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Description of document:	Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports of substantiated investigations closed in 2015 and 2016
Requested date:	01-February-2017
Release date:	10-August-2023
Posted date:	29-January-2024
Source of document:	FOIA Request FOIA Officer Peace Corps Inspector General 1275 First Street NE Washington, DC 20526 Email: <a href="mailto:FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov">FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov</a> <a href="#">FOIA Submission Portal (PAL)</a>

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## PEACE CORPS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

August 10, 2023

This letter is in response to your request for information under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, received by our office on February 1, 2017, for:

“A copy of the final report, report of investigation, closing report, closing memo, referral memo or other conclusive document associated with each of the investigations closed during CY 2015 and CY 2016.”

Our records indicate that on January 23, 2023, you agreed to narrow down your request to:

“Substantiated investigations only.”

On January 26, 2023, you agreed to further narrow down your request to:

“ the case summary which would include the findings”

A search of records located 77 pages that fell within your request. This letter is in response to that request, which was assigned 17-007.

A principal function of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is the enforcement of criminal laws, and to the extent that releasing the requested records would subject third parties, investigators, and witnesses to an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, information is being withheld in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) to protect the named individuals and identifying information about named individuals. In addition to these exemptions, certain information was withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(5), which protects inter-agency or intra-agency communications that fall under the deliberative process privilege. With respect to the responsive records for this particular request, the deliberative process pertains to summaries of what witnesses told investigators, or excerpts of intra or inter-agency emails. The application of the (b)(5) deliberative process redactions to these portions of the responsive records serves a recognized purpose of FOIA exemption (b)(5): to protect against

**Peace Corps Office of Inspector General**



public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency's actions.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

Your request is now closed in our office. If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, Peace Corps, 1275 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20526. Your appeal must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of the response to your request. Peace Corps OIG is exercising maximum telework flexibility per OMB guidance. Appeals submitted by mail or fax may not be processed until staff physically returns to the office. We are asking that any appeal be submitted via email to [FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov](mailto:FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov). Your appeal must include the FOIA request number in the body of your message, and a statement explaining the reason for your appeal. Clearly mark "FOIA Appeal" on the email subject line, along with the assigned FOIA case number. Your appeal must be electronically submitted within 90 days of the date of response to your request.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Respectfully,

*Belen Carriedo*

Belen Carriedo

FOIA Officer

Peace Corps Office of Inspector General

**Peace Corps Office of Inspector General**





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### ALLEGATION

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was notified by Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recently had a discussion with an unnamed Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) in which the PCV presented the hypothetical scenario of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV raped by a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV at the residence of a third PCV. The unnamed PCV asked CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what would happen if such a victim reported the matter to Peace Corps. CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the PCV of the agency's policy for handling such allegations, and on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) reported to OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been raped by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the residence of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (Exhibits 1 & 2).

### APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

18 U.S.C. § 2241 – Aggravated Sexual Abuse  
Interim Policy Statement (IPS) 1-12 – Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

During a recorded and transcribed interview, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was forcibly raped by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the guest bedroom of the residence assigned to PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided additional details to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (Exhibits 3-4).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from post on the day of OIG's interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned shortly thereafter. DOJ declined to prosecute.

### FINDINGS

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to all the essential elements of 18 USC 2241; however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOJ declined prosecution. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has retained counsel (through Peace Corps) to determine if prosecution in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a viable option. No further investigative support is required.

Date:

8/5/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



**Peace Corps  
Office of Inspector General**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**Allegation of Volunteer on Volunteer  
Sexual Assault at  
Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

**(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

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## SYNOPSIS

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a restricted sexual assault report to the agency's Critical Incident Report System (CIRS) concerning the reported aggravated sexual assault of Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by an unidentified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps Office of Safety and Security Supervisory Security Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Security Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that this report was converted to a standard report, against PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wishes after the determination was made under Peace Corps policy<sup>1</sup> there was a serious or imminent threat to the Volunteer or others as a result of the circumstances surrounding the allegation. As a result, the CIRS report was forwarded to the OIG.

The investigation determined that on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had gone to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to obtain a case of beer. After playing a drinking game with the other Volunteers, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a second time to acquire another case of beer. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexually assaulted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while they were walking home from their second trip to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexually assaulted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside, in a public area, near the residence of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dating, in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in spite of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeated verbal objections. The sexual contact included PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the evening of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and did not remember what happened between PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

Witness testimony corroborates the degree to which PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Three of the Volunteers OIG interviewed reported that, when PCVs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned from their second trip to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was upset.

This matter was not referred to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution, as it did not occur within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."

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## RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, OR AGENCY POLICY

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**Peace Corps Interim Policy Statement 1-12 Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct states:**

<sup>1</sup> Under IPS 3-13 section 4.4. *Responding to Sexual Assault* and related procedures designated staff may disclose restricted information to Peace Corps staff or law enforcement if necessary to prevent or lessen a serious or imminent threat. Conversion to a standard report in this case refers to the administrative process utilized by the agency to determine that a serious or imminent threat to the Volunteers or others exists that cannot be adequately prevented or lessened by designated staff or by the Volunteer.





### Findings

Based on OIG's findings, CD [REDACTED] decided to discipline PCV [REDACTED] for this incident by issuing a behavior memo. As such, no further investigative support is required.





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

### SYNOPSIS

Between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received four reports of sexual harassment by Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) against the reporting Volunteers.<sup>1</sup> In anticipation of the reports, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a report that one of the victims had sexually harassed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During the course of the investigation, OIG identified additional individuals that had been sexually harassed by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to cease all further communication with other Volunteers pending the resolution of the OIG investigation.

The OIG investigation identified at least seven Volunteers that had been sexually harassed by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Many other Volunteers were witness to these events or had heard of them. During an OIG interview, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to communicating in such a way that others could reasonably perceive it as harassing; however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communications offended others at the time they were made. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied using or growing marijuana and using Ecstasy<sup>3</sup> despite telling some Volunteers otherwise.

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned following the interview. Under IPS 1-12, *Procedures for Handling Complaints of Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct*, section 4.7, sexual misconduct complaints shall be considered to be closed if the accused Volunteer resigns. As such, no further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

Between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG received four reports of sexual harassment by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), each alleging a different incident.

#### Investigative Activities

OIG identified multiple Volunteers who were the recipient of communications from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that were sexually explicit and often harassing in nature. Many of these communications

<sup>1</sup> See Consolidated Incident Reporting System (CIRS) reports (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<sup>2</sup> See CIRS# (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<sup>3</sup> Ecstasy is a slang name for the chemical substance methylenedioxy methamphetamine, or MDMA, that combines a powerful stimulant with a hallucinogen. MDMA is chemically similar to the synthetic stimulant methamphetamine.

Date:

8/14/15

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



occurred after PCV [REDACTED] was directly told by the other Volunteer that they were not interested in physical contact or a sexual relationship. Numerous other Volunteers were witnesses to these events or were otherwise aware of them (Exhibits 1-12).

Out of concern that PCV [REDACTED] would attempt to influence potential witness, CD [REDACTED] gave PCV [REDACTED] a direct written order not to contact other Volunteers, and that violation of this order was grounds for administrative separation. Within one week, PCV [REDACTED] contacted eight different Volunteers on 11 occasions without management permission to do so (Exhibits 13-14).

The OIG investigation identified at least seven Volunteers that had been sexually harassed by PCV [REDACTED]. During an OIG interview, PCV [REDACTED] admitted to communicating in such a way that others could reasonably perceive it as harassing; however, [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] was not aware that [REDACTED] communications offended others at the time they were made. During the course of the investigation, OIG also developed information related to PCV [REDACTED] use or manufacture of marijuana, or [REDACTED] use of Ecstasy. PCV [REDACTED] denied using drugs or growing marijuana despite telling some Volunteers otherwise (Exhibit 14).

### Findings

OIG was able to substantiate several aspects of the allegation. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV [REDACTED] informed CD [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] intention to resign. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1	Memorandum of Interview or Activity (MOI), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 2	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 3	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 4	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 5	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 6	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 7	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 8	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 9	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 10	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 11	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 12	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 13	Text message (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 14	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]





# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps Safety and Security Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) of an allegation of a sexual assault involving PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who alleged, through a translator, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a public area approximately two and a half years ago after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached them asking for directions. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further advised that CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered to help them learn English and they met several times at cafés. During one arranged meeting, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) touched (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and made other unwanted sexual contact.

OIG interviewed the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who alleged to have been sexually assaulted by CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hereinafter identified by their confidential source (CS) identifiers (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how they met with CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) several times at cafés to practice language skills in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During their final meeting CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was intoxicated, groped (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then apologized for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) actions.

During an OIG interview, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) touched (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accidentally, but said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall additional detail. CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) falsely told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and did not tell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked for Peace Corps. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for social companionship, rather than to improve (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) language skills. CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) announced (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resignation from Peace Corps following the interview. No further investigative support is required.

## NARRATIVE

### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised OIG of an allegation of a sexual assault involving CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCCSO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who alleged, through a translator, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a public area approximately two and a half years ago after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached them asking for directions. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further advised that CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered to help them learn English and they met several times at cafés. During one arranged meeting, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) touched (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and made other unwanted sexual contact (Exhibit 1).

### Investigative Activities

OIG interviewed the victim (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who witnessed the assault (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Assisting with the interviews was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how they met with CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) several times at cafés

Date:

9/10/15

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



to practice language skills. During their final meeting CD [REDACTED] who was intoxicated, groped [REDACTED] and then apologized for [REDACTED] actions.

The last meeting between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and CD [REDACTED] took place at a café named "[REDACTED]" which has since been torn down) in the summer of [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said CD [REDACTED] was intoxicated during this meeting, slurring [REDACTED] speech and walking unbalanced. They stated that they sat at a corner booth, with CD [REDACTED] positioned to the left of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned to [REDACTED] right. They said CD [REDACTED] was explaining English vocabulary related to fruit. They said CD [REDACTED] referenced the word "melon" and raised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) into the air. [REDACTED] then placed [REDACTED] cupped hands on [REDACTED] (over [REDACTED] clothing). CD [REDACTED] pulled [REDACTED] hands away after a moment, and then referred to another fruit (unspecified). [REDACTED] said CD [REDACTED] then placed a single hand forcefully on [REDACTED] crotch. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) each expressed immediate shock by CD [REDACTED] actions. They stood and left the café without speaking further to CD [REDACTED]. They said CD [REDACTED] caught up to them at the front of the café and apologized.

The sexual assault was not reported to Peace Corps until recently, as neither the victim nor witness were aware of CD [REDACTED] affiliation with Peace Corps. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] recognized CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] was introduced as the head of Peace Corps in [REDACTED]. It was then that [REDACTED] reported the events of [REDACTED] to Director [REDACTED] who reported the incident to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibits 2 and 3).

CD [REDACTED] recalled meeting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met the [REDACTED] approximately four or five times at three different cafés over a period of a few months. [REDACTED] said the stated reason for [REDACTED] encounters with the students was for [REDACTED] to practice [REDACTED] language skills, and for them to practice their English. [REDACTED] acknowledged that [REDACTED] had access to superior language instruction through Peace Corps and the U.S. Mission, and that [REDACTED] continued to meet with the [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] enjoyed their company." CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not tell the students that [REDACTED] worked for Peace Corps and [REDACTED] told them that [REDACTED] was divorced.

CD [REDACTED] said they always met in a café. Whenever they meet, the [REDACTED] drank coffee or juice, and [REDACTED] drank coffee or beer. CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] purchased vocabulary book for [REDACTED] CD [REDACTED] recalled that in response to learning that [REDACTED] was celebrating a birthday in the near future, CD [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would take them both to [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made the comment in jest and was surprised to learn that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not think [REDACTED] was joking. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not recall inviting the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over to [REDACTED] home, as they claimed. They did not accept the invitation.

CD [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] last meeting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not believe that [REDACTED] was intoxicated, but it was possible. [REDACTED] recalled sitting next to [REDACTED] and across from [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] told OIG [REDACTED] did not recall the conversation. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] hand made accidental physical contact with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] apologized, but [REDACTED] could not recall to OIG the portion of [REDACTED] hand that contacted [REDACTED] nor could [REDACTED] the body part(s) of [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] contacted. When asked by OIG [REDACTED] touched (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] said it was possible, but that [REDACTED] did not recall. [REDACTED] did not think [REDACTED] touched [REDACTED] with both hands (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4).

## Findings

OIG was able to substantiate several aspects of the allegation. CD [REDACTED] was removed from [REDACTED] position in [REDACTED] and announced [REDACTED] resignation. No further investigative support is required.





