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Source of document:	FOIA Request Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FOIA/Privacy Act Group, Legal Division 550 17th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20429-9990 Fax: 703-562-2797 FDIC's SecureRelease™ Portal

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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20429-9990

Legal Division

April 7, 2025

Re: FDIC FOIA Log Number 2025-FDIC-FOIA-00568

This is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received on February 4, 2025, which is being processed under the above-noted FOIA request log number. Your request seeks the following:

I request a copy of each final report or closing report or equivalent from each o[f] the following: FDIC OIG Investigations below:

N-2014-0011-J closed January 3, 2023

A-2019- 0008-J closed February 27, 2023

X-2020-0013-J closed-March 6, 2023

A-2020-0005-J closed April 1, 2023

N-2021-0011, closed November 8, 2023

123MAR00275, closed December 26, 2023

We considered your request in light of the requirements of the FOIA and the FDIC's FOIA regulations.¹

Analysis

Our records search is complete. We have located seventy-six (76) responsive pages, which are being released in part. The information we withheld is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E).² The responsive pages that are not being withheld can be accessed via the link in the cover email to this letter.

We have also determined that the unreleased information should be withheld because it is reasonably foreseeable that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption described in subsection (b) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).

This completes the processing of your request. You may contact me by email at lkratzer@fdic.gov or our FOIA Public Liaison at FOIAPublicLiaison@fdic.gov or by telephone at 703-562-6040 for

¹ Our FOIA regulations and FOIA Fee Schedule are available in our FOIA Service Center, <https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/index.html>.

² Exemption 6 prohibits the disclosure of any record which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(C) provides protection for law enforcement information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(E) requires the withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001; email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the FDIC's General Counsel. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 calendar days from the date of the response to your request. Your appeal should be addressed to the FOIA/PA Group, Legal Division, FDIC, 550 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429. Please refer to the log number and include any additional information that you would like the General Counsel to consider.

Sincerely,
**LOREDANA
KRATZER**
Loredana Kratzer
Government Information Specialist
FOIA/PA Group
Legal Division

Digitally signed by
LOREDANA KRATZER
Date: 2025.04.07
10:11:28 -05'00'



DATE: December 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO: Frank R. Hughes
Acting Regional Director

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent

SUBJECT: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement by Public Servant
BB&T (now Truist), Charlotte, NC (FDIC Cert. 9846)
OIG Case: A2019-0008

The Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI), has concluded its investigation into allegations made against Tenna Trice (Trice), a public servant and a bank customer at BB&T (now Truist), (FDIC Cert. 9846). This memorandum is for informational purposes only; no action is required by your Office.

Background: Tenna Trice was a public school teacher in the Muscogee County School District and a former principal in Columbus, GA. Prior to teaching, she worked for a local Columbus, GA doctor for approximately 2 years. Trice worked as a volunteer campaign coordinator for the Columbus, GA Branch of the United Negro College Fund (UNCF) from 2005 to 2017. The UNCF is an organization that funds scholarships for African American students and historically Black colleges and universities. During her tenure with the UNCF, Trice organized and fundraised for the annual Columbus Mayors Masked Ball, the primary fundraising activity for the UNCF. Trice also worked for a nonprofit organization known as Samarc, run by two former NBA basketball players who conduct an annual basketball camp for underprivileged youth in the Columbus area.

Nature of the Alleged Misconduct: A review of bank records showed that Trice stole \$162,044 in donations and ticket sales intended for the UNCF. Trice diverted a total of \$7,784 in donations and basketball game ticket sales intended for Samarc to her own personal use. Further investigation revealed that Trice had been terminated as an employee from a Columbus doctor's office because she had taken funds intended for the Georgia Dental Society, outstanding patient balances, business utilities, and charities totaling \$70,231.

In two consensual interviews with FDIC OIG agents, Trice confessed to taking a total of \$240,259 in funds. Trice reviewed with investigators 109 fraudulently deposited checks and 265 credit card transactions fraudulently deposited into her BB&T account without authorization. She stated she was always careful to conceal her actions by using only outside ATMs to deposit checks with fraudulent endorsements and changing the settings in the Square App to disguise that she was the recipient of the donation money.

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Outcome: On March 29, 2022, Trice was sentenced in the Middle District of Georgia to 2 years imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for defrauding and embezzling money from several victims including charitable institutions such as the UNCF and the Samarc Foundation. Trice was ordered to pay restitution of \$162,044 to the UNCF, \$7,784 to the Samarc Foundation, \$70,231 to a Columbus dentist's office, and \$200 to the Georgia Dental Society. Trice utilized accounts at Truist Bank, an FDIC-regulated financial institution, to facilitate the scheme. The illegal activity could affect the operations of the Division of Risk Management Supervision (RMS). Total loss amount was \$240,259.00.

