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Description of document: Selected Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigations closed in 2023 and/or 2024

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Department of Energy  
Washington, DC 20585

March 5, 2025

VIA EMAIL:

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request No. HQ-2024-01282-F.

This is a response from the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG) to your request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. On February 12, 2024, your request sought the following:

- A copy of the closing report or final report or other conclusory report from each of the following DOE Office of Inspector General closed Investigations: 19- 0022-I, 19-0059-I, 20-0002-I, 20-0006-I, 20-0035-I, 20-0085-I, 21-0008-I, 21-0009-I, 21-0052-I, 21-0053-I, 21-0062-I, 21-0064-I, 21-0065-I, 21-0069-I, 21-0070-I, 21-0073-I, 21-0076-I, 21-0085-I, 21-0089-I, 22-0019-I, 22-0029-I, 22-0039-I, 22-0082-I and 21-0001-W.

The OIG has completed a search and review of its files and identified 23 documents responsive to your request. A review of these documents and a determination concerning their release has been made pursuant to the FOIA. Based on this review, we determined that documents 1 through 23 are being released to you with certain material withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA, referred to as Exemptions 6 and 7(C), respectively.

Exemption 6 protects from disclosure “personnel and medical and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . .” Exemption 7(C) provides that “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” may be withheld from disclosure, but only to the extent the production of such documents “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . .”

Names and information that would tend to disclose the identity of certain individuals have been withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Individuals involved in OIG enforcement matters, which in this case include subjects, witnesses, sources of information, and other individuals, are entitled to privacy protections so that they will be free from harassment, intimidation, and other personal intrusions.

In invoking Exemptions 6 and 7(C), we have determined that it is not in the public interest to release the withheld material. We have determined that the public interest in the identity of individuals who appear in these files does not outweigh these individuals' privacy interests. Those interests include being free from intrusions into their professional and private lives.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

To the extent permitted by other laws, the DOE, will make records available which it is authorized to withhold under 5 U.S.C. § 552 whenever it determines that such disclosure is in the public interest. *See* 10 C.F.R. § 1004.1.

As required, all releasable information has been segregated from the material that is withheld and is provided to you. *See* 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(3).

This decision may be appealed to the Office of Hearings and Appeals within 90 calendar days from your receipt of this letter pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8. Appeals must be in writing and should be addressed to the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, HG-1 /L'Enfant Plaza Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585-1615. You may also submit your appeal by email to [OHA.filings@hq.doe.gov](mailto:OHA.filings@hq.doe.gov). The appeal must be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" on the envelope and letter, and if submitted by email, in the subject line of the email. *See* 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8(b).

Once your administrative remedies are exhausted, judicial review will be available to you in the United States District Court in the district in which you reside, or have your principal place of business, in the district in which the records are situated, or the District of Columbia. *See* 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8(d)(3).

If you have any questions about the processing of your request, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison, Mr. Alexander Morris. He may be contacted to discuss any aspect of your request by phone at (202) 586-5955 or by email at [Alexander.Morris@hq.doe.gov](mailto:Alexander.Morris@hq.doe.gov). Please know that you also have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the FOIA Public Liaison or the Office of Government Information Services, <https://ogis.archives.gov>; (202) 741-5770; (877) 684-6448 (toll free), by fax: (202) 741-5769, or by email [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov).

Sincerely,

**Lewe F. Sessions** Digitally signed by Lewe F. Sessions  
Date: 2025.03.05 11:20:20 -05'00'

Lewe Sessions  
Assistant Inspector General  
for Investigations  
Office of Inspector General

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** April 5, 2021 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2021.04.05 15:28:23 -06'00'

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 8 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 19-0022-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of 19-0022-I, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 8 Investigations.

On December 4, 2018, a contractor employee at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) alleged timecard fraud at WIPP by first shift employees of Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP). Subsequent to the contractor employee's allegations to the Department OIG, the contractor employee filed a **sealed** Qui Tam complaint in District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon the filing of the **sealed** Qui Tam complaint, the Department OIG began working with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Main Justice's Commercial Litigation Unit and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia.

Of the matters alleged in the Qui Tam, DOJ focused the investigation on the allegations of timecard fraud and the allegations of a revision to the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) for a single award issued by NWP to a subcontractor. The Relator alleged the timecard fraud had occurred while the Relator was working at WIPP from April 2018 till November 2018 and the revision to the ICE fraudulently increased the cost of the project and justified the bid from the awarded contractor.

The investigation determined NWP's Internal Audit conducted a review of employee labor hours charged to the Department during the period of May 12, 2018 to August 1, 2018. A review of the audit identified minimal timecard discrepancies related to time charging practices at WIPP which were ultimately corrected administratively. Additionally, the audit noted that the badging system at the site was not a time keeping system and did not indicate when an individual was working at an off-site location. A review of the procurement file for the award that had the revision to the ICE did not provide any indications of the fraudulent activity alleged by the Relator.

Based on the investigative actions completed by DOJ and the Department OIG, DOJ determined the Relator's allegations of fraud were not substantiated and with Department OIG Counsel concurrence, DOJ declined intervention in the matter.

This matter is recommended for closure as no further expenditure of investigative resources is warranted.



