<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of document:</th>
<th>FBI Monograph: Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini Shiite Activities in the U.S., 24-February-1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Released date:</td>
<td>31-October-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19-September-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update posted:</td>
<td>19-December-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original post date:</td>
<td>27-September-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of document:</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Record Information/Dissemination Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170 Marcel Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winchester, VA 22602-4843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>Second release begins on (PDF) page 53 and reveals considerably more of the text of this FBI Monograph than the original release</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file.
September 19, 2008

Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI SHIITE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
FBI MONOGRAPH

FOIPA No. 1109734-000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked
below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552       Section 552a
\(\Box(b)(1)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(A)\)
\(\Box(b)(2)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(B)\)
\(\Box(b)(3)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(C)\)
\(\Box(b)(4)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(D)\)
\(\Box(b)(5)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(E)\)
\(\Box(b)(6)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(F)\)
\(\Box(b)(8)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(G)\)
\(\Box(b)(9)\)       \(\Box(b)(7)(H)\)
\(\Box(b)(10)\)      \\

47 page(s) were reviewed and 47 page(s) are being released.

\(\Box\) Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other
Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

\(\Box\) referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.

\(\Box\) referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this
information when the consultation is finished.

\(\Box\) You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in
writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425
New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the
date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information
Appeal” or “Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it
may be easily identified.

\(\Box\) The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was
the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other
individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown,
when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s).
Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).
If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed material is responsive to your FOIA request to FBI Headquarters.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
Memorandum

DATE: 05-16-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60322/UCLR/PJL/SDS
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-16-2033

SECRET

To: [Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI SHI'ITE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES TERRORIST RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CENTER (TRAC), OPERATIONAL MATTER-

PURPOSE: To submit attached summary, "Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini Activities in the United States." (U)

RECOMMENDATION: (U) That this summary be approved for dissemination to the intelligence community.

DETAILS: Attached summary was prepared in response to the increased activity of pro-Khomeini Shiite terrorist groups against United States interest in the Middle East and the threat of such activity occurring in the United States. TRAC has undertaken this project to determine the threat potential to the continental United States. (U)

This project has been coordinated by [Redacted], Intelligence Research Specialist, TRAC, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division. (U)

All information herein is classified "SECRET" in its entirety unless noted otherwise. (U)
(U) SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Nofofn

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

Nocontract (NC)

Not releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants

Oroon (OC)

Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator

Prepared by:

Terrorist Research and Analytical Center

(Intelligence Research Specialist)
THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF PRO-KHOMEINI SITE
ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Date of Information: January 1984] 

This communication is classified "Secret/Noform" in its entirety,
unless otherwise indicated.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... ii

I. THE SHIITE RELIGION .................................................. 1

II. ......................................................................................... 4

III. ......................................................................................... 5

IV. IRANIAN SHIITE THREATS ............................................... 14

CONCLUSION .................................................................... 19
Within the past year, terrorist acts have been committed in the Middle East against diplomatic establishments and military bases of the United States and several of its allies. These actions, the purpose of which is to rid the area of the Multinational Forces, have resulted in extensive damage and in numerous deaths and injuries. Beirut, Lebanon, has been the principal site of much of this activity, although other Middle East states have not escaped the actions of the terrorists.

The group that generally has claimed credit for these acts is a fanatic fundamentalist sect of the Islamic religious, whose leader is Ayatollah Khomeini of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This group, Islamic Jihad, is one of several factions of the religion that consider themselves to be in a holy war. Although not all Shiites adhere to this philosophy, those who do, believe that no sacrifice is too great in furtherance of their cause.

The United States is one of several nations viewed as an enemy by the fanatic Shiites in their struggle, and there is a concern that the terrorism currently confined to the Middle East may soon spread to the United States.
I. THE SHIITE RELIGION

SECRET/NOFORN
The major terrorist problem currently confronting the United States in the Middle East is based in a deep religious fanaticism found in the fundamentalist sect of the Islamic Shiite faith. The spiritual leader of the world's Shiites, the Avatollah Ruhollah Khomenei, who is also the temporal leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, serves as the manifestation both of this religious fervor and secular power. Fanatic fundamentalist Shiites are in a state of holy war against those in opposition to their philosophy, which includes the United States. As such, they believe that salvation can be obtained through martyrdom. Centuries ago, during the Crusades, this was accomplished by attacks with knives; today the same is gained by use of explosives-laden trucks.

