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1946

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This document is an illustrative product of its time and circumstances. It reflects the abhorrent racist and segregationist beliefs of the day, then so prevalent and accepted by many white people. To see these beliefs reflected in the text and conclusions of an official Army document gives us great pause.

The author of the report was Dr. Bell Irvin Wiley (1906-1980), a historian and scholar who wrote or edited 24 books, many of these works concerning the Civil War. His specialty was describing the perspective of the common man. During World War II, Dr. Wiley served in the U.S. Army, where in 1946 he produced this Secret report. Eight years later, the report was declassified, but it remained obscured until the present day.

Though it seems unlikely based on reading this report, Wiley is described as an early proponent of racial integration, which earned him some hate mail. But he came from provincial roots and his experience and education grew out of the segregationist south, something he took pains to describe in later years.

President Truman's Executive Order 9981, signed in July 1948, ordered the desegregation of the military. (Truman saw the Executive Order as a way to bypass the objections of southern legislators.) As a result, the Armed Forces served as an essential element in advancing racial integration and ensuring greater equality of opportunity and treatment in the United States.

The desegregation of the military was not without its difficulties. The Secretary of the Army was obliged to resign in April 1949 for continuing to refuse to desegregate the Army. The last of the all-black units was not eliminated until as late as 1954. But the existence of integrated military units was very helpful in providing a roadmap for the rest of the country.

It remains to others to assess the significance and meaning of this historical artifact, and the lessons it can teach us today.

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April 19, 2011

Historical Resources Branch
FOIA 11-012

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request dated April 2, 2011. You requested a copy of the Army Ground Forces Study No. 36, *The Training of Negro Troops*, by Bell I. Wiley.

We are providing you a copy of Army Ground Forces Study No. 36, *The Training of Negro Troops*, in the .pdf format that you requested.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Frank R. Shirer".

Frank R. Shirer
Chief, Historical Resources Branch



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THE TRAINING OF NEGRO TROOPS

Study No. 36

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THE TRAINING OF NEGRO TROOPS

Study No. 36

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By

Major Bell I. Wiley

Historical Section - Army Ground Forces

1946

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

* Auth: CG, AGF *
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* Initials: JEP *
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* Date: 1 SEPT 1946 *

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1 September 1945

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies

1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

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ATAG-AS-312/371 (16 Sept 46)

1 Incl:

Historical Study

The Training of Negro Troops

J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Acting Ground Adj General

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THE TRAINING OF NEGROES IN THE ARMY GROUND FORCES

Studies in the History
of the
Army Ground Forces

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Headquarters
Army Ground Forces
Ground Historical Section

1 September 1945

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PREFATORY NOTE

The purpose of this study is to portray the experience of the Army Ground Forces in preparing Negroes for overseas service in accordance with over all policies laid down by the War Department. The treatment is largely confined to the military problem which confronted the Army Ground Forces. Economic, social, and political considerations are included only as they were related directly to the specific mission assigned the Army Ground Forces, which was to prepare units and replacements for effective participation in combat operations.

Although economic, political, and social factors loomed large in the background of the task in that they determined the milieu in which was formed the raw material out of which General McNair and his successors were required to make soldiers, it was not clearly the province or the responsibility of the Army Ground Forces to change the pattern of society. A strictly military and therefore pragmatic view of the operation and consequences of these factors was the only one which General McNair could take, faced as he was with the task of making effective soldiers out of the material given him, in a time that was critically brief.

The most important nonmilitary factors affecting the aptitude of the Negro for war were the low educational level and the meager administrative and technical experience of the overwhelming majority of Negro trainees. For apparently these, more than any other circumstances, were responsible for the unhappy picture presented in the pages that follow. The shortcomings attributed to Negro trainees were in large measure the same as those found among underprivileged members of other racial groups.

Any study on the scale of this one must of necessity treat mainly of the general rule and neglect the unusual. Hence exceptions may be found to most if not all of the generalities developed in this monograph. Certainly it is true that some Negroes were exemplary soldiers and officers and that some colored units acquitted themselves well both in training and in combat. But it is equally true that efforts of the Army Ground Forces to accomplish its mission with respect to Negro troops were beset with exceptional difficulty and that the results, measured by the usual standards, left much to be desired. Official reports from the battle fronts make inescapable the conclusion that the attempt to produce colored fighting units led by Negroes comparable in combat efficiency to white units was a failure.

Much of the data for this study was obtained from personal interview of white and Negro officers who served with colored troops and with other personnel whose positions were such as to give them an intimate knowledge of Negro soldiers. In all, about 100 persons were interviewed, including a commander of each colored infantry division, two assistant division commanders, two division chiefs of staff, a division artillery commander, three regimental commanders, and numerous other officers ranging on down to platoon leaders. The writer also talked with commanders (and appropriate members of their staffs) of army and corps to which Negro units were assigned, with the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, with AGF members of Observer Boards in theaters of operations, and with various officers of Headquarters, Army Service Forces. During the course of his investigations the author spent a week with the 92nd Division at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., and similar periods at other camps where Negro nondivisional units were stationed.

A questionnaire prepared in the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, and sent to Observer Boards in Europe and the Southwest Pacific was used by AGF members of the Boards as the basis for interview of many other white and colored officers of Negro units. Reports of these interviews provided valuable material on the overseas performance of all types of Negro units. Records of the interviews, both those conducted by the AGF Historical officer and those held by AGF Observers, are on file in the AG Section of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.

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DIGEST

The policy of the Army Ground Forces with reference to colored troops was based on War Department requirements that Negroes be taken into the Army in numbers proportionate to their share in the population, that colored organizations be established in each major branch of the service, and that Negroes be given an opportunity to qualify as officers. These requirements had to be reconciled with the fundamental mission of the Army Ground Forces, which was to deliver to ports of embarkation units capable of meeting a highly efficient foe. Limitations of shipping increased the importance of sending only the most effective units.

The Army Ground Forces activated and trained Negro units in all major branches of the field forces. Colored officers trained in officer candidate schools were assigned to all types of Negro units as they qualified for service, and, as they became eligible for promotion, position vacancies were created for them by the relief of white officers. At the peak of expansion, 30 June 1943, Negroes in AGF units aggregated 167,957 and comprised 10.46 percent of the AGF enlisted strength.

Training Negro troops was beset with many difficulties, the most formidable being the Negroes' lack of education and mechanical skill. About 80 percent of the enlisted personnel of typical colored units were in Classes IV and V of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), as against about 30 - 40 percent in white units. Other deterrents included a venereal rate from eight to ten times that of white troops, a tendency to abuse equipment, lack of interest in the war, and particularly among Northern troops, a concern for racial "rights" which often culminated in rioting and other forms of violence. Still another difficulty was the failure of many Negro officers and non-commissioned officers to measure up to high standards of leadership. With the exception of a small minority they were lacking in initiative, self-confidence, aggressiveness, and a strong sense of responsibility.

The means devised by the Army Ground Forces for coping with these problems included: (1) extension of training periods to compensate for low AGCT ratings, (2) encouraging unit commanders to develop special techniques adapted to personnel of little education, and (3) attempting to fill command positions with officers specially qualified for service with Negroes. In all matters of training and discipline the Army Ground Forces insisted that colored troops be treated like other troops and that they be held to the same standards of proficiency. But because of the character of the difficulties confronting them, field commanders of colored units were only partially successful in meeting these standards.

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THE TRAINING OF NEGROES IN
ARMY GROUND FORCES

Chapter I

NEGRO UNITS IN THE TROOP BASIS

The nucleus of the colored element of the Army Ground Forces consisted mainly of units of the Regular Army. These included the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, organized in 1941 into the 4th Cavalry Brigade and commanded at that time by Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, the only Negro who had attained general officer rank in the Armed Forces; and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, of Spanish-American War renown, the former stationed at Ft. Benning, Ga., and the latter at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., sole peacetime station occupied exclusively by Negro units.¹ These organizations traditionally had white commissioned officers and colored noncommissioned officers. The fact that the number of colored applicants for army service in peacetime far exceeded vacancies conduced to a highly select personnel in these units. Noncommissioned positions were much sought after and went only to soldiers of long service and proved loyalty to superiors; their incumbents were wont to rule over the men with a firmness and constancy that, while sometimes approaching tyranny, gave white officers a large degree of immunity from disciplinary worries. Racial issues were rarely manifest.²

The National Guard organization contained three Negro units: the 184th Field Artillery Regiment, an Illinois unit inducted in January 1941; the 369th Coast Artillery (AA), from New York, inducted in June, 1941; and the 372d Infantry Regiment, whose personnel was drawn from Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and the District of Columbia, inducted in March, 1941.³ With a very few exceptions, officers of these units were colored; some of them, particularly those in the 184th Field Artillery, were men of considerable political influence.⁴

Early in the national emergency, the War Department, in line with provisions of the Selective Service Act and a presidential directive, announced that in the new army Negro organizations would be established in every major branch of the service and that the strength of Negroes in the armed forces would be maintained on a general basis of their share in the population of the country, which subsequently was fixed at 10.6 percent.⁵ It was further provided that Negroes should be eligible for admission to officers' candidate schools and that OCS graduates and colored Reserve officers should be assigned to Negro units, except existing Regular Army organizations, which were to have surgeons and chaplains as the only colored commissioned personnel. Against considerable opposition of racial groups sensitive to segregation, the War Department directed that colored and white enlisted personnel were not to be assigned to the same regimental organizations. "This policy has proven satisfactory over a long period of years," the War Department stated in its general policy letter of 16 October 1940, "and to make changes would produce situations destructive to morale and therefore detrimental to the preparations for national defense."⁶

As the field forces were expanded in 1941 old colored organizations increased in strength and new units in nearly all the Arms and Services were called into being. Expansion was hindered considerably by the meagerness of the leaven of experienced personnel, there being only about 13,000 Negroes in the peacetime army.⁷ Combat units activated during the General Headquarters (GHQ) period (26 July 1940 - 9 March 1942) included three infantry regiments (the 366th, 367th, and 368th), five coast artillery regiments (the 54th (155-mm Gun, TD), 76th (AA), 77th (AA), 99th (AA) and 100th (AA)), one field artillery brigade (the 46th) and four field artillery regiments (the 349th, 350th, 351st, and 353d), and one light tank battalion (the 758th).⁸

[REDACTED]

When the War Department was reorganized in March 1942, the Army Ground Forces received about 90 Negro units, most of which were service organizations. The cavalry regiments, all the infantry regiments except the 24th, and several other combat units were assigned to the defense commands.⁹

The spring and summer of 1942 witnessed a marked increase in both the number and types of colored units in Army Ground Forces. The 93d Division, first of the colored divisions to be organized in World War II, was activated in May 1942 at Ft. Huachuca. Its components included the 25th and 368th Infantry Regiments, transferred from the Western Defense Command.¹⁰

In June and July 1942, thirty Air Base Security Battalions, having colored enlisted personnel and white officers (except chaplains and surgeons), were activated.¹¹ Other Negro combat units activated during the six months following the establishment of the Army Ground Forces included 1 Tank Battalion, 1 Coast Artillery Regiment, 2 Coast Artillery Battalions (AA), 2 Field Artillery Regiments, 7 Tank Destroyer Battalions, and 5 Signal Construction Companies. Colored service organizations activated by the Army Ground Forces during this period included 6 chemical units, 25 engineer units, 1 veterinary company, 1 military police company, 15 ordnance units, and 18 quartermaster units.¹²

Colored units in the Army Ground Forces on 31 August 1942 aggregated 154. Incomplete reports on these units indicated an actual enlisted strength of about 65,000.¹³ During the next six months enlisted strength increased more than 100 percent to a figure approximating 160,000.¹⁴ Among the units created during this period was the 92d Infantry Division, activated on 15 October 1942. Cadre for the new division came from the 93d Division, and the assistant commander of the 93d, Brig. Gen. E. M. Almond, became commanding general. Elements of the new division were scattered at four stations, Ft. McClellan, Ala., Camp Robinson, Ark., Camp Atterbury, Ind., and Camp Breckinridge, Ky., until the departure of the 93d Division for maneuvers in April 1943 made Ft. Huachuca available with facilities adequate for their training as a division.¹⁵

In February 1943 the 2d Cavalry, last of the colored divisions of World War II, was activated. In this organization the scheme was followed of brigading an old Regular Army regiment with a new one--the 9th with the 27th and the 10th with the 28th. This division was stationed at Ft. Clark, Tex.¹⁶

The War Department Troop Basis of 1943 provided originally for still another Negro Division, the 105th. But for various reasons, including reduction of the planned strength of the Army, opposition of Army Ground Forces to organization of Negroes in large combat units, and the strong preference of theater commanders for white units, this division was not activated.¹⁷

The increased induction of Negroes in 1942 and early 1943 presented serious problems as to their organization, disposition, and ultimate use. To assist in the solution of these problems, the War Department in August 1942 created an Advisory Committee on Negro Troops, commonly referred to as the McCloy Committee, from the fact that it was headed by Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. McCloy. Through its successive members on this Committee, Col. Edward O. Barber, Col. Z. E. Lawhon, and Col. W. S. Renshaw, Army Ground Forces was able fully and frequently to express its views on matters of policy.¹⁸

The first comprehensive statement of basic AGF concepts as to the organization and employment of colored troops came from General McNair himself, in November 1942, when a War Department staff member suggested that beginning in 1943 Negroes and whites be placed in the same units in a ratio of 1 Negro to 10.6 whites.¹⁹ The Ground Force

commander pointed out that the infusion of Negroes with their extremely low AGCT average into combat organizations would impair the general quality of the fighting forces, and this he regarded as particularly undesirable because of the severe limitations of shipping. "We must see to it," he said, "that every shipload of troops has a maximum of fighting power. Shipping should not be wasted on mediocrity."²⁰

General McNair countered the War Department suggestion with a proposal to make use of colored troops in service and support functions and to discontinue the practice of organizing Negroes in large combat units. "A colored division is too great a concentration of Negroes to be effective," he said. "If the size of Negro combat units were limited to separate battalions they would be fully suitable for battle employment," he added, "yet the organization would permit the maximum flexibility in such employment. They could be put in here and there where the situation was such that they could be useful and effective."²¹

In this memorandum General McNair also proposed that in the theaters "weaker units ... be disposed where their weaknesses will cause no serious ill effect."²² He undoubtedly envisioned employment of most colored combat organizations in less exposed areas, particularly as defenders of communications lines. For such uses he deemed the separate battalion the most practicable organization.²³ In both training and tactical employment he favored attachment of Negro battalions to larger white units.²⁴

It should be borne in mind that in these and other recommendations for the utilization of Negro troops General McNair was thinking primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of fulfilling the AGF mission of producing a fighting force of the highest possible combat efficiency. He was in thorough accord with the policy repeated stated by the War Department that the promotion in the Army of social aims which had not been attained in the country as a whole would materially impede the effort to build and maintain a force capable of defeating an efficient and determined foe.²⁵ In short, General McNair's concern was military effectiveness and not social reform.

A factor in General McNair's preference for organizing Negroes into small units was the opposition of overseas commanders to the shipment of colored combat organizations to their theaters. In the spring of 1942, for instance, the 9th Cavalry was alerted for overseas shipment and moved to a staging area. The commander of the theater to which it was slated to go objected to receiving the unit and it was returned to its home station.²⁶ In their rejection of Negro troops, overseas commanders were often supported by native authorities.²⁷ It appeared to the Army Ground Forces that objection to Negro organizations, particularly to those in combat categories, would not be so great for small units as for large ones. So it was partly to prevent a wasteful piling up in the United States of apparently unemployable units that General McNair favored the battalion organization.²⁸

Nothing came of either the War Department G-3's proposal to place Negroes in white units or of General McNair's counter proposal. Meanwhile expansion proceeded at a pace which caused a multiplication of difficulties. On 31 July 1943 Negro units in the Army Ground Forces numbered 289 and had an aggregate enlisted strength of 164,619, a figure which represented 10.27 percent of the total enlisted strength of the Army Ground Forces.²⁹ Typical Negro organizations struggled along with inexperienced officers and with 80 percent of their enlisted personnel in Army General Classification Test Classes IV and V.³⁰ The necessity of diffusing intelligence and skill forced the intermingling of Northern and Southern Negroes, and factors of military convenience, including climate, caused the War Department to station most of the colored units in the South.³¹ This situation, abetted by overtaxing of recreational, housing, and transportation facilities increased racial tension and led in the summer of 1943 to a series of violent incidents involving both soldiers and civilians.³² In the midst of these disturbances the McCloy Committee was called on for remedial suggestions. This gave the Army

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Ground Forces an opportunity again to express its views on Negro troops. The recommendations submitted by the Army Ground Forces, based on a comprehensive staff study, extended considerably beyond a proposal of means of coping with current disturbances to a general revamping of existing policies. In brief, the Army Ground Forces suggested:³³

1. Discharge of Class V personnel in existing units (white and colored) and in future screening all Class V's at reception centers.
2. Restriction of colored units to the number that could be formed from personnel meeting over-all physical and mental standards of drafted whites.
3. Discontinuance of commissioning of Negroes until noncommissioned grades were filled with competent colored leaders.
4. Restriction of the size of colored units to the battalion.
5. Filling of commissioned positions in Negro units exclusively with white personnel until completion of basic training; and then simultaneous replacement of white officers in unit blocks, beginning with the most progressive organizations.
6. Preparation of a new troop basis for Negro units, providing for assignment of 75 percent of colored personnel to service units until the reorganized combat units had been tested in battle.

In support of these recommendations arguments were submitted as follows:

1. Negro units would be more acceptable to theater commanders.
2. The leadership of Negro units, particularly in noncommissioned grades, would be greatly improved.
3. The system of having all officers of a given unit either white or colored would promote racial harmony.
4. Colored troops thus selected, organized, and commanded would be more apt to make good in battle than they would under existing policies.

The AGF proposals did not get beyond the subgroup of the McCloy Committee to which they were presented. The officer who submitted the recommendations reported that they were received "with a marked lack of enthusiasm." War Department G-1, found him too radical in certain aspects and thought that they required too many decisions. General Benjamin O. Davis, Chairman of the Subcommittee, deemed them an unwarranted reflection on the "tried efficiency" of Negro combat soldiers. To this, the AGF representative replied that his headquarters did not contend that the Negro soldier was inefficient per se, but rather that soldiers of low intelligence were inefficient.³⁴

The wave of racial disturbances subsided before autumn, and provision by the War Department for screening Class V's at reception centers for special training promised amelioration of the personnel situation.³⁵ The War Department, acting apparently on General Marshall's suggestion,³⁶ gave notice in July 1943 that Negro units activated in the future would be limited to service types, except for the combat organizations already provided for in the troop basis.³⁷ The Army Ground Forces evidently despaired of reducing large units to battalions, as this proposal was not brought up again after the summer of 1943.

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One much-publicized unit added to the 1943 troop basis before the lid was closed on the activation of more Negro combat organizations was a colored parachute company. When Judge William H. Hastie, Secretary Stimson's colored civilian aide on Negro affairs, first proposed use of Negroes as parachutists (and commandos) in August 1942, the Army Ground Forces objected on the score of scarcity of specialized equipment and dearth among colored troops of the high order of intelligence required for such training.³⁸ But insistence of those who favored representation of Negroes among the airborne fighters ultimately prevailed, and in June 1944 colored members of the 555th Parachute Company made their first combat jump at Ft. Benning.³⁹ In November 1944 a parachute battalion was activated.⁴⁰

In August 1943 the Army Service Forces requested transfer from the Army Ground Forces of 14,500 colored enlisted men to fill urgent overseas requirements. To meet this request, the Army Ground Forces, with War Department approval, stripped to cadre strength 31 combat units; of these 13 were Antiaircraft Battalions, 10 were Field Artillery Battalions, and 8 were Tank Destroyer Battalions. Among the units affected were the 930th and 931st Field Artillery Battalions, successors to the 184th Field Artillery Regiment.⁴¹ The colored commander of one of these units wrote his friend Truman Gibson, successor to Judge Hastie as the Secretary of War's advisor on Negro affairs, a bitter letter on the subject.⁴² Presently a chorus of protest welled up all over the country.

In 1944 the War Department found it necessary to make outright conversions of many combat organizations to service units. White as well as colored units were affected, but the number of the latter was relatively greater than that of the former. For this circumstance the War Department G-3 offered the following explanation:⁴³

1. Demand for service units overseas was immediate and increasing.
2. Need for certain types of combat units, such as Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery, was decreasing because of the shift from defensive to offensive warfare.
3. In making the conversions the War Department naturally chose those units which were least ready for overseas movement or for which there was no immediate overseas requirement. A greater proportion of Negro than white units fell in these categories. Race was not a factor in the selection of units for conversion.

War Department G-3 indicated that the comparative unreadiness of colored units for overseas combat service was attributable in part at least to serious deficiencies of colored trainees, of which the most conspicuous was lack of education and technical skills. Another shortcoming cited was the dearth of competent leadership among Negroes. "It is ... a regrettable but inescapable fact," declared G-3, "that the majority of Negroes in the Army not only are deficient in qualities of leadership, but have less than the average desire to assume command responsibilities - the word responsibilities being used in its fullest sense. This circumstances militates heavily against the production of effective combat units wherein the initiative, reliability, intelligence and competence of junior officers and noncommissioned officers is all-important."⁴⁴ In these conclusions the War Department G-3 was, as will be shown below in close harmony with ideas prevailing in the Army Ground Forces. The same may be said of the further observation of G-3 that "colored personnel performs very creditably in (service) units of a type whose duties are more or less routine, and where a high degree of technical ability and adaptability is not essential."⁴⁵

Among the colored combat units converted to service uses in 1944 was the Second Cavalry Division, but conversion was not consummated until after the Division moved overseas. In justification of this measure the War Department G-3 stated: "No expected (combat) employment existed for this organization ... Its selection for

conversion did not result from deficiencies on its part but rather (because) it was the only available source of urgently needed personnel. The decision of the War Department in this case would have been the same had the personnel ... been white."⁴⁶

The two colored infantry divisions were moved overseas in 1944, the 93d to the South Pacific early in the year, and the 92d to Italy in several increments beginning in July.⁴⁷ These organizations retained their combat character, but as General McNair had foreseen, they were usually employed in regimental or smaller teams. Only the 92d was sent into combat as a unit and its employment thus was very limited.

The acceleration of overseas movement was reflected in a gradual decline of colored strength in the Army Ground Forces after the peak of July 1943. On 31 December 1943 there were 413 colored units in the Army Ground Forces with an enlisted strength of 105,391.⁴⁸ At the end of 1944 there were 130 units and 21,495 enlisted men, and on 30 June 1945, 18 units and 2,595 enlisted men.⁴⁹ The monthly enlisted strength (actual) by arms and services of colored AGF units after April 1943, together with the percentage which the enlisted strength of AGF colored units was of the enlisted strength of all AGF units, is tabulated below:⁵⁰

| Month | Arms | Services | Total | Percentage of AGF |
|-----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------------|
| 1943 | | | | |
| April | 89,725 | 64,803 | 154,528 | 9.6 |
| May | 95,488 | 69,339 | 164,827 | 10.2 |
| June | 99,045 | 68,912 | 167,957 | 10.46 |
| July | 95,861 | 68,758 | 164,619 | 10.27 |
| August | 74,442 | 57,033 | 131,475 | 8.55 |
| September | 66,984 | 52,401 | 119,385 | 8.20 |
| October | 64,792 | 48,977 | 113,769 | 7.92 |
| November | 64,502 | 42,845 | 107,347 | 7.82 |
| December | 61,857 | 43,534 | 105,391 | 8.00 |
| 1944 | | | | |
| January | 37,593 | 46,329 | 83,922 | 7.00 |
| February | 36,365 | 47,406 | 83,771 | 7.23 |
| March | 30,694 | 57,193 | 87,887 | 7.86 |
| April | 33,944 | 56,236 | 90,180 | 8.28 |
| May | 32,750 | 50,864 | 83,614 | 7.74 |
| June | 28,961 | 46,776 | 75,737 | 7.57 |
| July | 27,958 | 43,809 | 71,767 | 7.53 |
| August | 26,369 | 38,509 | 64,878 | 7.67 |
| September | 13,298 | 34,809 | 48,107 | 7.03 |
| October | 9,741 | 27,672 | 37,413 | 6.89 |
| November | 8,081 | 22,789 | 30,870 | 7.87 |
| December | 6,647 | 14,848 | 21,495 | 7.30 |
| 1945 | | | | |
| January | 4,869 | 11,485 | 16,354 | 8.02 |
| February | 4,946 | 7,641 | 12,587 | 10.33 |
| March | 4,803 | 5,901 | 10,704 | 10.70 |
| April | 348 | 4,726 | 5,074 | 5.97 |
| May | 0 | 3,845 | 3,845 | 5.13 |
| June | 0 | 2,671 | 2,671 | 3.17 |

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Chapter II

NEGRO TRAINEES - AN EVALUATION

One of the most important factors in the training of Negro troops was the character and quality of the colored privates. Personnel studies, inspection reports, and the testimony of officers who commanded colored units indicate that Negro trainees had more than their share of handicaps. Outstanding and basic among these was the lack of education. Negro soldiers of World War II had considerably more schooling than those who served in 1917-1918, thanks mainly to colored migration from South to North and from country to city in the twenty-five years preceding. Even so, that situation left much to be desired. The picture as of the summer of 1943 for personnel with some schooling in the Army as a whole was this:⁵¹

| | Negro | White |
|---|-------|-------|
| High School Graduates | 17% | 41% |
| High School - Non-Graduates | 26% | 29% |
| Grade School - Graduates and Non-Graduates | 57% | 30% |
| | 100 | 100 |

These figures understate the educational handicap of the Negroes because they do not take into consideration such factors as shorter school terms, inferior teachers, and less adequate facilities. The disparity in educational opportunity was greatest in the South, whence came three out of every four colored registrants.⁵²

Until the summer of 1943 there was no provision for the screening of educationally deficient personnel at reception centers. As a consequence commanders of colored units were swamped with men falling in AGCT Classes IV and V. Typical units had from 40 to 50 percent of their strength in Class V personnel and from 30 to 40 percent in Class IV. In January 1943, just after receipt of its fillers, the 92d Division reported distribution of enlisted personnel as follows:⁵³

| | Percent | Number |
|-----------|---------|--------|
| Class I | .2 | 32 |
| Class II | 3.2 | 528 |
| Class III | 11.7 | 1902 |
| Class IV | 44.6 | 7244 |
| Class V | 40.3 | 6557 |

In April 1943 the Third Army commander informed General McNair that 85.85 percent of the enlisted personnel of the 93d Division were in Grades IV and V, and in August 1943 the AGCT distribution of that division's enlisted personnel was as follows:⁵⁴

| | Percent | Number |
|-----------|---------|--------|
| Class I | .16 | 24 |
| Class II | 3.50 | 541 |
| Class III | 15.06 | 2323 |
| Class IV | 36.41 | 5616 |
| Class V | 44.87 | 6919 |

What did these figures mean in terms of training difficulties? They meant that less than one out of every four men in the average colored unit could comprehend such

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words as barrage, cadre, counter-clockwise, echelon, exterior, and ordnance, and that he had difficulty with such abbreviations as AGCT, CP, and SOP.⁵⁵ They meant frequent failures in Mobilization Training Program (MTP) Tests in such subjects as map reading, use of the compass, mortar firing, and communications. They meant that progress in most subjects was slow, that retention was poor, and that frequent review was necessary. They meant long hours of extra instruction by officers. They meant that a good showing in any one aspect of training required concentration over a considerable period of time on that subject to the neglect of all others.⁵⁶ A high ranking staff officer made this observation based on two years' experience with two colored divisions:

Negro soldiers learn slowly and forget quickly ... you can build up one line and get pretty good results, with every one of the white officers putting out everything he has all the time. But other things suffer while this one line is being stressed. Then when you concentrate on a second line, the first line is forgotten; after a while when you return to the first line you'll find that you have to start from scratch -- or nearly so.⁵⁷

Unit commanders devised sundry means of coping with the problems arising from the heavy admixture of men in Classes IV and V. Instructional programs were adapted to provide for a maximum of demonstration and review. Lecturing was reduced to a minimum and held to simple terms. One colored division prescribed this sequence for all tactical training:⁵⁸

- a. Demonstration.
- b. Application on drill at reduced intervals -- that is in "slow motion."
- c. Sand table discussions for squads and NCO's in larger unit training.
- d. Application on terrain at normal intervals.
- e. Repetition of steps "a" to "d" as necessary.

