recommendations for change. These recommendations have been sorted into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) categories in order to serve as a starting point for focused solution development.

(~~FOUO~~) As described in the introduction to this report, in order to begin to close the gap in ISR support to COIN targeting, forces must identify the environment, realign for COIN, and lead for success. The six study findings can be viewed through this framework:

- Identify the Environment
  - Understanding
  - Environment-Tailored Targeting
- Realign for COIN
  - Decentralized Capabilities
  - Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR
  - Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination
- Lead for Success
  - Agile Leadership

(~~FOUO~~) Following are the challenges believed remaining, along with associated preliminary recommendations for change.

Understanding - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- The military was neither well structured nor prepared to develop the necessary understanding of the human terrain.
- Unit rotation policies caused setbacks in sustained understanding of the human terrain.





Environment-Tailored Targeting - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- Although doctrine discussed environmental conditions as an influence on COIN targeting, it was not sufficiently detailed to support practical application.
- Forces and headquarters were not organized to easily support environment-tailored targeting in COIN.
- Knowledge-sharing networks were often ineffective and slow in supporting the development of understanding the environment.
- Leader understanding of network design principles, material capabilities, and operational tradeoffs was not sufficient to advantageously cobble together C2 networks in support of environment-tailored targeting.









Decentralized Capabilities - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- Doctrine recognized the need for decentralization of ISR capabilities, but supporting documentation and TTPs did not facilitate practical application.
- Service and joint force systems did not always support a joint force commander's decision to decentralize ISR assets.
- Joint training did not support operations/intelligence integrated team training for decentralized use of ISR.
- A concept of operations and supporting plan for use of ISR to support COIN was not developed. Assessment of ISR effectiveness fell short.





Flexible and Adaptive Use of ISR - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- Multiple organizations, each acting separately as a provider of ISR assets, complicated conventional force use of these assets.
- Airspace control and de-confliction measures over urban areas limited the effectiveness of aerial collection.
- National-to-tactical linkages for intelligence collection often did not support the user at brigade or below.
- Conventional force manning and training did not adequately address dynamic employment of ISR collection assets for COIN targeting.
- Knowledge-sharing networks were often ineffective and slow in supporting the flexible and adaptive use of ISR assets.
- Integration of law enforcement approaches into COIN operations has not been institutionalized.









Exploitation, Analysis, and Dissemination - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- Units below division level had insufficient organic exploitation and analysis capabilities for COIN. Although numbers have improved since 2003, shortages remained in intelligence analysts, interrogators, and interpreters.
- Integration of law enforcement approaches into sensitive site exploitation and analysis had not been institutionalized.
- Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) procedures for many collections assets were not optimized for convenient use by echelons below division.
- Service and joint force materiel systems and knowledge-sharing networks did not always support adaptive exploitation, analysis, and dissemination.
- Conventional force training and education did not keep pace with dynamic exploitation, analysis, and dissemination in support of COIN targeting.
- Lack of specific case study material and TTP hindered practical application.







Agile Leadership - Challenges Believed Remaining (~~FOUO~~)

- Education and training for conventional force leaders did not adequately address agile, adaptive leadership.
- Force personnel policies do not necessarily include the development and empowerment of agile leaders, especially in non-command billets.





Appendix C: Acronyms and Abbreviations (~~FOUO~~)

1 CAV – 1st Cavalry Division

AAR – After action report

AASLT – Air Assault

ABCT – Airborne Brigade Combat Team

ABN – Airborne

ACE – Analytical Control Element

AF – Air Force

AFB – Air Force Base

AIF – Anti-Iraqi forces

ALO – Air Liaison Officer

AO – Area of operations

AOR – Area of responsibility

AQI – Al Qaeda in Iraq

ASAS – All-Source Analysis System

ASOS – Air Support Operations Squadron

ASP – Analytical support packet

ATO – Air Tasking Order

AWG – Asymmetric Warfare Group

BATS – Biometric Automated Toolset System

BCT – Brigade Combat Team (US Army)

BDE – Brigade

BFC – Baghdad Fusion Cell

BN – Battalion

BSTB – Brigade Special Troops Battalion

C2 – Command and control

C2 OPS – Intelligence Operations Officer

CA – Civil affairs

CACE – Coalition Analysis and Control Element

CAOC – Combined Air Operations Center

CAOC ISR LNO – Combined Air Operations Center ISR Liaison Officer (by March 2008, CAOC ISR LNOs they were referred to as CFACC ISR LNOs)

CAS – Close air support

CAV – Cavalry

CDE – Collateral damage estimation

CELLEX – Cell-phone exploitation

CENTCOM – US Central Command

CEXC – Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell

CF – Coalition Forces; also Conventional Forces

CFACC – Combined Forces Air Component Command

CG – Commanding General

CGS – Common ground station

CHOPS – Chief of Operations

CI – Counter-intelligence

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CIED – Counter improvised explosive device (also C-IED)

CIOC – Combined Intelligence Operations Center

CIV – Civilian

CJSOTF – Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CLC – Concerned local citizens