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PCV [REDACTED] Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CD [REDACTED]) notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) [REDACTED] office had received an allegation in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that that PCV [REDACTED] Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV [REDACTED]) sexually assaulted several host country national (HCN) [REDACTED] on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at a Peace Corps-sponsored training conference. The allegation involving PCV [REDACTED] was not referred to OIG; rather, it had been "investigated" by post staff in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).<sup>1</sup> PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV [REDACTED]), the individual who initially raised the allegation to post, expressed concern to OIG that PCV [REDACTED] staff provided [REDACTED] identity to PCV [REDACTED] and other Volunteer witnesses while conducting its investigation.<sup>2</sup>

It was alleged that PCV [REDACTED] "slapped" two (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the [REDACTED] at a restaurant/bar hosting a social event for the conference attendees. This allegation was reported to PCV [REDACTED] Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PM [REDACTED]) by two HCN [REDACTED] counterparts assigned to PCV [REDACTED] one of whom was the victim. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that PCV [REDACTED] "groped" the [REDACTED] of one of [REDACTED] HCN counterparts. PCV [REDACTED] admitted to becoming very intoxicated at the social event, and giving one HCN [REDACTED] a provocative "lap dance." PCV [REDACTED] denied that [REDACTED] touched any [REDACTED] on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the social event. OIG was unable to identify a Volunteer that witnessed PCV [REDACTED] alleged misconduct.

During OIG's investigation, PCV [REDACTED] resigned on or about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as a result of [REDACTED] involvement in another incident. All investigation activities ceased and no further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CD [REDACTED] notified OIG [REDACTED] office had received an allegation in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that that PCV [REDACTED] allegedly sexually assaulted several HCN [REDACTED] on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at a social event during a Peace Corps-sponsored training conference. The matter was initially investigated by post, as documented in the Volunteer Information Database (VIDA) (Exhibit 1). PCV [REDACTED] who originally advised post of the allegation against PCV [REDACTED] on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), told OIG that [REDACTED] HCN's had reported that PCV [REDACTED] had "slapped" one of the HCN's [REDACTED] twice, and had groped the HCN on the [REDACTED] (Exhibit 2).

<sup>1</sup> See OIG Case Number [REDACTED] for additional details related to this allegation.

<sup>2</sup> See OIG Case Number [REDACTED] for additional details related to this allegation.

Date:

4/15/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIIG Init.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## Investigative Activities

PCV [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] was present at the restaurant/bar during the early evening. [REDACTED] said HCNs were dancing in a circle around the dancefloor when PCV [REDACTED] placed a chair in the middle of the circle, dragged one of PCV [REDACTED] counterparts (a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) into the circle and sat [REDACTED] in the chair. PCV [REDACTED] then performed a "lap dance," by grinding [REDACTED] into the [REDACTED] face, taking off [REDACTED] shirt, and unfastening [REDACTED] pants. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] left shortly thereafter, and [REDACTED] did not see PCV [REDACTED] touch a HCN on the [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The following day [REDACTED] met briefly with two of [REDACTED] counterparts, who reported that PCV [REDACTED] "is a very bad [REDACTED]." They reluctantly explained to PCV [REDACTED] that after PCV [REDACTED] left the social [REDACTED] PCV [REDACTED] was walking around the bar slapping (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both HCNs were horrified by PCV [REDACTED] conduct. PCV [REDACTED] reported the incident to a Peace Corps Medical Officer (PCMO), and with permission, reported the incident to PC [REDACTED] Deputy for Programming and Training (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DPT [REDACTED]) (Exhibit 2).

A records review by OIG revealed that the post's investigation was assigned to PM [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to VIDA records, one HCN reported that [REDACTED] was slapped on the [REDACTED] twice. No mention of was made that PCV [REDACTED] touched a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3).

OIG interviewed the two other Volunteers present at the restaurant/bar where the alleged sexual assault occurred. Both PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that they did not see PCV [REDACTED] touch a HCN on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) nor did anyone tell them that PCV [REDACTED] had done so (Exhibits 4-5). Two other Volunteers had peripheral knowledge of the incident. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended the conference, but not the social event. PCV [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCs [REDACTED] and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at [REDACTED] apartment during the conference. Neither PCV [REDACTED] nor PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard reports that PCV [REDACTED] had touched a HCN's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the social event (Exhibits 6-7).

PCV [REDACTED] admitted to becoming very intoxicated at the social event, and giving one HCN [REDACTED] a provocative "lap dance." PCV [REDACTED] denied that [REDACTED] touched any [REDACTED] on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the social event (Exhibit 8).

During OIG's investigation, PCV [REDACTED] resigned on or about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as a result of [REDACTED] involvement in another incident. As such the HCN victims were not interviewed (Exhibit 9).

## Findings

All OIG investigative activities ceased upon the resignation of PCV [REDACTED]. No further investigative support is required.

## EXHIBIT LIST

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| Exhibit 1 | Email Message (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)                              |
| Exhibit 2 | Memorandum of Interview or Activity (MOI), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]



### ALLEGATION

On [REDACTED] Returned Peace Corps Volunteer [REDACTED] (RPCV [REDACTED]) contacted the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and alleged that PCV [REDACTED] raped [REDACTED] at the Peace Corps [REDACTED].

### APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

#### 18 USC § 2241. Aggravated sexual abuse

(a) By Force or Threat.— Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act—

(1) by using force against that other person... or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

#### 18 USC § 2242. Sexual Abuse

Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States... knowingly...

(2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is— (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct... or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

#### Peace Corps Manual section, "Interim Policy Statement 1-12 Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct" Subsections 4.0 Sexual Misconduct Policy and 3.0 Definitions states in part:

Sexual Misconduct by a V/T violates Peace Corps policy. A V/T who is found to have engaged in Sexual Misconduct may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including administrative separation.

a) "Effective Consent" means words or actions that show a knowing and voluntary agreement to engage in mutually agreed-upon activity. Effective Consent cannot be gained by Force, by ignoring or acting in spite of the objections of another (unless those objections have been knowingly and voluntarily withdrawn) or by taking advantage of the Incapacitation of another if the accused knows, or a sober, reasonable person in position of the accused should have known, of such Incapacitation....

(c) "Incapacitation" and "Incapacitated" mean the physical or mental inability to make informed, rational judgments. States of Incapacitation include, without limitation, sleep and blackouts. If alcohol or drug use is involved, a person does not have to be intoxicated or drunk to be considered Incapacitated. Rather, Incapacitation is determined by how the alcohol or drug consumed impacts a person's decision-making capacity, awareness of consequences and ability to make informed judgments. Because Incapacitation may be difficult to discern, Volunteers and Trainees are strongly encouraged, when in doubt, to assume that another person is Incapacitated and therefore unable to give Effective Consent. Being intoxicated, drunk or under the influence of drugs is not a defense to a complaint of Sexual Misconduct under this policy.

Date:

6/28/2016

[REDACTED]

DIG Init

[Signature]





(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CV

called RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Messages

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG reviewed a screenshot of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exchange between RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning the incident. (Exhibit 2) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a message on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG received a lease via email from Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Exhibit 3) The one-year lease, with four option years, signed by Contracting Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of the United States Peace Corps on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pertained to a building located at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to the lease, the property was to be used by the Peace Corps as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Interview of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



- Review of Long Text Message

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



- Review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG and ARSO visited the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and photographed the facility and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 6) OIG also reviewed the guard logs, a copy of which had also been sent to OIG by CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via email, which disclosed that RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the facility at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The logs disclosed that PVC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ten other Volunteers entered the facility at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The security guard on duty was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

- Interviews of Volunteers

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed the following Volunteers who were at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) )

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

None of the Volunteers recalled hearing or observing anything unusual at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the night (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Interview of Security Guard (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG and ARSO interviewed Security Guard (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (SG (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) through an interpreter. (Exhibit 11) SG (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on duty on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at approximately (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that two (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers were asleep in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the next morning, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall anyone having sex in that area overnight.

- Continuation of Interview of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Second Telephonic Interview of RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Second Continuation of Interview of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Resignation of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

## FINDINGS

The investigation disclosed that on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), while on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a U.S. Government-leased facility, RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) verbally told PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not want to



have sex. The Volunteers smoked marijuana. PCV [REDACTED] then had sexual intercourse with RPCV [REDACTED]. PCV [REDACTED] acknowledged that RPCV [REDACTED] was "baked" [REDACTED] was "buzzed" at the time. PCV [REDACTED] stated that RPCV [REDACTED] nonverbally indicated consent to sexual activity.

Because use of marijuana is a violation of Peace Corps policy, PCV [REDACTED] resigned from Peace Corps service in lieu of administrative separation.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] U.S. Department of Justice, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions, declined to prosecute, (b) (5) [REDACTED]

#### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1	Memorandum of Interview or Activity (MOI/MOA), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 2	MOA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 3	MOA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 4	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 5	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 6	MOA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 7	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 8	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 9	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 10	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 11	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 12	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 13	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
Exhibit 14	MOI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]



## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### ALLEGATION

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was notified by the Office of Safety and Security (SS) that on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer (PCV) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) violated PC sexual assault policy by attempting to kiss PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at a Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On the second date, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used force when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to make sexual contact, and used force to restrain PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to leave the area (Exhibits 1 & 2).

### APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

Interim Policy Statement (IPS) 1-12 – Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

During a recorded interview on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as alleged, both which occurred in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had to push (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) away on the second occasion, and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefly when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to leave the building. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that while PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "no" on both occasions (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responses to relate to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); not a complete rejection of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed anger that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct to Peace Corps officials, and said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have expressed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) more clearly (Exhibit 3).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned in lieu of administrative separation on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4).

### FINDINGS

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to all the essential elements of conduct in violation of IPS 1-12. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should not constitute a violation of policy, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) no regret regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned in lieu of administrative separation. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Exhibit 2  
Exhibit 3  
Exhibit 4

Date:

8/2/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG was notified that a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was alleged to be involved in the distribution of a controlled substance. The allegation was received by a member of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff from a PCV who was closing her/his Peace Corps service. The PCV alleged that PCV's were using marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Exhibit 1).

### NARRATIVE

#### Investigative Activities

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed Returned Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) reference information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about mushroom use by Peace Corps Volunteers. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) has provided mushrooms (free of charge) at PCV gatherings to other PCV's. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that the mushrooms grow naturally on cow manure in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The mushrooms have been described as "less potent" than mushrooms in the United States (Exhibit 2).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was visited at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) site and was interviewed. The interview was conducted after PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed and signed PC OIG form 1502 (Request to provide information on a voluntary basis Garrity). Agent note: All interviews with PCV's mentioned in this report were conducted after the PCV reviewed and signed PC OIG form 1502. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to using both marijuana and mushrooms on different occasions while in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purchased marijuana from an unknown subject in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised the mushrooms grow wild in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided both marijuana and mushrooms to other PCV's while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) was interviewed at Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Agent note: All subsequent interviews of PCV's were conducted at Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised investigators that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used marijuana once while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and denied using any type of drugs while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 5).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and denied using any type of drugs while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 6).

Date: 3/20/15	Agent: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	AI/IG Init: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
---------------	----------------------------	---------------------------------

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] used marijuana and mushrooms while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 7).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] used marijuana one time while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 8).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] never used drugs while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 9).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] used marijuana one time while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 10).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators [REDACTED] used marijuana one time while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 11). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after being interviewed advised the Office of Victim Advocacy (OVA) that [REDACTED] "didn't answer truthfully" and denied using drugs in [REDACTED] (Exhibit 14).

PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] used mushrooms one time while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 12).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed and advised investigators that [REDACTED] used marijuana one time while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 13).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers resigned as a result of this matter. The other [REDACTED] Volunteers (Agent note: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers alleged to have used a controlled substance were not interviewed by OIG) will receive another form of discipline, but they will continue to serve as Volunteers (Exhibit 15).

### Findings

OIG was able to substantiate that one Volunteer distributed a controlled substance and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers used some type of controlled substance. The [REDACTED] Volunteers all resigned from their Peace Corps service. The other involved Volunteers were given another form of administrative discipline, but continued to serve as Volunteers. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1  
Exhibit 2  
Exhibit 3  
Exhibit 4  
Exhibit 5  
Exhibit 6  
Exhibit 7  
Exhibit 8  
Exhibit 9  
Exhibit 10  
Exhibit 11

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previously Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed Director of Program & Training Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previously Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that a fellow PCV, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previously Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a sexual relationship with an underage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initially conducted an investigation in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During this investigation (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to being in a relationship with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and also provided information that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a relationship with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

OIG obtained confessions from both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibits 1 & 2) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3) that they were both in sexual relationships with underage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a violation of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) declined prosecution of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

The DOJ initially declined prosecution of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however upon discovery that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with children, DOJ again attempted to pursue possible prosecution avenues from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). After extensive coordination's and investigative activities, DOJ once again declined prosecution of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4).

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a sexual relationship with an underage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confessed to being in a sexual relationship with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informed OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a relationship with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

#### Investigative Activities

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after advisement of rights (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) admitting to having sexual contact with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 1). In addition (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a written statement (attached) that stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a relationship with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 2).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after advisement of rights (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) admitting that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had sexual intercourse with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3).

Date:

3 SEP 2015

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

LAIGJ/mf  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOJ declined to prosecute (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOJ, Criminal Division, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Washington, D.C., stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be prosecuting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG communicated with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) VICTIM pertaining to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crimes, conducted numerous investigative activities to include travel to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to meet with VICTIM, conducted coordination's, indictment preparation, and several other investigative activities to prepare an indictment against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the DOJ once again declined to prosecute (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4).

