



# governmentattic.org

*"Rummaging in the government's attic"*

Description of document: National Security Agency (NSA) Oral History of [NAME REDACTED], OH-1989-14, Regarding the Seizure of the USS Pueblo in January 1968 by North Korea, OH-1989-14, 1989

Requested date: 25-June-2022

Release date: 06-July-2023

Posted date: 31-July-2023

Source of document: Mandatory Declassification Review  
NSA  
National Security Agency  
NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority P133  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road STE 6881  
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000



Serial: MDR-114595  
6 July 2023

This responds to your request of 25 June 2022 to have *Oral History of [redacted], NSA-OH 1989-14* reviewed for declassification. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection.

Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraphs (b) and (d) and remains classified TOP SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) (3) and/or (6) of the Executive Order.

Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, the names of NSA/CSS employees and information that would reveal NSA/CSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority. **The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter.** The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The

Serial: MDR-114595

appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jacqueline M. Amacher". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J".

Jacqueline M. Amacher  
Chief  
Declassification Services

Encl:  
a/s

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204123~~

**OHNR: OH-1989-14**

**DOI: 28 Nov 1989**

**TRSID:** [redacted]

**DTR: 29 Nov 1999**

**QCSID:** [redacted]

**Text Review:**

**INAME:** [redacted]

**Text w/Tape:**

**IPLACE:** NSA, OPS, Ft, Meade, MD; [redacted] Conference Room

**VIEWER:** NEWTON, Robert E.; FARLEY, Robert D.

[Tape 1, Side 1]

**TR NOTE:** Audio quality of this tape is good

**Farley:** Today is 28 November 1989. Our interviewee: Mr. [redacted] was a junior analyst assigned to the North Korean air problem and later, the North Korean navy problem during the period when the seaborne collectors were active. When the *Pueblo* incident took place in January of 1968, he became involved in the debriefing of the crew following their release in December of that year. [redacted] also participated in writing the damage assessment of the *Pueblo* compromise. This interview is taking place in the [redacted] Conference Room, NSA at Fort Meade. Interviewers: Bob Farley and Bob Newton. The classification of these two cassettes as determined by [redacted] are TOP SECRET CODEWORD NOFORN. And this is NSA Oral History Interview Number 14-89.

**TR NOTE:** Taping stops. When it resumes, [redacted] is speaking as follows:

[redacted] Well... (TR NOTE: He chuckles... ) This is... Dave probably could, in fact, collaborate a lot of what I have... He was involved, at least, superficially for some time in this...

**Farley:** Yeah.

[redacted] He was the 04...

**Farley:** Right.

[redacted] Under George Robb at the time. Did you... ? You interviewed him at all? Are you going to?

**Farley:** No...

[redacted] No?

**Farley:** We hadn't been... We were going to interview Robb. But he's hard to pin down. We have not approached Dave Gaddy. But I'm sure he'd be delighted. Trouble is we don't have enough tape! (TR NOTE: Laughter heard.)

[redacted] Not enough tapes! (B% You want me) buy tapes? Is that it?

**Farley:** You know Dave as well as I do!

[redacted] Yeah. How about Bernie Elliker?

~~Derived From: NSA/COM 1-82~~

~~Dated: 20041120~~

~~Declassify On: 20204123~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204123~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

Farley: No, we haven't talked to Bernie yet.

Newton: Ah, he's on my list also.

[redacted] Yeah.

Newton: Ah... I...

[redacted] Y.P. Kim, of course...

Newton: Right.

[redacted] I don't know if he's still cleared.

Farley: Yes. He's still at the school... Off and on at the school, I think.

[redacted] He had access to good... He went to the U.N. Bernie Elliker, George Robb and...

Farley: Sammy Hong?

[redacted] No. Bernie Elliker, George Robb and Y.P. Kim went to the U.N. And took the evidence...

Farley: I interviewed Y.P.

[redacted] You did?

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted] Yeah.

Newton: [redacted] Excuse me.

Farley: No. Go ahead.

Newton: What kind of... ?

Farley: Let me just start it off again, Bob.

Newton: Yeah.

Farley: [redacted] thanks much again for your time.

Newton: Yeah.

Farley: We're going to talk about the *Pueblo*. We don't need to go in details on your biog and your military service and all of that because we have that on the EC-121 tape. But what Bob wants to do: he has dozens of questions to sort of fill in the gaps on the *Pueblo* story. Henry Millington started to do this. And there are still big questions in certain areas that you can fill us in. So Bob had said that you had some trouble recalling what really happened. That if Bob really gave a run-through on what he remembers, it might stimulate your memory. So let's pick it up, Robert. And if you would just...

Newton: OK.

Farley: Give a resume of what you recall.

Newton: And first (2-3B).

[redacted] Excuse me. Can I take notes?

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291120~~

Farley:

Sure.

Newton:

Sure.

[redacted]

Of... Or should I interrupt as we go?

Farley:

Please do.

[redacted]

Either way?

Newton:

Interrupt any time, OK?

[redacted]

Yeah.

Newton:

Right. And before we start, what kind of classification are we getting into here, [redacted]?

[redacted]

Well, certainly it's TOP SECRET SI.

Newton:

Yes.

[redacted]

Some of it was declassified. But I don't know which parts. So... And I would certainly keep it at the NOFORN level. Certainly, some of this shouldn't be released [redacted] for example.

Farley:

Of course. Yeah.

[redacted]

Newton:

Any compartmented areas?

[redacted]

We might get into TK (B% a bit.) But none of the VRK that I...

Newton:

None of the VRK?

[redacted]

That I recall at the time.

Newton:

OK, I see.

[redacted]

It may. If it is, we'll stop and I'll tell you that. But I can't...

Newton:

We have some of the clearance... At least, I have some of the clearances, if that's necessary.

[redacted]

OK.

Newton:

If you find that...

[redacted]

Yeah. Right.

Newton:

OK. Briefly, just to - as you suggested before - to jog some memories. In 1964, some people, I believe led by the then-DDR&E Eugene Fubini - Dr. Fubini - made a suggestion that the U.S. might consider having what he called a U.S. SIGINT trawler program. When he found out that the Soviets had... had long since had such a program operating on the high seas, he said, "Well, why not the U.S.?" And along around the same time, (B% USIB) and the Intelligence Community said that, "We have some high... rather high priority items against North Korea that are not currently being satisfied. So let's get the... Let's get this program going." The problem was: they had a number of U.S. SIGINT ships. But they were large. Some of them six... Old Victory class ships. Six thousand tons. And

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

even Liberty class: 10 to 11 thousand tons. They were talking about a smaller ship. They called it a SIGINT trawler. But what they ended up with was: getting some old (B% AKLs) or light cargo ships. And they found them. They were in moth balls. They were used intra-island service in World War II. They got several of these. And the first of the... of this class was the *Banner*. She operated off of the Soviet, North Korean and maybe even the China periphery in '62 and '63. Ah... '63 and '64. This was the so-called AGER program: Auxiliary General Environmental Research. Which is what the Navy came up with as a cover for its SIGINT ship. After the *Banner* came the *Pueblo*. And she was outfitting for many months in Seattle. I think they ended up with something like 5 million dollars to covert the ship. That was much more than the ship was worth (3-4B by chuckling.) It was around 900 tons. Anyway, after many false starts, they finally got the ship going. They went, first, to Hawaii. And its first mission was off the coast of North Korea. And after that, to proceed off Primorskij Kraj and go against Soviet targets. Many questions about whether the capabilities of the NSG detachment aboard were capable before the ship departed. It all seemed to be... After they got the ship going, it all seemed to be a rush program just to get the ship operational. Some question about the capabilities of the Korean linguists, etcetera. And of course, there were many animosities among the various members of the crew. They weren't working together. She had proceeded to several of its stations off the North Korean coast: Mars, Pluto, what have you. And on the 23rd of January, some Korean sub chasers - torpedo boats - approached the ship and started circling. Several hours later... Finally, the order was issued: "Heave to, or we'll fire." They started backing down towards the stern of the *Pueblo* with the intention of boarding. This was after they had fired any number of rounds into the ship, trying desperately to knock out the command and control. None of the... None of the firing was directed below the water line or anywhere near the water line. It was all directed at the superstructure.

[redacted]

Newton:

At the bridge.

Right. And of course, while the sub chasers were firing away with their deck guns and machine guns, one of the shells hit a vital spot and killed one of the crew members. Then they boarded. And started to direct the ship towards Wonsan. Every time the *Pueblo* made an attempt to turn around or slow down or try to escape, they started the firing again. Eventually, they took the ship into Wonsan and then interred the crew for the next 11 months. On the release of the crew, they got them back to the U.S. They debriefed each member. And there, started to get, for the first time, a real good handle on the compromise: what documents were aboard; crypto equipment, etcetera.

Farley:

OK. That's good. Let's pick it up then, [redacted] where were you assigned, say, in December or the Fall of 1967? *Pueblo* is January 23rd, '68. Where were you assigned six or eight months before?

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291429~~

[redacted] Well, I was the chief of the North Korean navy section. Newly established. We didn't have much of an effort on North Korean navy. And it was a small section. Six to eight people. And I had originally... Before that, I had been assigned to the North Korean air problem as an analyst - and for a short time, the section chief there. And then, I was moved over take this new section. And I was trying to remember who the chief of that division was at the time. I guess it doesn't matter, but I... Oh! Don Beckman, I believe, was on the staff at the time.

Farley: The 05?

[redacted] Do you plan to interview him as well?

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted] You do?

Farley: We did interview him.

[redacted] You did?

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted] OK. So he could collaborate on some of this, I...

Farley: I saw him in Florida about three weeks ago.

[redacted] Oh, did you?

Farley: Yeah. He's doing well.

[redacted] Yeah. Good... Good for him. He's retired now. We...

Farley: Well...

[redacted] Can I comment at some of this that you said?

Newton: Please do.

