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Description of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Headquarters File number File Number HQ 105-18233 (Section 1), searches of diplomatic shipments leaving the United States, 1952-1967

Released date: 17-December-2010

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Date/date range of document: 25-May-1952 – 12-September-1967

Source of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attn: FOI/PA Request
Record/Information Dissemination Section
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Winchester, VA 22602-4843
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E-mail: foiparequest@ic.fbi.gov

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

December 17, 2010

Subject: FILE NUMBER HQ 105-18233
FOIPA No. 1144587- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

- ☒ (b)(1)
- ☒ (b)(2)
- ☐ (b)(3) _____
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- ☐ (b)(4)
- ☐ (b)(5)
- ☒ (b)(6)

Section 552a

- ☐ (b)(7)(A)
- ☐ (b)(7)(B)
- ☒ (b)(7)(C)
- ☐ (b)(7)(D)
- ☐ (b)(7)(E)
- ☐ (b)(7)(F)
- ☐ (b)(8)
- ☐ (b)(9)
- ☐ (d)(5)
- ☐ (j)(2)
- ☐ (k)(1)
- ☐ (k)(2)
- ☐ (k)(3)
- ☐ (k)(4)
- ☐ (k)(5)
- ☐ (k)(6)
- ☐ (k)(7)

155 **page(s)** were reviewed and 89 **page(s)** are being released.

☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☒ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", followed by a stylized flourish.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of FBI Headquarters file 105-18233.

The enclosed material is being provided to you at no charge.

R INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General
James M. McInerney
Director, FBI

August 6, 1952

WB
SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES
(ICIS-SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Referral/Consult

Could you furnish at this time any subsequent
draft prepared in the Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security by the Subcommittee on Foreign
Diplomatic and Official Personnel concerning the
examination of diplomatic shipments leaving the
United States?

RECORDED-43

EX-121

105-18233

FBI

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COMM - FBI

AUG 6 - 1952

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Department of Justice	
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Assistant Attorney General
James M. McInerney
Director, FBI

May 27, 1952

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES
(ICIS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL)

Referral/Consult

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EX - 80

You requested any comments on the above-mentioned draft prior to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Wednesday, May 28, 1952.

The basic problem of inspection of diplomatic shipments of baggage, pouches, and special packages is similar to that which was presented by your memorandum dated March 14, 1952, your reference JMM:RPW:dj, 44-03-19, forwarding enclosure number 142794 which was a proposed report to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel concerning the examination of baggage of incoming diplomatic personnel and shipments to diplomatic missions in the United States.

The Department of State working paper on outgoing baggage indicates the same reluctance to probe the contents of outgoing baggage as was displayed in the former paper in probing the contents of incoming baggage.

The predication for the instant working paper is the information furnished by this Bureau regarding attempts on the part of Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and Hungarian diplomats to evade export controls by shipping out of this country under diplomatic cover materials for which no export licenses would be granted.

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This Bureau will not comment on typographical errors and misspellings of names in this work paper draft. However, it must be pointed out that the draft is inaccurate in its reference to the departure of the Czech Embassy employee, Joseph Brazda, as set forth on page 4. The draft states:

"On February 1, 1952, when Mr. Brazda was leaving New York with excess personal baggage, the Customs officials were authorized to examine his baggage. It was found to contain only personal effects."

The facts are that the Department of State authorized the Customs officials to examine only Brazda's personal baggage and did not authorize the Customs officials to search his official baggage. It is not surprising, therefore, that his personal baggage was found to contain only personal effects and not the materials which he was suspected of smuggling out of the country.

It is noted that the Department of State working paper proposes to "deal with attempts by the Soviet bloc diplomatic missions in the U.S. to remove from this country articles which are subject to U.S. export controls" by asking the appropriate Soviet bloc official, in effect, if the baggage under diplomatic seal contains contraband and if they deny it, the shipment shall be permitted without further question.

Since the attempt by the Hungarian Legation to ship a radio transmitter and radio parts in March, 1951, at which time the shipment was not permitted after the Hungarian courier admitted the nature of its contents, there is little likelihood that Soviet bloc officials will admit to Customs officers that their baggage under diplomatic seal contains contraband.

Under the heading, "Possible Additional Steps," there are three items mentioned in the Department of State working paper. First is suggested a discreet external examination of baggage under diplomatic seal by use of mechanical devices and by observation. This suggestion does not go as far as that which was pointed out to the Criminal

Division by this Bureau's reply of March 19, 1952, in response to your memorandum of March 14, 1952. It was pointed out that although diplomatic baggage was not opened by Customs the containers could be subjected to X ray which would show the presence of the items sought to be smuggled. X ray could also be applied to outgoing items under diplomatic seal.

The second suggestion is sabotage of sealed baggage by magnetization, breakage, or other effective means of damaging the contents. In giving consideration to such a step it would be well to discuss the matter with intelligence agencies of this Government operating abroad inasmuch as such sabotage within the continental limits of the United States or on a United States vessel or air line could result in a conclusion by the aggrieved nation that such sabotage came from United States sources. If such were the case the retaliatory steps feared by the Department of State would likely happen.

The third possible step proposed by the Department of State is the discouragement of the sale of goods subject to export controls to members of Soviet bloc diplomatic missions or to their agents. Unfortunately many of the items subject to export controls are sold openly in United States markets to any purchaser having the means to buy. Eliminating from consideration the cupidity of certain sellers, who might not be restrained even by legislation prohibiting such sale, even a conscientious seller would have no way of knowing whether a casual purchaser was making the purchase for a Soviet bloc diplomat.

Any further drafts relating to this particular problem would be of considerable interest to this Bureau.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: ~~CLASSIFICATION UNDER~~
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10290

DATE: October 15, 1952

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DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

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Mr. Ray Whearty of the Department on October 10 informally advised that the Bureau's communication to Assistant Attorney General Charles B. Murray, dated October 3, 1952, captioned "Searches of Diplomatic Shipments Leaving the United States (ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel)" had been referred to him by Mr. Simpson in the Division of Records, with a large red stamp at the bottom, reading "Confidential." Mr. Whearty noted that typed on all pages of the communication, in accordance with Executive Order 10290, was the classification "Security Information - Secret." Whearty thought the Bureau would be interested in knowing of this conflict in classifications on this document.

The original of the memorandum in question was obtained temporarily from Mr. Whearty for observation. The file copy of the memorandum was also obtained and it is noted that no such stamp appears on our file copy. Inquiries were made in the offices of all the Bureau officials who handled this piece of mail, and no stamp such as that appearing on the original is located in any of those offices. In fact, all of our stamps read "Security Information - Confidential" rather than just "Confidential."

Mr. Whearty was advised that inquiries at the Bureau failed to reveal that such stamps are in existence in the Bureau. Whearty stated he feels this stamp was probably placed on the communication in question in the Department and that he is making more inquiries along this line. He said he would advise us of the results of the inquiries on an informal basis.

(See Addendum on page 2)

CEH:LL

RECORDED-140
INDEXED-140

62 OCT 24 1952

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Hennrich

10/15/52

Re: Classification Under Executive Order 10290

OR
ADDENDUM - CEH:LL - October 15, 1952

Mr. Whearty has now advised that he has determined the stamp was placed on the memorandum in the Department and that appropriate action has been taken there to preclude a recurrence of such a situation.

[Handwritten signature]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
October 3, 1952

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray
Director, FBI

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS LEAVING
THE UNITED STATES (ICIS SUBCOMMITTEE -
ON FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL)

Referral/Consult

No further word has been received by this Bureau
regarding any such revised draft.

Of possible interest in connection with any
recommendations by the Subcommittee, the following are the
results of a survey made by the Department of State at the
request of this Bureau concerning the treatment afforded
diplomatic baggage and shipments of the United States into
and out of the Communist countries:

(1) Diplomatic Pouches

RECORDED-140 OCT 7 1952
137

The USSR does not inspect accompanied pouches.
Poland does not inspect pouches. Hungary does not inspect
pouches. Rumania does not inspect pouches. Czechoslovakia
does not currently inspect pouches.

(2) Accompanied Baggage of the Chief of Mission

Not currently inspected by USSR, Poland, Hungary,
and Rumania. Czechoslovakia does not inspect incoming
accompanied baggage but does inspect outgoing accompanied
baggage.

(3) "Non-accompanied" Baggage of the Chief of Mission

Subject to inspection in the USSR. Not currently
inspected in Poland and Hungary. Inspection has occasionally
been made in Rumania. Czechoslovakia does not inspect incoming
baggage but does inspect outgoing baggage.

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62 OCT 24 1952

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

(4) Accompanied Baggage of other Diplomatic Personnel

Not inspected in USSR, Poland, and Rumania. Outgoing baggage occasionally checked in Hungary. Outgoing baggage regularly inspected in Czechoslovakia.

(5) "Non-accompanied" Baggage of other Diplomatic Representatives

Inspected in the USSR, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Not inspected in Poland. Incoming not inspected but outgoing inspected in Hungary.

(6) "Non-accompanied" shipments to the Mission

Inspected in the USSR, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Not inspected in Poland and Hungary.

(7) Personal Hand Baggage of Diplomatic Personnel

Not inspected in USSR, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. Inspected in Czechoslovakia on final departure.

(8) Baggage of Personnel Who Hold Special Passports as Distinguished from Diplomatic Passports

Inspected in USSR, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Inspected in detail on departure from Hungary.

A "laissez-passer" which is supposed to be considered as a clearance for baggage and pouches carried by diplomatic personnel is required for admission without inspection of accompanied baggage in the USSR. A "laissez-passer" may be issued by Poland and Rumania but seems to have no particular effect. It is not known whether a "laissez-passer" is issued in Hungary. Czechoslovakia does not issue a "laissez-passer."

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

You will recall that in the original draft on the subject of inspection of outgoing shipments, the Department of State representative urged reciprocity. The above data may be used to determine the full area in which such reciprocal treatment could be undertaken.

The application of strict reciprocity as to many types of baggage and shipments under consideration would limit the number of categories which would have to be subjected to other types of scrutiny, such as X ray.

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Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

October 21, 1952

Director, FBI

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES
(ICIS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL)

Referral/Consult

105-18233-6

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From the standpoint of the security of the United States, the attached draft contains nothing of a constructive nature. In effect, it recommends in general terms the procedures currently being followed.

In the discussion of the problem the draft points out that items known to be taken out by Soviet bloc officials from the United States, although of strategic importance, are not properly critical defense items.

The paper does not indicate the action which might be recommended in the event Soviet bloc officials attempted to take out of the United States, in diplomatic baggage, such "critical defense items."

The paper states that the United States acquires "an appreciable volume of articles of Soviet bloc origin of interest to the United States defense effort" through diplomatic channels available to its missions in Soviet bloc countries. The paper, in this regard, does not attempt to draw any valid conclusions regarding the comparative importance of the items obtained by United States diplomats in Soviet bloc countries to the United States defense effort and the value of the items taken out of the United States by Soviet bloc officials to the Soviet defense effort.

Attachment
105-18233

LW:kc

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Since nothing appears in the paper regarding the specific items the drafter of the paper had in mind, no conclusions can be drawn by this Bureau.

The recommendations are four in number:

(1) Any examination of Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage and shipments must be based on reciprocity.