#### Findings

OIG substantiated the allegations against both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOJ declined to prosecute in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pertaining to both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOJ again declined to prosecute on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) No further investigative support is required.

#### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1  
Exhibit 2  
Exhibit 3  
Exhibit 4

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DOJ Declination



**Peace Corps  
Office of Inspector General**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**Solicitation of Gifts  
By Program Manager at  
Peace Corps/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

♦ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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## SYNOPSIS

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an allegation from Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Health Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) solicited and received gratuities in the form of taro, a prized root crop.

During an interview conducted by OIG, PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disclosed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had solicited and received gifts from numerous Peace Corps related entities in the course of performing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) official duties. Additionally (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to borrowing money from a Volunteer.

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## RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, OR AGENCY POLICY

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### Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2635, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch

§ 2635.101 addresses the basic obligation of public service. It provides:

(14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

§ 2635.202 General standards.

(a) General prohibitions. Except as provided in this subpart, an employee shall not, directly or indirectly, **solicit** or accept a gift:

- (1) From a prohibited source; or
- (2) Given because of the employee's official position.

(c) Limitations on use of exceptions. **Notwithstanding any exception** provided in this subpart, other than §2635.204(j), an employee shall not:

- (2) **Solicit** or coerce the offering of a gift;

§2635.702 addresses the use of public office for private gain. It provides:

An employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, for the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, including nonprofit organizations of which the employee is an officer or member, and persons with whom the employee has or seeks employment or business relations. The specific prohibitions set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section apply this general standard, but are not intended to be exclusive or to limit the application of this section.

(a) *Inducement or coercion of benefits.* An employee shall not use or permit the use of his Government position or title or any authority associated with his public office in a manner that is intended to coerce or induce another person, including a subordinate, to provide any benefit, financial or otherwise, to himself or to friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity.



## MS 743 - Procurement of Personal Services of Host Country Residents by Contract

### Section 11.0, Standards of Conduct

Personal services contractors must adhere to the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of Conduct) set forth at 5 CFR 2635. While personal services contractors are not employees of the Peace Corps and they do not supervise Peace Corps employees, the requirement for compliance with the Standards of Conduct must be included in all personal services contracts.

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## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG received an allegation from CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) solicited and received gratuities in the form of taro, a prized root crop, during a visit to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The information was originally reported to CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by a source of information.

- **Interview of Source of Information**

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed a Source of Information (SOI) who stated that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for taro (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the host family of Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The SOI said that because of damage caused by a recent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a food shortage on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), which is only resupplied (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The SOI believed that the approximate value of the taro PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) host family provided to PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was \$20 U.S. dollars, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said was a substantial amount because the average income from the taro crop is \$80 U.S. dollars per year, per family.

The SOI also stated that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) borrowed money from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for shipping special cooking rocks back to PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'s home in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The SOI said that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unhappy with PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because the SOI believed PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position as Peace Corps staff member to receive gifts. The SOI stated that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was reportedly only receiving gifts and not reciprocating in a traditional exchange of gift giving.

- **Interview of PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rights and acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rights by signing PC Form 1502, "Request to Provide Information on a Voluntary Basis (Garrity)." (See Exhibit 1)

Following the interview, PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a written, sworn statement in which provided the following information. (See Exhibit 2)

PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received a mat from a Volunteer's host family in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), two wooden gongs in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and on other occasions (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received fruits and cooked food. Referring to gifts solicited PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated: "Maybe I was suggesting for them to give me 'gifts' and didn't realize that I was using PC's name to get what I wanted."

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also admitted that in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) borrowed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (approximately \$5 U.S. dollars) from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) whom PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervised. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that requesting gifts while representing Peace Corps was wrong. In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statement acknowledged "...I now realize that I was soliciting goods on behalf of my position with Peace Corps." PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that the total value of the gifts (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received while representing PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was approximately \$150-\$200 U.S. dollars over six years.

In addition to the information provided in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) written statement, PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged receiving chickens and flowers from other (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as gifts while representing PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted the flowers displayed on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office during the interview were a gift from a local (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) village where PCVs were holding a training seminar.

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## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG received an allegation from CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) solicited and received gratuities in the form of taro, a prized root crop.

Notwithstanding whether the staff member accepted gifts in violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, such rules strictly prohibit staff members from soliciting gifts.

An SOI told OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for taro (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) host family.

During an interview conducted by OIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disclosed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had solicited and received gifts from numerous Peace Corps related entities in the course of performing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) official duties, and borrowed money from a Volunteer.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Special Agent

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

John Warren  
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations





Kathy Buller  
Inspector General

Exhibit 1: Rights Advisement (Garrity)

Exhibit 2: Sworn Statement of PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps, Office of Inspector General (OIG)/Investigations, Washington, D.C., and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps, OIG/Investigation, Washington, D.C., conducted an interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 1), who stated that SUBJECT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Safety & Security Manager, Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had produced a falsified receipt for eyeglasses (Exhibit 2) in order to keep the money for personal use rather than paying for the glasses. However, SUBJECT did later return to the eyeglass shop and pay for the glasses.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SUBJECT who admitted to embezzling approximately \$500 in Peace Corps money (Exhibits 2-3).

The United States Department of Justice declined to prosecute due to SUBJECT resigning in lieu of termination.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

This investigation was opened based upon information from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 1) who stated that SUBJECT had produced a false receipt for eyeglasses (Exhibit 2) to Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in order to receive cash for personal use. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who worked at the eye glass shop where SUBJECT had obtained the false receipt.

#### Investigative Activities

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted an interview of SUBJECT. After advisement of rights (Garrity), SUBJECT provided a signed sworn statement (Exhibit 2) that essentially stated the following:

SUBJECT admitted to embezzling Peace Corps funds. SUBJECT had submitted a falsified receipt in order to receive money for eyeglasses that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not pay for (Exhibits 2-3). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the Peace Corps money for personal needs then went back and later paid for the eyeglasses, although (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had went back to the eyeglass shop. SUBJECT further admitted to stealing approximately \$200 in emergency use phone cards meant for warden kits for Peace Corps Volunteers to utilize in an emergency situation(s) (Exhibit 2, 3). SUBJECT further admitted to committing travel voucher fraud. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would round up travel cost, as an example SUBJECT stated if transportation cost (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) \$9 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would claim \$10 and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did this on a consistent basis (Exhibit 2).

Date:

6 Apr 2015

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



In addition to the fraud SUBJECT admitted to driving official Peace Corps vehicles for approximately one year without a valid driver's license, a violation of Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) policy (Exhibit 2). SUBJECT also admitted to providing transportation to non-Peace Corps employees, also a violation of Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) policy (Exhibit 2).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted a follow-up interview of SUBJECT. After advisement of rights (Garrity), SUBJECT provided a signed sworn statement (Exhibit 3) clarifying the stolen U.S. government money involving phone cards and travel voucher fraud.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned in lieu of termination.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Deputy Chief, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. declined to prosecute due to the SUBJECT resigning in lieu of termination.

### Findings

SUBJECT embezzled approximately \$500 in U.S. government funds. SUBJECT paid back approximately \$250 and was due to be charged the rest of the stolen money on closing contract costs. The Department of Justice declined to prosecute. No further investigative support for this matter is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4 DOJ declination

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### ALLEGATION

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was notified by Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director for Management and Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Skilled Maintenance Worker (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a voucher claiming that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid for local building repairs when (1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performed the work (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (2) when the contracted work was not complete (Exhibits 1-3).

### APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

18 USC § 1001 - Statements or entries generally  
18 USC § 641 - Public money, property or records

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract # (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) amounting to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which is equivalent to approximately \$70 USD) was issued to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the following work:

1. Replacement of deadbolt lock at DMO residence for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2. Replacement of deadbolt lock at DROPP residence for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3. Planeing and repositioning of PCMO office door for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4. Replacing of broken gutter at the main PC office entrance for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The work was scheduled to be completed on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a receipt # (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated March 29, 2016, for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed on the receipt confirming all work had been completed. The cashier disbursed the money to SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as an interim advance to pay (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received the disbursement voucher for signature and was concerned about the validity as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completing the installation of the deadbolt lock at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the GSM to contact the vendor to review the situation, and the vendor confirmed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only completed items 2 and 3 as listed above. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that item 1 was completed by SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to complete item 4 because the parts were not available. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to the GSM that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to submit the full invoice for all of the items totaling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was only paid (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that on or before (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told to replace the deadbolt at the residence of DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not complete this assignment before beginning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leave, which ran the next (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and included the Easter holiday (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date:

9/7/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIG:mt

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the office on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Early that morning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had replaced DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deadbolt lock, and was told that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coworker had not done so. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went immediately to DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence and replaced the lock. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told that post issued a contract to replace the lock at DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) house and that the contractor would replace the deadbolt lock at a second residence (that of the Director of Regional Operations and Program Performance (DROPP) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had already replaced the deadbolt at DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence.

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to DROPP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence to oversee the contractor. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replacement of the deadbolt. While there, SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the replacement cost would be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instead of the agreed amount of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the deadbolt provided by Peace Corps did not properly fit into the same door hole as the pre-existing deadbolt, so the new deadbolt would require a complete installation (rather than a more simple replacement of locks). As such, the cost would increase. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought it was a good idea to renegotiate the existing contract rather than require post to issue a new contract. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replaced the DMO's deadbolt saving the contractor work valued at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) convinced the contractor to accept (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for installing the deadbolt at DROPP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence (versus the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proposed). Because the contractor accepted the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reasoned, the total contract price remained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and did not require reissuance. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have the authority to negotiate contracts for PC, and noted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had done so before. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for a task that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contractually agreed to perform for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed tasks #2 and #3, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could receive payment for completing the contract so that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had money to purchase the parts needed to complete task #4, the gutter repair. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to do so, and signed a "Receipt for Cash/Subvoucher/Receipt Cover Sheet" acknowledging completion of all tasks and receiving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for payment to the contractor. By signing the receipt form, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also was acknowledging that the contractor had completed task #1, which SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had completed.

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the gutter was repaired on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should not have signed off that the contractor had completed all work when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) know that the contractor had not done so and wrong to have paid the contractor for work not done. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) now realizes that had the contractor not returned to post and complete the gutter repair, post would have been placed in a difficult position contractually.

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received any money from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the full (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received no money for repairing DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) door (Exhibits 4-5).

The Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to prosecute the case. SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received written counseling and was required to repay the entire contract cost of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (or \$70 USD).

## FINDINGS

SMW (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to follow numerous government procurement rules, but denied receiving any personal benefit. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received written counseling and repaid the amount of the repair contract. No further investigative support is required.

## EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 3

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### ALLEGATION

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was notified by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Regional Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)), Peace Corps, Washington, D.C., that Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) General Services Assistant/Driver (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) had admitted to stealing a Peace Corps fuel card and using the card for personal use (Exhibit 1).

### APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

18 USC § 1001 - Statements or entries generally  
18 USC § 641 - Public money, property or records

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided OIG a signed sworn statement where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to stealing fuel and money totaling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) either would fill (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal vehicle with fuel or charge the Peace Corps' government gas card for cash and give a portion of that money to the gas station attendant and keep the rest of the money (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for personal use. In addition to the written statement, GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) verbally stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had stolen approximately \$6 -7,000 in U.S. Dollars (which contradicts (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) written statement of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the currency currently exchanges at approximately (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibits 2 & 3). GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated that day. The Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to prosecute the case in lieu of support of local (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prosecution.

### FINDINGS

GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized a Peace Corps fuel card from approximately (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for an estimated amount totaling approximately \$7,000 US Dollars without authorization and for personal purposes. All OIG investigative activities ceased upon the resignation of GSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is attempting to recover the loss to the government from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remaining separation pay. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1  
Exhibit 2  
Exhibit 3

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date:

8/2/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Post: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

### SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated upon receiving information from an anonymous complainant, via the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Hotline, which identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a major supplier of marijuana to PCV's within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PC OIG Special Agents interviewed PCVs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the PC post in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and determined PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not distributed marijuana to PCVs within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but did however obtained confessions from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding their use of hashish during their time serving as PCVs in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In total OIG Agents obtained the names of 42 PCVs alleged to have smoked hashish while serving in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Hashish, also known as hash, is made from the most potent parts of the cannabis plant and therefore contains THC levels two to three times greater than that of marijuana.

OIG agents conducted 30 interviews and obtained 17 confessions (signed statements) from PCVs who admitted to their use of hashish while serving as PCVs in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Two additional PCV who did not confess to using hashish were considered to be highly suspected of using the drug. The remaining 18 PCVs denied using hashish or were not interviewed due to lack of credible information.

