



governmentattic.org

"Rummaging in the government's attic"

Description of document: General Services Administration (GSA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Reports of Selected Investigations Closed in 2020-2021

Requested date: 14-February-2023

Release date: 03-March-2023

Posted date: 19-February-2024

Source of document: FOIA Request
OIG Freedom of Information Act Officer
GSA, Office of Inspector General (JC)
1800 F Street, NW, Room 5326
Washington, DC 20405
Fax: 202-501-0414
Email: OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



U.S. General Services Administration
Office of Inspector General

March 3, 2023

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request (OIG Tracking Number 23-021)

This letter is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received by the General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG) FOIA Office on February 14, 2023, for:

The final report, or other conclusory document for each of these closed GSA OIG investigations: C20H00023, C20H00080, C20H00108, C21600013, C21H00061, C21W00043, C22600011, C22H00046, C22H00052, I16L00021, I19900032, I20000002, I20100054, I20300065, I20H00096, I20M00095, I21200040, I21700050, I21C00008, I21C00051, I22300040, I22W00028.

Upon review of the responsive material, I determined you are entitled to portions of the requested material under the FOIA. My review included consideration of the 'foreseeable harm standard', i.e., information which might technically fall within an exemption should not be withheld from a FOIA requester unless the agency can identify a foreseeable harm or legal bar to disclosure. The bases for any redacted information are Exemptions 6 and 7C of the FOIA.

Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), **requires** withholding of information that, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Similarly, Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C), **requires** withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, where disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirement of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirement of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that this office provides to all our requesters. You should not take it as an indication that excluded records do, or do not exist.

As we have redacted information referenced in the above paragraph(s), with the aforementioned FOIA exemptions, this technically constitutes a partial denial of your FOIA request. You have the right to appeal the denial of the information being withheld within 90 days of the date of this letter. You may submit an appeal electronically at: OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov, or in writing to the following address:

Freedom of Information Act Officer
Office of the Inspector General, General Services Administration
1800 F Street, NW, Room 5332
Washington, D.C. 20405

Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request. The appeal should include the GSA OIG FOIA Case Number (23-021). In addition, your appeal must contain a brief statement of the reasons why the requested information should be released. Please include a copy of your initial request and this response. Both the appeal letter and envelope or electronic appeal submission should be prominently marked, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Due to the COVID-19 situation, the GSA OIG is not receiving FOIA requests/appeals by standard mail. You may submit a FOIA request/appeal by email at OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov. Mailed FOIA requests/appeals will be processed after the GSA OIG returns to normal operations.

Should you have any questions, please contact Christopher Pehrson, GSA OIG's FOIA Public Liaison at (202) 501-1932 or via email at oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free at (877) 684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769.

Sincerely,
EDWARD
MARTIN

Digitally signed by
EDWARD MARTIN
Date: 2023.03.03
10:20:46 -05'00'

Edward J. Martin
Counsel to the Inspector General
(FOIA Officer)

Enclosure



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

August 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JI-D-6)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**
File Number: C22600011

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated on November 30, 2021, by U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), JI-D-6, based on a complaint from Federal Protective Service (FPS) that a GSA employee had reported the theft of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA-issued cell phones twice in a three month period. FPS said the employee claimed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rental car had been broken into and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bag stolen on August 27, 2021 in Portland, Oregon and on November 19, 2021 in San Francisco, California. FPS also said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have claimed the GSA-issued cell phones as stolen to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal credit card company, Chase Sapphire Reserve (Chase), in order to obtain money for them.

Investigation revealed that the employee reported the thefts to Portland Police Department, San Francisco Police Department, and FPS. All police reports noted the theft of one Samsung cell phone, along with various other items, such as a wallet, passport, wireless earbuds, and watches. According to the police departments, no camera footage of the incidents was available.

A review of the employee's cell phone records revealed that despite a wipe command from GSA IT being sent to the phone on August 30, 2021, there were several unusual text messages and phone calls in the middle of the night to and from numbers in Oregon and Washington, from September 4, 2021 to September 7, 2021. After this, the employee's cell phone usage went back to normal.

The wipe command sent to the second stolen phone on November 19, 2021 appeared to be effective, as there was no usage until December 8, 2021, when the employee's regular cell phone usage went back to normal.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Office of Investigations (JI-6)

2300 Main Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (816) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

An analysis of the employee's laptop by the Digital Crimes and Forensic Unit revealed a letter to the employee's insurance company on December 7, 2021, regarding (b) (6) use of Chase credit card benefits insurance instead of (b) (6) Progressive car insurance in San Francisco, California. Additionally, the employee accessed Chase Credit Card Services online on February 10, 2022. None of the other keywords searched came back with a result.

After an interview, the employee provided rental car and flight documents showing that (b) (6) arrived in Washington on August 24, 2021 and departed for (b) (6) home of record on August 29, 2021, and that (b) (6) arrived in California on November 19, 2021 and departed for (b) (6) home of record on November 24, 2021.

The employee also provided documents from a claim (b) (6) made to Chase on November 21, 2021, which showed (b) (6) did not claim (b) (6) GSA-issued cell phone as stolen, (b) (6) only claimed personal items.

Interviews with representatives from Chase revealed that they were not able to see what specific claims the employee made on (b) (6) personal credit card without a subpoena.