Farley: Please do.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted] Because I... I wasn't aware that Dr. Fubini, who was... I guess, he was... Was he in the... ? He didn't work at NSA.

Newton: No, no.

Farley: No.

Newton: He was DDR&E at the time.

[redacted] Yeah. And I didn't know about that basic DOD decision. I guess I heard about it after... during the debrief process. I was... I was a debriefer in San Diego as well.

Newton: Yes, yes.

[redacted] And heard of... and got exposed to some of that information later on in the *Congressional Review*. But the first we knew of the *Pueblo* - or the AKL program, I guess... You know, of course, we all knew about the *Liberty* being shot up. I guess was that a year or so before?

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291429~~ Page 5



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

Newton: '67.

[redacted] '67.

Newton: Right. Yes.

[redacted] Yeah.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted] And so, we were familiar with that very traumatic kind of incident. And I had the experience on the Korean air problem, so I had... on the air defense problem. So I had... I was aware that the Koreans... Whenever we would fly an airborne reconnaissance platform in the Sea of Japan, the Koreans would scramble fighters.

TRNOTE: Audio becomes overdriven at this point.

[redacted] And in one incidence... And I forget the exact year, but you can find it... I think it's an RB-47 was shot up. They went out and actually took a couple of shots at her. And we had pictures later on that they blew holes in the side of her. Not just one. But they hit her two or three times. She limped back into Yokota. But that was the airborne... the ACRP program: the early part of that in the Sea of Japan. So the Air Force was very sensitive to, you know, the whole White Wolf advisory program and all of that that was in place at the time. Airborne reconnaissance in that part of the world was a... was a very dangerous proposition.

Newton: And the Navy was not...

[redacted] Well, the whole White Wolf advisory system, of course, is... was geared towards the ACRP. And the Navy, of course... This whole thing about the decision of Dr. Fubini to do this... This was a Navy asset. It was a not an NSA asset.

Newton: Right.

[redacted] The AGER or the AKL program was a Navy asset. The Navy was taking the initiative to build SIGINT... small SIGINT trawlers. And I'm not sure and... To this day, I don't believe that that... that whole program, as far as the North Korean... the requirements for that kind of collection against North Korea - from where at least I sat at the time - there wasn't that kind of pressing requirement. Now, the Navy may have felt they had an operational requirement to do this, but insofar as the SIGINT analyst sitting at the desk close to the problem on the air and the navy target was concerned, we didn't have that kind of requirement: to collect more of the same, if you will. We... So the decision to send the *Pueblo*... Before her, the *Banner* actually made a pass by there. And there was a... There was some concern about that. The year before she made a pass...

Newton: Of the safety of the *Banner*?

[redacted] Yeah. There was some concern by us, as well, concerning the *Banner* - when she went breezing by on the way to deployment off Vladivostok. And this was, as you indicated, the initial deployment of the *Pueblo*. And when

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 6

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

we first saw the planning message for that in our section, it was near Christmas time that we saw it. Christmas of '67. Both Don Beckman and I... Don, of course, had a long history on the Korean air problem. And he and I worked together on that. And knew of the incidences... And there were several of these where we had scrambles. And one actual where it was a... where there was not only a scramble but an intercept (B% intent) and a shot... a shot at an airborne reconnaissance in the Sea of Japan...

Newton:

Yes. If I could interrupt for just a second, [ ] You mention the knowledgability of the U.S. Air Force and the sensitivity that the North Koreans had to U.S. ACRP flights. Was the Navy also involved in the airborne collection program? Running its usual... ?

[ ]

There was nothing specifically in the Sea of Japan - in close. They had, off land. They would run like they did with the EC-121 a year later. They had (B% off) Vladivostok, but nothing off the coast of Korea - that I recall - that the Navy ran in there. It was Air Force. And again, when the Navy ran their assets, it was not a... it was not a part of the national assets, it was part of the Navy assets.

Newton:

Right.

[ ]

So it wasn't part of the whole mechanism...

Newton:

So-called "direct support"?

[ ]

Direct support. And this...

Newton:

Yes.

[ ]

This deployment of the *Banner*, initially - and then, the *Pueblo* was under that same requirement to meet Navy needs. And it was an advisory to us. It was an advisory. It wasn't a... I don't... (TR NOTE: Phone begins to ring in background.) It wasn't part of NSA's chop, if you will, that we had a voice in whether or not the *Pueblo* or the *Banner* or any of them could... should be deployed for SIGINT requirements.

Newton:

Yes, right.

[ ]

It was for Navy requirements. That's why I want to make sure that was clear up front.

Farley:

Good!

[ ]

OK?

Newton:

Apparently... And I've... Going through the documents, the Navy got USIB to go along. NSA went along, too, because I guess they could satisfy some other collection - that they would not have to use, say, overhead. They could use the *Banner* to task on a "as available" basis when the Navy didn't need it for direct support. But do you personally know of any COMINT... ? Do you recall any COMINT requirements against North Korea that the U.S. community had that were not being satisfied by the usual sources of collection?

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 7

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

[redacted] No. And... I... We, at our level, at least and all that... You know, granted, at that time, you know, your vision is a little limited because you've got this little piece of the action you're involved with. But at that time, we didn't see any reason to deploy that kind of ship to collect... In fact, we (B% said)... You know, we often questioned whether or not the risk was worth the gain. That was always the question we analysts, at least, had at that time: whether or not you need to fly the ACRP in that air, I mean, to collect VHF. You get some very good tactical communications because they're coming off, you know, the intercept path.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted] Yeah. Out of GCI, you get a lot of tactic stuff. But they (B% were going after the) ACRP. And I don't know. I guess that's good information to have. But whether or not you need to put somebody in harm's way to do that... You see what I'm saying?

Newton: Yes. Sure, sure.

[redacted] The Koreans... We used to say this a lot. The Koreans... That piece of... That piece of geography which juts in around Wonsan: that is... that's... We always called it the North Korean Lake. They didn't respect... They felt that that was theirs, you know? That was... That's... Anything from Vladivostok down, you know, that whole body of water which we call the Sea of Japan out from Wonsan Harbor, that was Korean territory, in their eyes.

Newton: And...

[redacted] And we recognized that.

Newton: What period of time did the North Koreans consider this so-called "lake" to be theirs? What... ? When did this... ? When did this first become evident?

[redacted] Oh, it's for... I was trying to remember that. But if you went back and checked on the RB-47, the... you know, the ACRP, I bet that was '65. '65.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted] I'll bet it was and... A year before that, anyway. In '64, '65. And when I moved to the North Korean navy section, we began watching the Navy reaction from both coasts. Not just the east coast, but the west coast as well. Any fishing... South Korean fishing activity was (B% out). There would be constant reaction to that. Constant reaction. And it didn't matter where they were. Twelve... Three miles, 12 miles, 50 miles out. The South Koreans were always in danger of being... In fact, were shot up a lot on... near a coast, if they went across the hypothetical line that the DMZ extended out into the ocean. So they viewed anything that went north of that hypothetical line of the DMZ extended as fair game. And had for at least two or three years.

Newton: As far as the North Koreans were concerned: that DMZ line extended out into the water for as long a distance as they could reach. What it was.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 8

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

[REDACTED]: Whatever their tactical capability was to get out and come back: that was their... .

Newton: Say 50?

[REDACTED]: Whatever it was.

Newton: A hundred!

[REDACTED]: I don't know whether... Whatever the range of their vessels or aircraft were: they viewed that as their... their territory and their territory to protect. And they... And that was very evident from watching the North Korean... North Korean and South Korean fishing activity, which is very lucrative there on either side of the coast. That, that was... It was always a trouble spot. I can't remember how many spot reports that I was involved with that had to do with clashes between North Korean navy and South Korean navy - and North Korean fishing and South Korean fishing in that part of the... A lot of them. I mean, you could... A lot. Both coasts: almost every week you'd have an incident.

Newton: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: And they were looking for infiltration. Whatever they were doing. They always... Very, very sensitive about... about South Koreans infiltrating and the North Koreans infiltrating the other side. So, it's a state of siege almost. Anyway...

Newton: I have a number of questions here, [REDACTED] And I apologize if one may overlap the other. And I don't want to press us too much for time.

[REDACTED]: I think we're going to take a lot more time. I...

Farley: Yes.

[REDACTED]: The catharsis, you might suggest, is (B% ready); it's going to be good for me. (TR NOTE: He laughs.)

Farley: Well, you've been wanting to talk about this, right?

[REDACTED]: Well, yeah. There's a few things that I've been wanting to say.

Farley: OK.

[REDACTED]: And so, you know, if we can't do it today, we can take some more time.

Newton: All right.

[REDACTED]: Don't feel like we have time (2-3B)...

Farley: OK. Are you going to cover the bit about the message that... ?

Newton: Yeah. All right.

Farley: All right, Sir. (XB by Farley laughing.)

Newton: Number one. Number one. The circumstances surrounding *the* NSA message...

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~

**Newton:** To CINCPAC/JRC pointing out North Korean aggressiveness. Could you go ahead and describe that please? Where did that originate? How did it get going? What was your part in it?

[redacted]: Well, I originated it. I wrote it based on... You know... Based on all this (1G) I just gave you - having lived through that for a couple of years, at least; two or three years. And seeing that. And then seeing near Christmas a message from the Navy that kind of advised us they're going to send the *Pueblo* there, I was shocked. I said, "Isn't anybody reading the SIGINT?" You know? Because, you know, we had clear SIGINT evidence that that was a dangerous thing to do. So I crafted a message. And we had to play with the wording a lot, because it really was none of our business. I mean, in essence, it's a...

**Newton:** With the Navy directing the program.

[redacted]: Exactly.

**Newton:** Yes.

[redacted]: And... So we drafted a message. It was similar to a message we had drafted earlier on the *Banner* that said, "Hey," you know, "Just watch it." But after some back and forth - primarily between Don Beckman and I and some coordination throughout the building - the message went out. It was... I never kept a copy of the original draft. The original draft was quite a bit stronger. It was almost directive, you see: "You shouldn't do this," sort of language. I don't exactly... how it was put. But it was... In the finished process, it always is... you know...