With regard to reciprocal action, your attention is directed to the memorandum from this Bureau addressed to you under date of October 3, 1952, setting forth the treatment afforded the diplomatic baggage and shipments of the United States into and out of the Soviet bloc countries.

(2) When a Soviet bloc country takes restrictive action with regard to the outgoing shipment of United States diplomatic-accompanied baggage, unaccompanied baggage or pouches, the United States consider the situation thereby created with a view to instituting reciprocal restrictive measures if practical.

This suggestion places a premium on reciprocity rather than on what is best for the internal security of the United States. It presupposes initiative at all times lies with the Soviet bloc countries. This is an unrealistic approach to the question of what is best for the United States.

(3) When specific information is available regarding the possession by Soviet bloc officials of prohibited articles, the appropriate Soviet bloc mission in the United States should be notified that the export of such articles is prohibited and exportation via diplomatic channels would be "an abuse of the diplomatic privilege."

This is the policy currently being followed, but, without effective safeguards to prevent the export of such items, the notification to the Soviet bloc mission serves only to place them on notice as to the amount of information we have regarding their open purchases.

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(4) When information becomes available that prohibited articles are about to be exported in a specific piece of diplomatic material the draft recommends: (a) If in a regular diplomatic pouch, inform the Soviet bloc mission that such export is an abuse of diplomatic right and privilege. (b) If in a specific package under diplomatic seal, request the shipper for a list of the contents of the package and if such list shows prohibited articles, refuse to permit the export of the package. (c) If in diplomatic-accompanied hand baggage or other accompanied baggage, follow the same procedure as in (b). (d) If in diplomatic-unaccompanied baggage, request a list of contents, inspect the baggage and refuse shipment if prohibited articles are found.

As was commented in the memorandum from this Bureau to Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney under date of May 27, 1952, there is little likelihood that Soviet bloc officials will admit to customs officials that their baggage under diplomatic seal contains contraband.

Your attention is directed to an incident at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., on October 8, 1952. On the basis of prior notification from this Bureau, the Department of State made arrangements with the Bureau of Customs to have a Czech courier questioned concerning the contents of the diplomatic baggage in his charge at the time of his departure. The courier and a clerk from the Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., were met at the National Airport by representatives of the Bureau of Customs and the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce. The courier's baggage consisted of a Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic pouch and two cartons from the Czechoslovakian United Nations delegation in New York. The courier was unable to identify the contents on request of customs officials and asked to contact Karel Brus, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., for permission for the courier and the Embassy clerk to inspect the baggage and report its contents. When contacted by the courier, Brus refused this permission. Despite the fact that there was definite information that the Czechs were prepared to ship technical equipment by

- 3 -

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SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

means of this courier, the customs representative permitted the courier and his baggage to depart for Mexico. In this instance the State Department had previously advised the Czech Embassy that the export of such technical equipment was not allowed.

As you are aware, the problem of searching outgoing diplomatic shipments is closely tied in with the problem of searching incoming diplomatic shipments. The internal security of the United States requires a thorough reappraisal of the problem of incoming shipments and the corollary problem of outgoing shipments deserves equal consideration.

There is returned herewith one copy of the September 25, 1952, draft referred to above. Any further drafts relating to this particular problem would be of considerable interest to this Bureau.

- 4 -

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 17, 1952

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING DIPLOMATIC
BAGGAGE AND SHIPMENTSPURPOSE: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

To inform you of the background and recent developments affecting the study of searches of incoming and outgoing diplomatic baggage and shipments.

INCOMING ITEMS:

The problem of the smuggling of atomic weapons and parts in incoming diplomatic baggage and shipments was initially raised by the Bureau by memoranda of November 1, 1947, with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. (117-268-5)

The problem was also presented by the Bureau to the Honorable Brian McMahon, United States Senator, under date of November 4, 1947. (117-268-4)

After the establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the problem was referred to it and under date of April 2, 1951, the ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel prepared certain recommendations based on the erroneous conclusion that the smallest component into which an atomic weapon could be broken weighed more than 500 pounds. The 500 pound weight limitation was discussed orally by Bureau representatives with the Chairman of the ICIS and it was recommended that a check be made with the Atomic Energy Commission before the ICIS Subcommittee draft was accepted. The ICIS continued to study the matter until March, 1952, when the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel of the ICIS presented a report in which the majority recommended no examination of diplomatic baggage and shipments. The Department of Justice representative on the Subcommittee presented a minority view recommending the examination of unaccompanied baggage and the limitation of unsearched diplomatic pouches to 500 pounds weight.

The Bureau, in reply to the Department's inquiries on the ICIS documents, pointed out that searches of diplomatic

RECORDED - 43

117-268 (Smuggling Atomic Weapons)
105-18233 (Searches of Diplomatic Shipments
Leaving the United States)

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Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
Glavin ✓
Harbo ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
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Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

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baggage and shipments were desirable and that if pouches and personal hand luggage of diplomats were not searched, they should, nevertheless, be subjected to X-ray or other type inspection. (117-268-108)

During the ICIS study of this problem the Bureau of Customs representative on the ICIS was reported to be "taking his cue" from the Department of Defense, which was the majority view against searches. (117-268-45)

Under date of June 9, 1952, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security submitted to the National Security representative on Internal Security, Mr. J. P. Coyne, the report of the majority of the ICIS, the Department of Justice minority report, and a copy of a letter from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the ICIS, informing that the IIC agreed with the minority views of the Department of Justice on internal security. (117-268-173)

Mr. J. P. Coyne, of the National Security Council, was advised by letter dated June 20, 1952, that although the FBI, as a member of the IIC, had expressed itself in agreement with the minority views of the Department of Justice in the ICIS report, since it provided a search of certain diplomatic baggage and shipments, nevertheless, it was recognized that the nuclear components of atomic weapons could be brought into the United States in diplomatic pouches weighing much less than 500 pounds. The Bureau recommended consideration of X-ray or other devices to determine the existence of nuclear components. (117-268-169)

Under date of July 1, 1952, it was pointed out to the Attorney General that the majority recommendation of the ICIS afforded no protection to the internal security of the United States and that the minority recommendation, although making a more realistic approach to the problem, was unsatisfactory since parts of atomic weapons or other weapons of mass destruction could be brought to the United States in pouches weighing less than 500 pounds. The question of searches of incoming diplomatic baggage and shipments is still before the National Security Council. (117-268-173)

Since the most recent developments in the small atomic weapons field, the Bureau has urged the AEC to study proper counter-measures and detection devices, and the field offices of the Bureau at important ports of entry are making a survey of the problem as it applies to those ports. (117-268-179)

The Chairman of the AEC has agreed with the Bureau that any 500 pound limitation on pouches is unsatisfactory and that some means must be found to determine whether fissionable material is being brought into the United States under diplomatic immunity through the pouch or other shipments on the persons of the traveling diplomats.

OUTGOING ITEMS:

While the foregoing matters regarding incoming diplomatic material were under consideration, the Bureau had furnished to the Criminal Division and to the Department of State information regarding attempts on the part of Czechoslovakian, Soviet and Hungarian diplomats to evade export controls by shipping out of this country under diplomatic cover materials for which no export license would be granted. The problem was referred to the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel of the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security. Recommendations were made by the Subcommittee which were ineffective and substantially consisted of merely asking the departing official what his diplomatic baggage contained without looking at it. The Bureau informed the Criminal Division of the Department on May 27, 1952, that the recommendations were not calculated to meet the problem.

Under date of September 25, 1952, another Subcommittee draft was prepared in the ICIS and submitted to the Bureau under date of October 15, 1952. This paper suggests the application of reciprocity in searching outgoing diplomatic shipments of countries who search our outgoing diplomatic shipments. The paper recommends that where information is available that prohibited articles are being exported in a specific piece of baggage that it only be searched if it is unaccompanied. This proposal is, of course, unrealistic. A reply to the ICIS document is being prepared.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

During the course of the Bureau's investigation of representatives of the Office of the Commercial Attache, Czechoslovakian Embassy, Washington, D. C., it has been determined that the Czechs have been purchasing strategic materials in the United States for shipment to Czechoslovakia. These purchases have included great quantities of electronic tubes, calibrators, signal generators, microphones, etc. Delivery of many of these purchases has been made to the Offices of the Czech Delegation to the United Nations in New York City and to the apartment of Jaroslav Mercl, a clerk in the Office of the Commercial Attache, Washington, D. C.

Pertinent information has been made available to the Department of State, the Criminal Division of the Department of

Justice, the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce, CIA, ONI, G-2 of the Army, OSI of the Air Force, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The appropriate Governmental agencies were advised on September 26, 1952, that the Czechs were prepared to ship technical equipment previously purchased by them by means of a diplomatic courier who was expected in Washington, D. C., around October 8, 1952. They were also informed that, in connection with the purchase by the Czechoslovakians of technical equipment in the United States, it had been reliably reported that Major Ladislav Korcak, Czechoslovakian Military and Air Attache, Washington, D.C., had purchased twenty-five duffel bags with locks and two sets of iron handles for wooden boxes. (105-16859-56) The Department of State made arrangements with the Bureau of Customs to have the courier questioned concerning the contents of the diplomatic baggage on his departure.

On October 8, 1952, the Czech courier, accompanied by Jiri Cerny, Czech Embassy clerk, and another individual, was met at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., by representatives of the Bureau of Customs and the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce, acting on request of the Department of State. The courier's baggage consisted of a Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic pouch and two cartons from the Czechoslovakian United Nations Delegation in New York. The courier was unable to identify the contents on request of Customs and asked to contact Karel Brus, Third Secretary, Czechoslovakian Embassy, Washington, D. C., for permission for the courier and Cerny to inspect the baggage and report its contents. When contacted by the courier, Brus refused this permission and the Customs Bureau permitted the courier with the baggage to depart for Mexico. (WFOtel 10-9-52 Re: Jaroslav Mercl, IS - R and CZ)

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

These matters are being followed and pertinent developments will be brought to your attention.

EW

Suggest 1. Jones be kept,
thoroughly briefed
2. Memo to A.G.
re above.

K.

Sources has been
briefed on this as of
10-17-52.

E.S.S.

SEC Y INFORMATION - ~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-02-2010

The Attorney General

October 22, 1952

Director, FBI

SEARCHES OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING
DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE AND SHIPMENTS

Reference is made to the memorandum to you from this Bureau, dated July 1, 1952, regarding, "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into the United States," which commented on a report to the National Security Council by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with respect to the examination of incoming diplomatic baggage and shipments to diplomatic missions in the United States. This memorandum commented regarding the grave loophole in the internal security of the United States which existed in the possibility of representatives of Soviet bloc countries bringing parts of atomic bombs or other weapons into the United States through the diplomatic pouch and other diplomatic baggage and shipments.