This was an investigation by the FDIC-OIG and the FBI. This case is being prosecuted by the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Georgia.

Accordingly, this investigation is complete and closed. Should you have any questions or need further information, please contact me at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

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cc: Patrice Walker, Regional Counsel

bcc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Regional CHRON File
Headquarters CHRON File
Case File A2019-008

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DATE: December 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM TO: Frank R. Hughes
Acting Regional Director

FROM: b6,b7(C) b6,b7(C)
Special Agent

SUBJECT: Elder Abuse Scheme by Former Bank Manager
SunTrust (now Truist), Charlotte, NC (FDIC Cert. 9846)
OIG Case: A2020-0005

The Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI), has concluded its investigation into allegations made against Aasim Khan (Khan), a former branch manager at SunTrust Bank (now Truist). This memorandum is for informational purposes only; no action is required by your Office.

Background: Aasim Khan (Khan) was a branch manager at a SunTrust Bank branch in Arlington, VA suspected of fraud, elderly abuse, and conspiracy. After being terminated from SunTrust Bank, Khan went to work at another FDIC-insured bank.

Nature of the Alleged Misconduct: Starting in 2017, Khan defrauded a b6,b7(C) year old SunTrust Bank customer of \$240,000 while claiming to assist b6,b7(C) in opening a money market account. On November 3, 2017, Khan wrote a \$240,000 check from the victim's bank account to a fake charity he had set up called Feed the Kids, LLC. From November 29, 2017 to May 8, 2018, Khan wrote checks from the Feed the Kids, LLC account totaling \$239,894.89 to various individuals and companies. The elderly victim did not discover the fraudulent activity until October 2019, when b6,b7(C) informed b6,b7(C) family that b6,b7(C) would have to move out of b6,b7(C) living facility due to lack of funds.

In an attempt to conceal his activities, Khan used the accounts of several other elderly customers at the bank branch to launder funds. Khan used the account of one b6,b7(C) year old customer and embezzled \$2,639.33 from b6,b7(C) account. In another incident, Khan solicited \$5,000 from an elderly customer, claiming that he would put the customer's name as a beneficiary on the account of another elderly person so that when the account owner died, the customer would receive the funds in the deceased's bank account.

Khan was terminated from SunTrust Bank on May 10, 2019 for suspicious activity but went on to work at TD Bank in Tysons Corner, VA.

Outcome: On March 11, 2022, Khan was charged by criminal information of one count of bank fraud and pleaded guilty on the same date.

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On August 11, 2022, Khan was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration and two years of supervised release for defrauding and embezzling money from several elderly SunTrust customers.

Source: The case was initiated based on reports provided by SunTrust Bank and a referral from FDIC RMS.

Responsible Agencies: This investigation was conducted by the FDIC-OIG and the Arlington Police Department. The case was prosecuted by the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Accordingly, this investigation is complete and closed. Should you have any questions or need further information, please contact me at b6,b7(C)

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cc: Patrice Walker, Regional Counsel

bcc:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Regional CHRON File
Headquarters CHRON File
Case File A2019-008

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DATE: JUNE 7, 2023

TO: Frank Hughes
Regional Director

FROM: b6,b7(C)
Special Agent in Charge

b6,b7(C)

SUBJECT: Fraud by Bank Employee & Bank Customers
FDIC/OIG Case Number N-2020-0006

The OIG has concluded its investigation into the activities of Diape Seck (Seck), a former TD Bank Employee.

Background: This investigation was based on a request for assistance from the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).

Nature of the Alleged Misconduct: While employed at TD Bank, Seck facilitated the opening 412 accounts over the course of one year for a group of Romanian foreign nationals involved in a stolen check scheme. The Romanians would steal checks from the incoming and outgoing mail of several religious institutions, and deposit them into the bank accounts that were opened with Seck's assistance. After the stolen checks were deposited, the Romanians would make cash withdrawals from ATMs as well as various purchases using debit cards associated with the accounts. The Romanians obtained or attempted to obtain over \$700,000 using the stolen checks.

b4

Outcome: On February 24, 2023, Seck was convicted by a federal jury for his role in a bank fraud scheme in which he and his co-conspirators obtained or attempted to obtain almost \$2 million by fraud. On June 2, 2023, Seck was sentenced to 3 years in federal prison, followed by

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3 years of supervised release. Seck was ordered to forfeit \$114,647.50 and pay \$1,708,446.49 in restitution. [REDACTED] b7(A)

[REDACTED] b7(A)

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Investigative Report to Management
OIG Case Number: I23MAR00275

September 12, 2023

Office of Investigations

☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

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This document is not releasable outside of the FDIC without prior approval of the Inspector General.