For all technical instruction this division required:

- a. Reduction of the subject to its simplest components.
- b. Execution "by the numbers."
- c. Use of coach and pupil method.

Experience in this unit, and in others, showed that the enlisted coach often would think of simple devices or expressions for getting a subject across that would never occur to an officer or noncommissioned officer.⁵⁹ In general, commanders of colored troops found that the same methods used successfully in the training of low-grade white personnel were most effective in the training of Negro units, namely, simplicity of expression, abundant use of models, charts and other visual aids, dramatization of subject matter, and repetition. The Chief of Staff of the 93d Division stated: "Repetition and more repetition was the essence of reasonably successful instruction."⁶⁰

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, assisted unit commanders by extending training periods. At first extensions were granted on a request basis, but in September 1943 commanders of armies and other major units were given authority to make such adjustments as they deemed appropriate in the individual training period of units having more than 45 percent of personnel in Classes IV and V; it was suggested that in cases where the percentage of men in those classes ran as high as 75 percent, training periods should be doubled.⁶¹

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Army Ground Forces also authorized temporary segregation of backward personnel in special training units, both at replacement training centers and within tactical organizations, for the purpose of developing them to a point where they might fit into a regular training program. This arrangement was not completely satisfactory for various reasons, but principally because it diverted officers from normal training duties during a period when commissioned personnel was woefully scarce.⁶² In the 93rd Division, for instance, about fifty officers devoted most of their time to the special training of backward men.⁶³

In January 1943 the Army Ground Forces, in its various efforts to cope with backward trainees, recommended transferring most colored Class V personnel from selected combat organizations, including the 92d Division, to service units having white non-commissioned officers.⁶⁴ After considerable delay the War Department rejected the proposal to substitute white for Negro noncommissioned officers on the grounds of an adverse effect on colored morale but approved the rest of the recommendation.⁶⁵ The proposal was dropped in April 1943 because of changes in the Negro personnel situation in the Army Ground Forces and because of development by the War Department of a plan of its own for handling backward personnel, both white and colored.⁶⁶

This plan, instituted in the summer of 1943, provided for the rejection at induction stations, by a series of tests "based on intelligence rather than literacy," of the most backward men - presumably those who would fall in the lower three-fifths of Class V. At reception centers there was to be a second screening for segregation and assignment to special training units of all men who were unable to read or write English at a fourth-grade level, who could not speak or understand simple English, or who were graded as Class V in the AGCT. Special training units for the men thus screened were to be operated by the Service Commands. As soon as members of these units demonstrated their ability to undertake a regular course of training they were to be sent to their normal assignments. Trainees who did not in thirteen weeks evidence aptness for military training sufficient to justify further effort were to be discharged under Section VIII of AR 615-360.⁶⁷

The War Department program was a boon to colored units created after its enactment. But the peak of AGF activations had already passed, and the effect on units existing before July 1943 was indirect and meager; the only opportunity which these units had of benefitting from the new program was through replacement of personnel lost by transfer and normal attrition. But this slight turnover, coupled with the continuing effort of units in their own special training groups, brought some improvement. The effect on the 92d Division is revealed by a comparison of the AGCT distribution of January 1943 with that of May 1944:⁶⁸

| | January 1943 | May 1944 |
|---------|--------------|----------|
| Class I | 0.2% | 1.2% |
| II | 3.2% | 9.9% |
| III | 11.7% | 14.1% |
| IV | 44.6% | 43.8% |
| V | 40.3% | 31.6% |

Another deficiency of colored trainees was the dearth among them of mechanical and technical experience in civilian life. Typists afford an excellent illustration of the difficulty. The requirements for typists in the arms ran about 14.68 per thousand. Among men inducted in February, March, and April, 1942, the occurrence rate of typists among whites was 14.43 and among Negroes only 1.94.⁶⁹ Because of the scarcity of competent typists, unit commanders, after unsuccessful attempts to secure neat and accurate transcription of routine papers by third-rate copyists, often were forced to do their own typing.⁷⁰ This was a severe tax on officers already harassed by the

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multitudinous problems peculiar to a colored command. The situation in colored divisions was such that announcement by the Classification Officer of receipt of a Form 20 card indicating typing proficiency would set off a mad scramble among white officers for assignment of the recruit to their organization.⁷¹

The occurrence rate of other technical specialists among colored inductees was woefully small -- utterly inadequate for the needs, say, of a division commander whose requirements in noncommissioned officers and technicians approximated 34.2 percent of the enlisted strength of his command.⁷² The AGF Classification Officer observed in September 1942: "The situation of colored troops is an entirely different matter. As with all other skills, except cooks, there is a great disparity between what is needed and what is available."⁷³

Unit commanders and higher headquarters made gargantuan efforts to train the required specialists. But results fell considerably short of the needs.⁷⁴ A crux in the situation was the lack of a satisfactory foundation on which to build. The social and economic system prevailing in peacetime afforded only limited opportunity for participation by Negroes in technical pursuits. The race was ill-equipped, therefore, for full participation in a war conducted to a large extent with machines. It was a case of calling on an agricultural and laboring people, accustomed mainly to plows, shovels, and hoes, to enter an activity where essential tools were automatic weapons, motors, and radios. The commanding general of the Antiaircraft Command summarized thus the situation confronting him. "Each of the three types of antiaircraft battalions is equipped with a large amount of electrical, radio, and mechanical equipment ... the great majority of (colored) men are unable to grasp the barest fundamentals of the gunnery problems involved, and to care for and properly man the complicated equipment inherent in antiaircraft units. There are in the 16 colored antiaircraft battalions approximately 10,000 men whose opportunities for mental development have been so restricted as to necessitate their classification in AGCT grades IV and V. Of this number only about 3,000 could be employed to useful advantage within the 16 battalions were all to be continued active."⁷⁵

Another deficiency of the colored soldier was a tendency toward neglect and abuse of equipment. This was most frequently manifest in reckless driving, failure to take proper maintenance measures, loss of weapons, clothing, and tools, and carelessness as to small parts that were difficult to check. The following excerpt from an AGF staff officer's report of a visit to Ft. Huachuca is representative of the overwhelming majority of commentaries on colored units: "Maintenance of vehicles, small arms, artillery, fire control instruments, maintenance records, signal and quartermaster equipment was unsatisfactory ... mechanics were smoking in the regimental shop, signal equipment showed neglect and abuse, and serious damage to hand lanterns was due to deterioration of batteries which had been left in equipment. There were numerous instances of missing screws, broken knobs, loose keys, and equipment was dirty in general."⁷⁶ Units covered in this report were in advanced stages of training.

The penchant for high speed appears to have been widespread among colored drivers. Perhaps this was the Negroes' way of giving vent to an urge long repressed because of the white man's near-monopoly of fast-moving vehicles. Be that as it may, khaki-clad Negro drivers, when once removed from the surveillance of responsible officers, frequently yielded to the temptation of "gunning" their trucks and jeeps.⁷⁷ In overseas theaters Negro truck drivers, while frequently winning plaudits for zeal and dispatch in delivering the goods in forward areas, were commonly referred to as "TD's" (Truck Destroyers); their vehicles were called "low flying six-by-sixes"; and some white troops professed greater dread of encountering from around a curve on the highway a Negro-chauffeured 2½-ton truck than a shell-spitting German tank.⁷⁸

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Evidence collected by a Fourth Army inspector at Ft. Clark in the spring of 1944 tells a sad story of abuse of equipment in the 2d Cavalry Division. Among the findings were these:⁷⁹

1. Approximately 1,069 ordnance vehicles were turned in during movement of the Division to port of embarkation "in a condition which revealed evidence of neglect and lack of proper care ... approximately 125 vehicles would not run and had to be towed to San Antonio."

2. When a turn-in of extra blankets was ordered after alerting of the unit, 996 blankets could not be accounted for.

3. A considerable quantity of salvageable government property was discarded at the Ft. Clark dump and some of it covered by a bulldozer. Among articles thus discarded were "belts, mess kits, cans of cleaning and preserving material, boxes of preserving soap, first aid packets, helmet liner, 3 helmets ... knives, forks, and spoons ... ties ... belts ... fatigues ... leggings ... shoulder patches ... shelter halves and center poles."

4. A wrecked jeep, belonging to the Military Police Platoon, was found under a bridge after the Division left the post.

5. "Substantially all the units of the 2d Cavalry left serviceable and salvageable individual property in their quarters at Ft. Clark" on departure for the port of embarkation.

6. About four o'clock one morning, shortly before departure of the unit from Ft. Clark, several trucks driven by colored troops unloaded large quantities of clothing, including new khaki trousers and shoes, on a small arms range about three miles from the post.

The motive behind some of this hauling away of equipment was pilfering. A gate check on personnel going from Ft. Clark to near-by Brackettsville in the fall of 1943 resulted in recovery from colored soldiers of blankets, boots, helmet liners, ammunition, mess gear, belts, and other items of clothing. A search of the Brackettsville express office before the Division's departure revealed thirty-six packages prepared for shipment by as many colored soldiers - presumably to their homes or relatives - containing government clothing, including raincoats, field jackets, boots, barracks bags, and shoes. Examination of postal packages and search of colored dwellings in Brackettsville likewise resulted in the discovery of government property.⁸⁰

Property abuse may have been unusually bad in the 2d Cavalry Division but there is evidence of a regrettable amount of loss, damage, and theft in other units. During the course of an official investigation at Ft. Huachuca in September 1944, Col. E. N. Hardy, Post Commander, stated:⁸¹

I would like to say in that connection that I have been here for nearly two and a half years and from the very beginning I found that the Negro soldiers are very improvident in the handling of property, equipment and supplies. A few weeks after the 93d Division was activated, May 15th, 1942, we began to find on the dump entire hams that never had their wrappings or paper taken off, entire crates of fresh vegetables which had never been opened, entire crates of fresh strawberries that had never been opened, and various other articles which, to an ordinary person, it was inconceivable how anybody would resort to wastage.

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In August, 1944, G-4 of Fourth Army wrote to the Commanding General, 92d Division, suggesting, that in view of the impending departure of his command for port of embarkation, steps be taken to prevent loss of property; concerning prior experiences with movement to port of colored personnel he stated:⁸²

There are many instances, of record, where individuals and small organizations have buried property and hidden arms under buildings or in garbage cans. Large containers filled with weapons have been found on post dumps. Trucks, half-trucks, and even tanks have been driven off at night and hidden in ravines and woods ...

To make bad matters worse, we also find large numbers of individuals, who as a last act, mail government property to their relatives and friends. The scrutiny of parcel post packages showed the mailing of carbines and ammunition, as well as clothing. This was all government property.

The Commanding General of the 92d Division took precautionary steps, but even so, the movement of this unit was not accomplished without considerable loss of property. Army Service Forces officers who visited Ft. Huachuca in September 1944 during the final weeks of the 92d Division's sojourn there found large quantities of government property, including "dozens of pairs" of shoes, "bottles by the hundred -- soft drink and milk," helmet liners, and steel helmets, cans of C rations, and 3 cartons of toilet paper, had been thrown on a dump and that many other articles of government issue had been burned. About the same time the Post Commander of Ft. Huachuca, on a horseback ride, found a half-truck load of equipment which had been thrown into a canyon about a mile west of camp. Included among the equipment were these items.⁸³

- 25 Ties
- 100 Socks
- 10 Fatigue Shirts
- 5 OD Shirts
- 11 prs Service Shoes
- 7 prs Leggings
- 16 Shirts, COD
- 14 Trousers, COD
- 12 Gloves
- 8 Service Caps
- 11 Barracks Bags

The colored soldier's abuse of equipment was attributable in part, if not largely, to the character of his civilian background. A staff officer with wide experience in two Negro divisions remarked: "Negroes have never had much equipment of their own to look after. The equipment that they used in their farming and other activities usually belonged to the 'boss man' and they felt no responsibility for looking after it. The thing has carried over into the army. It will take a long time to make the Negro property conscious."⁸⁴

Another shortcoming of colored trainees was a lack of interest on the part of many of them in their military activities and in the war itself. The commander of a colored cavalry brigade wrote in December 1943: "The most difficult thing in all our work here is trying to instill a desire or determination in these soldiers' minds that they must and will fight. Approximately 95% 'just don't want to'."⁸⁵ In some instances the lethargy sprang from a conviction that the Negro had little to gain from the war; that the United States was a white man's country and that it would be no less so after the conflict than before. This conviction was nourished by instances of abuse and discrimination. Some white officers of Southern background offended their men by referring to them as "boys," "shines," "darkies," and "jigaboos."⁸⁶ Negro soldiers and their

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families sometimes were crowded off buses by whites, and those who dared protest were abused by drivers, policemen, and other civilians.⁸⁷ Colored troops traveling in the South sometimes had to go hungry: those riding the train, unless traveling in convoy, were usually excluded from dining cars; those who rode in buses sometimes did not have time during allotted stopovers for meals to find their way to "Negro-town" and back to the station.⁸⁸ Time Magazine reported that "Negro troops being shipped through El Paso, Texas, were barred from the Harvey House restaurant at the depot and given cold hand-outs. They could see German prisoners of war seated in the restaurant and fed hot food."⁸⁹ Negro soldiers visiting towns on passes were sometimes beaten without just cause by civilian police.⁹⁰ Incidents of mistreatment were given wide publicity by the Negro press; usually the accounts were exaggerated and distorted.⁹¹

Sensitiveness to discrimination, whether real or imagined, was more common among educated soldiers than those of little learning, and among those from the North more than those from the South.⁹²

There can be little doubt that Negro newspapers, which had a wide circulation among colored troops, particularly those from the North, contributed greatly to the idea that the war was a white man's affair and that the Negro would gain little from it. The extreme position sometimes taken by the colored press is illustrated by an editorial published shortly after V-E day in the Pittsburgh Courier, most widely circulated of all Negro newspapers. George S. Schuyler, author of the article, first posed a question: Now that the war in Europe is over, what has the Negro gained? He then continued with reference to the Japanese phase of the conflict:⁹³

Paul McNutt, Admiral Halsey and other highly placed bureaucrats are baying for annihilation of the entire Japanese nation, regardless of sex or age. Their attitude is shared by million of Americans easily indoctrinated by lying propaganda because of their traditional racial prejudice. Indeed, the enthusiasm for the war against the Japanese is based largely on race hatred. That is why our bureaucrats provoked the Japanese war as the quickest way to get us into the German war, since the Nazis flatly refused to be forced into attacking us, although we were openly aiding England and thus engaging in the war while pretending neutrality.

I for one refuse to be stampeded into any hatred of the Japanese people. Close contact with them for five years in Hawaii and observation of their home islands convinces me that they are a clean, orderly, courteous, intelligent, and resourceful people with a highly developed sense of beauty"

Such an article, far from stimulating enthusiasm for prosecution of the war against Japan, must have dampened it considerably.

Many white officers of Negro units were convinced that the lack of interest in soldiering was attributable largely to inertia and laziness. They sized up the situation as a carry-over to army service of the plantation Negro's inclination to lean on the hoe handle as much as possible because "the boss man was going to get the money anyhow," with "Uncle Sam" -- or his representative, the Captain -- filling the role of boss men, and the rifle substituted for the hoe. White commanders complained frequently of colored trainees shirking their duties and consuming much valuable time in idle chatter and horseplay.⁹⁴ The lieutenant colonel of a colored quartermaster battalion said: "The Negro soldier will go to sleep in a moment of inactivity if you do not keep an eye constantly upon him. The minute his truck comes to a halt he is apt to start nodding ... one day while I was making the rounds of a motor park I noticed a Negro under a truck with his hand upraised gripping a wrench, as if tightening a nut. On second glance I discovered that the hand was not moving. The Negro had gone to sleep in this position."⁹⁵

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"We have a rule," this officer continued, "that drivers must raise the hoods and clean their motors during extended stops. But if you don't watch the Negroes they'll move the rag aimlessly to and fro over the motor with one hand and at the same time shoot the bull with some other soldier or let their minds wander far away."⁹⁶

The commander of another colored quartermaster battalion stated: "They contrive various means of taking naps. When the trucks are to be washed, drivers will line the vehicles up before the wash rack far ahead of time, stretch out on the seats and go to sleep. If an officer calls them to task they're always ready with a quick, 'Suh, I was jes' waitin' my turn at de wash rack.'"⁹⁷ The executive officer of a colored engineer combat battalion said: "They will absent themselves from any activity at any time that they think they can get away with it. If you put them out on a job, they'll loaf if there is any possible chance of them doing so. I have known them to go to sleep standing up."⁹⁸

There was much malingering in some colored units. A company commander of more than three years service with the 25th Infantry and the 92d Division remarked: "You may watch most any company coming in off the field and you'll see a line of from five to twenty-five stragglers or 'cripples.' They will fall out on the march, go over and sit under a mesquite bush, laugh and talk, and yell at other men to come and fall out with them. They are by no means whipped; they have stamina left. But they have not the pride in themselves as men and soldiers to go ahead and finish the march."⁹⁹ A battalion commander of the 92d Division observed in June 1944: "Malingering is about to run me crazy. There are entirely too many 'cripples' - men complaining of ... 'hurting in de grine' (groin) and ... 'misery in de back.' You take them over to the medics. The medics may say that they're all right, but they'll continue their limping. You don't know what to do with them."¹⁰⁰

At Ft. Huachuca those men who could neither be discharged nor made acceptable as soldiers, gravitated to a casual camp made up largely of "impossibles." An AGF officer who visited this camp in the summer of 1944 found some 2,000 soldiers there, 874 of whom were rated as Class A physically. The AGF officer concluded that the overwhelming majority of the Class A men were malingerers. In interviews with 38 of them he heard a succession of complaints. One man testified that physical exertion gave him a feeling of water being "pumped in his head." Another said that he suffered pain in marching because one testicle was higher than the other. Others told of fast heart beats, difficult breathing, dizziness, pain in the side in damp weather, and other ailments for which the surgeons could find no cause. One soldier blurted: "I've got no guts"; another said: "I don't like to shoot a rifle. I just don't like it."¹⁰¹

Another deficiency of colored privates cited by many white officers was undependability. The commander of a Field Artillery battery said: "You could tell them to do a thing day after day for months and you could never feel confident of their carrying through on the details ... If you were going on a field problem, you had to make a minute check of equipment before you started, or else you would find on reaching your destination that some essential item had been left behind. It was not that the men did not know what to do. They were just irresponsible."¹⁰² The commander of a quartermaster battalion stated: "They won't turn in their shoes when these are in need of repair. They won't go to the supply room to get shoe strings. They will wear holey socks. They don't accept responsibility ... They generally require constant supervision. The officer has to check, double-check, triple-check, and quadruple-check."¹⁰³

Some officers observed that colored troops were emotionally unstable. The commander of a quartermaster group, for instance, remarked: "Apparently everything will be going well -- as in maneuvers, say. All of a sudden, there will be an outbreak of fights, disrespect to officers, absence without leave, and other violations. There will be no known reason for this phenomenon. It requires strong, fearless, and prompt

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handling. Such action will bring the incident to a swift and successful conclusion, with much less ill-feeling and disruption than in a white outfit. The thing blows over as quickly as it came."¹⁰⁴

A division commander stated that emotional instability combined with another peculiarity of colored troops -- namely, an aversion to firearms -- to create problems in marksmanship training. "At the first rifle marksmanship exercise (following maneuvers)," he said, "the first order was in position on the firing point. The first soldier who fired became so frightened when his gun went off that he slid back off the firing point. About half of the men on the line started to stand up. They had all gone through complete marksmanship courses and combat firing practice ... (in prior training), but they had not fired for several months, and they were jittery." According to this officer there was among Negro troops in general "a lack of determination to overcome flinching in firing practice. Eventually most of the men overcame this handicap," he added, "but it took a terrific amount of ammunition and time."¹⁰⁵

A minor weakness commonly observed by white officers was violation of uniform regulations. This deficiency appeared to spring mainly from a fondness for display and a flair for the unusual. Many colored privates seemed to have an obsession for wearing the bill-type garrison caps, which were forbidden in most organizations. They liked to stick feathers in their fatigue hats, and to pull their socks up over their trouser bottoms to achieve a "legged" effect. They delighted in wearing the high-crowned "overseas caps" of the Armored Forces; some of them increased the loftiness of the crowns by sewing two caps together, one on top of the other. On weekend visits to cities it was not uncommon for them to don paratrooper, or even cavalry, boots, medals, campaign ribbons, and noncommissioned officers' chevrons.¹⁰⁶ For a time at Ft. Huachuca there was a fad of "zoot" uniforms -- custom-tailored outfits of dark shirts and tight bottom trousers.¹⁰⁷

A considerable number of white officers testified to a lack of honesty and forthrightness among the colored troops. This seems to have been attributable in large measure to a defensive attitude, springing from longstanding subordination to the white man. It sometimes took the form of an individual covering up small errors until they developed into major mishaps.¹⁰⁸ The point may best be illustrated by a hypothetical but typical instance: A truck driver runs over a stump and tears a hole in a rear tire. For fear of being blamed and upbraided he fails to report the damage, but lets things drift along until the tire blows out and wrecks the truck. When questioned then as to whether or not he had observed the hole before the blowout he answers negatively and proposes some other reason for the wreck.

