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Description of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) File No.  
65-HQ-74480, Foreign Intelligence Analysis, 1972-1988

First Release date: 29-June-2011  
Second Release date: 15-September-2011  
Appeal Release date: 01-June-2023

Posted date: 15-April-2024

Source of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attn: FOI/PA Request  
Record/Information Dissemination Section  
170 Marcel Drive  
Winchester, VA 22602-4843  
Fax: (540) 868-4391/4997  
Email: [foiparequest@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:foiparequest@ic.fbi.gov)

Note: Sections 1-4 of FBI Headquarters File 65-HQ-74480,  
Foreign Intelligence Analysis are included here.

Note: Material released on appeal begins on PDF page 733.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

June 29, 2011

Subject: FBI FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480

FOIPA No. 1145585- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

Section 552a

- |  |   |                                 |
|--|---|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) _____      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____                                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____                                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) |   | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

641 pages were reviewed and 185 pages are being released.

Documents were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

The enclosed documents contained in sections 2 and 4 of FBI Headquarters file 65-HQ-74480 represent the first interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

No fee is being assessed at this time. When the second interim release is made in this case, you will be billed for the \$5.00 fee associated with this first release as well as the \$15.00 duplication fee for the second release for a total of \$20.00. Each subsequent release will be made at a cost of \$15.00 per CD.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)



September 15, 2011

Subject: FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480

FOIPA No. 1145585- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

Section 552a

- |   |   |                                 |
|---|---|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)                                | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) <u>18 U.S.C., Section 2518</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)                                |   | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

1,271 pages were reviewed and 511 pages are being released.

Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

The enclosed documents contained in Section 1 and 3 of FBI Headquarters file 65-HQ-74480 represent the second and final interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

By letter dated June 29, 2011, we sent you a CD containing the first interim release for this case. At that time, we explained that the \$5.00 balance associated with that release would be billed with this release. Accordingly, upon receipt of the enclosed CD-ROM, please make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of \$20.00 and remit payment to the Work Process Unit, Record Information/Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602. Please include the FOIPA Request Number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release will close any pending FBI FOIPA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0610

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION

5/79

FROM :

[Redacted]

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 01-13-2011

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

b6  
b7c

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

*Of B.I. Foreign Intelligence Analysis*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Communities. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

*TJD  
JPT  
JPT*

**DE-11**

*65-74480-45*

APPROVED:

Director	_____
Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____
Exec. AD-LES	_____

Adm. Serv.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____

Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____

OCT 16 1979

(CONTINUED - OVER)

*2- ENCLOSURE*

65-74480

Enclosure

TJD:en (8)

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [Redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified and Extended by 1756 *Curley*  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification September 26, 1999



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

97 OCT 3 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-77480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]

b1  
b6  
b7c

- (C) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the
- (C) activities of [redacted] during
- (C) the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979 and also the
- (C) activities of the [redacted]
- (U) during the first five months of 1979. It is a sanitized
- (U) version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DISSEMINATION LIST

[REDACTED] President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

b6  
b7c

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the  
Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;  
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;  
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention:  
Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence  
Staff - 1: Attention: National Foreign Assessment  
Center - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director  
of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department  
of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;  
Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office  
of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of  
the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-15-2011

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## REVIEW

### OCTOBER, 1979

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Classified and Extended by 1756 *CUP/ax*  
Reason For Extension ~~FOIA, II 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)~~  
Date of Review For Declassification (October 1, 1999)

*JRC*  
*en*

TJD:en

MAIL ROOM

~~SECRET~~

OCT 1 1979

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-15-2011

FBI/DOJ

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
(S)	1
	5
	6
	8
	9
II.	11
	11
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	11
Strategic Intelligence	16
Political Intelligence	17
Economic Intelligence	21
	22
	22
	23
	25
	26
(S) III.	29
	29
	29
	31
	32
	33

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IV.



35  
35  
35  
35  
35  
36  
37  
38

(S)

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

43  
43  
47  
51


(S)



"Lemon Aid"



(S)



PHOTOGRAPHS

(S)



39-41  
55-59

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States  
DISSEMINATION LIST

61  
61  
63

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b1

INTRODUCTION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of [redacted] during the first

(C) five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as the [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (S)

(U)

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
~~SECRET~~

- iv -

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Referral/Direct

(U)



At any rate, Soviet action did not prevent the trial,

[redacted] in the [redacted]

[redacted] In the meantime [redacted]

b6 per FBI  
b7C

[redacted] And [redacted] were

waived and they too were allowed to leave their country of  
detainment and return to the Soviet Union. Thus, [redacted]

[redacted] shared the same fate (although, of course, their

[redacted] still stand) as the other Soviets arrested since the

early 1960s. But the outcome of the [redacted] case was  
different in one sense. [redacted]

[redacted] (U)

Despite the arrest and conviction of the two Soviet  
operatives and the impending SALT ratification debate, during  
the past year the large complement of United States-based

(S)




b1 per FBI

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(S)

The Soviet official presence continues to be greatly augmented by large numbers of Soviets visiting the United States as tourists, as well as under the East West Exchange Program (EWEP). During the last six months of 1978 and first six months of 1979, 2,359 Soviet tourists visited the United States. Under

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the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to 26,861 Soviet seamen. (S)

(U)

(S)

[redacted]

Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also hopes to be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

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
Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 239 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979.

b1



(S)

In [redacted] the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when [redacted]



b6  
b7C

[redacted] An immediate result of [redacted] defection was the [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Overall,

a total of 36 suspected EGIS agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against 13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany.

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

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b6  
b7C

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

(S)



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b7C

The arrests that followed the [redacted] defection helped to illustrate the degree to which [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had maneuvered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of Brandt.

(S)




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
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(S)



Scientific and Technical Intelligence



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Strategic Intelligence



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Political Intelligence




(S)

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
It has often been stated by observers of the international scene that former President Richard Nixon is held in much higher esteem overseas--including the Soviet Union--than in the United States, and that many Europeans could not quite understand how Americans could drive a seemingly effective chief of state from office. 

(S)



Economic Intelligence

(S)



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b1



(S)

[Redacted]

(C)

A detailed listing of [Redacted] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of the "Review." During the first five months of 1979, a large number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respective [Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Large Redacted Area]

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- 28 -

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(S)



Within the past year, the Soviet overseas establishment has been rocked by some damaging defections, most notably that of Arkadiy N. Shevchenko, who served as Under Secretary to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Shevchenko is one of the highest-ranking Soviets to have defected to the West.




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(S)



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Below are three photographs depicting the type of paraphernalia and instructions which the asset received from the

(S)



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- 42 -



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

b1 per FBI  
b6  
b7C

(S)

[redacted] "Lemon Aid"  
On [redacted] the Soviets [redacted] and  
[redacted]  
shortly after clearing a dead-drop. Additionally, [redacted]  
[redacted] was detained, although he was not arrested [redacted]  
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

b1 per FBI  
b6  
b7C

(C)

Upon their arrest, [Redacted] were jailed at  
the [Redacted] they were held  
in lieu of [Redacted] was  
forced to leave the United States. Of [Redacted] however, [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Soviet  
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to await their trial, which was  
held in [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

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(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The arrest of these individuals came, however, at a time when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were strained. There was thus some concern that the arrests and trial of the two spies might place further strain on U.S.-Soviet relations. Therefore, the decision to arrest the Soviets was by no means a cut-and-dried affair, but involved the consideration of highly complex issues.

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(U)

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

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- 60 -

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 1, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
(S) Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	<u>2,428</u>

b1

NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the  
Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;  
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;  
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

---

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention:  
Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence  
Staff - 1; Attention: National Foreign Assessment  
Center - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director  
of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department  
of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;  
Attention: MS03 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office  
of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of  
the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
- 64 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar <sup>WDC</sup> <sub>WOP</sub>

DATE: 8/10/79

FROM : [Redacted] <sub>WOP</sub>

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 01-20-2011

*JPT WOP*

*11 DC*

DE-33  
V-33

65-74480-44

AUG 22 1979

TJD:en (7)

Enclosure

**ENCLOSURE**

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

1 - [Redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by 1756  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification August 10, 1999~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

97 OCT 12 1979

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

b6  
b7c

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]  
[redacted]  
(C) This issue is devoted to the activities of  
[redacted] during the latter half  
(C) of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of the  
[redacted] during the first  
(U) five months of 1979. (S)


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-15-2011

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## SUMMARY

JULY, 1979

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signature]*

MAIL ROOM

~~Classified and Extended by 1929~~  
~~Reason For Extension FCM, II 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)~~  
~~Date of Review For Declassification (August 1, 2009)~~

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

Not For Dissemination  
Outside The FBI

~~SECRET~~

FBI/DOJ

*[Handwritten initials]*




TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

iii

I.



1

1

5

6

9

10

11

II.

14

14

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

14

Strategic Intelligence

19

Political Intelligence

20

Economic Intelligence

24

25

25

26


28

29

30

31

III.



33

33

33

35

36

37

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IV.	[Redacted]	39
		39
		39
(S)		39
		39
		40
		41
		42

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	46
---	----

(S)	[Redacted]	"Lemon Aid"	46
	[Redacted]		50
		Aircraft Surveillances	53
(S)	[Redacted]		54

PHOTOGRAPHS

(S)	[Redacted]	43-45
		58-62

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States	63
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CHART

Major Communist Country Official Presence in the United States	64
--	----

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INTRODUCTION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

(C) This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities

(C) of [redacted] during the first five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as the [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain (U) friendly foreign Governments. (S)

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the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to (U) 26,861 Soviet seamen. (S)

(S)

[redacted]

Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. And, within the near future, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will probably be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest

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
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in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 234 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979.

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In [redacted] the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when [redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] An immediate result of  
[Redacted] defection was the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Overall, a total of 36 suspected EGIS  
agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have  
been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against  
13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany.


[Redacted]

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The arrests that followed the [redacted] defection helped to illustrate the degree to which [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had maneuvered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of the

(S)

embarrassed Brandt. [redacted]


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


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On the diplomatic front, the Czechs appeared to be making some steps toward improving the stagnant relations with the United States. In February of this year, the 



three influential U.S. Congressmen, Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Caliborne Pell, and Representative Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 



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
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Scientific and Technical Intelligence

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[Redacted]

A detailed listing of [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of the "Summary." During the first five months of 1979, a large number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respective [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Area]

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
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Referral/Consult

Aircraft Surveillances


As previously reported, the San Francisco Division has made successful use of aircraft surveillance in affording physical coverage of Soviet intelligence officers. Within the

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past year, San Francisco has continued to make good use of aerial surveillance of particularly active KGB officers on both covert and overt missions without the subjects becoming aware of such coverage. ~~(S)~~

SF SPIAs, 3/79, p.15; 11/78, p.18



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- 58 -



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
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APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, JUNE 9, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1222
PRC	234
Poland	271
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	107
Cuba	84
(S) Romania	80
Hungary	78
Bulgaria	48
Vietnam	9
North Korea	13
Yugoslavia	151
Albania	10
Mongolia	11
Total	<u>2,395</u>




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NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES



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- 64 -

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

April 11, 1979

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: [Redacted] Liaison Officer, Intelligence Division

*Rec 4/13/79*

FROM : [Redacted], Director  
Office of Intelligence Liaison  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

*BMF*

SUBJECT : FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

*Analysis United States*

*J.P. [Signature]*

I would appreciate receiving three additional copies of the March 1979 issue of FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review for transmittal to the Department's Offices of East European Affairs, East Asian Affairs, and American Republic Affairs.

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*3 copies provided to [Redacted] INR/OIC, State Dept 4/11/79*

[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

*File 65-74480*

*65-74480-42*

15 JUL 19 1979

84 AUG. 3 '79

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.:	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC*

DATE: 3/20/79

FROM

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~

PURPOSE:

*FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS UNIT ED CIA'S*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Committees (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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APPROVED: *WOC*

Director	_____
Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____

Adm. Serv.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____

Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____

TJD:en (8)

Enclosures (2) - *Copy kept in D.O.*

65-77480 -

REC-65

DE-49

V-21

*65-74480-41*

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

23 APR 19 1979

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

(CONTINUED - OVER)

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [Redacted]

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 02-22-2011

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Classified and Extended by (1929) *[Signature]*  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification (March 20, 1999)



16 MAY 10 1979



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [REDACTED] to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted  
wholly to the activities of [REDACTED]  
(C) [REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977  
through December, 1978. It is a sanitized version of one  
furnished to FBI Field Offices, with some updated material  
added. The next edition, which is now in preparation will  
focus upon operations of both [REDACTED]  
(C) [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

[REDACTED] the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1

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Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary,  
Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

65-74480-41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-15-2011

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE



## REVIEW (U)

**MARCH, 1979**

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TJD:en  
(10)

Classified and Extended by 1929  
Reason For Extension FCIM, 11, 1-2.4.2 (1, 2, and 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (March 31, 2009)

MAIL ROOM

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

ENCLOSURE

National Security Information  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PAGE

iii

I.



1

1

2

3

5

6

7

9

9

11


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Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping,  
and Students

13

II.



16

17

18

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21

23

23

24

25

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III	[Redacted]	27
		27
		29
		33
		33
IV.	[Redacted]	37
		37
		37
		38
		40
		40

(S)

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	42
Magic Dragon	42
Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country	47
Impediments to the Development of Assets	47

APPENDICES 48

(S)

[Redacted]	48
[Redacted]	49

DISSEMINATION LIST 52

~~SECRET~~

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INTRODUCTION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an  
overview and analysis of [redacted]  
[redacted] (S)  
[redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly  
(C) to the activities of [redacted] during the  
latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of  
brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this  
(C) paper as [redacted] In the  
interest of operational and administrative security and  
(U) acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set  
forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (S)

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
(S)

Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970s. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Beijing, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, science and technology, agriculture, and the armed forces. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)

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Despite Romania's continued good relations with the United States (typified by the April, 1978, meetings between President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and President Carter),



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Unfortunately for the Romanians, the RIS were dealt a crippling blow in [redacted] with the defection of [redacted]



[redacted] The damage that the defection of such [redacted]



[redacted] can have on an intelligence agency is obvious. [redacted]



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
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
Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the number of exchange visitors entering the United States has increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this

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escalation. From January 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977. [REDACTED]



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Throughout the year 1978, 170 vessels from 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 806 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 17,300 individual entries into the United States of varying duration, [REDACTED]




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Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80 percent of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific

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and technical fields.



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(S) II. [redacted]

Included below are objectives which, during the period under review, received the greatest amount of attention from the respective [redacted]. The primary objective of [redacted] was the collection of scientific and technical (S & T) intelligence. The reason for this is readily discernible--all of these countries are plagued with economies and technological bases of varying degrees of underdevelopment. [redacted]

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
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[redacted]

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Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's

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
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ability to exploit these resources



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
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
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Referral/Consult

Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups. 



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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Magic Dragon

On the night of [redacted] an Alexandria, Va., federal court jury returned a [redacted] in the espionage trial of the United States of America vs. [redacted]

The defendants were [redacted]

[redacted] The trial arose out of the alleged passage of material "relating to the national defense of the United States" to the [redacted] Several weeks later on [redacted]

[redacted] Thus climaxed an investigation [redacted]

The [redacted] intelligence operation consisted essentially of the transmittal of classified [redacted]

[redacted] The material, which was composed of both "Secret" and "Confidential" documents, included, but was not limited to, [redacted]

[redacted] who held a "Top Secret" security [redacted]

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clearance, had access to the information due to [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] was motivated to act as an agent for the [redacted]  
by his desire to gain [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was introduced in [redacted] an  
individual who supposedly could help [redacted] in this effort.

[redacted]

[redacted] also  
occupied his time with another function--as an agent for the

[redacted] (U)

Shortly after [redacted] became acquainted with [redacted]  
he began to pass documents to the [redacted] Evidence  
indicates that [redacted] had made a bargain with [redacted]

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[redacted] by supplying him with information then  
the [redacted]  
[redacted] although  
[redacted] continued, telephonically, to supply [redacted] with  
(U) classified information up to a few days before their arrest. (S)

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[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The successful outcome of the investigation was also  
furthered through the utilization of a panoply of technical  
surveillance devices. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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b6  
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The outcome of the appeals of the [redacted] convictions, which are expected to be taken by defense counsels to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary, could have important legal ramifications. Most significantly, the appeals question the inherent power of the President of the United States to authorize warrantless, electronic surveillances of American citizens in cases involving the national security, and further question whether the Government has the right to use the fruits of such warrantless surveillances in criminal trial proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of these issues. (U)

Another unresolved legal question relating to [redacted] [redacted] arises from a civil suit filed by [redacted] [redacted]. If the defendants are successful in pressing their case, such a court decision could open a veritable Pandora's box, for other individuals involved in previous, unrelated electronic surveillances could be spurred to launch similar civil suits. (U)


Finally, defendant [redacted] while under cross-examination, implicated certain other individuals as being possibly involved in this matter. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecution team is presently considering additional action concerning those implicated by [redacted]. Further action must, however, await the outcome of the [redacted]

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
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Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country


An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified information, and is a native of the target intelligence service's country. 

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Impediments to the Development of Assets

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APPENDICES

(S)

[Redacted]

In relation to

[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted] the priorities of the FBI, based upon the degree of threat posed by these services to the United States, are as follows (as of January, 1979):

[Redacted]

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b7C

DISSEMINATION LIST

the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary,  
Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

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Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1 (U)

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.
Director	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.
Assoc. Dir.	Ident.	Rec. Mgnt.
Dep. AD Adm.	Intell. Div.	Tech. Serv.
Dep. AD Inv.	Laboratory	Training
		Public Affs. Off.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

x Airtel

x

2/22/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-271060)  
ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CI/3 (A)  
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO  
SUBJECT: MONTHLY SUMMARIES  
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
RESEARCH MATTER - FCI  
BUDED 2/23/79

105-271060-1025

Re Bureau airtel of 2/1/79.

The following represents Chicago's comments on  
the questions asked by the Bureau in referenced airtel. (U)

- (U) 1. Frequency: Quarterly (S)
- (U) 2. Content: Reporting of intelligence activities  
should be written in summary form with sufficient detail to  
fully explain developments. (S)
- (U) 3. Format: The current topical headings are  
appropriate (particularly as they relate to SATPIA) with  
the following exceptions: (S)

65-74480

- 3 - Bureau (RM)  
(1 - 65-74480) (FINAL)
- 4 - Chicago  
(1 - 65-4268) (SATPIA)  
(1 - 65-3907) (SPEIA)  
(1 - 201-187) (YUPIA)  
(1 - 105-33496) (FINAL)

EBC/ejb  
(7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by 7107  
Reason For Extension EOPM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification 2/22/79~~

57 APR 18 1979



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) A. Eliminate arrival and departures of officials and additions and deletions of known and suspected intelligence officers (item number 5 in SATPIA). (S)

(U) B. Eliminate travel of officials and the arrival and departure of couriers. (S)

C. Eliminate forms 5-80 (Monthly Statistical Tabulation) and 5-81 (Monthly Recapitulation) unless one or the other or both have particular significance for the Intelligence Division. The information on the Monthly Statistical Tabulation form is available through COBIC.

(C) D. Add a sub heading (SATPIA) relating to Satellite commercial enterprises. Chicago did this on its own several months ago [redacted]

(U) 4. Distribution: FBIHQ and establishment offices. (One FCI supervisor suggests that the document go to FBIHQ and the 10 major FBI field offices.) Access to SATPIA and YUPIA should be limited to FCI personnel. (S)

(U) 5. Security: Summaries should be written in such a fashion as to protect the identity of sources and where appropriate, the circumstances surrounding the source's access to the information. Operations aimed at recruitment and assessment of officials for recruitment should be held on a strict need-to-know basis and not included in any of these documents. (S)

(U) 6. Analysis: The field should include its analysis of developments on a timely basis as particular events or trends become apparent. (In the case of personnel handling YUPIA, the opinion seemed to be that FBIHQ should handle analysis.) (S)

(U) Threat Assessments? Personnel in Chicago have differing views on this particular topic. One FCI supervisor expressed the opinion that at the present time, the field was unable to recognize a threat assessment. However, others think the field should not be excluded from this option. If, in any given situation, we have sufficient information and expertise to handle one. (S)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7. Countries: There is no reason why pertinent developments regarding non-criteria countries should not be added to our reporting. (S)

(U)

Comment: Chicago will take this opportunity to address at least two particular subjects in relation to this study by the Bureau which, we believe, have a direct bearing on the quality and usefulness of SPIA and SATPIA. In September of 1977, Chicago responded to another questionnaire from FBIHQ concerning our Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL). Bureau personnel who prepare our foreign intelligence analysis use these documents as a basis for their reports -- reports that are no better than the information furnished by the field. We see SPIA and SATPIA as having great potential for summarizing in one place on a regular basis [redacted] activities. But this requires thorough and complete reporting for each period the documents are submitted. This is subject the Bureau should address in this study and then issue the field explicit instructions. If establishment offices are allowed to pick and choose on their own what will be included in SPIA and SATPIA, there will be practically no consistency in reporting and the documents themselves will lose much quality and credibility.

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The dilemma in this is the question of security and need-to-know as currently applied by the Bureau. We have already expressed our opinion that recruitments should not be reported in SATPIA and SPIA. Yet, there is a need for an exchange of information among those of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations so we can be made aware on a timely basis of what [redacted] are doing in our own field in particular and other fields in general where we might learn valuable information as to techniques, targets and tradecraft. It is a question which finally will have to be resolved from the perspective of headquarters. (S)

(C)

(U)

All of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations in Chicago firmly believe that if the requirements for SPIA, SATPIA and YUPIA are revised these reports be submitted on a quarterly basis. Developments in many of our operations do not lend themselves neatly to monthly reporting. A longer time-frame would enable the field to base its reports on a wider area of developments which often make details more meaningful. (S)

(U)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC*

DATE: 1/31/79

FROM : [Redacted] *WOC*

*Analysis U.S. (info)*  
*WOC*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

[Redacted] *WOC*

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

<b>APPROVED:</b>	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Intell. <i>WOC</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

Enclosure

**ENCLOSURE**

65-74480

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

CONTINUED - OVER

TJD:slp/en *en*  
(7)

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [Redacted]

EX-106

REC-79 *65-74480-5*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11 FEB 14 1979

Classified and Extended by 1929 *WOC*  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification (January 31, 1999)

62 MAY 14 1979

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

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**DO NOT CLASS.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

- (C) This publication provides an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977 and 1978. An issue was published in June of 1978 which focused upon the activities of [REDACTED]  
(C) [REDACTED] The next issue, now in preparation, will focus upon the activities of both [REDACTED]  
(C) [REDACTED] "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL)." (S)

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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-16-2011

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## SUMMARY (U)

JANUARY, 1979

- Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*D*  
JPT

*off*

TJD:en  
(7)

MAIL ROOM

Classified and Extended by 1929 *1929*

Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (January 1, 2009)

*off*

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

Not For Dissemination  
Outside The FBI

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ENCLOSURE

65-74480-40X

FBI/DOJ

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION PAGE  
iii

I. [Redacted] 1

(S)

1  
2  
3  
5  
6  
7  
9  
9  
11

Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping,  
and Students 12

II. [Redacted] 14


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16  
19  
19  
21  
21  
22  
23

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i

III



25

25

27

32

34

36

(S)

IV.

39

39

39

40

42

42

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

44

Magic Dragon

44

False Flag Operation

49

Intelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country


51

Impediments to the Development of Assets

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APPENDICES

53



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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

(C)

[REDACTED]

This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as [REDACTED]

(C)

(C)

In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments.

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Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970's. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Peking, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier TENG Hsiao-Ping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, technology, science, and education. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)

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
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Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the numbers of exchange visitors entering the United States have increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this upward escalation. Through January 1, 1979, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977.

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For the first three quarters of 1978 (January 1 through September 30) the vessels of 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 722 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 13,264 individual entries into the United States of varying duration, [redacted]

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
(S)

Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80% of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific and technical fields. [redacted]

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
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Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's ability to exploit these resources,

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
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
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Residing within the United States is an unidentified subject who emigrated from West Germany in the early 1970s. The subject has assumed the identity of a citizen of West Germany (who will, for purposes of security, be called Schmidt).



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Also significant is the fact that after moving to the United States, the subject married a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S. citizen, is an emigrant from a communist country. (S)

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
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Referral/Consult

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Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups. 

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The outcome of the appeals of the [redacted] convictions, which are expected to be taken by defense counsels to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary, could have important legal ramifications. Most significantly, the appeals question the inherent power of the President of the United States to

[redacted]

The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of these issues. (U)

Another unresolved legal question relating to "Magic Dragon" arises from a civil suit filed by [redacted]

[redacted] They allege invasion of privacy as a result of being overheard in the electronic surveillances of [redacted] and seek various forms of relief, including monetary. If the defendants are successful in pressing their case, such a court decision could open a veritable Pandora's box, for other individuals involved in previous, unrelated electronic surveillances could be spurred to launch similar civil suits. (U)

Finally, defendant [redacted] while under cross-examination, implicated certain other individuals as being possibly involved in this matter. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecution team is presently considering additional action concerning those implicated by [redacted] Further action must, however, await the outcome of the [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

File 105-298634; CI-2 Supervisors

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False Flag Operation




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Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country


An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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(S)



APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *WCH* \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

1 - [redacted]  
1 - Mr. [redacted] Thomas  
1 - [redacted]

b6  
b7c

Date: January 17, 1979  
To: Director  
National Security Agency  
Attention: M503  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

BY LIAISON  
1/17/79 AK/NSA

*mg*

Mr. [redacted]  
DCI Security Committee  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Room 3E05  
Langley Headquarters Building

BY LIAISON  
1/18/79 to CIA  
9/5/79

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  
Chief of Naval Operations (Op-009D) BY LIAISON  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C. 20350  
Attention: Navy Security Committee Member

Delivered 1-19-79  
LPC

From: [redacted] Security Officer  
(Security Committee Member)  
FBI

*(Handwritten initials)*

Subject: ~~FBI~~ "FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW"

*FBI Form...*  
This is in reference to communications received from [redacted] National Security Agency Security Committee Member, dated November 30, 1978; from [redacted] DCI Security Committee, dated November 3, 1978; and from Mr. [redacted] Navy Member, DCI Security Committee, dated November 14, 1978. All of these communications referred to my offering at the November 1, 1978, meeting of the Security Committee to place each member of the Committee on the mailing list of the FBI to receive future editions of the "Foreign Counterintelligence Review" providing a specific request was submitted.

REC-106 65-74486-40

26 JAN 22 1979

Assoc. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:

DR:1fj  
(10)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

62 FEB 5 1979  
MAIL ROOM  
D. DRIN  
*Shannon -  
for delivery  
1/16/79*

Director, National Security Agency  
Mr. [redacted] DCI Security Committee  
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department

b6  
b7c

For your information, copies of the last edition of the FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence Review," dated July, 1978, are no longer available. However, one Xeroxed copy is attached for each requester.

While it was anticipated copies of the "Foreign Counterintelligence Review" would be produced on a quarterly basis, as of this time, because of manpower and resource commitments, it has not been possible to meet the four-month schedule. I anticipate an edition will be prepared for dissemination in the immediate future and thereafter periodic editions will be prepared. You may be assured you will be included on the FBI mailing list to receive all future copies.

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

Ser 009DB/670722

14 NOV 1978

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID RYAN, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535


*my* *FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States*  
[Subj]: Quarterly Counterintelligence review; request for

[ ] at the last meeting of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) you indicated that upon written request you would try and provide a copy of the quarterly counterintelligence review. It is requested that you provide a copy for the Navy SECOM members use at the following address.

Chief of Naval Operations (Op-009D)  
Navy Department  
Washington, D.C. 20350

*Wes*

Attn: Navy SECOM Member



Navy Member  
DCI Security Committee

REC-106

65-74480-38

JAN 23 1979

*4- [Signature]*

62 FEB 15 1979

LETTER TO NSA, DCI SECOM, NAVY  
DR:IF  
1-17-79

b6  
b7c

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC*

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]

FROM : [Redacted] *Mr.*

- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

DATE: 8/2/78

*JWC*

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs.
- Crim. Inv.
- Ident.
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Legal Coun.
- Plan. & Insp.
- Rec. Mgnt.
- Tech. Servs.
- Training
- Public Affs. Off.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director's Sec'y

b6  
b7c

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence Senate and House oversight committees.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States intelligence community and the Congress.

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

Director <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Adm. Serv. <input type="checkbox"/>	Legal Coun. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Assoc. Dir. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Crim. Inv. <input type="checkbox"/>	Plan. & Insp. <input type="checkbox"/>
Dep. AD Adm. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ident. <input type="checkbox"/>	Rec. Mgnt. <input type="checkbox"/>
Dep. AD Inv. <input type="checkbox"/>	Intell. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Tech. Servs. <input type="checkbox"/>
	Laboratory <input type="checkbox"/>	Training <input type="checkbox"/>
		Public Affs. Off. <input type="checkbox"/>

DETAILS:

(S) This publication provides an overview of [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [Redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. It is a sanitized version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices, and was prepared in coordination with CI-1 (Soviet) Section. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [Redacted]

(S) "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the discontinued external publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (Final)"

b1

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

65-74480

TJD:slp  
(8)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

ST-131 421

DE-67 65-74480-36  
14 SEP 25 1978

Continued **RECORDED**

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

61 OCT 23 1978

*[Handwritten initials and stamps]*

Memorandum to W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence  
Review  
65-74480

DISSEMINATION LIST

- [redacted] the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1  
Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1  
Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1  
Director of Central Intelligence - 1  
Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3  
Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1  
Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1  
Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1  
Director, National Security Agency - 1  
Director, FBI - 1  
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1  
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

b6  
b7c



~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-16-2011

**SUBJECT:** FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
REVIEW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**DATE:** JULY, 1978

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*SPT*

65-74480

TJD:en *en*

MAIL ROOM

*65-74480-36*

Classified by 1929  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 1, 2, and 3.  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

**ENCLOSURE**

~~SECRET~~

*RTM 17 JUL 1978*  
*10054*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE
(S)	I. [Redacted]	1
	II. [Redacted]	5
	Scientific and Technical Intelligence	5
	Political Intelligence	8
	Strategic Intelligence	9
	III. [Redacted]	11
	IV. [Redacted]	14
(S)	[Redacted]	14
	[Redacted]	16
	[Redacted]	16
	V. [Redacted]	18
	Students	18
	Shipping	18
	Use of Cover and Cut-outs	18
	Infiltration Techniques	19
	Recruitment Targets	20
	VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	21
	[Redacted]	21
	Dangle Operations	23
	VII. [Redacted]	24
	[Redacted]	24
	[Redacted]	26
	[Redacted]	26
(S)	[Redacted]	26
	VIII. [Redacted]	29
	IX. [Redacted]	30
	[Redacted]	30
	[Redacted]	30
	[Redacted]	30

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The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]

(C) [redacted] The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of


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(C) [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interest or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. (S)

(U)

PML



(S)

(C)

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A survey of the geographical distribution of Soviet student assignments in April of 1978 indicates the degree to which one element of the Soviet incursion has spread throughout the United States:

PMS

~~SECRET~~

<u>INSTITUTION AND LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE</u>
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York	2
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island	2
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico	1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts	3
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland	1
Northeastern Fisheries Center, Narragansett, Rhode Island	1
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois	1
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina	1
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio	3
University of Akron, Akron, Ohio	1
University of Texas, Arlington, Texas	1
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado	1
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas	1
University of California, Los Angeles, California	2
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	1
Columbia University, New York, New York	2
New York University, New York, New York	1
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma	1
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona	2

- 3 -


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PMS

<u>INSTITUTION AND LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE</u>
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
(U) University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois	1 <del>(S)</del>

Hence, 43 Soviet students were located in 17 different states across the United States, and attending universities with high technology research facilities. ~~(S)~~

(U)




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
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II.



Scientific and Technical Intelligence

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


(S)

PAR

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Political Intelligence



(S)


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KB



Strategic Intelligence



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
(S)

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The Soviet Trade and Economic Council was established in 1973 as a result of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit talks. Its main purpose is to help create an environment which will foster the growth of commercial trade between the Soviet Union and the United States.



(S)



(S)

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] who unsuccessfully attempted to pass classified documents to the Soviets), ended on a perhaps equally discordant note. ~~(S)~~

WFO SPIA, 1/30/78, pp 33 thru 35; WFO SPIA, 2/28/78, pp 23 thru 25.

*Mitch*

(S) v.

Students

(S)

Shipping

(S)


Use of Cover and Cut-outs

(S)

*note*


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
Infiltration Techniques

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
*mmw*

Recruitment Targets




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Referral/Consult



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
(S)

Upon their arrest [redacted] were  
jailed at the [redacted] in  
Manhattan. They were held in lieu of [redacted]  
each. [redacted]

[redacted] however, [redacted]  
the custody of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to  
await their [redacted] (U)

*Rec*

Dangle Operations



(S)

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*Handwritten initials*



(S) VII. [redacted]

(C) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

a. Local Party Organization (Profsoyuz) - The term Profsoyuz, when used outside the Soviet Union, refers to the Local Party Organization abroad [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b. Primary Party Organization (Pervychnaya Partiynaya Organizatsiya) - This is the basic Party cell of any department, office or shop of the Soviet colony. All Soviets in the Communist Party, therefore, belong to some Primary Party Organization, of which there are several. Within some, although not all, Primary Party Organizations are subgroups into which members of each Organization are concentrated according to their particular field of expertise. Meetings of the various Organizations are held monthly, [redacted]


(S) [redacted]

c. Political Seminar - In addition to membership in the Party and Primary Party Organizations, Soviets are also assigned to small groups referred to as Political Seminars. There are periodic meetings of these Seminars at which political issues are discussed from the perspective of Communist Party ideology. Attendance at these meetings is mandatory and considered a "Party duty." (S)

(U)

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


(S)

(U) e. Zhensovet - The Zhensovet, or Women's Council, is similar to a women's club. There are two such Zhensovets in the New York colony. Overseeing both Councils is the Trade Union Organization of Zhensovets. (S)

f. Trade Union Organization - Every Soviet enterprise or organization, whether within the Soviet Union or abroad, has a local Trade Union Organization, headed by a committee called a Mestkom. The Mestkom is ultimately subject to Communist Party guidelines and control, although it is not a Communist Party organization.

(S)



(U) g. Friends of Russian Books Club - The Soviets sponsor a club of this name which is quartered at the United Nations. The organization sponsors events such as the showing of movies on the Soviet Union, the staging of Russian dance exhibitions, etc. Such events serve as a convenient vehicle through which Soviets can become acquainted with individuals of various nationalities. (S)

NY SPIA, 1/19/78, pp 15 thru 18.

Hla


(S)

VIII.



b1

One of the most serious social problems afflicting the Soviet Union today is widespread alcoholism. Some observers believe that this disease has reached epidemic proportions. Per capita consumption of hard liquor in the Soviet Union is the highest of any country in the world. Staggering or unconscious drunks are a common sight in Soviet cities.




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
(S)



Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes.



(S)



~~SECRET~~

HR

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. [redacted] the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1

Director, National Security Agency - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

b1

APPROVED: *WWS*

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *Woc* \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. *JM* \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs Off. \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
memorandum

DATE: 7/26/78

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: SAC, DENVER (105-0)  
*Foreign Intelligence Analysis*  
SUBJECT: FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

*UNITED STATES*

*q*  
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74480)  
ATTN: INTD, CI-3-A Unit *4/16/78*

Re Bureau letter to Albany, dated 7/21/78, bearing same caption and which furnished Denver two copies of the new "Counterintelligence Summary," dated June, 1978.

Denver has read this summary with considerable interest and feels it is an excellent publication. It is obviously apparent a considerable amount of research and effort was expended in producing this outstanding summary. In addition, Denver feels it to be an ideal training aid for Agent personnel working FCI matters, whether newly exposed to that field or already possessing various degrees of expertise.

In line with the above, Denver requests the Bureau furnish it with 11 additional copies which will be used as training aids in upcoming conferences with headquarters and Resident Agency personnel.

*(Signature)*

REC-122

*65-74480-35*

23 SEP 15 1978

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
  - 1 - Denver
- TFH/sip

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b7c



*(Signature)*



*7/26/78*  
OCT 3 1978  
*TFH*

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1 - Mr. W. G. Gregar
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

SAC, Albany

7/24/78

Director, FBI (65-74480)

- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

b6  
b7c

FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States

Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of "FBI Counterintelligence Summary." This publication provides an overview of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another issue is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of non-Soviet intelligence services. "FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." (X)

b1

Issues of this publication will be prepared and disseminated periodically. Your comments concerning enclosed publication, as well as suggestions regarding similar future publications, are invited. Their purpose is to inform the field of current developments and items of presumed interest, within security limitations. Your comments and suggestions will assist in achieving this purpose. They should be addressed to the attention of the Intelligence Division, CI-3-A Unit. Additionally, submissions from the field of interesting case-type articles or analytical articles for possible inclusion in the "Summary" are also welcome. (U)

Enclosures (2)

- 2 - Chicago (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - Los Angeles (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)
- 2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - WFO (Enclosures - 5)
- 2 - All Other Field Offices (Enclosures - 2)

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

REC-89 EX-136  
65-74480-34

17 SEP 13 1978

SEE NOTE, PA

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Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

RECEIVED

FBI/DOJ

59 SEP 26 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Albany, et al.  
Re: FBI Counterintelligence  
Summary  
65-74480

NOTE:

By memorandum [redacted], to Mr. W. O. Gregar, 6/30/78, same subject, it was recommended, approved, that subject publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices.

b6  
b7c

JPT  




APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Assoc. Dir. <u>JPT</u>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Intell. <u>Walt</u>	Tech. Servs. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

Copies not needed for all Assistant Directors since it is not policy-type matter and only a cover letter for FCI publication.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [redacted]

DATE: 6/30/78

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b6  
b7C

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *woc/m*

FROM : [redacted] *PJ*

SUBJECT: FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

*FBI Foreign Intelligence*  
*ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel.

APPROVED:

- Director \_\_\_\_\_
- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. *woc/m*
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

V-39

~~SECRET~~

*65-74480-33*

DETAILS:

REC-128

2 AUG 4 1978

This publication provides an overview of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of the [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

(S)

"FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)."

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

TJD:en

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~



54 AUG 28 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.

FBI/DOJ

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DECLASSIFICATION  
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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
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DATE 03-16-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



**SUBJECT:** COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY

**DATE:** JUNE, 1978

*max*

*[Handwritten initials]*

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

65-74480

TJD:en *en*

APPROVED:

- Director \_\_\_\_\_
- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. *WVJ* \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
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MAIL ROOM

Classified by 1929 *[Signature]*  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 1, 2, and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

*AMS*

The purpose of this publication is to afford  
(C) an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular issue is  
(C) devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted]  
[redacted] during the latter half of  
1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publi-  
cation is being prepared which will focus upon the  
(C) operations of [redacted]

(C) [redacted] In the interest of operational and  
administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-  
know principle, information is not set forth in  
specific, detailed, documented form. Where information  
contained herein is pertinent to the interest or  
responsibilities of other United States intelligence  
agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been  
(U) made. (S)

b1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE	
I.	[REDACTED]	1	
(S) II.	[REDACTED]	4	b1
III.	[REDACTED]	8	
	Scientific and Technical Intelligence	8	
	Political Intelligence	11	
	Strategic Intelligence	12	
IV.	[REDACTED]	14	
V.	[REDACTED]	17	
(S)	[REDACTED]	17	
	[REDACTED]	19	
	[REDACTED]	19	
VI.	[REDACTED]	21	
	Dead Drops	21	
	Tradecraft	21	
	Students	21	
	Shipping	22	
	Use of Cover and Cut-outs	22	
	Infiltration Techniques	23	
	Recruitment Targets	23	
VII.	DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	24	
	Dangle Operations	24	
	Utilization of Aircraft for Surveillance	25	
	FBI Effectiveness	25	
	[REDACTED]	26	
VIII.	[REDACTED]	28	
(S)	[REDACTED]	28	
	[REDACTED]	30	
	[REDACTED]	30	

IX.

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(S)

CHART



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(S)

I.

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The USSR divides the responsibility for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence abroad between the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). The KGB is by far the dominant service and reports directly to the Council of Ministers and sections of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The GRU reports to appropriate command levels in the Soviet armed forces as well as to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Collectively the KGB and GRU are referred to as the Soviet intelligence services (SIS). (U)

The First Chief Directorate of the KGB is responsible for the KGB's intelligence operations outside of the USSR. Its mission is thus comparable to that of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. The First Chief Directorate consists of seven Directorates and two Special Services, as well as a total of nineteen Departments (see organization chart on page 36 for the titles and heads of the various elements). Coverage of the United States is assigned to Department One, which reflects the United States status as number one target of the KGB. Of the seven Directorates--Directorate "R" (Operational Planning and Analysis) and Directorate "OT" (Technical Operational Support)--have been recently established. The new Directorate "OT" is an elevation to Directorate status of the former Fourteenth Department and, at present, there is no known Fourteenth Department. (S)

(U)

Two of the Departments are also of relatively recent vintage. Department Nineteen was established in 1975 and is responsible for emigration matters. Department Twenty was established in 1977, and its mission is similar to that of the Eleventh Department. The former is responsible for maintaining liaison with intelligence services of developing countries, whereas the latter maintains liaison with intelligence services of socialist countries. (S)

(U)

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645


<u>INSTITUTION AND LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE</u>
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York	2
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island	2
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico	1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts	3
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland	1
Northeastern Fisheries Center, Narragansett, Rhode Island	1
Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts	1
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois	1
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina	1
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio	2
University of Akron, Akron, Ohio	1
University of Texas, Arlington, Texas	2
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado	1
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas	1
University of California, Los Angeles, California	2
University of California, Santa Barbara, California	1
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	1
Columbia University, New York, New York	2
New York University, New York, New York	1
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma	1
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona	2

<u>INSTITUTION AND LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN ATTENDANCE</u>
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois	1 (X)

(U)

Hence, 45 Soviet students were located in 17 different states across the United States. (X)

(U)



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
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VI.




Dead Drops

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
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Tradecraft




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Students




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
Snapping

(S)



Use of Cover and Cut-outs


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
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Infiltration Techniques

(S)



recruitment targets

(C)




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*mm*

VII. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
OPERATIONS


Dangle Operations



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Utilization of Aircraft for Surveillance



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FBI Effectiveness




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Referral/Consult

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


*1/2/2*

(S)



Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes.



(S)

b1

NOTE:

CI-1. Considerable material was also supplied by E Unit,

<del>APPROVED</del>	<del>Adm. Serv.</del>	<del>Legal Coun.</del>
<del>Director</del>	<del>Crim. Inv.</del>	<del>Plan. &amp; Insp.</del>
<del>Asso. Dir.</del>	<del>Ident.</del>	<del>Rec. Mgnt.</del>
<del>Dep. AD Adm.</del>	<del>Intell.</del>	<del>Tech. Servs.</del>
<del>Dep. AD Inv.</del>	<del>Laboratory</del>	<del>Training</del>
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*HR*

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*SP*

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- 1 - Mr. A. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]


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SAC, Baltimore

8/11/77

Director, FBI (65-74480)

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)



Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States."

This issue of FINAL is classified "~~Secret~~."

For the information of those offices receiving FINAL for the first time, its purpose is to periodically provide to offices expected to be engaged in foreign counterintelligence investigations significant elements of [Redacted]

The objective of FINAL is to furnish to interested offices these essential elements without violating the need-to-know principle which precludes broad dissemination of specific details of hostile operations and/or counterintelligence efforts against them.

Unfortunately, various other demands on the analytical and research elements of FBIHQ have, in the past, prevented the production of FINAL as frequently and in the form which was originally intended. Recently there has been some expansion of the analytical and research capability of FBIHQ and further expansion is anticipated. Accordingly,

(S)

MAILED 16  
AUG 10 1977

REC-56 65-74480-32

DEC 16 1977

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

- 2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)
- 2 - Philadelphia (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - Pittsburgh (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - Portland (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - Sacramento (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - San Diego (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - Seattle (Enclosures - 2)
- 2 - WFO (Enclosures - 5)

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FBI/DOJ

79 DEC 20 1977



Letter to Baltimore  
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence  
Analysis - United States  
(FINAL)  
65-74480

the comments and suggestions of all recipients as to the type or types of periodic analytical and research products to be produced are requested. Current thinking is that it would be desirable to furnish on a frequent basis, possibly monthly, an informative review of current developments. Less frequent communications containing the essence of trends noted at FBIHQ or analysis of situations brought to the attention of FBIHQ might be produced. Possibly submission of interesting case type articles or analytical articles based on local observations from the field would be of value and general interest.

It is requested that recipients bring the current issue of FINAL, as well as the foregoing comments, to the attention of personnel engaged in foreign counterintelligence investigations and address the resultant comments and suggestions to the attention of the Intelligence Division, Section CI-3.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
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Esp. Aff. _____	Ident. _____	Spec. Inv. _____
Eq. Aff. _____	Int. Aff. <i>ru/A</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Aff. Off. _____

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(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

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- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
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Date of Declassification Indefinite

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JUL 13 1977

62-74460-32 JULY 1977

RJC  
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ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TECHNIQUES AND TRADecraft	1
Determination of Intelligence Connection	4
Information Gathering	7
Some Current Operations	8
(S) [Redacted]	12
Courier Service	13
Shipping	13
TRENDS	14
Intra-bloc Relations	14
(S) [Redacted]	16
	18
	19
TARGETS	21
Specific Targets 1976-1977	27
ESTABLISHMENTS	34
Expansion-Security Measures	34
THREE CASES	37
[Redacted]	37
	38
and	38
Statistics as of 6/1/77	40

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
b1

The purpose of this publication is to afford,  
through a summary of situations and events, an overview  
(C) of [REDACTED]

It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI.  
In the interest of operational and administrative security  
and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information  
is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form.  
Where information contained herein is pertinent to the  
interests or responsibilities of other United States intelli-  
gence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been  
(U) made. (S)

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TECHNIQUES AND TRADECRAFT




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(C)

Experience has shown there are personal characteristics or factors which tend to make an individual susceptible to recruitment. These include political affinity for the bloc country or disaffection from the United States; venality; vulnerability to blackmail; need for sexual and/or emotional involvement or ego gratification; excessive drinking; marital or financial problems; and vulnerability to coercion when relatives reside in bloc countries. (S)

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A dead drop is a place through which communications, materials, or equipment may be transferred from one person to another without the necessity for personal contact.  
(U)




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
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Determination of Intelligence Connection

SOME FACTORS UPON which we may base our judgment as to an intelligence connection include the following:




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Information Gathering


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Topics discussed at these meetings range from fusion energy to the "Glomar Explorer," the ship which attempted to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine. ~~(S)~~

- 7 - (WFO SPIA 11/12/76, page 24)  
(WFO SPIA 2/15/77, page 26, 27)






(C)


b1

Some Current Operations



(S)


(S)



(NY SPIA 5/13/77, page 11)


Courier Service

(C)




Shipping

(S)



TRENDS

Intra-bloc Relations



(S)

(C)

(S)

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While it is obvious that not all clandestine activity has ceased, it is felt that the level of activity, now limited to essential contact with only the most trusted agents, will not increase until some time passes without derogatory public references to Soviet activity. (U)

(SF SPIA 5/13/77, page 2)




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TARGETS



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(C)

And each country in the bloc has the potential to benefit not only from its own findings but also from those of its allies. (U)

Thus, while two or more countries might have rather distinct target priorities.



(C)

~~SECRET~~

AN ILLUSTRATION: In November, 1975, a man, who before his defection to the United States had for 17 years been an intelligence officer of a communist-bloc service, testified before a Congressional Committee. (U)

He identified a great many of the targets of his service:

1. POLITICAL - the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department, the Justice Department, the National Security Council; all bureaus and independent agencies; the Republican and Democratic Parties, and all smaller parties except the Communist Party, USA; all of the more important mass organizations including the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Civil Liberties Union; Ralph Nader and his organizations. (U)

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Secret Service; major police departments including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, D. C.; private detective bureaus; exile organizations and defectors. (U)

3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL - the United States Atomic Energy Commission (now ERDA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation; research branches of United States universities, government research organizations and research of private companies; all research oriented toward the military; chemistry, computers, the fields of substitute energy and the entire "Project Independence." (U)

4. ECONOMIC - the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture; economic relations between the United States and the bloc countries, between the United States and the Common Market, and between the United States and the developing countries. (U)

~~SECRET~~

5. THE MILITARY - the Armed Forces of the United States; naval, air and ground bases; movement of troops, troop exercises, equipment, weapons, tactics, intelligence and morale; and military policy. (U)

IN ADDITION TO the above, the following targets are also pursued: developing contacts among workers of the United Nations Missions; penetration of the United Nations police, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Customs Office; and the obtaining of forms, documents, stationery, maps, schedules, cards, clothing, accessories and similar items needed for the support of illegals, including ascertaining the availability of housing and modes of travel. (U)

(Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigative the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, 94th Congress, 1st Session 11/18/75.)

Although this list was obtained from one defector and reflects his country's intelligence services' targets, every country discussed in this study can be presumed to have the same generic target priorities. They will vary as to the importance given to any specific target in any particular time frame. That a country's current primary target is discovering the activity of emigre groups does not mean it has no interest in penetration of the United States Government or acquisition of scientific information, nor that such penetration or acquisition could not become its primary target with the passage of time. As a government's national objectives change, so too the intelligence services' targets. (U)



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(C)

Specific targets 1976-1977

THOSE TARGETS SOUGHT by the various intelligence services listed below range from items commonly, or at least publicly available, to classified material and those on the restricted commodities list or otherwise restricted. The reasons for the tasking of an individual to obtain any one item, or related or unrelated series of items, vary from a mere test of willingness to cooperate to a test of competence in carrying out assignments to, it may be assumed, a substantial need for the item in question sufficient to warrant the risks inherent in its obtention. (S)

(U)

THE TARGET LIST which follows is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor does it necessarily fully define the current areas of interest of the country or intelligence service. It is, however, interesting, in spite of the fact that some of these targets might be shown to be somewhat dated, as it indicates areas of interest and suggests either the nature of ongoing projects within the country concerned; the state of development of a particular technology or industry in that country; or, perhaps, those items which logically will become targets of those intelligence services should these target acquisitions be accomplished. (U)

(S)




b1



ESTABLISHMENTS

Expansion-Security Measures

b1



(S)

(C)

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TASS News Agency in San Francisco signed a 5-year lease, commencing October, 1976, for a 2 room office adjacent to the local UPI office. They also leased a 2 room apartment for the TASS senior correspondent.


