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During the review it was determined that all portions of document (1) Joint Military Intelligence College Paper Number One should be withheld in its entirety. During the review of document (2) Joint Military Intelligence College Paper Number Four, it was determined that some portions of that document were eligible for declassification and release.

The portions withheld were withheld in accordance with Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), the Freedom Information Act Exemption (b)(6) and (b)(3) as applicable to 10 U.S.C., Section 424. All other reasonably segregable portions of the document are enclosed.

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William C. Joyner
Senior Intelligence Officer,
FOIA and Declassification Services Branch
Joint Military Intelligence College

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Joint Military Intelligence College

PERCEPTIONS, LABELS AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: THE CASE OF THE MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (U)

Occasional Paper Number Four

July 1998
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PERCEPTIONS, LABELS AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
THE CASE OF THE MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (U)

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, DC
July 1998

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PERCEPTIONS, LABELS AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
THE CASE OF THE MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (U)

AMBIGUITY AND INFORMATION NEEDS

Intelligence cannot operate in a vacuum. Its effectiveness is largely a function of its responsiv­ness, and its responsiveness is a function of the relationship it has with those it serves, from the President on down.

Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) Report, p. xii

To define reality is to create power because decisions reflect what people believe is “reality.”

Helga Drummond in “Triumph or Disaster: What is Reality?”

When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.

Humpty Dumpty to Alice in Through the Looking Glass

(U) The development of policy, whether it is ultimately successful or not, depends on the information used in the decisionmaking process. At one extreme, policymakers are called upon to base their deliberations on fragmentary and incomplete data. New or unanticipated crises stretch the process further by demanding that authorities consider options and reach conclusions at times when the weight of the uncertainties far exceeds available answers. All too often, decisions made under these circumstances are ineffective at best, disastrous at worst. Later assessments, employing the relative certainty of hindsight, quickly demonstrate the importance held by missing data, yet do little to prevent future repetitions of error.

(U) At the other policymaking extreme, decisionmakers are required to reach informed, well-considered policy despite an overabundance of data. More often than not, the available information points toward irrelevant and unimportant aspects of the problem, muddying the issue and severely hindering hopes of reaching a reasonable solution. Other decisions suffer from an overwhelming supply of contradictory information, forcing officials to make guesses concerning the veracity and relevance of reports received. Decisions resulting from such guesswork are haphazardly reached, at best, allowing for outright disaster as well as unqualified success.

(U) Fortunately, most decisions reached at the national level fall somewhere between the two extremes. The results are usually reasonable approaches to the problem at hand. This is not to say, however, that guesswork, estimation, and individual interpretation are eliminated from the process. They are an integral part in any human decision process. They usually are, however, managed advantageously. By managing and limiting the degree of uncertainty in the decision process, national policymakers are able to exercise judgment with reasonable expectation that any informational or decisionmaking errors have been reduced to the greatest extent possible.

(U) The key to the process of uncertainty reduction, in turn, lies with the quantity and quality of information available to the decisionmaker. Poor decisions may result despite adequate, high-quality information. The likelihood of a poor decision being reached,
nevertheless, rises with increased uncertainty, whether caused by too little information, too much information, or too poor quality information. The use of ambiguous and emotionally charged terms, such as "terrorism," further complicates the effective communication of information in the policy and intelligence bureaucracies. Successful information management lies at the heart of successful decisionmaking.

**Does Ambiguity Matter?**

The atomic building blocks of knowledge are concepts and conceptual relations. Concepts are quite a bit more flexible than mental images, their main competitor, which exist as complete and nondecomposable packages.

(U) This study will focus on the problems associated with clear communication of policymakers’ needs to the Intelligence Community. To that end, the central issue for examination will be the way in which information needs are “framed” or structured by policymakers and their staffs, and how those stated needs affect the direction of intelligence inquiry and collection. This paper will address the hypothesis that the labels used by senior policymakers in expressing their information needs ultimately determine the scope and depth of intelligence collection and production against a target.

(U) Inherent in this hypothesis is the concept of perceived threat to the United States and to American interests. It is in this area that the greatest effects of ambiguity, miscommunication, and misinterpretation can be seen. The effect of perceptions and labels is never more evident than during times of crisis. The urgency of events, the uncertainty of the situation, the concern for lives, all factor into the policymakers’ decisions, leaving considerable evidence for later examination. This study uses that evidence to assess the role of the perceptions and labels used in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran during the Iranian revolution. The subsequent development of the crisis and evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations allow the essential outlines of policy, born out of crisis, to be examined in light of the hypothesis.

(U) If the Intelligence Community is to provide accurate, relevant, and timely information to policymakers, they must be able to communicate their specific needs to the Intelligence Community effectively. The Intelligence Community, in turn, must be capable of effectively relaying those needs through the levels of bureaucracy to those in the field doing the actual collection. Without clear and unambiguous guidance from above, field collectors are forced to rely on their best judgments and interpretation of their particular tasking. The resulting reporting of information back toward the policy community, consequently, is fundamentally shaped by the collector’s interpretation of specific guidance. The process of policy definition and articulation, to the Intelligence Community and through its various layers of bureaucracy to the collector, is referred to in this study as the needs translation process.
Conceptualization and Communication of Needs

Conceptual issues and problems haunt virtually all major terms in the social and behavioral sciences, and any definition is ambiguous if it does not answer questions bearing on those issues and problems.

(U) Many different actors maintain the potential for significantly influencing needs translation outcomes. The present examination will focus on the president and his senior advisors, both in the cabinet and in the National Security Council, as they are the ultimate consumers of all intelligence produced. Seen another way, the president influences virtually all aspects of governmental operations, including those of the intelligence production bureaucracy. As Jon Turner and John Gosden astutely point out:

No other executive constantly faces so many decisions, over so wide a range of topics, with such potentially grave consequences, and subject to so much scrutiny. This is compounded by the fact that any one decision has ripple effects into many other areas, some foreseen and many that are not.1

The NSC staff, by providing advice and information to the president, contributes to and helps shape the opinions and policy positions of the president it serves.

(U) Ambiguity in defining information needs, however, has a significant impact on the Intelligence Community’s efforts to collect useful information. If imprecise terms are used to provide guidance to intelligence collectors, it stands to reason that the context of that guidance, and subsequent interpretations, will steer collection efforts in any of several general directions. Imprecision raises the level of complexity of the issue, while the associated lack of clarity leads to multiple instances in which each individual involved in the process can, and does, inject personal beliefs and opinions. Increasing the complexity, consequently, leads to a weakening of the conventions attached to that idea.2 The moral appeals, ethical arguments, and raw emotion associated with “terrorism,” for example, are ultimately simplistic and conspicuous, yet inherent in that label is a degree of complexity allowing multiple interpretations. More leeway in interpretation can lead to charges that the Intelligence Community has failed to meet the specific needs of policymakers.

Ambiguity in Action

(U) The impact of ambiguity in the information needs translation process can be seen in examining U.S. intelligence collection efforts against Iranian opposition groups. During the Shah’s reign, U.S. policymakers paid scant attention to the Iranian opposition, believing the Iranian government’s assessment that these groups were the radical fringe with little chance of significantly influencing the course of Iranian politics. As domestic stability deteriorated in Iran, however, American officials gradually came to see the Iranian opposition as a real threat to both the Iranian regime and U.S. interests. When the Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the catalyst for uniting these widely divergent opposition groups against the regime, the United States focused even more of its intelligence assets against the opposition. So long as the Shah remained head of the Iranian government, however, the United States approached the opposition with a mixture of timidity and antagonism.

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(U) The dramatic changes wrought by the Iranian clergy after the Shah left Iran, coupled with the intense passions aroused by the seizure and holding of American hostages in the U.S. Embassy for 444 days, pushed the United States into a pattern of institutionalized hostility toward the Iranian regime. Despite the resolution of the hostage crisis and the passing of the Ayatollah Khomeini, American rancor toward the government of Iran is still very much in evidence. The continuing hostility between Iran and the United States, in turn, has led to a noticeable, if limited, shift in American opinions toward selected Iranian opposition groups.

(U) During the Shah's reign, and into the initial years of the subsequent clerical regime, the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or simply Mojahedin-e Khalq) remained one of the more vilified Iranian opposition groups. Associated with assassinations of Americans in Iran, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) was seen as one of the greatest threats to the Shah's regime, to Americans in Iran, and to American interests. During the 444-day hostage crisis, the Mojahedin-e Khalq seemingly cemented its position as one of America's greatest Iranian enemies by actively supporting both the radical students holding the U.S. Embassy compound and the renegade Iranian regime. After several years of relative cooperation with the clerical regime, the Mojahedin-e Khalq broke with the government in 1981, quickly becoming Tehran's self-described main enemy.

(U) In the aftermath of the Mojahedin-e Khalq's break with the Iranian regime, the perceptions of the Mojahedin among American policymakers wavered and, for some, changed. The Department of State, relying heavily on the group's past attacks against Americans, refuses to consider the Mojahedin anything but a terrorist organization. A significant number of members of Congress, on the other hand, have apparently accepted the Mojahedin's arguments that it represents the democratic alternative to the current fundamentalist theocracy. While still officially shunned by Washington, the Mojahedin has created enough doubt among American policymakers over the years that, when coupled with the latent hostility directed at the Iranian government, the U.S. government's attitude toward the group has itself become rather ambiguous.

(U) Examining the Carter presidency, and Carter's NSC staff, in the context of Iranian events provides additional opportunity to isolate the beliefs, perceptions, expectations, and reactions of individuals involved in crisis. President Carter usually met with his top staff, particularly during the crisis, at least once each day. When he did not attend, detailed notes were prepared immediately for his review. These notes also served to forward policy questions to Carter for decisions, which he indicated in writing on the notes. Many of the decision notes and meeting minutes are available for examination at the Carter Presidential Library and, consequently, provide much of the raw material for assessing beliefs, perceptions, and information needs during the crisis. The value of these doc-


Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), however, sounds a note of caution in declaring, "We must be extremely careful not to support terrorism in the name of antiterrorism, Iranian or Iraqi front groups in the name of democracy, or extremist opposition groups in the name of human rights. We must not take sides between factions, and we must not encourage violence in the name of democracy." See Sen. John McCain (Arizona), "Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq," Congressional Record (21 January 1993), vol 139, pt. 5.

4 (U) Gary Sick notes that prior to the Iranian revolution, the U.S. government considered the MEK and other opposition groups to be leftist terrorists. By 1986, however, the MEK was accepted well enough to open an office in Washington. See Gary Sick, "Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses," SAIS Review 7, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1987): 19.

Documents lies in the language used, both by the president’s staff and by President Carter. Coupled with Carter’s recognition of the importance attached to word meanings, the records of the Carter Library offer a clear mechanism for isolating and assessing the labels used by President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, and other NSC principals.

(U) The inclusion of the National Security Council and its staff also allows for the isolation of individual influences on needs definition, as the operations of the NSC are rarely separable from the activities of the president.6 and his associates argue that even if the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) seeks to play the bureaucratic role of honest-broker, the NSC function is so intertwined with that of the president, and so influenced by the president, that the honest-broker approach largely remains an unrealized goal.7 President Carter highlighted the role of his staff, particularly during the Iran crisis, and considered input from his... (U) As analyst Mark Lowenthal suggests, however, Americans have a great capacity to believe that all methods, including by extension the information needs translation process, can be perfected.9 This unwillingness to accept fallibility can be seen clearly in the recent report of the Aspin-Brown Commission which found that the performance of the Intelligence Community can be improved by understanding that intelligence needs to develop and maintain a close working relationship with those it serves. In return, policymakers should appreciate the capabilities of the Intelligence Community and understand that they can contribute by providing better direction and guidance.10 The Commission noted that the interaction between the intelligence and policy communities is a two-way street, with the Intelligence Community responsible for meeting the clearly articulated needs of the policy community. It is necessary for the policy community to provide clear guidance and unambiguous statements of intelligence needs if it expects the Intelligence Community to be adequately responsive. Problematic targets, such as the Mojahedin, test the relationship between policymakers and the Intelligence Community. The better the two can communicate ideas and intent, the better the needs of each will be met.

Dependence on Policymakers

(U) If it is fair to characterize policy by its dependence on intelligence, it is also fair to characterize intelligence by its dependence on policy. Without adequate and accurate intelligence, policymakers face tremendous obstacles to defining and developing sound policy. At the same time, policymakers provide the direction and clarity needed for the effective employment of intelligence collection resources. Without clear goals and objectives from the policy community, the Intelligence Community is reduced to making its own assumptions and guesses concerning policymakers’ or even the country’s needs. While these guesses and assumptions often prove correct, the chances of a disconnect between policy need and...
intelligence provision rises in direct proportion to the ambiguity level of any guidance.\textsuperscript{11}

(U) The depth of the Intelligence Community's dependence on the policy community has long been recognized. In examining the intelligence process in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the House Foreign Affairs Committee noted that "the ultimate utility and impact of intelligence is generally dependent on the policymakers as consumers."\textsuperscript{12} The needed interaction, however, is not always smooth, with many commentators blaming either the transient nature of top policy personnel or the competition and debate over the proper role of intelligence. Regardless of the reasons, critics today find the same tendency toward policy-intelligence discontinuity. Highlighting the continued need for greater awareness of this relationship's importance, the Aspin-Brown Commission noted:

Like any other service organization, intelligence agencies must have guidance from the people they serve. They exist as a tool of government to gather and assess information, and if they do not receive direction, chances are greater that resources will be misdirected and wasted. \ldots Policy maker direction should be both the foundation and the catalyst for the work of the Intelligence Community.\textsuperscript{13}

Methodology

(U) This study will describe the needs translation process with respect to Iran and the Iranian Mojahedin. Beginning with the crumbling of political stability in Iran in 1978, the examination will trace the major events leading to the successful conclusion of the Iranian revolution, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, and the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations in the succeeding years. One thread of the examination will focus on U.S. policy, policymakers' perceptions, and the labels they used, while a second thread of examination will focus on both the formally expressed information needs of senior U.S. government policymakers and on relevant intelligence collection requirements. The threads will then be compared over time to determine if there is any clearly delineated parallel between the two, albeit with an expected time lag between events and reactions. Identifying and understanding the dynamics of the process, and of any apparent correlation between them, will ultimately allow the Intelligence and policy communities to achieve better focus and adjust needs statements and collection tasking involving emotional or ambiguous topics.

(U) Data on the events associated with the Iranian revolution, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, and the subsequent crumbling of relations can be found in a variety of classified and unclassified sources. Government documents provide valuable details concerning policymakers' perceptions and beliefs as well as U.S. government policy. The papers and memoranda found in the Carter Presidential Library, particularly first drafts and those with handwritten margin notes, provide insights into the thinking of key actors in the unfolding crisis. President Carter's method of conducting the business of government, notably his insistence on having questions and advice submitted in writing,\textsuperscript{14} allows ample opportunity to gain rare peaks into on-going mental processes without reliance on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(U)] Glenn Hastedt argues that the root cause of this disconnect, when it occurs, lies in the fact that U.S. intelligence policy is the product of bureaucratic bargaining, rather than of a specific policymaker's needs. Clarity, then, suffers with the Intelligence Community "left in the position of serving multiple political masters who do not necessarily agree on what is to be done and may have different expectations regarding the nature of intelligence useful to realizing policy goals." Glenn Hastedt, "Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: How to Measure Success?" \textit{International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence} 5, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 53.
\item[(U)] U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, \textit{The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process}, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, quoted in Lowenthal, 64. Arthur S. Hulnick, in "Determining U.S. Intelligence Policy," \textit{International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence} 3, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 215-216, notes that achieving this smooth interaction has not always been easy. It has, however, evolved from an earlier time in which intelligence managers were expected to anticipate policy needs to today's system in which both legislative branch and executive branch policymakers expect to be solicited for guidance at least periodically.
\item[(U)] Aspin-Brown Commission, 29.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
memory reconstruction. This, in turn, provides insights into the actors' unique frames-of-reference upon which they acted. 15

(U) To develop an understanding of the key events associated with the Iranian revolution, the embassy seizure, and subsequent U.S.-Iranian relations, news accounts and published analyses provide the primary data. Government documents, intended for both internal and external consumption, provide the bulk of data on perceptions, beliefs, and policies under which U.S. government officials acted. Similarly, the published speeches and addresses by the president and members of Congress illustrate the evolution of perceptions within the government over the past 20 years. Finally, the tasking and guidance provided to the Intelligence Community will be examined from the context of national-level information needs, expressed in comprehensive documents such as the annual statement of intelligence requirements issued by the

14 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 56.

THE IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONS AND LABELS

For the kinds of values we hold, the ways we relate to each other, and the kinds of societies we create for ourselves . . . are, to a great extent, based on the ways we interpret, and the meanings we give to, what we read and hear.

Milton Dawes in "Taking Responsibility for the Meanings We Give, Part I."

[T]he existence of . . . narrow limits on the span of human attention is a principal reason why we must distinguish between the "real" situation and the situation as perceived by the political actors when we try to apply the rationality principle to make predictions of behavior. People are, at best, rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only tiny, disjointed facets of reality.

Herbert A. Simon in "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science"

Limitations

(U) Despite the efforts of policymakers and the Intelligence Community, the communication of clearly articulated information needs to intelligence collectors remains problematic. Further, the political process guarantees relatively frequent turnover among top officials, with each newcomer bringing his or her own agenda to the process. With time, effort, patience, creativity, and a bit of luck, these barriers can be overcome.

(U) Beyond these solvable hindrances to effective communication of policy guidance to the intelligence community, however, lies a more fundamental barrier which can only be understood and adapted to, rather than solved outright. At the heart of the dilemma lies the ambiguity brought on by the growth and richness of language. The very diversity within the English language and the ways in which individuals process and interpret the resulting conceptualization of ideas must be understood before we can fully appreciate and implement corrections to guidance ambiguity.

(U) If the communication of policymakers' needs is important to the process, so too is the interpretation of those stated needs. Analysts Charles-Phillipe David, Nancy Ann Carrol, and Zachary Selden, in examining the Intelligence Community's difficulty in predicting the downfall of the Shah of Iran, demonstrate the way in which policymakers came to differing interpretations based in part of the way information was presented.16 That individuals' decisions differ based solely on variances in data presentation points to the crucial roles played by individual interpretation and context. While each individual interprets information in his or her own unique way, these processes can still be generalized for analysis and assessment. As David, Carrol, and Selden point out, all individuals tend toward a preferred method of cognitive information processing, yet switch cognitive mechanisms at times in response to stimuli variances.

(U) Also complicating the needs translation process are the mechanisms individuals use to weed through available information in order to select those data which will ultimately be used in developing a response. Depending on the cognitive mechanisms employed, as well as the quality and quantity of available data, the selection process can also play a critical role. Gary Sick's recollections of the National Security Council's workings reflect this complication. Sick noted that "... for each item of 'significant' evidence as perceived in hindsight, there were hundreds, perhaps thousands, of items that were contradictory, ambivalent or merely competing for policy attention. The problem was always to sort the wheat from the chaff."17 It is reasonable to conclude, based on Sick's

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16 (U) David, Carrol, and Selden, 147.
17 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 43.
observations, that an abundance of available data can easily lead to a heavy reliance on perceptions, biases, and individual world-view to provide the necessary mechanisms to begin Sick's separation process. Indeed, it is just such a series of mechanisms, resting on the firm foundation of self-image, which guided the development and implementation of foreign policy during the Carter Administration.

(U) The positions and influence of policymakers within the bureaucracy significantly affect the information needs translations process. The more influential the policymaker, whether by virtue of position, personality, or both, the greater the extent that the individual's perceptions and beliefs will shape needs definitions further down in the bureaucracy. While not often overwhelmingly dominant, the beliefs held by policymakers responsible for foreign policy color the agenda adopted by intelligence collection agencies. Much has been written about this process, particularly as it affects foreign policy construction and crisis response, yet its specific impact on shaping the focus of intelligence collection remains largely unexamined.

(U) Beyond the intricacies and mutability of specific personalities and bureaucratic organizations, the variety of the English language further complicates the needs translation process. As Gibbs points out, the use of "terrorism" as a labeling device adds a highly charged emotional content to the exchange of information. "Terrorism" connotes inhumanity, cruelty, and utter disregard for the accepted norms of civilized behavior. While the old platitude that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is arguably accurate, it points unequivocally to the inability of observers to reach a consensus on a definition. Stemming largely from the emotional content of the term "terrorism," no clear and unambiguous definition with wide appeal and acceptance has been offered.

(U) The problem stemming from using such an emotionally charged term prevents us from settling on a single definition, perpetuating the ambiguity associated with the label. Over time, the ambiguous nature of the term itself has become an accepted convention. Commonly expressed in terms of "I may not be able to define terrorism, but I know it when I see it," the vague convention has become comfortable. As the ambiguity inherent in our use of the term "terrorism" became the accepted practice, the more readily we rejected competing conventions. While the present imprecision remains comfortable and entrenched, it hampers efforts toward a smooth needs translation process.

Decisionmaking in Crisis

(U) The literature on decisionmaking in a crisis environment proposes a number of explanations for specific decisions as well as for the means of making those decisions. Yet, much of the literature focuses only on crisis reaction. This may be explained as a function of the restrictions imposed by analysis of open sources reporting, which usually covers only limited and selectively released data. As a crisis develops, the behind-the-scenes impact of decisionmaking

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18 (U) Jerel A. Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration," in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, eds. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 160-161. Rosati goes on to assert that "...the Carter administration's major foreign policy behavior cannot be explained or understood adequately without reference to its image of the international environment." This image, in turn, evolved over the course of Carter's presidency and foreign policy evolved concurrently. No one has yet explored the possible intelligence parallels with Rosati's finding.

19 (U) Kirsten E. Shulze, "Perception and Misperception: Influences During the 1982 Lebanon War," The Journal of Conflict Studies 16, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 143. Shulze argues that intelligence services, in such instances, "become the prisoner of those decision makers' images, dogmas, and perceptions."

20 (U) See, for example, David, Carrol, and Selden, 38-39. Similarly, Shulze examines the impact on the intelligence assessment process, while only briefly addressing the information needs translation process. Another particularly valuable examination is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).


22 (U) Kier and Mercer, 93 and Sick, All Fall Down, 44-47.
styles and outcomes gains even greater importance for, as Robert McCalla notes, "[t]he ways in which decision makers view events and change their minds about an opponent's behavior can have an important impact on the origin, duration, and termination of a crisis."\(^{24}\)

McCalla also points out that an examination of perceptions in the field of international relations is itself such a large topic that the scope of inquiry is necessarily limited to crisis behavior. By focusing on crises, analysts can reduce the scope of investigation into threat awareness and decision time, but the resulting study is frequently centered around strategic-level concerns. This situation results in severely restricting the analytic focus and leaving unexplained those decision-maker-induced behaviors that can be identified.

