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Description of document: General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigations Closed During CY2025

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Source of document: FOIA Request  
OIG Freedom of Information Act Officer  
GSA Office of Inspector General  
1800 F Street, NW, Room 5326 (JC)  
Washington, DC 20405  
Fax: (202) 741-8365  
Email: [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov)  
[FOIA.gov](http://FOIA.gov)

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U.S. General Services Administration  
Office of Inspector General

February 2, 2026

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request (2026-GSAIG-FOIA-00024)

This letter is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received by the General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG) FOIA Office on December 26, 2025, for:

"1) A copy of the final report, closing memo, or equivalent concluding document for each Inspector General investigation closed during CY2025.  
2) A copy of the list of Inspector General investigations closed during CY2025, including relevant data fields such as the subject or topic of the investigation, the case number, closing date, and opening date."

Upon review of the material being provided in this response, I determined you are entitled to portions of the requested material under the FOIA. My review included consideration of the 'foreseeable harm standard', i.e., information which might technically fall within an exemption should not be withheld from a FOIA requester unless the agency can identify a foreseeable harm or legal bar to disclosure. The basis for any redacted information is/are Exemption(s) (b)(3), 31 U.S.C. § 3730, (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA.

(b)(3), Permits the withholding of information protected from release by another federal statute., 31 U.S.C. § 3730, Civil actions for false claims; used to protect the integrity of the court ordered seal.

(b)(4), Permits withholding of records related to trade secrets and other confidential business information.

(b)(6), Permits withholding of records and information about individuals when disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(b)(7)(A), Permits withholding of records when interference with law enforcement proceedings can be reasonably expected.

(b)(7)(C), Permits withholding of records when an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy could reasonably be expected

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirement of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirement of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that this office provides to all our requesters. You should not take it as an indication that excluded records do, or do not exist.

As we have redacted information referenced in the above paragraph(s), with the aforementioned FOIA exemptions, this technically constitutes a partial denial of your FOIA request. You have the right to appeal the denial of the information being withheld within 90 days of the date of this letter. You may submit an appeal electronically through the GSA OIG Public Access Link at <https://gsa.oig.secureocp.com>, by e-mail to [OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov](mailto:OIGFOIA-PrivacyAct@gsaig.gov), or in writing to the following address:

Freedom of Information Act Officer  
Office of the Inspector General,  
General Services Administration  
1800 F Street, NW, Room 5332  
Washington, D.C. 20405

Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request. The appeal should include the GSA OIG FOIA Case Number (2026-GSAIG-FOIA-00024). In addition, your appeal must contain a brief statement of the reasons why the requested information should be released. Please include a copy of your initial request and this response. Both the appeal letter and envelope or electronic appeal submission should be prominently marked, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Should you have any questions, please contact Joseph Mobbley, GSA OIG's FOIA Public Liaison at (202) 501-1932 or via email at [oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov](mailto:oigfoia-privacyact@gsaig.gov).

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free at (877) 684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769.

Sincerely,

/s/

Christopher W. Pehrson  
Counsel to the Inspector General  
(FOIA Officer)

Enclosure(s)

**CLOSED CASES REPORT**  
(1 JAN 2025 - 31 DEC 2025)

Case #	Case Title	Date Opened	Date Closed	Current Case Status
I16000084	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	5/19/2016	3/21/2025	Closed
I16600070	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	4/18/2016	1/28/2025	Closed
I17100022	Avatar Computing, Inc. et al.	12/1/2016	5/19/2025	Closed
I17400055	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	2/28/2017	3/17/2025	Closed
I17600082	Michael Dingle	6/8/2017	3/10/2025	Closed
I17600093	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	7/19/2017	5/1/2025	Closed
I18100061	Dakota Outerwear, et al.	4/25/2018	3/4/2025	Closed
I18100072	Brooks Range Contract Services & (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	12/7/2017	7/23/2025	Closed
I18800077	DMS, Inc. (Qui Tam)	5/31/2018	3/7/2025	Closed
I18L00009	VA Hospital (FLEET)	11/27/2017	3/13/2025	Closed
I18L00062	KCorp Technology Services, Inc.	9/20/2018	5/7/2025	Closed
I19500056	AMAFHA ENTERPRISE INC. et al.	4/5/2019	7/16/2025	Closed
I19H00032	Adobe Systems, Inc., et al. (Qui Tam)	9/26/2019	1/23/2025	Closed
I20100073	Noresco LLC	10/4/2019	8/27/2025	Closed
I20300022	Fidelis Design and Construction	12/13/2019	4/23/2025	Closed
I20700027	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	2/4/2020	1/7/2025	Closed
I20700088	Shawn Karr (Federal Surplus Firearms)	9/28/2020	7/7/2025	Closed
I20L00021	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	12/26/2019	3/28/2025	Closed
I20L00085	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	12/20/2019	3/28/2025	Closed

I20L00108	San Diego Auto Body (FLEET)	9/3/2020	5/5/2025	Closed
I20W00068	Pro Network, LLC	7/30/2020	8/21/2025	Closed
I21500013	Verint Americas, Inc. d/b/a ForeSee Results Inc. (Qui Tam)	6/21/2021	3/21/2025	Closed
I21500059	Telecom Technologies, Inc.	4/29/2021	9/10/2025	Closed
I21600085	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	7/28/2021	1/27/2025	Closed
I21700081	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	7/15/2021	7/7/2025	Closed
I21H00014	(b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730	3/8/2021	1/30/2025	Closed
I21H00099	(b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730	9/22/2021	5/29/2025	Closed
I21L00014	Roceteer, Inc.	9/10/2021	2/14/2025	Closed
I21L00041	Purple Heart Heroes	7/23/2021	3/26/2025	Closed
I21L00064	Death Valley National Park (FLEET)	5/6/2021	5/7/2025	Closed
I21S00010	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	4/12/2021	8/13/2025	Closed
I21S00011	Advanced Digital Solutions International	3/12/2021	3/26/2025	Closed
I22000066	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	8/9/2022	9/30/2025	Closed
I22300033	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	2/9/2022	9/11/2025	Closed
I22700072	Louisiana Army National Guard (FLEET)	7/24/2022	3/21/2025	Closed
I22H00015	Dell Technologies Inc. (Qui Tam)	12/6/2021	2/28/2025	Closed
I22L00021	GC Experts et al.	3/8/2022	2/10/2025	Closed
I22S00071	Zelene Charles	9/23/2022	6/16/2025	Closed
I23600053	Sterling Computers-Regency Consulting-Metgreen Solutions	3/23/2023	2/24/2025	Closed
I23600054	Crowley Government Services	4/17/2023	6/27/2025	Closed
I23700149	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	9/1/2023	7/8/2025	Closed

I23800087	Allied Waste Services, LLC d/b/a Republic Services of Montana (Qui Tam)	6/14/2023	3/13/2025	Closed
I23C00096	Ernst and Young LLP	8/29/2023	7/26/2025	Closed
I23C00100	(b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730	9/26/2023	7/9/2025	Closed
I23C00102	Salesforce Inc. (Qui Tam)	3/30/2023	8/13/2025	Closed
I23H00478	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	9/22/2023	9/25/2025	Closed
I23L00003	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	10/28/2022	2/28/2025	Closed
I23L00075	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	2/6/2023	7/30/2025	Closed
I23M00058	G10-2198W (FLEET)	3/7/2023	8/4/2025	Closed
I23S00028	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	2/23/2023	1/15/2025	Closed
I23W00059	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	5/10/2023	9/10/2025	Closed
I24100051	Andrew Chaves (FLEET)	1/24/2024	3/20/2025	Closed
I24200046	Job Corps (Fleet)	1/18/2024	7/28/2025	Closed
I24200049	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	3/6/2024	8/18/2025	Closed
I24200063	Cloned WEX Cards (Fleet)	8/30/2024	7/30/2025	Closed
I24200097	NJ Army National Guard (Fleet)	6/7/2024	6/16/2025	Closed
I24300081	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	6/4/2024	6/2/2025	Closed
I24500054	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	3/5/2024	4/2/2025	Closed
I24600007	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	2/20/2024	1/27/2025	Closed
I24600116	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	9/9/2024	5/20/2025	Closed
I24600152	Anderson & Sons Contracting, LLC	1/5/2024	5/23/2025	Closed
I24C00017	(b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730	11/16/2023	4/28/2025	Closed
I24C00057	(b)(4) FAR Disclosure	7/25/2024	8/25/2025	Closed

I24C00058	(b)(4) (FAR Disclosure)	7/25/2024	5/17/2025	Closed
I24C00079	(b)(4) (FAR Disclosure)	2/1/2024	3/27/2025	Closed
I24C00142	FedEx Corporation - NY (QUI TAM)	1/8/2024	8/20/2025	Closed
I24L00054	Varidesk, LLC (Qui Tam)	6/11/2024	7/30/2025	Closed
I24L00080	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) & (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)	5/10/2024	3/28/2025	Closed
I24L00093	USDA FSIS (FLEET)	7/11/2024	3/26/2025	Closed
I24L00101	USMC 1st CAG (FLEET)	8/7/2024	7/31/2025	Closed
I24L00113	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	10/12/2023	3/28/2025	Closed
I24M00024	G61-1613S (FLEET)	5/3/2024	7/15/2025	Closed
I24M00061	Amtrak Card - Orlando (FLEET)	3/27/2024	2/28/2025	Closed
I24W00024	Potential WEX Fraud at Fort Gregg-Adams (FLEET)	12/26/2023	1/28/2025	Closed
I24W00036	Hill ASC., Inc. (SOI Referral)	3/13/2024	7/17/2025	Closed
I24W00128	DRC Emergency Services et al.	10/3/2024	8/12/2025	Closed
I24W00156	ACTFL Professional Services, LLC (Qui Tam)	9/17/2024	3/4/2025	Closed
I25200031	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	7/2/2025	8/1/2025	Closed
I25200034	WPA Painting "Chicago River" by Aaron Bohard	1/16/2025	1/28/2025	Closed
I25200088	JIA-2 Land Port of Entry Projects	10/30/2024	6/3/2025	Closed
I25200110	NY Air National Guard (Fleet)	10/22/2024	7/8/2025	Closed
I25400015	G41 B3265 (FLEET)	4/11/2025	4/28/2025	Closed
I25400081	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	10/18/2024	5/20/2025	Closed
I25500041	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	2/13/2025	6/2/2025	Closed
I25C00044	Sam H. Ray - "Chief Ouray" (WPA Recovery)	7/15/2025	7/16/2025	Closed

I25C00075	Ralph Nelson - "Gray Day on The Marshes" (WPA Recovery)	3/27/2025	4/10/2025	Closed
I25C00076	Julia Thecla - "Signal" (WPA Recovery)	3/27/2025	5/17/2025	Closed
I25C00079	(b)(4) (FAR Disclosure)	3/25/2025	3/27/2025	Closed
I25C00093	(b)(4) (FAR Disclosure)	11/13/2024	5/22/2025	Closed
I25H00375	Repaintex Company	12/3/2024	8/8/2025	Closed
I25H00577	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	12/10/2024	8/20/2025	Closed
I25M00021	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	6/24/2025	8/4/2025	Closed
I25M00133	G42-1281U (FLEET)	7/14/2025	7/15/2025	Closed
I25W00129	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	3/4/2025	7/7/2025	Closed
I25M00128	G62-0128Z (FLEET)	11/18/2025	12/05/2025	Closed
I25H00123	GOV G42-1509V	12/16/2024	12/02/2025	Closed
I25DA00105	Police Service Dogs Inc., et al	04/17/2025	12/03/2025	Closed
I23600002	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	09/22/2023	12/16/2025	Closed
I25200045	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	06/03/2025	11/21/2025	Closed
I25700125	Rush Springs Police Department (Federal Surplus Property)	02/11/2025	12/03/2025	Closed

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

December 12, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JIF)  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |

File Number: I16000084

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In June 2014, a GSA Property Disposal Specialist, Pacific Rim Region, reported to GSA OIG that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a screener of federal excess property reported through the GSA Personal Property Reutilization Program, had made suspicious requests of property. Initial investigation of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) conducted through GSA OIG proactive investigation V070006, determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was requesting excess property on behalf of the Native Village of Karluk (Karluk), a small Native-American village located on Kodiak Island, Alaska. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had screened excess property with a total original acquisition cost of over \$8 million for Karluk from June 2011 to May 2015, though (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was a resident of Washington State and not a member of Karluk. The investigation determined that a large portion of the property requested by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was stored in Washington State.

Over the course of the investigation, record reviews, witness interviews, consensually monitored telephone contacts, Inspector General subpoena returns, and surveillance operations identified where federal excess property items screened by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were located in Washington State. The investigation determined that the property was screened through the GSA program but was approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Investigative efforts led to the identification of two large repositories of the excess property in Washington State – one in Roy, Washington, at the residence of an associate of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (also known as (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)), and one at the location of the Society for the Collection of American Memorabilia Museum, operated by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in Toledo, Washington.

Office of Investigations (JIF-10)  
1301 A Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Tacoma, WA 98402

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In January 2018, GSA OIG special agents conducted consensual searches of the Roy and Toledo properties and interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

BIA officials and Karluk officials were also interviewed; the interview of Karluk officials was conducted jointly with a special agent from the Department of Interior (DOI) OIG.

In February 2018, the investigative findings were referred to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Western District of Washington, and the matter was declined.

In November and December 2018, items of excess property recovered from the property controlled by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in Roy were turned back in to the GSA Property Program, through the Washington State Agency for Surplus Property. The total amount of excess property returned originally cost the U.S. Government a total of \$1,048,821.

After 2018, GSA OIG continued under this investigation in a facilitation role between BIA and GSA, attempting to facilitate the return of the property located in Toledo. However, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was uncooperative and unresponsive in attempted communication with BIA and Karluk. Over time, it became clear that GSA's position was that the property in question was authorized for transfer pursuant to a BIA program and that the matter was between BIA, Karluk, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

Ultimately, GSA OIG determined that it would cease investigative activities related to this matter based on the following facts, which indicated the activity uncovered through this investigation impacted a BIA program, as opposed to a GSA program:

- The property transfers in question were approved by the BIA and authorized through a BIA program.
- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was authorized by Karluk officials to screen property on their behalf and communicated with Karluk about property screening.
- GSA's position was that the property was BIA's to recover, though GSA was willing to assist with the re-distribution of the property upon return if requested by BIA.
- The DOI OIG, was aware of the matter, including the results of subject interviews and the locations of the property screened by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) on behalf of Karluk.
- The investigation was declined for prosecution by the USAO after presentation by GSA OIG.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Midwest Division

May 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Date: 2024.05.16 08:34:59 -05'00'  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST DIVISION (JID)  
SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING  
File Number: I16600070

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was opened on April 18, 2016, based on information provided by Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS) regarding possible abuse of the SDVOSB program. The information alleged that Joseph Dial (Dial), owner of United Medical Design Builders (UMDB), was a figurehead who received payments to fraudulently allow (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and United Excel Corporation (UEC) to use Dial's name and status to obtain and perform government Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) contracts.

A review of government contract awards indicated that the Department of Defense awarded UMDB an Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity task order W9126G-09-D-0028 on May 1, 2009. This contract was issued for the construction and design of healthcare facilities for the U.S. Air Force Medical Services, U.S. Army Medical Command and other U.S. Army Corps of Engineers customers and was set-aside for a SDVOSB. The total estimated contract capacity was set at \$40 million.

The investigation revealed that from August 2008 until September 2015, Dial and UMDB fraudulently obtained multiple SDVOSB set aside contracts based on false representations and certifications in the System of Award Management administered by the U.S. General Services Administration. The case was prosecuted criminally by the United States Attorney's Office, District of Kansas.

On May 18, 2016, former UMDB project manager and UEC employee (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) falsely stated that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) never instructed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) about UMDB business. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) further falsely stated that Dial made the business decisions for UMDB.

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On November 29, 2017, a federal grand jury returned a seven count indictment charging Dial with four counts of major program fraud) and three counts wire fraud.

On May 8, 2018, Dial pled guilty to one count of major program fraud and one count of wire fraud.

On January 16, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a four count indictment charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with two counts of major program fraud) and two counts of false statements.

On September 25, 2019, Dial was sentenced to 26 months in prison and ordered to forfeit \$25,000.

On February 7, 2020, Dial was debarred contracting throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government through January 1, 2027 and UMDB was debarred throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government through February 6, 2024.

On December 17, 2020 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pled guilty to one count of false statements.

On April 9, 2021, former UEC contractor (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed. (b)(6); was responsible for UMDB's books and accounting. According to O'ffill, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) consulted with attorneys regarding the formation of UMDB.

On September 8, 2023, the AUSA formally declined to prosecute (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and UMDB due to an affirmative defense by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) attorney.

On May 10, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to 24 months of supervised release, 90 days of home confinement, fined \$11,000, and ordered to forfeit \$25,000.

This was a joint investigation with the DCIS and the Army Criminal Investigation Division.

The case was closed and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in IG-IDEAS.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

April 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM ✓

AVATAR COMPUTING, INC. ET AL

CASE NUMBER: I17100022

This investigation was initiated from a proactive initiative by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG,) to identify government contractors who potentially submitted false certifications and false statements to GSA in order to obtain set aside contracts. GSA OIG, New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1), 10 Causeway Street, Boston, MA, identified Avatar Computing, Inc. (Avatar), Worcester, MA, as a contractor potentially committing Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) fraud.

JIA-1's preliminary investigation revealed that in July 2011, Avatar changed its shareholder agreement, making (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. the President and fifty-one percent owner of Avatar. Meanwhile (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stepped down from being the President, and became Vice President of Avatar. On September 9, 2011, Avatar certified to GSA it was a SDVOSB. In November 2012, Avatar was denied SDVOSB status with the U.S. Veterans Administration's (VA) Center for Veterans Enterprise (CVE), with CVE concluding (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) "did not control the management and daily operation" of Avatar. Avatar elected not to reapply for consideration by CVE, however it continued to self-certify in the GSA's System for Award Management (SAM) that it was a SDVOSB.

In 2013, Avatar received two U.S. Army contracts which were both 100% SDVOSB set aside contracts. Additionally, Avatar remained on GSA schedule 70, which resulted in contract awards from the Department of Interior for 100% SDVOSB set aside contracts.

On November 29, 2016, JIA-1 contacted the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), regarding Avatar and Thomas Bouchard, Contracting Officer, Natick Contracting Division (NCD), Army Contracting Command (ACC), Milford, MA. JIA-1 also contacted the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (Army CID), Devens, MA, which revealed an Army CID investigation into Avatar in 2014 for allegations of SDVOSB fraud. The case was ultimately declined for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, and subsequently referred to the U.S. Army's Suspension and Debarment Office (SDO) for review. The Army's SDO elected not to debar Avatar, instead entering into a compliance agreement with Avatar.

Boston Field Investigations Office  
10 Causeway Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Boston, Massachusetts 02222

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Interviews conducted with former NCD contracting officials revealed concerns over the close relationship (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had with Bouchard, as well as with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) former Chief Contracting Officer, NCD. The investigation also revealed Bouchard and other NCD employees possibly used a meeting room in (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) personal condominium complex at Paradise Palms Resort, Kissimmee, FL, to conduct official NCD business.

The investigation into Avatar's SDVOSB status revealed Bouchard used his position to influence Evolution Enterprise, Inc., a government contractor, to hire (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for a "no show" job. This job earned \$490,000 from 2014 to 2018, which was ultimately billed back to and paid for by the Department of Defense. Additionally, the investigation revealed Bouchard and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) took dozens of government funded trips, purportedly for work purposes, however the investigation determined little if any work was completed, and they spent most of time in the same hotel room, relaxing poolside or at Disney amusement parks. At the conclusion of the trips, Bouchard created, altered, and approved false travel vouchers for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to cover their personal expenses incurred during the trip. In May 2018 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also made false statements to a grand jury about these trips.

On March 12, 2020, Bouchard and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were each indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts (DMA), for ten counts of theft of government funds and one count of conspiracy for their participation in the scheme. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was also indicted on one count of making false statements to a grand jury. As a result, arrest warrants were issued for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Bouchard.

On July 6, 2020, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was arrested in Maryland by GSA OIG special agents.

On July 9, 2020, Bouchard surrendered to agents in Massachusetts.

On April 3, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy, 10 counts of theft of government funds and one count of false statements to a grand jury.

On October 2, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to six months home confinement, followed by two years of supervised release, and a special assessment fee of \$1,200.

On April 24, 2023, Bouchard pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and ten counts of theft of government funds.

On August 5, 2024, Bouchard was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison followed by one year of supervised release. Both (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Bouchard were ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$487,659.

On January 24, 2024, the United States Attorney's Office, DMA, declined prosecution for Avatar, Evolution and the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) due to Bouchard not willing to proffer and lack of evidence.

On October 1, 2020, Both Bouchard and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were suspended from future contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch of the US Government by the US Army Procurement Fraud Division.

On August 27, 2024, Bouchard was sent a Notice of Debarment by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Suspension and Debarment Official, Procurement Fraud Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, US Army, to continue until September 17, 2030.

On October 26, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sent a Notice of Debarment by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Suspension and Debarment Official, Procurement Fraud Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, US Army, to continue until October 23, 2027.

No further activity will be conducted, and the case is closed.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspector General
Southeast and Caribbean Regional Office of Investigations

October 24, 2023

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Date: 2023.10.27 10:34:26
-04'00'

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

Case Closing

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Employee Criminal Misconduct-Automobile

Theft

Case Number: I17400055

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On June 2, 2016, the GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a request for investigative assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Atlanta, Georgia, for GSA employee (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Realty Specialist, GSA, Atlanta, Georgia. The FBI advised that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was involved in an ongoing criminal enterprise with several other individuals to steal luxury automobiles and fraudulently manufacture and clone new VIN's for the purposes of selling the stolen vehicles.

On June 16, 2016, through the review of evidence obtained by the FBI, it was discovered that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was facilitating contact between (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with other associates of a known criminal organization while (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was incarcerated. It was also discovered that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was running errands and coordinating criminal efforts in support of the organization.

On June 27, 2018, an indictment was obtained for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in the Northern District of Georgia charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with Title 18, United States Code, Section(s) 511(a); Conspire to knowingly and unlawfully remove, obliterate, tamper with, and alter an identification number for a motor vehicle. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was subsequently arrested on July 10, 2018, by Agents from the FBI and transported to the U.S. Marshalls Service in Atlanta, GA.

On September 07, 2022, a criminal information was filed against (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) further charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with Title 18, United States Code, Section 2313(a); Receive, posses, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle which has crossed State or United States boundary after being stolen. During this same court appearance (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) plead guilty in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia to Title 18, United States Code, Section 4; Misprison of a felony.

On March 17, 2023, in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to 2 years' probation and 200 hours of community service. On July 19, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was notified via letter that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had been removed from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) position as a Federal Employee with GSA.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-4)

401 W Peachtree Street NW, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Midwest Division

February 12, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

Digitally signed

by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.02.12

13:22:27 -06'00'

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST DIVISION (JID-6)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING

File Number: I16600082

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was opened on April 18, 2016, based on information provided by the Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General regarding possible abuse of the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) and other Small Business Administration 8(a) programs. The information alleged that Stephon Ziegler (Ziegler), owner of Zieson Construction Company (Zieson), was a figurehead who received payments to fraudulently allow Michael Dingle (Dingle) to run the day-to-day operations and manage/control the company. Furthermore, Dingle had created several SBA 8(a) minority-owned companies and placed his friends, Matthew McPherson (McPherson) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] in owner/president positions to attempt to obtain government set-aside contracts for the purpose of subcontracting 100% of the work to companies that would not qualify for these set-asides. Additionally, Dingle was running these companies and operating the day-to-day operations instead of the actual owners. McPherson was the owner of McPherson Contractors, Inc. (MCI) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] was the owner of Torgeson Electric Company (TEC).