The case was presented for criminal prosecution to the U.S. Attorney's Office on December 1, 2021, but was declined due to the low dollar loss.

The case was closed and all related documents have been transferred to this case in E-IDEAS.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

September 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM)
File Number: C22H00046

This memorandum presents the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by JI and JC.

GSA OIG received a complaint reporting allegations that the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) shared a link to a Google drive containing information and training on the GSA Screening Test Program (the testing program for unvaccinated GSA employees), and the Google drive's settings allowed other GSA employees to see who was currently viewing the document, who had viewed the document, and who had exited the document. The complainant alleged that an email, which included the link to the Google drive, was sent to a few hundred employees in GSA who had a reasonable accommodation; therefore, all persons could see who had a reasonable accommodation which was an apparent breach of confidentiality, violation of the Privacy Act and the "need to know basis" of employees' medical status. The complainant contacted OHRM staff and notified them of the Google drive's settings, and OHRM promptly took down the link and resent the information in a pdf version. JA and JE were both notified of the allegations and recommended to send the allegations to GSA. JC requested JI's assistance with a preliminary review of the matter.

JI and JC worked together on the matter. GSA OIG reviewed documents and information provided by the complainant, interviewed the complainant, interviewed the GSA Special Assistant in OHRM, and obtained and reviewed the GSA Initial Agency Response Team (IART) report regarding the incident. Additionally, JC conducted legal research concerning the matter. JC drafted a briefing memo summarizing the preliminary review.

Operations Division (JI-O)
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The preliminary review determined that upon discovering the issue, the complainant also contacted OHRM staff and notified them of the Google drive's settings, and OHRM promptly took down the link and reported the incident to the IART. IART conducted a review of the incident and determined that it was an "incident" because the ability to identify another employee viewing the Google slide presentation threatened to violate the security procedure put in place by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force COVID-19 Workplace Safety; however, there was no "breach" because no personally identifiable information (PII) was disclosed other than that information voluntarily added to the employees' Google profiles.

JC's legal research included that Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum on Preparing for and Responding to a Breach of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), M-17-12, states PII maintained by Federal agencies "may range from common data elements such as names, addresses, dates of birth...to...medical history." Presumably, an employee's vaccination status is part of their medical history and the medical history of unvaccinated employees was disclosed when employees participating in the Program accessed the Google slideshow. JI and JC decided to submit a referral to GSA through the GSA OIG hotline office.

On August 9, 2022, GSA OIG sent a referral to GSA for management review and any action GSA deemed appropriate. The referral advised GSA that the GSA OIG reviewed the hotline complaint and the IART report, and found there was an unauthorized disclosure of employee's medical history, e.g. vaccine status, and this unauthorized disclosure resulted in the potential disclosure of PII.

On August 15, 2022, JC sent a letter to the complainant stating that GSA OIG decided not to open an investigation of the allegations they raised. This letter also advised the complainant that GSA OIG forwarded the issues to GSA for further review and any action that they deem appropriate.

On September 8, 2022, GSA responded to the August 9, 2022 referral. The response stated that "Given GSA's previous actions in regard to this incident, the agency does not believe that additional steps are necessary at this time."

Based on the information noted above no further action is anticipated and this matter is now closed.



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

September 20, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Number: C22H00052

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated in April 2022 based on an anonymous hotline complaint titled "FRAUD & FAVOURATISM [sic] AT GSA REGION 11 LOCATED AT 1800 F STREET." The complaint stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a GSA Architect, offered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) private architectural practice services to contract bidders with the promise that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would review their bid submissions favorably. The complaint had no additional specificity, such as details regarding events, specific contract bidders, or transactions.

GSA OIG agents reviewed pertinent records, to include financial queries and review of Forms OGE 450. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) registered a (now inactive) company, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in 2019, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) properly disclosed on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 2019-2020 Forms OGE 450; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) no longer held the company on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 2021 Form OGE 450. Open source records confirm the LLC is inactive. GSA counsel provided guidance regarding avoidance of conflicts of interest and conducting outside work on GSA time, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "acknowledged and understood." GSA OIG agents also conducted a comprehensive review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government email account, and found no evidence of impropriety.

Because the complainant was anonymous, GSA OIG agents could not interview him or her to obtain additional details and specificity about the alleged misconduct.

This matter does not require any further investigation unless further actionable information is received.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

March 8, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 3/8/2021
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM
CASE TITLE: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – POSSIBLE
PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY ACT VIOLATIONS
CASE NUMBER: I16L00021

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On October 27, 2015, JI-9 received a complaint from Region 9 Assistant General Counsel [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that in September 2015, GSA awarded a Phase II contract for a \$130 million construction project at the San Ysidro Port of Entry (SYPOE). The Selection Evaluation Board (SEB) selected contractor Hensel Phelps (HP) for the project. [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) high level employee, had served on the committee. However, after retiring from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position with CBP at the end of September 2015, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to work for HP in October 2015. [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was concerned that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have violated the Procurement Integrity Act (41 USC 2104), as well as other violations of US Code 18, including 18 USC 207.