**Newton:** Right.

[redacted]: You know, it was much more polite. And much more polished, if you will. It wasn't as blunt as the way I had written it originally.

**Farley:** Somebody said it was watered down too much. (TR NOTE: He chuckles.)

[redacted]: Well, I don't know if it was watered down, but it said the same thing. But it said it in much softer language, if you will.

**Newton:** It has to be watered down, as usual, in these kinds of things, because of the politics of the situation. Right?

[redacted]: Of course! Of course! I mean, we went through Eugene Sheck and I guess... I don't know if you've talked to...

**Farley:** John Collins? Yeah.

[redacted]: Gene Sheck and... Dick Harvey is still in the building.

**Newton:** Yeah. Yes.

[redacted]: They were K, I think, at the time. And the collection management folks...

**Newton:** Yeah.

[redacted]: For the Agency. And they were tuned into this... this... the political side of this. And that is that, you know, "Hey. We got to... No, you can't tell the

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~ Page 10

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

Navy what to do. It's their program. But we got to, at least, point out to them what we've seen through SIGINT." Because it... What was in that message was... had already been reported ad nauseam in SIGINT product.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: And we just wanted to remind the Navy that, "Hey, there's a body of SIGINT that indicates that the risk you're taking here is not worth the gain." And the... I forget the exact... I have a copy in my desk. (TR NOTE: Shuffling of papers heard.) I guess, the risk... The exact wording of the message (B% went out)... Now, the other thing is that... I don't know if Don told you this or not. But there were a few other addressees on that message. You know, lower-level Navy folk. And in the process of coordination, they got chopped off. Did Beckman... ? Beckman tell you about that?

Newton: No.

[redacted]: He... He actually coordinated that message. He took it. I didn't. He was the staff guy. He took that message around. And I don't remember exactly how many or who exactly they were. But it... in the process of coordination, it was determined that it would be better to send it to the responsible people. To JRC, JCS. And it was theirs to call. And that readdressal of that and action downward by that was really theirs to do. Now, I've lived with that for some time, you know? I... That, and another thing that has bothered me for 22-odd years, I guess. And I want to get it off my chest. And that is, you know, we could... you could say, "Yeah, well, NSA did a good thing. We were great. We went out and we told the world what was going to happen before it happened." And you know, I guess General Carter used to wave that message around a lot.

Farley: I know! (TR NOTE: He chuckles.)

[redacted]: And say, you know, "Look what we did! We told you you shouldn't go. And you did it anyway." But see. I think... I mean, we have to take some responsibility. Not "we": "I", I think, here - in that, we could have probably done more. We could have maybe readdressed that message to others, you know? We could have done more phone work. We... The NSA... NSA people could have done more phone work with the people in liaison - as we... as we... We do more of that today, where we actually pick up the phone and call people and say, "Hey, have you... ? You ought to read that message I just sent you."

Newton: If I could interrupt, [redacted] for a minute.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: That was the complaint by the senior level people...

[redacted]: Yeah, I know.

Newton: In CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT...

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 11

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

[REDACTED]: I know.

Newton: After the fact, of course.

[REDACTED]: I know.

Newton: Claiming that - and I have no reason to doubt this - that they never saw the message...

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Newton: Saying things like, quote, "It was never addressed to me." Is that what you're referring to? Send the message to a specific individual, instead of commands?

[REDACTED]: Yeah. I think... I saw that complaint. And I felt that... I felt that when I came in that night and heard a guy got killed and another guy got his leg blown off and they were going to... (that) they'd been captured, (1G) you know... .In fact, Don Beckman and I said... The first reaction was, "Should have sent that message to a wider distribution." I mean, that was... That was our... Both of our initial reaction the day of the incident: was that.

Newton: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: And I think the Navy, you know... Although that never really came out anywhere. But I think the Navy had a point. That's my personal view today. And looking back on history, we could have done that. We could have also called people and say, "Read that message." It wasn't until, you know... An interesting twist to this... And you can look back through the damage assessment of... If you have all the damage assessment stuff...

Newton: Yes, yes.

[REDACTED]: Look back through there. I wrote part of the damage assessment one, when we debrief the crew. I was privileged to do that. And one of the messages that was on the *Pueblo* was the message we sent to the *Banner*.

Farley: Is that right?

[REDACTED]: Which went to a wider distribution.

Farley: Oh yeah. Yeah.

[REDACTED]: And though... Although it was much subtler, it had essentially the same message as the one we sent to the *Pueblo*. And that is: "It isn't smart to do this off of North Korea." OK?

Farley: Right.

[REDACTED]: So...

Farley: You called them "unpredictable."

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Farley: That was one of the words you used...

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 12

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Newton: Incidentally, some of the *Banner* reports, the OIC reports: they were aboard the *Pueblo*.

[redacted]: Yeah. And that was among them...

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Where you? That... The damage assessment that I wrote, concerning that, was... that particular item was: OK. This would show the North Koreans that we had the capability to assess their intentions regarding the deployment of a ship like this.

Farley: Oh, great. (TR NOTE: Laughter heard.) Great.

Newton: I wanted to ask you...

[redacted]: (XB by laughter.)

Newton: I wanted to ask you also: was anything ever received from [redacted] along the lines of this position that you and others here at NSA took regarding the danger of that area, as far as a SIGINT ship like the *Pueblo* deploying? Was anything received from [redacted] on that?

[redacted]: Not that I'm aware of. Was... ? Somebody say there is something in from [redacted]?

Newton: Ah...

[redacted]: You talked to Tom Land? He was out there.

Newton: He was there. And I did talk to him on the phone only. We didn't interview him. He said that he sent something. He recalled something coming in from [redacted] along the same lines. But his memory fails him on just what the message what.

[redacted]: So... He was at the other end. He was at...

Newton: He was at the other end, right.

[redacted]: [redacted] as was (B% [redacted]) He was out there.

Newton: Yeah. He was... He said when I called him, he said he was more involved with [redacted]?

[redacted]: [redacted]

Newton: [redacted] And also getting the materials to the U.N. thing.

[redacted]: Yeah. Yeah, I got a lot to say about that, too. (TR NOTE: Laughter heard.)

Newton: Again, I want to clarify one point. Your concern regarding the danger to the ship if they deploy: that was based on a whole slew of incidents? Not any one specific thing, right?

[redacted]: Yes.

Newton: OK.

Farley: A culmination, I guess, of...

Newton: Right - all of them.

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20251125~~

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Right.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: Was there any evidence at the time indicating that the North Koreans were planning the seizure of the next U.S. SIGINT ship that appeared off its east coast? The *Banner* or any other such vessel?

[redacted]: No, I know that had been speculated. But I... I didn't see anything that would suggest that. I do know - and this will get me into some of what we just talked about - was that [redacted] some of the technical material to assess this whole... this whole incident. I can go back in this. Because it's... Again, it's a catharsis for me. It's... We got... We got the initial reflections in electrical cables. We didn't have...

[redacted] HF manual Morse position reports of tracking... surface-to-surface tracking radars along the coast. And their positioning of the *Pueblo* and where she was. And then, some VHF collection, ok, [redacted] And because the comms weren't as they are today, it was hard to get all that in. [redacted]

And getting that information back was usually courier. And, you know, getting it into the system was hard. Manual Morse would get in, actually, sometimes, days after the fact. And the VHF voice collection, after it's transcribed - because you had to ship tapes and all that stuff... That was a long time before you...

Newton: [redacted] and LA problem.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]

So there was that snafu. Then, the other part was that some of what [redacted] sent in... And I communicated with him on the Opscomm and others [redacted] a couple of times during this whole period. The initial data that came in: we tracked... we plotted that out on a map. This part is going to get a little funny. We plotted all that out on a map. And it showed that she was clearly outside territorial waters off North Korea. We did a very nice (B% pretty) map with all kinds of lines on it. And it was a very impressive map. And George Robb, Bernie Elliker and Y.P. Kim took that map that we prepared in our section there up to the U.N. And displayed it for the world... To say, "Hey... " You know, to show... And they played a voice recording of the Koreans when she was backing up: "Heave to, or I'll open fire." Identifying the ship: the G-E-R 2. The... You

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~

could hear it clearly. "G-E-R 2. G-E-R 2." Identifying it at a precise time... at a precise time when the North Koreans themselves said, (TR NOTE: Phone rings twice) "This is where it was," to show clearly to the world and the U.N. body that she was in territorial waters and she was being attacked by these North Koreans. That was the reason they went there: to do that.

**Newton:** That was, perhaps, one of the reasons why the North Koreans - after they boarded - were so anxious to get that ship in close and quickly.

[redacted]: Yes. I'm sure of that. I'm sure of that. But we were presenting evidence - and had evidence clearly, in SIGINT, that she was clearly outside... I don't know how many... 20 some odd miles out there.

**Newton:** She went out to... I heard a figure like 25. But the closest she ever went in at any time was 12.8.

[redacted]: Yes.

**Newton:** Something like that.

[redacted]: During the whole (B% voyage.)

**Newton:** Yes.

[redacted]: Yeah.

**Newton:** Yeah.

[redacted]: Based on the track of her... But the part that I wanted to clarify on that was that it's an interesting little twist. It wasn't until they came back from the U.N. and this thing was in the press and it was declassified where it was and all of this stuff that we actually got the raw data on which [redacted] initial cable came in to support what they had said. That this is where she is, you know? And they had plotted that out and so forth. We got... finally got the raw data in. And I... We... Our analysts plotted it out again. And the track that we had didn't match the track that was on that map that went up to the U.N. (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.) Extremely traumatic. Did not... It didn't put it inside territorial water, obviously. But the track didn't match precisely what had been presented to the world. So the SIGINT fact... I mean, the Koreans could... The Korean, if they wanted to, you know... Or if they were smart enough or if anybody was smart enough (1-2G), you know, "That's not where she was." But, you know, in challenging that, you'd have to say that...

