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FOIA and Transparency
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Washington, D.C. 20220
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OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

January 18, 2024

Subject: OIG Freedom of Information Act Request 2023-FOIA-00552
 Final Response

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), dated July 3, 2023. Your request sought:

Copy of the final report, closing report, report of investigation, referral memo, and/or other conclusory document for each of the following closed Treasury Office of Inspector General investigations:

USM-18-0073-I, USM-21-0020-I, USM-20-0015-I, USM-20-0072-I, USM-20-0063-I, USM-22-0004-I, USM-21-0041-I, USM-22-0018-I, USM-22-0050-I, USM-22-0035-I, USM-22-0082-I, USM-20-0047-I, USM-22-0067-I, USM-21-0016-I, USM-21-0002-I, USM-22-0026-I, and USM-21-0050-I.

In response to your request a search within the Treasury Office of Inspector General (OIG) Office of Investigations (OI) was conducted. OI completed its search and identified 83 pages of records responsive to your request.

OIG confirms that any refusal of disclosure has been considered under the foreseeable harm standard, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i), and reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption, or that the disclosure is prohibited by law. As such, the responsive records have been reviewed under the FOIA, with information protected from disclosure pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7 of the FOIA, as described below.

FOIA Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Exemption 6 exempts from release "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Treasury OIG redacted the information of third parties that could

reasonably be expected to identify and/or cause unwarranted harassment and unsolicited invasion of the personal privacy of such individuals.

FOIA Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)

Exemption 7(C) protects and exempts from release “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes... [where disclosure] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Treasury OIG redacted the identities and any personal information of third parties contained in these investigative records that could reasonably be expected to identify such individuals.

Appeal

Such redactions constitute a partial denial of your request and therefore an adverse action under the FOIA. Accordingly, you have the right to appeal this determination within 90 days from the date of this letter. By filing an appeal, you preserve your rights under the FOIA and give the agency a chance to review and reconsider your request and the agency’s decision. Your appeal must be in writing, signed by you or your representative, and contain the rationale for your appeal. Please address your appeal to:

FOIA Appeal
FOIA and Transparency
Privacy, Transparency, and Records
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dispute Resolution and Mediation Services

If you would like to discuss this response before filing an appeal to attempt to resolve your dispute without going through the appeals process, you may contact the Treasury Departmental Office FOIA Public Liaison via telephone at (202) 622-8098, or email at FOIAPL@treasury.gov.

If you are unable to resolve your FOIA dispute through our FOIA Public Liaison, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) also mediates disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation. If you wish to contact OGIS, you may write directly to:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road (OGIS)
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Email: ogis@nara.gov

Website: <https://www.archives.gov/ogis>

Telephone: (202) 741-5770

Phone (toll free): 1 (877) 684-6448

If additional questions arise concerning this response, please contact us at OIGFOIA@oig.treas.gov and include the above-referenced request number.

Sincerely,

C., Camille

Assistant Counsel



OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

December 31, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent in Charge, Acting

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SUBJECT: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), et al

OIG Case Number: USM-18-0073-I

In February 2017, an investigation was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TIG), after receiving a request for assistance from the United States Secret Service (USSS), South Florida Organized Fraud Task Force in Plantation, Florida, regarding an investigation into Oriental Antiques and Coin, Inc. (Oriental Antiques). Oriental Antiques purported to purchase mutilated United States Coinage in China at a steeply discounted rate, due to the inability of these coins to be exchanged in China for Yuan, and ship the coins to the United States to be deposited into financial institutions. The funds for the coins were ultimately wired back to China for the purchase of more United States coinage.

The USSS was initially the primary investigative agency; however, the case was ultimately transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). TIG assisted the USSS and FBI. The FBI has completed its investigation, and the case has been pending indictment by the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Southern District of Florida (SDFL), for an extended period of time.

The TIG case agent was converted to a CARES Act only position and is not able to continue to work this case. As a result, TIG determined that this case does not merit additional investigative resources at this time, and the matter is being closed. If the FBI or the USAO requests TIG's assistance in the future, this matter may be reopened and assigned to another agent. This memorandum will serve as the declination for prosecution in the case management system.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations
Department of the Treasury



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-21-0020-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	March 11, 2021
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	5 CFR 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service, Other

Closing Summary:

On February 17, 2021, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from an U.S. Mint (USM) employee that another USM employee used information from the complainant's resume for the benefit of a third USM employee, in 2017, without permission. The OIG investigation revealed that the complainant provided the resume to the USM employee to use as a "go-by" and had an opportunity to review the resume via email. Criminal prosecution for this matter was presented on January 27, 2021, and was declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. Treasury OIG provided a report to the USM for their information.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received information from a USM employee that she provided her resume, in 2017, to another USM employee to use as a "go-by" for another USM employee, who is now retired. The complainant alleges that the resume was used without her permission, giving the appearance of impropriety. The OIG unsubstantiated the allegation based on information that the complainant provided the resume to the employee to be used as a "go-by" and had an opportunity to review the resume via email.



Report of Investigation



Approval:

Andrea L. Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

Subject(s):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - DECLINED - District Of Columbia (Federal)



Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



Report of Investigation

Case Title: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Police Officer
United States Mint

Case #: USM-20-0015-I

Case Type: Criminal _____
Administrative X
Civil _____

Investigation Initiated: November 25, 2019

Conducted by: (b) (6); (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent

Investigation Completed: January 15, 2020

Origin: United States Mint Police
Washington, DC

Approved by: Anthony J. Scott
Special Agent in Charge

Summary

In November 2019, a complaint was received from Hardin County KY Deputy Sheriff (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) stating that United States Mint Police Officer (USMPO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appeared at a movie theater in full United States Mint Police Officer uniform and duty belt in violation of the Treasury Policy on Weapons and Mint Directive 11003-11. During the incident, Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a professional, but agitated conversation with Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) and the movie theater manager about an incident involving his son. The complaint also states that Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and/or his wife contacted the movie theater manager and stated Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) was a "racist white cop."

The investigation determined that the allegation was substantiated. On November 16, 2019, at approximately 10:30 pm USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered into the Showtime Cinemas Movie Theater located at 895 N. Dixie Blvd., Radcliff, KY, in full USMPO uniform, to include badge, gun, and full duty belt, for the purpose of speaking with the theater manager, (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) about an earlier incident involving his juvenile son. United States Mint Police Policy MD 11003.11 (4)(e)(1)(a) states officers are only allowed to transport their government issued firearms between their residence and their duty locations. United States Bullion Depository (USB) Policy Memorandum 15-17 Mint Police personnel assigned to the USB are authorized to wear the United States Mint Police issued, duty uniform to and from the USB, on a voluntary basis. If worn, the uniform will be complete, with all equipment and assigned duty weapon. Personnel are instructed to minimize the time spent in public venues while in uniform.

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Basis and Scope of the Investigation

In November 2019, the United States Mint Police contacted TIG and requested an investigation into an off duty incident involving USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is assigned to the Bullion Depository in Fort Knox, Kentucky. The purpose of the request was to determine if USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) violated any policy and procedures during the incident. (Exhibit 1)

During the course of this investigation, interviews were conducted with:

- (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) Deputy Sheriff, Hardin County Kentucky
- (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) Showtime Cinema Manager
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) United States Mint Police Officer

In addition, TIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- USBD Policy Memorandum 12-17
- Mint Directive MD 11003.30
- Mint Directive MD 11003.11
- Treasury Order 105-12

Investigative Activity

On November 26, 2019, TIG reviewed all relevant policies, procedures, and memorandums related to the United States Treasury Department, the United States Mint Police Department, and the Bullion Depository regarding use of force, weapons, and uniform policies.

In interviews with TIG, (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) Manager, Showtime Cinemas Movie Theater, and Hardin County Deputy (HCSO) Sheriff (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) reported the following to TIG: (Exhibits 2 and 3)

On Saturday November 16, 2019, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) son was at the Showtime Cinemas movie theater to see a 7:00 pm showing of the movie "Playing with Fire." While waiting on his friends, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) son was loitering in the lobby area of the theater being disruptive (play fighting with friends). The movie theater staff asked the son to go into the theater twice, but he refused. At this point, HCSO Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) while working in his contracted security capacity, told the son he needed to go into the theater. The son then punched a wall and ran into another wall while entering the theater showing "Playing with Fire."

Later that evening, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife showed up at the theater and had a confrontation with Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) for "disrespecting" her son. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife was loud and causing a scene so Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) asked her to step outside onto the front porch of the theater. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife called her husband and said, "it is the white racist cop who is dating your boss's daughter that you are having trouble with." Deputy (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) and USMPO's wife continued the conversation

outside and the wife called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a “white racist cop”. At this time Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife that she needed to leave the premises or she would be arrested for disorderly conduct (Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised TIG he would have arrested USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife at this time if there would have been someone to take custody of the juveniles). USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife then took all of the children who were causing a disturbance and left the theater.

Continuing on November 16, 2019, at approximately 10:30 pm, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed up at the theater to speak with the theater manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the incident with his son. Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in his blue United States Mint Police Officer uniform with a badge, and duty belt with a firearm and handcuffs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated to TIG that USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not rude, however, she felt intimidated by him and his demeanor.

In an interview with TIG, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised TIG the reason for the stop was to “extrapolate” information from the manager about his son’s behavior regarding the incident earlier in the evening, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted he was in full uniform, to include badge, gun, and duty belt at the time he stopped at the Showtime Cinemas and that he was polite and professional to the manager. (Exhibit 4)

Referrals

N/A

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation determined that the allegation was substantiated. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is in violation of United States Mint Police Policy MD 11003.11 (4)(e)(1)(a), which states officers are only allowed to transport their government issued firearms between their residence and their duty locations. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made an unnecessary stop at the Showtime Cinemas after his tour of duty to speak with the manager in regards to an incident involving his son. During this stop USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in full United States Mint Police Uniform with badge, government issued weapon, and full duty belt. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made no attempt to cover up his uniform or conceal his identity as a United States Mint Police Officer.

USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is also in violation of United States Bullion Depository (USBD) Policy Memorandum 15-17, which states Mint Police Personnel assigned to the USBD are authorized to wear the United States Mint Police issued, duty uniform to and from the USBD, on a voluntary

basis. If worn, the uniform will be complete, with all equipment and assigned duty weapon. Personnel are instructed to minimize the time spent in public venues while in uniform. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made an unnecessary stop at the Showtime Cinemas after his tour of duty to speak with the manager in regards to an incident involving his son. During this stop, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in full USMP uniform with badge, government issued weapon, and full duty belt. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made no attempt to cover up his uniform or conceal his identity as a United States Mint Police Officer.

TIG found this off duty stop by USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unnecessary and did not constitute an "emergency" exception to the policies and memoranda listed above. The fact is the incident involving USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) son and wife occurred approximately three hours before USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stopped at the theater. USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) son and wife had left the theater earlier in the evening and were no longer in threat of being charged with a crime or being arrested. Furthermore, USMPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his wife were able to contact the theater manager the next day via telephone to "extrapolate" the information in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was seeking at the time of the off duty stop.

Per a preponderance of evidence, TIG found the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy (ies) were violated or could be applied to the case.

- 5 CFR 735.203 Conduct Prejudicial to the Government
- United States Mint Police Policy MD 11003.11 (4)(e)(1)(a)
- United States Bullion Depository (USBBD) Policy Memorandum 15-17.

[Agent Note: According to interviews, quick stops for gas, coffee, or an "emergency" while in full uniform between an officer's residence and their post of duty are accepted practices among personnel assigned to the Bullion Depository. While these stops may be necessary to get the officer to his or her post of duty or to their residence they can be considered in violation of United States Mint Police Policy MD 11003.11 (4)(e)(1)(a) and the USBBD Policy Memorandum 15-17.]