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** February 1, 2021 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: 2021.02.01 09:06:38 -07'00'

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) \_\_\_\_\_ Region 8 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) \_\_\_\_\_

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 19-0059-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of 19-0059-I, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 8 Investigations.

On May 28, 2019, the Department OIG was made aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Turab Lookman, a former Los Alamos National Laboratory contract employee, based on a grand jury indictment charging him with three counts of making false statements. Upon learning of Mr. Lookman's arrest, the OIG opened 19-0059-I to provide information to the Department/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for possible suspension and debarment, and security clearance action against Mr. Lookman.

The OIG issued an Investigative Report to Management (IRM), detailing Mr. Lookman's indictment and arrest. Based upon the IRM recommendations, the Los Alamos Site Office provided the information to Department security clearance personnel. Additionally, the NNSA Office of Acquisition and Project Management (OAPM) suspended Mr. Lookman, pending conclusion of his judicial process.

Mr. Lookman eventually pled guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 1001 (False Statements) and was sentenced to five years supervised release. Based on this, the NNSA OAPM debarred Mr. Lookman for 5 years, or until October 21, 2025.

This matter is being recommended for closure as Mr. Lookman has been sentenced and debarred. No further expenditure of investigative resources is warranted.



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** February 26, 2021  
**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations  
**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 20-0020-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

In August of 2019, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) referred whistleblower disclosures regarding the Department's Office of International Affairs (IA) to the Department. OSC determined there was a substantial likelihood these disclosures demonstrated a violation of law, rule, or regulation by IA, and directed the Department to investigate. Specifically, the disclosures alleged former Department employee (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and current Department employee (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) engaged in unethical, and potentially illegal, behaviors while working on various projects in Ukraine from 2014 through 2017.

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused, primarily but not exclusively, on potential violations of Title 18, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), § 208 (Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest); Title 18, U.S.C., § 207 (Restrictions on Former Officers of the Executive and Legislative Branches); and Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, § 2635 (Standards of Ethical Conduct of Employees of the Executive Branch).

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

OSC cited four allegations for investigation. The allegations and related findings are cited below.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) manipulated DOE energy policy to further personal business interests. This allegation was not substantiated.

(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to develop his private business interests as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) an entity in the same sector in which (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working as a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This allegation was not substantiated.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (3) [redacted] was not forthright in his sworn statements to Congress, including the following: (1) he refrained from working in his capacity as president of VBEG while employed as an SGE for the Department; (2) he mischaracterized as strictly personal his ongoing association with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) partner; and (3) he claimed ignorance of Department contractor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] employment by VBEG as an industry expert. This allegation was substantiated. While the inconsistencies did not appear to rise to the level of a criminal violation, independent review of his testimony uncovered information which [redacted] did not note in his responses. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (C)
- (4) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] hindered U.S. interests when he disclosed proprietary U.S. Government information on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] for the purchase of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] This allegation was not substantiated.

●n November 19, 2020, an Investigative Report to Management (IRM) was issued to the Department's Office of the Secretary (S) summarizing the investigation and providing responses to the OSC inquiry.

RECOMMENDATION

This case is being recommended for closure as the investigation was completed in response to specific allegations from OSC and reported to the Office of the Secretary through the abovementioned IRM. Should additional information develop concerning the alleged criminal activity or ethics violations, this case may be reopened.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 202-586-(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** June 8, 2021

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Office of the Assistant General  
Counsel for Ethics and Personal Law

**FROM:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Investigative Resolution Memorandum (OIG Case #20-0006-I)

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide notification that a U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation was opened to determine whether (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for the Department's Grid Operational Technology Division, failed to disclose outside employment activities.

The OIG investigation determined that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) income from SmartSenseCom, Inc. (SSC) in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after he began working as a Departmental employee in a position which required disclosure of outside employment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported to the Department, Office of General Counsel (GC) his financial affiliation with SSC in both his (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Public Financial Disclosure Reports. However, the investigation found that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not submit a formal outside employment request to GC until after filing his (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Public Financial Disclosure Report.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Based upon the foregoing information, this investigation is closed. Should new allegations or information emerge related to this investigation or this individual, the OIG may reopen this investigation or initiate a new investigation.

Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)





DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** November 17, 2021

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 7 Investigations,  
Western Field Operations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 20-0035-I**

This memorandum recommends closure of investigation 20-0035-I, conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 7 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

This investigation was predicated upon information from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) stating they received an allegation from the Livermore Police Department (Livermore PD) regarding an LLNL employee making threats against the Government and admitting to possessing child pornography. According to LLNL, Livermore PD informed them that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for the LLNL's National Ignition Facility (NIF) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) While speaking to a Clinical Psychologist, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made threats to bomb the NIF and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted to researching how to make pipe bombs and detonators, with the goal of using the devices to destroy the NIF. In addition, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted to being (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addicted to child pornography and advised he would hurt children if he came in contact with them.

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused on alleged violations of 18 USC Sec. 115, Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by making threats and 18 USC Sec. 2252, knowingly accessing or attempting to view child pornography.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

Based on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admissions, Livermore PD obtained a search warrant for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) residence and requested assistance from OIG Investigations to conduct the search.