The Shiite Moslems represent the Iranian, or Persian, variation of the Islamic religion. The beginnings of Islam can conservatively be traced to the prophet Mohammed in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. His teachings unified the majority of the Arab world and caused the Koran (the words of Mohammed) to be held as law in both civil and religious matters. An important aspect of Islam is that there is no discernible distinction between church and state. Interpretation of the religion is used to legitimize the state.

Following the death of Mohammed in A.D. 632, there resulted a succession of struggles in the faith. A schism, which continues into the present, occurred between two religious leaders, Ali and Abu Bakr. The followers of Ali, the Shiites, appear to adhere more closely to the actual teachings of the Koran as law. The other group, the Sunnites, who possibly are the followers of Abu Bakr, appear to be more liberal and realistic. The Shiite sect differs from the Sunnite sect in matters of law and ceremony. They have, moreover, rejected most of the oral traditions of Islam and believe in the coming of a Messiah. The Sunnite sect is considered the orthodox branch of Islam.

The Sunnites are the majority Islamic sect, comprising 85 per cent of all Arabs. Most of the Moslems in Turkey, the Far East, Afghanistan, and Africa, are Sunnite. The Shiites, by comparison, are centered in Iran (formerly Persia) where approximately 90 per cent of the population (1979 estimate) belong to the sect. Other important Shiite communities exist in Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Oman.
The Sunnites, historically, have held positions of leadership in the Middle East and have dominated the wealth. The rise to power of Khomeini in 1979, however, began to change this. Khomeini has sought to move Shiites into leadership roles in the states of the Persian Gulf by any means, including violence. This Islamic Revolution, therefore, is an attempt to spread the Shiite interpretation of Islam through political destabilization of other Arab states.

The fundamental concept of the Shiite philosophy emphasizes strict obedience to the religious leader, that is, Khomeini. His followers are faithful to his views and perform and act accordingly. This fundamentalist zeal, when combined with an intense Persian/Iranian nationalism, has given rise to several fanatic factions, to whom no sacrifice is too great. As Khomeini has justified the use of violence to further the Revolution through his strict interpretation of the religion and/or the Koran, the religion (or its interpretation) becomes the justification for any act. And, to be sure, Khomeini's interpretation is unquestioned. Thus, it is not the religion itself but the interpretation of religious teachings, as viewed by the spiritual/temporal leader, which is the driving force behind the Islamic Revolution and its consequences.

As part of his effort to expand and consolidate the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini has provided aid to dissident groups in neighboring Gulf states and has trained agents for attacks against exiled regime opponents. Tehran's subversive acts are most likely used to protect Iran's own revolution and to foster the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist regimes sympathetic to Iranian interests. They are also designed to reduce superpower influence in the Middle East.

In its commitment to spreading the Islamic Revolution, the Khomeini Government has been heavily involved in training and equipping Islamic fundamentalist groups for the subversion of several Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iraq. Available information indicates that Iran has run, at least since 1981, special paramilitary/terrorist training camps under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards.

Not all Shiites are fanatic to the point of self-sacrifice. Indeed, there are Shiites who accept Khomeini as a religious leader, and even as a political leader, but who are not involved in the terrorism. Thus, there exists within the Shiite philosophy a range of followers encompassing, on one extreme, those who treat their belief solely as a faith and, on the other extreme, those who willingly martyr themselves to enforce and expand the teachings of Khomeini.
Following the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, by militant Shiites in November 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran and ordered closed the Iranian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
back of page
IV.

IRANIAN SHIITE THREATS

SECRET/NOFORN
Although there have not yet been terrorist attacks by Shiite fundamentalists in the United States, there have been numerous allegations relative to such activity. Increased security measures have been put into effect at numerous United States Government offices and buildings as a result, and priority investigations have attempted to determine the validity of the information and/or to interdict any threats. To date, none of the intelligence has been substantiated. Included among these allegations are:

- information obtained on January 4, 1983 from

SECRET/NOFORN

15
Warning of possible kamikaze-style attacks against famous "houses" in the United States, to include the White House and other unspecified targets. There were also reports of terrorists carrying bombs aboard American flag oceanliners;