Distribution

Dennis O'Connor, Chief, United States Mint Police

Report of Investigation

Case Name: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Case # USM 20-0015-I

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Signatures

Case Agent: (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) /s/

Date: 01/15/2020

Supervisor: Anthony J. Scott /s/

Date: 01/15/2020

Exhibits

1. Initiation Dated November 25, 2019
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) Manager, Showtime Cinemas Movie Theater, dated December 13, 2019
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6); (b) (7)(C) Hardin County Sheriff's Deputy, dated December 13, 2019
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USM Police, dated December 16, 2019



U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General



Report of Investigation

Case Title: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory Die Manufacturing
Specialist
United States Mint

Case #: USM-20-0072-I

Case Type: Criminal
Administrative ☒
Civil ☐

Investigation Initiated: August 25, 2020

Conducted by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent

Investigation Completed:
November 23, 2020

Approved by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent in Charge
(Acting)

Origin: United States Mint

Summary

On August 7, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TIG), received a complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint (Mint). The complaint alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Former Die Manufacturer Mint, received material support as a perspective Mint employee from an unknown member of the hiring panel prior to her interview. The material support included assistance with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resume, access to the interview questions prior to the interview, and requesting Mint Human Resources to place (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the Hiring Referred list after the Bureau of Fiscal Service did not select her as 'Best Qualified'. The hiring panel consisted of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, Mint; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint; and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint.

The investigation substantiated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, Mint, committed violations concerning "Basic obligation of public service", (5 CFR § 2635.101); "Use of government property", (5 CFR § 2635.704); "Conduct prejudicial to the government", (5 CFR § 735.203) and "Prohibited Personal Practices", (5 USC § 2302 (b)(6)).

5 CFR § 2635.101, "Basic obligation of public service" provides, "Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual".

5 CFR § 2635.704, "Use of Government property" provides in pertinent part: "An employee has a duty to protect and conserve Government property and shall not use such property, or allow its use, for other than authorized purposes".

5 CFR § 735.203, "Conduct Prejudicial to the Government" provides, "An employee shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government".

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5 USC § 2302 (b)(6), "Prohibited Personal Practices" provides in pertinent part: "Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority.....grant any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any employee or applicant for employment (including defining the scope or manner of competition or the requirements for any position) for the purpose of improving or injuring the prospects of any particular person for employment".

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to emailing the interview questions for the Die Manufacturer position to his wife, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prior to the start of the Die Manufacturer hiring process. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed the questions to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the knowledge that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would forward the information to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

During a search of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mint email account, TIG identified emails addressed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that were intended for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). These emails contained interview questions and answers for positions at the Mint as well as scripted prompts as to what to say to a Mint Employee Interview Panel.

TIG presented this case to the United States Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) declined to pursue a criminal investigation and referred the case back to TIG for administrative action.

Basis and Scope of the Investigation

This case was initiated on August 25, 2020, based upon TIG receiving a complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint. The complaint alleges (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Former Die Manufacturer, Mint, received material support as a perspective Mint employee from an unknown member of the hiring panel prior to her interview. The material support included assistance with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resume, access to the interview questions prior to the interview, and requesting Mint Human Resources to place (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the Hiring Referred list after the Bureau of Fiscal Service did not select her as 'Best Qualified'. (Exhibit 1)

During the course of the investigation, interviews were conducted with:

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Human Resources Specialist, U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Human Resources Specialist, U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Former Die Manufacturer, U.S. Mint
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, U.S. Mint

During the course of the investigation, the following documents were reviewed:

- Internet site Facebook account with the name, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Internet site Facebook account with the name, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- U.S. Mint email account of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigative Activity

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Human Resources Specialist, U.S. Mint, stated the hiring panel consisted of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, Mint; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint; and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began working at the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia, PA on August 3, 2020, as a Die Manufacturer. On August 4, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was approached by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mint, who expressed his concerns to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not familiar with her job description or the use of any of the tools required to perform her job.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on August 5, 2020, he met with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) filed an official complaint in reference to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not being able to perform the tasks her position required her to do. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated later that day, he met with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint. They decided to interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and assess (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) competency to perform the tasks she was hired for. During the meeting, an anonymous letter was slid under the door of the meeting room which contained questions in reference to an individual being hired at the Mint.

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The anonymous letter asked four questions stating:

"How can someone from the outside with no machinery experience get hired [sic] in the Die Shop? This Person just happens to have worked with the Division Head's wife at a hospital."

"How can someone with no experience about machinery could answer all the question [sic] correctly during the Interview? I have recently applied for the position and I know what questions were asked. Could this person have been given the questions before hand?"

"How can qualified employees here at the mint get passed over for an outsider with no experience? Maybe it [sic] because she knows the Division Head's wife? I can only speculate but it's seems very coincidental."

"How can a first line supervisor in the Die Shop, supervise their family member? Does nepotism not apply here; because the employee can do no wrong in the supervisor's eye even though they keep making mistakes?"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on August 6, 2020, the assessment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) competency revealed she had no knowledge of the equipment, tools, or tasks to perform the job she was hired for. In addition, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he conducted a Human Resources (HR) interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a Nurse at Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia, PA, assisted her with obtaining the job at the Mint. In the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated that she did not have the knowledge or experience that was documented on her resume.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on August 10, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not report for her assigned shift at the Mint, and did not notify anyone. On August 11, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again did not report for her shift or notify anyone. Later, on August 11, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to Mint HR and resigned. (Exhibit 2)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HR Specialist, U.S. Mint, supplied TIG an email record from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The email dated November 18, 2019, shows (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requesting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) add (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the Die Manufacturing 'Cert list' (Certification list). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded back to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating the Mint does not create the Certification List. (Exhibit 3)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), U.S. Mint, stated he first observed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on August 4, 2020, on the production floor, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tasked with cleaning machine parts. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked completely lost in her tasks and appeared not to have any knowledge on operating the tools or equipment. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated, throughout the day other employees approached (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to complain that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no knowledge of what she was doing as a Die Manufacturer. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, that a newly hired Die Manufacturer usually comes from within the Mint from another department such as Coinage. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was very unusual to hire a new Die Manufacturer externally as the new hire would need to already know certain Mint machining processes and procedures on day one. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not familiar and had no knowledge of any Mint machinery processes or procedures.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned to him that she has never performed any machinery type work and was not familiar with tools. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previous employment was at Chestnut Hill Hospital where the wife of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, Mint, works as a nurse.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on August 5, 2020, he went to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to express his concerns about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inability to perform task that someone in the Die Manufacturing position should be able to do. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) will be fine and she did really well on her interview. After the conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then went to Mint HR with his concerns.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on August 6, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was given a test to see if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could identify tools used in the job of Die Manufacturing. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) incorrectly identified a micrometer as first, a "C-clamp", then called it a "mallet".

(Agent's Note: A micrometer is a tool used for accurate measurement of components in mechanical engineering and machining. A C-clamp is a tool used to hold multiple items together. A mallet is tool similar to a hammer.) (Exhibit 4)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint, stated he was supposed to be a member of the interview panel; however, he was not at the Mint that day and was unable to access work emails.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he first came into contact with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on Tuesday, August 4, 2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first day on the manufacturing floor. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he introduced himself to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his duties and introduced (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to her trainer, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Subject Matter Expert Die Cleaner, Mint. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was doing 'fine' in her training. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position was an 'Entry Level Apprentice' position in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not expected to be knowledgeable on her position.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on Wednesday, August 5, 2020, he received a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint, in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to perform an assessment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) capabilities as a Die Manufacturer. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lied on her application and resume for the Die Manufacturing Position. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he was not certain what brought (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to this conclusion.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HR Specialist, Mint, requested (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) operate a machine in the Die Manufacturing area. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he refused as the machine was too complex to operate for a person at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) skill level. Instead, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a Micrometer Test in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was to identify the micrometer and use it accurately. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first incorrectly identified the micrometer as a 'C-Clamp', but after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a few minutes to explain the micrometer and its use to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to correctly use the micrometer on the test and was able to correctly measure 8 out of 10 test lines. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performance on the test was better than most employees who take the test. (Exhibit 5)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint, stated he served on the interview panel that interviewed five people over two days for the Die Manufacturer position in May 2020. All

interviews were conducted telephonically and each interviewer was on the phone at separate locations throughout the Philadelphia Mint facility.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified him on the morning of the first day of interviews that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was selected to serve on the interview panel because the scheduled interviewer was not available. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he had no prior knowledge that he was going to sit on the interview panel for the Die Manufacturer position.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the interviews consisted of a series of questions, asked only by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the applicants and each interviewer would score the applicants answers. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not receive any guidance on how to score the applicants answers to the questions. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he had no knowledge or access to the interview questions prior to the start of the interviews.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a really good interview. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) answers "were too perfect". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had prior knowledge of the interview questions as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a specific question where one of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) answers were the exact wording of the example answer written on the interview question sheet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the answer example were number values in reference to measurement tolerances.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never met any of the applicants prior to the interviews and was not approached by anyone to score an applicant higher than another. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he did not have access to the interview questions prior to the interview and did not send the interview questions to anyone. (Exhibit 6)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Mint stated he served on the interview panel that interviewed four or five applicants for the Die Manufacturer position in May of 2020. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified him on the morning of the interviews that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was selected to serve on the interview panel because the scheduled interviewer was not available. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the interviews consisted of a series of questions asked by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the applicants and each interviewer would score the applicants answers. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated at the end of all of the interviews, he gave his score sheets to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a few days later.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was very pleasant and seemed very knowledgeable in reference to the questions asked of her. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did a great deal of studying and was very knowledgeable and experienced about the subjects asked of her during the interview.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never met any of the applicants prior to the interviews and was not approached by anyone to score an applicant higher than another. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he did not have access to the interview questions prior to the interview and did not send the interview questions to anyone beside (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 7)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Former Die Manufacturer, Mint, stated she became aware of Mint employment opportunities at her prior employment at Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia, PA. While employed at the hospital, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became friends with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Nurse, Chestnut Hill Hospital.

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During the course of their friendship, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) husband is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, Mint.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) often as they worked together and only spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a few times over the phone, when Mint positions were becoming open. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would encourage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to apply for the positions that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned. Prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview for the Die Manufacturing position, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned she applied to two previous Mint positions in the past. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one of those positions was in Coining and she applied sometime in the fall of 2019, but was not referred.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she spoke to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the Die Manufacturing position in which both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encouraged her to apply and to research tools and dies on the internet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) applied and received an interview for the Die Manufacturing position in May of 2020. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she prepared for the interview by conducting research on the internet, watching YouTube videos, and talking with her mother-in-law who is experienced in jewelry making. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated her mother-in-law assisted her with her resume and both "embellished" it in order for it to look more appealing.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated neither (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave her the interview questions or assisted with her resume. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeated, all assistance came from her mother-in-law or internet searches. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also mentioned she continued to speak with both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the application process because they were friends and encouraged her.

Once hired as a Die Manufacturer, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she felt welcomed at the Mint. Co-workers would greet her and engage her in conversations. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one particular co-worker, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Die Manufacturer, Mint, questioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to get a position in Die Manufacturing. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed her that individuals hired for the Die Manufacturer position are usually Veterans or individuals already employed from other divisions of the Mint. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she might have mentioned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she worked with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in her previous employment at the hospital.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on Thursday, August 6, 2020, she was brought to the Mint HR Office and met with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HR Specialist, Mint; a Union Representative whose name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall and another individual from HR whose name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall. While in the HR office, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the individuals began to accuse her of falsifying her application for the Die Manufacturing position. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she defended herself by explaining she researched the position on YouTube, spoke to her mother-in-law, and did other research on the internet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated these individuals then questioned her on if anyone at the Mint provided her with the interview questions, or helped her with her resume because there were very technical terms that were used. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated only her mother-in-law helped with the resume and she researched and studied tools and dies on the internet.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the HR individuals did not believe her and suggested to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she submit a letter of resignation because HR was in the process of terminating her employment. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the following day she submitted a letter of resignation. (Exhibit 8)

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, stated he led the interview panel and was the Selecting Official for the Die Manufacturer position in May of 2020.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he developed the questions for the interview and the requirements needed for an applicant to score well. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated the Die Manufacturer position is an "entry level training" position and he was looking for a person who was capable of learning the skills needed.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never met (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in person; however, spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the phone on several occasions before her interview and over the past year about employment opportunities at the Mint. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was introduced to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) through (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked together at Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia, PA.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned the phone calls he had with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only involved letting her know what positions were available and to check the website 'USAJOBS'.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated in November 2019, he sent an email to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requesting that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) be placed on the Referred List for a Coining position at the Mint.

Prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview for the Die Manufacturer position, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the phone and instructed her to research "Tool and Die Process" on the internet. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview, he emailed the interview questions to his wife, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knowing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would forward the questions to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was aware it was wrong, but was trying to help because he believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a good person and needed a chance.

During the Die Manufacturer interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was impressed with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) response to the interview questions and her experience with jewelry which included forging, stamping, and polishing. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the right candidate for the position and as the Selecting Official, submitted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) name to HR as being selected for the position. (Exhibit 9)

TIG reviewed the internet site Facebook account with the name, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The Facebook account consisted of a posting on July 22, 2020, by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating: *"I am officially an employee of the United States Mint Philadelphia Thank you Jesus, only with your grace was this opportunity made possible"*.

A comment within the posting inquired if the Mint was hiring in which the profile labeled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied: *"...I'm not sure if they are at the moment, they very rarely have openings... it took me a little over a year to get in and that's with knowing someone"*. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Facebook account list employment with Tower Health- Chestnut Hill Hospital. In addition, TIG reviewed the internet site Facebook account with the name, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). This account displays the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) account as friends. (Exhibit 10)

TIG reviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mint email account for emails sent and received from February 2020 to September 2020. TIG focused on this time frame as it was pertinent to the interview and hiring process of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). A review of the account revealed:

An email dated April 27, 2020, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife) in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) states to his wife, *"I need to talk to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) before the interview"*. The email also included an attachment titled 'Interview Questions: (Coining Division) Coin Manufacturer. WG-06'. The attachment contained interview questions as well as responses to the questions for a position at the Mint.

An email dated April 27, 2020, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) states to his wife, *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needs to read this prior to starting the interview"*. The email also included an attachment titled 'Interview Intro'. The attachment contained scripted paragraphs in which the intended reader would have guidelines on what to say to an interviewer of a Coin Manufacturing position at the Mint.

An email dated April 29, 2020, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife. The subject of the email is titled *"answers"*. The email begins with, *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not sure what you had in mind as far as answers for your interview tomorrow, but the following might give you some insight....good luck"*. The remainder of the email contains scripted responses an interviewee would say during an interview for a position at the Mint.

An email dated April 30, 2020, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife. The subject of the email is titled *"post interview questions"*. The email begins with, *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) At the end of the interview, you are afforded the opportunity to ask the panel questions."* The remainder of the email contains scripted responses an interviewee would ask at the conclusion of an interview for a position at the Mint.

An email dated August 4 2020, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Die Manufacturing, Mint. In the email, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inquired about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performance in which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she is doing well"*. (Exhibit 11)

Referrals

On September 22, 2020, TIG presented a criminal case for prosecution to the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (AUSA), for violations of Basic Obligation of Public Service, (5 CFR § 2635.101); Use of Government Property, (5 CFR § 2635.704); and Conduct Prejudicial to the Government (5 CFR § 735.203). AUSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) declined to pursue a criminal investigation and referred the case back to TIG for administrative action. (Exhibit 12)

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation substantiated the allegation regarding a violation of 5 CFR §2635.101, "Basic obligation of public service." In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted to contacting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) through (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife in order to give (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview questions and answers before (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview with the Mint. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also sent scripted prompts as to what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would say during her interview with the interview panel that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lead.

The investigation substantiated the allegation regarding a violation of 5 CFR § 2635.704, "Use of Government property". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized his Mint email account, emailing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the interview questions and answers. By giving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) this information, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) preferential treatment in the hiring process for the Mint position. Also note that this also constitutes a prohibited personnel practice under 5 USC § 2302 (b)(6).

The investigation substantiated the allegation regarding a violation of 5 CFR § 735.203, "Conduct Prejudicial to the Government". As the Selecting Official, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to conduct the hiring process of a Mint employee in an honest manner. Prior to the interview, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview questions, answers, scripted prompts and spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in order for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to secure a position at the Mint. TIG could not find any evidence these actions were taken for other Mint applicants that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed or was the Selecting Official. TIG considers (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acts to be egregiously dishonest, striking at the heart of the integrity expected of federal employees and the selection process.

Based on the findings of our investigation regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) we find by a preponderance of the evidence the subject has violated the following standards:

- 5 CFR § 2635.101, Basic obligation of public service.
- 5 CFR § 2635.704, Use of Government property.
- 5 USC § 2302, Prohibited Personnel Practices.
- 5 CFR § 735.203, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

Distribution

Dennis P. O'Connor, Chief of Police, United States Mint

Signatures

Case Agent:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisor:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Exhibits

1. Original Allegation, dated August 7, 2020.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated August 25, 2020.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated September 1, 2020.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated September 10, 2020.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated October 5, 2020.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated September 30, 2020.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated September 29, 2020.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), dated October 5, 2020.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated October 6, 2020.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Records obtained from internet search, dated September 9, 2020.
11. Memorandum of Activity, Records obtained from Mint emails of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated October 26, 2020.
12. Memorandum of Activity, Case Presentation Declination, dated September 22, 2020.



U.S. Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

Report of Investigation



Case Title: Anonymous Letter

Case #: USM-20-0063-I

Case Type: Criminal _____
Administrative X
Civil _____

Investigation Initiated: June 9, 2020

Investigation Completed: January 8, 2021

Conducted by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator

Origin: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
United States Mint Police

Approved by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent in Charge
(Acting)

Summary

On June 9, 2020, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TIG), received a referral from the United States Mint (USM) alleging that person(s) unknown sent an anonymous letter to the residence of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a USM Denver employee, making inappropriate comments about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 1)

The investigation was unable to identify any suspects in this matter. TIG interviewed the Complainant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who provided names of USM Police Officers that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted a Management Inquiry about, however, forensic evidence could not identify possible suspects. All reasonable investigative leads were exhausted.

Basis and Scope of the Investigation

On June 9, 2020, TIG received information from the USM that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received an anonymous letter at her former residence in Denver, CO.

During the course of the investigation, interviews were conducted with:

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Systems Accountant, USM

In addition, TIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- USM Police Report 20-DN-1515
- Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Forensic Examination Reports 2020-042

Investigative Activity

In an interview with TIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Systems Accountant, United States Mint (USM), Denver, CO, stated that on June 8, 2020, she received a letter from one of her neighbors who resided at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) old address located at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used to reside at that address, however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved into a neighboring property located at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) years ago, but still shares a common mailbox area with neighbors. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that she occasionally receives mail at her old address and the current residents bring it to her. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she opened the letter which was hand-written and contained obscenities directed towards her.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she gets along well with everyone and has not had any conflicts with any USM employees. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she was recently assigned a Managerial Inquiry (MI), on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for an incident that led to disciplinary action on a Denver Mint Police Officer, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she only made telephone contact with Officers (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding the MI, due to Covid-19 concerns.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) feels that one of these officers may have sent the letter due to the wording of the letter she received mentions the words: "a few of us officers". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she has nothing else to support that idea except the fact that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sounded very frustrated during the course of their conversation, stating that the case at the core of her MI was settled in mediation months prior. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she was unaware of this fact and didn't pursue further statements or information from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after receiving this information. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she followed up with Lt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Denver Mint Police, in an effort to verify (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claims. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that the case was settled in mediation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office at Headquarters, USM, Washington, DC, and tried to verify if this complaint had, in fact, been mediated. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she was advised by USM Legal Counsel to complete the MI and verify if Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still felt like he was being harassed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she completed the MI and forwarded the report to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), USM Police. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the only people who may have touched the letter would be

her neighbor who gave her the letter, one of her friends whom she let read the letter, herself, and Inspector (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USM Police. (Exhibit 2)

On August 18, 2020, TIG transferred evidence (an anonymous obscene letter) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via the USM Police, Denver, CO, to TIGTA Forensic Laboratory, Beltsville, MD. TIG submitted the original letter, along with a white envelope that contained the letter, to TIGTA for a fingerprint analysis examination. TIG also submitted 49 USM Police employees handwriting exemplars for comparison to the writing on the letter and envelope. (Exhibit 3)

On September 23, 2020, TIG received a laboratory report relating to the examination of evidence from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which was submitted to TIGTA Forensic Laboratory, Beltsville, MD, which states:

A forensic, comparative (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) examination using magnification revealed the following:

No conclusion could be reached regarding whether or not any of the Exhibit 002-001 through 002-049 known writers wrote the questioned handwriting appearing on Exhibits 001-001 and 001-002. Limitations were encountered during the examination. There was an insufficient amount of comparable words, letters, and letter combinations necessary for a thorough examination. (Exhibit 4)

On September 29, 2020, TIG received a laboratory report relating to the examination of evidence from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which was submitted to TIGTA Forensic Laboratory, Beltsville, MD, which states:

Two (2) latent prints of value for comparison were developed on Exhibit 001-002.
No latent prints of value for comparison were developed on the remaining exhibits.

Two (2) latent prints were entered and searched through the NGI System. No identifications were effected. (Exhibit 5)

Referrals

N/A

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation was unable to identify any suspects in this matter. TIG interviewed the Complainant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who provided names of USM Police Officers that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted a Management Inquiry about, however, forensic evidence could not identify possible suspects. All reasonable investigative leads were exhausted.

Distribution

Dennis O'Connor, Chief, United States Mint Police

Signatures

Case Agent:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisor:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Exhibits

1. Complaint letter from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USM Police, dated June 9, 2020.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), dated June 16, 2020.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Request for TIGTA examination, dated August 18, 2020.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Results of TIGTA handwriting examination, dated September 24, 2020.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Results of TIGTA fingerprint examination, dated October 13, 2020.



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0004-I
Complaint Title	Wheelhouse Group's Publication of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Article
Date Closed	November 30, 2021
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	5 CFR 2635.702 Use of public office for private gain, Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official, Procurement Fraud

Closing Summary:

On November 23, 2021, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of an anonymous complaint. The complaint alleged that a United States Mint (USM) Senior Executive Service (SES) employee engaged in contract fraud when they were interviewed for an article written by a contractor whose contract was entering into a recompetete process. The investigation determined that the allegation was unsubstantiated. The article was approved by the USM's Office of Corporate Communication (OCC), per USM and Treasury policy; however, the Contractor and the USM OCC failed to obtain approval from the Contracting Officer, as required by the USM contract, prior to publishing the article.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received information from an anonymous complainant alleging an USM SES employee committed an ethics violation when the employee was interviewed for an article written about the employee by a contractor entering into a recompetete process. The allegation was unsubstantiated against the SES employee because approval was obtained according to USM and Treasury policy; however, this particular contract included a publicity clause that required the contractor to obtain approval from the Contracting Officer. The Contractor violated the terms of its contract with the USM, and the USM approved the article without the COR consultation required by the terms of the USM contract. We found no evidence of intentional noncompliance with the contract or Mint policy indicative of fraud.

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Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

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Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Information Technology

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Wheelhouse Group



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-21-0041-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	September 13, 2021
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	Colorado
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.212 Use of government property, Theft

Closing Summary:

On August 30, 2021, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from the U.S. Mint (USM) that an employee allegedly removed error coins from an USM facility without authorization and possessed the coins at their residence. The investigation determined that the employee possessed 182 error coins and provided other error coins to two individuals, in spite of initial denials by the employee. Criminal prosecution of the employee was presented on April 6, 2021, and declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Colorado. Treasury OIG provided a report to the USM for their information.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received notification from the USM that a current employee may have removed kustered error coins from the Denver Mint, violating Use of Government Property and Theft of Government Property. The employee initially denied possessing any coins. After further questioning, the employee admitted to possessing a few coins at his residence and providing two or three coins as a "souvenir" to at least two individuals. The investigation determined that the employee accepted kustered coins from a USM contracted truck driver and then kept the coins in his garage. A consent search of the garage revealed 182 coins that were seized. The OIG substantiated the allegation that the employee violated Use of Government Property and Theft of Government Property through interviews and a consent search of the employee's residence.