On March 4, 2020, Livermore PD and OIG Investigations conducted the search warrant on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) residence. During the search warrant, multiple electronic items were seized.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

OIG Investigations coordinated this matter with OIG CIFA and the FBI. OIG Investigations transferred the electronic evidence to OIG CIFA for analysis. Based on OIG CIFA's analyses of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) seized devices, no further evidence was found to indicate [redacted] would be (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a continued credible threat against the Government. Additionally, no further evidence was obtained indicating (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) searched or possessed child pornography.

OIG Investigations presented the investigative findings to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Northern District of California. The USAO declined prosecution based on the lack of evidence obtained during the search of the seized devices.

Due to the egregious threats made by the subject, OIG Investigations issued an Investigative Report to Management (IRM) to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) recommending consideration for suspension and debarment. Pursuant to the IRM, the NNSA issued a five-year debarment to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend this case for closure as all appropriate investigative and judicial actions have been completed.

Case 20-0035-I is closed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Signature Indicates Concurrence  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** February 1, 2021  
 Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]  
 Date: 2021.02.01 11:48:24 -07'00'

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Region 8 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for ●IG Investigation 20-0085-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of 20-0085-I, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 8 Investigations.

On September 16, 2020, the OIG Hotline received a complaint alleging (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Newport News Nuclear BWXT Los Alamos (N3B) had a conflict of interest (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] The Lakeworth Group LLC (Lakeworth) to which N3B subcontracts are being awarded. N3B is the prime contractor with the Department Environmental Management Los Alamos (EM-LA) site.

The OIG interviewed the Department (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] for the N3B contract. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Lakeworth had a prime contract (No. DE-NA0002552) with the Department, but it expired. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] and contract DE-NA0002552 was subsequently revised to reflect this change. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]. A review of contract DE-NA0002552 showed Lakeworth had a prime contract with the National Nuclear Security Administration for environmental remediation work in Los Alamos, NM, and the contract expired in 2019. The records also showed the change (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Lakeworth and the revision of contract DE-NA0002552 to reflect this change.

A review of N3B subcontracts for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2020 determined Lakeworth was not a direct subcontractor to N3B. However, the OIG was informed by N3B that Lakeworth was doing work on N3B's prime contract under a subcontract N3B has with Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc (LATA).

The OIG reviewed the LATA proposal, names of the N3B employees who served on the source evaluation board (SEB), the name of the N3B selecting official, and a copy of the LATA subcontract.

According to this information, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] was not a member of the SEB or involved with the LATA subcontract. Additionally, the N3B (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] for the LATA contract was interviewed and stated

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] was not a part of the LATA subcontract proposal process (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

of Lakeworth. Additionally, the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] stated the LATA subcontract was managed under the N3B Remediation Program and not the Water Program where (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] was assigned. Therefore, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] did not have any interaction with LATA or the work LATA was performing under the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] subcontract.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was contacted to schedule an in-person interview. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was reluctant to meet in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

A review of business records for Lakeworth from the New Mexico Secretary of State's Office showed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Lakeworth and that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This matter is being recommended for closure as no evidence of a conflict of interest or fraud has been found and no further expenditure of investigative resources is warranted.



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

DATE: June 21, 2021

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 1 Investigations  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0008-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

On October 27, 2020, this office initiated an investigation after receiving an allegation that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Schedule C employee in the Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs (CI), may have participated in matters from which he had recused himself. Specifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had previously advised the Department's Office of the General Counsel (GC) that he was in employment negotiations with Clean Energy Technology Association (CETA), a non-federal entity, and had recused himself from participation in any matters pertaining to CETA.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) However, during the week of July 27, 2020, GC was advised by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had approached an assistant to the Assistant Secretary for CI seeking information on how to obtain, for a CETA employee, a meeting with the Secretary (S-1) or one of his senior advisors. At the time of the request, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had not advised GC that his employment negotiations with CETA had ended nor had he submitted a request to rescind his recusal. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The OIG investigation could not substantiate that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had in fact requested a meeting with S-1 for a CETA employee, that such a meeting ever took place, or that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) worked on matters related to CETA in his official capacity in CI. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) investigation further determined that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as well as his supervisors in CI left Department employment on or before (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

This matter was coordinated with the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section (PIN), who expressed no prosecutorial interest.

This investigation is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** November 4, 2021

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations,  
Eastern Field Operations (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0009-I

This memorandum recommends closure of investigation 21-0009-I, conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

On September 8, 2020, the Office of Investigations was notified by the Department's Office of General Counsel (GC), Office of Ethics, that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), a now-former Department (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Nuclear Energy, may have violated Federal ethics laws. The claims were (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) based on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inheritance of stock in companies which are involved in the nuclear energy sector. Specifically, her alleged stock ownership in Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell)--currently the Management and Operations contractor for Sandia National Laboratory, American Electric Power Company, Inc. (AEP), and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK).