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 12, 2023

TO: Lisa Gilmore
Assistant Director, FDIC Labor and Employee Relations Office (LERS)

Eric S. Gold
Assistant General Counsel, FDIC Labor, Employment and Administration Section (LEAS)

Todd Hamme
Assistant Director, Security Enterprise Programs Section (SEPS)

FROM: [b6,b7(C)]
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
FDIC Office of Inspector General

SUBJECT: FDIC Legal Division Referral Relating to FDIC Employee [b6,b7(C)]
[b6,b7(C)]
FDIC OIG Case No.: I23MAR00275

Executive Summary

This report serves to inform you that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Inspector General's (FDIC OIG) investigation relating to [b6,b7(C)] [b6,b7(C)] has concluded. This investigation was based upon a referral from the FDIC Legal Division alleging that in [b6,b7(C)] 2023 [b6,b7(C)] stole snack food from the [b6,b7(C)] storage area located in the [b6,b7(C)] parking garage in [b6,b7(C)]. The [b6,b7(C)] location is Federal property owned by the FDIC. The referral noted that in [b6,b7(C)] [b6,b7(C)] so stole [b6,b7(C)] grocery items from a [b6,b7(C)]. Additionally, the referral mentioned that a [b6,b7(C)] misdemeanor theft surfaced during [b6,b7(C)] Background Investigation (BI). Based on this referral, the FDIC OIG conducted an investigation into these allegations. During the course of the investigation, the OIG identified additional information relating to [b6,b7(C)] background. The OIG investigation determined that:

1. At [b6,b7(C)] video surveillance recording from [b6,b7(C)] captured [b6,b7(C)] removing snack food from the [b6,b7(C)] parking garage. During an OIG interview, [b6,b7(C)] admitted to this conduct.



Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

2. Based on information provided by the FDIC on **b6,b7(c)** the FDIC approached **b6,b7(c)** at the time about the incident and **b6,b7(c)** claimed to have mistakenly taken the groceries and reimbursed **b6,b7(c)** FDIC OIG did not independently investigate this matter as it was already closed.

3. Evidence indicates that **b6,b7(c)** has a **b6,b7(c)** misdemeanor theft conviction. **b6,b7(c)** was asked about this conviction during a **b6,b7(c)** FDIC background investigation and falsely stated to the Background Investigator that the arrest/conviction records did not relate to **b6,b7(c)**. During an OIG interview, **b6,b7(c)** confirmed that the arrest involved **b6,b7(c)** but stated **b6,b7(c)** answered the questions to Background Investigator to the best of **b6,b7(c)** recollection at the time.

4. Evidence indicates that **b6,b7(c)** may have been involved in an additional theft incident at a **b6,b7(c)** gas station in **b6,b7(c)** on **b6,b7(c)** During an OIG interview, **b6,b7(c)** stated **b6,b7(c)** did not recall the incident.

5. Evidence indicates that on **b6,b7(c)** the **b6,b7(c)** State Bar indicated **b6,b7(c)** was not eligible to practice law in **b6,b7(c)** due an interim suspension for the **b6,b7(c)** misdemeanor theft conviction. On **b6,b7(c)** **b6,b7(c)** State Bar records reflect that **b6,b7(c)** was placed on probation, and as of **b6,b7(c)** (the date of the OIG internet search), **b6,b7(c)** is on involuntary inactive status and is ineligible to practice law in **b6,b7(c)** **b6,b7(c)** is also barred in the **b6,b7(c)**

The following report provides a description of the investigation and the additional information relating to the factual findings. We are providing this report and related information to you for your information and referring this matter to the FDIC Labor, Employment and Administration Section (LEAS) and the FDIC Labor and Employee Relations Office (LERS) for administrative review to determine if further action, if any, is deemed appropriate.