**Farley:** Yeah.

[redacted]: You know, it was somewhere else. But it was outside territorial waters. But the track was different.

**Farley:** Your secrets were kept, then, weren't they? (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

[redacted]: So, I guess if you wanted to assess this, well, you know, no use of us changing our codes or tracking and all of that, because they obviously don't know! (TR NOTE: Burst of laughter.)

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Farley: (1-2B by laughter) (B% sad)!

[redacted]: (B% What they gave to the U.N. was more) accurate.

Farley: They didn't challenge it, right? (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

[redacted]: Now, the other part of that - and I'm sorry if I... You guys are going to have time with me, because I've got a lot to say.

Farley: Good. (TR NOTE: More chuckling.)

[redacted]: Some of it... (B% It isn't) anywhere in the record. I don't know whether or not... I think George Robb would remember this. I'm certain Bernie Elliker would. And...

Newton: Y.P. would.

[redacted]: Y.P. may. Although he didn't... He was... His main involvement was in the voice part of this. He wasn't in any management position in this whole situation. He was being used as a linguist. Pure and simple.

Newton: Yeah, yeah. Kim?

[redacted]: Y.P. Kim. Yeah. Beautiful man. He's like a father to me. But he... In this particular thing - although he was a division chief at one time there - he was being used as a linguistic consultant. And that was his primary role. And most of what he (1G) is the [im]punity of what the Koreans were saying. And he was going to the U.N. to make sure that if... that they were going to play the tape. And they did play the tape.

Farley: [redacted], he said that he sat behind the scenes...

[redacted]: Yes.

Farley: Because he didn't want the people who were with him at (B% Pam Moon Jong [Pan Mun Jong?])...

[redacted]: Yes.

Farley: To recognize him as the, you know...

[redacted]: Yes, that's right.

Farley: Person who had (1-2G). So he sat behind... And worked with the SSO people.

[redacted]: Yes.

Farley: And translated it over telephone.

[redacted]: Yep.

Newton: Question, [redacted], on... Did you ever see or come across anything in this whole thing that would lead you to conclude that there was collusion between the Soviets and the North Koreans?

[redacted]: Yeah. I've heard that, too. I was going to get to that. I didn't see... That has been speculated. They... Soon after they were there, in the process of debriefing... I mean, the advisors that came there to help debrief - I mean, to interrogate, I guess is a better word - the *Pueblo* crew... The

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 16

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20294423~~

Soviet advisors were there very soon after they were captured. So there was always a lot of speculation about that. I don't... I don't have anything from my database to support that. But I do want to talk about prior knowledge a little bit.

Newton: Yes. Good.

[redacted]: Because it's another one of those snafus [redacted]

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: It was a long time after... I forget the exact period. But it was quite a while after the incident. And George Robb made a decision that we needed to document this. You, perhaps, have seen the documentation. It's called "The Voyage and Capture of the *USS Pueblo*."

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: It has all the documentation concerning that. And his idea was to go back and... go back in time and review all of that data as minutely as we could...

Farley: Let me switch, [redacted].

[redacted]: OK. (TR NOTE: Taping stops. When it resumes, Farley is speaking as follows:)

Farley: (TR NOTE: Sound of tape recorder being turned on.) Go.

[redacted]: So they had a task force that I was the head of that was to get together and put it all in files for posterity. Catalog it. Inventory it. And make sure that it all was there. And get every piece of shred of information that we could get during the period that she was off the coast of Korea from 12 or 13, I think, January...

Newton: January, right.

[redacted]: To the day of the capture. And to document that as thoroughly as possible. And get all the (B% track) in one spot. So in starting that process, I found soon after we started that I was missing some tape numbers. I was missing some tape numbers in the logs that we were keeping - so that I couldn't account for a couple of tapes that were about an hour before the incident itself.

Farley: Oh, boy!

[redacted]: OK? I didn't know where the hell are these. So we sent a message to [redacted] And said, "We don't have the data for these tapes. Where's the electrical transcript and all that?" And it wasn't... I think it was like a month... It was almost a month after the fact. We're talking three weeks or... Maybe three weeks. Something like that. After the fact. We found out that [redacted] has some data when the ships first began tracking it, and identified it as an intruder. As they did... Now, they identified anything that crossed that imaginary line that I mentioned as an intruder - as an enemy, if you will. And they began tracking it. And they dispatched these North Korean ships

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20294423~~ Page 17

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~

out there. So we got the voice take on these ships as they were leaving Wonsan Harbor and going out, before they actually... before the data that we got that we that we had when we went up to the U.N. with all the, you know, "Heave to, or I'll open fire," and all of that stuff. We had a lot of... like an hour's worth of information that we didn't really have in the system until like three weeks after the fact. Which was kind of warning information, if you will...

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: Warning information that says, "Hey, the Koreans identified this ship as an intruder - an enemy. And they're making plans to go out and intercept her." And they went out and they started talking about her and what were... they were going to do and all that - long before the initial intercepts that we reported at the height of the incident itself. Am I clear on that? :

Farley: Yes. :

Newton: Yes, yes.

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted]: So there was a lot of stuff there. (B% And then,) it was... And we published that - the raw transcript - as a SIGINT product. It was a raw translation. But it wasn't published until some time afterwards, OK... :

Newton: Yes. :

[redacted]: Is the point I want to make on that. And the... The thing that bothers me still today is that, again, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] that the North Koreans are talking about? This G-E-R 2 thing - (they) were talking about. And this intruder... [redacted]

[redacted] And as was the common occurrence where you're having skirmishes between North Korea and South Korea, it was probably judged to be another one of those. And it wasn't until probably several hours after the fact [redacted] that it was a U.S. reconnaissance ship.

Newton: I see.

[redacted]: You see?

Newton: Yeah. And even, [redacted], if that material was available, say, to the *Pueblo* and to the senior U.S. Navy people before the fact, it would have been good for warning purposes. Is someone or a number of ships coming out to check you over, it didn't mean seizure...

[redacted]: No, but...

Newton: Or...

[redacted]: They based on the precedent, (2-3B by talking). I mean, they (XB; also,

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20251129~~

overdriven)...

Newton: That's true.

[redacted]: You know?

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: You could reach the logical conclusion...

Newton: Yes...

[redacted]: That they were going to do harm to this... whatever this intruder was.

Newton: Yes, yeah.

[redacted]: They didn't know... I didn't see anything in that transcript that they were deploying against something that they knew was going to be there. You see what I'm... ? In answer to your specific question about prior knowledge.

Newton: I see. Right.

[redacted]: I didn't see anything in that transcript that would suggest that. But they were reacting to - as they had for... as I've said two or three years before - to anything that comes into those waters and...

Newton: And in your view, it didn't make any difference what flag this ship was flying?

[redacted]: Nope.

Newton: Right. As long as it was in that area.

[redacted]: They became very excited when they found out it was a U.S. vessel. And they kept talking about the G-E-R 2 and the signal (3-4G) that, you know, that "We're going to board you," and all of this. Well, the reason I mentioned that is another... is that there is another hour there, OK? If you had a system in place of an advisory warning [redacted] and all of that was done, it... You look back on that and you say, retrospectively, could she have gotten out of harm's way had all of that had been in place? [redacted] and they say, "Hey. They're coming out," and you know... You... I don't know. (XG) speed to them, I guess; I don't know whether or not we could have done anything about keeping her from being capture: is all I'm saying. If the [redacted] you would issue an advisory and, at least, they take evasive action.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: [redacted]

Newton: OK. Next question, [redacted]. Can you describe from your recollection the extent of the compromise on [redacted] North Korean, [redacted]

[redacted]: Yeah. Al... You know, Al Murphy?

EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Yes.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: Have you talked to him?

Farley: No.

Newton: Not yet. No. I have him on my list also.

[redacted]: Yeah. He was involved. He's probably a better... He... I helped him on this project. But he was in charge of this project, where we were doing a study. He actually (B% graphed) such a study. My personal view -, and AI may argue with this a bit because I... It didn't make... I mean, it didn't... There was no ripple effect in Korea. They didn't [redacted] if that's what you're driving at. There wasn't any...

Farley: Hmm. That's something.

Newton: Boy! There it is again. Nobody does nothing. It's hard to believe, isn't it?

[redacted]: They didn't know what they had. I mean, I saw reports... I saw TV... I mean, not TV. It was film coverage of... a North Korean film. Plain across the table were top secret documents that I wrote. I mean, SIGINT product that I had written on that table. They... And it was encased with a yellow jacket on it. And all of that stuff. It was just all laying out there.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Tons of it. Just laying out there on tables. And they had it there for foreign visitors to see. And for propaganda, they took this picture. And we got a copy of this North Korean film. But the crew would tell me that, you know... Several months after the fact, I talked to several of the crew about this when we debriefed them. And they had... They'd be on the playground during one of their... during their exercise period...

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: And they'd be doing calisthenics or something. And there'd be a piece of paper float across the (B% darn) playground. And it'd have TOP SECRET UMBRA on it.

Farley: God! (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

[redacted]: And they had it stored in trash cans. And the wind was blowing it around. I mean, there wasn't any cataloging or any of that they could see that was done to all that.

Farley: Great.

[redacted]: And it was... There was no systematic, I don't think, that I... based on what the crew was saying... based on what... They didn't take any action as a result of this. I mean, [redacted] was on there, you know?

Newton: [redacted]

[redacted]: There was [redacted] I... They may [redacted] for all I know.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201428~~

Newton: There was some rumor that they passed a lot of that material to the Soviet Union.

[redacted]: That's possible, but it's... It would seem that Soviet advisors were there, helping in the debrief process.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: But...

Newton: You ever find any thing that you could lay your hands on on that, [redacted]?

[redacted]: No. No, there wasn't any...

[redacted]

I only learned... I only knew of that after the fact.

Newton:

[redacted]

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton:

[redacted]

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton:

[redacted]

[redacted]: Yeah. I don't remember reading that report. I don't... I don't know...