A few officers said that the Negroes were adroit at anticipating the answers desired for questions put to them and that they habitually gave the replies that were wanted. The executive officer of a quartermaster group said: "Unless the colored soldiers know you well, they will not tell you the truth. Rather they will give you the answer to any question that they think they ought to give you."¹⁰⁹

The defensive complex was also manifest in the reluctance of colored men to reveal delinquencies of their fellows, even when these delinquencies caused them injury or inconvenience. Cases of theft, sodomy, and destruction of property which would have come to light almost immediately in white units evaded detection for months in colored organizations because of the prevalent unwillingness to expose the guilty parties to the Army's counterpart of "the law."¹¹⁰

Even so, dispensers of justice in colored units were a busy group, for known breaches of military regulations were frequent among Negro troops. Between 15 October 1942 and 16 June 1944, in the 92d Division, 2,998 cases - an average of 150 cases a month - were submitted to the Division commander for trial general, special, or summary

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courts, or for disposition under the 104th Article of War. This figure does not comprehend cases handled by lesser commanders under the 104th Article of War, but only those of such seriousness as to require action of the division commander.¹¹¹ Handling of this tremendous docket required the attention of four general courts, each sitting habitually two nights a week, and imposed a heavy burden on officers already overtaxed by other duties. It was not uncommon for sessions to extend beyond midnight.¹¹²

The most common offense was absence without leave, consisting in a majority of cases of overstaying passes or furloughs. AWOL's increased sharply on week ends, after payday, and on the eve of arduous training periods such as field exercises and maneuvers; the rate was unusually high during preparation for overseas movement, but this was attributable apparently to an unauthorized extension of furloughs rather than to an effort to avoid shipment to foreign theaters.¹¹³

Other infractions of rather frequent occurrence were fighting, petty theft, disrespect to noncommissioned officers, unauthorized use of government vehicles, loss or abuse of equipment, and traffic violations.¹¹⁴ Disrespect to colored officers was common and to white officers rare.¹¹⁵ One instance of the latter occurred at Ft. Huachuca on the occasion of dedication of a baseball field. When the division commander arose to speak to a large audience, including Brig. Gen. B. O. Davis, he was greeted by a chorus of boos.¹¹⁶

Punishment which, according to the testimony of white officers, proved most effective for Negro troops were extra duty and restriction to camp; of these the latter seems to have been the more efficacious. Fines and confinement in the guard house appear to have made little impression. Dishonorable discharge seemed to be considerably less dreaded by colored soldiers than by whites.¹¹⁷ A company commander remarked: "They lose caste not at all among their families and friends when they are dismissed from the service. They seem to feel no shame..."¹¹⁸

Several officers testified to the effectiveness of taking offenders several miles out from camp at night and requiring them to walk in alone. Some condoned or even encouraged - though not with the knowledge or approval of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces - corporal punishment in case of disrespect to colored noncommissioned officers. One regimental commander, adjudged by high ranking War Department officials to be unusually successful in the command of Negro troops, wrote from overseas in February 1943: "Shortly after I came here, at a meeting of the senior non-coms, I told them that I would refuse to handle 'disrespect to noncoms' court martial cases. These and similar cases they would have to handle themselves out behind the barracks. I backed them up of course. We had one of these cases (sic) of a broken jaw, but as you readily know the man attacked the sergeant and the sergeant was acting only in self defense."¹¹⁹

Other officers stressed the importance of punishment following quickly after the offense. One company commander, to expedite punishment, followed the practice, in summary cases, of personally escorting the offender over to the summary court judge, submitting the charges orally, having the trial, initiating execution of the sentence, and then writing up the charges.¹²⁰ Other officers added impressiveness to serious court sentences by having them read at company formations.¹²¹ A division chief of staff observed: "Prompt punishment was effective. Hesitancy in handling disciplinary cases was always fatal to discipline."¹²²

White officers who commanded Negro troops also found virtues among them, though they deemed these to be heavily outweighed by deficiencies. The overwhelming majority of those whose views were checked stated that some of their troops were good soldiers in every sense of the word. Commanders of service units generally placed a higher percentage of men in the "good soldier" category than did officers of combat organizations. The attitudes of those who served in units having only white officers were more

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favorable to the colored trainee than were those in organizations officered partly by Negroes. Many officers testified that colored troops surpassed whites in close order drill, and some artillery commanders found Negroes better than whites in the service of the piece.¹²³

One quality mentioned by several officers when asked about the Negroes' "good points" was cheerfulness. "Negroes have more cheerfulness and patience under adversity than whites," said the commander of a colored quartermaster battalion. "In the Oregon maneuvers troops of my command worked seven days a week for three months - white troops would have balked under the same circumstances. Negroes won't bitch as much as white soldiers."¹²⁴

A high-ranking artillery officer with long experience in commanding colored troops stated that "the Negro ... is generally cheerful if wellfed. If he has plenty of food he will work long hours without belly-aching."¹²⁵ An AGF staff officer who observed the MTP test of the 93d Division reported that "with few exceptions the men were cheerful, very willing and uniformly courteous."¹²⁶

Other officers found colored soldiers responsive and easy to handle. "I sort of enjoy them in a way," a regimental commander said. "You can use a half-kidding manner on them effectively. On a march as they come by me, by companies, if a particular company looks especially good, I'll say so, loud enough for other companies to hear me. That stimulates those other companies to greater exertion. You'll hear a Negro captain, lieutenant, or sergeant down the line say: 'There's the Colonel up there. Let's look pretty for him now.' And they will perk up noticeably."¹²⁷ The commander of an antiaircraft unit wrote in February 1943: "They are without doubt the most responsive of any people ... The thing to do is to appeal to that responsiveness ... (by) passing out of compliments and the good word, giving them 'color,' always showing an outward humanness."¹²⁸ As might be expected there was a close correlation between responsiveness of the troops and the quality of their leadership.¹²⁹

Still other commanders thought the Negroes more responsive to individual notice, to flattery, and to competition than the whites; and the more successful ones capitalized on this characteristic in numerous ways. Drivers who had no wrecks for stipulated periods were given "safe driver" signs for their vehicles. One officer gave "Good Conduct" ribbons to every man "who had just stayed out of the guard house for three years."¹³⁰ Other commanders stressed weekly competitions between units for "bests" in every conceivably category -- "best mess," "best company area," and "lowest venereal rates." Winning units were given placards, published in bulletins, and cited at formations.¹³¹

Loyalty to officers whom they admired was another virtue attributed to colored soldiers. One officer, whose testimony was generally unfavorable to Negroes, remarked: "I'll say this to their credit -- when you win the friendship and affection of one of them, he will be very loyal to you ... Even the bad ones can be loyal."¹³²

In summary it should be noted that the quality of Negro trainees was not a constant thing, but varied with changing influences and circumstances. A "good unit" might deteriorate into a troublesome, inefficient, undisciplined mob when transferred from North to South, particularly if it contained a heavy admixture of racially sensitive men imbued with the attitudes of the Negro press, and was moved into a community where lines of segregation were tightly drawn and recreational facilities limited. A unit was almost certain to degenerate when capable officers, experienced in dealing with colored troops, were replaced by novices lacking in command ability. Conversely a poor unit might sometimes be brought to an efficient status by replacement of unsatisfactory or inexperienced officers with leaders of proved ability to command Negro troops.

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The efficiency of a unit was apt to be affected by a change of command, even though the new officer was equal in ability to the one replaced. For Negro troops were peculiarly influenced by the individual personalities of their leaders. In fact, many of them seemed to think of the war principally in terms of its relation to their immediate commander. A battery commander who questioned one of his men about his willingness to go overseas received the reply: "Well Captain, I'll go with you, but I don't care about going with anyone else."¹³³ This highly personalized relationship naturally made command changes disruptive. When a popular officer was transferred from a certain colored quartermaster company, the men of that unit wrote to the battalion commander saying that they loved their old leader; that they did not have anything against his replacement, but that they were going overseas soon and that they wanted to go with an officer whom they knew and loved. The letter closed with this sentence: "We belong to him, but he also belongs to us."¹³⁴

Other officers testified that when the men were going through infiltration and other combat courses, they kept a very close eye on their leaders and were greatly influenced by their actions. In sum, with Negro troops even more than with whites, effective leadership was the thing that counted most.

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Chapter III

NEGRO NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

In general, colored noncommissioned officers possessed the same virtues and weaknesses as the privates. Because of the dearth of education and skill among colored inductees, NCO resources were limited in Negro units; and these resources were practically exhausted by demands for officer candidate schools. White officers of peacetime experience in colored organizations often remarked that Negro noncommissioned officers of the war army were far inferior to the "old-timers."

Of shortcomings noted by commanding officers, lack of initiative and force was perhaps the most common. "Noncoms will walk right by gross deficiencies in motor pools and barracks, and will not correct them," remarked a group executive officer.¹³⁵ A battalion executive said that "the colored noncoms as a general rule will back up white officers, but they are sadly deficient in initiative, foresight, and force." "If you stand over them," he added, "they'll do a fair job."¹³⁶ The report on the MTP test of the 93d Division contained this comment: "Non-commissioned officers lack initiative and fail to make corrections."¹³⁷

Many officers said that the colored NCO's required constant checking and supervision. "If they see a delinquency or deficiency ... they let it slide," remarked a battalion executive. "If a noncom is corrected by an officer, he'll get the thing right that one time," this officer added, "but the next time he'll probably make the same mistake again."¹³⁸

Another failing of the colored noncommissioned officers was their tendency to fraternize unduly with private soldiers. Some of them vied with the men for the favor of their women, drank with them, gambled with them, and shielded them in wrongdoing.¹³⁹ One sergeant major manifested such fondness for gambling and carousing with his men that they dubbed him "Playboy."¹⁴⁰

A colored investigator who served for several months in an antiaircraft unit stated: "Usually if a non-commissioned officer can't get one Private to carry out his order, he will try to get another. Many of the non-commissioned officers have been heard to state that 'they don't care anything about the stripes, the money is what they want.'"¹⁴¹

Even some of the better noncommissioned officers were susceptible to periodic let-downs or slumps. A division staff officer said: "My master sergeant recently failed to send through an important paper. When he was asked the reason for this delinquency he simply said: 'I dunno.' He's been at low ebb about a week now. If I bawled him out, he'd get worse. If I simply wait, he'll snap out of it in about another week, and stay 'on the ball' for a couple months. Then, for no comprehensible reason, he'll have another slump."¹⁴²

A minor deficiency was the tendency of some noncommissioned officers in instructing the men to use words and phrases that were beyond the comprehension of both instructors and pupils. One noncommissioned officer was overheard using the word "substantiation" (for substantiate). Another, discussing rifle marksmanship, greatly overworked the word "manipulate." "Now when you manipulate the bolt," he said, "you manipulate it this way ..."¹⁴³

Some white officers spoke well of the instructional ability of their noncommissioned officers. Said a battalion commander: "We have noncoms do as much teaching as practicable. We find that they use simpler language, and within the range of their capabilities do a better job of instruction than we do."¹⁴⁴

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Unit commanders were doubtless responsible to some extent for the unsatisfactoriness of their noncommissioned officers. Some of them were not willing to pay the extra price in forbearance and supervision that the NCO's required in order to overcome the handicap of poor background and education and to build up confidence and prestige. After a period of failure to get their subalterns to take hold, unit commanders elected rather to perform the work of the squad leaders themselves.¹⁴⁵ Or else they were not sufficiently specific in their orders and instructions. "You have to tell the NCO what you want done and how you want it done," a group commander remarked: "if you fail to do this, you don't get good results."¹⁴⁶ Officers sometimes made the mistake of being too lenient with their colored noncommissioned officers, of not holding them to a sufficiently strict accountability. A battalion commander, who by his superiors was rated as unusually successful in commanding Negroes, summarized his experiences in dealing with noncommissioned officers thus: "The colored non-com is just as proud of his stripes as is the white. He will bear responsibility if you make him do it. If the colored non-com falls down in his job, rake his butt over the coals. If he does it again, bust him, and do it immediately. The effect ... is salutary ... The minute you excuse a non-com's poor performance on the basis of his being a Negro, that minute you have ruined him. You must consistently force him to accept responsibility. It is important to take non-coms into full confidence."¹⁴⁷

Most officers whose opinions were checked said that they had a few noncommissioned officers of superior abilities. One company commander of long and successful experience with colored troops stated: "There is no better company clerk than the one I had ... or no better first sergeant; there are smarter ones, but no better ones. They were responsible and dependable, and I think that they would make good commissioned officers if they could meet the AGCT and other requirements."¹⁴⁸

This officer was of the opinion, moreover, that colored noncommissioned officers in general compared favorably with white ones in initiative, firmness, and responsibility, but his view was that of a minority. By far a more representative estimate was that given by an officer of the Inspector General's Department in the fall of 1943, after a comprehensive survey of racial conditions at Southern camps. "Statements by officers commanding Negro troops," he said, "are to the effect that as a group they (colored noncommissioned officers) lack the qualities of leaders; that they demonstrate little interest, are slow to absorb instruction and lack the ability to transmit instruction to others; that in their desire to be on the good side of subordinates they exercise little control over them; that they fail to exercise their authority when they are expected to use it; that they will not assume responsibility, and fail to carry out orders and directives." "The deficiencies noted above," he added, "do not apply to a portion of the group who have or are developing satisfactorily."¹⁴⁹

The noncommissioned officer situation remained a major obstacle to the training of Negro troops throughout World War II.

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Chapter IV

NEGRO OFFICERS

When the Army Ground Forces came into being in March 1942, there were only about 500 colored officers on active duty in all the armed forces.¹⁵⁰ About a half-dozen of these were Regular Army.¹⁵¹ The others were apparently about equally divided between National Guard and Reserve components. Reserve officers came mainly from ROTC graduates of Howard, Tuskegee, Hampton, and Wilberforce.¹⁵² Exact figures on the number of colored officers in Ground units at inception of the Army Ground Forces are not available, but the number appears to have been about 250.

By 31 July 1943, the earliest date for which complete figures are available, colored officers in the Army Ground Forces had reached a total of 1,842. At the end of the year the figure was 1,876 and on 30 June 1944 it was 1,221. The sharp decline in the number of Negro officers in the Army Ground Forces in the first half of 1944 was the result of a heavy flow of colored units overseas. Continuation of this phenomenon reduced the total number of colored officers in the Army Ground Forces on 31 December 1944 to 471, and on 30 June 1945 to 164.¹⁵³ Details of rank and branch are set forth in the accompanying table. (Table I)

While the total number of Negro officers in the Army Ground Forces declined during the period after 31 July 1943 as the result of overseas movement of colored units, there was actually an increase during this period in the ratio of Negro officers to Negro troops, on account of the replacement of white with colored officers. On 31 July 1943 there was 1 Negro officer for every 89 colored enlisted men in AGF units; on 31 December 1943, the ratio was 1 to 57 and on 30 June 1944, 1 to 62.¹⁵⁴

The overwhelming majority of colored officers in Ground units came from officer candidate schools. Negroes were admitted to all officer candidate schools under AGF control except that of Coast Artillery. Seacoast Artillery units were not authorized Negro officers, but the Antiaircraft Officer Candidate School turned out large numbers of Negro graduates for Negro antiaircraft units. The Army Ground Forces sent colored students to Adjutant General, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal officer candidate schools and called upon appropriate chiefs to supply officer requirements in the various services; but these requirements, except for Engineer units, were insignificant.¹⁵⁵

Colored graduates of the AGF officer candidate schools consistently amounted to a little more than half of the colored graduates turned out by the army as a whole. And graduates of the Infantry Officer Candidate School always exceeded the combined production of other AGF schools. The cumulative colored output of officer candidate schools at six-month intervals was as follows:¹⁵⁶

| | Armd | Inf | Cav | FA | AA | TD | Total AGF | Total Army |
|-----------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|--------------|---------------|
| 31 Jul 42 | 20 | 155 | 3 | 40 | 31 | 0 | 249 | 422 |
| 31 Dec 42 | 37 | 644 | 32 | 138 | 132 | 6 | 989 | 1686 |
| 30 Jun 43 | 53 | 874 | 60 | 230 | 233 | 88 | 1538 | 2910 |
| 31 Dec 43 | 55 | 937 | 64 | 256 | 317 | 95 | 1724 | 3354 |
| 30 Jun 44 | 57 | 940 | 65 | 261 | 323 | 95 | 1741 | 3457 |
| 31 Dec 44 | 57 | 965 | 65 | 263 | 323 | 95 | 1768 | 3718 |

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Table I

Branch and Rank Distribution of Negro Officers in AGF
(Compiled from WD MRU Branch Tabulations # SDM
207 (monthly) "Colored Officers with the AGF by
Orgn and Grade." In 320.32/2 (R))

a. 31 July 1943

| | Col. | Lt. Col. | Maj. | Capt. | 1st Lt. | 2d Lt. | Total |
|-------|------|----------|------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| B.I. | | | | | 20 | 52 | 72 |
| Inf. | | | 4 | 22 | 115 | 572 | 713 |
| Cav. | | | | 2 | 9 | 51 | 62 |
| F.A. | | 3 | 10 | 36 | 65 | 141 | 255 |
| Armd. | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Tnk. | | | | 3 | 12 | 31 | 46 |
| AA. | | 1 | 2 | 13 | 43 | 142 | 201 |
| Qm. | | | | 2 | 14 | 49 | 65 |
| Ord. | | | | | 6 | 31 | 37 |
| Sign. | | | | | 1 | 17 | 18 |
| MP. | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Engr. | | 1 | 3 | 6 | 34 | 133 | 177 |
| Med. | | | | 15 | 22 | 7 | 44 |
| TD | | 1 | | 6 | 30 | 111 | 148 |
| Total | | 6 | 19 | 105 | 371 | 1341 | 1842 |

b. 31 December 1943

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|----|-----|-----|------|------|
| B.I. | | | | | 13 | 59 | 72 |
| Inf. | 1 | 3 | 6 | 46 | 241 | 582 | 879 |
| Cav. | | | | | 13 | 48 | 61 |
| F.A. | | 3 | 7 | 14 | 62 | 185 | 271 |
| Armd. | | | | | | | |
| Tnk. | | | | | | | |
| AA (CAC) | | | | 5 | 29 | 172 | 206 |
| Qm. | | | | 2 | 28 | 60 | 90 |
| Ord. | | | | | 3 | 18 | 21 |
| Sig. | | | | | | 29 | 29 |
| MP. | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Chap. | | | 2 | 14 | 17 | | 33 |
| CWS | | | | 1 | 1 | 11 | 13 |
| Engr. | | | | | 12 | 27 | 39 |
| MC | | | 4 | 55 | 44 | | 103 |
| TD | | | | | | | |
| IGD | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| DC | | | | 8 | 11 | | 19 |
| MAC | | | | | 8 | 14 | 22 |
| VC | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| AGD | | | | 1 | 4 | 10 | 15 |
| Total | 2 | 6 | 19 | 147 | 486 | 1217 | 1876 |

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Table I (Continued)

30 June 1944

| | Col. | Lt. Col. | Maj. | Capt. | 1st Lt. | 2d Lt. | Total |
|------------|------|----------|------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| B.I. | | | | | 14 | 38 | 52 |
| Inf. | 1 | 6 | 5 | 40 | 182 | 271 | 505 |
| Cav. | | | | | 5 | 28 | 33 |
| F.A. | | 2 | 4 | 13 | 41 | 104 | 164 |
| Armd. | | | | | | | |
| Tnk. | | | | | | | |
| AA (CAC) | | 1 | | 6 | 22 | 123 | 152 |
| Qm. | | | | 3 | 46 | 108 | 157 |
| Ord. | | | | | 7 | 16 | 23 |
| Sig. | | | | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 |
| MP. | | | | | | | |
| Chap. | | 1 | 1 | 8 | 11 | | 21 |
| CWS | | | | 1 | 4 | 6 | 11 |
| Engr. (CE) | | | | 1 | 6 | 9 | 16 |
| MC | | | 1 | 25 | 22 | | 48 |
| TD | | | | | | | |
| IGD | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| DC | | | | 5 | 4 | | 9 |
| MAC | | | | 2 | 4 | 14 | 20 |
| VC | | | | | | | |
| AGD | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Total | 2 | 10 | 11 | 105 | 370 | 723 | 1221 |

31 December 1944

| | | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|----|-----|-----|-----|
| B.I. | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Inf. | 1 | 5 | 5 | 29 | 71 | 99 | 210 |
| Cav. | | | | | | 9 | 9 |
| F.A. | | | | 3 | 2 | 21 | 26 |
| Armd. | | | | | | | |
| Tnk. | | | | | | | |
| AA (CAC) | | | | 4 | 24 | 65 | 93 |
| Qm. | | | | 2 | 21 | 65 | 88 |
| Ord. | | | | | | 7 | 7 |
| Sig. | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| MP. | | | | | | | |
| Chap. | | | | 3 | 1 | | 4 |
| CWS | | | | | | | |
| Engr. (CE) | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| MC | | | 1 | 7 | 5 | | 13 |
| TD | | | | | | | |
| IGD | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| DC | | | | 2 | 3 | | 5 |
| MAC | | | | | 3 | 6 | 9 |
| VC | | | | | | | |
| AGD | | | | | | | |
| Total | 2 | 5 | 6 | 50 | 130 | 275 | 471 |

Table I (Continued)

30 June 1945

| | Col. | Lt. Col. | Maj. | Capt. | 1st Lt. | 2d Lt. | Total |
|------------|------|----------|------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| B.I. | | | | | | | |
| Inf. | 1 | 1 | | | 11 | 113 | 126 |
| F.A. | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| AA (CAC) | | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Qm. | | | | | 7 | 14 | 21 |
| Ord. | | | | 1 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Engr. (CE) | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| MC | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| IGD | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| DC | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Total | 2 | 1 | | 3 | 26 | 132 | 164 |

It is apparent from these figures that the period of most rapid production of colored officers for AGF units was the latter half of 1942. The demand for colored officers was unusually great during this period because of activation between May 1942 and February 1943 of the three colored divisions, all of which were authorized Negro lieutenants, and because of a serious shortage at the same time of white officers.¹⁵⁷ There are indications that this situation caused a compromising of standards in the selection and training of colored officer candidates.¹⁵⁸ A staff officer of a Negro division cited the following instance: "An Army headquarters called for a quota of five students for infantry officers' candidate school. The division sent only two. Army telephoned division headquarters to provide the other three. Division informed Army that only two soldiers had been able to pass the OCS Board examination and that no more qualified men were available. Army replied that no excuses could be accepted but that the quota must be met in full. Under this pressure the division provided the three additional men."¹⁵⁹ The commander of a Field Artillery battalion in a sworn statement to an Inspector General officer remarked: "It has been stated to me by instructors in the Field Artillery School that pressure from above was such that they had reached the conclusion that a colored officer candidate must be graduated from the school regardless of his ability."¹⁶⁰

Production of Negro officers declined sharply in the latter half of 1943.¹⁶¹ By that time the two Negro infantry divisions were approaching their full allotment of colored lieutenants, and, as is shown below, promotion to higher grades was slow. Change in the white officer situation from scarcity to overabundance during this period lessened the urgency of replacing them with Negroes.¹⁶²

In the early months of 1944 output of colored officers dwindled to a mere trickle. In May no Negro graduated from an AGF officer candidate school and only eight from all others. Colored officer production increased slightly in the latter half of 1944, but the total output in Negro officers in the Army Ground Forces during this period was only 27 (25 infantry and 2 FA).¹⁶³

Ground Force policy for the assignment of Negro officers in 1942 was based on War Department directives issued in March and April.¹⁶⁴ These listed the colored units in the 1942 Troop Basis to which Negro commissioned personnel might be assigned and specified the grade. The two infantry divisions and some nondivisional units were authorized all colored lieutenants in lettered companies and batteries, and Negro chaplains;

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the National Guard units were allowed all colored officers; Regular Army organizations and many other units could have no colored officers except chaplains; certain quartermaster companies were authorized Negro officers in the grade of second lieutenant only. The War Department provided further that white officers should remain in colored units until qualified colored officers were available to replace them. To avoid white and Negro commanders serving in the same small unit, it was required that Negro officers be assigned in blocks only -- in battalion blocks for regiments and separate battalions and in company blocks for separate or detached companies. Assignments were to be restricted to units or agencies having suitable housing and messing facilities for colored officers.¹⁶⁵

In January 1943 the War Department initiated the practice of simply designating types of Negro units to which colored officers of prescribed grades might be assigned and left to the Army Ground Forces the choice of specific units. At the same time the Army Ground Forces was directed to designate units to which Negro officers of higher grades than those specified in the War Department list might be assigned as they demonstrated their fitness for promotion.¹⁶⁶

There was a delay of several weeks in publication by the Army Ground Forces of the list of units to which officers in grades higher than lieutenant might be assigned. In the meantime Negro lieutenants who had served in grade for more than six months chafed under the system which prevented their promotion. Dissatisfaction was particularly strong in the 93d Division, where a large number of first lieutenants from the Organized Reserve Corps with about a year's service were assigned.¹⁶⁷ After a protest by Gen. Benjamin O. Davis and an outpouring of criticism by the Negro press, the War Department on 17 March 1943 amended its promotion policies by directing: "As Negro officers in these units become capable of duties and responsibilities of higher grades (than lieutenant) ... position vacancies will be created by the relief of white officers."¹⁶⁸

Six days later, but apparently before receipt of the new War Department directive, the Army Ground Forces published a list of 58 units, including 3 colored divisions, "to which Negro officers who have demonstrated their fitness for promotion to higher grades may be transferred in order to qualify for promotion." The AGF list was accompanied by these provisions: (1) "the same rigid standards that apply in the promotion of white officers will be maintained"; (2) recommendations for promotion to grades above lieutenant must be forwarded to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, showing position vacancies; if no position vacancies exist, transfer to a unit where they do exist must be justified; (3) in regiments and higher units, assignment of colored officers of grade of captain or higher will be made in battalion or combat team groups. "In no cases will white officers be commanded by Negro officers."¹⁶⁹

Because the War Department directive of 17 March had not been received, the AGF letter of 23 March said nothing of creating position vacancies for colored officers by relief of white personnel. Not until August 1943 did the Army Ground Forces publish this provision to its subordinate units.¹⁷⁰

Those who expected a flood of captains' bars to follow in the wake of the March directives were doomed to disappointment. Paucity of promotions was attributable in large measure, no doubt, to a widespread feeling among white commanders that comparatively few colored lieutenants had demonstrated ability to serve in higher grades.¹⁷¹ But pertinent also were the conditions laid down by higher headquarters. For instance, the commander of a battalion not specifically authorized colored captains who had in his organization a Negro lieutenant of outstanding ability could qualify him for promotion only by recommending his transfer to a unit in which colored captains were authorized. This he might be reluctant to do. In units authorized colored captains and field grade officers, Negro promotions were probably impeded in some instances

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because of the reluctance of commanders to transfer white officers in order to provide position vacancies for the Negroes.

A further deterrent to promotion, particularly during the period prior to August 1943, was a lack of clarity in statements of policy by higher headquarters. Both the War Department letter of 10 January 1943 and the AGF letter of 23 March seemed to require that promotion of Negro officers be made by blocks or groups so that in a battalion or separate company no Negro officer would be senior to any white officer.¹⁷² Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces assumed that Division commanders would make the necessary shifts within their units to effectuate block promotion, but there was no specific instruction on the point. When Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis visited the 93d Division in April 1943, the Commanding General remarked that he had three colored lieutenants acting as captains in a Field Artillery battalion whom he desired to promote, but that his hands were tied because he did not have other lieutenants in that battalion qualified for promotion. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, directed this commander "to make any arrangements that would show some improvement in the situation."¹⁷³ Henceforth division commanders were given considerable leeway in matters pertaining to the promotion of colored officers.¹⁷⁴

Following a complaint concerning current promotion practices made in August 1943 by General Davis and Truman Gibson after a visit to the 92d Division, the War Department ordered the Army Ground Forces to make a comprehensive investigation and report for the period 1 January - 31 August 1943 covering the following points: (1) number of promotions, by month; (2) name of units in which there were no promotions; (3) number of Negro officers qualified for promotion, but not promoted, and reasons for failure to advance them; and (4) instances of failure to promote because of restrictions imposed by War Department policy.¹⁷⁵

Returns from this survey revealed that 28 units, with 1,544 colored officers, made 302 promotions between 1 January and 31 August. Of these 238 were from second lieutenant to first lieutenant; 56 from first lieutenant to captain; 5 from captain to major; 2 from major to lieutenant colonel; and 1 from lieutenant colonel to colonel. Over half of the officers promoted to captain were in the medical or chaplain's corps and only one-fourth were in the infantry and artillery. Of the 5 officers promoted to major 2 were chaplains, 2 were surgeons, and 1 was in the quartermaster corps. The two officers promoted to lieutenant colonel and the one promoted to colonel were infantrymen of the 366th Infantry Regiment (Separate).¹⁷⁶

There were 21 units, with 223 colored officers, in which there were no promotions of Negro commissioned personnel during this eight-month period.¹⁷⁷

Twenty-four units reported on aggregate of 130 colored officers eligible for promotion under current regulations and "considered qualified and deserving of promotion," who had not been advanced in grade. Reasons submitted for failure to promote were mainly these: "No vacancy exists"; "recommendations recently forwarded"; "officers have only recently become eligible"; and "commander desires further to observe officer's performance of duty." In only one case -- involving two officers of the 646th Tank Destroyer Battalion -- was it said that promotion was prevented by War Department policy, the prohibitive provision being that which forbade colored senior officers serving in the same unit with white junior officers. In one other case involving one officer, it was reported that failure to promote was attributable to misinterpretation of War Department policy by the unit commander.¹⁷⁸

The sentiment of the Army Ground Force headquarters with reference to General Davis' August complaint regarding promotion policies was expressed thus by a staff officer: "It is believed that the promotion policy concerning Negro officers is more liberal in its application than the promotion policy as applied to white officers for

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the reason that position vacancies need not exist in some units to which Negro officers are assigned, but rather may be created through the relief and transfer of white officers."179

During the period following General Davis' protest the rank status of colored officers in the Army Ground Forces gradually improved. On 31 July 1943, 1 out of every 74 Negro officers in the Army Ground Forces was of field grade, on 31 December, 1 out of 70, and on 30 June 1944, 1 out of 53. On 31 July 1943, 1 out of every 18 Negro officers in the Army Ground Forces was a captain, on 31 December, 1 out of 13, and on 30 June 1944, 1 out of 12. Seventy-five percent of all colored officers in the Army Ground Forces were second lieutenants on 31 July 1943; by 31 December the percentage had fallen to 60 and by 30 June 1944 to 59. On 31 July 1943 there were no colored colonels in the Army Ground Forces; on 31 December there were 2, and on 30 April 1944 there were 3 (1 was Commanding Officer of the 366th Infantry, 1 of the 372d Infantry, and 1 was a roving inspector of colored troops for Headquarters, Second Army). Monthly distribution of rank among colored officers in the Army Ground Forces is shown in the accompanying table (Table II).