During the **b6,b7(c)** interview with the OIG, **b6,b7(c)** stated **b6,b7(c)** was also barred in **b6,b7(c)**



Details of Investigation

I. Referral and Investigative Background

On **b6,b7(C)**, the FDIC Legal Division, provided information to the FDIC OIG regarding potential concerns relating to FDIC employee **b6,b7(C)**.² In an email the OIG, the Legal Division outlined the allegations and included an email chain with information that was referred to the **b6,b7(C)**. The referral alleged that on **b6,b7(C)** stole snack food from the **b6,b7(C)** storage area in the **b6,b7(C)** parking lot. The referral noted that **b6,b7(C)** video surveillance captured **b6,b7(C)** placing a 5-gallon bucket full of snacks into **b6,b7(C)** vehicle. The referral further alleged that on **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)** also stole grocery items from a **b6,b7(C)**. Additionally, the referral mentioned that as part of **b6,b7(C)** analysis, a **b6,b7(C)** misdemeanor theft conviction surfaced during **b6,b7(C)** Background Investigation (BI). According to the referral documents, the BI interview documentation presented concerns that **b6,b7(C)** falsely told the background investigator that the **b6,b7(C)** arrest/conviction records did not relate to **b6,b7(C)**. The FDIC provided documentation relating to the BI issue in the referral.

On May 1, 2023 the OIG initiated an investigation. The OIG obtained and reviewed the **b6,b7(C)** video surveillance information. The OIG conducted additional investigative activities relating to the original allegations. In addition, the OIG identified other potential criminal activities and potential improper conduct committed by **b6,b7(C)** resulting in additional investigative analysis. From **b6,b7(C)**, the OIG's investigation included the collection of:

- Referral documents from the FDIC;
- FDIC Badging records;
- Criminal background information;
- **b6,b7(C)** records and Booking Photos;
- **b6,b7(C)** Police Report;
- OPM **b6,b7(C)** Background Investigation;
- **b6,b7(C)** State Bar records; and
- **b6,b7(C)** Bar records

Finally, on **b6,b7(C)** the OIG interviewed **b6,b7(C)**.

b6,b7(C) is a CG-15 employee assigned to **b6,b7(C)** was placed on Administrative Leave on **b6,b7(C)**.



II. Investigative Results

This section includes information relating to the initial allegations that were referred to the OIG. This section also includes information about additional issues that were identified during the course of the OIG investigation.

A. Allegation: **b6,b7(C)** theft of snack items.

It was alleged that on **b6,b7(C)** stole items from the **b6,b7(C)** garage space located in the **b6,b7(C)** office building. The FDIC referral included emails from FDIC **b6,b7(C)** employees reflecting the theft. The emails reflect that between **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)** the **b6,b7(C)** contractors noted that someone had taken bags of potato chips from their makeshift office/staging area in the **b6,b7(C)** of the parking garage. The items were the property of the **b6,b7(C)** contractors and taken without their consent. The **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)** was asked to look at the cameras from the time frame mentioned, and determined that around **b6,b7(C)** someone pulled up to the **b6,b7(C)** garage space, rummaged around, and loaded bags into their car- some of which looked like chip bags. The **b6,b7(C)** determined **b6,b7(C)** was the individual responsible for the theft, and noted that the **b6,b7(C)** was familiar with **b6,b7(C)** from a prior theft reported in **b6,b7(C)**. Emails from the **b6,b7(C)** were included in the FDIC referral, and contained screen shots along with time stamps and **b6,b7(C)** badging records.

Video surveillance showed **b6,b7(C)** placing a 5-gallon bucket full of snacks into **b6,b7(C)** vehicle.

On **b6,b7(C)**, OIG investigators interviewed **b6,b7(C)** admitted that **b6,b7(C)** stole the snacks from the storage space. **b6,b7(C)** explained that **b6,b7(C)** was **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)** and by the end of the day was hungry and tired. **b6,b7(C)** stated **b6,b7(C)** had a lapse in judgement and was driven by impulse to take the bucket and snacks. **b6,b7(C)** said **b6,b7(C)** ate the potato chips on **b6,b7(C)** drive home. **b6,b7(C)** stated that **b6,b7(C)** did not take the snacks to sell. **b6,b7(C)** said **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)** said **b6,b7(C)** has never stolen items from the FDIC or FDIC property to sell for a profit. **b6,b7(C)** noted **b6,b7(C)** has **b6,b7(C)** **b6,b7(C)**

Based upon these investigative findings it is possible that **b6,b7(C)** could be found to have violated FDIC Directive 2410.6 (incorporating 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101)³ and/or committed misconduct.

³ See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(1) (Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private gain.).



B. Allegation: [b6,b7(C)], theft of groceries.

It was alleged that on [b6,b7(C)] stole groceries from [b6,b7(C)] who had placed the groceries in a refrigerator in the [b6,b7(C)].⁴ The FDIC reviewed video surveillance and observed [b6,b7(C)] carrying a bag of items the same shape as the [b6,b7(C)] groceries in the area of the pantry. [b6,b7(C)] later admitted to mistakenly taking the groceries and reimbursed [b6,b7(C)] for the groceries. The FDIC/OIG did not independently investigate this matter as it was closed.