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused on possible violations of 18 U.S.C. § 208 – Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

The investigation determined (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Nuclear Energy from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inherited the stocks in question (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) death (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) however, she did not disclose the stocks until her filing of the annual Office of Government Ethics (OGE) Form 278e Public Financial Disclosure Report in April 2020.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Following her OGE-278e filing, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) received conflicting advice from various officials in GC pertaining to whether she needed to divest of the identified stocks due to their individual and aggregate values. However, a review of the stocks' values during the relevant time-period identified routine market fluctuations, resulting in the stocks' value exceeding or falling short of the statutory limits for both particular holdings and aggregate limits. Furthermore, we were unable to substantiate that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) participated in a "particular matter" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 208, that is, in a manner that had a direct and predictable effect on either stock price or (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) personal financial interest.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) directed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to divest the three identified stocks, which she complied. Additional OIG record reviews found that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also divested other assets of concern during her Departmental employment, such as her holdings in the Vanguard Energy fund (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) resigned from her position as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Nuclear Energy on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

This matter was presented to the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section (PIN), who decline prosecutive interest.

A copy of this closing memorandum will be provided to Department General Counsel's office for awareness.

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend this case for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and expenditure of further investigative resources is not warranted.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2021.11.04 10:02:54 -04'00'

Signature Indicates Concurrence  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** May 09, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 7 Investigations,  
Western Field Operations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0052-I**

This memorandum recommends closure of investigation 21-0052-I, conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 7 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

This investigation was predicated upon information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) alleging (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) two former Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may have developed patents while working at LLNL and may have shared the patents with Japanese Audio Visual and Artificial Intelligence Company and a China-based company named Ming Ding (full company name unknown at this time).

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused on alleged violations of 18 USC Sec. 1832 anyone who steals trade secrets or receives stolen trade secrets knowing that they were unlawfully obtained.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

The OIG reviewed LLNL patent records to determine if (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) authored any patents while employed at LLNL. During LLNL employment, all patents for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) expired or abandoned, and all patents for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were expired or abandoned, except for one patent, U.S. Patent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) which was granted on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). However, the LLNL advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Patent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was only pursued in the United States and is not enforceable in other (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) countries. LLNL further advised that any country outside of the U.S. can obtain patent information (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from the U.S. Patent Trademark Office for U.S. Patent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and may develop, use, or sell the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) technology in any other country without recourse, except if used within the United States. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The OIG also conducted patent searches for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website and various other websites. The OIG did not find any other valid patents granted to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MEMORANDUM

The FBI advised the OIG that they could not find evidence to support allegations of patent theft. The FBI further informed the OIG they would no longer pursue this matter and they would close their investigation.

Pursuant to the lack of evidence that a crime had been committed, this investigation was not coordinated with the U. S. Attorney's Office.

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend this case for closure as all appropriate investigative and judicial actions have been completed.

Case 21-0052-I is closed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Signature Indicates Concurrence

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** February 11, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 7 Investigations, Western Field Operations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0053-I

This memorandum recommends closure of investigation 21-0053-I, conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 7 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

This investigation was predicated upon information from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleging that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of Nikola Motors (Nikola), made false public statements about Nikola's abilities with the purpose of attracting investors. The SEC notified the Department of such allegations, because Nikola had received grant funding from the Department's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). At the time of the allegation, the SEC was only investigating the actions of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and had not uncovered any false statements or claims made by Nikola's engineering team. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused on alleged violations of 31 USC § 3729-3733, False Claims Act and 18 USC § 287, False Claims.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On July 29, 2021, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was indicted by the U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, on two counts of Securities Fraud and one count of Wire Fraud. The charges have no nexus to the Department and are unrelated to the OIG investigation.

The investigation determined that the actions and statements of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to attract investors were unrelated to proposals Nikola engineers submitted to EERE for grant funds. Numerous documents from both the SEC and EERE were obtained and reviewed. It was determined that the Nikola engineering team acted independently of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) when applying for the necessary funding, which included two grants (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) totaling approximately \$2.7M. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) EERE continues to work with Nikola engineers on the funded projects and reported no issues. Nikola continues operations out of its Phoenix, Arizona headquarters.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MEMORANDUM

This case was not presented for prosecution due to lack of evidence of a criminal violation.

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend this case for closure as all appropriate investigative and judicial actions have been completed.

Case 21-0053-I is closed.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Signature Indicates Concurrence

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 25, 2022

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 3 Investigations

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for ●IG Investigation 21-0062-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), ●office of Inspector General (●IG), ●office of Investigations (OI), Region 3 Investigations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On February 3, 2021, the OIG Hotline received a referral from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NNSA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) alleging (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of the University of Michigan, may have violated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Section 57 b(2) of the Atomic Energy Act. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with students participating in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at Xiamen University. The complainant alleged some of the activities by the students (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) school may constitute assistance, which is a violation of Section 57b(2).

The results of the investigation determined as follows: 1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after he attended a Federal Bureau of Investigation presentation at the University of Michigan which discussed the issues of being influenced by foreign countries or having a relationship/association with a foreign country; 2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined to not be (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) affiliated with any foreign countries or being a member of any Talent Program; and 3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) identified as being the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on two Department Nuclear Energy University (C) Program (NEUP) awards between (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and neither award required foreign affiliation certifications by the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The investigative findings were coordinated with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan and were found to lack prosecutorial merit.