[redacted]: Because, you know, a day or two after, we were caught up in our own...

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]:

You know, trying to sort this thing out from the Korean side, I do know... I remember now that you mentioned it that there was that [redacted] That... But the particulars of it and [redacted] and its relationship to anything, I don't... Now, (1-2G) may be speculating (1-2G) [redacted] and others that the (C% So's) were there beforehand and after and all of that. But I didn't see anything in SIGINT to suggest... Of course, I was right in the middle of (B% of this flap)...

Farley: Sure.

[redacted]: So I... The peripheral vision on... for me wasn't very good.

Farley: Right.

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291420~~

Newton: On the documents, again, aboard the *Pueblo*, the most extensive damage

[Redacted]

[Redacted]: Well, they had the [Redacted] Ah... Do you know... ? [Redacted]  
[Redacted]? You know him?

Newton: Yes,

[Redacted]: Are you going to see him?

Farley: Is he still around?

[Redacted]: Yeah. He works in [Redacted] now.

Farley: Oh.

[Redacted]: He's in [Redacted] I think he has... He's in charge of the wellness... ? The gym that we built and all that? Yeah, he's in charge of that. But he was... He was the person that went to San Diego to help debrief... He was [Redacted] expert, if you will. So he would probably be able to answer that. And he helped write the damage assessment [Redacted] On the material that was aboard. ... My particular recollection was

[Redacted]

Farley: Gee!

[Redacted]: Yeah.

Farley: [Redacted]

[Redacted]: No.

Farley: No? I'll be darn! (TR NOTE: He chuckles.) A puzzle, Robert. A puzzle.

Newton: Yeah. [Redacted]

[Redacted]: Yeah. I don't know why. I don't know if they just stored it in barrels. I mean, the crew thinks that they didn't know what they had. And a lot of that stuff they just put in barrels. They... A couple of them saw it sitting... Saw some of this stuff in barrels sitting outside in the weather. And as I say, a couple of pieces floating around on the playground.

Newton: You want something to read? (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.) OK. The North Koreans seized both cryptologic and cryptographic materials from the *Pueblo* in '68.

[Redacted]: Yes.

Newton: Was there any... ever any attempt that you were aware of, [Redacted] whereby the North Koreans [Redacted] were making use of the U.S. cryptographic machines in any of their comms - after the *Pueblo* seizure?

[Redacted]: [Redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Newton: No communications that looked somewhat similar to what the U.S. does or...?

[redacted]: No, no. They... Their cryptographic principles were, at that time - it may be different now - were very archaic. Didn't have any really sophisticated kind of gear.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: I... If they got something like that intact - and I guess they did - it... Knowing how to use it, would, I think, would be outside... The Koreans (B% would want) some help from the So's or somebody. It would be outside their capability to understand what they had. I don't think they would...

Farley: They captured some... What? A KY-7's?

[redacted]: 7.

Farley: Right?

Newton: They took some KW-7, KW-37, KG-14...

[redacted]: Yeah. Right, right.

Newton: KY-8. (B% Not) KY-8. K...

[redacted]: Most of it intact, as well.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: You'd think they'd bounced a sledgehammer off a couple of these things. But...

Newton: And what was damaged on the machine: they had a whole storehouse full of replaceable parts. So... (TR NOTE: Farley chuckles.) Yeah.

Farley: Yeah.

Newton: Yeah. We mentioned a few minutes ago, [redacted], the compartmented areas. The only... (B% [redacted]). The only one that I came across in reading some of the damage assessment documents was something called a [redacted] which supposedly was at that time [redacted]

[redacted]: Yes.

Newton: [redacted]

[redacted]: Yes.

Farley: Right.

Newton: [redacted]

[redacted]: Right. I remember that.

Newton: [redacted]

Farley: So do I.

Newton: Whatever happened to that?

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

[redacted]: Don't know.

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: You can try... Ask [redacted] that [redacted] might remember.

Newton: Was it...? [redacted] (B% [redacted]?)

[redacted]: [redacted]

Newton: [redacted] OK.

[redacted]: He might know. I don't know. Would have to (1-2G). Again, I don't... I don't recall... And we watched it. And Al Murphy... Al Murphy's a good source on this, too.

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: Because this was... This study that he did was a year or so after the fact.

Newton: I want to get into that in just a minute, OK?

[redacted]: Yeah.

Farley: Is he at the school yet?

[redacted]: Yeah. I saw him in a hall the other day.

Farley: OK.

[redacted]: So he's still around. I don't know where he is. But he's still around.

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: In fact, you might want to... If you don't have it in the archives, you probably ought to get a copy of that. It's a very good study. It's a... He did a damn good job on that thing, as I recall. You know, in a fairly short period of time.

Farley: Do you have a copy, Bob? Have you seen the copy of it?

Newton: I have not seen it yet. But I want to get into that in just a second. I want to make... try and get some clarification as to just what this study was. But before we do that, you were an analyst in [redacted] at the time, [redacted]. Were you ever aware of any attempts by your office - other office - to restrict the flow of SIGINT information to the *Pueblo* or any other SIGINT platform?

[redacted]: Oh, no. No. We... Quite the contrary. We tried to get the information about the risk assessment...

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: We emphasized... I mean, it was... It was in product all over the place, you know. Literally...

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Literally hundreds of SPOT reports that were, you know... They...

Newton: I came across information that they were so anxious to do that - to give *Pueblo* everything it needed - that they were being fed by three or four

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 24

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

different source of... different... three or four different organizations.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Newton: Some of them feeding them the same information.

Farley: Oh, yeah.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Newton: That was one of the faults on... of the... That was one of the difficulties they had aboard the *Pueblo*. They had multiple copies of numerous documents.

[REDACTED]: Yes, they did. They Xeroxed a lot. They had a Xerox machine onboard the ship, I think, before she... I don't know whether or not she deployed with it onboard ship. But Bucher... One of them said that when they were in Yokota getting the (B% tech packers) ready to go... Was it Yokota? I think it was. Where they spent a lot of time just duplicating tech records and so forth: the callsigns systems, the tracking codes and all of that stuff.

Farley: Right.

[REDACTED]: Because they were... They didn't feel they were - as you indicated, I think... They didn't feel as though they were trained up to go. And so, they were taking the opportunity to get as much tech documentation as they could. Now, I don't know whether or not the *Pueblo* was... If your question is whether or not the *Pueblo* was on direct distribution to our SIGINT, I don't know that.

Farley: I doubt that.

[REDACTED]: Probably not. There may... Most of what I looked at was, what I called, GENSER traffic.

Newton: Right.

[REDACTED]: There was a tremendous GENSER... I mean, that's what the Navy does with all her ships at sea. There's a GENSER pipe that (2-3B by Newton speaking)...

Newton: Oh, the (B% Guppy)... The...

[REDACTED]: Yeah. Guppy. That's it. The Guppy (B% roll).

Newton: Guppy roll.

[REDACTED]: Yeah. There you go. Guppy roll. Just...

Newton: That (1B) covers a multitude of (B% sends.)

[REDACTED]: Oh, yeah.

Newton: Yes.

[REDACTED]: Tremendous volumes that... I had no idea that that kind of stuff was going to a ship at sea until I was involved with the damage assessment. There was a lot of SIGINT hardcopy information aboard. Some of them were the yellow jackets, and not reproduced copies. But they were... with the yellow

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 25

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

jackets on them. And there were a lot of those. As I say, a lot of it that I've written myself that I saw the serial numbers on this table when they were all spread all over the place. Working aids. TSRs [Technical SIGINT Reports] and hardcopy SIGINT reports. Callsign systems. All of that...

Farley: That they picked up in Japan, or in Hawaii?

[redacted]: The impression I had was both places, they were picked up. That: when they were getting ready to put their crew together for their first mission, they spent a lot of time getting these tech (2G) together.

Newton: The... Harris...

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: The NSG...

Farley: Ops officer?

Newton: Desk chief...

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: Right.

Newton: Was briefed here on all A and B targets...

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: Before he was... Before he...

Farley: Well...

[redacted]: I didn't brief him. (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.) Wish I had. There's another one I...

Farley: Oh, yeah!

[redacted]: I wish I had. That's another one I...

Farley: Trying to be (B% careful)...

[redacted]: And then he came back (XB by laughter.) I wish I had, really!

Farley: Yeah. (TR NOTE: More chuckling.)

Newton: OK. Getting back to the reports after the fact. A year or so after the seizure, there was supposedly some instructions issued - I can only guess by possibly DDO - to Zaslow, who was then [redacted].

[redacted]: Start over, Bob. What? Supposedly what?

Newton: Supposedly some instructions issued to Zaslow by DDO - and I'm taking a guess at these personalities involved here - to take a hard look at [redacted] [redacted] And determine their status. The purpose of this was to isolate the changes - if any - that the North Koreans [redacted] had made in their comms following the *Pueblo* compromise. When the report was completed, it was decided not to publish it. And it was destroyed.

[redacted]: That's the Al Murphy thing.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20251125~~

**Newton:** OK. It... ? Was this the... ?

[redacted] Ah... I don't know. I don't know that last part. But the...

**Newton:** OK. About the destruction?

[redacted] Yeah.

**Newton:** OK.

[redacted] I don't know about the destruction of it. But...

**Newton:** Is this the same report you're talking... ?

[redacted] Right.

**Newton:** OK.

**Farley:** I'm sure Murphy kept a copy for himself. (TR NOTE: He chuckles.)

[redacted] Yeah. It was a...

**Newton:** I got to really track this down.

[redacted] It was... It wasn't... Actually, it was a nice... really big graph chart that he did. He actually graphed it visually as to what happened. Now, it may be I... As I recall, when he briefed George Robb... And I'm not sure why, because I was pretty naive then. I still am, I guess, Bob. But George Robb was not happy with what Murphy had done. I remember that. I remember that. I was at the briefing. And George says, "You missed the mark. How can you graph it? You can't graph something like that." And Bernie was there, too. He might be able to... In fact, Bernie might be able to substantiate that.