(U) ~~(S)~~

(SF SPIA 9/16/76, page 12)



(C)

(C)



(S)


IN AUGUST, 1976, SOVFRACHT, a shipbroker for bulk carriers, especially American grain bound for the Soviet Union, acquired new office space at 277 Park Avenue, (near 48th Street), New York, New York. (S)

b1 per FBI

(U)


(NY SPIA 9/27/76, page 14)

(S)



(C)





Referral/Direct



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(S)

(U) THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office in Chicago, Illinois, occupied its new office space, Room 911, 100 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on June 1, 1976. (S)

(CG SATPIA 7/23/76, page 7)

THREE CASES

[Redacted]

During the evening of [Redacted] a Soviet

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

On [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] was arrested by the FBI on [Redacted] on charges of conspiring to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He has not yet come to trial. At the time of his arrest, in [Redacted] he had in his possession a [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] and has since left the United States. (U)

[Redacted]

On [Redacted] was arrested (on an unrelated charge) in [Redacted]. In his possession at the time were [Redacted]. [Redacted] was later returned to U. S. authorities. (U)



On [Redacted] was arrested at his home in [Redacted] California. He was, at the time, [Redacted] but had been employed as a [Redacted] and had possessed a "Top Secret" clearance which gave him access to highly classified intelligence communications, documents, and hardware. (U)

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]




After separate trials,



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STATISTICS AS OF 6/1/77

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	996
Albania	5
Bulgaria	47
Czechoslovakia	94
East Germany	65
Hungary	67
(S) Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	141
Poland	216
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	<u>226</u>
TOTAL	1953



b1

(S)

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. TWB \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
JULY 1973 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : *1/1*  
*2/1* Mr. T. W. Leavitt

FROM : [Redacted] *RJG*  
*RPG*

SUBJECT: *0* FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield

DATE: 8/2/77

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_ *[Handwritten]*
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b6  
b7C

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-22-2011

### PURPOSE:

(S) To recommend approval of attached issue of FINAL, subtitled "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States," for dissemination only within the FBI, and attached cover letter to 18 field offices transmitting same.

### DETAILS:

(S) FINAL provides to recipients an overview of [Redacted] [Redacted] No lateral dissemination of such material is made in the field. With this issue dissemination is being extended to Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Miami, and Philadelphia Offices.

### RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this issue and the cover letter will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters personnel.

Enclosures - *2*

65-74480

AGP:ded ded

(8)

APPROVED: [Signature]	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Fin. & Pers. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Spec. Inv. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Intell. <i>[Handwritten]</i>	Tech. Servs. <i>LEGT</i>
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

REC-56

EX-135

65-74480

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

17 DEC 16 1977

70 DEC 20 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

FBI/DOJ

*BU RT Y enclosures (43)  
to [Redacted] 5-11-77 AGP:ded*





UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

FROM : [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

DATE: 10/26/77

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7c

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached issue of FINAL for dissemination as noted on the attached list.

DETAILS:

FINAL offers the United States Intelligence Community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations within the purview of the FBI. This issue was prepared from material set forth in the previously approved July, 1977, FINAL which was disseminated solely within the FBI. The material was edited to eliminate sensitive information which should not be disseminated outside the FBI and has been previewed by representatives of Sections CI-1 and CI-2.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this issue will be numbered, dated, printed and disseminated.

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

AGP:dedded  
(6)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

- Director \_\_\_\_\_
- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

3 ENCLOSURE ENCL BEHIND FILE

EX-135  
REC-56

5-AP  
65-74480-30

17 DEC 16 1977



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

79 DEC 20 1977

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-09-2011

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74480)

DATE: 9/30/77

(ATTN:  Section Chief, CI-3)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-33496)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b7C

Re Bulet dated 8/11/77.

Referenced letter solicited the comments and suggestions of the field concerning current proposals for the FBI's Foreign Intelligence Analysis. Chicago feels there is a tremendous need for the timely publication of FINAL in a form which will materially assist us in fulfilling our foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. To this end, FINAL should be both timely, consistent and draw on both the perspective of FBIHQ and the experience of the field. (S)

(U)

Since FBIHQ made the decision to stop lateral dissemination of SPIA and SATPIA, there has been a serious lapse of communication among those of us with counterintelligence responsibilities. When the field stopped exchanging information, headquarters said FINAL would try to keep us abreast of important trends and developments in  operations. FINAL has largely failed to do this, in part, because of its infrequency of publication, unnecessary brevity, FBIHQ's failure to obtain contributions from the field and to some extent the use of the need-to-know principal. The crux or heart of the whole matter is getting sorely needed information to the case agents in the field where the Bureau's work is being done. (S)

(S)

(U)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

105-63483-

EX-108

REC-29

65-74480-29

23 OCT 18 1977

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7107  
Exempt from GDS Category 2&3  
Date of Declassification  
Indefinite

- 3 - Bureau
  - 1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
- 2 - Chicago
  - 1 - 65-4268 (SATPIA)

EBC/mmg  
(5)



1 cc removed & maintained

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

4825  
5010-110  
5010-110  
5107-40

5-File-RM

~~SECRET~~

(U) Our specific comments concerning FINAL are these: ~~(S)~~

(U) / FCI analysis and the reporting of trends and targets should be separated from strictly training material. ~~(S)~~

(S) We have reviewed copies of FINAL which are available to this office. The July, 1977 copy is the only one we find which has been liberally filled with training material. This, in our opinion, has no place in a document devoted to analysis of past and current situations and the reporting of trends and targets of [redacted] It can, of course, be cleverly incorporated into a lengthy analytical piece to add substance and depth. ~~(S)~~

(S) / The Bureau at this point in time, should seriously review its requirements for SATPIA and SPIA and decide whether they are useful documents in their present form. Bureau letter of April 12, 1972, pointed out that the success of FINAL was dependent upon the field's submission of appropriate material through SPIA and SATPIA. This was simply another way of saying these monthly summaries of [redacted] activities would be the core or basis for the preparation of FINAL. ~~(S)~~

(S) FBIHQ must recognize that SATPIA and SPIA do not now accurately reflect the scope of our knowledge of [redacted] activities directed at the United States and our efforts to thwart these operations. Information from the field is purposely withheld from these documents - sometimes at the direction of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) of headquarters under the guise of "security" or "need to know." The cumulative effect of these practices - and not all of them can be criticized in highly sensitive cases - is that SATPIA and SPIA do not accurately reflect what has transpired in a particular field or operation and are therefore, less than meaningful documents. The editors of FINAL, and ultimately the field, in this process, are often denied significant information. (S)

(U) But this is really a question which must be addressed by the Bureau and which will directly affect not only the content but the credibility of FINAL in the field. If we continue to report only selected material in SATPIA (which is the only document Chicago can write of with any real knowledge), we are not fulfilling its purpose and at the same time we are cheating FINAL. Realistically then, it should be discontinued except, perhaps, for our monthly statistics but these, of course, are available through COBICS. On the other hand, if headquarters feels there is a real need for SATPIA - and SPIA - then firm reporting guidelines should be given to the field, or perhaps reiterated for the field, so that headquarters and ultimately the field through FINAL will receive periodic documents reflecting the entire scope of hostile intelligence operations in the United States. (S)

/ Chicago feels the basic format of FINAL is adequate, although the document has great possibilities for expansion. There is, perhaps, too much brevity in FINAL when there are opportunities to explore various topics in more depth. The impression one gets when reading FINAL is that what we have are a collection of synopses similar to what one finds on the front page of an FBI report (FD-204). We are never told how these

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

things are interrelated if, indeed they are, and how current trends are related to past operations or what we might expect in the future. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, [redacted] requirements and targets, utilization of tradecraft and new innovations by the various services. (S) (U) (X)

An excellent example of these so called new innovations appeared in Chicago's SATPIA letter dated April 7, 1977, concerning [redacted]

*Subject of separate paper*

[redacted] This development received only three paragraphs in the July, 1977, edition of FINAL but lends itself to a great deal more discussion. (S) (U) (X)

Other field offices handling both the Soviets and satellites could benefit from Chicago's experience in this matter. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel
- 1 - [Redacted]

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b7c

January 10, 1977

[Redacted]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to your letter dated December 15, 1976, requesting the publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States" (FINAL).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recognizes the importance of your security programs to protect national security information and prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The FBI will fully cooperate with you in your efforts to discharge these responsibilities. Your interest in receiving FINAL is appreciated and I will see to it that future issues are disseminated to your Commission.

*2 copies*

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley  
Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

RECEIVED  
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE  
JAN 13 1977

MAILED 6  
JAN 10 1977  
FBI

65-74480 (FINAL)

RPW:dedded

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*A-105*  
*Re Telephonic*  
*4/11/77 with*  
*SNAC 2 copies of FINAL*

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2  
23 JAN 13 1977

RECEIVED

JAN 27 1977

TELETYPE UNIT

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NOTE:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has requested future issues of our publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis" (FINAL). The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. In view of this Commission's responsibilities we are advising that future issues of FINAL will be disseminated to them.

On 1/7/77, [redacted] Office of Legal Council, advised the Attorney General's guidelines for FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations were not intended to prohibit this type of dissemination, and stated it would be consistent with the guidelines to furnish FINAL to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

b6  
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APPROVED:	Adm. Serv.....	Legal Coun.....
	Ext. Affairs.....	Plan. & Insp.....
Director.....	Fin. & Pers.....	Rec. Mgt.....
Assoc. Dir.....	Gen. Inv.....	S. & T. Serv.....
Dep. AD Adm.....	Ident.....	Spec. Inv.....
Dep. AD Inv.....	Intell.....	Training.....

*[Handwritten signatures: J. A. [unclear] and J. [unclear]]*

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555



DEC 15 1976

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Pers.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgt.	_____
S. & T. Serv.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20535

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Kelley:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which was created on January 19, 1975, pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has specific responsibilities and authorities in the nuclear field and has a security program to protect national security information and a safeguards program to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear facilities.

To discharge the aforementioned responsibilities and authorities, we need intelligence information regarding foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States. Consequently, we would like to receive the publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis United States."

The Commission will protect this information in accordance with existing Executive Orders (e.g., E.O.'s 11652 and 11905); directives (e.g. Director of Central Intelligence Directives); and statutes (e.g. the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which remain in effect in accordance with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) and will insure that it is disseminated only to direct NRC employees with a need-to-know such information.

Your favorable consideration of this request would be appreciated.

If your staff has any questions regarding this matter, please contact the undersigned or [redacted]

[redacted]

X-105

REC-14

DE-43

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[redacted signature block]

27  
76

EXP. PROC.  
SA DESIG 16 1976  
#17

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b7c

see w. r. r. one document, KPW: dcd, 1/10/77

65-74480

[Signature]

57 JAN 27 1977

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Division number removed  
to find out telephone  
request 5-13-80



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt *TLW*  
FROM : A. B. Fulton *AF*  
SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]
- DATE: 8/17/76
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7C

*Handwritten signature/initials*

This recommends approval of Volume III, number 2, issue of the FINAL publication for dissemination to the White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

This issue was prepared from material set forth in the previously approved July, 1976, FINAL which was disseminated solely within the FBI. The material was edited to eliminate sensitive information which should not be disseminated outside the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

EX-109 REC-32 65-74480-26

MAILED 15  
AUG 31 1976

22 SEP 1976  
23

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

RPW:dcded

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

- |                  |                   |                   |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| APPROVED: _____  | Ext. Affairs..... | Laboratory.....   |
| Assoc. Dir.....  | Fin. & Pers.....  | Legal Coun.....   |
| Dep. AD Adm..... | Gen. Inv.....     | Plan. & Eval..... |
| Dep. AD Inv..... | Ident.....        | Rec. Mgnt.....    |
| Asst. Dir.:      | Inspection.....   | Spec. Inv.....    |
| Adm. Serv.....   | Intell.....       | Training.....     |

dissemination to HQ officials (8-31-76)  
2-24, WFO, SF, CG  
1-011 other field offices

ENCLOSURE



34 SEP 9 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

DISSEMINATION LIST

copy #

- 1 The White House  
Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- 2 Department of Justice  
The Attorney General
- 3 Department of State  
The Honorable, The Secretary of State
- 4 Department of Defense  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- 5, 5a, 5p Department of the Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- 6 Department of the Air Force  
Office of Special Investigation
- 7 Department of the Navy  
Director, Naval Investigative Service
- 8 Department of the Treasury  
The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

b6  
b7C

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

- D
- 9 Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Deputy Director For Operations
- 10 Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
- 11 Director, National Security Agency Attn: Director of Security
- 12 Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

3/23/77 13 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
give to [ ] (not on regular dissemination list)  
65-74480-26  
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
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**WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED**  
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*7/20/03*

*hm*

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*R/S*

*AW*

*A*

~~Classified by Director, FBI  
Exempt from GDS Categories 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

50 JUL 20 11 50 AM '03  
FBI RECEIVED  
V2212LWHL DIRECTOR

*65-74480-26*

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975

~~ENCLOSURE~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [REDACTED] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made. (U)

b1

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TARGETS

(C) [redacted] continue their efforts  
to obtain both classified and unclassified material. The following  
(U) paragraphs describe a representative number of these targets. (C)

b1



(S)

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION


TECHNIQUES

A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (C)

(U)

(C)

(S)



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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TRENDS



(S)


(C)

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~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



(C)

b1

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. (U)

SECRET (NY SPIA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

ON APRIL 4, 1976, THE Soviet Consulate in San Francisco received an anonymous telephone call claiming a bomb would explode in the Soviet Consulate within 30 minutes. The San Francisco Police Department responded and no bomb was found. (U)

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ON MARCH 14, 1976, THE Soviet Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the SMUN Yakov A. Malik, was seriously injured in a car accident at Glen Cove, New York. A woman in the other car involved was killed. Malik [redacted] were taken to Community Hospital in Glen Cove. Local police said Malik's driver was not at fault in the accident. (U)

b6  
b7c



(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

STATISTICS AS OF 7/1/76

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	1165	965	2130
Albania	7	9	16
Bulgaria	51	87	138
Czechoslovakia	108	108	216
East Germany	87	68	155
Hungary	67	79	146
Mongolia	9	18	27
Poland	248	303	551
PRC	168	9	177
Romania	101	122	223
Yugoslavia	203	288	491
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2214</b>	<b>2056</b>	<b>4270</b>

(U)

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, employees of ancillary organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, press representatives, and working wives.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Assoc. Dir.....	Ext. Affairs.....	Laboratory.....
Dep. AD Adm.....	Fin. & Pers.....	Legal Coun.....
Dep. AD Inv.....	Gen. Inv.....	Plan. & Eval.....
Asst. Dir.:	Ident.....	Rec. Mgmt.....
Adm. Serv.....	Inspection.....	Spec. Inv.....
	Intell. <i>TWT/SSM</i>	Training.....

**ENCLOSURE**

*65-74480-26*

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt *RMH*

FROM : A. B. Fulton *ABF*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]

DATE: 8/3/76

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. *RMH*
- Laboratory *RMH*
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b6  
b7c

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-23-2011

(S) This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

(S) The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events with an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO.

Enclosure  
65-74480

RPW:ded ded  
(7)

- APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_
- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Asst. Dir.:
  - Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
  - Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
  - Intell. *WJF*
  - Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
  - Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
  - Training \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

TUL  
2CF  
SSM  
JWR  
TBE

0-7 dated 8/1/76

SF-7  
SE-2  
WFO-5

NH-3  
NK-3  
NY-3  
PG-2  
PD-2

MAILED EX-108  
FIELD OFFICES AS INDICATED  
AUG 11 1976

REC-13 65-74480-25  
5 SEP 1976

*RMH*

[Redacted]

ENCLOSURE

*RMH*

*RM4426*

54 SEP 15 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

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~~SECRET~~

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-16-2011

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Dep. AD Inv.....	Ident.....	Rec. Mgmt.....
Asst. Dir.:	Inspection.....	Spec. Inv.....
Adm. Serv.....	Intell.....	Training.....

*mal*

b1

(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

**THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI**

~~Classified by 4375~~  
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3~~  
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*RW*  
*JGC*

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 uc baw  
sab/134

~~TOP SECRET~~

65-74480-25 JULY, 1976  
ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC baw  
sab/lsg

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a  
summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

b1

(C)

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of  
the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security  
and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not  
set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where informa-  
tion contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities  
of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed  
dissemination has been made. (X)


(U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per GDS 324 US b/w  
sab/lsq

TARGETS



(S)

b1

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS

A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (S)

(U)

(C)

(S)




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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TRENDS



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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

(C)

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THE POLISH SEJM (parliament) recently passed two amendments to the Polish constitution. One declaring the Communist Party as the leading party and force in Poland and the second declaring the Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries forms the foundation of Polish foreign policy. (U)


These amendments may represent the price Poland had to pay to maintain its special relationship with the West particularly the US. Those holding this view believe Leonid Brezhnev needed the amendments to show his adversaries on the USSR Politburo that despite Poland's dealings with the West she could still be trusted and is faithful to communism. (U)

(WFO SATPIA 4/5/76, page 46)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



(S)

(C)

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. (U)

The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. Information has been developed which indicates the Jewish Armed Resistance may be responsible for the SMUN shooting, the attempted bombing of Amtorg and the bombing of Aeroflot. (X)

(U)

(NY SPLA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

ON MARCH 14, 1976, THE Soviet Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the SMUN Yakov A. Malik, was seriously injured in a car accident at Glen Cove, New York. A woman in the other car involved was killed. Malik [redacted] were taken to Community Hospital in Glen Cove. Local police said Malik's driver was not at fault in the accident. (U)

(NY SPIA 4/12/76, page 13)

ON APRIL 4, 1976, THE Soviet Consulate in San Francisco received an anonymous telephone call claiming a bomb would explode in the Soviet Consulate within 30 minutes. The San Francisco Police Department responded and no bomb was found. (U)


(SF SPIA 5/12/76)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 7/1/78

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	149
Albania	7
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	101
East Germany	66
FRANCE	67
Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	145
Poland	222
Romania	98
Yugoslavia	200
TOTAL	1219



(S)

(S)

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *wrw*

FROM : F. J. Cassidy *FJC*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

DATE: 2/20/76

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
- 1 - [Redacted]

b6  
b7c

This recommends approval of Volume III, number 1, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to the White House, members of the United States Intelligence Board, and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies listed on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

2 - NY, WFO, SF, CG  
 1 - all others  
 2 - [unclear] 3-25-76  
 Enclosures  
 65-774480

EX-104

REC-3

65-74800-24

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

DKP:H  
(8)

*2 ENCLOSURES*

*WRS*

*JWS*

*wrw/wob*

5 JUL 9 1976

MAILED 15  
 FEB 27 1976  
 FBI

*FILE*

*54 JUL 20 1976*

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DATE 03-16-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*ref* *fw* *WRE was* *WAB* *EB* *JR*

*SWR* *SPT*

~~Classified by Director, FBI~~  
~~Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3~~  
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
VOLUME: III  
NUMBER: I  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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*65-74480-2410*

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
b1

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~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TRENDS



(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TECHNIQUES




(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TARGETS



(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

FEATURES

(S)



b1

NEGOTIATIONS BY THE Bulgarians for purchase of Rosedale Campus of St. Alban's School located on Newark Street, Washington, D. C., are apparently progressing smoothly. The property consists of three three-story dormitories/general purpose buildings and seven acres of land. The Bulgarians currently have an option for the purchase of the property for approximately \$3 million.

(S)



~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 1/1/76

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	1208	1116	2324
Albania	7	8	15
Bulgaria	60	84	<del>144</del>
Czechoslovakia	106	101	207
East Germany	87	60	147
Hungary	68	96	<del>164</del>
Mongolia	16	19	35
Poland	226	278	504
PRC	201	9	210
Romania	94	125	219
Yugoslavia	189	250	439
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2262</u>	<u>2146</u>	<u>4408</u>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, employees of ancillary organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, press representatives, and working wives.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE 65-74450-24

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director  
for Operations

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and  
Development Administration

Director, National Security Agency

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW/kpl*

FROM : F. J. Cassidy *FJC*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]

DATE: 2/11/76

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7c

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-23-2011

*T*  
*J. J. [unclear]*

(S) This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

(S) The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

*WRW-1*  
*WAB-1*  
*SSM-1*  
*JWR-1*  
*FJC-1*

FEB 25 1976

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO. *WRW/kpl*


**ENCLOSURE**

Enclosure  
65-74480

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

DKP:lfj  
(7)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE



*7-1*  
*0-7*  
*dated 2/17/76*  
*HD-2*  
*SC-2*  
*SD-2*  
*SF-2*  
*SE-2*  
*WFO-3*  
*CV-2*  
*LA-2*  
*NH-3*  
*NK-3*  
*NY-5*

84 MAR 2 1976

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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 uc ban  
sab/lsj

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 5736  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

FEBRUARY, 1976

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

b1

*Wade*  
*WJF*  
*DP Jun*  
*R*

65-74480-23

down graded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60327 UC baw/sab/lbg

~~TOP SECRET~~

b1

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

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


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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC, b1  
sub 1134

TARGETS

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


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TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS




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TRENDS




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STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



(S)


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~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 1/1/76

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	1025
Albania	7
Bulgaria	58
Czechoslovakia	97
East Germany	68
Hungary	68
Mongolia	15
Poland	201
PRC	175
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	<u>185</u>
TOTAL	1987



(S)

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\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

down graded to Secret  
per 20324 uc ban  
Sab/15g

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DATE 03-16-2011

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

b1

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI**

MAILED 7  
NOV 19 1975  
FBI

Classified by 5736  
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Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOV 13 2 12 PM 1975

INTELLIGENCE DIV  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECRET

NOVEMBER, 1975

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

**ENCLOSURE**  
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

b1

(S)

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TARGETS



(S)


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~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS




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TRENDS



(S)

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As a matter of interest, the starting salary for a teacher with a Master's degree in the NYC school system is \$11,550 annually. NY SPIA, 10/9/75, p. 18.



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(S)

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**THE PRESENT ECONOMIC situation in Romania, according to recent reports, is worse than ever before. The people, including members of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), are disillusioned, with the general populace being openly critical and those in the RCP making their displeasure known to proven friends. There are extreme shortages of skilled labor and materials. Huge foreign purchases of industrial machinery have created immense obligations, especially to West Germany. The people feel that the forced industrialization policy which led the country to compete with efficient, established industrial countries was poorly conceived; and the excuse that future generations will enjoy a better life no longer offers satisfaction to the average Romanian living now under miserable conditions.**

NY LHM 10/7/75 captioned,  
"Foreign Miscellaneous -  
Romania; IS - RO"

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~~TOP SECRET~~

## STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN executed allowing the Soviets to take possession on August 1, 1975, of the property at 9 East 91st Street, NYC, which will house the Soviet Consulate General. Several families are now living on the premises, and NYC Police Department officers are stationed outside.

NY SPIA, 8/11/75, p. 24

NY SPIA, 9/12/75, p. 32

THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT is desirous of establishing both a tourist office and an import-export company in the US and is continuing its efforts in this regard.


NY SATPIA, 10/7/75, p. 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 10/1/75 -

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	1039
Albania	8
Bulgaria	<del>49</del>
Czechoslovakia	95
East Germany	80
(S) Hungary	69
Mongolia	14
People's Republic of China	182
Poland	212
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>181</u>
TOTAL	2005



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\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *wrw*  
FROM : F. J. Cassidy *FJ*  
SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

- ~~1 - Mr. J. B. Adams~~
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

DATE: 10/28/75

- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7C

On 10/22/75 [Redacted] Security Office, Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), telephonically contacted Acting Section Chief Fred J. Cassidy to request additional copies of captioned publication for distribution to ERDA's 25 field offices throughout the United States.

On 10/24/75 Supervisor [Redacted] advised Mr. [Redacted] that, because of the classification and the sensitive sources and methods involved, dissemination of FINAL is extremely limited and strict accountability maintained. Mr. [Redacted] was told that, although we are unable to comply with his request for additional copies, we have no objection to his officials who have proper clearance and a need to know having access to information contained in FINAL.

Mr. [Redacted] was thanked for his interest in and comments concerning FINAL.

ACTION:

None. For information.

EX-115

REC-65


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65-74480

SJM:lfj/lfj

5

*wrw*  
*lfj*



*File*  
*5/lfj*

50 NOV 10 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 9/30/75

FROM : F. J. Cassidy *FJC*

- 1 [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
- 1 [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

*ST*  
*C*

b6  
b7c

Recommends approval of Volume II, number 4, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

- 2-NY, SF, WFO, CG
- 1 - all other offices

*sent separately*  
*SJM:lfj 10/9/75*  
**REC-21** 65-74480-20

Enclosures  
65-74480

SJM:lfj  
(8)

**ENCLOSURE**

*RD/ST-III*  
*for*

**5 OCT 14 1975**

MAILED 15  
OCT 10 1975  
FBI

**84 OCT 15 1975**

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FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

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FBI  
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INTELLIGENCE DIV.  
RECEIVED

*wastu*

*AK* *BM*

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Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*JK*

- Asoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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INTELLIGENCE DIV.  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
RECEIVED  
ENCLOSURE

DATE: 10/9/75  
VOLUME: II  
NUMBER: 4  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT


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
TRENDS

b1



(S)

A SOVIET NATIONAL has offered a surprisingly candid appraisal of problems in the USSR. He says that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and, in Leningrad, women are afraid to go out alone after dark. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing; transportation is critically short; and, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7



(S)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION


ENCLOSURE

65-74480 20

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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(S)



IN APRIL, 1975, the Director of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation said that if Congress approved the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for Romania, trade with the US would go to one billion dollars a year by 1980. As President Ford during August signed the MFN Pact with Romania, there should be a dramatic increase in 1975-1976 in contacts between US businessmen and Romanian officials. NY SATPLA 8/7/75, p. 14


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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TECHNIQUES




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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TARGETS



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(S)

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

### FEATURES

OCCUPANCY OF THE Soviet residential complex of Riverdale, New York, began earlier this year. Located in Bronx, New York, about 15 miles north of midtown Manhattan, the complex will eventually provide housing for 236 Soviet nationals and their families.  
NY SPIA 6/11/75, p. 25

THE SOVIETS HAVE requested another 26,000 to 29,000 square feet of floor space on the same floor as that now occupied by the Soviet Information Center, North Tower, World Trade Center, New York, New York. They probably will use the space for additional offices and a display area.  
NY SPIA 5/12/75, p. 28

CONTRACTS WERE RECENTLY executed to allow the Soviets to take possession of the property at 9 East 91st Street, New York, New York, which will house the Soviet Consulate General.  
NY SPIA 8/11/75

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 9/1/75

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	937	187	959	2083
Albania	4	4	10	18
Bulgaria	47	2	74	123
Czechoslovakia	88	8	106	202
East Germany	49	8	50	107
Hungary	64	0	66	130
Mongolia	8	1	22	31
Poland	200	22	248	470
PRC	160	26	9	195
Romania	75	6	114	195
Yugoslavia	180	5	235	420
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1812</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>1893</b>	<b>3974</b>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

1, Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

3 The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5, 5a, 5b Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6 Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7 Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8 The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9 Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations  
10 Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and  
Development Administration

11 Director, National Security Agency

12 Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

15 DIRECTOR, FBI

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC ban/sab/155

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DATE 03-17-2011

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

b1

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

Classified by 4375  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*WREW/Jan*  
*BBB*  
*pu*

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AUGUST, 1975

65-74480-19


MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT



~~TOP SECRET~~

down graded to ~~secret~~  
per 60324 UC ban  
sub 134

TARGETS




(S)

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
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b1



(S)

**TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS**



(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



(S)

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THE USSR IS having its problems, according to a Soviet national, currently assigned in Canada, who offered a surprisingly candid description. He said that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and that women cannot go out alone after dark in Leningrad. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing, and transportation is critically short. Also, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7

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
~~TOP SECRET~~

## STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

A REQUEST HAS been made by the Soviets for another 26,000 to 29,000 square feet of floor space on the same floor as that now occupied by the Soviet Information Center, Suite 86123, North Tower, World Trade Center, NYC. The Soviets are prepared to sign a lease as soon as this space can be made available and will probably use the space for additional offices and a display area.

NY SPIA 5/12/75, p. 28

THE SOVIET TRADE Office (SOVTRA) at 2001 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. is being remodeled and readied for business.



(S)

b1

A RECEPTION WAS held recently by the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California, honoring World War II Victory in Europe Day. The affair was held at the Palace of the Legion of Honor and was attended by several hundred business and civic leaders as well as individuals friendly to Soviet Consulate personnel.

SF SPIA 5/16/75, p. 3

OCCUPANCY OF THE Soviet Residential Complex at Riverdale, New York, by Soviet nationals began recently. This complex, located in Bronx, New York, about 15 miles north of midtown Manhattan, eventually will provide housing for 236 Soviet nationals and their families.

NY SPIA 6/11/75, p. 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Statistics as of 7/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	917
Albania	6
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	85
East Germany	45
(S) Hungary	66
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	162
Poland	201
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>183</u>
TOTAL	1,797



b1

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
- 9 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Putman

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: 5/20/75

- 1 - Mr. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. Fulton
- 1 -

TO : W. R. Wannall

FROM : A. B. Fulton *ABF*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b6  
b7c

Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle Overview of  Operations in the United States. This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of

This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

65-101 REC-20 65-74480-18

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

*by 0-7  
5/29/75  
SJM:pld*

Enclosure  
65-74480  
SJM:pld  
(7)

*WRW:tal*

*5/27/75  
SJM:pld  
JBA/pun*

MAY 28 1975

*PR*  
*fun*

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

343  
84 JUN 3 1975

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60327 UC law (sub) (13)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

*Handwritten mark*

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(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

- Vs. Soc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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fld*

Classified by 4375 *M*  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

*Handwritten initials*

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*JBA  
per*

*gm*

MAY, 1975


MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18

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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 40324 UC, bom  
subs/lsg

TARGETS



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
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65-74480-18




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**TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS**




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TRENDS



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
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
**STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS**

**THE SOVIETS RECENTLY renewed their extensive remodeling of the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California. In addition,**

(S)




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
**THE POLISH FOREIGN Trade Corporation (PEKAO) has opened an office in Chicago.**

(S)




**THE POLISH CONSULATE in Chicago, Illinois, has now completely switched its operations to its new space at 1530 North Lake Shore Drive. The old building is being made into apartments for some of the Consulate's personnel. CG SATPIA 4/4/75, p. 7**

(S)




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THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office (ROCOMO),  
Chicago, Illinois, which, it was believed, was being closed because of  
Romania's unsuccessful attempt to obtain Most Favored Nation status  
now appears to continue in operation. 

(S)




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Statistics as of 5/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials *</u>
USSR	899
Albania	6
Bulgaria	49
Czechoslovakia	89
East Germany	41
(S) Hungary	61
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	154
Poland	192
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>179</u>
TOTAL*	1,752



b1

\* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - J. B. Adams
- 1 - W. R. Wannall
- 1 - W. A. Branigan

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton

- 1 - W. O. Cregar
- 1 - F. S. Putman
- 1 - A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: **FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)**

1 - [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Recommends approval of Volume II, number 3, issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States Intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States' which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

- 2 - NY, WFO, SF, CG
- 1 - all other offices

see attached yellow.

sent separately  
SJM:pld 4/28/75

*DR*

*TWT/FSP*

REG-71

ST-117

JBA  
per

65-74480-16

Enclosures  
65-74480  
SJM:pld  
(8)

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FBI

APR 30 1975

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FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

*Arch*

*JBA  
PLM*

~~Classified by 4375 *AT*  
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Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*wld*

*EMM*

*APR 55 5 35 PM 1952*

*TW/FSP*

DATE: 4/28/75

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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
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
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TECHNIQUES



(S)

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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**TARGETS**




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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



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(S)

**FEATURES**



(S)

**RECENT INFORMATION SUGGESTS** that the opening of a Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, has been postponed indefinitely. WFO SATPIA 2/20/75, p. 19

**THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT** is anxious to start building its new chancery in Washington, D. C.; however, some problems are being encountered between the zoning office and Hungarian officials. WFO SATPIA 2/26/75, p. 36

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 3/1/75

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	898	185	1032	2115
Albania	6	0	15	21
Bulgaria	50	4	94	148
Czechoslovakia	86	9	125	220
East Germany	35	6	33	74
Hungary	60	0	101	161
Mongolia	7	1	15	23
Poland	198	21	291	510
PRC	168	25	6	199
Romania	74	7	124	205
Yugoslavia	180	7	249	436
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1762</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>2085</b>	<b>4112</b>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ENCLOSURE

65-74480-16

10

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State *sent sep.*

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General *sent sep.*

Department of State

- ✓3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

- ✓4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

- ✓5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

- ✓6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

- ✓7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8. The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations *sent sep.*  
✓10. Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Energy Research and Development Administration  
11. Director, National Security Agency *sent sep.*  
12. Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board *sent sep.*

15. Director, FBI - *sent sep.*

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Wannall

DATE: 2/19/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton

1 - Mr. Branigan  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Putman  
1 - Mr. Fulton  
1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [Redacted]

This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

### ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosure

65-74480

SJM:aso (8)

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 each to Wannall, Branigan, Cregar,  
Putman, Fulton  
2-28-75  
SJM:pld

b1  
b6  
b7c

written to CG (Enc. 4)  
CV (Enc. 2)  
LA (Enc. 3)  
NH (Enc. 3)  
NK (Enc. 3)  
NY (Enc. 5)  
PG (Enc. 2)  
PD (Enc. 2) SE (Enc. 2)  
SC (Enc. 2) WFO (Enc. 6) SJM:pld  
SD (Enc. 2)  
SF (Enc. 4)

SI-117

REC-117 65-74480-15

30 MAR 12 1975

JMA  
JMA  
JMA  
JMA

84 MAR 19 1975

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC ban  
sab/15g

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**BACKGROUND USE ONLY**

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
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DATE 03-17-2011

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

(S) (Overview of  Operations in the United States)

b1

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI**

*JBA*  
*800*  
*WAB*  
*EEB*  
*Pen*  
*A*  
*JRC*  
*DR*  
*gm*  
**Classified by 4375A**  
**Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3**  
**Date of Declassification Indefinite**

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

65-74480-15

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per 60324 UC baw  
sab/lsg

~~TOP SECRET~~

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

b1


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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 40324 UK ban  
3ab/150

~~TOP SECRET~~

TARGETS



(S)

b1


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
~~TOP SECRET~~

b6  
b7C



(S)

**MAXWELL SMART OF television fame would have trouble topping a recent performance by an individual who walked into the offices of a large firm in NYC** 



(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS



(S)

b1


A SOVIET STUDENT, while at the University of Michigan in 1972-73, established a rapport with an American and has been in correspondence with him ever since. Initially, after his return to the USSR, the Soviet's letters concerned innocuous, personal matters.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

He then requested various books of the public source variety. Finally, after the American suggested delivering the books to a Soviet establishment for forwarding in order to save on postal costs, the Soviet told him not to send any more books but added that a "neighbor" was planning to travel to the US soon and would look him up upon his arrival.

SF SPIA 11/8/74, 4-5




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
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TRENDS




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b1

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b1

**WHILE COMMERCE AND trade remain as high priority items of the Romanian Government, efforts in these areas have diminished with Romania's unsuccessful attempt to attain MFN status vis-a-vis the US Government. Romanian commercial offices in Chicago and San Francisco are being closed and decisions have been made to reduce the staff of the commercial office in NYC.**

**EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING to build rapport with numerous emigre groups, and interest is being directed toward increasing the exchange of delegations and academicians between the US and Romania.**

*WFO SATPIA 11/15/74, 45*

(S)




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~~TOP SECRET~~

**STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS**

(S)




b1

**THE SOVIETS HAVE** been negotiating for a building at 305 East 45th Street, NYC, in which to relocate the SMUN, now located at 136 East 67th Street, NYC. If these negotiations are successful, the present location might be used by the SOVEMB, WDC, to house the Soviet Consulate in NYC.

*NY SPIA 12/13/74, 24*

**BULGARIAN OFFICIALS IN WDC** have decided to approach US Department of State regarding the opening of a commercial office in Chicago and, possibly, one in San Francisco.


(S)



**THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC Republic (GDR)** has leased the top floor of a building at 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., WDC, for use as a chancery.

*WFO SATPIA 11/15/74, 51*

(S)



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE NCNA, NYC, reportedly is negotiating with Radio Corporation of America for a leased communications channel from NYC to Lima, Peru. This form of communications link suggests a large volume of traffic between Lima and NYC as customarily-used systems such as Telex would be less economical.

NY PR CIA 11/11/74, 4-5


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Statistics as of 1/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials *</u>
USSR	907
Albania	10
Bulgaria	52
Czechoslovakia	86
East Germany	54
(S) Hungary	71
Mongolia	15
People's Republic of China	184
Poland	201
Romania	86
Yugoslavia	182
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,848</b>



b1

\* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Airtel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2/28/75

To: SACs, Chicago (Encs. 4)	Portland (Encs. 2)
Cleveland (Encs. 2)	Sacramento (Encs. 2)
Los Angeles (Encs. 2)	San Diego (Encs. 2)
New Haven (Encs. 3)	San Francisco (Encs. 4)
Newark (Encs. 3)	Seattle (Encs. 2)
New York (Encs. 5)	WFO (Encs. 5)
Pittsburgh (Encs. 2)	

b1  
b6  
b7C

From: Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Wannall (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Cregar (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Putman (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Fulton (Enc.)
- 1 - [Redacted]

**FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)**

ReBuairtel 9/30/74 captioned "Submission of PRCIA,  
SATPIA, SPIA and YUPIA Communications"

EX-101 REC-31 65-74480-14

Enclosed are copies of captioned publication bearing the subtitle, "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States. This is solely for use within the FBI, and its purpose is to provide, through a summary of recent situations and events, a broad perspective of [Redacted] service activities in the United States, including targets, techniques and operations, and trends. This should be beneficial as it will periodically provide a summary of information from Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA) communications which, according to instructions in referenced airtel, no longer are laterally disseminated by the field offices preparing them.

MAR 3 1975

Recipient offices should insure that this publication is made available to all Agents involved in the preparation of the SPIA, SATPIA, PRCIA and YUPIA letters as well as to those Agents with investigative

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Classified by 4375  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

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FEB 28 1975  
FBI

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- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - 100-354839 (SPIA)
- 1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
- 1 - 105-244037 (PRCIA)
- 1 - 105-31417 (YUPIA)

SJM:pld  
(37)

58 MAR 10 1975

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN  
105-244037  
105-31417  
100-354839  
65-63483

PLM  
JF  
JF

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Airtel to Chicago, et al.  
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis -  
United States (FINAL)

interest in any of these areas. ] Because of the "~~Top Secret~~"  
classification of the enclosures, strict security precautions must  
be exercised by recipient offices in their handling.

Future issues will be forwarded to recipients by  
routing slip.

NOTE:

This dissemination was authorized by Fulton to Wannall  
memorandum dated 2/19/75. The number of copies to the 13 field offices  
is based on the number of PRCIA, SATPIA, SPIA and YUPIA communications  
prepared by those offices.

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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

1 - [ ]

b6 per FBI  
b7C


4 REC-31 65-74480-13

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 9, 1975  
EX 104  
To: Director  
Division of Safeguards and Security  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Attention: [ ] Acting Director  
From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director  
Subject: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS  
DATED AUGUST 21, 1974, VOLUME II,  
NUMBER 1

[ ]

Referral/Direct



*See page*

AJD:mjg  
(4)

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Classified by 4288 SEE NOTE PAGE TWO  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
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54 JAN 9 1975  
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*mjg*

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MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Wannall *Wannall*  
FROM : A. B. Fulton *ABF*  
SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Branigan

DATE: 12/5/74

- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Putman
- 1 - Mr. Fulton

1 -

*Fulton*

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:

- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7c

Recommends approval of seventh issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is a copy of Volume II, number 2, of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

1 - ENCLOSURE  
*OR*

*WOB*  
*WOB* EX-109 *W* *Per*

65-74480-12

65-74480  
Enclosures  
SJM:pld  
(8)

REC-119  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
DEC 13 1974  
REC-119

MAILED 20  
DEC 18 1974  
FBI

3 DEC 24 1974

84 DEC 31 1974

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

- [Handwritten initials]*
- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Training \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~Classified by 4375  
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Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*WRW/PLM*  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

DATE: 12/16/74  
VOLUME: 2  
NUMBER: 2  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

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DISCLOSURE: 65-74480-18

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TRENDS




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~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TECHNIQUES




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~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



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TARGETS



(S)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

b1

(S)




#### FEATURES

**REPRESENTATIVES OF THE German Democratic Republic** were recently in the US for negotiations regarding the establishment of an embassy and possibly a chancery in the Washington, D. C., area. (NY SATPIA 8/7/74 p. 3)

**EARLIER THIS YEAR Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York City, celebrated its 50th anniversary as an American corporation with a reception at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. Attendance at the reception was by invitation only, and several US businessmen have since indicated that it was a disappointing, ill-planned, and poorly-hosted affair.** (NYSSPIA 7/10/74 p. 29)

(S)



~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

THE LINE UP - 11/1/74

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
		<u>WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	
USSR	982	174	975	2131
Albania	10	0	10	20
Bulgaria	52	4	82	138
Czechoslovakia	102	8	114	224
Hungary	67	0	92	159
Mongolia	15	1	15	31
Poland	207	20	291	518
Romania	89	7	128	224
East Germany	36	4	17	57
Peoples Republic of China	185	22	6	213
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1745</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>1730</b>	<b>3715</b>

(S)

b1

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State SENT SEPARATELY

Department of Justice

The Attorney General - SENT SEPARATELY

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director for Operations <sup>SENT SEP</sup>  
Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission  
Director, National Security Agency SENT SEP.  
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board SENT SEP.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Wannall

DATE: 8/5/74

FROM : A. B. Fulton *AF*

- 1-Mr. Adams
- 1-Mr. Wannall
- 1-Mr. Branigan

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

- 1-Mr. Cregar
- 1-Mr. Fulton *F3 Putnam*
- 1- [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

*A.B. Fulton*

Recommends approval of sixth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is a copy of Volume II, number 1, of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

**ACTION:**

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

SM:nlb (7)

*SM/ree* *REC-71* *65-74480-11* *was* *Wannall*

AUG 15 1974

ENCLOSURE

INTELLIGENCE DIV  
RESEARCH

58 AUG 22 1974

84 AUG 27 1974

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

F.B.I.

AUG 13 3 53 PM '74

*Handwritten signatures: [unclear] [unclear]*

*Handwritten signatures: [unclear] [unclear]*

~~Classified by 4375 [unclear]  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

MAILED 3  
AUG 22 1974  
4-FBI

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
VOLUME: 2  
NUMBER: 1  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

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*Handwritten: 65-74480-11*

*Handwritten: wew/TJS*

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*Handwritten: [unclear] [unclear]*

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

(S)

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
TRENDS

(S)



THE STRICT ATTITUDE of the Czechoslovak government toward issuing visas appears to be continuing as are the rules against visiting with former Czech citizens now residing in the US. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 1)

(S)




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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION




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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TECHNIQUES



(S)

A RECENT EMIGRE REPORTEDLY has been "pressured" into retaining Romanian citizenship as a condition for the release of his wife and child from Romania. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 14)




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
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TARGETS



(S)

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

FEATURES

THE US-USSR JOINT Trade Council, Incorporated, 280 Park Avenue, New York (its counterpart is being set up in Moscow) has the following listed goals: (NY SPIA 4/10/74, p. 24)

1. To create a business and governmental environment in both countries conducive to expanded commercial relations between these countries.
2. To facilitate the exploration of opportunities for expanded trade.
3. To conduct research on major issues related to trade between the US and the USSR.
4. To provide assistance to members in both countries in the execution of commercial agreements.
5. To collaborate and provide liaison between both governments on expanding trade relations.

The Soviet trade organization Energomashexport apparently plans to open a company in New York City to market Soviet-produced hydroelectric turbines in the US. This company would most likely be connected with Amtorg Trading Corporation. (NY SPIA 4/10/74, p. 25)

Representatives of Amtorg Trading Corporation and the World Trade Center, New York City, signed a three-year lease to become effective June 1, 1974, for 3052 square feet of space on the 86th floor of the north tower of the World Trade Center. This will house a Soviet information center whose purpose is to promote and develop the import and export of products of the USSR in world trade and commerce. Six or seven Soviet nationals will staff the center at first, and the number next year will probably increase to ten or twelve. (NY SPIA 3/6/74, p. 21)


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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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THIS OBVIOUS EFFORT might have gone undetected except that the individual he approached was a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from another locale who was in the area to attend a special school.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

THE LINE UP - 7/1/74

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	793	163	881	1837
Albania	9	0	8	17
Bulgaria	40	5	76	121
Czechoslovakia	84	13	100	197
(S) Hungary	65	1	87	153
Mongolia	6	1	16	23
Poland	187	20	288	495
Romania	80	5	130	215
East Germany	24	5	8	37
Peoples Republic of China	152	21	5	178
<u>TC L</u>	<u>1440</u>	<u>234</u>	<u>1599</u>	<u>3273</u>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy Director of Plans

Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission

Director, National Security Agency

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Mr. Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gebhardt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Thompson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bowers \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Herington \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mintz \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *W. Small*

DATE: 4/2/73

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS Fulton*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

Recommends approval of fifth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 5 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be printed, and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

JEM:glw

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller *W. Small*
- 1 - Mr. Branigan ✓
- 1 - Mr. Cregar ✓
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith *Fulton*
- 1 - Mr. Larson
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

MAILED 5  
APR 4 - 1973  
FBI

APR 6 1973

84 APR 12 1973

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

- r. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Gebhardt \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Thompson \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- ele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Bowers \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Herington \_\_\_\_\_
- s. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Mintz \_\_\_\_\_
- cs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

COBB  
 Classified by D. E. Moore  
 Exempt from General Declassification  
 Schedule of Executive Order 11652  
 Exemption Category Number \_\_\_\_\_  
 Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

DEM  
 20/5  
 FBI HQ  
 20/5

DATE: 2/20/73  
 VOLUME: 1  
 NUMBER: 5  
 COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

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MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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ENCLOSURE

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The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

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
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## TRENDS

ALEXSEI KOSYGIN AND Leonid Brezhnev are scheduled to visit the United States this Spring.

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


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## TECHNIQUES


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
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TARGETS

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


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
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


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### FEATURES

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
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New Soviet Purchasing Commission

THE UNITED STATES Government has authorized the establishment of a temporary Soviet purchasing commission in New York City to service the Kama River Truck Complex (a massive truck-producing project being built with extensive United States industry participation). Tentative arrangements provide that the commission will be set up for one year, but will be extended in one-year segments, if necessary, for a maximum period of three more years. The commission will consist of a chairman and a maximum of 15 technical assistants

*Jan*

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and staff. It will be responsible to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Soviet trade representative in the United States. The commission has signed a three-year lease for space on the sixth floor of the General Motors Building, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It will take up occupancy in this space about April 1, 1973. Since its arrival in mid-January, it has occupied temporary space on the fourth floor of the General Motors Building.

(UNCLASSIFIED) (S)

(U)

## OMNIBUS NOTES

SOVIET DIPLOMATS ARE significantly expanding public appearances in an apparent attempt to improve public relations. Most of the speeches contain little that is new, or even interesting, but the mere increase in appearances is noteworthy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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AEROFLOT HAS MOVED from the space it shared with Intourist at 45 East 49th Street, New York City, and is now located at 545 Fifth Avenue, New York City. (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE MARINE DIVISION of the ATC is moving from the ATC space on the 19th and 20th floors of 355 Lexington Avenue, New York City, and acquiring separate space on the 10th floor of the same building. It will also have separate telephone service. (UNCLASSIFIED)

gen

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# THE LINE-UP

3/1/73

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	691	144	802	1881
Albania	7	0	11	20
Bulgaria	38	3	64	114
Czechoslovakia	79	11	97	213
Hungary	59	3	98	182
Mongolia	5	0	11	16
Poland	147	26	238	452
Romania	76	2	122	222
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1102</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>1443</b>	<b>3100</b>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

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DISSEMINATION LIST

The White House

*Secy of State*  
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
~~for National Security Affairs~~

Department of Justice

The Attorney General

Department of State

The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable, The Secretary of the Treasury

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans

Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission

Director, National Security Agency

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b7C



UL

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ENCLOSURE

65-74480-10



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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

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DATE 07-21-2011

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Felt	_____
Baker	_____
Callahan	_____
Cleveland	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Gebhardt	_____
Jenkins	_____
Marshall	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Miller, E.S.	_____
Purvis	_____
Soyars	_____
Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Ms. Herwig	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/wls*

DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS/EL2*

SUBJECT: *0*  
FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - U. S.  
(FINAL)

*CS*  
*Q*

Captioned publication provides an overview of the  
(S) activities of [redacted] and contains  
items taken from the full spectrum of our counterintelligence  
operations.

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b6  
b7C

It is classified "~~Secret~~," "Background Use Only" and  
"Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved."

### RECOMMENDATION:

Because of highly sensitive information contained in  
this file it should be maintained in the Special File Room.

*B*

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Marshall (Attn: [redacted] Room 1116 IB)
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]

65-74480

JFM:lkm  
(6)

*Please place 1cc  
in 66-17404  
NAP. STP 113*

REC-77

*65-74480-9*

DEC 8 1972

*EWL*

*Handled by  
Special File Room  
on 12-12-72.  
NAP.*

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DEC 8 1972

*JFM  
5-19-78*

97 DEC 12 1972

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG



- Waker \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Gebhardt \_\_\_\_\_
- Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller, E.S. *[initials]*
- Purvis \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *[initials]*

DATE: 12/1/72

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS/ELP*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

Recommends approval of fourth issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 4 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

65-74480

JFM:glw *[initials]*  
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REC-70

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
DEC 17 1972

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. Larson
- 1 - 

DEC 9 10 23 AM '72

DEC 11 15 52 PM '72

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REC'D E-2 WITTEB  
FBI-702LICE  
REC'D E-2 WITTEB



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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

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FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

*DEMWAS*  
~~Classified by D. E. Moore  
Exempt from General Declassification  
Schedule of Executive Order 11652  
Exemption Category Number 2  
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite~~

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

DATE: 12/5/72

VOLUME: 1

NUMBER: 4

COPY NUMBER: 1

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- rshall \_\_\_\_\_
- ller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- rvis \_\_\_\_\_
- yars \_\_\_\_\_
- lters \_\_\_\_\_
- le. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- . Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- . Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- . Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- s. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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JFM:cak cak

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

65-74480-8

*EM*  
*7/10/60*  
*DEMWAS*  
*WAR*  
*war*  
*TJS/ER*  
*M*

~~SECRET~~

b1

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

(S)

ENGLISH


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TRENDS



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- \_\_\_\_\_ ars
- \_\_\_\_\_ ters
- \_\_\_\_\_ e. Room
- \_\_\_\_\_ Kinley
- \_\_\_\_\_ Armstrong
- \_\_\_\_\_ Herwig
- \_\_\_\_\_ . Neenan

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

**ENCLOSURE**

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TECHNIQUES


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


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
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
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
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OMNIBUS NOTES

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


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ALL CZECHS TRAVELING to the United States as part of the East-West Exchange Program are required to report to the Czech Embassy upon arrival. This informs the Embassy of their presence in the United States and

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*Handwritten initials*

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THE LINE-UP

11/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	787	143	759	1689
Albania	11	0	11	22
Bulgaria	43	3	69	115
(S) Czechoslovakia	96	11	99	206
Mongolia	14	1	11	26
Hungary	68	3	96	167
Poland	173	27	232	432
Romania	82	2	109	193
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1274</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>1386</u>	<u>2850</u>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat and ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives. ~~(SECRET)~~

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller, E.S.
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 24, 1972

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

- 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

*T. J. Smith*

Recommends approval of third issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 3 of FINAL. FINAL is a bi-monthly publication. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

REC-53

*65-74480-7*

14 AUG 31 1972

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.