Investigative efforts disclosed that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first retired in 2005 from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position as the Port Director of the SYPOE. In 2007, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned as a rehired annuitant. In approximately 2008, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accepted the position of Program Manager at the SYPOE where [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked until 2015. During this time, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was actively involved in projects and contracts relating to the improvement and upgrade of the SYPOE. In May 2015, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had served on the SEB along with four other individuals from GSA and CPB to award Phase II of the project which was awarded to HP. Witnesses stated that in early October 2015, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed up at SYPOE project meetings with GSA and CBP as an employee representative of HP. GSA employees questioned [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the appropriateness of [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) working HP when [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on the source selection committee that awarded the contract to HP. [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed GSA employees that, prior to retirement, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received approval from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor and that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told the employment was acceptable. No evidence of such approval was ever found.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not seek legal guidance from CBP counsel until after [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was already working for HP and concerns were raised by GSA. After reviewing all the facts, CBP counsel came to the conclusion that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in violation of the Procurement Integrity Act. [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised of these preliminary conclusions by phone and email. A formal letter followed stating "As a CBP employee, you participated personally and substantially in the San Ysidro Construction Project through Phase Three. Therefore, you must abide by the restrictions in 18 USC 207, which

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

permanently preclude you from appearing before the Government on particular matters in which you participated personally and substantially as a CBP employee including the San Ysidro Construction Project Phases Two and Three.” At the end of the letter, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised to self-report to the Joint Intake Center if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activities were in violation of Federal law.

Several witnesses from GSA and CBP informed agents that in roughly late October to early November, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stopped working for HP and went to work for Priax, a subcontractor of HP on the SYPOE project. However, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties and role remained substantially the same.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) original agreement with HP was to provide consulting services on the project at a rate of \$8,400 per month for 69 hours per week which were to be performed by email, phone, remotely or in person. When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employment agreement switched from HP to Priax the financial terms remained the same, but an administration fee of \$938 was added for Priax. Priax then paid the \$8,400 to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of Priax, was interviewed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) original contract with HP was for an engineering service to build a crosswalk which was initially valued at approximately \$29,000 but ended up costing a total of \$40,000. The remainder of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreement was for monthly consulting provided by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the bulk of the consulting was for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who only worked on Phase II at the SYPOE.

A review of invoices submitted to HP by Priax disclosed that they did not change from the first two months when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assumed to be working for HP to the time (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) switched over to Priax. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also backdated two months’ worth of invoices to claim reimbursement for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consulting while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still directly consulting for HP.

Extensive interviews, email reviews and other investigative efforts disclosed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in negotiations with HP to be hired after retirement while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still an employee of CBP. Immediately upon retirement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed a consulting position with HP. After a couple of months of representing HP, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was questioned by GSA employees and received legal guidance to the contrary, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to work for Priax. While employed by Priax, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) role remained essentially the same. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acted as an intermediary between HP and CBP on many issues relating to the SYPOE project. However, there is evidence that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) undertook steps to disguise (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) participation (such as not identifying (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on calls) when GSA employees were present. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was paid, by HP, through Priax approximately \$84,000. HP ended the consulting relationship when they became aware of the investigation.

The case was originally referred to the Southern District of California in June 2016, it was declined in November 2017. After declination, it was referred and accepted by the Department of Justice Public Integrity Section (DOJ PID). All investigative efforts were completed by July 2019. DOJ PID declined the case February 24, 2021. A presentation had also been made to the Civil Division of the SDCA in 2016, but they closed the case in 2019. CBP is preparing an administrative report. All appropriate reports have been filed with the Office of Government Ethics.

The investigation is now closed.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
Pacific Rim Regional Office of Investigations

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

December 8, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 12/8/2021
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-9)

SUBJECT: Case Closing Memorandum

Case Title – Alleged WPA Artwork - Political Editorial By Artist
Mitchell Siporin

OIG File Number – I19900032

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On January 29, 2019, JI-9 received a referral from JI-2 concerning an alleged WPA painting. The painting, "Political Editorial" by artist Mitchell Siporin was listed for sale on eBay. The painting was listed for \$35,000 and the listing noted that the 1938 painting contained Federal Art Project - Works Progress Administration (WPA) markings. The GSA Fine Arts Division advised the painting was listed as "missing" in the GSA New Deal artwork database and estimated the value of the work as closer to \$14,000.

The case was presented to USAO-CDCA Civil Division who filed a civil complaint against [REDACTED] on February 21, 2021. Following the filing of the complaint, [REDACTED] first denied that it was the same WPA painting as described by Fine Arts. Later, [REDACTED] claimed [REDACTED] had donated "Political Editorial" to a local charity on an unknown date during 2020. [REDACTED] had no proof of this donation.

On November 5, 2021, [REDACTED] entered into an agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice and consented to a judgment against [REDACTED] in the amount of \$18,000 regarding WPA artwork "Political Editorial". In the agreement, [REDACTED] agreed that [REDACTED] had possession at one time of the WPA artwork which [REDACTED] listed for sale on eBay, was aware that the artwork belonged to the U.S. and even after being made aware of the U.S. claim of ownership, donated the artwork

Based on the above information, no further investigative activity is warranted and this investigation is closed. Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@gsaig.gov.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

July 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JI-10)

NORTHWEST / ARCTIC REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT

File Number: I20000002

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In August 2019, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the GSA Office of the Chief Information Security Officer regarding potentially inappropriate activity associated with the use of a laptop assigned to GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the Edith Green Wendell Wyatt (EGWW) Federal Building in Portland, Oregon. More specifically, a review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA Network traffic history revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned laptop was used to browse websites categorized as pornographic.