**Farley:** Was he Robb's deputy?

[redacted] He was his 04. He worked for Gaddy.

**Farley:** Oh.

[redacted] I think, at the time. Gaddy and Bernie and Charlie Ware.

**Farley:** Oh, yeah.

[redacted] And Bob (B% Thu). Well, they're part of...

**Farley:** I remember. The 04.

[redacted] They're all part of... Well, Bob Thu was the 05, I think. But they were all part of George Robb's staff and... I don't know. Bob... Is Bob still around?

**Farley:** Yes, over...

**Newton:** And Murphy was part of his staff?

[redacted] No. Murphy was an outside resource.

**Newton:** OK.

[redacted] I don't know where he was at the time. But he was called down because of his knowledge of the technique they wanted to use to document this: to go back and do a study. And the study originated pretty high. And George

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

wanted something that I... I don't... I'm not quite sure why... I can't remember why George... But I remember attending the briefing. And I got the clear distinction that Robb was not happy with what he said and saw.

**Newton:** Yes. I don't know who exactly mentioned... Maybe it was David... Dave Gaddy who mentioned that the report may have been destroyed because there was nothing really concrete that they could point to or because it was sensitive or what the reason was, I don't know. But I'll... I will see Murphy on that.

[REDACTED]: Well, I... Knowing Al, he would remember. He would (2-3G) the copy. He'd remember exactly what the thrust of the conclusions were.

**Newton:** Right.

[REDACTED]: And I'm sorry I don't.

**Farley:** It's all right.

**Newton:** I'm finished.

[REDACTED]: You're finished!

**Farley:** You're finished?

**Newton:** Oh, other than to ask: any general comments on the whole... the whole episode? On the standpoint of NSA? The Navy? [REDACTED]? Agree? Disagree?

[REDACTED]: Yes. Well, I think I've said most of what I've wanted to say. I can't... I was trying to think back, now, to some point of this. Did you want to talk about this operator AU? Remember we talked about this... ? At the height of this... It was in the aftermath of the *Pueblo*. And it doesn't relate specifically to the *Pueblo*, but it's something that came out later on. It's a very sensitive thing. Again, I think it was Tom Land involved with this. And we made a conscience decision... You know, it was one of those times where... One of the rare times you find yourself in (where) they say, "You got a blank check, and I'll fill in... What do you want to do? Collection resources? Do you need anymore? Do you want to do this? Do you want to do that?" And some of us said, "Well, what we need is 24-hour ACRP collection. That's what we need to have." And we almost had that. For some period of time... We're talking like a week after, you know... We're talking about, you know... You know, we didn't know whether or not... The SR-71 was making daily passes over Wonsan. And we're talking about strike... Whether or not the Navy wanted to go in there and take it back, you know? And contingency plans and...

**Newton:** Right.

[REDACTED]: You know, all kinds of things. And so, we were gearing up for...

**Newton:** A strike or...

[REDACTED]: A strike. Something, you know?

**Newton:** Yes.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 28

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~

[redacted]: Renewed conflict or whatever. And so, we had a lot of ACRP up at the time. There was a guy... And of course, the ACRP was into the White Wolf advisory. And of course, there was a lot of... a lot of concern, because of what had happened, and the history of this whole thing. That, you know, we have another incident, the Koreans would come over across the DMZ. And a lot of (B% it) was across the bottom (B% number). Obviously, none of it went up that way. We had a battle force that went up in there.

Newton: The *Enterprise*.

[redacted]: Yeah, the *Enterprise*, and I don't know how many destroyers accompanied... All went up in there just to show the flag... that "we owned the Sea of Japan. You don't," sort of reaction. (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard). And then, along the DMZ - parallel to the DMZ - continuous, almost ACRP, you know, collection (1G) deployed (1G) Japan. Staging out of Japan and out of [redacted] had the primary advisory warning responsibility for all of that: to make sure that if there's anything reflected at, you know, an intercept attempt or hostile reaction, that the warning would go. And there was a young Air Force intercept operator down at [redacted] I don't remember his name. I don't think I even knew him. But his operator initials were [redacted] I remember that [redacted] And what he did was: he put together a bogus...

Farley: OK. (TR NOTE: He chuckles.)

[redacted]: Remember this?

Farley: I do now.

[redacted]: He put together a bogus intercept attempt by the North Koreans on one of these ACRPs. And caused an abort. And this was within a couple of... week or two after the incident. It caused all kinds of ruckus, because it... You know, the CRITICs and all of this were flying again. And they'd said, "Here they are, crazy, going after another one." And it was this young kid down there that... He was trying to make a name for himself or... I don't know what prompts people to do these things. But to make up this incorrect story related to that. And of course, some of that came out. And of course, you look back and say, "Well, how much of this other stuff...?" And the reliability of SIGINT and somebody making this stuff up? And all of that went on.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: Land was very... They put the lid on it quick. Tom Land went down there with the ops officer and all. And they were able to find out who the guy was. And they yank him off position. But I don't know whatever happened to him. But that was... That was one of traumas that came out of that thing: is this air...

Newton: Yes. One of the things that... Looking back, it may be hard... At least, it's difficult for me to understand is after the event - or shortly after it happened. And of course, we had no U.S. forces in there to do anything in

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~ Page 29



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

a quick manner. But the overriding concern of the military and the civilians here in Washington was: not to violate Korean territorial waters. "Whatever you do, don't violate their waters." I guess they were more afraid... This was after... The Koreans had come out into international waters. Had seized the ship and so forth. "But whatever you do, don't violate their waters." I suppose there was an overriding concern with another war with Korea, while we were engaged in Southeast Asia.

[ ]:

Yes.

Newton:

Which is...

[ ]:

Well, don't forget, there was an attack on the (B% Blue House)...

Newton:

Oh, yes.

Farley:

Yes.

[ ]:

At the same time...

Newton:

Yes.

[ ]:

And we were right in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin at the same time.

Farley:

Yeah! (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

Newton:

That was one of (1B)'s...

Farley:

We were in trouble!

[ ]:

Yeah.

Newton:

Main complaints: that he was never told about that Blue House raid. This was after he had returned to the U.S. That would have... I don't know exactly what that would have done for him. But...

Farley:

Bob, do you want to talk about the interrogation of the crew?

Newton:

Yes.

Farley:

In which [ ] was involved?

Newton:

Yeah. Thanks for reminding me. Did you ever see any hesitancy by any of the crew members to talk about the whole experience? Was there any overriding fear that they would be subject to U.S. prosecution that may have caused, at least, some of them to hold back what they were telling the U.S. debriefing team? Anything like that?

[ ]:

I have heard that speculation by some that were on the debrief team. I had nothing in my own personal experience to support that.

Newton:

Yes.

[ ]:

I got... I interviewed the lower-level guys - the Korean linguists; two Marines. I've forgotten their names. I thought I'd never forget their names. Two young Marines that were born... that were the Korean linguists. Neither of which had (1G) high quality of linguistic skills. (TR NOTE: He laughs.)

Farley:

Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 30

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204423~~

[REDACTED]: This is the kindest way I can put it.

Newton: This was one of the *Pueblo's* problems.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Farley: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: That didn't... They were... You know, they were detached with guys... They may have come out of Hawaii, I think. The 414th? USN-414? Which is (1-2B)...

Newton: They had been recent graduates of the DLI.

[REDACTED]: Yeah. And hadn't had any prac... Yeah. That's right. And hadn't any practical experience. And they hadn't had any... any live intercepts-kind of experience.

Farley: Hmm.

[REDACTED]: And they... Both of them were pretty green. I...

Newton: And they voiced this before the *Pueblo* got underway on its voyage.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Newton: Yes.

[REDACTED]: There was one... one guy that worked for me. I... Two Marines... Two or three Marines that were attached to me not long after the *Pueblo* incident. It's a funny little story. One of them was supposed to be on the *Pueblo*. And something to do with his wife. Was pregnant or something. And his buddy said, "Nah. I'll take this one. You take the next one."

Farley: Oh, boy! (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

[REDACTED]: So... So he... He went off and deployed. And meanwhile, the other guy got... You know, of course, came to NSA later on and worked for me. But he...

Newton: They were Sergeants (B% Hammond and Chica.)

[REDACTED]: That's it. That's it. Hammond and Chica. I mean, not... No fault of their own. It's just that they just weren't trained up.

Newton: Yes.

[REDACTED]: and...

Newton: That's...

[REDACTED]: That's the only Korean linguist capability they had: were these two Marines. There were no CT's that had that capability. The CT's they had had mostly Soviet kind of background.

Newton: And they were not able to read out the intercept that the *Pueblo* was taking on the ships (2B by throat being cleared) out to them.

Farley: (B% Gosh.)

[REDACTED]: Yeah, yeah. They didn't... None of them came by for any training, you

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204423~~ Page 31

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

know, prior to deployment. And so, you have a bunch of, you know, pretty green troops - especially on... Well, there may have been... The CT's, in fact, were... I couldn't call them all "green," because there were professional SIGINTers on the Soviet problem, obviously.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Soviet navy, specifically. But I don't know that they had much of a base on North Korean...

Newton: I recall some description in the... in some of the crew debriefing papers that Bucher called on one of the Marine sergeants to come up to the (B% pilot) house and translate some Korean writing that appeared on the stern of one of the North Korean patrol boats. And after the Marine got to the bridge, he had to go back down again, because he needed his dictionary. (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.) And when he finally read it out, he told Bucher they were... the names on the two North Korean ships were "Rice Paddy 1", "Rice Paddy 2." (TR NOTE: More chuckling.)

[redacted]: Yeah.

Farley: [redacted]... Go ahead.

Newton: One question. When you were involved with the debriefing team in San Diego, [redacted], what was your impression of the information on SIGINT targets and general SIGINT knowledge that the general service people aboard the *Pueblo* had? The people who were not SI cleared? Who were... Who obviously had some information on... knowledge of the NSG detachment and what they were doing etcetera. Or were you surprised at that?