Based upon these investigative findings it is possible that [b6,b7(C)] could be found to have violated FDIC Directive 2410.6 (incorporating 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101)⁵ and/or committed misconduct.

C. Additional Issue: [b6,b7(C)] misdemeanor theft conviction and related [b6,b7(C)] false statement to a Background Investigator.

During this investigation, the OIG noted that in [b6,b7(C)], the FDIC conducted a background investigation of [b6,b7(C)]. The FDIC provided the information related to [b6,b7(C)] background investigation in the initial referral. The FDIC noted that the background investigation information arose as part of the [b6,b7(C)] of the [b6,b7(C)] theft. Based on a review of the security paperwork provided by the FDIC from this background investigation, the paperwork reflects that the OPM Background Investigators asked [b6,b7(C)] about a [b6,b7(C)] misdemeanor conviction for theft. The security paperwork states that [b6,b7(C)] told the investigators that the arrest/ conviction records did not relate to [b6,b7(C)].

As a result, the OIG collected additional information about the theft that was referenced in the background investigation report. The OIG requested the case report from the [b6,b7(C)] [b6,b7(C)]. The [b6,b7(C)] provided the case report, which stated [b6,b7(C)] stole clothing items from [b6,b7(C)] was arrested by [b6,b7(C)] and transported to the [b6,b7(C)]. The OIG requested [b6,b7(C)] booking photos through the [b6,b7(C)].

On [b6,b7(C)], 2023, the OIG interviewed [b6,b7(C)] stated that [b6,b7(C)] did not recall the conversation with the Background Investigator. [b6,b7(C)] explained that the background investigation form went back 7 years and the misdemeanor theft conviction was not on [b6,b7(C)] radar.

⁴ The employee, [b6,b7(C)] reported the incident to FDIC Security.

⁵ See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(1) (Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private gain.).



b6,b7(C) stated b6,b7(C) was answering the questions to the best of b6,b7(C) recollection. b6,b7(C) confirmed that the photos provided by the b6,b7(C) were of b6,b7(C).

Based upon these investigative findings it is possible that b6,b7(C) could be found to have lacked candor and was dishonest during b6,b7(C) interview for a security clearance for FDIC employment.

D. Additional Issue: b6,b7(C) alleged theft at a b6,b7(C) gas station in b6,b7(C), b6,b7(C)

The OIG determined that b6,b7(C) was involved in an incident for theft at a b6,b7(C) gas station in b6,b7(C) in b6,b7(C). The OIG contacted the b6,b7(C) Police Department b6,b7(C) requesting details of the incident. b6,b7(C) advised that b6,b7(C) decided they did not want to prosecute b6,b7(C) and instead b6,b7(C) chose to warn b6,b7(C) not to trespass.

On b6,b7(C) was interviewed and stated b6,b7(C) did not recall the incident.

Based upon these investigative findings it is possible that b6,b7(C) could be found to have violated FDIC Directive 1600.03 by failing to report an apparent violation of criminal law.

E. Additional Issue: b6,b7(C) State Bar status.

The OIG researched b6,b7(C) license on the b6,b7(C) State Bar website which showed that b6,b7(C) conviction record was transmitted to the State Bar b6,b7(C) of b6,b7(C). Per the State Bar records, b6,b7(C) was not eligible to practice law in b6,b7(C) as of b6,b7(C) and was given an interim suspension. On b6,b7(C) State Bar records reflect that b6,b7(C) was placed on probation, and as of b6,b7(C) (the date of the OIG internet search), b6,b7(C) is on involuntary inactive status and is ineligible to practice law in b6,b7(C).

The OIG then researched b6,b7(C) license information on the b6,b7(C) Bar website and determined that b6,b7(C) is in good standing with the b6,b7(C) Bar. The OIG spoke with a Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel from the b6,b7(C) Bar who advised that b6,b7(C) bar matters are confidential unless the matters have become public and that there was not specific information that could be shared relating to b6,b7(C) at that time.

On b6,b7(C) OIG investigators interviewed b6,b7(C). When asked about the b6,b7(C) and b6,b7(C) Bar, b6,b7(C) stated b6,b7(C) thinks b6,b7(C) made an anonymous call to somebody in Ethics and was advised that it was ok not to bring up the conviction. b6,b7(C) could not recall if it was the Bar Ethics or a former employer's Ethics. b6,b7(C) did not recall if there was an obligation to disclose the arrest. b6,b7(C) stated b6,b7(C) is active with the b6,b7(C) Bar, inactive with the b6,b7(C) Bar.



because [b6,b7(C)] did not want to keep paying the dues, and inactive with the [b6,b7(C)] Bar. [b6,b7(C)] advised [b6,b7(C)] paid penalties with the [b6,b7(C)] Bar and that [b6,b7(C)] was not disbarred.