During the investigation one of these companies was identified as Simcon Corporation (Simcon). The owner of Simcon was (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] who was a Native American and qualified for SBA 8(a) certification. However, Dingle, McPherson and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] were running Simcon and were using Simon's minority status to obtain set-aside government contracts.

Dingle, McPherson, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] did not have the service disabled veteran or 8(a) status to qualify for these set-aside programs.

Additionally, towards the end of the fraud scheme Dingle, McPherson, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] were attempting to fraudulently start additional SDVOSBs which culminated in the attempted take-

Midwest Division (JID-6)  
2300 Main Street, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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over of Onsite Construction Group (Onsite) owned by service-disabled veteran (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) the take-over was thwarted after this investigation became overt.

A review of government contract awards indicated that Zieson was awarded 199 contracts valued at over \$335 million between 2009 and 2018.

A review of government contract awards indicated that Simcon was awarded two contracts valued at over \$11 million in 2016.

During the investigation, agents from the participating agencies conducted approximately 116 interviews involving current and former MCI, TEC, Zieson, Simcon, and Onsite employees, government contracting officials, government set-aside program certifying officials, government protest officials, construction company employees, bank employees, and surety bonding employees.

During the investigation, 143 federal Grand Jury subpoenas were issued and served.

On March 6, 2018, search warrants were executed at Zieson headquarters, 1601 Iron Street, 2nd Floor, North Kansas City, MO 64116; Zieson Topeka, KS office, 5853 SW 29th, St., Topeka, KS 66614; Dingle's residence (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) residence, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Onsite headquarters, 245 W. Wilshire Blvd., Suite D, Oklahoma City, OK 73116.

On March 6, 2018, 31 seizure warrants were executed at several bank locations in the Kansas City Metropolitan area and at the search warrant location sites. Additionally, restraining orders were issued for the real property and investment accounts. Between March 9, 2018, and March 15, 2018, approximately \$10,785,699.38 was seized and restrained from financial accounts along with approximately \$1,521,371.11 in value of seized assets.

A review of the financial records showed from 2015 to 2018, McPherson was paid \$4.3 million, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was paid \$3.9 million and Dingle was paid \$6.1 million from Zieson and Simcon government set-aside contract funds. During this same time period Ziegler was paid \$1.2 million and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was paid \$645,000, although both were to be the highest paid individuals within their respective companies to be within the regulations of the set-aside program rules.

On February 12, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a four count indictment charging Dingle with filing a false tax return.

On May 21, 2019, Ziegler pled guilty to one count of false statements.

On May 22, 2019, Ziegler and Zieson were suspended by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee.

On June 3, 2019, McPherson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of major program fraud.

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On June 19, 2019, Simon pled guilty to two counts of false statements to the Small business Administration).

On June 25, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a thirteen count indictment charging Dingle and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with one count of wire fraud conspiracy, nine counts of wire fraud, and three counts of money laundering).

On July 3, 2019, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was suspended from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee.

On July 3, 2019, Dingle and the following business entity: METS, LLC were suspended from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee.

On November 28, 2019, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) died of natural causes in Topeka, KS.

On January 21, 2021, McPherson was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$5,516,786.

On March 19, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) estate was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$4,847,089.

On April 7, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$80,297. Zieson was ordered to pay forfeiture money judgement of \$590,221.

On May 10, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) estate was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$277,696.

On June 2, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$110,980.

On June 4, 2021, Ziegler was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$73,786. Simcon was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$346,012. Onsite was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgement of \$570,089.

On September 13, 2021, Dingle pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, major program fraud), and filing false tax returns.

On January 5, 2022, McPherson was sentenced to 28 months incarceration, three years supervised release, and a personal money judgement in the amount of \$5,516,786.

On March 1, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to five years probation. A special condition of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) probation included 12 months home confinement.

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On April 7, 2022, McPherson was debarred from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee until June 21, 2027 (5 years and 2 months).

On May 12, 2022, Ziegler was sentenced to 12 months incarceration and three years supervised release.

On June 6, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Simcon were debarred from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee for four years.

On September 6, 2022, Ziegler and Zieson were debarred from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee until June 25, 2026 (3 years and 10 months).

On September 22, 2022, Dingle was sentenced in two federal cases associated with this investigation. In the tax fraud case, Dingle was sentenced to 36 months incarceration and one year supervised release. The court also ordered Dingle to pay \$615,847 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service and \$82,704 in restitution to the Missouri Department of Revenue. In the procurement fraud case, Dingle was sentenced to 36 incarceration and 3 years supervised release. The court also ordered Dingle to forfeit to the government \$4,659,061, which represented his profits from the scheme. Dingle's incarceration sentences were to be served consecutive and his supervised release sentences were to be served concurrent.

On December 6, 2022, Dingle and METS were debarred from contracting with any agency in the Executive Branch by the Department of the Army Suspension and Debarment Committee until November 6, 2033 (11 years).

This was a joint investigation with the VA OIG, DCIS, USDA OIG, SBA OIG, DOL OIG, DOL EBSA, IRS CI, USSS, NCIS, and AFOSI.

The case was closed and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in IG-IDEAS.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

March 31, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by [redacted] (b)(6); Date: 2025.04.01 13:27:56 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
FILE NUMBER: I17600093

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary.

On July 7, 2017, JI-6 initiated this investigation based on allegations that Sergeant First Class [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acquired property from the U.S. General Services Administration's (GSA) Excess Personal Property Utilization Program on behalf of the Missouri Army National Guard (MOANG) but then converted it to [redacted] (b)(6) personal use. In 2015, most of the Bannister Federal Complex in Kansas City, Missouri closed, leaving the GSA with a large amount of excess property which they stored at a warehouse on the Bannister Complex. Agents of the GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division investigated the allegations jointly.

The investigation confirmed that [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequented the Bannister Federal Complex and acquired excess property, purportedly on behalf of the MOANG, but then converted it to personal use for [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(6) associates, Staff Sergeants [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]. GSA Area Property Officer [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) worked with [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) when [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acquired this property.

Records showed that [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) associates acquired excess property valued at approximately \$541,895. When questioned by agents [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) claimed that th [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) told [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) the excess property could be used for personal purposes. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) denied giving [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) permission to use excess property for personal purposes during two interviews with agents. A review of government email traffic revealed that [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) conspired to disregard property accountability procedures so the MOANG would not become aware of [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acquisitions, allowing [redacted] (b)(6) to use the excess property for personal purposes. During a subsequent interview, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to agents that [redacted] (b)(6) knew [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) used excess property for personal use.

Ultimately the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri declined to prosecute [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) associates citing [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) false statements to agents which weakened the case.

Midwest Investigations Division (JID-6)  
2300 Main Street [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) both received General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand for their actions. Additionally, the MOANG removed both service members from the Active Duty for Special Work program. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) retired from the MOANG in December of 2018 and, as of this writing, the U.S. Army Suspension and Debarment Official had not debarred or suspended (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

In December 2019, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resigned from the GSA in lieu of termination. On September 3, 2024, GSA Suspension and Debarment Official (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) sent a Notice of Debarment to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) notifying (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) of debarment through December 24, 2024.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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January 27, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-1) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

PROCUREMENT FRAUD, DAKOTA OUTERWEAR, et al.

CASE NUMBER: I18100061

The investigation was initiated in January 2018, when the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Rhode Island, received an allegation from a victim company, United Associates, LTD (United), North Kingstown, RI, that alleged a supplier, Dakota Outerwear (Dakota), a GSA contract holder, Minot, ND, owned by Terry Roe and Doyle Roe, was manufacturing and selling counterfeit uniforms to the United States Air Force through direct contracts and to third party government vendors. The matter was referred to Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) for investigation, who then contacted GSA OIG, New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1), for investigative assistance. It was determined there was an immediate safety concern because a large amount of the counterfeit gear, which lacked safety technology, was believed to have entered the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. A joint investigation was initiated which also included Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Army Criminal Investigation Division and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).

On April 13, 2018, the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Rhode Island (D-RI), accepted the case for parallel criminal and civil proceedings.

During the investigation, through the use of cooperating witnesses and consensual monitoring, Ramin Kohanbash, Owner, California Surplus, Elizabeth, NJ, as well as Gan Eden LLC, Elizabeth, NJ, and Terry Roe, Owner, Dakota Outerwear, Minot, ND were identified as coconspirators.

The investigation found that California Surplus and Gan Eden LLC, shared warehouse space in Elizabeth, NJ, and the DHS, U.S. Customs & Border Protection intercepted and destroyed a shipment of suspected counterfeit U.S. Army physical fitness jackets from China, valued at \$57,000, enroute to Gan Eden LLC. Additional inbound container inspections revealed shipments of suspected counterfeit military uniform items from China bound for Gan Eden LLC. It was determined that Dakota, California Surplus, as well as Gan Eden LLC, were supplying other GSA and DOD contract holders with counterfeit goods, under the guise they were authentic, which were being introduced to the government supply chain. Several controlled purchases were made confirming the matter.

New England Field Investigations Office  
10 Causeway Street, Room [REDACTED] Boston, Massachusetts 02222

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In October 2018, a search warrant was executed at Kohanbash's businesses in Elizabeth, NJ, which resulted in the seizure of voluminous counterfeit products. Simultaneously, Dakota was served a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) from USAO, for production of records pertaining to purchase and sales of uniforms. Kohanbash also participated in a proffer at USAO. As a result of the information developed from these activities, Bernard Klein and the Almont Group, INC., were identified as additional coconspirators.

The subsequent investigation revealed from January 2013 to October 2018, Terry Roe conspired with co-defendants Kohanbash, Owner, California Surplus, Inc., Gan Eden, LLC, and FR-HQ, LLC; and Bernard Klein, Owner, Almont Group, Brooklyn, NY; to manufacture, import and sell counterfeit military uniforms and gear manufactured in China and Pakistan, to fulfill US Government and third party government vendor orders under false pretenses and in violation of the Berry Amendment and Trade Agreements Act. Dakota purchased counterfeit items from Kohanbash, who directed the effort to develop, manufacture, import, and distribute the counterfeit products. Klein, acting as broker took orders from Kohanbash and had the counterfeit items made in China. Kohanbash used a warehouse they owned in Elizabeth, NJ, to import and sell military uniforms and gear to GSA and Department of Defense contractors.

On May 20, 2019, Kohanbash agreed to pay to the United States \$694,398 to resolve civil allegations that he violated the False Claims Act.

On May 21, 2019, an Information was filed in the United States District Court (USDC), D-RI, charging Kohanbash with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of trafficking counterfeit goods.

On June 4, 2019, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) suspended Kohanbash and his three companies, California Surplus, Gan Eden LLC, and FR-HQ LLC from conducting business with the U.S. Government.

On June 12, 2019, Kohanbash self-surrendered to the U.S. Marshals Service in Providence, RI. Kohanbash waived indictment and pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of trafficking counterfeit goods.

On October 12, 2022, Kohanbash was sentenced to 40 months incarceration, three years supervised release, and a \$200 special assessment. Kohanbash was also ordered to pay a fine and restitution, pending final calculation by the U.S District Court.

On August 26, 2020, Klein self-surrendered to agents and was arrested in Providence, RI. Klein pleaded guilty in the USDC, D-RI, to an Information charging him with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud.

On November 18, 2020, Klein agreed to pay to the United States \$348,000 to resolve civil allegations that he violated the False Claims Act for his role in the scheme.

On April 9, 2021, Klein was sentenced to 18 months incarceration, 3 years supervised release, and ordered to pay a fine of \$15,000.

On September 30, 2020, Terry Roe was indicted by a federal grand jury in the D-RI on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods.

On February 25, 2022, Roe, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods.

On October 20, 2022, Roe was sentenced to 24 months incarceration, three years supervised release, and a \$100 special assessment. Roe was also ordered to pay restitution, pending final calculation. As a result

of the U.S. Department of Justice's Denial of Federal Benefits Program and Defense Procurement Fraud Debarment System, Roe was automatically debarred for five years with termination date of October 19, 2027.

On September 22, 2021, the United States Air Force (USAF), Office of the Deputy General Counsel, Contractor Responsibility and Conflict Resolution (CRCR), suspended Terry Roe, Doyle Roe and Dakota from federal contracting.

On October 18, 2021, the USAF CRCR hosted a Presentation of Matters in Opposition (PMIO) to provide a platform for Dakota to make statements in support of an appeal to the suspension. Following the PMIO, the USAF reversed the suspension on Dakota, while the suspensions of Terry Roe and Doyle Roe were upheld.

On May 26, 2022, Dakota finalized a civil settlement agreement with the USAO, and agreed to pay \$1,000,000 to resolve civil allegations that the company violated the False Claims Act by conspiring with others to manufacture, import and sell counterfeit military uniforms and gear manufactured in China and Pakistan to fulfill U.S. Government and third party government vendor orders in violation of the Berry Amendment and Trade Agreements Act.

On December 7, 2023, Judge William Smith, USDC, D-RI, signed a Final Order of Restitution for Kohanbash to pay \$750,000, and Roe to pay \$100, split proportionally amongst the four victims: United, Nextec, Massif and Polartec.

On September 25, 2024, DCIS contracted for the removal and destruction of all counterfeit items seized from Kohanbash's warehouse during the search warrant execution in 2018, held at Army CID in Hartford, CT.

On October 2, 2024, JIA-1 destroyed all remaining evidence with the approval of AUSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

No further investigative activity will be conducted, and the case is closed.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

April 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
NEW ENGLAND FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-1)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
BROOKS RANGE CONTRACT SERVICES & (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
CASE NUMBER: I18100072

This case was initiated when the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1) 10 Causeway Street, Boston, MA, received an allegation that Brooks Range Contract Services, Inc. (BRCS), 1603 College Road, Fairbanks, AK, a GSA contractor providing mechanical services at the John F. Kennedy Federal Building (JFK Federal Building), 15 Sudbury Street, Boston, MA, may have made false claims and statements to the government while modifying its existing contract.

While initial case allegations were unfounded, the investigation revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Project Manager, BRCS defrauded both GSA and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) employer through various schemes. In (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) capacity as project manager (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supervised a crew of up to eight tradesmen responsible for maintaining building operations. In addition to regular mechanical services, BRCS also performed projects called Additional Service Requests (ASR). ASRs are separate contracts with GSA that are limited to projects up to \$100,000 in value. Some ASRs performed by BRCS required the use of subcontractors. If the subcontracted work exceeded \$2,000 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was responsible for soliciting at least three competitive bids and presenting that information to GSA. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was accountable for all materials used on ASR projects and was required to submit certified payroll records to GSA to ensure compliance with prevailing wage laws.

From October 2015 to September 2018 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) defrauded GSA by falsifying payroll records related to ASR projects resulting in GSA being regularly overcharged for BRCS labor. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also subverted the bidding process for ASR subcontract awards by submitting fake competitive bids to GSA in order to award those subcontracts to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) company. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also defrauded BRCS by purchasing items (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) attributed to ASR projects but were for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) personally owned commercial real estate properties. The total overcharge from the scheme was approximately \$39,000.

On April 20, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office District of Massachusetts.

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On April 21, 2021, a criminal information was filed in the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with one count of violating 18 USC § 1343, wire fraud.

On May 13, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty to the aforementioned felony charge.

On September 8, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to two months home detention with location monitoring and two years' probation. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was ordered to pay \$39,000 in restitution, a \$4,000 fine, and a \$100 special assessment.

On October 8, 2021, JIA-1 submitted a referral for debarment for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to GSA, Suspension and Debarment Division (VB), Office of Government-wide Policy.

On June 25, 2024, GSA VB proposed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for debarment and issued a show cause letter to BRCS.

On September 24, 2024, GSA VB debarred (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) through December 24, 2024.

On April 23, 2025, GSA VB terminated the show cause to BRCS.

No further activity will be conducted, and the case is closed.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

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March 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: [redacted] |  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE \_\_\_\_\_

Digitally signed by [redacted]  
Date: 2025.03.07 13:37:29 -06'00'

SUBJECT: DMS, Inc. (Qui Tam), File No. I18800077

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date.

The General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Denver, CO, received information from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), that Diversified Maintenance Systems, Inc. (DMS) allegedly circumvented the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) Program by using H&H Builders, Inc. (H&H), a SDVOSB company, as a pass-through to obtain contracts to which they were not entitled.

GSA OIG conducted a joint investigation with DCIS, the Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS), the Small Business Administration (SBA) OIG, and the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (DACID). The investigative team reviewed pertinent contract and government documents, conducted interviews, executed a search warrant, and served subpoenas. Investigative efforts showed, through its officers, DMS submitted false claims for payments under government contracts, wherein DMS did not meet program requirements.

The investigation was declined criminally; however, on September 9, 2024, DMS signed a civil settlement agreement and agreed to pay \$101,595 to resolve the allegations.

Further coordination's with the USAO provided clarification on the pursuance of suspension and debarment actions. Specifically, verbiage in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 125.15 was unclear in 2009 and was changed in 2016. The updated verbiage in the CFR no longer applied to the investigation and pursuing administrative action did not align with the current regulations.

DCIS, DACID, and GSA declined to pursue suspension and debarment actions.

Based on the facts and circumstances surrounding this investigation, no further investigative resources or activities are warranted. If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent

[redacted] at [redacted] or myself at [redacted]

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room [redacted], Fort Worth, TX 76102 [redacted]



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

Western Division (JI-9) 24000 Avila Road, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

*For Official Use Only*

September 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Suspected Fleet Card Fraud - Department of Veterans Affairs - Los Angeles, CA

File Number: I18L00009

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On October 19, 2017, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Fleet Management Loss Prevention Team (LPT) notified the GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG), Western Division, Laguna Niguel (JI-9LN), of suspected fraudulent fuel transactions associated with the Wright Express (WEX) GSA Fleet credit card (Fleet card) for GSA Fleet vehicle G10-1030U. The fuel transactions were identified as suspicious due to numerous same day fill ups, over tank capacity fill ups, and unusual mileage entries. The vehicle was leased to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in Los Angeles, CA. Following the receipt of LPT's referral regarding G10-1030U, JI-9LN received several referrals from LPT related to Fleet cards assigned to VA Los Angeles.

After initiating the investigation, JI-9LN obtained and reviewed gas station video surveillance footage, served subpoenas, executed multiple search and arrest warrants, interviewed subjects, and conducted surveillance activities. The investigation revealed that VA employee (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | wrongfully provided at least one Fleet card to a non-VA employee for personal use (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | also provided opportunities for other Fleet cards to be skimmed by other non-VA employees. The investigation determined that from October 2017 to February 2018, approximately \$40,000 in fraudulent transactions were conducted in connection with the fraud scheme.

The matter was presented to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Central District of California (CDCA), and the case was accepted for prosecution.

Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
Western Division (JI-9) 24000 Avila Road, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

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In June 2018, eight defendants were indicted in connection with the fraud scheme, and five defendants were ultimately convicted and sentenced in connection with the indictments (listed below):

- Daniel McLemore: indicted on 19 counts of Bank Fraud and 19 counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
- Byran Sweeney: indicted on three counts of Bank Fraud and three counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
- [REDACTED] indicted on four counts of Bank Fraud and four counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On March 7, 2019, [REDACTED] pleaded guilty to one count of Bank Fraud and one count of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On June 25, 2020, [REDACTED] was sentenced to time served, three years' probation, and ordered to pay \$183.61 in restitution and a special assessment of \$100.
- [REDACTED] indicted on three counts of Bank Fraud and three counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
- William White: indicted on four counts of Bank Fraud and four counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On February 28, 2019, White pleaded guilty to one count of Bank Fraud and one count of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
- [REDACTED] indicted on two counts Bank Fraud and two counts Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On September 24, 2020, [REDACTED] pleaded guilty to one count 18 USC 1344(2), Bank Fraud and one count 18 USC§ 2(a), (b), Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On January 7, 2021, [REDACTED] was sentenced to one month time served, two years' probation, and ordered to pay \$126.28 in restitution and a special assessment of \$100.
- Stacy Berry: indicted on one count of Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices.
  - On March 11, 2019, Stacy Berry pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices.
  - On July 18, 2019, Stacy Berry was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment, three years' probation, and ordered to pay a special assessment of \$100.
- Shawn Berry: indicted on three counts of Bank Fraud and three counts of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.
  - On September 5, 2019, Shawn Berry pleaded guilty to one count of Bank Fraud and one count of Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done.

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- On November 7, 2019, Shawn Berry was sentenced to six months imprisonment, two years' probation, and ordered to pay \$265.56 in restitution and a special assessment of \$100.

In September 2018, a superseding indictment was filed that charged the three defendants as listed below.

- Daniel McLemore: one count of Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices and one count of Aggravated Identity Theft.
  - On January 9, 2020, McLemore pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated Identity Theft.
  - On May 5, 2020, McLemore was sentenced to twenty-four months' imprisonment, one year probation, and ordered to pay \$1,104.60 in restitution and a special assessment of \$100
  - On December 21, 2018, the VA removed McLemore from employment with the VA.
- Byran Sweeney: one count of Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices and one count of Aggravated Identity Theft.
  - On February 6, 2020, B Sweeney pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated Identity Theft.
  - On July 2, 2020, B Sweeney was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment, one year probation, and ordered to pay \$149.16 in restitution and a special assessment of \$100.
- [REDACTED] one count of Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices and one count of Aggravated Identity Theft.
  - On May 24, 2022 [REDACTED] successfully completed a pretrial diversion program and all charges were dropped.

This office is now closing this file.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

July 2, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

KCorp Technology Services, Inc. – False Claims

File Number: I1800062

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On May 30, 2017, JIF-9A received a referral from GSA Region 9 Public Building Service (PBS) regarding sewage pumping at a Land Port of Entry. GSA alleged that a utility was established as part of an Operations and Management contract and became insolvent due to fraudulent and/or inflated invoicing/billing. PBS initially funded the sewage portion of the contract at \$26,000 per month and re-evaluated the contract each subsequent year based on how much sewage waste was collected and disposed of through self-reporting by K'OYITL'OTS'INA (KCorp). In conducting this investigation, JIF-9A conducted interviews, reviewed various contracts and the subsequent modifications, reviewed GSA payments and invoices, reviewed bank records, reviewed South Yuma County Landfill business records, and reviewed business records from vendors used to pump and transport the wastewater. The investigation indicated that a former KCorp employee invoiced GSA for inflated costs.

The findings of this investigation were presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Arizona, and that office declined the case.

The investigative findings were referred to the GSA Suspension and Debarment Official, who issued a Proposal for Debarment, but later issued a termination of their proposed debarment order.

This office is now closing this file.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

July 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted]  
Date: 2025.07.09 14:52:37 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
File Number: I19500056

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In April 2019, Defense Criminal Investigative Services notified GSA OIG of an active investigation involving (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] owner of Raj Traders, who was debarred for providing non-conforming counterfeit parts to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). To circumvent debarment other companies were created by other (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] family members.

On February 3, 2022, Amafha Enterprise Inc. (Amafha) and owners (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] along with Raj Fluid Technologies, Inc. and Raj Traders owned by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] were debarred after DLA found that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] bid on DLA solicitations for (b)(6); [redacted] during a period that (b)(6) [redacted] was previously debarred.

During the investigation, additional information identified Mendota Enterprise Inc., and M.Y. Naper Enterprise LLC may have also been involved with the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Email search warrants were issued, records reviewed, and interviews were conducted. The case was declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office because it did not meet their prosecutorial threshold.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Chicago, IL 60604 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

July 22, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JIF)  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

U.S. ex rel. Dowless v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al. - qui tam filed  
UNDER SEAL

File Number: I19H00032

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In November 2017, the Western Division received a qui tam complaint filed under seal in the District of Columbia against Adobe Systems, Inc.; Carahsoft Technology Corporation; Emergent, LLC; and CDW. Generally, the relators made two allegations in the complaint. First, the relators claimed that Adobe paid government contractors (the other subject companies listed in this investigation) that facilitated the sales of Adobe products a percentage of the sale proceeds, which, the relators alleged, amounted to kickbacks. The relators' allegations involved GSA awarded contracts. Second, the relators claimed that Adobe improperly charged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) usage fees for software provided to DHS employees for personal use under a contract between DHS and Carahsoft. The relators alleged that the improper usages fees may have also been billed on other federal contracts.