Table II¹⁸⁰

Rank Distribution of Negro Officers in AGF by Month, 30 June 1943 - 31 May 1945

| | Cols. | Lt. Cols. | Majs. | Cpts. | 1st Lts. | 2d Lts. | Total |
|------------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|-------------|------------|-------|
| 30 Jun 43 | | 4 | 11 | 86 | 287 | 1283 | 1671 |
| 31 Jul 43 | | 6 | 19 | 105 | 371 | 1341 | 1842 |
| 31 Aug 43 | 1 | 12 | 33 | 167 | 494 | 1178 | 1885 |
| 30 Sep 43 | 1 | 6 | 19 | 122 | 397 | 971 | 1516 |
| 31 Oct 43 | 2 | 6 | 20 | 139 | 415 | 1095 | 1677 |
| 30 Nov 43 | 2 | 9 | 27 | 162 | 485 | 1211 | 1896 |
| 31 Dec 43 | 2 | 6 | 19 | 147 | 486 | 1216 | 1876 |
| 1 Jan 44 | 2 | 7 | 18 | 142 | 467 | 1094 | 1730 |
| 29 Feb 44 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 85 | 319 | 705 | 1133 |
| 31 Mar 44 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 46 | 224 | 671 | 947 |
| 30 Apr 44 | 3 | 10 | 14 | 110 | 372 | 903 | 1412 |
| 31 May 44 | 2 | 13 | 17 | 109 | 412 | 926 | 1479 |
| 30 Jun 44 | 2 | 10 | 11 | 105 | 370 | 723 | 1221 |
| 31 Jul 44 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 115 | 390 | 707 | 1237 |
| 31 Aug 44 | 2 | 10 | 11 | 114 | 387 | 632 | 1156 |
| 30 Sep 44 | 1 | 10 | 11 | 57 | 202 | 382 | 663 |
| 31 Oct 44* | 2 | 5 | 6 | 57 | 174 | 366 | 620 |
| 30 Nov 44* | 1 | 5 | 6 | 54 | 138 | 276 | 480 |
| 31 Dec 44 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 50 | 130 | 275 | 468 |
| 31 Jan 45 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 45 | 99 | 186 | 343 |
| 28 Feb 45 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 96 | 188 | 340 |
| 31 Mar 45 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 40 | 103 | 186 | 340 |
| 30 Apr 45 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 31 | 116 | 159 |
| 31 May 45 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 28 | 131 | 169 |

* Note: The figures in these instances actually are those of 1 November and 1 December 1944.

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In January 1944 the War Department ceased designating type organizations to which colored officers might be assigned and gave Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, authority to assign them to any Negro unit. In February the Army Ground Forces published a new list of units to which Negro officers could be assigned and authorized subordinate commands to request such additions to the list as might be deemed necessary from time to time for absorption of colored commissioned personnel.¹⁸¹

With recurrence after the spring of 1944 of a shortage of white officers, the principal AGF commands increased pressure on subordinate agencies to make the widest practicable use of qualified colored officers. The Replacement and School Command went so far as to recommend to the Field Artillery School that all white captains and first lieutenants commanding colored companies and batteries at Ft. Sill, Okla., be replaced with colored officers. The Artillery School commandant protested against such a sweeping shift. Reference of this incident to the Army Ground Forces in June 1944 called forth a significant statement of policy:¹⁸²

1. It was not the intention of this headquarters to require all positions of captains and lieutenants to be filled by colored officers regardless of their qualifications.

2. It is desired that insofar as military efficiency will allow, colored officers replace white officers in the above grades, thereby releasing the latter for assignment to white units. Only those colored officers who are qualified to hold positions now occupied by white officers should be assigned to these positions. Only those officers qualified for promotion should be recommended for promotion.

3. Within a battalion of a regiment, within a separate battalion or within a separate company, no colored officer will be senior to any white officer. It is further desired that within the mentioned units, as soon as practicable, all officers of the same grade be of the same race.

The requirement that within a battalion no colored officer be senior to any white officer was to a considerable extent a "paper policy." Certainly there were many instances in actual practice of a battalion having some companies commanded by Negroes and others commanded by whites.¹⁸³

From the beginning there was widespread apprehension in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, as to the ability of Negro officers effectively to discharge command responsibilities. This uncertainty was attributable in large measure to the performance of Negro officer in World War I as recorded in studies by successive classes at the Army War College.¹⁸⁴ The War College monographs represented Negro officers of World War I, with few exceptions, as being unduly familiar with their men, hypersensitive to race, and ineffectual in combat.¹⁸⁵ The experience of the 368th Regiment of the 92d Division in the Meuse-Argonne action of September 26-30, 1918, was cited as an example of undependability of Negro leaders under fire. After this engagement the division commander requested relief of thirty colored platoon and company commanders on charges of worthlessness, inefficiency, and cowardice;¹⁸⁶ and the white commander of one of the battalions reported: "Every time the many halts under none-too-severe fire were made, I personally and often at the point of the pistol literally drove forward the battalion. Without my presence or that of any other white officer right on the firing line I am positive that not a single colored officer would have advanced with his men."¹⁸⁷

Commanders of colored AGF units in training testified to serious shortcoming of Negro officers, and their comments were supported by reports of inspectors sent out by higher headquarters. A deficiency frequently cited was lack of a sense of responsibility. The commander of a colored division said: "They work on the union plan ... when

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retreat sounds, they want to knock off. Come Saturday noon, regardless of the fact that their company records may be in a hell of a shape, they take off to the officers' club and they don't show up again until Monday morning."¹⁸⁸ A regimental commander remarked: "I have 127 Negro officers under my supervision. There are not over a half-dozen who would work overtime unless ordered to do so."¹⁸⁹ A company commander observed: "They feel that the government owes them a commission; that they should have their positions because they have a college education, because they are Negroes, or for some other reason. Too frequently their sense of responsibility is not commensurate with their confidence in their entitlement to the office."¹⁹⁰

A regimental commander complained bitterly that his Negro officers always disappeared in times of crisis, such as camp disturbances, leaving the brunt of restoring order to white leaders. After a night of rioting among his troops, he remarked: "Not a colored officer could be found. When I made a check later, they all had plausible excuses, but the fact remains that they were not on hand when I needed them. They had skedaddled."¹⁹¹

Another complaint against colored officers was lack of initiative, aggressiveness and self-confidence. "In many cases they will sit back and wait to be told to do something that needs obviously to be done," remarked a company commander. "They are reluctant to face difficult questions immediately and directly," he added, "but prefer evasive action and round-about methods."¹⁹²

The commanding general of the Third Army wrote to General McNair in April 1943 that the colored lieutenants of the 93d Division, "except for a small number (10 to 15%) are lacking in military background, aggressiveness, professional knowledge and ability to control or instruct their platoons."¹⁹³

Near the end of his long career as commander of the Second Army, General Ben Lear wrote General McNair:¹⁹⁴

The training of Negro organizations has demanded my particular attention. Reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that their unsatisfactory progress is largely due to deficiencies in leadership as demonstrated by many Negro officers ... Progress (of Negro units) ... has been in direct proportion to the percentage of white officers assigned to the units. Those with all white officers have made reasonable progress; those with all Negro officers are definitely substandard.

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned deficiency of Negro officers was a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude concerning race. This exaggerated sensitiveness, according to white commanders, caused Negro officers to construe routine incidents of administration and discipline as acts of discrimination.¹⁹⁵ "If a white officer is found guilty of some deficiency or delinquency," said the colonel of a Negro regiment, "you may call him in, dress him down, and the average one will take it, say 'Yes, Sir,' about face, and try to remedy the situation. The Negro officer on the other hand when faced with this situation ... will take the attitude that he is being called to account because he is a Negro ... (and) will brood over the dressing down."¹⁹⁶

Extreme race consciousness caused Negro officers sometimes to "cover up" shortcomings of enlisted men. Unit commanders found it exceedingly difficult in some instances to get colored commissioned personnel to initiate charges against Negro soldiers, to testify against them at court-martial, even when the knowledge of reprehensible conduct seemed practically certain.¹⁹⁷ In 1944 the Commanding General of the Fourth Army wrote to General McNair: "Almond (Commanding General of 92d Division) ... is faced with a difficult problem in his officer personnel as he has so many Negroes among his senior officers. It is very difficult for him to reclassify any of the

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juniors as the seniors flatly refuse to testify against them."¹⁹⁸

In a few cases Negro officers openly sided with their men in breaches of discipline. A white military police who attempted to restore order among some disorderly colored soldiers at Camp Stewart was upbraided by colored lieutenants, who according to the military police's sworn statement, said that "the men would keep on acting the way they did, and no one could do anything about it."¹⁹⁹ A white company commander of the 364th Infantry Regiment testified to hearing a colored lieutenant say to some soldiers after their efforts to raise a disturbance had been curbed: "Wait until we find out what has happened. I am colored the same as you and all the colored officers are with you 100 percent, and if we have to go down and do something about it, we will lead you."²⁰⁰

Several factors aggravated the colored officer's hypersensitiveness to race. First, most of them were from the North. When stationed in the South, as the overwhelming majority of them were, they were brought face to face, both in camp and out of camp, with mores which assumed the white man's superiority -- an assumption to which they were not accustomed. Their reaction was naturally one of protest and defense. Again, many had recently been to colleges where the importance of their race was emphasized. Many of them had attained college degrees at considerable sacrifice, and partially as a result of this, there was a tendency for them to expect too much of their diplomas. Further, many felt that they were discriminated against in promotions.²⁰¹ A colored artillery lieutenant remarked to a representative of The Inspector General's Department: "I have had executive officers ... tell me ... if you were a white man you would be a Major. It is too bad that two strikes are against you; you have good ability and you have leadership ... and I said, 'I know; that is one of those things. I have been a first lieutenant for a year and a half and I have done satisfactory work here and nobody is going to promote me ... I am going to work but I don't expect to be promoted.'"²⁰²

Negro officers were only slightly comforted, if at all, by explanations of superiors that they had not demonstrated fitness for advancement, or that promotion was impossible because of rules handed down by higher headquarters or lack of position vacancies.²⁰³

Still another factor which aggravated racial sensitiveness was the conviction that white officers were prejudiced and unfriendly. This feeling was not without foundation. Many white officers look with disfavor upon the assignment of Negroes and whites to the same unit. They were not accustomed to intimate association on an equal basis with Negroes in civilian life and they resented any pressure to that end in the army. Most of them met the minimum requirements of War Department orders prohibiting segregation in messes, barracks, and theaters, but the conformity of many was on a "duty" or "good soldier" basis. Efforts of commanders to intermingle their white and colored subordinates in officers' clubs were steadfastly resisted.²⁰⁴ White officers of one regiment when ordered by their colonel to admit recently assigned colored lieutenants to their club declared it disbanded; a little later they joined a private riding club beyond the camp limits which barred Negroes from membership.²⁰⁵

Under insistence of high command, white officers sometimes assembled with Negroes at official dinners and receptions, but efforts to bring wives and sweethearts into the picture, or to give interracial gatherings a purely social character usually aroused a tempest of opposition.²⁰⁶

At Ft. Huachuca and elsewhere, white and colored officers lived under the same roof and ate at the same messes. But they rarely got together for drinking, conversation, and yarn-swapping as was the custom in groups made up solely of white personnel. In mess halls they usually ate at different tables and in separate portions of the

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room. Segregation was hardly less real under rules which sought to prevent it than it would have been had the rules not existed.²⁰⁷

It was only natural that colored officers, especially those of Northern upbringing, should chafe greatly under this order of things. Some of them openly challenged it. At Camp Stewart, for instance, they would ride up to white officers' clubs to seek admission, leaving their drivers outside, in anticipation of certain refusal.²⁰⁸ In the 92d Division on one occasion, white officers of a regimental mess on coming to breakfast found a colored lieutenant sitting at each of the tables usually occupied by the whites. The white officers took their accustomed seats and ignored the "token visitors." After a few days the Negroes went back to the places they had previously occupied. Never again did they cross the aisle separating the colored and white officers in this "non-segregated" mess.²⁰⁹

Negroes seemed unable to understand the inability of the government to force the whites to accord them a fuller acceptance. To the Army's contention that enforcement of nonsegregation rules in the end rested on individual commanders, Judge William H. Hastie retorted: "It's a hell of a poor army which can't enforce its own orders."²¹⁰

To questions of an Inspector General officer about the desirability of postponing agitations of racial rights until victory over the Germans and Japanese, a well-educated colored lieutenant of successful business background replied: "To retard the war effort is a serious thing. However, I feel it is asking a little too much of me as a colored man ... to enter wholeheartedly into that struggle ... when I am not accorded the treatment to which my conduct entitles me ... I do believe that if the army requires me to be a member of it, it ought to accord me the same protection which my status entitles me. If it doesn't do that I cannot have the right attitude towards it ... I believe that a man should be treated as a man, whatever his complexion or color may be. That is not asking too much of the army ... I think that an officer in the U. S. Army ... ought to be able to go anywhere and do anything that any other officer is able to do."²¹¹

Other colored officers were considerably more bitter. Some of them imagined or grossly exaggerated acts of injustice or discrimination. A few communicated their grievances to the Secretary of War and to other high authorities outside prescribed channels.²¹² One lieutenant who was disciplined for violating security regulations and ignoring established channels wrote a protest to the Secretary of War denouncing his army commander for "slanderous and libelous statements" and referring to the disciplinary act as "illegal and malicious."²¹³

The feeling of abuse, regardless of the extent of its justification, caused many colored officers to become temperamental, morose and petulant, and impaired their effectiveness as leaders. Unfriendly white officers who observed the deterioration found in it support for existing prejudices, and those who were well-disposed toward the Negroes became discouraged if not disgusted with them. In some cases, white officers from the North who entered service with Negro officers with considerable enthusiasm became their most bitter critics. To the general run of white officers it appeared that the intermingling of Negro and white commissioned personnel produced a situation fraught with strife and misunderstanding and one that was impossible of solution.²¹⁴

As long as the practice prevailed of inducting Negroes in numbers proportionate to their share of the population, it was impossible for the colored race, its stage of development being as it was, to provide enough competent leaders completely to staff Negro units.²¹⁵ And to staff them exclusively with white officers would have meant denying colored enlisted men the prospect of commissions, which would have been deadly to their morale. A possible compromise was the staffing of some units exclusively with colored officers. But had this scheme been adopted, it would have been necessary,

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because of the dearth of Negroes capable of discharging duties of higher grades, to limit both the number and size of the units. The problem would have been easier to meet if induction had been regulated so as to maintain among Negroes the same AGCT distribution in Classes IV and V as prevailed among drafted whites.

The commanding general of the 93rd Division in 1943 as an experiment filled all of the officer positions in one infantry battalion (1st Battalion, 369th Regiment) with Negroes. He designated a Negro major whom he regarded as the most promising colored line officer in the division to command this battalion. The major assisted in the selection of the other colored officers. An effort was made to secure the best officers available in the division for the all-Negro battalion. But the battalion had hard going from the first, and after about three months the experiment was abandoned as a failure. Of this project, the assistant division commander later said:²¹⁶

I personally watched the battalion closely and gave it quite a bit of time. I checked it in individual and small unit training and in the battalion combat exercise. It was by far the poorest battalion of the nine infantry battalions in the division. It fell down in every respect - administration, housekeeping, and training. My colored striker told me that the Negroes did not respect their colored officers, and that they often said to him that they did not want to go into combat as members of the 1st Battalion, 369th Infantry Regiment. Major ... was incapable of getting compliance with division and regimental orders from the elements of his battalion, of making these orders effective on down through the companies and platoons.

The division commander stated that the Negro major was unable to elicit the confidence and cooperation of his staff and company commanders, and that the Negro officers resented being set off in a unit to themselves.²¹⁷

Another shortcoming frequently attributed to colored officers was failure to observe the time-sanctioned code of officer conduct. White officers accused them of all sorts of indiscretions in their relations with enlisted men. The commander of a colored division told of a Negro officer borrowing twenty dollars from an enlisted man "with apparently no intention of paying it back."²¹⁸ The commander of another colored division said:²¹⁹

"(Negro officers are) careless about the payment of debts, about the accuracy of official statements, and about standards of conduct in general. Acts which white officers regarded as unthinkable seemed to shock them very little if at all. Many had the enlisted man's viewpoint on matters of conduct."

At Camp Van Dorn, Miss., a white officer told a visiting inspector that "these (Negro) officers have not yet crossed the gap between the officer and enlisted men and it is believed that they never will"; another officer made this comment: "(They) want to be popular and one of the boys. Most were enlisted men and still act like one. They avoid disciplining and punishing their men. Leave it up to a white officer."²²⁰

A colored lieutenant informed a white captain that in Indianapolis bawdy houses colored officers would "pull their rank" to get service ahead of the enlisted men.²²¹ Another Negro lieutenant said that at Ft. Huachuca colored officers paid soldiers to make dates for them with enlisted members of the colored WAC.²²²

Fraternization was undoubtedly encouraged by the strong race consciousness which pervaded some Negro units. Colored officers who bore down severely on their men and who gave strong support to the disciplinary code of their white superiors were sometimes referred to as "Uncle Tom's" or "white mouths," and accused of being more concerned with getting promoted than with safeguarding the rights of their race.²²³

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Most white officers were convinced that comparatively few Negroes could fully command the respect of their men. A captain said that Negro enlisted men took this attitude toward the average colored officer: "Oh, hell, you're just a truck driver like me. You've got no business giving me orders."²²⁴ A battalion commander in a Negro division stated: "Once in a while discipline gets so bad ... that the men will argue pettily with their colored officers; an officer will give an order and the men will argue with him before obeying."²²⁵ Colored noncommissioned officers sometimes complained of the ineffectiveness of their Negro superiors. A sergeant on trial at Ft. Huachuca remarked: "I wouldn't have one of these colored officers for my back-yard dog."²²⁶ A Negro corporal wrote a white sergeant from a unit having all colored officers to which he had recently been transferred: "This battalion ... is a disgrace to the United States Army. It has no discipline whatever. It's a common thing for a buck private to give the Battery commander a good cursing ... It's the awfulest mess you ever saw. They (officers) fight among themselves. They go after the same women as the privates and enlisted NCO and if an enlisted man should get the woman the officer will throw his rank on the enlisted man and take the woman. These officers here know about as much about handling men as the newest buck private at Sill."²²⁷

It would be erroneous to leave the impression that no Negro officers were respected by their men, for the more capable ones certainly commanded a fair measure of esteem. But the conclusion is inescapable that the position of colored officers was made peculiarly difficult by the fact that in civilian life Negroes were far more accustomed to white than to colored supervision. The officers' effectiveness would have been considerably greater if in peacetime they had had more opportunity to hold positions of responsibility. For confidence, initiative, and other attributes of successful military leadership undoubtedly bear close relation to habituation to authority.

Colored officers in considerable numbers were haled before courts-martial for offenses usually regarded as utterly beyond the pale of persons holding Army commissions. A tabulation of offenses brought to the attention of the commanding general of the 92d Division during the period 15 October 1942 - 1 June 1944 revealed among colored officers 55 cases of absence without leave, 40 cases of neglect of duty, 18 cases of insubordination, 16 cases of misuse of government vehicles, 16 cases of false official statement, 10 cases of disrespect to superiors, 7 cases of drunkenness, and 4 cases of intoxication on duty. The list also included 1 case of rape and 1 case of "fornication on the highway." The total of offenses in this tabulation, which does not include cases handled by lesser commanders of the Division under the 104th Article of War, but only those requiring attention of the commanding general, was 203 for colored officers as against 12 for white officers. (At the beginning of the period covered by the tabulation the division had all white officers; these were gradually replaced by colored officers until at the end of the period the ratio of white to colored officers was about 1 to 2.)

The complete tabulation was as follows:²²⁸

Analysis of Offenses by Officers 92d Inf. Div. 15 Oct 1942 - 1 Jun 1944

(General courts-martial cases and cases handled by Division Commander
under 104th Article of War)

| | Colored | White |
|-----------------------|---------|-------|
| AWOL | 55 | |
| Abandoning Food | 0 | 1 |
| Assault | 2 | 1 |
| Breach of Arrest | 6 | |
| Breach of Restriction | 2 | |

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| | Colored | White |
|--|-----------|-------|
| Certificate made negligently | 1 | |
| Desertion | 1 (WO) | |
| Disorderly | 2 | 1 |
| Disrespect | 10 | |
| Drinking with EM | 2 | |
| Drunk | 7 | 1 |
| Drunk on duty | 4 | |
| Embezzlement | 2 | |
| Encouraging EM to disobey | 1 | |
| EM, offenses against | 1 | 1 |
| EM, ordering to drive car from Ft. McClellan to Ft. Huachuca | 1 | |
| Failure to pay debts | 2 | |
| False official statements | 16 (1-WO) | |
| Fornication on highway | 1 | |
| Fornication on highway (attempted) | 1 | |
| Improper use of AW 103 | 0 | 1 |
| Insubordination | 18 (1-WO) | |
| Larceny | 3 | |
| Lateness | 4 | 1 |
| Mexico, entering w/o pass | 1 | |
| Mexico, attempt to smuggle EM into | 1 | |
| Misuse of gov't vehicle | 16 | |
| Neglect of duty | 40 | 4 |
| Nuisance | 1 | |
| Rape | 1 | |
| Speeding | 1 | |
| Vulgar language toward MP | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 203 | 12 |

Note: The percentage of white officers (in T/O positions) in the Division ranged from 100 percent at activation to about 33 1/3 percent in June 1944. Throughout this period white officers were gradually being replaced by colored officers.

A regimental commander in a colored division remarked: "The colored officers are too often late for reveille ... Recently three of my (Negro) officers were tried for stealing a tire off a car ... I've had several ... to turn up with venereal diseases ... (they have) a fantastic desire to wear flashy uniforms. They take the *grummet* out of their caps when they can get by with it. They'll wear cavalry boots when they can. (They are) rotten in the management of their financial affairs ... They have a tendency to cover up the misdeeds and delinquencies of each other."²²⁹

Most white officers whose views were checked thought that reclassification and disciplinary action were regarded with considerably less dread by Negro than by white officers. A high-ranking officer of a colored division attributed this situation mainly to a difference in the codes of the two races. "If a white officer were faced with the prospect of court-martial or reclassification," he said, "the first thing that he would think of would be the disgrace and shame that would come to his family. The same is not true of the Negro, who apparently feels that he can be subjected to the most serious disciplinary action without shame to his family, or without loss of face to himself."²³⁰

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Even the colored chaplains were not free from violations of the officers' code. At Ft. Huachuca, according to the statement of several white officers, a Negro chaplain was found taking up collections, in violation of regulations, and presumably pocketing the money.²³¹ A white captain said that the Negro chaplain of his regiment consorted with prostitutes, and that the enlisted men who knew about the "padre's" digressions openly speculated on his "getting dosed up."²³² The most frequent complaint of unit commanders was a tendency of chaplains to put race before religion and the good of the service. One chaplain prayed publicly for the day when all races would be equal,²³³ and another allegedly preached a sermon on the "Double V."²³⁴ Many of them made a practice of protesting the punishment of chronic trouble-makers.