The results of this investigation were provided to the appropriate PC Management for action and as the result, 19 PCVs (17 who admitted and 2 highly suspected) were removed from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and afforded the opportunity to resign from their PC service in lieu of Administrative Separation.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

This investigation was initiated upon receiving information from an anonymous complainant, via the PC OIG Hotline. The complaint identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a major supplier of marijuana to other PCV's within (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

#### Investigative Activities

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PC OIG Agents obtained a Declination from Prosecution from Assistant United States Attorney (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions, U.S. Department of Justice, for the distribution and use of hashish and other controlled substances, given the distribution and use is/was primarily within the PCV environment, PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The PC OIG conducted 30 interviews of PCVs (under Kalkines rights advisement) regarding their use of a controlled substance (hashish) while serving for the PC in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The results are reflected in the following table.

Date:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	AIGI Init	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
25 August 2016		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	



PCV NAME		ADMITTED TO HASHISH USE	EXHIBIT NUMBER
1	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Admitted	Exhibit 1
2		Admitted	Exhibit 2
3		Admitted	Exhibit 3
4		Admitted	Exhibit 4
5		Admitted	Exhibit 5
6		Admitted	Exhibit 6
7		Admitted	Exhibit 7
8		Admitted	Exhibit 8
9		Admitted	Exhibit 9
10		Admitted	Exhibit 10
11		Admitted	Exhibit 11
12		Admitted	Exhibit 12
13		Admitted	Exhibit 13
14		Admitted	Exhibit 14
15		Admitted	Exhibit 15
16		Admitted	Exhibit 16
17		Admitted	Exhibit 17
		<b>HIGHLY SUSPECTED OF HASHISH USE</b>	
1	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Highly Suspected	
2		Highly Suspected	
		<b>DENIED HASHISH USE</b>	
1	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Denied Use	
2		Denied Use	
3		Denied Use	
4		Denied Use	
5		Denied Use	
6		Denied Use	
7		Denied Use	
8		Denied Use	
9		Denied Use	
10		Denied Use	
11		Denied Use	
		<b>LOW SUSPICION OF HASHISH USE</b>	
1	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
2		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
3		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
4		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
5		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
6		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	
7		Low Suspicion, not Interviewed	

### Findings

OIG obtained 17 confessions of the above (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV's for using marijuana. Two other PCVs were considered to be highly suspected of using hashish and also sent home.

### Exhibit List

		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Exhibit 1	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
Exhibit 2			
Exhibit 3			
Exhibit 4			
Exhibit 5			
Exhibit 6			
Exhibit 7			
Exhibit 8			
Exhibit 9			
Exhibit 10			
Exhibit 11			
Exhibit 12			
Exhibit 13			
Exhibit 14			
Exhibit 15			
Exhibit 16			
Exhibit 17			





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PC/(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director for Management and Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DMO [REDACTED]) notified the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the possible embezzlement of U.S. funds by Programming and Training Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PTS [REDACTED]). DMO [REDACTED] advised OIG that PTS [REDACTED] was given a cash advance to reimburse conference attendees for their out-of-pocket travel expenses, and that [REDACTED] may have claimed to make higher payments than [REDACTED] actually did. Additionally, DMO [REDACTED] alleged that the supporting documentation PTS [REDACTED] submitted to close out [REDACTED] cash advance may have included forged signatures.

During a recorded interview, PTS [REDACTED] confessed to embezzling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the USDE of \$1,096.33. [REDACTED] said in some instances, the principals received less reimbursement than authorized. In other instances, the principals that were fully reimbursed, but [REDACTED] overstated the reimbursement amount to Peace Corps. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not preplan the theft. [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] used the money to pay an overdue college tuition debt. Following the interview, PTS [REDACTED] provided OIG with information from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] recording a payment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PTS [REDACTED] denied forging any signatures on the "Petrol Payments" worksheet, as alleged.

PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal services contract was terminated shortly after [REDACTED] interview. DOJ declined to prosecute the matter, and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] are unwilling to initiate prosecution without a formal complaint from Peace Corps, which DOJ has advised against. No further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DMO [REDACTED] notified OIG of the possible embezzlement of U.S. funds by PTS [REDACTED]. PTS [REDACTED] was given a cash advance to reimburse conference attendees for their travel expenses. DMO [REDACTED] advised OIG that PTS [REDACTED] may have claimed expenses that were higher than incurred, and that the documentation PTS [REDACTED] submitted to close out [REDACTED] cash advance may have included forged signatures (Exhibit 1).

#### Investigative Activities

As background, PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held a Supervisor Workshop on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Attending the workshop were 53 primary school principals from throughout the country, as well as the corresponding Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) that would be working with the principals at each of their respective schools. School principals

Date:

3/4/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIIG Init

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



attending the workshop were provided with meals and lodging. Additionally, each principal was to be reimbursed in cash for their travel costs to and from the workshop. Reimbursement was based upon the round-trip distance from each principal's school to the workshop location (paid at a rate (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) per kilometer (km)), plus actual tolls. In support role for the workshop, PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tasked with (1) calculating the appropriate travel reimbursement for each attendee; (2) obtaining a cash advance from the post's cashier to cover the estimated expense; (3) distributing each cash payments to each attendee; and (4) submitting all receipts to the cashier with sufficient documentation so as not to become personally liable for the cash advance she obtained.

Prior to the workshop, the three education program managers gave PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) their estimates for the travel costs related to the school principals that each of them work with. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained an interim cash advance of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the Peace Corps cashier. The amount was based upon travel costs estimates received by PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). At the conclusion of the workshop, PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a two-page spreadsheet ("Petrol Payments") outlining what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly paid to each of the 53 principals that attended the workshop. The sum PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed to have paid out was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an increase of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 2).<sup>2</sup>

OIG interviewed PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware of a problem related to the travel reimbursements while attending the workshop. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Primary School approached (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to express (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) belief that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive sufficient compensation for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travel expenses. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the kilometer calculation used must have been significantly low, because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reimbursement was approximately one-half of what it should have been. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncertain as to why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not received sufficient reimbursement and asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to forward (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concern to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in writing after the workshop. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted a written concern dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received the following day (Exhibits 3-5).

PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the Line 20 of "Petrol Payments" worksheet submitted by PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the finance office to close out (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cash advance. The worksheet indicated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), which comprised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for distance and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 100 for tolls. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were no tolls associated with Principal (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travel from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) payment stated on the worksheet differed substantially from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) allegedly received. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the Line 5 of "Petrol Payments" worksheet submitted by PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that the worksheet indicated that the roundtrip distance from the school to the workshop was 500 km. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that number was impossible; the actual distance was closer to 120 km. In addition, that trip did not require payment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in toll charges, as claimed. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes that several signatures on the worksheet are fraudulent (Exhibits 3 & 4).

OIG compiled three essential pieces of data: (1) the amount each principal was entitled to receive for travel reimbursement; (2) the amount each principal claimed to have actually received as

<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Dollar Equivalent (USDE) was \$6,397.65, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USD, as reflected in the post's fiscal year (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) budget.

<sup>2</sup> The cashier distribution made to PTS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also included (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for "Trainee site visit allowance." That portion of the distribution is not related to the alleged embezzlement.



travel reimbursement; and (3) the amount PTS [REDACTED] allegedly paid each principal as travel reimbursement. OIG calculated the losses to the U.S. Government and to the principals of 45 of the 53 workshop attendees. OIG could not calculate the losses attributable to eight of the principals because the amount that each principal actually received from PTS [REDACTED] is currently unavailable. OIG calculated the loss to the U.S. Government to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the U.S. Dollar Equivalent (USDE) of \$1,657.<sup>3</sup> The total loss to the 45 school principals was calculated to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with the USDE of \$440.87 (Exhibit 6).

OIG interviewed five of the primary school principals who attended the workshop and received travel reimbursements. Of those five principals interviewed, only one received the correct reimbursement. The four other principals received amounts less than their entitlement (Exhibits 7-9 & 11). Nevertheless, PTS [REDACTED] submitted documentation to post's cashier that [REDACTED] paid the five principal amounts reflecting nearly three times the amounts [REDACTED] actually disbursed. The table below illustrates the financial loss to the U.S. Government and to the individual principals for those five interviewees. All amounts are represented in [REDACTED]

Principal Name	Amount Claimed (A)	Amount Authorized (B)	U.S. Gov't Loss (B-A)	Amount Issued (D)	Individual Loss (B-D)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)					

None of the five interviewees were aware that PTS [REDACTED] provided them with insufficient reimbursement. Four out of five of the interviewees recognized their signature on a spreadsheet [REDACTED] provided them when [REDACTED] distributed envelopes to them containing their travel reimbursements. However, those four individuals said that they did not review the calculations or financial information on the spreadsheet, and merely signed when asked to do so in order to receive their payments. The remaining individual denied signing the spreadsheet and alleged that someone may have forged [REDACTED] signature. One interviewee, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), still possessed the envelope that contained [REDACTED] reimbursement. The envelope is labeled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and supports [REDACTED] assertion that [REDACTED] was paid (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); not the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] claimed to have given [REDACTED] (Exhibits 7-12).

During a recorded interview, PTS [REDACTED] confessed to embezzling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with the USDE of \$1,096.33 [REDACTED] told OIG that after [REDACTED] was placed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in [REDACTED] purse before [REDACTED] and a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) filled all of the envelopes [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] was not systematic in [REDACTED] approach as to how [REDACTED] planned to conceal [REDACTED] theft. [REDACTED] said in some instances, the principals received less reimbursement than authorized. In other instances, the

<sup>3</sup> The USDE was calculated at a rate of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as reflected in the post's fiscal year [REDACTED] budget.

<sup>4</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) name is misspelled as [REDACTED] on several Peace Corps documents. Principal [REDACTED] is assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

principals that were fully reimbursed, but [REDACTED] overstated the reimbursement amount to Peace Corps. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not preplan the theft. [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] used the money to pay an overdue college tuition debt. Following the interview, PTS [REDACTED] provided OIG with information from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] recording a payment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PTS [REDACTED] denied forging any signatures on the "Petrol Payments" worksheet, as alleged (Exhibits 13 & 14).

PTS [REDACTED] personal services contract was terminated following the interview.


OIG contacted DOJ to discuss the investigation and potential U.S. prosecution. DOJ informed OIG that because the PTS [REDACTED] is not a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] the DOJ declined to prosecute the matter. OIG subsequently referred this matter to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] for investigation and prosecution, as appropriate. However, the [REDACTED] required that a PC official be the "complainant" for during the host-country investigation and prosecution. DOJ's Office of International Affairs (OIA) instructed Peace Corps not to act as complainant in this matter, as it would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity and open the agency and employees to possible civil suit (Exhibits 15-16).

#### Findings

PTS [REDACTED] admitted to embezzling just less than \$1,100, and was terminated. Neither DOJ nor [REDACTED] have decided to pursue criminal prosecution. No further investigative support is required.

#### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1  
Exhibit 2  
Exhibit 3  
Exhibit 4  
Exhibit 5  
Exhibit 6  
Exhibit 7  
Exhibit 8  
Exhibit 9  
Exhibit 10  
Exhibit 11  
Exhibit 12  
Exhibit 13  
Exhibit 14





**Peace Corps  
Office of Inspector General**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**Allegation of Staff Embezzlement at  
Peace Corps/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ♦ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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## SYNOPSIS

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that following an OIG audit, the post reviewed grants that were not properly closed and had contacted Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) about one of the grants. The value of the grant was approximately \$5,000 U.S. Dollar equivalent (USDE).<sup>1</sup> CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the post that after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed sites, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go forward with the grant and returned the money to Financial Administrative Assistant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in summer of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract had been terminated in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the money from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grant was now missing. OIG was informed that FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) former supervisor, PC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director for Management and Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the funds.

OIG determined that while working as the grant coordinator in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unlawfully used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position to embezzle U.S. funds from another Volunteer grant as well. The second embezzlement involved a Peace Corps Partnership Program (PCPP) grant in the amount of approximately \$4,000 USDE.<sup>2</sup> The total loss to the U.S. government from the two grants was approximately \$9,000 USDE. FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failure to maintain accurate grant records enabled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to continue (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) scheme to defraud the U.S. government.

FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct violated several federal laws including Theft and False Statements. Such conduct also violates the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch<sup>3</sup> and Peace Corps policy.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to prosecute FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in favor of administrative remedies.

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<sup>1</sup> Approximately (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<sup>2</sup> The PCPP grant had an established exchange rate of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to USD of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), making the USD equivalent of approximately \$4,000.

<sup>3</sup> See 5 C.F.R. Part 2635; such section is incorporated in all Peace Corps personal services contracts.



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## RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, OR AGENCY POLICY

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### **Title 18, U.S. Code § 641, “Public Money, Property or Records” states:**

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or

Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property in the aggregate, combining amounts from all the counts for which the defendant is convicted in a single case, does not exceed the sum of \$1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The word “value” means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.

### **Title 18, U.S. Code § 1001, “Statements or Entries Generally” states:**

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—

- (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
- (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
- (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.

### **Title 5, C.F.R. Part 2635, “Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch” states:**

Section 2635.702 addresses the use of public office for private gain. It provides:

An employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, for the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, including nonprofit organizations of which the employee is an officer or member, and persons with whom the employee has or seeks employment or business relations.

