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Description of document: Three (3) Department of Defense (DoD) Directives:

- DoD Directive C-5030.43 - Significant Military Exercises, March 26, 1970
- DoD Directive C-3325.05 - Interruption of Commercial and Civil Remote Sensing Space System Operations, February 25, 2000
- DoD Directive C-5030.44, Military Operations in or Near Politically Sensitive Areas, June 29, 1973

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES**  
1155 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1155



MAR 20 2025

Subject: OSD MDR Case 24-M-0864, Case No. 20240603073334

We have reviewed the enclosed document and have declassified it in full. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Jonathan P. Bennett by email at [whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil](mailto:whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JDS", written over a horizontal line.

John D. Smith  
Chief, WHS, Records and  
Declassification Division, ESD

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March 26, 1970  
 NUMBER C-5030.43

ASD (ISA)

## Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Significant Military Exercises (U)

- References:
- (a) National Security Action Memorandum 316, "Military Exercises," (U) November 12, 1964, (enclosure)
  - (b) DoD Directive C-5030.44, "Military Operations in or near Politically Sensitive Areas," (U) March 26, 1970
  - (c) Deputy Secretary of Defense multiaddressee memorandum, "Military Exercises," December 5, 1964 (hereby canceled)

### I. PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

This Directive provides Department of Defense policy and guidance in implementing reference (a). It delineates responsibilities of the military departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (International Security Affairs) and (Public Affairs), for assuring the reporting (see III C & D), review, coordination and approval of significant military exercises.

### II. CANCELLATION

Reference (c) is hereby superseded and canceled.

### III. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

The provisions of this Directive cover significant military exercises, as follows:

- A. A military exercise is a maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation and execution, carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. The criteria for deeming an exercise significant are set forth in paragraph 2 of reference (a).

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- B. A politico-military scenario is a narrative description of the situation or play of a military exercise which depicts interaction of political and military factors.
- C. Counterinsurgency Activities. In addition to exercises which fall under the provisions of paragraph 2 of reference (a), field exercises will be reported as significant if the situation, mission, intelligence buildup, concept of operation, politico-military scenario or public affairs guidance deals with counterinsurgency activities by United States forces. Exceptions to this policy are as follows:
  - 1. Exercises taking place in the United States; and
  - 2. Unilateral training exercises in normal United States training areas outside the Continental United States.
- D. Politically Significant Geographic Areas. Exercises planned for geographic areas considered politically significant by the Department of State will also be reported under the provisions of this Directive.
- E. Military Operations. Military operations in or near politically sensitive areas, as distinguished from significant military exercises, are governed by reference (b) above.

#### IV. POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

DoD will review carefully the scheduling of exercises whose character or location places them in a politically significant category, based on criteria outlined in reference (a) and Section III, paragraphs C and D above. For proposed exercises falling within this category, DoD will provide pertinent information to the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and the White House, and cooperate closely with those Agencies regarding the conduct of such exercises, as follows:

- A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) will:
  - 1. Provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff a list, and subsequent revisions thereto, of geographic areas considered politically significant by the Department of State.
  - 2. Provide the Department of State and the White House quarterly schedules of significant military exercises for the ensuing twelve months, as prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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3. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of such quarterly exercise schedules, secure the views of the Department of State regarding the planned exercises, consolidate with them the views of the United States Information Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and provide these consolidated views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance.
  4. Coordinate with the Department of State detailed briefs of military exercises which fall under the provisions of paragraph 2 of reference (a), and this Directive.
  5. Provide to the White House, at least seven (7) days (except in unusual circumstances) prior to the critical date for Presidential cancellation (C.I.b. below) the detailed brief of each proposed significant military exercise, together with the views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and the Department of Defense.
  6. Notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the decision made by the White House regarding each proposed significant military exercise.
  7. Coordinate as necessary with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA) in executing the above responsibilities.
- B. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will:
1. Provide the United States Information Agency the quarterly exercise schedules referred to in paragraph A.2. above, and furnish the views of that Agency to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) within twenty (20) days thereafter.
  2. Coordinate with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency the public affairs aspects of all detailed briefs of significant military exercises, in sufficient time to permit compliance by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) with the provisions of subparagraph A.5. above.
- C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will:
1. Prepare a quarterly schedule of significant military exercises planned for the following twelve months, to include for each exercise:
    - a. The name, sponsor, location, and date;