- information from a source of unknown reliability who reported

- information obtained on December 30, 1983 reporting that bombs would explode before mid-January 1984, at the United Nations Building, Pan Am Building, World Trade Center, and/or the Federal Building, in New York City;
back of page
- information obtained on December 30, 1983, from a source of unknown reliability that no time frame was indicated; (U)

- information obtained from an anonymous source (U)

- information, which has not been substantiated, advising on January 4, 1984 of rumors of a plot for a kamikaze-style mission against United States installations (NFI). Reportedly, the pilot is Lebanese and is associated with a group supported by Khomeini; (U)

- information from a source of unknown reliability, who reported (U)

- information obtained on January 18, 1984 that package bombs have been prepared to explode when in the possession of United States Postal Service employees; (U)

- information obtained from an anonymous telephone call on January 19, 1984 that
Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI
SHIITE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S./FBI MONOGRAPH
FOIPA No. 1109734-001

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA). Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked
below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 552</th>
<th>Section 552a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(1)</td>
<td>□(b)(7)(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(2)</td>
<td>□(b)(7)(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(3)</td>
<td>□(b)(7)(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□(b)(7)(D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□(b)(7)(E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(4)</td>
<td>□(b)(7)(F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(5)</td>
<td>□(b)(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□(b)(6)</td>
<td>□(b)(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□(k)(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 page(s) were reviewed and 47 page(s) are being released.

☐ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other
Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

☐ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
☐ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this
information when the consultation is finished.

☐ In accordance with standard FBI practice, this response neither confirms nor denies the
existence of your subject’s name on any watch lists.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the
Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW,
Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days
from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly
marked "Freedom of Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your
request so that it may be easily identified.
The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

As a result of your administrative appeal to the Office of Information Policy (OIP), Department of Justice (DOJ), material was remanded to the FBI for declassification review. The material from the FBI Headquarters file 199-4773 has been reviewed for declassification and processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A redacted copy of the documents is enclosed.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FBI/DOJ
Memorandum

(U)_

Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI SHI'ITE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES - TERRORIST RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CENTER (TRAC), OPERATIONAL MATTER.

PURPOSE: To submit attached summary, "Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini Activities in the United States." (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That this summary be approved for dissemination to the intelligence community. (U)

(U) APPROVED: Adm. Servs. Laboratory
Director
Exec. AD-Inv. Inspection Tech. Servs.
Exec. AD-LES Intel. Training

(U) DETAILS: Attached summary was prepared in response to the increased activity of pro-Khomeini Shiite terrorist groups against United States interest in the Middle East and the threat of such activity occurring in the United States. TRAC has undertaken this project to determine the threat potential to the continental United States. (U)

This project has been coordinated by [Intelligence Research Specialist, TRAC, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division] (U)

All information herein is classified "SECRET" in its entirety unless noted otherwise. (U)

(U) Enclosure

Enclosure

DE-173 199-4775 -57

(U) JUL 30 1984

(U) DECLASSIFIED BY G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

(U) JUN 25 1984

(U) XEROX

(U) MAR 1 1984
(U) SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Warning Notice
National Security Information
Noforn
Nocrent (NC)
Orcon (OC)

Intelligence Sources
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator

Prepared by:
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center
(Intelligence Research Specialist)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FILE#25039

CLASSIFIED BY: 9/45/BCE/GTT
DECLASSIFIED: 11/15/84

-3-
THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI SHIITE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

(U)

Date of Information: January 1984

This communication is classified "Secret/NoForN" in its entirety, unless otherwise indicated.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE SHIITE RELIGION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. OFFICIAL IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS - IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED OFFICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Mission to the United Nation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Interest Section</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Education Center</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostazafin Foundation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. MAIN IRANIAN SHIITE ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Student Association - Persian Speaking Group</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Society</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Guerrillas of America</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. IRANIAN SHIITE THREATS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN
Within the past year, terrorist acts have been committed in the Middle East against diplomatic establishments and military bases of the United States and several of its allies. These actions, the purpose of which is to rid the area of the Multinational Forces, have resulted in extensive damage and in numerous deaths and injuries. Beirut, Lebanon, has been the principal site of much of this activity, although other Middle East states have not escaped the actions of the terrorists.

The group that generally has claimed credit for these acts is a fanatic fundamentalist sect of the Islamic Shiites religion, whose leader is Ayatollah Khomeini of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This group, Islamic Jihad, is one of several factions of the religion that consider themselves to be in a holy war. Although not all Shiites adhere to this philosophy, those who do, believe that no sacrifice is too great in furtherance of their cause.