In addition to reviewing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA information technology-related activity, the GSA OIG conducted an interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The investigation determined: (1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government issued laptop to search for, view, and transmit sexually explicit material via the internet; (2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government issued laptop and cellphone to engage in sexually explicit chat conversations with foreign nationals; (3) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) engaged in sexual acts with a foreign national at the EGWW Federal Building on at least three occasions; and (4) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) masturbated in the EGWW Federal Building on at least 10 occasions.

On March 6, 2020, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon declined to pursue any action against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

Office of Investigations (JI-10)
400 15th Street SW, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Auburn, WA 98001

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

On April 22, 2020, this case was referred to the Office of the Regional Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, Region 10, for any action deemed appropriate. In response, on April 27, 2020, GSA management issued a proposed removal letter to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On May 27, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retired.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
New England Regional Investigations Office

January 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alleged Hatch Act Violation

File Number: I2010054

This investigation was initiated in April of 2020, when U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New England Field Investigations Office (JI-1), 10 Causeway Street, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Boston, MA, received an allegation that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA, Public Building Service, 10 Causeway Street, Boston, MA, may have used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal Facebook account during work hours to engage in political speech, thereby violating the Hatch Act during recent mandatory telework. ok

On April 27, 2020, GSA OIG referred the matter to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), for whatever action they deem appropriate. OSC confirmed with GSA OIG the referral was received.

On January 27, 2021, OSC confirmed they are actively investigating the matter and require no assistance from GSA OIG.

On January 29, 2021, a Letter Report was transmitted to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Acting Regional Commissioner, GSA, New England Region, 10 Causeway Street, Boston, MA, for informational purposes only.

No further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JI-1, and the case will be closed.



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

March 15, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION (JI-3)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Employee Misconduct
File Number: I20300065

In April 2018, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a complaint through the GSA Office of Human Resources alleging that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSA Construction Control Representative, Philadelphia, PA, received expensive dinners from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of Meizinger Construction Services, LLC (MCS). The complaint also alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have assisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in obtaining government approvals to start (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) new construction business, MCS.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a commercial General Contractor in the Philadelphia area. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started MCS in December of 2017. Prior to starting MCS, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shared ownership of a construction company called E2G, LLC (E2G), with two other partners. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had completed work for GSA and was considered a prohibited source.

GSA OIG special agents completed a review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email records for the time period August 16, 2016, to June 11, 2019. The email review revealed communication between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning work (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed for GSA and Raven Services. The email analysis did not reveal any sharing of procurement sensitive information between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or any direct evidence to support the allegations.

GSA OIG special agents conducted a review of a cell phone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used while employed at E2G. The analysis showed communications between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from April 19, 2017, to December 7, 2017. The analysis illustrated a personal relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The majority of text messages were unrelated to GSA work, and none of the texts revealed any sharing of procurement sensitive information.

GSA OIG special agents conducted interviews of associates of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well as multiple interviews of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisors spoke highly of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and had no employee issues with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first met (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in 2015 when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked at Worth & Company and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked as contractor for Worth & Company. The two became friends in 2016 and began socializing outside of work. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) both stated that they occasionally met for lunch, and they alternated paying when they ate lunch together.

Mid-Atlantic Division
Office of Investigations (JI-3)
Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 600 Arch St, Philadelphia, PA 19106

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

On June 3, 2017, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had dinner with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another mutual friend, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), at the Ocean Prime Restaurant, 124 S 15th Street, Philadelphia, PA. Meizinger paid \$842.97 using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) E2G company credit card for the entire cost of the dinner. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that alcohol comprised a large portion of the bill, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not drink alcohol. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) all described the dinner as a get together among friends. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not completed any work for GSA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had also placed other personal purchases on the company credit card, including furniture.

GSA OIG special agents did not substantiate that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accepted a gift consisting of dinner for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Ocean Prime Restaurant, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a prohibited source. Rather, it appeared to have been based on their friendship that existed prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being a GSA employee.

GSA OIG special agents did not find evidence that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in obtaining approval for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) construction company, MCS, in the System for Award Management (SAM) verification process. Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave any help to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in starting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) new company, MCS, or gaining approval in SAM to complete Government work.

During the course of the investigation, GSA OIG special agents learned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had completed solicitation work for M&M Facility Services (M&M), an HVAC, plumbing, and electrical contractor, while employed by GSA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) friend and former Air Force commander. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that during the government shutdown of 2018 to 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to "drum up some business" for M&M. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that in January of 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent approximately 25 emails from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal email address to various companies on behalf of M&M. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal contact information and displayed no affiliation with GSA in the solicitations. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear anything back from the emails (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not do any site visits, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any financial benefit or compensation of any kind. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA supervisor was not aware (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent these emails, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any verbal or written approval for this activity. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) corroborated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statements and acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to reach out to contacts from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previous employment to attract business for M&M. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any compensation from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or M&M.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined prosecution of this case and deferred any administrative actions to GSA. The U.S. Attorney's Office based their decision on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pre-existing relationship.