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- b. The critical date for Presidential cancellation;
  - c. A brief description identifying the type of exercise, the general concept of operations, the staging area (if in a country other than that listed as the location of the exercise), the politico-military scenario, and the expected degree of public visibility. If an exercise has no politico-military scenario, a statement to that effect should be made.
  - d. The purpose; and
  - e. The forces involved.
- 2. Report exercises in quarterly schedules before any commitment is made to other governments.
  - 3. Provide thirty (30) copies of these quarterly schedules to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), and ten (10) copies to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA).
  - 4. Prepare detailed briefs of each military exercise covered by this Directive. Fifteen (15) copies will be provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and ten (10) copies to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA), in sufficient time to assure coordination with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency prior to transmission to the White House. Normally, the briefs will be submitted at least 21 days prior to the critical date for Presidential cancellation.
  - 5. Include in each exercise brief a recommended statement of the general policy to be followed in the area of public affairs. Additional statements under separate headings may address general policy concerning diplomatic information, security restrictions, and psychological elements, as applicable.
  - 6. Insure that politico-military scenarios are coordinated in the first instance with the United States Embassy concerned. A summary of this scenario will subsequently be included in the significant exercise brief.

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- D. The military services will forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for review in accordance with the procedures herein, all exercises conducted by them which fall under the provision of Section III, paragraphs A, C, and D above.

V. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION.

This Directive is effectively immediately. Ten (10) copies of implementing instructions shall be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) within sixty (60) days.



Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosure 1  
NSAM 316

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 316

TO : The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Military Exercises

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the procedures to be followed in informing the President of significant military exercises, and for obtaining policy review and approval of such exercises.

2. The President desires to be informed of exercises deemed significant because they fall in the following categories:

a. Those involving comparatively large-scale participation of US or foreign forces or commands.

b. Those requiring the granting of rights or approval by another nation or representatives thereof, except where such approval is sought by NATO authorities.

c. Those which have particular political significance or implications.

d. Any exercise which is otherwise of such a nature as to receive prominent attention by the press.

e. Other exercises with which you or the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel they should be familiar.

3. In the case of exercises in the above categories, available advanced planning information should be forwarded on a quarterly basis covering the following twelve months to the Secretary of State, the US Information Agency, and this office. This information should include the name of exercise, sponsor, location, date, brief description, purpose and forces. Significant amendments to this

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information should be provided as they become available. In every case, this information should be provided prior to any commitment to foreign governments.

4. It is requested that you forward a more detailed exercise brief, which has been coordinated with the Department of State, and through the Department of State with the US Information Agency, a minimum of seven (7) days (except in unusual circumstances) prior to the critical date for the President to cancel any significant exercise. A statement of the general policy to be followed as to public information -- foreign and domestic, diplomatic information, security restrictions, and propaganda or other unusual elements -- should be included.

5. In the case of exercises which, in your opinion, do not have political implications requiring State Department coordination, the Department of State need only be informed.

6. This National Security Action Memorandum supersedes my memorandum on the same subject, dated 4 October 1961.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State  
Director, USIA

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. 552  
Declassify: X Declassify in Part: Deny in Full:  
Reason:  
MDR: 24-M-0865

Declassified in Full  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025

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Department of Defense  
**DIRECTIVE**

Declassified in Full  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025

February 25, 2000  
NUMBER C-3325.5

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT: Interruption of Commercial and Civil Remote Sensing Space System Operations

~~(S)~~

- References:
- (a) PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8, "National Space Policy" (U), September 14, 1996
  - (b) PDD-NSC-23, "U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space Capabilities" (U), March 9, 1994
  - (c) DoD Directive 3100.10, "Space Policy" (U), July 9, 1999
  - (d) Memorandum of Understanding Among Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Interior, and Intelligence Community Concerning the Licensing of Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems (U), February 2, 2000
  - (e) Sections 5601 et seq of title 15, United States Code (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. ~~(S)~~ Establishes Department of Defense (DoD) policy and assigns responsibilities regarding the limitation of data collection and/or distribution from U.S. commercial and civil remote sensing space systems, as well as the initiation of diplomatic efforts to limit data collection and/or distribution by foreign remote sensing space systems during periods when national security or related international commitments may be compromised.

1.2. (U) Supports, amplifies, and implements the policies in references (a) through (e).

1.3. (U) Authorizes publication of additional issuances consistent with this Directive and references (a) through (e).

1.4. (U) Shall be referred to by the title "Interruption of Remote Sensing Space System Operations" for unclassified purposes.

~~Derived from: PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, dated 9/14/96~~  
~~PDD-NSC-23, U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space Capabilities,~~  
~~dated 3/9/94~~  
~~Reasons: 1.5.(b), (c), 1.4.(1)~~  
~~Declassify on: X3~~

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## 2. (U) APPLICABILITY

(U) This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to as "the DoD Components").