This matter is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2022.07.25 14:56:40  
+04'00'

Concurrence  
Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** September 12, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0064-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

On February 4, 2021, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) referred a matter to the OIG involving possible violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) *Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest* by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Office of Energy Market Regulation, FERC. Specifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was alleged to have participated in a proceeding in which National Grid, an entity which (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has been actively seeking employment, has a financial interest.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The OIG determined (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) two FERC proceedings concerning National Grid (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The OIG found (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) submitted two applications for employment to National Grid on December (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) followed by a third application on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 2021. Furthermore, the OIG (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) investigation revealed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) failed to recuse himself from these proceedings until after applying for the third position with National Grid on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 2021. These findings were provided to FERC in an Investigative Report to Management, and on September 7, 2022, FERC responded with a decision to remove (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

The facts of the investigation were presented to Department of Justice Public Integrity Section (PIN), which declined the case for prosecution on June 28, 2021. The initiation of this investigation, and prosecutorial declination was reported to the Office of Government Ethics via OGE Form 202.

This investigation is being recommended for closure given all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2022.09.13 10:17:38 -0400

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
(C)

Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, Region 1



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 7, 2021

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0065-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

On April 8, 2021, this office initiated an investigation based upon an anonymous complaint received by the OIG Hotline alleging potential violations of Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 207 (Restriction on Former Officers, Employees and Elected Officials of the Executive and Legislative Branches) and Title 18, U.S.C. § 208 (Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest) by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Specifically, it was alleged (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NNSA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and began working at Criterion Systems, Inc. (Criterion), a NNSA contractor, at the beginning of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The complaint further alleged that Criterion was awarded a contract while (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of NNSA, later lost the contract to DKW Communications, Inc. (DKW), and was subsequently re-awarded the contract after the DKW contract was terminated.

The OIG investigation did not substantiate the allegations that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) violated post-employment restrictions and neither he, nor Criterion, personally benefited from his position at the Department while negotiating his prospective employment with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Criterion. Though it was found that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was in his former position with NNSA during the time of the Criterion and DKW awards, and was part of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the contract was initially awarded to DKW by the selecting official.

However, the investigation determined DKW did not provide adequate assurances to the NNSA's Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management that they were capable of fulfilling the requirements of the TO and as a result, DKW's award was terminated for cause in January 2020 and re-awarded to Criterion – a decision (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no part of.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The OIG determined (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided the Department's General Counsel the requisite signed recusal statement for Department employees seeking employment. Furthermore,

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MEMORANDUM

[(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)] received post-employment ethics briefings from the NNSA Office of General Counsel and later, confirmed his awareness of the one-year, post retirement restriction.

This investigation is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** June 25, 2021 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Date: 2021.06.25 07:56:25 -06'00'

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 8 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for ●IG Investigation 21-0069-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of 21-0069-I, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), ●office of Inspector General (●IG), ●office of Investigations, Region 8 Investigations.

On February 25, 2021, the OIG received information from Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) that a drone was found near building 892, a limited access area (LAA) of Sandia on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB). The ●IG coordinated this information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), both of whom deferred to the OIG. The OIG met with Sandia’s personnel and took custody of the drone.

●n March 3, 2021, the OIG transferred the drone to Sandia’s Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) office for analysis. The UAS office was unable to determine the drone’s origin or owner and returned the drone to the OIG.

●n April 2, 2021, the OIG transferred the drone to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for forensic analysis. The FAA subsequently provided the OIG with a Digital Investigations Report, which identified the last known address where the drone took off as well as the possible owner. The FAA also returned the drone to the ●IG.

On May 21, 2021, the OIG interviewed residents of the last known address of where the drone took off. One of the residents admitted to being the owner of the drone and provided proof of ownership and advised the wind blew the drone towards KAFB as he was flying it. The owner stated he did not intentionally fly the drone over KAFB and that his attempts to recover it, as it was flying toward KAFB, were unsuccessful. The OIG briefed both the FBI and AFOSI regarding the interview with the drone owner and both were not interested in pursuing the matter further.

●n June 21, 2021, the Department ●IG returned the drone to the owner.

This matter is being recommended for closure as no evidence of a crime has been determined and no further expenditure of investigative resources is warranted.





DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** October 13, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 3 Investigations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0070-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Region 3 Investigations.

On February 16, 2021, the OIG initiated an investigation predicated upon information received from the National Science Foundation (NSF) alleging (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may have foreign affiliations that he failed to disclose prior to accepting his Joint Appointment (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Lemont, IL

The OIG investigation determined that from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 250 journal articles (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) awards or grants from United States and other countries, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Finally, the OIG investigation determined that from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, PRC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) An OIG review of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ANL employment paperwork showed that on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) signed a Joint Appointment Acknowledgement Form stating that he was not receiving any compensation from any foreign government-run program. The questionnaire did not ask about any prior affiliations with foreign entities. An interview with ANL's legal department revealed that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) no requirement to disclose any prior foreign affiliations before accepting a position with ANL. ANL's legal department stated they would only be concerned about (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) foreign (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) affiliations if they occurred after his Joint Appointment, and no publications or funding from any (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) foreign entities were discovered pertaining to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after his Joint Appointment with ANL in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This matter is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted. A summary of the investigative findings were also presented to the Department of Justice, National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, who concurred with the recommendation to close the investigation.