GSA OIG special agents presented findings to the GSA Regional Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, Mid-Atlantic Region (3Q) in the form of a Report of Investigation (ROI). GSA management concluded that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accepted a gift in violation of 5 CFR 2635.202(b)(1) of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. GSA management also determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to obtain prior written approval from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediate supervisor to perform services for a prohibited source, as required by Supplemental Standards of Conduct for Employees of the General Services Administration at 5 CFR 6701.106.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was issued a written Official Warning Notice from GSA management and acknowledged receipt on December 16, 2020. GSA OIG considers this investigation closed.



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

April 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Number: I20H00096

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated in December 2019, after the GSA OIG received a complaint alleging that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), IT Category (QT3K) conducted an unauthorized commitment with GSA contractor, Greystones Group, LLC (Greystones), who had a subcontract with SIE Consulting Group (SIE). The complaint also reported concerns with the relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SIE.

GSA OIG investigated the allegations. Based on our interview with the complainant, GSA appeared to be aware of the unauthorized commitment and was working on a ratification to the contract. During the early part of the investigation, we learned that SIE was involved in a private dispute arbitration with Greystones regarding a GSA contract where Greystones was the primary contractor and SIE was the subcontractor. The arbitrator ruled in favor of SIE and awarded it \$87,799 for work performed prior to termination of the subcontract by Greystones. Greystones' counsel provided us with documents from the arbitration. Based on a review of those documents, along with a review of GSA emails, we did not find sufficient evidence showing a violation of law regarding the relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SIE. In April 2021, a search of the GSA OIG Hotline information did not reveal any additional complaints involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or SIE.

Due to limited resources in the investigative field office, along with the lack of direct evidence showing violations of law, this investigation will be closed.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Office of Investigations (JI-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

September 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-4)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**
Conflict of Interest – GSA Employee – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Case Number: I20M00095

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On July 19, 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), South Florida Contracting LLC (SFC), informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Building Manager, General Services Administration (GSA), was engaged in outside employment as a General Contractor; that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working on this outside employment during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duty hours; that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was improperly using Government resources and equipment for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment; and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had offered to set up a business with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to obtain Government work.

GSA OIG conducted an investigation to including interviewing witnesses, reviewing documents and emails, conducting surveillance, and interviewing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on October 10, 2019.

The investigation determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used government resources, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office to conduct meetings, GSA facilities to store building supplies and equipment, a mailbox to receive mail, and IT resources, for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment in violation of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.704, Use of Government property, GSA Order ADM 7800.11A, Personal Use of Agency Office Equipment, and HRM 9751.1 - SUBJECT: Maintaining Discipline - Appendix A Table 2 - Penalty Guide Violation: #1. Unauthorized use of Government property. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted activities for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment, including conducting meetings, sending emails, and making phone calls, during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA duty hours. GSA OIG was unable to determine the exact frequency or duration of such activities. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activities may have violated 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705, Use of Official Time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a restricted drawing of an antenna in violation of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703, Use of Nonpublic Information.

The investigation also determined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have violated HRM 9751.1 - SUBJECT: Maintaining Discipline - Appendix A Table 2, #8 when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made false or misleading statements to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment.

On May 26, 2020, this matter was declined for criminal prosecution by AUSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Southern District of Florida.

On December 21, 2020, a Report of Investigation (ROI) regarding this matter was referred to GSA.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Office of Investigations (JI-4)
401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308 (404) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

On September 14, 2021, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Regional Commissioner, GSA, provided a signed Disposition Report indicating that a Personnel Action had been taken in response to the ROI and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was removed from service.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

March 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

Works Progress Administration Artwork
Recovery File Number: I21200040

On February 2, 2021, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Fine Arts Management Specialist, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Art in Architecture and Fine Arts Division, Office of the Chief Architect, GSA, 1800 F Street, NW, Room [REDACTED] Washington, DC, notified GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JI-2), 26 Federal Plaza, Room [REDACTED] New York, NY, of a potential Works Projects Administration (WPA) painting listed for sale via online auction by Swann Auction Galleries, 104 East 25th St., New York, NY. Specifically, in sale number 2557, lot 89, was a painting by Maxim Lubovsky, titled *Lights from the Beresford across the Reservoir* and described as an "Oil on canvas, 30x24 1/2 inches. Signed and dated, lower right recto and signed and titled, verso. With the Federal Art Project ink stamp, verso. 1938." In addition, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated photographs on Swann Auction Galleries website depicted multiple "Federal Art Project" stamps on the back of the canvass.

On February 4, 2021, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed JI-2 the painting was commissioned under the WPA and is property of the U.S. Government. Furthermore, Lubovsky was employed by the WPA and the painting in question was actually titled *Lights Across the Lake* and was documented by the WPA Photographic Division of the Federal Art Project on May 23, 1939.

On February 4, 2021, JI-2 subsequently issued a Determination Letter to Swann requesting acknowledgement of claim and that it be returned to government custody.

On March 10, 2021, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Vice President, Swann Auction Galleries, informed JI-2 the consignor, later identified as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) New York, NY, refused to allow the release of the painting to GSA OIG.