CM – Collection Manager

CMD – Collection management and dissemination; also **CM&D**

CO – Company; Commanding Officer

COCOM – Combatant command

COIC – Counter-IED Operational Integration Center

COIN – Counterinsurgency

CONOPS – Concept of operations

CORDS – Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

COM – Collections operations management

COMEX – Communications exploitation

CONUS – Continental United States

CPOF – Command post of the future

CR – Collection request

CRM – Collections requirements management

CST – Cryptologic Support Team

CTI – COIN Targeting and ISR

D3A – Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess

DART – Distributed Ground Station (DGS) Analysis and Reporting Team

DCGS – Distributed common ground system

DGS – Distributed ground station

DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency

DIIR – Draft Intelligence Information Reports

DOCEX – Document exploitation

DOD – Department of Defense

DOTMLPF – Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

EAD – Exploitation, analysis, and dissemination

ECP – Entry control point

F3EAD – Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

FID – Foreign internal defense

FM – Field Manual

FMV – Full motion video

FOB – Forward operating base

FOUO – For official use only

FP – Force protection

FRAGO – Fragmentary order

FSE – Fire Support Element

FSO – Fire Support Officer

GBOSS – Ground Based Observation Sensor System

GEOINT – Geospatial intelligence

GMTI – Ground movement target indicator

HCT – HUMINT collection team

HET – HUMINT exploitation team

HIIDE – Hand-held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment

HOC – HUMINT Operations Cell

HUMINT – Human intelligence

HVI – High value individual

HVT – High value target

IA – Iraqi Army; Individual Augmentee; Inter-agency

ID – Identification; or Infantry division

IDF – Indirect fire

IED – Improvised explosive device

IIR – Initial Impressions Report; Initial Intelligence Report

IMINT – Imagery intelligence

IN – Infantry

IO – Information operations; or International organizations

IOT – In order to

IP – Iraqi Police

IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IS – Intelligence Squadron

ISF – Iraqi Security Forces

ISO – In support of

ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ISRD – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

JAM – Jaysh Al-Mahdi

JCOA – Joint Center for Operational Analysis

JFACC – Joint Force Air Component Command

JFC – Joint Force Commander

JFCOM – US Joint Forces Command

JLENS – Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted System

JNN – Joint Network Node

JOC – Joint Operations Center

JP – Joint Publication

JSS – Joint Security Station

JSTARS – Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAC – Joint terminal attack controller

LEP – Law Enforcement Program

LN – Local national

LNO – Liaison Officer

LOO – Line of Operation

LOS – Line of sight

MAGTF – Marine Air Ground Task Force

MASINT – Measurement and signature intelligence

MCO – Major combat operations

MCWP – Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

MEDEX – Media exploitation

MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force

MI – Military intelligence

mIRC – Mardam-Bey Internet Relay Chat

MNC-I – Multi-National Corps - Iraq

MND – Multi-National Division

MND-B – Multi-National Division - Baghdad

MND-C – Multi-National Division – Central

MND-N – Multi-National Division - North

MNF-I – Multi-National Forces - Iraq

MNF-W – Multi-National Force - West

MSC – Major subordinate command

MSO – Military Source Operation

MTOE – Modified Table of Organization and Equipment

MTT – Military Transition Team (in Iraq); also known as MiTT

Multi-INT – Multiple intelligence sources

NASIC – National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NCOIC – Non-commissioned officer in charge

NGA – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGIC – National Ground Intelligence Center

NIST – National Intelligence Support Team

NRT – Near real-time

NSA – National Security Agency

NTISR – Nontraditional ISR

OCE – Operational Control Element

OEF – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OGA – Other government agency

OIC – Officer in charge

OIF – Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OJT – On the job training

OPORD – Operation Order

OSRVT – One System Remote Video Terminal

PED – Processing, exploitation, and dissemination

PID – Positive identification

POC – Point of contact

POO – Point of origin

POR – Program of record

PR – Personnel recovery

PSDS2 – Persistent Surveillance Dissemination System of Systems

PTDS – Persistent Threat Detection System

PTT – Police Transition Team

QRF – Quick response force

RAF – Royal Air Force

RCT – Regimental Combat Team

RDF – Regional Detention Facility

RFI – Request for information

RIP/TOA – Relief-in-place/Transfer of authority

ROE – Rules of engagement

ROVER – Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver

SBCT – Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SDR – Source Directed Requirements

SIGACTS – Significant activities

SIGINT – Signals intelligence, also **SI**

SIPRNET – Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

SIR – Specific information requirement

SME – Subject matter expert

SOCOM – Special Operations Command

SOF – Special operations forces

SOP – Standard operating procedure

SSE – Sensitive site exploitation

SST – SIGINT Support Teams

STG – SIGINT Terminal Guidance

S-VoIP – Secure-Voice over Internet Protocol

TACAIR – Tactical air

TAREX – Target exploitation

TCN – Third country national

TF – Task Force

THT – Tactical human intelligence [HUMINT] team

TIB – Technical Intelligence Bulletin

TIC – Troops in contact (with the enemy)

TIR – Tactical Interrogation Report

TOC – Tactical Operations Center

TS-SCI – Top secret, sensitive compartmented information

TST – Time Sensitive Target

TTP – Tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAS – Unmanned aerial system

UAV – Unmanned aerial vehicle

UGS – Unattended ground sensor

VBIED – Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol

WIT – Weapons Intelligence Team

XO – Executive Officer