The United States is one of several nations viewed as an enemy by the fanatic Shiites in their struggle, and there is a concern that the terrorism currently confined to the Middle East may soon spread to the United States. Many Shiites, of Iranian and other Middle East nationalities, reside in the United States. Many of these individuals are involved in several Shiite organizations, such as the Islamic Society, the Muslim Student Association-Persian Speaking Group, and the Islamic Guerrillas of America. Should Shiite oriented violence occur in the United States, these organizations and/or their members could provide a support base. Moreover, the official Iranian establishments, such as the Mission to the United Nations and the Interest Section, could be expected to provide guidance and financial support.

Current information indicates that activities, such as intelligence gathering and violent confrontations, are being conducted by members of these Shiite organizations against, and limited to, anti-Khomeini elements in the United States. Furthermore, funding and direction for these actions emanate from the Government of Iran through the various Iranian establishments.
I. THE SHIITE RELIGION
The major terrorist problem currently confronting the United States in the Middle East is based in a deep religious fanaticism found in the fundamentalist sect of the Islamic Shiite faith. The spiritual leader of the world's Shiites, the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, who is also the temporal leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, serves as the manifestation both of this religious fervor and secular power. Fanatic fundamentalist Shiites are in a state of holy war against those in opposition to their philosophy, which includes the United States. As such, they believe that salvation can be obtained through martyrdom. Centuries ago, during the Crusades, this was accomplished by attacks with knives; today the same is gained by use of explosives-laden trucks.

The Shiite Moslems represent the Iranian, or Persian, variation of the Islamic religion. The beginnings of Islam can conservatively be traced to the prophet Mohammed in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. His teachings unified the majority of the Arab world and caused the Koran (the words of Mohammed) to be held as law in both civil and religious matters. An important aspect of Islam is that there is no discernable distinction between church and state. Interpretation of the religion is used to legitimize the state.

Following the death of Mohammed in A.D. 632, there resulted a succession of struggles in the faith. A schism, which continues into the present, occurred between two religious leaders, Ali and Abu Bakr. The followers of Ali, the Shiites, appear to adhere more closely to the actual teachings of the Koran as law. The other group, the Sunnites, who possibly are the followers of Abu Bakr, appear to be more liberal and realistic. The Shiite sect differs from the Sunni sect in matters of law and ceremony. They have, moreover, rejected most of the oral traditions of Islam and believe in the coming of a Messiah. The Sunni sect is considered the orthodox branch of Islam.

The Sunnites are the majority Islamic sect, comprising 85 percent of all Arabs. Most of the Moslems in Turkey, the Far East, Afghanistan, and Africa, are Sunni. The Shiites, by comparison, are centered in Iran (formerly Persia) where approximately 90 percent of the population (1979 estimate) belong to the sect. Other important Shiite communities exist in Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Oman.
The Sunnites, historically, have held positions of leadership in the Middle East and have dominated the wealth. The rise to power of Khomeini in 1979, however, began to change this. Khomeini has sought to move Sunnis into leadership roles in the states of the Persian-Gulf by any means, including violence. This Islamic Revolution, therefore, is an attempt to spread the Sunni interpretation of Islam through political destabilization of other Arab states.

The fundamental concept of the Shiite philosophy emphasizes strict obedience to the religious leader, that is, Khomeini. His followers are faithful to his views and perform and act accordingly. This fundamentalist zeal, when combined with an intense Persian/Iranian nationalism, has given rise to several fanatic factions, to whom no sacrifice is too great. As Khomeini has justified the use of violence to further the Revolution through his strict interpretation of the religion and/or the Koran, the religion (or its interpretation) becomes the justification for any act. And, to be sure, Khomeini's interpretation is unquestioned. Thus, it is not the religion itself but the interpretation of religious teachings, as viewed by the spiritual/temporal leader, which is the driving force behind the Islamic Revolution and its consequences.

As part of his effort to expand and consolidate the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini has provided aid to dissident groups in neighboring Gulf states and has trained agents for attacks against exiled regime opponents. Tehran's subversive acts are most likely used to protect Iran's own revolution and to foster the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist regimes sympathetic to Iranian interests. They are also designed to reduce superpower influence in the Middle East.