On March 17, 2021, a JI-2 special agent telephonically contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the matter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disagreed with the government's claim, refused to provide additional information to support (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position, and would not return the painting unless the government could prove title by producing a "Loan Document." When advised the U.S. Attorney's Office could become involved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) abruptly ended the call stating to "file a lawsuit."

New York Field Investigations Office (JI-2)
26 Federal Plaza, Room [REDACTED] New York, NY 10278

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

On March 23, 2021, a JI-2 special agent learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had originally obtained the painting from Jackson's International Auctioneers, 2229 Lincoln Street Cedar Falls, Iowa, on or about April 6th, 2013, as part of auction lot 714 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Client Services, Jackson's International Auctioneers informed JI-2 no other documentation accompanied the painting, and later provided a link to the aforementioned sale. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the consignor was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Guthrie Center, Iowa.

On March 23, 2021, a JI-2 special agent telephonically spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who stated (b) (6) obtained the painting many years ago at a swap meet outside of Des Moines, Iowa, at least ten years prior, from a regular attendee. (b) (6) indicated no other documentation came with the painting, does not have any contact information for the person (b) (6) bought it from, nor seen them in over ten years, when the swap meets stopped occurring.

On March 23, 2021, the matter was presented to and accepted by the U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, Civil Division.

On June 28, 2021, a JI-2 special agent telephonically spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to check on the status of the painting. (b) (6) advised it was still at Swann, but if the consignee showed up today, there would be nothing stopping (b) (6) from turning it over to (b) (6) possession. However, if the government provided a subpoena, (b) (6) would release it.

On July 15, 2021, the R/A issued a GSA OIG subpoena to Swann, and subsequently recovered the painting.

On July 19, 2021, GSA FAD informed JI-2 the painting's estimated value was approximately \$7,000.

On March 9, 2022, US Art Company, Inc., picked up the painting from JI-2, so it could be loaned to the Genesee Valley Council on the Arts Museum.

No further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JI-2, and the case will be closed.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

September 6, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Property Disposal Specialist – Arrested by Local Law
Enforcement
File No. I21700050

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

The General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division, Fort Worth, TX, was contacted by a GSA, Human Resources (HR), Region 7, Fort Worth, TX, regarding the arrest of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Property Disposal Specialist, Fort Worth, TX. According to the representative, on April 17, 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was arrested by Grand Prairie Police Department (GPPD) officers while on duty at the Fritz Lanham Federal Building, 819 Taylor St., Fort Worth, TX, for allegations of child sexual abuse, and child sexual assault of a victim under the age of fourteen. Subsequent to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrest, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government-assigned laptop computer was provided to GSA OIG. An investigation was opened to assist GPPD in future investigative activities.

At the time of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrest, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) belongings were left unsecured at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned work area within the federal building. It was requested by HR personnel that GSA OIG take possession of the property. Agents conducted an inventory of the contents of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) backpack, and secured (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) property. Subsequent to a search warrant, GSA OIG relinquished (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) backpack to GPPD officers. GSA OIG, Digital Crimes and Forensics Unit, conducted a forensic acquisition and exam of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA-issued computer. The analysis revealed no pornography or evidence of child exploitative material. GSA OIG maintained its active investigation through disposition for the possibility of an administrative referral pending the outcome of the case.

On March 1, 2022, GPPD's case against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was adjudicated. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault of a child under 17 years of age, and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for each count, to be served concurrently.

On March 1, 2022, immediately following (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sentencing, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attorney, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Fort Worth, TX, submitted a signed letter of resignation from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position with GSA.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Office of Investigations
819 Taylor Street, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

April 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

AbilityOne Commission
Case Number: I21C00008

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JI-C.

On October 15, 2020, GSA OIG received a request for assistance from the AbilityOne Commission (AbilityOne) OIG regarding its investigation into Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations by AbilityOne. GSA, through USDA, provides financial management services to AbilityOne. An ADA investigation conducted by GSA found that AbilityOne committed 11 violations of the ADA. AbilityOne OIG requested assistance from GSA OIG in determining if there was intent by GSA personnel.

GSA OIG assisted AbilityOne OIG with its investigation. The investigation determined that in 2015, the federal shared services provider for financial management moved from GSA over to USDA, resulting in 200-300 GSA employees becoming USDA employees. However, the GSA email accounts were retained and were still being used by those employees. GSA OIG obtained and provided relevant GSA email records and other GSA records to AbilityOne OIG. GSA OIG also assisted AbilityOne OIG in interviewing GSA personnel. The case remained open in order to provide AbilityOne OIG with further assistance.

AbilityOne OIG has all information requested from GSA OIG for their investigation and are continuing to handle the case internally.

No further action is anticipated and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

December 15, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

Whistleblower Retaliation
Case Number: I21C00051

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JIC.

On March 26, 2021, GSA OIG received a whistleblower complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleging whistleblower retaliation from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employer, Jay Henges Enterprises, Inc., D.B.A. Porta-King Building Systems, at their Montgomery City, Missouri facility. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated from the company because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) raised concerns over management's policies regarding pre-employment drug screening.

During a review of information provided by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was discovered GSA held no contracts with Jay Henges Enterprises, Inc. or Porta-King during the timeframe in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was employed.