Since the date of the referenced communication, this Bureau has urged the Atomic Energy Commission to study proper countermeasures and detection devices and the field offices of this Bureau at important ports of entry are making a survey of the problem as it applies to these ports.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission has agreed with this Bureau that any 500 pound limitation on diplomatic pouches as was suggested in the minority report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security regarding the smuggling of atomic bombs is unsatisfactory because research has eliminated any such weight limit for atomic weapons or parts thereof. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission likewise agrees with this Bureau that some means must be found to determine whether fissionable material is being brought into the United States under diplomatic immunity through the pouch or other diplomatic shipments or on the persons of traveling diplomats.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

117-268 ~~SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~
(Smuggling of Atomic Weapons)
105-18233 (Searches of Diplomatic Shipments
Leaving the United States)

LW:cem

63 NOV 17 1952

Downgraded to Secret on 4/9/10
Per 60324 UC BAN/DK/CLS

ORIGINAL FILE IN

During the consideration of the foregoing matters regarding incoming diplomatic material, this Bureau has furnished to the Criminal Division and to the Department of State information regarding attempts on the part of Czechoslovakian, Soviet and Hungarian diplomats to evade export controls by shipping out of this country under diplomatic cover materials for which no export licenses would be granted. This problem, like the problem of smuggling of atomic bombs, was referred to the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic Personnel of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Recommendations were made by the Department of State for the Subcommittee which were ineffective and substantially consisted of merely asking the departing official what his diplomatic baggage contained without looking at it.

This Bureau informed the Criminal Division of the Department on May 27, 1952, that these recommendations were not calculated to meet the problem. Under date of September 25, 1952, another Subcommittee draft was prepared in the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and referred to this Bureau under date of October 15, 1952. This paper suggested the application of reciprocity in searching outgoing diplomatic shipments of countries who search our outgoing diplomatic shipments. The paper recommended that where information is available that prohibited articles are being exported in a specific piece of diplomatic baggage such as a pouch, the offending diplomatic establishment be informed that such export is an abuse of diplomatic privileges. The paper recommends that if the item is in some other package under diplomatic seal that a list of the contents of the package be requested and if the offending diplomatic establishment lists the prohibited items, the export of the package should be refused. Only in the case of unaccompanied baggage is there any recommendation of possible physical inspection of the contents.

These recommendations are unrealistic. There is little likelihood that Soviet bloc officials will admit to United States Customs officers that their baggage under diplomatic seal contains contraband.

- 2 -

As bearing directly on the matter under consideration, you may be interested in an incident which occurred at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., on October 8, 1952. On the basis of prior notification from this Bureau, the Department of State made arrangements with the Bureau of Customs to have a Czech courier questioned concerning the contents of the diplomatic baggage in his charge at the time of his departure. The courier and a clerk from the Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., were met at the National Airport by representatives of the Bureau of Customs and the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce.

The courier's baggage consisted of a Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic pouch and two cartons from the Czechoslovakian United Nations delegation in New York. The courier was unable to identify the contents on request of the customs representative and asked to contact Karel Brus, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., for permission for the courier and the Embassy clerk to inspect the baggage and report its contents. When contacted by the courier, Brus refused this permission. Despite the fact that there was definite information that the Czechs were prepared to ship technical equipment by means of this courier, the customs representative permitted the courier and his baggage to depart for Mexico. In this instance the State Department had previously advised the Czech Embassy on July 29, 1952, that the export of such technical equipment was not allowed.

The internal security of the United States requires a thorough reappraisal of the problem of incoming diplomatic shipments and the corollary problem of outgoing shipments deserves equal consideration. I urge that these views be brought to the attention of the National Security Council when the matter of examination of incoming diplomatic baggage and shipments to diplomatic missions in the United States comes up for consideration by that body.

cc - 2 - Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

TY INFORMATION

Assistant Attorney General
Warren Olney III

May 25, 1953

Director, FBI

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES
(INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL
PERSONNEL)

Reference is made to the memorandum from
this Bureau to former Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray dated January 14, 1953, regarding
the above-captioned matter. Any further drafts of
recommended procedures would be of considerable
interest to this Bureau.

105-18293

RECOMMENDATION
FOR RECIPROCAL
SEARCHES REFERRED
BY STATE TO ITS
OFFICES IN SOVIET
BLOC 7-1-53

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

LW

RECORDED - 7
EX - 106

MAY 26 1953

281

MAY 26 1953

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
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Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

LW:brg

COMM - FBI

MAY 25 1953

MAILED 28

RECEIVED
MAY 26 1953

JUN 5 1953

MR. A. H. BELMONT

November 13, 1952

W. A. BRANIGAN

CONFIDENTIAL FILES MAINTAINED
IN ROOM 1101-IB

○ It is recommended that the file entitled,
"Searches of Diplomatic Shipments Leaving the United
States," Bureau file 105-18293, be maintained with
the confidential files in Room 1101, Identification
Building.

This file contains highly classified information
relating to items being shipped out of the United States
under diplomatic cover by Soviet bloc establishments, as
well as policy proposals for coping with this situation.

The problem presented in this file is closely
associated with the problem existing in the file entitled,
"Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts thereof and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," which
is maintained with the confidential files in Room 1101-IB.

RECOMMENDATION:

Because of the importance of the content of this
file to our national security, it is recommended that it be
maintained with maximum security in the confidential files
in Room 1101-IB, and that its contents be made available
only on a strictly "need to know" basis.

66-17404

LW:hmm

cc: 105-18233

105-18233-
NOT RECORDED
146 NOV 20 1952

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
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Clegg _____
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63 NOV 28 1952

TYMIBINO NO STYLLINT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-17404-16

The Director

October 22, 1952

Mr. Ladd

SEARCHES OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING
DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE AND SHIPMENTS

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS LEAVING
the UNITED STATES

There is attached a memorandum to the
Attorney General bringing him up to date on the
captioned problem, pursuant to your instructions.

This is also to inform you that, also
pursuant to your instructions, Admiral Souers has
been thoroughly briefed by Supervisor E. S. Sanders.

Attachment

LW:gem

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105-18233-
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71 OCT 30 1952

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ORIGINAL FILE IN

117-768-192

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

RECORDED-53

EX-126

Assistant Attorney General
Warren Olney III

February 25, 1954

Director, FBI

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES


Referral/Consult

You requested comments on the draft. There appears to be basically little change from the draft of the ICIS Subcommittee on this problem dated May 20, 1952, which was forwarded to this Bureau by Mr. James M. McInerney, former Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, under date of May 22, 1952.

In connection with Customs inspection of incoming shipments, it is the understanding of this Bureau that it is the intention of the Department of State to request that all incoming unaccompanied diplomatic shipments with the exception of the diplomatic pouch be searched by Customs. It is also this Bureau's understanding that the State Department intends to request such Customs searches of incoming accompanied shipments with the exception of the diplomatic pouch only on a random basis.

The afore-mentioned program of the Department of State involving Customs searches of incoming shipments had apparently not been taken into consideration at the time the attached draft was prepared. If the procedures are applied to outgoing shipments a large existing loophole will be corrected.

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Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____



~~SECRET~~

The recommendations that the Soviet Bloc mission concerned be notified that the export of contraband via diplomatic channels would be an abuse of the diplomatic privilege and the recommendation that the shipper of a suspect package under diplomatic seal list the contents of the package do not appear to offer any practical benefits. In the first instance the United States Government merely informs the Soviet Bloc mission that we know what they are doing. In the second instance the United States Government asks the Soviet Bloc mission to admit in writing that it is shipping contraband. It would be expecting too much for a Soviet Bloc diplomatic establishment to admit shipping contraband unless they were willing to force the issue to see what the U. S. would do. Since this Government does not propose to limit the diplomatic pouch to documentary material because of fear of retaliation by the Soviet Bloc, a question arises as to whether this Government would actually prevent the departure of a Soviet Bloc pouch with contraband on the manifest if Soviet Bloc retaliation against our pouches would be the result.

105-18233

Attachment

cc - 1 - Thomas J. Donegan
Special Assistant to the Attorney General

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
October 26, 1953

Assistant Attorney General
Warren Olney III

Director, FBI

0 SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Consult

Due to the fact that the problem of searches, reciprocal or otherwise, of incoming shipments is still under consideration by the National Security Council's Planning Board, a positive program regarding shipments leaving the United States might be of assistance and guidance in solving the question of incoming shipments.

Could we at this time have the benefit of any suggested planning by the ICIS Subcommittee?

105-18233

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE:
October 1, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF OUTGOING
DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

By letter dated 9/22/54, Scott McLeod of the State Department asked our views as to the desirability of the State Department's giving the Bureau blanket authorization to conduct surreptitious technical examinations of diplomatic pouches in all cases where our information might reflect that diplomatic courier channels were being used to evade export control laws.

We think the State Department should pass on each instance where such an examination is made. The surreptitious technical examination referred to by McLeod means instances where we have, through investigation, ascertained that the Soviets or Satellites have purchased radio equipment or other technical equipment which, under the export laws, they are not allowed to send out of the country, and where they are attempting to use the diplomatic pouches to unlawfully send the material out of the country. We have told the State Department in the past that in some instances we can, in advance, insert radioactive material in these items purchased by the Soviet bloc without obtaining export licenses, thus enabling us, through the use of a Geiger counter, to detect whether these items are included in a diplomatic pouch.

The State Department proposes to give us the green light to utilize these methods wherever we see fit. We are demurring because in the past the State Department has not committed itself as to the course of action it will take, if we do find that this material is included in the diplomatic pouches. We feel that the State Department should commit itself that some course of action will be taken if we go to the trouble and expense of finding out that such material is in the diplomatic pouches.

In addition, each one of these instances involves international relations and can be a very delicate matter, and we think the State Department should specifically pass on each instance. Hence our letter, which is attached, turns McLeod down on his proposal and points out that the real question involved is what action the Department of State would take if it was furnished information that the diplomatic pouches contained such material. It is recommended that the attached letter be sent to McLeod.

Attachment *Secret 10-1-54*

AHB:CSH

55 OCT 12 1954

I am approving the letter but it seems strange when State is willing to pay for going to the green light that we should object.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

57-111
FBI

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: February 11,
1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF PERSONS, BAGGAGE,
PARCEL POST, AND FREIGHT
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

An ICIS Subcommittee has been studying a recommendation that a special examination be made of the baggage of persons known to be or suspected of being destined directly or indirectly to Communist-controlled countries. The Subcommittee noted that the Treasury Department has stated that an examination is made of baggage of departing vessel and aircraft passengers who are on a suspect list. Treasury has noted,

"Very few passports are issued by the State Department to American citizens for travel to Soviet Bloc countries, and as such passports are issued only under very special circumstances and after thorough screening of the individuals involved by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is highly improbable that these travelers would engage in the smuggling of strategic materials out of the country, and it is not believed that a special examination of their baggage is warranted."

By letter dated February 2, 1955, the Chairman of the ICIS inquired as to whether the FBI furnishes to Customs the names of persons the FBI knows to be or suspects of being destined directly or indirectly to Communist-controlled countries. The ICIS inquired as to the nature of information the FBI furnishes to the Bureau of Customs and requested any comments the Bureau may care to make concerning the information which has been furnished by the Department of the Treasury to the ICIS.

Attached is a suggested letter to the ICIS advising that the Bureau does not furnish to Customs the names of individuals the FBI knows to be or suspects of being destined directly or indirectly to Communist-controlled countries

Attachment *sent* 2-16-55ESS:hke
(5 copies)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 43
105-18233-
21 FEB 18 1955

51 FEB 24 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-94938-1

typed

L. V. Boardman

January 11,
1955

A. H. Belmont *Searches of Diplomatic Shipments Leaving
the United States*

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

As a result of the National Security Council decision to tighten up on controls over Soviet bloc diplomatic traffic and shipments, the Department of State sent a note to the Soviet Embassy on June 3, 1954, outlining new regulations in connection with the Customs inspection of outgoing unaccompanied Soviet shipments. The Bureau of Customs issued instructions to their inspectors that the accompanied baggage and effects of the Soviet Ambassador and all other Soviet diplomatic officers attached to the Soviet Embassy shall not be inspected on any arrival or departure. However, unaccompanied baggage and effects of these persons shall be subjected to inspection and manual search upon arrival and to a cursory inspection upon departure. In the case of all other Soviet official personnel accompanied or unaccompanied baggage and effects shall be given cursory inspection upon arrival or departure. The unaccompanied baggage and effects of such personnel shall be subjected to inspection and manual search - upon arrival.