The commander of a colored truck regiment serving overseas said that his chaplain "once worked hard to defend 'a pore colored boy' who had killed two white officers in cold blood" and then "brazenly lied at the trial."²³⁵ A company commander at Ft. Huachuca was constrained to bar two chaplains from his unit because each of them, acting on the complaints of malcontents, had come down and upbraided the first sergeant.²³⁶

Some officers thought that the influence of the colored chaplains over the conduct of the men was negligible. But others held strongly to a contrary view. The commander of a quartermaster battalion told of a chaplain who took it upon himself to keep fellow colored officers in line. "One morning I found him with two colored officers backed up against a wall," he said, "lecturing them for not having taken care of their rooms as officers should - leaving their clothes and bunks untidy, etc; he told them that they should maintain as high, or higher, standards as white officers -- that they were a disgrace to their race, etc."²³⁷ General R. G. Lehman, Commanding General of the 93d Division, said that his colored chaplains were "swell."²³⁸

Some colored officers were found to be lacking in military courtesy. A lieutenant colonel related this experience in connection with assuming command of a colored Field Artillery battalion: "I went out to the rifle range where the second lieutenants were firing the carbine and called one of them to report to me, which he did without saluting, without standing at attention; when addressed by me instead of replying 'Yes, sir', he replied 'Okay' and presented a very poor military appearance ... at approximately the same time I went into the mess hall to give some instructions ... when I came up to the table none of the officers rose, not even the one I had addressed personally, until I told them to stand."²³⁹

Another deficiency attributed to colored officers was lack of ability as instructors. General R. G. Lehman, Commanding General of the 93d Division, stated that his Negro officers were inclined to be too verbose and to consume the greater part of the instructional period in protracted "background" discourses that bore little or no relation to the subject listed on the schedule. He observed further that the officers' lack of self-confidence caused them to resort frequently to bluffing.²⁴⁰

The overwhelming majority of white officers whose opinions were recorded stated that some of the Negroes whose work they had observed were good officers in every sense of the word. Estimates of the proportion of colored officers who might be classified as proficient usually ranged between 10 and 20 percent. Several testified that the work of the colored officers improved with experience. The lieutenant colonel of a Field Artillery battalion said to a representative of The Inspector General's Department in June 1944: "Give me eight or ten of those colored officers I have got now and I would be willing to go any place."²⁴¹

Colored officers seem to have been more successful in specialist roles, because of educational and professional prerequisites, than as line commanders. High-ranking officers of Negro units generally spoke highly of the work, both in training and

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overseas, of their colored medical and dental staffs. They also found Negroes more acceptable as artillery leaders than as infantry commanders.²⁴² Two of the 92d Division's artillery battalions had Negro officers only, and these units turned in good performances both in training and in combat. But it was pointed out by higher commanders that these battalions were exceptional in that each of them was led by a Negro of unusually good background and general ability, and that other key officers had considerable experience in National Guard units before joining the 92d Division.²⁴³ The fact that Negro artillery officers generally had a better record than those in the infantry was attributable mainly to two factors: (1) Artillery organization made possible a closer supervision by higher echelons of command -- a circumstance that was freely exploited in the case of units commanded by Negroes. (2) In combat, artillery rarely encountered the enemy in hand-to-hand conflict.²⁴⁴

Generally speaking, the leaven of high quality colored officers was too small to be of much avail in organizations officered predominantly by Negroes. Large-scale replacement of white officers by Negroes in a given unit led almost invariably to noticeable deterioration of its efficiency. An Inspector General officer who made an extensive study of the colored troop situation in 1943 reported: "One of the most disturbing situations met during this survey was in engineer regiments where all the white lieutenants of the company were relieved by Negro lieutenants, recently graduated from OCS's ... Many of the white commanders were struggling to find a solution ... Most of the Negro lieutenants were inefficient; many undisciplined, imprudent, belligerent, extremely race conscious ..." ²⁴⁵ About the same time The Inspector General in his quarterly report on overseas readiness observed: "Units containing Negro personnel were found not to have attained the efficiency of corresponding white units and this condition was more noticeable when the unit contained Negro officers. This was particularly the case in technical units, and was a factor contributing to the large number of unqualified antiaircraft and engineer units." ²⁴⁶

The large proportion of unsatisfactory colored officers points to two weaknesses in the personnel system. One was the failure to devise a more effective means of screening colored officer candidates that would prevent the commissioning of men unfit for command positions. The other was the inadequacy of machinery for getting rid of Negro officers after they had demonstrated their inefficiency. Reclassification, tortuous enough under normal conditions, was even more difficult in the case of Negroes. This was attributable in part to the reluctance of colored officers to testify against each other because of race consciousness and in part to a conviction of white officers that Negroes exerted an influence in high places that made reclassifying them a dangerous business.²⁴⁷

A Field Artillery battalion commander in turning over his unit to a successor said that "the Group Commander had told him that there was no use trying to do anything in the way of disciplining the colored officers -- that they were favored by the War Department; that they can get away with practically anything, and that they were just a cross that he had to bear."²⁴⁸ Another battalion commander stated his difficulty thus: "It is extremely difficult to put your finger on any one thing that you can reclassify these officers for ... I have held conferences with Col. B on one or two of these officers and ... with Col. F ... He said 'what basis have you got?' I told him that I told Lt. B to do something ... but he failed to do it because he lacked initiative or lacked the qualification for assuming any responsibility or going forward with the work. Col. F said 'That's not enough. You have got to give him something more. Is he guilty of any misconduct?' 'No Sir', I said." Reclassification was not initiated.²⁴⁹

It seems probable also that fear of getting into trouble with "higher-ups" caused officers sometimes to give satisfactory ratings to Negroes whom they really regarded as unsatisfactory."²⁵⁰

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Chapter V

WHITE OFFICERS OF NEGRO TROOPS

Some white officers of Negro units felt that they were given their assignments because of having incurred the disfavor of superiors. A new officer reporting to a colored unit sometimes was greeted with the query: "Well, what did you do to get sent here?" The apprehension was rather widespread among officers serving with Negroes that they were regarded by officers at large as inferiors -- as men who had failed to make the grade with white troops.²⁵¹

Available evidence does not support the view that assignment to Negro units was used as punishment. It seems unlikely that officers of colored troops were of a lower quality than those serving with white units, but the War Department for a time had qualms on the subject. In August 1942 General McNarney complained to General McNair of a "tendency to assign to colored units officers of mediocre caliber."²⁵² General McNair immediately instituted a survey, the findings of which indicated that efficiency ratings of Regular Army officers assigned to colored units without exception fell into the "Superior" and very high "Excellent" class, and in many cases were "higher than those currently being assigned to new divisions."²⁵³

General Robert C. Richardson, commander of the VII Corps, found General McNarney's observations "more or less correct." "The newer officers," he said, "have a tendency to argue with the noncommissioned officers and privates."²⁵⁴

In answering General McNarney's criticism, the Chief of Staff of the Army Ground Forces cited the difficulty in 1942 of securing officers who could be counted on successfully to command Negro troops. "The number of officers in the United States Army who are known to have had experience in handling colored troops is practically negligible," he said. "The bulk of officers now serving with colored troops are now gaining experience in handling such troops," he added. "Approximately 60 percent of the officers assigned to new divisions are recent graduates of officer candidate schools upon whom there are no records available ... which would indicate their suitability or lack thereof for assignment to duty with colored troops."²⁵⁵

The Chief of Staff of the Army Ground Forces went on to say that it was to take advantage of such limited experience as was available that the officer cadre for the 92d Division, then being prepared for activation, was being drawn from the 93d Division. But, "thus far," he observed, "the serious shortage and the constantly shifting requirements for officers have made it very difficult to plan far enough in advance to permit making special efforts to prepare officers for duty with colored troops."²⁵⁶

If officers of colored units made poorer showing than their opposites in white organizations in 1942, it seems likely that the reason was lack of experience in dealing with Negroes rather than a deficiency in the qualities of leadership.

The quality of white officers commanding Negro troops continued to be a matter of concern in 1943 and 1944. Attention was directed recurrently to the subject by Inspector General's reports of poor discipline of colored units and by outbreaks of violence. In March 1944 the War Department laid down the requirement that no officer whose efficiency rating was lower than "Excellent" was to be assigned to colored units.²⁵⁷

This provision may have improved the situation, but it was far from efficacious. For the ability effectively to command Negro troops, as both the War Department and the Army Ground Forces readily recognized, required more than a high efficiency rating.

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An officer having a splendid record with white troops sometimes would fail utterly when placed over Negroes.

It seems incontrovertible that the command of colored units, particularly of combat organizations, was one of the Army's toughest assignments.²⁵⁸ To make good at it, an officer had to have sound judgment, common sense, tact, aggressiveness, initiative, self-confidence, and the other qualities usually associated with leadership. But he had to have more.

It was imperative that he have an inexhaustible store of patience, since irresponsibility, procrastination, carelessness, and inability to carry out the simplest instructions were his daily trial. "If I want some pictures made tomorrow morning," said a division staff officer, "I must get the photographer and his driver together this afternoon, take them to the place where the pictures are to be made, explain in detail just what I want done, and then have them meet me at my office next morning at the appointed time. That's the only way I can be sure of getting the task done on schedule. If I went about the thing in the manner that you would use with white troops -- phoning driver and photographer to meet me at a designated place and go out and take pictures of such and such an activity at a given time and place -- I'd get 'Yes, Suhs' all down the line but more than likely the driver would go one place, the photographer another, and I'd get the best of excuses but no pictures."²⁵⁹

The officer had also to have an understanding of the peculiarities, the weaknesses, and the virtues of his men. He had to know how to blend firmness with kindness, to punish promptly but without show of bitterness or rancor, to avoid sarcasm, and to "kid" the men without seeming to get down on their level. To get the best results he had to call them by name, know something of their families, and establish himself as protector against all who might seek to abuse them. He had to be aware of their sensitivity to such terms as "nigger," "boy," "shine," and "darkey." He had to demand neither too much nor too little of them. And last but not least he must not be upset by unpredictable turns in their attitudes or actions. Rare indeed, and usually inexperienced, was the small unit commander who was bold enough to say: "I know the Negro."²⁶⁰

The officer who had a genuine fondness for Negroes and whose interest in them was real was apt to be more successful than one who posed his relationships on an abstract or pure duty basis. For Negroes were quick to detect a difference between artificiality and the real thing.²⁶¹

The officer of colored troops needed also to differentiate between Northern and Southern Negroes, between college graduates and those of little education. The rustic Southern recruit, accustomed to strawbosses and white patriarchy, would brook, and perhaps even like, an assumed roughness of command that would provoke sullenness or revolt from educated Northerners, particularly those whose attitudes were shaped by the Pittsburgh Courier or the Chicago Defender.

Above all, the commander of colored troops needed to have physical stamina. For his hours were long and his duties arduous. Higher command was always insistent that there be no compromising of standards for colored troops -- they must pass the tests, they must make a good impression on visiting inspectors, they must acquit themselves well on maneuvers, and they must not get into difficulty with civilians. While higher headquarters often extended training periods, additional time could never be taken for granted, for it could come only by special dispensation. Faced with this situation, the officer, and usually the white officer, had to compensate for the disparity between a colored unit with 85 percent of its personnel in Classes IV and V and a white unit with only 40 percent in these categories. He "pulled" his units through tests and maneuvers by being all places at all times. He spent long hours rehearsing his men for

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inspections, reviews, and public functions. "How do you account for the fact that your division made as good a showing as they did on the firing tests?" an artillery officer of a colored division was asked. "The officers set up and supervised the tests," he responded. "It's the officers who passed the tests, too, rather than the men," he added.²⁶² A battalion commander when asked for an explanation of the comparatively good performance of the 92d Division on maneuvers, replied: "I'll tell you how we turned in that good performance. The white officers worked day and night. We would say, 'Now, Private Johnson, you get behind that stump, Private Smith, you get under that bush, and Private Jones, you conceal yourself behind that log.' We moved the men as if on a checker board. We were operating at reduced strength, and by moving about all the time, we were able to maintain control over every man in our units."²⁶³ This testimony was corroborated by that of the Division G-3 who said: "In maneuvers that battalion and higher commanders saw to it that the men were in their proper places at the right time, if it meant staying up all night, as it frequently did, to get them there. The principal credit would go to General Almond, his staff, and the unit commanders."²⁶⁴

The physical strain imposed by minute supervision and long hours broke a considerable number of officers and made others old before their time. Said a regimental commander shortly after he joined a colored division: "I've been out of this country until a few months ago. I had known many of these officers in years gone by. When I saw them again I was struck by the way they had aged. They're working and worrying themselves into a premature old age, and that in a hurry."²⁶⁵

Many officers suffered greatly from mental and emotional stress, particularly those in combat units having Negro commissioned personnel. This was attributable in part to resentment of association with Negroes and in part to a conviction that the effort to make effective soldiers out of the material at hand was futile and wasteful. A sense of stigma also entered the picture, along with a feeling that transfer was virtually impossible, once successful service with Negro troops had been entered on an officer's record.²⁶⁶

A captain of long service in a Negro division described his own attitude thus: "I came here fresh from Officers' Candidate School full of piss and vinegar. But after a few months of trying futilely to develop a sense of pride in my men and in the Negro officers, I began to slip. After a few more months I came to the attitude 'Oh what the hell's the use.' I know that I'm not near as good an officer as I was when I came here."²⁶⁷

A battalion commander who had served forty-four months with colored troops and whose perspective was probably affected by the length of his incumbency made this comment:²⁶⁸

Officers in higher headquarters don't have any idea of what we have to put with. I have been told that written across my 66-1 is the statement: "specially qualified for field command of Negro troops." That is my death warrant. I'll never get out of here unless I get shot down leading these in battle.

The people in Washington don't give a damn about us. All they want is that we keep the Negroes under control and out of their minds -- that we don't get the Negro press on their necks. It is not right to sacrifice officers to endless tours of service with an outfit like this.

At first we bit our nails and worried. It used to upset me terribly for the Old Man to chew me. But that happened so often, and the men harassed me so with their eternal dilly-dallying and evasion of duty that I had to quit

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worrying. I got to where I did not give too much of a damn. When the Old Man chews me now, I just grin.

But I got on -- and all my fellow officers likewise; they're a grand bunch -- wearing myself out, because I can't sit on my ass while my outfit goes to pot and do nothing about it. I have two kids. I can't, for their sake, get my record smeared ... I have to carry on.

The position of this officer and of other officers who served in divisions, trying as it was, in some respects was not as difficult as that of commanders of small separate units. For leaders of nondivisional units had less intimate supervision and less capable guidance than did their opposites in divisions. Moreover, divisions had a sprinkling of Regular Army personnel in both commissioned and noncommissioned categories, an advantage which was not usually found in "spare parts"; and small though this nucleus was, it did much to set the tone of the unit and to lighten the load of the commander.²⁶⁹

In some units, officers were uneasy about their personal safety. A lieutenant recently transferred from a colored infantry regiment to a white organization said that he and his fellow officers slept with pistols under their pillows. "We were aware of ... (the troops) muttering what they were going to do to the 'white sons of bitches,'" he observed.²⁷⁰

An officer in a colored division in telling of his experiences in suppressing a riot in camp the night before stated: "They (the Negroes) broke the windshield out of my jeep, and some others too, by throwing rocks as we drove down through the area trying to quell the disturbance. They would stand back in the shadows and throw the rocks ... (yelling out) such remarks as 'Get out of here, you white son of a bitch; when we get over we're going to be shooting someone besides the Japs!'"²⁷¹

During an investigation of conditions at Ft. Clark, Tex., by the Fourth Army Inspector General a white officer testified: "There was a tension in the air that indicated that many officers of the 2d Cavalry Division were afraid that their troops would riot and wipe them out ... I felt that we were on the edge of riot for several months."²⁷²

Fear of physical violence seems to have been limited mainly to a few notoriously troublesome units, including the 364th Infantry Regiment, the 100th Antiaircraft Regiment, and the 2d Cavalry Division. But loathing of service with colored troops was almost universal among white officers of Negro combat units and common among those in service organizations. It was far more prevalent in organizations that contained an admixture of colored officers than in units staffed entirely with whites.²⁷³ Officers of higher headquarters who visited colored units were constantly importuned with the plea, "For God's sake, can't you do something to get me out of here -- anything but this."²⁷⁴

The desperation to which even the most successful officers were driven after long service with colored troops, and the nature of the problems confronting them, is well illustrated by two letters written at Ft. Huachuca. The first is an official letter of a Military Police major to The Adjutant General, requesting transfer to a white outfit:²⁷⁵

... Reasons prompting application: I have served over three years at this negro post and during the past two and one-half years that I have been in this office my efforts to keep down crime, maintain good order and discipline at and around one of the largest concentrations of negro soldiers in the world has necessitated my intermingling almost daily and nightly with the lowest forms of

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negro life, including murderers, rapists, panderers, prostitutes, bootleggers, dope peddlers, gamblers, and others and my confidence in trusted negro soldiers has been shattered so many times that my faith in the negro race as a whole has descended to the lowest ebb that the tide of human emotions can reach and my once retributive attitude replaced by a feeling of dejection out of which I can only see the negro, devoid of improvement, remaining in an abject state, loathed, abhorred, and despised.

The other letter is a personal communication of a general officer in a colored division to the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, requesting reduction to permanent rank of lieutenant colonel and transfer to a white combat unit in Europe.²⁷⁶

... I believe the only way we will ever make passable combat soldiers out of these negroes is to officer them completely with white officers to include doctors and chaplains. The white officers must be good ones too.

General, I am asking the first favor I have asked in the Army. Please relieve me from this assignment; reduce me to my permanent grade; and send me to a combat unit on the European front. Before the next push begins. I ... could be ... of more use there as a lieutenant colonel than I am in this division. As a matter of fact, I am a pretty poor general, whereas I was a pretty good battalion commander.

I am honest in saying that it would be to the best interests of the service to replace me in this division and I am quite serious in requesting reduction in order to effect the reassignment.

The general was serious, and General McNair treated his request as such, but thinking the proposed action "pretty stiff," he advised the petitioner to "sit tight for a while yet."²⁷⁷

A high ranking officer made this significant comment shortly after assignment to a colored infantry division:²⁷⁸

I have talked with all the principal officers of this division since coming here, and to many of my subordinates. I have not found one who was happy in his work As to my own officers they're all seeking transfers or assignments to schools -- anything that will take them away for good, for a few weeks, or even for 24 hours.

Commanding one of these outfits is like having a stick of dynamite in one pocket and fulminate of mercury in the other. You never know when the blow-up will come.

My biggest problem is to try to boost the morale of my white officers. They are depressed and gloomy. They have tried hard to make a go of this situation. And they're the best -- the weaklings have gone before now -- but they're overcome by a sense of futility.

This officer thought that white personnel serving with Negro troops should be rotated after about a year of service. The Commanding Generals of the 92d and 93d Divisions also favored a plan of rotation, but they deemed 18 months a preferable stint of service.²⁷⁹

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, reached the conclusion in the fall of 1943 that some plan of reassigning officers after long service with colored troops was desirable. But it was thought unwise to impose an inflexible system on local commanders. "In some

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cases white officers will be so fed up with colored troops within six months that their efficiency will be impaired if kept longer," wrote the G-1 Control Officer to G-1 of the Army Ground Forces on 29 November 1943. "On the other hand," he continued, "there will be officers who have the temperamental stability to serve longer than 12 months with colored troops; these should not be rotated." He added that there would be some officers peculiarly adapted to service with colored troops and others who liked their assignments. "The whole thing sums up to a matter of individual suitability for command duty with colored units," he concluded, and "the only one in a position to evaluate this suitability is the commander."²⁸⁰

This officer also pointed out that an arbitrary scheme of rotation might cause some officers just to "mark time" and wait for the "expiration of their sentence." Rotation after as short a period as one year, he added, "would remove the officer about the time he had gained the confidence and respect of his troops" -- a factor of great importance in view of the tendency of Negroes to develop "respect and affection for an individual rather than for rank itself."²⁸¹

On 31 December 1943 Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, issued a confidential directive requiring commanders of colored divisions and separate units "to report monthly, not to exceed 5% of their total number of white officers, distributed approximately by grade below general officer, who meet the following conditions:

- a. 18 months or more of continuous service with colored troops.
- b. Do not desire further service with colored troops.
- c. Efficiency rating of Very Satisfactory or better."

On the basis of these reports, higher commanders were "to effect necessary reassignments insofar as replacement officers are available."²⁸²

This action came too late to have much effect on Negro divisions, two of which were on alert status. In view of the reluctance of unit commanders to lose officers of long experience and the difficulty of securing suitable replacements, it is doubtful whether the AGF directive achieved any considerable amount of rotation.

There can be little doubt that the promulgation of a policy which permitted rotation after a specified time at the will of the officers concerned would have resulted in a wholesale heira to white organizations. But there was a small proportion of white officers, who, even after long service with Negroes, professed a liking for their assignments.²⁸³ As has been previously stated, these officers were to be found usually in service units and in organizations having no colored commissioned personnel.

Did Northerners or Southerners make better officers of Negro troops? This question, when put to division, regimental, and battalion commanders, usually brought the answer: geographical background makes little difference. Some commanders thought initially Southerners had the advantage, because they were aware of the Negroes' shortcomings, and consequently were not thrown off balance by their poor showing in training; moreover, they were less apt to be fooled by plausible excuses and eloquent lip service than were men of Northern upbringing. But this advantage was sometimes an offset -- particularly in the cases of units having an admixture of Northern Negroes -- by the insistence of some Southerners on addressing their men as "boys" and clinging to other practices to which they were habituated in civilian life but which were offensive to soldiers. Northern officers avoided this error, but they sometimes make the mistake, in their earnest desire "to give the underdog his due," of being overindulgent toward the Negroes and of being hoodwinked by their adroitness at substituting excuses for work.²⁸⁴

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After a few months' experience such differences as existed initially between Northern and Southern officers usually disappeared. Sometimes Northern Negroes who raised objections to their officers on grounds of their Southern origin learned to their surprise that they were protesting against leaders born and reared in their own part of the country.²⁸⁵

In the long run it was found that success in command of Negro troops rested mainly on such qualities as initiative, tact, common sense, emotional stability, integrity, and physical stamina, and that over possession of these geography had little if any control.

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Chapter VI

THE VENEREAL PROBLEM

The prevalence of venereal disease among Negroes was one of the most serious problems confronted by those who had the responsibility of training them. The annual rate per thousand of venereal cases among colored troops at Ft. Huachuca in 1942 was as follows:²⁸⁶

| | | | | | |
|----------|-----|--------|-----|-----------|-----|
| January | 140 | May | 188 | September | 94 |
| February | 171 | June | 141 | October | 168 |
| March | 361 | July | 102 | November | 103 |
| April | 280 | August | 112 | December | 118 |

In February 1944 the War Department reported that the venereal disease rate of Negro troops consistently had been eight to ten times that of the whites,²⁸⁷ and a study prepared in Headquarters, Army Service Forces, showed that Negro troops representing 11 percent of the total strength of the Army accounted for about half of all the venereal disease in the Army in 1943.²⁸⁸ The syphilis rate among Negro soldiers was about fifteen times that for whites.²⁸⁹

The high occurrence of venereal infection among Negroes was attributable to several factors. First was a widespread ignorance of the cause of the diseases. Many Negroes, particularly those from the rural South, thought that infection of the genital organs resulted from "strain" or "haircut" in sexual intercourse. Second was persistent refusal of many Negroes to take the diseases seriously; gonorrhea was thought to be no worse than a "cold," and was regarded as lightly as a toothache. Third was a lack of a strong moral consciousness with reference to sexual relations.²⁹⁰

The Army's task in coping with the venereal problem was fivefold: (1) to cure the cases contracted prior to induction, (2) to disabuse colored soldiers of erroneous ideas of the cause and seriousness of venereal disease, (3) to educate recruits in methods of preventing venereal infection, (4) to see that these methods were effectuated, and (5) to eliminate as far as possible civilian sources of infection.²⁹¹

In the Army Ground Force units various means were used to combat the venereal menace. Instruction as to the character and the danger of infection and ways of avoiding it had high priority. Most educational programs included frequent lectures, moving pictures, film strips, and conspicuous display of realistic posters.²⁹²

A War Department directive of 28 February 1944 required the appointment in each Negro company or similar unit of a venereal control officer with noncommissioned assistants. Company venereal control officers were to have frequent conferences with the station medical venereal disease control officer on prevention and control of venereal infection. Where practicable a colored medical officer was to be appointed at posts having as many as five thousand Negro troops, to act as assistant to the station medical venereal control officer. The colored officer's principal duties were the direction of venereal disease education and the supervision of prophylactic facilities for Negro personnel. The station medical venereal disease control officer was to give a course of instruction for all company venereal disease control officers and noncommissioned officers, and these in turn were to indoctrinate their men, by simple procedures, in small groups not exceeding six persons. The War Department order stressed command responsibility for the venereal problem. "Unless extenuating circumstances exist," the directive stated, "a high incidence of venereal disease in a command shall be regarded as indicative of a lack of efficiency on the part of the commander concerned."²⁹³ An earlier War Department order required provision of prophylactic kits

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for individual soldiers from company funds.²⁹⁴ In October 1944 policy was changed to provide for issuance of prophylactic items, without reimbursement like any other expendable article of supply, by medical supply officers.²⁹⁵

In many instances the AGF units exceeded War Department requirements for prevention and control of venereal disease. Army Regulations forbade punishing a soldier for failure to take prophylactic treatment, but they also stated that the individual who exposed himself to the risk of venereal infection would utilize such preventive measures as his commanding officer made available.²⁹⁶ Some unit commanders used the latter provision to circumvent the former. For instance, the 92d Division insisted that soldiers going to Nogales, Mexico, on passes utilize facilities made available at prophylactic stations along the border. If they failed to do so and later turned up with a venereal disease they were punished, not on the charge of refusal to use prophylactic facilities but for disobeying the order requiring them to take prophylactic treatment when exposed.²⁹⁷

Army Regulations also forbade compelling a soldier to avail himself when going on pass of the prophylactic kits (condom and ointment) which the commanding officer placed at his disposal, but "uncooperative" soldiers not infrequently found it difficult to obtain permission to leave camp.²⁹⁸

It was not uncommon for unit commanders to quarantine soldiers who become infected with venereal diseases. Ostensibly this was to prevent exposing innocent comrades to germs and to facilitate treatment but the effect of the policy, if not the intent, was punitive. Most soldiers found isolation in a tent for thirty days to be very disagreeable.²⁹⁹

Prevention of infection during furloughs and passes was one of the most difficult aspects of the venereal problem. Exposure was apt to be frequent at such times. Soldiers often failed to take an adequate supply of condoms. During furlough periods, especially, pressure to take prophylactic treatment after exposure was relaxed.³⁰⁰

Officers strove mightily to indoctrinate the soldier before he departed from camp. In the 92d Division each man going on pass or furlough was put through this routine before he left camp: (1) Examination to see that there was no infection; (2) instruction by movie or lecture in the importance and methods of preventing venereal disease; (3) orientation as to location of prophylactic stations in areas to be visited; and (4) insistence that an ample supply of venereal kits be taken. At a conveniently situated building near the railway station this program was repeated. On return from pass or furlough the soldier was given another medical examination.³⁰¹

A battalion commander who had considerable success in controlling venereal disease summarized his pass procedure thus:³⁰²

We have a standard form which lists the men going on pass at a given time. This list is sent over by the company to the dispensary -- a noncom takes it over and checks the men off. The dispensary checks to see that the men have condoms and sulfa tablets. As the men return from pass they are questioned at the dispensary to find out whether or not they have had sexual intercourse, and if so whether or not they took a prophylaxis within two hours. If they report that they have not had a prophylaxis since exposure they are treated at the dispensary. Generally we can take their word as to whether or not they have been exposed and taken the prescribed precautions. The dispensary reports to the company commander any men who do not sign in within the time specified by the list. All men who fail to sign in properly, through the dispensary, are subject to disciplinary action of the company commander.