GSA OIG initiated a joint investigation, which included the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, under the guidance of the United States Attorney's Office (USAO). The investigation, which included support from the GSA OIG Office of Audits and Office of Counsel, included a review of affected contract files, interviews of the relators, and interviews of additional witnesses. Additional subject companies were identified and added as subjects of investigation, including Softchoice Corporation; ClearInfo, LLC; Dolby Laboratories; i3 Integrative Creative Solutions; and Wunderman Thompson.

Office of Investigations (JIF-10)  
1301 A Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Tacoma, WA 98402

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Ultimately, a negotiated settlement of \$3 million between the United States and Adobe was reached in March 2023. The settlement covered the government's claim that payments made under GSA contracts GS-35F-0131R, GS-35F-0119Y, 47QSWA18D008F, GS-35F0511T, GS-35F-0195J, GS-35F-0085U, 47QTCA18D004K and GS-35F-0119W during the period from January 2011 through December 2020, were improper and resulted in false claims for payment to Adobe. The USAO intervened and filed an amended complaint. In May 2023, a dismissal order was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

In September 2023, the Western Division referred Adobe and the other subject companies to the GSA Suspension and Debarment Official (SDO) for consideration of debarment proceedings. In October 2023, the SDO submitted Request for Information letters to all of the subject companies. In April 2024, the SDO terminated their review of the subject companies, with no further action taken.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

August 27, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted]  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-1)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

NORESKO LLC

CASE NUMBER: I20100073

This investigation was initiated in June 2019, when the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New England Field Investigation Office (JIA-1), received allegations that Noresko, One Research Drive, Westborough, MA, a GSA Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contract holder was defrauding the U.S. Government. Noresko was allegedly inflating prices by adding unnecessary costs to its proposals on energy-saving performance contracts (ESPCs). The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG received a hotline complaint about Noresko employees engaged in various pricing schemes. The complainant, a former Noresko employee, claimed that Noresko inflated ESPC bid proposals by hiding unnecessary contingency costs in their cost estimates.

Separately, it was learned in May 2020, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), OIG, issued a subpoena to Noresko and other contractors in the ESPC industry in response to concerns that ESPC contractors may have been requiring banks and other financiers to include basis points in the interest rate margins charged on ESPC financing loans.

Around February 2021, Noresko contacted DOE OIG and explained that it wished to voluntarily disclose a different financing overcharge that it discovered while responding to the DOE subpoena. DOE OIG then referred the matter to U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Civil Frauds, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts. Thereafter, the government investigated the financing overcharge that Noresko self-disclosed, as well as the whistleblower concerns that prompted the June 2019 investigation.

In the course of responding to DOE OIG's subpoena, Noresko discovered that its internal model for estimating project costs, financing, and energy savings assumed a longer period of construction than the actual period required. The model defaulted to a more expensive accounting methodology for accruing interest. Noresko calculated that it overcharged, or would have overcharged, financing costs to the various government agencies by an aggregate of \$5,645,655 over the expected lifetime of those contracts. Because payments on the impacted projects extend over a period of several years, the government agencies only had improperly paid a total of \$1,466,180 to Noresko. In response to the findings, Noresko changed its procedures, terminated the CFO, and reprimanded two members of the Finance team.

Boston Field Investigations Office  
10 Causeway Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Boston, Massachusetts 02222

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The investigation, which involved interviewing current and former Noresco employees, did not reveal evidence that Noresco personnel knew about the overcharges at the time they bid on and won the relevant contracts. Likewise, the investigation did not reveal evidence that Noresco and/or its financiers included basis points in the interest rate margins charged on ESPC financing loans.

The government concluded, and Noresco conceded, that Noresco improperly inflated contingency costs in the U.S. Navy (Navy) Japan ESCO Contract (Contract Number: N3943018F9914). Specifically, after Navy contracting personnel partially rejected Noresco's request to include certain contingency costs in the price of the task order, Noresco employees instructed two of its subcontractors to add a total of \$3,460,000 to their sub-contractor bids to address potential contingency costs, which was never disclosed to the Navy. In March of 2023, after consultation with DOJ and the Navy, Noresco issued a \$3,460,000 credit to the Navy in connection with the relevant energy savings project.

On May 13, 2025, Noresco, agreed to a \$9,585,141 settlement to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by overcharging numerous federal agencies for Energy Savings Performance Contracts,

No further activity will be conducted, and the case is closed.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

March 12, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.03.12  
07:59:29 -04'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (Acting)  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Case Title: Fidelis Design and Construction**  
Case Number: I203000022

This memorandum ~~present~~ presents the findings of an investigation conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In December 2019, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was invited to assist in an investigation conducted by the Department of Veterans Affairs OIG (VAOIG), regarding allegations of false statements made by Fidelis Design and Construction (FIDELIS), a Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB), located in Bridgeport, PA. Fidelis has been awarded approximately \$120 million in VA contracts since 2010.

GSA OIG helped determine that Pride Enterprises Inc. (Pride) shared an Internet Protocol address during a self-certification process conducted in the System for Awards Management **database**. This information was provided to VA OIG for further analysis to determine if (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) owner of Fidelis, was paying a veteran to run Pride in order win SDVOSB contracts.

On January 29, 2025. This VA OIG led investigation was declined for prosecution in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania due to lack of evidence.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division Office of Investigations (JIB-3)  
600 Arch St, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Philadelphia, PA 19106

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

January 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.01.07  
09:01:57 -06'00'

SUBJECT:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)

File No. I20700027

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Fort Worth, TX, received information from GSA, Loss Prevention Team (LPT), that suspected fraudulent transactions had occurred related to GSA Fleet Cards associated to vehicles leased to the Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC), Houston, TX. Transactions were deemed suspicious in nature due to the detection of fuel purchases that exceeded the vehicle's fuel tank capacity, multiple fuel purchases made within short time frames, and the odometer entries for the transactions were inconsistent with the assigned vehicle readings.

GSA OIG agents along with investigators from the Veterans Affairs Medical Center Police (VAMCP) conducted the investigation. Agents and officers reviewed purchase records, conducted business records checks, conducted physical surveillance, interviewed witnesses and subjects. The investigative efforts revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a VAMC employee, utilized the Fleet Cards to purchase fuel for (b)(6) privately owned vehicle, and additional vehicles. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was identified as having allegedly conducted fraudulent transactions on 11 total Fleet Cards and was subsequently arrested by the VAMCP.

The Harris County District Attorney's Office (HCDAO) accepted the case for prosecution. However, the case was subsequently dismissed on April 5, 2024, due to a perceived lack of evidence.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@gsaig.gov, or me at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@gsaig.gov.

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

July 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Digitally signed by [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 Date: 2025.07.07 14:16:49 -05'00'

SUBJECT: Shawn Karr – Federal Surplus Firearms  
 File No. I20700088

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), regarding potential stolen GSA-owned firearms from the Boswell Police Department (BPD), Boswell OK. It was alleged that between July 17, 2019, and October 28, 2019, Shawn Karr, Assistant Police Chief (former), BPD, pawned Department of Defense and GSA-owned surplus weapons in BPD's inventory; Karr was also suspected of pawning Tasers from the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chief (former), BPD, allegedly provided false statements by certifying the weapons were in inventory and under BPD's control, while pawnshop records revealed their weapons were at their establishment.

Agents conducted surveillance, interviews, reviewed documents, and recovered government firearms. The investigative efforts revealed from September 2, 2018, through December 18, 2019, Karr sold a Colt 5.56 Rifle and two Remington Rand .45 caliber Model 1911 Pistols belonging to the Department of Defense, and a Sig Sauer .45 ACP, two Remington 870 12 Gauge shotguns, and a Smith & Wesson 9mm pistol belonging to GSA. On January 28, 2021, the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), Eastern District of Oklahoma, accepted the case for prosecution. On November 2, 2023, Karr was convicted on one count of Possession of a Stolen Firearms, Karr received 12 months and 1 day confinement, followed by two years' supervised release.

On November 6, 2024, GSA OIG received authorization from the USAO to dispose of the firearms in evidence. On January 13, 2025, the weapons were shipped to GSA OIG headquarters for destruction and subsequently destroyed on June 4, 2025.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), or me at [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102 [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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July 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Fleet Card Fraud

Case Number: I20L00021

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

In September 2019, the U.S. Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Phoenix, Arizona, contacted the General Services Administration (GSA) OIG to request analysis of GSA Fleet vehicles G62 0461P and G62 1198V for indications of fraud related to the use of the Wright Express Fleet Credit Cards (Fleet Card). Both Fleet vehicles were leased to the Navajo Area Indian Health Service (IHS), Tuba City Service Unit, Tuba City, Arizona. HHS OIG advised they received information from an IHS Hotline complaint that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Engineering Technician, IHS, Tuba City, was committing fraud by stealing from the government. It was alleged (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stole septic tanks, fence posts, plumbing parts and other federal property, and resold them to the community in Tuba City. GSA OIG worked the investigation with HHS OIG. The GSA Fleet Loss Prevention Team subsequently conducted an analysis of the transaction history for G62 0461P and G62 1198V, which revealed an estimated fraud loss of approximately \$1,100.

During the investigation, agents reviewed Fleet Card transaction data; analyzed surveillance video recordings from gas stations; interviewed IHS employees; and conducted multiple records checks. On November 18, 2019, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed and admitted to fraudulently using Fleet Cards to purchase fuel for (b)(6) personal use.

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The investigative findings were presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona, and that office declined the case for criminal prosecution. The investigation was subsequently presented to and accepted by the Navajo Nation Office of the Prosecutor, Window Rock District.

On June 7, 2023, two criminal complaints were filed in the District Court of the Navajo Nation, Judicial District of Tuba City, charging [REDACTED] with one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property; however, on May 28, 2024, the District Court of the Navajo Nation dismissed [REDACTED] case with prejudice.

On June 18, 2024, HHS OIG submitted an administrative referral for [REDACTED] to the Chief Compliance Officer, National Compliance Program, IHS; and to the Navajo Area Director, IHS. On July 23, 2024, the Navajo Area IHS Area Director informed HHS OIG and GSA OIG that the Navajo Area IHS management team decided not to pursue any administrative action against [REDACTED].

GSA Office of Fleet Management billed back Navajo Area IHS in the amount of \$1,843 for [REDACTED] fraudulent use of the GSA vehicles.

This office is now closing this file.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

For Official Use Only

May 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) – Fleet Card Fraud

Case Number: 120L00085

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

In July 2019, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the GSA Office of Fleet Management, Loss Prevention Team, regarding suspicious and unauthorized use of two GSA vehicles, G62-0228W and G62-3089, which were leased to the Tohono O’odham Nation Health Center (TONHC) in Tucson, Arizona. According to the referral, the vehicles were driven by an employee and used for unauthorized travel. This employee was subsequently identified as (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Information Technology Specialist, Indian Health Service. GSA OIG worked the investigation with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) OIG and the Tohono O’odham Nation (TON) Police Department.

During the investigation, the investigative team reviewed Wright Express Fleet Credit Cards (Fleet Card) transaction data; analyzed surveillance video recordings and fuel transaction receipts from gas stations; interviewed HHS and TONHC employees; and conducted multiple records checks. On December 4, 2019, GSA OIG and HHS OIG agents interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who confessed to fraudulently operating both GSA vehicles and fraudulently using the Fleet Cards to purchase fuel (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also provided a written affidavit regarding (b)(6) fraudulent use of the GSA vehicles.

The investigative findings were presented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, which declined the case for prosecution. The investigation was subsequently presented to and accepted by the TON Office of the Prosecutor.

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On January 17, 2024, two criminal complaints were filed against [REDACTED] in the District Court of TON, Sells, Arizona; with each complaint charging [REDACTED] with one count of embezzlement.

On March 15, 2024, in the District Court of TON, [REDACTED] pleaded guilty to one count of embezzlement and was sentenced to 180 days of incarceration (suspended pending completion of 12 months of supervised probation). Per [REDACTED] plea agreement [REDACTED] was ordered to pay a \$500 fine by the end of [REDACTED] probation period.

GSA Office of Fleet Management billed back TONHC in the amount of \$1,843 for [REDACTED] fraudulent use of the GSA vehicles.

This office is now closing this file.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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May 5, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
San Diego Auto Body (FLEET)  
File Number: I20L00108

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On August 18, 2020, JIF-9A received a referral from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Zone 4, Office of Fleet Management, regarding suspected fraudulent fuel transactions associated with the Wright Express (WEX) GSA Fleet fuel credit card (Fleet card) for GSA Fleet vehicles G61 0726X, G62 2819L, G13 0007X, and G62 4578P. GSA identified the fuel transactions as suspicious because they occurred after the vehicles were returned to the marshaling vendor by the Department of Energy (DOE).

The investigation revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) an employee of San Diego Auto Body, a GSA-contracted marshaling vendor, drove the Fleet vehicles and used their respective Fleet cards after DOE returned them for disposition with GSA. The investigation also determined that from February 2020 to August 2020, approximately \$9,668 in fraudulent Fleet card transactions and vehicle lease payments occurred in connection with the fraud scheme of not returning the vehicles to GSA.

The matter was criminally prosecuted by the San Diego County District Attorney's Office and in March 2022, a criminal complaint was filed for one count of grand theft of personal property, in violation of California Penal Code Section 487a; one count of grand theft – of using access card/account information, in violation of California Penal Code Section 487e; and four counts of unlawful use or tampering by bailee, in violation of California Penal Code Section 560, against (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in April 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) agreed to pay full restitution in the amount of \$9,668 and in exchange, a stipulation dismissing all criminal charges against (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was entered by the San Diego County Superior Court.

This office is now closing this file.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

June 26, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.06.26  
16:34:50 -04'00'

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**  
**Pro Network, LLC**  
Case Number: **I20W00068**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on information the U.S. General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG) received from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). During 2018 and 2019, the U.S. Navy received Cisco equipment under a U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Schedule contract that was later tested by Cisco and determined to be counterfeit. The investigation revealed the equipment was sourced from Pro Network, LLC (Pro Network) and that its owner, Onur Aksoy (Aksoy), Pro Network, and its related entities have purchased counterfeit Cisco equipment from Chinese suppliers. The equipment was then imported into the U.S. and resold to customers at prices far below the prices of authorized Cisco dealers. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials seized nearly 180 shipments of counterfeit Cisco equipment to Aksoy, Pro Network, and its related entities from suppliers in China and Hong Kong.

On July 21, 2021, law enforcement officers from GSA-OIG, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), CBP, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and NCIS executed a search warrant at Pro Network’s warehouse located in Doral, Florida. During the execution of the search warrant, agents seized 1,156 counterfeit Cisco units with an estimated Cisco list price value of over \$7 million dollars.

On June 29, 2022, a criminal complaint was filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, charging Aksoy with mail fraud. An arrest warrant was issued, and GSA-OIG agents immediately arrested Aksoy on his way to Miami International Airport before departing the U.S. for Turkey.

On July 7, 2022, Aksoy was indicted by a Grand Jury for the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The indictment charged Aksoy with conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods and to commit mail and wire fraud, along with additional counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and trafficking in counterfeit goods.

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On June 5, 2023, Aksoy appeared in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods and to commit mail and wire fraud, and mail fraud.

On May 1, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Aksoy was sentenced to 78 months in prison, three years of supervised release, fined \$40,000.00, and was ordered to forfeit \$15 million dollars. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Aksoy agreed to pay restitution of \$100 million dollars to Cisco, \$103,985.65 to other victims, and to permit the destruction of millions of dollars of counterfeit goods seized from his businesses.

On June 4, 2025, the U.S. Navy's Suspension and Debarment Official debarred Aksoy, Pro Network, and its related entities from all Federal contracts, benefits, and federally backed loans.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

July 26, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR:

**FILE**  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2023.07.26  
12:09:20 -05'00'

FROM:

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING  
File Number: I21500013

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Office of Investigations, received information from the U.S. Department of Justice that a qui tam was filed in the Eastern District of Michigan alleging that Verint Americas Inc d/b/a ForeSee Results, Inc. (ForeSee) was not using American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) survey technology as required in their GSA Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contract. ForeSee has had a GSA MAS contract since 2009. In 2012, ForeSee was awarded a \$35 million blanket purchase agreement (BPA) from Department of Interior, Federal Consulting Group (FCG). Federal agencies also procured surveys from ForeSee through the FCG BPA.

Interviews were conducted and documentation was reviewed by GSA OIG. It was determined that ForeSee began using their own in-house technology for customer service surveys as early as 2010 and terminated their ACSI license in 2013. ForeSee agreed to pay the United States \$7 million to resolve the allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by providing customer service surveys with a substandard technology.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chicago, IL 60604

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

September 8, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Date: 2025.09.09 10:40:56 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING  
File Number: I21500059

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, received a referral from the Air Force, Office of Special Investigations (AF OSI) stating that Telecom Technologies, Inc. (TTI) was selling products not compliant with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA).

The investigation revealed that TTI sold federal agencies approximately \$144,000 in counterfeit products and approximately \$145,000 in products not compliant with the TAA. Additionally, TTI claimed it was a Women Owned Small Business when it was, in fact, owned by a man. TTI agreed to pay the United States \$400,000 to resolve allegations it violated the False Claims Act by selling government agencies counterfeit products and products not compliant with the TAA.

TTI's owner (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and director of operations (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were debarred for a period of three years. TTI was administratively dissolved on June 17, 2025. Trust Security & Solutions, Inc. (TSS) was registered with the Minnesota Secretary of State on February 12, 2025 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is the chief financial officer and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is the director of operations. TSS was also debarred for a period of three years.

This was a joint investigation with the Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Army Criminal Investigation Division; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; the Department of Commerce OIG; and AF OSI.

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Office of Investigations (IJD-5)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chicago, IL 60604

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Midwest Division

December 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST DIVISION (JID)  
SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING  
File Number: I21600085

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2024.12.17  
08:57:48 -06'00'

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was opened on July 28, 2024, based on information provided by Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS) regarding possible abuse of the woman-owned small business (WOSB) program. The information alleged that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) owner of Midwest Metals, Florence Metals, and STL Loft Metals, used non-conforming parts and defective parts to fulfill contact terms.

The investigation revealed that from April until October 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) bid on and received at least nine federal contracts by way of fraudulent misrepresentations, including that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) would provide domestically-sourced parts when in fact (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) provided parts from foreign countries including China. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also registered Florence Metals as a WOSB and listed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as the owner in the System of Award Management (SAM). (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was the actual owner and operator of Florence Metals and it fraudulently obtained a WOSB set aside contract based on Murar's false representations and certifications in the SAM U.S. General Services Administration. The case was prosecuted criminally by the United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Missouri.

On February 7, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

On July 23, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to five years supervised release, a fine of \$50,000, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$83,355.47.

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On May 16, 2023, [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] Midwest Metals, Florence Metals, STL Loft Metals, and Murar LLC were suspended contracting throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government.

On July 23, 2024, [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] was debarred contracting throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government through July 23, 2032 and [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] Midwest Metals, Florence Metals, STL Loft Metals, and Murar LLC were debarred throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government through August 29, 2027.

This was a joint investigation with the DCIS, AF-OSI, DOC-BIS, and the Army Criminal Investigation Division.

The case was closed and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in IG-IDEAS.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

July 7, 2025

**MEMORANDUM FOR FILE**

**FROM:** (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

**SUBJECT:** (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - Fleet Card Fraud.  
File No. I21700081

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.07.07 12:11:21 -05'00'

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from the Department of Justice (DOJ) OIG regarding potential fraud associated with a GSA-leased vehicle assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, El Paso, TX. It was alleged that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a Sergeant with El Paso Police Department, serving as a Task Force Officer (TFO) with the FBI did not return the assigned GSA-leased vehicle for over a year, May 2020 through July 2021.

Agents conducted surveillance, interviews, reviewed documents, analyzed transactional data, and telematics data. The investigative efforts revealed from May 2020 through July 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) used the GSA-leased vehicle for personal use, attending sporting events, running personal errands, and transporting family members. A loss calculation was conducted for administrative remedies by GSA Fleet Loss Prevention regarding the use of the vehicle. Since the vehicle was sold after it was returned to GSA, no administrative recourse was pursued. The U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Texas, accepted the case in April 2022 but subsequently declined prosecution on May 15, 2024.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) or me at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Fort Worth, TX 76102 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

January 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
[ (b)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 373 ]  
Case Number: I21H00014

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JIC.

(b)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 373

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
[ (b)(3):31 U.S.C. § 373 ]  
File Number: I21H00099

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JI-O.

(b)(3): 31 U.S.C. § 373

No further action is anticipated, and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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August 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
ROCeteer, Inc. - Corruption related to AFWERX contracting  
Case Number: I21L00014

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

In October 2020, the General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Laguna Niguel Office (JIF-9A), received a request for assistance from the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Procurement Fraud Detachment 1, Los Angeles Air Force Base (AFB), California, regarding concerns of fraud occurring within AFWERX, a Technology Directorate for the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the innovation arm of the Department Air Force (DAF). The AFWERX program was established to encourage partnerships with academic institutions, science and technology communities, and private industries with a vested interest in solving complex security issues. The program's goal is to create a partnership with innovators and entrepreneurs to generate technology at an accelerated rate for the DAF. The subject of this investigation, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), worked as a contractor at AFWERX's Las Vegas location. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as also the Chief Executive Officer of ROCeteer, Inc., which was awarded GSA Schedule contract number 47QRAA20D0026. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was alleged to have improperly benefited from the relationships (b)(6) developed at AFWERX.

During the course of the investigation, AFOSI and JIF-9A special agents analyzed numerous records, including GSA contract records and GSA database information. Special agents also interviewed multiple individuals, to include GSA contracting officials and DAF personnel.

The investigative findings were presented to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Acquisition Fraud Counsel, DAF, Air Force Material Command Law Office, Procurement Fraud Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) declined to pursue any sort of action related to this investigation.

This office is now closing this file.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

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July 2, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Purple Heart Heroes LLC (PHH) – Possible SDVOSB Fraud  
File Number: I21L00041

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On April 9, 2021, the General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Pacific Rim Office of Investigations (JIF-9A) received information from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG Los Angeles Resident Agency regarding a Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) allegation. VA OIG received a Google alert which indicated that the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) ruled that the VA must cancel an outpatient clinic lease to a veteran-owned small business, finding that the company was not actually controlled by a veteran. The alert indicated that the veteran listed as the majority owner of Purple Heart Heroes, LLC (PHH) did not actually control the company, making PHH ineligible for the VA's SDVOSB set-aside lease.

VA OIG advised that on March 4, 2021, an administrative judge ruled that the veteran did not have managerial experience of the extent and complexity needed to run PHH. The judge concluded PHH failed to prove its eligibility as an SDVOSB. As a result of the ruling, it was believed PHH may have submitted false certifications in the GSA System for Award Management (SAM) which resulted in the award of at least one set-aside contract worth over \$2.1 million.

JIF-9A obtained and reviewed SAM and Login.gov records, reviewed the OHA ruling, served email preservation letters, obtained and reviewed subpoenaed records, and interviewed GSA Public Buildings Service employees. Subjects were identified and interviewed.

The criminal division of the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California declined to prosecute the case.

The GSA Suspension and Debarment Official decided to terminate their proposed debarment order.

This office is now closing this file.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
Death Valley National Park (FLEET)  
File Number: I21L00064

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On April 5, 2021, JIF-9A received a referral from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Fleet Loss Prevention Team (LPT) regarding suspected fraudulent fuel transactions of approximately \$11,000 associated with the Wright Express (WEX) GSA Fleet fuel credit cards (Fleet card) associated with multiple vehicles leased to the National Park Service (NPS), Death Valley, NV.