**Perception and Belief Systems**

(U) At the heart of the needs translation process lie perceptions and individual belief systems.\(^{25}\) At their most benign and beneficial, operative belief systems allow decisionmakers an easy path to interpretation where the flow of incoming data may otherwise be too great or too confusing. By providing a simple and effective mechanism by which the individual can order the world around him, belief systems free the individual from the laborious and unsettling mental process of continuously reordering his mental map of the world to accommodate dissonant incoming information. At its worst, maintenance of a blindly rigid belief system breeds intolerance for contradictory information. The intolerance, in turn, frequently leads to the outright rejection of data which seem to conflict with the established world view regardless of the merits that new information may possess.

(U) Perceptions and beliefs evolve over time, and this evolution accounts for changes in attitudes and outlooks among policymakers. Studies highlight a number of critical influences relevant to the policy process, not the least of which are the ever-changing perceptions of Congress.\(^{26}\) In addition, individual cognitive processes play an important role in the decisionmaking process, although in a bit of a backhanded way.

(U) By demonstrating the tenuous nature of various influences, political scientist Philip Powlick succeeds in unintentionally raising the likelihood of the significant role to be played by processes and factors unique to the individual.\(^{27}\) Powlick himself addresses that likelihood in his summary of findings:

To officials in the foreign policy process, public opinion speaks with many voices, some of which are not typically thought of as "public opinion" (such as the Congress), and certain voices are more likely to be heard by actors in different positions within the policy process — Congress speaks loudly to careerists, but not necessarily to appointees; interest groups are heard on economic issues, but much less so in other areas of policy. Thus public opinion as a factor in the foreign policy process should not be viewed as a


\(^{24}\) (U) McCalla, 1.

\(^{25}\) (U) Chan and Sylvan provide a good review of the state of research into the role of perceptions and information processing in the area of foreign policy decisionmaking. Parallels into the area of intelligence decisionmaking should be readily apparent. Similarly, Robert Axelrod provides an illustration of how perceptions and belief systems can, at times, blind political actors to conclusions which might be obvious to others, but which are overlooked or ignored for their failure to meet the actor's operative belief system. See Robert Axelrod, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition," *The American Political Science Review* 67, no. 4 (December 1973): 1265.


\(^{27}\) (U) Powlick, 440-441.
unidimensional variable, either in terms of how it is viewed by foreign policy officials, or in terms of how it affects (or perhaps fails to affect) policy outcomes. The influence of different forms of opinion must therefore be seen as dependent upon first, whether relevant policy actors actually use a particular source to represent public opinion, which is in turn dependent upon the type of issue involved, the backgrounds and predispositions of the actors, and the positions represented by other (perhaps countervailing) forms of opinion.28 If, as Powlick asserts, the factors involved must be seen as multidimensional and dependent on the issue involved as well as on the individual, certainly one is led to conclude that individual cognitive processes play a significant role in interpreting and acting on incoming information.

Individual Reasoning

(U) If the analytic approach must take into account the cognitive processes of the individual, it must also account for the various ways in which individuals process incoming information. Each individual sorts, interprets, and selects data for assessment based on unique individual criteria. Just as Powlick addresses the evolutionary nature of perceptions and belief systems, individuals tend to change and adapt reasoning styles with age and with experience. Even as these general styles evolve for each individual, no hard barriers preclude the use of various styles within a very short span of time. Styles of reasoning may even vary from hour to hour, based on factors both internal and external to the individual.

(U) While the potential effect of presidential and cabinet officer decisions is obvious, the individual intelligence collector has perhaps greater potential to affect the outcome of collection efforts. Kirsten Shulze notes that:

It is inevitable that the gathering as well as the evaluation of any data will be influenced by the psychological character of the intelligence officer. Images, perceptions, world view, ideological bias and wishful thinking all help to determine which factors the observer will notice and which he will ignore. They also influence the importance attached to selected data and patterns drawn. Indeed, actors in the “game” of intelligence do not respond to the objective reality but to their individual subjective perception of that reality.

While Shulze focuses on the role of perception in influencing data collection and interpretation, this study takes the additional step of focusing on the way in which perceptions in both the intelligence and policy communities shape the focus of intelligence collection efforts through the framing of needs statements and collection requirements.

Defining the Paradigm

The frame of an issue is . . . constructed through the questions that are asked. Do the questions emphasize potential risks, or gains? The costs of something, or possible benefits? Do the questions assess what is innovative, what is important?

Jeffrey Pfeffer in “Seeing What We’re Made to See”

(U) Noting that the context and structure of questions determines the responses each generates, Pfeffer suggests that the framing of questions often determines the resulting answers. Consequently, those individuals who are able to set the tone and overall context for the examination of a question have the power to shape the

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28 (U) Powlick, 447.
29 (U) Shulze, 138. Italics appear in the original.
outcomes. An important element of the development, or framing, of the context under which questions are addressed is the tone and the style of language in which the question appears. The wording chosen for communicating thoughts, ideas, and questions provides both concrete and subtle indicators of the framer's perspective. On the one hand, the wording used conveys intent through common interpretation and accepted meaning. At the same time, the chosen wording may also have an emotional content which provides the recipient with additional inputs. The more emotionally charged the wording, the greater the impact which can be expected. Politicians throughout the years have known of and used the power of emotion, employing it to great effect on their audiences.

Those same politicians, in their roles as decisionmakers, have also applied the power of emotional speech in the normal conduct of government business. The use of emotional content, however, is often unintentional, yet no less dramatic, in the outcomes produced. At other times, policymakers have deliberately chosen to use the power of emotion in an effort to attain specified policy goals. Beyond intentional use, much of the emotional speech encountered in government business can be traced to the normally used wording decisionmakers use to describe the objects of their attentions. The labels used to characterize targets of intelligence collection efforts, consequently, shape and define the context under which information is sought. It stands to reason, then, that the greater the emotional charge attached to a label, the greater the impact which can be expected on those who receive instructions based on those characterizations.

(U) The impact of decisionmakers' characterizations are not limited simply to the tone and context of the labels they apply, as the flow of information through the bureaucracy continues to shape and modify the resulting context. If the president communicated his information needs directly to the individual intelligence officers tasked with undertaking collection efforts, the scope of an examination of the process could be limited strictly to that information linkage. The president's requests, however, are filtered through multiple layers of bureaucracy, where each expression of information needed can be and often is combined with similar requests from other intelligence customers. At each step in the process, individuals involved interpret the instructions and guidance from above, add additional inputs from outside the system which may be available to them, and add their own interpretations, biases, and knowledge. As one multiplies the number of individuals involved, starting with the president, through the National Security Council bureaucracy, the National Intelligence Council, the Community Management Staff, the requirements staffs of the various intelligence collection agencies, and the operational bureaucracies which ultimately collect and process the intelligence, the picture gets quite complicated.

Also complicating the process is the lack of understanding found within the policy community of the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence Community. Assuming the Intelligence Community could collect whatever is needed to address vague and poorly-defined statements of information needs, policymakers too frequently apply little effort toward clearly articulating those needs. Poorly framed

30 (U) Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Seeing What We're Made to See," *Across the Board* 30, no. 3 (April 1993): 40.
33 (U) Helga Drummond, "Triumph or Disaster, What Is Reality?" *Management Decision* 30, no. 8 (1992): 29, notes that "[d]ecision makers often take refuge in the apparent certainty of concrete facts . . . . [B]ut facts are only useful if they are relevant, yet decision makers may not know the questions to ask."
questions add considerable ambiguity to the context through which the Intelligence Community is expected to develop concrete answers. Nevertheless, policymakers still tend toward broader, more ambiguous statements, rather than more focused and specific guidance. Efforts by the Intelligence Community to solicit more specific guidance are frequently seen as unnecessarily limiting by senior policymakers. This sets the stage, particularly during crises and for events involving highly emotional issues, for the transmission of poorly framed and emotionally charged information requests into the intelligence bureaucracy, where they are transformed into intelligence requirements which may or may not fit the original intent of the decisionmaker requesting information.

LABELS AS DEMARCATORS: TOWARD AN INDIVIDUAL MODEL

If a pickpocket meets a holy man, he will see only his pockets.

Sufi teaching explored
by Baba Ram Dass in Be Here Now

In trying to explain why a person takes an umbrella in the morning, it is irrelevant to the explanation of this behavior whether or not it rains that day or even if there was any objective (true) likelihood of rain. All that matters for that explanation is that the person thought there was a chance of rain.

Robert B. McCalla in Uncertain Perceptions: U.S. Cold War Crisis Decision Making

We are not usually aware that we give our own meaning values to our experiences, or to what we hear or read. We make interpretations and give meanings without being aware that we are doing so. We are constantly making interpretations—it is an automated process.

Milton Dawes in "Taking Responsibility for the Meanings We Give: Part II"

(U) Our actions are guided by the information we possess, the experiences we have had, and the meanings we give to each. The things that each individual holds to be important become the primary frame of reference for that individual. Like the Sufi’s pickpocket, the status or position of the object under observation may have little or no meaning beyond the parameters of the observer’s perspective. Contents are important to the pickpocket because they provide him with his livelihood. The specific identity of the pocket’s owner, on the other hand, remains irrelevant to the pickpocket, as knowing or understanding this provides no material gain or advantage. Consequently, the Sufi’s thief sees only the holy man’s pockets.

(U) Also illustrating the importance of perspective, McCalla’s subject chose to take an umbrella with him in the morning because he believed in, rather than knew of, the possibility of rain. Here again, McCalla’s example illustrates the critical importance of perception as the genesis for specific actions. What McCalla does not explicitly point out, however, is that his man may have used almost any criteria imaginable to reach his own forecast.

(U) The foundation for these cognitive mechanisms is, and remains, the words associated with the perceptions and interpretations used. Sawin argues that in the end words are not nearly as important as the thoughts, ideas, and emotions they represent. As it is the interpreted meaning of the word, rather than the word itself, which has the greatest impact, Sawin suggests our limited perceptual abilities can at times result in interpretations different from those intended by the information’s provider. Consequently, we can expect the conveyance of information about emotionally charged events or situations, such as terrorism, has more to do with the transfer of value judgments, feelings, and attitudes than it does about objective reality. Beyond mere interpretation, the effects of a
lifetime of receiving information and constructing perceptual models of the world are cumulative. Over time, the compounded inputs result in the development and use of attribute sets as a means of quickly interpreting and categorizing additional inputs. Across the gap between the relevant use of attribute sets in cognition and irrelevant use and stereotyping is but a short bridge frequently crossed.

**Individual Decisionmaking: Framework of a Model**

(U) Many analyses of the decisionmaking process look at it from the organizational or principal-actor standpoint. These approaches present a gross or simplified approximation of the process. Other explanations of decisionmaking focus on models of the processes involved, placing importance and emphasis on the lines of reasoning used by the decisionmaker. Often, these models test observed behaviors in comparison with expected behaviors which are based, in turn, on formal or informal rules. Others focus on mental, or cognitive, constructs and their explanation of behavior and decisionmaking outcomes. The complexity of the human mind becomes quite evident, however, with the acknowledgment that each of these approaches has merit. Not only does the universe of decisionmakers exhibit the range of decisionmaking models, but frequently a decisionmaker will exhibit a variety of actions predicted by and associated with the full range of decisionmaking models. Accepting the ability of each individual to use a vastly divergent range of decisionmaking processes, sometimes even within the same decisionmaking episode, is perhaps the most difficult part of understanding the diversity and complexity of decisionmaking.

**External Inputs: What We Know and What We Do With It**

(U) At the most basic level, decisions depend on a series of inputs which are subjected to interpretation and understanding. These inputs are generally thought of as bits of information which the individual gathers or receives from outside the self, and can be obtained or gathered by the individual in a number of ways. Most often these inputs are in the form of data supplied by support elements or subordinates, such as the Intelligence Community, which in some way contribute to the policymaker's understanding of a given problem. In the decisionmaking process, the policymaker is frequently a passive recipient of data. Similarly, the inputs received may have also been obtained in the act of gathering data for making specific decisions, with the policymaker undertaking an active data-gathering role. Yet another possibility is that the inputs may be of considerable age, having come to the decisionmaker in the distant past, then stored in memory for later use. At the same time,
Simple Individual Model of Decisionmaking. Source: Author.

the meanings and interpretations attached to those memories and perceptions may provide an additional series of inputs in a decisionmaking episode. Whether passively received or actively gathered, whether used immediately upon receipt or recovered from either short-term or long-term memory, or whether existing as interpretations or perceptions of data rather than the objective data itself, the inputs had their genesis outside the self. Viewed in this way, these inputs can be considered external inputs, as their origins can be traced to the external environment.

Once the external inputs are gathered, either actively from outside the self or from resident memory, they must be acted on for them to have meaning in the context of a specific decisionmaking episode. In short, they must be processed through some cognitive mechanism chosen at that time by the individual.

Unfortunately, individual recognition of the process used to arrive at a decision seems difficult, if not impossible. One study, in which decisionmakers were asked to describe and define the process they used to reach a decision, indicated their decisionmaking was done "by the seat of their pants." While this suggests that decisionmakers may follow fairly simple and proven means of decisionmaking, it also offers the strong possibility of changes in processes employed both over time and according to context. Without a formalized system exclusively employed in individual decisionmaking, the process chosen remains subject to frequent variation.

This study will consider that decisionmakers represent the problem at hand in a three-step process in which the issue will first be categorized and defined. Once the issue has been defined, the individual will more thoroughly critique the issue, allowing it to be represented in terms of some form of causal or cognitive paradigm. Finally, the individual will use selected cognitive processes to sort the available information, test its validity with respect to perspectives and biases, and reach a conclusion.


Outputs: A Major Influence for Others

(U) Once a decision is made, the conclusions reached can be presented as outputs available to share with additional individuals in the decisionmaking process. While not always shared with others in the larger decisionmaking process, these outputs, when passed along outside the self, constitute new external inputs for other individuals. Indeed, as Richard W. Leeman points out, these outputs can be specifically modified and shaped, or tailored, before transmittal to a particular audience. By shaping and modifying the tone and texture of information passed along in the decisionmaking process, the individual can serve as a catalyst for influencing the interpretations and, perhaps, the decisions of others. Restricting the tone and context of information also allows the decisionmaker either to reinforce or modify the external inputs of others in such a way as to increase the likelihood that others will reach the same or substantially similar conclusions. While the blatant exercise of this capability is often seen, as Leeman points out, in the context of politics and the competition for public support, it can also be seen operating in the day-to-day decisionmaking process. The political exercise of this capability lies in a calculated effort to sway opinion, while the more commonplace occurrence may go undetected as well as unrecognized, even by those individuals exercising that capability.

42 (U) Leeman, 13 and 20-21. Leeman notes, in the context of his examination, that the dialogue exchanged between the government and terrorists is modified not only to address each other, but also to address public opinion as a separate third constituency.

43 (U) Besides Leeman, Edelman's *Symbolic Uses and Symbolic Action* also illustrates the ordinary and extraordinary uses of message manipulation structured for specific needs. Shulze, 140, also notes that the day-to-day occurrences in bureaucracies can also be attributed to staffs' tendencies to take on the political coloration of their bosses.
The Cumulative Impact

I was provided with additional input that was radically different from the truth. I assisted in furthering that version.

Lt. Col. Oliver North, reportedly discussing his role in the Iran-Contra affair

(U) No matter what type of input is isolated, individuals process information in varying ways. Like Lt. Col. North’s explanation of his involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, individuals at times make conscious decisions to alter their use of data in order to meet their own agendas. Individuals may act as North did because the inputs received either do not meet preexisting conceptions held of the world or the individual’s understanding of proper and expected roles and functions. Helga Drummond’s assertion that organizational decisionmaking usually takes place in an atmosphere characterized by tension heightens understanding of the conflict and pressure inherent in many decisionmaking episodes where individuals consciously act to modify discomforting inputs. By controlling reality, or at least attaining the sense that reality is controlled, the decisionmaker gains a sense of clarity and purpose. At other times, individuals modify or adjust inputs unconsciously. Unlike North’s example, this tends to take place most often when the discomforting nature of the input does not severely strain preexisting perceptions. These inputs, then, are modified to fit with existing notions of the world, particularly when those modifications are relatively minor. On reflection, most people can recognize when this takes place by addressing occasions in which a choice was made to consider only portions of the incoming data or in choosing to view the data in a particular, and more favorable, light. When the discomforting inputs require too much modification to fit easily and acceptably with existing perceptions and beliefs, and when that information is judged to be of little enough importance or relevance, we simply choose to reject or ignore those inputs. When we do take the time to consider these data, we find it easy to rationalize our decisions to selectively modify or accept inputs by addressing their perceived irrelevance.

(U) As information moves through the bureaucratic chain, there exists a multitude of opportunities for subsequent actors to modify or manipulate the information. Billings and Hermann refer to this as rerepresentation and suggest that the final output of the decisionmaking process is directly linked to a series of rerepresentations in the process. With each actor in the process able to reinterpret and rerepresent the subject, the original representation can be significantly changed in the final outcome. The process of receiving external inputs, coupling them with self-generated inputs, biases, and perceptions, then subjecting

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44 (U) North’s rationalization is an excellent example of bolstering. David, Carrol, and Selden, 81, note that bolstering takes place “when an advocate for a position becomes so convinced that their option must be adopted that they take active steps to distort the discussion in their favor.” As will be evident later, Zbigniew Brzezinski was also guilty of this type of behavior. A second aspect of such selectivity is groupthink, a series of actions and reactions revolving around shared perceptions and interpretations. David, Carrol, and Selden, 90-91 and 94-95, note that subordinates tend to selectively provide data which lends support to leadership conceptualizations.

45 (U) Drummond, 30.

46 (U) Billings and Hermann, 2.

47 (U) Lowenthal’s examination, 71-72, highlights another potential complication in the process. Intelligence consumers, he notes, shape the product they receive by “establish[ing] the milieu in which intelligence operates....” In addition, Lowenthal argues that consumers are often inundated with concerns, forcing them to frequently ignore topics until events force the situation into crisis, during which many decisionmakers seek to act as their own analyst. Former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates supported this assessment in noting that “policymakers in successive administrations have largely abdicated their intelligence-guidance responsibilities. For many years, trying to get senior principals to attend meetings to discuss longer-range intelligence requirements has been an exercise in frustration.” Gates lays blame for this tendency squarely on the short-lived tenure of political appointees. See Robert M. Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987/1988): 226.
it all to any one of a number of cognitive manipulations to produce an outcome is repeated for each and every individual in the decisionmaking chain.

(U) Within the bureaucracy, we can easily envision an almost infinite series of actions and reactions in terms of oral and written communications, often as rhetorical discourse and rerepresentation.48 The president's statement of information needs, whether expressed rhetorically or in the expectation of a direct answer, in oral or written form, explicit or implied, will provoke an interpretive response among his advisors and subordinates. These individuals, such as staff members on the NSC, will engage, in turn, in consideration and rerepresentation of the subject as they discuss and interpret the president's needs. The result of this consideration will then be passed along as output to be addressed by the Intelligence Community. Within the intelligence structure, the same exercises in interpretation, cognitive processing, rerepresentation, and decision will be made before the information needs, as intelligence requirements, are passed to the collection agencies' requirements management bureaucracies. These collection requirements elements will undertake the same processing and communicative activities as they work to provide effective collection requirements for appropriate intelligence agencies to act on. Each of these agencies, in turn, will replicate the processes as the intelligence requirements are transformed into specific intelligence collection taskings eventually acted on by specific individuals, who will also interpret the guidance and tasking they receive. In sum, at each point in the chain from original statement of information need to the operator who collects data to satisfy that need, opportunities abound for interpretation, reinterpretation, and rerepresentation, any of which could change the tone and focus of the original need statement.

(U) The final outcome, in terms of specific collection taskings acted on by intelligence officers, is nevertheless expected to reflect the original intent and desire of policymakers quite well. Despite multiple layers of bureaucracy and countless opportunities for reinterpretation and rerepresentation, the great majority of intelligence target topics are easily understood and hold the same or substantially similar meaning for all actors in the process. The less heated the associated rhetoric, the lower the expected variance between original inputs and final outcomes. Since "terrorism" is a heated topic, considerable variance is expected in the translation process.

(U) The following sections will examine one aspect of this process, focusing on the likelihood that emotional issues associated with events in Iran affected the perceptions of senior policymakers. The impact of those events on policymakers, as well as on most Americans, coupled with other cognitive and environmental factors, are believed to have significantly shaped process outcomes. Measurable aspects of the process can be traced by focusing on the degree of continuity and congruence between original inputs, in terms of characterizations of people and events associated with Iran, and final outputs in terms of specific collection tasking.

48 (U) This idea expands on Leeman's discussion, 27-42, of rhetorical strategies in terms of a dichotomy of actions.

Impact of Multiple Manipulations, Interpretations, Re-representations

Modified Statement of Information Needs

Additional Modifications in the Translation-to-Requirements Process

Various Resulting Intelligence Collection Foci. Direction and Intensity are Determined by Context and Tone.
GROWING INSTABILITY

Iran over the past decade has made a very important contribution to the stability of the Middle East. The United States has worked very closely with the Shah, and Iran is a close and valued ally.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, responding to a news conference question in November 1978

(U) For American policymakers, Iran seemed to buttress U.S. strategic interests in the region. Assistant Secretaries of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Alfred Atherton and Harold Saunders, in April and June 1978 statements respectively, asserted the primacy of Soviet intentions, oil, regional stability, and human rights in America’s Middle East policies. Iran, while not an Arab state, was seen by American leaders as vital to U.S. interests in the region. By virtue of its geographic position, Iran served as both a buffer against potential southward expansion of the Soviet Union and as a potential controller of commerce through the Persian Gulf. Rich in oil, Iran was seen by U.S. leaders as an additional hedge against radical Arab manipulations of the global oil market despite Iran's demonstrated support of previous oil embargoes. While the Shah of Iran grew increasingly assertive and independent in the 1970's, he continued to see the United States as a valued ally and, consequently, helped foster U.S. interest and support through activities designed to bolster U.S. policies such as supplying oil to Israel. In return, American leaders saw the Shah as a cornerstone of U.S. interests in the region.

American Perceptions

I still, of course, remain frustrated in some measure about our inability to comprehend everything that makes these people [the Iranians] tick, but at least in these days we do not lack voluble expressions of their often illogical viewpoints.

Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan, in a letter dated 24 December 1978


50 (U) Harold H. Saunders, “Middle East: The Situation in Iran and Its Implications,” Department of State Bulletin 79, no. 2023 (February 1979), 45. In his address before the House Committee on International Relations on 17 January 1979, Saunders notes that Iranian independence is critical to the U.S. since Iran controls the Straits of Hormuz, through which 50% of the free world’s oil passes. Saunders also asserts that “[b]ecause of Iran’s importance to the security of the gulf region, the future of the Middle East, and the production of oil, we have a strong interest in a free, stable, and independent Iran.” Saunders also highlights Iran’s role by noting Iran “helped protect Western access to oil supplies” by assisting nearby Oman cope with an insurgency.
(U) Although American leaders were keenly aware of Iran’s place in the world, at least as structured by U.S. policy and interests, most Americans remained fairly ignorant of Iran. To many, Iran was a far-off and exotic place, made even more so by popular images of Ali Baba and the Arabian nights. After years of looking toward southeast Asia, many in this country were simply not yet ready to pay attention to still more conflict, even if involving American interests, particularly in such a seemingly remote part of the world. Yet when growing anti-Americanism in Iran became so pervasive and apparent that it attracted notice of the American public, the most common reaction was shock.51

(U) Policymakers also viewed Iran in idealized terms, despite receiving information suggesting Iranian stability was not as assured as the Washington bureaucracy hoped. Jimmy Carter’s election contributed to this vision, at least during his administration’s first two years, as a result of the president’s liberal idealist world view.52 Gary Sick, National Security Council desk officer for Iran during the hostage crisis, notes that there was a “perceptual gulf” between the United States and Iran. Arguing that we poorly understood Iran, Sick suggests that the United States was content to equate our relationship with the Shah with our relationship with his country. As a result, American policymakers relied on official Iran for information and this reliance became a “deeply institutionalized pattern of behavior.”53 Policymakers, consequently, were quick to accept information received from the Iranian government as complete, accurate, balanced, and valid without independent verification.54

(U) While Carter placed heavy emphasis on human rights, he was, nevertheless, willing to give the Shah the benefit of the doubt as far as internal Iranian affairs were concerned.55 Carter understood the apparent inequity between his idealism and his policies, yet chose to rationalize it by citing the moral strength of America:

I was familiar with the widely accepted arguments that we had to choose between idealism and realism, or between morality and the exertion of power, but I rejected those claims. To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence.56

These values, in turn, consciously57 and expressly shaped the Carter administration’s foreign policy. The Carter administration, nevertheless, tempered its

51 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 5, 13, 70, and 76. Sick suggests the same holds true for Khomeini and that the clash between romanticized images of Iran and the fierce reality may have led to the American public’s reaction after the hostages were seized of uncharacteristic vengeance. Sick also noted that the Carter administration, at least until October 1978, was much more preoccupied with other crises and policy initiatives, specifically the Camp David peace process, normalization of relations with China, and SALT II. More than 10 months of Iranian disturbances passed before the subject was taken up in administration meetings.


53 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 36-37.


55 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 38.

56 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 143.

treatment of Iran, largely as a result of the administration's views of Iranian strategic importance.\footnote{58}

(U) The American government was willing to accept the Shah's interpretation of events. Carter publicly admitted supporting the Shah for the same security and foreign policy objectives as previous presidents, yet deferred to the Shah's judgment on Iranian domestic affairs and stability. As a result, Carter seemed willing to accept the Shah's characterization of Iranian opponents as communists or communist pawns which threatened to the stability of the entire region.\footnote{59} By his own admission, much of Carter's understanding of the Iranian opposition came from the Shah, prompting Carter to write:

Still, there is no question in my mind that he [the Shah] deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had the Shah been a staunch and dependable ally of the United States for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized and maintained in Iran. We knew little about the forces contending against him, but their anti-American slogans and statements were enough in themselves to strengthen our resolve to support the Shah as he struggled for survival. . . .

Meanwhile, through their propaganda machine, the Soviets were doing everything possible to aggravate the situation. Aware of the 1500-mile border shared by Iran and the Soviet Union, I was concerned that the Soviet leaders might be tempted to move in, a repetition of what they had already done three times in this century.\footnote{60}

While Carter's perspective remained clearly focused on qualities such as loyalty, he came to realize the Shah was in serious political trouble at home. By November 1978, the President was willing to concede that the Shah's fate no longer rested squarely in America's hands. Through it all, however, Carter maintained his preference that the Shah remain in power, even if that meant his heading a military government.\footnote{61}

(U) Not only did perceptions color the administration's views of the Shah, and of the Shah's opponents, but the mechanisms for foreign policy development and implementation also skewed the administration's views and actions. One of the hallmarks of the Carter administration was persistent infighting within the administration over policy guidance and implementation. While the President tended to see Secretary of State Vance as his primary foreign policy advisor and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), as his personal counselor, Brzezinski's aggressive pursuit of foreign policy objectives led to frequent clashes with Vance and the State Department. By the end of 1978, Brzezinski had successfully changed his role from personal counselor to principal policy advocate.\footnote{62} Brzezinski saw around him others incapable of seeing a broader strategic picture, and claimed that role for himself:

It is . . . increasingly evident that the coordination of foreign policy and the infusion of it with strategic content will have to come from this [his own NSC] office. The way the Executive Branch has been set up, and particularly

\footnote{58} Sick, \textit{All Fall Down}, 28.

\footnote{59} (U) Carter, \textit{Keeping Faith}, 435-436. Carter also felt that opening lines of communication with the Shah's opponents, particularly the Ayatollah Khomeini, would send the message that the United States was prepared to abandon the Shah. Sick highlights Carter's reluctance to even suggest such a course of action was being considered in writing of the State Department's stake in propagating the image of likely outcomes in ways favorable to U.S. interests. See Sick, \textit{All Fall Down}, 219-220. Stempel, \textit{Inside the Iranian Revolution}, 67-68, maintains that U.S. perceptions centered around the idea of Iranian stability began to take shape as early as 1964, when domestic Iranian politics was seen as sufficiently oriented toward U.S. standards.

\footnote{60} (U) Carter, \textit{Keeping Faith}, 440.

\footnote{61} (U) Carter, \textit{Keeping Faith}, 439.

the staffing of the State Department, seems to indicate that operational decisions, negotiating, and so forth may well be handled from the State Department, Defense Department, and other agencies, but that there is no single source of larger strategic thinking and innovation in the government.\textsuperscript{63}

Citing the "institutional flexibility" and "inherent ambiguity in the way foreign policy is made," Brzezinski took advantage of both his position and his relationship with Carter to seize control of the flow of information reaching the president.\textsuperscript{64} Institutional interests also adversely shaped the administration’s perspectives of Iran and the Iranian opposition, where ambiguity in the way foreign policy is implemented policy were hampered by institutional biases and preferences, the administration also harbored a bias against the Intelligence Community\textsuperscript{65} which destroyed any realistic hope of eventually achieving analytic balance. Early administration efforts to define its intelligence needs centered on improving the interaction between the NSC staff and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Efforts to gather key personnel from CIA and the NSC staff in order to discuss the NSC’s information needs remained, however, an \textit{ad hoc} undertaking.\textsuperscript{66} To improve the quality of intelligence, a variety of proposals, some trumpeting "radical approaches" to restructuring the Intelligence Community, appeared,\textsuperscript{67} although little concrete action appears to have resulted. The directives ultimately issued, nevertheless, continued to call on intelligence consumers to provide the impetus for defining requirements, suggesting consumers "play a dominant role in establishing requirements... and prioritize them through some sort of high level committee mechanism."\textsuperscript{70} Carter, in approving Presidential Directive/NSC-17, "Reorganization of the Intelligence Community," adopted such a mechanism in handing the responsibility for defining national requirements to a Policy Review Committee consisting of the DCI, the Secretaries of State, Defense,


\textsuperscript{64} (U) Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle}, 57.

\textsuperscript{65} (U) Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle}, 64. He notes, as well, that he was insistent that he, and he alone, present the president’s morning intelligence briefing. When DCI Turner objected to CIA briefers being excluded by Brzezinski, the APNSA simply renamed the briefings the “national security briefing” and used this new label to continue excluding representatives from the Intelligence Community.

\textsuperscript{66} (U) Especially instructive here is the difficulty encountered by government analysts who considered predicting that the Shah might not be able to retain power. The first to do so, after much self-examination, was the State Department’s Henry Precht. Despite his intention to go against the institutional grain, Precht felt his “negative” report would damage his professional reputation and likely ruin his career. See Sick, \textit{All Fall Down}, 81.

\textsuperscript{67} (U) Lowenthal, 49. Lowenthal notes specifically that the administration’s attitude on taking office ranged from skeptical to overtly hostile. See also Donald Gregg and Robert Rosenberg, \textit{SECRET/SENSITIVE Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski}, Subject: "Intelligence - The Next 16 Months," 28 August 1979, Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: Source marked “Review on August 28, 1984.”

\textsuperscript{68} (U) Zbigniew Brzezinski, CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: “NSC/CIA Liaison on Information/Intelligence,” 13 April 1977. Classified by: unmarked; declassify on: unmarked.


\textsuperscript{70} (U) Zbigniew Brzezinski, \textit{SECRET Memorandum for the President}, Subject: “Reorganization of the Intelligence Community”; 9 July 1977, Classified by: unmarked; declassify on: Source marked “XGDS(2)” Interestingly, the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) community established just such a functional mechanism in the working of the National SIGINT Committee considerably earlier than did the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) community.
and Treasury, the APNSA, and others. PD/NSC-17 also assigned to the DCI, during peacetime, the responsibility for translating Policy Review Committee requirements. Despite these efforts, the quality of political reporting out of Iran continued to suffer.\(^72\)

\(\text{(6)}\) Even if the administration had presented itself with a positive opinion of the Intelligence Community's capabilities and efforts, few of the resources needed for effective intelligence collection on Iran remained after 10 years of steady reductions.

One assessment prepared for Brzezinski focused on problems associated with monitoring a strike by oilfield workers, yet was equally applicable to the rest of Iran:

Our information has been extremely meager.\(^73\)

We need to realign the resources available to us to focus as effectively as possible on the present gaps in our information, and we must begin building an intelligence capability that will serve us better in the future.\(^73\)

Events in Iran would quickly outpace U.S. actions, denying the Intelligence Community the time needed to build the independent capability envisioned.\(^76\)

\(\text{(6)}\) Additionally, few of the State Department employees in Iran could speak Farsi, significantly cutting their capability for independent collection, analysis, and reporting.\(^74\) Without the ability to collect and analyze information independently, particularly on the Iranian opposition, due to the lack of necessary linguistic skills and a policy limiting much of the potential contact with opposition elements, the United States came to rely on the Shah's government for information.


\(^74\) (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 77 and 90-91 and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 67-72.
Carter was aware of the intelligence shortcomings his administration faced, enough to complain quite critically to DCI Stansfield Turner, APNSA Brzezinski, and Secretary Vance in a November 1978 memorandum. In the end, however, the note had little significant effect save for a bitter round of bureaucratic finger-pointing about responsibility for leaking the memorandum to the press. Further aggravating the President was the steadily escalating conflict between himself and the Secretary of State, on the one hand, and Ambassador Sullivan in Iran, on the other.

Carter came to believe that he could not rely on Sullivan, closing off one avenue of reporting while allowing Brzezinski the opportunity to expand his own back-channel avenues of information gathering.

Several authors examine the conflict between Washington and Ambassador Sullivan as well as the episode's implications for U.S. information gathering and policy implementation. See, for example, Sick, *All Fall Down*, 4 and 161; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 443-450; and Wahl, 25 and 31. Sick goes so far as to say that Sullivan's change in reporting tone ignited a "policy firestorm," while Wahl, on page 25, notes that the episode revealed a "dysfunctional relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking."
Awakening to the Threat

(U) In Iran, political stability steadily crumbled. Guerrilla activity, which had begun in 1971, reached new heights in audacity and destructiveness by mid-1977. Through 1978, unrest and rioting in Iran resulted in so many deaths and injuries that American policymakers could no longer ignore the possibility that the violence could spiral out of control, eventually bringing down the Shah's regime. Despite mounting evidence clearly indicating the Iranian government's precarious situation, American leaders still saw Iran's future intimately linked to the Shah. The situation in Iran eventually forced analysts and policymakers in Washington to begin considering the political programs and goals of the Iranian opposition, particularly the secular moderates. The religious opposition remained marginalized in the minds of many American observers, except where they formed common cause with the secular moderates, while the leftist opposition was considered too small and ineffectual to be of serious concern without active Soviet intervention.

(U) Officials in Washington found it difficult to reconcile their own perceptions of Iran and actors in Iranian politics, on the one hand, and the message they received about the goals and intent of the Iranian opposition. The anti-American sentiments, the vicious verbal attacks against the Shah and the Iranian monarchy, and the political platforms of the opposition were largely alien ideas to American policymakers. How the Iranians could so willingly reject the regime which had begun opening the political process, which had implemented sweeping land reform, and which had instituted a program of rapid modernization was beyond official Washington's comprehension. Adding to this inability to reconcile perceptions with observations were the cognitive difficulties brought on by the pervasive influence of Islam, particularly the "radical" Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini, in the political debate. America's heritage of state-religion separation and religious tolerance made the uncompromising and intimate mix of Islam and politics all but unfathomable to most Americans. Even assessments from the NSC contributed to the confusion by noting that the worst-case, and most unlikely, outcome of Iranian unrest still centered around the Shah remaining on the throne or the government passing into the hands of right-wing military leaders. In the latter case, the specter of increased Soviet influence remained a primary concern.

(U) The discontinuity between preferred perceptions and observations resulted in American observers becoming fairly quick to label the Iranian opposition in unflattering terms. Undersecretary of State Harold Saunders, for example, wrote of "activist religious leaders" who had "not yet found orderly ways of expressing their views." Khomeini caused considerable perceptual problems for American observers. As
The center of much of the Iranian opposition, American policymakers focused considerable attention on Khomeini, although much of that attention portrayed Khomeini as an enduring "enigma." Although Carter came to consider Khomeini the emerging leader of a more-or-less unified Iranian opposition, he considered Khomeini remote and aloof with "an air of martyrdom" about him. The Ayatollah's religious beliefs, to the President, "bordered on fanaticism" and demonstrated a "militant attitude of demanding action and violence." This propensity toward violence also led Carter to worry about the impact of religious fervor in Iran, as his views of Iranian fanaticism led him to conclude that Iranians would "work themselves into a frenzy" during religious observances. 86 These characterizations, both of Khomeini and of the Iranian opposition in general, were eventually to shape the tone and texture of American policies toward Iran. Not only was the future of U.S.-Iranian relations conditioned by these perceptions and by Americans' inability to grasp the philosophies and outlooks of the Iranian opposition, but these perceptions also shaped the way in which the United States approached the Iranian government.

The Guerrillas

(U) Much of American policymakers' attention in the final months of the Shah's regime revolved around the various opposition groups. The Iranian political landscape by this time was a complex and fluid environment, no doubt adding significantly to the confusion in Washington. In the early 1960's, the Shah's primary opponents could be found among various nationalist groups and among the Tudeh, or communist, party. 87 Beginning in 1962, the Shah's White Revolution, through which he hoped to fully modernize Iranian society, began to break down the once-special relationship the Shah enjoyed with clerical leaders. Many of the White Revolution reforms, instituted effectively, stripped traditional powers and influence from the clergy, angering them and leading directly to Khomeini's opposition to the regime. The Shah, for his part, contributed to the growing rift by speaking publicly of "black revolutionary mullahs" and "ice-ridden clerics" 88 who resisted White Revolution reforms. From that time on, Islamic constituencies lost influence in Iranian society, paving the way for more radical and violent underground groups. 89

(U) Among the secular groups which sought influence in Iranian politics were the liberals, best exemplified by the National Front. Harking back to the liberal government in the early 1950's of Mohammed Mosaddeq, the National Front longed to recreate liberal Iranian democracy as it had existed prior to Mosaddeq's overthrow in 1953. While the secular liberals of the 1970's were receptive to using religious symbolism and accepting a measure of Islamic influence, the closely associated lay-religious liberals such as Mehdi Bazargan's Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) took a more pragmatic foreign policy approach in its willingness to accept continued ties to the United States, albeit in a reduced and controlled capacity. 90 Nevertheless, the Liberation Movement was characterized by a generational split within its ranks. While the older LMI members were generally reformist, non-violent, secular, and anti-British, younger members tended to be more influenced by Islam, anti-American, more radical, and supportive of armed struggle as a means of gaining control. 91 The influence of this younger LMI generation was quite apparent in Bazargan's insistence that the Shah's government was systematically spreading...
gharbzadegi, or the plague of Western culture, undermining Iran's national identity. 92

(U) Among the clergy, the liberals appeared more tolerant of the Shah than the clerical populists. The liberal clergy tended to support the ideals encompassed in the 1905-1909 Fundamental Laws, envisioning a viable constitutional monarchy. The clerical populists, on the other hand, were influenced by Khomeini and insisted on the creation of a theocratic state along the guidelines laid out in Khomeini's Velayat-e faqih: hokumat-e Islami ("The Jurist's Trusteeship: Islamic Government"). Khomeini's followers attacked real and perceived threats from the United States, American imperialism, Zionists, the Soviet Union, Freemasons, Baha'is, Marxists, royalists, and a host of others. 93

(U) Among the radical groups active in Iran, secular organizations included the Tudeh, the Feda'iyan, and various Maoist groups. Each in their own way sought traditional Marxist outcomes by overthrowing the existing socio-political structure, distancing Iranian policies from those of the West, nationalizing trade and the means of production, eliminating private property, and redistributing resources, among others. 94 SAVAK had been fairly effective in curbing the activities of these groups until 1978, when the Feda'iyan withered and the Tudeh emerged as the principal secular guerrilla organization. 95 Among the religious radicals, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) would emerge during the 1970's as the most important guerrilla group. Not only did the Mojahedin seek the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, but it sought also the complete reordering of the basis of Iranian society. While taking important cues from Islam, much of the political program espoused by the religious radicals included elements borrowed from rather shallow readings of Marxist theory, 96 leading the MEK in particular to be branded with the label "Islamic Marxists." 97 The Mojahedin were soon to emerge in the growing chaos following the Shah's permanent departure from Iran in January 1979 as one of the two primary competitors for control of Iranian society and politics. The revolutionary credentials of the Mojahedin, their actions during the revolution, and their popularity would, within the next three years, lead to direct confrontation between the MEK and the clerics in control of the government. This struggle, in an evolving format, shaping virtually all aspects of internal Iranian politics between 1979 and 1982, and continuing today, provides the clearest sense of continuity through the revolution, the hostage crisis, the consolidation of the theocratic regime, and later policies of the mature Islamic regime.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq

(U) For the younger generation of LMI members, unrest in June 1963 became a turning point in their political development. Influenced both by events in Iran and abroad, younger LMI members sought to make sense of their world by forming discussion groups to explore the potential offered by revolution and armed struggle. Looking back on the early 1960's, the Mojahedin would later argue:

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92 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 42-45.
94 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 47 and Zabih, 46.
95 (U) Zabih, 88.
96 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 46. Abrahamian notes, on page 114, that many of the religious radicals, particularly among the MEK, were influenced by the teachings of Ali Shariati, who advocated a dictatorship of the intelligentsia rather than the proletariat. Nevertheless, Shariati was influenced by Marx, particularly "... the neo-Marxism of Gurvitch for whom Marx was a humanistic social scientist treating history as a dialectical process, and for who religion was the key element in popular culture providing the oppressed with comfort, dignity, an outlet for suffering, a sense of justice, the feeling of community, and, at times, even ideological tools to fight their oppressors."
97 DCI, SECRET Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: "The Opposition to the Shah," 3 November 1978, 3. Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked. This memorandum notes that the "People's Strugglers," the MEK, drew its members from among religious Iranians, yet had an original and current leadership of Marxists.
The June Uprising was a turning point in Iranian history. It revealed not only the political awareness of the masses but also the fundamental bankruptcy of the old organizations that had tried to resist the regime and its imperial patrons through armed struggles: through street protests, labour strikes, and parliamentary reforms. After June 1963, militants — irrespective of ideology — realized that one cannot fight tanks and artillery with bare hands. Thus we had to ask ourselves the question, “What is to be done?” Our answer was straightforward: “Armed struggle.”

The Mojahedin has long claimed the 1963 uprising was a seminal event in the development of the Iranian armed resistance. In explaining how it gave rise to its “revolutionary ideology,” the Mojahedin felt that the uprising clearly revealed the failure of reform efforts. The rationale used in arguing this view was characteristically uncompromising:

... the masses could no longer delude themselves with the idea that such a bloodthirsty regime could reform itself. Thus reformist ideas were finally laid to rest in the cemetery of dead political ideas ... [sic] It was after this historic turning point that the founding leaders of the Mojahedin began to think of a three-pronged struggle: an ideological struggle, an organizational struggle, and an armed struggle.

(U) Belief in the efficacy of armed struggle resulted, on 6 September 1965, in the transformation of LMI discussion groups into the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. Still focused largely on study and discussion, the organization’s early reading list consisted of the Koran, Marx, Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Carlos Marighelli. As an underground group, part of the new armed resistance, the MEK would manage to remain a secret to authorities until 1972.

Mojahedin Philosophy

(U) The ideological underpinnings of the Mojahedin owe much to the teachings of Ali Shariati, a sociologist whose speeches and writings on Islamic ideology earned him recognition as the “ideologist of the Iranian revolution.” Shariati, in turn, was heavily influenced by the works of Marx, although Shariati rejected significant philosophical and economic aspects of Marxist thought. Seeing class conflict as a political struggle, rather than an economic one, Shariati placed greater emphasis than did Marx on the role of religion and the power of ideas. For Shariati, Islam was a revolutionary religion, providing the masses with a means to achieve a classless society, nezam-e tawhidi, much like Marx’s advanced communism.

(U) While promoting an ideology very similar to that of Marx, Shariati nevertheless saw communists as ideological rivals and treated them as such.

(U) The Mojahedin, on the other hand, took a more pragmatic approach to existing communist groups. Placing the goals of the revolution above the purity of ideological implementation, MEK leaders argued that communist groups such as the Tudeh and Feda’iyen should be afforded respect as fellow revolutionaries seeking a common goal. The Mojahedin, like their ideological mentor, nonetheless saw Islam as a powerful tool for promoting the overthrow of the Iranian regime. The strong spiritual inspiration the Mojahedin took from Shia Islam, however, did not prevent the group from developing a strong anti-clerical orientation. Focusing on the right of all Muslims to interpret


100 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 88-89. This work represents perhaps the most detailed examination of the founding and evolution of the Mojahedin.