Following delivery of the State Department note, the Soviet Embassy determined from the Department of State that when unaccompanied baggage of Soviet officials is ready for departure the Soviet Embassy should contact the Department of State who would arrange for inspection by Customs at the residence of the Soviet official or at the warehouse handling the shipment

From time to time, through reliable sources, WFO is able to examine the baggage of the Soviet officials for information of interest to the Bureau. It is noted that such activity by WFO is considerably different from the "cursory inspection" which Customs performs. In order that WFO could contact its sources to determine the contents of Soviet shipments with adequate security,

65-30092

Attachment

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Peasinger

Loc - 105-18233
CWP:et:mbr
(5)

105-18233-
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 17 1955

66 JAN 18 1955

7-189

100-1-1000

WFO requested that arrangements be made by Liaison with Customs in order that WFO would receive advance notice of the time and place of Customs examination. Mr. P. J. Sullivan of the Liaison Section discussed this matter with Mr. Chester Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Customs who instructed the Deputy Collector of Customs at the Georgetown Customs House to advise WFO in advance concerning Customs inspections of Soviet baggage and effects.

RECOMMENDATION:

That WFO be advised concerning the above. A letter to WFO for this purpose is attached hereto for approval.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: September 27,
1954

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Mr. B. Willis, Jr., of the Internal Security Division of the Department, called at the Bureau at 2 p.m., September 24, 1954, and discussed the captioned matter with Supervisor Whitson.

Mr. Willis stated the Department files showed there was still pending in ICIS the question of searches of outgoing diplomatic baggage. He wondered where he could find additional data on the status of this problem.

He was referred to the following:

1. The reciprocal search program instituted during the past summer by Customs, with State Department concurrence and instructions.

2. The status report to NSC on the Continental Defense Program.

3. The discussions currently in progress regarding the acquisition of strategic intelligence. This has only indirect bearing on the question of diplomatic baggage.

It was pointed out to Willis that the NSC planning board, at insistence of State, Defense and CIA had gone on record as opposing the idea of limiting the contents of the Diplomatic Pouch to documentary material.

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED - 87

None. For your information.

105-18233

LW:blo)

OCT 4 1954

Memorandum for The Director, 2/11/55

unless there are some reasons for notifying Customs, such as knowledge or indication that such persons may attempt to violate U. S. Customs laws. The Bureau does not, of course, know the identities of all individuals who may be destined for Communist-controlled countries and, if any such list is to be furnished to Customs, such list should be furnished by the State Department, which is in the best position to make this notification. There appears to be no reason why the Bureau should notify Customs in any cases except where there is information indicating the person may attempt to violate U. S. Customs laws or where there is some other specific reason therefor.

The attached letter to the ICIS also notes that the Bureau furnishes to the Department of State, upon request, any information which the Bureau may have concerning any individual in the United States who is going abroad. The letter notes, in addition, that the FBI furnishes to the Department of State any derogatory information the FBI may have concerning individuals who the FBI determines may be going abroad or who may be attempting to perpetrate passport frauds or violations. The letter notes that the FBI does not, in connection with the issuance of passports, make a "thorough screening" of individuals who are known to be or suspected of being destined directly or indirectly to Communist-controlled countries as indicated by the Treasury Department.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Chairman of the ICIS.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-02-2010 BY 60324 UC/BAW/SAB/DF

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Tamm

DATE: 8/11/60

FROM : B. J. White

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC
SHIPMENTS

A review of an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) news release dated 8/1/60, revealed that Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., had been awarded a \$30,170 contract (#AT-30-1-2586) for "an investigation of limiting factors in proposed schemes for surveillance of luggage by nuclear techniques."

Since we are vitally interested in luggage inspections from both criminal and internal security standpoints, it is felt that Liaison should obtain further information relative to the instant contract to determine if the contract is directly applicable to airline luggage inspections for bomb devices or to diplomatic shipment inspections for detection of clandestine nuclear weapon components.

ACTION:

Liaison should obtain purpose and details of AEC Contract No. AT-30-1-2586.

1-Mr. Whitson, Room 2710

WRH:FCP

(5)

105-18233

REC-89

ENCLOSURE

4 SEP 9 1960

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. R. O. L'ALLIER

DATE: August 18, 1960

FROM : J. M. FITZGERALD

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Enclosed memorandum White to Tamm of 8-11-60 requested Liaison obtain purpose and details of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contract announced 8-1-60 as having been awarded Catholic University, Washington, D. C. for "an investigation of limiting factors in proposed schemes for surveillance of luggage by nuclear techniques."

On 8-17-60 Mr. Earl Hightower, Chief, Technical Security Branch of the AEC Division of Security, furnished the enclosed copy of the contract in question. Inasmuch as the contract contains no more detail about the background and purpose of the Catholic University study, Hightower made further checks within AEC without reference to Bureau's interest in the matter. He reported that the contract is being administered out of the New York Operations Office of AEC and that there are 3 individuals at Headquarters, AEC, concerned with it; namely, [redacted] and [redacted] all at the AEC Office of Isotopes Development at Germantown, Maryland.

Hightower said that the contract in question was let at the request of [redacted] Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) after recent airline disasters in which "suitcase bombs" were used or suspected of having been used. Hightower learned that Senator Monroney (Dem.-Oklahoma) is also interested in this matter. Hightower added that letters had also been received from people in the scientific world suggesting that AEC use its waste products in dynamite, thus providing a readable background which could be detected in luggage. Hightower said that contract is concerned specifically with attempts to detect by nuclear techniques the presence of unusual objects in luggage being loaded on domestic airline flights. He said that final report of results of the Catholic University study can be made available to the Bureau.

Liaison will follow with AEC in order to obtain a report of the Catholic University study as soon as it becomes available.

57 SEP 13 1960

4 SEP 9 1960

This memorandum is being directed to the attention of the Physics-Chemistry Section of the Laboratory.

ENCLOSURE

JMF:sap (6) Enclosures

1-B.J. White

1-W.R. Heilman

1-Whitson

1-Liaison

1-Fitzgerald

LIAISON

b6
b7c

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this contract.

Witnesses as to execution
in behalf of the Contractor:

/s/ J. E. Rupp
Washington 17, D. C.
(Address)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

BY: /s/ Morris Goldberg
Contracting Officer

/s/ J. A. Brady
Washington 17, D. C.
(Address)

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

BY: /s/ William J. McDonald, Rt. Rev. Mgr.

TITLE: Vice President

I, James A. Wagner, certify that I am the
Assistant Secretary of the corporation named as Contractor
herein; that William J. McDonald who signed this contract on
behalf of the Contractor was then Vice President of
said corporation; that said contract was duly signed for and on behalf of
said corporation by authority of its governing body and is within the scope
of its corporate powers.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and the seal of said
corporation.

/s/ James A. Wagner, Rt. Rev. Mgr.

(Corporate Seal)

Upon submission of covering invoices or vouchers, evidencing, to the satisfaction of the Commission, the purchase by the Contractor of the following item(s) of Government Property, title to which shall pass directly from the vendor to the Government:

Electronic Equipment	\$8,600.00
----------------------	------------

(or the net delivered cost to the Contractor for each of the above items, whichever is less); provided, however, that the contractual provisions as to such equipment purchases may be changed in whole or in part (and an appropriate change made in paragraph 1 of this Article III), at the discretion of the Commission, which shall be reflected by a formal modification to this contract.

Said payments shall be made on or as soon as practicable after the respective times specified.

3. It is understood and agreed that in performing the research activities hereunder, the Contractor shall accord substantially with, but shall not be bound to conform to, the details of the budget therefor which has been finally approved by, and is on file in the New York Operations Office of the Commission and with the Contractor.

ARTICLE IV - ADDITIONAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS

All of the provisions of the instrument captioned "MASTER TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION LUMP-SUM, BASIC-RESEARCH CONTRACTS WITH THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA"

(9/15/59), duplicate originals of which are on file in the New York Operations Office of the Commission and with the Contractor, are hereby incorporated in and made a part of this contract.

It is understood, however, that if, in the course of research, discoveries are made or any data is used or developed that constitute "restricted data" within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Contractor shall promptly inform the Commission. The continuation of research activities found to involve such restricted data will be subject to subsequent agreement between the Contractor and the Commission.

2. The research activities contemplated by this contract shall be carried out under the direction of Dr. Edward D. Jordan, or such other member(s) of the Contractor's staff as may be satisfactory to the Commission.

ARTICLE II - PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The period of performance of this contract shall commence on May 1, 1960, and continue up to and including September 15, 1960; provided, however, that the term of this contract may be extended for additional periods by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE III - CONSIDERATION

1. In consideration of the Contractor's performance hereunder, the Commission shall pay the Contractor the sum of not more than \$30,170.00 as more specifically provided in paragraph 2 below.

2. Payments will be made by the Commission as follows:

Upon execution of this contract, \$21,570.00

~~XX~~

Said payments shall be made on or as soon as practicable after the respective times specified.

CONTRACT NO. AT(30-1)-2586, Mod. No. 1

THIS MODIFICATION, entered into the 20th day of June, 1960, by and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter referred to as the "Government"), as represented by the UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), and THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA (hereinafter referred to as the "Contractor"),

WITNESSETH THAT:

WHEREAS, the Government and the Contractor entered into Contract No. AT(30-1)-2586, the 1st day of May, 1960, for the performance by the Contractor for certain research; and

WHEREAS, the parties desire to modify said contract, as hereinafter provided; and

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the Government to expand the magnitude of the work hereunder; and

WHEREAS, this modification is authorized by law, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;

NOW, THEREFORE, Contract No. AT(30-1)-2586, is hereby modified as follows:

1. In paragraph 1 of Article III, substitute the amount "\$40,170.00" for the amount "\$30,170.00".
2. In paragraph 2 of Article III, substitute the amount "\$16,870.00" for the amount "\$21,570.00", and substitute the amount "\$23,300.00" for the amount "\$8,600.00".

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this document.

Witnesses as to execution
in behalf of the Contractor:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

By: UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

/s/ J. E. Rupp

Catholic University of America
Washington 17, D. C.
(Address)

/s/ Morris Goldberg
Contracting Officer

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

/s/ J.A. Brady

Catholic University of America By: /s/ William J. McDonald,
Washington 17, D. C.
(Address)

Rt. Rev. Msgr.