In its commitment to spreading the Islamic Revolution, the Khomeini Government has been heavily involved in training and equipping Islamic fundamentalist groups for the subversion of several Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iraq. Available information indicates that Iran has run, at least since 1981, special paramilitary/terrorist training camps under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards.

Not all Sunnis are fanatic to the point of self-sacrifice. Indeed, there are Sunnis who accept Khomeini as a religious leader, and even as a political leader, but who are not involved in the terrorism. Thus, there exists within the Shiite philosophy a range of followers encompassing, on one extreme, those who treat their belief solely as a faith and, on the other extreme, those who willingly martyr themselves to enforce and expand the teachings of Khomeini.
II.

OFFICIAL IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS - IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED OFFICES
Following the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, by militant Shiites in November 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran and ordered closed the Iranian Embassy in Washington, D.C. In June 1980, the Iranian Interests Section (ISEC) was officially opened in Washington, D.C., to provide the same services as the Embassy, such as passport and visa matters. Because the United States and Iran had no official relations, however, ISEC affairs were to be coordinated through the Algerian Embassy.

By mandate of the United States Department of State, ISEC is to be staffed by United States persons whose number is not to exceed 20. Investigations have determined, however, that there are in excess of 50 full and part-time employees. Many of these are pro-Khomeini Iranian students who volunteer their services, thereby avoiding Department of State detection.
The Islamic Education Center (IEC), located in Potomac, Maryland, serves two functions in the Islamic emigre community. Overly, it is an education center, a religious meeting site, and a social gathering place. An Islamic Sunday School is held for religious instruction, and meetings are conducted for translating the Koran. These activities are coordinated by . In addition, there is a Muslim School, grades 1 - 12, during the week. Anyone who is Muslim can visit the IEC; however, those Iranians who are anti-Khomeini reportedly would not be entirely welcomed. Conversely, there is information that the IEC may be used as a cover organization and that it serves as a base for terrorism and/or covert intelligence-gathering activities under the direction of a foreign power (i.e., Iran). Of the Islamic Guerrillas of America (IGA), maintains a high profile at the Center. He has no connection to the school, but his purposes for using the facility, other than that they are political in nature, are unknown. There is concern within the intelligence community that IGA activities are "tainting" the Center. Examples of questionable activity at the IEC include: 

- armed guards in camouflage dress on patrol; 
- contacts with Muslim Student Association-Persian Speaking Group students throughout the United States; 
- individuals from the Center who are observed gathering intelligence at anti-Khomeini demonstrations; and 
- the use of the IEC to house individuals who engage in pro-Khomeini demonstrations.

The IEC was purchased by the Government of Iran with monies from the Mostazafin Foundation in New York, through which it receives regular support funds.
The Mostazafin Foundation (MF), also known as the Mostazafan Foundation or "oppressed peoples," was formerly known as the Payman Foundation and was founded during the regime of [redacted]. It is currently closely aligned with the incumbent Iranian Government. The Foundation has two locations in New York City.

The MF was chartered in the State of New York as a non-profit organization, but was later found to be a "front" for the Iranian Government to channel funds to agents in the United States in an effort to spread propaganda and to ascertain the identities of anti-Khomeini students currently enrolled in colleges and universities. Investigations have determined that the MF advocates the use of intimidation of family members in Iran when an Iranian student in the United States is identified as having either expressed anti-Khomeini views or violated the tenets of his Moslem faith.

The MF experienced conflict with the Iranian Interests Section and with the administration at the Iranian Mission to the United Nations. As a result, new officers were selected to head the Foundation, and Tehran is now in complete control of all decisions affecting the MF's daily operations.

It has been determined that the MF is currently facing serious financial difficulties, and an advisor to the Foundation, Reminded, to postpone payment of a 1.5 million dollar tax obligation which the Foundation currently owes to the United States Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, in light of the Foundation's impending financial difficulties, it is currently unable to issue student loans to anyone in the foreseeable future.

The MF finances its activities, in part, by renting high priced office space in one of New York City's more fashionable locations. Investigations have determined that besides the income which the Foundation has obtained through the rental of office space, an undisclosed amount of money has been sent to the Foundation by the Khomeini regime to finance demonstrations, publications, and various slogans.
III.