Enclosures

65-74480

EWL:dan *dan wps*

*5 [Signature]*

ENCLOSURE



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57 SEP 5 1972 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

*EWL*

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS

~~(FINAL)~~  
~~(FINAL)~~

UNITED STATES

- Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~FBI~~  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

65-74480-7

ENCLOSURE

DATE: 8/28/72  
VOLUME: I  
NUMBER: 3  
COPY NUMBER:

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*FWL*  
*WAL*  
*WAP*

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FINAL

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

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
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
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
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TARGETS

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
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### FEATURES

#### SOVIET STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Each academic year since 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained agreements whereby Soviet students have studied at colleges and universities in the United States while their American counterparts have studied in Russia. From the vantage point of 15 years' experience, there are several interesting observations which can be made. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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


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For the upcoming academic year 40 Soviet students have been proposed for study in the United States at about 20 universities and 35 of these have already entered the country. From past experience it was not unusual to note that only one of these students was pursuing study in the field of history and the other 39 were designated for scientific curricula. This apparent oversight was recently corrected when the lone history student was removed from the list of candidates by the Soviets and in his place was substituted a bio-chemist. (CONFIDENTIAL) (WFO airtel, 8/14/72, Bufile: 105-116937)

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES



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
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OMNIBUS NOTES



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
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THE LINE-UP

8/1/72



<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	619	135	710	1464
Albania	7	0	13	20
Bulgaria	38	3	60	101
Czechoslovakia	77	10	96	183
Hungary	60	3	90	153
Mongolia	6	1	10	17
Poland	134	27	209	370
Romania	66	2	107	175
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1007</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>1295</b>	<b>2483</b>

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\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States; including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

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FINAL

DISSEMINATION LIST

Copy No.

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8.  Director,  
Office of Administrative Security

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
10. Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security;  
Att:  M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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b7c

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
 HOFFMAN BUILDING  
 2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 03-10-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

IN REPLY REFER TO  
 NIS-41B/jb  
 3850  
 Ser U 3967  
 21 JUL 1972

*pit*

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service  
 To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subj: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (United States),  
 16 June 1972

1. Subject document was reviewed with great interest at this Service. The information contained therein is considered valuable to staff members and to field units.
2. It is requested that twenty-five (25) additional copies be furnished this Service for distribution to Naval Investigative Service Offices.

[Redacted Signature]

By direction

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*8/11/72 - DISCUSSED WITH ADVISED THAT NISHQ, WHO WAS NOT SUPPLY REQUESTED BUREAU COVERED BUT THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO NIS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE PAPER CLEARANCES AND NEED TO KNOW HAVING ACCESS TO INFO IN THIS PUBLICATION. LRS*

EX-114

REC-58

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
 65-74480-6

16 AUG 11 1972

*[Handwritten Signature]*

*File 65-74480*

*5-Ext*  
 [Stamp: NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE]

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 70 AUG 16 1972

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Felt	_____
Mohr	_____
Rosen	_____
Bates	_____
Bishop	_____
Callahan	_____
Campbell	_____
Casper	_____
Cleveland	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Miller, E. S.	_____
Ponder	_____
Soyars	_____
Waikart	_____
Walters	_____
Tele Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- DATE: 6/7/72
- 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: **FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)**

Recommends approval of second issue of FINAL publication for dissemination to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board and all field offices.

Attached is copy of Volume I, number 2 of FINAL. The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States Intelligence Community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI.

First issue was dated 4/7/72 and considerable favorable response has been received from outside agencies. Although FINAL was initially envisioned as a monthly publication, it appears through experience that a bi-monthly period will assure a better quality document and future issues will be keyed to this period.

Attached also is a dissemination sheet for outside agencies. Copies designated to these agencies will be numbered and recorded for strict accountability.

ACTION:

SI-111

AUG 10 1972

If approved, this issue will be printed and disseminated to agencies on dissemination sheet as well as all field offices and to appropriate Seat of Government officials and supervisors.

Enclosures

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*WAC*

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*EM* *DEM/BCM*

*FBI-INTICE  
REC'D E'S MILLER*

*WGC*

*JP*

*5/1/72*

MAILED 22  
JUN 16 1972  
FBI

*Approved*

*6/12 1146p*

70 AUG 16 1972

FINAL

DISSEMINATION LIST

Copy No.

The White House

1. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Department of Justice

2. The Attorney General

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

Department of Defense

4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

Department of the Navy

7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8.  Director,  
Office of Administrative Security

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
10. Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security;  
Att:  M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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65-744807-5

ENCLOSURE

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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**FINAL**

June 9, 1972

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

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EWL:dan

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
- Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Waikart \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

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ENCLOSURE




TRENDS



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TECHNIQUES




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
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## FEATURES

### PIONEER POINT SOVIET ESTATE

On 5/18/72, the Soviet Government completed purchase of approximately 45 acres of land commonly called Pioneer Point, Maryland, for reported price of \$1,120,000. The property is located on the eastern shore in Queen Annes County, and is designated on commercial maps as Corsica Neck, west of Centerville, Maryland. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Buildings on the site consist of former estate house for use as summer residence by Ambassador, a smaller building for use as summer recreation center for children, and several outbuildings including a caretaker's residence. Existing dock on Chesapeake Bay can accommodate boats of 40 feet in length and up to nine feet in draft. Soviets are negotiating for two cabin cruisers in the 27-foot range. They plan to surround acreage with high chain link fence. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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### CHINESE IN UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

Because of the increase in Chinese language work at the United Nations, the Secretariat is currently hiring and training 45 new Chinese translators and interpreters, at a cost of \$500,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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
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


It was stated that their jobs should not be considered "secure" and their degree of compliance with the above conditions, especially the first, would bear on promotions and even tenure in their present jobs. The Mission was apparently under the impression it had significant, if not complete, control over Secretariat employees engaged in Chinese related work. The hiring issue has been resolved by allowing the Mission to talent-scout and recommend people for the additional positions. It is now in the process of recruiting loyal, "ideologically safe" individuals from China and the rest of the world. How far the Mission will be able to enforce its demands on Secretariat employees is yet to be seen.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Source: 62-7787-Sub 246

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




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OMNIBUS NOTES



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EVIDENCE INDICATES THE Romanian Government may be in serious need of U. S. dollars. It is charging exorbitant "processing fees" for Romanian-born U. S. residents to bring relatives here, and to renounce Romanian citizenship in order to apply for U. S. citizenship. The government has gone so far as to legislatively broaden the definition of a Romanian citizen, to require more individuals to be subject to these "processing fees." (UNCLASSIFIED) Source: CG SATPIA 5/5/72 p. 14  
NYO SATPIA 5/5/72 (Romanian)



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- 10 -

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THE LINE-UP

5/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	627	144	784	1555
Albania	5	0	8	13
Bulgaria	37	3	75	115
(S) Czechoslovakia	77	10	91	178
Hungary	57	3	104	164
Mongolia	7	1	11	19
Poland	134	26	230	390
Romania	63	3	94	158
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1007</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>1397</b>	<b>2592</b>

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\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

~~SECRET~~  
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



# **FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis**

UNITED STATES


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NUMBER: 2  
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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION  
ENCLOSURE

65-74480-5



TRENDS



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TECHNIQUES



(C)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Felt	_____
Campbell	_____
Rosen	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Miller	_____
Callahan	_____
Casper	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Cleveland	_____
Ponder	_____
Bates	_____
Walkart	_____
Walters	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- DATE: 4/5/72
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: <sup>①</sup> FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends dissemination of first issue of monthly FINAL publication to The White House, members of United States Intelligence Board, and all field offices.

*7/13*  
Purpose of FINAL is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Text of first issue was approved by Director per memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, 3/29/72.

Attached is copy of first issue in finished form. Cover page on this issue will be replaced in future issues by distinctive, stylized cover now being prepared. *ay*

Recommend copies be disseminated as follows:


1. To The White House and the Acting Attorney General.
2. To the following members of the United States Intelligence Board: State Department; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army; Naval Investigative Service; Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force; National Security Agency; Treasury Department; and Atomic Energy Commission. *REC-29 65-74480-4*

22 APR 21 1972

For strict accountability, all copies disseminated to outside agencies will be numbered, and a record of dissemination kept for each issue.

Enclosure

EWL:jan jan  
(7)



*5 [Signature]*  
CONTINUED - OVER

**ENCLOSURE**  
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

56 APR 25 1972 *SM*

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States (FINAL)

3. All FBI field offices. Believed essential that same broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations which we offer to intelligence community should be given to our own field offices. We note that more and more smaller offices throughout the country are becoming involved in sensitive espionage investigations.

Consideration was given to disseminating FINAL to all Legal Attaches; however, in view of potential weakness in security in disseminating this document abroad and also in view of the lack of operational responsibility on part of Legal Attaches, it is recommended that no dissemination be made to these offices.

ACTION:

1. That first issue of FINAL be approved for dissemination as stipulated above.

2. That, if approved, this memorandum be returned to Research Section, which will effect dissemination.

FWL

DEM  
VAS

OK  
#

~~7~~

✓

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WGC

EM

js  
DHS  
JMM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Waikart \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

DATE: 4-13-72

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - U.S. (FINAL)

*Wannall*

This is to recommend dissemination of monthly FINAL publication to [redacted] Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

b6  
b7c

The purpose of FINAL is to offer to the U.S. intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the U.S. which are within the purview of the FBI. The first issue dated 4-7-72 has been disseminated to Dr. Henry Kissinger at The White House, the Acting Attorney General and members of the United States Intelligence Board. Strict accountability is being maintained on dissemination to outside agencies.

[redacted] PFIAB, advised Supervisor R. H. Haynes that this publication would be of direct interest to [redacted] in his position as [redacted] of the PFIAB and asked if [redacted] could be added to the dissemination.

In view of the responsibilities of the PFIAB, this appears to be a legitimate request.

ACTION:

If approved, the initial copy of FINAL dated 4-7-72, as well as subsequent issues, will be disseminated by White House liaison to Admiral Anderson.

- EMH:sjr (8)
- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson
- 1 - Mr. R. H. Haynes

*forwarded Burke for Anderson* GAD

REC-38/17/72 *EM/DEM*

ST-116 *OK* 65-74480-311

22 APR 20 1972

*WGC*

*5-Anderson*

APR 24 1972

SAC, Chicago

4/12/72

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Attention of recipient offices is called to new publication in above caption. Initial issue was sent to all field offices and member agencies of the United States intelligence community under date 4/7/72. You will note that FINAL is keyed to the monthly SPIA and SATPIA letters which are submitted by your offices. Your continuing cooperation is necessary to insure that the FINAL publication is a success and that appropriate material is called to the Bureau's attention in the SPIA and SATPIA letters.

You should alert appropriate personnel to this continuing need at the Bureau. If interim information of importance suitable for inclusion in this publication is developed, it may be sent separately by communication entitled "FINAL" and marked "Attention: Research Section." Any other correspondence relating to this publication, including your comments or suggestions, may be sent in the same form. FINAL is planned as a monthly publication.

- 2 - San Francisco
- 2 - New York
- 2 - WFO

EWL:jan jan  
(12)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Moher \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-30-2011

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EMH*

FROM : T. J. Smith *TSS*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- DATE: 3/29/72
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Campbell	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Miller	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Bates	_____
Mr. Waikart	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Recommends initiation of regular monthly letter  
in above caption for circulation to elements of United States  
intelligence community.

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the  
United States intelligence community a broad perspective of  
foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States  
which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on

In the interest of operational  
and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-  
know principle, information is not set forth in specific,  
detailed, documented form. Where information contained  
therein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities  
of other United States intelligence agencies, separate,  
detailed dissemination is made.

Attached is text of first issue of FINAL. Format  
is broken down into several categories, i.e. Trends, Techniques,  
Targets. As a feature of this issue, we set forth a perspec-  
tive on the recent arrest of a Soviet on espionage charges.  
As a continuing feature, we conclude with section entitled  
"The Line-Up" which tabulates legal presence of hostile intel-  
ligence in United States, broken down by countries, number of  
officials, known or suspected intelligence officers, percentage  
of intelligence officers, number of working wives, and number  
of dependents.

FINAL is intended as quality publication for highly  
selective circularization to The White House and other essen-  
tial elements of United States intelligence community. It  
will bear classification "Secret - No Foreign Dissemination."  
Upon approval, attached proposed text and format will be  
placed in finished form which will include appropriate cover  
page now being prepared.

Enclosure

EWL:jan  
(7)

ENCLOSURE

APR 11 1972

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MAY 2 1972

**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States (FINAL)

ACTION:

1. If approved, FINAL will be initiated as monthly publication. Appropriate memorandum will be submitted with finished product specifying United States intelligence agencies to which FINAL will be directed.

2. If approved, attached copy should be routed to Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, for further processing as indicated above. (ATTACHMENT should bear A CURRENT DATE when DISSEMINATED)

*FWK  
WOB*

*DEM*

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: 3/29/72: ESM:jan:

We have had this on the "drawing board" for about four months since we feel a need to draw the activities of Soviet-bloc intelligence into a perspective whereby a better appreciation for the impact of such activities can be created within the Bureau and in selected offices outside the Bureau. I feel we will accomplish this through this document and recommend approval.

*JAS*

*✓*

*OK  
H. ESM*

*ds*

*7 WGC*

*R*

*DJD  
JLM*

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS  
- UNITED STATES -  
FINAL

APRIL 7, 1972

- Olson \_\_\_\_\_
- Elt \_\_\_\_\_
- Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Tosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Lohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Asper \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Albey \_\_\_\_\_
- Leveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Wunder \_\_\_\_\_
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- Alters \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Olmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Andy \_\_\_\_\_

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
Volume 1  
Number 1

ENCLOSURE

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FINAL

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The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on  In the interest of operational security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

(S)

EWL:kaf

SEE NOTE PAGE SEVEN

*Le P*

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Waikart \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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*EM*

*WGC 30*

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TRENDS


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SINCE THE SEPTEMBER, 1971, defection in England of  
Oleg Lyalin, officer of the 13th Department of the KGB


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TECHNIQUES

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
TARGETS



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FEATURE

AT 7:00 p.m. on [redacted] KGB officer  
 [redacted] a Soviet national employed as [redacted]  
 [redacted] met with an American  
 agent at the [redacted]  
 New York. [redacted] was pleased with the confidential material  
 [redacted] which this agent brought to the meeting  
 and spoke enthusiastically concerning the future. Outside  
 the restaurant he obtained the material from the agent and  
 placed it in a briefcase. He gave the agent an envelope con-  
 taining \$650, and after a cordial exchange of farewells, the  
 two separated. Seconds later, [redacted] was confronted by  
 Special Agents of the FBI and placed under arrest. At this point


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[redacted] in a vain  
 attempt at disassociation. He was advised of his rights under  
 United States law, both in English and Russian, and returned to  
 New York City. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Although this instance was marked by a degree of drama, as well as a happy counterintelligence [redacted]

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
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Since all other Soviet officials stationed in the United States are subject to reciprocal agreement restricting unapproved travel to within 25 miles of the city of employment, the freedom of travel accorded to all UNSEC employees is an advantage which Soviet intelligence has never failed to exploit. However, there is one distinct disadvantage to the Soviets of which [redacted] became painfully aware. He does not have diplomatic immunity and is presently free on \$100,000 bail awaiting trial on espionage charges. (UNCLASSIFIED)

**OMNIBUS NOTES**

(S)



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~~SECRET~~

### THE LINE-UP

3/1/72

COUNTRY

PERCENTAGE	WORKING WIVES	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL	
USSR	33.85	140	804	1591
Albania	33.34	0	10	16
Bulgaria	22.23	3	73	112
Czechoslovakia	31.89	9	101	179
Hungary	40	3	100	158
Mongolia	0	1	8	15
Poland	23.62	25	216	368
Romania	36.21	4	88	150
TOTAL	32.27	185	1400	2589

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

NOTE:

- Classified "~~Secret - No Foreign Dissemination~~" due to sensitivity of information and sources from which derived, unauthorized disclosure of which would cause serious damage to defense interests of the United States. See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 3/21/72, captioned "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAI)", prepared by EWL;jan.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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Page 436 ~ b1  
Page 438 ~ b1  
Page 439 ~ b1  
Page 440 ~ b1  
Page 441 ~ b1  
Page 452 ~ b1  
Page 454 ~ b1  
Page 455 ~ b1  
Page 463 ~ b1  
Page 464 ~ b1  
Page 466 ~ b1  
Page 468 ~ b1  
Page 471 ~ Duplicate  
Page 475 ~ b1  
Page 476 ~ b1  
Page 478 ~ b1  
Page 479 ~ b1  
Page 487 ~ Duplicate  
Page 491 ~ b1  
Page 493 ~ b1  
Page 494 ~ b1  
Page 498 ~ Duplicate

Page 500 ~ Duplicate  
Page 502 ~ b1  
Page 504 ~ b1  
Page 505 ~ b1  
Page 507 ~ b1  
Page 512 ~ Duplicate  
Page 514 ~ b1  
Page 515 ~ b1  
Page 517 ~ b1  
Page 518 ~ b1  
Page 525 ~ Duplicate  
Page 528 ~ b1  
Page 530 ~ b1  
Page 539 ~ b1  
Page 540 ~ b1  
Page 543 ~ b1  
Page 545 ~ b1  
Page 546 ~ b1  
Page 547 ~ b1  
Page 555 ~ Referral/Direct  
Page 556 ~ Referral/Direct  
Page 559 ~ Duplicate  
Page 563 ~ b1  
Page 564 ~ b1  
Page 566 ~ b1  
Page 575 ~ b1  
Page 576 ~ b1  
Page 577 ~ b1  
Page 586 ~ b1  
Page 587 ~ b1  
Page 589 ~ b1  
Page 590 ~ b1  
Page 591 ~ b1  
Page 592 ~ b1  
Page 604 ~ b1  
Page 605 ~ b1  
Page 607 ~ b1  
Page 608 ~ b1  
Page 609 ~ b1  
Page 612 ~ b1  
Page 618 ~ b1  
Page 619 ~ b1  
Page 623 ~ b1  
Page 632 ~ b1  
Page 633 ~ b1  
Page 634 ~ b1  
Page 636 ~ b1  
Page 644 ~ Duplicate  
Page 645 ~ Duplicate  
Page 646 ~ Duplicate  
Page 647 ~ Duplicate

Page 648 ~ Duplicate  
Page 649 ~ Duplicate  
Page 650 ~ Duplicate  
Page 651 ~ Duplicate  
Page 652 ~ Duplicate  
Page 653 ~ Duplicate  
Page 656 ~ Duplicate  
Page 657 ~ Duplicate  
Page 658 ~ Duplicate  
Page 659 ~ Duplicate  
Page 660 ~ Duplicate  
Page 661 ~ Duplicate  
Page 662 ~ Duplicate  
Page 663 ~ Duplicate  
Page 664 ~ Duplicate  
Page 673 ~ b1  
Page 677 ~ b1

FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 2

Memorandum

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE, EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1), DATE 03-17-2011



- Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

CONFIDENTIAL

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 3/19/82

From : [Redacted]

Subject: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Servs., Laboratory, Crim. Inv., Legal Coun., Off. of Cong. & Public Affs., Director, Ident., Rec. Mgnt., Exec. AD-Adm., Inspection, Tech. Servs., Exec. AD-Inv., Intel, Training, Exec. AD-LES

File 65-74480

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1 - Mr [Redacted]
1 - Mr [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr [Redacted]
1 - Mr [Redacted]
1 - Mr [Redacted]

TJD:emb
Enclosure

(CONTINUED - OVER)

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Classified and Extended by 859
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)
Date of Review for Declassification March 19, 2002

ENCLOSURE

65-74480-57

MAY 10 1982

61 MAY 20 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

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b7c

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]  
[redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign  
(C) counterintelligence operations is also provided. This  
issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the  
first nine months of 1981. Printed copies will be supplied  
(U) when printing process is complete. (S)

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL



~~SECRET~~

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VII



Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

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Security Precautions

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources  
and Methods Involved

National Security  
Information

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified and Extended by 4671~~

~~Reason For Extension FCM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)~~


~~Date of Review For Declassification (January 1, 2002)~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

iii

I.



1

1

5

~~8~~ 7

~~8~~ 8

~~11~~ 10

~~13~~ 12

II.

15

~~16~~ 17

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

~~16~~ 17

Military Intelligence

21

Political Intelligence

25

Economic Intelligence

28

~~29~~ 28

~~33~~ 32


~~35~~ 34

III.

37

37

IV.



~~45~~ 43

~~45~~ 43

~~49~~ 47

~~50~~ 48

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b1

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
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~~49~~ 49

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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~~51~~ 51

~~51~~ 51


Defection of

~~62~~ 62

b6  
b7C

PHOTOGRAPHS

(S)



~~51~~ 51

53

~~58-61~~

58-61

b1  
b6  
b7C

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States, October, 1979-December, 1981

~~67-71~~

65-69

CHARTS

Major Communist Country Presence in the United States, October, 1979-December, 1981

~~73~~ 71

~~75~~ 73

b1

~~77~~ 75

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Dissemination List →

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

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[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C)


[redacted] during the first nine months of 1981. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. (S)

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Perhaps the  
most significant of these involved the investigation of  
[redacted]  
After extensive interviews, [redacted] was arrested on [redacted]  
and charged with espionage; he pleaded [redacted] and was  
sentenced to [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The compromise could very well have had a damaging impact on U.S. national security interests, since it is

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~

[Large Redacted Block]

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(S)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the United States Department of State (USDS), [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] At the same time, the USDS protested such Soviet espionage activities and demanded that they be halted immediately. ~~(S)~~

(S)

[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

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On the other hand, during 1981 the arrest and conviction of William Holden Bell, an employee of the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, and [redacted]

[redacted] on charges of espionage, demonstrated more clearly than ever the damage that may be done to U.S. national security interests by the smaller (vis-a-vis the SIS) Warsaw Pact services. In a highly sophisticated operation, [redacted] spotted, assessed, and recruited a U.S. citizen with access to highly classified information of value to the Soviets. The Poles were willing to pay a substantial sum for the information and employed sound operational security practices. Moreover,

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[redacted] cover was impeccable--he was a [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted]

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[redacted]

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(U) In compiling the data for this section, two principal sources have been tapped--tasking of double agents by intelligence officers and general inquiries made to FBI assets by IOs. Therefore, in some cases, for reasons of operational security, specificity has been avoided. ~~(S)~~

(S)




Scientific and Technical Intelligence

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
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A case conducted jointly by U.S. Customs, the USDC, and the Internal Revenue Service involving a businessman named [redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those trends. On [redacted] were




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
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Military Intelligence



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


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
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Political Intelligence



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Economic Intelligence

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


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
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
Conclusions

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
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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- 53 -



Defection of [redacted]

[redacted]

On [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] years old [redacted]

[redacted] was accompanied by his wife, daughter, and son-in-law. In defecting, [redacted] stated:

[redacted]

The defection of [redacted] climaxed a year which saw the defection (as well as recruitment-in-place) of a considerable number of Polish officials and intelligence officers. (S)

(U)

[redacted]

(S)

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
POLAND	287
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	100
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	51
VIETNAM	12
NORTH KOREA	12
YUGOSLAVIA	154
ALBANIA	12
MONGOLIA	10
TOTAL	2,428

(S)

b1

# COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,050
PRC	481
POLAND	389
GDR	135
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	155
(S) ROMANIA	89
HUNGARY	109
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	20
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	342
ALBANIA	9
KAMPUCHEA	9
LAOS	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,990</b>

b1

# COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,113
PRC	820
POLAND	331
GDR	119
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	94
CUBA	72
ROMANIA	90
HUNGARY	114
BULGARIA	86
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	15
YUGOSLAVIA	246
ALBANIA	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,131</b>


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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES


OCTOBER, 1979 - DECEMBER, 1981



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
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**OFFICIAL PRESENCE**

**DECEMBER 1, 1981**


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


# INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE

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## DECEMBER 1, 1981

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
Fort Ritchie Resident Office  
Fort Ritchie, Maryland 21719

123

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

IAGPA-A-FR

10 September 1981

*PH*  
SUBJECT: ~~X~~ FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

*FBI Foreign Intelligence ANALYSIS*

Chief  
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center  
Room 4049  
FBI Headquarters  
Washington, D.C. 20535

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-17-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

Dear Sir:

Request that this office be put on the mailing list for your publication, FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review. I have reviewed past issues of this publication and have found it most helpful in the performance of our unit mission to provide Operations Security support to military units in our assigned area of responsibility.

If there is a similar document concerning terrorist activity that you publish, I would like to be put on that mailing list as well.

I have found your field elements to be most helpful and appreciate your assistance in this matter.

The mailing address for this office is:

Special Ag. <sup>(S)</sup> in-Charge  
Fort Ritchie Resident Office  
902d MI Group  
Ft. Ritchie, MD 21719

DE-34

65-74480-560

10 OCT 21 1981

Sincerely,

*Vernon L. Fleming*  
VERNON L. FLEMING  
Captain, MI  
Special Agent-in-Charge

*[Signature]*

*Communication sent out dated 10/21/81*

*[Signature]*  
FEB 3 1982



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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Washington, D.C. 20535

44

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DATE 03-17-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

# Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_  
 Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_  
 Exec AD LES \_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:  
 Adm. Servs. \_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_  
 Ident. \_\_\_  
 Intell. \_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_  
 Legal Coun. \_\_\_  
 Plan. & Insp. b6  
 Rec. Mgnt. b7C  
 Tech. Servs. \_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_  
 Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_  
 Director's Sec'y \_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION '6/81  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
 DATE 03-17-2011

From : [Redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. \_\_\_ Laboratory \_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_\_\_  
 Director \_\_\_ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_  
 Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_ Ident. \_\_\_ Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_  
 Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_ Inspection \_\_\_ Tech. Servs. \_\_\_  
 Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_ Intell. go/n Training \_\_\_

Enclosures - 2 ~~ENCLOSURE~~

65-74480

TJD:enb (8)

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~ 55  
 DE-85  
 (CONTINUED - OVER)  
 7 OCT 22 1981

- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

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~~Classified and Extended by 859  
 Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
 Date of Review for Declassification August 6, 2001~~

79 NOV 3 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

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b7C

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted] b1  
(C) This particular issue is devoted to the activities  
of [redacted]  
(U) during the latter six months of  
1980. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied  
when print process is completed. (X)

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VI

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*July, 1981*



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**Security Precautions**

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<b>Warning Notice</b>	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
<b>National Security Information</b>	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
<b>ORCON</b>	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
<b>NOFORN</b>	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~Classified and Extended by 859  
Reason For Extension FOM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (July 1, 2001)~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	4
	7
	9
	11
II.	15
	17
	23
	23
	25
	27
	28
III.	31
	31
IV.	39
	39
	39
	41
	43
	45

(S)

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 49

(S)

[Redacted]

49

b1

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RGB Agent

Neutralization of Recruited

57

PHOTOGRAPHS

[Redacted]

51

b6  
b7C

54-55

57

[Redacted]

Soviet Principal Confronted by SA

61

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-June, 1981

65-69

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[Redacted]

73

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CHART

Major Communist Country Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-June, 1981

71

DISSEMINATION LIST

75

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INTRODUCTION

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The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ,

(U)

Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3(A). ~~(S)~~

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The latter half of 1980 also saw the culmination of the massive influx of Cuban refugees into the United States-- eventually, the figure mounted to roughly 127,000 refugees.



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[REDACTED]


In September of 1980, the National People's Congress of the PRC formally admitted that the targets of the 1976-1985 economic plan were unattainable and announced that an entire new plan would be devised to take its place. In accordance with this new plan a number of contracts have been cancelled with the Western nations and Japan, primarily in the area of heavy industry. Cutbacks in the budget regarding the procurement of military hardware have also occurred, however, the State Council of the PRC has stated that China intends to push new programs in light industry (consumer goods, computers, microelectronics), agriculture and energy, that will require inputs of foreign technology, capital, and management skills. (U)

The U.S. Government, under the Carter administration, supported China's modernization program in consideration of China's contribution to global strategy. China's failure to modernize would erode its role in maintaining the global balance to the disadvantage of China as well as the United States and its allies. Therefore, the United States signed numerous bilateral agreements in science and technology, education, and trade and granted loans and trade credits to the PRC. This situation led to a liberalization of controls on the export of U.S. high technology items and on authorization, on a case-by-case basis, for sales of non-lethal military support equipment (trucks, radar, transport aircraft, helicopters, and communications and training equipment) to the PRC. Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous defense-related corporations seeking military-related information. (U)

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As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States.




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
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Officials Involved in Criminal Activities

(S)




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was perhaps dramatized on [Redacted] when [Redacted] was arrested in New York City by Special Agents (SA), shortly after [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] a

[Redacted] citizen, was allegedly tasked by the Soviets to

[Redacted] (Although the fact that [Redacted] was in contact with the Soviets has been established, [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] "claims" to have been so tasked, but he conceivably could have claimed such tasking to alleviate fears of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The case also brought to the fore an issue

which is increasingly becoming a concern of the U.S.

Government--the [Redacted] to

(U)

the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. ~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

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The case opened in [redacted] when [redacted] of [redacted]

[redacted]

offered the individual [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] are company trade secrets and thus proprietary information. A [redacted] compared the [redacted] to the "recipe for Coca Cola." Needless to say, the [redacted] is embargoed for exportation to the Soviet Union. (U)

Fortunately, the employee contacted by [redacted] reported the [redacted] offer immediately to his superiors at [redacted] who in turn contacted the FBI. From that point on, [redacted] dealings with [redacted] as well as other computer firms, were constantly monitored by the FBI. In his negotiations, [redacted] freely admitted that he was attempting to obtain the [redacted] for the Soviet Government, with which [redacted]

As the negotiations wore on, [redacted] offer escalated first to [redacted] then finally to [redacted] (U)

Eventually, however, [redacted] realized that he could not, himself, acquire the [redacted] He thereupon contacted an employee of a firm housed in the same building in which [redacted] is located, and offered to pay

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the individual to obtain the [redacted] The individual immediately contacted the FBI, and at this point a UCA was interjected into the case. The UCA was introduced to [redacted] as a [redacted]

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b7E

(U)

[redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] He was sentenced on [redacted]  
to [redacted] in prison. In a [redacted] the U.S.  
Government [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Why the Soviets would target [Redacted] in particular, is explicable. As noted by an official of

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] The [Redacted] offered by the [Redacted] is, the official explained, "a drop in the bucket," compared to the millions spent by [Redacted] in developing this type of advanced technology. The prosecution in the case estimated the value of the [Redacted]

[Redacted] (U)

(C)

[Redacted]

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## APPENDIX

### COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,222
PRC	234
POLAND	271
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	107
CUBA	84
ROMANIA	80
(S) HUNGARY	78
BULGARIA	48
VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
TOTAL	2,395

NOTE: OFFICIALS IS A GENERIC DESIGNATION USED BY THE FBI FOR PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL CONVENIENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DIPLOMATIC DESIGNATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

(S)

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,041
PRC	701
POLAND	365
GDR	112
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	90
CUBA	79
(S) ROMANIA	87
HUNGARY	107
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	352
ALBANIA	11
TOTAL	3,059

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
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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES


## JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1981

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In April, 1981, alterations were made in the list of

(S)




and Cambodia, Laos, and

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Outer Mongolia were deleted. The complete



list is as follows:



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~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION LIST



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- ✓ Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1
- Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service -1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1
- Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2
- Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5
- Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1
- Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1
- Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff; Publications Unit) - 2; National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1; Director of Security (Security Analysis Group) - 1
- National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1; Publication Unit - 1
- Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1
- Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1
- Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1
- Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission - 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Department of Energy - 3

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

~~SECRET~~

- 76 -

~~SECRET~~



# Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_  
 Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_  
 Exec AD LES \_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:  
 Adm. Servs. \_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_  
 Ident. \_\_\_  
 Intell. \_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_  
 Legal Coun. \_\_\_  
 Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_  
 Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_  
 Tech. Servs. \_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_  
 Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_  
 Director's Sec'y \_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE,  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
 DATE 03-17-2011

65-74480-54

From

[Redacted]

Subject: ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*sec*  
*[Signature]*

*ANALYSIS*

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DE-85

V-84

Enclosure - ENCLOSURE

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

65-74480 OCT 23 1981

TJD:enb (7)

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by 859  
 Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)  
 Date of Review for Declassification June 24, 2001~~

79 NOV 2 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

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b7C

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]

(C)

This issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] during the last six months of 1980. Printed copies  
will be supplied when printing process is complete. (S)

(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~  
Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

---

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VI

*April 1981*



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Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

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I

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Security Precautions

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources  
and Methods Involved

National Security  
Information

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Classified and Extended by 859  
Reason For Extension E.O. 11.1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (April 1, 2001)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

b1

INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	4
	7
	9
	11
II.	15
	17
	24
	24
	26
	28
	30
III.	33
	33
IV.	41
	41
	41
	43
	45
	47

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

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b7C

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[Redacted]

51

[Redacted]

55

[Redacted]

Neutralization of Recruited

61

KGB Agent

PHOTOGRAPHS

[Redacted]

55

[Redacted]

with UCA

58-59

[Redacted]

61

[Redacted]

Soviet Principal Confronted by SA

65

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-March, 1981

69-73

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[Redacted]

77

CHART

Major Communist Country Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-March, 1981

75

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence

(U)


Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3(A). (S)

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Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous U.S. military installations and defense-related corporations with almost a free hand to gain material. An interesting note to this cooperation is that [redacted]

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
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As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States. [redacted]

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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# APPENDIX

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1979

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USSR	1,222
PRC	234
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VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
TOTAL	2,395

(S)

NOTE: OFFICIALS IS A GENERIC DESIGNATION USED BY THE FBI FOR PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL CONVENIENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DIPLOMATIC DESIGNATIONS.

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

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VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,778</b>

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# COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH, 1981

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COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,026
PRC	626
POLAND	369
GDR	127
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	92
CUBA	79
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	104
BULGARIA	83
VIETNAM	23
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	357
ALBANIA	9
MONGOLIA	14
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,002</b>


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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES


## JUNE, 1979-MARCH, 1981

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- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

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DECLASSIFICATION 2/23/81  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-21-2011

Director, FBI

LEPAT, London (703+0)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SPIA; SATPIA  
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
FCI MATTER

Classified "~~Confidential~~" in entirety, unless  
otherwise noted. (U)

Re Legat London airtel 2/12/81 and Bureau 2/3 dated  
3/3/81 with enclosure. (U)

By above referenced routing slip, Legat London was  
furnished a copy of the current, September, 1980, edition  
(Volume 35) of the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS).  
Legat London will receive future editions of this semi-annual  
summary.

The purpose of this communication is to address the  
forwarding of copies of SPIA and SATPIA to Legat London.

A review of this matter at FBIHQ determined that the  
SPIA and SATPIA bi-monthly publications are timely and  
summaries of active and ongoing cases of the FBI. While  
efforts are made not to identify assets and sensitive techniques,  
sufficient detail is present on specific cases to lead to their  
identification. The SPIA summary has distribution only to  
FBIHQ, and establishment offices of New York, WFO, and  
San Francisco, upon whom these summaries have impact.

The detail reported in particular cases in  
investigation in the U. S. as set forth in [Redacted] is  
seen by FBIHQ as information not actually needed by Legat  
London, whereas the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
is seen to best serve the needs of the Legat since [Redacted]  
forth a broad FCI view and analysis to include [Redacted]

65-74480-100

NOT RECORDED

(C)

[Redacted]

RLJ:smd  
(11) 65-74480 (FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)  
100-354839 (SPIA) CONFIDENTIAL  
1 - 65-63482a (SATPIA) and extended by 4412  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.3 (2 and 3)  
Date of Review for Declassification [Redacted]

55 AUG 31 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

100-354839-62344

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Airtel to Legat, London  
Re: SPIA, SATPIA  
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
FCI MATTER

Your interest in keeping abreast of current matters in the FBI field is noted by FBIHQ, and we will remain cognizant of any additional studies or publications on FCI subjects which could be of assistance to you, and will forward same where appropriate.

Inquiries and/or comments concerning the FCS should be directed to INTD, attention CI-3-A Unit.

NOTE:

This addresses Legat, London's request to receive current issues of SPIA, SATPIA, and FCS as previously indicated they should in Cregar memorandum 10/31/79, captioned (C) "Coordination of Leads To/From [redacted] setting forth (U) policy as pertains to Legat, London. (X)

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(U) Coordination with [redacted] Assistant Section Chief CI-2, and [redacted] CI-3, has determined that copies of SPIA and SATPIA have not been sent to Legats in general for reasons to include security of the information, assets and techniques described in the documents; the fact that SPIA and SATPIA are tightly held summaries for FBIHQ and establishment office use, and are not seen as needed by Legats since the information on individual cases and trends may be too specific for a specific area (i.e., San Francisco), and not necessary for the (U) needs of a Legat, such as London. (X)

(U) After review of this matter, it is apparent that CI-3-A Unit publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS)" clearly fills the needs and requests of Legat, London to be kept advised of current trends and interests in the FCI field, since this publication covers the broad FCI field and cites trends and major developments. CI-3-A has insured Legat, London will regularly receive copies of FCS, current copy of (U) which is now in preparation. (X)

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Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-21-2011

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume V

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*November, 1980*



Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~SECRET~~



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Security Precautions

Warning Notice	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
ORCON	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~Classified and Extended by 1756  
Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (November 1, 2000)~~

~~SECRET~~

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
(S) [Redacted]	1
	5
	6
	8
	11
II.	13
	15
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	15
Military Intelligence	19
Political Intelligence	22
[Redacted]	25
	28
	31
	31
	32
III.	33
(S) [Redacted]	33
	36
	36
IV.	39
	39
	39
	42

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 45

(S)



45

The Neutralization of an East German  
Illegal

53

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56

PHOTOGRAPHS

(S)



49-52

APPENDIX

60-61

CHART

63

DISSEMINATION LIST

65

~~SECRET~~

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

b1

(C)

[redacted] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as the [redacted]

(C)


[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed,

(U)

documented form. (S)

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Aside from the  case, two other significant counterintelligence actions, involving double agent operations, were initiated against the SIS in mid-1980. In May of 1980, the U.S. Department of State (USDS) lodged a strong

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protest with Soviet diplomatic officials regarding the activities of [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Following the USDS protest, [redacted] recalled by the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

That same month, the USDS lodged yet another protest, this one relating to the activities of [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)


[redacted] was also impelled to depart the United States. ~~(S)~~

[redacted]

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
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Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban

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economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. (U) (S)



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


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Scientific and Technical Intelligence




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his  
subjects  
have been  
established

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Political Intelligence




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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The Neutralization of an East German Illegal

As detailed in the "Review" of March, 1979, a suspected East German illegal using the identity, [redacted] [redacted] (at the time of publication, for security purposes, the name "Schmidt" was used in the article) was located in New York City. He was employed by a major [redacted] [redacted] which has, as one of its clients, the United States Department of Defense; thus the firm handled some classified data. [redacted] was married to a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S citizen, is a Cuban immigrant. [redacted]

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APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	<u>2,428</u>

(S)

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
NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

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COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1980

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	897
PRC	481
Poland	359
GDR	121
Czechoslovakia	96
Cuba	155
(S) Romania	78
Hungary	87
Bulgaria	66
Vietnam	18
North Korea	14
Yugoslavia	324
Albania	9
Mongolia	11
Kampuchea	3
Laos	11
Total	<u>2,730</u>



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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

## OCTOBER, 1979 - OCTOBER, 1980


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DISSEMINATION LIST

Number

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36



35 Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

37, 74 Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

30, 31, 32 Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2

34, 55, 56, 29 - DOE  
Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

27, 28 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

22, 23, 24, 25, 26 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 5

16 Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 28 Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff; Hostile Contacts Branch) - 2; National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1; Publications Unit - 1

40 N.R.C.

57, 58, 59, 9, 10, 59 National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1

8 Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

7 Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - 1

6 Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial Security Institute - 1


1 Director, FBI - 1

4 Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

5 Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

2 - O'Connell

3



37

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *EJO/BA*

DATE: 12/15/80

FROM: [Redacted]

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-21-2011

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED	Adm. Servs. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Intell. <i>EJO/BA</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD Inv. _____	Laboratory _____	Training _____
Exec. AD LES _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

*(Handwritten initials in a circle)*

*(Handwritten signature)*

Enclosures - 2

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

TJD:enb (8)

- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

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Classified and Extended by 5071  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification December 15, 2000

*(Handwritten number 52)*

61 APR 13 '81

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech./Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: 9/22/80

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

0124

FROM :



SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

*Handwritten notes:*  
C/O  
10/20/80  
E.A.  
10/21/80

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "~~FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary~~," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

b6  
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RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

*Handwritten:* fsc

APPROVED:

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_

Director \_\_\_\_\_

Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_

Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_

Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

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Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_

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DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)

DATE 03-21-2011

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*Handwritten:* 157-140-51

TJD:enb (7)

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Enclosure

65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - Mr. [Redacted]

1 - Mr. [Redacted]

1 - Mr. [Redacted]

1 - Mr. [Redacted]

1 - Mr. [Redacted]

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Classified and Extended by 1756  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification September 22, 2000



84 NOV

3 1980

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

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DETAILS:

(C) of [redacted] This publication provides an overview and analysis  
[redacted] This issue is devoted to  
(C) the activities of [redacted] during the  
(U) first six months of 1980. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-21-2011

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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## Volume V

### *September, 1980*



ENCLOSURE

65-1480-51

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FBI/DO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
(S) [Redacted]	1
	4
	5
	8
	10
	13
	14
	14
	18
	20
II.	23
(S) [Redacted]	27
	32
	32
	33
	35
	35
	39
	43
	43
	43
IV.	46
	47

b1

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

[Redacted] 51

[Redacted] 56

(S) [Redacted] 66

b6  
b7C

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PHOTOGRAPHS

(S) [Redacted] 62-65

APPENDIX

Communist Country Presence in the United States, June 9, 1979 71

Communist Country Presence in the United States, June 1, 1980 73

CHART

Major Country Communist Country Presence in the United States, June, 1979 - June, 1980 75

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(C)

[redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services

(U)

of certain friendly, foreign Governments. (S)

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[Redacted]

During the initial portion of 1980, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate, largely as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

(S)

[Redacted]

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Within the past year, however, there has been a marked decline in Soviet official presence. Due in part to the closing of the Soviet Consul General, New York, New York (SOVCONY),

(S)

[Redacted] Soviet presence has declined from 1,222 in June, 1979 to 1,116 in June, 1980. Furthermore, within the past year there has been a decrease in Soviet east-west exchange visitors to the United States, as well as a marked decrease in Soviet merchant shipping docking in U.S. ports.

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[Redacted]

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


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


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Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by two central elements--a stepped up anti-American propaganda campaign by Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. A stimulant to Cuban anti-American propagandizing has been a perception by Castro that U.S. hostility towards Cuba and the Soviet Union is escalating dangerously.




(S)



The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. The exodus will, however, probably result in only temporary alleviation of pressures on the Cuban leadership since the country's basic economic problems are not being addressed and will continue to cause trouble for Castro. (S)

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
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Political Intelligence



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[REDACTED]

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In February, 1980, the Government of Canada declared Assistant Military Attache [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Persona Non Grata (PNG), because of the Soviet's persistence in abusing their diplomatic status by conducting espionage activities. Concomitant with the PNG action, the Canadians released a statement for the press which detailed the abuses of the Soviets:

"The case involved a citizen of the United States, employed in a sensitive position in the U.S.A., who was in contact with the Soviet Embassy and tasked to obtain information. The R.C.M.P., with the cooperation of the FBI, monitored the case and, with the help of a U.S. citizen, determined that over a period of some sixteen months the Soviets met clandestinely with the U.S. citizen, using traditional signal arrangements and dead letter boxes, in the Ottawa area, where exchanges of information and money took place."

[REDACTED]

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRY PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,778</b>

(S)


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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES


## JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1980

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 Asst. Dir.:  
 Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
**Memorandum**

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *[Handwritten initials]*

DATE: 3/28/80

FROM : J. H. Geer *[Handwritten initials]*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

*Analysis*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
 DATE 03-28-2011

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec. AD-Inv. *[Handwritten R]*  
 Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_  
 Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures **ENCLOSURE**

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

TJD:en (9)

- 1 - Mr. L. Colwell
- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.  
(Attn: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

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Classified and Extended by 222  
 Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
 Date of Review for Declassification March 28, 2000

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Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

(C) This publication provides an overview and  
analysis of [redacted]  
[redacted] This particular issue  
is devoted to the activities of [redacted]  
(C) [redacted]  
(U) during the latter seven months of 1979. (S)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

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[REDACTED]

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret Service -1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Counterintelligence - 2

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1; Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Office of East European Affairs - 1; Office of East Asian Affairs - 1; Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff) - 1; National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1; Publications Unit - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M503 - 1; M56-1; Publications Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce, Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Director of the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

65-74480 - 5

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Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

- 2 -

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-24-2011

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume IV

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*March, 1980*



- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

JD:en

*hrc*  
*hrc*  
*JD*  
*9/11/80*  
*hrc*

MAIL ROOM

*65-74480-50*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page	
INTRODUCTION	iii	b1
I.	1	
	1	
	3	
	4	
	6	
	7	
	10	
II.	13	
	13	
(S)	19	
	24	
	26	
	27	
	28	
	28	
III.	31	
	31	
	32	
	34	
	34	

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
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS




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DISSEMINATION LIST


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PHOTOGRAPHS

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41-47



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INTRODUCTION

(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

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(C) [redacted] during latter seven months of 1979. For

purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be

(C) referred to as [redacted] In

the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not

(U) set forth in specific detailed, documented form. ~~(S)~~

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
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During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were undermined by a number of developments, the most decisive of which was, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.


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 which was dramatized in the fall of 1979 by publicity surrounding the publication of The Fourth Man, by Andrew Boyle. This book explores the lives of the infamous Englishmen

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who spied for the Soviets, Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, who were recruited to the Soviet cause when they were students at Cambridge University in the 1930s. ~~(S)~~

(U)

[Redacted]

CI-1 Unit Chiefs.

(S)

[Redacted]

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As reported in the "Review" of March, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish diplomatic efforts in the United States are thus centered around fostering trade and, in general, cultivating good relations between the two nations. In light of Poland's positive stance towards the United States, it is not surprising that [Redacted]

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(C)

[Redacted]


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
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The current leadership of the People's Republic of China has launched a multibillion-dollar program to acquire Western machinery and technology to help modernize their nation's primitive industrial base. The program was initiated in February of 1978, when Chairman Hua Guofeng announced that,

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as the initial stage of the modernization plan, 120 major industrial projects were to be completed under a ten-year (1976-85) economic plan. To achieve the ambitious construction and production targets of the plan, massive infusions of Western technology and equipment will be required. The long-range objective of the program is to propel the Chinese economy to "front line" status by the year 2000.  
(U)



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(U) Shortwave Radio ~~(S)~~

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(U) Encryption and Decryption Codes and  
Toilet Paper Concealment Device (S)

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(U) ..... Custom-Built Miniaturized Camera (S)

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Camera in Operational Position ~~(S)~~


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(U)

Sample of Film From Camera ~~(S)~~

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(U)

There has long been a question over the placement of homosexuals in sensitive positions, mainly because it has been held that homosexuals are particularly vulnerable to compromise and recruitment

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Generally speaking, the homosexuals present an opportunity for recruitment that cannot be overlooked

(S)

An individual employed in a sensitive position and discovered to be a homosexual will be closely assessed

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Homosexuality may, however, be



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only one of many factors that are considered. Homosexuality, combined with financial distress, drug or alcohol addiction, employment dissatisfaction, or marital discord are a few of the possibilities that may prove to be a deciding factor in a recruitment approach. The posture of the SIS vis-a-vis the homosexual was discussed by John Barron in his book, "KGB: The Secret Work of the Soviet Secret Agents" (Reader's Digest Press, 1974). Barron noted, that "contrary to popular supposition, the KGB is not primarily interested in homosexuals because of their presumed susceptibility to blackmail. In its judgment, homosexuality often is accompanied by personality disorders that make the victim potentially unstable and vulnerable to adroit manipulation. It hunts the particular homosexual who, while more or less a functioning member of his society, is nevertheless subconsciously at war with it and himself. Compulsively driven into tortured relations that never gratify, he cannot escape awareness that he is different. Being different, he easily rationalizes that he is not morally bound by the morals, values and allegiances that unite others in community or society. Moreover, he nurtures a dormant impulse to strike back at the society which he feels has conspired to make him a secret leper." (U)

105-271060

(C)

There have been a number of cases in history of modern espionage where the recruited [redacted] agent was a homosexual. Perhaps most notable were the [redacted]

[redacted] Of these three individuals, homosexuality played a pivotal role in the

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recruitment of

[Redacted]

[Large redacted area]

(C)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

*Rec'd  
3-20-80  
EAC*

DAMI-CIC

19 March 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
ATTN: Acting Chief, Intelligence Division  
J. Edgar Hoover Building  
Washington, DC 20535

*J. H. [Signature]*

b6  
b7c

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-28-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETG

Dear Mr. O'Malley:

Your publication, FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review, which is periodically disseminated by your office, has been of great value to this Directorate. In order for more of our senior counterintelligence personnel located at Fort Meade, Maryland and Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia to benefit from this excellent publication, we require an increase in the number of copies received by this Directorate from three (3) to five (5).


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
*65-74480-49*

Sincerely,

7 APR 7 1980



LTC(P), GS  
Director of Counterintelligence



*66 MAY 1 1980  
769 74480*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

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 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_ b7C  
 Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 2/13/80

FROM : J. H. Geer

F.B.I. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 03-28-2011

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U) VOLUME IV FEB., 1980

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Exec. AD-LES _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Intell. <u>actual</u>	Laboratory _____	Legal Coun. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____	Tech. Servs. _____	Training _____	Public Affs. Off. _____
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TJD:en (7)

Enclosure

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 10 1980

Classified and Extended by 222  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification February 13, 2000



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

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IV.	[Redacted]	41
		41
(S)		41
		43
		44

Security Review of Agent Operations

Travel by Intelligence Officers

[Redacted]	45
(S)	45

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[Redacted]	47
(S)	47
[Redacted]	59

PHOTOGRAPHS

(S)	[Redacted]	51-58
	[Redacted]	59

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INTRODUCTION

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(C) The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]


(C) [redacted]

[redacted] during latter seven months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

(C) In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments. (S)

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(S)



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During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were considerably undermined by a number of developments. In late August, an incident occurred which sparked enmity between the two states. Soon after [redacted] defected in New York City, [redacted] was escorted by Soviet officials to a departing Aeroflot flight for an immediate trip back to the Soviet Union. Since it was not known whether or not [redacted] was being coerced into leaving the United States, the U.S. Government prevented the airliner from departing Kennedy International Airport. For three days, controversy ensued, until the Soviets allowed American officials on board to interview the defector's [redacted] (U)

U.S.-Soviet relations became further strained when it became disclosed that a Soviet combat brigade, made up of over 2,000 troops, was stationed in Cuba. The Soviets contended that the brigade had been in Cuba since the early 1960s, and was used strictly for training purposes. The U.S. Government differed with this contention, as elucidated by President Carter on October 1, "there is a high degree of confidence that it is not a unit with a primary purpose of training Cubans." The U.S. Government entered into negotiations with the Soviets and attained assurances from the Soviets, that, among other things, the "unit in question is a training center; that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more." To help insure Soviet cooperation, the

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United States took a number of steps, which included an increase in surveillances of Cuba and the expansion of military maneuvers in the region. (U)

But, by far the most decisive event to affect U.S.-Soviet relations adversely occurred, of course, in late December, when upwards of 85,000 Soviet troops poured into neighboring Afghanistan, to help consolidate the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime [redacted]

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[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] President Carter reacted to the Soviet invasion with a number of moves, including the postponement of consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); the halting of grain shipments to the Soviet Union; and the consideration of a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, which are scheduled to be held in Moscow. (U)

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
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
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As reported in the "Summary" of January, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish


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diplomatic efforts in the United States are thus centered around fostering trade and, in general, cultivating good relations between the two nations. 