The investigation revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) both former NPS employees, admitted to using multiple WEX Fleet cards to purchase fuel for their personally owned vehicles. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to misusing (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) government purchase card to purchase personal items such as a washing machine, dryer, three water heaters, and other items exceeding \$10,000.

JIF-9A presented the case for prosecutorial consideration to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Nevada, who declined the case. The matter was later presented and accepted for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of California, Misdemeanor Unit.

On December 20, 2021, an information was filed against (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for one count of theft of public money, property, or records, in violation of Section 641, Title 18, United States Code, to which (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty and was convicted in October 2022. In November 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) agreed to pay full restitution in the amount of \$5,167.30 and was sentenced to 14 days of confinement, one year of probation, and 100 hours of community service. As a result of this investigation, NPS also terminated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) employment with NPS.

On May 12, 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resigned from NPS shortly after being interviewed about the transactions and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admission of misusing the Fleet cards and government purchase card. On

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June 22, 2021, an information was filed against [REDACTED] for one count of theft of public money, property or records, in violation of Section 641, Title 18, United States Code. In February 2025, a motion for dismissal was filed as the plaintiff and defendant reached a deferred prosecution agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the case was dismissed without prejudice in the interest of justice.

This office is now closing this file.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

June 24, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JIF)  
 WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)

File Number: I21S00010

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In January 2021, the GSA Fleet Loss Prevention Team (LPT) reported to the Sacramento Field Office (JIF-9B) that they had identified suspicious transactions charged to the Wright Express Fleet Credit Cards assigned to multiple GSA leased Government Owned Vehicles (GOVs), ostensibly for repair services at multiple Big O Tires vendor locations in the San Mateo and San Francisco, California area. LPT believed these transactions to be suspicious as it appeared that the transactions for the GOV repair services were not completed, and the Fleet Card transactions appeared to have been processed through a Square Inc. account as opposed to going through Big O Tires.

Jl-9B initiated an investigation that included coordinating with the California Department of Consumer Affairs, Bureau of Automotive Repair, for inspections of GSA vehicles that were billed for suspicious repairs. These inspections indicated that the repairs for which GSA issued payments to Big O Tires were not actually completed. Ultimately, the investigation identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]an employee of Big O Tires, as the subject of investigation. The case was accepted by the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office and search warrants were issued for the financial accounts that received GSA payments for the false repair claims. The investigation uncovered evidence that repairs at Big O Tires locations for multiple GSA GOVs were paid by GSA Fleet for repairs that were not completed and the payments in question were diverted to a Square, Inc. account controlled by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Office of Investigations (JIF-10)  
1301 A Street, Suite (b)(6), Tacoma, WA 98402

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On September 30, 2022, [REDACTED] was charged by Felony Complaint, filed in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Mateo, with one count of Embezzlement by Employee in violation of Penal Code Section 508 and one count of Grand Theft of Personal Property in violation of Penal Code Section 487(a). On January 6, 2023, [REDACTED] was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued based upon the Felony Complaint. On March 30, 2023, [REDACTED] pleaded nolo contendere (no contest) to the felony charge of Embezzlement by Employee, and the charge of Grand Theft of Personal Property was dismissed. [REDACTED] was sentenced to two years' probation, 90 days' confinement, and ordered to pay \$6,961.37 in restitution, and \$370 in fees.

On June 24, 2025, [REDACTED] was debarred by the GSA, Suspension and Debarment Official.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General**

Western Division (JI-9) 24000 Avila Road, (b)(6),  
(b)(7)(C) Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

*For Official Use Only*

July 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (WESTERN DIVISION)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

Advanced Digital Solutions International, Inc. - Alleged Product Substitution and TAA Violations

CASE NUMBER: I21S00011

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

On November 20, 2018, the Western Division Laguna Niguel (JI-9LN) was contacted by JA-4 to discuss concerns regarding an audit of Advanced Digital Solutions International, Inc. (ADSII). ADSII was a Schedule 75 Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contractor (GS-02F-0032R), and a former Schedule 70 contractor (GS-35F-0032Y). JA-4 reported the following concerns: 1) ADSII was charging shipping costs; however, shipping was FOB destination and should have been free; 2) ADSII was portraying open market items as MAS schedule items; 3) ADSII was selling non-compliant TAA products; 4) ADSII was selling refurbished items as new items and incomparable/less expensive products in substitute of out of stock products; 5) ADSII submitted alleged false invoices. JI-9LN also learned Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was interested in ADSII and its alleged sales of counterfeit Cisco products associated with its GSA contracts.

JA-4 reported that ADSII provided K&F Associates, Inc.'s invoices in support of its modification requests for adding products to its Schedule 70 MAS contract. However, K&F Associates, Inc. and ADSII were both owned by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). Additionally, invoices submitted to the GSA Contracting Officer had no invoice numbers or signatures, and it appeared that these invoices were created to show that ADSII was granting GSA a discount compared to its commercial customers, but these commercial sales were not believed to exist.

JI-9LN contacted the current Contracting Officers (CO) for the ADSII schedule 75 contract as of March 3, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as well as the former COs for the ADSII schedule 70 contract, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). JI-9LN learned the ADSII contracts utilized Transaction Data Reporting (TDR). The TDR Rule required vendors to electronically report the

Office of Investigations (JI-9)  
Western Division (JI-9) 24000 Avila Road, Suite (b)(6);  
(b)(7)(C) Laguna Niguel, CA 92677

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price the federal government paid for an item or service purchased through contracts covered by TDR. Under the TDR system, it was not required to provide Commercial Sales Practices (CSP) disclosures identifying discounts, terms, and conditions offered to your commercial customers, Most Favorable Customers (MFC) that equaled or exceeded the discounts, terms, and conditions offered to GSA. Additionally, the requirement to monitor price reduction violations through Price Reductions clause tracking was removed.

The COs reported the K&F invoices were not used or referenced in any type of significant way to influence or aid in any contractual determinations or to establish reasonableness. Although the invoices were questionable and provided as supporting documents to the government, the documents were optional in accordance to TDR and not materially significant or relied upon according to the COs.

In conducting the investigation, JI-9LN reviewed documents provided by JA-4, contract file documents, GSA Advantage sales data, contacted government customers, and contacted former GSA CO and contract specialist (CS) assigned to GS-35F-0032Y and GS-02F-0032R. Some of the documents reviewed were customer complaints, emails, Industrial Operations Analyst (IOA) reports, and modification documents. A review of the contract files revealed ADSII's schedule 70 contract (GS-35F-0032Y) was cancelled effective March 1, 2019, by the GSA CO and CS due to numerous customer complaints and discrepancies with the contract in accordance with contract clause 552.238-73, Cancellation, where either party may cancel the contract.

In 2019, JI-9LN received a hotline complaint alleging ADSII instructed the product substitution of non-TAA compliant electronic cables and wires of government orders through GSA Advantage. A GSA Advantage cables and wire specific sales report was obtained and reviewed. The report included data from 2017 to 2022, and total sales were approximately \$365,913.59. JI-9LN emailed numerous government customers inquiring about the products they purchased through GSA Advantage from ADSII between 2019 and 2022. Some of the purchasers reported they were contacted by ADSII and offered alternative items. The vast majority of the government purchasers agreed to the alternative or substituted products in lieu of their previously ordered item(s) as open-market. Alternative or substituted items were offered when products were "back ordered" or "out of stock." There was not a clear pattern or evidence that showed specific items were targeted, cheaper or incomparable items were always being substituted for higher prices, or refurbished items were being sold as new.

JI-9LN identified at least one instance where an electronic cable or wire appeared to be substituted without the government agreeing to the alternative product. The purchaser reported receiving the cable or wire; however, they were not sure if what they ordered from GSA Advantage and what was received were one in the same, because there was no picture and no viable part number to compare.

JI-9LN contacted the GSA National Customer Service Center (NCSC) to inquire whether ADSII customers filed complaints or concerns about non-TAA products or substitutions. The NCSC

2

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provided a spreadsheet which detailed issues from customers regarding shipping status, tracking, system errors, customer order error, or a product on backorder.

A review of the contract file revealed when non-TAA compliant issues arose to the attention of the CO or CS, ADSII was informed and given multiple opportunities to address and remedy the concerns. This included removing the item(s) from GSA Advantage/catalog or supporting the item's country of origin. This was confirmed after speaking with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Through document review and communications with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) JI-9LN discovered some of JA-4's and other GSA employee concerns about ADSII went back as early as 2015.

JI-9LN previously received complaints from GSA customers regarding ADSII for potential non-TAA compliant violations and counterfeit products and a case was opened (Z18H00018). However, in that investigation, the questioned products were determined to be authentic and the case was closed.

CO (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unaware ADSII had a cancelled schedule contract, but (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) never received any complaints or documented any issues with ADSII with regard to their schedule 75 contract. None, of the issues or concerns of the ADSII schedule 70 contract appeared to be synonymous with the ADSII schedule 75 contract.

A review of ADSII sales data revealed Cisco products of interest were only sold against their cancelled schedule 70 contract and not their schedule 75 contract. JI-9LN reviewed multiple ADSII GSA Advantage sales reports over the course of the investigation; however, none of the reports included new sales of Cisco products of interest.

The case was presented to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) Northern District of California (NDCA) on two occasions; the first referral included the limited sales data related to Cisco products and information and the scope was counterfeit Cisco products sold by ADSII. The initial referral was based on a joint investigation with HSI, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the USAO NDCA. The case was declined on January 25, 2022. At this time, JI-9LN learned Cisco had reached a settlement with ADSII and obtained a permanent injunction.

On May 13, 2022, the investigative findings related to the hotline complaint's 2019 allegation was presented to the USAO NDCA; the case was declined.

This investigation is now closed.

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**REPORT INSERT - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

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**CASE CLOSING REPORT**

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This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

On August 1, 2022, the GSA OIG Western Division was notified by the GSA Fleet Loss Prevention Team (LPT) that a Wright Express (WEX) Fleet Credit Card (Fleet Card) assigned to GSA vehicle G71 0480S, leased to the Yakama Nation Indian Tribe (Yakama Nation), was reported missing on July 27, 2022. A review of information from the WEX Fleet Card database identified a pattern of suspicious transactions, which started occurring on July 23, 2022, and continued until the Fleet Card was cancelled on July 28, 2022. These suspicious transactions included unleaded fuel charges, though G71 0480S was a diesel fuel vehicle, and non-sequential odometer entries. The investigation revealed that a second WEX Fleet Card assigned to GSA vehicle G63 3164X, also leased to the Yakama Nation, was reported stolen on July 29, 2022, and incurred additional suspicious transactions. Through a review of gas station surveillance video footage of the suspicious transactions and witness interviews, [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] a former employee of the Yakama Nation Tribal Maintenance Facility where the vehicles were assigned, was identified as the subject of investigation. The GSA OIG Western Division referred the case to the Yakama Nation Police Department for a joint investigation. The investigation indicated that the total loss to the government due to fraudulent Fleet Card transactions was \$1,687.91.

On November 1, 2022, the Yakama Nation Police Department referred the investigation to the Yakama Nation Prosecuting Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution.

On October 17, 2024, based on this investigation, GSA LPT processed an Agency Incurred Expense (AIE) charging the leasing agency \$1,593.12, representing the total cost of fraudulent transactions identified on the Fleet Card assigned to GSA leased vehicle G71 0480S. Also on October 17, 2024, GSA LPT processed an AIE charging the leasing agency \$94.79, representing the total cost of fraudulent transactions identified on the Fleet Card assigned to GSA leased vehicle G63 3164X.

On September 25, 2025, Yakama Nation Police Department informed the GSA OIG Western Division that the case was declined for prosecution by the Yakama Nation Prosecuting Attorney's Office.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.

CASE NUMBER	PREPARED BY	DATE PREPARED	APPROVED BY
I22000066	[ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]	September 26, 2025	[ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] A/SAC [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

September 4, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Date: 2025.09.09 11:17:58 -0400'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Ashley Melton (FLEET)**  
Case Number: I22300033

On February 2, 2022, JIB-3 received a referral from the GSA Loss Prevention Team regarding G43 3482W. Specifically, G43 3482W was reported stolen on January 25, 2022. G43 3482W is assigned to a white 2019 Ford F-250 truck and leased to Amtrak in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

The investigation determined that Ashley Melton trespassed an Amtrak train station in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on January 22, 2022, and stole G43 3482W as well as Amtrak property. On February 2, 2022, Melton was charged with one count each of burglary, criminal trespassing, theft from a motor vehicle, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. In addition, Melton was charged with two counts of theft by unlawful taking.

On February 9, 2022, the Amtrak Police Department recovered G43 3482W, which was abandoned in a parking lot in Aberdeen, Maryland. On February 12, 2025, the Amtrak Police Department arrested and transported Ashley Melton to the Magisterial District Court, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

On July 8, 2025, in the Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Melton pleaded guilty to all her charges and was sentenced to three months' confinement. In addition, Melton was ordered to pay \$2,190.25 in court fees. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-3)  
600 Arch St, Room (b)(6); Philadelphia, PA 19106



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

March 20, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | [redacted] | Date: 2025.03.21  
15:06:41 -05'00'

SUBJECT: Louisiana Army National Guard - Fleet  
File No. I22700072

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation.

The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Fort Worth, TX, was notified by a GSA Loss Prevention Team Coordinator of questionable fuel transactions related to a GSA-leased vehicle assigned to the Louisiana Army National Guard (LAARNG), Funeral and Honor Unit, Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. A review of the questionable transactions revealed a history of back-to-back transactions, over-the-tank purchases, incorrect odometer entries, and fuel types incompatible with the assigned vehicle. A review of transaction history logs for other vehicles assigned to LAARNG revealed two other vehicles with similar questionable transactions.

Agents obtained multiple surveillance videos, reviewed documents, and analyzed transactional data related to the fraudulent transactions. The investigative efforts identified approximately five non-GSA-leased vehicles associated to the confirmed fraudulent transactions. Coordination's with the Funeral and Honor Unit's leadership led to the identification of the following subjects responsible for the fraudulent use of the Fleet Cards:

- [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) E-5, Bravo Company, 3-156<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion;
- [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) E-4, 844<sup>th</sup> Engineering Company, 527<sup>th</sup> Battalion;
- [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) E-4, 844<sup>th</sup> Engineering Company, 527<sup>th</sup> Battalion;
- [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) E-5, 2228<sup>th</sup> Military Police Company; and
- [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) E-3, 3673<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company.

Each of the subjects was interviewed and confessed to having used the Fleet Card for personal use, or knowingly benefited from the fraudulent use of a Fleet Card to receive fuel for their personal vehicle.

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102

The cases were each declined for criminal prosecution in lieu of administrative action under the United States Code for Military Justice (UCMJ). Each subject was found to have violated Article 121 of the UCMJ and the following administrative actions were taken in response to their respective involvement in the fraudulent activities:

- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Ordered \$100 forfeiture of pay, and a \$25 fine;
- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Reduced in rank to E-1, ordered \$100 forfeiture of pay, and a \$25 fine;
- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Reduced in rank to E-3, one-day suspension;
- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Reduced in rank to E-3; and,
- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ; Ordered \$50 forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank to E-2, ordered to serve 14 days' extra duty, and 14 days' restriction.

The Louisiana Army National Guard was billed back \$11,549 to recover the losses identified through analysis of the fraudulent activity.

Based on the aforementioned administrative actions, the matter was considered resolved and the investigation was closed.

If you have any questions, please contact at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @gsaig.gov, or (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
 Southeast and Caribbean Regional Office of Investigations  
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December 27, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Date: 2024.12.27 15:18:13 -0500'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JI-C)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
**Dell Technologies Inc. (Qui Tam)**  
 Case File No: **I22H00015**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was predicated on information obtained in a Qui Tam where the relator alleged Dell Technologies, Inc., and Dell Federal Systems, L.P. (collectively Dell) engaged in false statements and false claims, violating the Federal False Claims Act. The relator alleged that Dell violated the Federal False Claims Act by requiring resellers to enter into a teaming agreement that required the resellers to offer any brand-name product to the government but sell only Dell products upon award.

According to the relator, Dell fraudulently submitted invoices for the supply of Dell products and conspired with other contractors to submit fraudulent invoices on at least four government-wide acquisition contracts. The contracts were: (1) the Army Desktop and Mobile Computing-3 ("ADMC3"); (2) the Army Desktop and Mobile Computing-2 ("ADMC2"); (3) Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement ("SEWP") managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"); and (4) GSA Schedule 70 Multiple Award Schedule awarded to Dell and Teaming Partners.

The investigative team reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and found Dell entered into teaming agreements with several contractors, including Iron Bow Technologies LLC (Iron Bow). From May 2020 to April 2024, Dell operated a dealer registration program that gave advantageous pricing to Iron Bow to sell certain Dell computer hardware products to the Army in response to solicitations under the ADMC3 contract. Furthermore, Dell submitted its direct bids to the Army on the same solicitations, knowing its prices would be higher than Iron Bow's. This collusion between Dell and Iron Bow created a false appearance of fair competition. Dell's higher direct bids influenced the Army's source selection process and enabled Iron Bow to overcharge the Army for certain Dell products.

On September 11, 2024, the GSA OIG Office of General Counsel concurred with DOJ's Civil Litigation Branch's proposal to decline to intervene on the GSA Schedule 70 MAS contract and instead focus on the previously mentioned ADMC-3 contract.

On November 19, 2024, after negotiations, Dell agreed to pay \$2,300,000 to resolve allegations that Dell violated the False Claims Act by submitting and causing the submission of non-competitive bids to the Army under the Army Desktop and Mobile Computing 3 (ADMC-3) contract. Iron Bow Technologies LLC also agreed to pay \$2,051,000 for its role in the scheme and for colluding with Dell to submit non-competitive bids.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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 Office of Investigations (II-C)  
 401 W Peachtree Street NW, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

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August 14, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

GC Experts, Reitmeyer & Associates Inc., et al: Alleged Bid Rigging  
and Conspiracy to Commit Contract Fraud

Case Number: I22L00021

In February 2021, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a request for assistance from the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) OIG Western Region, Office of Investigations, Sacramento, California, in connection with a procurement fraud investigation. DOI OIG had previously reviewed several contract abstracts of offers on unrelated contracts from various bureaus that listed the same vendors consistently bidding on the same contracts. The vendors in question were all attendees or affiliates of Government Construction Experts, which was owned and operated by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and located in Cedar Park, Texas. Additionally, it was determined that these vendors submitted resumes, trade references, and letters to the government misrepresenting that members of Government Construction Experts were their employees and project managers.

DOI OIG opened its investigation in July 2019 and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, accepted the case for prosecutorial consideration that same year. DOI OIG conducted multiple investigative activities, to include subpoena requests, prior to requesting GSA OIG's assistance. GSA OIG agents supported this investigation by conducting multiple investigative activities, to include analyzing various GSA databases, such as the System for Award Management and Login.gov.

In June 2023, the Antitrust Division declined the case for further prosecutorial consideration due to insufficient evidence.

This office is now closing this file.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

June 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JIF)  
 WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Zelene Charles  
 File Number: I22S00071

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

On May 13, 2021, the GSA OIG Western Division received a referral from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service concerning an allegation that a Zelene Charles, civilian employee of the Department of Defense, at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, fraudulently deposited funds from Government Purchase Cards transactions into Square Inc. accounts controlled by Charles, for her personal use. The investigation revealed that Charles perpetrated a multi-year scheme to defraud the U.S. government by submitting fake purchase requests and invoices for government purchases from both fictitious and legitimate business entities. The items listed in these invoices were never actually purchased or received by the government. Between December 2016 and April 2020, Charles placed approximately 185 fraudulent charges, causing a total loss to the government of \$624,250. To conceal that Charles was the recipient of the stolen funds, she frequently renamed the business names associated with intermediary accounts and, in total, used at least 78 different account names.

On May 17, 2024, Charles was charged by information filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California with one count of Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343) and one count of Theft of Government Property (18 U.S.C. §641). On July 1, 2024, Charles pleaded guilty both counts as charged in the information.

On March 3, 2025, Charles was sentenced to 10 months in prison and ordered to pay \$630,628 in restitution.

Office of Investigations (JIF-10)  
1301 A Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Tacoma, WA 98402

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On March 13, 2025, Charles was debarred by the Department of the Army for a period of five years. On May 20, 2025, Zelly Tech Millennial Solutions, Inc., and Varlack Enterprises, LLC, companies controlled by Charles were also debarred by the Department of the Army for a period of five years.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

October 2, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR

FILE

(b)(6);  
(b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.10.02  
13:57:30 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**  
File Number: I23600002

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On August 29, 2022, the Personal Property Management Division of the General Services Administration (GSA) notified JID-6 of a stolen or lost surplus GSA firearm. Property records identified the weapon as a .40 caliber, Glock, model 22C pistol. The Hallsville, Missouri Police Department (HPD) possessed the weapon at the time of loss. HPD Chief (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) could not locate the weapon during an inventory and notified the Missouri State Agency for Surplus Property (MOSASP), who in turn notified GSA. JID-6 reviewed surplus property records, insurance company records, and bank statements. Agents also interviewed witnesses during the investigation.

The investigation revealed that MOSASP also donated a military cargo truck to HPD in February 2021. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stored the truck at (b)(6) home, in violation of the terms and conditions associated with the surplus property. Additionally, the City of Hallsville leased the cargo truck to the Police Foundation of Hallsville, also in violation of the terms and conditions associated with the surplus property. Weeks after HPD received the truck, a barn fire at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) residence destroyed it. A Surplus Property Utilization Report showed that although the fire destroyed the cargo truck in March 2021, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not report the loss to the MOSASP until August 2021. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) failed to promptly report the destruction of the cargo truck to the MOSASP, again violating the terms and conditions associated with the program.

The investigation further revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) contacted the GSA to learn the procedures necessary for destroying another surplus pistol which the department possessed. The following day the MOSASP notified GSA that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) improperly destroyed the weapon, despite having been advised of the proper procedures.

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The investigation did not reveal the location of the lost or stolen surplus pistol. Additionally, JID-6 confirmed that neither (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) nor the Hallsville Police Foundation received any compensation from an insurance company for the loss of the cargo truck.

Following the investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri declined the case on the grounds that the investigation did not reveal a federal law violation.

JID referred this matter to the GSA Suspension and Debarment Official. The official transmitted a Show Cause Letter to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). After receiving a response from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) the official terminated that office's review of the matter.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

February 20, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.02.20 10:34:21 -06'00'

**SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE**  
**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)**

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**  
File Number: I23600053

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On March 23, 2023, the U.S. General Services Administration, Office of Inspector General (OIG), initiated this investigation based on a referral from U.S. Department of Interior OIG regarding allegations that woman-owned small business Sterling Computers was using Regency Consulting, a HUBZone/Indian small business economic enterprise/service-disabled veteran-owned small business, and Metgreen Solutions, a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, as pass throughs to obtain set aside contracts.

On April 22, 2023, the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Northern District of Iowa (NDIA), and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division (Antitrust), accepted the case for prosecution.

Through interviews of the subjects and the companies' responses to subpoenas, it was determined that the companies developed a joint venture and mentor-protégé agreements between themselves which included contracting and payroll assistance and outlined the ways in which the companies would cooperate.

The investigation revealed that the government had prior knowledge of the companies working together to obtain set aside contracts, to include how the companies structured their activities of federal procurement, so the concerns of set aside contract fraud could not be substantiated.

On February 11, 2025, the USAO, NDIA, and Antitrust declined the case for prosecution.

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Midwest Investigations Division (JID-6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
2300 Main Street (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

June 26, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6);  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.06.27 07:39:41  
-05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID-6)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**  
File Number: I23600054

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On April 17, 2023, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General initiated this investigation based on a referral from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) regarding a congressional inquiry from Congressman (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office about U.S. Transportation Command (USTC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, Defense Freight Transportation Service contract, HTC711-17-D-R0003, awarded to Crowley Government Services, Inc. (Crowley). A GSA audit revealed that Crowley overcharged the government \$36 million under the contract and GSA therefore withheld payment. Crowley filed suit against GSA for lack of jurisdiction for the audit.