Title: Vice President

6/27/60

Lump-Sum, Basic-Research Contract

CONTRACT NO. AT(30-1)-2586

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
NEW YORK OPERATIONS OFFICE

THIS CONTRACT, effective the 1st day of May, 1960,
by and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter referred to as the
"Government"), as represented by the UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
(hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), and THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
OF AMERICA, a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its
principal office in Washington, D. C. (hereinafter referred to
as the "Contractor"),

WITNESSETH THAT:

WHEREAS, the Commission desires to have the Contractor perform certain research,
as hereinafter provided; and

WHEREAS, this contract is authorized by law, including the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954;

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE I - STATEMENT OF WORK

1. The Contractor shall furnish the necessary personnel, facilities and
equipment, and shall do all other things necessary, in accordance with a
program(s) approved by the Commission, for the purpose of conducting the
following unclassified research activities:

An Investigation of Limiting Factors in Proposed Schemes for Surveillance
of Luggage by Nuclear Techniques.

TRUE COPY:

- 1 -

(b,rev.1)

M. Murray
084

I, James A. Wagner, certify that I am
the Assistant Secretary of the corporation named as Con-
tractor herein; that William J. McDonald who signed this document
on behalf of the Contractor was then Vice President of said
corporation; that said document was duly signed for and on behalf of said
corporation by authority of its governing body and is within the scope of its
corporate powers.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and the seal of
said corporation.

/s/ Rt. Rev. Wm. James A. Wagner

(Corporate Seal)

Office of [illegible]

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This document consists of 3 pages.
No. 6 of 9 copies. Series A.

MODIFICATION NO. 1
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT TO
CONTRACT NO. AT(30-1)-2586

MODIFICATION NO. 1

CONTRACTOR AND ADDRESS:

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Washington, D. C.

MODIFICATION FOR:

EXPANSION OF MAGNITUDE OF CONTRACT
ACTIVITIES

INCREASE IN COMMISSION OBLIGATION: \$10,000.00

TOTAL COMMISSION OBLIGATION: \$40,170.00

SUBMIT INVOICES TO:

United States Atomic Energy Commission
New York Operations Office
376 Hudson Street
New York 14, New York

TRUE COPY:

M. Murray
BY

UNITED STATES G

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Memorandum

TO : MR. R. O. L'ALLIER *✓*

DATE: 9-28-60

FROM : J. M. FITZGERALD *JMF*SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
1 page

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

Previous memoranda have indicated that Catholic University, Washington, D. C., is conducting a study under Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contract, into the feasibility of using nuclear techniques to detect unusual objects in luggage on airplanes, this study having been instigated at the request of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).

Liaison has been following this matter closely with AEC and on 9-27-60 Mr. Earl Hightower of AEC Security furnished one copy each of the May, June and July monthly progress reports furnished to AEC by Catholic University. These are enclosed.

Hightower said that the study is continuing and we will be furnished copies of further reports from him. Liaison will follow with Hightower.

ACTION:

This memorandum and enclosed reports are being directed to the attention of the Laboratory.

Enclosures

JMF:sap (7)

1-Trainor
1-B.J. White
1-W.R. Heilman
1-Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Fitzgerald

ENCLOSURE
3

51 NOV 7 1960

REC- 88

105-10-19
12 NOV 1 1960

The Catholic University of America
Washington 17, D.C.

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DATE 08-02-2010 BY 60324 UC/BAW/SAB/DF

DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL AND
AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING

June 30, 1968

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Office of Isotopes Development
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: J. W. Hitch

Dear Mr. Hitch:

Enclosed you will find the first Monthly Progress
Report for Contract AM(30-1)2586, "Limiting Factors in
Identification of Selected Materials by Nuclear
Techniques."

Any comments that you care to make are welcomed.

Very truly yours,

Edward D. Jordan
Principal Investigator

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY, 1960 MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT

KEY FACTORS IN RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED
MATERIALS BY NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES

ARC CONTRACT AT(30-1)2586

Abstract

This is the first progress report for the investigation of the limiting factors in the rapid identification of selected materials by nuclear techniques. Activity on the project was initiated during the first week of May. As usual at this initial stage of a research project little technical progress can be reported. Equipment capabilities and availabilities were determined and major equipment orders were placed by the end of the month. Approximately \$26,000.00 of Atomic Energy Commission funds were committed. This represents most of the anticipated project expenditures (67% of the revised estimated budget).

Introduction

Various schemes have been proposed for the rapid identification of selected materials such as explosives by nuclear techniques. One such scheme which is being investigated by the Catholic University of America is based upon the detection of the products of a neutron interaction with some component of the explosive device. Of particular interest is the possibility of incorporating additives to commercially manufactured explosives. In this scheme the suspected material is exposed to a beam of thermal neutrons which results in the liberation of a gamma ray. The gamma radiation could then be detected by a scintillation crystal and appropriate electronic circuitry. Because of the many possibilities for neutron thermalization and absorption as well as gamma ray production and attenuation an experimental program is required to realistically determine the level of technical feasibility.

The project was formally initiated on May 1 and approximately 10% of the currently foreseen project work was completed by the end of the month. The first task undertaken was to review the specifications and capabilities of the required major items of equipment. Since it is apparent that the key item of equipment for this approach is a high-intensity neutron generator, it was determined that the production of this unit was desired. It was determined that the only unit of this type currently available in the United States could be obtained from the Texas Nuclear Corp. This unit is

essential small Cockcroft Walton accelerator which delivers up to 4 $\times 10^9$ neutrons/sec at 150 Kv with pulse lengths as short as μ s. Efforts made to obtain this unit on loan were not successful since Texas Nuclear would consider only an outright purchase agreement at a cost of \$22,500.00. Since this amount of funding was not available from the Commission a decision was made to obtain another source. The McCullough Tool Company of Los Angeles was contacted for possible use of their oil-well logging neutron generator which has a production rate of 10^9 neutrons/sec. Lack of a readily available commercial model prevented this source from being acquired. Finally the Kaman Nuclear Corp. neutron source with a rating of 10^8 neutrons/sec was obtained on loan. This source produces a pulse of 10^7 neutrons with a maximum output of 10 pulses per second. The tube lifetime of the current model is approximately 100,000 pulses, which is equivalent to about three hours of continuous operation. Because of the relatively low neutron source strength obtained with this source, the measurement of detectable effects becomes more difficult. This may be alleviated in part by additional detection equipment.

Another major item of equipment is the multi-channel pulse height analyzer. Five firms were contacted for information on the availability and capabilities of their analyzers: Radiation Instrument Development Laboratories, Radiation Counter Laboratory, Nuclear Data, Victoreen and Technical Measurements. The pulse height analyzer could not be obtained on loan at a reasonable

cost. It was decided, following the suggestion of the Atomic Energy Commission, to purchase outright an appropriate unit. Because of the capabilities and the immediate delivery that could be obtained with the RIDL 200 channel transistorized analyzer, an order was placed for this unit.

Because of the lack of success in obtaining a high intensity neutron source a greater amount of detectional equipment is required to partly compensate for this loss in sensitivity. The exact amount of compensation that can be obtained by increasing the number of crystal detectors is presently unknown and can only be determined by experimental measurements.

Budgetary

Because of the purchase of a multi-channel pulse height analyzer, \$300.00 in additional funding was requested from the Atomic Energy Commission on May 31. This was in accordance with suggestions made by the AEC.

The amounts of AEC funds for the month of May were as follows:

Two Neutron Generators (Two on Loan)	\$ 1,500.00
High Voltage Supply	495.00
Two Amplifiers (Two)	1,720.00
Two Counters (Two)	2,190.00
Multi-Channel Pulse Height Analyzer	
Print Out Mechanism	12,695.00
Crystal Phototube and Preamplifiers	6,022.75
Cadmium and Barium Materials	228.00
Lead Box Shielding	901.00
Miscellaneous Materials and Supplies	55.35

This total commitment of \$25,607.10 represents 67% of the revised estimated budget.

Part of the University's contribution of equipment to the project is as follows:

Equipment:

Geiger General Long Counter with Chamber	\$1,500.00
Fast-Slow Neutron Survey Meter	1,275.00
Neutron Chicago Cutie Pie	345.00
Neutron Chicago B - Y Probe	255.00
Neutron Chicago Scaler	735.00
Neutron Chicago Timer	102.00
Television Oscilloscope	<u>750.00</u>
	\$4,962.00

The principal investigator devoted approximately 56 hours to the project during the month and the associate investigator 8 hours. His professional time amounting to \$665.00 is part of the University's contribution and is not charged to the Atomic Energy Commission.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- No. 1 D. P. Richtmann, NYOO, AEC
2 O. M. Bizzell, OGD, AEC
3 J. W. Hitch, OGD, AEC
4 J. C. Dempsey, OGD, AEC
5-7 TISE, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
8 H. Potter, Brookhaven Area Office, NYOO, AEC
9 D. E. Marlowe, CUA
10 J. L. Lackler, CUA
11 C. L. Cowan, CUA
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C. L. Cowan, CUA

P. L. Talbott, CUA

H. L. Johnston, CUA

E. D. Jordan, CUA

P. G. De Bottoncourt, CUA

E. E. Brady, CUA

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VI. SUMMARY

A workshop on the applications of nuclear techniques to the detection of explosives in aircraft luggage was held on June 10 at AEC Headquarters in Washington with representatives from AEC, NRL, FBI, Army, the Detention Branch and Catholic University. The Catholic University approach to this problem was presented and liaison was established with other groups working on this problem.

The principal investigator went to the meeting of the American Nuclear Society in Chicago on June 14 and 15 in order to attend the session on the application of isotopes and in particular to hear the papers presented by the General Motors Laboratory on the γ ray spectra of explosives.

On June 24 a visit was made to Fort Belvoir with representatives of the FBI in Washington. Various approaches to the problem of nuclear detection of explosives was discussed with the various groups at Fort Belvoir interested in this general problem.

The Commission funds committed for this project through June 30 amounted to \$22,445. This represents approximately 75% of the estimated project expenditures.

The University of Arizona's total contribution toward this project through June 30 amounted to \$6,638.

The principal investigator is Dr. J. J. Kelly and V. I. Kelly, the Russian is V. I. Kelly, Sergeant

of these problems were corrected with the assistance of RIDL. Other problems are still not totally corrected (as of the end of July). This is probably due to the complexity of the instrument which requires a relatively long "debugging time."

Salting materials to be used as targets also arrived during the month. Materials that will be investigated are Gadolinium Oxide (99%+), Gadolinium Nitrate (99%+), Gadolinium-Samarium Oxide (45%-45%+) and Gadolinium-Samarium Nitrate (45%-45%+). The advantage in using a possible Gadolinium-Samarium mixture is due to its relatively low price as compared to the pure form of Gadolinium.

The gamma spectra of both Gadolinium and Samarium were determined using primarily the Russian data (1). As suspected they were found to be quite complex. The primary gamma ray energy peaks from Gadolinium are at 1.13 Mev and 0.96 Mev. Each of these have an approximate intensity factor of 10%.

Some measurements were undertaken with gadolinium oxide as the target material. The results of this indicated that the 0.96 and the 1.13 Mev peaks were detected. This series of measurements used a plutonium-beryllium fast neutron source with a fast neutron (average about 4 Mev) output of 1.68×10^6 neutrons/sec. Definite identification of peaks or positions at this point is not complete. Measurements that will be made include the effect of the following factors on the signal to background ratio: amount of material, geometry of the detector, detector position, and neutron intensity level. It is believed that about 20% of the work load of the program was completed through June 30.