(C)




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Travel by Intelligence Officers




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
OPERATIONS



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(U) ..... Forged Identification Documents (S)

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

0610

In reply refer to  
I-02331/80

26 FEB 1980

POLICY REVIEW

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED b6  
DATE 03-28-2011 BY 60322/UC/LRP/PLJ/ETC b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

The FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review has come to our attention as being a document that would be most useful to us in the execution of our responsibilities both as Program Manager for the DoD FCI Program and in our overall policy making capacity for Counterintelligence within the Department of Defense.

We would appreciate being added to your distribution list and, in addition, it would be most helpful if you would provide us copies of previous issues.

*for* *Paul A. Munn*  
L. Britt Snider  
Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy


DE-AM

65-74480-47

MAR 1980

FBI

File 65-74480



79 MAR 27 '80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J.H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]

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b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

0610

BY LIAISON

Date: December 13, 1979

To: Commander  
Office of Special Investigations  
Department of the Air Force  
Forrestal Building  
Washington, D. C.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-28-2011

Attention: Chief, Acquisitions and Analysis Division  
Directorate of Counterintelligence

From: William O. Cregar, Assistant Director

Subject: REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to your letter dated December 3, 1979, captioned "Release of Information," your reference IVOA. (U)

We interpose no objection to your reprinting in the "AFOSI Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" the article and photographs entitled [redacted]

(C)  
(U)

[redacted] as sanitized in the enclosure to referenced letter. It is understood that the "~~Secret~~" classification will be maintained. (X)

Your attention is invited to the final paragraph of the text of the article which makes reference to "pages 55 through 59" of the FCI Review. It is expected that you will desire to change this reference. (U)

62-85557

① - 65-74480 (FCI Review)

JPT:vcl/prh (9)

SEE NOTE - Page 2

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-74480

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED

Classified and Extended by 222  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) & (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification December 13, 1999

59 JA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Commander  
Office of Special Investigations

Note:

In the October, 1979, edition of the "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" appeared aforementioned article which described a double agent operation which resulted in the temporary detention of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] AFOSI submitted a sanitized copy of the article and requested permission to reprint it in its "Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" which is designed to provide USAF commanders worldwide significant counterintelligence information. (S)

(U)

This has been coordinated with Supervisor [redacted] CI-2. (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT


October 24, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM O. CREGAR  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM:

[Redacted Name]

SUBJECT: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review




The Secretary of the Treasury has forwarded the copy of subject publication to my office, which is responsible within Treasury for liaison with the intelligence community. We have found the publication of definite interest to our office and selected officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations.

I am sure the publication would also be of definite interest to the Director of the Secret Service. Because of the physical separation of our offices I would very much appreciate your sending a separate copy directly to him at Secret Service headquarters, 1800 G Street, N.W., on a regular basis.

I would also suggest that future copies of this and similar publications be sent directly to my office in Room 4324, Main Treasury Building, since it is our responsibility to see that the documents are made available to Treasury officials on a need-to-know basis.

65-74460-46



10/24/79  
OCT NOV 2 1979

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 357

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Page 271 ~ b1  
Page 274 ~ b1  
Page 275 ~ b1  
Page 276 ~ b1, Referral/Direct  
Page 277 ~ b1  
Page 278 ~ b1  
Page 279 ~ b1  
Page 281 ~ b1  
Page 282 ~ b1  
Page 283 ~ b1  
Page 284 ~ b1  
Page 285 ~ b1  
Page 286 ~ b1  
Page 287 ~ b1  
Page 288 ~ b1  
Page 289 ~ b1  
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Page 297 ~ b1  
Page 298 ~ b1  
Page 299 ~ b1  
Page 300 ~ b1  
Page 301 ~ b1  
Page 304 ~ b1  
Page 305 ~ b1  
Page 306 ~ b1  
Page 312 ~ b1

Page 313 ~ b1  
Page 314 ~ b1  
Page 315 ~ b1  
Page 316 ~ b1  
Page 325 ~ Duplicate  
Page 329 ~ Duplicate  
Page 334 ~ b1  
Page 335 ~ b1  
Page 336 ~ b1  
Page 337 ~ b1  
Page 338 ~ b1  
Page 339 ~ b1  
Page 341 ~ b1  
Page 342 ~ b1  
Page 343 ~ b1  
Page 345 ~ Duplicate  
Page 346 ~ b1  
Page 347 ~ b1, Referral/Consult  
Page 348 ~ b1  
Page 349 ~ b1  
Page 350 ~ b1  
Page 351 ~ b1  
Page 353 ~ b1  
Page 354 ~ b1  
Page 355 ~ b1  
Page 356 ~ b1  
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Page 452 ~ b1  
Page 453 ~ b1  
Page 454 ~ b1  
Page 455 ~ b1  
Page 463 ~ b1  
Page 464 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 465 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 466 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 470 ~ b1  
Page 476 ~ Duplicate  
Page 481 ~ b1  
Page 484 ~ b1  
Page 485 ~ b1  
Page 486 ~ b1  
Page 487 ~ b1  
Page 488 ~ b1  
Page 489 ~ b1  
Page 490 ~ b1  
Page 491 ~ Duplicate  
Page 492 ~ Duplicate  
Page 493 ~ Duplicate  
Page 494 ~ b1  
Page 495 ~ b1  
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Page 512 ~ b1  
Page 513 ~ b1  
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Page 515 ~ b1  
Page 516 ~ b1  
Page 517 ~ b1  
Page 519 ~ b1  
Page 520 ~ b1  
Page 521 ~ b1, Referral/Consult  
Page 522 ~ b1, Referral/Consult  
Page 526 ~ b1  
Page 527 ~ b1  
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Page 539 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 540 ~ b1, Referral/Consult  
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FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 3

- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

65-74480  
62-117931

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *850/8*

Date 7/25/85

From :

b6  
b7c

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~ VOLUME XI  
FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This communication is classified "Confidential" in its entirety.

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" for dissemination to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

*John*

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated externally to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

DE-60 65-74480-65

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
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AUG 30 1985

*John*

2-ENCLOSURE  
Enclosure ~~ENCLOSURE ATTACHED~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011

~~— MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 -
- 1 -
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- 1 -

TAD:aw (7)

*John*

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Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR

JAN 10 1986

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

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b7C

DETAILS:

The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review"  
provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b1

(C)

[redacted] it is for dissemination  
externally to individuals and elements listed on attached  
dissemination list. Printed copies will be distributed when  
printing process is completed.

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and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director, Office of  
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Publication Unit - 1

65-74480-65

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DATE 03-03-2011

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~~SECRET~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME XI

This communication is classified "~~Secret/Orcon~~" in its entirety.

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~~Declassify on: OADR~~

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65-74480-65


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

iii

(S)



b1  
b6  
b7C

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

23




23

27

Neutralization

of an [redacted] Agent

29



Arrest

and Conviction of a [redacted] Agent

34

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

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[redacted]


Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3 Section, B Unit.

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
The expulsion of nearly 150 Soviet officials worldwide in 1983 was directed primarily at those engaged in S & T intelligence collection. Many of those expelled, including two from the United States, were KGB Line X officers. These expulsions, even when coupled with strained U. S. - Soviet relations, do not appear to have had a significant effect on Line X activities in the United States. It would seem that there would be a disruptive effect upon SIS operations when a KGB officer is forced to depart unexpectedly, since it frequently requires several months to arrange for a replacement. The FBI has, however, not detected any activity which might be construed as compensating for the expulsion of an officer. This may be explained in part by the fact that the broad S & T requirements can often be satisfied through the acquisition of unclassified information. Furthermore, targeted material can be acquired outside the United States under more favorable operating conditions, or inside the United States by Warsaw Pact intelligence services.

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Active Measures

During the first week in July, 1984, allegations surfaced that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) had sent a letter to the Olympic Committee of Zimbabwe, threatening violence against its Olympic teams. Shortly thereafter, similar letters containing threats, racist, and derogatory language were received by other African and Asian countries. Countries known to have received the letters are Ghana, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, Burma, Japan, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China (PR C).



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Top-level leaders of the different factions of the KKK were interviewed by the FBI. They categorically denied any knowledge of the letters and pointed out many discrepancies in the logo appearing on the letters.

The words and phrases used in the purported Klan letters are not colloquial English and are characteristic of nonnative use of the English language. In addition, the timing of the mailing of the letters to coincide with the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Malaysia is indicative of a desire to make the most of these circumstances for propaganda purposes. During this visit, Tass published an article saying that the KKK has "expressed in an extremely base manner what the architects of American Policy have in their mind." The article said that the Reagan administration "has mounted such ferociously anti-socialist activities as has made participation of sportsmen from Socialist countries in the Los Angeles Olympics impossible."

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It is clear that the news release was part of a preconceived plan on the part of the Soviets to immediately publicize material that would support their decision to boycott the Olympics and imply that the letters are in some way connected with President Reagan's foreign policy.

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In [redacted] a separate but seemingly related espionage matter came to the attention of the FBI. Through [redacted] the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and then the FBI were approached concerning the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] in exchange for information he would supply to the U. S. Government on his illegal activities. [redacted]

[redacted]

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It was apparent that the activities of the [redacted] [redacted] under investigation by the FBI. [redacted] [redacted] it became necessary to establish a relationship with the [redacted] to insure a continued dialogue. This was accomplished by the [redacted] [redacted]

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In [redacted] [redacted]. They were in the form of detailed but anonymous depositions which [redacted] transcribed from cassette tapes. The depositions were quite detailed but frequently rambling in style. Most important, however, based upon one of the depositions, the FBI was able to identify [redacted] [redacted] who resided in [redacted] California. Thus, the first goal of the FBI investigation had been accomplished with the identification of [redacted]

Further investigation revealed that [redacted] had maintained [redacted] who was an [redacted] [redacted]

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All the pieces of the investigative puzzle seemed to fit.

[REDACTED]

For arrest purposes, it was now necessary to catch [REDACTED] flagrante delicto with classified material, or at least locate documents in his possession.

The FBI's technical coverage provided the answer to this problem. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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
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In conclusion, U. S. army analysts have described the damage caused by [redacted] espionage involvement with the [redacted] as



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- 40 -

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- 46 -

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		Training _____

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[REDACTED]

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the forefront as a result of the murder of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Within a month of the murder, FBI investigations had developed five suspects all of whom belonged to the [REDACTED]. Further investigation revealed that officers of the [REDACTED] had been in contact with [REDACTED] and had tasked gang members to murder [REDACTED] since the [REDACTED] had received information that [REDACTED].

Eventually, the Government [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for complicity in the murder plot, all of whom were tried and convicted on charges of murder. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Although the [REDACTED] Government denied any involvement in the murder of [REDACTED] the incident has become a cause celebre, and has spurred protests from members of the United States Congress and the Chinese-American community.

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- 22 -

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[redacted] Neutralization of an [redacted] Agent

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On [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] investigation also spawned the arrest in [redacted] [redacted] of [redacted] a U.S. citizen, on charges of espionage, and also led to investigations (some of which are still ongoing) of several other individuals.

The investigation was initiated in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The period during which he sold the documents occurred during the 1970s. The woman reported that [redacted]

[redacted] served as a conduit through which the documents were passed to the [redacted]

In the course of an interview, the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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After [redacted] departure, the [redacted] explained that the

[redacted]

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During the interview with the FBI, the woman recounted other suspicious activities on the part of [redacted]. Several years ago, while the [redacted] had given a [redacted] which was similar to that used by [redacted] during his visit. Further, during another visit to the

[redacted]

[redacted] A security service of the [redacted] was then contacted regarding [redacted] and the response of the [redacted] tended to corroborate the woman's allegations. As early as [redacted] had been investigated by the [redacted] for suspected espionage activities. From that point on the [redacted] cooperated in the FBI investigation of [redacted].

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The [redacted] regarding the allegations of [redacted]. He firmly denied any of the charges and countered by stating that [redacted]

[redacted]

Fortuitously, shortly after the interview it was learned that the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Under monitoring by the FBI, a meeting was duly arranged. At this rendezvous, [redacted] was quite voluble, giving

[redacted]

Based upon what was learned in this meeting, it was decided to set up a double agent operation, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] It was further decided to introduce a UCA into the operation. The UCA would impersonate a [redacted]

[redacted]


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Through the end of [ ] the woman communicated with [ ] by telephone, and mentioned to him that she had a



[ ] for the document and departed the scene of the meeting, whereupon he was placed under arrest.

There were a number of spinoffs of the [ ] case. The one which had the most tangible results was the neutralization and arrest by [ ] authorities of [ ] a U. S. citizen and civilian employee of the U. S. military, for supplying military documents to [ ] awaits trial in [ ] [ ] The [ ] and other military personnel who allegedly supplied documents to [ ] admitted being acquainted with the [ ] but strongly denied compromising any classified data. The fact that [ ] was not cooperative with the prosecution assured that no further convictions would evolve from his arrest.

The most significant aspect of the case is its degree of sophistication, which demonstrated once again the high level of skill of which the [ ] services are capable. [ ] operated, almost without detection, in excess of 15 years, and the precise number of servicemen compromised by the [ ] will probably never be known. The modus operandi executed by [ ] was

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quite ingenious. Although a [redacted] may seem innocuous, it could serve as an excellent setting for spotting, assessing, and recruiting agents. [redacted] like local taverns, oftentimes take on the form of a "club-house," where individuals can socialize. This is apparently what [redacted] was to U. S. [redacted] also provided a service that is needed by virtually everyone-- [redacted]

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The case also demonstrates the potential security problems caused when hundreds of thousands of American troops, most poorly paid, are stationed in a foreign setting. It is interesting to note that, in [redacted] long career of espionage, few American servicemen reported his activities.

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[redacted]  
Arrest and Conviction of [redacted] Agent

On [redacted] a  
United States citizen, was sentenced to [redacted]  
[redacted] FBI investigation had discovered that over a  
[redacted]  
[redacted] included in these documents was extremely sensitive  
information relating to the [redacted]  
[redacted] of the United States.

For his services [redacted]  
The [redacted] case marked the [redacted] that an  
American had been arrested for involvement with the [redacted] for  
espionage purposes [redacted] as a  
result of his espionage activities with [redacted]  
[redacted]

The FBI learned in [redacted] that sensitive classified  
information concerning the [redacted] had been  
compromised to the [redacted]. The information was received from a  
confidential source who at that time was a [redacted]  
[redacted] (This fact was disclosed in the  
affidavit and subsequent court documents after [redacted] arrest and  
arraignment; the source has since been [redacted]  
[redacted]. The source also reported that the classified information  
was furnished to the [redacted] who had  
been introduced to the [redacted] in [redacted]

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According to the source, the introduction of the American was brokered by an individual named [redacted]. The FBI had previously investigated [redacted] due to his alleged involvement in [redacted] to the Soviets and Soviet Bloc countries. After an extensive investigation, it was eventually decided to proceed with an interview of [redacted]. On [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed by the FBI and denied any knowledge of involvement in the [redacted] to a hostile country.

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[redacted]

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# Memorandum

214



Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *BSD/O*

Date 5/24/85

From :  *MM*

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY *INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION*

This communication is classified "**Confidential**" in its entirety.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

Approved: (U)

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
		Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

*Handwritten initials and signatures: D, W, DESK, MM, etc.*

*Handwritten initials in a circle: AS*

*Handwritten number: 65-1440-64*

Enclosure

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 -

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
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DATE 03-28-2011

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19D:gam (8)

*Handwritten signature: FERDE*

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Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR

68 DEC 18 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

b1  
b6  
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The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] it is solely for dissemination within the FBI. Printed copies will be distributed when printing process is completed.

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# Memorandum

62



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/9/84

From :



Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

*CFIT Foreign Intelligence Review*

This memorandum is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

*(Handwritten initials)*

*DMS jyl*  
*DESREC*  
*FCB*  
*O/S*

*DXP/18*

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. <i>SP/D</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.

- 1 -
- 1 -

DMS:jyl  
(6) *jyl*

(CONTINUED - OVER)

*19* ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011

33 DEC 11 1984

*SULLIVAN*

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

DETAILS:

b1  
b6  
b7C

This study provides an overview and analysis of

(S)

[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME X

October 1984

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in  
~~its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

13

Security Precautions

**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
and Methods Involved

**National Security  
Information**

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**NoFORN**

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

**ORCON**


Dissemination and Extraction of  
Information Controlled by Originator

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . .iii

(S)



b1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

III. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE . . . . . 35

    EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS. . . . . 35

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 35

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 36

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 36

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 36

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 37

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 37

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 39

        [REDACTED] NEUTRALIZATION OF AN

        [REDACTED] COOPTEE . . . . . 41

        [REDACTED] THE ARREST OF AN IO OF

        THE [REDACTED] . . . . . 43

        [REDACTED] . . . . . 44

IV. DISSEMINATION LIST . . . . . 46

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b7c

~~SECRET~~

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. ~~(S)~~

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NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of August 1984.

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In [redacted]

[redacted] in the United States. [redacted] went  
[redacted] was learned by the news media;  
but in early [redacted] an unrelated FBI investigation developed  
information that several pro-PRC Chinese-Americans were

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[redacted]

[redacted] It is not clear that the Chinese-Americans planned  
this at the behest of Chinese diplomats, but investigation

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indicated that some PRC diplomats were at the least aware of  
[redacted] IOs from the [redacted] Government also became involved  
in the [redacted]

[redacted]

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
[redacted]

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
Since the closure of most Nicaraguan Consulates in June 1983, the NIS appears to be utilizing the Nicaraguan solidarity groups more extensively. The groups most frequently used are the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, and various local groups. The above two groups seem to be specifically designed to influence U.S. policy and public opinion on Central

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America. The National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan people is funded in part by contributions from approximately 60 local groups, churches, and public foundations. CISPES is a federation of approximately 300 local organizations which support the Salvadoran opposition through demonstrations, teach-ins, and publications. They are active on university campuses and are supported by individual contributions and foundation grants.

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
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Silicon Valley

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The Silicon Valley, an area of high technology in Santa Clara County near San Jose, California is of continuing interest to  There are more than 300 firms in this area that have DOD contracts and have personnel with national security clearances and facilities approved for maintaining national security classified information. These manufacturers produce a large portion of American high-tech material, such as semi-conductors, guided missiles and space vehicles. They also produce engineering and scientific equipment and surgical and medical instruments.

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 could also target major military facilities located near the Silicon Valley area. Such facilities include Moffett Field Naval Air Station (anti-submarine warfare regional center), U.S. Air Force Facility, Sunnyvale (satellite servicing center), Defense Language Institute (DOD Language Training Center), etc.

Also located nearby are research and/or educational institutions involved in classified or highly technical studies. Such institutions include Stanford University, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, NASA-Ames Research Center and the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS

According to public accounts, host governments have expelled at least 135 Soviet officials for inappropriate activities during 1983, a sharp increase from 49 in 1982 and 27 in 1981. Most were expelled from countries (United States, France, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Thailand, Great Britain, West Germany, Norway, and Spain) for engaging in traditional forms of espionage. Others were expelled for active measures operations involving the West European antinuclear movement (Switzerland, West Germany). Because many governments prefer not to publicize such expulsions, the total number of expellees may be higher than the public record would indicate.

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During the past year or so, eight Soviet officials were expelled from the United States for attempting to acquire classified information. A brief synopsis of these cases is presented below:

[REDACTED]

While assigned as [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was  
confronted by FBI Agents as he met with a U.S. citizen who had  
access to information concerning the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], who was  
attempting to obtain classified information, voluntarily  
departed the United States on [REDACTED] after a protest  
by the U.S. Government.

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[redacted]

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While assigned as [redacted]  
[redacted] retrieved a package from a dead drop  
in a rural area of [redacted]. He was  
detained by the FBI. The package was recovered and found to  
contain photographs of classified U.S. Government documents.  
He was expelled by the State Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

While assigned to the [redacted]  
[redacted] initiated an approach to  
[redacted] and attempted to secure a  
highly classified document. He was expelled by the State  
Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was assigned as [redacted]  
[redacted] was the primary  
handling officer of a U.S. citizen passing classified  
documents to the Soviets from [redacted]  
[redacted] was quietly recalled after [redacted] who  
serviced a drop in this operation, was confronted by the FBI.

[redacted]

On [redacted] Special Agents of the FBI  
confronted [redacted]  
[redacted] as he met with an

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FBI asset in a restaurant parking lot in [redacted]  
The asset was in the process of delivering a classified  
document for which [redacted]  
[redacted] was declared PNG.

[redacted]

While assigned as [redacted]  
[redacted] initiated contact with [redacted]  
and asked this individual to obtain specific  
classified/restricted military-related documents. [redacted] met  
with [redacted] obtained the required documents and was  
confronted by FBI Agents. The documents were retrieved and  
[redacted] was expelled by the State Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

While assigned as [redacted]  
[redacted] was observed by  
the FBI removing material from a clandestine dead drop as part  
of a Soviet intelligence operation. He was expelled by the  
State Department on [redacted]

[redacted]

On [redacted] the FBI interdicted a clandestine  
[redacted] being handled by [redacted]  
[redacted]  
as [redacted] was in the process of clearing a dead drop [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] at the KGB

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Residency in New York, [ ] quietly departed the United States for Moscow on [ ] before any formal PNG action could be taken against him. While the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been orally informed that [ ] activities in the United States were considered by the U.S. Government to be incompatible with his diplomatic position, there has been no publicity given to this incident to date.

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[REDACTED]


An individual assigned to the U.S. Navy at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had contacted the SMO, in Washington, D.C. on [REDACTED] and twice again on the afternoon of [REDACTED]. He indicated that he possessed a security clearance and had access to highly classified material, and wanted to arrange the transfer of that material to the Soviets. Due to the fact that [REDACTED] was in the U.S. Navy, liaison was immediately established between the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

Investigation ascertained that [REDACTED] was employed as an [REDACTED] in the U.S. Navy, with the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] He had a "Top Secret" clearance and extensive access to sensitive compartmented information concerning [REDACTED].

It was next decided to approach [REDACTED] with a [REDACTED] operation, in an attempt to determine precisely how determined he was to sell classified data.

[REDACTED]

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[redacted] was taken into administrative custody by NIS.  
In a general court martial that followed, [redacted]



After the court martial, [redacted] was given [redacted]



[redacted] During extensive interviews conducted by the FBI and NIS, [redacted] admitted that he had contacted the Soviets with the objective of obtaining money. He fully intended to sell highly classified, sensitive, compartmented information to the Soviets, and had considered defecting to the Soviet Union as early as [redacted] also admitted that he had considered [redacted]

A polygraph examination of [redacted]



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[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

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[REDACTED] THE ARREST OF AN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

On [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was arrested by  
the FBI and indicted on charges of espionage. The arrest of  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of a  
[REDACTED] in the United States.

The operation began in early [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] a  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] had previously been spotted  
and assessed in a classic recruitment scenario. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In  
return, [REDACTED] offered to pay, and in fact did pay [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] then  
encouraged [REDACTED] to obtain employment with a  
firm which held contracts with the DOD. Instead, the American  
obtained employment with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] continued to task the  
American to obtain unclassified documents.

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In [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] and the American passed classified U.S. Government documents to [redacted] at each meeting for these documents.

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In [redacted] tasked the American to provide classified documents on the subject of [redacted] [redacted] During the next meeting at [redacted] restaurant, the American student passed a [redacted]

[redacted]  
Upon exiting the restaurant, [redacted] was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of espionage.

[redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Our investigation of [redacted] was initiated in [redacted] predicated upon information received from the [redacted]

[redacted] We assisted the [redacted] in their investigation of prime suspect [redacted] while [redacted] was at the [redacted]

[redacted] was [redacted]

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The damage assessment of the [ ] affair has not been fully determined. It is clear, however, that [ ] was passing classified documents concerning [ ] national security and foreign affairs to the KGB.

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Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

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# Memorandum



214

- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 9/26/83

From : [Redacted]

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on enclosed list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

TJD:pjh (8)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

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~~Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

17 JAN 4 1985

FBI/DOJ

'4 APR 14 1985



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

b1  
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This publication provides an overview and  
analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] Printed copies  
of this publication will be supplied when printing process  
is completed.

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DISSEMINATION LIST

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Intelligence Policy - 1

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Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff/IC Staff - 1

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(DDO) - 1; Office of Communications/DOD - 1; Policy  
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Staff - 1; CI Staff (Publications) - 1; Deputy  
Director for Intelligence (DDI) - 1; Chief, Collection  
Requirements and evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director,  
Office of Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis  
Group/Office of Security - 1

National Security Agency - 5

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy  
Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
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of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting Office - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

CI-3B.


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PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] . . . . . 46-47  
Interdiction of [redacted] . . . . . 54-55

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


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b6  
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DISSEMINATION LIST . . . . . 63

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . iii



(S)

b1  
b6  
b7C

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS . . . . . 41

[Redacted] Arrest and Conviction  
of an Agent of the [Redacted] . . . . . 41

Counterintelligence Actions . . . . . 52

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 26, 1983

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~ - ORCON/NOFORN"  
~~in its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

~~SECRET~~ - ORCON/NOFORN

~~Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR~~

65-744  
UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~ - ORCON/NOFORN

Another key development is that since January, 1983, a total of about 70 Soviet officials (including 47 from France) have been expelled from countries of the industrial West, as well as, one from Japan—the first time a Soviet had been expelled from that country for espionage since World War II. Multiple, seemingly coordinated expulsions will perhaps compel the Soviets to be less aggressive in their intelligence activities. In the case of the United States, this will perhaps apply to S & T collection and active measures (see Section IV for more information on expulsions). Based on past experience, we would expect Soviet intelligence officers to exercise caution in continuing intelligence related contacts and to institute selective counterintelligence and security measures to test their sources and developmental contacts. It is expected that Soviet intelligence officers will resume their aggressive collection activities with little change in their methods once the current expulsion issue cools.

The [redacted] also saw the culmination of an operation that resulted in the neutralization of an individual who could have been developed into a useful agent by the Soviets. The case was initiated when an individual was detected making contact with the Soviet Military Office (SMO), Washington, D. C. The individual indicated that he had access to highly classified data he was willing to sell to the Soviets.

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Investigation identified the potential agent as [redacted] a member of the United States Navy who did in fact have access to sensitive information. [redacted] was eventually apprehended (before passing any data to the


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Soviets) and in [redacted]  
unauthorized contact with the Soviets. The case is very much  
similar to the recent case involving [redacted]  
(see the last issue of the "Review;" a more detailed account of  
the [redacted] case will be included in Volume X of the "Review").

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Counterintelligence Actions

b1 per FBI

During the past year a significant number of counterintelligence actions were initiated against  some of which involved the expulsion of IOs. They are as follows:

Soviet Intelligence Services



Referral/Direct

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INTERDICTION OF

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INTERDICTION OF

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Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

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Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*  
DP/36.8

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U.S. Department of Justice  
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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume IX

~~6-1-89  
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
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Paragraphs 1 and 3 are  
not pertinent per  
paragraph C of  
stipulation dated 4-28-89.

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
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# Memorandum

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- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/29/83

From :

[Redacted]

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED:

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1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

DE-118

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2 JUL 23 1984

Enclosure

TJD:p/h (7)

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Declassify on: OADR~~

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

68 AUG 9 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

This semiannual publication provides an overview  
and analysis of [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] detailing of key FBI foreign  
counterintelligence operations is also provided. Printed copies  
will be supplied when printing process is complete.

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

AUGUST, 1983

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . iii



(S)

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS . . . . . 41

[Redacted] Arrest and Conviction  
of an Agent of the [Redacted]  
[Redacted] . . . . . 44

Counterintelligence Actions . . . . . 53

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PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] . . . . . 46-47

[redacted] . . . . . 49

Interdiction of [redacted] . . . . . 54-55

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

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[redacted]

CI-3B. ~~(S)~~

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Another key development is that since January, 1983, a total of about 70 Soviet officials have been expelled from countries of the industrial West, including one from Japan-- the first time a Soviet had been expelled from that country for espionage since World War II. Multiple, seemingly coordinated expulsions should send the Soviets a clear message that their intelligence activities have exceeded acceptable levels. In the case of the United States, this message applies to S & T collection and active measures (see Section IV for information on this topic). Based on past experience, we would expect Soviet intelligence officers to exercise caution in continuing intelligence related contacts and to institute selective counterintelligence and security measures to test their sources and developmental contacts. It is expected that Soviet intelligence officers will resume their aggressive collection activities with little change in their methods once the current expulsion issue cools.


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
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In early 1983, officials at the U. S. Department of State (USDS) formally protested the type of activity described above to a senior official at the PRC Embassy. In a separate incident, USDS officials also protested the activities of a San Francisco Consulate official (see Section IV for more on this topic).

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[redacted] That agent, identified as [redacted]  
[redacted]

was sentenced to [redacted] (see Section IV). As a result of this incident, the FBI anticipates that the [redacted] will revert to its practice of avoiding meets in the United States.

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Two known CuIS IOs were expelled for their involvement in clandestine intelligence activity (see Section IV). In addition, the U. S. Department of State has recently imposed a 25 mile travel restriction on official Cuban representatives assigned in New York City. It is speculated that such a move will force Cubans to arrange for more clandestine meets in New York City.

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
GOC involvement in narcotics trafficking has enjoyed tremendous media attention in recent months. Various allegations have surfaced which indicate that the GOC has provided safe haven in Cuba to narcotics traffickers in exchange for a service charge and to some extent, the support of guerrilla insurgency in Latin America.

In examining the available information/allegations regarding the likelihood that the GOC is involved in narcotics trafficking, it must be said that there are ample motivations for the GOC to become involved: a desire to support insurgency in South and Central America; a dire need to obtain hard currency to offset economic woes; and possibly an attempt to subvert U. S. society by making narcotics more readily available.

Various reporting suggests that the GOC is certainly capable and willing to engage in illicit narcotics trafficking; however, the bulk of reporting regarding the GOC role stems from individuals closely associated with one particular case and does not further establish a widespread Cuban involvement.

Although many drug-traffickers in the Miami area are of Cuban extraction evidence is not available to indicate that these individuals are operating in concert with the GOC. Investigations are continuing regarding certain individuals who have been implicated as part of the Cuban connection. One

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


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
In the overview, we can speculate that the GOC has participated in and benefited from narcotics trafficking throughout the Caribbean. Considering the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the increasing volume of narcotics activity in the Caribbean, and the potential benefits to the GOC from its participation, it appears feasible and likely that the GOC's involvement will continue.

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policy posture maintained by the United States vis-a-vis Poland. Finally, there has been some very recent targeting related to Poland's ongoing financial crisis. Efforts have been made in Washington and New York City to determine American views regarding the ability of Poland to meet its massive debts.

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**UNITED STATES**  
**OCTOBER, 1980 - JUNE, 1983**

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*[Handwritten mark]*

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[Redacted]

Whatever the Soviets paid for this type of information, this is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s [at the dollar's current value, [Redacted] was paid the equivalent of over [Redacted] the amount paid [Redacted] far exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. during the 1970s, [Redacted])

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Referral/Direct

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65-14480-60

Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. *b6*
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date: 2/15/83

From : [Redacted]

*FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS*

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW VOLUME VIII  
JANUARY, 1983 PUBLICATION

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

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*TO U/S*  
Classified by *SP4 ELW/KFA*  
Declassify on: OADR  
*#261,612*

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

<b>APPROVED:</b>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
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Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

Enclosures - 2 **ENCLOSURE**

65-74480

**ENCLOSURE ATTACHED**

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. J. L. Tierney
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

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*65-74480-59*  
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71 APR 28 1983

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII  
65-74480

DETAILS:

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This publication provides an overview and analysis

(C)

[redacted]

This particular issue is devoted to the activities of the hostile intelligence service during the latter half of 1982. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. ~~(S)~~

(U)

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VOLUME VIII

January, 1983

This document is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety,  
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- (S-1) = ARMY
- (S-2) = Customs (Treasury)
- (S-3) = Air Force
- (S-4) = ...



V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION

63




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PHOTOGRAPHS


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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

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[redacted]


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[redacted] A GRU officer, [redacted]  
energetically pursued the development of a social relationship  
with an American. ~~(S)~~

After learning, through an acquaintance, that the  
American had access to classified U. S. military information,  
[redacted] tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States  
Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of [redacted]  
the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to [redacted]. Two  
days later, [redacted] was declared *persona non grata* (PNG) by the  
U. S. Department of State (USDS). [redacted]

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Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff/IC Staff - 1

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Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy  
Security Committee Member - 1

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Commission - 1

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BY LIAISON

Date: August 3, 1982

*0* FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

To: Colonel   
Director of Counterintelligence  
Headquarters Air Force  
Office of Special Investigations  
Department of the Air Force

Attention: IVO

From: Edward J. O'Malley  
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

Subject: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE  
FBI PUBLICATION "FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW"

Regarding your letter dated July 26, 1982, requesting approval to reproduce and distribute FBI publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review."

We are pleased to learn that this FBI publication is of considerable interest and value to your organization. You have our approval to reproduce 16 copies of the document for distribution within AFOSI to those U. S. based units engaged in counterintelligence activities.

*OK*

*TJD:bjk (8)*

NOTE: Based on consultation with  it was decided to allow AFOSI to reproduce and distribute the publication.

*Rec'd*  
*File 45-74470*

*RLF*

- Exec AD Adm.
- Exec AD Inv.
- Exec AD LES
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs.
- Crim. Inv.
- Ident.
- Insp.
- Intell.
- Lab.
- Legal Coun.
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
- Rec. Mgnt.
- Tech. Servs.
- Training
- Telephone Rm.

Delivered by Liaison  
on 8/4/82

by RLF

*45-74470-58 X3*

17 DEC 29 1982

6 APR 25 1984 MAIL ROOM



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

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DATE 02-22-2011 BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

IVO

**FBI FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS**

26 JUL 1982

SUBJECT: FBI Counterintelligence Review

**ANALYSIS**

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TO: Mr Edward J. O'Malley  
Asst Director, Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington DC 20535

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

5-

1. Your publication, FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VII, was recently brought to my attention by members of my counterintelligence staff. They were enthusiastic about this product and suggested that, if possible, we should make it available to AFOSI District offices in the United States. After reviewing the publication, I share my staff's appreciation for the product. It would indeed be of considerable interest and value to AFOSI officers working on counterintelligence matters throughout the U.S. In this regard and with your concurrence, we would like to reproduce 16 copies of this document for distribution within AFOSI to those U.S.-based units engaged in CI activities. We fully recognize the sensitivity of this publication and would insure its protection accordingly.

2. Please pass on my appreciation and that of my CI staff to the members of your Intelligence Division for this outstanding publication.



**RICHARD F. LAW, Col., USAF**  
Director of Counterintelligence

*Let. to Col. Law, 8/3/82  
100:67k.*

DE-60 **65-74480-58X2**

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RELEASE UNDER E.O. 13526

*Rec'd by Lawson, 7/28/82  
RLF*

**61 APR 25 1984**

# Memorandum

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Director's

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

From : [Redacted]

Date 1/3/83

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE~~ ANALYSIS  
~~SUMMARY VOLUME VIII~~  
FBI Foreign Intelligence

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

*[Handwritten signatures]*

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. <i>[Signature]</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

TJD:ppm(7)

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1 - [Redacted]  
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5-74480  
File

DE-105

65-74480-58X1

JG 25 1983



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII

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DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis

(C)

[redacted]  
[redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign  
counterintelligence operation is also provided. Printed

(U)

copies will be supplied when printing process is complete. ~~(C)~~

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VIII

December, 1982



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Security Precautions

**Warning Notice**

Intelligence Sources  
and Methods Involved

**National Security  
Information**

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
VOLUME VIII

December, 1982

This document is classified ~~"Secret" in its entirety,~~  
unless otherwise indicated.

~~Classified by 1541  
Declassify on: OADR~~

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~~SECRET~~

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION 63

[Redacted] 63  
[Redacted] 73

PHOTOGRAPHS

Interdiction of [Redacted] 4

[Redacted] 13  
[Redacted] 63

[Redacted] 66  
[Redacted] 67

Referral/Consult

APPENDIX


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
[redacted] A GRU officer, [redacted]

(S)

energetically pursued the development of a social relationship with an American.

After learning, through an acquaintance, that the American had access to classified U. S. military information, [redacted] tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of [redacted] the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to [redacted] Two days later, [redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the U. S. Department of State (USDS). [redacted]

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


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100-316259 JF, April, CF-2 Supervisor

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
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Notes: see p. 55 For overall reference

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Whatever use the Soviets made of the [redacted] windfall, the case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s (at the dollar's current value, [redacted] was paid the equivalent of over [redacted] [redacted]. The amount paid [redacted] far exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. during the 1970s, [redacted]

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65-27863 j

[redacted] *CJ-1 Supervisor*

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Referral/Direct

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# Memorandum

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Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

**CONFIDENTIAL**

To : Mr. E.J. O'Malley

Date 5/9/82

From : [Redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
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Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. <i>gplw</i>	Training _____

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - [Redacted]

TJD:cmf (7)

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - [Redacted]

JUN 9 1982

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~~Classified and Extended by 859  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification May 18, 2002.~~

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

7 JUN 21 1982

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis

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(U) [redacted]  
(C) [redacted]

(C) [redacted] Printed copies of  
(C) this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. (C)

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DISSEMINATION LIST

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Office of Legislative Affairs - 1; Counsel for  
Intelligence Policy - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret  
Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Security Committee/Intelligence Community (IC) Staff - 1

Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff/IC Staff - 1

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Coordination Staff/DDO - 2; Chief, Counterintelligence (CI)  
Staff - 1; CI Staff (Publications) - 1; Deputy  
Director for Intelligence (DDI) - 1; Chief, Collection  
Requirements and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director,  
Office of Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis  
Group/Office of Security - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1;  
Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy  
Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting  
Office - 1

Department of Energy - 3

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VII



Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

iii

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

Neutralization of a [redacted] Agent Operation 51

Defection of [redacted] 62

PHOTOGRAPHS

[redacted] 51

[redacted] Concealment Devices 53

58-61

[redacted]

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DISSEMINATION LIST

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

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[redacted]


[redacted] in the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention [redacted] CI-3A. (C)

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


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


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b1 per FBI



Referral/Consult



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The case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s. The amount paid  far

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
exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. [redacted])

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


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Referral/Direct

In handling [redacted] the Soviets were extremely amateurish and ineffective, and this enabled the FBI to blunt an operation that could have been very productive for the SIS. In this sense, the case is very similar to another recent case in which a valuable source of information was compromised due largely to a lack of security employed by the Soviets. (Detailed studies of both the [redacted] and [redacted] cases will appear in the next issue of the "Review.") (S)

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
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A case conducted jointly by [redacted]  
[redacted] involving a businessman named  
[redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those  
trends. On [redacted]



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
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FBI Operation vs. PRCIS Agent

This investigation was a spinoff of another FBI operation which involved an investigation into the activities of a Chinese national and resident of the United States who had

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(U) been tasked by the PRC to collect material in the United States. To facilitate the collection of the targeted material, the individual was instructed to establish a number of projects. Initial funding for the projects, which came from the PRC Government, amounted to \$250,000. ~~(S)~~

(U) In providing guidance to the leadership of the various projects, the PRCIS established a conduit for communications. Investigation revealed, however, that the PRCIS were also using the conduit to task agents operating inside the United States. Further investigation disclosed that the agent was employed at a major defense-related institute, held a high security clearance, and thus had access to significant, classified information. In communications, the PRCIS stressed to the agent the necessity for maintaining strict security, since the operation had been productive. ~~(S)~~

At one point, the PRCIS aimed questions at the agent, geared to clarify information, which the agent had previously provided. The agent was instructed to transmit the answers in the most secure manner possible, i.e. through a trusted colleague or a known PRCIS officer assigned to the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C.

(U) As the investigation continued, it was determined that the agent was planning to travel overseas, most probably to meet with PRIC operatives. Through cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service, the agent's luggage was searched as he attempted to depart the United States. Inside the luggage was found a note containing the above-noted questions, with an answer to the first question. Before boarding the airline, however, the agent, perhaps "spooked," tore up the note and handed it to his wife. ~~(S)~~

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Considering the level of sensitivity of material being compromised, it was decided to interview the agent and either recruit him or eliminate his access to classified data. Thus, the subject was interviewed and, initially, denied any knowledge of espionage activities. But he soon ended his attempts at denial. He acknowledged that the FBI had done a professional job in uncovering his activities, but refused to put forth a formal confession. Shortly thereafter, he voluntarily resigned from his position. ~~(S)~~

Shortly after this confrontation, it was also decided to interview another individual who conceivably had knowledge of the agent's espionage activities. After an initial period of deception, the individual, who is a native-born Chinese, made several admissions. Besides admitting that he had arranged for the agent to meet with PRC representatives, he also stated that he had received information from the agent and had delivered it to a PRCIS operative in Washington, D.C. Shortly after this delivery, the Chinese traveled to the PRC and met with PRCIS officers, who praised the quality of information passed by the agent and gave him the list containing the questions for passage to the agent. ~~(S)~~

Aside from these cursory admissions, the subject refused to supply the FBI with any further information and would not agree to testify against the agent. Due to this uncooperativeness, measures were taken to force his permanent departure from the United States. ~~(S)~~

As for the PRCIS agent, he is now employed elsewhere and no longer has access to classified data. At this point, one thing is certain--the PRCIS, in a classic espionage operation, was able to obtain significant data of great value to the PRC. ~~(S)~~

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Neutralization of a [ ] Agent Operation

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On [ ] an FBI investigation, which lasted well over two years, culminated when [ ] year old employee of the [ ] was interviewed by Special Agents (SAs) of the Los Angeles Field Office. After a lengthy period of verbal maneuvering,

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during which [ ] was confronted with the fact that the FBI had determined that the [ ] employee was a recruited agent of the

[ ]

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[ ] Thus ended a counterintelligence operation which resulted in the neutralization of what had been, for the [ ] a highly productive recruitment. ~~(S)~~

(U)

The case was initiated when information was developed that the [ ] had perhaps recruited as an agent an employee of the [ ] with access to classified data of interest to the [ ] Further investigation isolated an individual who was an employee of [ ] with pertinent access and lived within a [ ] [ ] named [ ] was then presumed to be the principal in the operation. Surveillance of the subject revealed him making contact with [ ] in what appeared to be, conceivably, an intelligence meet. ~~(S)~~

(U)

After a period of unproductive investigation however, it was decided to survey the neighborhood to determine if any other likely suspect could be uncovered. Since surveillances of [ ] had not disclosed much hard

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evidence of the principal engaging in clandestine meetings within the United States, it was also decided to determine which [redacted] employees had traveled abroad, in particular at a time when [redacted] was also out of the country. ~~(S)~~

Detailed examination of [redacted] neighborhood quickly disclosed that a [redacted] with pertinent access to classified information, lived within [redacted] and had traveled to Europe at roughly the same time that the [redacted] operative was on a similar trip. [redacted]

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(U) [redacted] Needless to say, [redacted] now became the prime suspect in the case. ~~(S)~~

[redacted]  
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Subsequent investigation of [ ] revealed that he held a position at [ ]

[ ] he therefore had excellent access to classified data. It was also discovered that [ ] had made several trips to Western Europe, conceivably to be debriefed by his [ ] handlers. After another trip to Europe in [ ] [ ] it was decided to attempt to bring the case to a conclusion by confronting [ ] in an interview. (S)

(U)

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In developing a strategy for the confrontation, it was decided to approach [ ] initially along the lines of a standard contact case interview, with the interviewing Agents questioning the suspect about the activities of [ ] [ ] was quite open about his knowledge of [ ] giving information about the [ ] personal habits, etc. But, as the interview evolved, the Agents gradually shifted the focus of the interview to [ ] with particular attention being directed to [ ] overseas travel. (S)

(U)

[ ] was then shown surveillance photos of him taken in the lobby of a hotel; the photos showed [ ] standing alongside an unidentified individual. Upon seeing the photos,

[ ] then appeared to shift into a mood of deep-conscience searching. (S)

(U)

The interviewing SAs then changed the direction of the interview by broaching the details regarding the defection of a highly placed [ ] officer and the "shocking" revelations

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he made to the FBI. [redacted] greeted this initially with silence, but then said, [redacted]

[redacted] was then apprised of right to counsel, whereupon he paused and reflected for roughly two minutes. It was at this point that [redacted] admitted that he had done it "for the money." At the conclusion of the interview he signed a statement acknowledging his complicity in acts of espionage. Being a commercial representative, [redacted]

[redacted] incriminating statement, the [redacted] was arrested by SAs of the Los Angeles Field Office. (S)

(U)

In subsequent debriefings, [redacted] disclosed the full details of his dealings with [redacted] had developed a social relationship with [redacted] in the latter part of [redacted]. In the course of this relationship [redacted] revealed to [redacted] that he was having financial difficulties. [redacted] offered financial assistance to [redacted] in return for [redacted]. [redacted] jumped at the offer, initially supplying the [redacted] with unclassified documents. [redacted] realized, however, that even by supplying [redacted] with unclassified documents, he had compromised himself and eventually the [redacted] would request classified material. Inevitably, [redacted] did begin to request classified material, and [redacted] was only too capable of satisfying [redacted] requirements (see Section II of this issue for a detailed recounting of the information supplied to [redacted] was paid well for his services: in the course of the operation, [redacted] received approximately [redacted]

(U)

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Initially, [ ] met with [ ] in the United States, and supplied the agent with [ ]

[ ]

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(U)

From a counterintelligence perspective, a most difficult aspect of the case was establishing the identity of the agent. The individual originally investigated was, in several ways, a very plausible subject, and hence, some valuable time was expended unproductively. [ ] modus operandi in the case, i.e., executing intelligence meetings in Europe, also made identification of the agent difficult. The fact that the [ ] began to execute intelligence meetings overseas meant that surveillance of [ ] would not have uncovered the agent. (S)

(U)

In relation to [ ] modus operandi in the operation, the use of trade as an intelligence cover is by no means without precedence. But [ ] is in many ways quite unique. Usually, an IO operating out of a trade establishment can be identified since he is one of the more unproductive members of the staff. [ ] had, however, made the

[ ]  
[ ] Achievements of this nature are quite unusual for a [ ] IO. When one takes into account that [ ]

[ ] it becomes apparent that the [ ] was a very talented IO. (S)

(U)

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(U)

[REDACTED]

Regarding the overall impact of the case, the response of [REDACTED] officials to the arrest and conviction will probably serve to undermine morale within the [REDACTED]. Following the arrest of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED] The vision of a loyal IO, one who had performed a great service to the [REDACTED] state in recruiting a highly valuable agent, [REDACTED] cannot help having a sobering effect upon [REDACTED] personnel. (S)

(U)

Secondly, the damage assessment which the [REDACTED] was forced to undertake as a result of various defections has been made more difficult by the neutralization of [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] will now have to attempt to determine which [REDACTED] defector developed by the FBI within the past few years was responsible for the compromise of the [REDACTED] operation. (S)

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Finally, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case is that it helps to demonstrate the existence of cooperation between the 


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(S)



05-7005

(S)



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(S)



As yet, it is difficult to determine what impact the defection has had on the [redacted] diplomatic corps or upon [redacted] operations. Due to an internal security crackdown imposed upon the [redacted] official community in the United States, [redacted] personnel have been close-mouthed about such sensitive topics. One thing, however, is certain--the defection of such a prominent official is strong evidence of the deep malaise infecting the Polish diplomatic and intelligence corps. (S)

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(U)

105-36612; [redacted] CI-2 Supervisor

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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Page 13 ~ b1  
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FBI File No. HQ 65-74480 - Section 4

# Memorandum

DATE: 03-28-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 03-28-2036

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Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Off. Cong. &  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JHG*

Date 3/7/88

From :  *JHG*

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SSE

Subject

FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) REVIEW

CLASS \_\_\_\_\_  
SRC'D \_\_\_\_\_  
SER \_\_\_\_\_  
REC \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to all FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (see attached list), and to recommend that publication of a separate FCI Summary be discontinued.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the FCI Review be approved for dissemination to all FBI field offices and members of the U.S. Intelligence Community appearing on the attached dissemination list.

*M. Dasky*  
*JHG*

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_ Insp. \_\_\_\_\_ Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_ Intell. *JHG* \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_ Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_ Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_ Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

2. That henceforth, the FCI Review be disseminated to both FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the separate FCI Summary publication be discontinued.

*M. Dasky*  
*JHG*

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_ Insp. \_\_\_\_\_ Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_ Intell. *JHG* \_\_\_\_\_  
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Exec AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_ Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_ Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

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Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.


- 1 -
- (Attn: )
- 1 - Mr.

RJS:enb (6)

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~~Classified by: 9912~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~



~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer  
Re: Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Review

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DETAILS:

The attached report was prepared by the CI-3A Unit with considerable input from the CI-3B Unit. It was coordinated with both the CI-1 and CI-2 Sections. The study provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The FCI Summary and FCI Review have heretofore been disseminated to FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, respectively. An examination of previous issues, however, indicates such a close similarity between the two as to essentially constitute a duplication of effort which necessarily entails a waste of manpower and resources.

Therefore, it is recommended that only one publication be produced, entitled the FCI Review, and that this publication be disseminated to both FBI field offices and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

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Diplomatic Security Service - 1

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Policy Coordination Staff/DDO - 2; Chief Counterintelligence  
(CI) Staff - 1; CI Staff Publications - 1; Deputy Director  
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and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director, Office of  
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Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security  
Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Chief, Security Education Group - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army - 8

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DATE: 02-25-2011  
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REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME XIV

b6  
b7C

This document is classified "~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~" in  
~~its entirety~~ unless otherwise stated.

The purpose of this publication is to provide on a  
semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted] detailing and analysis  
of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the  
interest of operational and administrative security and acknowl-  
edging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth  
in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries  
regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to  
(U) FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] (S)

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of  
January 1, 1983, unless otherwise stated.

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During September and October, 1986, the U.S. Government expelled 80 Soviet officials, the overwhelming majority of whom were known or suspected intelligence officers (IOs) and coopted agents. The expulsions represented an unprecedented punitive action by the U.S. Government and an extraordinary opportunity, from a counterintelligence perspective, to regulate the Soviet intelligence presence in the United States.


The September, 1986 expulsion of 25 officials from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN) in New York resulted from Soviet failure to comply with the phased reduction of SMUN, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Missions to the United Nations (UMUN and BMUN) personnel ordered by the U.S. Government in March, 1986, in response to rising national security concerns over the disproportionately large Soviet presence in New York and the concomitant increase in espionage activity. Based on recommendations from the FBI, the U.S. Government selected IOs or coopted agents to depart the United States in accordance with the schedule for the phased reduction in personnel.

The mass expulsion of the Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS) operatives has had a tremendously disruptive impact on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Soviet capabilities to mount effective intelligence operations were further diminished by the deliberate ouster of many experienced operations officers, operations support personnel, and all en poste officers serving in leadership positions. Soviet intelligence operations have undoubtedly suffered without the benefit of experienced operatives and the guidance afforded staff personnel by veteran officers.

(S)

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On March 4, 1987, Jonathan Pollard, a former counterintelligence analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), Suitland, Maryland, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Pollard's wife, Anne Louise Henderson-Pollard, received a sentence of two concurrent five-year terms. The Pollards' convictions and subsequent sentencings stemmed from Jonathan Pollard's passage of classified material to the Government of Israel over a one-and-one-half year period beginning in June 1984.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

[REDACTED]

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recent case, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was arrested and convicted of violations of the Arms Export and Control Act and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] acting as a courier for [REDACTED] was interdicted at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California by U.S. Customs Services agents. [REDACTED] was placed under arrest after a search of [REDACTED] luggage revealed three boxes containing documents restricted for export. As a result of [REDACTED] activities, [REDACTED] departed the United States prior to being declared persona non grata by the United States Department of State.

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b7C



II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]



Referral/Consult




b6  
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arrived in the United States in [redacted] maintained a G-4 Visa (officer or employee of an international organization) and, therefore, retained only limited immunity.