Investigation revealed a \$2.9 million in loss to the U.S. Government for incorrect billing and overuse of exception codes under the contract. According to DCIS, Crowley agreed to administratively settle and forfeit approximately \$2.9 million dollars to USTC.

On February 12, 2024, this matter was declined for civil prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Illinois, due to the alternative for an administrative settlement with USTC.

The case was closed, and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in E-IDEAS.

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Midwest Investigations Division (JID-6)  
2300 Main Street, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

July 8, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE | Date: 2025.07.08 08:42:04 -05'00'

SUBJECT: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
File No. 123700149

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Fort Worth, TX, received information from a GSA Loss Prevention Team Coordinator who suspected fraudulent transactions had occurred on three Fleet Cards associated with GSA-leased vehicles assigned to the Michael E. DeBakey Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center, Houston, TX. Transactions related to a Fleet Card were deemed suspicious in nature due to the detection of fuel purchases that exceeded the vehicle's fuel tank capacity, multiple fuel purchases made within short time frames, odometer entries for the transactions were inconsistent with the assigned vehicle readings, and telematics data reflected purchases for fuel with no increase in the registered fuel level percentage.

GSA OIG agents conducted the investigation. Agents reviewed purchase records, conducted business records checks, conducted physical surveillance, interviewed witnesses and subjects. The investigative efforts revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a VA employee, utilized the Fleet Card for fuel purchases and car washes for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) privately owned vehicle.

The Montgomery County District Attorney's Office accepted the case for prosecution. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) self-surrendered to the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office on July 2, 2024. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) entered a guilty plea on December 4, 2024, and was ordered to serve 2 years' probation and to pay restitution in the amount of \$3,310.33.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @gsaig.gov, or me at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @gsaig.gov.

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Office of Investigations (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

March 12, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

Digitally signed by

[ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]

Date: 2025.03.12  
15:48:20 -05'00'

SUBJECT: Allied Waste Services, LLC d/b/a Republic Services of Montana (Qui Tam),  
File No. I23800087

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date.

The General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG) was notified by the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Montana, of information related to a qui tam complaint filed against Allied Waste Services, LLC, doing business as Republic Services of Montana (Republic). The complaint alleged that Republic had fraudulently billed the Government by providing undersized garbage containers to public buildings and charged overage fees when containers exceeded their capacity.

GSA OIG conducted an investigation to assess the merits of the allegations. Agents reviewed pertinent contract and government documents, coordinated with GSA contracting personnel, and conducted a Relator interview. Investigative efforts did not show damage to the government.

On December 12, 2024 [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] AUSA, USAO, District of Montana, declined to intervene in this action.

Based on the facts and circumstances surrounding this investigation, no further investigative resources or activities are warranted. If you have any questions, please contact [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] at [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] or myself at [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] Fort Worth, TX 76102

[ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

---

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July 25, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
Ernst and Young LLP  
Case Number: I23C00096

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JIO.

GSA OIG received a request for assistance from the GSA Suspension and Debarment Division regarding a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Order Instituting Public Administrative and Cease-and-Desist proceedings against Ernst & Young, LLP (EY) for failures to act with the integrity required of a public company auditor (SEC Order). According to the SEC Order, over multiple years, a significant number of EY audit professionals cheated on the ethics component of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exam, as well as on a variety of other examinations required to maintain their CPA licenses. Additionally, the SEC Order stated that as this was ongoing, EY withheld this misconduct from SEC staff conducting an investigation of potential cheating at the firm, EY audit professionals' repeated cheating on exams, and the firm's misrepresentations to the SEC violated ethics and integrity standards and discredited the accounting profession. The SEC Order required EY to pay a civil penalty in the amount of \$100 million to the United States.

GSA OIG met with EY representatives to determine the potential impact of the misrepresentations on federal contracts. EY was represented by its outside counsel, Arnold & Porter LLP. On April 9, 2024, GSA OIG met with representatives from SEC. SEC sent a termination letter to EY and essentially closed its investigation except for minor continuing obligations for EY pursuant to the SEC order. On April 10, 2024, the matter was referred to the GSA Suspension and Debarment Official for consideration of Suspension. On July 16, 2025, the GSA Suspension and Debarment Official signed an Action Referral Memorandum concurring with the internal recommendation to take no action against EY. No further action is anticipated, and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)  
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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

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July 9, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: [redacted] (b)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 3730 |  
File No. I23C00100

Digitally signed by [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
[redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.07.09 11:27:46  
-05'00'

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date.  
(b)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 3730

Based on the facts and circumstances surrounding this investigation, no further investigative resources or activities are warranted. If you have any questions, please contact Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @gsaig.gov or me at [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @gsaig.gov.

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Office of Investigations (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
819 Taylor Street, Room [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

July 25, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

Salesforce Inc. (Qui Tam)

Case Number: I23C00102

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1), initiated an investigation pursuant to the September 27, 2022, notification by the U.S. Department of Justice to GSA OIG that a qui tam complaint was filed (under seal) in the District of Massachusetts against Salesforce. The Relator alleged Salesforce knowingly failed to comply with government cybersecurity requirements, triggering persistent and unabated cyber threats, cybersecurity events, cyber-attacks, and cyber incidents that jeopardized massive amounts of sensitive government data. The complaint also alleged Salesforce knowingly submitted false or fraudulent claims to government agencies and submitted false records material to fraudulent claims, all of which were paid by numerous government agencies.

Salesforce is a public cloud-based software company that offers Government Cloud (GovCloud) services. In addition to providing the cloud service, Salesforce software states it seeks to protect government customers by identifying, protecting against, detecting, responding to, and recovering from cyber incidents.

Salesforce currently does not have any direct contracts with GSA; however, Salesforce products are sold through multiple resellers via GSA multiple award schedule (MAS) and other contract vehicles. Prior to December 2020, GSA offered the Salesforce implementation, integration, and support services (SISS) blanket purchase agreement (BPA) to federal customers. After the BPA expired, Salesforce products were incorporated into the MAS schedule under SIN 54151S.

A review of the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) revealed more than 200 resellers have provided Salesforce services/products to the federal government since 2009. The amount of dollars obligated for those contracts/orders exceeds \$1.7 billion. The majority of products concern information technology software and computer goods and services.

New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1)  
10 Causeway Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Boston, Massachusetts 02222  
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On February 12, 2025, the Relator withdrew the complaint on February 12, 2025, prior to the completion of the investigation.

The United States Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, concurred with the withdrawal but reserved the re-initiation of future action if additional evidence of Salesforce contract breaches were discovered and if individual agencies sought to take administrative action.

This matter was a joint investigation which included the following agencies: Air Force Office of Special Investigations; Army Criminal Investigation Command; Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Department of Commerce OIG; Department of State OIG; Federal Communications Commission OIG; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) OIG; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency OIG; National Science Foundation OIG; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; Securities and Exchange Commission OIG; Small Business Administration OIG; U.S. Department of Agriculture OIG; U.S. Department of Education OIG; U.S. Department of Energy OIG; U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG; U.S. Postal Service OIG; U.S. Department of Transportation OIG; U.S. Department of Treasury OIG; U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs OIG; as well as the State of California Department of Justice.

No further investigative activity will be conducted by JIA-1 and the case is closed.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

September 24, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

Digitally signed  
by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.09.24  
10:09:08 -04'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Case Number: I23H00478

In September 2023, the General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG) Mid-Atlantic Division received an allegation that GSA employee (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was using (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) government furnished equipment for personal use. It was alleged that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was viewing inappropriate images on the internet and communicating with Chinese women using (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) government furnished equipment, creating an insider threat concern. The GSA OIG coordinated this matter with the GSA Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) Insider Threat Team.

GSA OIG agents interviewed several OMA employees, including (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supervisor. Three employees confirmed seeing images of scantily clothed females displayed on Hall's electronics while (b)(6) was at work.

GSA OIG conducted a review of information obtained from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA laptop and found multiple websites cached on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA laptop and browser history that referenced dating sites and Asian countries.

GSA OIG conducted a review of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA cell phone. Agents discovered numerous explicit messages and nude photos of women on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA cell phone. GSA OIG discovered foreign numbers on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA cell phone but was unable to determine the registered owners. International codes included Canada, Hong Kong, Ghana, United Kingdom, Germany, Panama,

Mid-Atlantic Division Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
409 3rd Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

the Netherlands, Columbia, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Cote D'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Investigators found that most of the communications with foreign phone numbers were through WhatsApp.

GSA's Deputy Director of Personal Security, OMA, told GSA OIG that there was no requirement for an individual with a Tier 4 Reinvestigation (T4R) clearance to report foreign contacts. [redacted] had a T4R clearance, which is for a High-Risk Public Trust Position with no national security sensitivity.

On November 19, 2024, GSA OIG agents interviewed [redacted]. During the interview [redacted] was asked about the explicit messages and nude photos of women on [redacted] SA cell phone. GSA OIG agents told [redacted] multiple times that lying to a law enforcement officer was a federal criminal offense and that they found messages and nude photos in [redacted] government furnished equipment spanning several years. [redacted] denied responsibility for the messages and nude photos on [redacted] GSA cell phone and, at times, claimed not to recall the messages. [redacted] stated [redacted] never had these conversations and never requested nude photos from the senders. [redacted] would only converse with the senders to see who they were and what they wanted. [redacted] also denied ever accessing pornographic websites on [redacted] government phone. [redacted] alleged that someone hacked [redacted] GSA cell phone and had these conversations and saved the explicit material without [redacted] knowledge. When agents asked [redacted] if [redacted] reported these issues to the GSA IT desk, [redacted] said no.

On May 19, 2025, GSA OIG provided [redacted], Associate Administrator, OMA, GSA, and [redacted] Chief Human Capital Officer, GSA, with a report of investigation substantiating that 1. [redacted] misused [redacted] government furnished equipment, including [redacted] GSA-issued cellular phone, to send and receive explicit conversations and photographs; 2. [redacted] used [redacted] government furnished equipment to communicate with foreign nationals; [redacted] failed to disclose to investigators [redacted] misuse of government furnished equipment. [redacted] used [redacted] GSA-issued cellular phone to access a dating application and send and receive explicit conversations and photographs.

On July 23, 2025, [redacted] Zonal Branch Chief – East, OMA, issued a Notice of Proposed Removal to [redacted]. On August 15, 2025, [redacted] retired from [redacted] position with GSA.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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October 13, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION OFFICE

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) – Fleet Card Fraud

File Number: I23L00003

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

In September 2022, the GSA Loss Prevention Team (LPT) referred information to JIF-9A regarding suspect Fleet Card transactions conducted with the card assigned to GSA leased vehicle G41 1537X, which was assigned to the U.S. Army, Pacific Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. The LPT referral stated that the Fleet Card was used to purchase multiple car washes in excess of the monthly \$25 limit per vehicle, for a collective loss amount of \$1,519. GSA OIG contacted the Army CID Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU) in Hawaii and requested their assistance in obtaining surveillance video and established real-time alerts on the identified Fleet Card with LPT. Based on a review of surveillance footage, Army Sgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) an active-duty U.S. Army soldier, was identified as the suspect.

On April 17, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received an Article 15 nonjudicial punishment for violation of Article 121, Larceny/Wrongful Appropriation, of the uniform Code of Military Justice, and was sentenced to a forfeiture of \$1,519 in pay, 45 days of extra duty, 45 days of restriction, reduction in grade from E-5 to E-4, oral counseling and admonition, and a suspended sanction of \$459 for the 6 months.

On July 24, 2023, GSA LPT issued an Agency Incurred Expense (AIE) in the amount of \$1,519 to U.S. Army, Pacific Command, Fort Shafter (BOAC: 021602).

JIF-9A is now closing this investigation.



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Office of Inspector General

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July 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

File Number: I23L00075

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On June 17, 2022, JIF-9A received a referral from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) regarding fraudulent car titles for vehicles purchased from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) online auction and registered through the California (CA) DMV.

The investigation revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to altering/creating fake documents and submitting them to the CA DMV. GSA sent (b)(6) a U.S. Certificate to Obtain Title, Standard Form 97, after (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) won a bid for a vehicle through the GSA auction. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) then altered the price paid for the vehicle through the GSA auction before creating a fraudulent document for submission to the DMV to pay significantly fewer taxes.

The case was submitted for prosecutorial consideration to the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office, who accepted it for criminal prosecution.

On August 25, 2023, the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office filed a complaint against (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) charging (b)(6) with one count of California Penal Code Section 115.3, Alteration of an Official Document.

On August 20, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was granted Court Diversion with interim conditions to successfully complete, which, with successful completion, would dismiss all charges. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was required to participate in the Court Diversion program for 12 months, obey all laws and commit no new criminal offenses, provide 15 hours of community service, and pay \$1,209.87 to the DMV.

On July 25, 2025, the San Mateo County District Attorney determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had completed all the requirements of the Court Diversion Program and moved to dismiss the charge.

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This office is now closing this file.

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Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

July 8, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6);  
Date: 2025.07.09 09:48:46  
-04'00'

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**  
**G10-2198W (FLEET)**  
Case Number: **I23M00058**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On February 20, 2022, deputies from the Collier County Sheriff's Office responded to the Naples Nissan dealership regarding a suspect, later identified as Christopher Gonzalez, who had been detained by dealership staff for entering vehicles on the lot. Gonzalez was observed driving into the parking lot, exiting a government-owned vehicle (GOV) identified as G10-2198W, and entering two dealership vehicles.

The GOV G10-2198W was assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station in Fort Myers, Florida. Gonzalez was not a military member and was unauthorized to possess the GOV. When searched following his arrest, Gonzalez was found to have the key to the GOV, along with a wallet containing business cards from the U.S. Marine Corps. Additionally, he was in possession of a controlled substance. Consequently, Gonzalez was charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle and possession of a controlled substance.

Through investigative interviews and telemetry data related to the GOV, the GSA-OIG was able to determine when the vehicle was stolen.

On July 8, 2025, in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in Collier County, Florida, Gonzalez pleaded no contest to the charges of grand theft of a motor vehicle and possession of a controlled substance. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to twenty-four months in prison, with credit for time served, and ordered to pay court fees.

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Office of Investigations (JI-C)

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

September 10, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE (JIF)  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Fleet Card Fraud

File Number: I23S00028

This memorandum presents the investigative findings related to this matter.

In December 2022, the Western Division, Sacramento Office (JIF-9B), received a referral from the GSA Fleet Loss Prevention Team (LPT), which alleged the fraudulent use of the Wright Express Fleet Credit Cards (Fleet Cards) assigned to GSA vehicles G10 4397S and G61 1693U, both leased to the U.S. Forest Service, Six Rivers National Forest Headquarters, Eureka, California (USFS – Six Rivers). According to LPT, the transactions were suspected of fraud due to the inclusion of purchases of premium fuel, purchases of quantities of fuel in excess of the assigned vehicles’ fuel tanks, and non-sequential odometer entries associated with the fuel purchases. JIF-9B collected and reviewed surveillance video footage from gas stations and interviewed witnesses; these investigative activities identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a former employee of USFS – Six Rivers, as the subject of investigation. JIF-9A briefed the United States Department of Agriculture OIG, which joined the investigation.

In March 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed by GSA OIG and USDA OIG special agents and admitted to fraudulently using the Fleet Cards for (b)(6) personal gain. The loss to the government from the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) fraudulent use of the Fleet Cards was approximately \$2,000. The results of the investigation were referred to the Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office for consideration of prosecution.

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In August 2023, a criminal complaint was filed in the Superior Court for the State of California in and for the County of Humboldt, charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with one count of Grand Theft in violation of the California Penal Code – PC487(a).

In April 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) paid restitution to the USFS – Six Rivers in the form of a personal check for \$2,000.

In August 2024, pursuant to a plea agreement with the Humboldt County District Attorney's Office, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) entered a plea of guilty to violating one count of PC487(a), Theft, at the misdemeanor level. On the same date, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to one day in the county jail, one year of probation, and a \$649 fine.

In September 2024, LPT administratively billed the USFS – Six Rivers approximately \$1,800 to recoup losses attributed to the fraudulent use of the Fleet Cards.

This office is now closing the investigation related to this matter.



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Office of Inspector General

September 9, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed

by (b)(6);  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.09.09  
16:12:49 -04'00'

SUBJECT:

Closing Memorandum RE:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) } LEET)

Case Number: I23W00059

On February 8, 2023, GSA Fleet Loss prevention notified GSA OIG of suspicious transactions that included fuel purchases exceeding the assigned vehicle's tank capacity, inconsistent odometer entries, and multiple same-day Wright Express (WEX) credit card usages associated with GSA registrations G61 1243P and G41 2661X. GSA leased the vehicles to the Program Support Center Transportation Services, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), who in-turn assigned the vehicle to Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), HHS. The investigation revealed that the vehicles were not present at the fuel stations when the suspicious transactions were made.

GSA OIG obtained surveillance footage and identified the HSS employee (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as the individual who allegedly made the fraudulent transactions.. On May 30, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) told agents that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) knew that the WEX credit card could not be used for personal fuel purchases nor car washes for (b)(6) personal vehicle but that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had done so. The investigation determined that fraudulent changes made between January 10, 2019, and May 24, 2023, attributed to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) amounted to \$7,061.53. GSA Loss prevention billed the leaseholder for the fraudulent charges.

On February 18, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty in the District of Maryland to one count theft of U.S. property for the fraudulent use of the GSA fleet card. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to twelve months' probation, ordered to pay \$7,061.53 restitution, and ordered to complete 20 hours of community service within 12 months.

On May 9, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resigned from federal employment and accepted Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment totaling \$19,860. This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
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Office of Inspector General

March 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
NEW ENGLAND FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JI-1)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
ANDREW CHAVES (FLEET)  
CASE NUMBER: I2410051

On January 16, 2024, a proactive analysis of the Wright Express (WEX) online database by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New England Field Investigations Office (JI-1), identified suspicious activity on a Wright Express (WEX) card issued by GSA. Specifically, the WEX card assigned to G43-1720W, 2019 silver Chevrolet CG3300 van, owned by GSA and leased to the Rhode Island Air National Guard, Quonset Point Air National Guard Base, North Kingstown, RI, had been used on a near daily basis from December 16, 2023, through January 16, 2024, to purchase general merchandise, food, snack items and gasoline in Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. JIA-1 obtained surveillance video of multiple transactions in New England, identifying a potential unknown subject.

On January 19, 2024, coincidentally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), OIG, requested GSA OIG join an ongoing investigation, in which they were assisting the US Forest Service (USFS), Law Enforcement and Investigations (LEI), regarding multiple stolen GSA and USDA owned government vehicles, WEX cards, and GSA travel cards, throughout Vermont, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. A comparison of CCTV footage from gas stations obtained by both the USFS LEI and GSA OIG, confirmed the same subject was involved in both cases. The individual was identified as Andrew Chaves, when his latent print and empty prescription bottle with his name was found in a recovered stolen USFS vehicle. In conjunction with the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Vermont (DVT), an arrest warrant was sought and issued for Chaves by the U.S. District Court (USDC), for one count 18 U.S.C. § 641.

On January 19, 2024, Chaves was arrested at Sugarbush Resort, Warren, VT, by the U.S. Marshals Fugitive Task Force. When captured, Chaves was driving a GSA vehicle, stolen from Lodi, NJ, that displayed GSA issued license plates stolen from a GSA vehicle in Hanover, MD. Chaves was also found to be in possession of stolen government property to include multiple GSA Wright Express fuel cards, several government license plates, keys to an additional GSA vehicle, several GSA issued Smart Pay travel credit cards, issued military clothing, government equipment and personal property of government employees.

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On January 22, 2024, Chaves was arraigned in USDC, DVT. He pleaded not guilty and was ordered to be held without bail, pending trial.

Subsequent investigative activity determined Chaves also stole a GSA vehicle leased to the US Army in Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, along with numerous GSA SmartPay credit cards and USDA credit cards from federal government and military facilities in New Hampshire and Rhode Island, which he fraudulently used to purchase ski equipment, ski lift tickets, food, and other items throughout New England. The investigations also linked Chaves to multiple commercial burglaries and credit card thefts throughout Vermont.

On March 28, 2024, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Chaves with three counts of theft of government property, one count of aggravated identity theft, and one count of fraud and related activity in connection with access devices.

On July 1, 2024, in USDC, DVT, Chaves pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated identity theft and was held without bail.

On January 28, 2025, Chaves was sentenced to two years imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$25,245 in restitution and a \$100 special assessment fee.

No further investigation is necessary and this case is closed.

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Office of Inspector General

July 8, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
JOB CORPS (FLEET)  
CASE NUMBER: I24200046

On January 4, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fleet Loss Prevention Representative, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Fleet Loss Prevention Team (FLPT), notified the GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, of Wright Express (WEX) card discrepancies with multiple vehicles at the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Job Corps, 822 River Road, Glenmont, NY. Specifically (1) G13-1200U, a 2017 Ford Focus; (2) G71-0074R, a 2015 Dodge Ram 4500; and (3) G43-2446W, 2019 Chevrolet 2300, all exhibit back-to-back, over tank fuelings, inconsistent odometer entries and premium fuel purchases since October of 2023. GSA FLPT estimated the loss at \$2,700. JIA-2 subsequently opened an investigation into the matter.

On January 9, 2024, JIA-2 contacted the DOL Job Corps, and learned they were already looking into the matter, as their GSA Fleet Services Representative, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had informed them of the irregular activity. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Acting Center Director, Adams and Associates, Glenmont Job Corps, 822 River Road, Glenmont, NY, subsequently indicated Tracy Albea, Safety and Security Advisor, Adams and Associates, a DOL subcontractor, was identified as potentially misusing the WEX cards.

On January 16, 2024, JIA-2 recovered video surveillance footage involving suspected fraudulent WEX transactions that occurred at a Stewart's fuel station on December 23, 2023. A review of the video indicated an individual matching Albea's description refueling a personally owned vehicle (POV).

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On January 17, 2024, JIA-2 and DOL OIG agents interviewed Albea. Albea admitted using four WEX cards for personal use (G13-1200U, G71-0074R, G42-2446W and G42-1441Y) and confirmed he was the individual seen on the December 23, 2023, Stewart's fuel station video surveillance footage using the WEX card for personal use.

On January 19, 2024, Albea was terminated from his employment with Adams and Associates.

On January 23, 2024, the matter was declined for criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of New York, due to minimal loss to the government.

On January 23, 2024, Albany County District Attorney's Office, Albany, New York, accepted the case for prosecution.

On April 8, 2024, Albea self-surrendered for arrest at the Glenmont Police Department. Albea was charged with New York State charges for Grand Larceny in the 3<sup>rd</sup> degree and Falsifying Business Records in the 1<sup>st</sup> degree.

On June 10, 2024, Albea plead guilty to Grand Larceny in the 4<sup>th</sup> degree, a Class E felony, in Albany County Court.

On June 12, 2024, GSA FLPT charged back DOL Job Corps a total of \$3,662.03 (G13-1200U: \$1,814.47; G71-0074R: \$597.88; G42-2446W: \$335.16; and G42-1441Y: \$914.52)

On August 13, 2024, Albea was sentenced in Albany County Court to 5 years' probation and \$3,662.03 in restitution.

On September 6, 2024, DOL OIG submitted Albea for federal debarment.

On March 3, 2025, DOL issued a notice of debarment for Albea.