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Commanders of colored units devoted special attention to recreational programs as an indirect means of combatting venereal infection. The Surgeon of the 92d Division in his report of May 1944 listed these facilities as being available to men of that organization: (1) six recreation buildings suitable for athletic contests, musicals, dramatic productions, and other diversions; (2) four moving picture theaters in the division area, one in the service command area, and one in the adjacent town of Fry, each of which ran two programs daily plus a matinee on Sunday; (3) a bowling alley in the division area; (4) football field; (5) baseball field; (6) a basketball court in each battalion area; (7) mass athletics in all unit training schedules; (8) a large USO building in Fry; (9) a large Field House in the division area; (10) two large Enlisted Men's Service Clubs and a Noncommissioned Officers Club; (11) camp shows sponsored by the USO; and (12) a large swimming pool (under construction).³⁰³

The greatest drawback to the recreational program at Huachuca, as in other camps far removed from large colored population centers, was the inability to secure anything like an adequate number of women as partners for camp dances. At one dance held during the sojourn at Huachuca of the 93d Division there were about 1,000 men and only 5 girls.³⁰⁴

Another means used by some commanders to cope with the venereal problem was to persuade the men to put their money in allotments and jewelry, or even to waste it in gambling, before they had an opportunity to spend it on women of easy virtue.³⁰⁵

The colonel of a Negro antiaircraft regiment, who in a six-month period reduced venereal disease cases in his unit from 98 to 10, described his methods as follows:³⁰⁶

By War Department policy we are not allowed to punish a man for contracting a venereal disease. However, a non-com is busted at once - he knows it is coming and generally has his chevrons off before the order is out. But a funny thing, no non-com get venereals anymore. We restrict V.D.'s after their return from the hospital but it is purely for medical reasons. It is only common justice to all, that they should make up the training that they have missed, and especially the fatigue details that were missed. Also a V.D. case, only to protect himself, must have an allotment, full amount of insurance, and to show his faith must take out a War Bond. Some may call this punishment with fine. We call it showing his patriotism and willingness to become a trained soldier and to pull his weight. Money of course is at the root of a great deal of our trouble so we explore every possible alley where we can get the soldier to spend it - on anything but rum, women and venereal. For awhile I was permitted to send my PX Officer to countries around here to pick up luxury goods. For three months he brought back at least \$10,000 worth of jewelry, watches and such each month. Men bought it before it hit the counters. Each month I had \$10,000 out of the soldiers' pay and there was not a single case of venereal disease in it. It was out of circulation. It was a Godsend but was finally stopped by Sector Headquarters. We encouraged gambling in order to segregate the money. I did encourage betting on athletic contests but since we win everything I found that I was cutting my own throat so now we are trying to stop that. We have active sales in our Post Exchange. We had an insurance campaign all based on the need of having insurance but it takes a sizeable chunk of the free money away from the man and from the venereal standpoint (which was never mentioned) it was perfect. Every man was sold insurance. The money spent on \$16,266,500 worth of insurance does not have a single venereal case in it.

Most commanders of Negro organization followed the practice of citing units in official publications that had no venereal cases for a week or some other specified period of time. Units that had unusually high venereal rates were published in

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"black lists." The 92d Division published a weekly Venereal Disease Bulletin which kept the soldiers informed as to the current venereal rate of the Division as compared to the rate in the Army as a whole, announced the black list, warned of "Hot Spots" -- i.e., localities where infected prostitutes were reported to be hanging out -- and gave common-sense advice on venereal dangers. The issue of 23 May 1944 carried this counsel:³⁰⁷

Beware of all prostitutes and pick ups, who are conducting their business in cars. To have sex contacts under such conditions is inviting trouble, because of the physical impossibility of maintaining cleanliness ... All soldiers should clearly understand that every woman who is loose is likely to be diseased whether she takes money for her services or not. You can be certain that the great majority of women who do business for money are infected with one or more of these diseases and highly dangerous to you ... It is a sad bargain to trade your case and your fun in exchange for venereal disease that may ruin your life.

Unit commanders, in accordance with Army Regulations, maintained close liaison with post medical officers and with public health authorities in an effort to prevent soldiers from coming in contact with prostitutes. Places of unsavory reputation were commonly placed "off limits." But not all communities cooperated heartily in efforts to suppress vice. Citizens of towns located near large Negro camps, in some instances, appeared to be apprehensive that the driving out of prostitutes would lead to criminal attacks on their wives and daughters. It seems probable also that there were tie-ups in some cases between vice rings and local politicians. Vice control was accentuated by the ingeniousness of some of the nymphes du paye in eluding the long arm of the law. In one town prostitutes allegedly confused the authorities by becoming the wives of soldiers and thus acquiring a visible means of support -- without any apparent change of pace in their illicit activities.³⁰⁸

At Ft. Huachuca a peculiarly difficult situation caused military officials, in collaboration with civilian authorities, to resort for a time to a scheme of controlled prostitution. This post was stationed in a sparsely settled portion of Arizona. The closest towns were from forty to sixty miles distant and none of them had a Negro colony.³⁰⁹

As Ft. Huachuca expanded a squalid village named Fry, composed largely of Negro prostitutes, grew up just outside the post. These prostitutes were practically the only Negro females with whom the troops could associate. On paydays long lines of soldiers could be seen in front of the numerous huts bordering the streets of Fry awaiting the opportunity to invest their three dollars.³¹⁰

Faced with a choice of evacuating the women in Fry entirely or instituting a system of medical regulation, the authorities decided on the latter. The prostitutes and their shacks were moved to a fenced inclosure known as the Hook. Only soldiers were admitted to the Hook; all were examined before entering and given treatment on leaving at a prophylactic station located near the gate. It was assumed that everyone who entered was exposed. Some men evidently went in with the idea of "just lookin' around" but they usually changed their minds when scantily attired girls staged voluptuous pantomimes in front of the huts. On one night following payday the 150 prostitutes accommodated over 2,000 customers.³¹¹

The women in the Hook were given weekly medical inspections by a civilian physician and the post venereal control officer. Each prostitute was required to have an identification card.³¹²

This experiment in controlled prostitution led to a definite lowering of the venereal rate in units stationed at Ft. Huachuca. But various civilian organizations

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objected to the army sponsoring a red light establishment, and the project was discontinued. Some of the prostitutes were moved from Fry, and the Hook was placed off limits.³¹³

The venereal trend of a colored division in training is depicted in the accompanying chart prepared by the Surgeon of the 92d Division. The venereal curve must be interpreted cautiously, because it was affected by many variables and intangibles. But it is significant that the rapid increase of infection in May and June 1943 came in the wake of removal of the Division to Ft. Huachuca at a time when prostitution was subjected to little regulation, and the sharp decline in the summer of 1943 followed resumption in July of segregation of "scarlet women" in the Hook and controlled prostitution. The high peak of April and May 1944 came after a post-maneuver bivouac in a Louisiana community where prostitutes were under little control and was coeval with a marked stepping up of furloughs in anticipation of overseas movement. The all-time low of February 1944 accompanied a period of intensive training in the field, when opportunities for exposure were reduced to a minimum.

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Chapter VII

RIOTS AND RACIAL DISTURBANCES

Tension between Negroes and whites often erupted into incidents of violence. Some of the outbreaks were post affairs, involving only military personnel. Others extended beyond camp limits to towns and cities and were participated in by civilians of both races.

There was a tendency for outbreaks to run in cycles. In the fall of 1941 eruptions took place at Ft. Bragg, N. C., Camp Davis, N. C., Gurdon, Ark., and Ft. Benning, Ga. Another series of incidents occurred in the early months of 1942. The first of these was a riot at Alexandria, La., in January, involving several hundred soldiers and civilians. It was precipitated by a white policeman clubbing a colored soldier in front of a theater in the Negro section of town.³¹⁴ Another disturbance occurred in March 1942, at Little Rock, Ark. A civilian patrolman, assisting military policemen subdue a drunken colored private, struck him with a club causing his head to bleed. While the soldier's wounds were being bandaged, a large crowd of Negroes -- soldiers and civilians -- assembled. A colored sergeant in upbraiding the military policemen for permitting a soldier to be thus abused became so troublesome that he also was arrested. A scuffle ensued between the sergeant and the military police, and the crowd closed in, threatening to deliver the prisoners from their custodians. A civilian patrolman volunteered to take the sergeant to a military vehicle while the military police held back the crowd. A tussle developed during which the patrolman and the sergeant fell to the ground, with the latter on top. One of the military police clubbed the sergeant, and as he rolled over in a daze the policeman got up and fired four shots into his body, killing him instantly. The crowd moved back after the shooting, but for several days feeling was tense among both colored civilians and soldiers, who felt "that under similar circumstances, a white soldier would not have been killed."³¹⁵

Early in April 1942 an altercation at Ft. Dix, N. J., over the use of a telephone culminated in a gunfight between white military police and Negro soldiers. One of the military police and two Negro soldiers were killed.³¹⁶

For several months there were no major flare-ups in colored units assigned to the Army Ground Forces. But on Thanksgiving night, 1942, Negro troops of the 364th Infantry Regiment staged a riot in Phoenix, Ariz. This affair seems to have originated in a run-in between colored soldiers and Negro military police over a Negro woman. During the argument an MP shot one of the colored soldiers in the leg. The wounded man raised a terrific howl, and a fight was on. Colored soldiers in camp near by heard about the incident, broke into the supply room for weapons, boarded an army truck, and rushed to the succor of their comrades in the city. A white captain, assisted by white military police and civilian patrolmen, attempted to suppress the disturbance. The captain was killed by a Negro soldier. A white patrolman shot and killed the Negro. During the melee a colored spectator was killed as he sat in a car.³¹⁷

After a period of comparative calm, there was another series of outbreaks, beginning in May 1943, with small-scale encounters between white and colored soldiers in antiaircraft units at Ft. Bliss.³¹⁸ In the latter part of May the situation at Camp Van Dorn, Miss., became quite critical. Members of the 364th Infantry Regiment, recently transferred from Phoenix, alarmed the citizens of near-by Centerville, by boasting of their intention to take over the town, the camp, and the state of Mississippi. On Saturday night, 29 May, a number of men from the regiment paraded the streets of Centerville in formation, using abusive and indecent language. Local police and deputized citizens armed with shotguns arrested about seventy-five of the Negroes

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and turned them over to the military police. The next day Private William Walker was stopped just outside the reservation by an MP for being improperly dressed. Walker attacked the MP. The county sheriff came along during the scuffle and was threatened by Walker. The sheriff shot and killed the soldier. This enraged the men in camp. One company of the regiment broke into a supply room and got rifles. A crowd of several hundred collected near the regimental post exchange. A riot squad of military police fired into the crowd, wound a private. The regimental commander and chaplain arrived at this time, and the former quieted the rioters with a speech, after which he ordered them to their area for confinement. During the next few days there were a number of instances of attack on white soldiers who passed the area, and much offensive shouting.³¹⁹ As a result of this and earlier outbreaks, steps were taken to expedite movement of the 364th Regiment from the United States.³²⁰

The affair at Camp Stewart, Ga., in June 1943, provides the profile of a typical outbreak.³²¹ At the time of the disturbance there were about 15,000 Negroes stationed at Stewart. Recreational facilities in the colored portion of the camp were grossly inadequate. The nearest towns having any considerable population were Savannah, 42 miles from camp; Waycross, 60 miles; Brunswick, 66 miles; and Statesboro, 40 miles. Limited transportation facilities made these towns inaccessible to the great majority of Negro soldiers.

No serious trouble had arisen before the spring of 1943. At that time two groups of Negro soldiers arrived at camp whose presence greatly influenced the attitude of other colored troops. One of these groups was the 100th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. Over half the members of this unit were Southerners, but their original ideas of race had been changed by association with comrades from the North and by a year of service in Sault Ste. Marie on the Canadian border, at which place they had intermingled with the whites freely, and some of them had married white women. Transfer of the unit to Georgia placed the soldiers in contact with a social system which most of them regarded as intolerable. Some of them boasted that they were going to break down the local barriers of racial prejudice. Their stories of equality in Canada and their success in building up a reputation for toughness at Stewart tended to make them popular champions among other Negro troops. Their influence was diffused by the breaking up of the 100th Regiment and the dispersion of its members among other units at Stewart.

The other provocative element was a group of soldiers of the 369th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, originally from New York, who had served in Hawaii where they had been well treated by the natives and the nonbelligerent Japanese. When subjected to Georgia conventions and the unpleasant conditions at Camp Stewart these soldiers became disgruntled. Some of them raised the question whether the Japanese would not treat them better than the Georgians. Resentment was sharpened by designation of certain camp latrines and other facilities as "white only," in violation of War Department policies.

The discontented Negroes wrote letters of protest to their friends in the North. Some of the complaints fell into the hands of colored newspapermen who used them as grist for exaggerated and inflammatory articles about "the hell-hole of Georgia." Copies of the Chicago Defender, The Afro-American, the Pittsburgh Courier, and other papers featuring these articles circulated at Stewart and added fuel to the smouldering fire of resentment.

Negro officers contributed to the unrest by manifestations of sympathy for aggrieved soldiers. They also challenged the existing order of things by attending camp theaters and exchanges in white areas contrary to the customs of the Post. Discontent of the officers was aggravated by the fact that many of them had served for long periods without promotion, under white executives who had been advanced with comparative expedition.

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The influence of colored noncoms was generally unsalutary. A special agent who investigated conditions at Stewart reported: "It is difficult for a junior non-commissioned officer to get a Private to carry out his order. Usually if he can't get one Private to carry out the order he will get another A lot of the NCO's gamble, tease, drink, and associate freely and equally with the Privates, so much so that they are unable to gain respect from them, and lose their ability to discipline and control them."322

Some of the white officers contributed to the discontent by expressing their distaste for Camp Stewart and an earnest desire to leave the state of Georgia.

The presence of white military policemen among them was also an irritant to the Negroes. Whether justifiably or not, colored soldiers at Stewart, and in general, regarded white military policemen as more cruel and oppressive than those of their own race. Resentment at Stewart was heightened considerably by reports that white military police used a machine gun to disperse a crowd that had assembled outside a Negro service club.

For several weeks in the late spring the Negroes surreptitiously collected weapons and ammunition. It seems likely that supply sergeants in some instances permitted the soldiers to obtain arms and later made up the tale that the weapons were taken by force.

Emotions were heightened from time to time by minor interracial incidents in and out of camp and by rumors of mistreatment and abuse.

On 9 June 1943 the Negro portion of camp was electrified by a rumor that white soldiers had raped and murdered a colored woman and killed her soldier husband. One version of the report was that the assailants were white military police. It mattered little that the rumor in all its versions was false. About 9:30 that evening a mob of approximately one hundred colored soldiers, some with guns, assembled in the east wing of the camp. As officers attempted to disperse the group a wild shot was fired from the mob and military police were called. Excitement mounted and the crowd increased. During the next half-hour some of the Negroes raided supply rooms for ammunition, rifles, and machine guns, while others took to the woods in fright. Confusion was heightened by the unauthorized sounding of a gas alarm.

About ten o'clock an MP vehicle approached the scene of disturbance and received a heavy fusillade from elements of the 458th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. Four military police were wounded. This initiated a general firing in the 458th and other areas which lasted for two hours. Much of the shooting was in the air, but several vehicles were fired on and a civilian bus driver was wounded.

Just before midnight the MP detail was fired on while marching across a firebreak and one of the members was killed. The military police fired one shot in return; this and two others, one of which was accidental, were the only shots fired by the military police during the entire melee. It was estimated that the rioters fired from 600 to 800 rounds.

Shortly after midnight two white battalions came to the area in half tracks and the firing ceased.

A board of officers investigated the riot, and courts-martial meted out punishment to some of the ring leaders. The board's recommendation to disband the 458th Battalion, principal offender in the affair, was overruled because the unit had already been alerted for overseas movement, but steps were taken quietly to reduce the number of Negro troops at Camp Stewart to about five thousand.323

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There were no more outbreaks at Camp Stewart, but a special agent who served as a private in one of the colored units there for several weeks after the riot reported:³²⁴

The attitude of most of the Colored soldiers was that the Riot showed the whites that the Negro soldiers would not take just any kind of treatment. The majority of them seem(ed) to feel that they had gotten away with the Riot ... none of the punitive measures taken as a result of the Riot had any tendency to discourage further riots.

In September 1943 there were minor outbreaks among colored troops at Camp Tyson, Tenn. Following these incidents the racial situation in the Army Ground Forces settled down to a long period of comparative calm. In the summer of 1944 there were strong protests from Southern civilians, particularly from political leaders, against a War Department order of 8 July prohibiting exclusion of Negroes from any post theater or exchange, and forbidding their restriction to certain sections of government busses "either on or off a post, camp, or station, regardless of local civilian customs."³²⁶ An Alabama Congressman denounced this action as showing less regard by the War Department for Southern usages than for the customs of foreign countries. American soldiers in foreign countries were required to comply as far as possible with local customs, he said, but the War Department's nonsegregation ruling proposed to set aside Southern state laws and traditions which had existed for generations.³²⁷ Some Southerners regarded the War Department action as a bid on the part of the administration for Negro support in the forthcoming election.³²⁸

There was some apprehension among the War Department staff that the antisegregation pronouncement might provoke serious new "incidents," but these did not materialize.

In August 1944 there was a riot among Army Service Troops stationed at Camp Claiborne, La.,³²⁹ and in October 1944 soldiers of the 379th Quartermaster Truck Company at Camp Shelby, Miss., manhandled white company officers, beat an assistant post exchange manager, and repeatedly flouted orders of their superiors; interposition of the commanding general of the division to which this unit was attached was required to quell the disturbance.³³⁰ Following these and other disorders of less serious character, the racial situation again settled down to a state of comparative calm.³³¹

Racial disturbances of World War II tended to follow a fairly uniform pattern. Trouble usually began with a real or fancied incident of discrimination or abuse; disaffection was aggravated by circulation of gossip and rumor; a minor incident then precipitated a general outbreak.

The factors which produced the outbreaks were numerous and complex. Inadequacy of transportation facilities and of opportunities for recreation, particularly on week ends, was undoubtedly a source of much unrest among colored troops. In the South, Negro troops were often unable to secure seats on commercial busses because of the higher priority of white passengers. The government provided vehicles in some cases, but rarely in numbers adequate to demands. Even when colored soldiers were able to secure transportation, there was frequently no suitable place for them to go. Towns near the camps were usually too small to accommodate large crowds of soldiers, and entertainment facilities consisted mainly of dilapidated beer dispensaries, gambling dens, theaters, "juke joints," and bawdy houses, all of which were greatly overcrowded. Most soldiers who went to town seeking recreation were reduced to the necessity of roaming the streets. The lack of diversion made them moody and irritable. Competition for such entertainment as existed often produced fights. This in turn led to intervention by "the law" and the situation was ripe for a riot.³³²

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The character of "the law" increased the tension, for in most Southern towns the police force consisted in part at least of ignorant, tactless, underpaid men drawn from the stratum of society which had the strongest race prejudice. These qualities combined with fear in some instances to make the law enforcers unduly quick with club and bun.³³³

A basic cause of racial disturbance was the conflicting view of whites and Negroes as to the latter's place in society. The fear and antipathy with which Southern whites regarded colored soldiers is revealed by the following letter which a Louisiana woman wrote to her congressman during the period when the 93d Division was maneuvering in the vicinity of her home.³³⁴

I am writing you hoping you can help us in a matter of which is troubling us very much Mr. Allen. We are patriotic and want to help win this war and hate to complain of anything the Government does but having all these Negroes placed in our rural community is a problem. They are rude and brazen and indecent. We haven't but a few men folks left in our community here (in Sabine Parish) and the women aren't safe alone. They curse, use any kind of bad language and there is a swimming hole in view of several families and they go there perfectly nude and come in the yards at night without permission. I'm not saying they are all this type but there are several thousand in our community and it is serious with us. A little girl about 11 years old was hit on the head and someone (we suppose was a Negro soldier) was trying to carry her out of the house when her parents woke up. She was in bed with her father when it happened. Some of the children had to stay out of school on the account of having to pass thru the camps to catch the bus and Mr. Allen if there is anything that can be done about this we will appreciate it so much. Is there no other way to train them? Please give this your consideration.

Many Southerners strongly opposed the stationing of colored units in their midst. A Texas mayor, for instance, on hearing that several thousand Negroes were to be brought to a near-by camp, asked his congressman to inform the President that he would personally shoot the first colored soldier who came to town.³³⁵ Southerners were especially resentful of colored officers, because it was feared that the authority and prestige which attached to military rank might promote ideas of social equality. In May 1942 the Mississippi congressional delegation entered a joint petition that no Negro officers be stationed in Mississippi.³³⁶

Over against the Southern conviction that colored soldiers, especially those from the North, were "uppity," boisterous, rapacious, trouble-bent, and in general a menace to the traditional order of life, was a feeling equally strong among Negro troops hailing from the country north of the Mason-Dixon line that Southern ideas and customs of race were cruel, oppressive, and more akin to Nazidom than to democracy.³³⁷

The conflict between Southerners' and Northerners' viewpoints on race was intensified by a number of factors. One of these was the crowding of the two races together on busses and trains and in all types of public places. The usual niceties of segregation were difficult to maintain under these conditions, and tired people, struggling for space and service, were unduly sensitive about their respective "rights."

Another aggravating influence was the belief by many Southerners that the Negroes and their white friends in the North were trying to use the war as a wedge to pry open the doors of social equality. They found support for this view in the War Department's drive against segregation on military posts.

Cleavage was also sharpened by conviction of the Negroes that it was illogical for them to submit to a discriminatory social system at home while preparing to fight for the four freedoms overseas.³³⁸

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But the influence of these factors was overshadowed by that of the Negro press, which agitated steadily for the overthrow of segregation within the army and out of the army. Stories of mistreatment of colored troops were given in the boldest headlines, and often written up in provocative, sensational style. There was apparently little effort to distinguish between fact and rumor. Minor incidents of interracial friction were often played up as major instances of abuse and persecution. Accounts of racial disturbances were almost always exaggerated.³³⁹ An idea of the line taken by most of these newspapers may be obtained from the Pittsburgh Courier's account of the Ft. Bragg disturbance of August 1941. An editorial headed "Hitlerism at Home" denounced the "Nazi-like persecution" of colored soldiers. "Here were men serving their country in time of stress and in their country's uniform," declared the editor, "being baited, bullied, humiliated, beaten, and in one instance killed with cruel, cold and sadistic calculation by white men in the same uniform detailed to maintain law and order." "It is time to fix the blame where it belongs, on the War Department," he continued. "With craven spirit the War Department has bowed from the beginning of the National emergency to the doctrine of white supremacy and racial separation with a zeal that Dr. Joseph Goebbels would regard as commendable."³⁴⁰ Even the comic strips were invoked as inflammatory agents, as witness the accompanying portrayal of an episode in the career of the Chicago Defender's "Speed Jaxon."³⁴¹

The War Department tried by persuasion and gestures of good will to curb the subversiveness of the Negro press, but with only partial success.³⁴² Some commanders on their own initiative barred the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier from their units.³⁴³

The Army Ground Forces took the position that racial disturbances were attributable primarily to poor leadership. In June 1942 General McNair wrote the War Department: "Competent commanders can forestall racial difficulties by firm discipline, strenuous training programs, just treatment, and wholesome recreation."³⁴⁴ Following a disturbance in May 1943, he made this significant observation:³⁴⁵

It is emphasized that matters of this kind are primary functions of command. While the principal function of a troop commander under present conditions is training, he must concern himself adequately with discipline and welfare. It is of course important that there be no discrimination against Negro troops in the matter of privileges and accommodations provided. It is equally important that there be no discrimination in favor of colored troops by way of compromised disciplinary standards. Under no circumstances can there be a command attitude which makes allowances for the improper conduct of colored soldiers. The colored soldier, while of lower intelligence than the white soldier, can and must be a disciplined soldier. The difficulties in connection with colored troops must be handled firmly, legally, and without compromising standards.

Some commanders in the field regarded the formula -- if you have the right kind of leadership you will not have racial outbreaks -- as having too much of an armchair slant. Their attitude was that, given certain conditions -- such as placing a unit composed of racially sensitive Northern Negroes in the deep rural South, with limitations of transportation and recreation -- the most effective command may not be able to forestall a racial flare-up.³⁴⁶

The total experience of the Army Ground Forces indicated that the following measures were of greatest efficacy in preventing racial disturbances: (1) filling command positions in colored units with strong leaders -- officers who combined outstanding qualities of command with an intimate knowledge of Negro troops; (2) a generous program of camp recreation including movies, sports, and music; (3) stationing of Negro troops near towns having a sufficiently large colored population to "absorb" them on week ends and provision of ample facilities for transporting troops from camp to towns;

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(4) programs of training sufficiently strenuous to prevent accumulation of excessive energy; (5) use of colored rather than white military police, and the sending of large numbers of military police to towns frequented by colored troops, particularly on week ends following payday; and (6) a rigid system for safeguarding weapons and ammunition. The Commanding General of the 92d Division, who reported considerable success with the policy regarding military police, had a double quota of military police, all of whom were husky Negroes ranging in height from 6 feet to 6 feet, 6 inches. Said this commander of the value of colored military police in forestalling difficulty: "If trouble starts brewing and a flock of white MP's appear, the Negro's resentment will be aroused. If the colored MP's show up, the Negro troublemakers will more than likely decide to move on."³⁴⁷

There was much pressure from civilians and station commanders to move colored units, particularly the more troublesome ones, every time a threat of disturbance appeared on the horizon. This pressure was consistently and strongly resisted by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. It was felt that one move would lead to requests for others, and that the prestige of the Army would suffer from repeated concessions to community whims and fears. Moreover, it was deemed better to meet each crisis squarely and on the spot than to evade it by shifting units about from one place to another.³⁴⁸

For the fundamental problem underlying most racial disturbances, namely the conflicting concept of whites and blacks as to the Negroes' place in the social pattern, the Army Ground Forces found no solution. Distribution of intelligence and skills required the mixing of Southern and Northern Negroes in the same units, and the War Department felt that consideration of climate necessitated the stationing of most Negro units in the country below the Mason-Dixon line. It was impossible, therefore, to avoid encamping Northern Negroes in Southern communities and thus aggravating racial discord by placing extreme antagonists at each other's throats. The problem posed by this situation was older and deeper than the national emergency. Its solution lay with society at large and not primarily with the armed forces.