The OIG also substantiated a lack of candor by the employee. During the interview, the employee initially denied possessing any coins,



Report of Investigation



then eventually admitted to possessing a few coins. Ultimately, 182 coins were discovered in his residence.

Approval:

Andrea L. Peacock	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
-------------------	---------------------

Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Coin Manufacturer

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - DECLINED - Criminal Division, Main Justice (Federal)



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0018-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), et al.
Date Closed	April 6, 2022
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.201 Acting within scope of authority, Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official, Other

Closing Summary:

On February 22, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information that a U.S. Mint (Mint) manager gave Mint products to the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) after being informed by Mint Counsel that it was not authorized and violated agency policy. The OIG found that the Mint had a Memorandum of Understanding written and approved by Mint Counsel to supply the coins to the USNA at Mint cost; therefore, there was no violation.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received notification from a U.S. Mint (Mint) employee who alleged that senior Mint employees had misused government property by selling products to the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) at below cost in violation of Acting within scope of authority. The OIG unsubstantiated the allegation. The investigation determined that 100 coins were sold to the USNA at Mint cost, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two organizations. This MOU was written and approved by Mint Counsel in collaboration with the Mint's Office of Sales and Marketing. Mint management informed the OIG that this sale was done to increase interest in other markets.



Report of Investigation



Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

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Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] Sales and Marketing
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0050-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), et al.
Date Closed	May 15, 2022
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	California
Confidentiality	Yes
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official

Closing Summary:

On April 15, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from a U.S. Mint (Mint) employee that Mint management in San Francisco installed four Tesla charging stations at the facility, even though the Mint did not have any electric vehicles or a policy regarding electric vehicles. The complainant also alleged that only three employees were in the "pilot program" and no other employees were asked to enroll. The investigation found that the Mint recently installed six charging units and was conducting a pilot program in accordance with federal policies and created a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the use of these stations. The Mint will purchase electric vehicles, as required by Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act and Executive Order. Employees may participate in the program and use the chargers for a monthly nominal fee; however, priority will be given to government vehicles.

Administrative Summary:

The U.S. Mint (Mint) San Francisco recently purchased, installed and implemented the use of six electric vehicle charging units at their facility and created a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the use of the units. Tesla units were purchased because these units were the least expensive, but other electric vehicles can use the units. Employees will be allowed to use the units for their personally owned vehicles after completing a registration form and paying a monthly flat fee to reimburse the Mint for the units and electricity. The Mint's government owned vehicles will have priority at the units. The OIG investigation determined that Mint officials followed the Guidance for Federal Agency Implementation of Workplace Charging Pursuant to the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Fixing America's

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Surface Transportation (FAST) Act document: Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment, E.O. 13693. According to the Mint's draft memorandum of understanding, the FAST Act authorizes the General Services Administration (GSA) and other Federal agencies to install, operate and maintain plug-in EV charging units for privately owned plug-in EVs in parking areas used by Federal employees and authorized users, and requires the collection of fees to recover these costs. The MOU stresses this new program is voluntary for employees and that government fleet vehicles will have priority at the charging units.

Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Coins)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(W) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), US Mint San Francisco

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(W) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), US Mint San Francisco

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(W) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0035-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	July 7, 2022
Subject Type	Bureau and/or Government Agency
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	Yes
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.211 Falsification of official records, Law Enforcement Misconduct

Closing Summary:

On July 1, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from the OIG complaint hotline, alleging that an USM Police employee knowingly submitted an altered training request. The OIG investigation determined an original training request was submitted and denied, then a second request for the same training class was submitted and approved, containing false course dates. Criminal prosecution was presented on January 5, 2022, and declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. A report was provided to the USM for appropriate action.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received a complaint alleging that a U.S. Mint Police employee knowingly falsified and submitted an official training request in violation of the Treasury Employee Rules of Conduct and Falsification of Official Records. The OIG investigation determined that a training request for two courses was declined in part due to the high cost of both; one was approved and the second was declined. The subject stated that his supervisor told him to resubmit the declined training request in the new quarter, and admitted to changing the course dates, and reflecting the date of the new quarter in lieu of the training start date. By a preponderance of the evidence, the employee knew that this information was false or misleading. The allegation was substantiated through employee interviews in conjunction with official document and email reviews.



Report of Investigation



Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

Subject(s):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - DECLINED - New York, Southern District (Federal)



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0082-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	July 7, 2022
Subject Type	Bureau and/or Government Agency
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	Yes
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.211 Falsification of official records, Law Enforcement Misconduct, Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official

Closing Summary:

On July 1, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from the OIG complaint hotline, alleging that a U.S. Mint Police (USMP) supervisor knowingly approved a falsified training request for a direct report. The OIG was unable to substantiate the allegation due to conflicting statements between the supervisor and direct report, as well as a lack of any additional evidence. Criminal prosecution was presented on January 5, 2022, and declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received a complaint alleging that a U.S. Mint Police (USMP) supervisor knowingly approved a falsified official training request for a direct report.

The OIG conducted USMP employee interviews in conjunction with email and document reviews to determine the allegation is unsubstantiated. The direct report, in an OIG interview, advised he was advised by the supervisor to submit the document with discrepancies. The supervisor, in an OIG interview, advised he knew nothing of the discrepancies and did not advise the direct report to submit an inaccurate document. This investigation found no additional evidence to substantiate the allegation.



Report of Investigation



Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

Subject(s):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - DECLINED - New York, Southern District (Federal)



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-20-0047-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	February 15, 2022
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.210 Cooperation with official inquiries, 5 CFR 2635.703 Use of nonpublic information, 18 USC 1001 False Statements

Closing Summary:

On February 3, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon notification that a U.S. Mint (USM) employee reported receiving an "inappropriate" anonymous email that revealed Treasury employees by name with details about telework, promotions, complaints filed, and disciplinary actions associated with each employee mentioned. The investigation determined the email originated from an USM employee. The employee was interviewed and denied sending the email or having knowledge of the anonymous email; however, the subject admitted to sending the email during a subsequent interview. The OIG substantiated false statements and unauthorized use of information through interviews and records review. Criminal prosecution of the employee was presented on October 26, 2021, and declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received notification from the U.S. Mint (USM) that an "inappropriate" anonymous email was sent to a USM employee that revealed Treasury employees by name with details about telework, promotions, complaints filed, and disciplinary actions associated with each employee mentioned and referenced in violation of use of non-public information. The OIG substantiated the violation through interviews and review of records.

The OIG substantiated false statements and lack of candor through interviews and review of Internet Protocol (IP) address information and router registration. The investigation determined that the anonymous email was sent from an email address registered to the USM employee. The employee was interviewed and denied knowledge of the

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anonymous email, even after the OIG provided evidence the email address was registered to the employee's residence. During a subsequent interview the subject admitted to sending the "inappropriate" anonymous email, as well as creating the email account from which the email was sent.

Approval:

Andrea L. Peacock	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(H) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(M) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Doe, John

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - DECLINED - Maryland (Federal)



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0067-I
Complaint Title	Counterfeit Coins
Date Closed	August 10, 2022
Subject Type	No Affiliation
Allegation Location	Ohio
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Cooperating Agencies	United States Mint
Allegation(s)	SCAM-Other

Closing Summary:

On July 25, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon receipt of information from the U.S. Mint concerning a website advertising coins for sale while utilizing the U.S. Mint seal without permission. During the investigation, it was determined that the website did not explicitly state that they were selling coins directly from the U.S. Mint, but displayed the U.S. Mint seal within their website. Prior to issuing a Cease and Desist letter, the website was removed.

Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

amurose.com,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(W) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-21-0016-I
Complaint Title	Release of Confidential EEO Settlement
Date Closed	February 18, 2022
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	31 CFR 0.209 Disclosure of records or information, Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official

Closing Summary:

On February 18, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon notification from a U.S. Mint (USM) employee that a confidential EEO settlement agreement was disseminated to various other USM employees not authorized to receive the document. The investigation determined the confidential EEO settlement agreement was sent to multiple USM employees from a personal email address registered to a Senior USM Official without a legitimate business purpose in violation of Disclosure of Records or Information. Criminal prosecution of the employee was presented on January 6, 2021, and declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA). Treasury OIG provided a report to USM for their information.

Administrative Summary:

The OIG received notification from a USM employee that a confidential EEO settlement agreement was emailed to several USM employees not authorized to receive the document, in violation of Disclosure of Records or Information. The OIG determined that the confidential document was disseminated from a personal email account registered to a Senior USM Official to other USM employees through interviews, forensic exams, and the examination of USM records and personal email account registration records. The Official reported that he was unable to provide information regarding how he received the document.



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Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge

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Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Environment, Safety and Health

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(H) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(W) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Legal :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C). - DECLINED - Virginia, Eastern District (Federal)



OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 17, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY JANET L. YELLEN
VENTRIS C. GIBSON, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. MINT

FROM: Richard K. Delmar, Deputy Inspector General
/s/

SUBJECT: Inquiry into Allegations of Racially Disparate Treatment of
U.S. Mint Employees (USM-21-0002-I and OIG-CA-23-003)

On July 10, 2020, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a letter from then-Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin,¹ regarding a complaint received from six African American U.S. Mint (Mint) employees (complainants). The complainants alleged a pattern of "rampant racism," an "oppressive environment," and "systematic racism" against African American employees at the Mint. Former Secretary Mnuchin and former Mint Director Ryder² requested the OIG undertake an inquiry regarding these allegations.

The OIG initiated a review of workforce diversity and personnel practices at the Mint to determine whether:

1. There are patterns or practices of racial discrimination, including but not limited to, intimidation or disproportionate and meritless investigatory actions; and

¹ Janet Yellen was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury on January 25, 2021 and sworn in on January 26, 2021.

² Director Ryder resigned on October 1, 2021. Ventris Gibson served as Mint Deputy Director (Acting Director) beginning October 25, 2021 and was confirmed as Mint Director on June 15, 2022.

2. The quality of the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and other complaint processes are satisfactory.

The OIG conducted interviews with Mint officials and staff from the Diversity Management and Civil Rights, Human Capital, Protection, and General Counsel Directorates. Interviews were also held with willing complainants³ and union representatives, as well as other Mint employees recommended for interview by the complainants. Officials from Treasury's Office of Civil Rights and Diversity were interviewed and provided data for our inquiry. Specifically, we received and reviewed data from EEO complaints for fiscal year (FY) 2017 through FY2021. Additional data reviewed included: Management Inquiries (MI); Administrative Investigations (AI) completed by, or for, the Mint for FY2015 through FY2020;⁴ the Mint Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) results for FY2017 through FY2021; the U.S. Mint FY2019 EEO, Diversity and Inclusion, and Civil Rights Programs Audit Report; the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) 2020 Conflict Assessment; and the TI Verbatim Consulting (TIVC) 2021 Mint Culture Assessment and Strategic Action Plan reports. We also reviewed Mint employee demographics, including the overall percentage of Black or African American employees at each grade within the organization. See Appendix 1 for more detail on the scope and methodology related to our work.

Executive Summary

We found that the quality of the Mint's EEO program is generally satisfactory; however, there are opportunities to improve certain aspects of how anti-harassment program complaint data (including inquiry information such as MIs and AIs) are tracked and analyzed. In addition, the Mint's outdated policies for how complaints are investigated create confusion among employees and potential risk for the agency.

Due to the scope of our review and challenges with access to complete and reliable data, we were neither able to substantiate nor unsubstantiate whether there are patterns or practices of racial discrimination; however, we made a number of key observations using available workforce and formal EEO complaint statistics.