## 3. (U) DEFINITIONS

3.1. (U) Foreign Remote Sensing Space System. Remote sensing space systems predominantly owned or operated by foreign entities.

3.2. (U) Remote Sensing. Refers in a general sense to space-based observation or information gathering, excluding signals intelligence, which can support a wide variety of purposes.

3.3. (U) Remote Sensing Space Capabilities. Refers to all remote sensing space systems, technology, analytical capabilities, products, data archives, and data.

3.4. (U) Remote Sensing Space System. Consists of the spacecraft, mission package(s), ground stations, data links, and associated command and control facilities, and may include data processing and exploitation hardware and software.

3.5. (U) Space Control Prevention. Measures to preclude an adversary's ability to use U.S. and allied space systems and services for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests. These may be diplomatic, legal, or military measures.

3.6. (U) U.S. Civil Remote Sensing Space System. Remote sensing space systems owned and operated by U.S. Government civil departments or agencies.

3.7. (U) U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space System. Remote sensing space systems licensed by the Department of Commerce and owned and operated by U.S. private entities.

## 4. (U) POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. ~~(S)~~ An adversary's ability to use remote sensing space capabilities for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests shall be precluded, in accordance with references (a) through (c).

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4.2. (U) Data collection and/or distribution shall be limited only to the extent necessitated by the given situation during periods when national security or related international commitments may be compromised, in accordance with references (a), (b), and (d).

4.3. (U) Requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations for situations involving the threat of imminent hostilities or threats to the lives of U.S. or coalition military forces or civilians shall be reviewed expeditiously on a case-by-case basis.

4.4. (U) Requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations for situations where U.S. national security may be compromised, but do not involve the threat of imminent hostilities or threats to the lives of U.S. or coalition military forces or civilians, shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

4.5. (U) Requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations may be made by the Heads of the DoD Components, as necessary. Such requests may also be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4.6. (U) Determinations to interrupt U.S. commercial or civil remote sensing space system operations and requests to interrupt foreign remote sensing space system operations shall be made by the Secretary of Defense and shall not be delegated below the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Such determinations and requests shall be forwarded to the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Secretary of State, as appropriate, in a manner that assures operations security and communications security.

4.7. (U) Protection of U.S. military activities shall be supported by overflight warning of U.S. civil, U.S. commercial, and foreign remote sensing space systems.

4.8. (U) The Department of Commerce shall be supported, as appropriate, in the monitoring and enforcement of the compliance of U.S. commercial remote sensing space system operators with licensing conditions regarding limitations on data collection and/or distribution during periods when national security may be compromised.

## 5. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. (U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) shall:

5.1.1. (U) Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of this Directive.

5.1.2. (U) Provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense regarding space control prevention measures and implementation of this Directive.

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5.1.3. (U) Ensure that the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA), provides information assurance and analysis support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies, as appropriate, for their monitoring of compliance with remote sensing space system operating limitations. Such support is limited to technical information security issues, excluding the determination as to whether encryption is being actively applied to a particular data stream.

5.1.4. (U) Ensure that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Dir., DIA), in coordination with the Combatant Commander, advises the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command, as appropriate, on the impacts to the defense intelligence production and combat support activities, as well as the benefits for force protection and other national security interests, resulting from the proposed interruption request.

5.1.5. (U) Ensure that the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) serves as advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Central Intelligence on remote sensing space system technical performance and operations.

5.1.6. (U) Ensure that the Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, in coordination with other DoD Components, provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command on the capabilities, availability, performance, and operation of remote sensing space systems that may be the subject of a recommendation for interruption of service.

5.2. (U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) will review all requests contained in Combatant Command operations and contingency plans to ensure proposed interruptions to systems are coordinated and consistent with DoD policy and overall National Military Strategy. In coordination with the ASD(C3I), the USD(P) shall manage notifications or consultations with foreign governments, as appropriate, in consultation with the National Security Council staff and the Department of State, regarding determinations or requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations

5.3. (U) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD) shall provide legal support to the Secretary of Defense and other DoD Components concerning the application of references (a) through (e) and other applicable statutes, directives, international agreements, and interagency agreements pertinent to remote sensing space activities.

5.4. (U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) shall:

5.4.1. (U) Provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense regarding space control prevention measures and implementation of this Directive.

5.4.2. (U) Validate requirements for limiting remote sensing space system operations.



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5.4.3. (U) Ensure that operational procedures for requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations are integrated into operations and contingency plans and, as appropriate, are exercised, in accordance with this Directive.

5.5. (U) The Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command (USCINCSpace) shall:

5.5.1. (U) Act as the point of contact for all requests coming from within the Department of Defense to interrupt remote sensing space systems.