Investigation determined that [redacted] was born on [redacted]








[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] arrest, arrested [redacted]  
[redacted] on charges of espionage. In an agreement  
brokered at the highest levels of both governments, [redacted] was  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 Per FBI  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] returned to the Soviet Union on [redacted]  
one day after [redacted] was released from confinement in  
Moscow. The incident clearly emplied the extent to which  
the Soviets will act in order to secure the release of an  
intelligence officer not protected by diplomatic immunity  
as well as the dilimma faced by the United States when contemplating  
measures to counter the threat posed by such officers.  
In addition to securing [redacted] release, the arrest of  
[redacted] was almost certainly designed to warn the United States  
of the consequences of such countermeasures.





Referral/Consult

[redacted] ESPIONAGE CASES

On [redacted] Sergeant [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] and asked if they could talk. Subsequently, [redacted] advised that he had been meeting with Soviet intelligence since late [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was born [redacted]  
in Chicago, Illinois.

b6  
b7C

In [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] was a [redacted]  
[redacted] in turn, introduced [redacted] to her  
[redacted] has been identified as [redacted]  
a KGB Officer. [redacted] met with [redacted] several times  
and provided valuable classified material.

In [redacted] was transferred to the  
[redacted] met approximately [redacted]  
with [redacted] and continued to provide classified information.  
At the [redacted] turned [redacted] over to his  
friend [redacted] has been identified as [redacted]  
a known KGB Line KR officer.

On [redacted] was convicted in  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] An agreement was reached with [redacted] to  
reduce his sentence by five years in exchange for his complete  
cooperation.

During the debriefing, [redacted] admitted passing  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

As the investigation proceeded, others were implicated.  
[redacted]  
[redacted] claims that [redacted] admitted to  
him that he had been cooperating with the Soviets "for quite  
a while" and had [redacted]  
[redacted] allegedly told [redacted]  
that he was mad at "the system" and was "paying them back  
in his own way."

[redacted]  
[redacted]

saw [redacted] reading classified information and setting some aside, presumably for transmittal to the Soviets. [redacted] apparently confided in [redacted] and "admitted that he was in a bad situation with the Russians and they were forcing him to do it." According to [redacted] he and [redacted]

[redacted]

After [redacted] departed Moscow in [redacted] the KGB attempted to recruit [redacted] reportedly had

[redacted]

[redacted] who wanted him [redacted] to provide classified information on Embassy activities. All charges against [redacted] were dropped in [redacted] because, to date, the U.S. Government has not been able to corroborate [redacted] statements that he and [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7c



~~SECRET~~

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (S)~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume XIV

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DATE: 02-25-2011  
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REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036

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Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_ b7C  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum


SSP  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer

Date 2/9/87

From :



DATE: 03-28-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 03-28-2036

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

This communication is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~"  
~~in its entirety.~~

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary/Review," for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees, as detailed on attached list.


*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

APPROVED

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Inv \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

### Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. 
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

(CONTINUED-OVER)

TJD:k11 (9)  
"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

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7 JAN 6 1989

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer  
RE: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

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b7C

DETAILS:

This publication (the version called the "Summary  
is disseminated internally; the "Review" is disseminated  
externally) provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b1

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[redacted] Detailing  
of key counterintelligence operations is also included.  
External dissemination list is attached. Copies of publication  
will be provided upon completion of printing process.

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DISSEMINATION LIST

Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - 2

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1;  
Office of Legislative Affairs - 1; Counsel for  
Intelligence Policy - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret  
Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Department of State, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff,  
Diplomatic Security Service - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

U.S. Army Threat and Analysis Center - 1

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 5

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Chief, Community Counterintelligence Security  
and Countermeasures Staff - 1

Central Intelligence Agency, Chief of Counterintelligence - 1;  
Office of Communications/DDO - 1;  
Policy Coordination Staff/DDO - 2; Chief Counterintelligence  
(CI) Staff - 1; CI Staff Publications - 1; Deputy Director  
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Security - 1; Chief, Special Activities Division/Office of  
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Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security  
Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
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of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Chief, Security Education Group, - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

Director, FBI - 1

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Intelligence - 1

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

VOLUME XIII

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS


	<u>PAGE</u>
INTRODUCTION.....	ii

(S)



b1

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 25

 .....	25
.....	29
.....	32
.....	35

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

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[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

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
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
NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of November 1, 1986, unless otherwise stated.



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In the United States, the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), and its front groups have been directed to undertake operations to influence the activities of independent peace organizations. One objective of the Soviet campaign is to influence United States and European peace and disarmament organizations to focus only on the American SDI program, while ignoring Soviet strategic defense programs.


A campaign centered around the U.S./USSR People's Peace Treaty (PPT) is one of the more recent Soviet efforts to influence the American public opinion in favor of current Soviet foreign policy priorities and to exert pressure on U.S. Government officials to effect changes that are favorable to Moscow. This active measures campaign is designed to stimulate the collection of millions of signatures on a bilingual petition addressed to

the President of the United States, the General Secretary of the USSR, and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The petition was adopted and signed August 8, 1986, by a joint U.S./USSR delegation. The signature gathering part of the PPT will last for a year in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The stated aim of the PPT campaign is to "influence the negotiations in Geneva to speedy and substantial arms reductions," along the lines proposed by the Soviet Union. The principal control and direction for this program comes from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in Moscow.

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During the past year, [redacted] was disrupted by the arrest of [redacted]

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[redacted] a known [redacted] of espionage for



Reliable sources indicate that [redacted] previously [redacted]



[Redacted]

arrest resulted in a public exposure

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]


The arrest was significant because it

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

On [Redacted] a Federal Grand Jury in the District of Columbia returned a two-count indictment charging [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[redacted] to the second part of the indictment and was subsequently sentenced to [redacted] [redacted] in prison.

[redacted] indictment was the result of an FBI

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Approximately 30 minutes later, a black male wearing a maroon jacket and carrying a briefcase arrived at

(S)

[REDACTED]

He left a half hour later.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (During a subsequent interview with [REDACTED] he stated that he visited another Soviet establishment, believed to be the Soviet Embassy, on [REDACTED] at which time he provided the Soviets with 15 more pages of a document.)

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Investigation revealed that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] an employee of [REDACTED] Washington, D.C., which [REDACTED] [REDACTED] during which Secret and Top Secret information relating to the national security was provided to Congress. [REDACTED] had access to this material.

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b7E

On [REDACTED] an undercover Special Agent

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

this point, [REDACTED] was arrested.

It is significant to note that [REDACTED] is a confirmed [REDACTED] with a long history of drug-related problems. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] When he was arrested for espionage, it was determined that he was pressed by a need for money as a result of his continued drug use. Among the spate of espionage prosecutions that have occurred in the past few years, substance abuse played an important role in three other cases: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] et al.

[REDACTED]

On [REDACTED] was found guilty of espionage charges, including the attempt to pass classified information to a foreign government, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The following day,

[REDACTED]



# Memorandum

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 Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JHG*

Date 2/12/86

From :



b6  
b7C

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

This memorandum is classified "~~Secret~~" in its ~~entirety~~.

### PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

*JHG*  
*JET/lyd*  
*Dash*  
*CI-2A TVM/cab*  
*1/12*  
*CI-2A*  
*CI-2A*

*311*

### APPROVED

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD-Inv \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
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### Enclosure

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer



EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
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 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
 DATE 03-28-2011

DE-607

DMS:skp

*ENCLOSURE*

~~(CONTINUED OVER)~~

~~SECRET~~

8 MAY 1986

~~Classified by: 859~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

69 SEP 17 1986

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*Handwritten signatures and initials*

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted] Mr. J. H. Geer  
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

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DETAILS:

This study provides an overview and analysis of

b1

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[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI (S)

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 02-25-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume XII

May 1986

~~6-1-89  
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## Security Precautions

<b>Warning Notice</b>	Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
<b>National Security Information</b>	Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
<b>Nofor</b>	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
<b>Orcon</b>	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator

~~SECRET-NOFORN-ORCON~~

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
VOLUME XII

This document is classified ~~Secret-NOFORN-ORCON in its entirety,~~  
unless otherwise stated.

~~SECRET-NOFORN-ORCON~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction








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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS/EXCLUSIONS

	.....	27
	.....	28
Expulsions of Polish Officials	.....	28
	.....	29
	.....	29
	.....	30
	.....	30
	.....	30
Expulsion of a Cuban IO	.....	32

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
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES



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. . 38  
. . 39  
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b1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b1

(S)

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ,

(U)


Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] ~~(S)~~

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NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of December 1, 1985, unless otherwise stated.




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The Geneva Summit in November, 1985 was the target of an aggressive Soviet active measures campaign conducted by the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA) and its front organizations. In response to CPUSA national directives, local CPUSA chapters initiated several programs:

- telephone calling program and letter writing campaigns to various Congressmen.
- distribution of literature and petitions on topics such as nuclear test bans and "Star Wars".
- attempts to influence and mobilize a broad movement within church groups, unions and civic organizations to end the arms race.
- publication of a special issue of The Daily World covering the Geneva Summit.

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The most recent example of this cooperation was seen in the [redacted], espionage case. [redacted]



[redacted] had provided the PIS with classified documents relating to the [redacted]

[redacted] Many of the documents [redacted]




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


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The main thrust of the Romanian effort is penetration of the emigre community in attempts to influence opinions. Additionally, there is a real concern by the Ceausescu regime toward the Hungarian emigre community and its emphasis on human rights violations against the Hungarian minority in Romania.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS/EXCLUSIONS

According to recent information, host governments in Africa, Europe and Asia/Pacific expelled a total of 57 Soviets for espionage in 1985. No expulsions were reported in the Middle East or in the Western Hemisphere; however, this is due more to the preference by governments not to publicize such expulsion actions rather than a lack of expulsions. In spite of the quiet expulsions, this number is still higher than the 1984 figure of 19.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] Washington, D.C., was [redacted] arrived in the United States on [redacted] and had become a rather active IO. [redacted]

[redacted] the killing of Major Arthur Nicholson. Nicholson, a member of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East Germany, was shot on March 24, 1985, by a Soviet sentry. Nicholson was observing a Soviet military installation at the time of the shooting. The official Soviet statement issued by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., said the sentry was acting in strict conformity with the military manual against an "unknown intruder." The statement also said that Nicholson did not comply with the sentry's warnings.

[redacted]

[redacted] departed the United States on [redacted]  
[redacted] as a result of his participation in the [redacted]  
espionage case. [redacted] arrived in the United States on  
[redacted] and was assigned as a [redacted]  
[redacted] in Washington, D.C.

b6  
b7C Per FBI

On [redacted] was seen in the area where  
[redacted] had dropped a bag filled with classified documents  
which resulted in [redacted] arrest. [redacted] was subsequently  
recalled to the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

Expulsion of a Cuban IO

b1  
b6  
b7C

(S) During 1985, [redacted] led to a PNG action against [redacted] at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. Based upon [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Contributing factors to the PNG action were two separate [redacted] and his [redacted]

On the two occasions, the first involving [redacted] and the second [redacted] attempted to remove several [redacted] from a Washington [redacted]


[redacted] Protests over these two incidents were lodged with the Cuban Government which chose to ignore an informal recommendation that [redacted] permanently depart the United States on [redacted]

Shortly after the second incident, [redacted] travelled to Albuquerque, New Mexico, [redacted]

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES




During [redacted] contacted the Boston Division of the FBI and said that [redacted] [redacted] was committing espionage by selling secrets to the Soviet Union. [redacted] alleged that [redacted] had been engaged in this activity for approximately [redacted] years, commencing in [redacted] further alleged that [redacted] [redacted] was continuing to commit espionage by using people he



b6  
b7c

During the week of [redacted] the FBI learned that [redacted] was planning to travel over the weekend of [redacted] [redacted] The Norfolk and Washington Field Divisions of the FBI were mobilized in the event that [redacted] traveled to Washington, D.C. On [redacted] FBI Agents observed [redacted]



He proceeded to a remote area in [redacted]  
[redacted] stopped  
at a certain intersection [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7c

[redacted] A search of the drop  
area resulted in the recovery of a paper shopping bag near a  
tree. The bag was partially filled with pieces of trash to  
conceal a carefully wrapped manila envelope sealed with  
masking tape. The envelope contained approximately [redacted]  
classified and unclassified documents.

On [redacted] at approximately 3:30 a.m., [redacted]  
[redacted] was arrested in the [redacted]  
[redacted] Maryland and charged with espionage by Special  
Agents of the FBI.

During the surveillance of [redacted] a car bearing  
[redacted]  
[redacted] was later  
identified as the driver of the vehicle. [redacted] abruptly  
departed the U.S. several days later.

An examination of the documents recovered at the  
drop site revealed that the majority came from the [redacted]  
[redacted] was  
assigned to the [redacted] at the time. In addition to the  
documents recovered at the drop site, there were [redacted]  
[redacted] to his Soviet handler addressed, "Dear  
Friend". In the [redacted]  
[redacted] and provided his Soviet handler with status



reports and assessment information concerning each. Subsequent investigation and analysis resulted in the identification of all [redacted]

[redacted] It was later determined that [redacted] but based on investigation, it was determined that he was not involved in espionage activity. [redacted] was identical to [redacted] and [redacted]

b6  
b7c

On [redacted] was detained for questioning [redacted] A search of [redacted]

[redacted] On [redacted]

[redacted] Upon arrival, he was arrested by the FBI for espionage. In a subsequent statement he confessed to committing espionage. In short, he advised that in [redacted]

[redacted]

In a series of interviews with [redacted] he admitted that on a number of occasions beginning in [redacted] he delivered classified and unclassified documents to his [redacted] The documents were obtained from his [redacted]

[redacted]

compensation for his espionage activities. Finally, [redacted] advised that [redacted] was making "big bucks" by furnishing "high class," "high level" information.

b6  
b7C

Following the arrest of [redacted] the FBI searched [redacted]

The search resulted in the recovery of numerous documents and papers of evidentiary value. Most significant, however, were the following: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

He also traveled to [redacted] for face-to-face meetings with Soviet IOs. [redacted] received money and instructions from the drops within the United States and at the meetings outside the United States. FBI analysis reveals that [redacted] would meet [redacted] shortly before his contacts with Soviet intelligence.

[redacted] profession as a [redacted] was an excellent cover for conducting espionage. [redacted]

[redacted]

but yet avoid attracting suspicion. In short, [redacted] was considered by Soviet intelligence to be an excellent agent. He provided the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] were indicted for espionage  
on [redacted]  
[redacted] to espionage charges. Under the terms of a [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] was indicted on [redacted] and  
convicted [redacted]

[redacted]

The trial of [redacted] the sole remaining  
defendant, began in [redacted]

[redacted]

DISSEMINATION LIST

Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - 2

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1;  
Office of Legislative Affairs - 1; Counsel for  
Intelligence Policy - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret  
Service - 1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Department of State, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff,  
Diplomatic Security Service

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 5

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Security Committee/Intelligence Community (IC) Staff - 1

Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff/IC Staff - 1

Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for  
Operations (DDO) - 1; Office of Communications/DDO - 1;  
Policy Coordination Staff/DDO - 2; Chief, Counterintelligence  
(CI) Staff - 1; CI Staff (Publications) - 1; Deputy Director  
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and Evaluation Staff/DDI - 2; Director, Office of  
Security - 1; Chief, Security Analysis Group/Office of  
Security - 1

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National Security Agency, Director - 1; M56 - 1; M503 - 1;  
Publication Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy Security  
Committee Member - 1

Department of Energy - 5

Department of Defense, Director for Counterintelligence  
and Security Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense - 1

Chief, Security Education Division, Defense Industrial  
Security Institute - 1

Chief, Security Education Group, Office of Security - 1

Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission - 1

Director, Office of Security, General Accounting  
Office - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army - 8

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SEPTEMBER 11, 1985

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ROUTINE

\*SRR 112116Z SEP 85

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 02-11-2011

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO LEGAL ATTACHE LONDON ROUTINE

BT

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FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY;

VOLUME XI

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE LEGAT LONDON TELETYPE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1985, CAPTIONED

AS ABOVE.



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- 1 - MR. [redacted]
- 1 - MR. [redacted]
- 1 - MR. [redacted]
- 1 - MR. [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

67-74450-67

2 SEP 28 1985

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FBI/DOJ

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PAGE THREE

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NOTE:

IN REFERENCED TELETYPE, LEGAT, LONDON REQUESTED  
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

BT

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 02-11-2011

FBI FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: [redacted] CI-3; [redacted] CI-1

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, VOLUME XI.

(S) ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET IN ENTIRETY.~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

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pls. [unclear] [unclear]

SPECIFICALLY, PERMISSION IS HEREBY REQUESTED TO PASS THE

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[redacted]

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JAN 10 1986

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PAGE TWO LON 203-2 ~~SECRET~~

(S) FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE MATERIAL QUOTED ABOVE TO BE PASSED TO BOTH

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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 99

Page 9 ~ b1

Page 10 ~ b1

Page 11 ~ b1

Page 12 ~ b1

Page 13 ~ b1

Page 14 ~ b1

Page 15 ~ b1

Page 16 ~ b1

Page 17 ~ b1

Page 18 ~ b1

Page 19 ~ b1

Page 20 ~ b1

Page 21 ~ b1

Page 22 ~ b1

Page 23 ~ b1

Page 24 ~ b1

Page 25 ~ b1

Page 26 ~ b1

Page 27 ~ b1

Page 28 ~ b1

Page 29 ~ b1

Page 30 ~ b1

Page 31 ~ b1

Page 33 ~ b1, Referral/Direct

Page 34 ~ b1

Page 36 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 37 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 38 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 39 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 41 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 42 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 44 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 98 ~ b1, Referral/Direct

Page 99 ~ b1

Page 102 ~ b1

Page 105 ~ b1

Page 106 ~ b1

Page 107 ~ b1

Page 108 ~ b1

Page 109 ~ b1

Page 110 ~ b1

Page 111 ~ b1

Page 112 ~ b1

Page 113 ~ b1  
Page 114 ~ b1  
Page 115 ~ b1  
Page 116 ~ b1  
Page 117 ~ b1  
Page 118 ~ b1  
Page 119 ~ b1  
Page 120 ~ b1  
Page 121 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 122 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 123 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 124 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 161 ~ b1, Referral/Direct  
Page 162 ~ b6, b7C, b7E, Referral/Direct  
Page 163 ~ b7E, Referral/Direct, Referral/Consult  
Page 164 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 165 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 166 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 167 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 176 ~ b1  
Page 177 ~ b1  
Page 178 ~ b1  
Page 180 ~ b1  
Page 181 ~ b1  
Page 182 ~ b1  
Page 183 ~ b1  
Page 184 ~ b1  
Page 185 ~ b1  
Page 186 ~ b1  
Page 188 ~ b1  
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Page 191 ~ b1  
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Page 193 ~ b1  
Page 194 ~ b1  
Page 195 ~ b1  
Page 196 ~ b1  
Page 197 ~ b1  
Page 198 ~ b1  
Page 200 ~ b1  
Page 204 ~ b1, Referral/Direct  
Page 205 ~ b1, Referral/Direct  
Page 206 ~ Referral/Direct  
Page 213 ~ Referral/Direct  
Page 214 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 215 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 216 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 217 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 218 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 219 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 220 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 221 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 222 ~ b1  
Page 223 ~ b1



Washington, D.C. 20535

June 1, 2023

Appeal Number: 11-02504
FOIPA Number: 1145585-000
Subject: FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Information Policy referred your appeal referenced above to the DOJ's Department Review Committee (DRC). The DRC reviewed the classified information withheld by the FBI from your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request to determine whether the information should remain properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526.

As a result of our review of the appealed classified information and/or a determination by the DRC:

- Checked: All the previously withheld classified FBI information has been declassified.
Unchecked: All the previously withheld classified FBI information may be disclosed.
Unchecked: All the previously withheld classified FBI information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to subsection(s) of Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a.
Checked: Portions of the declassified information are exempt from disclosure pursuant to subsection(s) of Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemptions boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

Section 552a

- Checked (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), (b)(6)
Unchecked (b)(2), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(B), (b)(7)(F), (b)(8), (b)(9), (d)(5), (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(4), (k)(5), (k)(6), (k)(7)

Other information was withheld by Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Army, the United States Navy, and the National Security Agency. You may appeal to those agencies at the following addresses:

Information and Privacy Coordinator  
Central Intelligence Agency  
1000 Colonial Farm Road  
1J17 IP Building  
Gate 5  
McLean, VA 22101

Secretary of the Army  
Office of the General Counsel  
US Army Intelligence and Security Command  
FOIA/PA Office  
ATTN: IAMG-CIC-FOI/PA  
4554 Pike Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755

Judge Advocate General (Code 14)  
Department of the Navy  
1322 Patterson Avenue, SE  
Suite 3000  
Washington Navy Yard  
Washington, DC 20374-5066

and


NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJP4)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Suite 6248  
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248

1394 pages were reviewed and 558 pages are being released.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a main entity record search of the Central Records System (CRS) per our standard search policy. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA appeal. This material is being provided to you at no charge. Duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

Sincerely,



Joseph E. Bender, Jr.  
Acting Section Chief  
Record/Information Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosure

FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480  
1145585-0 - - Section 1 Serial 1 no descriptionMedi

Released on Appeal Number: 11-02504  
June 1, 2023

FOIPA Number: 1145585-000

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Total Deleted Page(s) = 191

Page 24 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 25 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 27 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 30 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 31 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 32 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 35 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 36 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 37 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 38 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 39 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 41 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 42 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 43 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 44 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 45 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 47 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;  
Page 49 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 56 ~ b3 - Per FBI; b6 - Per Navy; b7C - Per Navy; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 63 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 64 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 65 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 66 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 96 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 98 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 99 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 101 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 104 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 105 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 106 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 110 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 112 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;  
Page 113 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 114 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 115 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 117 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 118 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 119 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 138 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 140 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 175 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 176 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 179 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 180 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 197 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 198 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 199 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 203 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 207 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 208 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 209 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 238 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 245 ~ b3; b7E;



Page 246 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 247 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 248 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 249 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 250 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 251 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 254 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 255 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 257 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 258 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 260 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 262 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 263 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 270 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 282 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per FBI; b7C - Per FBI;  
Page 288 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 293 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 294 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 295 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 297 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 298 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 300 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 301 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 303 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 308 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 313 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 493 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 502 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 504 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 545 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 546 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 547 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 563 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 564 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 566 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 575 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 591 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 609 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 612 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 618 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 619 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 623 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 632 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 633 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 634 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 636 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 673 ~ b3; b7E;  
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0610

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

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AUTHORITY DERIVES FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 01-13-2011~~

6/79

FROM : G. W. Pangburn *GW*

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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b7C

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

*Of B.I. Foreign Intelligence Analysis*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Communities. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

*TJD  
JPT  
JPT*

**DE-11**

*65-74480-45*

APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *WBC/ep* \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 16 1979

2- ENCLOSURE

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Enclosure  
TJD:en<sup>ex</sup> (8)

- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - [ ]

- 1 - Mr. G. W. Pangburn
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [ ]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified and Extended by 1756 *GW*  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification September 26, 1999



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. G. W. Pangburn to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-77480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted to the  
activities of [REDACTED] during  
the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the  
activities of the [REDACTED]  
during the first five months of 1979. It is a sanitized  
version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices. (S)

(U)

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b7E

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DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President  
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Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the  
Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;  
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;  
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

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Staff - 1: Attention: National Foreign Assessment  
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Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department  
of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;  
Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office  
of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of  
the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## REVIEW

### OCTOBER, 1979

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
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Classified and Extended by 1756 *curly*  
 Reason For Extension ~~FOIA, II 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)~~  
 Date of Review For Declassification (October 4, 1999)

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten initials]*

TJD:en

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
TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	5
	6
	8
	9
II.	11
	11
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	11
Strategic Intelligence	16
Political Intelligence	17
Economic Intelligence	21
	22
	22
	23
	25
	26
III.	29
	29
	29
	31
	32
	33

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IV.



35  
35  
35  
35  
35  
36  
37  
38

b3  
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



"Lemon Aid"



43  
43  
47  
51

PHOTOGRAPHS



39-41  
55-59

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States  
DISSEMINATION LIST

61  
61  
63



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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of [REDACTED] during the first five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (S)


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
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Referral/Direct



(U)

At any rate, Soviet action did not prevent the trial,

[redacted] in the [redacted]

[redacted] In the meantime [redacted]

b6 per FBI  
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[redacted] And

[redacted] were

waived and they too were allowed to leave their country of  
detainment and return to the Soviet Union. Thus, [redacted]

[redacted] shared the same fate (although, of course, their

[redacted] still stand) as the other Soviets arrested since the

early 1960s. But the outcome of the [redacted] case was  
different in one sense. [redacted]

[redacted] (U)

Despite the arrest and conviction of the two Soviet  
operatives and the impending SALT ratification debate, during  
the past year the large complement of United States-based



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(U)

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(U)

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(U)

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The Soviet official presence continues to be greatly augmented by large numbers of Soviets visiting the United States as tourists, as well as under the East West Exchange Program (EWEP). During the last six months of 1978 and first six months of 1979, 2,359 Soviet tourists visited the United States. Under

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the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [REDACTED]

(U)

During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to 26,861 Soviet seamen. (S)

(U)

[REDACTED]

Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also hopes to be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

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Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 239 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979.



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(U)

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In January of 1979, the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when Werner Stiller, an officer in the EGIS, defected to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Stiller, who had been assigned to the Research and Development Section of the Main Department XIII, Ministry for State Security (MES),

b6  
b7C

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] An  
immediate result of Stiller's defection was the [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Overall,

a total of 36 suspected EGIS agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against 13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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
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The arrests that followed the Stiller defection helped to illustrate the degree to which 

 Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had maneuvered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of Brandt.



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


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In August, 1978, Ion Mihai Pacepa, then acting Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence (DGIE) defected to the West. [REDACTED]

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
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Scientific and Technical Intelligence



(U)

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[Redacted]

b3 Per FBI  
b7E

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[Redacted]

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA and FBI  
b7E per FBI

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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b3 per FBI  
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Strategic Intelligence




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Political Intelligence



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
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It has often been stated by observers of the international scene that former President Richard Nixon is held in much higher esteem overseas--including the Soviet Union--than in the United States, and that many Europeans could not quite understand how Americans could drive a seemingly effective chief of state from office.



(U)

Economic Intelligence



(U)

(U)

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b7E

[REDACTED]

A detailed listing of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of  
the "Review." During the first five months of 1979, a large  
number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those  
which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which  
indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respective [REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U)

(U)

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
(U)



Within the past year, the Soviet overseas establishment has been rocked by some damaging defections, most notably that of Arkadiy N. Shevchenko, who served as Under Secretary to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Shevchenko is one of the highest-ranking Soviets to have defected to the West.



(U)




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
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(U)

Below are three photographs depicting the type of paraphernalia and instructions which the asset received from the



(U)

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b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[redacted] "Lemon Aid"  
On [redacted] the Soviets [redacted] and

[redacted]  
shortly after clearing a dead-drop. Additionally [redacted]  
[redacted] was detained, although he was not arrested [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1 per Navy  
b3 Per FBI  
b6 Per Navy  
b7C Per Navy  
b7E Per FBI

~~SECRET~~

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[Redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per Navy  
b7C per Navy  
b7E per FBI

(U)

X

[Redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

(U)

X

Upon their arrest, [Redacted] were jailed at

the [Redacted] they were held

in lieu of [Redacted] was

forced to leave the United States. Of [Redacted] however, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to await their trial, which was

held in [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The arrest of these individuals came, however, at a time when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were strained. There was thus some concern that the arrests and trial of the two spies might place further strain on U.S.-Soviet relations. Therefore, the decision to arrest the Soviets was by no means a cut-and-dried affair, but involved the consideration of highly complex issues.

(U)

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~

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
(U)

William Peter Kampiles

Some of the greatest intelligence coups have not been the result of the efforts of an intelligence service, but rather have come about as the result of a windfall. Such was the path through which the Soviets acquired the "KH-11 System Technical Manual." The manual was sold to the Soviets in February of 1978

by a former CIA employee named William Kampiles for a mere \$3,000. The document (which is classified "Top Secret") sold for this pittance is a technical manual for an advanced American reconnaissance satellite. This satellite is one of the major intelligence collection systems used by the United States

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA and FBI  
b7E per FBI



(S)

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The apprehension of Kampiles came about as a result of his own action. In a letter given to a former CIA colleague, Kampiles recounted how he had accidentally met a Soviet in Athens in February of 1978. Although Kampiles did not mention in the letter the actual sale of any material to the Soviets, he did describe more than one meeting with the Soviet, and did note that he had discussed such things as his access to classified material and the type of information the Soviet wanted. He ended the letter with the cryptic comment, "What I have talked about thus far has been generalized, I did this because to be entirely specific, it would take the length of a short book to narrate this entire story. If you think there might be agency interest, I might be willing to discuss this experience in full detail."  
(U)

Having thus drawn attention to his activities, Kampiles was soon thereafter contacted by Special Agents, and consented to a polygraph examination. ~~In a post-examination~~  
interview Kampiles confessed to the act of espionage. Kampiles admitted that, while on a visit to Greece, he went to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, where he met a man whom he later determined to be Director of Security for the Embassy. Kampiles informed the Soviet that he wished to supply information on a long-term basis, but the Soviet replied that nothing could be arranged until the American produced something of value. In subsequent visits, Kampiles supplied the manual to the Soviets for the sum of \$10,000, of which \$7,000 was to be supplied at a later date.  
(U)

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Kampiles had obtained the document during his service as a GS 7 Watch Officer [REDACTED]

b3 per CIA

[REDACTED] He was employed in this capacity from March 29 through November 4, 1977, and in view of his sensitive duties with the CIA, held a large variety of security clearances. One evening, while on duty, he simply took the document from a file cabinet, placed it in his sports coat, and took the document to his apartment. (U) (C)

Kampiles was motivated to a great extent by disgruntlement towards the CIA. He desired a transfer to the Directorate of Operations in CIA where he could become a case officer. Due to Kampiles' poor work performance, CIA officials considered this to be out of the question. Kampiles was told this in no uncertain terms. He was also sharply criticized for his unsatisfactory work performance. Soon after, Kampiles stole the KH-11 Manual. (U) (S)

Kampiles was also motivated by a strong desire to become a "Secret Agent." Kampiles was a James Bond aficionado who, while driving in his Oldsmobile Cutlass, played tapes of sound tracks from Bond movies. And, spurned by the CIA in his desire to become a case officer, Kampiles embarked on an ill-conceived venture to become a spy on his own. He stated that he had come forth to the CIA and the FBI with the story of "accidentally" meeting with the Soviets in Athens because he felt that American intelligence would decide that he would make a good double agent. He thought that the CIA would provide him with classified "feed" material and encourage him to continue meeting with the Soviets as a double agent. A search of

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
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(U) Kampiles apartment after his arrest uncovered a copy of "Inside the Company," by Philip Agee. Inside the book Kampiles had highlighted a number of sections. One of these sections was, interestingly, on double agents. (S)

(U) Monetary gain was also a factor spurring on Kampiles. He was due to return to Greece to receive the remaining \$7,000 payoff, and was to be given an additional \$10,000 for any other classified material he could supply the Soviets. As mentioned above, Kampiles hoped to acquire the classified data for the second trip from U.S. intelligence. At the same time, Kampiles believed that U.S. intelligence would provide him with cash in payment for his services as an agent, and thus Kampiles hoped to collect money from both the Soviets and the Americans. (S)

Kampiles was tried, convicted, and sentenced to serve 40 years in a Federal penitentiary. But, the impact of the Kampiles case extended far beyond the incarceration of Kampiles.

The U.S. intelligence collection system had already been undermined by the loss of classified data relating to American intelligence satellites, which had been passed to the Soviets by Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce in 1976. The system was further compromised by the loss of the KH-11 Manual. Finally, the Kampiles theft indicated the ease with which a even a low-level employee could do severe damage to U.S. national security. (S)



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APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 1, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	<u>2,428</u>

b3  
b7E

NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

~~SECRET~~

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DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the  
Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1;  
Attention: Director of Intelligence Liaison - 1;  
Attention: Office of East European Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of East Asian Affairs - 1;  
Attention: Office of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

---

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention:  
Deputy Director for Operations (Counterintelligence  
Staff - 1; Attention: National Foreign Assessment  
Center - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary, Director  
of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department  
of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1;  
Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce - Attention: Director, Office  
of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Attention: Director of  
the Office of Investigations and Security - 1

~~SECRET~~

0610

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- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
**Memorandum**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar <sup>WUC</sup> <sub>sup</sub>

DATE: 8/10/79

FROM : G. W. Pangburn <sup>GP</sup>

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - -

UNITED STATES

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 01-20-2011~~

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V-33

65-74480-44

AUG 22 1979

TJD:en (7)

Enclosure

**ENCLOSURE**

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]

1 - Mr. G. W. Pangburn

1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas  
1 - [redacted]

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Classified and Extended by 1756  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification August 10, 1999



97 OCT 12 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. G. W. Pangburn to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This issue is devoted to the activities of  
[REDACTED] during the latter half  
of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of the  
[REDACTED] during the first

(U) five months of 1979. (X)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~


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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-16-2011~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 09-01-2020 BY:

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b7c

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## SUMMARY

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signature]*

**JULY, 1979**

~~Classified and Extended by 1929~~  
Reason For Extension ~~FCIM, II 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)~~  
Date of Review For Declassification ~~(August 1, 2009)~~

MAIL ROOM

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

Not For Dissemination  
Outside The FBI

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FBI/DOJ

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	5
	6
	9
	10
	11
II.	14
	14
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	14
Strategic Intelligence	19
Political Intelligence	20
Economic Intelligence	24
	25
	25
	26
	28
	29
	30
	31
III.	33
	33
	33
	35
	36
	37

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
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IV.




39  
39  
39  
39  
39  
40  
41  
42

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



"Lemon Aid"


46  
46



50

Aircraft Surveillances

53



54

PHOTOGRAPHS



43-45  
58-62

APPENDIX

63

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States

63

CHART

Major Communist Country Official Presence in the United States

64

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1978 through May of 1979, and also the activities of [redacted] during the first five months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as the [redacted]

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments. (U) ~~(S)~~

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the EWEP, 5,636 Soviets in commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural delegations entered the United States. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In addition there are (as of early May, 1979) currently 43 Soviet graduate/research students studying at 29 universities located in 24 FBI field divisions. [REDACTED]

(U) During the last six months of 1978 and first three months of 1979, 1,090 Soviet merchant vessels, which have access to 40 deep-water ports in the United States, docked in American ports. These port calls afforded repeated shore privileges to 26,861 Soviet seamen. ~~(S)~~

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[REDACTED]

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Since the official United States recognition of China, diplomatic relations between the two nations have continued to improve. An American-Chinese trade agreement has been settled and awaits approval by the United States Senate. And, within the near future, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will probably be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status. The opening of two PRC Consulates, one each in San Francisco, California, and Houston, Texas, is imminent. The rationale for choosing San Francisco as a Consulate site is obvious--this city has the largest population of overseas Chinese in the United States, and its location will give the PRC a base on the west coast of the United States. The choice of Houston reflects the PRC's interest


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in acquiring oil exploration and production-related technology. The opening of four further PRC Consulates has been agreed upon; two of these four will probably open within the next year. (U)

Since January, PRC official presence has increased somewhat. There are now 234 PRC officials stationed in the United States, as opposed to 188 at the beginning of 1979.

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In January of 1979, the East German intelligence services (EGIS) were dealt a damaging blow when First Lieutenant Werner Stiller defected to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Stiller, who had been assigned to the Research and

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Development Section of the Main Department XIII, Ministry for  
State Security (MFS) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] An immediate result of  
Stiller's defection was the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Overall, a total of 36 suspected EGIS  
agents have been uncovered in West Germany. Of these, 10 have  
been arrested, judicial enquiries have been instigated against  
13, and the remaining 13 have managed to escape to East Germany.

[redacted]


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The arrests that followed the Stiller defection helped to illustrate the degree to which [redacted]


[redacted] Within the past decade a number of other East German agents have been arrested in the FRG, some of whom had maneuvered themselves into very sensitive positions. The most notorious of these was most probably Gunter Guillaume, longtime former aid to German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The publicity surrounding Guillaume's arrest forced the resignation of the embarrassed Brandt. [redacted]

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


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On the diplomatic front, the Czechs appeared to be making some steps toward improving the stagnant relations with the United States. In February of this year, the 



three influential U.S. Congressmen, Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Calborne Pell, and Representative Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 



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Referral/Direct

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(U) [Redacted]

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In August, 1978, Ion Mihai Pacepa, then acting Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence (DGIE) defected to the West. [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

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Referral/Direct

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
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Referral/Direct



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
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Scientific and Technical Intelligence



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
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
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Strategic Intelligence



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[REDACTED]

A detailed listing of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] targeting was contained in the January, 1979, issue of  
the "Summary." During the first five months of 1979, a large  
number of new targets have been detected. Listed below are those  
which are most significant, with emphasis upon items which  
indicate a shift in the targeting strategy of the respective [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] X

[REDACTED]

X (U)

X (U)

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Insight into East German intelligence services collection requirements has been provided by the defector, Werner Stiller. He disclosed that EGIS collection requirements are in order of priority:

- political information;
- military information;

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Kampiles apartment after his arrest uncovered a copy of "Inside the Company," by Philip Agee. Inside the book Kampiles had highlighted a number of sections. One of these sections was, interestingly, on double agents. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Monetary gain was also a factor spurring on Kampiles. He was due to return to Greece to receive the remaining \$7,000 payoff, and was to be given an additional \$10,000 for any other classified material he could supply the Soviets. As mentioned above, Kampiles hoped to acquire the classified data for the second trip from U.S. intelligence. At the same time, Kampiles believed that U.S. intelligence would provide him with cash in payment for his services as an agent, and thus Kampiles hoped to collect money from both the Soviets and the Americans. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Kampiles was tried, convicted, and sentenced to serve 40 years in a Federal penitentiary. But, the impact of the Kampiles case extended far beyond the incarceration of Kampiles. The U.S. intelligence collection system had already been undermined by the loss of classified data relating to American intelligence satellites, which had been passed to the Soviets by Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce in 1976. The system was further compromised by the loss of the KH-11 Manual. Finally, the Kampiles theft indicated the ease with which a even a low-level employee could do severe damage to U.S. national security. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Aircraft Surveillances


As previously reported, the San Francisco Division has made successful use of aircraft surveillance in affording physical coverage of Soviet intelligence officers. Within the

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past year, San Francisco has continued to make good use of aerial surveillance of particularly active KGB officers on both covert and overt missions without the subjects becoming aware of such coverage. ~~(S)~~ (U)

SF SPIAs, 3/79, p.15; 11/78, p.18



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


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APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, JUNE 9, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1222
PRC	234
Poland	271
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	107
Cuba	84
Romania	80
Hungary	78
Bulgaria	48
Vietnam	9
North Korea	13
Yugoslavia	151
Albania	10
Mongolia	11
Total	<u>2,395</u>



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NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

1,250  
1,200  
1,150  
1,100  
1,050  
1,000  
950  
900  
850  
800  
750  
700  
650  
600  
550  
500  
450  
400  
350  
300  
250  
200  
150  
100  
50  
0

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- 64 -

BULGARIA

CUBA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GERMANY  
DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC

HUNGARY

YUGOSLAVIA

PRC

ROMANIA

USSR

YUGOSLAVIA

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC*

DATE: 3/20/79

FROM : [redacted] *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

*FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS UNITED STATES*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Senate and House Intelligence Committees (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

Director	_____
Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____

Adm. Serv.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____

Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____

TJD:en (8)

Enclosures (2) - Copy kept in D.O.

65-77480 - 1

REC-65

DE-49

V-21

*65-74480-1*

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

23 APR 19 1979

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [redacted]

(CONTINUED - OVER)

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 02-22-2011~~

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Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification (March 20, 1999)



247  
6 MAY 10 1979

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Memorandum from Mr. [REDACTED] to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review

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b7E

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted  
wholly to the activities of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977  
through December, 1978. It is a sanitized version of one  
furnished to FBI Field Offices, with some updated material  
added. The next edition, which is now in preparation, will  
focus upon operations of both [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary,  
Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

Director, FBI - 1

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

65-74480 41  
L. 15

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-15-2011~~

# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~



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## REVIEW (U)

### MARCH, 1979

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TJD:en  
(10)

Classified and Extended by 1929  
Reason For Extension FCIM, 11, 1-2.4.2 (1, 2, and 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (March 31, 2009)

65-74480-41

MAIL ROOM

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

**ENCLOSURE**

National Security Information  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	2
	3
	5
	6
	7
	9
	9
	11
	12
Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students	13
II.	16
	17
	18
	21
	21
	23
	23
	24
	25

b3  
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III		27
		27
		29
		33
		33
IV.		37
		37
		37
		38
		40
		40

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 42

Magic Dragon 42

Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country 47

Impediments to the Development of Assets 47

APPENDICES 48

		48
		49

DISSEMINATION LIST 52

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INTRODUCTION


The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as [REDACTED]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (S)

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


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Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970s. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Beijing, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, science and technology, agriculture, and the armed forces. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)


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

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
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


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
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


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
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Cuba

The latter half of the 1970s has witnessed a lessening of the generally negative tone which dominated Cuban-American relations since the early 1960s. A major cause of the development of closer ties between the two neighbors has been the Cuban desire to terminate the United States embargo of Cuba and to attract U.S. investments into Cuba. The most visible evidence of the evolution of less hostile American-Cuban relations was the establishment, in September of 1977, of the Cuban Interests Section (CUBIS) in Washington, D.C., and the removal of travel restrictions placed upon Cuban diplomats stationed in the United States. Cuban aspirations vis-a-vis relations with the United States have to an extent been undermined by a concomitant interventionist policy in the Third World, the most evident target of which has been Africa. Indeed, there are indications that, despite the Cuban failure in Latin America during the 1960s, the principal objective of Cuban foreign policy is to spread the Marxist World Revolution to the Third World, using the Cuban revolution as a model. (S)



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
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Despite Romania's continued good relations with the United States (typified by the April, 1978, meetings between President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and President Carter).




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Unfortunately for the Romanians, the RIS were dealt a crippling blow in August of 1978 with the defection of Ion Mihai Pacepa, then Acting Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence of the Romanian intelligence services [redacted]

[redacted] The damage that the defection of such [redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted] can have on an intelligence agency is obvious.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the number of exchange visitors entering the United States has increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this

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escalation. From January 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977. [REDACTED]



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(U)

Throughout the year 1978, 170 vessels from 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 806 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 17,300 individual entries into the United States of varying duration, [REDACTED]




(U)

Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80 percent of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific

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and technical fields.



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


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II. [redacted]


Included below are objectives which, during the period under review, received the greatest amount of attention from the respective [redacted]. The primary objective of [redacted] was the collection of scientific and technical (S & T) intelligence. The reason for this is readily discernible--all of these countries are plagued with economies and technological bases of varying degrees of underdevelopment. [redacted]



(U)

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
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Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's


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ability to exploit these resources



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
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b3 per FBI  
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
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b3 per CIA

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
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b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups.

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI



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[redacted] by supplying him with information than  
the [redacted]  
[redacted] although  
[redacted] continued, telephonically, to supply [redacted] with  
classified information up to a few days before their arrest. (S)

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

(U)

The key to the operation for the FBI was a jointly  
controlled [redacted]

b3 per CIA and FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

The successful outcome of the investigation was also  
furthered through the utilization of a panoply of technical  
surveillance devices. [redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI


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Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country


An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified information, and is a native of the target intelligence service's country.

b3  
b7E



(U)

Impediments to the Development of Assets



(U)

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APPENDICES

[REDACTED]

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In relation to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] the priorities of the FBI, based upon the degree of  
threat posed by these services to the United States, are as  
follows (as of January, 1979):

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



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DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, The Secretary of the Treasury - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 1

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 3

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Attention: Deputy  
Director for Operations - 1; Attention: Deputy Director  
for Intelligence - 1; Attention: Executive Secretary,  
Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department of  
Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; Attention: M503 - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department - Attention:  
Navy Security Committee Member - 1

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

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x

2/22/79

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-271060)  
ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CI/3 (A)  
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO  
SUBJECT: MONTHLY SUMMARIES  
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
RESEARCH MATTER - FCI  
BUDED 2/23/79

Re Bureau airtel of 2/1/79.

The following represents Chicago's comments on the questions asked by the Bureau in referenced airtel. (U)

1. Frequency: Quarterly (S)

2. Content: Reporting of intelligence activities should be written in summary form with sufficient detail to fully explain developments. (S)

3. Format: The current topical headings are appropriate (particularly as they relate to SATPIA) with the following exceptions: (S)

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
  - (1 - 65-74489) (FINAL)
- 4 - Chicago
  - (1 - 65-4268) (SATPIA)
  - (1 - 65-3307) (SPIA)
  - (1 - 201-187) (YUPIA)
  - (1 - 105-33496) (FINAL)

EBC/ejb  
(7)

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~~Classified and Extended by 7107  
Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)  
Date of Review for Declassification 2/22/94~~

57 APR 17 1979

105-271060-105

RECEIVED

MAR 30 1979

65-74480

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(U) A. Eliminate arrival and departures of officials and additions and deletions of known and suspected intelligence officers (item number 5 in SATPIA). (S)

(U) B. Eliminate travel of officials and the arrival and departure of couriers. (S)

C. Eliminate forms 5-80 (Monthly Statistical Tabulation) and 5-81 (Monthly Recapitulation) unless one or the other or both have particular significance for the Intelligence Division. The information on the Monthly Statistical Tabulation form is available through COBRO.

D. Add a sub heading (SATPIA) relating to elite commercial enterprises. Chicago did this on its own several months ago [redacted] X

(U) 4. Distribution: FBIHQ and establishment offices. (One FCI supervisor suggests that the document go to FBIHQ and the 10 major FBI field offices.) Access to SATPIA and YUPIA should be limited to FCI personnel. (S)

(U) 5. Security: Summaries should be written in such a fashion as to protect the identity of sources and where appropriate, the circumstances surrounding the source's access to the information. Operations aimed at recruitment and assessment of officials for recruitment should be held on a strict need-to-know basis and not included in any of these documents. (S)

(U) 6. Analysis: The field should include its analysis of developments on a timely basis as particular events or trends become apparent. (In the case of personnel handling YUPIA, the opinion seemed to be that FBIHQ should handle analysis.) (S)

(U) Threat Assessments? Personnel in Chicago have differing views on this particular topic. One FCI supervisor expressed the opinion that at the present time, the field was unable to recognize a threat assessment. However, others think the field should not be excluded from this option. If, in any given situation, we have sufficient information and expertise to handle one. (S)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7. Countries: There is no reason why pertinent developments regarding non-criteria countries should not be added to our reporting. (S)

(U) Comment: Chicago will take this opportunity to address at least two particular subjects in relation to this study by the Bureau which, we believe, have a direct bearing on the quality and usefulness of SPIA and SATPIA. In September of 1977, Chicago responded to another questionnaire from FBIHQ concerning our Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL). Bureau personnel who prepare our foreign intelligence analysis use these documents as a basis for their reports -- reports that are no better than the information furnished by the field. We see SPIA and SATPIA as having great potential for summarizing in one place on a regular basis [redacted] activities. But this requires thorough and complete reporting for each period the documents are submitted. This is subject the Bureau should address in this study and then issue the field explicit instructions. If establishment offices are allowed to pick and choose on their own what will be included in SPIA and SATPIA, there will be practically no consistency in reporting and the documents themselves will lose much quality and credibility. (S)

(U) The dilemma in this is the question of security and need-to-know as currently applied by the Bureau. We have already expressed our opinion that recruitments should not be reported in SATPIA and SPIA. Yet, there is a need for an exchange of information among those of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations so we can be made aware on a timely basis of what [redacted] are doing in our own field in particular and other fields in general where we might learn valuable information as to techniques, targets and tradecraft. It is a question which finally will have to be resolved from the perspective of headquarters. (S)

(U) All of us handling foreign counterintelligence investigations in Chicago firmly believe that if the requirements for SPIA, SATPIA and YOFIA are revised these reports be submitted on a quarterly basis. Developments in many of our operations do not lend themselves neatly to monthly reporting. A longer time-frame would enable the field to base its reports on a wider area of developments which often make details more meaningful. (S)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC*

DATE: 1/31/79

FROM : 

*Analysis U.S. (info)*  
*Per [signature]*


SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

  
*[signature]*

b6  
b7c

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 02-14-2017 BY: 

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

*[Handwritten scribble]*

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*[Handwritten initials]*

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Intell. <i>[initials]</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

Enclosure




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**ENCLOSURE**

65-74480

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

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TJD:slp/en *[initials]*  
(7)

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - 
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - 
- 1 - Mr. I. P. Thomas
- 1 - 

EX-106

REC-79 *65-74480-5* *40X*

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**FEB 14 1979**

Classified and Extended by 1929 *[initials]*  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification (January 31, 1999)



*[Handwritten initials]*  
**62 MAY 14 1979**

*[Handwritten signature]*  
**DOC CLASS**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This issue is devoted wholly to the activities  
of [REDACTED] during  
the latter part of 1977 and 1978. An issue was published in  
June of 1978 which focused upon the activities of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The next issue, now in preparation,  
will focus upon the activities of both [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" is  
the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence  
Analysis (FINAL)." (S)

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b7E

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~~SECRET~~

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-16-2011~~

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# FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



## SUMMARY (U)

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*JPT*

**JANUARY, 1979**

*off*

TJD:en *en*  
(7)

Classified and Extended by 1929 *yes*  
Reason For Extension FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)  
Date of Review For Declassification (January 1, 2009)

MAIL ROOM

Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources  
And Methods Involved

~~Not For Dissemination  
Outside The FBI~~

*PLS*

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

*65-74480-40X*

FBI/DOJ

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	2
	3
	5
	6
	7
	9
	9
	11
Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students	12
II.	14
	15
	16
	19
	19
	21
	21
	22
	23

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III		25
		25
		27
		32
		34
		36
IV.		39
		39
		39
		40
		42
		42
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS		44
Magic Dragon		44
False Flag Operation		49
Intelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country		51
Impediments to the Development of Assets		52
APPENDICES		53
		53
		54

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [REDACTED] during the latter part of 1977 through December of 1978. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to in this paper as [REDACTED]

In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments.

(U) (S)

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
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Bilateral relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), after more than two decades of mutual hostility, have come out of the deep freeze during the 1970's. Secret negotiations led to President Nixon's 1972 journey to Peking, and three months before that trip the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Recognition of the PRC by most of the world's nations followed these events, and with the exchange of liaison missions in April of 1973, informal relations between the United States and the PRC were established. Within the past two years, although there have been difficult moments in U.S.-PRC relations, the basic stance of the Chinese has been to achieve full normalization of its relations with the United States, including the achievement of most-favored-nation (MFN) status. On the night of December 15, 1978, a major step was taken in this direction when President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The current rulers of the PRC, with Vice Premier TENG Hsiao-Ping in the forefront, recognize that China is a backward country and has much to gain from the West, especially the United States, in its drive to modernize industry, technology, science, and education. It should be pointed out that the Chinese tilt toward the West is further stimulated by the PRC's profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union. (U)


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
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Commercial, Special Exchange, Shipping, and Students

With the onset of the period of detente between the United States and the Eastern European countries, there has been a proliferation of commercial establishments with attendant, increased exchanges of students, cultural and business visitors, and non-Soviet, communist country ships (these include Cuba, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania) calling at U.S. ports. Since 1972, the numbers of exchange visitors entering the United States have increased yearly, and the year 1978 has seen a continuation of this upward escalation. Through January 1, 1979, 10,559 exchange visitors entered the United States as compared to 6,393 for the entire year of 1977.