### **The Peace Corps Manual section 743, “Personal Services Contracts with Host Country Residents”**

#### **11.0 Standards of Conduct**

Personal services contractors must adhere to the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of Conduct) set forth at 5 CFR 2635. While personal services contractors are not employees of the Peace Corps and they do not supervise Peace Corps employees, the requirement for compliance with the Standards of Conduct must be included in all personal services contracts. A written copy is available at the following internet site

[http://www.usoge.gov/ethics\\_docs/publications/reference\\_publications/rfsoc.pdf](http://www.usoge.gov/ethics_docs/publications/reference_publications/rfsoc.pdf)

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## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised OIG that following an OIG audit the post reviewed grants that were not properly closed and had contacted PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about one of the outstanding grants<sup>4</sup>. The value of the grant was approximately \$5,000 USDE. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the post that after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) site (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go forward with the grant and returned the money to the FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the summer of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed OIG that FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract had been terminated in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that the money was missing. OIG was informed that FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) former supervisor, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the funds.

### Employment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the post entered into a personal services contract with FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had many duties, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) primary responsibilities included the day-to-day oversight of SPA grants and Peace Corps Partnership Program (PCPP) grants issued to Volunteers.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was notified of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract would not be renewed effective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) last known address is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

### SPA Grant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SPA Grant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the amount of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (or approximately \$5,000 USD) was approved on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) upon the signing of the project agreement by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the Community Partner, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The grant was established to promote conservation through ecotourism by establishing tours at an organic cacao farm.

The post electronically transferred the grant funds to the bank account of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to a different location within the country shortly after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grant was approved, and did not start the project.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the post to arrange for the return of the grant funds (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided official transportation to a nearby branch of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and withdrew the full amount. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed the thick stack of money in an envelope, returned to the post in an official vehicle, and met with FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the envelope

<sup>4</sup> See [Final Report on the Audit of Peace](#) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



containing the cash and was told that [REDACTED] would take care of it from here." FAA [REDACTED] never mentioned the matter to PCV [REDACTED] again.

PC [REDACTED] Administrative Assistant [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] became an acting grant coordinator following FAA [REDACTED] termination [REDACTED] reported that no bill of collection (BOC) was generated to reflect PCV [REDACTED] requirement to repay the grant money not used. Additionally, FAA [REDACTED] failed to maintain accurate grant files. OIG determined that accurate grant files would have identified FAA [REDACTED] embezzlement scheme before [REDACTED] was terminated.

#### **PCPP Grant [REDACTED]**

PCPP Grant [REDACTED] in the amount of [REDACTED] (or approximately \$4,000 USDE) was approved on [REDACTED] and funds were obligated by the Peace Corps. Shortly thereafter, the amount was deposited into the personal bank account of PCV [REDACTED] (PCV [REDACTED]). The grant was established to build a children's park, but a member of the family that intended to donate the land had died, and the land could not be readily transferred to the community for development. As a result, no grant money was spent on the project.

PCV [REDACTED] was scheduled to close service on [REDACTED]. Before doing so, PCV [REDACTED] closed [REDACTED] local bank account. On or about [REDACTED], PCV [REDACTED] met with FAA [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] office and provided [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] in cash, representing a full refund of PCPP grant money.

Peace Corps headquarters learned that the project had been cancelled on [REDACTED] and began working with FAA [REDACTED] to return the grant funds. Headquarters was not aware that PCV [REDACTED] had closed [REDACTED] service, nor that FAA [REDACTED] had received the grant money from PCV [REDACTED]. FAA [REDACTED] employment ended before headquarters became aware that FAA [REDACTED] had embezzled the PCPP grant money.

#### **Interview of FAA [REDACTED]**

On [REDACTED] FAA [REDACTED] went to the post to assist several staff members resolve various questions related to missing grant files. FAA [REDACTED] whose employment had ended [REDACTED], was questioned about PCV [REDACTED] grant, and [REDACTED] told two staff members that [REDACTED] needed to return the money to the office."

On [REDACTED] FAA [REDACTED] was interviewed by OIG. FAA [REDACTED] confessed [REDACTED] received all of PCV [REDACTED] grant money and did not deposit it with the cashier. [REDACTED] admitted to retaining the money for [REDACTED] personal use.

FAA [REDACTED] also admitted that [REDACTED] embezzled the funds associated with PCV [REDACTED] grant. However [REDACTED] recalled the amount to be approximately \$2,500 USDE.

At the conclusion of the interview, FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed a sworn statement in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stole the money associated with grants issued to PCVs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (see Exhibit I).

### Criminal Referral to DOJ

OIG was advised on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that DOJ had declined to prosecute FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) actions in favor of administrative remedies available to the government.

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## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

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OIG determined that while working as the grant coordinator in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unlawfully used (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position to embezzle U.S. funds from two grants issued to Volunteers. One grant involved a SPA grant in the amount of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and the other grant involved a PCPP grant in the amount of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The total loss to the U.S. government was approximately \$9,000 USDE. FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failure to maintain accurate grant records enabled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to continue (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) scheme to defraud the U.S. government.

FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct violated several federal laws including Theft and False Statements. Such conduct also violates the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch and Peace Corps policy.

DOJ declined to prosecute FAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) actions in favor of other remedies available to the government. Such remedies could include requesting the return of the funds through the issuance of a bill of collection or demand letter, as well as other host country criminal, civil, or other administrative action the agency deems appropriate.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Special Agent

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

John S. Warren

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

  
Kathy A. Buller

Inspector General

Exhibit 1: Sworn Statement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

### SYNOPSIS

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint from a Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff member that Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) was involved in promoting "Agriculture and Gardening" workshops. These workshops were not Peace Corps related, but the workshops were conducted in conjunction with PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) site visits.

### Investigative Activities

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) site in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke to the headmaster at PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school about rice and spoke about the need to start growing root crops. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has held "workshops" and "sells" some type of root crop seeds. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does this while on leave from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) job at Peace Corps.

Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held two jobs, one with the Peace Corps and one with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Agriculture Department. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducts (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) job after Peace Corps site visits with volunteers on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it appeared that PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was very successful in this secondary employment and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is well respected on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted an interview with Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Garrity rights via PC OIG form 1502, PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed the form and provided a three page sworn statement.

PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involvement in agriculture training on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted the training and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only attended. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) didn't receive any compensation for this training. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) collected the money from the community members who attended the training. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) help because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) scheduled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps travel around these training dates. PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised two trainings were held in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and one was in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not get any more for these trainings, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did promote the training while doing his Peace Corps work.

Date:

3/1/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIIG Init

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## Findings

OIG was able to substantiate the allegation. No further investigative support is required. PM  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract was not renewed and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employment ended with Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Regional Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director for Management and Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have improperly passed sensitive official information to former Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). PVC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly used the information to support (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EEO complaint with the agency and to publicly denigrate Peace Corps in email messages and in social media forums. Two of three of the alleged information leaks by DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involve sensitive information related to an OIG investigation. RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also asserted that DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has communicated with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after receiving a direct order not to do so.

The OIG investigation established that DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did, in fact, provide PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with confidential official information on three occasions without PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) need to know. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to articulate a clear reason why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) released the information, other than acknowledging that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maintained a close, personal relationship. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recognize the significance of the information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) released, nor did (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) anticipate how PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would use the information.

The OIG investigation established that after DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was given a direct order not to have further contact with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to interact with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with management's permission. However, the facts demonstrate that DMO involved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in matters resulting in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal contact with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involvement was not required.

During the investigation, OIG uncovered information related to DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) receipt of an allegation of criminal wrongdoing by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, then Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Rather than refer the allegation of criminal misconduct to OIG, DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to investigate the complaint by searching agency records and participated in a victim interview. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was required as a manager to report the wrongdoing to OIG, but did not do so because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not want to become involved in OIG's investigation.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to prosecute DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in favor of available administrative remedies. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned effective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG was notified by RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have improperly passed sensitive official information to former PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PVC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purportedly used the

<sup>1</sup> See OIG Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for additional details related to this allegation.

Date: 10/23/15	Agent Name/ Signature: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	AIG/ Jit (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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information to support [REDACTED] EEO complaint with the agency and to assert in social media forums that PCV [REDACTED] has been retaliated against by PC management. Two of three of the alleged information leaks by DMO [REDACTED] involve sensitive information related to an OIG investigation. RD [REDACTED] also asserted that DMO [REDACTED] has communicated with PCV [REDACTED] after receiving a direct order not to do so.

### Investigative Activities

#### **Alleged Unauthorized Release of Agency Information**

- Information Regarding Volunteer Fraternization with Embassy Staff

On the afternoon of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), three PC [REDACTED] Volunteers were observed by Deputy for Programming and Training (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DPT [REDACTED]) playing basketball at the U.S. Embassy Residence Compound with several U.S. Embassy staff members. According to the three Volunteers, DPT [REDACTED] approached them and verbally counselled them for having violated post policy regarding fraternization with Embassy staff. The Volunteers explained that they were invited to play by an Embassy staff member who was a returned Volunteer (RPCV), and that they were not aware of the fraternization policy. One of the Embassy staff members stated that [REDACTED] was leaving, and DPT [REDACTED] agreed to play the remainder of the game in progress. When the game was over, the three Volunteers left the residence compound.

The Volunteers told OIG that they did not know how PCV [REDACTED] would have learned of the incident. Two of the Volunteers closed service within weeks of the incident, and all three Volunteers stated that they did not mention the incident to other Volunteers. Two of the Volunteers noted that they were embarrassed about their own conduct and for having been counselled for it (Exhibits 1-3).

DPT [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] observed DMO [REDACTED] walk past the basketball court while [REDACTED] played basketball with the three Volunteers. [REDACTED] also said [REDACTED] mentioned to DMO [REDACTED] and CD [REDACTED] the following day that [REDACTED] encountered three Volunteers playing basketball with Embassy staff, and that [REDACTED] intended to prepare a policy reminder for Volunteers in upcoming "Staff Notes." [REDACTED] did not mention to DMO [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] verbally counselled the three Volunteers, nor did [REDACTED] discuss the incident with other Volunteers. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PC [REDACTED] issued a "Staff Notes" including the statement, "we strongly discourage Volunteers from meeting socially with U.S. Embassy personnel while in [REDACTED]" (Exhibits 4 & 5).

An OIG review of agency records confirmed that the three Volunteers were disciplined (verbal counselling) for the policy infraction. Only DPT [REDACTED] and CD [REDACTED] had access to this record at post.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV [REDACTED] sent an email message to DPT [REDACTED] that alleged, in part, that [REDACTED] discriminated against female Volunteers. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

During a recorded OIG interview, DMO [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] are close friends. [REDACTED] said they belonged to the same [REDACTED] club, getting together for tea, book discussions, and social outings. DMO [REDACTED] also stated that PCV [REDACTED] was provided (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] acknowledged that they both thought poorly of CD [REDACTED] and DPT [REDACTED], and that [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] often shared the experiences they had with CD [REDACTED] and DPT [REDACTED]. DMO [REDACTED] acknowledged to OIG that [REDACTED] relationship with PCV [REDACTED] created, at a minimum, a potential conflict of interest.

DMO [REDACTED] recalled CD [REDACTED] and DPT [REDACTED] issuing "Staff Notes" reminding Volunteers about the policy prohibiting them from fraternization with Embassy staff. [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] thought DPT [REDACTED] was being a hypocrite at the time, as [REDACTED] had seen [REDACTED] playing basketball with Volunteers and Embassy staff at the Embassy's residence compound the prior weekend. DMO [REDACTED] told OIG that it was very possible that [REDACTED] told PCV [REDACTED] about DPT [REDACTED] apparent "hypocrisy." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]

- Information Regarding OIG Travel

On the afternoon of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], OIG was notified of the alleged misconduct of CD [REDACTED] by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], and initiated its investigation the following day. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], OIG submitted an electronic Country Clearance (eCC) request to the U.S. Embassy [REDACTED] seeking official permission for an OIG investigator's travel to [REDACTED] for Peace Corps business. DMO [REDACTED] received an email copy of that travel request in [REDACTED] capacity as DMO at post. DMO [REDACTED] forwarded the eCC request to Peace Corps Safety and Security Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (PCSSO [REDACTED]) the next day to obtain assistance with processing the request (Exhibits 8 & 9).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] PCV [REDACTED] sent an email message to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], the Administrator of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] a non-governmental organization (NGO) working in [REDACTED]. The email, with a subject line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] stated in part:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Country Director Peace [REDACTED] (sic) is currently under investigation for inappropriate behavior towards (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. A number of [REDACTED] have come forward with accusations in recent weeks. They complained to the US Embassy and investigators from Washington DC are coming to [REDACTED] this week to interview these [REDACTED] (Exhibit 10).

At the time this email was sent by PCV [REDACTED] only DMO [REDACTED] and PCSSO [REDACTED] were aware that the allegation had been forwarded to OIG and that OIG had planned to travel to [REDACTED]. PCSSO [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] did not inform other PC [REDACTED] staff or any Volunteer that OIG was travelling to [REDACTED].