102 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 124-125.
Islam, the Mojahedin argued the ulama, or clerics, had no special interpretive authority. The intelligentsia, then, was seen by MEK leaders as the true exponents of Islam and the proper vanguard of the revolution. This line of argument earned the MEK labels such as monafeqin (hypocrites), Islamic Marxists, and Marxists in Islamic clothing. 103

(U) The Mojahedin have always, however, emphatically rejected the Marxist label. Denying even that they are socialists, the Mojahedin have nevertheless admitted the efficacy of learning from kindred revolutionary ideologies, like Marxism, without accepting the philosophy itself. 104 Ervand Abrahamian presents perhaps the most concise summary of the Mojahedin philosophy:

The ideology of the Mojahedin was thus a combination of Muslim themes; Shi'i notions of martyrdom; classical Marxist theories of class struggle and historical determinism; and neo-Marxist concepts of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary heroism. From Bazargan, Taleqani and Ouzegan, the Mojahedin derived the view that Islam was not only compatible with reason, science and modernity, but was also the main world religion that wholeheartedly favoured human equality, social justice and national liberation. From Marx they obtained their perception of economics, history and society, especially the history of the class struggle. From Lenin they acquired the economic interpretation of imperialism and revolutionary contempt for all forms of reformism. From Che Guevara and Debray, they learnt the contemporary arguments about Third World dependency and the new left polemics against the old communist parties, especially against the old school's preference for organizations over spontaneity; trade unions over guerrilla bands; industrial workers over radical intellectuals; tactical alliance over uncompromising zeal; and, of course, the political struggle over the armed struggle. Finally, from Marighella and Guillen (a Spanish anarchist living in South America) they obtained a modern version of the Bakuninist strategy for making revolution. According to this strategy, once a small but well-organized and highly dedicated group of armed revolutionaries dared openly to assault the authorities, their heroic example inspires others to follow suit until eventually the whole state disintegrates. In this way, the nineteenth-century Russian anarchist notion of "propaganda by deed" entered Iran and inevitably reinforced the traditional Shi'i concept of heroic martyrdom. 105

(U) Several basic tenets have remained largely intact through the years since the MEK's founding. Foremost among these is the primacy of Islam as a dynamic and revolutionary philosophy, albeit one best interpreted through the dialectics of Marxism. Earlier Iranian revolutionary organizations failed to adopt and practice adequately the lessons from Marx, the social scientist, leading to their ultimate failure. 106 Failing to adopt and adapt these lessons resulted, in the MEK view, in an organization's inability to harness the true power of Islam. Finally, the MEK has consistently

103 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 122.
104 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 2 and 100-102. See also Sick, All Fall Down, and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, for discussions of the close association of ideology born of Shariati and the Mojahedin with those of Marx. A Mojahedin handbook cited by Abrahamian, pages 92-93, clearly states "We [the MEK] say 'no' to Marxist philosophy, especially to atheism. But we say 'yes' to Marxist social thought, particularly to its analysis of feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism."
105 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 100.
106 (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation, "The Mujahedin-e-Khalq: An Open Source Review, December 1, 1987," in "Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq," by Senator John McCain (Arizona), S174-S180, The Congressional Record (21 January 1993), S174. Interestingly, despite a long-term reliance on Islam, Mojahedin philosophy has interpreted Islamic concepts in radically new ways. This reinterpretation has resulted in jihad being defined as liberation struggle, rather than crusade; shahid as revolutionary hero rather than religious martyr; mojahed as freedom fighter rather than holy warrior; and imam as charismatic revolutionary leader rather than religious leader. For additional examples, see Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 96.
seen its struggle as one demanding armed struggle in order to achieve success. This belief in the necessity of armed struggle led to a long and bloody history, first against the Shah's governments and then against the clerical regime, the latter continuing to this day.

The organization split in 1975 with the issuance of a scathing attack entitled "Manifesto explaining the ideological position of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran" (Bayanieh-e 'alam-e navaze'-e ideolozhik-e Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran). Stating that religion was, indeed, the opiate of the masses, the Marxist Mojahedin claimed it was abandoning Islam in favor of the scientific philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The Muslim Mojahedin, on the other hand, refused to give up either Islam or the organization's name, leading no doubt to considerable confusion in Washington. Even an author as intimately familiar with the Mojahedin as Abrahamian has difficulty in clearly delineating the organization's turbulent split:

From then on there were two rival Mojahedin organizations. One was the Muslim Mojahedin which refused to relinquish its original name and accused its opponents of gaining control through a bloody coup d'etat; after the Islamic Revolution it managed the regain fully the original title. The other was the Marxist Mojahedin which initially took the full name of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran; then in 1978 assumed the label Bakhsh-e Marksisti-Leninisti-ye Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (The Marxist-Leninist Branch of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran); and finally during the revolution merged with some Maoist groups to form the Sazeman-e Paykar dar Rah-e Azadi-ye Tabaqeh-ye Kargar (The Combat Organization on the Road for the Emancipation of the Working Class). This became known as the Paykar Organization. Another group of former mojaheds who had converted to Marxism while in prison were less favourable to Maoism and had never contested the Mojahedin title, on their release from gaol during the revolution formed the Sazeman-e Kargan-e Engelabi-ye Iran (The Organization of Revolutionary Workers of Iran). They later became better known as Rah-e Kargar (Worker's Road).

For analysts in the U.S. administration, both at the time and in later years, confusion over the Iranian opposition became the order of the day, particularly since the organization now known as the Mojahedin grew out of the Qasr prison commune of the Muslim Mojahedin headed by Massoud Rajavi. Confusion stemmed from the organization's bewildering series of names, from the schism itself, separate and competing communications channels between Washington and reporting elements, the lack of U.S. government contacts with the opposition, informational reliance on the Iranian government, and the dearth of Farsi-speaking reporting personnel in the U.S. Embassy. This confusion, coupled with the MEK's repugnant philosophy and goals, led American leaders to reinforce the already negative perceptions of the organization. The result was an overwhelmingly negative, and simplified, view of the Iranian opposition in general, and the Mojahedin in particular.

The Rise of the Mojahedin

(U) Mojahedin attacks in its campaign of armed struggle certainly helped to solidify its negative image in Washington. In its pre-revolutionary days, the MEK appealed to a wide segment of Iranian society through its affiliation with Islam, eventually coming to dominate

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108 (U) This confusion remains evident in such works as Stempel's. Although serving as a political officer in the U.S. Embassy, Tehran, and having significant contact with the Iranian opposition, Stempel frequently blurred the distinction between the two wings of the Mojahedin into a single entity. The same lack of distinction is also quite evident in U.S. government documents of the period.
110 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 164.
much of the Iranian left. As the organization developed its capability to carry out armed resistance, however, it remained pragmatic and sought assistance from like-minded revolutionary organizations. In a move sure to solidify American disdain, the MEK actively sought the support of, and cooperated with, the Palestine Liberation Organization. As early as 1970, MEK leaders received training from the PLO, particularly from Yasir Arafat’s Al Fatah faction, at camps in Lebanon and Jordan. Additional training and assistance came from Libya, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and other radical left organizations in Iran.112

(U) Pushed into violent activity before it was ready by the actions of other guerrilla groups,114 the organization’s earliest attacks tended to be at night and resulted in few casualties. That changed in May 1972, however, when the Mojahedin “honored” the visit of President Richard Nixon by bombing the Iran-American Society, the U.S. Information Office, the Hotel International, Marine Oil Company offices, General Motors and Pepsi offices, and Reza Shah’s mausoleum. While the Feda’iyan also bombed targets during Nixon’s visit, the Mojahedin earned lasting American enmity by bombing Reza Shah’s mausoleum 45 minutes prior to Nixon’s scheduled arrival and by attempting to assassinate BG Harold Price, the head of the U.S. military mission in Iran.115 Other attacks by the Mojahedin against Americans in the years preceding the Shah’s departure included the assassinations of LtCol Davis Hawkins in 1973, Col Paul Schaeffer in 1975, and LtCol Jack Turner, also in 1975.116 Coupled with the Mojahedin’s stridently anti-American, Marxist-flavored rhetoric, American leaders received a steady stream of discomforting information about the Mojahedin, information which would further solidify negative characterizations of the Iranian opposition.117

(U) While U.S. policymakers received fairly thorough, if confused, information on Iranian guerrilla groups, the American public did not begin getting a clear picture of Mojahedin activity until September 1978. On the 7th, generally considered a turning point in Iranian unrest, a half-million people turned out for a Tehran rally which saw the first appearances of public praise for the Mojahedin and Khomeini coupled for calls for the death of the Shah.118 The publicity attached to this rally, the largest protest to that point in Iran, indelibly linked in American minds Khomeini and the Mojahedin. By December, the Mojahedin had turned to sponsoring even larger public demonstrations, some of which gained considerable media attention in the United States. The organization had also adopted, by this time, a policy of refraining from armed attacks without Khomeini’s approval.119

112(U) Zabih, 89-90.
113(U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 127-138. Abrahamian claims that while approximately 30 MEK leaders received PLO training, the U.S. Intelligence Community inflated that number to several hundred.
114(U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 128. Fearing the already active Feda’iyan would claim the forefront in opposition to the Shah, the MEK staged its first attack against a gendarmerie post on 8 February 1971
117(U) Characterizations of the Mojahedin in a wide variety of reporting were consistent in application of the “terrorist” label. See, for example, Ambassador William H. Sullivan, CONFIDENTIAL Message to the Department of State, Subject: “Straws in the Wind: Intellectual and Religious Opposition in Iran,” 25 July 1977, National Security Archives item 01201; CIA, Draft NIE on Iran: Ambassador William H. Sullivan, SECRET: Message to the Department of State, Subject: “The Iranian Opposition,” 1 February 1978, National Security Archives item 01296; Peter Tarnoff, SECRET: Memorandum and cover letter to Zhigiew Brzezinski, Subject: “Iranian Opposition,” 18 September 1978, Classified by: unmarked; declassify on: Source marked “XGDS-2”; and numerous CIA, State, and Defense Intelligence Agency studies.
118(U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 34.
By January 1979, Iranian unrest had reached such an intensity that the Shah handed the reigns of power to his Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, and left Iran. His departure galvanized the opposition and Iran descended further into chaos. While the Mojahedin, along with the Feda'iyyen, are credited with providing the military capability that made the revolution a success, the inspiration, drive, and direction came from the Ayatollah Khomeini. While the MEK continuously asserted its independence from all other elements of the opposition, including the clergy, U.S. policymakers continued to consider the MEK little more than the armed wing of a relatively united opposition under the guidance of Khomeini.

Many observers, particularly within the administration, saw Khomeini as a "dour medievalist" and ideologue stuck in an uncompromising philosophy of hatred for the West and for anything smacking of modernity. Viewed as prone to seeing the world in starkly black and white terms, the Ayatollah's actions and apparent reversals seemed to defy logical explanation. Even President Carter experienced considerable difficulty in efforts to reconcile Khomeini's actions, on the one hand, with Carter's views of proper conduct, on the other. Despite this difficulty, Carter came to see this behavior from Khomeini as "typical." Carter also saw Khomeini's return to Iran from exile as leading inevitably to either complete anarchy or the establishment of a radical regime, yet others felt that the Ayatollah would spearhead the revolution, then retire to Qom to "serve as the conscience of the government." Despite Khomeini's long-standing commitment to a radical vision of Islamic government and his repeated refusals to compromise his principles, Carter's advisors felt as late as January 1979 that because of Khomeini's ignorance of international relations he would not be a threat.

As confused as analysts were over the core of Khomeini's philosophy, the reports they produced added still more confusion, rather than clarifying the administration's picture of Iran. In one study, Khomeini was portrayed as fervently anti-communist but "his followers may be susceptible to communist and radical penetration." The administration, however, recognized the shortcomings in its understanding of events in Iran and the role of Islam in Khomeini's politics, and sought assessments of each. The results, unfortunately, remained confusing.

Despite the stridency of Khomeini's pronouncements, American leaders could not understand Khomeini's vision of the Islamic state. Reflecting a radical new concept of that state, the Ayatollah's vision centered around his concept of his own divine role in interpreting Allah's will in the absence of the Hidden Imam. While the sheer intimacy of Khomeini's vision of Islam and the state confused American leaders, the audacity and arrogance exhibited by Khomeini hardened American views of the Ayatollah as a madman.

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119 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 36-37 and 170-172.
121 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 448.
122 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 446.
123 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 99.
124 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 161-162. Sick notes that this opinion emerged as the consensus in an 11 January 1979 mini-Special Coordinating Committee meeting chaired by David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy.
126 (U) Zbigniew Brzezinski, UNCLASSIFIED Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: "Islamic Resurgence," 20 December 1978.
Intelligence and Pre-revolutionary Iran

Perhaps the most difficult tasks for the DCI in his role as Community coordinator have been establishing an effective link between policymakers' information needs and intelligence requirements, prioritizing those requirements, and maintaining effective control over the allocation of intelligence resources.

(U) Until the early 1970's, the generation of intelligence requirements was largely accomplished by analysts and collectors. In 1971, President Richard Nixon instituted a more focused top-down mechanism for determining information needs and intelligence requirements, resulting in several general Community-based guidance documents. Known variously as “Perspectives for Intelligence,” “Objectives for the Intelligence Community,” and “Key Intelligence Questions,” these documents provided a Community-level look at pending and anticipated information and intelligence needs.131 By the late 1970's, the Community-level guidance had evolved once again, this time to appear as National Intelligence Topics (NITs), which defined topics of interest in the broadest possible terms. The NITs, in turn, formed the foundation on which the DCI-produced list of “U.S. Intelligence Objectives and Priorities,” issued as an attachment to DCI Directive 1/2, was built. These attachments would soon become known as the Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities (FIRCAP) and would be updated and issued regularly until the early 1990's. The NITs and FIRCAP comprised an expression of the DCI's, and hence national level, topics of interest and the priorities attached to each. As such, these documents were intended to guide and shape the development and prioritization of more detailed collection requirements in each of the intelligence disciplines.

In the years preceding the Iranian revolution, administration officials understood a continuing need for a more controlled and effectively managed collection effort. Much of the intelligence collection undertaken at the time focused on current intelligence, with little substantive effort expended on longer term predictive analysis.132 While this current reporting focus met specific short-term needs, it failed to provide policymakers with a sufficient picture of likely futures. To meet this shortcoming, some NSC staffers initiated contacts with collection and analysis personnel in the Intelligence Community, although this activity met with strong disapproval from the highest Intelligence Community leadership.133

The context of information needs, nevertheless, was well defined for Iran by early 1978. Consolidating input from intelligence consumers throughout the civilian and military communities, the NSC's

130 (U) Shahrough Akhavi, "The Clergy's Concept of Rule in Egypt and Iran," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 524 (November 1992): 101. Akhavi writes that Khomeini was to develop his vision to the point of claiming “the state could even abrogate one of the five pillars of Islam if it saw that it was necessary for the safeguarding of the 1979 revolution.”


132 Hoskinson, SECRET Memorandum to Brzezinski, “Improving Political Intelligence.” DCI Turner complained that he did not want the NSC staff telling the Intelligence Community how to do its job.
Policy Review Committee (Intelligence) outlined topics of national long-term interest. The author's examination found that Iran, considered in this document a "Key Developing Country," held interest for policymakers in terms of industrial and resource development, foreign policy, economic policy, military capabilities, and domestic instability. Using a system of priority settings ranging from 1, for topics considered vital to United States national survival, to 8, for those topics considered to be of "some interest," Iran entertained priorities in the middle ranges. Of particular note, Iranian domestic instability, a category suggesting the activities and potential disruptiveness of guerrilla groups, received a priority of 3, indicating the topic was of "major importance" to U.S. security or policy interests. The document also posed several questions considered critical by policymakers. The administration's focus, however, is evident in the higher priority assigned to questions concerning Iranian investments and materials procurement than for the potential for internal instability. Clearly, American policymakers failed to see the Shah in serious trouble, despite the continued and growing unrest in Iran.

The perspective held in Washington, which assigned high priorities to Iranian topics concerned with Iranian oil and economic strength, is also evident in the evolution of the priorities assigned in the FIRCAPs through 1978. Although the exact layout of these documents changed over the years, several themes directly indicative of high-level interest in Iranian internal unrest and the activities of guerrilla groups remain apparent. Each of the documents outlines interest in the possibility of serious or active insurgency in Iran. In each year between 1972 and 1977, this topic rated a priority 6, indicating policymakers felt it was of "some importance" but obviously not of serious concern. Similarly, that the priority of the topic did not change over 5 years of growing unrest seems to indicate that U.S. officials believed the potential for insurgent success was minimal. Beginning in 1973, the priorities listings expanded by adding such topics as "Internal political developments," "Internal security situation," and "Political/sociological interactions."

Designed to indicate U.S. policymakers' interests in the state of internal affairs for each targeted country, the internal political developments and security situation categories remained constant through 1977 at priority 5, indicating the belief that those topics were of "moderate importance" to the United States.

Reassured regularly that the opposition was little more than a nuisance, U.S. policymakers must have accepted the official Iranian position and remained content to focus attention on other topics.
The priority for political/sociological interactions did rise one mark in 1977, from 6 ("some importance") to 5 ("moderate importance"), probably reflecting a newly discovered appreciation for the depths of Iranian dissatisfaction with the Shah and their increasingly open, numerous, and vocal methods in expressing those views. Nevertheless, the priority remained relatively low, also indicating a lack of alarm over Iranian events.

The evolution of national-level topics of interest, and the priorities attached to those items, indicate a growing sophistication on the part of Intelligence Community managers to refine statements of interest to more accurately accommodate the range of intelligence customer interests and desires. At the same time, that evolution also indicates a growing appreciation for the nuances of events and ideas which might be of use in American policy development and implementation. The growing detail associated with the broad topics outlined in the FIRCAP and its immediate predecessors shows an Intelligence and policy community interaction developing into a more dynamic and responsive instrument of effective management. At the same time, however, the apparent stagnation of topics directly related to Iran and the potential for greater instability in Iran demonstrates a clear complacency on the part of the administration. No doubt fed in part by the sheer extent and scope of all U.S. intelligence interests as well as the increasing demands for information placed on the Intelligence Community, also contributing to an apparent malaise was the persistently held belief that any Iranian future revolved around the Shah. Beginning in January 1979, that perception would shatter rapidly.
REVOLUTION AND CONSOLIDATION

Once committed, it was not easy to escape the inexorable logic of the situation. Each side was operating without a safety net. Even the prospect of failure was not to be admitted: it was too painful to contemplate.

Gary Sick, in All Fall Down

They even took the cockroaches.

(U) Following the Shah's departure on 16 January 1979, Iran seemed to descend into chaos. Despite the upheavals in Iran, Washington continued to hold on to the belief that the situation would stabilize under the new government. President Carter expressed support for the new government of Shahpour Bakhtiar, and appealed to Khomeini to support that government. The Ayatollah refused and called for Bakhtiar's overthrow. Despite the hostility expressed in Khomeini's refusal and in his calls for the overthrow of the Bakhtiar government, all parties seemed to believe that events would conclude in their favor. Bakhtiar maintained hope in his administration, Carter believed the moderate regime would prevail, and Khomeini saw the downfall of the regime and its replacement by an Islamic government. Gary Sick alludes to this struggle to maintain a positive outlook even though the course of events indicated otherwise because the possibility of failure was, indeed, "too painful to contemplate."

The evolution of events in Iran continued to puzzle American officials, with subsequent characterizations used to describe people and events couchèd in sarcasm, overgeneralization, or, like Shellenberger's cockroaches, absurdity.

(U) Khomeini returned to Iran on 17 February and within four days had appointed Mehdi Bazargan head of the provisional government. The following day, Washington reaffirmed support for the Bakhtiar government but was forced to acknowledge Bazargan's when Bakhtiar resigned shortly thereafter. The hostage crisis which would eventually define the Carter presidency was foreshadowed on the 14th, when an Iranian mob led by the Feda'iyan attacked and held the U.S. Embassy for a brief period. 137 A few weeks later, on 1 April, Khomeini announced "the first day of a government of God" in proclaiming the Islamic Republic of Iran after a national referendum in which 90 percent of the votes cast reportedly supported the establishment of an Islamic government.

(U) Bakhtiar's resignation, Bazargan's appointment, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic added to the administration's discomfort. Carter felt pleased over the prospects demonstrated by the Bazargan government initially, noting that the Prime Minister, his deputy Ibrahim Yazdi, and a few others seemed to act responsibly. While Khomeini's ultimate authority was recognized, Carter held hope in the new regime. That hope, however, was tempered by the "irrational" Khomeini and his "fanatical followers" who managed to keep Iran in a state of "constant turmoil." 138 The president also worried about the revolution's excesses, which resulted in a "continuing bloodbath," as well as

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137 (U) Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 184-192. Stempel writes that the Feda'iyan turned over the Embassy to Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, who was backed by Mojahedin units, later in the day. This confrontation marked the beginning of a "mini-civil war" between the Feda'iyan and the Mojahedin which, although ended quickly, would effectively end close relations between the two groups. See particularly page 167.

138 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 453.
the steady stream of "responsible" officials leaving Iran. As Khomeini’s domestic troubles mounted, Carter saw the Ayatollah “. . . [lash] out more and more at the United States.” 139

(U) As Carter’s views illustrate, U.S. policymakers failed to understand clearly the nature of the Iranian regime following Khomeini’s announcements. The policy bureaucracy, focused on the present and on the familiar structures of government,140 failed to grasp the duality of the Iranian power structure. On the one hand, American leaders easily understood and accepted the Bazargan government, which ran state institutions, bureaucracies, the military, and other aspects of formal state structure and governance. Unfamiliar, on the other hand, was the parallel shadow government composed of the clergy and Revolutionary Council. It was this second group, which included Khomeini and the komitehs, that controlled the more easily recognized and understood governmental structures nominally headed by Bazargan.141

(U) Inside Iran, the dual nature of political control caused friction between various claimants to power. Khomeini, however, began to bring the fractious revolutionary movement together through promises to free Iran from foreign influence, to bring social justice to all, and to extend freedom to all political parties.142 In the quest for unity, the Mojahedin’s support, in particular, was sought by the clergy due in large part to the MEK’s large number of “revolutionary martyrs.”143 Revolutionary unity began to break down quickly, however, as the clerics sought to eliminate contenders for power. The regime embarked on a reign of terror, citing both its pan-Islamic ideology and an inherent right of self-defense, focused largely on the guerrilla groups which had helped guarantee revolutionary success.144

(U) In the weeks and months prior to the Embassy seizure in November, Khomeini’s dream seemed to be crumbling as opposition to the Islamic Republic of the clerics mounted. Not only were the guerrilla groups openly challenging the authority of Khomeini’s revolutionary government, but the middle class, outlying tribal and clan groups, and even some of the more moderate clergy were questioning the legitimacy of the regime. As Khomeini faced the prospect of losing his dream just when it appeared to be solidifying, he desperately sought a means of distracting the Iranian people. The Shah’s admission to the United States on 22 October, sanctioned by the president on humanitarian grounds so the Shah could undergo medical treatment, gave Khomeini the hook he needed to divert attention from domestic Iranian problems.145 Over the course of the next 14 months, the consolidation of revolutionary authority in the hands of radical clerics would play itself out in the context of the Embassy seizure and the resulting hostage crisis.