III. Conclusion

Based on the allegations contained in this report relating to the [b6,b7(C)] theft and false statements during the [b6,b7(C)] background investigation, on [b6,b7(C)] the OIG referred this matter to the to the United States Attorney's Office for the [b6,b7(C)]
The U.S. Attorney's Office declined to prosecute [b6,b7(C)].

The FDIC OIG's investigation is being closed at this time and is referred to FDIC LERS and LEAS for administrative review.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

1. [b6,b7(C)] OPM Background Information (provided by the FDIC).
2. Memorandum of Activity (MOA) ([b6,b7(C)] (documenting [b6,b7(C)] booking photos from the [b6,b7(C)] arrest in [b6,b7(C)]).
3. [b6,b7(C)] Case Report, [b6,b7(C)]
4. Memorandum of Activity (MOA) [b6,b7(C)] (documenting [b6,b7(C)] incident in [b6,b7(C)] in [b6,b7(C)]).
5. [b6,b7(C)] State Bar Licensee Search.
6. Memorandum of Interview (MOI) ([b6,b7(C)] (interview of [b6,b7(C)] with attachments).

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)



Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

DATE OF ACTIVITY: b6,b7(C)

CASE NUMBER: b6,b7(C)

SUBJECT: Interaction with b6,b7(C) County Detention Center b6,b7(C)

On b6,b7(C), Special Agent b6,b7(C) reached out to b6,b7(C) via email requesting b6,b7(C) b6,b7(C) booking photos from an arrest in b6,b7(C) b6,b7(C) replied, requesting b6,b7(C) name so b6,b7(C) could send a copy of the photo.

On May 9, 2023, b6,b7(C) emailed SA b6,b7(C) copies of b6,b7(C) booking photos. The photos have been uploaded to b6,b7(C) and are also attached to this MOA.

SECTION II- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

DATE PREPARED

b6,b7(C)

Page 1 of 1

NAME

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

NAME

SIGNATURE AND DATE

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)



Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

DATE OF ACTIVITY: [b6,b7(C)]

CASE NUMBER: C23HTL00275

SUBJECT: Interaction with [b6,b7(C)] Police Department

On [b6,b7(C)] Special Agent [b6,b7(C)] emailed the [b6,b7(C)] Police Department [b6,b7(C)] in reference to an incident at a [b6,b7(C)] involving [b6,b7(C)]. The [b6,b7(C)] case number was [b6,b7(C)].

On May 10, 2023, [b6,b7(C)] responded to SA [b6,b7(C)] request and copied [b6,b7(C)] [b6,b7(C)] who called SA [b6,b7(C)] shortly thereafter. [b6,b7(C)] advised [b6,b7(C)] did not know the retention rate of [b6,b7(C)] Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) but would check their system. SA [b6,b7(C)] provided the subject's name, DOB, and [b6,b7(C)] case number. [b6,b7(C)] called SA [b6,b7(C)] back later that afternoon and advised that [b6,b7(C)] went through a period of time where [b6,b7(C)] chose to trespass subjects rather than prosecute, and the incident with [b6,b7(C)] was one of those instances. [b6,b7(C)] advised that since the victim [b6,b7(C)] refused to prosecute, an official case file may not exist because they have to also include the victim. [b6,b7(C)] advised that if SA [b6,b7(C)] could provide him with the date and time of the incident, he may be able to locate further details.

On [b6,b7(C)] SA [b6,b7(C)] emailed [b6,b7(C)] with the additional information [b6,b7(C)] requested. Per [b6,b7(C)] the incident occurred on [b6,b7(C)] at [b6,b7(C)] in [b6,b7(C)]. [b6,b7(C)] SA [b6,b7(C)] is currently awaiting a response from [b6,b7(C)].

[b6,b7(C)] can be reached at [b6,b7(C)]

Email communications with [b6,b7(C)] are attached.