[redacted]: No. I guess not. I mean, the Navy... The way the Navy operates... I mean, I guess, even at that age - I was a lot younger, but at the time, I... But I... I mean, it was a SIGINT trawler. That's why she was built.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: And the GENSER guys, I think, they probably knew. Just the fact that, you know...

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Why are you running around with a ship like that? I mean, it's a reconnaissance ship. And...

Newton: Yes. In some cases, more than what the appearance of the ship was... And from casual conversations, some of them had some...

[redacted]: Details...

Newton: Detailed... Detailed knowledge of what was going on.

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: Yeah. I had heard that. And I guess that... that bothered me a little bit. But I... You know, but I just considered it... I mean...

Newton: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 32

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~

[redacted]: I just considered it another way that the Navy did business. I guess the... The way I... You know, I... It's kind of the... Bucher had the... He was the captain of the ship. And how he ran his ship and how he chose to advise his crew as to what the mission of the ship was, he set the stage for that. And whether or not some of the crew told those of the crew who were not cleared for S... I mean, I guess I was... I saw that, but I guess I wasn't overly bothered by it. But I had heard about that second-hand. But I guess I didn't focus on it that much.

Farley: [redacted], in the early days of the interrogations at San Diego, were you aware that the Navy was sort of elbowing out the NSA troopers...

[redacted]: Yeah.

Farley: And they wanted to take over the whole program?

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah. To his credit, Dick Finlay didn't let that happen. That was Dick Finlay's (B% job).

Farley: Right.

[redacted]: Dick Lord was there. He was the [redacted] guy. And he probably is a good source, if you haven't talked to him...

Newton: We have not.

[redacted]: For the debrief and that sort of thing. Also, the... This business about damage assessment and the prior knowledge and all of that: he and... I think, a young Captain Inman was there, as well.

Farley: Oh, yeah? (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: If you want to talk to him, (XB).

Newton: He was a commander in the CINCPAC staff.

[redacted]: Yeah. He was sent there.

Newton: Yeah, yeah. (B% I'm) surprised...

Farley: I'll be darned.

[redacted]: And he and Lord hit it off real well.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: And there was a lot of that going on among (1G) and discussions about that. But I wasn't a part of that. I concentrated more on the tech side of it and lower-level discussions with the analysts that were aboard. Like my debrief was mostly with the younger guys that were...

Newton: Because some of this information we've been discussing here concerns that information derived from the crew debriefings, I guess we better throw in a SENSITIVE on this overall classification, Bob.

Farley: OK. Good.

Newton: I have no more questions.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~ Page 33

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Farley: Well, [redacted], has a couple more items he wants to talk about.

Newton: Yes.

Farley: We have... I have 10:30. Is that your limit today?

[redacted]: Yeah. I guess I wanted to respond a little bit more to the debrief process.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: We can maybe do that another time. But I guess, before it escapes me, the thing about the posturing of the Navy in San Diego and NSA's role in that whole thing... I think to Dick Finlay's credit... Have you talked to him? Or are you going to?

Farley: We've talked to him a little bit about the *Pueblo*.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: Yes.

Farley: Where he had to walk down two or three miles to a gas station to call the director back here.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: He and I... In fact, he took me with him, because... under the guise of going up to see his niece in Los Angeles. He and I took a trip up to... up to Los Angeles with the first report. The Navy wanted... We had our own comms, see? And we wanted to report back to the NSA headquarters what we had learned. And some of it was fairly sensitive stuff about the crew and all of this.

Farley: Yes.

[redacted]: And the Navy was trying to control all that within their own channels. And of course, they had the comms. In order for us to communicate to anybody, we had to use their comms system. And so, in order to do that, they had to chop on what we were going to send, right? So, his way of getting around that was...

Farley: Let me switch, [redacted]. (TR NOTE: Taping stops.)

[End of Tape 2, Side 1?]

[Tape 2, Side 2?]

Farley: OK. Go.

[redacted]: His way of getting around that was to take a copy of that... He took me with him. And we went up to Los Angeles. And there was an SSO shop. Did he tell you this?

Newton: No.

Farley: No.

[redacted]: There's an SSO shop up there. And we sent it back from there. Up in the... in the Los Angeles area.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 34

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Got up there, so (that) General Carter could have the scoop...

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Before the Navy. But there was a lot of concern that the Navy would whitewash this thing somehow.

Newton: Yes, yes.

[redacted]: And I don't have any indications in my own base to support that. But there was a lot of concern about that by Finlay and others. And we wanted to make sure that damage assessment and what we had gathered and... And we participated in that very well. We were able to document everything. All the transcripts... The whole process there was... To his credit, he organized a very, very good management system of keeping track of who said what, when. Cataloging the transcripts which were being recorded and then transcribed by the secretaries we had with us. And then, all of that went into a vault down in Nebraska Avenue. And...

Newton: Was there some disagreement of... even about that and materials that were to be sent back here? (1-2B)... The Navy wanted to keep it in their channels?

[redacted]: Yeah, we... They wanted to keep it in NSG. And we wanted it. And all that. So the final agreement was that it went to the NSG archives - the data, OK?

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: All the transcripts and all the material and... Duplications of every piece of... As best we could, every piece of documentation that was aboard the ship was also duplicated, you know, so that we could - in our damage assessment - ok? (We could say) "This was aboard." If it was lost, we could read it and then write an assessment about that.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: And we spent another three months when we came back... We were down in San Diego 17 or 18 days, I guess. Out in San Diego gathering the data. And all that came back. And we went to NSG in a vault. And then, a bunch of us, including Finlay and Lord and [redacted] and I and some others who were involved with the debrief of the crew went down to NSG for about three months in that vault and did the final damage assessment.

Farley: Hmm.

Newton: Right.

[redacted]: Wrote the final damage assessment. And I'm sure that copies of all that... I used to have a copy... I'm sure copies of all that are...

Farley: I think so.

Newton: Right. I have that over there in the archives, (B% that I found)...

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah. Gene Sheck was involved with that.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 35

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204120~~

Farley: (B% [redacted]). Was he... ?

[redacted]: [redacted] was involved with that.

Farley: Yeah.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: A lot of documents... A lot of catalog... cataloging, (B% [redacted]) was involved with that.

Farley: Oh, was he?

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah.

Farley: [redacted]?

[redacted]: Yeah. Or... Not... No. Not commander. This is... He's now M3A. [redacted]

Newton: Yeah.

Farley: OK.

Newton: Used to be personnel rep in [redacted] Bob.

Farley: OK, ok.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Yeah, he's...

Farley: I'm thinking of somebody else.

[redacted]: Yeah. I think I know who you mean.

Farley: He was deputy chief, command center for a long time.

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah.

Farley: First name was [redacted] I think.

[redacted]: Ah... Oh, I don't know whether or not it's worthwhile, but I think certainly Dick Lord... Some of the questions you're asking about prior knowledge and Navy control and those kinds of things...

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: Either Dick Lord or Dick Finlay would probably be in a better position to answer those questions. (1-2B)...

Farley: Buffham was involved in this, too. Didn't Buffham sign off on the message to the Navy? Or did Carter also?

[redacted]: No. Carter did not personally sign off on the message... The warning message?

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: The warning message... Ah, there's a little story related to that, too. I originally had my name as drafter on that thing. And because it was being released at a higher level, the policy was, at that time, that the Chief, B... I believe he was - at the time - had to sign this draft... (TR NOTE: Phone

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20204120~~ Page 36

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291123~~

rings.) My name appeared on the MR (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard) - but that was taken off as well because they re-ran it. When they re-ran it to clean up some of the, you know... the softening part of it... So it was almost a year before... I think Buffham went down as... claimed authorship because he signed it.

**Newton:**

Yes.

**Farley:**

Yeah, he did. (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.)

[REDACTED]:

And he went down to Congress, I think, and...

**Newton:**

Yeah.

[REDACTED]:

(B% But he didn't)...

**Newton:**

I think...

[REDACTED]:

He just... I mean, he's like a releaser, rather than (B% the author)...

**Farley:**

Yeah.

**Newton:**

I saw a... I saw a description of that... what happened - the aftermath - after the *Pueblo* seizure - in regard to the message: some descriptions that... of Carter's position. He was told immediately about the message, of course. And he said he didn't want people marching around the halls or on the phone downtown blaring all this good stuff about the message. He wanted it low-keyed.

[REDACTED]:

Yes. I heard that.

**Newton:**

And if someone asked about it during the review to mention it. Very low-key. And it was neat the way it was done.

[REDACTED]:

Yes, yes. He... He was quite gentlemanly, if I could say, about the whole process. Except that... I heard this. I didn't know this from a fact, but I had heard when he had visitors from his office, he had a couple of copies in his upper right drawer to use to pawn (XG by laughter.) But I mean... I was called down by... not the... It was a long time afterwards that... I don't know how they finally found out that I was the author of the message. But legal counsel for the Pike Committee had me down to talk about that message.

**Farley:**

Yes?

[REDACTED]:

Yeah.

**Newton:**

In some of his words to the Congressional committee - I think maybe it was the Pike Committee - he said... He was asked about that message by...

[REDACTED]:

Buffham or Carter?

**Newton:**

Carter.

[REDACTED]:

Yeah.

**Newton:**

By Pike. And Pike said something like, "Is this the thing... ? Is this the kind of thing that NSA normally does?," holding up a copy of the message. And Carter just sat back and said, "No. It's just a bunch of NSA people doing

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291120~~ Page 37



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20251129~~

their jobs." (TR NOTE: Chuckling.)

[REDACTED]: I have a transcription of that. I've been carrying that around. That's very (1-2B).

Farley: Yeah, that's right. He had nothing but good to say about the way the Agency handled the *Pueblo* affair: General Carter did.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Farley: And I have that on tape.

Newton: Yes.