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For the first three quarters of 1978 (January 1 through September 30) the vessels of 7 non-Soviet communist countries made 722 port calls in the United States at separate United States ports. Crew members of these vessels made at least 13,264 individual entries into the United States of varying duration, [redacted]

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[redacted]  
X

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
Analysis of Eastern European students attending academic institutions within the United States during the last three years determined that roughly 170 of these students have been within the United States at any one time. Of these 170 students, an estimated 95 percent are graduate students, 80% of whom are engaged in advanced research in scientific and technical fields. [redacted]

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X

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


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Two of Poland's principal natural resources are coal and copper, and the Poles have banked heavily upon the development of these resources to help diminish somewhat their massive trade deficit. In order to enhance their nation's ability to exploit these resources,

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
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(U)

Residing within the United States is an unidentified subject who emigrated from West Germany in the early 1970s. The subject has assumed the identity of a citizen of West Germany (who will, for purposes of security, be called Schmidt).



~~SECRET~~



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[REDACTED] Also significant is the fact that after moving to the United States, the subject married a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S. citizen, is an emigrant from a communist country. ~~(S)~~

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b3 per FBI & CIA  
b7E per FBI

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[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

Within the United States and its possessions, Cuba's internationalist policy has been exhibited in relation to several different political groups. [Redacted]


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False Flag Operation

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
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Counterintelligence Operation vs. an Eastern European Country

An operation was recently launched against the intelligence service of an East European nation. The linchpin of the operation was an asset who has access to classified

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *wol*

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [redacted]

DATE: 8/2/78

FROM : [redacted] *W.T.*

- 1 - Mr. H. C. Peterson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [redacted]

*ST*  
*De*  
SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence Senate and House oversight committees.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States intelligence community and the Congress.

*P*  
*JPT*  
*RJC*  
*JPT*  
*en*

APPROVED: <i>Wan</i>	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
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*DEPT*  
*44-1710*  
*grel*

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular

issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. It is a sanitized version of one furnished to FBI Field Offices, and was prepared in coordination with CI-1 (Soviet) Section. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

"FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the discontinued external publication entitled "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (Final)"

Enclosures

65-74480

ENCLOSURE

TJD:slp  
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ST-131

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14 SEP 25 1978

Continued *REQ*

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

61 OCT 23 1978

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Memorandum to W. O. Cregar  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence  
Review  
65-74480

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Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 1

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 2)  
DATE 09-18-2011~~

**SUBJECT:** FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
REVIEW

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

**DATE:** JULY, 1978

REC-117  
JUL 17 1978  
FBI

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*SP*

65-74480

TJD:en  
MAIL ROOM

*65-74480-36*

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Exempt from GDS, Categories 1, 2, and 3.  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. [Redacted]	1
II. [Redacted]	5
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	5
Political Intelligence	8
Strategic Intelligence	9
III. [Redacted]	11
IV. [Redacted]	14
	14
	16
	16
V. [Redacted]	18
Students	18
Shipping	18
Use of Cover and Cut-outs	18
Infiltration Techniques	19
Recruitment Targets	20
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	21
[Redacted]	21
Dangle Operations	23
VII. [Redacted]	24
	24
	26
	26
VIII. [Redacted]	29
IX. [Redacted]	30
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
The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]

[redacted] The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interest or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. ~~(S)~~

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A survey of the geographical distribution of Soviet student assignments in April of 1978 indicates the degree to which one element of the Soviet incursion has spread throughout the United States:


PAS

INSTITUTION AND  
LOCATION

NUMBER OF STUDENTS  
IN ATTENDANCE

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois	1 <del>(S)</del>

(U) Hence, 43 Soviet students were located in 17  
different states across the United States, and  
(U) attending universities with high technology research  
facilities. ~~(S)~~




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II.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence


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
Strategic Intelligence



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


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The Soviet Trade and Economic Council was established in 1973 as a result of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit talks. Its main purpose is to help create an environment which will foster the growth of commercial trade between the Soviet Union and the United States.



13



[redacted] who unsuccessfully attempted to pass classified documents to the Soviets), ended on a perhaps equally discordant note. ~~(S)~~ (U)

WFO SPIA, 1/30/78, pp 33 thru 35; WFO SPIA, 2/28/78, pp 23 thru 25.

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
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Students



Shipping




Use of Cover and Cut-outs



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Infiltration Techniques




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Recruitment Targets



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~~(U)~~

Upon their arrest, [redacted] were  
jailed at the [redacted] in  
Manhattan. They were held in lieu of [redacted]  
each. [redacted]


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[redacted] however, [redacted]  
the custody of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to  
await their [redacted] (U)

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Dangle Operations



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VII. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

a. Local Party Organization (Profsoyuz) - The term Profsoyuz, when used outside the Soviet Union, refers to the Local Party Organization abroad [redacted]

[redacted]

b. Primary Party Organization (Pervychnaya Partiynaya Organizatsiya) - This is the basic Party cell of any department, office or shop of the Soviet colony. All Soviets in the Communist Party, therefore, belong to some Primary Party Organization, of which there are several. Within some, although not all, Primary Party Organizations are subgroups into which members of each Organization are concentrated according to their particular field of expertise. Meetings of the various Organizations are held monthly, [redacted]


[redacted]

c. Political Seminar - In addition to membership in the Party and Primary Party Organizations, Soviets are also assigned to small groups referred to as Political Seminars. There are periodic meetings of these Seminars at which political issues are discussed from the perspective of Communist Party ideology. Attendance at these meetings is mandatory and considered a "Party duty." (S) [redacted]

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*Asm*

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e. Zhensovets - The Zhensovets, or Women's Council, is similar to a women's club. There are two such Zhensovets in the New York colony. Overseeing both Councils is the Trade Union Organization of Zhensovets. (S) (U)

f. Trade Union Organization - Every Soviet enterprise or organization, whether within the Soviet Union or abroad, has a local Trade Union Organization, headed by a committee called a Mestkom. The Mestkom is ultimately subject to Communist Party guidelines and control, although it is not a Communist Party organization.



g. Friends of Russian Books Club - The Soviets sponsor a club of this name which is quartered at the United Nations. The organization sponsors events such as the showing of movies on the Soviet Union, the staging of Russian dance exhibitions, etc. Such events serve as a convenient vehicle through which Soviets can become acquainted with individuals of various nationalities. (S) (U)

NY SPIA, 1/19/78, pp 15 thru 18.

*HRC*

VIII. [REDACTED]

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One of the most serious social problems afflicting the Soviet Union today is widespread alcoholism. Some observers believe that this disease has reached epidemic proportions. Per capita consumption of hard liquor in the Soviet Union is the highest of any country in the world. Staggering or unconscious drunks are a common sight in Soviet cities.



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Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes.

~~(U)~~

~~(U)~~

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Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for  
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- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

7/21/78

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI (65-74480)

- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [redacted]

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FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Foreign Intelligence Analysis - United States

Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of "FBI Counterintelligence Summary." This publication provides an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another issue is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of non-Soviet intelligence services. "FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)." (S)

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Issues of this publication will be prepared and disseminated periodically. Your comments concerning enclosed publication, as well as suggestions regarding similar future publications, are invited. Their purpose is to inform the field of current developments and items of presumed interest, within security limitations. Your comments and suggestions will assist in achieving this purpose. They should be addressed to the attention of the Intelligence Division, CI-3-A Unit. Additionally, submissions from the field of interesting case-type articles or analytical articles for possible inclusion in the "Summary" are also welcome. (U)

Enclosures (2)

- 2 - Chicago (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - Los Angeles (Enclosures - 4)
- 2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)
- 2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 4)
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EX-136  
REC-89 65-74480-34

17 SEP 1978

[redacted]

SEE NOTE, PA

- 59 SEP 26 1978

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Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas
- 1 - [redacted]

DATE: 6/30/78

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *woc/m*

FROM : [redacted] *[initials]*

SUBJECT: FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

PURPOSE: *F.B.I. F.O.S. 9/11 INTELLIGENCE - 106*  
*ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES*

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Intell. <i>woc/m</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

V-39

~~SECRET~~

*65-74480-33*

DETAILS:

REC-128

2 AUG 4 1978

This publication provides an overview of [redacted]. This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of the [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]. "FBI Counterintelligence Summary" is the successor to the publication "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis-United States (FINAL)."

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

65-74480

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

TJD:en *[initials]*  
*(7)*



ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

54 AUG 28 1978

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FBI INFORMATION ONLY

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DATE 03-16-2011~~

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**



**SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY**

**DATE: JUNE, 1978**

*check*

*[Handwritten initials]*

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

65-74480

TJD:en *en*

APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_

Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_

Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Intell. *WVJ*

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_

Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_

Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

Classified by 1929 *[initials]*  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 1, 2, and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

*PMJ*

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular issue is devoted wholly to the activities of [redacted] during the latter half of 1977 and first four months of 1978. Another publication is being prepared which will focus upon the operations of [redacted]

In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interest or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. (S)

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
TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE	
I.	1	
II.	4	b3
III.	8	b7E
	8	
	11	
	12	
IV.	14	
V.	17	
	17	
	19	
	19	
VI.	21	
	21	
	21	
	21	
	22	
	22	
	23	
	23	
VII.	24	
	24	
	25	
	25	
	26	
VIII.	28	
	28	
	30	
	30	

IX.

X.

CHART



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34

34

34

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35

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I.

The USSR divides the responsibility for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence abroad between the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). The KGB is by far the dominant service and reports directly to the Council of Ministers and sections of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The GRU reports to appropriate command levels in the Soviet armed forces as well as to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Collectively the KGB and GRU are referred to as the Soviet intelligence services (SIS). (U)

The First Chief Directorate of the KGB is responsible for the KGB's intelligence operations outside of the USSR. Its mission is thus comparable to that of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. The First Chief Directorate consists of seven Directorates and two Special Services, as well as a total of nineteen Departments (see organization chart on page 36 for the titles and heads of the various elements). Coverage of the United States is assigned to Department One, which reflects the United States status as number one target of the KGB. Of the seven Directorates--Directorate "R" (Operational Planning and Analysis) and Directorate "OT" (Technical Operational Support)--have been recently established. The new Directorate "OT" is an elevation to Directorate status of the former Fourteenth Department and, at present, there is no known Fourteenth Department. (S)

Two of the Departments are also of relatively recent vintage. Department Nineteen was established in 1975 and is responsible for emigration matters. Department Twenty was established in 1977, and its mission is similar to that of the Eleventh Department. The former is responsible for maintaining liaison with intelligence services of developing countries, whereas the latter maintains liaison with intelligence services of socialist countries. (S)

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
845

INSTITUTION AND  
LOCATION

NUMBER OF STUDENTS  
IN ATTENDANCE

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia	2
University of Texas, Austin, Texas	1
University of California, Berkeley, California	5
Stanford University, Stanford, California	4
University of California, San Francisco, California	1
University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois	1 <del>(S)</del>

(U) Hence, 45 Soviet students were located in 17  
(U) different states across the United States. ~~(S)~~




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VI.



Dead Drops



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Tradecraft



Students



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
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Shipping



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Use of Cover and Cut-outs



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X (U)

Infiltration Techniques



X (U)

Recruitment Targets




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VII. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
OPERATIONS

Dangle Operations



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Utilization of Aircraft for Surveillance



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*10/10*

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



FBI Effectiveness



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b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI



(S)

× (S)

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA and FBI  
b7E per FBI

× (S)



b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

× (U)

11/12



[Redacted]

Since the late 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations have been, to put it mildly, marked by acrimony. A new charge was, however, added to the arsenal of Soviet anti-PRC diatribes.

[Large Redacted Area]

X (U)

X (U)

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b7E

NOTE:

CI-1. Considerable material was also supplied by E Unit,

<del>APPROVED</del>	<del>Adm. Serv.</del>	<del>Legal Coun.</del>
<del>Director</del>	<del>Crim. Inv.</del>	<del>Plan. &amp; Insp.</del>
<del>Assoc. Dir.</del>	<del>Ident.</del>	<del>Rec. Mgnt.</del>
<del>Dep. AD Adm.</del>	<del>Intell.</del>	<del>Tech. Servs.</del>
<del>Dep. AD Inv.</del>	<del>Laboratory</del>	<del>Training</del>
		<del>Public Affs. Off.</del>

*Handwritten mark*

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - [ ]

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SAC, Baltimore

8/11/77

Director, FBI (65-74480)

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

Enclosed for recipient offices are copies, as indicated, of the current issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [ ] Operations in the United States."

This issue of FINAL is classified "~~Secret~~."

For the information of those offices receiving FINAL for the first time, its purpose is to periodically provide to offices expected to be engaged in foreign counterintelligence investigations significant elements of [ ]

The objective of FINAL is to furnish to interested offices these essential elements without violating the need-to-know principle which precludes broad dissemination of specific details of hostile operations and/or counterintelligence efforts against them.

Unfortunately, various other demands on the analytical and research elements of FBIHQ have, in the past, prevented the production of FINAL as frequently and in the form which was originally intended. Recently there has been some expansion of the analytical and research capability of FBIHQ and further expansion is anticipated. Accordingly,

- |                         |                                  |                                    |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Assoc. Dir. _____       | Enclosures - 2                   | 2 - New York (Enclosures - 5)      |
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| Training _____          |                                  |                                    |
| Public Affs. Off. _____ |                                  |                                    |
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| Director's Sec'y _____  |                                  |                                    |

AGP/JPT:dedded  
(43)

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

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(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
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THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI

~~Classified by 1929  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION  
WASH DC

62-74480-32 JULY 1977

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TECHNIQUES AND TRADecraft	1
Determination of Intelligence	4
Connection	7
Information Gathering	8
Some Current Operations	12
[Redacted]	13
Courier Service	13
Shipping	13
TRENDS	14
Intra-bloc Relations	14
[Redacted]	16
	18
	19
TARGETS	21
Specific Targets 1976-1977	27
ESTABLISHMENTS	34
Expansion-Security Measures	34
THREE CASES	37
[Redacted]	37
[Redacted]	38
[Redacted] and	38
Statistics as of 6/1/77	40

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
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The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [REDACTED]

(U) It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made. (S)

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
TECHNIQUES AND TRADECRAFT




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(U) Experience has shown there are personal characteristics or factors which tend to make an individual susceptible to recruitment. These include political affinity for the bloc country or disaffection from the United States; venality; vulnerability to blackmail; need for sexual and/or emotional involvement or ego gratification; excessive drinking; marital or financial problems; and vulnerability to coercion when relatives reside in bloc countries. (S)

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A dead drop is a place through which communications, materials, or equipment may be transferred from one person to another without the necessity for personal contact.  
(U)



[Redacted] ~~(U)~~

[Redacted] ~~(U)~~

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Determination of Intelligence Connection


SOME FACTORS UPON which we may base our judgment as to an intelligence connection include the following:

[Redacted]


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


Information Gathering



Topics discussed at these meetings range from fusion energy to the "Glomar Explorer," the ship which attempted to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine. ~~(S)~~

- 7 - (WFO SPIA 11/12/76, page 24)  
(WFO SPIA 2/15/77, page 26, 27)




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Some Current Operations



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(NY SPIA 5/13/77, page 11)

Courier Service



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
Shipping



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TRENDS


Intra-bloc Relations



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While it is obvious that not all clandestine activity has ceased, it is felt that the level of activity, now limited to essential contact with only the most trusted agents, will not increase until some time passes without derogatory public references to Soviet activity. (U)

(SF SPIA 5/13/77, page 2)



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
TARGETS



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And each country in the bloc has the potential to benefit not only from its own findings but also from those of its allies. (U)

Thus, while two or more countries might have rather distinct target priorities



~~SECRET~~

5. THE MILITARY - the Armed Forces of the United States; naval, air and ground bases; movement of troops, troop exercises, equipment, weapons, tactics, intelligence and morale; and military policy. (U)

IN ADDITION TO the above, the following targets are also pursued: developing contacts among workers of the United Nations Missions; penetration of the United Nations police, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Customs Office; and the obtaining of forms, documents, stationery, maps, schedules, cards, clothing, accessories and similar items needed for the support of illegals, including ascertaining the availability of housing and modes of travel. (U)

(Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, 94th Congress, 1st Session 11/18/75.)

Although this list was obtained from one defector and reflects his country's intelligence services' targets, every country discussed in this study can be presumed to have the same generic target priorities. They will vary as to the importance given to any specific target in any particular time frame. That a country's current primary target is discovering the activity of emigre groups does not mean it has no interest in penetration of the United States Government or acquisition of scientific information, nor that such penetration or acquisition could not become its primary target with the passage of time. As a government's national objectives change, so too the intelligence services' targets. (U)

~~(U)~~


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Specific targets 1976-1977

THOSE TARGETS SOUGHT by the various intelligence services listed below range from items commonly, or at least publicly available, to classified material and those on the restricted commodities list or otherwise restricted. The reasons for the tasking of an individual to obtain any one item, or related or unrelated series of items, vary from a mere test of willingness to cooperate to a test of competence in carrying out assignments to, it may be assumed, a substantial need for the item in question sufficient to warrant the risks inherent in its obtention. (U) ~~(S)~~

THE TARGET LIST which follows is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor does it necessarily fully define the current areas of interest of the country or intelligence service. It is, however, interesting, in spite of the fact that some of these targets might be shown to be somewhat dated, as it indicates areas of interest and suggests either the nature of ongoing projects within the country concerned; the state of development of a particular technology or industry in that country; or, perhaps, those items which logically will become targets of those intelligence services should these target acquisitions be accomplished. (U)



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ESTABLISHMENTS

Expansion-Security Measures


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


REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TASS News Agency in San Francisco signed a 5-year lease, commencing October, 1976, for a 2 room office adjacent to the local UPI office. They also leased a 2 room apartment for the TASS senior correspondent.

(U) (S)



(SF SPIA 9/15/76, page 12)





(U) IN AUGUST, 1976, SOVFRACHT, a shipbroker for bulk carriers, especially American grain bound for the Soviet Union, acquired new office space at 277 Park Avenue, (near 48th Street), New York, New York. (X)

(NY SPIA 9/27/76, page 14)





Referral/Direct



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~~(U)~~

(U) THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office in Chicago, Illinois, occupied its new office space, Room 911, 100 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on June 1, 1976. (S)

(CG SATPIA 7/23/76, page 7)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was arrested by the FBI on [Redacted] on charges of conspiring to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He has not yet come to trial. At the time of his arrest, in [Redacted] he had in his possession a [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] and has since left the United States. (U)

[Redacted]

On [Redacted] was arrested (on an unrelated charge) in [Redacted]. In his possession at the time were [Redacted]. [Redacted] was later returned to U. S. authorities. (U)

On [Redacted] was arrested at his home in [Redacted] California. He was, at the time, [Redacted] but had been employed as a [Redacted] and had possessed a "Top Secret" clearance which gave him access to highly classified intelligence communications, documents, and hardware. (U)

[Redacted]


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b6  
b7C

b3 per CIA  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI



After separate trials.



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b7C

STATISTICS AS OF 6/1/77

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	996
Albania	5
Bulgaria	47
Czechoslovakia	94
East Germany	65
Hungary	67
Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	141
Poland	216
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	<u>226</u>
TOTAL	1953

(S)

b3  
b7E

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
 Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Intell. *FWA* \_\_\_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
JULY 1973 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield

DATE: 8/2/77

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

FROM : [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 08-22-2011~~

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached issue of FINAL, subtitled "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States," for dissemination only within the FBI, and attached cover letter to 18 field offices transmitting same.

### DETAILS:

FINAL provides to recipients an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] No lateral dissemination of such material is made in the field. With this issue dissemination is being extended to Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Miami, and Philadelphia Offices.

### RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this issue and the cover letter will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters personnel.

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

AGP:ded ded  
(8)

### APPROVED:

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
 Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

REC-56

EX-135

65-74480

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-22-2020 BY: [Redacted]

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

17 DEC 16 1977

7 DEC 20 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C

BU 127 Y enclosure (43)  
for INTAD  
5-11-77 AGP:ded

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-09-2011~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74480)

DATE: 9/30/77

(ATTN:  Section Chief, CI-3)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-33496)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

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Re Bulet dated 8/11/77.

Referenced letter solicited the comments and suggestions of the field concerning current proposals for the FBI's Foreign Intelligence Analysis. Chicago feels there is a tremendous need for the timely publication of FINAL in a form which will materially assist us in fulfilling our foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. To this end, FINAL should be both timely, consistent and draw on both the perspective of FBIHQ and the experience of the field. (S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

65-63483-

Since FBIHQ made the decision to stop lateral dissemination of SPIA and SATPIA, there has been a serious lapse of communication among those of us with counterintelligence responsibilities. When the field stopped exchanging information, headquarters said FINAL would try to keep us abreast of important trends and developments in  operations. FINAL has largely failed to do this, in part, because of its infrequency of publication, unnecessary brevity, FBIHQ's failure to obtain contributions from the field and to some extent the use of the "ad-to-know" principal. The crux or heart of the whole matter is getting sorely needed information to the case agents in the field where the Bureau's work is being done. (S)

EX-108 REC-29 65-74480-29 23 OCT 18 1977

~~SECRET~~  
Classified by 7107  
Exempt from GDS Category 2&3  
Date of Declassification  
Indefinite

- 3 - Bureau
  - 1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
- 2 - Chicago
  - 1 - 65-4268 (SATPIA)

EBC/mmg  
(5)

*5-File-RM*



*1 cc removed & maintained*

*Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

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(U) Our specific comments concerning FINAL are these: ~~(S)~~

(U) / FCI analysis and the reporting of trends and targets should be separated from strictly training material. ~~(S)~~

(U) We have reviewed copies of FINAL which are available to this office. The July, 1977 copy is the only one we find which has been liberally filled with training material. This, in our opinion, has no place in a document devoted to analysis of past and current situations and the reporting of trends and targets of [redacted] It can, of course, be cleverly incorporated into a lengthy analytical piece to add substance and depth. ~~(S)~~

(U) / The Bureau at this point in time, should seriously review its requirements for SATPIA and SPIA and decide whether they are useful documents in their present form. Bureau letter of April 12, 1972, pointed out that the success of FINAL was dependent upon the field's submission of appropriate material through SPIA and SATPIA. This was simply another way of saying these monthly summaries of [redacted] activities would be the core or basis for the preparation of FINAL. ~~(S)~~

FBIHQ must recognize that SATPIA and SPIA do not now accurately reflect the scope of our knowledge of [redacted] activities directed at the United States and our efforts to thwart these operations. Information from the field is purposely withheld from these documents - sometimes at the direction of

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things are interrelated if, indeed they are, and how current trends are related to past operations or what we might expect in the future. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, [redacted] requirements and targets, utilization of tradecraft and new innovations by the various services. (S)

An excellent example of these so called new innovations appeared in Chicago's SATPIA letter dated April 7, 1977, concerning [redacted]

*Subject of separate paper*

[redacted] This development received only three paragraphs in the July, 1977, edition of FINAL but lends itself to a great deal more discussion. (S)

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Other field offices handling both the Soviets and satellites could benefit from Chicago's experience in this matter. [redacted]

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~~(U)~~

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~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-16-2011~~

**WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED**

**BACKGROUND USE ONLY**

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-22-2020 BY:

b6  
b7c

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~Classified by Director, FBI  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

RECEIVED  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

65-74480-26

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975

~~ENCLOSURE  
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [REDACTED] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made. (S)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION


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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

**TARGETS**

continue their efforts to obtain both classified and unclassified material. The following paragraphs describe a representative number of these targets. (C)

(U)

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


~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TECHNIQUES

(U) A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (S)




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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TRENDS




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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



b3  
b7E

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. (U)

SECRET (NY SPIA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

ON APRIL 4, 1976, THE Soviet Consulate in San Francisco received an anonymous telephone call claiming a bomb would explode in the Soviet Consulate within 30 minutes. The San Francisco Police Department responded and no bomb was found. (U)

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~




~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

ON MARCH 14, 1976, THE Soviet Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the SMUN Yakov A. Malik, was seriously injured in a car accident at Glen Cove, New York. A woman in the other car involved was killed. Malik [redacted] were taken to Community Hospital in Glen Cove. Local police said Malik's driver was not at fault in the accident. (U)

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~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt *TLW*

FROM : A. B. Fulton *ABF*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
- 1 - [Redacted]

DATE: 8/3/76

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. *TLW*
- Laboratory *RPW*
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b3  
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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-23-2011

This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events with an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO.

Enclosure  
65-74480

RPW:ded  
(7)

**ENCLOSURE**

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

[Redacted]

TLW  
ECF  
SSW  
WWR  
LBF

0-7 dated 8/1/76

SF-4  
SE-2  
WFO-5

NH-3  
NK-3  
NY-3  
PG-2  
PD-2

54 SEP 15 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-22-2020 BY: [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE (25X(1, 6))  
DATE 03-18-2011

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-22-2020 BY:

b6  
b7C

APPROVED:	Ext. Affairs.....	Laboratory.....
Assoc. Dir.....	Fin. & Pers.....	Legal Coun.....
Dep. AD Adm.....	Gen. Inv.....	Plan. & Eval.....
Dep. AD Inv.....	Ident.....	Rec. Mgmt.....
Asst. Dir.:	Inspection.....	Spec. Inv.....
Adm. Serv.....	Intell.....	Training.....

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(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

**THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI**

Classified by 4375  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

*PK*  
*JFC*

*downgraded to Secret*  
*per us 324 wa baw*  
*sab/134*

~~TOP SECRET~~

*65-14480-25*  
ENCLOSURE  
JULY, 1976

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC baw  
sab/lsg

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a  
summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of  
the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security  
and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not  
set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where informa-  
tion contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities  
of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed  
dissemination has been made. (X)


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~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per A5324 US Army  
sab/15g

TARGETS



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
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TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS

A STUDENT AT Vilnius State University in Lithuania married a US citizen of Lithuanian extraction who was attending the University for graduate study. Subsequent to the marriage the student, who had been warned not to marry the American girl, was dropped from the rolls of the University and his wife returned to the US not knowing whether or not her husband would be allowed to emigrate. (S)

(U)




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TRENDS



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× (U)

× (U)

THE POLISH SEJM (parliament) recently passed two amendments to the Polish constitution. One declaring the Communist Party as the leading party and force in Poland and the second declaring the Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries forms the foundation of Polish foreign policy. (U)

These amendments may represent the price Poland had to pay to maintain its special relationship with the West particularly the US. Those holding this view believe Leonid Brezhnev needed the amendments to show his adversaries on the USSR Politburo that despite Poland's dealings with the West she could still be trusted and is faithful to communism. (U)


(WFO SATPIA 4/5/76, page 46)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



b3  
b7E

During the first four months of 1976 there were four instances where violence was directed toward Soviet facilities located in NYC. On February 27, 1976, shots were fired into the Soviet residential complex; on March 8, 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Aeroflot Office; on March 26, 1976, there was an attempted bombing of the Amtorg Corporation and on April 3, 1976, a shot was fired at the SMUN which pierced a ninth floor window. (U)

(U) The "New York Post" carried an article which reported that the Jewish Armed Resistance, an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League, claimed responsibility for the attack on April 3, 1976. Information has been developed which indicates the Jewish Army of Resistance may be responsible for the SMUN shooting, the attempted bombing of Amtorg and the bombing of Aeroflot. (X)

(NY SPLA 4/12/76, pages 12 & 13)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 7/1/78

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b7E

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officer*</u>
USSR	860
Albania	7
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	101
East Germany	66
Hungary	67
Mongolia	8
People's Republic of China	145
Poland	222
Romania	93
Yugoslavia	<u>200</u>
TOTAL	1919

(S)  
\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

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
The purpose of this publication is to offer the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TRENDS




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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TECHNIQUES




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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TARGETS



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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~


~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

### FEATURES



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NEGOTIATIONS BY THE Bulgarians for purchase of Rosedale Campus of St. Alban's School located on Newark Street, Washington, D. C., are apparently progressing smoothly. The property consists of three three-story dormitories/general purpose buildings and seven acres of land. The Bulgarians currently have an option for the purchase of the property for approximately \$3 million.



~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW/Full*

FROM : F. J. Cassidy *FJC*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]

DATE: 2/11/76

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1) (6)  
DATE 03-28-2011

This recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States." This issue will be disseminated only within the FBI.

The purpose of this issue is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] This is being done to keep the pertinent field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries which involve Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources have been concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors and to the following offices: Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and WFO.

ENCLOSURE  
Enclosure  
65-74480

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

DKP:lfj  
(7)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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b7E

b6  
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WRW-1  
WAB-1  
SSM-1  
JWR-1  
FJC-1

1  
0-7 dated 2/17/76

FD-2  
SC-2  
SD-2  
SF-4  
SE-2  
WFO-3

CV-2  
LA-2  
NH-3  
NK-3  
NY-5



84 MAR 2 1976

~~TOP SECRET~~

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 uc ban  
sab/lsq

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-22-2020 BY:  

b6  
b7C

(Overview of   Operations in the United States)

b3  
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Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*WPH*  
*CB*  
*DP*  
*JAN*  
*DR*

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY, 1976

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*fw*

65-74480-23

down graded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60327 UC baw/sab/lsg

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3  
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The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]


[redacted] it is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC, bom  
sability

TARGETS




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TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS




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TRENDS




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- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS



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~~TOP SECRET~~

STATISTICS AS OF 1/1/76

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	1025
Albania	7
Bulgaria	58
Czechoslovakia	97
East Germany	68
Hungary	68
Mongolia	15
Poland	201
PRC	175
Romania	88
Yugoslavia	<u>185</u>
TOTAL	1987

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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3ab/13g

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ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

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(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

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MAILED 7  
NOV 19 1975  
FBI

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NOV 13 2 12 PM 1975

~~INTELLIGENCE DIV  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
TOP SECRET~~

NOVEMBER, 1975

65-74480-22

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 568

**ENCLOSURE**

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The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.

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TARGETS




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TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS




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
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TRENDS



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As a matter of interest, the starting salary for a teacher with a Master's degree in the NYC school system is \$11,550 annually. NY SPBA, 10/9/75, p. 18.



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**THE PRESENT ECONOMIC situation in Romania, according to recent reports, is worse than ever before. The people, including members of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), are disillusioned, with the general populace being openly critical and those in the RCP making their displeasure known to proven friends. There are extreme shortages of skilled labor and materials. Huge foreign purchases of industrial machinery have created immense obligations, especially to West Germany. The people feel that the forced industrialization policy which led the country to compete with efficient, established industrial countries was poorly conceived, and the excuse that future generations will enjoy a better life no longer offers satisfaction to the average Romanian living now under miserable conditions.**


NY LHM 10/7/75 captioned,  
"Foreign Miscellaneous -  
Romania; IS - RO"

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STATISTICS AS OF 10/1/75 -

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	1039
Albania	8
Bulgaria	49
Czechoslovakia	95
East Germany	80
Hungary	69
Mongolia	14
People's Republic of China	182
Poland	212
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>181</u>
TOTAL	2005



\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

### FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS UNITED STATES

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OCT 5 4 5 1980

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*[Handwritten initials]*

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DATE: 10/9/75  
VOLUME: II  
NUMBER: 4  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

65-74480 - 20




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TRENDS



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A SOVIET NATIONAL has offered a surprisingly candid appraisal of problems in the USSR. He says that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and, in Leningrad, women are afraid to go out alone after dark. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing; transportation is critically short; and, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7



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ENCLOSURE

65-74480 20

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IN APRIL, 1975, the Director of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation said that if Congress approved the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for Romania, trade with the US would go to one billion dollars a year by 1980. As President Ford during August signed the MFN Pact with Romania, there should be a dramatic increase in 1975-1976 in contacts between US businessmen and Romanian officials. NY SATPIA 8/7/75, p. 14




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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TECHNIQUES




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TARGETS



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**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

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~~Classified by 4375  
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Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*WPCW/par*  
*JBA/pur*

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**AUGUST, 1975**

*65-74480-19*


MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

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down graded to ~~secret~~  
per 60324 UK ban  
sub 164

TARGETS



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


**TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS**



~~TOP SECRET~~  
- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~



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THE USSR IS having its problems, according to a Soviet national, currently assigned in Canada, who offered a surprisingly candid description. He said that crime, especially rape, is on the increase and that women cannot go out alone after dark in Leningrad. Large numbers of Soviets are cramped together in severely inadequate housing, and transportation is critically short. Also, although education is excellent, one needs connections to get his children into the proper schools. WFO SPIA 6/13/75, p. 7

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

## STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

A REQUEST HAS been made by the Soviets for another 26,000 to 29,000 square feet of floor space on the same floor as that now occupied by the Soviet Information Center, Suite 86123, North Tower, World Trade Center, NYC. The Soviets are prepared to sign a lease as soon as this space can be made available and will probably use the space for additional offices and a display area.

NY SPIA 5/12/75, p. 28

THE SOVIET TRADE Office (SOVTRA) at 2001 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. is being remodeled and readied for business.



b3  
b7E

A RECEPTION WAS held recently by the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California, honoring World War II Victory in Europe Day. The affair was held at the Palace of the Legion of Honor and was attended by several hundred business and civic leaders as well as individuals friendly to Soviet Consulate personnel.

SF SPIA 5/16/75, p. 3

OCCUPANCY OF THE Soviet Residential Complex at Riverdale, New York, by Soviet nationals began recently. This complex, located in Bronx, New York, about 15 miles north of midtown Manhattan, eventually will provide housing for 236 Soviet nationals and their families.

NY SPIA 6/11/75, p. 25

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Statistics as of 7/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials*</u>
USSR	917
Albania	6
Bulgaria	50
Czechoslovakia	85
East Germany	45
Hungary	66
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	162
Poland	201
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>183</u>
TOTAL	1,797

\*This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. R. Wannall

FROM : A. B. Fulton

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES  
(FINAL)

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Putman

DATE: 5/20/75

- 1 - Mr. Redfield
- 1 - Mr. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle Overview of [Redacted] Operations in the United States. This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [Redacted]

[Redacted] This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved, this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

65-101 REC-20 65-74480-18

by 0-7  
5/27/75  
SJM/pld

Enclosure  
65-74480  
SJM:pld  
(7)

Wannall

5/27/75  
SJM/pld

16 MAY 28 1975

JBA/Pm

DR  
JRM

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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84 JUN 3 1975

downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 uc bow (sub) (39)

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**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

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b7E

(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

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- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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~~Classified by 4375  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

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*FBI  
per*

*Handwritten initials*

MAY, 1975


MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18

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per 40324 UC, baw  
sab/lsg

TARGETS




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ENCLOSURE 65-74480-18

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
**TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS**



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-4-

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
TRENDS



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
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


**STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS**

**THE SOVIETS RECENTLY renewed their extensive remodeling of the Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, California. In addition,**



**THE POLISH FOREIGN Trade Corporation (PEKAO) has opened an office in Chicago.**



**THE POLISH CONSULATE in Chicago, Illinois, has now completely switched its operations to its new space at 1530 North Lake Shore Drive. The old building is being made into apartments for some of the Consulate's personnel. CG SATPIA 4/4/75, p. 7**




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THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office (ROCOMO),  
Chicago, Illinois, which, it was believed, was being closed because of  
Romania's unsuccessful attempt to obtain Most Favored Nation status  
now appears to continue in operation.




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Statistics as of 5/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials *</u>
USSR	899
Albania	6
Bulgaria	49
Czechoslovakia	89
East Germany	41
Hungary	61
Mongolia	6
People's Republic of China	154
Poland	192
Romania	76
Yugoslavia	<u>179</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,752</b>



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\* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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DATE 08-17-2011~~

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

*Arch*

*JSA  
PLM*

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Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*w/cw*

*EMM*

*APR 55 5 35 PM '75*

*TWK/FSP*

DATE: 4/28/75

FBI  
CORRESPONDENCE SECTION  
REC.D

VOLUME: II

NUMBER: 3

*APR 53 8 12 AM '75*

COPY NUMBER:         

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*65-74480-16*

*[Signature]*


ENCLOSURE

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

TRENDS

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~


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ENCLOSURE


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**TECHNIQUES**




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**TARGETS**




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
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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~



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**FEATURES**



**RECENT INFORMATION SUGGESTS** that the opening of a Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, has been postponed indefinitely.  
WFO SATPIA 2/20/75, p. 19

**THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT** is anxious to start building its new chancery in Washington, D. C.; however, some problems are being encountered between the zoning office and Hungarian officials.  
WFO SATPIA 2/26/75, p. 36

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

DATE: 2/19/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Putman
- 1 - Mr. Fulton
- 1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:

- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Recommends approval of attached issue of FINAL publication bearing the subtitle "Overview of [redacted] operations in the United States." This issue will receive no dissemination outside the FBI.

The purpose of this issue, which is for internal use only, is to provide the field (only 13 offices included), through a summary of situations and events, with an overview of [redacted]

This is being done to keep the interested field offices aware of recent situations in sections of the country other than their own as there is currently no lateral dissemination by the field offices preparing summaries involving Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities (PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA). The identities of sensitive sources are concealed and information from them has been suitably paraphrased.

ACTION:

If approved this issue will be dated, printed, and disseminated only to the Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New Haven, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices and to appropriate Headquarters officials and supervisors.

Enclosure

65-74480

SJM:aso (8)

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 each to Wannall, Branigan, Cregar, Putman, Fulton

30 MAR 12 1975

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84 MAR 19 1975

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sent to CC (Enc. 4) NM (Enc. 3) PD (Enc. 3) SE (Enc. 2) 2/28/75  
 CV (Enc. 2) NK (Enc. 3) SC (Enc. 2) WFO (Enc. 6) SOM/ld  
 LA (Enc. 2) NY (Enc. 5) SD (Enc. 2) SF (Enc. 4)  
 PG (Enc. 2) SF (Enc. 4)

REC-117  
 5-74480-15  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials]



*downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 40324 UC ban  
sab/15g*

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**WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED  
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DATE 08-17-2011~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

(Overview of  Operations in the United States)

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- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*JBA  
800*  
*Ward W/Rob  
2008*  
*pm*

**THIS DOCUMENT IS SOLELY FOR USE WITHIN THE FBI**

*epu*  
**Classified by 43754  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite**

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*W/Rob  
DR  
pm*

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

**ENCLOSURE**

*65-74480-15*

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downgraded to ~~Secret~~  
per 60324 UC baw  
sab/lsg

The purpose of this publication is to afford, through a summary of situations and events, an overview of [redacted]

[redacted] It is intended solely for the internal use of the FBI. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination has been made.


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per 40324 UK ban  
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
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
**MAXWELL SMART OF television fame would have trouble topping a recent performance by an individual who walked into the offices of a large firm in NYC** 



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## TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS




A SOVIET STUDENT, while at the University of Michigan in 1972-73, established a rapport with an American and has been in correspondence with him ever since. Initially, after his return to the USSR, the Soviet's letters concerned innocuous, personal matters.

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He then requested various books of the public source variety. Finally, after the American suggested delivering the books to a Soviet establishment for forwarding in order to save on postal costs, the Soviet told him not to send any more books but added that a "neighbor" was planning travel to the US soon and would look him up upon his arrival.

*SF SPIA 11/8/74, 4-5*




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**WHILE COMMERCE AND** trade remain as high priority items of the Romanian Government, efforts in these areas have diminished with Romania's unsuccessful attempt to attain MFN status vis-a-vis the US Government. Romanian commercial offices in Chicago and San Francisco are being closed and decisions have been made to reduce the staff of the commercial office in NYC.

**EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING** to build rapport with numerous emigre groups, and interest is being directed toward increasing the exchange of delegations and academicians between the US and Romania.

WFO SATPIA 11/15/74, 45



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
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
**STATUS OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS**



**THE SOVIETS HAVE** been negotiating for a building at 305 East 45th Street, NYC, in which to relocate the SMUN, now located at 136 East 67th Street, NYC. If these negotiations are successful, the present location might be used by the ~~SOVEMB~~, WDC, to house the Soviet Consulate in NYC.

*NY SPIA 12/13/74, 24*

**BULGARIAN OFFICIALS IN WDC** have decided to approach US Department of State regarding the opening of a commercial office in Chicago and, possibly, one in San Francisco. 



**THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC Republic (GDR)** has leased the top floor of a building at 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., WDC, for use as a chancery.

*WFO SATPIA 11/15/74, 51*



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Statistics as of 1/1/75

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials *</u>
USSR	907
Albania	10
Bulgaria	52
Czechoslovakia	86
East Germany	54
Hungary	71
Mongolia	15
People's Republic of China	184
Poland	201
Romania	86
Yugoslavia	<u>182</u>
TOTAL	1,848

\* This is a generic designation used for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. These figures do not include working wives.

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2/28/75

To: SACs, Chicago (Encs. 4)  
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Los Angeles (Encs. 2)  
New Haven (Encs. 3)  
Newark (Encs. 3)  
New York (Encs. 5)  
Pittsburgh (Encs. 2)

Portland (Encs. 2)  
Sacramento (Encs. 2)  
San Diego (Encs. 2)  
San Francisco (Encs. 4)  
Seattle (Encs. 2)  
WFO (Encs. 5)

- 1 - Mr. Wannall (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Cregar (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Putman (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Fulton (Enc.)
- 1 - [redacted]

From: Director, FBI

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

ReBuairtel 2/30/74 captioned "Submission of PRCIA,  
SATPIA, SPIA and YUPIA Communications."

EX-101 REC-37 5-74480-14

Enclosed are copies of captioned publication bearing the  
subtitle, "Overview of [redacted] Operations in the United States.  
This is solely for use within the FBI, and its purpose is to provide,  
through a summary of recent situations and events, a broad perspective  
of [redacted] service activities in the United States, including  
targets, techniques and operations, and trends. This should be beneficial  
as it will periodically provide a summary of information from Soviet  
Personnel Intelligence Activities (SPIA), Satellite Personnel Intelligence  
Activities (SATPIA), People's Republic of China Intelligence Activities  
(PRCIA), and Yugoslav Personnel Intelligence Activities (YUPIA)  
communications which, according to instructions in referenced airtel, no  
longer are laterally disseminated by the field offices preparing them.

MAR 3 1975

Recipient offices should insure that this publication is made  
available to all Agents involved in the preparation of the SPIA, SATPIA,  
PRCIA and YUPIA letters as well as to those Agents with investigative

MAILED 25  
FEB 28 1975  
FBI

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- 1 - 100-354839 (SPIA)
- 1 - 65-63483 (SATPIA)
- 1 - 105-244037 (PRCIA)
- 1 - 105-31417 (YUPIA)

SJM:pld  
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Date of Declassification Indefinite

FEB 50 11 47 AM '75

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MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

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- Director Sec'y

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Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

*WRW/plm*

*WAB*

*ABF/AC*

*WAB*

DATE: 12/16/74  
VOLUME: 2  
NUMBER: 2  
COPY NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

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MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE 65-74480-12


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TRENDS

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


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
TECHNIQUES



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~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~



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TARGETS



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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

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## FEATURES

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE German Democratic Republic were recently in the US for negotiations regarding the establishment of an embassy and possibly a chancery in the Washington, D. C., area. (NY SATPIA 8/7/74 p. 3)

EARLIER THIS YEAR Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York City, celebrated its 50th anniversary as an American corporation with a reception at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. Attendance at the reception was by invitation only, and several US businessmen have since indicated that it was a disappointing, ill-planned, and poorly-hosted affair. (NYSSPIA 7/10/74 p. 29)

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THE LINE UP - 11/1/74

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>		<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	982		174	975	2131
Albania	10		0	10	20
Bulgaria	52		4	82	138
Czechoslovakia	102		8	114	224
Hungary	67		0	92	159
Mongolia	15		1	15	31
Poland	207		20	291	518
Romania	89		7	128	224
East Germany	36		4	17	57
Peoples Republic of China	185		22	6	213
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1745</b>		<b>240</b>	<b>1730</b>	<b>3715</b>

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\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

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**FBI  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS  
UNITED STATES**

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR  
F.B.I.

AUG 13 3 53 PM '74

*Handwritten initials and scribbles on the left margin.*

*Handwritten signatures and initials: "JWA", "S.W.P.", "WAB", "W.D.G.", "JWA".*

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~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3~~  
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ENCLOSURE

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- Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

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
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
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TRENDS



THE STRICT ATTITUDE of the Czechoslovak government toward issuing visas appears to be continuing as are the rules against visiting with former Czech citizens now residing in the US. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 1)




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
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TECHNIQUES




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A RECENT EMIGRE REPORTEDLY has been "pressured" into retaining Romanian citizenship as a condition for the release of his wife and child from Romania. (NYO SATPIA 5/7/74, p. 14)




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TARGETS



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THIS OBVIOUS EFFORT might have gone undetected except that the individual he approached was a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from another locale who was in the area to attend a special school.

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THE LINE UP - 7/1/74

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>		<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	793		163	881	1837
Albania	9		0	8	17
Bulgaria	40		5	76	121
Czechoslovakia	84		13	100	197
Hungary	65		1	87	153
Mongolia	6		1	16	23
Poland	187		20	288	495
Romania	80		5	130	215
East Germany	24		5	8	37
Peoples Republic of China	152		21	5	178
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1440</b>		<b>234</b>	<b>1599</b>	<b>3273</b>

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives. ~~SECRET~~

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- r. Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Gebhardt \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Thompson \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- ele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Bowers \_\_\_\_\_
- r. Herington \_\_\_\_\_
- s. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Mintz \_\_\_\_\_
- cs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

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# TRENDS

ALEXSEI KOSYGIN AND Leonid Brezhnev are scheduled to visit the United States this Spring.

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
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
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
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
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FEATURES



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New Soviet Purchasing Commission

THE UNITED STATES Government has authorized the establishment of a temporary Soviet purchasing commission in New York City to service the Kama River Truck Complex (a massive truck-producing project being built with extensive United States industry participation). Tentative arrangements provide that the commission will be set up for one year, but will be extended in one-year segments, if necessary, for a maximum period of three more years. The commission will consist of a chairman and a maximum of 15 technical assistants

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
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and staff. It will be responsible to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Soviet trade representative in the United States. The commission has signed a three-year lease for space on the sixth floor of the General Motors Building, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It will take up occupancy in this space about April 1, 1973. Since its arrival in mid-January, it has occupied temporary space on the fourth floor of the General Motors Building.

~~(UNCLASSIFIED) (S)~~

## OMNIBUS NOTES

SOVIET DIPLOMATS ARE significantly expanding public appearances in an apparent attempt to improve public relations. Most of the speeches contain little that is new, or even interesting, but the mere increase in appearances is noteworthy. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ (U)



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AEROFLOT HAS MOVED from the space it shared with Intourist at 45 East 49th Street, New York City, and is now located at 545 Fifth Avenue, New York City. (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE MARINE DIVISION of the ATC is moving from the ATC space on the 19th and 20th floors of 355 Lexington Avenue, New York City, and acquiring separate space on the 10th floor of the same building. It will also have separate telephone service. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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THE LINE-UP

3/1/73

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	691	144	802	1881
Albania	7	0	11	20
Bulgaria	38	3	64	114
Czechoslovakia	79	11	97	213
Hungary	59	3	98	182
Mongolia	5	0	11	16
Poland	147	26	238	452
Romania	76	2	122	222
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1102</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>1443</b>	<b>3100</b>

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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Baker \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_  
Gebhardt \_\_\_\_\_  
Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_  
Marshall \_\_\_\_\_  
Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_  
Purvis \_\_\_\_\_  
Soyars \_\_\_\_\_  
Walters \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_  
Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_  
Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/juraw*

DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS/ELZ*

SUBJECT: *0*  
FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ANALYSIS - U. S.  
(FINAL)

Captioned publication provides an overview of the activities of   and contains items taken from the full spectrum of our counterintelligence operations.

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- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson
- 1 - Mr.

65-74480  
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- . Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- . Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- . Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- s. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

**ENCLOSURE**

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
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# TRENDS



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
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
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TECHNIQUES




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


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
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OMNIBUS NOTES

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ALL CZECHS TRAVELING to the United States as part of the East-West Exchange Program are required to report to the Czech Embassy upon arrival. This informs the Embassy of their presence in the United States and

[Redacted]

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THE LINE-UP

11/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	787	143	759	1689
Albania	11	0	11	22
Bulgaria	43	3	69	115
Czechoslovakia	96	11	99	206
Mongolia	14	1	11	26
Hungary	68	3	96	167
Poland	173	27	232	432
Romania	82	2	109	193
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1274</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>1386</b>	<b>2850</b>

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UNITED STATES

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- Mr. Baker \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jenkins \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Marshall \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

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# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

65-74480-7

ENCLOSURE

DATE: 8/28/72  
VOLUME: 1  
NUMBER: 3  
COPY NUMBER:

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*TJS*  
*DEM*  
*WAL*  
*FWL*  
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FINAL

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on  In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

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
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
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# TRENDS



# ~~TECHNIQUES~~

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- rad \_\_\_\_\_
- bey \_\_\_\_\_
- king \_\_\_\_\_
- shall \_\_\_\_\_
- ler, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- ider \_\_\_\_\_
- ars \_\_\_\_\_
- ters \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

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
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TARGETS

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
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
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### FEATURES

### SOVIET STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Each academic year since 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained agreements whereby Soviet students have studied at colleges and universities in the United States while their American counterparts have studied in Russia. From the vantage point of 15 years' experience, there are several interesting observations which can be made. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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
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For the upcoming academic year 40 Soviet students have been proposed for study in the United States at about 20 universities and 35 of these have already entered the country. From past experience it was not unusual to note that only one of these students was pursuing study in the field of history and the other 39 were designated for scientific curricula. This apparent oversight was recently corrected when the lone history student was removed from the list of candidates by the Soviets and in his place was substituted a bio-chemist. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) (WFO airtel, 8/14/72, (U)  
Bufile: 105-116937)

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES



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
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OMNIBUS NOTES



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THE LINE-UP

8/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	619	135	710	1464
Albania	7	0	13	20
Bulgaria	38	3	60	101
Czechoslovakia	77	10	96	183
Hungary	60	3	90	153
Mongolia	6	1	10	17
Poland	134	27	209	370
Romania	66	2	107	175
TOTAL	1007	181	1295	2483

\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

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FINAL

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2. The Attorney General

Department of State

3. The Honorable, The Secretary of State

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4. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of the Army

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

6. Office of Special Investigation

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7. Director, Naval Investigative Service

Department of the Treasury

8. Mr. Dennis E. Southern, Special Assistant to the Director,  
Office of Administrative Security

Other Intelligence Agencies and Interested Government Agencies

9. Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Att: Deputy Director of Plans
10. Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission
11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security;  
Att: Mr. William F. Greeney M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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FINAL

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11. Director, National Security Agency - Director of Security;  
Att: Mr. William F. Greeney M-55
12. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

65-744807-5

ENCLOSURE

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-17-2020 BY: [redacted]

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**FINAL**

June 9, 1972

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

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
- Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Dalbey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Cleveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ponder \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bates \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Waikart \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: J, WGC, JS, EM, DEM/GCM, TSS, EWL]*

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ENCLOSURE

TRENDS




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
TECHNIQUES



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TARGETS



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## FEATURES

### PIONEER POINT SOVIET ESTATE

On 5/18/72, the Soviet Government completed purchase of approximately 45 acres of land commonly called Pioneer Point, Maryland, for reported price of \$1,120,000. The property is located on the eastern shore in Queen Annes County, and is designated on commercial maps as Corsica Neck, west of Centerville, Maryland. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Buildings on the site consist of former estate house for use as summer residence by Ambassador, a smaller building for use as summer recreation center for children, and several outbuildings including a caretaker's residence. Existing dock on Chesapeake Bay can accommodate boats of 40 feet in length and up to nine feet in draft. Soviets are negotiating for two cabin cruisers in the 27-foot range. They plan to surround acreage with high chain link fence. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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### CHINESE IN UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

Because of the increase in Chinese language work at the United Nations, the Secretariat is currently hiring and training 45 new Chinese translators and interpreters, at a cost of \$500,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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


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It was stated that their jobs should not be considered "secure" and their degree of compliance with the above conditions, especially the first, would bear on promotions and even tenure in their present jobs. The Mission was apparently under the impression it had significant, if not complete, control over Secretariat employees engaged in Chinese related work. The hiring issue has been resolved by allowing the Mission to talent-scout and recommend people for the additional positions. It is now in the process of recruiting loyal, "ideologically safe" individuals from China and the rest of the world. How far the Mission will be able to enforce its demands on Secretariat employees is yet to be seen.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Source: 62-7787-Sub 246



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


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
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
OMNIBUS NOTES

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EVIDENCE INDICATES THE Romanian Government may be in serious need of U. S. dollars. It is charging exorbitant "processing fees" for Romanian-born U. S. residents to bring relatives here, and to renounce Romanian citizenship in order to apply for U. S. citizenship. The government has gone so far as to legislatively broaden the definition of a Romanian citizen, to require more individuals to be subject to these "processing fees." (UNCLASSIFIED) Source: CG SATPIA 5/5/72 p. 14 NYO SATPIA 5/5/72 (Romanian)



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THE LINE-UP

5/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFFICIALS*</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	627	144	784	1555
Albania	5	0	8	13
Bulgaria	37	3	75	115
Czechoslovakia	77	10	91	178
Hungary	57	3	104	164
Mongolia	7	1	11	19
Poland	134	26	230	390
Romania	63	3	94	158
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1007</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>1397</b>	<b>2592</b>

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# **FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis**


UNITED STATES

DATE: 6/16/72  
VOLUME: I  
NUMBER: 2  
COPY NUMBER:     

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ENCLOSURE

65-74480-5

TRENDS



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TECHNIQUES



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Campbell	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Miller	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Bates	_____
Mr. Waikart	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- DATE: 3/29/72
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EMH*

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS -  
UNITED STATES (FINAL)

Recommends initiation of regular monthly letter  
in above caption for circulation to elements of United States  
intelligence community.