MAIN IRANIAN SHIITE ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
The Muslim Student Association (MSA) is an organization of Muslim students of various nationalities in the United States and Canada. A faction of the MSA, the Persian Speaking Group (PSG), is comprised of Iranian students who fervently support the policies of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The leadership of the MSA-PSG in the United States, which had been held by a fanatic who claims leadership of the Islamic Society of America, is now held by of the Islamic Society (IS). The MSA-PSG is, for all practical purposes, synonymous with the IS.

The main headquarters of the PSG reportedly is in Plainfield, Indiana, although policy-making functions and major funding operations of the organization appear to be in Washington, D.C. Investigations, for example, have determined that funding for the PSG comes from the Iranian Foreign Ministry through the Iranian Interest Section.

The MSA-PSG serves as an extension of the present regime in Iran and operates on United States campuses to silence opposition through acts of intimidation and/or terror. The main targets of the MSA-PSG are Iranians who are in opposition to Khomeini or who are monarchists. Several incidents of violence and heckling of opposition elements have been reported. At Oklahoma University in Norman, Oklahoma, in March 1982, MSA-PSG members were armed with knives, tear gas, and a number of weapons used in the martial arts in a confrontation with anti-Khomeini students. Moreover, investigations have determined that 30 MSA-PSG/IS members traveled (date unknown) to Iran and there met with authorities concerning measures to counter opposition elements.

There are also indications that the PSG acts as the information-gathering arm of the Iranian intelligence service, SAVAMA.
The Islamic Society, also known as Anjoman Islamie, which is made up of a number of groups variously referred to as Anjoman, the Hezbollah (Party of God) or Muslim Student Association-Persian Speaking Group (MSA-PSG), is comprised principally of pro-Khomeini Iranians. This organization operates primarily through the MSA-PSG, which is a group generally accepted on many college and university campuses in the United States. The main Islamic Society contact with the Iranian Interest Section (ISEC), Washington, D.C., is of Washington, D.C. of Akron, Ohio. of the Society in the United States.

The Islamic Society fulfills numerous tasks on behalf of the Government of Iran, including gathering intelligence on anti-Khomeini Iranians and covertly shipping embargoed United States technology to Iran. In addition, the Society is also involved in spreading propaganda to further the Islamic Revolution of Khomeini. This is accomplished through meetings, publications such as magazines and brochures, demonstrations, and forceable takeovers of Islamic Mosques. The latter is an attempt to spread the fundamentalist Shiite religion and make the philosophy dominant, as is Khomeini's intent. Other areas of activity include financing and coordinating pro-Khomeini activities in the United States, such as demonstrations; providing defense costs for arrested pro-Khomeini activists; and disrupting anti-Khomeini activities. Indications, therefore, are that the Society is used to promote pro-Khomeini violence and terrorism.

The monies which help support the activities of the Society are received from the Government of Iran, through either ISEC or the Mostazafin Foundation, New York City.
The Islamic Guerrillas of America (IGA), also known as Majlis As-Shura, Council of Guidance, is a socio-political, fundamentalist Sunni religious organization comprised of American Black Muslims and foreign-born Muslims, many of whom are Iranians loyal to the present Iranian Government.

The IGA is a pro-Khomeini organization providing support for the Khomeini Revolution in the United States. The IGA intends to facilitate change in American policy towards Iran and halt what it feels is United States harassment of Iranian people residing here. The most powerful figure in the organization is an agent of the Iranian Government. All actions taken by the IGA must be cleared with the American-Black Muslim Community.

Activity of the IGA is centered in the Washington, D.C. area. One of its primary objectives - complete control of the Islamic Center, 2551 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., was temporarily achieved in November 1981, when and his followers illegally wrested control from the Center's Board of Governors. In March 1983, the Board of Governors regained control of the Islamic Center, which resulted in the arrest and conviction of and several IGA members.