Introduction

Various schemes have been proposed for the rapid identification of suspected materials such as explosives by nuclear techniques. One such scheme which is being investigated by the Catholic University of America is based upon the detection of the products of a neutron interaction with some component of the explosive. Of particular interest is the possibility of incorporating additives to commercially manufactured explosives. In this approach the suspected material is exposed to a beam of thermal neutrons which results in the liberation of a gamma ray. The gamma radiation could then be detected by a scintillation crystal and appropriate electronic circuitry. Or alternately, the depression of γ radiation due to capture of neutrons by moderating materials may be detected when the suspected material is exposed to thermal neutrons. Because of the many competing possibilities for neutron thermalization and absorption as well as gamma ray production and attenuation an experimental program is required to specifically determine the level of technical feasibility.

Program

During the course of some most of the equipment and materials which were needed during May were delivered. The equipment was tested and found to be satisfactory. The following are some of the items such as multi-channel pulse height analyzer. There were problems with the multi-channel analyzer not properly. Some

Abstract

Most of the equipment for the project arrived this month and preliminary measurements were undertaken with the belief that the γ rays would appear at 0.96 and 1.18 Mev. Although this was not certain at the time. Approximately \$10,000 of Atomic Energy Commission funds were committed from the initiation of the project through June 30 with a University contribution of about \$6,650 for the same period.

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUNE, 1960 MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT

FACTORS IN RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED
MATERIALS BY NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES

ABC CONTRACT AT(30-1)2586

Cambridge Mass

D. E. Kitchmann, NYCO, ABC

G. E. Russell, OGD, ABC

J. W. Hitch, OGD, ABC

J. C. Thompson, OGD, ABC

W. H. Higgs, WASH

M. J. Porter, Brookhaven Area Office, NYCO, ABC

D. E. Harlowe, CUA

A. J. Harlowe, CUA

F. A. Talbot, CUA

E. L. Johnston, CUA

A. J. Harlowe, CUA

A. J. Harlowe, CUA

A. J. Harlowe, CUA

Cambridge Engineering Firm

Table I - Preliminary Data: Masking Effect of Gd₂O₃ on Hydrogen Neutron Source

Run No.	Neutron Source to Crystal Distance (cm)	Test Channel Width (cm)	Counting Time, Lifetime (Minutes)	(Peak/Background) No Gd ₂ O ₃	(Peak/Background) Gd ₂ O ₃	Remarks
11	21	1.1	2.0	1.38		
13-1	21	7.4	2.0	1.17	1.17	
13-2	21	7.4	2.0	1.10	1.10	
13-3	21	7.4	2.0	1.38	1.38	
13-4	21	7.4	2.0	1.27	1.27	
13-5	21	1.1	2.0	1.05	1.05	
13-6	21	1.1	2.0	1.07	1.07	
13-7	21	7.4	10.5	1.02	1.02	
13-8	21	1.1	2.0	1.05	1.05	
13-9	21	7.4	2.0	1.05	1.05	

Various schemes have been proposed for the rapid identification of special materials such as explosives by nuclear techniques. One such scheme which is being investigated by the Catholic University of America is based upon the detection of the products of a neutron interaction with some component of the explosive device. Of particular interest is the possibility of incorporating additives to commercially manufactured components of the bomb. In this approach the suspected material is exposed to a beam of thermal neutrons which are captured resulting in the liberation of a gamma ray. The gamma radiation could then be detected by a scintillation crystal and associated electronic circuitry. Or alternately, the depression of the gamma radiation due to capture of neutrons by the moderating material surrounding the neutron source may be detected when the suspected material is exposed to thermal neutrons due to the masking effect of high cross section material. Because of the many competing possibilities for neutron thermalization and absorption as well as gamma production and attenuation an experimental program is in progress to realistically determine the level of technical feasibility.

Differential measurements on gadolinium oxide were made with

the following results: and the 1.1 MeV gamma ray produced

the method of measurement (adding a positive signal with the presence of gadolinium to a negative background signal and taking

the difference) emphasis was placed on the investigation of a technique using the thermal neutron masking effect of gadolinium.

This report makes use of a plutonium beryllium source to supply fast neutrons to the systems. The neutrons are then rapidly thermalized by hydrogen moderator and after thermalization are absorbed by the test material (which has a high cross section) emitting a very strong gamma ray. The neutrons then escape (mostly by diffusion) from the moderator surrounding the source through the test channel, into another layer of moderator placed in front of the crystal detector. Therefore the crystal sees 2.23 Mev gamma rays from the moderator before the test channel and after the test channel. The test channel can contain harmless materials or materials containing high neutron capture cross section additive materials such as gadolinium. When a high cross section material is present in the moderator the neutron flux is depleted allowing less neutrons to flow into the layer of moderator near the crystal causing a decrease in the number of 2.23 Mev gamma rays as seen by the electronic detector. The background gamma radiation increases due to the (n, γ) reaction from gadolinium. Therefore the number of gamma rays in the 2.23 Mev peak to background ratio in the background varies. This gives an indication of the presence and degree of a neutron absorber in the test channel. It is interesting to note that this technique might have broader application than the labeling of explosives.

With this technique the data is reported in terms of the number

of 2.23 was due to hydrogen capture compared to the back-
ground level. This quantity is determined under the same condi-
tions with the presence of gadolinium. The ratio of
these quantities given an indication of the effect of gadolinium as
a neutron absorber. The gadolinium used in these runs was in the
form of gadolinium oxide powder placed in inactive plate holders. The
dimensions of the gadolinium target were 17 cm by 22 cm with the
thickness of about 0.1 cm.

Information obtained from the American Potash and Chemical Corp.
and Krypton Chemicals Inc. indicate that with current technology and
an expanded market of about 500 tons of gadolinium the price
of gadolinium could be about \$10.00 per pound. There is apparently
no shortage of gadolinium or samarium even at expanded market rates.

Future experiments will be undertaken with thinner and smaller
targets of gadolinium and samarium (both in the oxide and nitrate
form). The effect of the masking effect will continue with emphasis
on the effect of the masking effect. The effect of battery interaction with
gadolinium will be considered. It appears that about 50% of the
work of the project was completed through July 31.

About \$7,157.00 of funds committed for the project through
July 31, 1964. This represents approximately 52%

\$7,157.00.

Abstract

A technique which determines the masking effect of gadolinium on the 2.2 MeV gamma ray peak from hydrogen capture of neutrons was investigated. This method indicated that a relatively strong gadolinium discrimination signal may be obtained under test conditions. Results will be placed on this technique in undertaking future experiments. Approximately \$31,600 of Atomic Energy Commission funds were committed for expenditure from the initiation of the project through July 31. The University contributed approximately \$7,160 toward the project for the same period.

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY, 1960 MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT

RESEARCH IN RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED
MATERIALS BY NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES

AEC CONTRACT AT(30-1)2586

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: December 22, 1960

FROM : J. M. Fitzgerald

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

(U)

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

Previous memoranda have reported results of a study being performed by Catholic University under Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contract regarding feasibility of using nuclear techniques to detect unusual objects in luggage in airplanes.

On 12-22-60 Mr. Earl Hightower of AEC Security furnished the enclosed copy of a report from Catholic University dated 12-1-60. Hightower recognized that the copy is not as legible as might be desired and he stated that he was trying to obtain a more legible copy for transmittal to us.

Hightower also advised that Catholic University is continuing its study into this matter and that recently a demonstration which was considered reasonably successful was put on at the University for the benefit of some AEC representatives. Hightower said that he had not heard about this demonstration until after it was over, therefore, he was not able to alert us in advance. He suggested we might wish to contact Catholic University directly concerning another demonstration. In any event he assured that he will continue to furnish us copies of reports from the study as they come to his attention.

ACTION:

This memorandum and enclosed report are being directed to the attention of the Laboratory.

JMF:ban
(7)

- 1 - Mr. Trainor
- 1 - Mr. B.J. White
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Heilman
- 1 - Mr. Whitson
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

Enclosure

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15 JAN 16 1961

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57 JAN 24 1961

~~SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tamm

DATE: 1/5/61

FROM : B. J. White

SUBJECT: ~~SEARCHES OF LUGGAGE~~

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

On 8/1/60, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced that a contract had been awarded to Catholic University, Washington, D. C., for an "investigation of limiting factors in proposed schemes for searching of luggage by nuclear techniques." Memorandum White to Tamm dated 8/11/60, requested liaison to obtain purpose and details of contact. Memorandum J. M. Fitzgerald to L'Allier dated 12/22/60, attaches a copy of Catholic University's report received from Mr. Earl Hightower of the AEC Security. This report, dated 12/1/60, sets forth the results of Catholic University's studies to date.

Briefly, Catholic University's approach is a method whereby an extra element would have to be included in dynamite by all of the manufacturers. This element is then detected in the secreted dynamite by subjecting the luggage to a neutron source. By nuclear absorption, the included element would emit gamma radiation which would be detected by scintillation counter techniques.

Catholic University experimentally tried adding a gadolinium salt (50 grams of gadolinium) to dynamite and irradiation with a steady state plutonium beryllium neutron source. Since such a source emits fast neutrons, it is necessary to surround it with paraffin to obtain thermalized (slow) neutrons. It was found that a complex gamma ray spectrum resulted making discriminating detection difficult.

Promising results were obtained by using 2.4 grams of boron instead of gadolinium distributed uniformly throughout three simulated sticks of dynamite in a 5" attache case. However, it was concluded that considerable refinement of the techniques and additional data is needed before this approach could be considered commercially feasible.

Although the above techniques are technically sound and, as indicated, are experimentally workable under controlled laboratory conditions, they do not appear to be practical. Each baggage processing point would require considerable complicated technical equipment as well as operators and the method would require additional expenses and equipment for the manufacturers of dynamite. In addition, even if the method were practical, it would not encompass homemade devices not necessarily requiring dynamite or any commercial explosive.

ACTION: For information.

JAN 23 1961

- 1 - Mr. Trainor, Room 4706 (sent direct)
- 1 - Mr. Whitson, Room 2710 (sent direct)
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald, Room 7647 (sent direct)

WRH: KO (7)

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Figure 1

Experimental Device




TABLE II

Masking Effect of High Cross-Section Materials

Target	Distance of Target from Crystal (cm.)	Noise to Signal Ratio
Gd_2O_3 (10 gm.)	5	2.74
	10	2.55
	15	2.24
	20	1.96
Gd_2O_3 (4 gm.)	5	1.97
	10	2.02
	15	1.84
	20	1.62
$Gd(NO_3)_3 \cdot 6H_2O$ (45%)	5	1.99
$Sm(NO_3)_3 \cdot 6H_2O$ (45%) (9.25 gm.)	10	2.04
	15	1.80
	20	1.63
Borax, $Na_2B_4O_7 \cdot 10H_2O$ (21 gm.)	5	1.62
	10	1.65
	15	1.54
	20	1.40

Table I

High Cross Section Additive Materials ($\sigma_a > 200$ barn)

Element	A	σ_a (barn)	Gamma Ray Spectra
Gd	64	45,000	Complex 11% of captives to $E_\gamma = 0.96$ mev 10% of captives to $E_\gamma = 1.18$ Mev
Sm	62	5,600	Complex
Eu	63	4,300	Complex
Cd	48	2,450	Complex
Dy	66	950	Complex
B	5	0.1 (n, γ) 755 (n, α)	Simple, $E_\alpha = 0.48$ mev
In	77	410	Complex
Fe	80	380	Complex

sticks of dynamite of dimensions 8 in. by 1.25 in. These runs were taken with the sample in a 12 cm. test chamber in which a small 12 cm. thick "attache-type" suitcase can be interposed. The ratio is sustained with the boron in the suitcase when the suitcase is filled with typical travelling materials such as clothing, shaver, etc. It should be emphasized that this data was taken with a point neutron source rated at 1.68×10^6 neutron/sec. The counting time was varied down to twelve seconds and in some cases six seconds live time with the ratio being sustained. However, statistical effects can result in decreased reliability when counting times are in the order of seconds. This technique appears attractive as a relative "quick and dirty" type of scan.