Albea's debarment became effective on May 2, 2025, with an expiration date of May 1, 2028.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
 Office of Inspector General

August 13, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |

CASE NUMBER: I24200049

On December 21, 2023, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Northeast Field Investigation Division (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, received an anonymous allegation that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Asset Manager, GSA, Public Buildings Service (PBS), Asset Analysis Branch (2PTM), One World Trade, New York, NY, a virtual employee for the Northeast and Caribbean Region (Region 2), has been employed as a teacher with the New York City Public Schools, full time, without GSA's knowledge, working as a teacher during (b)(6); GSA work hours. Additionally, they alleged (b)(7)(C) requested reasonable accommodation and additional time off due to being blind in one eye, however (b)(6) is not limited by such and used that extra time to finish her college degree and teacher certification requirements.

On January 9, 2024, a review of open-source data indicated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was a teacher at Pathways College Preparatory School, 109-89 204th Street, Saint Albans, NY; and held a New York State Teaching license valid from August 2022 until Augst 2024.

On January 10, 2024, a review of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) electronic Official Personnel Folder (eOPF), revealed (b)(6); started with GSA on May 20, 2002. It revealed on March 13, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) position changed from a #1101, Client Planning Manager, GS-13, step 6, to #1101, Data Management Specialist, GS-12, step 6. As a result, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was no longer required to file Office of Government Ethics (OGE), Form 450, on an annual basis. eOPF also revealed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) duty station was changed to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) residence in Baldwin, NY, on April 4, 2022.

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On January 10, 2024, The Special Commissioner of Investigation for The New York City School District (SCI) advised JIA-2 that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is a teacher under their purview (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) started as a substitute teacher on May 20, 2021, and was (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a full-time teacher. SCI agreed to join the investigation. They subsequently provided (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) work schedule, showing a daily overlap between (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) teachings schedule and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA work schedule.

On January 31, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supervisor (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Supervisory Program Analyst, GSA, PBS, 2PTM, Portfolio Management Division (254D), One World Trade Center, NY, NY, was interviewed. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) joined (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) team approximately three years prior and transitioned from being a Client Planning Manager (GS-13), to a Data Manager (GS-12). She stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) career path was not normal. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was working in a role that required more work from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and for a manager that was "tight" and had less flexibility. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had reasonable accommodation, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) team could provide (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with more flexibility.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) works remotely on an alternate work schedule (AWS), working ten hours a day. As a result (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) has a day off every week, but (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not know which day. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) begins (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) workday between 8:00 am and 8:30 am but noted there is "some flexibility" with start times. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is personable and gets along with everyone, however (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) lacked technical competence in the position and doesn't seem to recognize (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) potential to develop such. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is not a "5" performer. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) explained (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was a "weaker link" on the team, and others were more dependable and reliable. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) missed a significant amount of work, including meetings, but takes leave when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) cannot work. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had not asked (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for approval for outside employment and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was not aware (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was working anywhere else.

On February 1, 2024, a review of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) OGE 450's for 2020 to 2023 was completed. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was not required to file form in 2023. In prior years, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) failed to report the outside employment or income with the City of New York.

On February 20, 2024, SCI provided JIA-2 a copy of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) work schedule while teaching for the New York City Department of Education. A review indicated significant overlap with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA work schedule.

On March 5, 2024, pursuant to an OIG Subpoena, the City of New York provided W2's for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) indicating (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had earned income in 2021, 2022 and 2023, while employed as a schoolteacher for the New York City Department of Education.

On April 8, 2024, pursuant to an OIG Subpoena, the State of New York provided (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) teacher license file. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) obtained a Master of Science in Education, on June 1, 2022, from the Community University of New York, Brooklyn College. On May 20, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) applied for teaching credentials. On August 31, 2022, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was issued license #1644533221, License to Teach Students with Disabilities, Grade 7-12, Generalist – Emergency COVID 19, valid until August 31, 2024.

On April 22, 2024, the matter was presented to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Eastern District of New York (EDNY), for criminal prosecution.

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On May 22, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed by JIA-2 and SCI. During the interview, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acknowledged that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) has been employed full-time as a Special Education Teacher for the New York City Department of Education since August 2022, while also working at GSA. (b)(6) daily teaching schedule varied depending on the school and day of the week, with start times around 8:00 a.m. and end times between 2:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., which conflicted with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA schedule. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was able to complete (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA responsibilities while in the classroom during moments when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was not actively teaching students. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also admitted to frequently missing meetings held by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA supervisor due to teaching commitments, clarifying that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) absences were not due to illness or disability, despite previous claims to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supervisor. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) revealed that she requested medical leave from GSA when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) experienced temporary blindness caused by COVID-19, but (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) recovered quickly. Instead of notifying GSA and returning to work, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) used that leave time to complete (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) student teaching and earn (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) teaching credentials. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) explained that since the leave was approved for a specific period, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) took advantage of it. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also acknowledged that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) used sick leave at GSA to teach on days (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was not actually ill, claiming (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unaware that sick leave could not be used when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was not sick. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) described (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) failure to list (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) teaching position on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) 2021 and 2022 OGE Form 450 as an "oversight." (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated that no one at GSA knew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was teaching, although several teachers were aware of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) employment at GSA. Finally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) explained that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not share (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) medical disability or the accommodation on file with GSA with the New York City Department of Education, because (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not require any accommodation to teach. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) instead to leave GSA when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) started teaching, however (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) encountered financial difficulties due to a divorce. Therefore, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) kept both jobs to make ends meet. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) voluntarily provided a sworn statement at the conclusion of the interview.

On June 3, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resigned from GSA.

On May 23, 2024, the USAO, EDNY, declined to prosecute the matter.

On September 25, 2024, the matter was presented to the Queens District Attorney's Office, for criminal prosecution.

On September 25, 2024, SCI referred the matter to the New York City Department of Education for administrative action.

On July 2, 2025, JIA2 learned (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was terminated by the New York City Department of Education on April 8, 2025.

On July 7, 2025, the Queens District Attorney's Office declined criminal prosecution.

On July 30, 2025, a Letter Report was transmitted to GSA, for information purposes, detailing the investigative findings.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

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July 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
CLONED WEX CARDS (FLEET)  
CASE NUMBER: I24200063

On March 1, 2024, [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Loss Prevention Specialist, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Fleet Loss Prevention (FLP), contacted GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, with concerns of potential skimming of GSA issued Wright Express (WEX) fuel cards. Specifically, a GSA Government Owned Vehicle (GOV), G13-1005U, leased to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), used a WEX fuel card to buy regular gas at Express Fuel, 1696 US Highway 130, North Brunswick, NJ. Shortly after the initial transaction, the card was cloned and used to buy diesel fuel at other gas stations in central New Jersey. GSA cancelled the original card and issued a new WEX card. The replacement card was only used at Express Fuel, cloned again, and used for continued diesel fuel purchases. GSA cancelled the first replacement card and issued another. The second replacement card was used only at Express Fuel, cloned again, and used for continued diesel fuel purchase. GSA cancelled the second replacement card, told USDA to stop using Express Fuel, and referred the matter to GSA OIG. Losses were estimated to exceed \$5,000. JIA-2 opened an investigation into the matter.

On March 7, 2024, a JIA-2 special agent conducted a site visit at Express Fuel, 1696 US Highway 130, North Brunswick, NJ. The agent found a skimming device located inside of one of the fuel pumps. The owner of the fuel station claimed no knowledge of the device.

In March and April 2024, site visits were conducted at locations where the cloned cards were used. Surveillance video of the locations was recovered; however, no suspect was able to be identified based on the videos.

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On April 1, 2024, the skimming device discovered at Express Fuel was transferred to the United States Secret Service (USSS) for fingerprint and DNA analysis.

On December 19, 2024, JIA-2 received the USSS lab report for the skimming device discovered at Express Fuel. The USSS lab report indicated that no latent prints suitable for comparison were detected. A DNA swab was conducted and a report with the DNA results would be provided at a later date.

In March 2024, the skimming device was returned by the USSS and returned to GSA, with no positive results. It was destroyed on March 10, 2025.

The case will be closed, and no further investigation will be conducted.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

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June 13, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT:

CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM

NJ Army National Guard (Fleet)

CASE NUMBER: I24200097

On Saturday, May 25, 2024, a special agent with U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, observed a GSA government owned vehicle (GOV), specifically G62-1026Z, a 2024 Nissan Titan, being used for personal travel at a baseball tournament in central New Jersey. The driver was later identified as (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fleet Director, New Jersey Army National Guard (NJANG), Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, Building 3650, Ft. Dix, NJ. A subsequent review of the Wright Express fuel card (WEX card) activity for G62-1026Z determined (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had also used the card to fuel (b)(6) personal vehicle. JIA2 subsequently opened an investigation into the matter.

In May 2024, JIA-2 retrieved surveillance footage of recent WEX card activity. A review of the recent activity indicated that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had used the WEX card to refuel (b)(6) personal vehicle. JIA-2 further determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), a former sheriff officer, was previously arrested and convicted of New Jersey criminal statute 2C:20-31A, a 3<sup>rd</sup> degree felony computer crime. JIA-2 further determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had been in possession of a firearm since (b)(6) conviction.

In June 2024, Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) joined the investigation. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed and admitted (b)(6) had used the GOV WEX card for personal use and had driven the GOV with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) inside.

In July 2024, JIA-2 determined (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also provided false statements regarding (b)(6) felony conviction on security clearance background documentation for the United States Army National Guard on January 14, 2020.

New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2)  
26 Federal Plaza, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York, NY 10278  
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On September 4, 2024, the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey declined the case for federal prosecution due to minimal financial loss to the government, limited resources, and the availability of administrative remedies.

JIA-2 presented the case to New Jersey Assistant Attorney General [REDACTED], and after consideration, the matter was declined for state prosecution on September 18, 2024 .

As a result of GSA OIG's investigation, the NJANG provided [REDACTED] with a notice of proposed termination from his civilian federal technician position on October 31, 2024.

On November 13, 2024, JIA-2 filed a formal complaint with the Pemberton Police Department against [REDACTED] for 3<sup>rd</sup> degree credit card fraud.

In December 2024, JIA-2 received information that [REDACTED] coworker, [REDACTED] Traffic Management Specialist, NJANG, was misusing GOVs. JIA-2 agents subsequently interviewed [REDACTED] who admitted to using GOVs for home-to-work use without proper authorization.

On January 16, 2025, GSA fleet billed back the NJANG \$867.16 related to [REDACTED] GOV misuse and \$105.67 related to [REDACTED] GOV misuse.

On February 27, 2025, the NJANG confirmed [REDACTED] a was terminated from employment on January 25, 2025. [REDACTED] was issued a termination notice and subsequently resigned, effective March 8, 2025. Additionally, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] supervisor, [REDACTED] Supply Management Specialist, NJANG, was issued a 14-day suspension notice.

In March 2025, Burlington County Court downgraded [REDACTED] criminal charge to New Jersey statute 2C:20-3, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, a misdemeanor.

On April 28, 2025, [REDACTED] plead guilty to a violation of a local ordinance 132-10, prohibited acts. [REDACTED] was sentenced to pay \$100 fines, \$75 in restitution and \$33 court costs.

On May 30 , 2025, NJANG JAG [REDACTED] informed JIA-2 that [REDACTED] suspension was downgraded to four days, and [REDACTED] was reassigned.

No further investigation will be conducted, and the case is closed.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

May 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
 MID-Atlantic DIVISION  
 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB) | Date: 2025.05.08  
 0:15:53 -04'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Fleet Fraud, VA UB15-714, Department of the Navy,  
 Newport News, Virginia**  
 Case Number: I24300081

On May 1, 2024, JIB-3 agents received a referral from the United States Navy Systems Command (NAVSEA) Mid-Atlantic Division regarding a suspicious trend occurring with the Fleet Card assigned to VA UB15-714. Specifically, this Fleet card exhibited back-to-back fuel transactions and premium gasoline purchases. JIB-3 agents obtained surveillance video and determined that the card was fraudulently used to purchase fuel for non-government vehicles. This vehicle is leased to the Department of the Navy under the GSA short term rental program and assigned to a gray 2022 Ford F-250 truck with Virginia license plate UB15-714 (VA UB15-714). JIB-3 agents initiated an investigation and obtained surveillance videos associated with the fraudulent fuel transactions which showed an individual, later identified as NAVSEA employee Stephen Bowman, fraudulently utilizing the Fleet card to purchase fuel for non-government vehicles. During his interview with JIB-3 agents, Bowman admitted to using the Fleet Card assigned to VA UB15-714 to fuel his personal vehicle since he was utilizing his personal vehicle during work hours for work purposes.

On August 5, 2024, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia declined to prosecute the case because the total amount of fraudulent WEX card charges did not meet the threshold for prosecution.

On October 3, 2024, a Commonwealth Attorney for the State of Virginia filed criminal charges for credit card theft in violation of Virginia State Code § 18.2-195(a)(4) (Credit Card Fraud; Conspiracy; Penalties) and 18.2-178 (Obtaining Money or Signature, etc., by False Pretense). On October 5, 2024, Bowman was arrested on the aforementioned charges by the Hampton Virginia Police Department. On January 21, 2025, Bowman pleaded guilty to one count of Conspire to Commit Credit Card Fraud in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-195(4), FRD-2789-F6, a felony. Bowman was sentenced to pay restitution in the amount of \$265.85, five years of uniform good behavior, and payment of court costs.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-3)  
 600 Arch St, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Philadelphia, PA 19106

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On November 6, 2024, a Letter Report was issued to Naval Ensign [REDACTED], Personnel Security Officer. In February 2025, Bowman was officially terminated from his position with NAVSEA and permanently barred from the Norfolk Naval Shipyard Portsmouth as well as all military bases and federal buildings.

No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

April 1, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Digitally signed by [redacted]  
Date: 2025.04.01 12:34:13 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT INC CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING  
FILE NUMBER: I24500054

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, received a referral from GSA Fleet Loss Prevention regarding potentially fraudulent fleet card transactions. The card was associated to a Ford Transit van (G42-1493Y) which was assigned to the [redacted] Veteran's Affairs (VA) Medical Center in North Chicago, IL. The investigation identified the subject to be [redacted] a VA employee, that was using the fleet card for personal use. [redacted] [redacted] to GSA OIG and VA OIG agent's and accounted for \$1,467.29 in fraudulent transactions. [redacted] plead guilty to one count of misdemeanor fraudulent use of credit/debit card in the 19<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit Court in Lake County, IL. [redacted] was ordered to pay a \$75.00 fine, \$1,467.29 in restitution to the Department of Veteran's Affairs, and was sentenced to 12 months of court supervision.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5) [redacted]  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite [redacted] Chicago, IL 60604 [redacted]



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

January 10, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR

FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.01.10 14:20:50

-06'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID-6)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**

File Number: I24600007

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On October 18, 2023, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation based on a referral from the GSA OIG Data Analytics office, whose proactive initiative identified a GSA employee as someone who may have fraudulently received Small Business Administration (SBA) funds through the Payroll Protection Program. The GSA employee received funds for a business allegedly run by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who was debarred from government procurement and non-procurement programs during the time of the request. The GSA employee's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also received a different SBA loan during this time.

On February 5, 2024, this matter was declined for criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri, due to the low dollar loss amount.

On February 20, 2024, this matter was accepted for civil prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri.

Investigation revealed that the GSA employee's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) paid back the loan to SBA, so there was no true dollar loss. The loan to the GSA employee could not be tied to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). A review of the GSA employee's GSA emails revealed (b)(6) did not do work for outside employment using GSA resources.

During an interview with the GSA employee, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) claimed that both (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) owned and operated the business that received the loan forgiveness.

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On October 1, 2024, this matter was declined for civil prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri, due to the low dollar loss amount and lack of evidence of wrongdoing.

The case was closed, and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in E-IDEAS.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

May 17, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FREY RYAN  
Date: 2025.05.16 13:08:13 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID-6)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
File Number: I24600116

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

On September 9, 2024, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation based on a proactive search of the GSA-owned WEX Clearview database. The search revealed unusual fuel transactions for government vehicle (GOV) G62 2379Y, to include multiple same-day purchases of large amounts of diesel and non-sequential odometer readings, from May 3, 2024, to July 30, 2024. The investigation revealed that the fleet credit card information had been skimmed and used by the subject to fraudulently purchase \$1600 of diesel.

On September 2, 2024, the subject was arrested by Olathe Police Department in Olathe, Kansas, and the case was accepted for prosecution by the Johnson County District Court.

On December 11, 2024, the subject pled guilty to two counts of identity theft and one count of felony theft less than \$25,000 in the Johnson County District Court

On April 10, 2025, the subject was sentenced by the Johnson County District Court to 18 months of probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$3,413.20.

The case was closed, and all related documents have been transferred to this case file in E-IDEAS.

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Midwest Investigations Division (JID-6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
2300 Main Street (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kansas City, Missouri 64108 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

May 19, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

(b)(6);  
(b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digital Signature by  
(b)(6);  
Date: 2025.05.21  
11:26:18 -05'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JI-6)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**  
FILE NUMBER: I24600152

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary.

On January 5, 2024, JID-6 initiated this investigation based on allegations that a construction company used its status as a Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) to obtain set-aside government construction contracts and then "pass-through" the work to other non-eligible companies. The complainant alleged that Anderson & Sons Contracting LLC (ASC) and its owner (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were awarded SDVOSB set-aside contracts, but that non-eligible subcontractors completed all subsequent work and management of the projects.

Agents from the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Department of Agriculture OIG, the Department of Transportation OIG, and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service investigated the case. The U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Western District of Missouri (WDMO) declined criminal prosecution in May 2024. The USAO for the WDMO accepted the case for potential civil litigation the same month.

Agents interviewed contracting officers and contracting officer representatives from five federal agencies as well as numerous ASC subcontractors. Additionally, agents reviewed numerous contracts and other records for evidence of false claims or other violations. Ultimately, the investigation did not reveal substantial evidence which established that ASC or Anderson submitted false claims to the government. The USAO for the WDMO subsequently declined the civil case in May 2025.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
 Office of Inspector General  
 SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

March 26, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6);  
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]  
 Date: 2025.04.25 08:58:10  
 -04'00'

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
 SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
 (b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730  
 Case Number: 124C00017

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

(b)(3);31 U.S.C. § 3730

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

---

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August 14, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

FAR Disclosure  
Case Number: I24C00057

(b)(4)

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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(b)(4)

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**Office of Inspector General**

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May 16, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

FAR Disclosure  
Case Number: I24C00058

(b)(4)

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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(b)(4)

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

---

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March 26, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

FAR Disclosure  
Case Number: I24C00079

(b)(4)

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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(b)(4)

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Page 112 of 156

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(7)(A)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



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Office of Inspector General

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July 1, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
  
Varidesk, LLC (Qui Tam)  
  
File Number: I24L00054

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On December 22, 2022, a relator filed a qui tam complaint (under seal) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Varidesk, LLC and Vari Sales Corporation, and related entities (Varidesk). GSA OIG received the complaint in January 2023. The complaint provides that the defendants hold Multiple Award Schedule Contract Number GS-27F-007GA with GSA through Vari Sales Corporation of 450 N. Freeport Parkway, Coppel, Texas 75019. Varidesk and Varidesk LLC are listed as the "manufacturer" for Multiple Award Schedule contracts listed on the GSA eLibrary website for the following contractors and contract numbers: (1) Cartridge Savers, Inc; #47QSEA19D0037, (2) Mono Machines LLC; #47QSEA18D008C, and (3) Photikon Corporation; GS-02F-0115V. The complaint alleges that the defendants provided discounts to private sector clients that exceed the discounts provided to the U.S., despite being required by regulations and contracts to do so, and that the defendants failed to accurately disclose the discounts provided to private sector clients during an audit performed pursuant to the Varidesk-GSA contract renewal. JI-9 initiated this investigation to determine whether the defendants have violated the False Claims Act.

On April 15, 2025, Varidesk, LLC and Vari Sales Corporation agreed to pay \$1,100,000 to resolve the above stated allegations, specifically that Varidesk violated the False Claims Act.

On June 12, 2025, the case, 22-cv-09146-JCS, was unsealed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and the case was closed.

This office is now closing this file.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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November 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (FLEET)

Case Number: I24L00080

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

In March 2024, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the GSA Office of Fleet Management, Loss Prevention Team (LPT), regarding suspicious Fleet Card transactions for GSA vehicle G13-4034R, which was leased by the National Park Service (NPS), Yosemite National Park (Yosemite), El Portal, California. These transactions were identified as suspicious because they included over tank capacity transactions, odd odometer reading entries, back-to-back fuel transactions, premium gasoline transactions, transactions occurring outside of normal duty hours, and unauthorized purchases of general merchandise items. On April 2, 2024, GSA OIG received another referral from LPT for suspicious Fleet Card transactions for G61-1938X, which was also leased by the same NPS Yosemite customer. G61-1938X's suspicious transactions followed a similar pattern as G13-14034R's suspicious transactions. GSA OIG subsequently coordinated with NPS Yosemite Park Rangers and the Mariposa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), and it was determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who was a suspect in a previous Fleet Card fraud investigation, was already incarcerated at the Mariposa County Adult Detention Facility for unrelated violations. A review of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) prison communications revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) conspired with co-defendant (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to conduct Fleet Card fraud against GSA vehicles leased to NPS Yosemite during (b)(6) incarceration. GSA OIG worked the investigation with NPS Yosemite Park Rangers and MCSO.

During the investigation, the investigative team reviewed Fleet Card transaction data, analyzed surveillance video recordings from gas stations, interviewed multiple individuals, conducted multiple records checks and a search warrant of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) residence. Analysis of gas station surveillance video footage revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) conducted fraudulent transactions with G13-

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4034R's Fleet Card prior to (b)(6) incarceration and that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) conducted fraudulent transactions with G61-1938X's Fleet Card while (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was incarcerated. During a 2023 investigation, GSA OIG and NPS Yosemite Park Rangers identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as a suspect for fraudulent transactions conducted with the Fleet Cards belonging to NPS Yosemite leased GSA vehicles, G62-1676U and G61-1235Z.

The investigative findings were presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California, and that office declined the case for criminal prosecution. The investigation was subsequently presented to and accepted by the Mariposa County District Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution.

On April 22, 2024, a Ramey warrant was issued for Brown by the Mariposa County Superior Court, charging him with violating California Penal Code (PC) 182(a)(1), Conspiracy to Commit a Crime; PC 487(a), Grand Theft; PC 484g, Grand Theft by Access Card; and PC 484e(d), Grand Theft of Access Card Account Information.

On April 24, 2024, a criminal complaint was filed in the Mariposa County Superior Court, charging (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with PC 182(a)(1), Conspiracy to Commit a Crime; PC 487(a), Grand Theft; PC 484g, Grand Theft by Access Card; and PC 484e(d), Grand Theft of Access Card Account Information.

On August 6, 2024, Brown pleaded guilty to one count of Felony Grand Theft and was subsequently sentenced to two years' incarceration, levied a restitution fine of \$300, and ordered to pay \$17,405 to Yosemite National Park.

On August 27, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pleaded guilty to one count of Grand Theft and was subsequently sentenced to 90 days' incarceration, one year summary probation, fined \$785, and ordered to pay \$1,400 in restitution to NPS Yosemite.

GSA Office of Fleet Management billed back NPS Yosemite in the amount of \$19,975 for Brown's and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) fraudulent use of the GSA vehicles.

This office is now closing this file.

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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February 21, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
USDA FSIS (FLEET)  
File Number: I24L00093

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On March 11, 2024, JIF-9A received a referral from the GSA Fleet Management Loss Prevention Team (LPT) regarding suspicious Wright Express Fleet credit card (Fleet Card) transactions assigned to GSA vehicle G13-1839X, leased to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).

On April 3, 2024, while reviewing video surveillance footage evidence from a gas station in Pasadena, California, JIF-9A agents observed an individual activating a gas pump terminal and fueling two non-GSA vehicles. The transactions were verified with the gas station manager and GSA LPT to have been made with the Fleet Card assigned to G13-1839X.