Our review of workforce statistics showed that the percentage of Black or African American General Schedule (GS) workforce at the Mint among the higher grades was

³ Five (5) of the 6 signatories of the letter agreed to be interviewed.

⁴ The Mint has two levels of fact-finding inquiries – Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations. See pages 9-11 for a more detailed discussion of AIs and MIs.

higher than the overall percentage of the Black or African American GS workforce for the rest of Treasury; however, among the Non-GS workforce at the Mint, we observed that the percentage of Black or African American employees in higher grade positions was appreciably lower when compared to the overall percentage of Black or African American employees in the Non-GS workforce for the rest of Treasury (primarily BEP).

Our review of formal EEO complaints over a 5-year period from FY2017 through FY2021 found a higher percentage of complaints filed with alleged discrimination on the basis of race, Black or African American, at the Mint when compared to the rest of Treasury, and complaints on this basis are increasing at a higher rate at the Mint. In addition, we observed that reprisal claims at the Mint were filed by Black or African American employees more often than by employees of all other races combined.


While we were unable to identify a definitive root cause for these observations, we believe that a number of the recent actions taken by Mint management are steps in the right direction, and we recommend that Mint management continues proactively addressing the findings from the TIVC Culture Assessment as well as the Treasury OCRD audit and FMCS conflict assessment. We plan to follow up on the Mint's progress in implementing corrective actions in response to our recommendations as well as the reports issued by TIVC, OCRD, and FMCS. We will work with Mint management on the timing of our follow-up review.

Mint Workforce Analysis

As of July 2022, the Mint was authorized 1,705 Full-time Equivalent (FTE) personnel. Unlike most of Treasury, a significant proportion of the Mint's workforce is comprised of Non-GS employees on the Federal Wage System (FWS), in addition to employees on the GS pay system. The FWS is a uniform pay-setting system that covers Federal blue-collar employees who are paid by the hour. The system's goal is to make sure that Federal trade, craft, and laboring employees within a local wage area who perform the same duties receive the same rate of pay. In comparison, the GS pay system covers most white-collar civilian Federal employees. There are a number of other differences between the GS and FWS in terms of occupational coverage, geographic coverage, pay ranges, and pay adjustment cycles.

Based on data contained in the Mint's Management Directive (MD) - 715 Workforce Data Tables,⁵ and depicted in Figure 1 below, between FY2017 and FY2021 the Mint employed an average total workforce of 1,595 employees including an average of 55.8 percent GS and 44.2 percent Non-GS (FWS) employees. The only other Treasury bureau with a large proportion of Non-GS employees is Treasury's other manufacturing facility, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). During the same period, BEP's workforce average was 48.4 percent GS and 51.6 percent Non-GS employees. In comparison, the rest of Treasury was comprised of 99.9 percent GS employees.

Figure 1: Workforce Distribution between GS and Non-GS Employees




When examining the GS and Non-GS workforce, we found that the percentage of Black or African American employees at the Mint has been generally consistent over the last five fiscal years. As shown in Figure 2 below, in FY2021 the GS workforce of the Mint was comprised of 25.8 percent Black or African American employees, while 21.7 percent Black or African American employees made up the Non-GS workforce. During the same time period, the GS workforce of the rest of Treasury was comprised

⁵ According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), MD-715 Workforce Data Tables are useful as a diagnostic tool. MD-715 requires agencies to report on the race/ethnicity and gender of employees as well as information that includes, but is not limited to, occupational categories, pay plans/grade levels, and gains and losses in the total workforce. MD-715 Workforce Data Tables used for the analysis discussed in this report include (1) Table A1: Total Workforce Distribution by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, (2) Table A4-1: Senior Pay & General Schedule (GS) Grades - Distribution by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex (Across), and (3) Table A4WG-1(All): Participation Rates Across Wage Grades.

of 27.6 percent Black or African American employees compared to 29.9 percent for the Non-GS workforce.⁶


Figure 2: Black or African American Employees in the GS and Non-GS Workforce



As shown below in Figures 3 and 4, when examining the workforce by grade level, we computed the 5-year average for the GS and Non-GS populations. The percentage of Black or African American GS workforce at the Mint (see Figure 3) among the higher grades of 11 to 15 was appreciably higher than the overall percentage of the Black or African American GS workforce for the rest of Treasury. The percentage is even more pronounced when focusing on GS Grades 14 and 15. For example, Black or African Americans comprised approximately 30.6 percent of all GS Grades 14 and 15 compared to approximately 19.3 percent for the rest of Treasury.


⁶ The rest of Treasury's Non-GS workforce is primarily comprised of BEP employees as BEP is the only other Treasury bureau that has a manufacturing facility.

Figure 3: Black or African American Employees by Grade in the GS Workforce



Among the Non-GS workforce at the Mint, as shown in Figure 4, we observed that the percentage of Black or African American employees at grade levels 11 through 13 was lower when compared to the overall percentage of Black or African American employees in the Non-GS workforce for the rest of Treasury. Black or African Americans at the Mint comprised 10.7 percent of all Non-GS Grades 11 through 13 positions even though they comprised 23.1 percent of the Non-GS workforce at the Mint based on the 5-year average (2017-2021).

Figure 4: Black or African American Employees by Grade in the Non-GS Workforce⁷



Background on Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Complaint Processes and Anti-Harassment Programs

According to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance, federal agency Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs should have both an EEO complaint process and an Anti-Harassment Program.⁸ The EEO complaint process and an Anti-Harassment Program serve different purposes, but each is a critical component to address harassment allegations. Unlawful harassment includes but is not limited to unwelcome conduct (whether they occur in person, online or by email, on social media, or by any other manner), intimidation, ridicule, insult, offensive comments, jokes, or physical conduct based on race, color, religion, sex (pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity), national origin, age (over 40), disability, genetic

⁷ The non-GS workforce includes multiple pay plans that we consolidated in order to summarize by grade. We are not displaying non-GS grades 14 and 15 because the Mint has very few employees at these levels.

⁸ EEO Management Directive 715 (EEO MD-715), *Reporting Requirements for Federal Agencies*, (Oct. 1, 2003). Agencies must establish an anti-harassment program (including anti-harassment procedures/policy) outside the EEO complaint process. See also, *Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors* (Enforcement Guidance), EEOC No. 915.002, § V.C.1 (June 18, 1999). An employee or applicant can file concurrent complaints under the agency's anti-harassment and equal opportunity processes.

information, or reprisal/retaliation. Even though the EEO complaint process and Anti-Harassment Program serve two distinct purposes, both processes can occur simultaneously, if an alleged victim seeks to pursue both options. At a minimum, however, all harassment allegations must be reported to the Anti-Harassment Program per EEOC guidance.

The EEO complaint process is an employee-driven process that is designed to make individuals whole by focusing on equitable relief and damage awards paid by the agency to the alleged victim. EEO complaints may result in various types of monetary and/or nonmonetary remedies such as requested relocation and leave restoration. The EEO complaint process is not primarily designed to discipline an alleged harasser.⁹ Even though a manager or coworker may refer an allegation to the EEO office,¹⁰ moving forward with an EEO complaint is dependent on what the alleged victim ultimately decides.

In contrast to the employee-driven EEO complaint process, the Anti-Harassment Program is a management-driven process that is designed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action to stop harassing behavior regardless of whether the conduct violated the law and regardless of whether the employee is making the complaint or pursuing corrective action. The primary objective of the Anti-Harassment Program is to eliminate such conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive. According to EEOC guidance, the Anti-Harassment program should focus solely on taking whatever action is necessary to promptly bring the harassment to an end or to prevent it from occurring. Furthermore, depending on the severity of the conduct and surrounding circumstances, the corrective action may be as simple as speaking with an employee about their behavior or as severe as termination of employment. Even though EEOC guidance requires that all harassment allegations be reported to the Anti-Harassment Program, not all harassment allegations will necessarily have an associated EEO complaint, as the employee may elect not to proceed with the EEO complaint process.

Since the EEO complaint process and Anti-Harassment Program have different objectives, the outcome of one process has no impact on the other. For example, if an EEO complaint results in a settlement agreement and there is no finding of

⁹ In appropriate cases, however, EEOC may recommend that federal agencies consider disciplining employees who have been found to engage in unlawful harassment.

¹⁰ An allegation may be reported by someone who experienced or observed harassing conduct.

retaliatory harassment or discrimination, this has no bearing on how the allegation would be investigated under the Anti-Harassment Program.

Reporting Harassment and Misconduct Allegations at the Mint

The Mint Diversity Management and Civil Rights (DMCR) Office is responsible for administering the agency's EEO Program Office. DMCR handles the EEO complaint process whereas the Human Capital Directorate (HCD), which is outside of DMCR, has oversight of the Anti-Harassment Program.¹¹ The organizational separation between the EEO complaint process and the Anti-Harassment Program is an EEOC requirement to prevent potential conflicts of the EEO Director acting as the decision-maker for both programs. The decision-maker in the EEO complaint process must decide whether the law was violated, but the Anti-Harassment Program should address issues that may not yet be severe or pervasive enough to violate the law.

Any Mint employee who believes they have experienced or observed incidents of harassment may report the allegation in several ways. These options include promptly reporting the allegation to the following:

- A supervisor or manager (within or outside the employee's chain of command);
- The Anti-Harassment Program Hotline;
- The Anti-Harassment Program Coordinator;
- The local Human Resources Officer (HRO); or
- The local DMCR office

Regardless of the initial reporting method, the Mint's Anti-Harassment Policy¹² requires that all harassment allegations are ultimately reported to the Anti-Harassment Program Coordinator within HCD for tracking and monitoring. The Anti-Harassment Program Coordinator (in conjunction with HCD officials) is also responsible for determining the level of fact-finding inquiry to be conducted that will help identify the severity of the alleged behavior and whether any immediate corrective action is required to protect the alleged victim.

The Mint has two levels of fact-finding inquiries – Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations. According to the Anti-Harassment Program policy,

¹¹ The Mint began implementing its Anti-Harassment Program in July 2019 following an audit completed in June 2019 by Treasury's Office of Civil Rights and Diversity. The Mint officially issued its updated Anti-Harassment Program policy in January 2021 and subsequently revised it in May 2022.

¹² USM Directive MD 8003.21 (May 2022)

allegations of harassment of limited scope or complexity that may be assessed within the supervisory chain, and do not include allegations of sexual or retaliatory harassment, will be addressed through a Management Inquiry. In contrast, allegations or harassment of greater scope and complexity requiring a more formal and independent assessment, or that include allegations of sexual or retaliatory harassment, will be addressed through an Administrative Investigation. Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations are also used as fact-finding methods outside of harassment and/or misconduct allegations. For example, Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations may also be performed when examining reports of potential operational or programmatic deficiencies or other potential system vulnerabilities at the Mint. The concept of multiple levels of fact-finding inquiries is not unusual for anti-harassment programs. According to Treasury guidance¹³ for addressing harassment allegations, “the scope and formality of the inquiry is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature and complexity of the allegations”; however, we observed that Treasury guidance consistently uses the term “inquiry” to describe the overall fact-finding process, even though the scope of the process may vary.

While Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations are considered two levels (or types) of fact-finding inquiries, they are governed by two separate policies maintained by different Mint divisions. The Management Inquiry policy¹⁴ is owned by HCD while the Administrative Investigation policy¹⁵ is owned by the Protection Directorate in conjunction with the Office of the Chief Counsel.

During our review, we made several observations about how having two different types of inquiries governed by separate policies affects employees. We observed that having two distinct and independently owned policies has proven to cause confusion amongst the workforce. A cultural assessment of the Mint conducted by TI Verbatim Consulting (TIVC),¹⁶ an independent third party, in September 2021 reported that “participants were confused between the requirement between a Management Inquiry

¹³ Civil Rights and Diversity Issuance System, CRD-009, *Procedures for Addressing Allegations of Discriminatory Harassment*, U.S. Department of the Treasury (February 25, 2021).

¹⁴ USM Policy Memorandum 8001.04, *Management Inquiries* (April 28, 2008).