139 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 454. See also page 450 for Carter’s reaction to assassinations, preemptory arrests, summary judgments, and sanctioned executions by the Islamic regime.
140 (U) Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 285.
141 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 47.
143 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 187-189. Abrahamian notes that the number of martyrs was significant in light of Iranian culture, which places a premium on self-sacrifice, and the dearth of clerical martyrs. The Mojahedin’s importance was rated so highly that Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the Islamic Republican Party, claimed the three pillars of the Islamic Revolution were Khomeini, Ali Shariati, and the Mojahedin.
144 (U) Zabih, 91. See also Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 189 for a discussion of the ideological genesis of the regime - guerrilla split.
145 (U) See Sick, All Fall Down, 236-239; Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 190-197; and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, chapter 10, especially pages 213-219.
Embassy Seizure

The seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran . . . is best understood not in foreign policy terms but rather, as Khomeini designated it, as the “second Iranian revolution.”

Gary Sick, in “Iran’s Quest for Superpower Status”

(U) As Gary Sick maintains, the ebb and flow of the crisis which began with the attack and seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, followed by 444 days of captivity for 52 Embassy personnel, was attributable more to internal Iranian politics than to anything the United States had done. U.S. policymakers, however, would not come to understand this until much later. At the time of the takeover on 4 November 1979, American officials had little solid information to work with. Seized by a group calling itself the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line, to Washington the Embassy represented a collapse in effective and responsible Iranian government. The audacity of the attack shocked Washington and led quickly to both hostility and disdain, as shown in government references to those guilty of such an appalling breach of international law. Sick notes, for example, that the Embassy was seized by a “ragtag band of self-appointed revolutionary guards” who “had a perverse affinity for Sundays and U.S. holidays.”

The Mujahedin, due to their actions in leading the attack and urging Khomeini not to release the hostages, would be the focus of American enmity for years.

(U) The President’s reaction to the Embassy seizure was one initially of hope born of the quick reaction of Iranian authorities during the February Embassy takeover. Looking back on that day, Carter would later write that he was “deeply disturbed, but reasonably confident” Iranian officials would act as expected. The supportive response the militants gained confused Carter as he struggled to understand the unfolding events:

It was not at all clear what the militants wanted. My impression was that originally they had not intended to remain in the embassy or to hold the Americans captive beyond a few hours. However, when they received the adulation of many of their fellow revolutionaries and the support of Khomeini and other leaders, they prolonged their illegal act. As kidnappers, they seemed to have no clear ideas about ransom, except to repeat the cry we had been hearing ever since January 16 of the previous year—return the Shah and his money to Iran.

Although the identity and the specific goals of the militants would continue to confound U.S. leaders, and the world, for months to come, Carter was nevertheless quick to question the militants’ claims of being students, noting that “American citizens—including the President—were in no mood to watch Iranian students demeaning our country.”

147 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 205 and 206. See also Abrahamian, The Iranian Mujahedin, 57-58.
150 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 458. See also Sick, All Fall Down, 240, for a list of Iranian leaders who quickly expressed support for the militants.
151 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 460.
Reactions Solidify

It's almost impossible to deal with a crazy man, except that he does have religious beliefs, and the world of Islam will be damaged if a fanatic like him should commit murder in the name of religion against 60 innocent people.

From President Carter’s diary, entry of 6 November 1979

While the Embassy seizure shocked America, little of the administration’s rage was directed specifically at the Embassy’s attackers. Perhaps because their identities were clouded, the compound militants rated generalized negative characterizations, from “militants,” “revolutionaries,” “students,” and “fanatics” to “kidnappers” and “terrorists.” The hostage takers were considered irrational and unpredictable, criminal and ruthless. Khomenei and the Iranian leadership, however, bore the brunt of the administration’s most direct and scathing criticism. Perhaps because the Iranian authorities had been quick to support the Embassy takeover, and continued to express that support, the U.S. administration saw an Iranian power structure specifically, consciously, and wantonly derelict in its moral, ethical, and legal responsibilities. The Iranian leadership, in U.S. eyes, not only failed to live up to its responsibilities, but gloried in its refusal to do so. The Iranian regime quickly became, to American leaders, a lawless and renegade regime, guilty of shockingly illegal acts, both inhuman and degrading in its abuse of human dignity.

At the root of such deviant behavior, however, Carter saw Khomeini “acting insanely,” and wrote in his diary on 28 November:

We were notified that the Foreign Minister was dismissed and a guy named Ghotbsadeh was made Foreign Minister. Every time one of the Iranian government officials shows any sign of rationality, he is immediately incompatible with Khomeini and is replaced.

Public expressions throughout the administration reflected the confusion and outrage. The reactions quickly solidified and, as Gary Sick notes, set the tone for U.S. policy throughout the remainder of Carter’s presidency. At the United Nations, Iran was branded as a renegade state which violated “the most basic obligation of nations” by condoning the Embassy takeover and holding accredited diplomats in inhuman and degrading conditions. Iran had violated “every standard of international behavior, whether established by practice, by ethics, by treaty, or by

152 Classified and open-source reports reaching the National Security Council and the White House, even very late in the crisis, frequently offered contradicting analyses of the hostage holders. Henry Precht, in a CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum for Gary Sick, Subject: “Authority of Compound Militants,” 8 January 19(80), Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked, suggested the “militants” had a degree of autonomy from Khomeini. Later in the crisis, the CIA assessed the militants as belonging to several different organizations associated with Islamic groups, while noting that “information is in many cases unconfirmed and contradictory.”

By mid-1980, the hostage questions had largely evolved from determining the identities of the compound militants to determining whether the hostages had been effectively and fully transferred to government control. President Carter and his advisors, however, saw the Iranian government as the ultimate responsible party from very early on in the crisis. See, for example, Carter, Keeping Faith, and Sick, All Fall Down, for relevant discussions.

153 (U) See, for example, Carter, Keeping Faith, 459-467.
154 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 256-257.
155 (U) Alexander and Nanes, 482, quoting transcripts of a presidential news conference.
156 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 459.
157 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 467.
158 (U) Sick, All Fall Down, 242.
common humanity” in its actions. The administration continued its verbal assault before the International Court of Justice, where Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti highlighted the “illegal and inhuman” conditions under which American diplomats were being held. Even the president made clear his anger as the months progressed, seeing the “Iranian nightmare,” initiated and perpetrated by “irrational people on the other side of the world over whom I had no control,” as so grievous that a return to the status quo of early 1979 would be wholly inadequate.

While the crisis dragged from month to month, the Carter administration’s fury focused less and less on the militant Iranians holding the American diplomats and more on the intransigent Iranian government. At the same time, the crisis finally forced Carter and his chief advisors to choose between the competing foreign policy directions offered by APNSA Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance. The hostage crisis, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, finally succeeded in hardening Carter’s outlook, moving him cognitively from a fairly close congruence with Vance’s world view toward a perspective quite similar to the considerably more hawkish views of Brzezinski. By 1980, events had forced Carter to focus less on a global community of nations and peoples and more on U.S. national security and global


160 (U) Attorney General Civiletti’s oral argument, 10 December 1979, quoted in Alexander and Nanes, 489.

161 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 566.

(U) As the crisis extended into 1980, foreign policy briefings often focused on Iran and the fate of the hostages. Here, President Carter discusses the situation in a 9 January 1980 briefing.

Photograph courtesy of the Carter Presidential Library.

stability in an increasingly uncertain world. The frustration Carter felt in coping with the Iranian crisis provided the key series of discomforting events which forced the President to revise his most fundamental perceptions of the world. These changes were evident in the increased stridency of Carter's characterizations, not of the compound militants but of Khomeini and the Iranian government.

(U) In 1980, Carter more frequently and freely disputed the militants' claims of being students. In a White House briefing for Congressmen, the message from the president was quite clear:

... this small group of people — who may originally have comprised some students, but who are not students and who should not be referred to as students . . . . They don't necessarily have as one of their prime interests the integrity of Iran as a nation or the well-being of the Iranian people or even the security of the country within which they live.

163 (U) Rosati, 170-174 and 180-184.

164 (U) White House briefing on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan, 8 January 1980, quoted in Alexander and Nanes, 495.
The most difficult part of the Iranian question is that there's no government entity with whom we can communicate or negotiate or register a complaint or a request. ... [T]he most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of international terrorists or the kidnappers who are holding our hostages. Wherever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed.\footnote{165}

Even internal administration communications reflected this hardening of opinion, indicating the harsh rhetoric reflected personal feelings, beliefs, and perceptions as much as it did suasive rhetoric designed to influence others.

(U) Despite the administration’s confusion, Carter still struggled to find a functioning and responsible governmental structure in Iran. In January 1980, Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani Sadr was elected Iran’s president, bolstering Carter’s hopes that the Iranian regime would now settle into a more smoothly performing and predictable state. Events in Iran, however, promptly disabused Carter of those ideas, forcing him to acknowledge Khomeini’s continued control over Iran.\footnote{166} Raised hopes, followed by crushing disappointment, appeared to be the order of the day. Above all, Carter blamed Bani Sadr’s weakness and the unpredictability of a reclusive and “deranged” Khomeini for a series of false starts in negotiations and hostage transfers.\footnote{167} Growing frustrations led to a further hardening of opinions,\footnote{168} leading Carter on 7 April to finally break formal diplomatic relations with Iran, freeze Iranian assets, and announce sanctions. Four days later, Carter authorized a rescue attempt that would ultimately end in failure two weeks later.\footnote{169}

\footnote{165} (U) White House briefing, 8 January 1980, quoted in Alexander and Nanes, 494-495.

\footnote{166} (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 499. Carter specifically writes “Khomeini had also tried to avoid any responsibility one way or the other, but the militants had forced it on him. He had betrayed his own Islamic republic by siding with the militants against the official decision of the elected government representatives — an act that would perpetuate disorder and chaos in Iran during the months ahead.” At the same time in Iran, contenders for power continued to jockey for influence. As Bani Sadr lost Khomeini’s support, the MEK — at the time drawing 150,000 people to anti-Islamic Republican Party rallies — became the critical counter to the growing power of the radical clergy. See Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 64-65.

\footnote{167} (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 497-499.

\footnote{168} (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 505-506. Carter notes that when Henry Precht called the Iranian ambassador to order Iranian diplomats out of the country, the ambassador angrily countered that the hostages were under Iranian government control and were well cared for. Precht replied “Bullshit!” and the ambassador complained of mistreatment and abusive language to the press. Carter learned of the incident and noted “I wrote Henry a note, saying that one of the elements of good diplomatic language was to be concise and accurate and clear, and his reply to the Iranians proved that he was a master of this technique.” See also Peter Constable, “U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran,” Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2040 (July 1980) for additional details of measures taken.


\footnote{170} (U) See, for example, “Iran’s Proposals for Release of American Hostages,” Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2045 (December 1980): 47. This article provides the text of a U.S. government translation of one such Iranian announcement.
In a closer view of the briefing on 9 January 1980, President Carter's concern and worry are evident in his face. Demonstrations featuring prominent anti-American themes strengthened these perceptions and bolstered a growing hard-line American approach. In the end, the tone of Iranian messages supported Carter's dawning view of Iranian officials as radically Anti-American, suspicious, lacking in sophistication, and confused in their efforts to govern effectively.\(^{171}\) This perspective continued as the drama played out through the remainder of 1980, during which time the Shah died on 27 July, Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September, and Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in his bid for re-election.

\(^{171}\) (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 580.
The Carter administration's efforts to deal with the crisis, and with the Iranians, ultimately met with failure, although not because of any lack of effort. In reviewing American attempts to resolve the conflict and defuse the crisis, Warren Christopher accurately notes that the administration faced a difficult challenge in initially deciding that the proper course of action included probes and negotiation, even when met with "insolence and insults." Carter and his administration faced the problem of having to reconcile a basic instinctive desire to insure the safety and freedom of American diplomatic personnel, while also somehow acting within the framework of a commitment to refuse to negotiate with terrorists. Christopher sums up this dilemma:

One of the most controversial questions raised about U.S. policy on the Iranian crisis is whether it was right, as a matter of principle, to negotiate with the terrorists who took over the embassy. In

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this case, a refusal to negotiate with the terrorists would have entailed a refusal to negotiate with the government that subsequently embraced the terrorists' actions. Some are still disturbed by the remembered image of the United States constantly probing for ways to start discussions, while the hostages were being paraded blindfolded before the cameras and while the Ayatollah, rebuffing every attempt to talk, was escalating his abusive, Anti-American rhetoric. It might have been more satisfying psychologically to turn a cold shoulder to these international outlaws, or to threaten them in kind — or perhaps to pound them back to the Stone Age. 173

Christopher's assessment notes the difficulty faced by administration officials upon finding two fundamental beliefs challenged in such a way as to set up an inherent conflict between any chosen reaction and an individual sense of justified and appropriate actions. The United States could negotiate, but only if willing to admit that acts of terror could achieve desired results. Brzezinski opposed any such option, lecturing Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown on the subject in an 8 November 1979 Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting. When Vance and Brown suggested the United States might return the Shah to Mexico, Brzezinski argued that action would be a historical first in "abject capitulation" to foreign mobs, an action which would "sully the dignity" of the country. 174 On the other hand, refusal to seek a negotiated outcome challenges the cherished belief that disputes should be resolved peacefully if possible even though in this instance such efforts would also undermine stated policy to refuse negotiations with terrorists. The United States could also respond in kind, but only if the country was willing to abandon its long-held sense of moral and ethical superiority. The U.S. could also respond with a military strike, either limited or general, but only by abandoning its sense of appropriate and reasonable response. Because each of these themes is firmly embedded in the American psyche, any chosen course or actions would strike a discordant note with at least a significant portion of Americans. Each option stood to produce significant discomfort, leading decisionmakers easily onto a course of minimizing the requirement to make a firm and irrevocable decision or to rationalize a continued search for a more appropriate course to follow. This latter course, easily and quickly perceived by many outsiders as a "do-nothing" response, would cause the least discomfort with cherished beliefs and perceptions. The result was the administration's adoption of that course of action, through design or chance, and almost fourteen months of publicly-perceived inaction. The less the administration was seen to do by the American people, regardless of any unpulicized behind-the-scenes activity, the lower Carter sank in the polls. The perceived lack of activity led, in turn, to Carter's loss in the election at the hands of voters who took personally the embarrassment of a continued insult from Iran.

(U) Carter also took the crisis personally, although he sought to maintain the image of a world leader in control while displaying firmness laced with patience. The President would later write:

The holding of the American hostages had cast a pall over my own life and over the American people since November 4, 1979. Although I was acting in an official capacity as President, I also had deep private feelings which were almost overwhelming. The hostages sometimes seemed like part of my own family. I knew them by name, was familiar with their careers, had read their personal letters written from within their prisons in Iran. I knew and had grown to love some of the members of their families, and had visited with them in Washington and even in their hometowns around the country. More than anything else, I wanted those American prisoners to be free. 175

173 (U) Christopher, 19.
174 (U) SCC, SECRET Meeting Minutes (informal), 8 November 1979. Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked.
175 (U) Carter, Keeping Faith, 4.
While Carter tended to keep the very intense private feelings he had separated from the public persona of the president, Ronald Reagan acted openly on his. While the two men shared the shame and anger of the American people, Carter expressed his privately among friends and intimate associates in his administration as well as with his and the hostages’ families. Reagan, upon assuming the presidency, acted on his feelings by declaring that his administration would not be held to the terms of any agreement reached by Iran and the Carter administration until his own administration had the opportunity to review the terms and conditions involved. In their own ways, Carter and Reagan sought to deal with the Iranian regime and the problems for the United States it represented while preserving those qualities and principles each held to be of greatest importance.

(U) While Carter and Reagan sought their own paths for resolving the cognitive conflicts they encountered in balancing private and personal feelings with their duties as president, both failed to appreciate fully the roots of Iranian behavior during and immediately after the hostage crisis. In Iran, the hostage drama continued on a separate stage from the struggle for power and control of the Iranian state. While acknowledging this conflict, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie continued to express the Carter administration’s hopes for political normalcy, on generally American terms, in the later months of the hostage crisis. While extending nominal recognition to the reality of Iranian politics of the time, the administration continued to struggle to fit the Iranian regime into a neatly defined cognitive construct of government, with the State Department’s Peter Constable summarizing that desire by stating “[w]e are dealing with a government in Iran that has few of the attributes we expect of national authorities.” The end result remained constant: the United States acknowledged the power and apparent authority of the militants as well as that of Khomeini, while insisting on holding the formally constituted government responsible.

(U) The hostage crisis played out in Iran as the backdrop for a growing struggle between the clerics and the more secular elements of the revolutionary coalition. After the March 1980 Majles, or parliament, elections, conflict between the Mojahedin and the government escalated sharply. By mid-year, close associates of Khomeini had begun calling the MEK monafeqin, or hypocrites, as well as charging that the Mojahedin were agents of the United States, of the Soviet Union, and of the “international Jewish conspiracy.” The militants holding America’s hostages joined the chorus, accusing the Mojahedin of being Marxists who worked with “pro-American liberals.” The growing antagonism within Iran involving the Mojahedin, however, would prove lost on American officials. While the MEK would go on to break

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177 (U) "Secretary Muskie’s News Conference of June 13,” Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2040 (July 1980): special section page D. Muskie is quoted as saying: “If we can get to the point where political authority begins to be concentrated in Iran and to the point where Iran begins to perceive that it has other overriding priorities which it ought to be concentrating on and pursuing, I think we may reach the time when appropriate help from appropriate quarters could bring us to our goal.”

178 (U) Constable, 72.

179 (U) Constable, 72 and Carter, Keeping Faith, 496-498.

180 (U) The Mojahedin ran 12 candidates, including its leader Massoud Rajavi, in the August 1979 election for the Islamic republic’s Assembly of Experts, although none were elected. Similarly, the MEK ran 127 candidates nationwide for the Majles in 1980 and backed several more whose platforms were generally supportive of the Mojahedin’s. While no MEK candidates were elected, largely due to a complex two-stage process designed to work against the clerics’ opponents, the Mojahedin received enough votes to frighten the clerical leadership. See Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 199-207 and 218-219.


182 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 211.
completely from the Iranian regime, organize the most effective opposition to Tehran to date, and set themselves up as the democratic alternative to the clerical regime. The MEK’s newfound opposition to Tehran’s rulers and its newfound support for democratic principles would fall on deaf ears in Washington.

Evolution of Interest

If it is fair to assume that the objectives of the militants is to destroy relations between the United States and Iran, to move the revolution into a more militant path, and to identify and bring down any political leadership in the country...they have succeeded to a very considerable extent.

Gary Sick, in a memorandum to Jody Powell, 8 January 1980

Devious leadership and incompetent administration are the twin curses of Iranian political history. These baleful themes have now been pressed to their ultimate absurdity by the simultaneous emergence of Khomeini and Bani-Sadr. It is easy to understand the widespread belief in Iran that only the will of Allah could have installed such an improbable regime. It is doubtful that even Allah will long be able to avoid the conclusion that it was all a dreadful mistake.

Gary Sick, in a memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 May 1980

Throughout the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, American policymakers focused their attention on identifying the captors of American personnel, identifying the level and extent of Iranian government control of those hostages, and understanding the roles and objectives of Ayatollah Khomeini and the radical clerics who were quickly extending their control over the country.183 Unfortunately for America’s leaders, the previous U.S. dependence on Iran for information about the Shah’s opposition would prove detrimental to efforts aimed at identifying the myriad players emergent in Iranian politics.

183 Minutes of Special Coordination Committee and Mini-Special Coordination Committee meetings reflect this trend. The minutes from the 11 January 1979 mini-SCC meeting, for example, demonstrate an overwhelming concern with identifying the likely participants in Iranian politics, the extent to which each identified group might ultimately exercise power in Iran, and the extent of Soviet interference deemed likely. See Mini-Special Coordination Committee, SECRET Meeting Minutes, 11 January 1979. Classified by Gary Sick; Declassify on: Source Marked “Review for Declassification on January 11, 1985.” Similarly, the office diaries of the NSC desk officer for Iran, Gary Sick, indicate confusion and uncertainty over the collapse of the Shah’s government, although those assessments enjoy a measure of optimism in anticipated stability due to the expected influence of the military.
(TS) National policymakers drove this shift in emphasis, although the formal documents outlining the new emphasis of American policymakers failed to reflect many of the nuances of this shift. Largely due to the rapidity of events in Iran, the administration and the Intelligence Community were left to scramble in a desperate attempt to catch up with a swiftly shifting Iranian political landscape. While early assessments, particularly among the NSC and its staff, centered around identifying the participants in the revolution, after the hostages were seized efforts centered around both identifying the hostage takers and determining the proper response. By the end of November 1979, the administration’s focus was on the hostages, yet it still worried about Soviet intervention or the possibility of a leftist takeover in Iran, with a subsequent alignment with the USSR. In either event, Khomeini was seen as his own worst enemy who would eventually destroy himself.

Prior to the hostage crisis, Brzezinski’s views of the world remained marginal within the administration. The crisis, however, shifted Brzezinski’s views toward center stage, quickly setting the tone for the entire administration. Brzezinski’s views were mirrored by Gary Sick, the NSC desk officer for Iran, who enjoyed a position of considerable influence throughout the crisis. Sick’s characterizations and reports of administration deliberations indicate both a thinly disguised hostility toward Iran and an equal disgust for more passive members of the administration. In his notes of an SCC meeting on 8 November 1979, for example, Sick recorded both the context of the discussion and his own opinions of the participants:


(SCC, TOP SECRET Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1979. Classified by: Zbigniew Brzezinski; Declassify on: Source Marked “Review November 20, 1999.” Carter expressed caution in developing a course of action, yet in handwritten notations also agreed that Khomeini would eventually bring about his own demise.
SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

November 20, 1979

Time and Place: 9:00-10:10 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran

Participants:
The Vice President  CIA
State
Secretary Cyrus Vance  Admiral Stansfield Turner
Warren Christopher  Frank Carlucci
Harold Saunders

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown  White House
W. Graham Claytor

NSC
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of domestic issues was cancelled for today.