On May 3, 2021, JC emailed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attorney, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Law Firm, informing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA did not have a contract with Jay Henges Enterprises, Inc. or Porta-King during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employment and therefore was not involved in the matter, and the GSA OIG case was closed.

No further action is anticipated and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

October 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
ACTING SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-3)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), **Employee Misconduct**
Case Number: I22300040

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On March 24, 2022, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, received information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of an investigation concerning GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) General Engineer, Public Buildings Service, Philadelphia, PA. FBI special agents had received allegations that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position within GSA to improperly award several government contracts to G. Adams Construction Group, located in Pennsylvania. It was further alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have had a personal relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of G. Adams Construction Group. G. Adams Restoration LLC (DBA G. Adams Construction Group) was the recipient of \$10.7 million in contract awards between 2014 and 2022, with \$8.22 million awarded by GSA.

FBI and GSA OIG agents analyzed bank records, telephone records, and public source information. Agents also analyzed and reviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email correspondence and additional work-related documents. Witness interviews were conducted. Extensive record checks and database searches were conducted and resulting information was reviewed. Based on analysis of the foregoing, no criminal or administrative violation was identified and further investigation is not warranted at this time.

On August 8, 2022, the United States Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey, concurred that as a result of the investigation no criminal violation was identified. This case is considered closed by the U.S. Attorney's office.

FBI special agents will close this case as a C4 Administrative Closing.

All investigative methods initiated have been completed and/or discontinued. All appropriate leads have been pursued and completed. All evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence policy. This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-3)
600 Arch St, Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Philadelphia, PA 19106

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

May 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:
Auction of WPA Painting, Hollyhocks
Case Number: I22W00028

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On December 6, 2021, this office received a notification from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of GSA's Fine Arts Program Office (FAP) regarding an auction of a possible Works Progress Administration (WPA) painting. The painting in questions, *Hollyhocks*, by known WPA artist Pedro Cervantez, was being auctioned by Weschler's Auctioneers and Appraisers in Rockville, Maryland. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested that JI-W contact the auction house to see if they would pull the painting from the auction in order to give (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office time to authenticate the painting as a recoverable piece of WPA artwork.

On December, 6, 2021, SAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Weschler's and explained the government's potential claim to the painting. Weschler's agreed to remove the painting from their upcoming auction and hold it pending authentication by the FAP.

On January 27, 2021, the FAP's legal counsel determined that there was sufficient document for the government to establish provenance to the painting. SAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Weschler's and relayed that information to them. On February 25, 2022, SAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recovered the painting from Weschler's and returned it to the FAP. The comparative value for the painting was estimated at \$10,000.00.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

May 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Employee Misconduct
Case Number: C20H00080

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In April 2020, GSA OIG received a complaint reporting several allegations of administrative misconduct involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Contract Specialist, Information Technology Category, Federal Acquisition Service, GSA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reportedly lied about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disability, did not adhere to GSA policy regarding time and attendance, conducted personal business during hours of duty, and violated the Hatch Act.

GSA OIG agents reviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email records, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personnel file, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) public online social media presence, and interviewed the complainant and multiple GSA officials, to include supervisors.

Although GSA management identified some historical issues with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performance and time and attendance, GSA OIG was unable to obtain any documentation substantiating this allegation. Through interviews, GSA OIG agents found that GSA management did not document or take any adverse action for any infractions they may have identified. GSA OIG did not substantiate that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted personal business during duty hours. We also did not find sufficient evidence of a Hatch Act Violation, so this matter was not forwarded to the Office of Special Counsel. GSA OIG found that GSA human resources (HR) had engaged with the Federal Occupational Health office and was in the process of re-evaluating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reasonable accommodation; therefore, this matter requires no further investigation or action from this office.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

December 28, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – Employee Misconduct

Case Number: C21W00043

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On May 12, 2021, a RICOH USA, Inc. (RICOH) loss prevention specialist notified GSA OIG, Mid-Atlantic Division, of toner purchasing irregularities associated with the account assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA), Washington, D.C.

The RICOH loss prevention specialist stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RICOH account was used to purchase an excess of approximately 283 toner cartridges beginning as early as March 2018. RICOH records revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordered with some regularity one set of toner, which included one each of black, cyan, yellow, and magenta, for each of the three machines leased to CBCA. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordering history averaged one set of toner per machine per month.

RICOH loss prevention specialists track machine output and measure toner supply in real time for machines that are actively online. RICOH estimated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordered nearly \$60,000 in excess toner.

Agents toured the CBCA office space, to include secured spaces, escorted by CBCA leadership. After gaining entry to the security room, Agents located the excess toner ordered. Agents interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who stated that, upon transferring duties to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) former GSA employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the contract with RICOH included one set of toner, per month, per machine. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never reviewed the contract (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to confirm the requirements, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was authorized to order the toner and did so to ensure the government collected the goods it paid for.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

A review of contract number 4875448, awarded to RICOH, revealed, in exchange for a flat rate fee of \$80 per month, per machine, CBCA was authorized unlimited copies, labor, toner, and staples. CBCA has three printers costing approximately \$2,880 annually. Toner is supplied on an as needed basis and not intended to be stockpiled.

After learning of the over ordering error, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked directly with the RICOH loss prevention specialist to coordinate the return of the excess toner.