5.5.2. (U) Provide recommendations for courses of action for interrupting remote sensing space system operations.

5.5.3. (U) Advocate space control prevention measures for the Combatant Commanders.


5.5.4. (U) Provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and the Combatant Commanders regarding space control prevention measures and implementation of this Directive.

5.5.5. (U) Provide overflight warning of U.S. civil, U.S. commercial, and foreign remote sensing space systems.

5.6. (U) The Heads of the DoD Components shall exercise responsibility for their respective Component's requests to interrupt remote sensing space system operations.

## 6. EFFECTIVE DATE (U)

(U) This Directive is effective immediately.

  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. 552  
Declassify: X Declassify in Part: Deny in Full:  
Reason:  
MDR: 24-M-0864

Page Determined to be Unclassified  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025

UNCLASSIFIED

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June 29, 1973  
NUMBER C-5030.44

ASD (ISA)

## Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Military Operations in or Near Politically Sensitive Areas (U)

Refs: (a) DoD Directive C-5030.43, "Significant Military Exercises (U)," March 26, 1970 (U)  
(b) DoD Directive C-5030.44, subject as above, (U), March 26, 1970 (hereby cancelled)

### I. (U) PURPOSE AND REISSUANCE

This Directive provides policy and guidance regarding military operations in or near geographic areas designated by the Department of State as politically sensitive. It reissues reference (b) which is hereby superseded and cancelled.

### II. ~~(S)~~ APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

(U) A. The provisions of this Directive apply to the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

~~(S)~~ B. Combat-related military operations and peacetime reconnaissance operations are excluded from the scope of this Directive.

(U) C. Significant military exercises, as distinguished from military operations, are governed by reference (a).

### III. ~~(S)~~ DEFINITIONS

~~(S)~~ A. A military operation involves the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.

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~~CLASSIFIED BY: 162 (ISA)~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF~~  
~~EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION~~



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- ~~(e)~~ B. A significant military operation, for the purpose of this Directive, is defined as:
1. A military operation having a strategic, tactical or training military mission, conducted either in or over a country (which includes its territorial seas as recognized by the United States) designated politically sensitive, or in or over a sea designated politically sensitive. If a warship in the exercise of its right of innocent passage transits foreign territorial seas in a routine manner, the transit is not regarded as a significant military operation. However, innocent passage through territorial seas does not confer the right to conduct military operations in such waters.
  2. A military operation conducted near a politically sensitive area when such an operation constitutes a change of significant nature in the type, size, frequency or locale of United States military presence.
- ~~(e)~~ C. Politically sensitive areas are geographical land or water areas designated by the Department of State as being politically sensitive with regard to the conduct of military operations. Geographical areas may be added or deleted as politically sensitive at any appropriate time; however, a joint State/Defense review of the currency of sensitive areas will be made at least every six months.

IV. ~~(e)~~ POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Department of Defense will take special care in scheduling or conducting military operations in or near geographic areas which are considered by the Department of State to be politically sensitive from the standpoint of U.S. foreign relations and will cooperate closely with the Department of State in carrying out this policy, as follows:

- ~~(e)~~ A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) will:
1. Obtain and provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff a list, and subsequent revisions thereto, of geographic areas considered politically sensitive by the Department of State.

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C-5030.44

2. Notify the Department of State of significant military operations scheduled to be conducted in or near politically sensitive areas. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff when a question arises as to the scheduling or conduct of a military operation of this type.

~~(C)~~ 8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will:

1. Consult with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency regarding public affairs aspects of significant military operations in or near politically sensitive areas.
2. Advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding such public affairs aspects.

~~(C)~~ C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will:

1. Communicate to all unified and specified commands, and to the military services, the lists of politically sensitive areas referred to in paragraph A.1. above.
2. Insure that special care is taken by the commanders of unified and specified commands, and by the military services in scheduling and conducting military operations in or near politically sensitive areas.
3. Notify the Secretary of Defense of significant military operations scheduled to be conducted in or near politically sensitive areas.
4. Take necessary steps to communicate the views of the Department of State to the command or military service responsible for scheduling and conducting that significant military operation.


~~(C)~~ D. The military services will notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff when a question arises regarding the propriety of military operations scheduled or conducted by them in or near politically sensitive areas, for compliance with the foregoing procedures.

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V. (U) EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Ten copies of implementing instructions shall be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) within 60 days.

  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Declassified in Full  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records and Declass Div, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 11MAR2025 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. 552  
Declassify: X Declassify in Part: Deny in Full:  
Reason:  
MDR: 24-M-0866