¹⁵ USM Policy Memorandum 2001.01, *Administrative Investigations* (December 10, 2007).

¹⁶ TIVC is a Certified Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business that is also Minority and Women Owned. It specializes in business and consulting services that include diversity, equity, and inclusion, workplace culture optimization, training and development, and strategic communications.

and Administrative Investigation.”¹⁷ The different terminology used for levels of fact-finding reviews potentially creates the perception that not all allegations may receive the same level of care, especially since “limited scope” (i.e., Management Inquiry) and “greater scope” (i.e., Administrative Investigation) reviews are handled by two completely different Mint divisions. As previously mentioned, HCD has responsibility for the policies governing Management Inquiries and the Protection Directorate in conjunction with the Office of Chief Counsel has responsibility for the policies governing Administrative Investigations. The policies for Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations have not been updated since 2007 and 2008, respectively, although updates to both policies are currently being drafted, as of August 2022. The cultural assessment final report cited that outdated policies not only signify a “lack of attention,” they also demonstrate that “the organization does not place value in policy impact and presents a significant risk and potential legal burden for the organization.”

As part of our review, we selected a judgmental sample of Management Inquiry and Administrative Investigation final reports to better understand their composition and structure.¹⁸ While we did not evaluate the soundness of the decisions reached or the overall quality of these fact-finding reviews, we noted that there are opportunities to improve the policies governing them to ensure consistency in application. For example, the current Management Inquiry policy includes a table that explains the distinction between a Management Inquiry and an Administrative Investigation. According to that table, an Administrative Investigation should be performed for “issues involving unlawful discrimination or harassment”; however, we found instances where a Management Inquiry was performed for certain allegations involving harassment, racial discrimination, and/or retaliation and other instances where an Administrative Investigation was performed for allegations involving similar issues. While we did not evaluate the quality of these reviews, we saw clear opportunities to update existing policies to more accurately explain how they are currently conducted and the delineation between the two different levels of fact-

¹⁷ TI Verbatim Consulting, Inc. (TIVC), *Culture Assessment Project Report*, Department of the Treasury (DOT) US Mint (September 10, 2021).

¹⁸ Management Inquiry and Administrative Investigation final reports were selected judgmentally from cases identified in the Mint’s Anti-Harassment Program tracking spreadsheet that were reported between November 2019 and February 2022. We judgmentally selected cases that included some allegations that were substantiated and other cases where the allegations were not substantiated. A judgmental sample is a nonprobability sample, the results of which cannot be used to project to the population.

finding reviews. For example, while we observed that the Mint has a process flowchart for the EEO complaint process on its public-facing website, there does not appear to be a comparable flowchart illustrating the Anti-Harassment complaint process and the levels of internal harassment inquiries. We believe that it is important that the policies are updated with Mint employees in mind rather than an administrative management focus. There may be advantages to having one policy for both types of inquiries, or at a minimum some information describing the Anti-Harassment complaint process and the types of internal harassment inquiries.

Tracking of Internal Harassment Allegations at the Mint

According to the EEOC, agencies should utilize a centralized system for tracking and monitoring all inquiries or allegations of harassment. EEOC guidance advises agencies to institute specific guidelines for monitoring allegations and inquiries to support the early identification and effective resolution of conflict situations that could otherwise escalate, if left unchecked. The monitoring of allegations may also support activities that include conducting trend analysis, root cause analysis, and climate assessment to locate "hot spots" of harassment and to obtain feedback on the climate in the workplace.

During our review, we found that tracking of Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations is a shared responsibility between HCD and the Protection Directorate. This decentralized system is one of the contributing factors that made our review of the universe of reported allegations challenging to perform. Although the official Mint Anti-Harassment Program policy places the responsibility for oversight of harassment and misconduct allegations with HCD, we learned during our interviews with officials from HCD and the Protection Directorate that there may be circumstances where some harassment and misconduct allegations are tracked only by the Protection Directorate. Specifically, we were informed that the complete universe of cases could only be obtained by reviewing and comparing the tracking spreadsheets separately maintained by each unit. We observed that each tracking spreadsheet uses a different template, and the data elements that are tracked are not consistent between the two spreadsheets.

Another factor that presented challenges during our review is that neither tracking system cross-references key demographic information (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender) about the complainant and subject of allegations to the official human resources

system of record. Therefore, the Mint has no system to proactively measure circumstances where a disproportionate number of individuals from a specific demographic group are filing internal complaints or are the subjects of internal complaints in certain locations.

As a result of the challenges described above, we were unable to effectively use the Management Inquiry and Administrative Investigation tracking spreadsheets to perform further aggregate level analysis. To ensure reliable and consistent data was used for our analysis, we decided to focus our complaint analysis on formal EEO complaints¹⁹ based on the certified reports filed with the EEOC via the Treasury Office of Civil Rights & Diversity (OCRD).²⁰ In addition, the EEOC complaints allowed us to identify demographic information based on the type of alleged discrimination claimed (e.g., race, sex).

Analysis of Complaints Received

As part of our review, we examined data on complaints received at the Mint and compared it to those received across the rest of Treasury. Specifically, we obtained the certified formal EEO complaints (EEOC Form 462) data from Treasury OCRD reported for FY2017 to FY2021. We compared the complaint data with workforce numbers contained in the Mint's MD-715 Workforce Data Tables.


Over the five-year period, Treasury averaged approximately 96,481 employees, of which Mint averaged approximately 1,595 employees (1.7 percent of Treasury employees). As shown in Table 1, from FY2017 to FY2021, Mint employees filed 149 formal EEO complaints. Of those, 56 (37.6 percent) claimed a Basis of "Race:

¹⁹ The EEO complaint process provides individuals the opportunity to seek either a mutual resolution of the alleged discrimination or a decision by a third party on the validity of the claim of discrimination. In the pre-complaint (informal) stage, the aggrieved individual (claimant) makes an initial contact with an EEO Manager to initiate an EEO complaint and an EEO Counselor is then assigned to work with the claimant. The EEO Counselor will offer the claimant the choice between traditional counseling and the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process for resolving the complaint. If no resolution is achieved through the traditional counseling process or ADR, the counselor will provide the complainant with a Notice of Right to File a Formal Discrimination. Treasury Office of Civil Rights & Diversity (OCRD) will make a determination to accept or reject the formal complaint. If the complaint is accepted for processing, OCRD will assign an investigator to investigate the allegations.

²⁰ EEOC Form 462, Annual Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Statistical Report of Discrimination Complaints

Black or African American.” During the same time period, employees filed 1,709 formal EEO complaints across the rest of Treasury. Of those, 463 (27.1 percent) claimed a Basis of “Race: Black or African American.” In other words, Mint filed 8.0 percent of all complaints filed in Treasury and 10.8 percent of the complaints filed with Basis of “Race: Black or African American.” Further, as shown in Figure 5, from FY2017 to FY2021, the percentage of Mint formal EEO complaints claiming a Basis of “Race: Black or African American” has been increasing at a higher rate compared to the rest of Treasury. In FY2021, 48 percent of all formal EEO complaints filed at the Mint (or 12 of 25 total complaints) claimed a Basis of “Race: Black or African American” compared to 31.4 percent for all other Treasury bureaus (or 91 of 290 total complaints). In FY2017, the percentages were almost equal.²¹

Figure 5: Percent of EEO Formal Complaints Claiming a Basis of Race – Black or African American



²¹ The total number of formal EEO complaints filed at the Mint from FY2017 to FY2021 represents 8 percent of all formal EEO complaints for Treasury. Since the Mint has a smaller universe of formal EEO complaints in comparison to Treasury as a whole, smaller fluctuations in the number of complaints from year to year for the Mint may result in more pronounced percent changes. For example, the number of complaints filed annually on the Basis of “Race: Black or African American,” ranged from 7 to 15 in the period analyzed. Therefore, a thorough interpretation of complaint analysis should consider the number of complaints when percent calculations are presented.

Table 1: Number of EEO Formal Complaints Claiming a Basis of Race – Black or African American (Supports Figure 5 above)

	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021
Complaints Filed with Basis of Race: Black or African American					
Mint	7	15	12	10	12
Rest of Treasury	96	103	90	83	91
Total Complaints Filed					
Mint	25	43	31	25	25
Rest of Treasury	342	404	364	309	290
% Total Complaints (Basis of Race: Black or African American)					
Mint	28.0%	34.9	38.7%	40.0%	48.0%
Rest of Treasury	28.1%	25.5%	24.7%	26.9%	31.4%

As shown in Figure 6 and Table 2 below, we also examined complaints filed at the Mint with a Basis of Reprisal during the same five-year period. With the exception of FY2018, the majority of formal EEO complaints at the Mint claiming a Basis of Reprisal have been filed by Black or African American employees (or 53 of 84 complaints filed with a Basis of Reprisal over the five-year period). In FY2021, 68.4 percent of all formal EEO complaints claiming a Basis of Reprisal at the Mint (or 13 of 19 complaints) were filed by Black or African American employees.

Figure 6: Percent of EEO Formal Complaints Claiming a Basis of Reprisal that were Filed at the Mint by Black or African American Employees




Table 2: Number of EEO Formal Complaints Claiming a Basis of Reprisal that were Filed at the Mint by Black or African American Employees (Supports Figure 6 above)²²

	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021
Complaints Filed with Basis of Reprisal					
Black or African American	8	10	9	13	13
Total Complaints Filed	11	22	14	18	19
% Black or African American	72.7%	45.5%	64.3%	72.2%	68.4%

²² To identify the ethnicity and race, we analyzed an extract from the EEO database that generates the certified reports. Treasury OCRD then manually queried each complainant in the Human Resources database unless it was otherwise noted in the extract. We observed some small discrepancies when reconciling the case totals to the certified reports. These discrepancies were attributed to the fact that the EEO database may include subsequent updates to EEO cases that were not incorporated in the certified reports and did not materially impact the results of the analysis.

In summary, we made the following observations based on our analysis of the OCRD EEO data:

- A higher percentage of EEO complaints with the basis of race: Black or African American were filed at the Mint when compared to the rest of Treasury;
- Complaints filed with the basis of race: Black or African American at the Mint are increasing at a higher rate than the rest of Treasury; and
- Black or African American employees filed the majority of EEO reprisal complaints at the Mint.

Analysis of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey

The OIG reviewed the Mint's results from responses to relevant questions²³ from the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) for FY2017 through FY2021 and compared them with Treasury-wide results. The percentage of Mint respondents that identified Black or African American each year was 21.7 percent, 21.7 percent, 20.6 percent, 22.0 percent, and 19.6 percent for FY2017 to FY2021, respectively. Because individual employee's FEVS responses are anonymous, it is impossible to break down the responses to any given question by race.

In every year, the Mint employees' responses were generally more positive than negative by a large margin and often by percentages similar to those collected Treasury-wide; however, some deviations from this pattern were noted.

For four of the six questions noted, the Mint had fewer positive responses and more negative responses in comparison to all of Treasury. The four questions following this pattern were "I can disclose a suspected violation of law, rule or regulation without fear of reprisal," "Promotions in my work unit are based on merit," "Prohibited

²³ The survey questions changed in FY2020 and three questions were no longer included: (1) Promotions in my work unit are based on merit; (2) Policies and programs promote diversity in the workplace (for example, recruiting minorities and women, training in awareness of diversity issues, mentoring); and (3) Prohibited Personnel Practices (for example, illegally discriminating for or against any employee/applicant, obstructing a person's right to compete for employment, knowingly violating veterans' preference requirements) are not tolerated.

Personnel Practices (for example, illegally discriminating for or against an employee/applicant, obstructing a person's right to compete for employment, knowingly violating veterans' preference requirements) are not tolerated," and "My supervisor is committed to a workforce representative of all segments of society."

For the question "Policies and programs promote diversity in the workplace (for example, recruiting minorities and women, training in awareness of diversity issues, mentoring)," the Mint had more negative responses than those of Treasury, however in two of the years (FY2018 and FY2019) they also had more positive responses.

