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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT OFFICE 2600 ERNIE PYLE STREET FORT MEADE, MD, 20755-5995 May 19, 2023

Freedom of Information/ Privacy Office

This is in reponse to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 28, 2022, and supplements our letter of March 8, 2022.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review of the INSCOM information in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized that would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information that is exempt by statute. The applicable statute is 50 U.S.C. § 3024 (i), which protects intelligence sources and methods.

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
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Sincerely,

HEATON.MICH Digitally signed by HEATON.MICHAEL.TODD. 0922075 Date: 2023.05.19 07:12:59 -04'00' Michael T. Heaton GG-15, Director Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office

Enclosure





U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center Munitions Building, Washington, D.C. 20315

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Comments, and requests for additional copies, should be sent to the Commanding Officer, at the above address.

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## DESCRIPTORS

Biological warfare; field testing centers; Soviet Bloc; proving grounds; microbiological research.

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# COMMUNIST BLOC FACILITIES FOR BW FIELD TESTING (U)

February 1965

(Based on information available as of July 1964)

# ABSTRACT

(U) This study presents a summary of published intelligence data on Communist Bloc facilities for BW field testing and proving ground activities.

## NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



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## COMMUNIST BLOC FACILITIES FOR BW FIELD TESTING (U)

#### COMPENDIUM

# (U)

# 1. <del>(C)</del> PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to provide information concerning the existence of Communist Bloc biological warfare (BW) field testing and proving ground facilities used in the development of BW agent weapon systems. Because of limited intelligence information from behind the Iron Curtain, this study reports primarily on the U.S.S.R.

#### (U) 2. <del>(S)</del> SUMMARY

a. The existence of BW field testing and proving ground facilities in the Communist Bloc nations, excluding the U.S.S.R., has not been definitely established. In these countries, the most suspected installation is at Rembertów (52 15 N - 21 10 E) in Poland; however, no positive confirmed intelligence information has been obtained to identify this as the Polish BW testing facility.

## b. In the U.S.S.R.,

Vozrozhdeniya Island (45 03 N -59 12 E) in the Aral Sea is considered a biological test center which could be testing BW agents and which could support a Soviet BW agents/munitions program. Data on Vozrozhdeniya Island are in-

cluded in several intelligence publications: The appendix lists four such published reports.

(U)

#### 3. <del>(S)</del> CONCLUSIONS

a. Intelligence information is sufficient to confirm BW agentrelated research and development in the Communist Bloc countries but is not sufficient to pinpoint the locations where potential BW agents are being field tested.

b. The Soviets are known to have used Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea for BW agent testing during the midthirties. No intelligence information is available to deny or confirm that this testing is continuing in the present time frame.

c. The possibility exists that much of the Soviet Bloc BW agent field testing is being conducted under the guise of public health and medical research at laboratory level; if this possibility is true, evidence of the activity would be difficult to obtain.

d. Although no specific BW field testing centers are known to



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exist in the Communist Bloc coun- West. This strategem would intries, other than the one in the crease the difficulties of locating U.S.S.R., such testing may possi- and confirming the operation and bly be underway in less sophisticat- provide greater security to the ed facilities than those found in the facility.

#### DISCUSSION

4. (C) The Communist Bloc countries, especially the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, are conducting extensive microbiological research and development with BW application. In many instances, the research effort of these countries parallels the work underway in Western nations; i.e., in attacks on the same diseases and their pathogens, use of similar techniques, and attempts to solve the same problems.

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5. (C) The Communist scientists stress the development of multivalent vaccines to permit compatible and effective use of up to 15 antigens, and recent reports from the Soviet Union reflect considerable improvement in the state-of-the-art. Many of the antigens involved in this research are potential BW agents.

6.  $(\mathbf{C})$  One of the most significant aspects of vaccine research is the application of aerogenic means to produce immunization. The development of aerosol immunization techniques is directly related to comparable work on BW agent dissemination. Aerosol research gives a country two major advantages: an improved capability for BW agent dissemination in offensive operations, and an excellent mass immunization capability for BW defensive purposes. The Soviets have pioneered in aerosol research and lead the world in advancing the basic art.

#### (U)

7. (C) In addition, the Soviets have a long history in research on arthropod-borne diseases, with special emphasis on the encephalitides. This research, through use of infected insect vectors, is also related to offensive BW.

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8. (C) Soviet spokesmen repeatedly stress their awareness of BW and the need for the country to develop a strong defensive posture against. BW attack. A logical assumption, based on the fact that the Soviets continually emphasize the possibility of BW being waged against them,



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would be that these men are familiar with the Communist capability to support a BW agent development program.

(U) 9. (C) Most of the reported research has been conducted in large cities and involves exposure of considerable numbers of the population to mass immunization by aerosolized vaccines. Such research could be interpolated and extrapolated to acquire data of military significance in advancing a BW agent program.

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10. (S) The Communist Bloc nations have not published on military field testing, except in the area of insecticide testing. Literature from tehind the Iron Curtain has not made reference to concepts or actual field testing other than accusing the West of such considerations and activities.

11. (C) Information obtained from the Germans after World War II indicated that the Soviets had conducted BW agent development and field test work on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the midthirties. This activity allegedly was a continuation of work begun earlier and was carried on after the thirties under the direction of the Scientific Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene of the Armed Forces (NIIEG).

12. (S) Although information is not available with respect to current activities and administrative control of Vozrozhdeniya Island, this site is still strongly suspected to be testing BW agents.

13. (S) Intelligence information does not indicate any other site to be a major BW field testing center. Considering the vastness of the country and the diversity of terrain and climate in the Soviet Union, however, one or more could exist. The extreme security measures practiced by the Soviets would naturally be intensified to protect such a facility from exposure and compromise.

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# APPENDIX <del>(S)</del>

## PUBLISHED INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING VOZROZHDENIYA ISLAND (U)

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1. The Biological Warfare Capabilities of the U.S.S.R., 1960 Through 1964 (C)(U) b3 22 June 1960. (Secret/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Except U.K. and Canada). UNCLASSIFIED

2. <u>The BW Proving Ground (U)</u>. DA, OACSI: IRP PI 1322, l February 1961. <u>(Secret/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals Except-U. K., Canada, and Australia</u>).UNCLASSIFIED

3. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare (S)(U) b3 26 August 1964. (Secret/Controlled-Dissemination).UNCLASSIFIED

4. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare (S)(U) b3 2 November 1964. (Secret/Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals). UNCLASSIFIED



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