OIG also interviewed [REDACTED] Ministry of Social Work and Youth Director [REDACTED] (Director [REDACTED]). Director [REDACTED] had facilitated the victim interview with DMO [REDACTED] and PCSSO on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Director [REDACTED] stated that while [REDACTED] was aware that the matter had been reported to OIG by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as required, [REDACTED] did not discuss the matter with PCV [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] was not aware that OIG was travelling to [REDACTED] when PCV [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Thus, [REDACTED] could not have disclosed this information to PCV [REDACTED] (Exhibit 11).

PCV [REDACTED] was interviewed by OCRD on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as part of its review of [REDACTED] EEO complaints. During that interview, PCV [REDACTED] told OCRD that [REDACTED] learned of the OIG investigation from Director [REDACTED]. Director [REDACTED] unequivocally denied PCV [REDACTED] assertion (Exhibits 11 & 12).

DMO [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] did not specifically recall telling PCV [REDACTED] that OIG was travelling from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to [REDACTED] to investigate the allegation against CD [REDACTED]; however, [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] must have done so (Exhibit 7).

- Information Related to OIG Evidence Collection

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG asked DMO [REDACTED] for assistance with gathering agency records related to CD [REDACTED] government-issued cell phone. [REDACTED] was also instructed not to discuss this request with any staff other than those with a need to know. [REDACTED] was also advised that if [REDACTED] delegated this request to a member of [REDACTED] staff, [REDACTED] should warn the staff member not to discuss the matter with others. The requested records were provided to OIG the following day (Exhibit 13).

OIG did not discuss the request for CD [REDACTED] cell phone records with other PC/ [REDACTED] staff, nor was the topic raised during CD [REDACTED] interview on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] did not discuss any aspect of the OIG investigation with PCV [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] did not know OIG reviewed the victim's telephone records, and thus could not have been the source of PCV [REDACTED] information (Exhibit 11).

PCSSO [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] had no contact with PCV [REDACTED] during the period of the OIG investigation, and [REDACTED] did not know OIG reviewed CD [REDACTED] cell phone records (Exhibit 15).

The facts indicate that DMO [REDACTED] was the only person with direct knowledge that OIG had requested CD [REDACTED] cell phone records. DMO [REDACTED] told OIG that "it's completely possible"



that [REDACTED] told PCV [REDACTED] about OIG's request for CD [REDACTED] telephone records, but [REDACTED] did not remember a specific conversation. DMO [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] did not recognize the significance of the information [REDACTED] released, nor did [REDACTED] anticipate how PCV [REDACTED] would use the information (Exhibit 7).

### **Alleged Failure to Obey Supervisory Direction**

On Friday, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 6:35 pm (Eastern Time), RD [REDACTED] sent DMO [REDACTED] an email message stating, "In light of recent events, please cease all communication with PCV [REDACTED] immediately." Because of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) time difference between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the message was received at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DMO [REDACTED] acknowledged to OIG that [REDACTED] read the directive on Saturday morning, and [REDACTED] replied to RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) message at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) morning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) time) (Exhibits 16).

DMO [REDACTED] denied that [REDACTED] had any unofficial contact with PCV [REDACTED] following receipt of RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) direct order. [REDACTED] enumerated several in-person, email, and telephonic contacts [REDACTED] had with PCV [REDACTED] after having received RD [REDACTED] order, but said all of the contacts were official in nature and made with the knowledge of DPT [REDACTED], who was then the acting CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] advised PCV [REDACTED] via email on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that [REDACTED] could not communicate with PCV [REDACTED] any further. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] told PCV [REDACTED] this via email, as [REDACTED] post-issued cell phone no longer worked. [REDACTED] denied that PCV [REDACTED] was at [REDACTED] residence on that afternoon, immediately before [REDACTED] received a replacement cell phone from post.

DMO [REDACTED] told OIG that it was [REDACTED] responsibility to ensure the proper administrative processing of PCV [REDACTED] separation, which included matters related to lodging, personal property and equipment, banking, official travel, and pay. DMO [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] personally handled several of these matters because PCV [REDACTED] refused to deal with other PC [REDACTED] staff. DMO [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] personal contact with PCV [REDACTED] was not required and that [REDACTED] staff was sufficiently competent that they could have handled matters in [REDACTED] stead (Exhibit 7).

A review of official and personal email accounts did not indicate that there were personal communications between DMO [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED]. Official cell phone records reported that DMO sent and received 353 text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and 152 of those messages were exchanged between [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED]. Did not identify email communications between DMO [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] on DMO [REDACTED] Peace Corps or Yahoo! Accounts that appeared to either be unauthorized or personal in nature. OIG did not review telephone records related to DMO [REDACTED] replacement cell phone.<sup>2</sup>

### **Alleged Failure to Forward Criminal Misconduct Allegation to OIG**

DMO [REDACTED] advised OIG that [REDACTED] received information from PCV [REDACTED] on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), that CD [REDACTED] had sexually assaulted a [REDACTED] host-country national (HCN) at a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) The information from PCV [REDACTED] also alleged that CD [REDACTED] had stalked the victim and harassed the victim via cell phone after the alleged assault. PCV [REDACTED] had told DMO [REDACTED] that

<sup>2</sup> OIG was advised that DMO [REDACTED] announced [REDACTED] intention to resign before [REDACTED] replacement cell phone was analyzed, and the cell phone was returned to the agency upon their request.



PCV [REDACTED] learned of the allegation from an official with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who worked closely with PCV [REDACTED]

DMO [REDACTED] acknowledged that after having received the initial allegation information from PCV [REDACTED] on or about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] initiated [REDACTED] own fact-finding investigation by reviewing phone records associated with the government-issued cell phone assigned to CD [REDACTED] also admitted that [REDACTED] set up a meeting on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to interview one of the victims. Accompanying the victim was Director [REDACTED] PCSSC [REDACTED] also attending the meeting.

DMO [REDACTED] told OIG during [REDACTED] interview that [REDACTED] was aware of MS 861 and [REDACTED] duty to report alleged CD [REDACTED] alleged wrongdoing, and that [REDACTED] accessed OIG's web-based system to report the incident. However, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] decided not to do so because [REDACTED] did not want to become involved in any investigation that may have followed. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] reviewed CD [REDACTED] cell phone records out of simple curiosity. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] participated in the victim interview on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), because [REDACTED] did not feel that [REDACTED] possessed sufficient information to report allegation before doing so (Exhibit 7).

### Findings

The OIG investigation established that DMO [REDACTED] provided PCV [REDACTED] with confidential official information on three occasions without PCV [REDACTED] need to know. On one occasion, PCV [REDACTED] used the information provided by DMO in PCV [REDACTED] EEO complaint against the agency. The two other releases of information related to an OIG investigation, and PCV [REDACTED] used the information in a personal email and blog to publicly denigrate Peace Corps. Additionally, after DMO [REDACTED] was given a direct order not to have further contact with PCV [REDACTED] the facts demonstrate that DMO involved [REDACTED] in matters resulting in [REDACTED] personal contact with PCV [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] involvement was not required.

Further, the investigation established that DMO [REDACTED] failed to report an allegation of misconduct by [REDACTED] supervisor to OIG, and instead initiated [REDACTED] own investigation into the allegation due to [REDACTED] personal curiosity. DMO [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] was required as a manager to report the wrongdoing to OIG, but did not do so because [REDACTED] did not want to become involved in OIG's investigation.

DOJ declined to prosecute DMO [REDACTED] in favor of administrative remedies. [REDACTED] resigned effective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and no further investigative support is required (Exhibits 17 & 18).

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 5

Exhibit 6

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Post: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

### SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated upon receiving information from the Peace Corps Office of Victim Advocacy (OVA) that a returned Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer who wished to remain anonymous (Anonymous RPCV) reported Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers (PCVs) were using drugs. OIG telephonically interviewed the Anonymous RPCV on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and s/he reported that s/he witnessed Volunteers using marijuana during a Volunteer Advisory Committee (VAC) meeting and in the Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transit house in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) was selling marijuana to other Volunteers. The Anonymous RPCV also reported that Volunteers were using over-the-counter opiates, sometimes in combination with alcohol. The Anonymous RPCV provided the names of several Volunteers s/he had either personally witnessed using marijuana or strongly suspected of using marijuana.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a second complaint (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was filed via the hotline in which the complainant alleged that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV) was using illegal substances during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps service. OIG Investigators interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as part of this investigation, and the results of that interview are summarized in this report and will be maintained in this case file.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the U. S. Department of Justice, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions section declined prosecution of any Volunteers for use or within country distribution of marijuana.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG Investigators interviewed, or attempted to interview, 19 Volunteers, and 10 of these Volunteers admitted to using marijuana and signed statements to that effect. Eight additional Volunteers were identified for interviews, but they were two to three days travel away from Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headquarters and these interviews were not conducted.

The results of the interviews, including copies of the signed statements, were provided to the appropriate Peace Corps Officials in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and in Washington, DC, and, as a result, 10 Volunteers who admitted to using marijuana and 2 Volunteers who were strongly suspected of using marijuana. These 12 Volunteers were afforded the opportunity to resign from their Peace Corps service. One additional Volunteer resigned from Peace Corps rather than be interviewed by OIG Investigators.

Date:

5/10/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI In

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

## NARRATIVE

### Allegation

This investigation was initiated by the OIG after it received information from OVA about Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers using marijuana.

### Investigative Activities

The PC OIG conducted, or attempted to conduct, 19 interviews regarding Volunteers' use of a controlled substance (marijuana) during their Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) service. The results are reflected in the following table and narrative.

PCV NAME	ADMITTED TO MARIJUANA USE OR HIGHLY SUSPECTED OF MARIJUANA USE (ALLOWED TO RESIGN FROM THE PC)	EXHIBIT NUMBER
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Admitted	Exhibit 1
	Admitted	Exhibit 2
	Admitted	Exhibit 3
	Admitted	Exhibit 4
	Admitted	Exhibit 5
	Admitted	Exhibit 6
	Admitted	Exhibit 7
	Admitted	Exhibit 8
	Admitted	Exhibit 9
	Admitted	Exhibit 10
	Denied - Highly Suspected	Exhibit 11
	Not Interviewed – See Below	N/A
PCV NAME	DENIED MARIJUANA USE AND/OR LOW SUSPICION OF MARIJUANA USE	EXHIBIT NUMBER
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Denied	Exhibit 12
	Denied	Exhibit 13
	Denied	Exhibit 14
	Denied	Exhibit 15
	Denied	Exhibit 16
	Denied	Exhibit 17

\* Denotes a Volunteer who provided a signed statement.



PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed, admitted to using marijuana during this interview, and provided a signed statement (see Exhibit 18). As PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was already in the process of being medically separated from Peace Corps, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was allowed to continue with the medical separation process.

The OIG attempted to interview PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)), but PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned rather than be interviewed (See Exhibit 19).

In addition to the 19 Volunteers who OIG interviewed, or attempted to interview, this investigation identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who allegedly used marijuana while serving in Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Due to logistical and travel restraints, the OIG was not able to interview these eight Volunteers. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were only identified by one witness as having used marijuana, this was considered to be a low suspicion of marijuana use, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers were all allowed to continue their service. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers, specifically (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were identified by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as having used marijuana. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported personally observing PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) smoke marijuana, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was allowed to resign from the Peace Corps. One witness reported personally observing PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) smoke marijuana, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was allowed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to continue (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) service (see Exhibit 20).

#### Findings

OIG obtained 10 confessions from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteers for using marijuana and identified two additional Volunteers who were considered to be highly suspected of using marijuana. Peace Corps afforded these 12 Volunteers the opportunity to resign from service. One Volunteer resigned rather than be interviewed by OIG Investigators.





# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

## SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Deputy for Management and Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised OIG that General Services Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have attempted to embezzle U.S. funds from the post's finance office by submitting a falsified receipt for a vehicle gate motor.

GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) personnel assigned to the Regional Security Office (RSO) at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the request of OIG. Through the RSO's effort, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confessed to having attempted to embezzle U.S. funds. GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid a local print shop \$10 USDE to prepare a fabricated receipt, which claimed that a gate motor cost was \$1,350 when the actual cost was \$905. GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned on keeping the excess \$445 for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

The U.S. Department of Justice declined prosecutorial interest in the case. Termination proceedings are ongoing. No further investigative action is required.

## NARRATIVE

### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised OIG that GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have attempted to embezzle U.S. funds from the post's finance office earlier that day (Exhibit 1).

### Investigative Activities

In late (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked by DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to determine the cost of replacing the motor to the office compound's vehicular gate. GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at that time the lowest price found was \$1,350. The repair was planned for the following month. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) re-contacted DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the motor to the gate had completely broken down and a complete replacement was necessary. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approval to replace the motor.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Financial Assistant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerns (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had regarding the receipt GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) submitted the previous day for the gate motor. DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also met with Administrative Assistant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who had similar concerns. Below is a summary of information provided by FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

Date:

2/28/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI In  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



On the afternoon of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) brought a receipt to AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for replacing the motor for \$1,350. AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the receipt looked strange and possibly suspicious as it seemed to be just printed from a computer with no logo for the company or other official looking information. There was only one phone number listed on the receipt which was noted as strange by the FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed the receipt to FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at which point (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to call the phone number listed for the company and ask about the cost of the motor. The person on the phone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with repeatedly told FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the cost of such a motor was only \$905 (not \$1,350). After the call FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the medical unit to discuss a separate matter with a Peace Corps Medical Officer (PCMO). During the time that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was away from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk, GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came to AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk and said something to the effect of - "the company called me about the motor and there is an error with the cost, maybe the man (repairman) is trying to cheat me". GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then took the original receipt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had previously given to AA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for \$1,350 and left the financial office.