For the question "I recommend my organization as a good place to work," the Mint had more positive responses than those of Treasury, with the exception of FY2021 when they had fewer positive responses than Treasury as a whole.²⁴ For this question the Mint also had fewer negative responses than Treasury for FY2017 to FY2019, but had more negative responses than Treasury for FY2020 and FY2021. See Table 3 below.

²⁴ In 2021, Treasury experienced a drop in the FEVS response rate. This drop in response rate is likely the result of several factors, including (1) Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) decision to survey a sample of the Treasury population, (2) a reduction in the number of weekly survey reminders previously sent out by OPM, (3) a survey period of only 5 weeks, instead of the typical 6, (4) survey fatigue, and (5) on-going impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Table 3: Summary of Select FEVS Responses

	FY2017			FY2018			FY2019			FY2020			FY2021		
	# Responses	% Positive Response	% Negative Response	# Responses	% Positive Response	% Negative Response	# Responses	% Positive Response	% Negative Response	# Responses	% Positive Response	% Negative Response	# Responses	% Positive Response	% Negative Response
I can disclose a suspected violation of law, rule, or regulation without fear of reprisal															
Mint	1,028	58.5%	21.4%	921	60.2%	21.3%	909	63.1%	19.7%	781	61.3%	24.0%	460	59.3%	21.7%
Treasury	43,850	67.7%	14.8%	40,001	68.0%	14.8%	39,801	69.1%	14.0%	40,249	72.3%	11.9%	15,240	72.4%	11.8%
Promotions in my work unit are based on merit															
Mint	1,031	31.1%	43.4%	891	37.1%	40.1%	916	35.2%	37.6%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Treasury	42,365	37.1%	34.1%	38,377	36.7%	34.2%	37,936	39.9%	31.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Policies and programs promote diversity in the workplace (for example, recruiting minorities and women, training in awareness of diversity issues, mentoring)															
Mint	1,015	57.9%	15.7%	894	62.6%	16.9%	904	60.2%	15.3%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Treasury	41,183	58.3%	14.1%	37,422	58.2%	14.5%	36,851	59.9%	13.2%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
I recommend my organization as a good place to work															
Mint	1,062	67.8%	13.2%	941	70.5%	12.4%	940	72.3%	10.7%	794	75.0%	11.4%	474	67.5%	11.7%
Treasury	45,567	64.8%	15.5%	41,424	64.5%	15.9%	40,816	66.9%	14.2%	40,249	74.3%	10.2%	15,710	72.4%	11.6%
Prohibited Personnel Practices (for example, illegally discriminating for or against an employee/applicant, obstructing a person's right to compete for employment, knowingly violating veterans' preference requirements) are not tolerated															
Mint	983	61.7%	17.5%	890	62.9%	17.8%	879	61.7%	16.3%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Treasury	40,634	69.1%	11.6%	37,010	69.2%	11.9%	36,472	69.3%	11.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
My supervisor is committed to a workforce representative of all segments of society															
Mint	1,002	65.6%	13.8%	899	68.8%	12.3%	896	69.3%	10.4%	767	76.6%	8.1%	455	78.5%	8.9%
Treasury	41,555	75.1%	7.6%	37,910	75.0%	7.6%	37,310	75.8%	7.1%	37,595	83.0%	5.1%	14,502	83.6%	5.3%

Note: Positive – Strongly Agree and Agree; Very Satisfied and Satisfied; Very Good and Good. Negative – Strongly Disagree and Disagree; Dissatisfied and Very Dissatisfied; Poor and Very Poor

Analysis of Treasury OCRD's Internal Review of the Mint's EEO Program

Approximately one year prior to the July 2020 complaint to former Secretary Mnuchin,²⁵ Treasury OCRD completed an audit of the Mint's EEO, Diversity and Inclusion, and External Civil Rights Programs. Treasury OIG reviewed the final report,²⁶ which concluded that the Mint was compliant with many EEOC requirements and found the EEO Program generally satisfactory. However, Treasury OCRD also reported that there were areas where the Mint was not compliant and identified recommended corrective actions. The report stated that in focus groups and interviews, Mint employees expressed fear of reprisal, confusion about the EEO Office structure and processes, a belief that EEO is biased towards management, and skepticism surrounding the EEO resolution process. The report also stated that other employees and managers believed Mint management was too willing to settle EEO claims and that they failed to take action against employees who filed multiple false complaints. In addition, it was reported that some managers told employees to provide positive responses to certain FEVS questions because a poor response could

²⁵ See Appendix 2 for a timeline of key milestones prior to and following the complaint.

²⁶ Department of the Treasury, Office of Civil Rights and Diversity, U.S. Mint FY2019 EEO, Diversity and Inclusion, and Civil Rights Programs Audit Report (June 20, 2019).

result in the facility losing work. Treasury OIG reviewed the report, paying special attention to the discrepancies found relating to the quality of EEO counseling and the complaint process. Findings included:

- issues with access to information on how to file an EEO complaint or about the Anti-Harassment Policy and Procedures;
- a lack of a comprehensive Anti-Harassment Program policy;
- confusion as to which department has ownership of the Anti-Harassment Program and who is the Anti-Harassment Coordinator;
- lack of an EEO Strategic Plan, recognized by EEOC as a best practice;
- lack of a policy requiring that inquiries into harassment allegations be initiated within 10 days of the reported allegation;
- lack of an adequate tracking system to determine timely initiation of inquiries into harassment allegations;
- lack of an out-briefing of all parties following a harassment inquiry;
- lack of anti-harassment training for employees and managers;
- lack of a disciplinary policy or a table of penalties that covers discriminatory conduct;
- issues with the quality control process for EEO complaint documents;
- improper record retention procedures;
- a lower than Treasury average for EEOC Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) offer rate; and
- issues with ensuring that the Ethnicity and Race Indicator (ERI) and gender for new employees who do not self-identify during the onboarding process is accurately captured.

Even though the Mint officially responded to the recommendations to the Treasury OCRD audit report in September 2020, it began the process of taking a number of corrective actions almost immediately after it was issued in June 2019. For example, an Anti-Harassment Program coordinator was named in July 2019 and assumed the position in November 2019. At that time, the Anti-Harassment complaint tracking system was implemented. The Mint also developed and implemented a checklist in July 2019 to ensure that all EEO complaint documents uploaded into the EEO complaint management system are accurate and complete.

Analysis of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Conflict Assessment of Mint Protection Directorate

In May 2020, approximately two months prior to the July 2020 complaint, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) completed a Conflict Assessment²⁷ of the Mint Police Field Unit in Washington, D.C. The assessment was requested by the Deputy Chief of the Protection Division, which oversees the Mint Police. FMCS facilitators conducted interviews to gain insight into what works well for the unit, what challenges they face, and what recommendations could be made to improve the climate in the workplace. The primary findings were: (1) poor communication flow about mission, goals, and day to day operations; (2) lack of trust between staff and management; and, (3) lack of self-awareness and accountability. FMCS made a number of recommendations that included creating a collaborative working group to address communication gaps, employee morale, and effective training, and offering focused leadership development training emphasizing employee engagement and improving communication.

Office of Investigations Interviews and Records Review

Treasury OIG's Office of Investigations (OI) interviewed five of the six complainants, who signed the letter to the former Secretary of the Treasury; one complainant had the opportunity to be interviewed but did not accept. OI also spoke with 12 current and former Mint personnel, referred to OI by the five interviewed complainants. The individuals discussed their perceptions and experiences about the Mint, including alleged retaliation after filing complaints against the Mint or their managers. Thirteen (13) of the 17 interviewed advised they were harassed by supervisors after they complained, and four became subjects of investigations after they filed a complaint. Allegations of misconduct were substantiated for two of the four individuals who became the subject of investigations.

To broaden the scope of interviews, OI contacted the Union Representatives at all six of the Mint locations to inquire if they were aware of any relevant cases involving union members. OI spoke with representatives in San Francisco, Denver, and Philadelphia; no one recalled any cases related to harassment or retaliation. Numerous attempts to contact the Union Representatives from West Point, Fort Knox, and Headquarters were unsuccessful; no one responded to OI's calls or emails.

²⁷ Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Conflict Assessment: US Mint Police, DC Field Unit (May 5, 2020).

The OIG reviewed allegations referenced by the complainants in the letter to the former Secretary, in listening sessions, and during interviews. The complaints mentioned were received by the OIG between 2015 and 2020. Four out of the five complaints referenced occurred prior to former Director Ryder's arrival in 2018.

- A 2015 investigation involving racist writings on a bathroom wall was investigated and referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, Civil Rights Division. Due to the lack of evidence to identify a subject, the matter was declined for prosecution.
- A 2017 investigation related to a noose found at a Mint facility, was substantiated, and the subject was removed.
- The OIG attempted to investigate the receipt of a racially motivated, threatening letter in 2020; however, the complainant/victim became combative, refused to cooperate with the investigation, and subsequently withdrew the complaint. No determination could be made about this allegation due to the failure of the complainant to cooperate.
- A 2015-2016 investigation comprised 14 allegations, 4 of which were substantiated (unauthorized search and storage of agency email and personally identifiable information (PII), and failure to adhere to Personal Use of Government Technology resources).
- A 2017 investigation, alleging unauthorized use of the complainant's resume for the benefit of another party, was unsubstantiated.

OI identified factors that could exacerbate perceptions of disparity. Since investigations contain protected information and Mint management has an obligation to protect adverse action and settlement information, all parties are not privy to all the facts surrounding an investigation or Mint management's response to an investigation, resulting in potentially inaccurate assumptions by the complainants. Our review also identified a significant leak and unauthorized sharing of privileged personnel information related to internal Mint Management Inquiries, Administrative Investigations, and EEO or MSPB settlement information that was circulated among certain Mint personnel, including some of the complainants.

During four investigations, two of the complainants exhibited lack of candor, which hindered the investigations and undermined the allegations.

Mint Management has taken steps to Improve Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility

Mint Management has taken a number of steps to address the concerns set forth in the July 2020 complaint. In an interview with Treasury OIG, former Mint Director David Ryder said he took every complaint of racism seriously. In the weeks following the complaint, he personally met with the individuals who signed the letter and invited them to attend a series of listening sessions²⁸ with Mint and Treasury officials responsible for diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. He also took steps to commission the TIVC cultural assessment, implement additional EEO training for all supervisors and managers, and require all Mint employees to complete diversity and inclusion training and anti-harassment training.

Regarding the TIVC cultural assessment, the Mint contracted with TIVC to perform a comprehensive cultural assessment of the Mint Headquarters and Fort Knox locations focusing on “cultural behaviors, opinions, beliefs, views, feelings, values, and practices to determine business needs and appropriate actions.” The assessment, which was performed between March 2021 and September 2021, included but was not limited to, reviews of processes and policies, focus groups, surveys, and interviews with management, key personnel, and non-supervisory employees. Root-cause analysis performed during the assessment found that “diversity, equity, inclusion, and race relations are a widespread issue and not relegated to just a few ‘disgruntled people with an ax to grind.’” The assessment also reported that the disagreement on the state of race relations and treatment of minorities is a shared perception across demographics.

According to the final report containing the strategic action plan,²⁹ contributing factors to the state of Mint’s culture included “a lack of updated policies, conflicting and polarized views on Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion, race and gender relations, and the perception of inconsistent application of policies.” Another major concern

²⁸ According to the complainants that Treasury OIG interviewed, several of them only attended the first of three listening sessions because they believed that Director Ryder was being dismissive of their concerns and insensitive to how Black or African American Mint employees felt about current and prior racial incidents.

²⁹ TIVC published two reports as part of the cultural assessment review. The first report, Culture Assessment Project Report, was provided to the Mint on September 10, 2021. The second report, Culture Assessment Strategic Action Plan, was provided on September 29, 2021. The Culture Assessment Strategic Action Plan included detailed recommendations and proposed implementation methodologies to address the findings discussed in the Culture Assessment Project Report.

expressed in the cultural assessment was the lack of psychological safety. In particular, the report stated that a “statistically significant number of participants across demographics conveyed fear of retaliation and fear of reprisal as the main reason for refusing to participate in focus groups or interviews. Seven percent of participants cited ongoing or previously filed grievances that resulted in retaliatory administrative investigations as the reason to decline focus group participation. This perceived lack of trust persisted and appeared to be present during focus groups, one-on-one interviews, and in the survey data.”