1. Possible Trials of Hostages. State has prepared a preliminary paper on U.S. options. This will be reviewed today by the interagency group under David Aaron for discussion tomorrow. The group will also examine the ramifications of the possibility that the hostages may be moved to prison. (C)

   -- Increase contacts with dissidents. To be more effective to our current contacts, this would have to involve some financial support. Our hand would begin to show.
   -- Support for tribal elements.

Strategy

   -- Focus on developments in Tehran.
   -- Focus on tribal support with emphasis on securing a base in the oil producing region in the south.

(C) Minutes of the Special Coordinating Committee meeting held 20 November 1979. Carter's comment at the end reads "Be extremely cautious about U.S. action for now."

Source: Carter Presidential Library.
One could only take away a feeling of disgust. [Secretary of Defense Harold] Brown’s quease-
mish smiles and Vance’s naturally dull face revealed, in this exchange, a shocking lack [sic] of character and moral courage. A sniveling spineless informed their performance. One can only wonder if they are worthy of the power with which they are netrusted [sic]. I confess to a deep sense of satisfaction is [sic] watching ZB [Brzezinski] confront them so directly and candidly with the political and moral implications of their positions.189

(TS) As the crisis dragged on, Carter’s views began to harden and more and more came to reflect those of Brzezinski and Sick. By the end of December, Carter’s harder line was beginning to emerge when he indicated that the United States should act to deny the Iranian hostages takers any semblance of legitimacy by refusing to send legal representation in the event the hostages were put on trial.190 Despite the growing hostility toward Iran, Carter was quick to remind members of his administration that the country’s antipathy was directed at Iran, not other Islamic states or Muslims in general.191 Even while the crisis continued, however, the administration continued to deny the possibility of the clerical regime’s permanence. While recognizing the role and importance of the Mojahedin, Gary Sick nonetheless noted as late as May 1980 that the Islamic Republic was “a temporary aberration which cannot and will not succeed.”192

Gross Characterizations

(S) The administration’s abhorrence of the Iranian government and Embassy militants soon became quite evident in internal memoranda. To the administration, Iran’s revolutionary government was fractured and ever-changing. The Iranian regime remained “a collection of second-rate, venal, power hungry, self-centered, inexperienced and disreputable individuals” with “not a good mind or a good idea in the lot.”193

Khomeini, the ultimate authority in Iran, was seen as “an old man obsessed with his vision of an Islamic state” who was “erratic and possibly mentally unstable.”194 While understanding the relationship between Khomeini’s vision of Islam and events in Iran was recognized as vital, key observers in the administration remained confused and apparently unable to reconcile events with perceptions.195

(S) The militants holding American hostages fared no better among administration observers. Seen as masochistic,196 yet powerful and independent, some in the administration questioned whether Khomeini controlled the “students” or whether they controlled

189 (U) SCC, SECRET Meeting Minutes (informal), 8 November 1979.
190 (U) SCC, TOP SECRET Meeting Minutes, 21 December 1979. Classified by: Zbigniew Brzezinski; Declassify on: Source marked “Review December 21, 1999.”
191 (U) Presidential assistant Hedley Donovan submitted a memorandum to the President which began “There was agreement at one of the recent SCC meetings that it could be useful for you soon to reaffirm that the U.S. has no quarrel with the people of Islam, has long-standing ties with Islam, and great respect for the principles of the faith.” Carter’s handwritten response implied that he saw a significant difference between U.S. and Soviet activities: “Hedley: have [paragraph] added referring strongly but indirectly to SU [Soviet Union] attempts to subjugate Moslems in Afghanistan. I presume a Moslem scholar has approved text. J.” See Hedley Donovan, UNCLASSIFIED Memorandum to the President, Subject: [Draft Presidential Statement], 20 December 1979.
192 (S) Sick, SECRET/SENSITIVE Memorandum, Subject: “Iran,” 2 May 1980. Sick further demonstrates his disdain for the Iranian regime in comparing it to the United States: “Imagine the state of this country if the Yippies had seized control of power in 1968.”
195 (U) See, for example, Gary Sick, UNCLASSIFIED letter to Shahram Chubin, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 16 July 1980.
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Khomeini. Despite improved data as the crisis progressed, the identities, affiliations, and objectives of the Embassy compound militants remained problematic. John Stempel, a political officer in the Embassy who had had the most extensive contacts with the Iranian opposition during the Shah's reign admits to the uncertainty surrounding the militants, both in terms of identity and intentions:

Those captors who may not wish to harm the hostages — probably the various mujahaddin [sic] groups — could easily get into physical conflict with their opponents within the terrorist assembly which make decisions. It is becoming increasingly difficult for any external force to prevent internal strife within the militant terrorist group which is likely to injure or kill the hostages.

Uncertainty over the roles and intentions of the secular radicals, particularly the Tudeh, remained constant through much of the revolutionary upheaval and hostage crisis. Early analyses of the Iranian left focused on those groups clearly Marxist in orientation, such as the Tudeh, the Chariks, and the Feda'i'yen. Initial reports on the Embassy militants mirrored this confusion and ambiguity, although the administration's picture of the militants became clearer over time. While the administration gradually obtained a better sense of the militants' identities and goals, opinions hardened as frustration mounted. Earliest reporting and references to the hostage holders tended to refer to the "students," "militants," "kidnappers," and "hostage-holders." In internal communications, the first reference to the hostage holders suggesting they might be something other than students occurred in a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting on 1 December 1979. The first clear indication of the President's opinions, however, came 26 days later when the SCC meeting minutes came back to Brzezinski from President Carter with the handwritten notation from Carter "ZB: Please do not call them students. Otherwise ok.":
SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
December 27, 1979

Time and Place: 9:00-9:45 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran

Participants:
State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher
David Newsom
Harold Saunders

Defense
W. Graham Claytor
Robert Komer

JCS
Admiral Thomas Hayward
General John Puitav

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci

Energy
Secretary Charles Duncan

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

1. Japan. The Japanese have requested our guidance on their forthcoming negotiations with Iran on oil. Thus far the Japanese have held firm at $28.50 per barrel, and they have indicated that they are prepared to stay with that price for the moment if Shell and BP do the same. The SCC agreed that we should ask the Japanese to hold firm at $28.50 and that we were contacting the British to inform their companies to do the same. Secretary Duncan felt that if this price can be sustained for another week or ten days the market price may soften. We will also remind all parties of the agreement to pay only dollars for oil. (C)

Source: Carter Presidential Library.

(U) Minutes of the Special Coordinating Committee meeting held 27 December 1979. Carter's comment to Brzezinski about the militants holding the Embassy and its personnel reads "ZB - Please do not call them students. Otherwise, ok. J"
Minutes of the Special Coordinating Committee meeting held 10 January 1980. Carter reiterates his opposition to calling the Iranians holding the Embassy students by circling "students" and noting "They're not" in the margin.

Source: Carter Presidential Library.
handwritten notation in the margin from the President reading "They're not." Despite the apparent strength of Carter's convictions, others in the administration were not as careful as Brzezinski to mirror Carter's preferences in terminology, although the President's characterization began to filter through the bureaucracy within the next few months. By mid-year, Carter's message had permeated well throughout the bureaucracy. When pressed by representatives from several peace groups suggesting the President stop referring to the "terrorists" holding the American hostages, Gary Sick pointed out that the President's characterization was correct. The President and his administration would continue to strike verbally at the Iranians over the months to come. By the end of Carter's term in office, few restraints on the administration's rhetoric were evident. In what appears to be the draft of a speech welcoming the hostages to freedom, Gary Sick wrote:

The attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and your subsequent imprisonment has focused world attention on a disease which has been spreading but which has too often been ignored by the world community. Increasingly over the last decade, terrorists have attempted to publicize their political objectives through attacks on the diplomats of other nations. This trend reached some sort of new low in Tehran where the existing government of a sovereign nation not only condoned the kidnapping of accredited diplomats of another nation but actually participated in efforts to extort concessions for their release.

(U) Gary Sick and others also expressed uncertainty over the exact nature of one of the main groups involved in the Embassy seizure, the Mojahedin, as well as their philosophy, writing:

It occurs to me ... that the most important difference between the classic Marxist Left and the Mujahedin [sic] is the fact that the Mujahedin profess a totally "persian" homegrown amalgam of Marxism and Islam. Although it may be less than rigorous and lack the historical underpinnings of Marxism, in the end that may be one of its greatest strengths. If there is truly a national impulse toward Islam and a conviction that a progressive image is preferable to reaction, then the attractiveness of this new dogma is more important than its philosophical rigor. ... Did those who participated in the revolution imagine themselves sacrificing for a future which looked like Khomeini's ideal Islamic Republic, or did they imagine something much closer to the mixture of Islam and progressive doctrine espoused by the Mujahedin?

Other information coming in to the administration portrayed the Mojahedin in more conventional terms, referring to the organization as the Bazargan government's main military force, or as an umbrella organization for a number of sub-groups.

204 (U) SCC, SECRET Meeting Minutes, 10 January 1980. Classified by: Zbigniew Brzezinski; Declassify on: Source marked “Review on 10 January 2000.”
205 (U) See, for example, Gary Sick, CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: “Iran,” 21 February 1980. Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked. In this memorandum, Sick is consistent in referring to the “students.”
206 (U) National Security Council, SECRET/SENSITIVE Meeting Minutes, 7 April 1980. Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked. These minutes, apparently typed by an NSC staff secretary, originally contained the passage “The Pres said we are no longer involved in a negotiation with the militants....” The word “militants” was typed over and replaced with the word “terrorists.”
209 (U) Sick letter to Shahram Chubin.
211 (U) Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 150.
The Questions for Intelligence

We are prepared to maintain an honorable relationship of mutual respect with the government and people of Iran. We are not, however, prepared to yield to crude blackmail or to humiliate our nation in response to a terrorist act which is viewed with repugnance by virtually every nation in the world.

In 1979, the administration faced significant challenges in identifying major foreign policy problems and prioritizing them. From the DCI’s perspective, foremost among these challenges was the need to construct and maintain an effective Intelligence Community capable of meeting the needs of policymakers in an increasingly complex international environment. The fluid and complex situation in Iran between January 1979 and January 1981 puzzled the administration in many respects. The identities of the hostage-takers, their intentions, Khomeini’s exact role in governing Iran, the relationship between Khomeini and the Embassy militants, and the potential for Soviet intervention—particularly after the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan—all fought for attention at various times within the administration.

The National Intelligence Topics (NITs), published by the NSC’s Policy Review Committee for the DCI, presented a consolidated statement of general topics of interest to the policymaking community. Not intended in most cases to present specific topics directed at a given country, the NITs were intended to define general categories of information applicable to a range of similar countries. Listed as one of nine “Key Developing Countries” in the JULY 1979 NIT, policymakers’ interests among those nine afforded the highest priority to Iranian stability, asking:

What is the outlook for Iran, over both the short and longer term? How serious is the continuing political instability? How does Iran perceive its regional role in the wake of recent internal upheavals? What are Soviet policies and expectations regarding Iran? How does the current instability affect the security of other countries in the region?

Other NITs questions concerning Iran centered around its investment and procurement programs and, tangentially, the role of fundamentalist Islamic religious bodies in the region. In some respects, interestingly enough, little seems to have changed over time, as William Odom’s suggestions for NITs in May 1980 still sought to address the potential for Soviet alliance.

In its broadest manifestation, the administration’s information needs during the revolution and hostage crisis centered around a need to understand the new Iranian regime. In the August 1979 Basic U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements, Categories, and Priorities (FIRCAP), highest priorities for Iranian targets focused on Iranian relations with other states, Iran’s

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213 (U) DCI, National Intelligence Topics, SECRET Document NI 79-10005, July 1979. Classified by: Declassify on: Source marked “Review on 6 years from date.”


national security objectives and intelligence services, and its internal political development and stability. In each case, these broadly defined topics received a priority designation of 3, indicating the topics were considered to be of major importance to the United States. American interest at this time also focused on Iran’s potential links to international terrorist activity, reflected in a priority of 3 for that topic as well. No specific listings, however, existed for expressing interest in opposition groups, such as the Mojahedin, except where the organization’s activity fell under the general rubric of internal security, internal political developments, and active insurgency, all of which carried a priority 3 in the 1979 FIRCAP. Nevertheless, the changes in priority since the last FIRCAP in 1977 reflect the significant changes which had taken place in Iran. Internal political developments and internal security situations both jumped in priority from 5, moderate importance, to 3, major importance. Even more telling, active insurgency and coup d’etat topics jumped from priority 6, some importance, to priority 3. The designation of international terrorism topics underwent significant modification between the two FIRCAP editions, making direct comparison difficult, yet an increase in priority is evident.

Increased interest is also evident in the 1980 FIRCAP. In the midst of the hostage crisis, most Iranian targets retained the priorities assigned in the previous FIRCAP. Iranian foreign policy objectives and programs, however, increased yet again to priority 2, indicating the topic had come to be considered of critical importance to the United States. Similarly, fears that a radical Islamic regime could develop close and continuing relations with Moscow, or that the various Iranian leftist groups could seize control of the country and move it into the Soviet camp sparked an increase in priority, from 3 to 2, for Iranian relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Also in terms of Iranian foreign policy, the realization that Iran would not, under the new regime, have cooperative relations with Israel was marked by the elimination of any priority, indicating the topic was no longer applicable. The only clear manifestation of the hostage crisis to appear in the FIRCAP, however, was an increase in priority, to priority 2, in the topic covering internal political developments. All other relevant Iranian categories remained essentially the same, indicating that with the exception of possible Soviet influence and concern over the internal political situation, presumably as it affected the hostage situation, information needs concerning revolutionary Iran remained static despite the Embassy seizure.

Refining the Targets

Reporting on Iran mirrored the broad categories and priorities established in the FIRCAPs. Reporting during the initial revolutionary period centered around identities as noted previously, as well as around efforts to understand the relationships between various Iranian constituencies, Iranian perceptions of Khomeini and Bazargan, and Iranian perceptions of the United States. While the power and influence of Khomeini, the military, and the Tudeh sparked considerable interest among American policymakers and, consequently, intelligence collectors, little effort is apparent against lesser known groups such as the Mojahedin. As late as July 1980, emphasis still lay with the hostages, although finding the hostages became the primary effort since their Iranian captors had begun moving them after April’s failed military rescue attempt.


217 (U) See, for example, U.S. Department of State, SECRET Message STATE106426 to U.S. Embassy Tehran, Subject: “Reporting Subjects,” 271630Z April 1979, National Security Archives item 02496; U.S. Department of State, SECRET Message STATE168047 to U.S. Embassy Tehran, Subject: “Reporting Subjects,” 292000Z June 1979, National Security Archives item 0274; U.S. Department of State, SECRET Message STATE178673 to U.S. Embassy Tehran, Subject: “Political Reporting,” 113000Z July 1979, National Security Archives item 02749; U.S. Department of State, CONFIDENTIAL Message STATE196929 to U.S. Embassy Tehran, Subject: “Political Reporting,” 290545Z July 1979, National Security Archives item 02790. With each exchange between State and the Embassy, the emphasis on leftist groups increased, although by July it was still a relatively minor topic for Embassy reporting.
The silence is so loud it hurts.

Quoted in a memorandum from Christine Dodson to Zbigniew Brzezinski and others, 4 April 1980

Collection Difficulties

The general theme within the administration, however, had by this time begun to shift once again toward the development of policies for the future, rather than on strict crisis management.


220 (U) See, for example, Gary Sick, SECRET/SENSITIVE Memorandum for David Aaron, Subject: “Special Intelligence Meeting,” 11 July 1980. Classified by: unmarked; Declassify on: unmarked.

221 (U) U.S. Department of State, SECRET Message STATE215972 to U.S. Embassy Tehran, Subject: “Political Reporting: Needed Resources,” 172236Z August 1979 is just one of many messages available through the National Security Archives Collection “Iran: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977-1980” that reflect this recognition and the apparent lack of progress.


Others, however, such as Paul Henze, managed to inject a note of bitterness into an otherwise good assessment:

in recent years, in spite of all the other problems the intelligence community has had, it has not been accused of suppressing information. Misinterpreting, failing to collect, not having enough of the right kind of sources...? — all of these things, yes. And these criticisms have been valid. But holding back on information received because it is uncomfortable for someone in the policy process to have to take it into account? — No.

The SIGINT community's efforts during the crisis are illustrative of those of the larger Intelligence Community. Following the overthrow of the Shah's government and the establishment of the Islamic Republic,
MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Intelligence Process - Response to your Note on my EX of 2 December 1980

I have not gone into the details of the problem re NID publication on Nicaragua that Pastor raised because I saw no advantage in my being involved in it and advised him to handle it directly. As for the larger question you raised on the intelligence process, let me make the following observations:

There was debate about this during the Vietnam period, when various elements were accused of suppressing information that indicated that claimed policy successes were dubious, etc. There have been other cases. But in recent years, in spite of all the other problems the intelligence community has had, it has not been accused of suppressing information. Misinterpreting, failing to collect, not having enough of the right kind of sources... all of these things, yes. And these criticisms have often been valid. But holding back on information received because it is uncomfortable for someone in the policy process to have to take it into account? No. The Carter Administration's record in this respect is good.

(U) National Security Council memorandum from Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski. Note the degree of bitterness injected into the assessment. Source: Carter Presidential Library.
By the end of the Carter administration's term of
office, the impending release of the hostages, coupled
with a weariness over Iran, led to a final outlook
directed more at the global system in general, than at
Iran. The outgoing Carter administration's emphasis,
in briefing the incoming Reagan team, stressed other
pressing matters. Within the Middle East region,
incoming administration officials were presented
briefings on initiatives to build Saudi Arabia as a logi-
cal successor to America's partner in Gulf security.233
Information concerning the Mojahedin, as with other
radical groups in Iran, was generally ignored by both
the Carter and Reagan teams. While Carter focused his
attention in the waning days of his presidency on the
return of the hostages, the incoming Reagan adminis-
tration seemed to split its attention on Iran between
welcoming the hostages home and verbally attacking
the Iranian government for condoning and participat-
ing in the long crisis. Within the government, however,
seeds were sown for an eventual split between the
executive branch and the Congress when the Carter
administration refused to pass information it consid-
ered sensitive on the hostage-holders to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.234 The refusal of the
Carter administration, and the subsequent refusal of
the Reagan administration, opened the door for Con-
gress to seek alternative sources of information about
Iran and the Mojahedin. Over the next ten years, these
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233 (U) Leslie Denend, TOP SECRET Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: "Your Meeting With Haig," 5 January 1981. Classi-
 fied by: Zbigniew Brzezinski; Declassify on: Source marked “Review January 5, 2001.”

234 (U) J. Brian Atwood, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, UNCLASSIFIED Letter to The Honorable
Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, dated 29 September 1980.
(U) On 21 January 1981, as he prepares to leave office, President Carter receives word that the hostages had finally been released.

Photograph courtesy of the Carter Presidential Library.
STABILIZATION OF THE STATUS QUO

(U) Following the return of the American hostages to the United States, American policy toward Iran quickly settled into an antagonistic standoff. The U.S. government sought to isolate the Iranian regime first for condoning and then for participating directly in keeping American diplomats in captivity, and even later for Tehran’s aggressive foreign policy which sought to export the Iranian revolution. Iran’s war with Iraq further weakened the stability of the Iranian state and Tehran’s willingness to extend its fight with Iraq to Persian Gulf shipping increased American determination to cut off Iran politically from the rest of the world. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s American-Iranian relations remained frigid, with efforts to test the waters of reconciliation consistently undermined by Iranian behavior or ridiculed by the American people.

(U) Due in part to its philosophical underpinnings and to its natural reaction to American efforts to isolate Iran, Tehran’s foreign policy has remained relentlessly hostile to the United States. While Iranian policies have evolved to the point that the regime has sought normalized relations with other Western states,235 Iranian policies remain firmly opposed to the United States. The U.S., citing Iranian support to various terrorists, attacks against Gulf shipping, and Iran’s efforts to develop and expand its nuclear program, among other areas, remains equally hostile to Iran.

(U) An inability to grasp fully the complexity of Iranian political affairs hinders American attempts to understand the clerical regime. In the years since active American involvement in Iran ended, policymakers have continued efforts to define the Iranian regime in comfortable and familiar terms. In much the same way as during the hostage crisis, Iranian foreign policies remain dependent on internal Iranian politics and power struggles.236 America’s search for an understandable Iran can be seen in secret negotiation attempts that became a central episode in the Iran-Contra scandal and in numerous attempts by the Reagan and Bush administrations to identify and work with Iranian “moderates.” Shireen Hunter, writing in Foreign Affairs, questions the existence of any significant differences between Iranian politicians, implying that any perceived differences may be due as much to Western paradigms as actually qualitative differences. While Hunter sees “different types and varying degrees of both moderation and extremism,” American officials have actively sought those moderate enough to suit American preferences.237

From Heroes to Hypocrites

(U) The resolution of the hostage crisis did not ease the simmering political conflict within Iran. Radical clerics under the banner of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) continued their consolidation of control while engaged in a running battle with President Bani Sadr. By mid-June 1981, the IRP-dominated Majles had begun impeachment proceedings against the president. The Mojahedin, already challenging the government as a result of the clergy’s having systematically excluded it from active participation in government,238 staged a massive pro-Bani Sadr rally, estimated to involve 500,000, on 20 June. The Revolutionary Guards’ gunfire, which broke up that rally, also served as the trigger for open and violent conflict between the Mojahedin and Khomeini’s government.239 The following day, the Majles declared Bani Sadr incompetent and Khomeini officially removed him from his government duties, completing

235 (U) Sick, “Iran’s Quest,” 701-702.
236 (U) Sick, “Iran’s Quest,” 698, argues this point quite well. Although written before Khomeini’s death, the dynamics Sick examines remain essentially intact.
237 (U) Shireen Hunter, “Post-Khomeini Iran,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 5 (Winter 1989/1990): 139. Hunter notes, for instance, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had at one point complained that all Iranian moderates were dead. The cautious, but encouraged, American reaction to the 1997 Iranian presidential election continues the trend of seeking and encouraging moderates in Tehran.
238 (U).
239 (U) Decker, 15.
the consolidation of power in the hands of the radical clergy. The Mojahedin and Bani Sadr reacted by declaring the clerical regime much worse than the Shah's while calling on the Iranian people to repeat the 1978-1979 revolution and overthrow the clerics.