[REDACTED]: Yeah, he was very proud of us - of the Agency - for all we had done. But, again, I have to (B% hark backward) some. You know, I still feel that we could have done more, you know?

Farley: Was Y.P. Kim here when that message was written? Or was Sammy Hong here when that message was written? Because either of them said that it was very strong language. And it should have gone out in the original. But everybody wanted to tone it down. And he said it was sort of insipid, by the time it did get to the Navy.

[REDACTED]: Y.P. was not the division... I don't think... Was he the division chief at the time? I don't think he was.

Farley: I don't... I can't recall.

[REDACTED]: Yeah. I don't think he was. I can't remember who was, for the life of me. I know Sam Hong was at the time of the EC-121. He was in charge of the division.

Farley: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: But... Have you interviewed Sam?

Farley: Yes.

[REDACTED]: You have. I know that a lot of people say that... I mean, I wish I had kept a draft, OK? And I wrote the original draft. But my sense was that it said pretty much the same thing. It just was not blunt. I was a young guy.

Newton: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: And I... My language was - and still is, I guess - a little blunt.

Farley: Yes.

[REDACTED]: Oh, it's... And it was softened. It was softened, no question about it. But it said the same thing. Now, what did Don Beckman say about that?

Farley: He said it went through a lot of re-writes, I believe.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

Newton: Hmm.

Farley: And he said he wanted it to have stronger language.

[REDACTED]: Yeah, we all did.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20251129~~ Page 38

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: That's true.

Newton: I suppose when you come right down to it, you can't... you could not... NSA could not put itself in the position of telling the Navy...

[redacted]: What to do.

Newton: To run or not to run a mission.

[redacted]: Yeah. And that's when it started, you see? You know, it was almost like, "You shouldn't do this."

Newton: I mean, a direct support mission?

[redacted]: Ah, yeah. And you know, we... I was counseled by a lot of people: "You can't say that. You don't run the Navy. The Navy does what they wish."

Newton: Yeah.

Farley: Yes.

[redacted]: "This is their resource for doing what they wish." And I said, "Well, you know, aren't they reading the SIGINT?" And they said, "OK, well, that's the way it has to be cast." So we rewrote it again and... A couple of different times. And then the chop process (XG), I think, primarily by Sheck and the guys in [redacted] because of their sensitivity to this whole kind of issue of Program 2, Program 1, and resources and all of that. They... That's, I think, (XG), some of the final softening, if you will.

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: But I kick myself a hundred times for not having kept a draft.

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: But in final analysis, I think it was pretty much the same. I think... The only thing that I feel badly is that it probably... It probably could have gotten wider distribution. That's a good criticism of the Agency. And it probably could have been more phone work... Maybe it would have been, if it hadn't been over Christmas. You know, that thing went out...

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: (B% The 24th of) December.

Newton: Yes, it was over Christmas.

Farley: OK.

Newton: Right.

[redacted]: And maybe it would have been, like others that...

Newton: That's why a lot of people didn't see it, right.

[redacted]: To call people and say, "Hey! You ought to read that message."

Newton: Yes.

[redacted]: (4-5G) about that. But she was already on the way, by then.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201423~~ Page 39

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

Newton: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: Oh... I mean, she hadn't left... I don't think she had left Yokota yet. But she was as close to... I don't know whether or not the Navy would have done anything about it anyway.

Farley: She was captured the 23rd of January.

[REDACTED]: Right.

Farley: So that was almost a month in there - that something could have been done.

[REDACTED]: Yeah, well, 23rd...

Newton: She left her base in Japan on the 11th of January. She may have spent Christmas at a stopover in Hawaii.

[REDACTED]: No.

Newton: No?

[REDACTED]: No.

Farley: Too far back?

[REDACTED]: No, no...

Newton: Yeah...

[REDACTED]: She arrived off the northern part of (C% Vlad) - off the coast of Vlad - the northern part of Korea - on the 12th.

Newton: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: So...

Newton: On the 12th of January.

[REDACTED]: Yeah. So she couldn't have left port on the 11th.

Newton: Oh, no. No, no. No, no.

[REDACTED]: She had to leave, maybe, as early as the first of the year... first of the... in order to get up that far.

Newton: Right. Yes.

[REDACTED]: And then, come down the coast. It would have been...

Newton: Yes.

[REDACTED]: What a God-awful time to go anyway.

Newton: That's right.

Farley: Yeah.

[REDACTED]: It was January. Really!

Farley: Yeah. (TR NOTE: He chuckles.)

Newton: And she's relatively slow. Nine knots, 10 knots.

[REDACTED]: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 40

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~

Farley: Did you talk to Bucher at all yourself?  
[redacted]: No. I met him.  
Farley: Oh, yeah.  
Newton: Yes.  
[redacted]: I didn't... I wasn't involved with his debrief.  
Farley: How about the ops officer or the... ? What was his name?  
[redacted]: Harris?  
Farley: Harris.  
[redacted]: Yeah, I met him. I didn't debrief him. I think Lord...  
Newton: How about Murphy, the exec? Did you... ?  
[redacted]: I met him. But I didn't debrief him as well as these guys.  
Newton: Yes.  
[redacted]: But I met a lot of the CT's and of course the (B% Marines).  
Farley: Yeah. Are any of them around here? People who were aboard?  
[redacted]: Yes. There was a guy... I saw him over in... the warehouse the other day. What the heck was his name?  
Newton: A CT?  
[redacted]: Yeah.  
Farley: I'll be darned!  
[redacted]: Yeah.  
Farley: You ought to talk to him, Bob.  
[redacted]: Yeah.  
Newton: Who was that, I wonder (1-2G)... ?  
[redacted]: I wish I remembered his name. He's over in the warehouse. He's over in...  
Farley: Photo shop?  
[redacted]: Well, the building across the street here.  
Farley: Oh. You mean where we live? SAB 2?  
[redacted]: Yeah.  
Farley: I wonder who that could be? What rank is he now?  
[redacted]: He's a civilian.  
Farley: Oh, I see.  
[redacted]: He's a civilian and he's working here in... He recognized me. I was walking through there. What was I doing? I was going over to talk to somebody.  
Farley: Talk to Dick Jones or... ?  
Newton: Well, I have a crew list.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201120~~ Page 41

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~

Farley: Oh, do you?

Newton: Yes.

Farley: We could at the telephones... Yeah.

[redacted]: He probably would be in L (Group) something or other, I guess.

Newton: Oh, oh. OK.

[redacted]: He's in L...

Newton: Not in T?

[redacted]: Well, I don't know.

Newton: Yes, yes.

[redacted]: T or L, I guess. It seems to me, he was... He recognized me right away. He says, "Hi, [redacted]. How are you doing?" Talked to him for a minute. But I've forgotten his name. I...

Farley: Not [redacted] is it?

[redacted]: I don't.

Farley: No. I don't know. I'm just trying to think of the strangers who were working with L Group in refurbishing our area. So he might have been working in there.

[redacted]: No, he had a green badge on.

Farley: Oh! OK. Well, we can check the list, Bob.

Newton: Sure.

[redacted]: Yeah. He had a green badge.

Farley: He'd be interesting to talk to.

[redacted]: Yes, he would. He spent... Now. Let me think about that for a minute: if he was one of the guys - or if he was one of the CT's that went with us out to the *Pueblo*. The debrief. Ah, that may be it.

Newton: Oh. One of the team?

[redacted]: One of the team...

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: From NSG.

Newton: OK.

[redacted]: The more I think of it, maybe that was it. I know he was involved with the *Pueblo*. And I saw him. And I recognized his face. I couldn't remember his name and I couldn't see his badge. But I know it was green...

Newton: Do you... ? Excuse me. Do you recall the name of (B% [redacted])?

[redacted]: Yeah...

Newton: Who may have been involved with the debriefing team?

[redacted]: Chief... Navy Chief [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20201420~~ Page 42

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

Newton: Probably. Yes.

[redacted]: Yeah...

Newton: QK. He's in P5 now.

[redacted]: Is he?

Newton: Yeah.

Farley: Is he a civilian now?

Newton: Yes, a civilian.

[redacted]: Maybe it's the same guy.

Newton: Yeah.

[redacted]: Maybe it's the same guy. I recognize him as being with me in San Diego. It was like he was one of the crew. But then, the more I think of it, maybe he was... Maybe he was one of the Navy guys that were there (XG).

Newton: Right.

[redacted]: (XG).

Farley: Good. [redacted], do you want to talk about some other things? We can come back later, while you meditate on them.

[redacted]: Yeah. Let me think about it. I think I got... Most of what I wanted to say, I think I've said. But I'll think about it some more.

Farley: Yeah, there's some that just probably escaped you.

[redacted]: Yeah.

Farley: And maybe Bob can come up with some more piercing, penetrating questions.

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah. I'll be happy, if you can think of anything else.

Farley: All right.

Newton: Yes, for sure...

[redacted]: I think if you talk to others, like Bernie...

Farley: Yeah.

[redacted]: (B% Might) be a good source

Newton: Yeah. And I certainly thank you for these additional names that you gave me.

[redacted]: Yeah. Right.

Farley: So, we've confirmed the classification of this...

Newton: Right.

Farley: These two cassettes?

Newton: Ah: TOP SECRET CODEWORD NOFORN SENSITIVE.

Farley: SENSITIVE.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~ Page 43

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//SENSITIVE//20291129~~

[redacted]: Yeah.

Newton: OK.

Farley: Any comments before I knock it off? Close it down?

[redacted]: No. I'd like to thank... Well, thanks for letting me talk about all...

Farley: Yeah.

Newton: Sure, (XG).

Farley: Bet it was an interesting experience.

[redacted]: Yeah, yeah.

Farley: I was in B05 at the time, so I know what you went through.

[redacted]: Oh, really? Yeah.

Farley: Right. Part of history, [redacted]! (TR NOTE: Chuckling heard.) I'll flip it off then.  
(TR NOTE: More chuckling heard.)

[End of Interview OH-1989-14 [redacted]]