When FA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the office the next morning, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found a different - rather official looking - receipt in the finance inbox from the motor repair company for \$905. This receipt was presumably placed in the inbox by GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 2).

GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by DSS personnel assigned to the RSO at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Through the RSO's effort, GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confessed to having attempted to embezzle U.S. funds. GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid a local print shop \$10 USDE to prepare the fabricated receipt, which claimed that the gate motor cost was \$1,350 when the actual cost was \$905. GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned on keeping the excess \$445 for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3).

Following the interview, RSO revoked GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Security Clearance, took custody of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Embassy badge, PC cell phone, and keys to the Peace Corp vehicle (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to the embassy, and escorted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) off the compound. DOJ declined prosecutorial interest in this case (Exhibits 4-5).

### Findings

GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to attempting to embezzle \$445 by submitting a fabricated receipt inflating the actual cost of a replacement vehicle gate motor. DOJ has declined to prosecute, and Peace Corps is terminating GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employment contract. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

- Exhibit 1 Peace Corps ICMS Inquiry (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Exhibit 2 Email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to OIG, dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Subj: "Report Possible Issue."
- Exhibit 3 Sworn Statement of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).
- Exhibit 4 Email message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Exhibit 5 Email message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Subj: "RE: Peace Corps OIG Referral"





# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



## ALLEGATION

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Technical Trainer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made unwanted sexual advances towards (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while they were together at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further alleged that TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had consensual sexual relations with two to three other Volunteers in violation of the post's fraternization policy.<sup>1</sup> PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred these concerns to post management on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that management failed to address (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexual assault allegation appropriately (Exhibits 1-2).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

Peace Corps MS 243, "Responding to Sexual Assault"  
Peace Corps MS 861, "Office of the Inspector General"

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised of PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complaint on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged that TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the previous evening where TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became "obnoxiously drunk and repeatedly threw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had to repeatedly tell TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stop, and had to be physically forceful with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not mention that there was kissing or any sexual contact, nor did PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mention that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been sexually assaulted. DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concluded that TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct was unprofessional to the extent that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became intoxicated in front of a Volunteer and was physically falling onto (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Because PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was clearly upset by the incident, DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could relay the incident to the Peace Corps Medical Office (PCMO) for follow-up, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consented to.

DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred the matter to the PCMO, and because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know whether the incident constituted a sexual assault under the agency's policy, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left that determination for the PCMO to make. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the PCMO did not conclude that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sexually assaulted, as defined by Peace Corps policy.

DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefed Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor Master Trainer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (MT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described to them an incident wherein TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had consumed excessive alcohol and harassed PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said no staff had mentioned or suggested the applicability of the sexual assault policy or the need to generate a report in the Consolidated Incident Reporting System (CIRS).

<sup>1</sup> See OIG Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for additional details related to this allegation.

Date:

4/26/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and MT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to obtain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explanation of events. TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became very intoxicated and acted unprofessionally, and in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) defense, TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no reason to make a sexual advance towards (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and MT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed that the appropriate course of action would be to draft a cure notice for TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and obtain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) written commitment to behavioral changes.

DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the cure notice was drafted and TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drafted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) letter of commitments. Later that day (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for an update. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the proposed agency action, and PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became upset because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deemed to be too lenient. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then told DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware of at least two former Volunteers that had previously engaged in fraternization with TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the names of the former Volunteers or ask them to come forward, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could consider the information at that time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asserted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had proof, but did not share any specific information. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to address the allegation of fraternization based solely upon (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assertions. DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to OIG that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) erred in telling PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how post would respond to TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conduct.

Later that day DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email from PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wherein (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complained about the post's handling of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexual assault allegation, and of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) intent to contact the Office of Victim Advocacy (OVA) and OIG. Prior to that time, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not view the incident between PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a sexual assault, and it was PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statement to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that triggered post's handling of the event as a sexual assault. A CIRS report was generated on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with the offense listed as sexual assault. DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that while the post's safety and security manager may not have been aware of the incident until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware of the incident on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not involved in any discussion of logging the incident into CIRS prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware that all allegations of staff misconduct, particularly as they involve Volunteers, should be reported to OIG. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that post could have responded more quickly (Exhibit 3).

During OIG's investigation, DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the agency effective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit XX). Additionally, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relieved of duties at post as of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). OIG was advised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resigned in lieu of termination effective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit XX).

## FINDINGS

All OIG investigative activities ceased upon the resignation of CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). No further investigative support is required.

## EXHIBIT LIST

- Exhibit 1 Email Message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to OIG dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Subject: "Complaint Against Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Staff Member."
- Exhibit 2 Memorandum of Interview or Activity (MOI), Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**PEACE CORPS**  
**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPORT A POSSIBLE PROTECT ACT  
VIOLATION TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ♦ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**RESTRICTED USE - PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL - INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
**EXTERNAL RELEASE WITHOUT INSPECTOR GENERAL APPROVAL IS NOT AUTHORIZED**



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## SYNOPSIS

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On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Office of Inspector General (OIG) hotline received a concern pertaining to former Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who remained in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) following close-of-service in the fall of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Allegedly, PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to marry (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)-year-old (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with whom (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a relationship while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still a Volunteer. [Agent's Note: This matter will be reported separately.]

In the course of investigating the above matter, it became apparent that Regional Director for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (RD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director of Programming and Training (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief of Operations for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ChOps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief of Operations for Africa (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ChOps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Country Desk Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (CDO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to report to OIG a potential child sexual abuse of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by a Peace Corps Volunteer. The RD, CD, DPT, ChOps, and CDO are required to report potential child sexual abuse to OIG as a part of their minimum duties in responding to a potential PROTECT Act violation. This requirement is a recognition of both the seriousness of PROTECT Act allegations and the criticality of OIG's involvement in any agency response to potential child sexual abuse by staff or Volunteers. By not reporting to OIG as required, the staff failed to take an essential step in a policy designed in part to detect and prevent potential child sexual abuse. Instead, efforts appear to have been focused on encouraging the Volunteer to resign in order to protect the integrity and reputation of the Peace Corps.

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## RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, OR AGENCY POLICY

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### *Peace Corps Manual* section 648, "Child Protection"

#### 3.0 Definitions ...

(b) **Child Abuse** includes four categories of abuse:

- (3) **Sexual Abuse** ... includes any behavior that makes it easier for an offender to procure a child for sexual activity (i.e. grooming for a child to engage in sexual activity.)

...

(c) **Child Protection** is defined as all reasonable measures taken to protect children from child abuse.

#### Attachment-A, "Child Protection Code of Conduct"

##### Acceptable Conduct

At a minimum, the employee or Volunteer will: . . .

- (d) Promptly report any concern or allegation of child abuse by an employee or Volunteer.

### ***Peace Corps Manual section 861, "Office of Inspector General"***

#### **7.0 Duties and Responsibilities of Peace Corps Staff and V/Ts**

##### **7.1 Reporting to OIG . . .**

(c) . . . However, the following types of suspected misconduct by V/Ts must be reported expeditiously to the OIG: . . .

- (2) Engaging in sexual activities or sexual contact with any person under the age of 18.

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## **INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

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### **Review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Email Correspondence**

OIG reviewed email correspondence between Peace Corps staff pertaining to PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 1)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent an email to ChOps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had reported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to marry a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) village.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent two emails to ChOps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In the first email, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated: "it has just come to our attention (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proposed to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) village that is believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) years old." In the second email, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would meet with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), to have a "heart-to-heart chat" to discuss the PROTECT Act. In addition, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the goal of the conversation would be to have PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resign from the Peace Corps.

CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a conversation with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) addressing concerns regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Amongst the concerns addressed with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussed the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) age and whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having sexual contact with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the situation could be very damaging to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well as to the reputation and credibility of the Peace Corps, since the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was under the legal age of consent. PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assured CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no intention of having a sexual relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did plan to marry (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) someday.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by stating:



(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent two emails to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one email before meeting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and one after. In the first email, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In the second email, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was in love with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned to marry and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not had a sexual relationship. During the meeting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) counseled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the PROTECT Act and on Peace Corps policy, including Manual Section (MS) 648, "Child Protection". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that they believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would not be intimately involved with the minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of legal age. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to these emails and asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff "investigated in the community to verify whether or not (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a physical relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)."

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and stated:

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

#### Review of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Email Correspondence

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent an email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding "recent developments that are very concerning", stating that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was going to marry (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from his village after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps close-of-service. In the email (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) states: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concludes (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by requesting support on how to handle this situation.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and several other recipients acknowledging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerns. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated: "I am copying (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) this email chain as I am sure (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) will want to weigh in on the situation". [Agent's Note: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 2)]

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged receipt of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email and an ensuing conference call by stating: "we had a good call." During the interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG discovered that the call referenced by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) phone call between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussing the situation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

#### Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The interview was audio recorded and a copy is available upon request. Following the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (Exhibit 3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) aware of Peace Corps Manual Section 861, "Office of Inspector General" but had not read it recently. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not report the situation to OIG because the information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not disclose allegations pertaining to sexual acts with a minor child. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did authorize the Program Manager and the Safety and Security Officer to conduct an investigation of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) authorized the investigation to display extra diligence and caution over the matter at hand, not because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) actually thought (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having an intimate relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) very confident there was no sexual element involved. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the potential seriousness of the situation became clear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview with OIG. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) actions were not meant to be reckless and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would never purposefully refrain from informing OIG of this type of matter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have informed OIG when this matter first came to her attention.

#### Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The interview was audio recorded and a copy is available upon request. Following the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (Exhibit 4)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) aware of MS 861, but did not report this situation to OIG because the information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not disclose information or allegations pertaining to sexual acts with a minor child. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the conference call with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others regarding this matter, which occurred on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never purposefully refrained from informing OIG of this matter. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have informed OIG when this matter first came to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attention.

#### Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The interview was audio recorded and a copy is available upon request. Following the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (Exhibit 5)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she had been a new (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and had been unaware of MS 861 and OIG reporting requirements (Agent's Note: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a Country Director prior to holding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position). When asked about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) use of the term "investigation", (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not realize it was inappropriate for a post to conduct an investigation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have reported this situation to OIG. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no ill intent in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decision not to report to OIG, and that it had not been a conscious attempt to keep OIG out of the situation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to inform (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the situation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware as to why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not been informed when this situation first came to light in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

#### Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The interview was audio recorded and a copy is available upon request. Following the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (Exhibit 6 / See Note)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the situation was being handled by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) area of responsibility. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are assigned to approximately thirteen (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) countries each.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that in hindsight, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have independently reported the situation to OIG. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it had originally been discussed as a marriage/wedding with no overtones of sexual assault. During our interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) viewed the situation differently than when it had first happened, and in retrospect could clearly see how sexual assault could be a factor in that situation.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood why the agency would have wanted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resign but that from what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could remember there was no unusual "push" to get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resign. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) part of a conference call regarding this issue, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had absolutely no recollection of what the participants discussed or even the call itself. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied that anyone suggested not reporting to OIG on this matter.

#### Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Following the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (Exhibit 7 / See Note)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) job duties, but stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is ultimately in charge. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that questions had been asked regarding if local police should be called to investigate whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having sex with the minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and to obtain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) age. It was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understanding these questions had been answered via the investigation conducted by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when the situation was first mentioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again addressing the relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately knew the situation was serious (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was looped in. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) greatly surprised that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not been informed of this situation prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not aware why.

After receiving the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took part in a conference call with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took detailed notes

during the call, which indicated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had obtained a hardcopy of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) birth certificate that showed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) birthdate as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) meaning the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time of the conversation. To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knowledge, the birth certificate was never shown to any Peace Corps Staff.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied anyone suggested not to call OIG to disclose this matter, and also (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought that the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had likely received adequate training to know that they should have immediately looped in OIG.