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Chapter VIII

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL LESSONS LEARNED

The principal lessons learned by Army Ground Forces in the training of Negro troops may be summarized as follows:

1. The training of Negro troops, owing to their poor educational and technical background, invariably required more time than that allotted in regular training schedules. For colored units formed in World War II, it was found desirable to extend training periods for as much as 50 to 100 percent. Experience showed that it was better to prescribe longer training periods as general policy than to make extensions piecemeal as training progressed.

2. Organization of Negroes into units as large as divisions increased problems of training and employment.

a. It was difficult to qualify enough men for the technical positions in a division, particularly in such fields as communications, artillery survey, and fire control.

b. There was not enough colored leadership material in a division to fill non-commissioned officer positions with qualified personnel, let alone provide capable platoon and company commanders.

c. Divisional organization did not conduce to close association in training of colored and white units; hence Negroes in divisions could not conveniently observe troops who had attained greater proficiency than themselves; in short, they were without example of desired standards.

d. The number of communities capable of absorbing colored personnel "in division doses" on week ends was limited.

e. Theater demands for Negro divisions was not as great as for smaller units.

3. White officers deteriorated after long service with Negro troops. Field commanders of colored units deemed rotation imperative after not more than two years service.

4. Assignment of white and colored officers to the same units proved undesirable. Regardless of pressure from above, white officers as a rule avoided intimate association with colored officers, and this fact was resented by Negroes. Moreover, the better background of white officers resulted in their being promoted more rapidly than their colored associates, and this led to ill-feeling and charges of discrimination on the part of the latter. In view of the retarded development of the colored race, the general run of Negro officers could not compete on equal terms with the average white officer, and when such competition was enforced by assignment to the same unit, the inevitable result was a "chip-on-the-shoulder" complex and a sense of frustration on the part of the Negroes.

5. Colored infantry units having Negro officers were greatly inferior both in training and in combat to those having white officers. The disparity was not so great in other kinds of units. In some instances, colored artillery, engineer, and service units officered by Negroes performed acceptably in theaters of operations.

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6. Difficulties would have been less formidable if Negroes had been screened at induction to the extent necessary to give colored units about the same mental profile as the average white units. This would have been particularly desirable in the case of combat units.

7. A cadre drawn from Regular Army sources was a great asset to the training of a colored unit. Experience indicated the desirability of the Regular Army nucleus being a generous one, to include all noncommissioned officers.

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NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. "Distribution of Negro Soldiers." Mimeographed paper (undated, but about 1 Oct 41) in Negro Troop Data Notebook in possession of Dr Walter L. Wright, Chief Historian, WDGS.
2. Statement of Lt Col F. Bacon, AGF G-3 Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 16 Sep 44.
3. (1) "National Guard Troops (Colored)," typed document (undated, but about 1 Sep 41) in Dr Wright's Negro Troop Data Notebook. (2) Data from unit cards in files of AGF G-3 Sec, Mobilization Div.
4. Memo (S) of Lt Col Ray Adams, WDGS, to WD G-3, 24 Aug 42, sub: Colored Tr Situation at Ft Custer. 319.1/112 (S).
5. (1) WD ltr AG 291.21(10-9-40)M-A-M to CGs, 16 Oct 40, sub: War Department Policy in Regard to Negroes. 314.7(AGF Hist). (2) The basis actually adopted was not the percentage of Negroes in the national population (9.8) but the percentage of Negroes among men registering for the draft (10.6). WD Gen Council Min (S), 24 Mar 42.
6. (1) WD ltr AG 291.21(10-9-40)M-A-M to CGs, 16 Oct 40, sub: War Department Policy in Regard to Negroes. 314.7(AGF Hist). (2) Personal ltr, Gen G. C. Marshall to Senator H. C. Lodge, 27 Sep 40. Dr Wright's Negro Troop Data Notebook.
7. Time Magazine, 10 Jul 44, p 65.
8. Information furnished by WD AGO Opns Br, Orgn and Directory Sec.
9. AGF memo (C) to CofS USA, 26 Mar 42, sub: AGF Units as of 23 Mar 42. 3 320.2/1(AGF) (C). (2) Information compiled from AGF files 319.26(WDC) (R). 319.26(EDC) (R), and 319.26(WDC) (C).
10. Information furnished by AGF G-3 Sec, Mobilization Div.
11. "Strength of AGF Units Having Colored Personnel as of August 21, 1942." Tabulation (C) filed in AGF Stat Sec.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. "Aggregate Actual Strengths of AGF as of 31 January 1943, Showing White and Colored Personnel." Tabulation (C) filed in AGF Stat Sec.
15. "Brief Outline of 92d Infantry Division," typed paper prepared by 92d Div Hq for Gen L. J. McNair, 31 May 44. 314.7 (AGF Hist).
16. "Organization and T/O's, Corps, Armies and Divisions." Compilation filed in AGF G-3 Sec, Mobilization Div.
17. (1) Memo (S) of Col H. J. Matchett, WD G-3 for Gen M. G. White, WD G-1, 29 Apr 43, sub: Informal Conference with the CofS. (2) WD memo (S) 370.5 WDGCT(20 May 43) to CG AGF, 9 Jul 43, sub: Air Base Security Bns. AGF Plans Sec files 320 TB (S). (3) History of AGF Study No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army. (4) The 1942 Troop Basis provided originally for four colored infantry divisions, the 92d, 93d, 105th,

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and 106th. At a War Department conference on 18 January 1942 it was decided to reduce the number of colored divisions to two and to increase the number of colored nondivisional units. See (a) undated paper (but early Jan 42) sub: Recommended Cadre Sources for New Div to be Activated in 42, and (b) Memo of Col Mark W Clark for CofS GHQ, 19 Jan 42, sub: Changes in TB 42. AGF Records, Mark W Clark file.

18. (1) WD ltr (C) AG 334.8(7-18-42)(OF-A, to CGs, 27 Aug 42, sub: Advisory Committee On Negro Tr Policies. 314.7(AGF Hist)(C). (2) Information obtained from survey of AGF G-1 Sec, Control Div, Negro Policy File (S); material now filed in 314.7(AGF Hist)(C).

19. Memo (draft)(S) (undated, but Nov 42) of Col W. W. Chamberlain, WDGS, for Brig Gen I. H. Edwards, WD G-3, sub: Negro Pers TB 43. WD G-3 "Negro File" (S). This draft memo was sent to Gen Floyd Parks, AGF CofS, for comment. See AGF memo (S) for WD G-3, 11 Nov 42, sub: Negro Pers in the TB. 322.999/1 (Cld Trs)(S).

20. AGF memo (S) for WD G-3, 11 Nov 42, sub: Negro Pers, TB 43. 322.999/1 (Cld Trs)(S). For evidence of Gen McNair's personal authorship of this document see M/S, CofS AGF to AGF Plans, 12 Nov 42. AGF Plans Sec File, No. 185/27 (TB 43).

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. (1) Memo (S) of Col E. W. Chamberlain, WD for Gen I. H. Edwards, WD G-3, 19 Dec 42, sub: Negro Units in the 43 TB. WD G-3 "Negro File" (S).

24. AGF ltr (S) to G-3 WD, 9 Mar 43, sub: 93d Div. Originally consulted in 322/1 (93d Div) (S); missing in records at date of final revision.

25. (1) Personal ltr of SW Stimson to Mr Charles H. Fearing, 10 Oct 41. Wright Negro Troop Data Notebook. (2) WD memo (C) WDCSA 291.21 (7-1-42) for Judge Hastie, 14 Jul 42, sub not given. Originally consulted in 291.2(Races) (C); missing in records at date of final revision.

26. AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 14 Jun 42, sub: Mvmt of Negro Pers. 291.2/5 (S).

27. For example, Australian opposition to Negro Troops. See ASF Rpt (S) SPINT, 26 Aug 1944, sub: US Trs in Australia and New Guinea." 314.7(AGF Hist).

28. Draft memo (S) of Col Winn, AGF Plans Sec, for CofS AGF, 12 Jun 43, sub: Utilization of Colored Manpower. Originally consulted in AGF G-1 Control Div Negro Policy File (S); document missing at date of final revision.

29. AGF Stat Sec Bull 45 (C), 17 Aug 43. Files of AGF Stat Sec.

30. Draft memo (S) of Col Winn to CofS AGF, 12 Jun 43, sub: Utilization of Colored Manpower. Originally consulted in AGF G-1 Control Div Negro Policy File (S); document missing at date of final revision.

31. AGF M/S (C), G-1 to CofS, 12 May 42, (sub not given). 291.2/11 (C).

32. See below, p 102 ff.

33. (1) Draft memo (S) of Col Winn to CofS, 12 Jun 43, sub: Utilization of Colored Manpower. Originally consulted in AGF G-1 Control Div Negro Policy File (S); document missing at date of final revision. (2) Draft memo of Lt Col W. S. Renshaw,

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AGF representative on McCloy Committee, for Brig Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Chairman, Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Colored Tr Policies, 30 Jun 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (C).

34. AGF M/S (C), G-1 to CofS AGF, 1 Jul 43, sub: Negro Tr Policy. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (C).

35. See below, pp 91 ff.

36. (1) Memo (S) of Col H. J. Matchett for Gen M. G. White, G-1 WD, 29 Apr 43, sub: Informal Conference with CofS. WD G-3 "Negro File" (S). (2) Memo of Col H. J. Matchett for Gen I. H. Edwards, G-3 WD, 4 May 43, sub: Informal Conference with CofS. Ibid.

37. WD memo (S) WDGCT 370.5 (20 May 43) for CG AGF, 9 Jul 43, sub: Air Base Security Bns. 322/6 (ABS) (S).

38. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 24 Aug 42, sub: Use of Negro Trs in Procht and Com-mando Serv. 322.999/11 (Cld Trs) (C).

39. Time Magazine, 10 Jul 44, p 65.

40. WD ltr (R) AG 322 (6 Nov 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M to CG A/B Center, 9 Nov 44, sub: Activation of 555th Procht Inf Bn. 321/228 (Inf) (R).

41. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 25 Aug 43, sub: Negro Units in 43 TB. 322.999/10 (Cld Trs) (S).

42. (1) Personal ltr of Lt Col Marcus H. Ray to Truman K. Gibson, 5 Sept 43. 322.999/277 (Cld Trs). (2) The Army Ground Forces requested permission to substitute white units in the Troop Basis for colored organizations that had been stripped, citing the recent War Department announcement that no Negro combat units were to be activated except those already authorized in the Troop Basis. But the War Department, influenced perhaps by the effect of such a move on Negro sentiment, ordered retention of the skeleton colored units in the Troop Basis. WD memo (S) WDGCT 370.5 (9 Jul 43) to CG AGF, 28 Aug 43, sub: Negro Units in 43 TB. 322.999/10 (Cld Trs) (S).

43. WD memo (S) WDGCT 291/21 (4 Mar 44) to ASW, 4 Mar 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower. WD G-3 files 291.21 (S).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Information furnished by AGF G-4, Task Force Div.

48. AGF Stat Sec Bull 55 (C), 23 Jan 44, sub: Comparative Str of AGF Units Having Negro Enl Pers. 320.2 (Comp Str) (C).

49. AGF Stat Sec Bull 69 (C), 24 Aug 44, sub: Comparative Str of AGF Units Having Negro Enl Pers, and AGF Stat Sec Rpt 3 (C), 17 Jan 45 and 19 Jul 45, (same sub). 320.2 (Comp Str) (C).

50. AGF Stat Sec Bulls 42-71 (c) and Rpt 3 (C), sub: Comparative Str of AGF Units Having Negro Enl Pers. Ibid.

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CHAPTER II

51. WD Pamphlet 20-6, Command of Negro Troops, p 3.
52. (1) Ibid. (2) Draft of proposed ASF Manual (R), "The Negro Soldier," p 2. Files of ASF Intelligence Div. The term "South" as used in this source includes 16 states.
53. Statement of Maj C. P. Mock, G-1 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.
54. (1) Personal ltr (C) of Gen Hodges to Gen McNair, 8 Apr 43. 322/1 (93d Div) (C). (2) AGF memo, G-1 for G-3, 31 Aug 43, sub: Rpt of Inspection. AGF G-3 file 333.1/44 (Inspections by AGF Staff Off).
55. (1) Command of Negro Troops, p 4. (2) Draft of proposed ASF Manual (R), "The Negro Soldier," p 28.
56. (1) These statements on the difficulty of training Negro personnel are based mainly on interviews by a member of the AGF Historical Section of officers serving with Negro units. Seventy-two officers at five stations, including Ft. Huachuca, were interviewed on a field trip, 13 June - 21 July 1944, and additional ones were interviewed at various times and places. Hereinafter this source will be cited as "Interviews of Officers." (2) Third Army ltr AG 333.3 GNMCC to CG AGF, 28 Oct 43, sub: Inspection Rpt 93d Inf Div. AGF G-3 Tng Div files 333.1 (93d Div). (3) III Corps ltr to CG Second Army, 20 Mar 43, sub: Rpt of MTP Tests of 92d Inf Div (less Arty). AGF G-3 Tng Div files 333.1 (92 Div).
57. Statement of CofS 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.
58. (1) 92d Div Tng Memo 63, 16 Sep 43. Files of 92d Div G-3 Sec. (2) A similar procedure was followed in the 93d Division. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman, CG 93d Div to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.
59. Interviews of officers.
60. (1) Ibid. (2) Statement of Col Stanley M. Prouty, formerly CofS 93d Div to AGF Hist Off, 22 Nov 44.
61. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 17 Sep 43, sub: Tng of Sub-Standard Individuals and Units. 353.01/68. (2) A change made in January 1944 required that a unit have 65 percent (instead of 45 percent) of its personnel in Classes IV and V as a condition for extension of training periods. Ibid.
62. Interviews of officers.
63. Personal ltr of Maj Gen Fred W. Miller to AGF Hist Off (undated, but about 15 Mar 45). 314.7 (AGF Hist).
64. AGF memo (S) to CofS USA, 4 Jan 43, sub: Negro Pers. 322.999/4 (Cld Trs) (S).
65. (1) M/S (S), Col Z. E. Lawhon to G-1 AGF, 23 Feb 45, sub: Meeting of the Committee on Negro Tr Policies. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 291.21 (1-4-43) to CG AGF, 5 Mar 43, sub: Negro Pers. 322.999/4 (Cld Trs) (S).
66. AGF memo (S) to G-3 WD, 9 Apr 43, sub: Negro Pers. 322.999/4 (Cld Trs) (S).

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67. (1) Draft memo (S) G-3 WD to CofS USA, 12 Mar 43, sub: Employment of Gr V Pers in the Army. 327.3/2 (Selective Serv) (S). (2) WD ltr (R) AG 291.6(4-28-43)OC-0 to CG 1st Serv Comd, 11 May 43, sub: Mental Induction Standards and Procedures. 353/32 (R). (3) WD ltr (R) AG 353 (10 Jun 43)OB-D-A to CGs AGF, ASF, and AAF, 17 Jun 43, sub: Sp Tng Units. 353/32 (R). (4) ASF ltr (R) SPX 353 (5-14-43)OB-D-SPGAE to CGs Serv Comd and Mil Dist of Washington, 28 May 43, sub: "Establishment of Sp Tng Units." 353/32 (R). (5) A modification of 25 Sep 43 prescribed 12 weeks as the maximum period for special training. See C 7, AR 615-28.

68. Data furnished by Maj C. F. Mock, G-1 92d Div, 19 Jun 44.

69. AGF memo, AG Classification Off to G-1, 22 Sep 42, sub: Pre-Induction Tng Course in Typing. 353.9/28.

70. Interviews of off.

71. Ibid.

72. AGF M/S (C), G-1 to DCoFS, 30 Dec 43, sub: Preparation of Comments for Gen Marshall. 314.7(AGF Hist)(C).

73. AGF memo, AG Classification Off for G-1, 22 Sep 42, sub: Pre-Induction Tng Course in Typing. 353.9/28.

74. Interviews of offs.

75. WD memo (S) WDGCT 291.21(4 Mar 44) for ASW, 4 Mar 44, sub: Utilization of Colored Pers. WD G-3 files, 291.21 (S).

76. AGF ltr to CG Fourth Army, 7 May 44, sub: Maint Inspection of Equip, Fourth Army Units, 26-29 Apr 44. 353.02/524 (AGF).

77. Interviews of offs.

78. (1) Statement of an AGF Staff Off who served in Italy in 43-44 to AGF Hist Off, 15 Sep 44. (2) AGF M/S (S), G-2 to DCoFS, 30 Sep 43, sub: Negro Units in Combat Theaters. WD G-3 file, "Negro Combat Trs," 291.21 (S). (3) Statement of Col Otis McCormick, AGF Obsr in ETO, to AGF Hist Off, 8 Aug 45.

79. Rpt of Investigation (C) of 2d Cav Div by Lt Col J. D. Petty, Asst IG Fourth Army, 27 Apr - 10 May 44. 333.5/103 (C). (Inclosure, sep binder).

80. Ibid.

81. Ltr (S) Asst IG Fourth Army to CG Fourth Army, 14 Oct 44, sub: Rpt of Investigation of Alleged Poor Sup Discipline by 92d Inf Div (Exhibit B-8). 333.1/2 (92d Div) (S) (Sep Binder).

82. Ibid, Exhibit C-8.

83. Rpt (S) of Lt Col H. H. Bond, ASF Fld Br, Dist Div, to Col T. G. Jenkins, Chief ASF Fld Br, Dist Div, 12 Sep 44, sub: 92d Div. 333.1/2 (92d Div) (S).

84. Statement of G-2 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jul 44.

85. Extract of ltr from unnamed brig comdr of 2d Cav Div to Gen M. G. White, G-1 WD, 3 Dec 43. 322/67 (2d Cav Div).

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86. Memo (C) of Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 13 Oct 43, sub: Summary Rpt of Recent Surveys at Southern Posts Cps Relative to Racial Matters. AGO Records, 291.2(C).

87. (1) Rpt (C) of a visit to 9 Southern Army cps by the Rev James L. Horace, 25 Nov - 22 Dec 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C). (2) Personal obsns of an off of AGF Hist Sec on bus trips in Miss and La, 42 - 43. (3) Agnes E. Meyer, "The Negro and the Army," Washington Post, 26 Mar 44. (4) Time Magazine, 10 Jul 44, p 65.

88. Time Magazine, 10 Jul 44, p 65.

89. Ibid.

90. (1) Ibid. (2) Meyer, "The Negro and the Army," Washington Post, 26 Mar 44. (3) Rpt of Investigation (C) re: The Alleged Beating of Colored Soldiers by Civilians at Starkville, Miss, by TIG. AGO Records, 291.2 (C).

91. For example, see file of miscellaneous clippings in Dr Wright's Negro Troop Data Notebook.

92. Interviews of offs.

93. Pittsburgh Courier, 17 May 45.

94. Ibid.

95. Statement of Lt Col Philip E. Ware, CO 193d QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 1 Jul 44.

96. Ibid.

97. Statement of Maj P. A. Dongieux, CO 140 QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jul 44.

98. Statement of Capt Warren L. Sommer, ExO 1697 Engr C Bn to AGF Hist Off, 8 Jul 44.

99. Statement of Capt W. C. Williamson, CO Co D 1st Bn 365th Inf Regt, 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

100. Statement of Maj Ralph L. Todd, CO 1st Bn 365th Inf Regt 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.

101. Memo (S) of Col F. P. Morrow, G-3 AGF for CG AGF, 14 Aug 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to Ft Huachuca, Ariz. 333.1/1 (92d Div) (S). (Incl, sep binder).

102. Statement of Maj Pridgen, 219 FA Gp (formerly a btry comdr in 46th FA Brig) to AGF Hist Off, 8 Apr 44.

103. Statement of Maj P. A. Dongieux to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jul 44.

104. Statement of Maj Norman H. Gold, CO 166th QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

105. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

106. Statements of offs

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107. Statements of offs, (1) Personal ltr of Lt Col John R. Reasonover to AGF Hist Off 19 Feb 46. 314.7 (AGF Hist). Lt Col Reasonover was assigned to the Provost Marshal's Office, Ft Huachuca during the period Feb 42 - April 44.

108. Statements of off, particularly Capt W. L. Tate, 40th QM Bn (Mbl) and Maj Frank Tressler, 518th QM Gp to AGF Hist Off, Jun - Jul 44.

109. Statement of Maj Frank Tressler, 518th QM Gp to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

110. Interview of eleven offs of 371st Inf Regt 92d Div by AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.

111. Information furnished by Lt Col Gebhardt, JA 92d Div, 17 Jun 44.

112. Interview of eleven offs of the 371st Inf Regt 92d Div by AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.

113. Statement of Maj C. F. Mock, G-1 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

114. Interviews of offs.

115. (1) Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44. (2) Statement of Maj Ralph L. Todd, CO 1st Bn 365th Inf Regt 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.

116. Memo (C) (19) IG 333.9 Ft Huachuca, Ariz, 7 Aug 43, sub: Survey Relative Conditions Affecting Racial Attitudes at Ft Huachuca, Ariz. 210.31/449 (C).

117. Interviews of offs.

118. Statement of a co comdr (name withheld), 19 Jun 44.

119. Extract of ltr of unnamed off to Lt Col Marshall S. Carter, WD, 2 Feb 43. Personal files of Col E. W. Chamberlain, G-3 WD.

120. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

121. Statement of offs.

122. Personal ltr Col S. M. Prouty (formerly CofS 93d Div) to AGF Hist Off, 22 Nov 44.

123. Gen R. G. Lehman, CG 93d Div, was among those who found Negroes superior to whites at marching and service of the piece. Statement to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

124. Statement of Maj Norman H. Gold, CO 166th QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

125. Statement of Brig Gen William H. Colbern, Arty Comdr 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

126. Third Army ltr AG 333.3 GNMCC to CG AGF, 28 Oct 42, sub: Inspection Rpt, 93d Inf Div. AGF G-3 Tng Div file 333.1 (93d Div).

127. Statement of regtl comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

128. Extract of ltr of unnamed off to Lt Col Marshall S. Carter, WD, 2 Feb 43. Personal files of Col E. W. Chamberlain, G-3 WD.

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129. (1) Personal ltr Maj Gen Fred W. Miller, formerly CG 93d Div to AGF Hist Off, 24 Feb 45. 314.7 (AG Hist). (2) Personal ltr Col S. M. Prouty, formerly CofS 93d Div to AGF Hist Off, 22 Nov 44. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Statements of Offs.

132. Statement of an off (identity withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

133. Statement of Maj Pridgen, 219th FA Gp, to AGF Hist Off, 8 Apr 44.

134. Statement of Col Marcell Gillis, 12th Hq & Hq Det Sp Trs, Fourth Army, to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

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CHAPTER III

135. Statement of Maj Frank Tressler, ExO 518th QM Gp, to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

136. Statement of Maj William H. Downs, ExO 122d QM Bn, to AGF Hist Off, 1 Jul 44.

137. Third Army ltr AG 333.3 GNMCC to CG AGF, 28 Oct 42; sub: Inspection Rpt 93d Inf Div. AGF G-3 Tng Div file 333.1 (93d Div).

138. Statement of Capt Warren L. Sommer, ExO 1697 Engr C Bn, to AGF Hist Off, 8 Jul 44.

139. Statements of Offs.

140. Statement of Maj Norman K. Helmrath, CO 78th Sig Constr Bn, to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jul 44.

141. 4th SvC Memo of Investigation(C), 11 Jan 44, sub: Race Riot 9 Jun 43 and Racial Situation, Cp Stewart, Ga. MIS Admin Records Sec file (57) MID 000.2412 4th SvC, 11 Jan 44 (21 Jun 43) (C).

142. Statement of 92d Div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jul 44.

143. (1) Statement of regtl comdr 92d Div (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44. (2) Statement of 92d Div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 11 Jun 44.

144. Statement of Lt Col Philip E. Ware, CO 193d QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 1 Jul 44.

145. Statement of Lt Col William J. McCaffrey, G-3 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.

146. Statement of Lt Col Donald C. Foote, CO 518th QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

147. Statement of Lt Col Philip E. Ware, CO 193d QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 1 Jul 44.

148. Statement of Capt W. L. Tate, 40th QM Bn (Mbl) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.

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149. Memo (C) of Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 13 Oct 43, sub: Summary Rpt of Recent Surveys at Southern Posts and Cps Relative to Racial Matters. AGO Records, 291.2 (C).

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CHAPTER IV

150. On 31 Mar 42 there were 534 Negro off in all the U.S. Armed Forces. "Monthly Negro Strength of the Army From November 1941 Through July 1944," in Strength of the Army, 31 Jul 44 320.2/727 (S).

151. Of six Regular Army officers on active duty in August 1941, 3 were chaplains and 3 were line officers. The line officers were: Brig Gen B. O. Davis, his son Capt (later Col) B. O. Davis, Jr, and 2d Lt James D. Fowler. Newspaper clippings dated 1 Aug 41 in Dr Wright's Troop Data Handbook.

152. Statement of William H. Hastie, Civ Aide to SW for Negro Affairs, Dec 40 to Mar 43, to AGF Hist Off, 15 Oct 44.

153. From WD MRU Br Tabulations (R) #SDM 207 (Monthly) "Colored Officers with the AGF by Organization and Grade." 330.32/2 (R). Beginning with 31 Dec 44, this information was issued by AGF Stat Sec as Report 43. The latter report is filed in 322.999 (Cld Trs) (C).

154. Ibid.

155. WD Stat Br Bi-Monthly Publications (C) "Status of Personnel, AUS," Jul 42. Originally consulted in 320.2 (Str)(Status of AUS) (C); missing in records at date of final revision.

156. Ibid. (2) This curve follows generally that of white OCS graduates. See Studies in Histroy of AGF No 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers. WAC OC's (of which AGF had none) and VOC's are not included in this tabulation.

157. History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.

158. During the period of most rapid expansion, commanders of white units, yielding to pressure from higher headquarters, also sent men to OCS whom they deemed considerably below the desired OC standards. Statement of Maj Gen Leo Donovan, G-3 AGF, to AGF Hist Off, 7 Aug 45.