(U) The conflict between the government and the MEK quickly took a newer, more violent turn. On 28 June, a bomb destroyed IRP headquarters, killing its chairman and Iranian Chief Justice, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, and 71 other leading IRP figures. The dead also included 4 government ministers, 6 deputy ministers, and 27 members of the Majles. Within three days, the government announced it had arrested Mojahedin members for attempting to "blow up parliament." Over the next several months, more than 200 Mojahedin and its supporters would be executed by the regime. Faced with mounting threats against them, Bani Sadr and MEK leader Massoud Rajavi commandeered an Iranian jet and flew into Parisian exile on 28 July.

(U) With Rajavi's exile, the Mojahedin lost much of its potential to alter the course of Iranian affairs. In a brief period, the competition between the radical ulama and the Mojahedin converted the latter from full revolutionary partner to the largest and most viable opposition organization challenging the government. Abrahamian explains this shift in terms of the potential threat to the clergy's power and influence:

The Mojahedin at their height, especially in June 1981, had truly been a mass movement. They could bring thousands, even five hundred thousand, into the streets to demonstrate against the Islamic Republic. They could mobilize an impressive array of allies, sympathizers, and front organizations to vote against the ruling Islamic Republican Party. Their organization had established clandestine networks as well as open branches throughout the country. Their radical version of Shi'i Islam was a highly potent force, particularly at a time when Iran was gripped by the fervour of both radicalism and Shi'i revivalism. Their impressive record of heroism and death was an additional force, especially since the country's political culture placed a great value on the mystique of martyrdom.

Rajavi's flight, coupled with an aggressive round-up of MEK activists in Iran, significantly weakened the organization within the country. Nevertheless, the clerical regime saw, and continues to see, the Mojahedin as its principal threat. Even Khomeini seems to have feared the Mojahedin's potential as a mobilizing force in Iran, reputedly saying in 1981: "Our real enemy is neither in Iraq, nor in Kurdestan, nor anywhere else, but right here in Tehran. It is the monafeqin." Rajavi understood he would have to reexamine the structure and appearance of the Mojahedin if his organization stood any realistic chance of regaining its ability to challenge the Iranian government. Defeated tactically in Iran, the Mojahedin used their leader's exile to initiate a propaganda campaign designed to transform the MEK's image in addition to denigrating the Iranian regime.


241 (U) The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that the Mojahedin claims that this conflict has resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Mojahedin members and the imprisonment of 150,000 more. Saying these figures are "somewhat" exaggerated, the CRS also notes that MEK attacks over the years have killed 10,000 Iranians, mostly innocent civilians. CRS assessments are contained in McCain, S181.

242 (U) Numerous newspaper articles chronicle this ongoing struggle. Similarly, several works examine the highlights as well as the implications of those actions. See, for example, Pesaran, 39; Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 219-223; Wright; Milani; Green; Sick, "Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses;" and Fouad Ajami, "Iran: The Impossible Revolution," Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988/1989): 149-150. Abrahamian, in particular, notes that the regime's "reign of terror" resulted in a significant number of executions, including teenaged girls arrested in the 20 June rally. These executions, as much as anything else, prompted the Mojahedin to initiate its own terror campaign against the regime.


244 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 259. Monafeqin is Arabic for "hypocrites" and is the term by which the regime has consistently referred to the Mojahedin since mid-1981.
Seeking to highlight differences between the Iranian regime and itself, the Mojahedin moved the issue of Iranian democracy into the spotlight and began to portray itself as the democratic alternative to the theocratic Iranian regime. While this represented a reversal from earlier MEK philosophy, the propaganda campaign Rajavi initiated used the ideas embedded in democratic theory to attack the Iranian regime’s failure to follow through on promises of political freedom. Turning from the Marxist-inspired rhetoric of the past, the Mojahedin sought to convince its audience that true Iranian independence could only come from political freedom, which only a democratic government headed by the MEK could guarantee. To blacken Iran’s image, the Mojahedin claimed Iran’s clerical government had engineered the 1979 Embassy takeover as a means of sweeping aside the Bazargan government in order to impose Khomeini’s “medieval” velayat-e faqih concept of clerical rule.

(U) For an opposition organization, the MEK’s leadership has had a detrimental effect on the organization’s ability to combat the regime. Efforts to set itself apart from the government through its promotion of democratic ideals, coupled with the organization’s separation from its core Iranian constituency, left the organization looking inward. As Rajavi has focused the Mojahedin’s propaganda campaign on a worldwide audience, its message has become lost to the average Iranian. Physical separation from that constituency also forced Rajavi to seek political and economic support from around the world, further widening the gulf between the Mojahedin and the Iranian people. To regain its mass appeal, however, Rajavi and Bani Sadr announced the creation of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) along with a provisional Iranian government based in Paris. The NCRI and its provisional government addressed the political and diplomatic needs of the new “legitimized” organizational structure. As a necessary complement, Rajavi sought to move the organization beyond its guerrilla past and toward a more permanent structure mirroring recognized governmental institutions. To that end, Rajavi also announced the creation of the National Liberation Army of Iran (INLA) in June 1987.

(U) Mojahedin efforts to “internationalize” its reach resulted in its inclusion of a variety of other Iranian opposition groups under the NCRI umbrella. While the Mojahedin, and Rajavi, dominate the NCRI, membership is open to any “democratic” Iranian group opposed to the government established under Khomeini. The broad base of Iranian opposition

245 (U) See Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 209 and Decker, 23-25. Another source is the National Council of Resistance of Iran’s (variously NCR and NCRI) web site (URL: <http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html>) although this source should be seen as carrying an ulterior motive in the selection of its contents. The site, nevertheless, carries statements of the Mojahedin philosophy, NCRI organizational lists, the NCRI Constitution and Bylaws, its political structure, and the NCRI Peace Plan. The later document formed the basis of a joint announcement by the NCR and the government of Iraq, suggesting future cooperation.

246 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 208-209.

247 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 260, notes that the greatest contributing factors were the organization’s severance from its traditional base of support among the Iranian people and from its traditional social roots in Iranian society, destruction of the organization’s rank and file membership through aggressive government efforts, and internal structural reorganizations instituted in Paris.

248 (U) NCRI web site, accessed numerous times since March 1997. Interestingly, the NCRI web pages maintain the NCR was formed in Tehran in 1981, then later moved to Paris. See also Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 243.

249 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 260, suggests the INLA’s creation completed the transformation of the Mojahedin into an inward looking sect tantamount to a cult of personality centered on Massoud Rajavi.

250 (U) NCRI web page. As presently constituted, that includes the Mojahedin, the Organization of Iranian People’s Feda‘iyen Guerrillas, the National Democratic Front, the Association to Defend Iran’s Independence and Democracy, the Towhidi Merchant’s Guild, and a group using the name Committed Professors of Iran’s Universities and Schools of Higher Education. The NCRI claims more than 500 distinct members, including representatives of ethnic and religious minorities, Kurds, Baluchis, 229 individual “distinguished public figures,” and a number of Iranian army officers. Abrahamian, in The Iranian Mojahedin (page 246), notes that the only major groups specifically excluded from NCRI membership are monarchists, the LMI, the Tudeh, and the Feda‘iyen, although this last one seems contradicted by the NCRI web page. See also Decker, 21.
within the NCRI largely collapsed, however, by mid-1985 as the NCRI increasingly became a tool of Rajavi and the Mojahedin. Abrahamian notes a number of factors which contributed to the collapse, including the belief by many member groups in 1981 that the demise of the clerical regime in Tehran was imminent. The resulting jockeying for position, coupled with Rajavi’s role in approving all major NCRI decisions, the growing Rajavi personality cult, and the intimate cooperation between the Mojahedin and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war forced many groups and individuals, including Bani Sadr, to break with Rajavi, the Mojahedin, and the Mojahedin-dominated NCRI.  

This later charge also stewed the Mojahedin in its efforts to maintain profitable ties to Iranian society. By attacking Iranian targets in support of Iraqi aggressors during and after the war, the Mojahedin destroyed years of popular support and goodwill by siding with Iran’s mortal enemy during a war which brought out strong feelings of nationalism and patriotism in Iran.

(U) As support within Iran crumbled, the Mojahedin turned to improving its image and levels of support in other parts of the world. Propaganda directed at the Western media provided one critical pillar of this effort, as does an active public relations and lobbying program directed at Western legislators and prominent private individuals.  

Despite difficulties encountered in convincing many that the Mojahedin is not a tool of Iraq, the Mojahedin understands the West’s commitment to democratic principles. Noting that a key theme in American foreign policy pronouncements is the desire to support those working to promote and implement democracy, church groups, labor organizations, academics, human rights lawyers, and legislators have been key targets of Mojahedin lobbying efforts.

In addition, the Mojahedin’s political drive includes active participation in conferences and meetings as well as exchanges and cooperative efforts with a wide variety of organizations. While much of the Mojahedin’s efforts in the West center around its public relations and lobbying efforts, the goodwill generated is often tempered by Mojahedin-organized and choreographed demonstrations targeting Iranian embassies and diplomatic missions.

251 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 246-249.  

253 (U) Department of State, “People’s Mojahedin,” 14 and Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 245.  
254 (U) Secretary of State George Shultz stated it well in writing that U.S. policy sought to back “... democratic governments and democratic political forces against extremists of both the left and the right. If we abandon those seeking democracy, the extremists will gain and the forces of moderation and decency will be the victims. Our nation’s vital interests and moral responsibility require us to stand by our friends in their struggle for freedom and against those who glorify violent revolution and repression.” George P. Shultz, “New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 713. Emphasis is in the original. It does not take much effort to understand how the Mojahedin have targeted their message to mesh intimately with the themes raised by Secretary Shultz.

255 (U) Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 245. Abrahamian notes that two Mojahedin petitions went to as many as 57 countries and, combined, carried the signatures of 6,700 prominent individuals, including 1,700 in the U.S. and Europe and 3,500 legislators from countries such as India, France, the UK, Sweden, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands.

256 (U) The MEK has sent delegations to or had meetings with former Algerian president Ahmed Ben Bella, the PLO’s Hani al-Hasan, the British Labour Party, Germany’s Christian Democratic Party, the Greek Communist Party, the Indian Socialist Party, the British Liberal Party, Italy’s Communist and Christian Democratic Parties, Socialist International, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and various United Nations special hearings. See Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 245.
(U) Within the United States, the Mojahedin has sought to portray itself as a desirable alternative to the clerical regime, believing the American support would lead to both profitable political capital as well as material support. While the MEK efforts have met with failure in attempting to sway the State Department, it has enjoyed a measure of success in the Congress. Many members of the House and Senate appear to have accepted the Mojahedin’s contention that despite the organization’s anti-American history, a MEK-ruled Iran would nevertheless be much preferable to the present Iranian government. MEK lobbying efforts to date have resulted in expressions of support from a number of U.S. legislators.258 While not opposing colleagues who have expressed support for the Mojahedin, Senator John McCain has, however, noted that “anyone can use the rhetoric of democracy” and cautioned against rushing to the Mojahedin simply because of difference with the present government:

There is no question that we have every ethical, moral, and strategic reason to encourage Iraqi and Iranian democratic movements....

This said, it still is not true that the “enemy of our enemy is our friend.” This may be a Middle Eastern proverb, but political wisdom has scarcely proved proverbial during the history of the Middle East. We must not fall into the trap of taking sides between authoritarian movements, or confusing the loser in violent quarrels between extremists in Iraq or Iran with the defenders of democracy and human rights.259

Despite McCain’s warning, some members of Congress appear to feel quite strongly that support for the Mojahedin, however distasteful its history may be, is indeed better than allowing the present Iranian government to exist without challenge. The end result, consequently, is a mixed American message of committed opposition to the Mojahedin from the State Department,260 a cautious and largely neutral approach by the CIA,261 and a generally supportive message from the Congress. While the split approach may not confuse observers external to the government, the rank-and-file of the U.S. Intelligence Community might have difficulty reconciling the conflicting messages from various leaders.

(U) The Iranian government has, since the end of the hostage crisis, continued to act antagonistically toward the United States. In mid-1986, for example, in what would come to be called the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan administration officials visited Iran in an effort to obtain the release of Americans being held hostage in Lebanon. One such delegation, headed by Robert McFarlane, landed in Tehran only to be kept waiting and be the object of a kidnapping attempt by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.262 Iranian behavior led naturally to an American policy of isolation and containment. Recalling years of Iranian efforts to promote

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257 (U) Department of State, “People’s Mojahedin,” 13-16. The State Department, which adamantly insists the Mojahedin is a terrorist organization, is particularly critical of the public relations and lobbying efforts the MEK pursues while emphasizing the conspiratorial and disruptive demonstrations the organization is responsible for.

258 (U) Morton Kondrake reports that Mojahedin representatives have met and presented their case to President Clinton, Mrs. Clinton, and several Congressional leaders at a Democratic Leadership Council dinner in December 1992, but offers no indication of how the MEK’s presentation was received there. See Morton K. Kondrake, “Iran Rebel Group Lobbies Well, but is it Anti-American?” in McCain, S.182. Two months earlier, the Mojahedin had succeeded in convincing one senator to lead 61 colleagues in urging the United Nations to condemn the Iranian government for human rights abuses and to support the “Iranian People’s Resistance.” On other occasions, as many as 200 House members have signed letters urging support for the Mojahedin in their struggle against the clerical regime. See also CRS, in McCain, S.182.

259 (U) McCain, S.172-S173.

260 Department of State, “People’s Mojahedin.” The State Department’s opposition to the Mojahedin is also reflected in the Patterns of Global Terrorism report series.

261 (U) Sick, “Iran’s Quest,” 707. The McFarlane party was rescued by others loyal to Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East, Iranian support for Lebanese terrorists, Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process, and Iranian efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Wendy R. Sherman has noted that American policy toward Iran has long been predicated on the premise that "Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal, state-to-state relations with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior." 263

(U) Iranian government behavior has prompted U.S. officials, in both the legislative and executive branches, to brand the Iranian government a terrorist state, moderating in turn perceptions of opponents to the Iranian regime, such as the Mojahedin. White House spokesman Michael McCurry, noting the constructive engagement approach to Iran undertaken by America’s European allies, argues that the Clinton administration sees Iran as the "number one proponent of terrorism." 264 In a similar vein, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) has called Iran "one of the most horrendous enemies of the American people," 265 while State department spokesman Nicholas Burns lambasted a prominent American who visited Iran for "cavorting" with dictators who have "American blood on their hands" by "fraternizing with leaders of governments that the United States abhors." 266

(U) From mixed signals, even within the government, it appears difficult to reach a firm conclusion expressing the exact nature of policymakers’ opinions of Iran and of the Mojahedin. On the one hand, the Mojahedin has a history of violent anti-American activities which have earned it the State Department’s enmity. The organization’s history, coupled with questions concerning the sincerity of its claimed philosophical evolution, led the State Department to condemn Rajavi and the Mojahedin “terrorists” who are dedicated to armed struggle. 267 The State Department’s opposition, in turn, led Senator McCain to caution his colleagues against rushing to embrace an organization which may only claim to support democracy. 268 At the same time, the Mojahedin has, over the last few years, achieved success in its lobbying of the U.S. House and Senate. The hundreds of legislators who have signed letters and sponsored resolutions which call the Mojahedin the democratic alternative to the Iranian regime probably did so not so much to express solidarity with the Mojahedin, but to express displeasure or hostility toward the Iranian government. Regardless of the specific reasons, the message such actions send out to observers contradicts those from the State Department. While the competing messages certainly do not indicate a complete shift in U.S. policy and perceptions over the last 20 years, it does indicate that competing perceptions and policies have forced some policymakers to compromise and adjust their perceptions to accept an ever-changing international environment.

Evolution In National Needs

In the 1990's, political Islam became a focus for the Intelligence Community as the threat posed by militant Islamic groups became more widely recognized.

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263 (U) Assistant Secretary Sherman’s remarks are in the text of a cover letter to Rep. Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, accompanying the State Department’s “People’s Mojahedin of Iran.”


265 (U) Quoted in “House Creates Panel to Probe U.S. Role in Letting Iran Send Weapons to Bosnia,” Baltimore Sun, 9 May 1996, 10A.

266 (U) Michael A. Fletcher, “Farrakhan Wants to Take Libya’s Aid,” Washington Post, 26 February 1996, A6. White House officials were particularly incensed that Minister Farrakhan timed his visit to Iran to coincide with celebrations marking the anniversary of the Embassy takeover.

267 (U) Department of State, “People’s Mojahedin of Iran,” 1 and 2. The State Department’s report is quite full of disparaging characterizations of the Mojahedin.

268 (U) At Senator McCain’s insistence, section 523 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Public Law 103-236 requires the President to submit “a report detailing the structure, current activities, external support, and history of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran. Such report shall include information on any current direct support by the People’s Mojahedin for acts of international terrorism.” The amendment to PL103-236 led to State’s issuance of its “People’s Mojahedin” report.
While the focus of concern rests largely on militant groups operating in and against Israel or with Iranian sponsorship of radical Islamic groups, policymakers still have difficulty grasping the complexities of Islam and its use, or abuse, by various groups. National Security Review 29, "Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005 (U)," of March 1992, retained a measure of the indications and warning (I&W) focus previously seen with respect to Iran. The stability of Iran, warnings of insurgencies which might affect U.S. interests, and warnings of terrorist threats against U.S. citizens or interests retained the highest level of interest. Iranian sponsorship, on the other hand, was of considerable interest, but was not rated as highly as I&W concerns. By mid-1995, however, a newly implemented tier system had reshuffled the assigned priorities, allowing for greater interest in Iranian and Iraqi sponsorship of terrorist activities.

In an attempt to better define the threat and policymakers' interests, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-35, "Intelligence Priorities (S)," sought to place strategic concerns into one of several tiers based on the perceived threat to the United States. Noting that the Intelligence Community needed to maintain a broad, global view, PDD-35 also emphasized the need for Intelligence to "refine and focus its collection on information unavailable to the policymaker by other means or from other sources." The emphasis on political Islam is apparent in PDD-35's assignment of terrorism to Tier IB, defined as "transnational issues that threaten U.S. security," while adding that Tier IB topics require "highly focused collection and end-to-end analysis on selected problems of concern to the policymaking and military-operational communities." Those selected topics, however, do not include the Mujahedin although an interest in Iranian and Iraqi state organizations are included.

The PDD-35 tier system replaced the priority system based on the FIRCAP. The FIRCAPs issued between 1981 and their final 1993 edition reflect similar levels of interest, with the only significant changes noted found under the topics "internal political developments" and "support to terrorist groups." Between 1984 and 1990, the internal developments topic was assigned a FIRCAP priority of 2, indicating an area of critical importance to the United States. These changes, however, likely represented uncertainty in the wake of Khomeini's death in June 1989 as well as internal Iranian struggles over the scope and course of that country's foreign policy. In the same manner, the increase of "support to terrorist groups" to priority 2 during the same general time frame likely reflected the growing American concern over Iranian sponsorship of militant Islamic groups.273

270 (U)]. Classified by: source copy unmarked; declassify on: source copy unmarked. Iranian stability, I&W of insurgencies affecting U.S. interests, and I&W of terrorist attacks were all labeled "Critical 1" topics, while Iranian and Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism were labeled "Critical 2" topics.

271 (U)]. U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive/ NSC-35, "Intelligence Priorities (S)," classified by: unmarked; declassify on: Source marked "OADR."

272 (U)]. The Tier IB terrorism topics are listed as:...
Intelligence Requirements: SIGINT

National SIGINT Requirements (NSRs)

274 (U) National Intelligence Council, *Annual Strategic Intelligence Review: Counterterrorism (U)*, classified by: , declassify on: Source marked "OADR."

275 (U) National Intelligence Council, *Annual Strategic Intelligence Review: Counterterrorism (U)*, classified by: 2050904; declassify on: Source marked "X6."

276 (U) NIC, *Counterterrorism* (U), 5-7.

277 (U) NIC, *Counterterrorism* (U), 18.
personnel. The threat indications noted in the require-
ment all carry the highest priority, 1, indicating that
information is vital to U.S. interests. 278

The NSRL also contains requirements cov-

priority 1 designation. Only indications of planning for
attacks against non-U.S. persons or facilities, and gen-
eral organizational, structural, biographic, and logisti-
cal topics received the lesser priority of 2. Like the

previous terrorism requirement, also did not
delineate interest in specific groups.

In 1994, however, the NSRL saw the addi-
tion of a requirement specifying national needs in the

National SIGINT requirements

278 19 January 1984. Classified by: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: OADR.
279 (FOUO) National SIGINT Committee. 8 December 1988, Classified by: Multiple Sources; declassify on: OADR.
280 (U) National SIGINT Committee. 16 September 1993. Classified by: Multiple Sources; declassify on: OADR.
281 (FOUO) National SIGINT Committee. 28 June 1994, Classified by: Multiple Sources; declassify on: OADR. Reflects the Annual Strategic Intelligence Review in its core areas of interest, but breaks priorities into country and perceived threat groupings like:
282 (U) National SIGINT Committee. 3 March 1994, Classified by: Multiple Sources; declassify on: OADR.
The Impact of the Mojahedin Since Its Formation

The Mojahedin has changed over the years since its formation. Once virulently anti-American and anti-Western, the organization now seeks Western support in its political struggle against the Iranian regime. Although its new-found commitment to democracy remains questionable, the organization has evolved into a somewhat nebulous entity enjoying a measure of support in the West. Moving out of the clandestine shadows of the early and mid-1970s, the Mojahedin seeks the spotlight today in order to continue its public relations campaign against the theocratic Iranian regime. By presenting itself as the democratic alternative to Tehran’s current rulers, the Mojahedin has sought legitimacy in those countries it once targeted.

At the same time, the Mojahedin has gained some support not through its message, but by virtue of the continued hostility between the United States and the Iranian government. Unresolved differences, and continued suggestions of intimate Iranian involvement in anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorism in the Middle East, have led to hardened opposition to Iran within the United States. To many, Iran is not only a rogue state and sponsor of international terrorism; it maintains a government lacking any sense of morality and is seemingly beyond redemption. While events such as the election of Mohammed Khatami to the Iranian presidency offer some hope for moderation of the virulence in Iranian revolutionary philosophy, the persistent memory of past injustices and degradation visited on America by the Iranians is not likely to ease for many.

The impression of a “positive” evolution of the Mojahedin, combined with the continued hostility many American leaders feel for Iran, has led some to extend support to the Mojahedin despite its history of attacks against American citizens. The venom evident in some policymakers’ characterizations of Iran, almost 20 years after the Embassy seizure, suggests nothing short of radical change in the Iranian government will moderate their views. The Mojahedin, in turn, offers those individuals hope that there can be a more acceptable Iranian government in the future. It is this hope which likely leads some to accept the Mojahedin’s claims. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, trite as that may be, holds true for some. In regarding the Iranian regime with such hostility, the Mojahedin’s claims of democratic influence offer those individuals a clear distinction between the evil represented by Iran’s clerical regime and an organization willing and able to at least communicate in terms imminently more acceptable to American sensibilities, leading to competing perspectives and opinions within the U.S. government. While the Mojahedin has clearly not evolved from enemy to friend, to some policymakers the organization offers a needed foil to the Iranian government, making it in comparison the lesser of evils.