During the investigation, fuel receipts and video surveillance were obtained from the gas station in Pasadena. JIF-9A agents personally observed and positively identified a subject fueling a non-GSA vehicle with the Fleet card at issue; however, the video surveillance obtained was insufficient for confirming the identity of the subject identified at the Pasadena gas station. The findings of the investigation were presented to the Office of the City Attorney, City of Pasadena, for criminal prosecution, but the matter was declined due to an inability to positively identify a subject in the video surveillance footage.

This office is now closing this file.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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July 21, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION (JIF)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

USMC 1<sup>st</sup> CAG (FLEET)

File Number: I24L00101

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On March 14, 2024, JIF-9A received a referral from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Fleet Loss Prevention Team (LPT) regarding suspected fraudulent fuel transactions associated with the Wright Express (WEX) GSA Fleet fuel credit card (Fleet card) associated with vehicles leased to the Department of the Navy, Southwest Region Fleet Transportation, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton (MCBCP), 1<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Group, Marine Forces Reserve.

The investigation revealed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a former U.S. Marine, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) an active-duty, U.S. Marine, admitted to improperly using a WEX Fleet card to purchase fuel for their personally owned vehicles. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to purchasing an access device which contained the information for a WEX Fleet card.

JIF-9A presented the case for prosecutorial consideration to the San Diego County District Attorney's Office, who subsequently declined the case.

JIF-9A also presented the case to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Criminal Investigation Division, who coordinated a referral to USMC Command for action deemed appropriate.

On March 28, 2025, the USMC issued (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Administrative Discharge, Other Than Honorable, with separation code JKA1 – Pattern of Misconduct.

On June 2, 2025, the USMC issued (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) non-judicial punishment for violation of Article 121a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Fraudulent Use of Credit Cards. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) rank was reduced to E-1 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was required to forfeit \$1,054 per month for two months, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) movements on base were restricted for 45 days, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received 45 days of extra duty. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

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March 19, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
WESTERN DIVISION

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

File Number: I24L00113

This memorandum presents the details related to this investigation.

On July 10, 2023, JIF-9A received a referral regarding GSA Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) personnel seeking assistance with the recovery/payment of a recently auctioned 1995 Warrior Travel Trailer, Sale-Lot #91QSCI23-222. JIF-9A contacted the GSA FAS senior sales contracting officer who facilitated the auction and discovered that on May 31, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) won GSA Auction #91QSCI23222605 with a winning bid of \$3,565. On May 31, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) initiated an ACH payment in the amount of \$3,565. On June 6, 2023, GSA FAS received notification of the ACH transfer, after which a "paid" notification was autogenerated and sent to GSA and the property owner/seller, the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Angeles National Forest.

On June 16, 2023, GSA FAS discovered that the ACH payment was "pulled back" due to insufficient funds and attempted to contact (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and inquire into the withdrawal of funds. On June 20, 2023, GSA FAS again attempted to contact (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) regarding payment and to advise that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) payment was not yet received, to no avail. On June 21, 2023, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) personally retrieved the travel trailer from the Angeles National Forest without remitting payment. JIF-9A initiated this investigation in coordination with the USFS to determine if (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) fraudulently acquired the federal property.

During the investigation, GSA Auction records pertaining to Sale-Lot #91QSCI23-222 were reviewed, and it was determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) entered a secured federal facility, the USFS Angeles National Forest supervisor's office, for the purpose of acquiring federal property without remitting payment. The findings of this investigation were presented the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California, and a USFS citation for 36 CFR 261.9(b), Removing Property of the United States, and a subsequent arrest warrant were issued.

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On January 15, 2025, (b)(6) was arrested by USDA OIG personnel, and on February 19, 2025, (b)(6) pleaded guilty to Removing Property of the United States and agreed to pay full restitution in the amount of \$3,656 on or before March 19, 2025.

This office is now closing this file.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

July 10, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

Date: 2025.07.10

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

10:30:13 -04'00'

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**  
**G61-1613S (FLEET)**  
Case Number: **I24M00024**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on a referral from GSA Fleet Loss Prevention which showed large dollar amount diesel fuel purchases and unusual odometer entries associated with fleet credit card transactions in the Miami, Florida area. The fleet credit card was assigned to government-owned vehicle (GOV) G61-1613S.

GSA-OIG obtained video surveillance footage from several gas stations and license plate reader information which identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as a likely violator. During an interview with GSA-OIG and the City of Hialeah Police Department, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in video surveillance still photographs obtained from the gas stations.

On September 13, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was arrested by the City of Hialeah Police Department with assistance from GSA-OIG. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was charged with an organized scheme to defraud, grand theft, and fraudulently obtaining fuel using a credit card.

On November 4, 2024, the State Attorney's Office for Miami-Dade County dropped the charges.

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Office of Investigations (JI-C)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

February 11, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [Redacted] Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [Redacted] Date: 2025.02.11 09:30:42 -05'00'

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [Redacted] SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**AMTRAK CARD – ORLANDO (FLEET)**  
Case Number: **I24M00061**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This case was initiated based on a request for assistance from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation Office of the Inspector General (AMTRAK-OIG), which showed diesel fuel purchases and unusual odometer entries associated with Fleet credit card transactions in Orlando, FL. The Fleet credit card was assigned to government vehicle G63-1438V, a Region 4 GSA leased vehicle.

Utilizing transaction spreadsheets provided to GSA-OIG by GSA, surveillance video footage supplied by various gas stations, and a surveillance operation conducted jointly by GSA-OIG, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS), and AMTRAK-OIG, two suspects were identified and arrested for fuel and credit card related offenses.

On March 19, 2024, GSA-OIG and AMTRAK-OIG agents surveilled Ernesto Ruiz (Ruiz) and Erik Muinos Cardenas (Cardenas). They observed them departing their residences and traveling to four gas stations in Orlando, FL. Agents contacted Ruiz and Cardenas at a gas station. Ruiz and Cardenas were charged with credit card-related offenses and unlawful conveyance of fuel, and they were transported to the Orange County jail for processing. Ruiz' and Cardenas' trucks were impounded. FDACS investigators obtained search warrants for cellular phones and a laptop, which were recovered.

On November 19, 2024, Cardenas pleaded nolo contendere to unlawful possession of another person's personal identification and was adjudicated guilty by the Honorable Barbara J. Leach in the Ninth Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. Cardenas was sentenced to two days incarceration, with credit for time served, and ordered to pay court fees.

On January 29, 2025, Ruiz pleaded nolo contendere to fraudulent use of a credit card and was adjudicated guilty by the Honorable Barbara J. Leach in the Ninth Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. Ruiz was sentenced to one day of incarceration, with credit for time served, and ordered to pay court fees.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-C)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [Redacted] Atlanta, GA 30308

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [Redacted]



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

January 15, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.01.21  
22:33:58 -05'00'

(A) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE \_\_\_\_\_  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Case Title Potential WEX Fraud at Fort Gregg-Adams**  
Case Number: I24W00024

In November 2023, the Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) manager at Fort Gregg-Adams, in Virginia, informed GSA OIG that they had received a complaint indicating that a driver may have been misusing GSA leased vehicles. The complaint indicated (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a civilian Army employee, was seen using a GSA leased vehicle for personal use and may have been engaging in other fraudulent activities. The TMP manager provided GSA OIG with consent to place a vehicle tracker on a GSA leased vehicle that would be assigned to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) On November 20, 2023, a tracker was placed on the GSA vehicle with registration G10 1050S. On November 21, 2023, the vehicle was assigned to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Between November 21, 2023, and December 21, 2023, the WEX credit card assigned to G10 1050S was used to purchase fuel at the AAFES station on Fort Gregg-Adams on five occasions when the tracker was not recorded at the same station.

GSA OIG reviewed surveillance video and identified a personal vehicle being fueled with the WEX credit card. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed in January 2024 and admitted to fraudulently using the WEX card to fuel (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) personal vehicle. GSA OIG identified \$245 in fraudulent charges.

GSA billed the Army for the fraudulent \$245 in transactions. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resigned from the Army. In January 2024, GSA OIG spoke with an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA). The AUSA agreed to add the case to the misdemeanor docket for criminal action. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was issued a target letter in June 2024. GSA OIG attempted to work

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
409 3rd Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

with the AUSA to prosecute the case for several months. In December 2024, the AUSA declined prosecution to utilize resources on other matters.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

July 15, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.07.15  
13:28:24 -04'00'

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION (JIB)

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Hill ASC., Inc. (SOI Referral)**  
File Number: I24W00036

GSA OIG initiated an investigation based on a Suspicion of Irregularity Report titled "Independent Post Award Examination of Multiple Award Schedule Contract Hill ASC, Inc., Contract Number GS-35F-0235U, Assignment Number A220025." During the audit, GSA OIG's Office of Audits (JA) found several conditions that warrant further investigation, including work outside the scope of the contract, overcharging GSA customers, and failure to disclose prompt payment discounts to government customers. JA calculated that, between January 2018 and December 2022, Hill ASC Inc. (Hill) may have improperly charged GSA customers nearly \$64.3 million. It was found Hill ASC, Inc., had worked outside the scope of the contract, overcharged GSA customers, and failed to disclose prompt payment discounts to government customers between 2018 and 2023.

On March 12, 2024, Assistant United States Attorney, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Columbia's Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section accepted the case for prosecution.

On July 14, 2025, Hill agreed to pay at least \$14.75 million to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act in connection with a GSA contract for information technology services.

This matter does not require any further investigation by this office unless further actionable information is received.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
409 3rd Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington, DC 20024

Page 126 of 156

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(7)(A)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

March 3, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(A) SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

Digitally signed by

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.03.04  
09:12:30 -05'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**ACTFL Professional Services, LLC**  
Case Number: I24W00156

On September 20, 2023, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia requested JIB's assistance in investigating allegations that the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages Inc. (ACTFL) and ACTFL Professional Services, LLC (ACTFL-PS) violated the False Claims Act. Specifically, the relator alleged that ACTFL created a shell company (ACTFL-PS) to evade small business restrictions. Since 2018, GSA awarded ACTFL-PS two small business set-aside contracts (47QFHA18D0001 and 47QFHA22D0003) on behalf of the Department of the Army's Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The total obligated amount against those contracts was \$1,148,711.89 and \$569,011.66, respectively.

GSA OIG agents, alongside Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division, conducted several interviews and reviewed both contract files, as well as records generated by the Small Business Administration in response to multiple protests filed by the relator. The review of records revealed the relationship between the two entities was permissible and while ACTFL-PS did subcontract a large portion of the work to an eligible entity, the amount subcontracted did not exceed the allowable limit.

The AUSA assigned to this matter consulted with relator's counsel and obtained consent to the close the matter. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice

This matter does not require any further investigation and is now closed.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB)  
409 3rd Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington, DC 20024



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

July 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
 [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |

CASE NUMBER: I25200031

On December 5, 2024, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Investigations and Operations Division, Threat Management Operations, contacted the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY regarding a potential impersonation/unauthorized access scheme, involving a person employed as a GSA contractor.

An unidentified individual virtually interviewed with a DHS contractor for a position that would have had access to sensitive information. During the onboarding process, it was discovered the person that interviewed and the person who reported were not the same. DHS HSI subsequently identified the person, as [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who actually appeared for work during an outbound inspection flight. During the inspection, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) identified [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as a GSA contract employee. A GSA OIG preliminary inquiry determined [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was a full-time contractor working for GSA Region 2, employed as an IAM OKTA Application Engineer, with an address of One World Trade Center, New York, NY. Additionally, information was developed that [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) may have been working full time, concurrently, as a contractor for the U.S. Postal Services (USPS).

In January, 2025, JAI-2 determined [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as no longer employed by GSA or USPS.

In March and April, 2025 USPS and DHS attempted to conduct an interview of [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) however, attempts to contact [redacted] (b)(6) were unsuccessful.

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In May, 2025, JIA-2 confirmed [REDACTED] current home address in Lyndhurst, NJ and coordinated with USPIS to conduct an in-person interview.

On June 17, 2025, a JIA-2 special agent and USPIS special agent interviewed [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] home. During the interview, [REDACTED] admitted to working at GSA and USPS concurrently and indicated [REDACTED] did not accept the position with DHS because it was beyond [REDACTED] capabilities.

During the investigation, DHS was able to retrieve a fingerprint believed to be that of the unidentified individual who had interviewed with DHS for [REDACTED] position. To date, the individual associated with the fingerprint has not been identified or linked to GSA.

Due to there being no current nexus to GSA and no known loss to GSA at this time, the case will be closed.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

January 28, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
RYAN  
Date: 2025.01.28 14:22:47 -06'00'  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**  
File Number: I25200034

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary.

On January 6, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Board President, Art Center Highland Park, 1957 Sheridan Road, Highland Park, Illinois contacted the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Northeast Region Investigations Office (JIA-2), regarding a Works Progress Administration painting titled "The Chicago River" by Aaron Bohard.

The investigation was transferred to the GSA OIG Midwest investigations Division (JID-5), for further investigation. On January 21, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Fine Arts Specialist, Center for Fine Arts, Office of Architecture and Engineering, GSA provided the investigating agent a signed loan agreement with the Art Center Highland Park. The agreement is valid until GSA states otherwise. The painting has a internal value of \$3,000.



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

September 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**  
[REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

CASE NUMBER: I25200045

On January 27, 2025, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, received a proactive lead from the New Jersey State Police State (NJSP), State Agency for Surplus Property (SASP), regarding [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who owns three separate companies: (1) Medex Medical Equipment Supply and Transportation LLC, located in Brooklyn, NY; (2) Aberdeen Trucking located in East Orange, NJ; and (3) Aberdeen Mechanical LLC, located in Brooklyn, NY, and East Orange, NJ. All three companies are listed as Veteran Owned Small Businesses (VOSB). The NJSP/SASP believed [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) may be claiming to operate in New Jersey to avoid transfer fees on the equipment, since they do not charge a transfer fee, compared to New York State SASP who charges 5% based on the value of the item. Furthermore, a web search indicated both locations are residences, and a Thompson Reuters Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR) report indicated [REDACTED] (b)(7)(C) current address as 1788 Schenectady Ave., Brooklyn, NY. [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is the only employee listed at the company. Additionally, seethroughny.net reports [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is employed by the City of New York as a plumber and earned \$163,077 in 2024, and another \$13,687 with the New York City Department of Social Services. A search of SAM extract indicated all IP activity occurs in Brooklyn, NY. [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received \$404,409.70 in equipment through New Jersey and \$685,215.16 in equipment through New York, for a total of \$1,089,624.86 in surplus equipment. JIA-2 opened an investigation into the matter to confirm [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) eligibility, whether the companies are fictitious, and if the government sustained a loss.

On February 25, 2025, JIA-2 conducted a site visit to 1788 Schenectady Ave., Brooklyn, NY, the address reported as [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) residence and New York business locations of Aberdeen

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Mechanical and Medex. A van registered in New York was located at the location and had Aberdeen Mechanical written on the side of the vehicle that was registered to [REDACTED]

On March 3, 2025, JIA-2 conducted a site visit of 93 Girard Ave., East Orange, NJ, the purported business address of Aberdeen Mechanical, Medex, and Aberdeen Trucking. The owner of the residence stated [REDACTED] operated [REDACTED] businesses at the location but would not provide an affidavit to substantiate the claim. No equipment related to [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] business was visible on or around the property.

In March 2025, JIA-2 conducted a site visit of 309 Houses Corner Rd., Sparta, NJ. On the property was equipment received by [REDACTED] through the New York SASP and New Jersey SASP, specifically a compressor and tanker truck received through the New Jersey SASP and a mobile generator received through the New York SASP. JIA-2 inquired with local law enforcement regarding the property and discovered the owner of the property was the subject of an on-going criminal investigation. Records indicated the owner of the property had also been fined by authorities for large-scale illegal dumping.

In May 2025, JIA-2 interviewed [REDACTED] and conducted a surplus property inspection of the New York and New Jersey locations. All equipment was identified, excluding a piece of equipment, listed as a "Jet Vac" truck, still located in Hawaii. The equipment in Hawaii was later confirmed to have been picked up by a third-party contractor and awaiting shipment.

On May 28, 2025, JIA-2 conducted a follow-up interview of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] attorney present. During the interview, it was determined [REDACTED] had lied on [REDACTED] surplus application to receive equipment. [REDACTED] falsely claimed on two separate applications, to both the New Jersey SASP and New York SASP, that [REDACTED] was an active company, with two employees, that provided medical transportation services. The investigation revealed Medex was not yet operational, did not have employees, and had not provided any services to date. [REDACTED] also falsely claimed to have a home office located in East Orange, NJ. It was further determined [REDACTED] lied on official documentation claiming equipment had already been placed into use when it was not, specifically: (1) [REDACTED] received a paving breaker set valued at \$2,714.84 on November 5, 2024 and falsely claimed it was placed into use on November 5, 2024; (2) [REDACTED] received a hazmat command system valued at \$174,719.84 on November 5, 2024 and falsely claimed it was placed into use on November 5, 2024; (3) [REDACTED] received two arc welders valued at \$4,000 each on January 21, 2025 and falsely claimed they were placed into use on December 30, 2024; (4) [REDACTED] received a compressor valued at \$102,957 on November 18, 2024 and falsely claimed it was placed into use on November 20, 2024; and (5) [REDACTED] received another pavement breaker valued at \$13,200 on November 18, 2024 and falsely claimed it was placed into use on February 5, 2025. In his initial interview with JIA-2, [REDACTED] stated the compressor was used to crush rocks, however in a follow-up interview, [REDACTED] admitted the compressor was never used or placed into service.

On June 3, 2025, JIA-2 presented the case to Eastern District of New York (EDNY), Assistant United States Attorney, (AUSA), [REDACTED] for potential criminal prosecution. AUSA [REDACTED] suggested presenting the case to the Public Integrity Unit at EDNY.

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In June 2025, GSA, New Jersey SASP, and New York SASP determined [redacted] would be removed from the surplus program and all equipment [redacted] received through the New Jersey and New York SASPs would be recovered.

On June 25, 2025, and June 27, 2025, JIA-2 assisted New Jersey State Police with the successful recovery of all surplus equipment [redacted] received through the New Jersey SASP.

In July and August 2025 [redacted] returned all equipment received via New York SASP.

On August 1, 2025, [redacted] reported all equipment to include a "Jet Vac" truck located in Hawaii had been returned. On August 11, 2025, the New York SASP confirmed with JIA-2 that they had received all equipment from [redacted] and the "Jet Vac" truck was returned to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Hawaii.

On August 19, 2025, JIA-2 presented the case to EDNY, Chief of Public Integrity [redacted] for prosecution. EDNY declined prosecution due to limited resources and no loss to the government.

No further investigation will be conducted, and the case will be closed.

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

May 12, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
  
Region 2 Land Ports of Entry Paving Projects  
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)  
File Number: I25200088

This investigation was initiated in May 2024, when the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General, (OIG), Northeast and Caribbean Regional Audit Office, 26 Federal Plaza Room [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York, NY (JA-2), contacted GSA, OIG, Northeast Region Investigations Office JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, Room [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York, NY, regarding an audit conducted of GSA, Public Building Service (PBS), Northeast & Caribbean Region (Region 2) \$5.3 million construction and pavement projects at six Land Ports of Entry (POE) stations in New York, using Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) funds. Specifically, they shared concerns of an improper project method of award, via task order, to the Lake Champlain POE Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contractor Action Facilities Management (AFM), 237 W. Service Road, Champlain, NY; and a potentially inappropriate relationship between [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Project Manager (PM), GSA, PBS, Upstate Field Office, 237 W. Service Road, Champlain, NY, and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Owner, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Excavating 2086 Plank Road, Ellenburg Depot, NY, the Lake Champlain POE snow plow contractor, and AFM's consultant and subcontractor on the paving project.

In May 2024, a JIA-2 special agent obtained and reviewed emails from several GSA employees and contractors associated with the project. In sum, the emails were primarily work related and professional in nature, however, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) forwarded [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) several emails received from third party contractors with project specification and pricing information, unrelated to the POE pavement projects.

On January 14, 2025, JIA-2 special agents interviewed [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who acted as a Construction Control Representative before and during the project. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) assisted [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Senior Property Manager (retired), GSA, Northern Border Property Management Office, GSA Upstate Field Office, EbM Service Center, Region 2, 237 W. Service Road, Champlain, NY, and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PM, GSA, Region 2, 1 Clinton Ave, Albany, NY, who managed the project. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not have influence over how the project was awarded, nor was he involved in the contractor selection process. He believed GSA issued the task order to AFM because it was the quickest avenue to award and completion. AFM added value to the contract by handling project management and oversight. AFM subcontracted the milling and paving to Kubricky Construction Corp, Queensbury, NY (subsidiary of DA Collins Construction Co. Inc.).

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acted as both AFM's PM and excavating sub-contractor. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) claimed no outside relationship with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) nor had (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received anything in value in exchange for government information or contracts. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acknowledged (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) forwarded (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) third party contractor pricing information, and that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) should have removed it before sending it. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was privy to the project specification information, but not the pricing.

On January 14, 2025, JIA-2 special agents interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PM, AFM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) handled daily paving operations validation with GSA, was involved throughout the project, and performed general laborer oversight. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had no knowledge of any wrongdoing or inappropriate relationships with contractors or anyone at GSA during the project. Overall, the project ran smoothly from start to finish. He did not think anything was abnormal about (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) involvement. In fact, he believed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) provided savings to AFM and the government. A national contractor from outside the area would most likely have charged more.

On January 14, 2025, JIA-2 special agents interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who had the snowplow contract at the Lake Champlain POE for the last 20 years. GSA came to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) several years prior and added a line item to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) contract, to allow (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to do repair work around the POE. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) believed GSA benefited from utilizing Kubricky, a local company who provided the asphalt and self-performed the installation. Additionally, the project was completed before the winter, done properly and completed on time. Large outside construction firms would have undoubtedly taken longer and charged more. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) understood how the project was under the microscope, but noted there are limited options in the region to do that work. A quality job was done, and the government received good value. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was never given anything of value to anyone at GSA in exchange for information or contracts.

On March 14, 2025, JIA-2 special agents interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) The project was not put out to the public for bids because AFM had a line item in their O&M contract for asphalt repairs, so it was logical to issue it to AFM. This allowed GSA to get the job started and finished before the upcoming winter season. It wasn't until the GSA OIG audit report (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) learned there was a potential issue with method of award. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) felt GSA saved time and money by doing it that way. In addition, there were no injuries or major issues, and it was done well and on time. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not have any knowledge of anyone at GSA receiving anything of value from GSA contractors in exchange for special treatment, inside information or contracts. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not know of any inappropriate relationships between anyone at GSA with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) or other contractors.

No further investigation of this matter will be conducted by JIA-2, and the case will be closed.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

June 24, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (JIA-2)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Fleet Card Fraud – NY Air National Guard  
File Number: 125200110

On June 25, 2024, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Fleet Loss Prevention Team (FLPT), contacted GSA, Office of Inspector General (OIG), New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, with concerns about the GSA issued Wright Express (WEX) cards issued to the New York Air National Guard (NYANG), in Western New York. Specifically, GSA FLPT identified two WEX cards of significant concern: (1) G61-1154Y, a 2021 Ford Escape, dark blue in color, and; (2) G61-1649Y, a 2021 Ford Escape, black in color. The Both GOV's have telematics, which indicated the WEX cards are being used when the GOV's are not present and purchasing fuel in excess of the fuel tank capacity. The current estimated loss for the two GOV's is over \$4,000 dollars.

During September and October 2024, a JIA-2 special agent conducted multiple reviews of the transactions related to G61-1154Y and noted possible fraudulent activity confirmed through discrepancies with fueling and telematic data. Video of transactions identified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Recruiter, NYANG, as a subject.

On March 28, 2025, JIA-2 special agents interviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to fueling (b)(6) personal vehicle on 2 occasions with GSA WEX cards, resulting in approximately \$80.00 dollars in of fraudulent charges (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supervisor, Major (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Recruiting and Retention Battalion, NYANG was also briefed on the investigative findings.