Our investigation did not substantiate an allegation of misconduct by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however, it did identify a potential flaw in the RICOH contract, which, when executed, gave the appearance of impropriety, and could create the potential for fraud.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

March 2, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JI-6)

SUBJECT: Case Closing
File Number: C21600013

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated on November 9, 2020, after U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), JI-6, received information from JI-5 about a data analytics search revealing that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Cost Estimator, Public Building Service, GSA, may have a conflict of interest in working for GSA and also owning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a construction company which was awarded two Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) contracts and one VA purchase order, totaling \$66,917.

Two witness interviews revealed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and OIG in February 2018 regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment. OGC counseled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to only bid on contracts that were not associated with the GSA.

Analysis of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emails, timesheets, Employee Personnel File, and Financial Disclosure Forms showed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) declared (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment to the GSA annually. However, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used GSA resources to print and scan documents, and sent the documents in five emails from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal email address and back. The documents concerned verification of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and proof of licensure with the VA, as well as information on a contract on which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bid.

In a subject interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA email and GSA resources for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside employment, and wrote a sworn Affidavit to that effect.

A Letterhead Report was sent to GSA Management Officials for information only.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Office of Investigations (JI-6)
2300 Main Street, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (816) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

March 26, 2021

CLOSING MEMORANDUM

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigative Analyst, (JI-I)

SUBJECT: Closing Memo to File
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)/NTVI Federal, LLC
Case Number: C20H00023

In December 2019, JI-I/Hotline Office received an anonymous voicemail complaint alleging that in August 2019 GSA contract employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of NTVI charged GSA over 40 hours of overtime for the removal/demo of two Automatic Transfer Switches (ATS) in room G-013 and the actual overtime used was 6 hours.

Our office referred this complaint to GSA for a response that was provided to us on January 14, 2021 and it stated:

Our investigation found the invoice for the task in question (attached for reference) lists three staff at 16 hours each for a total of 48 hours. Based on approval of the invoice by the COR, GSA believes that the time spent is in fact what was invoiced. We did not find any charges for 40 hours by one individual or any reference to the job taking only 6 hours to complete. NTVI also confirmed that three individuals, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), performed the services in question at the rate of \$119.95 per hour for 16 hours = \$5,757.60.

JI-I/Hotline Office reviewed the response and determined the information and documentation provided was sufficient. Therefore, this case is being closed.

Office of Investigations (JI-I)
1800 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20405

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General

July 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: For (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:
Office of Chief Architect
Case Number: C20H00108

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

ACTING SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JI-W)

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated in 2020 based on three separate, anonymous Hotline complaints involving GSA's Office of Chief Architect. These complaints alleged the following: (1) potential preferential treatment to certain vendors based on personal relationships with GSA personnel, leading to contracts being awarded to certain firms for work pertaining to the Bean Federal Building exterior Architect & Engineering (A&E) contract in Indianapolis, Indiana; (2) the use of sole-source contracts to direct awards to the A&E firms Gensler, Perkins & Will, PWC, AI, or LEO A DALY; (3) and that Washington, D.C., A&E firm Devroux & Purnell Architects paid a monetary Christmas bonus to GSA Regional Chief Architect (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (New York, New York) during [REDACTED] time as a temporary intern with the firm between 2009 and 2011.

The first allegation was referred to the GSA OIG office of audits, which, on September 11, 2020, informed agents that they noted no irregularities in the competitive procurement process for the Bean Federal Building exterior A&E contract award.

Agents reviewed GSA emails belonging to GSA Public Buildings Service (PBS) National Capital Region employees identified in the second complaint. The email review did not substantiate that GSA PBS employees gave undue preference in awarding sole-source contracts or provided source selection information to employees associated with Gensler, Perkins & Will, PWC, AI, or LEO A DALY.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JI-W)
409 3rd Street SW, Suite [REDACTED] Washington, DC 20024

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Agents reviewed records pertaining to Devroux & Purnell Architects, (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) GSA emails, (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) electronic Official Personnel File (eOPF), and (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) open source employment records. (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) eOPF and résumés indicated (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) has been a federal employee since 2007. Agents found no evidence substantiating claims that (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) worked for Devroux & Purnell Architects as a temporary intern and received a Christmas bonus from Devroux & Purnell Architects during the 2009-2011 timeframe.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

August 5, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JI-6)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING
FILE NUMBER: C21H00061

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary.

This case was initiated on March 31, 2021, based on a hotline complaint from an employee at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), National Records Center (NRC) in Lee's Summit, MO, that a janitor working at the NRC had committed sexual harassment in the workplace.

U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) interviewed three NRC employees, who all stated that the janitor had made lewd comments to them while at work and on social media. One employee stated the janitor had exposed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at work.

Due to the harassment occurring over a year ago, there is no camera footage available to review. Two of the employees were able to provide some of the messages the janitor had sent, one conversation which was lewd in nature, however most of the messages the janitor sent the three employees were deleted.

When contacted by GSA OIG, the janitor declined an interview, but stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) currently lives and works out of state, and does not work for the federal government.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri and the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office both declined the case for criminal prosecution.

On July 16, 2021, a Letterhead Report for Information Only was submitted to GSA Management.