*I concur with the recommendation to close investigation #21-0070-I.*

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Region 3 Investigations



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** March 2, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 8 Investigations,  
Western Field Operations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0076-I

This memorandum recommends closure of investigation 21-0076-I, conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 8 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

On April 22, 2021, the Office of Investigations (OI) was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a National Nuclear Security Administration contractor employee of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LLC in Los Alamos, NM, was arrested for his participation in the riots on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

The investigation focused on standards of conduct violations.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

OI determined pursuant to the FBI investigation (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted he traveled to Washington, D.C. to attend a political rally and unlawfully entered the United States Capitol building on January 6, 2021. A criminal complaint was filed against (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for violating (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Title 18 United States Code 1752(a)(1), 1752(a)(2), Title 40 United States Code 5104(e)(2)(D), (C) and 5104(e)(2)(G). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) subsequently turned himself into the FBI and was arrested.

Based on this information, OI issued an Investigate Report to Management (IRM) and recommended the Office of Acquisition and Project Management determine if suspension action (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was warranted against (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and recommended the Office of Personnel and Security (C) Clearances and Classification determine if the information in the IRM concerning (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) warranted inclusion in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Personnel Security File.

The Office of Acquisition and Project Management determined suspension/exclusion action would not be taken at this time and the Office of Personnel and Security Clearances ensured the national databases were updated with the information from the IRM concerning (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MEMORANDUM

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend case closure as all investigative activities have been completed and further expenditure of investigative resources is unwarranted.

(b)(6), (b)(7)  
(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6), (C)  
(b)(6)  
Date: 2022.03.02 14:22:09  
-07'00'

Signature Indicates Concurrence

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

## MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** February 24, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | Region 4, ORI

**FROM:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | Special Agent

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 22-0017-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 4, Oak Ridge Investigations.

This investigation was initiated on June 1, 2021, after the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | UT-Battelle, LLC at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), notified the OIG of information she received alleging 1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6), (b)(7) | negotiated with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | to replace (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | as the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6), (b)(7) | at ORNL in exchange for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | approving a classified computer system to be housed at ORNL; 2) (b)(6), (b)(7) | improperly required ORNL to procure the services of Strongbox, LLC (Strongbox), whose (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | allegedly had an affair with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | to develop a classified computer system and 3) The classified computer system ultimately did not work. (b)(6), (b)(7) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7) (C)

(C) The OIG reviewed contract documentation and interviewed multiple ORNL and federal oversight officials, but we did not identify any evidence supporting the allegations. The OIG was told by multiple ORNL and Federal oversight officials that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | was highly qualified to be the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | There were not any indications that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | improperly negotiated or coerced ORNL officials to hire him. Also, an (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | ORNL official stated that the classified computer system was requested by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | to support a DOE (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | National Security initiative which needed to be developed quickly to support the initiative. ORNL (C) procurement officials determined that Strongbox was the only vendor capable of completing the project within the short timeframe; therefore, they utilized a sole source contract for the procurement. ORNL General Counsel and DOE federal oversight officials reviewed and approved the sole-source procurement between ORNL and Strongbox. An ORNL official confirmed that the classified computer system, developed by Strongbox, did work per the terms and conditions of the subcontract between Strongbox and ORNL.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

In summary, the OIG investigation did not substantiate the allegations. The findings did not disclose any federal criminal activity, and thus were not coordinated with the United States Attorney's Office. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | is no longer employed by the Department and no administrative referrals were appropriate based on the findings of the investigation. This matter is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.

I concur with the recommendation to close this investigation.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) |  
Date: 2022.02.24 16:52:04 -05'00'

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | Region 4, Oak Ridge Investigations



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 19, 2022

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (C)  
Date: 2022.05.19 14:57:30 -0400

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 21-0089-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

This investigation was initiated on February 26, 2021, after the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) notified the OIG that funding recipients responsive to the Department's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E) to develop microreactor technology may have falsely inflated their Technology Readiness Level's (TRL) to make their proposals more competitive.

The OIG, after contacting contract management officials and program directors from NE and ARPA-E (b)(7)(E)

to measure a technology's progress. NE and ARPA-E utilize an independent review process that assesses the fidelity of an application's TRLs, however, neither NE nor ARPA-E use TRLs as the sole determining factor when funding award recipients. Conversely, the Department uses

(b)(7)(E)

In summary, the OIG investigation found no indication applicants intentionally falsified TRLs. Moreover, NE and ARPA-E evaluate more heavily weighted criteria in proposals other than TRLs, to demonstrate why an applicant is selected for funding. The OIG investigation found no reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law or Departmental regulation. This matter is being recommend for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and expenditure of further investigative resources is not warranted.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (C)  
Date: 2022.05.23 11:12:04 -0400  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1



Department of Energy  
Washington, DC 20585

January 27, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA)

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA)

SUBJECT: Case Closing Summary (OIG File No. 22-0019-I)

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA).