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the  
United States intelligence community a broad perspective of  
foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States  
which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on

In the interest of operational  
and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-  
know principle, information is not set forth in specific,  
detailed, documented form. Where information contained  
therein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities  
of other United States intelligence agencies, separate,  
detailed dissemination is made.

Attached is text of first issue of FINAL. Format  
is broken down into several categories, i.e. Trends, Techniques,  
Targets. As a feature of this issue, we set forth a perspec-  
tive on the recent arrest of a Soviet on espionage charges.  
As a continuing feature, we conclude with section entitled  
"The Line-Up" which tabulates legal presence of hostile intel-  
ligence in United States, broken down by countries, number of  
officials, known or suspected intelligence officers, percentage  
of intelligence officers, number of working wives, and number  
of dependents.

FINAL is intended as quality publication for highly  
selective circularization to The White House and other essen-  
tial elements of United States intelligence community. It  
will bear classification "Secret - No Foreign Dissemination."  
Upon approval, attached proposed text and format will be  
placed in finished form which will include appropriate cover  
page now being prepared.

Enclosure

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ST-114  
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ICT-57

APR 11 1972  
(74480)

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

- UNITED STATES -

FINAL

APRIL 7, 1972

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- Olson \_\_\_\_\_
- Alt \_\_\_\_\_
- Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Cosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Fuhr \_\_\_\_\_
- Hishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Miller, E.S. \_\_\_\_\_
- Mullan \_\_\_\_\_
- Nasper \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Albey \_\_\_\_\_
- Leveland \_\_\_\_\_
- Wunder \_\_\_\_\_
- Ates \_\_\_\_\_
- Alkart \_\_\_\_\_
- Alters \_\_\_\_\_
- Myers \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Olmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Andy \_\_\_\_\_

65-74480-1

Volume I

Number I

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

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FINAL

b3  
b7E

The purpose of this publication is to offer to the United States intelligence community a broad perspective of foreign intelligence operations in and against the United States which are within the purview of the FBI. Emphasis is placed on [redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Where information contained herein is pertinent to the interests or responsibilities of other United States intelligence agencies, separate, detailed dissemination is made.

EWL:kaf

SEE NOTE PAGE SEVEN

*Re 10*

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Campbell \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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
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TRENDS



SINCE THE SEPTEMBER, 1971, defection in England of Oleg Lyalin, officer of the 13th Department of the KGB


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TECHNIQUES





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TARGETS





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FEATURE

AT 7:00 p.m. on [redacted] KGB officer [redacted] a Soviet national employed as [redacted] met with an American agent at the [redacted] New York. [redacted] was pleased with the confidential material [redacted] which this agent brought to the meeting and spoke enthusiastically concerning the future. Outside the restaurant he obtained the material from the agent and placed it in a briefcase. He gave the agent an envelope containing \$650, and after a cordial exchange of farewells, the two separated. Seconds later, [redacted] was confronted by Special Agents of the FBI and placed under arrest. At this point [redacted] in a vain attempt at disassociation. He was advised of his rights under United States law, both in English and Russian, and returned to New York City. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Although this instance was marked by a degree of drama, as well as a happy counterintelligence

[Redacted]

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Since all other Soviet officials stationed in the United States are subject to reciprocal agreement restricting unapproved travel to within 25 miles of the city of employment, the freedom of travel accorded to all UNSEC employees is an advantage which Soviet intelligence has never failed to exploit. However, there is one distinct disadvantage to the Soviets of which [Redacted] became painfully aware. He does not have diplomatic immunity and is presently free on \$100,000 bail awaiting trial on espionage charges. (UNCLASSIFIED)

**OMNIBUS NOTES**

[Redacted]

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### THE LINE-UP

3/1/72

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>WORKING WIVES</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	33.85	140	804	1591
Albania	33.34	0	10	16
Bulgaria	22.23	3	73	112
Czechoslovakia	31.89	9	101	179
Hungary	40	3	100	158
Mongolia	0	1	8	15
Poland	23.62	25	216	368
Romania	36.21	4	88	150
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32.27</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>1400</b>	<b>2589</b>

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\*This is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations. The definition refers to all foreign nationals assigned to Country establishments in the United States, including embassies, consulates, United Nations missions, United Nations Secretariat employees, and employees of ancillary organizations, such as Amtorg, Intourist, Aeroflot, commercial offices, and press representatives.

**NOTE:**

Classified "~~Secret - No Foreign Dissemination~~" due to sensitivity of information and sources from which derived, unauthorized disclosure of which would cause serious damage to defense interests of the United States. See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 3/21/72, captioned "FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis (FINAL)", prepared by EWL;jan.

FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480  
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Released on Appeal Number: 11-02504  
June 1, 2023

FOIPA Number: 1145585-000

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- Page 20 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 21 ~ b3; b7E;
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- Page 24 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 25 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 28 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 29 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 30 ~ b3; b7E;
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- Page 36 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 37 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 39 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 40 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 41 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 42 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 43 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 44 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 45 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 46 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 47 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 48 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 49 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 50 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 51 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 52 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 54 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 55 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 56 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 57 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 58 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7E - Per FBI;
- Page 59 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 60 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 61 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 62 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 64 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 65 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 66 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 67 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 68 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 69 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 75 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 91 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 92 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 93 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 94 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 95 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 96 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 97 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 98 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 99 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 100 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 102 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 103 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 105 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 106 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 109 ~ b3; b7E;
- Page 110 ~ b3; b7E;
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Page 114 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 116 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 433 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 436 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 437 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 438 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 439 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 440 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 441 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 442 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 443 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 444 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 446 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 447 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 448 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 449 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 450 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 451 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 452 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 453 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 454 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 481 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 484 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 485 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 505 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 506 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 507 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 508 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 509 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 510 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 511 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 512 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 513 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 514 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 515 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 516 ~ b3; b7E;

Page 517 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 519 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 520 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 521 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA & FBI; b7E;  
Page 522 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA & FBI; b7E;  
Page 526 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 527 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 528 ~ b3; b7E;  
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**Memorandum**

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DATE 03-17-2011



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Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *LO/N*

Date 3/19/82

From : [Redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

*9 FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis*

PURPOSE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

To recommend approval of attached publication,  
"FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination  
within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated  
internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters  
personnel. (U)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_

*File 65-74480*

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr [Redacted]

TJD:emb *(7)*

Enclosure

(CONTINUED - OVER)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED**

Classified and Extended by 859  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification March 19, 2002

*ENCLOSURE*

*DE-94 65-74480-57*

**16** MAY 10 1982

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 06-07-2018 BY: [Redacted]

*705*  
**61** MAY 20 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

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DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]

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[redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign  
counterintelligence operations is also provided. This  
issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted] during the  
first nine months of 1981. Printed copies will be supplied  
when printing process is complete. (S)

(U)

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~~Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 10-16-2020 BY:   
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

**FBI**  
**Foreign**  
**Counterintelligence**  
**Summary**  
**Volume VII**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	5
	<del>8</del> 7
	<del>9</del> 8
	<del>11</del> 10
	<del>13</del> 12
II.	15
	<del>16</del> 17
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	<del>16</del> 17
Military Intelligence	21
Political Intelligence	25
Economic Intelligence	28
	<del>29</del> 28
	<del>33</del> 32
	<del>35</del> 34
III.	37
	37
IV.	<del>45</del> 43
	<del>45</del> 43
	<del>49</del> 47
	<del>50</del> 48

b3  
b7E

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~~50~~ 49

b3  
b7E

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[Redacted]

~~50~~ 51

~~50~~ 51

Defection of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~50~~ 62

b6  
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PHOTOGRAPHS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~50~~ 51

53

~~50-63~~

58-61

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States, October, 1979-December, 1981

~~67-71~~

65-69

CHARTS

Major Communist Country Presence in the United States, October, 1979-December, 1981

~~75-71~~

75-73

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Dissemination List →

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

[redacted] during the first nine months of 1981. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. ~~(S)~~


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
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


Perhaps the most significant of these involved the investigation of Joseph George Helmich, a retired U.S. Army warrant officer. After extensive interviews, Helmich was arrested on July 15 and charged with espionage; he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison. Helmich admitted passing to the Soviets in the early 1960s, for approximately \$131,000,

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information relating to the KL-7 cryptographic system, including rotors, maintenance and instruction manuals, key lists, etc. The compromise could very well have had a damaging impact on U.S. national security interests, since it is conceivable that the Soviets used the information to assist its communist allies during the Vietnam War. ~~(S)~~



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
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


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[redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the United States Department of State (USDS), [redacted]



At the same time, the USDS protested such Soviet espionage activities and demanded that they be halted immediately. ~~(S)~~ (U)



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On the other hand, during 1981 the arrest and conviction of William Holden Bell, an employee of the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, and [redacted]

[redacted] on charges of espionage, demonstrated more clearly than ever the damage that may be done to U.S. national security interests by the smaller (vis-a-vis the SIS) Warsaw Pact services. In a highly sophisticated operation, [redacted] spotted, assessed, and recruited a U.S. citizen with access to highly classified information of value to the Soviets. The Poles were willing to pay a substantial sum for the information and employed sound operational security practices. Moreover,


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
(U) In compiling the data for this section, two principal sources have been tapped--tasking of double agents by intelligence officers and general inquiries made to FBI assets by IOs. Therefore, in some cases, for reasons of operational security, specificity has been avoided. ~~(S)~~



Scientific and Technical Intelligence



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A case conducted jointly by U.S. Customs, the USDC, and the Internal Revenue Service involving a businessman named [redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those trends. On [redacted] were




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
Military Intelligence



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
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Political Intelligence




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
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Economic Intelligence



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Conclusions




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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Defection of Ramould Spasowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States

On December 19, 1981, Ramould Spasowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States, and senior member of the Polish diplomatic corps, requested and received asylum in Washington, D.C. Spasowski, 61 years old and a career diplomat, was accompanied by his wife, daughter, and son-in-law. In defecting, Spasowski stated:

"A week ago, a state of war has been imposed upon Poland, a state of war against the Polish people. Under the umbrella of the military, specially trained units and security police began an unprecedented reign of terror...I cannot have an association--not speaking about representation--with the authorities responsible for this brutality and inhumanity. I have decided this the moment I have learned that Lech Walesa was arrested and kept by force. What I am doing now is an expression of solidarity with him."

The defection of Spasowski climaxed a year which saw the defection (as well as recruitment-in-place) of a considerable number of Polish officials and intelligence officers. ~~(S)~~

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
POLAND	287
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	100
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	51
VIETNAM	12
NORTH KOREA	12
YUGOSLAVIA	154
ALBANIA	12
MONGOLIA	10
TOTAL	2,428

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

# COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,050
PRC	481
POLAND	389
GDR	135
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	98
CUBA	155
ROMANIA	89
HUNGARY	109
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	20
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	342
ALBANIA	9
KAMPUCHEA	9
LAOS	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,990</b>

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~~SECRET~~

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 1, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,113
PRC	820
POLAND	331
GDR	119
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	94
CUBA	72
ROMANIA	90
HUNGARY	114
BULGARIA	86
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	15
YUGOSLAVIA	246
ALBANIA	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,131</b>


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
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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

## OCTOBER, 1979 - DECEMBER, 1981


**TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICIALS**



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
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**OFFICIAL PRESENCE**

**DECEMBER 1, 1981**



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
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# INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE

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## DECEMBER 1, 1981



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# Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
 DECLASSIFICATION /6/81  
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
 DATE 03-17-2011

From : [Redacted]

Subject : FBI, FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 DATE 09-30-2020 BY: [Redacted]

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURES

65-74480

TJD:enb (8)

- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED  
 DE-85 (CONTINUED - OVER)

7 OCT 22 1981

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Classified and Extended by 859  
 Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
 Date of Review for Declassification August 6, 2001

79 NOV 3 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

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DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]

[redacted] This particular issue is devoted to the activities  
of [redacted]

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[redacted] during the latter six months of  
1980. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied  
when print process is completed. (C)

(U)

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~~SECRET~~

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 10-16-2020 BY:   
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011~~

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VI

*July, 1981*



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Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	4
	7
	9
	11
II.	15
	17
	23
	23
	25
	27
	28
III.	31
	31
IV.	39
	39
	39
	41
	43
	45

b3  
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 49

[Redacted] 49

b3  
b7E

[Redacted] 51

[Redacted]

Neutralization of Recruited 57

KGB Agent

PHOTOGRAPHS

[Redacted]

51

b6  
b7C

54-55

57

[Redacted]

Soviet Principal Confronted by SA

61

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-June, 1981

65-69

[Redacted]

73

b3  
b7E

CHART

Major Communist Country Presence in the  
United States, June, 1979-June, 1981

71

DISSEMINATION LIST

75



~~SECRET~~

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

[redacted] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [redacted]

[redacted] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3(A). ~~(S)~~

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The latter half of 1980 also saw the culmination of the massive influx of Cuban refugees into the United States-- eventually, the figure mounted to roughly 127,000 refugees.

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[REDACTED]


In September of 1980, the National People's Congress of the PRC formally admitted that the targets of the 1976-1985 economic plan were unattainable and announced that an entire new plan would be devised to take its place. In accordance with this new plan a number of contracts have been cancelled with the Western nations and Japan, primarily in the area of heavy industry. Cutbacks in the budget regarding the procurement of military hardware have also occurred, however, the State Council of the PRC has stated that China intends to push new programs in light industry (consumer goods, computers, microelectronics), agriculture and energy, that will require inputs of foreign technology, capital, and management skills. (U)

The U.S. Government, under the Carter administration, supported China's modernization program in consideration of China's contribution to global strategy. China's failure to modernize would erode its role in maintaining the global balance to the disadvantage of China as well as the United States and its allies. Therefore, the United States signed numerous bilateral agreements in science and technology, education, and trade and granted loans and trade credits to the PRC. This situation led to a liberalization of controls on the export of U.S. high technology items and on authorization, on a case-by-case basis, for sales of non-lethal military support equipment (trucks, radar, transport aircraft, helicopters, and communications and training equipment) to the PRC. Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous defense-related corporations seeking military-related information. (U)

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As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States.




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
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Officials Involved in Criminal Activities




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was perhaps dramatized on [redacted]

when [redacted] was arrested in New York City by Special Agents (SA), shortly after [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] a

[redacted] citizen, was allegedly tasked by the Soviets to

[redacted] (Although the fact that [redacted] was

in contact with the Soviets has been established, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] "claims" to have been so

tasked, but he conceivably could have claimed such tasking to

alleviate fears of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The case also brought to the fore an issue

which is increasingly becoming a concern of the U.S.

Government--the [redacted] to

the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. ~~(S)~~

(U)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

the individual to obtain the [redacted] The individual immediately contacted the FBI, and at this point a UCA was interjected into the case. The UCA was introduced to [redacted] as a [redacted]  
(U)

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[redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] He was sentenced on [redacted]  
to [redacted] in prison. In a [redacted] the U.S.  
Government [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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Why the Soviets would target [REDACTED] in particular, is explicable. As noted by an official of

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] offered by the [REDACTED] is, the official explained, "a drop in the bucket," compared to the millions spent by [REDACTED] in developing this type of advanced technology. The prosecution in the case estimated the value of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED]

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## APPENDIX

### COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,222
PRC	234
POLAND	271
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	107
CUBA	84
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	78
BULGARIA	48
VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
TOTAL	2,395

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NOTE: OFFICIALS IS A GENERIC DESIGNATION USED BY THE FBI FOR PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL CONVENIENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DIPLOMATIC DESIGNATIONS.

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~~SECRET~~

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

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~~SECRET~~

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE, 1981

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,041
PRC	701
POLAND	365
GDR	112
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	90
CUBA	79
ROMANIA	87
HUNGARY	107
BULGARIA	79
VIETNAM	21
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	352
ALBANIA	11
TOTAL	3,059

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
# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

## JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1981

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In April, 1981, alterations were made in the list of  and Cambodia, Laos, and Outer Mongolia were deleted. The complete  list is as follows:



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~~SECRET~~

# Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *efo/w*

From : [redacted] *efo*

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-17-2011~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

*sec*  
*efo*

*ANALYSIS*

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DE-85

V-84

*5-7441-54*

Enclosure **ENCLOSURE**

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

*65-74480* OCT 23 1981

TJD:enb (7)

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified and Extended by 859  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) and (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification June 24, 2001~~

79 NOV 2 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]

This issue is devoted to the activities of [redacted]

[redacted] during the last six months of 1980. Printed copies  
will be supplied when printing process is complete. ~~(S)~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~  
Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 10-18-2020 BY:

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~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-17-2011~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VI

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*April 1981*



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Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

b3  
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INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	4
	7
	9
	11
II.	15
	17
	24
	24
	26
	28
	30
III.	33
	33
IV.	41
	41
	41
	43
	45
	47

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	51	b3
[REDACTED]	51	b6 b7C b7E
[REDACTED]	55	
[REDACTED] Neutralization of Recruited KGB Agent	61	

PHOTOGRAPHS

[REDACTED]	55	
[REDACTED] with UCA	58-59	
[REDACTED]	61	
[REDACTED] Soviet Principal Confronted by SA	65	

APPENDIX

Communist Country Official Presence in the United States, June, 1979-March, 1981	69-73	
[REDACTED]	77	

CHART

Major Communist Country Presence in the United States, June, 1979-March, 1981	75	
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INTRODUCTION

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The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during the latter six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [REDACTED] CI-3(A). ~~(S)~~

(U)

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Additionally, delegations from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) have visited numerous U.S. military installations and defense-related corporations with almost a free hand to gain material. An interesting note to this cooperation is that

~~(U)~~

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As part of the modernization program and in tune with U.S.-PRC educational exchange initiated in 1978, approximately 6,000 PRC students are now in the United States studying and doing research in all academic disciplines in every region of the United States.


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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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# APPENDIX

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1979

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,222
PRC	234
POLAND	271
GDR	77
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	107
CUBA	84
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	78
BULGARIA	48
VIETNAM	9
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	151
ALBANIA	10
MONGOLIA	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,395</b>

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b7E

NOTE: OFFICIALS IS A GENERIC DESIGNATION USED BY THE FBI FOR PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL CONVENIENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DIPLOMATIC DESIGNATIONS.

## COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980

COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
TOTAL	2,778

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
# COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH, 1981

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COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,026
PRC	626
POLAND	369
GDR	127
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	92
CUBA	79
ROMANIA	80
HUNGARY	104
BULGARIA	83
VIETNAM	23
NORTH KOREA	13
YUGOSLAVIA	357
ALBANIA	9
MONGOLIA	14
TOTAL	3,002

# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES JUNE, 1979-MARCH, 1981

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124

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 03-21-2011

2/23/81

Director, FBI

LEGAT, London (703+0)

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SPIA; SATPIA  
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
FCI MATTER

Classified "~~Confidential~~" in entirety, unless  
otherwise noted. (U)

Re Legat London airtel 2/12/81 and Bureau A/S dated  
3/3/81 with enclosure. (U)

By above referenced routing slip, Legat London was  
furnished a copy of the current, September, 1980, edition  
(Volume 35) of the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS).  
Legat London will receive future editions of this semi-annual  
summary.

The purpose of this communication is to address the  
forwarding of copies of SPIA and SATPIA to Legat London.

A review of this matter at FBIHQ determined that the  
SPIA and SATPIA bi-monthly publications are timely, bold  
summaries of active and ongoing cases of the FBI. While  
efforts are made not to identify assets and sensitive techniques,  
sufficient detail is present on specific cases to lead to their  
identification. The SPIA summary has distribution only to  
FBIHQ, and establishment offices of New York, WFO, and  
San Francisco, upon whom these summaries have impact.

The detail reported in particular cases in the  
investigation in the U. S. as set forth in [redacted] and [redacted] is  
seen by FBIHQ as information not actually needed by Legat  
London, whereas the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
is seen to best serve the needs of the Legat since [redacted]  
forth a broad FCI view and analysis to include [redacted]

[redacted]

RLJ:smd  
(11) 65-74480 (FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY)  
100-354839 (SPIA)  
1 - 65-63482a (SATPIA) and extended by 4412  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)  
Date of Review for Extension [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

55 AUG 31 1981

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100-354839-6234  
 100-354839-6234-201  
 DIRECTOR, FBIHQ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Airtel to Legat, London  
Re: SPIA, SATPIA  
FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
FCI MATTER

Your interest in keeping abreast of current matters in the FBI field is noted by FBIHQ, and we will remain cognizant of any additional studies or publications on FCI subjects which could be of assistance to you, and will forward same where appropriate.

Inquiries and/or comments concerning the FCS should be directed to INTD, attention CI-3-A Unit.

NOTE:

This addresses Legat, London's request to receive current issues of SPIA, SATPIA, and FCS as previously indicated they should in Cregar memorandum 10/31/79, captioned "Coordination of Leads To/From [redacted] setting forth policy as pertains to Legat, London. (S)

(U) Coordination with [redacted] Assistant Section Chief CI-2, and [redacted] CI-3, has determined that copies of SPIA and SATPIA have not been sent to Legats in general for reasons to include security of the information, assets and techniques described in the documents; the fact that SPIA and SATPIA are tightly held summaries for FBIHQ and establishment office use, and are not seen as needed by Legats since the information on individual cases and trends may be too specific for a specific area (i.e., San Francisco), and not necessary for the needs of a Legat, such as London. (S)

(U) After review of this matter, it is apparent that CI-3-A Unit publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary (FCS)" clearly fills the needs and requests of Legat, London to be kept advised of current trends and interests in the FCI field, since this publication covers the broad FCI field and cites trends and major developments. CI-3-A has insured Legat, London will regularly receive copies of FCS, current copy of which is now in preparation. (S)

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume V

*November, 1980*



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TABLE OF CONTENTS




	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	5
	6
	8
	11
II.	13
	15
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	15
Military Intelligence	19
Political Intelligence	22
	25
	28
	31
	31
	32
III.	33
	33
	36
	36
IV.	39
	39
	39
	42

b3  
b7E

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	45
	45
The Neutralization of an East German Illegal	53
	56
PHOTOGRAPHS	
	49-52
APPENDIX	60-61
CHART	63
DISSEMINATION LIST	65

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. (S)

(U)

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Aside from the  case, two other significant counterintelligence actions, involving double agent operations, were initiated against the SIS in mid-1980. In May of 1980, the U.S. Department of State (USDS) lodged a strong

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protest with Soviet diplomatic officials regarding the activities of [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Following the USDS protest, [redacted] recalled by the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~ (U)

That same month, the USDS lodged yet another protest, this one relating to the activities of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was also impelled to depart the United States. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~(U)~~

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
Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban

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economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. ~~(S)~~

(U)



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
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Scientific and Technical Intelligence




his  
sets  
sources  
have been  
established

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Political Intelligence



~~(U)~~


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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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~~X~~ (U)

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The Neutralization of an East German Illegal

As detailed in the "Review" of March, 1979, a suspected East German illegal using the identity, [redacted] [redacted] (at the time of publication, for security purposes, the name "Schmidt" was used in the article) was located in New York City. He was employed by a major [redacted] [redacted] which has, as one of its clients, the United States Department of Defense; thus the firm handled some classified data. [redacted] was married to a woman who, although being a naturalized U.S citizen, is a Cuban immigrant. [redacted]

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


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APPENDIX

COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1979

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	1,217
PRC	239
Poland	287
GDR	77
Czechoslovakia	98
Cuba	100
Romania	80
Hungary	79
Bulgaria	51
Vietnam	12
North Korea	12
Yugoslavia	154
Albania	12
Mongolia	10
Total	<u>2,428</u>



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
NOTE: Officials is a generic designation used by the FBI for practical operational convenience and should not be confused with diplomatic designations.

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COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES, OCTOBER, 1980

<u>Country</u>	<u>Officials</u>
USSR	897
PRC	481
Poland	359
GDR	121
Czechoslovakia	96
Cuba	155
Romania	78
Hungary	87
Bulgaria	66
Vietnam	18
North Korea	14
Yugoslavia	324
Albania	9
Mongolia	11
Kampuchea	3
Laos	11
Total	<u>2,730</u>




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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER, 1979 - OCTOBER, 1980

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- 63 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech/Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *EJM*

DATE: 9/22/80

FROM : G. W. Pangburn *GWP*

0124

SUBJECT: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

*CIA/DIR*  
*10/20/80*  
*EN/A*  
*10/21/80*

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "~~FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary~~," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. <i>EJM</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-21-2011~~

DE-21 *15-14061-51*

TJD:enb (7)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Enclosure

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 10-19-2020 BY: \_\_\_\_\_

65-74480

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

- 1 - Mr. G. W. Pangburn
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1 - Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

*PJB*

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Classified and Extended by 1756  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification September 22, 2000



84 NOV 3 1980

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. G. W. Pangburn to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis  
of [redacted]  
[redacted] This issue is devoted to  
the activities of [redacted]  
[redacted] during the  
first six months of 1980. (X)

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 08-21-2011~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume V

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## September, 1980

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ENCLOSURE

105-11480-51

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
I.	1
	1
	4
	5
	8
	10
II.	13
	14
Scientific and Technical Intelligence	14
Military Intelligence	18
Political Intelligence	20
	23
	27
	32
	32
	33
III.	35
	35
	39
IV.	43
	43
	43
	46
	47

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b3  
b7E

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

[Redacted] 51

[Redacted] 56

[Redacted] 66

PHOTOGRAPHS

[Redacted] 62-65

APPENDIX

Communist Country Presence in the United States, June 9, 1979 71

Communist Country Presence in the United States, June 1, 1980 73

CHART

Major Country Communist Country Presence in the United States, June, 1979 - June, 1980 75

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during the first six months of 1980. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States intelligence community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly, foreign Governments. (S)

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[REDACTED]

During the initial portion of 1980, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate, largely as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Within the past year, however, there has been a marked decline in Soviet official presence. Due in part to the closing of the Soviet Consul General, New York, New York (SOVCONY), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Soviet presence has declined from 1,222 in June, 1979 to 1,116 in June, 1980. Furthermore, within the past year there has been a decrease in Soviet east-west exchange visitors to the United States, as well as a marked decrease in Soviet merchant shipping docking in U.S. ports.

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
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Cuban-American relations during the initial portion of 1980 have been greatly affected by two central elements--a stepped up anti-American propaganda campaign by Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the influx of over 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States. A stimulant to Cuban anti-American propagandizing has been a perception by Castro that U.S. hostility towards Cuba and the Soviet Union is escalating dangerously.



~~(U)~~

The refugee exodus is the result of economic, social, and political pressures that have been building since 1977. The Cuban economy has stagnated, and the already austere standard of living has deteriorated even further. Additionally, a rapidly expanding labor force has created a labor surplus, and incidences of crime, of poor job performance, and of political discontent have been on the increase. The exodus will, however, probably result in only temporary alleviation of pressures on the Cuban leadership since the country's basic economic problems are not being addressed and will continue to cause trouble for Castro. ~~(S)~~

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
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Scientific and Technical Intelligence




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Political Intelligence



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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[REDACTED]

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In February, 1980, the Government of Canada declared Assistant Military Attache [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Persona Non Grata (PNG), because of the Soviet's persistence in abusing their diplomatic status by conducting espionage activities. Concomitant with the PNG action, the Canadians released a statement for the press which detailed the abuses of the Soviets:

"The case involved a citizen of the United States, employed in a sensitive position in the U.S.A., who was in contact with the Soviet Embassy and tasked to obtain information. The R.C.M.P., with the cooperation of the FBI, monitored the case and, with the help of a U.S. citizen, determined that over a period of some sixteen months the Soviets met clandestinely with the U.S. citizen, using traditional signal arrangements and dead letter boxes, in the Ottawa area, where exchanges of information and money took place."

[REDACTED]

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## COMMUNIST COUNTRY PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 1, 1980


COUNTRY	OFFICIALS
USSR	1,116
PRC	448
POLAND	301
GDR	98
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	104
CUBA	159
ROMANIA	74
HUNGARY	79
BULGARIA	52
VIETNAM	18
NORTH KOREA	14
YUGOSLAVIA	279
ALBANIA	8
MONGOLIA	13
KAMPUCHEA	4
LAOS	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,778</b>

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# MAJOR COMMUNIST COUNTRY OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

## JUNE, 1979 - JUNE, 1980

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- 75 -



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Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
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Asst. Dir.:  
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Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

DATE: 3/28/80

FROM : J. H. Geer

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

SUBJECT: ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)  
DATE 08-28-2011~~

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

(CONTINUED - OVER)

65-74480

TJD:en (9)

- 1 - Mr. L. Colwell
- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen, Jr.  
(Attn: [redacted])
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]

- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]

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Classified and Extended by 222  
Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification March 28, 2000



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and  
analysis of [redacted]  
[redacted]  
This particular issue  
is devoted to the activities of [redacted]  
[redacted]  
during the latter seven months of 1979. ~~(S)~~

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(U)

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DISSEMINATION LIST

Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs - 1

Department of Justice, The Attorney General - 1

Department of the Treasury, Director, U.S. Secret  
Service -1; Special Assistant for National Security - 1

Director of Central Intelligence - 1; Special Assistant  
to the Director of Central Intelligence for  
Counterintelligence - 2

Department of State, The Secretary of State - 1; Director  
of Intelligence Liaison - 1; Office of East European  
Affairs - 1; Office of East Asian Affairs - 1; Office  
of American Republic Affairs - 1

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - 2

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army - 5

Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force - 1

Director, Naval Investigative Service, U.S. Navy - 1

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director  
for Operations (Counterintelligence Staff) - 1;  
National Foreign Assessment Center - 1; Executive  
Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence Security  
Committee - 1; Publications Unit - 1

Director, Division of Safeguards and Security, Department  
of Energy - 1

National Security Agency, Director - 1; M503 - 1;  
M56-1; Publications Unit - 1

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Navy  
Security Committee Member - 1

Department of Commerce, Director, Office of Intelligence  
Liaison - 1; Director of the Office of Investigations  
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Federal Bureau of Investigation

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-24-2011~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume IV

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## March, 1980



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- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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MAIL ROOM

65-74480-50

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page	
INTRODUCTION	iii	
I.	1	b3 b7E
	1	
	3	
	4	
	6	
	7	
	10	
II.	13	
	13	
	19	
	24	
	26	
	27	
	28	
	28	
III.	31	
	31	
	32	
	34	
	34	

~~SECRET~~

IV.



37

37

37

38

38

40

48

48

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



49

49

DISSEMINATION LIST

57

PHOTOGRAPHS



41-47



49

b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] during latter seven months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [REDACTED]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific detailed, documented form. ~~(S)~~

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
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During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were undermined by a number of developments, the most decisive of which was, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.




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which was dramatized in the fall of 1979 by publicity surrounding the publication of The Fourth Man, by Andrew Boyle. This book explores the lives of the infamous Englishmen

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who spied for the Soviets, Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, who were recruited to the Soviet cause when they were students at Cambridge University in the 1930s. ~~(S)~~

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[redacted] CI-1 Unit Chiefs.

[redacted]

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As reported in the "Review" of March, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish diplomatic efforts in the United States are thus centered around fostering trade and, in general, cultivating good relations between the two nations. In light of Poland's positive stance towards the United States, it is not surprising that [redacted]

[redacted]


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
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The current leadership of the People's Republic of China has launched a multibillion-dollar program to acquire Western machinery and technology to help modernize their nation's primitive industrial base. The program was initiated in February of 1978, when Chairman Hua Guofeng announced that,

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as the initial stage of the modernization plan, 120 major industrial projects were to be completed under a ten-year (1976-85) economic plan. To achieve the ambitious construction and production targets of the plan, massive infusions of Western technology and equipment will be required. The long-range objective of the program is to propel the Chinese economy to "front line" status by the year 2000.  
(U)




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
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There has long been a question over the placement of homosexuals in sensitive positions, mainly because it has been held that homosexuals are particularly vulnerable to compromise and recruitment [redacted]



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Generally speaking, the homosexuals present an opportunity for recruitment that cannot be overlooked [redacted]  
[redacted] An individual employed in a sensitive position and discovered to be a homosexual will be closely assessed [redacted] Homosexuality may, however, be

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only one of many factors that are considered. Homosexuality, combined with financial distress, drug or alcohol addiction, employment dissatisfaction, or marital discord are a few of the possibilities that may prove to be a deciding factor in a recruitment approach. The posture of the SIS vis-a-vis the homosexual was discussed by John Barron in his book, "KGB: The Secret Work of the Soviet Secret Agents" (Reader's Digest Press, 1974). Barron noted, that "contrary to popular supposition, the KGB is not primarily interested in homosexuals because of their presumed susceptibility to blackmail. In its judgment, homosexuality often is accompanied by personality disorders that make the victim potentially unstable and vulnerable to adroit manipulation. It hunts the particular homosexual who, while more or less a functioning member of his society, is nevertheless subconsciously at war with it and himself. Compulsively driven into tortured relations that never gratify, he cannot escape awareness that he is different. Being different, he easily rationalizes that he is not morally bound by the morals, values and allegiances that unite others in community or society. Moreover, he nurtures a dormant impulse to strike back at the society which he feels has conspired to make him a secret leper." (U)

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There have been a number of cases in history of modern espionage where the recruited [redacted] agent was a homosexual. Perhaps most notable were the [redacted] [redacted] Of these three individuals, homosexuality played a pivotal role in the


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b3  
b6  
b7C  
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recruitment of



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IV.



41

41

41

43

44

Security Review of Agent Operations

44

Travel by Intelligence Officers

45

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



45

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

47



47



59

PHOTOGRAPHS



51-58



59



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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to afford an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations and operational techniques is also afforded. This particular issue is devoted to the activities of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during latter seven months of 1979. For purposes of brevity, these services will henceforth be referred to as [REDACTED]. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific detailed, documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the intelligence services of certain friendly foreign Governments. (S)

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During the latter part of 1979, relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were considerably undermined by a number of developments. In late August, an incident occurred which sparked enmity between the two states. Soon after [redacted] defected in New York City, [redacted] was escorted by Soviet officials to a departing Aeroflot flight for an immediate trip back to the Soviet Union. Since it was not known whether or not [redacted] was being coerced into leaving the United States, the U.S. Government prevented the airliner from departing Kennedy International Airport. For three days, controversy ensued, until the Soviets allowed American officials on board to interview the defector's [redacted] (U)

U.S.-Soviet relations became further strained when it became disclosed that a Soviet combat brigade, made up of over 2,000 troops, was stationed in Cuba. The Soviets contended that the brigade had been in Cuba since the early 1960s, and was used strictly for training purposes. The U.S. Government differed with this contention, as elucidated by President Carter on October 1, "there is a high degree of confidence that it is not a unit with a primary purpose of training Cubans." The U.S. Government entered into negotiations with the Soviets and attained assurances from the Soviets, that, among other things, the "unit in question is a training center; that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more." To help insure Soviet cooperation, the

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United States took a number of steps, which included an increase in surveillances of Cuba and the expansion of military maneuvers in the region. (U)


But, by far the most decisive event to affect U.S.-Soviet relations adversely occurred, of course, in late December, when upwards of 85,000 Soviet troops poured into neighboring Afghanistan, to help consolidate the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime headed by Moscow protege Babrak Karmal. As articulated by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a "watershed" event, since it is "the first time since 1945 that Soviet armed forces have been used to impose direct Soviet will on a foreign country not previously under Soviet control." President Carter reacted to the Soviet invasion with a number of moves, including the postponement of consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); the halting of grain shipments to the Soviet Union; and the consideration of a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, which are scheduled to be held in Moscow. (U)



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

As reported in the "Summary" of January, 1979, Poland was the first among Eastern European nations to attempt a special relationship with the United States. Poland has held most-favored-nation status (MFN) since 1960, and trade between Poland and the United States has increased steadily. Unfortunately for Poland, its economic standing in the international community has been undermined by heavy indebtedness to the West, including the United States. Polish

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
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Travel by Intelligence Officers




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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
OPERATIONS



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



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There has long been a question over the placement of homosexuals in sensitive positions, mainly because it has been held that homosexuals are particularly vulnerable to compromise and recruitment 



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0610

- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J.H. Geer
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [redacted]

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BY LIAISON

Date: December 13, 1979

To: Commander  
Office of Special Investigations  
Department of the Air Force  
Forrestal Building  
Washington, D. C.

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DATE 03-28-2011~~

Attention: Chief, Acquisitions and Analysis Division  
Directorate of Counterintelligence

From: William O. Cregar, Assistant Director

Subject: REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to your letter dated December 3,  
1979, captioned "Release of Information," your reference  
IVOA. (U)

We interpose no objection to your reprinting  
in the "AFOSI Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" the  
article and photographs entitled [redacted]

[redacted] as sanitized  
in the enclosure to referenced letter. It is understood  
that the "~~Secret~~" classification will be maintained. (C)

(U)

Your attention is invited to the final paragraph  
of the text of the article which makes reference to "pages  
55 through 59" of the FCI Review. It is expected that you  
will desire to change this reference. (U)

62-85557

① - 65-74480 (FCI Review)

JPT:vcl/prh (9)

SEE NOTE - Page 2

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-74480

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DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED

Classified and Extended by 222  
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2) & (3)  
Date of Review for Declassification December 13, 1999

160 28 1979

55 JA

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Commander  
Office of Special Investigations

Note:

In the October, 1979, edition of the "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" appeared aforementioned article which described a double agent operation which resulted in the temporary detention of [redacted]

[redacted] AFOSI submitted a sanitized copy of the article and requested permission to reprint it in its "Quarterly Counterintelligence Brief" which is designed to provide USAF commanders worldwide significant counterintelligence information. (S)

(U)

This has been coordinated with Supervisor [redacted] CI-2. (U)

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FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480  
1145585-0 - - Section 3 Serial 1 no descriptionMedi

Released on Appeal Number: 11-02504  
June 1, 2023

FOIPA Number: 1145585-000

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Total Deleted Page(s) = 273

Page 11 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 13 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 16 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 17 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 18 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 19 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 20 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 21 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 22 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 23 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 29 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 30 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 31 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 32 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 33 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 37 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 38 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 40 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 41 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 42 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 43 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 44 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 46 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 47 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 48 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 49 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 50 ~ b1 - per Army; b3 - per FBI; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 51 ~ b1 - per Army; b3 - per FBI; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 67 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 70 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 77 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 85 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 117 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 118 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 119 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 120 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 121 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 122 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 123 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 124 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 125 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 128 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 129 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 130 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 131 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 132 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 133 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 134 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 135 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 136 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 139 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 141 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 142 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 143 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 144 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 145 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 146 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 147 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 148 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 149 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 150 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 157 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 158 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 164 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 165 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA;  
Page 172 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 173 ~ b3; b7E;

Page 180 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 181 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 182 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 183 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 184 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 185 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 186 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 187 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 189 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 190 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 191 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 192 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 193 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 194 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 195 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 196 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 197 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 198 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 199 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 200 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 201 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 202 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 203 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 204 ~ b1;  
Page 211 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 213 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 215 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 216 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 217 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 218 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 219 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 220 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 221 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 222 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 225 ~ b1 - per Army;  
Page 230 ~ b1 - per Army;  
Page 236 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 243 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 244 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 246 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 247 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 248 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 249 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 279 ~ b6; b7C;  
Page 284 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 297 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 299 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 301 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 302 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 303 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 304 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 306 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 310 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 311 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 312 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 313 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 314 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 315 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 316 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 317 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 318 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 319 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 320 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 321 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 322 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 324 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 325 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 326 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 327 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 328 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 329 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 330 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 331 ~ b3; b7E;

Page 332 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 333 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 334 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 335 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 343 ~ b1 - per Army; b3 - per FBI; b6 - per FBI; b7C - per FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
Page 345 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 362 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 366 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 374 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 377 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 378 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 381 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 382 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 383 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 384 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 385 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 386 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 387 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 388 ~ b1 - Per Army; b3 - Per FBI; b6 - Per FBI; b7C - Per FBI; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 389 ~ b1 - Per Army; b3 - Per FBI; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 390 ~ b1 - Per Army; b3 - Per FBI; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 391 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 393 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 394 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 395 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 396 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 397 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 398 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 399 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 400 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 401 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 402 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 403 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 404 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 405 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 406 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 407 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 408 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 409 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 410 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 411 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 412 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 413 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 414 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 415 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 417 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 418 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 419 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 420 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 421 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 422 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 423 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 424 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 425 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 426 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 427 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 428 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 429 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 430 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 431 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 433 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 434 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 435 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 436 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 437 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 446 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 447 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 449 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 450 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 451 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 468 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 474 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 477 ~ b1 - Per ARMY; b3 - Per FBI; b7E - Per FBI;

Page 478 ~ b1 - Per Army; b3 - Per FBI; b7E - Per FBI;  
Page 486 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 487 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 488 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 489 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 490 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 491 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 492 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 495 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 499 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 503 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 504 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 509 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 510 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 521 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 523 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 526 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 532 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 541 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 543 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 545 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 547 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 559 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 560 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 563 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 564 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 565 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 566 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 567 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 568 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 569 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 570 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 571 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 573 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 574 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 576 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 580 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 581 ~ b3; b7E; Referral/Direct;  
Page 582 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 583 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 584 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 585 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 586 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 587 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 588 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 589 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 590 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 591 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 592 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 593 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 599 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 600 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 601 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 602 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 603 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 604 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 605 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 606 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 607 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 608 ~ b3; b7E;

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- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley *ESOP*

Date 7/25/85

From :  *VK*

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~

VOLUME XI

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This communication is classified "Confidential" in its entirety.

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review" for dissemination to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated externally to individuals and elements listed on attached dissemination list.

DE-60 65-74480-65

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____	Insp. _____
Exec AD-LES _____	Intell. _____
	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Tech. Servs. _____
	Training _____

AUG 28 1985

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011~~

Enclosure ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

~~IT MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR~~

JAN 10 1986

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*[Handwritten signature]*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

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b7C

DETAILS:

The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review"  
provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] It is for dissemination  
externally to individuals and elements listed on attached  
dissemination list. Printed copies will be distributed when  
printing process is completed.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-08-2011~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT (U)  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 10-28-2020 BY:   
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME XI

This communication is classified "~~Secret/Orcon~~" in its entirety.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~EXEMPTION~~

65-74480-65

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 200px; width: 100%;"></div>	
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	23
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 280px; height: 20px;"></div>	23
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 280px; height: 20px;"></div>	27
of an <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 15px;"></div> Agent Neutralization	29
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 300px; height: 15px;"></div> Arrest	34
and Conviction of a <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 15px;"></div> Agent	34
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 25px;"></div>	

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]


[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3 Section, B Unit.

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
The expulsion of nearly 150 Soviet officials worldwide in 1983 was directed primarily at those engaged in S & T intelligence collection. Many of those expelled, including two from the United States, were KGB Line X officers. These expulsions, even when coupled with strained U. S. - Soviet relations, do not appear to have had a significant effect on Line X activities in the United States. It would seem that there would be a disruptive effect upon SIS operations when a KGB officer is forced to depart unexpectedly, since it frequently requires several months to arrange for a replacement. The FBI has, however, not detected any activity which might be construed as compensating for the expulsion of an officer. This may be explained in part by the fact that the broad S & T requirements can often be satisfied through the acquisition of unclassified information. Furthermore, targeted material can be acquired outside the United States under more favorable operating conditions, or inside the United States by Warsaw Pact intelligence services.

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Active Measures

During the first week in July, 1984, allegations surfaced that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) had sent a letter to the Olympic Committee of Zimbabwe, threatening violence against its Olympic teams. Shortly thereafter, similar letters containing threats, racist, and derogatory language were received by other African and Asian countries. Countries known to have received the letters are Ghana, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, Burma, Japan, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China (PR C).



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
Top-level leaders of the different factions of the KKK were interviewed by the FBI. They categorically denied any knowledge of the letters and pointed out many discrepancies in the logo appearing on the letters.

The words and phrases used in the purported Klan letters are not colloquial English and are characteristic of nonnative use of the English language. In addition, the timing of the mailing of the letters to coincide with the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Malaysia is indicative of a desire to make the most of these circumstances for propaganda purposes. During this visit, Tass published an article saying that the KKK has "expressed in an extremely base manner what the architects of American Policy have in their mind." The article said that the Reagan administration "has mounted such ferociously anti-socialist activities as has made participation of sportsmen from Socialist countries in the Los Angeles Olympics impossible."

~~SECRET~~

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It is clear that the news release was part of a preconceived plan on the part of the Soviets to immediately publicize material that would support their decision to boycott the Olympics and imply that the letters are in some way connected with President Reagan's foreign policy.



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All the pieces of the investigative puzzle seemed to fit.

[REDACTED]

For arrest purposes, it was now necessary to catch [REDACTED] flagrante delicto with classified material, or at least locate documents in his possession.

The FBI's technical coverage provided the answer to this problem.


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


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In conclusion, U. S. army analysts have described the damage caused by [redacted] espionage involvement with the [redacted] as



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[REDACTED]

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the forefront as a result of the murder of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Within a month of the murder, FBI investigations had developed five suspects all of whom belonged to the [REDACTED]. Further investigation revealed that officers of the [REDACTED] had been in contact with [REDACTED] and had tasked gang members to murder [REDACTED] since the [REDACTED] had received information that [REDACTED].

Eventually, the Government [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for complicity in the murder plot, all of whom were tried and convicted on charges of murder [REDACTED].

Although the [REDACTED] Government denied any involvement in the murder of [REDACTED] the incident has become a cause celebre, and has spurred protests from members of the United States Congress and the Chinese-American community.

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214

# Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 5/24/85

From : [Redacted]

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel.

APPROVED: (U)

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
		Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

(U)

65-14400-64

Enclosure

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

65-74480

(CONTINUED - OVER)

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

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DATE 03-28-2011~~

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Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR

68 DEC 18 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary  
65-74480

DETAILS:

The "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary" provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted] It is solely for dissemination within the FBI. Printed copies will be distributed when printing process is completed.

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# Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Asst. Dir.:
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- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/9/84

From :

[Redacted]

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

*FCIR Foreign Intelligence Community*

This memorandum is classified "Secret" in its entirety.

### PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

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### RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to designated members of the Intelligence Community.

*(Handwritten initials)*

### Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. [Redacted]

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

DMS:jyl  
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ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

DETAILS:

This study provides an overview and analysis of

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

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DATE 10-29-2020 BY:

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME X

October 1984

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in  
~~its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

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Declassify on: OADR~~


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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . .iii



b3  
b7E

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted] CI-3A. ~~(S)~~

NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of August 1984.

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In [redacted]

[redacted] in the United States. [redacted] went  
[redacted] was learned by the news media;  
but in early [redacted] an unrelated FBI investigation developed  
information that several pro-PRC Chinese-Americans were

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[redacted] It is not clear that the Chinese-Americans planned  
this at the behest of Chinese diplomats, but investigation

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indicated that some PRC diplomats were at the least aware of  
[redacted] IOs from the [redacted] Government also became involved  
in the [redacted]

[redacted]


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~~SECRET~~



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Since the closure of most Nicaraguan Consulates in June 1983, the NIS appears to be utilizing the Nicaraguan solidarity groups more extensively. The groups most frequently used are the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, and various local groups. The above two groups seem to be specifically designed to influence U.S. policy and public opinion on Central

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America. The National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan people is funded in part by contributions from approximately 60 local groups, churches, and public foundations. CISPES is a federation of approximately 300 local organizations which support the Salvadoran opposition through demonstrations, teach-ins, and publications. They are active on university campuses and are supported by individual contributions and foundation grants.



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Silicon Valley

The Silicon Valley, an area of high technology in Santa Clara County near San Jose, California is of continuing interest to [REDACTED]. There are more than 300 firms in this area that have DOD contracts and have personnel with national security clearances and facilities approved for maintaining national security classified information. These manufacturers produce a large portion of American high-tech material, such as semi-conductors, guided missiles and space vehicles. They also produce engineering and scientific equipment and surgical and medical instruments.

[REDACTED] could also target major military facilities located near the Silicon Valley area. Such facilities include Moffett Field Naval Air Station (anti-submarine warfare regional center), U.S. Air Force Facility, Sunnyvale (satellite servicing center), Defense Language Institute (DOD Language Training Center), etc.

Also located nearby are research and/or educational institutions involved in classified or highly technical studies. Such institutions include Stanford University, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, NASA-Ames Research Center and the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

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[REDACTED]

b7E

[REDACTED] THE ARREST OF AN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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On [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was arrested by  
the FBI and indicted on charges of espionage. The arrest of  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of a  
[REDACTED] in the United States.

The operation began in early [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] a  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] had previously been spotted  
and assessed in a classic recruitment scenario. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In  
return [REDACTED] offered to pay, and in fact did pay [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] then  
encouraged [REDACTED] to obtain employment with a  
firm which held contracts with the DOD. Instead, the American  
obtained employment with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] continued to task the  
American to obtain unclassified documents.