An effective detectional device would probably require the combination of several different schemes. This particular approach is considered to be a relative technique directed toward a rapid scan of baggage resulting in a low percentage of possible suspected bags. These suspected bags could then be scanned by a more absolute but time consuming technique.

Considerable refinement of the technique and additional data is needed before this approach can be considered to be commercially feasible. In particular, the statistical variation and distribution of high cross section materials in typical airline baggage is required.

Other applications are foreseen for some of these detectional schemes. For example, it has been suggested that the use of borated water in hydrological studies could be used in conjunction with a plutonium bryllium source and BF_3 counter to determine flow rates and flow patterns in various bodies of water.

sustained down to a counting time of one second with increasing statistical error because of the decrease in the total number of counts. The problem with this technique is in the variability of the noise level of different suitcases, i.e., a standard noise level does not exist. A possible method of creating a standard noise level might consist of monitoring the 2.23 Mev peak due to hydrogen capture. If the assumption is made that most parasitic neutron capture in bags would be by hydrogen, then this might be an effective means of normalization.

While we were investigating the masking effect due to the boron capture of neutrons, we observed the presence of gamma radiation at approximately 0.5 Mev. This temporarily had us somewhat puzzled, since we had previously seen in one of the handbooks that boron does not produce gamma radiation and is, therefore, a good neutron shielding material. However, this is only partially true. The (n, γ) cross section for elemental boron is about 0.1 barn; however, the (n, α) cross section is 755 barns, which has the following reaction:



The indicated branching ratio results in an effective cross section of 700 barn for the production of the excited state of lithium and, therefore, the 0.48 Mev gamma ray.

With this technique, signal to noise ratios of the order of 1.7 were obtained with approximately 2.4 gm. of boron distributed uniformly through a lucite plate in the shape of three adjacent

test channel where the neutrons are subject to varying degrees of absorption depending upon the type and amount of neutron absorber in the channel. The gamma radiation produced by neutron absorption can be detected by scintillation techniques. The depressed neutron flux can be measured with a BF_3 counter. The pulses are counted and analyzed by conventional techniques.

Samples of Gadolinium oxide (about 50 grams Gd) were tested in the device. Because of the complex gamma ray spectra, a difference method of detection was required to see the more prominent peaks. This difference technique consisted of putting the target signal plus the background signal in the analyzer, and then subtracting the background signal in the analyzer in a second run without the target. This obviously is not a practical situation but the technique was used to pick up some parts of the gadolinium spectra. A two minute live time run resulted in the observation of the 0.96 and the 1.18 mev gamma ray peaks. The use of complex spectra additive materials does not appear promising with the use of steady state neutron sources. Pulsed neutron source activation however, might eliminate much of the background and produce a more definitive spectra.

The masking effect of high cross section materials was determined, using a BF_3 chamber as the neutron detector. The ratio of the total number of counts for a prescribed counting time was determined with and without the target material when the test channel was 22 cm. wide. The data for some of these measurements is presented in Table II. A two minute counting time was used for this series of measurements in order to obtain good statistics. Other measurements indicate that the ratio is

This reaction has a small cross section (about 0.1 barn) and would also require a nitrogen density device to distinguish between high density explosive nitrogen and low density nitrogen as found in fabrics.

3. Fast Neutron Interactions - The backscattering of fast neutrons can be detected when the backscattering is caused by a few component materials system. This does not appear to be feasible in a multi-component systems because of the lack of resolution.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY'S APPROACH

The scheme which we have been looking at makes use of the interaction of thermalized neutrons with high cross section additive materials in the explosive device. Both the prompt gamma rays produced by the (n, γ) reaction and the depression of the thermal neutron flux by the high cross section material may be detected. Table I presents a list of possible high cross section elements that might be considered as additive materials. As seen from the table, the rare earth gadolinium has the highest capture cross section and because of this was the first element to be investigated.

Figure I presents a block diagram of the experimental device as it incorporates the steady state plutonium beryllium neutron source (4 Mev neutrons). A pulsed neutron generator source (14 Mev neutrons) will also be used. Since these sources emit fast neutrons, the source is surrounded with hydrogenous moderating material, such as paraffin ($C_{30}H_{62}$), to thermalize the neutrons. The thermalized neutrons then diffuse into a


shield the radio waves, but may be used to scan passengers for "carry-on" explosives, because of the use of non-ionizing radiation.

4. X-Ray Units - About 10 days ago, the X-Ray Division of the Westinghouse Corporation announced that they have developed an experimental unit that can detect bombs in suitcases. This technique requires visual observation of the bag. Also, the X-rays would fog photographic film.

For the nuclear approaches, we have the following schemes:

1. Radioactive Materials - Here, a radioactive material such as Co^{60} would be added to the commercially manufactured explosive material. This would make the bomb relatively easy to detect, but would require from 10 to 100 microcures per pound of explosive. This results in complicated handling procedures in the manufacturing process, problems in storage of radioactive dynamite and contamination of the environment in closed explosive operations, such as pit or shaft mining.

2. Detection of Nitrogen - This scheme, which was proposed by Dr. Maynard Cowan of the Sandia Corporation, would attempt to detect the presence of nitrogen in a bomb by monitoring for the gamma ray produced by the capture of thermal neutrons in nitrogen:



INTRODUCTION

The general problem upon which we have been working is the detection of bombs in suitcases before they are loaded aboard airplanes. Various schemes have been proposed for the rapid identification of explosive materials. We will briefly review some of these schemes for the purpose of orientation. The various approaches to the problem can be divided into two main groups, viz., non-nuclear and nuclear techniques. Among the non-nuclear approaches are the following:

1. Vibration - In this approach, all suitcases would be vibrated in order to induce the explosive charge to be set off in a controlled environment, e.g., in a blast-proof building at a remote area of the airport. For various reasons, this approach apparently is not acceptable to the airlines.
2. Sound Devices - It appears that the military have developed some very sensitive listening devices which can detect either mechanical or chemical sound, so that the timing mechanism of the bomb might be detected. These devices, however, require a controlled soundproof environment.
3. Radio Waves - In this approach, a miniature tuned circuit would be incorporated into every container of commercially manufactured explosive material. Radio waves would be directed at the target with the resultant detection of the resonant frequency of the tuned circuit. This system cannot be used with suitcases because metallic cases would

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DATE 08-02-2010 BY 60324 UC/EAN/SAB/DF

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

F B I

Date: 9/8/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (105-18233)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-New)

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
IS - R

Re Bureau airtel 8/30/67 concerning captioned matter.

Since the early 1950s, Customs representatives in the Washington metropolitan area have regularly notified this office of the arrival of shipments destined to Iron-Curtain embassies and which shipments require clearance through the Customs Bureau. We have good relations with these representatives and in many instances the Customs Inspector when notifying us of the receipt of a shipment destined to an Iron-Curtain embassy, adds that the shipment contains books, wines, etc.

In a number of instances, WFO has indicated an interest in viewing the shipment as described by the Customs representative and this is done with the explicit understanding that Customs in the course of its normal business opens the shipment and that the FBI's interest is maintained in confidence. WFO does not make a search of shipments. We visually observe the contents and occasionally take photographs of the contents. The opening of the shipments is always left to the judgment of Customs which exercises its prerogative to examine shipments. The searches are made by Customs.

- ③ - Bureau
2 - Baltimore (RM)
2 - New York (RM)
3 - WFO
(1 - 105-12521)
(1 - 105-13117)

CJJ:teb
(10)

EX 104

18 SEP 15 1967

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-02-2010 BY 60324 UC/BAW/SAB/DF

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

BY LIAISON

REC-75

Date: September 12, 1967

To:

Chief, Division of Protective Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: INSPECTION OF BLOC COUNTRY SHIPMENTS
TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES

With reference to your communication of August 28, 1967, a representative of FBI Liaison will be available to discuss with interested officials of the Treasury Department and the Department of State future procedures to be followed in matters of mutual interest regarding incoming and outgoing Soviet-bloc shipments.

The FBI is not interested in searching shipments and will not search such shipments. However, the FBI is interested in being notified if Customs, through inspection and manual search, determines that an incoming shipment contains matters of interest to the intelligence community, such as electronic gear, radio equipment, cameras and other photographic equipment, or weapons, so that these items might be photographed if desired.

LW:cls (8)

NOTE: Classified "~~Confidential~~" because State Department so classified its inquiry to which this is a response.

See memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, dated 9-11-67, captioned "Searches of Diplomatic Shipments; IS - R," prepared by LW:cls.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
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Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

57 SEP 22 1967

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11-27-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
LEAVING THE UNITED STATES

Bufile: 105-18233

Tolson _____
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The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

LWB:amb

(2)

6-7-67
RETAIN IN
SPECIAL FILE
ROOM LW

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5

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Callahan ✓
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Malone ✓
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FAA Seeks Preventive For Airliner Sabotage

By the Associated Press

The Federal Aviation Agency said yesterday it has under way a \$300,000 research program aimed at combatting the bombing of airplanes.

A major portion is centered on the possible seeding of all explosive materials with inert radioisotopes. The presence of such materials could be detected with Geiger counters.

Other possible measures include use of X-rays and fluoroscopes, moisture analysis magnetic reaction and even training animals to detect the distinct odor of nitroglycerine.

The agency long has refused to discuss sabotage-prevention programs for fear publicity might stir psychopathic individuals into action.

However, the recent suspected bombing of a Continental Airlines jet plane has convinced some officials it is time to answer queries on this subject to demonstrate that the agency is not standing idle.

An FAA spokesman said the agency's current budget provides about \$50,000 for the studies.

Primarily the work has involved the radioisotopes approach under a project started by former FAA Administrator E. R. Quesada, with the co-operation of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The study was completed by Catholic University last fall. A

report, still not made public, has been presented to FAA Administrator N. E. Halaby.

Recently the FAA decided to undertake laboratory studies to test solutions suggested by the Catholic University project. The FAA has set aside \$125,000 for this study in the fiscal year starting next month, and a like sum for the fiscal year following.

The work would be aimed at determining how much "branded" material would be required to identify it through luggage. Another question is the required duration of the radioactive material.

The work will include studies at the FAA experimental center at Atlantic City, simulating bomb detection efforts.