SECTION II- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

DATE PREPARED

[b6,b7(C)]

Page 1 of 1

NAME

[b6,b7(C)]

[b6,b7(C)]

NAME

SIGNATURE AND DATE

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C),b7(E)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)



Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW OF	DATE OF INTERVIEW	LOCATION
b6,b7(C)	b6,b7(C)	b6,b7(C)
INTERVIEWED BY	OTHER INDIVIDUALS PRESENT	
SA b6,b7(C)	b6,b7(C)	

On b6,b7(C), Special Agent b6,b7(C) and b6,b7(C), Associate Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Inspector General (FDIC-OIG) interviewed b6,b7(C) at b6,b7(C) attorney, b6,b7(C) b6,b7(C) participated in the interview via Microsoft Teams. b6,b7(C) and b6,b7(C) reviewed the Kalkines warning prior to the interview, and SA b6,b7(C) reviewed the form again with b6,b7(C) at the time of the interview. After obtaining their consent, SA b6,b7(C) recorded the interview with the b6,b7(C) b6,b7(C). A copy of the interview transcript, along with the interview exhibits and Kalkines warning, will be attached to this MOI.

FOR AGENCY USE ONLY			
CASE NUMBER	DATE PREPARED		Page 1 of 1
I23MAR00275	b6,b7(C)		
NAME	TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
b6,b7(C)	Special Agent	b6,b7(C)	b6,b7(C)
NAME	TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



KALKINES WARNING
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE ADVICE OF RIGHTS
Employee Required to Provide Information

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

You are being asked to provide information as part of an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General into alleged misconduct and/or improper performance of official duties. This investigation is being conducted pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The investigation involves the following: [description of relevant incident]:

The **b6,b7(C)** incident relating to stolen food items from the contractor workspace in the **b6,b7(C)** parking garage (located at **b6,b7(C)**) **b6,b7(C)** as well as ~~potential misstatements to FBI investigators~~ during the **b6,b7(C)** background investigation. Specifically, potential misstatements th **b6,b7(C)**

The purpose of this interview is to obtain information which will assist in the determination of whether administrative action is warranted.

- You are going to be asked a number of specific questions concerning the performance of your official duties. You have a duty to reply to these questions, and agency disciplinary action, including dismissal, may be undertaken if you refuse to answer, or fail to reply fully and truthfully.
- The answers you furnish and any information or evidence resulting there from may be used in the course of civil or administrative proceedings.
- Neither your answers nor any information or evidence which is gained by reason of such statements can be used against you in any criminal proceedings, except that if you knowingly and willfully provide false statements or information in your answers, you may be criminally prosecuted for that action.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Location b6,b7(C)		Date b6,b7(C)	Time 11:02
Employee's Printed Name b6,b7(C)		Employee's Signature b6,b7(C)	
Witness' Printed Name b6,b7(C)	Date b6,b7(C)	Time 11:04 am	Witness' Signature b6,b7(C)
Witness' Printed Name b6,b7(C)	Date b6,b7(C)	Time 11:04	b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

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b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)

b6,b7(C)



DATE: DECEMBER 29, 2022

TO: Frank R. Hughes
RMS Regional Director

FROM: b6,b7(C)
Acting Special Agent in Charge
Mid-Atlantic Region

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM,
*MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS INVOLVING FDIC INSURED
INSTITUTION, CAPITAL ONE, N.A. (FDIC CERT. 4297);*
FDIC/OIG Case No. N-2014-0011

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has concluded its investigation into the allegations of fraud committed against Capital One Bank, private citizens, and other financial institutions by Kristin Kitchen (Kitchen), also known as Kristin Vargas.

Background: This investigation was initiated based on information obtained during another FDIC-OIG investigation. The information alleged that Kitchen was stealing and selling social security numbers that could be used to obtain credit from financial institutions.

Nature of the Alleged Misconduct: In 2013 and 2014, Kitchen obtained and sold stolen social security numbers (SSNs) over the internet through websites such as Craigslist. Kitchen advertised these stolen SSNs as “credit profile numbers” and encouraged her customers to use these SSNs in place of their own on credit and loan applications as a means to escape negative credit histories. In most instances, Kitchen applied for certain credit cards and car loans on behalf of her customers. Additionally, Kitchen applied for and received credit herself using stolen SSNs. It was determined that approximately 300 SSNs were stolen by Kitchen and used to obtain approximately \$5.2 million in credit from financial institutions. Further, majority of the stolen SSNs belonged to children.

Outcome: On May 31, 2017, Kitchen was indicted on one count of Conspiracy (18 USC 1349), four counts of False Statements to a Financial Institution (18 USC 1014), and four counts of Misuse of a Social Security Number (42 USC 408 (a)(7)(B)). Subsequently, Kitchen plead guilty to one count of Conspiracy and one count of False Statements to a Financial Institution on

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January 9, 2018. On October 18, 2022, Kitchen was sentenced to time served plus 12 consecutive weekends of intermittent confinement, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Kitchen was also ordered to pay a \$10,000 fine and a \$200 special assessment. No others will be prosecuted related to Kitchen's scheme, therefore the investigation will be closed.