As the internal politics of Iran has evolved, so too have the relations between Iran and the United States.
States. Starting with a glimmer of hope for a stable and cooperative Iran, the hostage crisis shattered the expectations of American policymakers. No longer could the Iranian regime be counted on to maintain the standards considered acceptable in international affairs. Iran became a pariah to American leaders. In the intervening years, Iranian rhetoric has remained hostile toward the United States and American leaders have responded by continuing to deny the legitimacy of recognition to the Iranian regime. The Intelligence Community, in turn, has been forced to struggle with this policy and perceptual evolution. In the midst of openly hostile views of Iran in the 1980's, the task for the Intelligence Community remained fairly straightforward in requiring information and warning on the Iranian regime, its constituent organizations such as the Mojahedin, and its agents. The violent split between the Iranian regime and the Mojahedin, in turn, contributed to a perceptual evolution among some U.S. Government officials. As a result, the Intelligence Community today must take into account the disparate views of the Mojahedin among consumers or overseers of the Community. Although the State Department remains adamant in calling the Mojahedin a terrorist group, Congressmen seem to support the contention that the Mojahedin provides a democratic alternative to the theocratic regime in Tehran. The focus, then, for the Intelligence Community has become quite blurred by conflicting information demands presented it.
MATCHING PERCEPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

Vision is influenced by expectations, and perceptions — especially in politics — are colored by the models and analogies all of us carry in our heads.

Gary Sick, in All Fall Down

The failure to acknowledge the dynamics of Iranian politics constrained the United States in dealing with the hostage crisis. A tragic feature of the relations between revolutionary Iran and the United States was that pragmatism was not a consideration for either side. Policy was constructed in an atmosphere of paranoia, hatred, ignorance, and emotion.

Barbara June Urschel, in A Study of the United States Embassy Takeover and Its Effect on Crisis Management

Public opinion and media pressures are similarly schizophrenic, one day calling for toughness and no concessions to terrorists, but the next day moved by the plight of the hostages and the appeals of the families.

Former Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism Robert Oakley, in “International Terrorism”

(U) The intent of this project was to test the strength of a presumed relationship between the characterizations applied to a specific target of interest by senior policymakers, on the one hand, and the scope and tone of resulting intelligence collection requirements, on the other. If those characterizations carried any weight through the bureaucratic process, it was expected that collection requirements would largely mirror those characterizations in the areas of concern in which emphasis was placed. It was further theorized that the stronger and more emotional that characterization, the stronger the observed linkage between characterization and requirement would be. If, for example, senior policymakers requested information about “terrorists,” whether that characterization was itself accurate or not, the phraseology used to convey those information needs would become evident in an examination of applicable intelligence requirements.

(U) Terrorists, by the very nature of their actions, are considered threats and any such characterization was expected to lead to intelligence collection requirements focusing on the nature and potential engendered in that threat. In sum, senior policymakers’ expressed desires for information about a “terrorist” group should result in short order in an intelligence requirement focusing on the indications and warning aspect of the problem. If at any point those characterizations changed, whether by change in perception or in administration, the applicable intelligence requirements should reflect that altered perceptual stance. Once the “terrorists” become something different and less threatening in those characterizations, a shift in intelligence requirements to more general political and biographic information would be anticipated.

(U) This hypothesis was tested by reviewing the case of the Mojahedin-e Khlaq, an Iranian opposition group which has undergone a significant transformation, both in philosophy and threat potential, since its founding in the early 1960’s. While the Mojahedin has undergone significant changes, so too has the relationship between the United States and Iran. Where once the two governments were closely allied and the Mojahedin represented the common enemy, the United States and the Mojahedin today share a common enemy in the government of Iran. Examination of the available SIGINT and HUMINT intelligence collection requirements between 1976 and 1996 appears to be generally supportive of the hypothesis. That being the case, however, it must also be noted that the attributable relationship
between policymaker characterizations and intelligence requirements is a tenuous one.

At least one senior official of the Intelligence Community feels that any unintended consequences resulting from the process of translating senior policymakers’ information needs are mitigated by the structure and application of the process itself. 294 The tenuous nature of the apparent linkage, however, demands further exploration of the factors that may have exerted an influence on the present outcome.

**Individual Factors**

(U) Stephen Ambrose, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, notes that “[t]he great successes in U.S. foreign policy tend to come in those areas in which there is a consensus and thus a continuity in policy.” Failure, he notes, is found in “those areas in which there is not a consensus and thus confusion and inconsistency in the policy.” 295 As he suggests, this is one of the primary reasons for the apparent failure of U.S. policies in the Middle East since the Truman administration. As each new administration enters into office, the president and senior policymakers supporting him have had the opportunity to act on their own biases, beliefs, and perceptions. Consequently, as Ambrose suggests, American policies have undergone considerable fluctuation over the years.

(U) Intelligence policy and operations have largely mirrored the inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy, at least with respect to the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular. From the subordination of information-gathering responsibilities to the Shah’s government, to the willing dismantlement of intelligence collection networks in the region, intelligence policy and operations have reflected the perceptions and opinions of both the sitting president and his DCI. In the case of Iran during the Carter administration, foreign and intelligence policies also reflected quite well the conflict and tension within the administration, particularly between Secretary of State Vance and APNSA Brzezinski.

(U) With respect to Iran, the hostage crisis struck Washington policymakers in a highly emotional and personal way, creating a shared sense of guilt for allowing the unthinkable to happen. 296 Adding to the confusion, policymakers and the public were bombarded almost daily with discomforting images of Iranian hatred and fury. Gary Sick notes that those images “had a profound effect on the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy throughout the crisis. It helped sustain the illusion that Iran would be susceptible to traditional instruments of negotiation and political pressure.” 297 The highly personal nature of the crisis, as well as the intervening years of confrontation with Iran, prevents overwhelming confidence in an analysis based largely on suppositions of perception and opinion garnered from both formal and informal writings. During such emotional times, individuals rarely stop to fully assess the reasons for their decisions. The Iranian hostage crisis and the emotionally based policies toward Iran are such situations. Decisions, as well as calls for information, reflect as much or more emotion than they reflect considered thought. To analyze those actions years later on the basis of scattered evidence allows only for educated guesses of the true emotional state of the decisionmaker at any given time. To be sure, many informal writings, such as margin notes on documents and diary entries, present relatively strong evidence pointing to an individual’s true perceptions and opinions. More formal communications, such as memoranda, present considerable variance depending on recipient, the degree of formality, and the strength

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294 Chuck Roades, National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center, SECRET interviews by the author, 17 August 1993 and 12 February 1996. Roades believes that there is sufficient redundancy in the series of checks and balances built into the HUMINT requirements systems. These redundancies serve to mitigate any bias introduced inadvertently through personal preference and perception.

295 (U) Ambrose, 123.

296 (U) Sick, *All Fall Down*, 260.

297 (U) Sick, *All Fall Down*, 259. Christopher, “Introduction,” 27 also addresses the emotionalism of the crisis and the effect it had on policymakers. Sick, in “Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses,” 20-21, notes that the American preoccupation with terrorism carries with it a sense of hysteria formed of the shock and outrage at the actions witnessed.
of conviction on the part of the author. In the end, such evidence can only point to likely emotional states of mind for any decisionmaker at any point in time.

(U) Also adding to the uncertainty of apparent conclusions is the number of individuals involved in the needs translation process. While evidence of the beliefs, biases, and opinions of senior policymakers or their principal staffs such as Carter, Brzezinski, Vance, and Sick are readily available, a host of other, forever nameless individuals contributed to the final outcome. The extent to which these individuals contributed context and meaning to the resulting intelligence requirements can not be adequately assessed in the absence of concrete evidence illustrating their roles. Further complicating this ambiguity is the frequent turnover in personnel, not so much at the higher levels, but among the rank-and-file workers who contributed. Hirings, firings, retirements, and changes in assignments all carried an impact over twenty years, so much unrecorded that any firm conclusion is impossible. While the process itself may very well act to smooth, or mitigate, the impact of personnel turnover, the extent to which that may be the case lies within the realm of speculation.

(U) Terrorism is an emotionally-laden phenomenon, adding to the inherent difficulty in assessing the specific strength of the characterization-requirement linkage. Not only would the emotionalism of terrorism have an effect on the process, but the cumulative reactions of individuals to the phenomenon would be difficult to judge without significantly detailed evidence. Coupled with the crisis atmosphere of the 444-day hostage ordeal, the impact of such emotions can be expected to be significantly greater than if there had been attendant hostage standoff, although the extent to which that is the case can not be assessed. Under such conditions of stress, cognitive information processing is less complex, suggesting that the more emotional topics resulted in a more instinctive reaction. Similarly, individuals who are characterized by an uncompromisingly firm stand on policy issues, or “hawks,” exhibit lower rhetorical complexity than less ideological, or “dovish,” individuals.299 Both less complex information processing and less complex rhetorical construction are evident in the writings of several prominent Carter administration officials, suggesting that their influence helped steer the country’s policy toward a harsher, more unflinchingly confrontational stance which, in large degree, remains evident today.

(U) While the apparent rhetorical complexity and cognitive processing “simplicity” argue in support of the hypothesis, testing the validity remains problematic. Only by interviewing the decisionmakers as the decisions are made, or very shortly thereafter, can a firm conclusion be reached. With intervening years and the opportunity for subjects to reconsider and change phrasing in written works, the linkage here remains supported, but not as strongly as it might be. An expected effect of crisis situations is that communications exhibit strong emotional content. This is quite evident in the record, yet most written communications do not adequately convey in full the communicator’s emotional state.

(U) In the end, individual factors centered around the specific cognitive processes experienced by individuals involved argue against a firm conclusion in the absence of on-the-scene data collection. Only those individuals who actively participated, or who personally witnessed the deliberations, can accurately assess both the emotional states of the individuals involved and the relative impact or weight granted to specific data or beliefs in that decisionmaking episode. Even then, those observers can also be biased or view the process through an emotional lens. Efforts in later years to reconstruct the emotional states and revisit the rationale for arriving at a specific decision are doomed to softening and selective recall of memory. Nevertheless, an assessment is possible using writings and recorded oral communications, if tempered by the knowledge that the data available may not present the full and unadulterated picture.

299 (U) Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk, 103.
System Factors

(U) Mark Lowenthal has written that the “executive branch is an unruly democracy, with competing agencies and offices each representing different points of view on any issue.” While not unique in its insight, Lowenthal’s view points to additional complications that can affect the present effort to reach a firm conclusion. The unruly democracy within the government allows for sometimes stiff competition between agencies as a result of the bureaucratic positions each represents. The outcome of those competitions may reflect the simple determination, relative strength, and organizational tenacity of the victor more than any other single factor, throwing analyses of those outcomes open to speculation.

As Arthur Hulnick notes, the history of development and application of intelligence policy exhibits a pronounced tendency toward responsiveness rather than anticipation. Even though intelligence policy can stem from policymakers’ understanding of American needs and conscious deliberation and planning, he argues, it just as frequently results from reaction to events and crises abroad that the United States was unprepared to monitor. The result, Hulnick argues, is intelligence policy and Intelligence Community structures that reflect the outcomes of bureaucratic reactions and conflicts. Several factors inherent in the intelligence system suggest the apparent linkage between characterizations and requirements may be less firm than desired. The Aspen-Brown Commission noted, echoing Hulnick, that:

The institutional role played by the NSC in providing guidance and direction for intelligence activities has varied widely. Often substantial lapses occur at the change of Administrations when there is no guidance at all. As a result, a consistent level of guidance concerning appropriate roles for intelligence, as well as the guidance establishing requirements and priorities for collection and analysis, has, all too often, been missing.

(U) Bureaucratic agendas are also evident in the evolution of U.S. interests in both Iran and the Mojahedin. Former DCI Stansfield Turner has written quite clearly that the rivalry between the State Department and the CIA over assessments of the Shah and his government reflected competing perceptions and desires within those two bureaucracies. Another DCI, Robert Gates, added to Turner’s thoughts by indicating that regardless of how much energy is expended to make intelligence non-political and neutral of bureaucratic desires, “[p]olicymakers have always liked intelligence that supported what they want to do, and they often try to influence the analysis to buttress the conclusions they want to reach.” To get intelligence that supports bureaucratic agendas, Gates also contends that policymakers “ask carefully phrased questions; they sometimes withhold information; they broaden or narrow the issue; on rare occasions they even try to intimidate.” In such a setting, particularly with competing bureaucracies, it is understandable that the reason for the final outcome of decisionmaking, particularly in the guidance of intelligence, is often obscured. Even with such competition, the history of U.S. policy, both foreign and intelligence, with respect to Iran since 1976 seems fairly clear. Confusion and uncertainty can be traced directly to the competition between State and CIA, on the one hand, and Vance and Brzezinski, on the other. The same pattern was evident in the Reagan administration in competition between those supportive of secret overtures to Iran in an effort to free hostages in Lebanon and those opposed to dealing with the clerical state. The relative strength of each bureaucracy, and decisionmaker, however, is as much a function of the moment as it is

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300 (U) Lowenthal, 115.
301 (U) Hulnick, 211.
304 (U) Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” 228.
305 (U) David, Carrol, and Selden, 179.
of position, argument, and maneuvering. Consequently, while assessments are possible with a fairly high degree of expected reliability, absolute confidence remains elusive.

Perhaps even more important in preventing firm assessments of the characterization and requirement linkage is the very structure of the Intelligence Community’s requirements process. The Aspin-Brown Commission noted:

By law, the principal source of external guidance for intelligence activities has been the National Security Council (NSC). In practice, however, the institutional functions of the NSC with respect to intelligence have varied from one Administration to another. Moreover, the organizational structures created to perform these functions have often foundered due to lack of involvement by senior officials. This has resulted in inconsistent, infrequent guidance, and sometimes no guidance at all, leaving intelligence agencies to fend for themselves.  

The Intelligence Community has, through the years, sought to maintain a steady course in providing needed intelligence to policymakers through its requirements system. Although the SIGINT requirements system has functioned fairly well in defining specific collection objectives for SIGINT assets, it has nevertheless frequently been criticized for setting its own collection agenda without regard to its customers’ needs. HUMINT requirements management, on the other, remained fairly haphazard and unfocused until the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC) was created in June 1992. At the NSC level, however, the requirements management process has remained largely informal and poorly documented through the years. Within the NSC, tracking requirements through the bureaucracy is extremely difficult and in some cases impossible due to the casual, informal, fluid, and at times undocumented requirements definition process employed.

The limited nature of existing Intelligence Community databases also poses significant problems in attempting to track the evolution of requirements. At the national level, the FIRCAPs provide a good overview of the interest accorded various intelligence targets, although these expressed areas of interest are rendered in necessarily broad and generalized terms. Iranian internal stability, for example, encompasses a host of possible sub-categories, each of which could be equally valuable for determining existing linkages to specific information needs. The topics were not, however, broken down into smaller units, leaving the establishment of specific linkages to educated inference. Similarly,  

306 (U) Aspin-Brown Commission, xviii.

307 (U) Roades interviews.

308 (U) David Kelly, National Security Council staff, SECRET telephone interview with the author, 21 September 1993. Mike Waguespack, Office of Intelligence, National Security Council, substantially confirmed this assessment in noting that different decisions are made by varying levels of officials, from the Deputies Committee to the President, depending on the nature of the issue at hand. Waguespack, SECRET interview with the author, 28 September 1993.
within the Intelligence Community.\textsuperscript{310} The HUMINT Community also presents significant research difficulties, since the NHRTC's store of historical data reaches only back to its creation in 1992.\textsuperscript{311} 

(U) An effort to compensate for the lack of available data can provide some insight, yet raises the possibility of misinterpretation based on necessary supposition. Jerel Rosati cautions that such attempts can misdirect research if care is not exercised. Rosati notes that any time an attempt is made to infer beliefs and values from the contents of messages, speeches, and other communications, we run the risk of mixing representational communications, which could be considered to truly reflect the actors' beliefs, and instrumental communications, which are shaped and crafted for specific purposes.\textsuperscript{312}

External Factors

(U) Even external factors divorced from the process of translating information needs to intelligence requirements could negatively affect an examination of that process. The stresses associated with crisis management were quite evident in the examination at hand, particularly where American hostages were concerned. This stress certainly affected the participants from the president down. In addition, the roles of individual actors can be expected to reflect to some degree the nature of crisis management activity, when the circumvention of normal routine and procedure can be easily justified. The competing lines of communication Brzezinski used to obtain information is an excellent example, as were his efforts to exert control over the flow of information to the president. In each case, Brzezinski's actions were justified by citing the urgency of the situation.

(U) At the same time, decisions in Washington were largely reactions to events abroad. As the administration came to realize that militants in Iran, both in the Embassy compound and in the government, were dictating the pace and direction of activity, the administration had no choice but to react to each new development. Reaction, rather than proactive policy implementation, in turn affected the intelligence collection effort of the communities by directing efforts toward understanding and identifying the Iranians involved. In this situation, the Intelligence Community also had little choice but to react to the course of external events. The ensuing hostility between Iran and the United States has arguably helped maintain much of this reactive posture by preventing the opening of normal channels of communication, both official and unofficial, fostering an aura of misunderstanding and uncertainty.

(U) Perhaps more compelling, however, has been the evolution of the international environment itself. Since 1979, monumental changes have taken place, significantly altering both the world in which the United States finds itself and our perceptions of that world. No longer does the United States face the challenge of a monolithic communist threat. No longer is the world seen as a bipolar arena for the constant competition between two superpowers. Today's world is largely taken to be a unipolar one, dominated in many respects by the sole remaining superpower. Challenges to the United States remain, but have changed dramatically and in a sense have become less oppressive. The threat of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union has given way to the threat of entanglements in essentially unwinnable wars in places like Bosnia and Somalia. As the international environment, and America's perception of its place in that environment, have changed, so too has our vision of both Iran and the Mojahedin. Time has helped heal many, but not all, of the wounds inflicted with the Embassy takeover and

\textsuperscript{310} Chief, Requirements Management Branch (P04), telephone interview by the author, 3 May 1997. Also indicated the effort to place all ad hoc amplifications in the NSRL database only began in the mid-1980's.

\textsuperscript{311} Roades interview.

\textsuperscript{312} Rosati, 162-163. Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk, 104-105, also note that political speakers often manipulate the rhetorical complexity of communications to suit their particular needs and goals.
444-day hostage ordeal. Iran has evolved as a threat, now secure in its revolutionary consolidation and ever more threatening to regional stability. At the same time, the Mojahedin lost its struggle within Iran to the radical clerics, shifting that organization into a state of general irrelevance, at least in terms of U.S. interests.

In the view of some U.S. policymakers, the perception of an Iranian threat has increased while the perception of threat from the Mojahedin has declined. This shift appears to be reflected in the evolution of requirements. Where

Until the Mojahedin once again poses a direct threat to U.S. interests, the threat from a relatively stable and radical Iran will remain higher on the agenda of American policymakers. In this respect, the hypothesis presented here—that labels by policymakers set the tone for and are positively aligned with associated intelligence collection requirements—appears generally supported although the linkage, for reasons elaborated above, remains tenuous at best. The transcendant uncertainties associated with the needs translation process will continue to leave room for charges of intelligence failure, on the one hand, and for the charges that policymakers have not created adequate guidance for the Intelligence Community, on the other.

Toward The Future

The first problem for all of us... is not to learn, but to unlearn.

Gloria Steinem

(U) There will be future situations in which the policies developed to respond to past crises is of critical importance. The greater the challenge presented by such situations, the more critical will be the need for accurate intelligence, tailored to meet the specific requirements of policymakers. Only by learning from experience will the Intelligence Community be able to implement more efficient and effective methods for ensuring that intelligence meets those specific needs. This study has tried to point out the need for a more thorough understanding of the requirements process as well as the way in which various factors affect that process. It is hoped that such an understanding will allow the Intelligence Community to reassess its requirements development process in light of the linkages examined here so that future requirements development efforts minimize, and work toward the elimination of, the negative and distracting influences present today.

(U) All crises involve stress, which detracts from the efficiency of response. As Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk note:

[Crisis] induces a heightened perception that time is running out in leaders and commanders, who begin to see their freedom of action as more restricted while their adversary’s options are perceived to increase... They begin to focus on short-term “quick fixes” rather than medium- or long-term lasting solutions, concentrate on pre-existing knowledge and exclude or restrict the search for novel information, and reduce communication with adversaries...

(U) The Aspin-Brown Commission recognized the need for clear communications of policymakers’ needs to the Intelligence Community, noting that the promulgation of PDD-35 in early 1995 marked the first time the President’s intelligence priorities

313 (U) Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk, 95.
had been established. Better understanding of the dynamics involved in any bureaucratic process, particularly one in which emotionally-laden issues are frequent, will help achieve a better, more responsive intelligence prioritization and requirements development process. The Community's failure to consider various factors within that process will doom it to perpetuate its inability to translate emotionally-laden labels accurately and effectively into value-neutral intelligence collection requirements. Continued critical self-examination of that process may allow the Intelligence Community to overcome some institutional weaknesses and better meet the information needs of policymakers, at the same time reducing any influence stemming from unacknowledged emotional engagement with the topic.

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314 (U) Aspin-Brown Commission, 30-31. Previous publications established the DCI's priorities.
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• Approval for citation of National Security Agency material on page 61 (footnote 230) was granted by the Special Access Office, National Security Agency, via e-mail to the author, 6 August 1997.

• Approval for the SIGINT Requirements materials was coordinated with Mr. Ron Sova, Executive of the National SIGINT Committee; Mr. Paul Newland, Chairman, SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES), and; Mr. Syd Jammes, Vice-Chairman, SIRVES. Telephone conversations with Mr. Jammes and Mr. Bill Shaw of SIRVES on 18 August 1997 indicate that release authorization is not necessary for all SIGINT Requirements currently available on either NSA’s Anchory database or Intellink.

(U) Most classified materials cited in this thesis are available through the CIA’s History Office, NSA’s Archives, or the classified holdings of the Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia. Addresses and phone numbers for each of these repositories follows with the author’s point of contact where appropriate.

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Mr. Martin Elzy, Director


(U) Branch Chief, Requirements Management Branch, National Security Agency. Telephone interview with author. 3 May 1996.


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