The investigation was predicated upon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), contacting the DOE OIG (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) alleging misuse and abuse of a NNSA information technology (ITS) system called the Clearance Action Tracking System (CATS). The CATS is a security clearance adjudication system housing electronic personnel security files (ePSF), also known as "safe files," which also contains various personally identifiable information (PII) and other sensitive digital data. This digital data may also contain derogatory information regarding the specific individual the CATS ePSF file(s) are associated with.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for Nuclear Security (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for the Office of Personnel and Facility Clearances and Classification (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported an audit of the CATS indicated numerous problems including, but not limited to, the following based on the provided CATS auditing logs:

- The download (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and who is suspected of uploading these files to CATS in violation of the CATS End-User Agreement;
- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being assigned to both the DOE (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the DOE (b)(6), (b)(7)(C);
- The creation of an authorized system of record requiring a system of record notice (SORN) for the download (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thereby being in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended;

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- The belief numerous CATS users were utilizing roles and privileges exceeding those officially assigned to them thereby intentionally bypassing the intended and official use restrictions of the CATS;
- The accessing and viewing of the ePSF files for President of the United States (POTUS) Joseph Biden and Vice-President of the United States Kamala Harris (VPOTUS) by (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) suspected as being without a legitimate need-to-know and business duty;
- The suspected viewing or downloading (b)(7) files within the CATS for (b)(6), DOE personnel without the user possessing a legitimate need-to-know and business duty in violation of the CATS End-User Agreement;
- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) without a legitimate need-to-know and business duty;
- The possibility of CATS users exceeding their uniquely assigned roles and privileges within the CATS;
- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CATS records associated with separate unique individuals being accessed in the CATS with the users suspected as having no legitimate need-to-know or business duty associated with those sessions;
- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- The possible verbal dissemination of suspected CATS information to individuals having no legitimate need-to-know or business duty associated thereby in violation of the CATS End-User Agreement;
- Possible exploitation of any derogatory or other sensitive information contained within the CATS (b)(7)(F) where the user had no legitimate need-to-know or business duty associated with the session(s).

The DOE OIG OI determined based on detailed and extensive review of the provided CATS auditing logs and additional information provided by CATS team members there was a high probability most, if not all, of the allegations are substantiated. The DOE OIG OI also

(b)(7)(E)

No information was obtained indicating any criminal violations were present warranting any additional action to be taken by the DOE OIG OI, however, due to the extensive appearance of severe administrative infractions by numerous CATS users along with CATS system and software design issues this matter will be referred to the DOE OIG Hotline Director, the DOE OIG Office of Technology, Financial, and Analytics (OTFA), Technology Audit Group (TAG), and the DOE Office of Inspections, Intelligence Oversight, and Special Projects. As a result, this matter is being recommended for closure as all criminal investigation activities are complete.



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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**Department of Energy**  
Washington, DC 20585

January 20, 2022

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA)

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA)

**SUBJECT:** Case Closing Summary (OIG File No. 22-0029-I)

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Cyber Investigations and Forensic Analysis Section (CIFA).

The investigation was predicated upon a complaint made alleging the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) paired a software program called "Align" with another system called "Secure Evidence Locker" (SEL) to store and track all reliability compliance evidence under NERC's purview as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) designated Energy Reliability Organization (ERO). North American utilities participating in the bulk electrical system are required to place sensitive data into Align to be compliant with NERC Reliability Standards, including the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs). The complainant indicated the following: Align has no valid system security plan in violation of FISMA under FIPS 200; no authority to operate in violation of FISMA under FIPS 200 and OMB A-130; Align does not have the required cybersecurity elements; and there are foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI) issues with Align as it is owned by a Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) company named Bwise, which owned by SAI Global, and SAI Global is now owned by Baring Private Equity Asia (BPEA) based out of Hong Kong, PRC.

The OIG determined the Department, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) division, conducted evaluations for both Align and SEL through a "Deep Dive Assessment Report (Residual Risk)" for each. These risk assessments were done at the request of the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA) due to their FOCI concerns primarily with SEL due to it containing sensitive evidence and documentation as required by NERC compliance standards. The two separate independent risk reports evaluated and scored the FOCI issues, but they also provided evaluations and risk assessments of numerous other areas. These reports, however, serve to only be advisory in nature regarding the residual risk assessment areas and do not carry the authority as to whether or not both Align and SEL may be procured or implemented. Each DOE customer is expected to conduct a due diligence and assessment of any such concerns and may find and implement methods to mitigate such risks.

This report, including any attachments and information contained therein, is the property of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and is for ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. The original and any copies of the report must be appropriately controlled and maintained. Disclosure to unauthorized persons without prior OIG written approval is strictly prohibited and may subject the disclosing party to liability. Unauthorized persons may include, but are not limited to, individuals referenced in the report, contractors, and individuals outside the Department of Energy. Public disclosure is determined by the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5, U.S.C., Section 552) and the Privacy Act (Title 5, U.S.C., Section 552a).

There was no instance of Align or SEL present within the DOE enterprise with the caveat this finding was based on the voluntary information provided and submitted to DOE OCIO entities conducting the search. NERC, however, indicated Align and SEL would "be implemented in the near future" at all PMAs, to include SWPA, otherwise financial penalties could be imposed given the enforcement powers given to NERC through their selection by FERC.

No information was obtained indicating any criminal violations or wrongdoing were present warranting any additional action to be taken. As a result, this matter is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted. This matter is being referred to the Department OIG Hotline Director to determine if any further referral or actions should be taken by any other Department OIG entity to include, but not limited to, the Department OIG Office of Technology, Financial, and Analytics (OTFA), Technology Audit Group (TAG).