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DATE: October 30, 2023

MEMORANDUM TO: Frank R. Hughes
Regional Director

FROM: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: Case Closing Memorandum;
Alleged Commodity Manipulation,
JP Morgan Chase Bank (FDIC Cert. 628), Bank of America (FDIC
Cert. 3510), Citibank (FDIC Cert. 7213)
FDIC/OIG Case: N-2021-0011

The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), has concluded its investigation of Ceres Global Ag. Corp (Ceres), a grain merchandiser registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to conduct business on grain exchanges with counterparties, including major banks such as JP Morgan Chase Bank (FDIC Cert # 628), Bank of America (FDIC Cert # 3510), and Citibank (FDIC Cert # 7213).

Background: This case was initiated based on a referral from the Department of Justice.

Nature of the Alleged Misconduct: FDIC OIG opened this investigation upon request of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to allegations made against Ceres related to violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and other federal laws pertaining to commodities trading. Specifically, the DOJ received information alleging that Ceres built large positions in the oats futures market for the purpose of manipulating the price of oats and thereby “squeezing” other market participants, and forcing them to pay artificially high prices to satisfy futures contract obligations. This investigation also discovered evidence that, at the same time, Ceres took delivery of physical oats pursuant to futures contracts, despite having no immediate need for the commodity, which further inflated oat prices by forcing counterparties to source oats in “squeezed” market conditions.

Outcome: On October 23, 2023, the CFTC announced that it issued an order simultaneously filing and settling charges against Ceres for commodity market manipulation. The order required Ceres to pay a \$3 million fine and cease and desist from future violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.

The FDIC-OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the CFTC’s regulatory inquiry, investigated this case. The DOJ declined to file criminal charges at the

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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General
Office of Investigations

conclusion of the investigation. The investigation is complete and accordingly, the case will be closed.

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DATE: 2/15/2023

TO: Shimon Richmond
Assistant Inspector General for Investigation

FROM: [b6,b7(C)]
Acting Special Agent-in-Charge
Electronic Crimes Unit

SUBJECT: Intrusion - ABS Ransomware
Case Number: X-2020-0013

The OIG has concluded its investigation into the activities of American Bank Systems (ABS)/Avaddon ransomware. The case was worked jointly with Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) - Boston and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

Background:

This investigation was based on information from FDIC's Division of Administration (DOA) concerning the company American Bank Systems (ABS), and six banks that are their clients, including Labette Bank, Altamont, KS (FDIC #17068); First National Bank of Moody, TX (FDIC # 3351); Hancock Bank and Trust (FDIC # 5058); Freedom Bank of Southern Missouri (FDIC # 35276); Impact Bank (FDIC # 17399); Citizens National Bank (FDIC # 20954); and Oxford University Bank (FDIC # 57034). The allegations indicated the institutions were notified by their document imaging services company, ABS, that data had been compromised. It was discovered that ABS had been victimized by malware being injected into the software used for loan and deposit account imaging conversion. As a result of the malware, bank customer data for six financial institutions was stolen and used to extort a ransom from ABS.

On October 23, 2020, ABS was found to be a victim of the Avaddon malware that resulted in the theft of customer data for the financial institutions. The President of ABS was contacted and ordered to pay for the return of the stolen data. The President of ABS declined payment, and on November 2, 2020, a message was posted on the social media platform Twitter, detailing the breach, and 5 GB of data was released. The posted message also indicated the perpetrators had 50 GB of data from ABS, and additional data would be released if the ransom was not paid. ABS engaged an outside law firm, Mullen Coughlin Law Firm, and an incident response company, Arete Instant Response, to assist with the breach.

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Outcome:

FDIC OIG agents worked closely with FinCEN to trace all of the cryptocurrency transactions identified during the investigations. Additionally, FDIC OIG worked closely with FBI to identify the Avaddon infrastructure, creators, and victims.

In June of 2021, Avaddon released about 1,500 master keys and allowed Coverware to build a single master version of their UniDecrypt tool for all victims. After the release of the master keys, the FBI and FDIC OIG continued to investigate the creators of Avaddon but were unsuccessful in identifying the threat actor(s).

The FBI and FDIC OIG have closed their investigation as a result of Avaddon shutting down, the malware variant being discontinued, and efforts to trace the funding being unsuccessful.

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