In response to the cultural assessment, the Mint created a culture steering committee under the leadership of the current Mint Director, Ventris Gibson, to oversee the planning and implementation of proposed strategic action plan items that prioritize culture optimization. As of August 2022, the Mint had taken a number of actions including the following:

- Created the Office of Equity and Inclusion (OEI) to be led by the newly appointed Chief Equity and Inclusion Officer (CEIO). Currently, position descriptions are being developed and recruitment will be underway for mission-critical positions necessary to carry out Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) efforts at the Mint.
- Added new performance plan requirements for all employees on workplace requirements as part of employee engagement. DEIA elements are currently being drafted for FY2023 Performance Management Plans for all Mint employees with an estimated completion date prior to October 1, 2022.
- Provided training and coaching for managers and supervisors focused on equity. A contractor conducted psychological safety and change management training for Mint Headquarters and Fort Knox managers and supervisors in May 2022.
- Appointed a diversity expert in May 2022 to assist in the development of the Mint’s strategic action plan for culture optimization and to help ensure that the Mint is on the appropriate implementation path.
- Held listening sessions with Mint staff. The Mint Director and CEIO visited each of the Mint facilities in the field (Philadelphia, San Francisco, Denver, West Point, and Fort Knox) and each directorate in Mint Headquarters to meet with employees and share their thoughts and experiences.

- Continued to address all remaining outstanding recommendations from the June 2019 Treasury OCRD audit report of the Mint's EEO, Diversity and Inclusion, and External Civil Rights Programs and the May 2020 FMCS Conflict Assessment of the Mint Police Washington, D.C. Field Unit.
- Assigned Anti-Retaliation training to all managers and employees. This training was assigned in February 2022. As of August 2022, 98 percent of the Mint workforce has completed it.
- Began taking steps to reinstitute the Aspiring Leaders Development Program³⁰ and create a career path framework with mentoring capability. Mint leadership is currently evaluating the Aspiring Leaders Program for incorporation into FY2023 sessions and researching options for a career path framework with mentoring capability. According to Mint officials, they are in the process of selecting a contractor for an online mentoring program for Mint employees for potential roll out during FY2023.
- Began drafting updates to policies governing Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations.

Recommendations

We recommend that Mint leadership:

1. Proactively evaluate patterns and trends in Administrative Investigations, Management Inquiries, and EEO complaints as it pertains to demographic characteristics including, but not necessarily limited to, race and ethnicity. To facilitate this type of analysis, the data collection process for Administrative Investigations and Management Inquiries should be improved to ensure the capture of necessary information and to ensure consistency of data collected

³⁰ The Aspiring Leaders Development Program (ALDP) is the Mint's leadership development program. The ALDP provides participants with knowledge, skills and tools to support their professional development. The ALDP focuses on engaging participants in a fundamental examination of their own leader identity, leadership competencies, and learning strategies. The learning outcomes are for participants to: (1) establish/develop their leader identity, (2) analyze their leadership styles and leader competencies for future professional growth, and (3) implement a personal employee/leader development strategy. The fall cohort for the ALDP begins on October 10, 2022.

across the programs. These enhancements will help ensure information is tracked, monitored, and analyzed at a consolidated level.

2. Enhance efforts to proactively evaluate patterns and trends in Mint workforce statistics such as hiring and promotion practices as it pertains to demographic characteristics including, but not necessarily limited to, race and ethnicity. As part of this proactive evaluation, steps should be taken to identify potential adverse trends, understand why they exist, and review whether there are opportunities to address them.
3. Ensure that the Mint workforce has the proper policies, resources, and tools to aid employee understanding of how to file complaints pertaining to harassment, employee misconduct, and potential deficiencies and/or vulnerabilities in Mint operations, programs, and/or systems. This also pertains to ensuring that policies for Management Inquiries and Administrative Investigations are clearly written so that employees understand the distinction between the two processes. To ensure that efforts are effective, consideration should be given to conducting surveys and/or other forms of outreach among the workforce as it pertains to the complaint process.

We plan to follow up on the Mint's progress in implementing corrective actions in response to our recommendations as well as the reports issued by TIVC, OCRD, and FMCS. We will work with Mint management on the timing of our follow-up review.

We appreciate the cooperation of the Mint and OCRD personnel during our inquiry, and look forward to continued collaboration to monitor developments. We are available to discuss our findings, processes, and recommendations. Please call me on (202) 528-8997.

Appendix 1: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a review of workforce diversity and personnel practices at the Mint to determine whether:

- There are patterns or practices of racial discrimination, including but not limited to intimidation or disproportionate and meritless investigatory actions; and
- The quality of the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and other complaint processes are satisfactory.

To accomplish our objective, we conducted fieldwork from October 2020 through September 2022. As part of our fieldwork, we interviewed the following key Mint officials and staff:

- Director, Mint
- Former Director, Mint
- Chief Equity and Inclusion Officer, Office of Equity and Inclusion
- EEO Officer, Diversity Management and Civil Rights (DMCR) Directorate
- Acting EEO Officer, DMCR
- Director, Human Capital Directorate (HCD)
- Anti-Harassment Program Coordinator, HCD
- Chief Counsel
- Deputy Chief Counsel
- Commander, Protection Directorate
- Inspector, Investigation and Intelligence, Protection Directorate

We also interviewed:

- five of the six complainants who signed the letter to the Secretary of the Treasury (One complainant had the opportunity to be interviewed but did not accept the opportunity);
- twelve current and former Mint personnel the five complainants referred to the OIG for interviews;
- union representatives from Mint locations in San Francisco, Denver and Philadelphia (Numerous attempts to contact the union representatives from West Point, Fort Knox and Headquarters were unsuccessful); and
- Officials from the Treasury Office of Civil Rights and Diversity

We reviewed and analyzed the Mint's policies and procedures related to Management Inquiries, Administrative Investigations, and the agency's Anti-Harassment program. We also reviewed government-wide, Treasury, and system guidance including:

- EEOC, Management Directive 715 (EEO MD-715), Federal responsibilities under Section 717 of Title VII and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act (Oct. 1, 2003);
- EEOC, Instructions to Federal Agencies for EEO MD-715, Part G, Agency Self-Assessment Checklist;
- EEOC, Model EEO Programs Must Have An Effective Anti-Harassment Program (2006);
- EEOC, Form 462, Annual Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Statistical Report of Discrimination Complaints, Form Completion Instruction Manual (2021)
- Civil Rights and Diversity Issuance System, CRD-009, Procedures for Addressing Allegations of Discriminatory Harassment, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Feb. 25, 2021);
- Mint Directive MD 8003.21, Anti-Harassment Program (May 2022);
- Mint Directive MD 8003.21, Anti-Harassment Program (Jan. 2021);
- Mint Policy Memorandum 8001.04, Management Inquiries (Apr. 28, 2008);
- Mint Policy Memorandum 2001.01, Administrative Investigations (Dec.10, 2007); and
- icomplaints EEO Case Management User Guide, MicroPact, Inc. (MicroPact's icomplaints is an enterprise level Commercial Off-The-Shelf product used for tracking EEO complaints and cases)

We obtained data from the following sources to facilitate analysis related to our review:

- EEOC Form 462, Annual Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Statistical Report of Discrimination Complaints, Fiscal Years 2017-2021, Mint and Treasury-wide;
- MD-715 Workforce Data Table A1: Total Workforce Distribution by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, Fiscal Years 2017-2021, Mint, BEP, and Treasury-wide;
- MD-715 Workforce Data Table A4-1: Senior Pay & General Schedule (GS) Grades - Distribution by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex (Across), Fiscal Years 2017-2021, Mint, BEP, and Treasury-wide;
- MD-715 Workforce Data Table A4WG-1(All): Participation Rates Across Wage Grades, Fiscal Years 2017-2021, Mint, BEP, and Treasury-wide;


- Mint iComplaints data for Formal and Informal EEOC Complaints, Fiscal Years 2017-2021;
- HR Connect Ethnicity and Race Indicator (ERI) for Mint EEO Formal Complaints Claiming a Basis of Reprisal for Fiscal Years 2017-2021;
- Mint Anti-Harassment Program Tracking Report, November 2019 through February 2022;
- Judgmental sample of Management Inquiry and Administrative Investigation final reports selected from the Mint Anti-Harassment Program Tracking Report (We judgmentally selected cases that included some allegations that were substantiated and other cases where the allegations were not substantiated. A judgmental sample is a nonprobability sample, the results of which cannot be used to project to the population.);
- Monthly complaint case logs provided to Mint Deputy Chief Counsel from the Anti-Harassment Program Coordinator and the Protection Directorate; and
- Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, 1st Level Subagency Report, Department of the Treasury: Mint, United States Office of Personnel Management, Fiscal Years 2017-2021;

We also reviewed the following reports and documentation related to Mint activities:

- EEOC Form 715-02, Part A – D, Federal Agency Annual EEO Program Status Report, Mint, Fiscal Years 2017-2021;
- Department of the Treasury, Office of Civil Rights and Diversity, U.S. Mint FY2019 EEO, Diversity and Inclusion, and Civil Rights Programs Audit Report (Jun. 20, 2019);
- Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Conflict Assessment: US Mint Police, DC Field Unit (May 5, 2020);
- TI Verbatim Consulting, Inc. (TIVC), Culture Assessment Project Report, Department of the Treasury (DOT) US Mint (Sep. 10, 2021);
- TIVC, Culture Assessment Strategic Action Plan, DOT US Mint (Sep. 29, 2021);
- InfoMINT Newsletter, Mint (Summer 2022);
- A Blueprint for Change Update, Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility, Mint (Aug. 2022);
- Status of Mint Actions in Response to Cultural Assessment, Mint (Aug. 12, 2022); and
- Mint Office of Equity and Inclusion Organization Chart and Position Descriptions

Appendix 2

Mint Timeline of Key Milestones





Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-22-0026-I
Complaint Title	Error Coins 2021 American Gold Eagles
Date Closed	December 12, 2022
Subject Type	No Affiliation
Allegation Location	New York
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	Other

Closing Summary:

On November 29, 2022, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated after receiving a complaint from the U.S. Mint (USM), alleging that a third-party coin and banknote grading company had possession of error coins, specifically numerous 2021 American Gold Eagle coins. The investigation determined that the coins were struck with a West Point "W" mint mark and distributed in error by the USM. No criminal or administrative violations were identified.

Administrative Summary:

Approval:

Andrea L. Peacock	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

Unknown,

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Office of Inspector General - Office of Investigations
U.S. Department of the Treasury



Report of Investigation



Case Information:

Complaint Number	USM-21-0050-I
Complaint Title	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date Closed	August 5, 2021
Subject Type	Treasury Employee
Allegation Location	District of Columbia
Confidentiality	No
Congressional Interest	No
Allegation(s)	5 CFR 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service, Misconduct by Senior (GS-15 or Above) Treasury Official

Closing Summary:

On July 22, 2021, the OIG completed its report of investigation for a case initiated upon notification that senior officials pressured a subordinate to rescind a hiring selection based on the selectee's race. The allegation was unsubstantiated based on conflicting statements and the unanimous approval of the subordinate's selection by a hiring panel and the senior officials.

Administrative Summary:

The U.S. Mint (Mint) provided the OIG with allegations of misconduct against the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for compelling a subordinate to rescind his hiring selection of the Deputy Associate Director of Sales and Marketing based on the selectee's race. The OIG unsubstantiated the allegation based on conflicting statements of all parties. In addition, the subordinate did not rescind his selection, which was ultimately approved by both the Director and Acting Deputy Director.

Approval:

Andrea L.
Peacock

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Agent in Charge



Report of Investigation



Subject(s) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) US Mint

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)