159. Statement of div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

160. Statement (C) of Lt Col James E. Jacobs, CO 351st FA Bn, to Col Carl L. Ristine, IGD, 14 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

161. "Status of Personnel, AUS," (C), Jul - Dec 43. Originally consulted in 320.2 (Str) (Status of AUS) (C); missing in records at date of final revision.

162. History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.

163. See note 161 above.

164. (1) WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (3-18-42) MC-C to CGs, 24 Mar 42, sub: Asgmt of Negro Offs. 210.31/86 (C). (2) WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (4-17-42) MP-SP-M to CGs,

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21 Apr 42, sub: Asgmt of Negro Off. Ibid. (3) WD ltr (R) AG 210.31 (4-13-42) OF, to CGs, 28 Apr 42, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. 210.31/8 (R).

165. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (C), G-1 ExO to G-1, 30 Apr 43, sub: Promotion of Negro Off in 93d Div. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C).

166. WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (1-4-43) OB-S-A-M to CGs, 10 Jan 43, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. 210.31/449 (C).

167. Memo (C), Truman K. Gibson, Civ Aide, SW, for Col S. L. Leonard, WD, 1 Mar 43, sub not given. 210.31/449 (C).

168. (1) AGF M/S (C), G-1 ExO for G-1, 30 Apr 43, sub: Promotion of Negro Off in 93d Div. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C). (2) WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (3-16-43) OB-S-A-M to CGs, 17 Mar 43, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. 210.31/449 (C).

169. AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 23 Mar 43, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. Ibid.

170. (1) AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 16 Aug 43, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. 210.31/449 (Asgmt of Offs)(C). (2) AGF M/S (C), G-1 Control Div for G-1, 28 Sep 43, sub: Negro Off Asgmt Policy. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C). (3) AGF 1st ind on memo (C) 210.31/449 GNGAP-B (4-29-43) for Truman K. Gibson, Jr, 1 May 43, sub not given. Ibid.

171. Interviews of offs.

172. See 210.31/449 (C).

173. (1) AGF M/S (C), G-1 ExO for G-1, 30 Apr 43, sub: Promotion of Negro Off in 93d Div. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C). (2) In March 1945, Gen Fred W. Miller, who commanded the 93d Division until June 43, in commenting on a draft of this study, stated:

If my memory does not fail me I had only three lieutenants in the entire Division Artillery whom the Artillery Commander considered for promotion - and one of these fell down on the job and the Artillery Commander withdrew his recommendation. Furthermore the continual shifting of company commanders to make vacancies for Negro captains does not contribute to morale, esprit, or efficiency.

Personal ltr, Maj Gen Fred W. Miller to AGF Hist Off (undated, but about 15 Mar 45). 314.7 (AGF Hist).

174. Statement of Lt Col W. S. Renshaw, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 24 Sep 44.

175. WD ltr (C) AG 310.31 (14 Aug 43) OB-S-SPGAM-M to CG AGF, 28 Aug 43, sub: Off Promotion Policies. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C) file (S).

176. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 29 Sep 43, sub: Policy on Asgmt of Negro Off Pers. Returns from the survey called for by the War Department are filed in AGF G-1 Control Div Negro Policy file (S).

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.

179. AGF M/S, G-1 for CofS, 19 Aug 43, sub: Inspection Made by Gen Davis. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (Gen).

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180. Compiled from WD MRU Br Tabulation SDM, 207 "Colored Officers with the AGF by Organization and Grade." 330.32/2 (R).

181. WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (3 Jan 44) OB-S-A-M to CGs, 7 Jan 44; sub: Policy on Promotion and Asgmt of Negro Off Pers, and AGF 1st ind thereto, 8 Feb 44. 210.31/706 (C).

182. (1) R&SC ltr (C) GNRSPA 210.31 to Comdt FA Sch, 27 Mar 44, sub: Asgmt of Colored Off, AGF G-1 Off Div files (C). (2) AGF 1st, 2d, and 3d inds to foregoing letter. 210.31/706.

183. Statement of Lt Col W. S. Renshaw to AGF Hist Off, 24 Nov 44.

184. For a study based on Army War College monographs, made by AGF G-1 off, see AGF M/S (R), G-1 to CofS, 11 Mar 44, sub: Combat Experience of Negro Tr Units. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (R).

185. See especially the following studies: (1) 298-Ao23, 1921-1925, Organization of Negro Combat Units (S); (2) 1-1937-3, 1936-1937, Employment of Manpower (R); (3) 127-1 to 31 (C); (4) 127-21, Use Made of Negroes in the U.S. Military Service; (5) 127-25, Proposed Plan for Use of Negro Manpower.

186. Ltr of Maj Gen C. C. Ballou, CG 92d Div, to CG IV Army Corps, 12 Oct 18, sub: Inefficient Off. AWC file 127-21.

187. Ltr of Maj J. N. Merrill, CO 1st Bn 368th Inf Regt, to CO 386th Inf Regt, 3 Oct 18, sub: Opn of Bn Off and Men during Period Sep 26-30. AWC file 127-21.

188. (1) Statement of Maj Gen E. M. Almond, CG 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44. (2) Maj Gen Fred W. Miller and Maj Gen R. G. Lehman, both of whom commanded the 93d Div in training, stated that lack of a sense of responsibility was an outstanding weakness of Negro officers. Personal ltr of Gen Miller to AGF Hist Off, 18 Feb 45; statement of Gen Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

189. Statement of regtl comdr (name withheld) 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

190. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

191. Statement of regtl comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off 21 Jun 44.

192. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

193. Personal ltr (C) of Gen Hodges to Gen McNair, 8 Apr 43, 322/1 (93d Div) (C).

194. Second Army ltr (C) AG 210.31-20(GNMBA) to CG AGF, 13 Apr 43, sub: Removal of Limitations on Off Asgmt to Negro Orgns. 314.7 (AGF Hist)(C).

195. (1) Personal ltr, Maj Gen F. W. Miller to AGF Hist Off, 24 Feb 45. (2) Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44. (3) Personal ltr, Col S. M. Prouty to AGF Hist Off, 22 Nov 44. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

196. Statement of regtl comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

197. Interviews of off.

198. Personal ltr, Maj Gen J. P. Lucas to Gen McNair, 30 May 44. McNair Correspondence.

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199. 4th SvC memo, 26 Apr 43, sub: Racial Situation at Cp Stewart. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (53) MID 291.2 (Negroes, Cp Stewart) (4-26-43) (C).

200. 4th SvC Monthly Int Summary (C), Jun 43. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (53) MID 000.24 364th Inf Regt 6-29-43 (C).

201. (1) Statement of off. (2) Memo (C) of Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 13 Oct 43, sub: Summary Rpt of Recent Surveys at Southern Posts and Cps Relative to Racial Matters. AGO Records, 291.2 (C).

202. Transcript of statement (C) of 1st Lt Cyrus J. Colter to Col Carl L. Ristine, 13 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

203. See transcript of testimony (C) of Negro off collected by Col Carl L. Ristine in Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

204. Interviews of offs.

205. Statement of one of offs concerned (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Apr 44.

206. Statement of staff off (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

207. (1) Statements of offs. (2) Personal obsns of AGF Hist Off on visit to Ft Huachuca, 14 - 21 Jun 44.

208. 4th SvC memo of investigation (C), 11 Jan 44, sub: Race Riot 9 Jun 43 and Racial Situation, Cp Stewart, Ga. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (57) MID 000.2412 4th SvC, 11 Jan 44 (21 Jun 43) (C).

209. Statement of off (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

210. Quoted in Time Magazine, 10 Jul 44, p 69.

211. Transcript of statement (C) of 1st Lt Cyrus J. Colter to Col Carl L. Ristine, 13 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

212. Interviews of offs.

213. 201 files of Linwood G. Koger, AGF and Second Army.

214. (1) Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 27 Oct 44. (2) Interviews of off.

215. G-1, AGF, wrote to CG AGF, 12 Oct 42: "The colored race cannot produce enough military leadership to officer the colored units. A good estimate would be that enough can be produced to meet 10% of the total requirement for colored units." AGF M/S (C) for CG AGF, 12 Oct 42, sub: Asgmt of Colored Off to Units. 322.999/26. (C).

216. Statement of Brig Gen L. R. Boyd, Asst Comdr 93d Div to AGF Hist Off, 13 Jul 45.

217. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

218. Statement of CG 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.

219. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

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220. Memo (C) of Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 13 Oct 43, sub: Summary of Recent Surveys at Southern Posts and Cps Relative to Racial Matters. AGO Records, 291.2 (C).

221. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

222. Ibid.

223. Statement of 92d Div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

224. Statement of 92d Div off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.

225. Statement of Maj Ralph L. Todd, Comdr 1st Bn 365th Inf Regt 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.

226. Ibid.

227. Personal ltr of Cpl Hugh Cash to Sgt Wilson, 13 Jun 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

228. Information furnished AGF Hist Off by G-1 92d Div, 19 Jun 44.

229. Statement of regtl comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.

230. Statement of off (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 18 Jun 44.

231. The identity of these officers can not be divulged.

232. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

233. Statement of 92d Div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

234. Statement of arty off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

235. Transcript (S) of an interview of Lt Col George H. Barrows, CO 29th QM Truck Regt, by an ASF Int Off, 25 Aug 44. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

236. Statement of co comdr (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 19 Jun 44.

237. Statement of Lt Col A. J. Comerford, CO 141st QM Bn, to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jul 44.

238. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

239. Transcript (C) of statement of Lt Col Elliott Jacobs, CO 351st FA Bn, to Col Carl L. Ristine, 14 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

240. Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.

241. Transcript (C) of statement of Lt Col Marion W. Gooding, CO 350th FA Bn, to Col Carl L. Ristine, 14 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

242. (1) Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44. (2) Personal ltr of Maj Gen Fred W. Miller to AGF Hist Off, 24 Feb 45. (3) AGF Obsr Rpt (S) 805-45, 7 May 45, sub: Final rpt of Col Paul N. Starlings, Pres and Inf Member, AGF Bd, MTOUSA. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

243. Statement of Brig Gen William H. Colbern to AGF Hist Off, 2 Jul 45.

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244. (1) Ibid. (2) Statement of Maj Gen R. G. Lehman to AGF Hist Off, 26 Oct 44.
245. Quoted in WD Gen Council Min (S), 26 Jul 43.
246. Ibid, 19 Jul 43.
247. Fourth Army ltr to CG AGF, 27 May 44, sub: Surplus Colored Off, 92d Inf Div. 210.31/100 (92d Div) (C).
248. Transcript (C) of statement of Lt Col Jesse E. Jacobs, CO 351st FA Bn, to Col Carl L. Ristine, 14 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).
249. Transcript (C) of statement of Lt Col Marion W. Gooding, CO 350th FA Bn, to Col Carl L. Ristine, 14 Jun 44. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).
250. Ibid.

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CHAPTER V

251. Interviews of off.
252. Memo (C) of Gen Joseph T. McNarney for Gen McNair, 10 Aug 42, sub: Professional Qualities of Off Asgd to Negro Units. 322.999/23 (C).
253. Memo (C), CofS AGF for DCoFS USA, 20 Aug 42, sub as in note 252. Ibid.
254. Ltr (C), Gen Robert C. Richardson, CG VII Corps to CG AGF, 28 Aug 42, sub as in note 252. Ibid.
255. Memo (CO of CofS AGF for DCoFS USA, 20 Aug 42, sub as in note 252. Ibid.
256. Ibid.
257. WD ltr (C) AG 210.31 (21 Mar 44) PO-A to CG AGF, 24 Mar 44, sub: Asgmt of White Off to Colored Units Undergoing Tng. 210.31/730 (C).
258. Truman K. Gibson stated in August 1943: "The white officer has a five times harder job commanding Negro troops than white troops." Minutes of meeting of Advisory Committee on Negro Tr Policies, 14 Aug 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (C).
259. Statement of staff off (name withheld) 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 16 Jun 44.
260. Interviews of offs.
261. Ibid.
262. Statement of 92d Div arty off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.
263. Statement of 92d Div bn comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.
264. Statement of Lt Col William J. McCaffrey, G-3 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.
265. Statement of 92d Div regtl comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 18 Jun 44.

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266. Interviews of offs.
267. Statement of 92d Div co comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 17 Jun 44.
268. Statement of 92d Div bn comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.
269. AGF M/S (S), QM to Hist Off, 10 Jan 45, sub: Chap in AGF Hist. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (S).
270. Statement of off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 7 Apr 44.
271. Statement of 92d Div plat comdr (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.
272. Lt Col J. D. Petty, Asst IG Fourth Army, Rpt of Investigation (C), 2d Cav Div, 27 Apr - 10 May 44. 333.5/103 (C) (Incl, sep binder).
273. Interviews of offs.
274. Statements at various times, 1943 - 1944, of Hq AGF off to AGF Hist Off.
275. Ltr (S), Maj John R. Reasonover to TAG, 21 Apr 44 (through channels), sub: Request for Detail in AAF. 201 Reasonover, John R (Off) (S).
276. Personal ltr of _____ to Gen McNair, 1 Jun 43, McNair Correspondence.
277. Personal ltr of Gen McNair to _____, 4 Jun 43. Ibid.
278. Statement of 92d Div off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 18 Jun 44.
279. (1) Memo (C) of Gen R. G. Lehman, CG 93d Div for CG C-AMA (undated, but Dec 43). 210.31/592 (C). (2) Statement of Gen E. M. Almond, CG 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.
280. AGF M/S (C), G-1 Control Div to G-1, 29 Nov 43, sub: Rotation Plan for White Off Asgd to Colored Units. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (C).
281. Ibid.
282. AGF ltr (C) to CGs, 31 Dec 43, sub: Rotation of White Off on Dy with Negro Trs. 210.31/592 (C).
283. (1) Interview of off. (2) Memo (C) of Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 13 Oct 43, sub: Summary Rpt of Recent Surveys at Southern Posts and Cps Relative to Racial Matters. AGO Records, 291.2 (C).
284. Interviews of offs.
285. Statement of CG 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 21 June 44.

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CHAPTER VI

286. Memo (S) of The Surgeon Gen for CofS USA, 17 Feb 43, sub: Ft Huachuca - A Survey of VD and Social Hygiene Conditions. Originally consulted in 322/1 (93d Div); missing in records at date of final revision.

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287. Cir 88, WD, 28 Feb 44.
288. ASF Mil Tng Div, draft (R) of proposed ASF Manual, The Negro Soldier, p 65.
289. Ibid.
290. Statement of Maj R. M. Matts, Asst Surg 92d Div to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.
291. Ibid.
292. Interviews of offs.
293. Cir 88, WD, 28 Feb 44.
294. C 3, AR 40-210, 1 May 43.
295. Cir 410, WD, 19 Oct 44.
296. (1) Par 23b, AR 40-210, 15 Sep 42. (2) C 2, AR 40-210, 16 Mar 43.
297. Statement of Maj R. M. Matts, Asst Surg 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.
298. (1) C 3, AR 40-210, 1 May 43. (2) Interviews of offs.
299. Statement of Maj R. M. Matts, Asst Surg 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.
300. Ibid.
301. Ltr of Div Surg to CG 92d Div, 1 Jun 44, sub: Sanitary Rpt for May 44. Div Surg files.
302. Statement of Maj Jesse Sankin, CO 40th QM Truck Bn (Nbl), to AGF Hist Off, 7 Jul 44.
303. Ltr of Div Surg to CG 92d Div, 1 Jun 44, sub: Sanitary Rpt for May 44. Div Surg files.
304. Memo (S), The Surg Gen for CofS USA, 17 Feb 43, sub: Ft Huachuca - A Survey of VD and Social Hygiene Conditions. Originally consulted in 322/1 (93d Div) (S); missing in records at date of final revision.
305. Transcript (S) of remarks of CO of a Negro AA unit (name withheld) to a VD Symposium, 30 Jul 43. WD G-3 file 291.21 (S) (Negro C Trs).
306. Ibid.
307. Copies of this and other issues of the VD Bull were on file in 92d Div Surg off.
308. Information obtained by AGF Hist Off. Identity of sources withheld.
309. See note 304 above.
310. Ibid.
311. (1) Ibid. (2) Statement of 92d Div staff off (name withheld) to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.

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312. Ibid.

313. (1) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 9 Mar 43, sub: 93d Div. Originally consulted in 322/1 (93d Div) (S); missing in records at date of final revision. (2) Statement of Maj R. M. Matts, Asst Surg 92d Div, to AGF Hist Off, 20 Jun 44.

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CHAPTER VII

314. WD Memo (c), G-2 for G-3, 17 Jun 42, sub: The Negro Problem in the Army. 291.2/14 (Races) (C).

315. Ltr (C), Post Comdr, Cp Jos T Robinson to CG Second Army, 24 Mar 42, sub: Shooting of Colored Sgt by Civ Policeman in Little Rock, Ark. 291.2/4 (Races) (C).

316. WD memo (C), G-2 for G-3, 17 Jun 42, sub: The Negro Problem in the Army. 291.2/14 (Races) (C).

317. (1) Statement of officer (name withheld) who was assigned to the unit at time of the disturbance to AGF Hist Off, 7 Apr 44. (2) Memo (C), Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 21 Sep 43, sub: Survey at Cp Van Dorn, Miss, Relative Racial Matters. 291.2/25 (Races) (C).

318. AA Comd 1st ind, 23 Nov 43, to AGF ltr, 24 Jul 43, sub: Monthly Rpts of Chaplains. 322.999/370 (Cld Trs).

319. (1) Memo (C), TIG for DCofS USA, 8 Jun 43, sub: 364th Inf, Cp Van Dorn, Miss. 291.2/25 (Races) (C). (2) Rpt (C) of Lt John B. Meriwether, Post Int Off, Cp Van Dorn, 4 Jun 43, sub: Disturbance Among Units and Pers of 364th Inf Regt (Colored), Cp Van Dorn, Miss. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (237) 000.2412 4th SvC, 6-8-43 (6-5-43) (C). (3) Memo (C), Col Lathe B. Rowe, IGD for TIG, 21 Sep 43, sub: Survey at Cp Van Dorn, Miss, Relative to Racial Matters. 291.2/25 (C).

320. Memo (S), Col E. W. Chamberlain, G-3 WD for G-3 WD, 6 Nov 43, sub not given. WD G-3 file 291.21 (S).

321. This account of the Camp Stewart riot is based mainly on the following sources: (1) Memo (C) of TIG for CofS USA, 4 Jun 43, sub: Investigation and Inspection Conducted at Cp Stewart, Ga, Relating to Alleged Racial Discrimination and Dissatisfaction on the Part of Certain Colored Trs. 291.2/22 (Races) (C). (2) Fourth SvC memo of investigation (C), 11 Jan 44, sub: Race Riot 9 Jun 43 and Racial Situation, Cp Stewart Ga. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (57) MID 000.2412 4th SvC, 11 Jan 44 (C). (3) AGF M/S (R), G-1 to G-2, 2 Aug 43, sub: Rpt of Bd of Off Aptd to Investigate Riot. 322.999/6 (Cld Trs) (R).

322. Fourth SvC memo of investigation (C), 11 Jan 44, sub: Race Riot 9 Jun 43 and Racial Situation, Cp Stewart Ga, Investigation of Thornton R. Greene. WD MIS Admin Records Sec file (57) MID 000.2412, 4th SvC, 11 Jan 44 (C).

323. (1) AGF memo (R), G-1 for G-2, 2 Aug 43, sub: Rpt of Bd of Off Aptd to Investigate Riot. 322.999/6 (Cld Trs) (R). (2) AGF 3d ind (R), 11 Aug 43, on ltr of Brig Gen S. L. McCroskey to CG AAATC, 8 Jul 43, sub: Rpt of Bd of Off. Ibid.

324. 4th SvC memo of investigation (C), 11 Jan 44, sub: Race Riot 9 Jun 43 and Racial Situation Cp Stewart Ga, Investigation of Thornton R. Greene. WD MIS Admin

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Records Sec file (57) MID 000.2412 4th SvC 11 Jan 44 (21 Jun 43) (C).

325. Personal ltr of George A. Anderson to the SW, 15 Nov 43, and atchd papers. 322.999/379 (Cld Trs).

326. (1) WD ltr (R) AG 353.8 (5 Jul 44) OB-S-A-M-(R) to CGs, 8 Jul 44, sub: Recreational Facilities. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (R). (2) WD Gen Council Min (S), 4 Sep 44.

327. Washington Evening Star, 28 Aug 44.

328. Ibid.

329. Memo (C), Col J. S. Leonard, WD for ASW, 3 Oct 44, sub: Summary Rpt of Recent Visits of Obsn of Southern Cps Relative to Racial Matters. Files of ASF Dir of Int.

330. ASF Rpt (C) SPINT 291.2, 7 Nov 44, sub: Racial Situation in the U. S., 15 Oct to 28 Oct 44. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

331. Ibid. Rpts dated 21 Nov 44, 2 Dec 44, and 20 Dec 44.

332. (1) Interview of off. (2) Meyer, "The Negro and the Army," Washington Post, 26 Mar 44.

333. Ibid.

334. Ltr (S) of Mrs Lizzie Rains to Hon A. Leonard Allen, 12 Apr 43, with attached papers. AGO Records, 291.21 (S). Investigation verified most of Mrs Rains's charges, but failed to identify the girl's assailant as a soldier.

335. Memo (C), Opns Div for CofS AGF, 9 Apr 42, sub: Location of Combat Teams of 92d Div. 322.999/3 (Cld Trs) (C).

336. WD Gen Council Min (S), 4 May 42.

337. A typical expression of this feeling may be found in the following excerpts from the report of a visit to Southern camps made by the Rev James L. Horace of Chicago in the latter part of 1943 (Photostatic cpy in AGF G-1 Control Div Negro Policy file).

1. Civilian Treatment of Colored Soldiers.

Cp Livingston, La - Very cruel. The colored men feel punished. They will sacrifice their rank (noncoms) in many cases to get to leave Louisiana. Police are brutish.

Cp Claiborne, La - Very hostile. We live in a sense of fear. White civilians seem to think the men are there for punishment and they are free to inflict it at will. Men jailed often.

Cp Flora, Miss - Police hostile and mean. They arrest men in uniform without any offense. Exceedingly brutal. The civilians seem to hate Negro soldiers. Treated as dog. Called "nigger" freely.

Cp Shelby, Miss - Rotten as if we were animals. No sense of appreciation.

Cp McCain, Miss - Very prejudiced and hostile. Many off limited places. Often mistreated. They seem to hate soldiers.

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Cp Sibert, Ala - Courteous some places but varies. More sympathetic but the feeling of resentment is present.

Ft McClellan, Ala - From good to excellent. A sense of appreciation.

Ft Benning, Ga - Largely hostile. Police officers are cruel and heartless. They take jurisdiction over military cases. No sense of interest in colored soldiers mainly.

2. Segregation - Practices and Experiences.

Cp Livingston, La - Segregation is wide open, general and vicious. Men are handled as animals instead of soldiers fighting for our nation. They live constantly under insults and fear.

Cp Claiborne, La - Segregation is vicious and devastating to morale. Willfully cruel. Men who had been trained over a year given pick and shovel. Some given basic training two or three times. Many cases of plain mistreatment. Civilians make policies as they please.

Cp Flora, Miss - Segregation is the most vicious. Colored can't even use Post cleaners. Forced to send things to town - often to be lost. Not allowed to enter white section of Post. Negro Papers barred.

Cp Shelby, Miss - Often reprimand Negro officers before men. Segregation is cruel and cold.

Cp McCain, Miss - Not allowed in main Post Exchange. Stay in limited area of Post. It seems unthinkable that soldiers would be restricted to a section of a Government Post who have done no wrong.

Cp Sibert, Ala - Tables of Organization frozen for 4th Service Command, but whites get rating. No rating since May, not even PFC. After 16 months in a theater of war now getting basic training for what they have done.

Ft McClellan, Ala - Less segregation. More Democracy than any. The spirit of fair play seems to be present.

Ft Benning, Ga - Vicious and insulting. Administered with no sense of concern or sympathy. Appear as punishment.

3. Transportation.

Cp Livingston, La - Rotten beyond description. Whites have much better facilities and a sympathetic interest. Colored are driven and rejected with cruelty and disgust.

Cp Claiborne, La - Painfully inadequate. Bus drivers seem to have been urged by the enemy to destroy Negro morale. Exceedingly cruel and void of sympathy or concern. Only 5 seats allowed and 5 must be present to ride.

Cp Flora, Miss - Rotten and woefully inadequate. Bus drivers are terribly cruel. Soldiers are miserable on buses and constantly insulted.

Cp Shelby, Miss - Very bad. They seek to embarrass you. Pass us often with empty seats. Limited seats for Negroes.

Cp McCain, Miss - The rottenest possible. We paid \$2.50 to go eight miles to town. Buses too few and insufficient room for colored.

Cp Sibert, Ala - Poor. Far inadequate but not vicious. More buses needed. More room for Negroes.

Ft McClellan, Ala - Poor. Inadequate. More buses needed. More room for colored.

Ft Benning, Ga - Rotten and terribly inadequate. Colored soldiers must walk long distances to get small space in bus. Many will not carry them at all. Regular bus inadequate.

338. Transcript (C) of testimony taken by Col Carl L. Ristine, IGD, Jun 44, at Ft Sill, Okla. 291.2 (C) (Incl, sep binder).

339. (1) Ibid. (2) Interviews of offs.

340. Clipping in Dr Wright's Negro Troop Data Notebook.

341. This item appeared in issue of 8 Jul 44.

342. (1) Draft memo (C) of Lt Col W. S. Renshaw, AGF representative on McCloy Committee, for Gen B. O. Davis, 30 Jun 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist) (C). (2) Ltr (S), Gen William Bryden, CG 4th SvC to CG ASF, 12 Jul 43, sub: Disturbances Among Negro Trs. With attached papers WD G-3 files 291.2 (S).

343. Interviews of offs.

344. AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 14 Jun 43, sub: Mvmt of Negro Pers. 291.2/5 (S)

345. Memo (C) of Gen McNair for GAG, 14 Jun 43, sub: TIG Investigation at Cp Stewart Ga, re Colored Trs. 291.2/22 (Races) (C). This statement was incorporated in a ltr (C) to CG AA Comd, 14 Jun 43, Ibid.

346. Interviews of offs.

347. Statement of Maj Gen E. M. Almond to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jun 44.

348. Memo (C) of Gen McNair for CG Second Army, 1 Sep 44, sub: 184th FA (Colored). 319.1/112 (C).

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