*Did we know
of this?*

ENCLOSURE

105-18233
NOT RECORDED
140 JUN 12 1962

ENCLOSURE

- The Washington Post and Times Herald
- The Washington Daily News
- The Evening Star
- New York Herald Tribune
- New York Journal-American
- New York Mirror
- New York Daily News
- New York Post
- The New York Times
- The Worker
- The New Leader
- The Wall Street Journal
- The National Observer
- Date

JUN 12 1962

JUN 3 1962

XEROX
JUN 12 1962

*cc. Mr. Conrad
6-5-62 RHG:Jaw
cc. Belmont, Rosen, Sullivan (at Liaison Sec.)
4 Evans.*

RE: CALBOM
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT
OR MOTOR VEHICLES

the problem because of these obvious loopholes. For example, memorandum from B. J. White to Mr. Tamm January 5, 1961, relating specifically to progress reports obtained by Liaison concerning the work being conducted at Catholic University points out that, although the technique of adding special tracer is experimentally workable, it does not appear to be practical for several reasons including the loophole of "homemade" explosives. There has been no scientific development which would affect either of the two basic weaknesses outlined and it is, therefore, still the Laboratory's opinion that this is not a sound approach to the problem.

ACTION:

None...for information only.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE 11-01-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Memorandum

TO : MR. I. W. CONRAD

DATE: June 5, 1962

FROM : MR. R. H. JEVONS

SUBJECT: CALBOM
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT
OR MOTOR VEHICLES

Summary of Diplomatic Channel to 2000, 1962

The Washington Evening Star for June 3, 1962, carried a news item indicating the Federal Aviation Agency had under way a research program aimed at combating bombing of airplanes. The Director inquired, "Did we know of this?"

In reply to the Director's inquiry, it is noted that the Bureau has been aware of this research program from its inception in the Fall of 1960. At that time Catholic University was awarded an approximately \$30,000 contract for "an investigation of limiting factors in proposed schemes for surveillance of luggage by nuclear techniques." Memorandum from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. L'Allier dated August 18, 1960, sets forth that Earl Hightower of the Atomic Energy Commission advised that this contract was awarded to Catholic University by the Atomic Energy Commission at the request of then Administrator [redacted] of Federal Aviation Agency.

The basic approach considered by this research project involved the "tagging" of commercial explosives at the time of manufacture with radioactive or other materials, the presence of relatively small quantities of these "tagging" materials being sufficient to permit detecting the material inside of ordinary luggage. This technical approach, of course, is not new and was considered in substantial detail back in 1955, when the Bureau made a thorough study of possible technical approaches to the sabotage prevention problem. At that time the Bureau was advised by military representatives that the military would probably not permit their explosives to be marked with radioactive tracers, since many applications of explosives would be lost, such as the use of explosives for concealed military mines, etc., (obviously, if the radioactive tracers would permit the detection of the explosives in luggage, it would also permit detection of the explosives in a concealed military mine). In addition, it is noted that "homemade" explosives are relatively easy to manufacture and a would-be saboteur could readily make his own explosive which would not contain the tracer. Accordingly, there would be two very large loopholes in this radioactive tracer approach to the problem (or any other similar "tagging" approach), namely, explosives manufactured for the military and "homemade" explosives. For this reason, the Laboratory in its study of the problem back in 1955 and on subsequent reviews has consistently felt that this is not a sound approach to

1 - Messrs. Belmont
Evans
Sullivan (Att: Liaison Section)

RHJ:dmg (8) JUN 12 1962

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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 9-11-67

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS LEADING THE
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA *11.5*

Tolson _____
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The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that Department of State be informed Bureau Liaison will meet with interested officials of Treasury and State to discuss procedures with respect to notification by Customs to the FBI regarding incoming and outgoing Soviet-bloc shipments.

BACKGROUND:

Bureau of Customs circular number X-54 dated 6-1-54 provided for reciprocal treatment of incoming and outgoing baggage and effects of diplomatic personnel of Soviet-bloc countries. This provided that unaccompanied Soviet baggage and effects would be subjected to inspection and manual search by Customs upon arrival and to a cursory inspection upon departure. It has been the practice at ports of entry, particularly Baltimore and Washington, D. C., for Bureau of Customs to notify the FBI when shipments inspected by Customs contained items of apparent intelligence interest, such as electronic gear, radio equipment, cameras or other photographic equipment and weapons. This notification has made it possible for Special Agents of the FBI to observe the items and make notes or photograph them. Inspections and manual searches are performed by Customs personnel and not by Special Agents of the FBI.

CURRENT REQUEST:

By memorandum of 8-28-67 [redacted] Division of Protective Security, Department of State, transmitted through Bureau Liaison a memorandum from the Protocol Office of State requesting that the views of the FBI be solicited with regard to a meeting between Treasury, FBI and State to discuss future procedures. [redacted] communication was acknowledged personally 8-31-67 by Bureau Liaison and [redacted] was informed the FBI was checking on the matter.

The Protocol Office reported that over the years 1967, Bureau Agents, according to Treasury, have been examining

Enclosure *sent 9-13-67*

LW:cls (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

32 SEP 11 1967

Handwritten signature and initials

WFO 105-New

With respect to the allegations of the Soviet aide - MEMOIRE, attached to RefBuairtel, regarding the opening of Soviet-Embassy cargo and the damage thereto, the Bureau's attention is referred to Baltimore airtel dated 2/26/67 entitled, "SODAC" and the accompanying LHM. Paragraph one indicates that Customs notified the Baltimore Division of the receipt of a shipment of goods and that it had been damaged in transit and some of the contents had been pilfered. In all instances in Washington, D. C., the custody of the goods has remained within the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities and WFO has not taken possession of them.

The guide lines exercised by WFO as to whether FBI representatives desire to view shipments is one of common sense. Generally, those instances where we have viewed the contents, the shipment concerned electronic, radio, or other technical gear. WFO is of the opinion that we should continue viewing diplomatic shipments when the contents appear to be of interest. The above-described Baltimore LHM concerned the receipt of Phillips' recorders. By airtel dated 5/2/67, the Baltimore Office furnished photographs and descriptions of short-wave radio receivers and other technical gear, including tape recorders. In 10/66, WFO obtained the serial numbers of a number of cameras and lenses which were shipped to the Soviet Embassy.

It is offered that this data is of general intelligence value and that we should continue to view diplomatic shipments on a selective basis as in the past.

Airtel to SACs, Baltimore
New York
WFO

RE: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
105-18233

NOTE CONTINUED:

property of the Embassy and Embassy personnel. Among the items complained of was damage to shipments arriving at the Baltimore and Washington Custom houses. Other complaints included use of obscene language by teenagers, towing away of improperly parked automobiles, etc.

With regard to the Customs item, the Protocol Office, State, indicated that over the years FBI Agents have examined on occasion incoming shipments of goods consigned to Bloc countries. It is our understanding that Customs has the responsibility and duty to examine any incoming shipment not under diplomatic seal.

By letter of 8-28-67 the Chief of the Division of Protective Security, Department of State, advised that the Protocol Office, State, requested that the views of the FBI be solicited regarding the situation with a view toward a possible formalizing of procedures between Treasury, FBI and State concerning inspection of incoming shipments.

1 - Mr. Whitson

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DATE 08-02-2010 BY 60324 UC/BAW/SAB/DF

8-30-67

Airtel

To: SACs, Baltimore (Enclosures - 2)
New York (Enclosures - 2)
WFO (Enclosures - 2)

From: Director, FBI (105-18233) 24

SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
IS - R

Referral/Consult

Baltimore and WFO should comment on the allegations on pages two and three of the Soviet aide-memoire regarding the opening of Soviet Embassy cargo.

In the event Bloc shipments are currently being examined by Bureau Agents or by Customs at the request of Agents, offices receiving this airtel should set forth the guidelines that are used in arriving at a conclusion that such shipments should be examined and should comment on the necessity for and productivity of such examinations.

The Office of Protocol of the Department of State has requested the views of the FBI regarding such procedures.

Expedite.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

LW:cls (8)

NOTE:

On 6-15-67 Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., furnished Department of State an aide-memoire protesting various acts of vandalism and theft with respect to automobiles, apartments and

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan
RE: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

incoming shipments of goods consigned to Bloc country personnel and installations on notification by individual Customs inspectors. Treasury wanted to formalize the procedures and indicated that in some situations FBI Agents themselves checked the shipments.

State Department concern arose from Soviet Embassy complaint of 6-15-67 regarding damage to shipments arriving at the Baltimore and Washington Custom houses, the use of obscene language by teen-agers, towing away of improperly parked Soviet automobiles and street attacks by hoodlums.

b6
b7C

Comments of the New York, Baltimore and Washington Field Offices were requested regarding Customs procedures. Those offices advised that in no instance was any physical search of shipments conducted by FBI personnel.

The field has taken advantage of Customs' notification when a shipment has been opened by Customs and found to contain electronic gear, radio equipment, cameras and other photographic equipment, or weapons, to make notes of identifying numbers or photograph items. All searches are done by Customs and at no time have Bureau Agents taken possession of any such items.

ACTION:

There is attached a letter to [redacted] State, stating that a representative of Bureau Liaison will be available to discuss the problem with representatives of State and Treasury; that the FBI is not interested in searching shipments and will not search shipments but that we are interested in being notified if Customs through inspection and manual search, determines that an incoming shipment contains matters of interest to the intelligence community such as electronic gear, radio equipment, cameras and other photographic equipment or weapons so that these items might be photographed if desired.

W. A. Branigan
OK
John
Rel
JS

F B I

Date: 9/6/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-18233)
 FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (100-11978)
 SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS
 IS - R

Re Bureau airtel, dated 8/30/67.

As to the examination of incoming shipments consigned to Soviet diplomatic establishments and personnel, no searches are made of incoming shipments by FBI Agents, and no searches are made by Customs at FBI request in Baltimore.

Concerning pages two and three of the Soviet aide-memoire, there is no information available in the Baltimore files, in any way conducive to a request for an examination by the Baltimore Custom House on 3/16, 22, 26 and 6/7/67. Since 1948, there has been an informal working arrangement between the Baltimore Office and the Custom House in Baltimore. If during the normal operations, Customs examines suspicious shipments of Soviet Bloc cargo, Customs advises the Baltimore Office so SA's of the FBI can make a visual inspection of such cargo. These have been very limited and have been confined to visual examination of electronic device equipment, radio equipment and firearms.

As to the necessity for, and productivity of such examination, it is suggested that WFO comment in this regard, as that office is in a better position to logically evaluate the value of such examinations.

3 Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
 1 - New York (REGISTERED MAIL)
 2 - WFO (REGISTERED MAIL)
 1 - Baltimore
 MEG:rlj
 (7)

REC-41 105-18233-25
 EX-110
 (INFO.)

SEP 19 1967

C. C. Bishop

Approved: SEP 20 1967
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M. Per _____

SOVIET UNION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-02-2010

F B I

Date: 9/7/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-18233)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-90611) (RUC)

SUBJECT: SEARCHES OF DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS.
IS-R

ReBuairtel 8/30/67.

Reairtel sets forth Bureau's request for information concerning the searches of Soviet-bloc shipments by FBI agents or by Customs at FBI request.

The NYO has not participated in a project of this type in any manner. For many years, it has been felt that examination of such shipments would prove of little, if any, value and therefore, no consideration has been given to undertake such a project.

(S) Furthermore, [REDACTED] have advised on various occasions that shipments of material or goods of a restricted or intelligence nature are done only under diplomatic pouch. This applies to shipments from the Soviet-bloc countries to US as well as shipments from the US to the Soviet bloc.

EX-110

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Baltimore (RM)
1 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - New York

HFC:lat
(9)

REC-41

105-18233-216

NO SEP 8 1967

SOVIET SECTION

Approved: [Signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

b1
b2

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FOIPA
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