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## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS


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The OIG investigation disclosed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff to include (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), among others, were aware that PVC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned to marry a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in his village and yet they did not report this potential violation of Peace Corps policy and the PROTECT Act to OIG. The aforementioned staff stated they did not report the matter to OIG because they thought it did not explicitly indicate child sexual abuse and therefore sexual abuse had not crossed their minds. This was contradicted by the staff's actions in counseling the Volunteer about the PROTECT Act and Peace Corps' policy and inquiring into whether PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had an inappropriate sexual relationship with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). These actions demonstrate that potential sexual abuse of the minor was forefront on their minds. The staff have all since admitted that they should have reported this matter to OIG.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

John S. Warren  
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

  
Kathy A. Buller  
Inspector General



**Peace Corps  
Office of Inspector General**



**ALLEGATION OF FALSE STATEMENTS BY  
A USAID OIG EMPLOYEE**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**RESTRICTED USE - PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL - INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
**EXTERNAL RELEASE WITHOUT INSPECTOR GENERAL APPROVAL IS NOT AUTHORIZED**

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## SYNOPSIS

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The Peace Corps Office of Inspector (OIG) initiated an investigation at the request of the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG). Acting Deputy Inspector General Catherine Trujillo (ADIG Trujillo) asked OIG to investigate whether USAID OIG Management and Program Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided false statements in connection with the background investigation into his eligibility for Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (see Exhibit 1).<sup>1</sup>

The OIG investigation disclosed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previous employment with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On that date, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was "not a good fit," and was escorted to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office, told to pack up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) things, and was prohibited from using the company telephone or computer systems before being escorted from the building.

In a letter dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the company cited his "declining performance, unprofessional conduct, and numerous allegations by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) employees that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) engaged in inappropriate behavior" as the reasons for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) termination.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) certified in a security questionnaire that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filled out for USAID that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was "laid off from job by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)." When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked to specify the reason, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated, "Management's decision."

When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by a USAID background investigator on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a written statement to the investigator that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was laid off by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because the company did not win a contract for an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In a signed, written statement, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the investigator that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "was not laid off for disciplinary problems or unfavorable conditions."

In a sworn statement to OIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the above answers to USAID security investigators after discussing the matter with an attorney. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied being terminated essentially because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disagreed with the stated reasons for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) release.

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## RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, OR AGENCY POLICY

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### Title 18, U.S. Code § 1001. "Statements or entries generally"

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, USAID OIG requested assistance from the Peace Corps OIG asking it to conduct this investigation because the subject is an employee of USAID OIG. The subject worked in the Office of Investigations for more than three years and currently works for the Office of Management.



- Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning the circumstances of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dismissal. Prior to the commencement of the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sworn. The interview was audio-recorded, and a transcript of the recording is attached (see Exhibit 10).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on the day (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his employment was being terminated for performance and that it was not working. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the separation paperwork and then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) escort (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office to gather (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal property and escort (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the building. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) phone call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) within minutes after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saying that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trying to access information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) computer and picking up files to put (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bag. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) make sure that no company property leaves and to stay (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exits the building.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

- Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

OIG asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the papers (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to place in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) backpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the documents were reviewed and many of them appeared to have been company records. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) some of the documents related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and were probably confidential or proprietary. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know whether or not the documents (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were classified.

- Department of Justice Prosecution Declination

On March 17, 2015, OIG discussed the case with the Fraud and Public Corruption Unit of U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. Assistant U.S. Attorney Ellen Chubin Epstein declined to prosecute MPA Bellini in lieu of administrative remedies (see Exhibit 5).

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## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

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OIG initiated an investigation upon receipt of a request from USAID OIG ADIG Trujillo to determine whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided false statements in connection with a background investigation into his eligibility for a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmentalized Information.

OIG's investigation disclosed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated from his previous employment with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). On that date, he was escorted to his office.

told to pack his things, and was prohibited from using the company telephone or computer systems before being escorted from the building.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the company cited his "declining performance, unprofessional conduct, and numerous allegations by female employees that [he] engaged in inappropriate behavior" as the reasons for his termination.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) certified in a security questionnaire that he filled out for USAID that he was "laid off from job (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)". When he was asked to specify the reason, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "Management's decision."

When he was interviewed by USAID (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), he provided a written statement, which claimed he (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "was not laid off for disciplinary problems or unfavorable conditions."

In a sworn statement to OIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the above answers to USAID (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after discussing the matter with an attorney. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied that he was terminated because he disagreed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated reasons for his release.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

John S. Warren  
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

Joaquin Ferrao  
Deputy Inspector General

Kathy A. Buller  
Inspector General





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PC [REDACTED] Country Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) [REDACTED] office had received an allegation in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that that PC [REDACTED] Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexually assaulted several host country national (HCN) teachers in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at a Peace Corps-sponsored training conference.<sup>1</sup> CD [REDACTED] inaction was in violation of Peace Corps Manual Section 861, *Office of Inspector General*. OIG received a separate concern that post violated the Kate Puzy Act in revealing the identity of the original complainant to PCV [REDACTED].<sup>2</sup>

The OIG investigation established that CD [REDACTED] failed to refer to OIG an allegation that a PC [REDACTED] Volunteer had sexually assaulted one or more HCNs. CD [REDACTED] told OIG that [REDACTED] was unaware at that time that the matter should have been referred to OIG. Approximately two weeks later CD attended Overseas Training (OST), at which time [REDACTED] was provided additional information regarding the processing of complaints involving staff and Volunteer wrongdoing. By that time, however, the complaint involving PCV [REDACTED] had been investigated by post's staff, corrective action had been administered to PCV [REDACTED], and the matter was considered closed. In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD [REDACTED] learned that the original allegation against PCV [REDACTED] should have been referred to OIG, and [REDACTED] did so.

The investigative findings were provided to Inspector General Kathy Buller (IG Buller) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and OIG senior staff will brief PC senior staff on those findings as they relate to training. No further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CD [REDACTED] notified OIG [REDACTED] office had received an allegation in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that that PCV [REDACTED] sexually assaulted several host country national (HCN) teachers in (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) at a Peace Corps-sponsored training conference (Exhibit 1).

#### Investigative Activities

CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] arrived at post on or about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and met with former PC [REDACTED] CD [REDACTED] (CD). CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was informed by CD [REDACTED] that post had recently received a sexual assault complaint involving PCV [REDACTED] and that staff had been investigating it. CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] reviewed various Peace Corps Manual Sections to determine

<sup>1</sup> See OIG Case Number [REDACTED] for additional details related to this allegation.

<sup>2</sup> See OIG Case Number [REDACTED] for additional details related to this allegation.

Date:

4/15/16

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI in

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



how the complaint should be handled, to include the sections on "Responding to Sexual Assault" and "Volunteer Conduct." [REDACTED] acknowledged that [REDACTED] did not review the section pertaining to the Office of Inspector General. CD [REDACTED] stated that the following week the concern was addressed by PC [REDACTED] Deputy for Programming and Training (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DPT [REDACTED], PCV [REDACTED] was counseled and received a behavior contract. CD [REDACTED] considered the matter resolved. [REDACTED] did not advise OIG or Region staff at headquarters.

In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CD [REDACTED] traveled to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attend OST. While attending OST [REDACTED] learned additional information regarding the handling of complaints [REDACTED] noted that the training was not clear on post's responsibility to report allegations that Volunteers sexually assault HCNs. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] was likely informed that such an allegation should have been referred to OIG and he may have "missed it."

CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] became aware of [REDACTED] responsibility under MS 861 to refer the sexual assault allegation to OIG in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and [REDACTED] did so. The allegation was not deliberately concealed from OIG or Region staff (Exhibit 2).

### Findings

The investigation established that CD [REDACTED] failed to report an allegation of sexual assault by a Volunteer to OIG. CD [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] continued the course of action initiated by [REDACTED] predecessor, CD [REDACTED] received additional training on the handling of allegations a few weeks later during OST; however, [REDACTED] stated that it remained unclear to whom [REDACTED] would report an allegation of sexual assault by a Volunteer upon a HCN. [REDACTED] referred the allegation to OIG when [REDACTED] became aware of [REDACTED] responsibility to do so. OIG found no evidence that [REDACTED] deliberately concealed the allegation from OIG or Region staff.

The investigative findings were provided to IG Buller, and OIG senior staff will brief PC senior staff on those findings as they relate to training. No further investigative support is required.

### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





## SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Case Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) POST: Headquarters



### SYNOPSIS

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Investigative Unit of the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated investigative activities in support of an ongoing OIG audit. Peace Corps provides medical insurance to Peace Corps Volunteers and has a contract with Seven Corners, Inc. (Seven Corners) to process its medical claims.<sup>1</sup> The OIG audit uncovered a potential false claim submitted by Seven Corners in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for nearly \$180,000 that related to a medical claim paid by Medicare (another government entity). After being questioned by auditors, Seven Corners submitted an adjusted bill in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resolve the previous billing error. While the investigation confirmed that a false claim was submitted in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the billing error was corrected in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and the investigation found that the false billing was an isolated event.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG issued a Management Advisory Report (MAR) entitled "Peace Corps' Volunteer Health Care Administration Contract Should be Replaced." The MAR identified numerous problems with the Seven Corners contract, and provided detailed information about the billing error identified above.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to prosecute the matter criminally, and DOJ Civil Division declined to pursue civil remedies. No further investigative support is required.

### NARRATIVE

#### Allegation

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Investigative Unit of the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated investigative activities in support of an ongoing OIG audit of the Seven Corners contract with Peace Corps (Exhibit 1).

#### Investigative Activities

According to an invoice dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the University of California, Davis Medical Center (UCDMC) billed \$597,900.90 for providing services to Peace Corps Volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Of the total billed, Medicare paid \$593,408 as primary insurer, the Estate of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paid \$3,360, and Peace Corps paid the remaining \$1,132 through Seven Corners (Exhibit 2-3).

<sup>1</sup> According to the contract between Peace Corps and Seven Corners, the Network Fee is a 30% commission Peace Corps agrees to pay Seven Corners on savings achieved by Seven Corners when processing medical claims for Peace Corps. Seven Corners achieves savings by using a contractor (Health Services International, Inc., a.k.a., HSI) to compare the bills submitted by medical services providers to the rates billed in its medical network. If the rates in its network are lower than the rates billed by the medical service provider, then HSI tries to negotiate a discount with the medical service provider. If negotiations are unsuccessful, Seven Corners refers the claims to Peace Corps at the agreed upon network price.

Date:

4/6/15

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIG

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Seven Corners submitted a \$277,811 voucher to Peace Corps, which Peace Corps paid in full. \$211,467 of the voucher constituted a "Network Fee" for the month of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- \$179,030.70 of which was charged for processing the UCDMC bill (Exhibit 4). Specifically, Seven Corners and HSI claimed a 30% commission for lowering the bill from \$597,900.90 to \$1,132. In other words, Seven Corners and HSI claimed a \$179,030.70 commission on the \$593,408 paid by Medicare and the \$3,360.00 paid by the Estate. Neither of them, however, negotiated the payments by Medicare or the Estate. Therefore, the \$179,030.70 "savings" fee presented to Peace Corps is a false claim.

As a result of Seven Corner's billing practice, the charges billed to the government (Medicare and the Peace Corps) exceeded the hospital's original bill by 30 percent. This resulted in total charges to the U.S. government of nearly \$774,000 (see Table below).

**Claim Billing and Payment History**

Billed by Hospital & the Contractor	Amount Billed*	Payments Made by U.S. Government
Hospitalization Charges Originally Billed to Medicare by Hospital	\$593,409	\$593,409
Hospitalization Charges Billed to Volunteer's Estate by Hospital	3,360	-
Hospitalization Charges Billed to Peace Corps by the Contractor	1,132	1,132
Network Fee Billed by the Contractor to Peace Corps	179,031	179,031
Total Amount Paid by U.S. Government before OIG inquiries		\$773,572

\*Amounts rounded to nearest dollar.

OIG Audit made initial inquiries into this matter in late (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Because Seven Corners and HSI failed to voluntarily produce information needed for the audit, OIG issued subpoenas (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Seven Corners and HSI, respectively. OIG subsequently issued subpoenas (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to HSI and Seven Corners, respectively, seeking supplemental information (Exhibits 5-8).

Subsequent to OIG inquiries on this transaction, Seven Corners and/or HSI later contacted UCDMC staff and Medicare to adjust their billings without appraising Peace Corps or OIG of their activities, in an apparent attempt to correct their previously submitted false claim.



OIG learned that UCDMC had credited Medicare for the full amount originally billed and HSI re-negotiated the hospital charges. By letter dated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UCDMC advised HSI that it agreed to accept \$65,298 as payment in full for billed charges of \$612,791 (revised), minus the previous payment of \$1,132. Other information indicated Seven Corners earned a re-calculated 30% commission fee of \$164,248 derived from Subcontractor-reported savings of \$547,493. Seven Corners issued a credit to Peace Corps for the difference between the original unearned commission fee charged (\$179,030.70) and the revised commission fee (\$164,248). As of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peace Corps has been fully reimbursed (Exhibits 9-10).

#### Findings

OIG determined that Seven Corners submitted a false claim to Peace Corps in the amount of \$179,030.70. After OIG auditors questioned the original billing, Seven Corners submitted an adjusted bill in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that corrected the billing error.

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG notified the agency of multiple concerns related to the Seven Corners contract, to include Seven Corner's submission of the false claim. DOJ declined to take criminal or civil action related to this matter. No further investigative support is required.

#### EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1  
Exhibit 2  
  
Exhibit 3  
Exhibit 4  
  
Exhibit 5  
Exhibit 6  
Exhibit 7  
Exhibit 8  
Exhibit 9  
Exhibit 10

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)