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

[Redacted]

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

12 Oct. 83

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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FORWARDED

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[Redacted]

Intelligence Division  
FBI

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- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 9/26/83

From :

[Redacted]

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~

~~This communication is classified "Confidential" in its entirety.~~

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved for dissemination, as detailed on enclosed list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

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DATE 03-28-2011~~

Enclosures - 2

65-74480

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

TJD:bjh (8)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

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~~Classified by 859  
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

17 JAN 4 1985

4 APR 14 1985

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*DESTROY  
CO, NIS, KAW/BA  
TS/SW*

*2. [unclear]*

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

[Redacted]

*(initials)*

*(handwritten initials)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and  
analysis of [redacted]

[redacted] Printed copies  
of this publication will be supplied when printing process  
is completed.

b3  
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b7C  
b7E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

[redacted]

CI-3B. ~~(C)~~

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(U)

PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] . . . . . 46-47  
Interdiction of [redacted] . . . . . 54-55



b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

DISSEMINATION LIST . . . . . 63

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . iii



b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS . . . . . 41

[Redacted] Arrest and Conviction  
of an Agent of the [Redacted] . . . . . 41

Counterintelligence Actions . . . . . 52

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b7C

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 26, 1983

This communication is classified "~~Secret - ORCON/NOFORN~~"  
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
(5-74)

CLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET - ORCON/NOFORN~~

Soviets) and in [redacted]  
unauthorized contact with the Soviets. The case is very much  
similar to the recent case involving [redacted]  
(see the last issue of the "Review;" a more detailed account of  
the [redacted] case will be included in Volume X of the "Review").



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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

[Redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

On August 3, 1982, [Redacted] a naturalized United States citizen [Redacted] was sentenced to 15 years in a Federal prison on charges of espionage. [Redacted] an agent of the HIS had been arrested by the FBI four months previously, [Redacted]

b1 per Army

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

(S) [Redacted] The arrest and conviction [Redacted]

(S)

(S) [Redacted] the first time an espionage conviction has been obtained against an HIS operative.

b1 per Army

[Redacted]

(S)

The Arrest

b1 per Army

(S)





(S)



b1 per Army

(S)

During the meeting  an individual later identified as



b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

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
[redacted] was interviewed on two occasions by SAs of the NYO. He said he made the purchases at the behest of an individual known only as [redacted] whom he had met in Europe. He further said that since immigrating to the United States in 1964 he had travelled [redacted] at least 30 times.

b6  
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In April, 1982, he was to be arrested on espionage charges. After his arrest, [redacted] realized that the prosecutive case against him was strong. He thus pled guilty on July 1 and was sentenced to 15 years in a Federal penitentiary. Shortly before his sentencing, he submitted to an extensive interrogation.

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Spinoffs [redacted]

b1 per Army


(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

[redacted]



There remained one further subject associated with




Aftermath

b1 per Army

Based upon information [redacted]

(S) [redacted] it is apparent [redacted] officials were quite angered and disturbed by the arrest [redacted] and the neutralization of its [redacted] agents in Western Europe. [redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI



Summary and Conclusion

b1 per Army

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1 per Army  
b3 per FBI  
b7E

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]


Counterintelligence Actions

b3 per FBI  
b7E

During the past year a significant number of counterintelligence actions were initiated against  some of which involved the expulsion of IOs. They are as follows:


Soviet Intelligence Services

Referral/Direct




Referral/Direct

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b3 per FBI  
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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume IX

~~6-1-89  
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Paragraphs 1 and 3 are  
not pertinent per  
paragraph C of  
stipulation dated 4-28-84.

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~~6-1-89  
Classified by 152580e/etj  
Declassify on: OADR  
Para. 2 only reviewed~~

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Immediately following the arrest [redacted] the address and telephone number were both provided by the FBI [redacted] [redacted] which commenced an investigation.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 8/29/83

From :

[Redacted] *JTK*

[Redacted]

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of enclosed publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

*[Handwritten signatures]*

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. <i>[Signature]</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

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DATE 03-28-2011~~

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2 JUL 23 1984

Enclosure

TJD:prh (7)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

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68 AUG 9 1984

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
RE: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary

DETAILS:

This semiannual publication provides an overview  
and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] detailing of key FBI foreign  
counterintelligence operations is also provided. Printed copies  
will be supplied when printing process is complete.

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

AUGUST, 1983

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~~its entirety~~, unless otherwise indicated.

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~~INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
Classified by 859 CIA  
Declassify on: OADR~~


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . iii



IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS . . . . . 41

[redacted] Arrest and Conviction  
of an Agent of the [redacted]  
[redacted] . . . . . 44

Counterintelligence Actions . . . . . 53

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
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PHOTOGRAPHS

Arrest of [redacted] . . . . . 46-47

[redacted] . . . . . 49

Interdiction of [redacted] . . . . . 54-55



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~~SECRET~~

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

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[redacted] CI-3B. ~~(S)~~

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
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Another key development is that since January, 1983, a total of about 70 Soviet officials have been expelled from countries of the industrial West, including one from Japan-- the first time a Soviet had been expelled from that country for espionage since World War II. Multiple, seemingly coordinated expulsions should send the Soviets a clear message that their intelligence activities have exceeded acceptable levels. In the case of the United States, this message applies to S & T collection and active measures (see Section IV for information on this topic). Based on past experience, we would expect Soviet intelligence officers to exercise caution in continuing intelligence related contacts and to institute selective counterintelligence and security measures to test their sources and developmental contacts. It is expected that Soviet intelligence officers will resume their aggressive collection activities with little change in their methods once the current expulsion issue cools.

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
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In early 1983, officials at the U. S. Department of State (USDS) formally protested the type of activity described above to a senior official at the PRC Embassy. In a separate incident, USDS officials also protested the activities of a San Francisco Consulate official (see Section IV for more on this topic).




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
[redacted] That agent, identified [redacted]  
[redacted] was arrested by the FBI, later pled guilty and  
was sentenced to 15 years in prison (see Section IV). As a  
result of this incident, the FBI anticipates that the [redacted] will  
revert to its practice of avoiding meets in the United States.

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 Two known CuIS IOs were expelled for their involvement in clandestine intelligence activity (see Section IV). In addition, the U. S. Department of State has recently imposed a 25 mile travel restriction on official Cuban representatives assigned in New York City. It is speculated that such a move will force Cubans to arrange for more clandestine meets in New York City.

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
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GOC involvement in narcotics trafficking has enjoyed tremendous media attention in recent months. Various allegations have surfaced which indicate that the GOC has provided safe haven in Cuba to narcotics traffickers in exchange for a service charge and to some extent, the support of guerrilla insurgency in Latin America.

In examining the available information/allegations regarding the likelihood that the GOC is involved in narcotics trafficking, it must be said that there are ample motivations for the GOC to become involved: a desire to support insurgency in South and Central America; a dire need to obtain hard currency to offset economic woes; and possibly an attempt to subvert U. S. society by making narcotics more readily available.

Various reporting suggests that the GOC is certainly capable and willing to engage in illicit narcotics trafficking; however, the bulk of reporting regarding the GOC role stems from individuals closely associated with one particular case and does not further establish a widespread Cuban involvement.

Although many drug traffickers in the Miami area are of Cuban extraction evidence is not available to indicate that these individuals are operating in concert with the GOC. Investigations are continuing regarding certain individuals who have been implicated as part of the Cuban connection. One



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
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In the overview, we can speculate that the GOC has participated in and benefited from narcotics trafficking throughout the Caribbean. Considering the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the increasing volume of narcotics activity in the Caribbean, and the potential benefits to the GOC from its participation, it appears feasible and likely that the GOC's involvement will continue.

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policy posture maintained by the United States vis-a-vis Poland. Finally, there has been some very recent targeting related to Poland's ongoing financial crisis. Efforts have been made in Washington and New York City to determine American views regarding the ability of Poland to meet its massive debts.




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
b1 per Army

(S)

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b1 per Army



(S)

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[redacted] was interviewed on two occasions by SAs of the NYO. He said he made the purchases at the behest of an individual known only as [redacted] whom he had met in Europe. He further said that since immigrating to the United States in 1964 he had travelled [redacted], at least 30 times. Based on this information, the [redacted] matter was elevated to a [redacted] investigation in January, 1982.

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
Just over three months later, he was to be arrested on espionage charges. After his arrest, [redacted] realized that the prosecutive case against him was strong. He thus pled guilty on July 1 and was sentenced to 15 years in a Federal penitentiary. Shortly before his sentencing, he submitted to an extensive interrogation.

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b3 per FBI  
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There remained one further subject associated with




Aftermath

b1 per Army

Based upon information gleaned [redacted] (S)  
(S) [redacted] it is apparent [redacted] officials were quite angered  
and disturbed by the arrest [redacted] and the neutralization  
of its [redacted] agents in France. [redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b6 per FBI  
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b7E per FBI



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


b3 per FBI  
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Summary and Conclusion

b1 per Army

(S)



(S)



b1 per Army


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b1 per Army

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**UNITED STATES**  
**OCTOBER, 1980 - JUNE, 1983**



10/10/83

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DATE 03-29-2011~~

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of  
[redacted] information. This is particularly true when one calculates  
[redacted] the amount expended by the Soviets in terms of what the dollar  
[redacted] was valued at in the early 1960s (at the dollar's current  
[redacted] value, [redacted] was paid the equivalent of over [redacted]  
[redacted] the amount paid [redacted] FBI exceeds that  
[redacted] given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases  
(e.g. during the 1970s) [redacted]

b6 per FBI  
b7C

Referral/Direct

[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

b3 per FBI  
b7E  
Referral/Direct

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65-17780-60

# Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date: 2/15/83

From : [Redacted]

FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Subject: ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW VOLUME VIII~~

JANUARY, 1983

PUBLICATION

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

10/4/85  
Classified by SP4ELW/KFA  
Declassify on: OADR  
#261,612

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review," for dissemination to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House intelligence committees. (U)

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and dissemination, as detailed on attached list, to elements of the United States Intelligence Community and the Congress. (U)

<b>APPROVED:</b>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

Enclosures - 2 ENCLOSURE

65-74480

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. J. L. Tierney
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1) DATE 03-28-2011~~

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Classified by 1541  
Declassify on: OADR

(CONTINUED - OVER)  
65-74480-59  
DE-82

MAR 21 1983

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724  
71 APR 28 1983



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis

[redacted]

This particular issue is devoted to the activities of the hostile intelligence service during the latter half of 1982. Printed copies of this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)  
DATE 03-03-2011

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-16-2020 BY:   
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

VOLUME VIII

January, 1983

This document is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety,  
unless otherwise indicated.

~~10/4/85 multiple sources~~  
~~Classified by SP4ELW/KFA~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR # 261,612~~  
~~Declassified Army information~~  
~~on page #64 per Army Let, 11/18/85.~~  
~~SP4ELW/KFA 12/5/85~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

~~Classified by 1541~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

FOI/PA #	261,612
APPLICANT	
SERIAL NO.	
E.O. #	12356
DATE	10/4/85
INITIALS	KFA

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- (S-1) = ARMY
- (S-2) = Customs (Treasury)
- (S-3) = Air Force
- (S-4) = ...

~~SECRET~~

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION 63

[Redacted]

63

70

PHOTOGRAPHS

Interdiction of [Redacted]

4

[Redacted]

13

63

70

[Redacted]

DISSEMINATION LIST

77

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INTRODUCTION

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The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semiannual basis, an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [redacted]

[redacted]

CI-3B.


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~~(S)~~ (U)

[redacted] A GRU officer, [redacted]

energetically pursued the development of a social relationship with an American. ~~(S)~~ (U)

After learning, through an acquaintance, that the American had access to classified U. S. military information, [redacted] tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of [redacted] the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to [redacted]. Two days later, [redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the U. S. Department of State (USDS). [redacted]

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(U) ~~(S)~~ Joseph George Helmich, Jr. ~~(S)~~

(U) On September 28, 1981, during the sixth day of his trial, Joseph George Helmich, Jr., pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy. On October 16, Helmich was sentenced to life in prison. Helmich had been arrested by the FBI on July 15, following a series of interviews in which he admitted cooperation with the Soviets in the early 1960s. For a payment of \$131,000, Helmich passed to the Soviets extremely sensitive and vital information relating to the KL-7 cryptographic system (which at that time, was widely used by the U. S. military), including rotors, key lists, maintenance and instruction manuals, etc. Although Helmich was brought to justice, it is without doubt that he had already done great damage to U. S. national security interests. ~~(S)~~

(U) [ Joseph George Helmich, Jr. ] ~~(S)~~

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The origins of the case date back to the pre-1980s, when information surfaced that the Soviets had developed a highly valuable agent during the period 1964-1965. Among other things, it was learned that the agent had been a member of the U. S. army, had access to communications, and had most probably been assigned to a position in France. (S)

(U) Subsequent U. S. Army investigations narrowed the list of suspects to one man, a former Warrant Officer named Joseph George Helmich, Jr. From 1959 through 1963, Helmich had served in a signal unit in France, as a Classified Document Custodian with "Top Secret" cryptographic access. In 1964, Helmich had fallen under suspicion, since he had adopted a life-style far beyond the financial means of the average Warrant Officer (e.g. he owned two Jaguar sports cars). Helmich claimed that he had gained the additional finances through gambling and other means, and he agreed to take a polygraph examination to prove the veracity of his explanation. (S-1)(S)(U) Declassified per Army let, 11/18/85. SP4ELW/KFA 12/5/85

Four days later, however, he refused to take the polygraph examination. He was then assigned to a position where his access to classified information would be tightly restricted. After Helmich's life-style provoked yet another security investigation (this inquiry was spawned by the discovery that Helmich had fallen heavily into debt--his period of financial prosperity had been of short duration), his security clearance was completely removed and soon after, in November, 1966, he resigned from the U. S. Army. Helmich then entered a career which saw the ex-Warrant Officer drift from one menial job to another. (S-1)(S)(U) Declassified per Army let, 11/18/85. SP4ELW/KFA 12/5/85

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Although Helmich was tentatively identified as the Soviet agent, for various reasons it was decided not to pursue the case any further. The case was therefore held in abeyance until March, 1980. It was then decided that it should be determined if Helmich was in fact the Soviet agent. On February 12, 1980, [redacted] was launched relative to Joseph George Helmich, Jr. ~~(S)~~

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Coincidentally, just three months after the investigation was initiated [redacted]

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[redacted] Further investigation revealed that the American was Helmich. Since Helmich (who now lived in Aiken, South Carolina, where he was employed as a car salesman) was at this time experiencing financial difficulties, it was quite conceivable that he had contacted the Soviets to solicit monetary assistance or to arrange a defection to the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

Soon after it was decided to contact Helmich directly and confront him with an interview. In August, 1980, Helmich was contacted at his place of employment and informed that the FBI would like to interview him regarding his contacts with Soviets. Helmich agreed to meet with the FBI that evening. ~~(S)~~

During the initial interview, Helmich admitted that he had first contacted the Soviets as early as 1962 and that he had received \$20,000 in payments from the Soviets, but he maintained that he had not compromised any classified ~~(S)~~


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


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information. He voluntarily submitted to numerous additional interviews, but the information he provided was riddled with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. ~~(S)~~

(U) Eventually, however, Helmich recounted the full details of his espionage activities. Throughout his tour of duty in France, Helmich had continual financial difficulties, and in particular, was constantly being reprimanded for passing checks, not backed by sufficient funds, at various military clubs. Finally, in early 1963, he was told by his commanding officer that unless he resolved approximately \$500 to \$700 worth of bad checks, he would be court-martialed. Unable to acquire a bank loan and faced with a one day deadline to pay his debt, Helmich decided to turn to the Soviets for financial assistance. ~~(S)~~

Helmich probably did not realize the full bartering value of the product he had at his disposal. Helmich was assigned 

  
As a Warrant Officer, Helmich was afforded all the necessary clearances and had access to all communications equipment including card keys and card blocks, keying lists, operations manuals, 

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Helmich, possessing a sample of the type of information he had for sale, visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris and told the Soviets where he was assigned. Needless to say, the Soviets readily agreed to deal with him and a meeting was set up for the next day. For the next few weeks (Helmich was due shortly to be transferred to Ft. Bragg, North Carolina) he met with the Soviets on several occasions and provided them with a bounty of information relating to [redacted]

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[redacted] Helmich also sold the Soviets an assortment of documents relating to the [redacted]

(U)

Upon being transferred to Ft. Bragg, Helmich continued to provide the Soviets photographs [redacted] [redacted] and to this end travelled to both France and Mexico City to rendezvous [redacted]. The value the Soviets placed upon the material was evident. Aside from paying Helmich roughly \$131,000, Helmich was told that, due to his achievements, he had been promoted [redacted] in the Soviet Army and that he had been awarded a First Class Hero's Medal of the Highest Order. ~~(U)~~(S)

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The Soviet appreciation for Helmich evaporated following his difficulties with U. S. Army security investigators, and especially after he no longer had access to classified data. In 1967, shortly after he had left the Army, Helmich attempted to recontact [redacted] but to no avail. [redacted]

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(U) There were a number of possible barriers to a successful prosecution of Helmich. One was the statute of limitations. But there is another statute (relative to capital offenses) which states that an indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation. Helmich faced such an indictment. ~~(U)(S)~~

Another difficulty related to the sensitive nature of some of the evidence that could be used in a Helmich prosecution. This included the information obtained from the [redacted] as well as possible testimony by the [redacted] which could detail why Helmich's espionage activities were so damaging to U. S. national security interests. [redacted]

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[redacted] agreed to cooperate with the prosecution,


~~(U)~~

(U) Helmich's defense counsel was therefore confronted with an imposing prosecutive case, most of which had been constructed with evidence provided by Helmich (which was admissible since all of Helmich's interviews had been voluntary). Helmich decided to plead guilty, after it was agreed that he would be charged with only one count in the indictment (conspiracy). ~~(U)(S)(K)(S)~~

Although Helmich was sentenced to life in prison, he had already done severe damage to U. S. national security interests. This is particularly true since his activities on behalf of the Soviets had gone undetected for 17 years. [redacted]

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


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Whatever use the Soviets made of the Helmich windfall, the case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s

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# Memorandum



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

Date 1/3/83

From :

Subject : ~~FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE~~ SUMMARY VOLUME VIII  
FBI Foreign Intelligence Analysis

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated. (U)

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary," for dissemination within the FBI. (U)

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved and disseminated internally to 59 field offices and appropriate Headquarters personnel. (U)

*[Handwritten signatures]*

<b>APPROVED:</b>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. <i>[Signature]</i>	Training _____

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 -
- 1 -

- 1 -
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TJD:pmc (7)

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 03-28-2011~~

~~Classified by 1541  
Declassify on: OADR~~

5-79480  
File

DE-105 65-74480-58X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary, Volume VIII

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis

[redacted]  
[redacted] Detailing of key FBI foreign  
counterintelligence operation is also provided. Printed  
copies will be supplied when printing process is complete. ~~(S)~~

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Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 12-03-2020 BY:   
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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 8)  
DATE 02-22-2011~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume VIII

December, 1982



Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION	63
Joseph George Helmich, Jr.	63
[REDACTED]	73
PHOTOGRAPHS	
Interdiction of [REDACTED]	4
[REDACTED]	13
Joseph George Helmich, Jr.	63
[REDACTED]	66
	67

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APPENDIX




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[redacted] A GRU officer, [redacted] energetically pursued the development of a social relationship with an American.


After learning, through an acquaintance, that the American had access to classified U. S. military information, [redacted] tasked the American to obtain a "Secret" United States Air Force (USAF) document. On the night of [redacted] the FBI interdicted the passage of the material to [redacted] Two days later, [redacted] was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the U. S. Department of State (USDS). [redacted]



*File 105-524896*

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


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100-356259 JF, April, CF-2 Supervisor

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*Notes: see p. 55 for overall reference*

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When Helmich was tentatively identified as the Soviet agent in 1976, it was decided not to pursue the case any further. The source of the information identifying the agent was still extremely sensitive, and Helmich, who at this time was employed as a car salesman, was in no position to assist the Soviets. The case was therefore held in abeyance from early 1976, until March, 1980. It was then decided that the source was now sufficiently protected, and that it should be determined if Helmich was in fact the Soviet agent. On February 12, 1980, [redacted] was launched relative to Joseph George Helmich, Jr.

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Coincidentally, just three months after the investigation was initiated, [redacted]

[redacted] Further investigation revealed that the American was Helmich. Since Helmich (who now lived in Aiken, South Carolina, where he was employed as a car salesman) was at this time experiencing financial difficulties, it was quite conceivable that he had contacted the Soviets to solicit monetary assistance or to arrange a defection to the Soviet Union.

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Whatever the reasons for Helmich contacting the Soviets, the fact that he had contacted them provided the FBI with a pretense for interviewing him and, [redacted]

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During the initial interview, Helmich admitted that he had first contacted the Soviets as early as 1962 and that he had received \$20,000 in payments from the Soviets, but he maintained that he had not compromised any classified information. He voluntarily submitted to numerous additional interviews, but the information he provided was riddled with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. It was apparent that Helmich would have to be subjected to a polygraph interview/examination.

Under polygraph, Helmich recounted the full details of his espionage activities. Throughout his tour of duty in France, Helmich had continual financial difficulties, and in particular, was constantly being reprimanded for passing checks, not backed by sufficient funds, at various military clubs. Finally, in early 1963, he was told by his commanding officer that unless he resolved approximately \$500 to \$700 worth of bad checks, he would be court-martialed. Unable to acquire a bank loan and faced with a one day deadline to pay his debt, Helmich decided to turn to the Soviets for financial assistance.

Helmich probably did not realize the full bartering value of the product he had at his disposal. Helmich was assigned

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Whatever use the Soviets made of the Helmich windfall, the case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s (at the dollar's current value, Helmich was paid the equivalent of over [redacted]

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[redacted]. The amount paid Helmich far exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. during the 1970s, [redacted]

[redacted]


65-27863j

[redacted] CI-1 Supervisor


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
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Referral/Direct  
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Referral/Direct  
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This information was disseminated to OSI, which initiated an investigation of the enlisted man. OSI determined that at the time the call was made, from

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. J. O'Malley  
Re: FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review  
65-74480

DETAILS:

This publication provides an overview and analysis

(U)

[redacted]

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[redacted] Printed copies of  
this publication will be supplied when print process is completed. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 2)  
DATE 02-22-2011~~

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume VII

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 03-16-2021 BY:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

iii

b3  
b7E

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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 51

Neutralization of a [redacted] Agent Operation 51

Defection of [redacted] 62

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

PHOTOGRAPHS

[redacted] 51  
[redacted] 53

[redacted] Concealment Devices 58-61

[redacted]

DISSEMINATION LIST 71

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview and analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted] in the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Some of the material contained herein has been obtained from other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention [redacted] CI-3A. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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
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During 1981, a number of major counterintelligence achievements were accomplished [redacted] Perhaps the most significant of these involved the investigation of Joseph George Helmich, a retired U.S. Army warrant officer. After extensive interviews, Helmich was arrested on July 15 and charged with espionage; he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison. Helmich admitted passing to the Soviets in the early 1960s, for approximately \$131,000, information relating to the KL-7 cryptographic system, including rotors, maintenance and instruction manuals, key lists, etc. [redacted]

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

The case demonstrated clearly the substantial amount of money the Soviets are willing to pay for this type of information. This is particularly true when one calculates the amount expended by the Soviets, in terms of what the dollar was valued at in the early 1960s. The amount paid Helmich far

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exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. [redacted])

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b3  
b7E  
Referral/Direct

In handling [redacted] the Soviets were extremely amateurish and ineffective, and this enabled the FBI to blunt an operation that could have been very productive [redacted]

In this sense, the case is very similar to another recent case in which a valuable source of information was compromised due largely to a lack of security employed by the Soviets. (Detailed studies of both the Helmich and [redacted] cases will appear in the next issue of the "Review.") (S) (U)


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Referral/Direct

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A case conducted jointly by [redacted]  
[redacted] involving a businessman named  
[redacted] and two other subjects illustrates those  
trends. On [redacted]



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× (U)

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FBI Operation vs. PRCIS Agent


This investigation was a spinoff of another FBI operation which involved an investigation into the activities of a Chinese national and resident of the United States who had

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Finally, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case is that it helps to demonstrate the existence of cooperation between the



05-7005

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~~(U)~~

As yet, it is difficult to determine what impact the defection has had on the [ ] diplomatic corps or upon [ ] operations. Due to an internal security crackdown imposed upon the [ ] official community in the United States, [ ] personnel have been close-mouthed about such sensitive topics. One thing, however, is certain--the defection of such a prominent official is strong evidence of the deep malaise infecting the Polish diplomatic and intelligence corps. (S)  
105-36612; [ ] CI-2 Supervisor

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FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-74480  
1145585-0 - - Section 4 Serial 1 no descriptionMedi

Released on Appeal Number: 11-02504  
June 1, 2023

FOIPA Number: 1145585-000

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1145585-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 77

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Page 10 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 12 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 13 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 14 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 15 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 16 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 17 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 18 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 19 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 20 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 21 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 22 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 23 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 24 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 25 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 27 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 34 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 99 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 102 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 105 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 117 ~ b3; b7E;  
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Page 165 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 166 ~ b1 - per CIA; b3 - per CIA & FBI; b7E - per FBI;  
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Page 176 ~ b3; b7E;  
Page 177 ~ b3; b7E;  
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DATE: 03-28-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (a)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 03-28-2036



# Memorandum

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- Exec AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD LES \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JHG*

Date 3/7/88

From :  *JHG*

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Subject: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) REVIEW

SSP  
CLASS  
SRC'D  
SER  
REC

This memorandum is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to all FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (see attached list), and to recommend that publication of a separate FCI Summary be discontinued.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the FCI Review be approved for dissemination to all FBI field offices and members of the U.S. Intelligence Community appearing on the attached dissemination list.

*Handwritten initials and signatures: NW, Dasky, JHG, etc.*

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	& Intl Affs. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off of Lia. _____
Exec AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	& Intl Affs. _____
	Intell. <i>JHG</i>	Rec Mgnt. _____
	Laboratory _____	Tech Servs _____
	Legal Coun. _____	Training _____

2. That henceforth, the FCI Review be disseminated to both FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the separate FCI Summary publication be discontinued.

*Handwritten initials and signatures: NW, Dasky, JHG, etc.*

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	& Intl Affs. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off of Lia. _____
Exec AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	& Intl Affs. _____
	Intell. <i>JHG</i>	Rec Mgnt. _____
	Laboratory _____	Tech Servs _____
	Legal Coun. _____	Training _____

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.


- 1 -
- (Attn: )
- 1 - Mr.

RJS:enb (6)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: 9912  
Declassify on: OADR



b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer  
Re: Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Review

b6  
b7C

DETAILS:

The attached report was prepared by the CI-3A Unit with considerable input from the CI-3B Unit. It was coordinated with both the CI-1 and CI-2 Sections. The study provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The FCI Summary and FCI Review have heretofore been disseminated to FBI field offices and appropriate members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, respectively. An examination of previous issues, however, indicates such a close similarity between the two as to essentially constitute a duplication of effort which necessarily entails a waste of manpower and resources.

Therefore, it is recommended that only one publication be produced, entitled the FCI Review, and that this publication be disseminated to both FBI field offices and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

DATE: 02-25-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY 80322 UC/LP/ELJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 03-16-2021 BY:   
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW  
VOLUME XIV

b6  
b7C

This document is classified "~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~" in  
~~its entirety~~ unless otherwise stated.

The purpose of this publication is to provide on a  
semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of

Detailing and analysis  
of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the  
interest of operational and administrative security and acknowl-  
edging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth  
in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries  
regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to  
FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention:  (S)

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(U) NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of  
January 1, 1983, unless otherwise stated.

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
During September and October, 1986, the U.S. Government expelled 80 Soviet officials, the overwhelming majority of whom were known or suspected intelligence officers (IOs) and coopted agents. The expulsions represented an unprecedented punitive action by the U.S. Government and an extraordinary opportunity, from a counterintelligence perspective, to regulate the Soviet intelligence presence in the United States.

The September, 1986 expulsion of 25 officials from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN) in New York resulted from Soviet failure to comply with the phased reduction of SMUN, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Missions to the United Nations (UMUN and BMUN) personnel ordered by the U.S. Government in March, 1986, in response to rising national security concerns over the disproportionately large Soviet presence in New York and the concomitant increase in espionage activity. Based on recommendations from the FBI, the U.S. Government selected IOs or coopted agents to depart the United States in accordance with the schedule for the phased reduction in personnel.

The mass expulsion of the Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS) operatives has had a tremendously disruptive impact on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Soviet capabilities to mount effective intelligence operations were further diminished by the deliberate ouster of many experienced operations officers, operations support personnel, and all en poste officers serving in leadership positions. Soviet intelligence operations have undoubtedly suffered without the benefit of experienced operatives and the guidance afforded staff personnel by veteran officers.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~



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On March 4, 1987, Jonathan Pollard, a former counterintelligence analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), Suitland, Maryland, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Pollard's wife, Anne Louise Henderson-Pollard, received a sentence of two concurrent five-year terms. The Pollards' convictions and subsequent sentencings stemmed from Jonathan Pollard's passage of classified material to the Government of Israel over a one-and-one-half year period beginning in June 1984.

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[REDACTED]

b3  
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recent case, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was arrested and convicted of violations of the Arms Export and Control Act and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] acting as a courier for [REDACTED] was interdicted at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California by U.S. Customs Services agents. [REDACTED] was placed under arrest after a search of [REDACTED] luggage revealed three boxes containing documents restricted for export. As a result of [REDACTED] activities, [REDACTED] departed the United States prior to being declared persona non grata by the United States Department of State.

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b7C

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

RONALD WILLIAM PELTON CASE UPDATE

On November 24, 1985, FBI Special Agents interviewed former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Ronald William Pelton, the subject of an espionage investigation predicated upon information provided [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a recently discharged NSA employee walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and offered to sell information to the Soviets concerning sensitive NSA projects. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1 per NSA  
b3 per NSA and FBI  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

[REDACTED] stated that the subject, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] FBI with a general description of the individual as well as numerous other items of identification.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

The FBI's Washington Field Office recalled an investigation involving an unknown individual who telephoned the Soviet Embassy on January 14, 1980, indicating that he was a U.S. Government employee who wished to provide the Soviets with information. While the investigation failed to identify the individual, a voice recording of the telephone conversation was secured. On October 15, 1985, the voice recording was played to an NSA official who identified the voice as that of Ronald William Pelton, who resigned from NSA in July 1979. Pelton's description and background were consistent with the information furnished [redacted] subsequently identified Pelton from a spread of photographs, and identified Pelton's name as the individual involved.

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During the first of two interviews with Pelton on November 24, 1985, FBI agents related to him an account of an unidentified ex-employee of the federal government who provided sensitive national security information to a foreign government. The account included many of the details provided [redacted] Pelton also heard a tape recording of the two telephone calls made to the Soviet Embassy on January 14-15, 1980, and was [redacted]

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[redacted] to Pelton as [redacted] Pelton, though visibly shaken, was initially unresponsive. However, as the FBI's extensive knowledge of his activities became apparent, Pelton gradually disclosed the details of his relationship with the Soviets.

Pelton admitted meeting with the Soviets in Vienna in 1980 and 1983. He stated there was little conversation during these meetings and that all questions and answers were in writing.

Pelton advised that he lost contact with the Soviets following his 1980 trip to Vienna and was not recontacted until just prior to his second trip to Vienna when the Soviets telephoned him at his Silver Spring, Maryland, residence. Pelton also admitted traveling to Vienna for a scheduled meeting in July 1985, and waiting three days for a contact which never occurred. The Soviets again contacted him by telephone at his home. Pelton agreed to return to Vienna in October 1985; however, he claimed that he failed to make the predesignated telephone contact during which arrangements for the meeting were to be made.

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Pelton advised that he had been paid \$30,000-35,000 plus expenses by the Soviets—\$20,000 after the first trip to Vienna and \$10,000-15,000 after the second. He also admitted walking into the Soviet Embassy in January 1980, but continued to deny having taken any classified or sensitive documents into the Embassy with him.

During the second interview on that day, Pelton admitted that he had furnished the Soviets with information

b1 per NSA  
b3 per NSA

(S) [redacted] As a result, Pelton was placed under arrest and charged with espionage. (S)

On December 20, 1985, Pelton was indicted by a Special Grand Jury in Baltimore, Maryland, on six counts of espionage. He was subsequently arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. On June 5, 1986, Ronald Pelton was found guilty on four of the six counts. On December 16, 1986, Ronald Pelton was sentenced to three concurrent life terms. Another 10-year sentence was imposed for unlawful disclosure of classified intelligence information to run concurrently with the life sentence.

Initial debriefings of Pelton were conducted in August-September 1986, during which he provided details surrounding his two meetings with the Soviets in Vienna. Pelton advised that on both occasions he was housed and debriefed in the apartment of the Soviet Ambassador. Pelton first arrived in Vienna on Monday, April 7, 1980. On the following day, as instructed, Pelton took a taxicab to the Soviet Consulate building. He was met by an individual described by Pelton as his handler who stayed with him throughout the debriefing process. This individual has been tentatively identified from a composite drawing as [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

The handler advised Pelton that they were not ready for him as "experts" had yet to arrive from Moscow. The handler asked Pelton, however, if he had brought anything with him. Pelton produced two typewritten sheets of paper on which he had organized topics of discussion as follows:

b1 per NSA  
b3 per NSA

[redacted] (S)

The debriefing process, conducted entirely in writing, began late in the afternoon that day and continued until the afternoon of Friday, April 11. Each question appeared in written English, one to a page. Each answer was taken from the room by the handler who would then return with another question. The questions initially dealt with the organizational structure of NSA and follow-up questions on the compartmented project Pelton had disclosed to the Soviets on the day he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. The remainder of the debriefing followed the outline furnished by Pelton. Pelton reported that it was evident his handler had no technical background and that the debriefing was being supported by individuals with an engineering background. They pressed for details on equipment which Pelton for the most part was unable to provide. Pelton contended that the Soviets

At the conclusion of the debriefing process, Pelton was given a briefcase containing \$15,000, plus \$2,000 for traveling expenses. At this point, Pelton was advised by his handler that the Soviets desired for him to return to NSA to seek employment. Pelton advised that he could not pass the polygraph. Pelton was then asked if he could, in the future, provide the names and titles of NSA officials. He was also asked to develop NSA contacts.

Pelton was then secreted out of the Soviet compound in the back seat of an Embassy vehicle. He departed Vienna on the morning of April 12, arriving in Washington, D.C. that afternoon.

Pelton returned to Vienna on Friday, March 4, 1983. On the following day, Pelton proceeded, as instructed, to a church where he was met by an individual he later identified from a photograph as [redacted] the same KGB officer with whom he dealt on the day


b6  
b7C

Pelton commented that the questions prepared for this session indicated that the Soviets had carefully reviewed what he had given them in 1980 and had developed a proper appreciation for the significance of the information. He added that the questions were clearly formulated by individuals with a cryptographic background having a demonstrated interest in mathematics. This suggests that support for these debriefings was provided by the KGB Sixteenth Directorate which is responsible for cryptoanalysis and the Sixteenth Department, which has the overall supervision of operations involving recruited communications specialists.

At the conclusion of the debriefings, Pelton received instructions to attempt to obtain any information from NSA regarding any reactions NSA had to communications changes initiated by the Soviets as a result of the information provided them by Pelton in 1980. He was then given instructions regarding future drop sites located in rural Prince Georges County, Maryland.

Pelton was then given a briefcase containing \$20,000 in U.S. currency, which included a \$5,000 bonus for the information he provided the Soviets at their 1980 meeting. He was also given \$2,000 in cash for travel expenses. Pelton returned to the U.S. on the following day.

In late February 1987, the Philadelphia Office of the FBI received a letter from [redacted]



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b7D

Pelton was confronted by FBI personnel at the Lewisburg Penitentiary on April 16, 1987. A search of Pelton's cell and personal effects yielded a number of items pertinent to the investigation; a search of the prison library resulted in the identification of the typewriter used by Pelton to type the classified information he attempted to pass to the media.

As the result of his attempted unauthorized disclosure of classified information, Pelton was asked and agreed to sign a Non-Disclosure and Security Agreement. Among other things the agreement:

- prohibited the unauthorized disclosure of all information protected by Section 798 of Title 18 United States Code and Section 6 of the National Security Act;

- placed additional restrictions and conditions on Pelton regarding interviews, correspondence, visiting privileges, and telephone communications; and,

- required Pelton to submit to periodic, NSA-monitored polygraph examinations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

arrived in the United States in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] maintained a G-4 Visa (officer or

employee of an international organization) and, therefore, retained

only limited immunity.

b6  
b7C

Investigation determined that [REDACTED] was born on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals ~~(S)~~

(U)

U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation



~~DATE: 02-25-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60332 UC/LP/PLG/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036~~

# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Review Volume XIV

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~~6-1-89  
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Declassify on: OADR  
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(U)

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- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Insp. \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Lab. \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. -b6
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. -b7C
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

SSP  
CLASS  
SRC'D  
SER  
REC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer

Date 2/9/87

From :

~~DATE: 03-28-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 03-28-2036~~

Subject : FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

This communication is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~"  
in its entirety.

### PURPOSE:

To recommend approval of attached publication, "FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary/Review," for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That attached publication be approved for dissemination within the FBI and to elements of the United States Intelligence Community, as well as the Senate and House Intelligence committees, as detailed on attached list.

*[Handwritten signatures]*

APPROVED

- Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_

- Director \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. 1/11/87

### Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.
- 1 - Mr.

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

(CONTINUED-OVER)

TJD:k11 (9)  
"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classified by: 9912  
Declassify on: OADR

7 JAN 6 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. J. H. Geer  
RE: FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SUMMARY/REVIEW VOLUME XIII

b6  
b7C

DETAILS:

This publication (the version called the "Summary is disseminated internally; the "Review" is disseminated externally) provides an overview and analysis of [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] Detailing of key counterintelligence operations is also included. External dissemination list is attached. Copies of publication will be provided upon completion of printing process.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

~~DATE: 02-25-2011  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF  
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-25-2036~~

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 04-13-2021 BY:

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FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

VOLUME XIII


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~~its entirety~~ unless otherwise stated.

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*(Handwritten signature)*


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
INTRODUCTION.....	ii



b3  
b7E

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 25

 .....	25
.....	29
.....	32
.....	35

b6  
b7C

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide, on a semi-annual basis, an overview and analysis of [REDACTED]

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
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Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded. In the interest of operational and administrative security and acknowledging the need-to-know principle, information is not set forth in specific, detailed documented form. Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome and may be addressed to FBIHQ, Intelligence Division, Attention: [REDACTED] CI-3B. ~~(C)~~

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NOTE: The information contained in this study is current as of November 1, 1986, unless otherwise stated.




In the United States, the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), and its front groups have been directed to undertake operations to influence the activities of independent peace organizations. One objective of the Soviet campaign is to influence United States and European peace and disarmament organizations to focus only on the American SDI program, while ignoring Soviet strategic defense programs.

A campaign centered around the U.S./USSR People's Peace Treaty (PPT) is one of the more recent Soviet efforts to influence the American public opinion in favor of current Soviet foreign policy priorities and to exert pressure on U.S. Government officials to effect changes that are favorable to Moscow. This active measures campaign is designed to stimulate the collection of millions of signatures on a bilingual petition addressed to


the President of the United States, the General Secretary of the USSR, and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The petition was adopted and signed August 8, 1986, by a joint U.S./USSR delegation. The signature gathering part of the PPT will last for a year in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The stated aim of the PPT campaign is to "influence the negotiations in Geneva to speedy and substantial arms reductions," along the lines proposed by the Soviet Union. The principal control and direction for this program comes from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in Moscow.



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During the past year, [redacted] was disrupted by the arrest of [redacted]

[redacted] a known [redacted]

[redacted] of espionage for [redacted]

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Reliable sources indicate that [redacted] previously [redacted]



[Redacted]

arrest resulted in a public exposure

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The arrest was significant because it

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Ronald William Pelton

[redacted]  
[redacted] a recently discharged National Security Agency (NSA) employee walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and offered to sell information concerning sensitive NSA projects to the Soviets. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that the subject [redacted]

[redacted]

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RONALD WILLIAM PELTON

[redacted] FBI with a general description of the individual, as well as other types of identification. He reported that this individual had been met in Vienna sometime around 1982 [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] He added that the  
[redacted]

The FBI Washington Field Office recalled an investigation involving an unknown individual who telephoned the Soviet Embassy on January 14 and January 15, 1980, indicating that he was a U.S. Government employee who wished to provide the Soviets with information. While the investigation failed to identify the individual, a voice recording of the telephone conversation was retrieved. Based on information provided [redacted] a list of suspects was developed by the NSA and the FBI, one of whom was Ronald William Pelton. On October 15, 1985, the voice recording was played for review by an NSA official, who identified the caller as Pelton, who had resigned from the NSA in July 1979. Pelton's description and background was consistent with information furnished [redacted] [redacted] subsequently identified Pelton from a spread of photographs and also identified him by name.

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Pelton was interviewed twice by the FBI on November 24, 1985, concerning his possible involvement with the Soviets. During the first interview, FBI agents related to him an account of an unidentified government

employee who provided sensitive national security information to a foreign government. This account included many of the details provided [redacted] Pelton, though visibly shaken, was initially unresponsive. As the FBI's knowledge of his activities became apparent, however, Pelton gradually disclosed the sordid details of his relationship with the Soviets.

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Pelton admitted having met with the Soviets in Vienna in October 1980, and April 1983, and stated he was housed and debriefed in the apartment of the Soviet Ambassador. He stated that there was little conversation during these debriefings and that all questions and answers were in writing. Pelton reported that he lost contact with the Soviets following his 1980 trip to Vienna, until the Soviets telephoned him at his Silver Spring, Maryland, residence. Pelton expressed surprise that the Soviets were able to contact him at his residence which had an unlisted telephone number. He was told that the Soviets were aware of his place of employment and could easily have devised a deceptive tactic to acquire his number from his employer. Pelton was also advised that following his initial walk-in, the Soviets located his residence and took photographs of it.

Pelton admitted traveling to Vienna for a scheduled meeting in July 1985, and waiting three days for a contact that never occurred. The Soviets subsequently contacted him by telephone at his home. Pelton agreed to return to Vienna in October 1985, however, he claimed to the FBI that he had failed to make the prearranged telephone contact during which arrangements for the meeting were to be made.

Pelton was paid between \$30,000 and \$35,000 plus expenses by the Soviets - \$20,000 after the first trip to Vienna and \$10,000 to \$15,000 after the second. He identified a photograph [redacted] as the only Soviet with whom he had contact, which directly conflicted with

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The former NSA employee further stated that he had disclosed to the Soviets details concerning agent handling techniques, but continued to deny having taken any classified or sensitive documents into the Soviet Embassy on the day of the initial walk-in.

During his second interview with the FBI on November 24, 1985, Pelton admitted that he had furnished the Soviets with highly classified and sensitive information. Pelton advised that he had not received payment for this information until his initial meeting in Vienna. He was arrested the evening of the 24th and charged with espionage.

On December 20, 1985, Ronald William Pelton was indicted by a Special Grand Jury in Baltimore, Maryland, on six counts of espionage. On June 5, 1986, Pelton was found guilty on four of the six counts. He later agreed to full cooperation in exchange for a single life sentence.

Debriefings of Pelton were conducted during July and August, 1986. In addition to the sensitive project, Pelton admitted that he also provided the Soviets with information in varying degrees detailing several NSA programs and projects.

The Pelton case dramatized a serious breach in security practices. Following the onset of financial and personal problems, Pelton decided to commit espionage when he was no longer employed at NSA and when his activities and behavior could not be monitored by NSA security officials. This phenomenon has occurred in several other cases, the most notable of which are perhaps those of

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

On [REDACTED] a Federal Grand Jury in the District of Columbia returned a two-count indictment charging [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[redacted] to the second part of the indictment and was subsequently sentenced to [redacted] [redacted] in prison.

[redacted] indictment was the result of an FBI

[redacted]

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[redacted]



Approximately 30 minutes later, a black male wearing a maroon jacket and carrying a briefcase arrived at

[REDACTED]

He left a half hour later.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(During a subsequent interview

with [REDACTED] he stated that he visited another Soviet establishment, believed to be the Soviet Embassy, on

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[REDACTED] at which time he provided the Soviets with 15 more pages of a document.)

Investigation revealed that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] an employee of [REDACTED]

Washington, D.C., which [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during which Secret and Top Secret information relating to the national security was provided to Congress. [REDACTED] had access to this material.

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On [REDACTED] an undercover Special Agent

[REDACTED]

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- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JHG*

Date 2/12/86

From :



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Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

This memorandum is classified "~~Secret~~" in its ~~entirety~~.

### PURPOSE:

To submit FCI Review for approval to be disseminated to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That FCI Review be approved for dissemination to appropriate agencies of the Intelligence Community.

*JHG*  
*DASH*  
*01-2A TVM/cab*  
*01-2A*  
*01-2A*  
*JHG*

### APPROVED

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-Inv \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
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### Enclosure

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer



DMS:skp

*ENCLOSURE*

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Declassify on: OADR~~

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*JHG*  
*File*

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Memorandum from [redacted] Mr. J. H. Geer  
Re: FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEW

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DETAILS:

This study provides an overview and analysis of

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[redacted]  
Detailing and analysis of key FBI counterintelligence operations is also afforded.

The Foreign Counterintelligence Review is published on a semi-annual basis.

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~~Not for Dissemination Outside the FBI (S)~~

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DATE 04-13-2021 BY:   
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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~DATE: 02-25-2011  
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# FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Summary Volume XII

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May 1986

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS








Introduction



b3  
b7E

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

EXPULSIONS/EXCLUSIONS

	27
	28
Expulsions of Polish Officials	28
	29
	29
	30
	30
	30
Expulsion of a Cuban IO	32

b6  
b7C

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES



. . 33  
. . 38  
-  
. . 39  
. . 45

b6  
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INTRODUCTION

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
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
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The Geneva Summit in November, 1985 was the target of an aggressive Soviet active measures campaign conducted by the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA) and its front organizations. In response to CPUSA national directives, local CPUSA chapters initiated several programs:

- telephone calling program and letter writing campaigns to various Congressmen.
- distribution of literature and petitions on topics such as nuclear test bans and "Star Wars".
- attempts to influence and mobilize a broad movement within church groups, unions and civic organizations to end the arms race.
- publication of a special issue of The Daily World covering the Geneva Summit.






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The most recent example of this cooperation was seen  
in the [redacted], espionage case. [redacted]




[redacted] had provided the PIS with classified documents  
relating to the [redacted]

[redacted] Many of the documents [redacted]



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The main thrust of the Romanian effort is penetration of the emigre community in attempts to influence opinions. Additionally, there is a real concern by the Ceausescu regime toward the Hungarian emigre community and its emphasis on human rights violations against the Hungarian minority in Romania.

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Expulsion of a Cuban IO

During 1985, [redacted] led to a PNG action against [redacted] at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. Based upon [redacted]

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[redacted] Contributing factors to the PNG action were two separate [redacted] and his [redacted]

On the two occasions, the first involving [redacted] and the second [redacted] attempted to remove several [redacted] from a Washington [redacted]

[redacted] Protests over these two incidents were lodged with the Cuban Government which chose to ignore an informal recommendation that [redacted] permanently depart the United States on [redacted]

Shortly after the second incident, [redacted] travelled to Albuquerque, New Mexico, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Sharon Marie Scranage/Michael Agbotui Soussoudis -  
Neutralization of a Third World Espionage Operation

On July 11, 1985, Special Agents of the FBI arrested Sharon Marie Scranage, a 29 year old CIA employee. Michael Agbotui Soussoudis was arrested on July 10, 1985, and both were charged with violations of the U.S. espionage statutes. Scranage and Soussoudis were arrested in connection with their



Michael Agbotui Soussoudis

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b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

activities in providing classified information, [redacted] (S)  
(S) [redacted] to  
Ghanaian intelligence officials.

(S) [redacted]  
(S) [redacted]

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S) [redacted]  
however, Scranage was subjected to a polygraph examination by  
the CIA Office of Security, and [redacted] (S)  
(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Scranage eventually admitted that she had  
continued the relationship with Soussoudis and had in fact  
provided classified information to Soussoudis. She also  
confessed that she was tasked by the Ghanaian to collect  
information from CIAHQ to give to Soussoudis in July, 1985;

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S) [redacted] The case was then referred  
to the FBI which, with the full cooperation of the CIA,  
launched an investigation.



Sharon Marie Scranage

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

In subsequent interviews conducted by the FBI, Scranage admitted passing classified information to Soussoudis from December 1983, through May 1985, [REDACTED]

This classified information was obtained through her access to classified CIA cables and documents. Scranage stated that she

(S)

never removed any actual documents, but admitted making hand-written notes of classified CIA documents. [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

Soussoudis thereupon entered the United States on or about June 29, 1985, and contacted Scranage. At FBI direction, Scranage arranged to meet with Soussoudis at a Holiday Inn in Springfield, Virginia, on July 10, 1985. Upon his arrival at the meet site, Soussoudis was arrested by the FBI. Scranage was arrested the next day in Alexandria, Virginia. Both were charged with various violations of the espionage statutes.

On September 27, 1985, Sharon Marie Scranage appeared in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, and entered a plea of guilty to violation of Title 50, U.S.C., Section 783 (b) (Communication of Classified Information by an Employee of the United States to a Representative of a Foreign Government). Scranage also entered pleas of guilty to violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 421 (a) (Disclosure of Information by Persons Having Access to Classified Information that Identifies a Covert Agent). Scranage was sentenced to five years in prison for her participation.

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)

The Scranage/Soussoudis affair was not without negative diplomatic repercussions. In retaliation for the arrest of Soussoudis, the Ghanaian Government immediately expelled two U.S. diplomats [Redacted]

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)



(S) [redacted] This followed Soussoudis' departure from the United States. In retaliation, the United States expelled two Ghanaian diplomats and cut back financial aid to the African country.

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

The Scranage/Soussoudis affair has demonstrated that U.S. counterintelligence must maintain awareness of the threat posed by Third World countries, as well as hostile country intelligence services. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S)  
b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S) [redacted] The case was also significant in that it showed that motivational factors other than financial greed--in this case romance-- continue to play a factor in treason. Finally, the case showed that the polygraph can be an effective counter-intelligence tool. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S)  
b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

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Karel Koecher

Karel and Hana Koecher were arrested in New York on November 27, 1984, hours before their planned departure to Austria. Koecher was charged with passing classified national defense information while employed by the CIA between 1973 and 1975. Hana Koecher was arrested as a material witness and charged with acting as a paid courier for the CIS.

Available information indicates that Karel Koecher, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Czechoslovakia, was recruited by the CIS in 1962, received training as an IO from 1963-1965 and subsequently entered the United States in 1965 with his wife. From 1973-1975, Koecher was employed by the CIA as a contract employee, possessed a security clearance and had access to national security information. Koecher had been directed by the CIS to obtain employment and infiltrate a U.S. intelligence agency.

Karel Koecher was indicted on December 20, 1984. Following a ruling to overturn Hana Koecher's 18-month sentence for refusing to answer questions concerning her husband's involvement with the CIS, Mrs. Koecher was released on bond on March 21, 1985.

On February 3, 1986, Karel and Hana Koecher appeared in U.S. District Court and Karel pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage. He was sentenced to life in prison;

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however, his sentence was reduced to time served. On February 11, 1986, the Koechers and three other agents serving sentences in the Federal Republic of Germany were returned to the GDR in exchange for five Soviet and Eastern Bloc prisoners, including Soviet dissident Anatoliy Scharanskiy.

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
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VOLUME XI

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- 1 - MR. [REDACTED]
- 1 - MR. [REDACTED]
- 1 - MR. [REDACTED]
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SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

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