The loss amount falls under the minimum federal prosecutorial threshold for the U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of New York.

On May 13, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) informed JIA-2 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) had resigned from the NYANG, was demoted a rank, and received a general officer memorandum of reprimand.

On May 21, 2025, GSA Fleet Loss Prevention billed back the NY Army National Guard for vehicle G61-1154Y, for a total of \$86.32.

A JIA-2 special agent also conducted various checks related to the WEX card for G61-1649Y, but was unable to locate any additional fraudulent activity.

No further investigative activity will be conducted, and this case is considered closed.

New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2)  
26 Federal Plaza, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York, NY 10278

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**  
**SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE**

April 15, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Date: 2025.04.16 09:07:58 -04'00'

SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**G41 B3265 (Fleet)**  
Case Number: **125400015**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

GSA-OIG initiated this investigation to determine if fraudulent transactions were made with the WEX Fleet credit card assigned to G41-B3265. JI-C conducted a thorough investigation by reviewing WEX transactions; obtaining video surveillance; and interviewing subject(s). The case was presented to an AUSA in the Eastern District of North Carolina and was declined. The possible violation was 18 U.S. C. 641 (Theft of Government Property).

On March 31, 2025, Staff Sergeant (SSG) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) signed a Waiver of Time to Consult with an Attorney in Article 15 Proceeding. SSG (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) acknowledged there is an Article 15, nonjudicial punishment against him. SSG declined time to consult with an attorney and moved forward with the immediate reading of the Article 15. SSG (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also waived his right to wait 48 hours prior to proceeding.

As disclosed in the Record of Proceedings Under Article 15, SSG (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was found guilty of all allegations pertaining to the misuse of a WEX Fleet Fuel Card assigned to a GOV with tag number G41-B3265 (2024 Chrysler Pacifica) assigned to the Department of Army, NC Recruit Retention, Raleigh, North Carolina. SSG (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received a reduction in grade from an E-6 to an E-5, forfeited one-half base pay for two months, and received an oral reprimand.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Office of Investigations (JI-C)  
401 W Peachtree Street NW, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308



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U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

May 12, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.05.12 12:40:28  
-04'00'

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) J  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

**Case Closing**  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Case Number: **I25400081**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. To close this matter, no further actions or referrals are necessary.

On October 18, 2024, GSA OIG received a referral from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) alleging that U.S. Army member, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was selling stolen government property in violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). It was believed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) obtained this equipment through the fraudulent use of a Government Purchase Card (GPC).

On April 30, 2024, it was determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was never a GPC holder. Attempts to identify a military GPC used in the purchasing of this military property were negative. It was later learned through the investigation that the military property was not purchased with a GPC.

Information was developed that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was in possession of Department of Defense owned weapons, parts accessories, and Night Vision Devices (NVD) obtained during the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The complaint stated that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was allegedly selling these government owned devices on a peer-to-peer trading platform for military surplus items. It was determined that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did sell this type of equipment on the trading platform however, the equipment could not be traced back to U.S. Army records. After reviewing records obtained during the investigation, the investigation did not indicate any ongoing activities by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to continue to sell military equipment.

On March 11, 2025, the United States Attorney's Office, Western District of Arkansas, declined prosecution based on the inability to establish the origin and disposition records of the military equipment in question.

Based on the complaint, interview review, and evidence reviewed, this matter does not require any further investigation or action.

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Office of Investigations (JI-C)

401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

**MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

May 28, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |  |  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MIDWEST INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (JID)

SUBJECT: **Case Closing**  
File Number: I25500041

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further action or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

In January 2025, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received an email from GSA Short Term Rental (STR) Branch Chief, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) regarding an individual, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) accessing GSAFleet.gov and attempting to obtain a vehicle from the STR branch. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) created multiple accounts within GSAFleet.gov and was impersonating FBI, DHS, and ICE agents in profiles and email communication with GSAFleet representatives.

During the investigation documents were reviewed, to include the profiles (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) created within GSAFleet.gov. Audio recordings were reviewed from which (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) called GSA Fleet customer service phone number. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) email and IP address were investigated further and located back to various locations within Minnesota.

The FBI Minneapolis Field Office opened an investigation to assist. Local law enforcement was contacted regarding (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) attempt to obtain a government fleet vehicle and for situational awareness. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the FBI office in Minneapolis, MN.

Due to facts and information presented in the case and federal prosecution guidelines, the USAO declines prosecution of the case.

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Office of Investigations (JI-5) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chicago, IL 60604 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
Southwest and Rocky Mountain Division

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

December 2, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Digitally signed by

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.12.02

12:33:01 -06'00'

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Rush Springs Police Department (Federal Surplus Property)  
File No. I25700125

This is to advise you that the above-captioned investigation was officially closed on this date. This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

The General Services Administration Office of Inspector General (GSA OIG), Fort Worth, TX, received information from the GSA Personal Property Division (PPD) regarding a possible stolen GSA-owned firearms from the Rush Springs Police Department (Rush Springs), Rush Springs, OK. On August 22, 2024, GSA PPD reported that during the annual firearms inventory, Rush Springs Chief (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to GSA that a firearm could not be located. The firearm was obtained through GSA's federal firearms donation program. The inventory reports from August 15, 2024, indicated that the Grady County Sheriff's Office was notified of the stolen firearm and was investigating. On August 29, 2024, the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) assumed investigative efforts.

GSA OIG and OSBI agents conducted the investigation. Agents reviewed historical reports, conducted database records checks, and interviewed witnesses and potential subjects. The investigative efforts were unsuccessful in identifying a subject, and the firearm was unable to be located.

The case was presented for prosecutorial consideration to the Sixth Prosecutorial District, Chickasha, Oklahoma. The case was declined due to insufficient evidence.

If you have any questions, please contact Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@gsaig.gov, or me at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@gsaig.gov.

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Office of Investigations  
819 Taylor Street, Room (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fort Worth, TX 76102

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

July 16, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Sam H. Ray – "Chief Ouray" (WPA Recovery)  
File Number: I25C00044

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JI-O.

As part of the General Services Administration Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG) New Deal era art recovery project, an individual contacted GSA OIG regarding a potential New Deal era painting, "Chief Ouray" by Sam Ray, that was listed for sale by an art gallery in Durango, Colorado. GSA OIG coordinated with GSA Fine Arts to determine if the painting was New Deal era art. On January 31, 2025, GSA Fine Arts advised that they received legal concurrence to recover the painting as federal property. GSA OIG corresponded and coordinated with the art gallery. The gallery had sold the painting to a customer, and they advised that they would contact the customer to have them return the painting to the gallery.

On April 25, 2025, the gallery stated that they recovered the painting from the customer and asked if the painting could be donated to the Southern Ute Tribe Cultural Center and Museum. GSA OIG coordinated with GSA Fine Arts regarding the donation request. GSA Fine Arts agreed to complete loan paperwork with the museum. On July 15, 2025, GSA Fine Arts advised that the loan paperwork was completed. GSA Fine Arts provided an estimated internal value of \$3,000 (the estimate is for internal use only and is not a formal appraisal or representative of the market value of the artwork) for the painting.

No further action is anticipated, and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
 Office of Inspector General

April 3, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
 NEW ENGLAND FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE (JIA-1)

SUBJECT: CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM  
 RALPH NELSON- "GRAY DAY ON THE MARSHES" (WPA RECOVERY)  
 CASE NUMBER: I25C00075

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close the matter.

On March 10, 2025, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Hotline Division, received a voicemail from [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ], VT, stating [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] came into possession of a WPA painting when helping move a friend's parents into a retirement community. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] observed the WPA tag on the painting and wanted to turn it in.

GSA OIG, Operations Division (JI-O), coordinated with [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] and GSA Center for Fine Arts. GSA confirmed the artwork, titled "Gray Day on The Marshes", painted by Ralph Nelson, is a WPA piece. GSA Legal Division approved recovery of the painting. GSA OIG, New England Field Investigations Office (JIA-1), was assigned the case and was tasked with recovering the artwork.

On March 27, 2025, JIA-1 met [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] in Bradford, VT, and took custody of the painting. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] signed a GSA OIG release form.

On March 31, 2025, the painting was physically transferred to GSA, OIG, New York Field Investigations Office (JIA-2), 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY.

On April 2, 2025, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] Fine Arts Specialist, GSA, advised [redacted] (b)(6) ] could not accept the painting as the lease for their storage facility had been cancelled. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] requested JIA-2 hold onto the painting while [redacted] (b)(6) ] determines potential destinations for the painting.

JI-O advised WPA recovery cases could be closed even if GSA OIG is storing WPA artwork until GSA can accept them.

JIA-2 will maintain custody of the painting and assist in returning it to GSA at a later date.



**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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May 16, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

Julia Thecla- "Signal" (WPA Recovery)  
File Number: I25C00076

This memorandum presents the findings of an investigation conducted by JI-O.

As part of the General Services Administration Office of Inspector General's (GSA OIG) New Deal era art recovery project, an individual notified GSA OIG that they had a potential New Deal era artwork, "*Signal*" by Julia Thecla. GSA OIG corresponded and coordinated with the individual to obtain additional information.

On March 24, 2025, GSA Fine Arts staff advised that they received legal concurrence to recover the painting as federal property. On March 27, 2025, GSA Fine Arts staff provided an estimated internal value of \$8,000 (the estimate is for internal use only and is not a formal appraisal or representative of the market value of the artwork) for the painting. On April 3, 2025, GSA OIG recovered the painting from the auction house in Addison, Illinois. On April 15, 2025, GSA OIG delivered the painting to the Illinois State Museum, Springfield, Illinois.

No further action is anticipated, and this matter is now closed.

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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March 27, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

FAR Disclosure  
Case Number: 125C00079

(b)(4)

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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(b)(4)

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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**Office of Inspector General**

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May 16, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION (JI-O)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM**

FAR Disclosure  
Case Number: I25C00093

(b)(4)

Operations Division (JI-O)  
1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405

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**REPORT INSERT - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
CASE CLOSING REPORT**

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This investigation was initiated based on a referral from GSA OIG's Data Analytics team alleging that six companies, Police Service Dogs Inc., Logistics Canine Services Inc., Strategic Canine International Inc., Nightwinds International Inc., Texas K9 Solutions LLC, and Kajun K9 LLC DBA Kajun Kountry Kennels, appeared to be affiliated based on information in the System for Award Management (SAM). The referral mentioned that the companies all bid against one another in the Unison Marketplace submitting consistently matching bids. The Unison Marketplace is a reverse auction platform for government contractors to bid on solicitations at a price they are willing to sell their goods and services to the government. The solicitations associated with this investigation were for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) contracts to provide canines for border protection.

The investigation revealed that only three of the six companies were affiliated. Those three related companies are Police Service Dogs, Strategic Canine International and Logistics Canine Services. These companies shared the same principals and the same address.

A review of government employee emails revealed CBP was aware of the affiliation. The CBP Mission Support Specialist was interviewed who explained besides price, there were several other factors such as open contracts, past performance, breed conformance, expertise and capacity to deliver, that were taken into consideration when selecting a vendor's bid and awarding a contract to them. The government official stated the affiliation was not an issue since the selection of whom to award the contract to was not just based on the lowest price but other selecting factors as well. The government official opined that Police Service Dogs, Logistics Canine Services and Strategic Canine International provided the best quality canines.

Numerous additional interviews and document reviews revealed that their affiliation did not provide any competitive advantage given the fact that they were bidding the same amount on Unison and CBP treated all three companies as a single entity.

On September 30, 2025, the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida declined to prosecute this case since multiple government officials were aware of the affiliation and they continued to award contracts to these companies.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.

<b>CASE NUMBER</b> I25DA00105	<b>PREPARED BY</b> Special Agent [redacted] [redacted]	<b>DATE PREPARED</b> 11/28/2025	<b>APPROVED BY</b> ASAC [redacted]
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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**REPORT INSERT - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
CASE CLOSING REPORT**

This report presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on a complaint from a U.S. Navy employee which alleged that government-owned vehicle (GOV) G42-1509V was stolen from Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola.

On December 15, 2024, the Escambia County Sheriff's Office located the vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. The driver, identified as (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) contract employee at NAS Pensacola, was detained and later released to the NAS Pensacola Police Department. During an interview with law enforcement (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) admitted to stealing the GOV. Telemetry data obtained by GSA-OIG later confirmed that the GOV had been taken to (b)(6); residence. (b)(6); was arrested by the NAS Pensacola Police Department and was issued a U.S. District Court violation notice, charging (b)(6); with theft of government property.

The investigation later determined that (b)(6); also stole tools from NAS Pensacola.

On March 12, 2025, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Florida filed a criminal information charging (b)(6); with two counts of theft of government property.

On June 18, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) appeared in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida and pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of government property. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was sentenced to twelve months of probation and was ordered to pay a special monetary assessment.

On November 17, 2025, (b)(6); was adjudicated guilty of probation violations and was committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons for a total term of three months with credit for time served in Federal custody.

On July 16, 2025, GSA-OIG referred the matter to the Navy Acquisition Integrity Office (AIO) for debarment action. On July 31, 2025, the Navy AIO issued a notice of proposed debarment to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). On November 25, 2025, the Navy AIO advised that due to other circumstances, a debarment to protect the government's interests was not warranted. As a result, the Navy AIO terminated and closed the matter.

CASE NUMBER	PREPARED BY	DATE PREPARED	APPROVED BY
I25H00123	Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	11/26/2025	



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

August 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Digitally signed by [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
 MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION (JIB)  
 Date: 2025.08.06  
 15:13:30 -04'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
**Repaintex Company**  
File Number: I25H00375

GSA OIG received a referral from GSA PBS alleging that Repaintex Company (Repaintex), a GSA contractor, that had been awarded a firm fixed price design-build contract for phases five and six renovations at the Ronald Reagan Building located in Washington, DC had defrauded the government by engaging in activities that include acceptance of payments for work not completed, overbilling, presentation of certified invoices for incomplete work, and misallocation of work between contracts. GSA OIG and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG agents conducted several interviews, reviewed all pertinent contract documents and conducted several queries of online GSA, USAID, and law enforcement databases.

On July 15, 2025, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, Department of Justice, Civil Division was briefed on the investigation, but declined prosecution due to loss amounts under \$10 million.

On July 18, 2025, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Assistant United States Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, was briefed on the investigation, but declined prosecution due to loss amounts below \$10 million and lack of prosecutive resources.

On July 24, 2024, the GSA Office of Counsel and GSA Office of Audits received a briefing on the case. The Office of Audits stated they would decline to review this matter further.

This matter does not require any further investigation by this office unless further actionable information is received.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
409 3rd Street, Suite [redacted] (b)(6); Washington, DC 20024



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

August 20, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (JIB)

Digital Signature  
by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.08.20  
09:45:47 -04'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Case Number: I25H00577

The General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Pittsburgh, PA, received anonymous allegations through a hotline tip that government employees in the U.S. District Court facility, Clarksburg, WV, were exposed to hazardous work conditions and unsafe drinking water. The complainant alleged (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), District Court Clerk for the Northern District of West Virginia, Wheeling, WV, let the hazardous conditions persist by not withholding lease payments to GSA and by not elevating the issues above (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Charleston Field Office Manager, GSA Public Building Service (PBS) Region 3, Charleston, WV. In exchange for not elevating the issues and for having the court continue to make lease payments, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) allegedly arranged for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to obtain employment with GSA PBS Region 3 as a building manager.

GSA OIG Audit's Division conducted a preliminary review of GSA's responses to the hazardous conditions and validated some of the complainant's allegations of hazardous work conditions that included natural gas leaks, mold, and general air contamination. The Audit Division determined no further audit was required to review GSA's handling of the hazardous facility issues as the issues were being reasonably addressed. GSA OIG Investigation's Division investigated the *quid pro quo* allegations related to GSA's hiring of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

GSA OIG agents coordinated with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts who had oversight of Judiciary employees. The two Judiciary investigators were conflicted because they previously worked for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). Without any other investigative resources, the Chief of Staff to the Office of the Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts assisted GSA OIG with the investigation in a support capacity. Interviews with Judiciary employees revealed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-3)  
600 Arch Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Philadelphia, PA 19106

was the senior facilities contact for both GSA and the Judiciary for the Northern District of West Virginia. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) interacted with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) about facility issues. A witness recalled (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) participated in a conference call with the Assistant Circuit Executive of Judiciary Facilities (ACE of Space) about withholding lease payments to GSA. The discussion pertained to the space vacated by Judiciary employees because of the hazardous conditions. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not voice an opinion for or against withholding lease payments to GSA during the meeting with the ACE of Space. Interviews with senior space and facilities managers at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts revealed it could not withhold lease payments to GSA to force performance on a lease.

GSA OIG reviewed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) emails, reviewed human resource documents, national security questionnaire documents, travel records, and conducted interviews. Agents confirmed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) visited with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) on May 15, 2024, in Wheeling, WV. After 9:00 p.m. on May 15, 2024, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) son sent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) resume to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) GSA email account. The resume was revised and sent to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) on May 16, 2024. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) then immediately forwarded the resume to hiring managers within GSA PBS Region 3, Philadelphia, PA. In a separate communication weeks after referring (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) there were communications between (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and the hiring manager where the hiring manager referred to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) "cousin." GSA Human Resources Manual (HRM) 9310.2 *Restrictions on Employment of Relatives*, dated March 4, 2020, prohibited GSA employees from referring the family member to another public official for consideration of employment within GSA.

GSA OIG requested the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to assign an independent person to review (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) email to determine if there were any communications about withholding lease payments to GSA and about (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) employment with GSA. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts declined to review (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) government email communications to investigate the *quid pro quo* allegations out of concern for violating (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) privacy.

Further investigation revealed the familial reference to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was made in gest between (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and a colleague. During interviews, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) both denied being related and the colleague admitted the "cousin" comment was a joke. It also revealed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was qualified for the position and was subsequently hired by the GSA hiring manager in August 2024, under Schedule A direct hiring authority. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) worked as a building management specialist assigned to GSA PBS Region 3, until February 2025, when (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was terminated during government-wide reduction in-force activities affecting probationary employees.

The information available to GSA OIG did not support the allegations of a *quid pro quo* arrangement for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to obtain employment with GSA and there was no information to support that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were cousins as defined by HRM 9310.2.

This matter does not require any further investigation or action.



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

June 24, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FILE

Digitally signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FROM:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Date: 2025.06.24  
10:59:30 -04'00'

ACTING SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT:

**CASE CLOSING**

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Case Number: I25M00021

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated on December 11, 2024 when the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Personal Property Sales Division reported a fraudulent chargeback to GSA's Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG). According to the complaint, an individual named (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) won GSA Auctions sale lot 21QSCI24765019 for thirty-five laptop computers in the amount of \$4,012.00. The laptop computers were picked up from a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital and were later transported using a third party delivery service named Roadie. GSA later received a chargeback because the transaction was unauthorized.

On December 19, 2024, GSA provided GSA-OIG with information which indicated that a third party delivery service named Dispatch was used for sale lot numbers 11QSCI25009011 and 31QSCI25133, and that the Dispatch orders were placed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). The Dispatch documentation for sale lot numbers 11QSCI25009011 and 31QSCI25133 reference the names (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) respectively.

On June 12, 2025, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was interviewed by GSA-OIG. The interview revealed that an individual from the Republic of Ghana named (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to sign up for GSA Auctions and provided (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with credit card information to submit bids. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) asked (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to sign up for GSA Auctions because (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unable to from the Republic of Ghana. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was supposed to pay (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for the orders (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was awarded, however (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) never received any money from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) told (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to pay for the laptop computers after the chargeback, however, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unresponsive. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) sent the laptop computers to Dubai to resell them. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) never told (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) where the credit card information was obtained; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unaware if the credit card information was stolen. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to use the credit card information under (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) name. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) coordinated with Roadie and used it as a delivery service. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was unfamiliar with the names (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

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On April 22, 2025, GSA-OIG obtained shipping records from United Parcel Service which indicated there were shipments to Dubai that referenced the names [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] and [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ]

On June 24, 2025, GSA informed GSA-OIG that it would be seeking reimbursement from [ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ] for the laptop computers in the amount of \$4,012.00.

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**REPORT INSERT - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**CASE CLOSING REPORT**

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This report presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on a referral from the General Services Administration (GSA) Fleet Loss Prevention which showed over tank purchases associated with Fleet credit card transactions in Sanford, Florida. The Fleet credit card is assigned to government-owned vehicle (GOV) G62-0128Z.

On August 8, 2025, the GSA Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG) obtained gas station video surveillance footage and information regarding the transactions. GSA-OIG determined that the GOV was present at the gas station during the times of the transactions and that gas cans were being filled up.

On September 4, 2025, Amtrak Office of Inspector General met with Amtrak employees who confirmed that Amtrak authorized them to fill up gas cans to fuel a compressor. The employees were advised that GSA's policy does not authorize the GSA Fleet credit cards to be used for that purpose.

On September 4, 2025, GSA issued bill backs to Amtrak totaling \$266.98.

<b>CASE NUMBER</b>	<b>PREPARED BY</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>APPROVED BY</b>
I26M00006	Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	11/18/2025	



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**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
Office of Inspector General

SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE

July 10, 2025

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

Digital signed by (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
Date: 2025.07.10 16:32:28  
-04'00'

FROM: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
SPECIAL AGENT-IN-CHARGE  
SOUTHEAST AND CARIBBEAN DIVISION (JI-C)

SUBJECT: **CASE CLOSING**  
**G42-1281U (FLEET)**  
Case Number: **C24M00133**

This memorandum presents the findings of our investigation. No further actions or referrals are necessary to close this matter.

This investigation was initiated based on a referral from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General which showed diesel fuel over tank purchases and unusual odometer entries associated with fleet credit card transactions in Orlando, Florida. The fleet credit card was assigned to government-owned vehicle (GOV) G42-1281U.

On September 11, 2024, the U.S. General Services Administration – Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG) obtained gas station video surveillance footage and transaction information regarding the fraudulent charges and identified the suspect vehicles using license plate reader information. Investigators were unable to identify the suspects in the video surveillance footage.

On October 24, 2024, GSA-OIG and investigators from the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services conducted surveillance of the suspect vehicles but did not observe any illegal activity.

GSA-OIG will refer this matter to GSA Loss Prevention to initiate a chargeback request.

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Office of Investigations (JI-C)  
401 West Peachtree Street, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Atlanta, GA 30308

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
Office of Inspector General

July 1, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM: [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  
 MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION (JIB) \_\_\_\_\_ Digitally signed by  
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 Date: 2025.07.02  
 08:16:05 -04'00'

SUBJECT: Closing Memorandum RE:  
 [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)  
 File Number: I25W00129

GSA OIG initiated an investigation based on a request for assistance from HUD OIG investigating allegations that [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a GS-15 employee working in HUD's Office of the Chief Information Officer, had been operating multiple undisclosed businesses, including USNIA, Inc., which has a \$475,000 contract with GSA's Federal Acquisition Service (Contract No. 47QSWA24D000R) for security guards and patrol services. [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is also the recipient of potentially fraudulent Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act funds under the Small Business Administration's Paycheck Protection Program and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program. GSA and HUD OIG agents conducted several interviews, reviewed all pertinent contract documents, and conducted several queries of online GSA, HUD, and law enforcement databases. The investigation did not disclose any illegal activity regarding the contract with GSA.

On March 28, 2025, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Public Integrity Section, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, D.C. (USAO DC) declined criminal prosecution. On May 15, 2025, AUSA [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Eastern District of Virginia, U.S. Attorney's Office declined criminal prosecution. On June 25, 2025, AUSA [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fraud Section, Market Integrity & Major Frauds Unit, USAO DC declined criminal prosecution.

This matter does not require any further investigation by this office unless further actionable information is received.

Mid-Atlantic Division, Office of Investigations (JIB-W)  
 409 3rd Street, Suite [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington, DC 20024