The IGA is involved in various activities in support of its cause. Pamphlets have been distributed, which berate United States intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, for their alleged harassment of Muslims. The IGA has conducted meetings at the Islamic Center and at another location, the Islamic Education Center (IEC) on Seven Locks Road, Potomac, Maryland, encourages members to demonstrate support for the Iranian Revolution by staging marches. Source information indicates that Iran has directed that more efforts be concentrated on new programs and propaganda in order to attract more American Black Muslims. Also, it is believed that has traveled to Iran for training in intelligence gathering for the Iranian Government. Members of the IGA have been observed wearing camouflage fatigues and carrying weapons.
The IGA, which has been involved in illegal activities for which some members have been convicted and jailed, was suspected of being involved in the assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, for which two IGA members were convicted in December 1981. Tabatabai, who was a pro-Shah Iranian exile residing in Bethesda, Maryland, was murdered in July 1980. Several United States federal officials involved in terrorist investigation were the recipients of death threat letters signed by the IGA in 1982. Moreover, investigations reveal that weapons have been purchased by IGA members. Reportedly, money for weapons procurement is obtained through robberies. Various members of this group have been alleged to be responsible for harboring the fugitives of these crimes. Sources have reported... were also reported.
IV. IRANIAN SHIITE THREATS

SECRET/NOFORN

14
Although there have not yet been terrorist attacks by Shiite fundamentalists in the United States, there have been numerous allegations relative to such activity. Increased security measures have been put into effect at numerous United States Government offices and buildings as a result, and priority investigations have attempted to determine the validity of the information and/or to interdict any threats. To date, none of the intelligence has been substantiated. Included among these allegations are:

- information obtained on January 4, 1983 from a source of unknown reliability that two sites in Iran have been used to train terrorists for the 1984 Olympics;

- information obtained on January 18, 1983 from a source of unknown reliability that two sites in Iran have been used to train terrorists for the 1984 Olympics;

- information from September 1983 that investigations have documented smuggling-related activity in the border area;

- an anonymous letter received on November 22, 1983 by the Manassas, Virginia, Police Department, in which the author overheard a conversation concerning
- information obtained on December 14, 1983 regarding an anonymous telephone call to the United States Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, warning of possible kamikaze-style attacks against famous "houses" in the United States, to include the White House and other unspecified targets. There were also reports of terrorists carrying bombs aboard American flag oceanliners.

- information from a source of unknown reliability who reported

- information developed on December 20, 1983 through a source of another United States Government agency, concerning

- information from

- information obtained on December 30, 1983 reporting that bombs would explode before mid-January 1984, at the United Nations Building, Pan Am Building, World Trade Center, and/or the Federal Building, in New York City.
- information obtained on December 30, 1983, from a source of unknown reliability that no time frame was indicated;

- information obtained from an anonymous source;

- information, which has not been substantiated, advising on January 4, 1984 of rumors of a plot for a kamikaze-style mission against United States installations (NFI). Reportedly, the pilot is Lebanese and is associated with Islamic Amal, a Lebanese Shiite fundamentalist group supported by Khomeini;

- information from a source of unknown reliability who reported;

- information obtained on January 18, 1984 that package bombs have been prepared to explode when in the possession of United States Postal Service employees;

- information obtained from an anonymous telephone call on January 19, 1984 that;

- information from a source of another United States Government agency advising that The source, who had provided reliable information in the past, was polygraphed and found to be deceptive.
In addition to the allegations of Iranian terrorism against United States Government targets, an incident recently occurred in Seattle, Washington, wherein a pro-Khomeini Iranian group, whose members are involved with the Islamic Society, planned to set fire to a theater during a performance attended by pro-Shah and anti-Khomeini followers. Because of FBI actions, however, the plans were canceled. Although this incident did not involve activity against United States Government facilities, it is of importance because it is an example of the activity which the Shiites in the United States are capable of.
That there have been no attacks perpetrated by fanatic Shiite groups and/or individuals against United States Government facilities or persons in the United States does not suggest that the probability of such activity occurring is minimal. The threat does exist, and it should be so viewed. The various violent anti-Khomeini acts, such as the planned firebombing in Seattle, proves that at least a psychological framework (that is, the ability to commit and/or condone violence for a given cause) is in existence. To be sure, this framework is necessary in establishing a terrorist capability. The extent of this capability, however, remains unknown.

A support base, that is, avenues of escape, safehouses, etc., does not exist in the United States to the same extent as in the Middle East. Furthermore, the same fanaticism which generates the suicide missions in the Middle East may not be as strong here, given that the majority of the Shiites in America are either Arabs who have been removed from the environment which spawns the fanaticism, or they are Americans who have never fully experienced it.

If, therefore, an attack were to occur in the United States, it is least likely that it would be a suicide-style mission, similar to the Beirut, Lebanon, bombings of the United States Embassy and Marine Corps compound. Alternative methods, which would provide a high profile, include assassinations and kidnappings.