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(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
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(b)(7)(E)  
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Concur:  
(b)(7)(E)  
Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

DATE: December 9, 2022

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 1 Investigations

FROM: Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 22-0039-I

This memorandum serves to recommend closure of an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Region 1 Investigations.

The Department OIG received concerns from the Department Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN) related to an ongoing Office of Science (Science) grant to the University of Maryland (Maryland), DE-SC0020682 (the Award), under the direction of

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was initially flagged for a potential undisclosed foreign affiliation.

The Department OIG reviewed Maryland submissions to the Department with (b)(6), (b)(7) as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and identified numerous disclosures of (b)(6), (b)(7) foreign (C) affiliations, including: a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PandaX Dark Matter and Double Beta Decay Experiment in China from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) honor/award listed for 2010; and, a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Peking University

(b)(6), (b)(7) from (b)(6), (b)(7) While it was initially unclear whether (b)(6), (b)(7) had a legal right to work in (b)(6), (b)(7) the U.S., it was subsequently determined that (b)(6), (b)(7) had employment validity dates through (C) September 2024 (b)(6), (b)(7) on the Award beginning (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (C).

The investigation identified no spending or performance concerns under the Award. However, the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did identify discrepancies in (b)(6), (b)(7) biographical (C) sketch versus the proposal narrative in a renewal under the Award and requested (b)(6), (b)(7) provide an updated curriculum vitae (CV), affirmatively representing to the PM that (b)(6), (b)(7) position with SJTU terminated in (b)(7). A review of the open-source information from IN did not reveal any obvious discrepancies between (b)(6), (b)(7) representation to the (b)(6), (b)(7) Department that he ended his affiliation with SJTU and (b)(6), (b)(7) reported affiliations in the (b)(6), (b)(7) scientific literature. Despite Science's knowledge of potential issues with (b)(6), (b)(7) (C) affiliations, Science released a \$46,000 supplement under the Award, for which (b)(6), (b)(7) remained (b)(7) however, Science later declined to fund a renewal proposal under the

(b)(6), (b)(7) Award with (b)(7) as (b)(7) (C).

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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MEMORANDUM

This investigation is being recommended for closure as all prudent investigative activities are complete and further expenditure of investigative resources is not warranted.

(b)(6), (b)  
(7)(C)

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(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Region 1



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

**DATE:** December 16, 2022

**TO:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Region 8 Investigations,  
Western Field Operations

**FROM:** Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**SUBJECT:** Closing Memorandum for OIG Investigation 22-0082-I

This memorandum recommends closure of 22-0082-I, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), Region 8 Investigations.

**ALLEGATION**

On July 6, 2022, the OIG received a complaint from the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch regarding an allegation of Passport Fraud by Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), an Idaho National Laboratory (INL) employee. Specifically, the DSS had received an allegation that Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) falsified his place of birth on his passport to avoid detection of criminal activities that were in his past.

**POTENTIAL STATUTORY OR REGULATORY VIOLATIONS**

This investigation was opened as an administrative case and in support of the U.S. Department of State DSS.

**INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

The DSS investigation determined Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may have made a common error that many applicants make while filling out the passport application. Specifically, Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) listed his place of birth on the application as where he was living at the time of the application. Additionally, the DSS investigation determined the Colorado Passport Agency issued Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) passport with the incorrect place of birth. Furthermore, at the time of the application in 2013 when the passport was adjudicated a copy of the birth certificate was not kept within Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) records.

According to DSS, Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) passport is set to expire on December (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), which will require him to apply within 6 months of the passport expiring. DSS and the Colorado Passport Agency agreed to place a lookout on Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) next passport application, which will require Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to be adjudicated as a first-time applicant. At that time, Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) will be required to provide his birth certificate as part of the application process which will then be verified, and a copy placed within his application records. Based upon their investigative findings, DSS has closed their investigation.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

OI determined Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) does not have a clearance. Additionally, it was determined Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has outstanding legal matters in the State of New Mexico and Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed the matters to INL officials. These matters are set for trial in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) INL is allowing Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to continue to work pending the outcome of the legal matters.

**RECOMMENDATION**

I recommend case closure as DSS closed their investigation and OI support is no longer needed. Additionally, due to the preceding information, no administrative actions are being pursued against Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6)  
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Signature Indicates Concurrence

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



## Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

July 30, 2021

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Complaint of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) against  
Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC.  
OIG Case No. 21-0001-W

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This letter is in reference to the whistleblower retaliation complaint you filed with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG), pursuant to Title 41, United States Code, Section 4712, "Enhancement of contractor protection from reprisal for disclosure of certain information" (Section 4712).

The OIG previously requested a 180-day extension to complete the whistleblower investigation involving your complaint. However, per written communication to this office by your legal counsel, you declined to consent to an extension of your whistleblower investigation. Further, you have advised the OIG that you will be bringing this same claim of retaliation to U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.

Consequently, the OIG will not continue an inquiry into this matter pursuant to Section 4712. Specifically, the OIG will close the investigation without any adverse determinations, findings, orders, or other actions against the contractor. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact our Hotline at: IG Hotline@hq.doe.gov, or 800-541-1625.

Sincerely,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Hotline Operations and Whistleblower  
Investigations