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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: MDR - 114538
2 January 2026

Please refer to your request of 25 June 2022 for a Mandatory Declassification Review of the **Oral History of Richard L. Bernard, NSA OH 1988-13**. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection.

Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraphs (b) and (c) and remains classified TOP SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) (3) and/or (6) of the Executive Order.

Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, the names of NSA/CSS employees and information that would reveal NSA/CSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Please be advised that the responsive document includes other government agencies' information. We have consulted with and received input from two other government agencies and have protected their equities with the other government agency (OGA) redaction code. At the time of this letter, other agencies' responses are outstanding. However, we were able to isolate those agency's equities, and we have protected them using the other government agency (OGA) redaction code.

Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority. **The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter.** The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline M. Amacher

Jacqueline M. Amacher
Chief
Declassification Services

Encl:
a/s

OHNR: OH-1988-13 **DOI: 31 Aug 1988**

TRSID: [redacted] **DTR: 28 Sep 1998**

QCSID: **Text Review:**

INAME: **BERNARD, Richard L.** **Text w/Tape:**

IPLACE: **NSA, OPS1, Ft. Meade, MD; DEFSMAC Office**

IVIEWER: **TUCKER, Helen; [redacted] FARLEY, Robert D.**

[Tape 1, Side 1]

Farley: Today is 31 August 1988. Our interviewee is Mr. Richard L. Bernard. Mr. Bernard, the fifth director of DEFSMAC, began his career as an United States Air Force electronics officer in 1948 and later joined NSA and was assigned as an electronics engineer in the R&D element in the agency. At that time he helped to improve or develop a variety of collection related equipments and systems. His background and experience in the engineering field later served him well as a director and gave him a fuller appreciation of the many technical problems facing DEFSMAC and the field sites, which, in most cases, he was able to resolve. This interview is taking place in DEFSMAC, Operations Building, NSA. Interviewer is Bob Farley with Helen Tucker and [redacted] the present director of DEFSMAC. Mr. Bernard desires that the classification of these two cassettes be ~~Top Secret Codeword, SI/TK.~~ And this is NSA Oral History Interview Number 13-88. Well, Mr. Bernard, thank you very much for your time for coming by. What we hope to do is to pick your brain about your career basically. We're going to devote most of the time to the time you spent in DEFSMAC. Talk at any level you like. I have a dispensation form that relieves you from any oath that you might have signed so that you can talk about privileged information for the history that Helen's writing.

Bernard: All right. And generally we're operating at the ~~SI/TK~~ level?

Farley: Yes sir, and anything else. If you want to go into any VRKs. If you think something should be on the tape, and it's a little sensitive, and you're a little concerned about it, try to sanitize it. Try to clean it up a little bit so it's acceptable. Well sir, what we're going to do is start off with your background. Your late teenage days before you were in the military, or after college, or some information so we can sort of set the stage.

Bernard: Okay. I'll have to start by saying that this is a different topic than I thought it was going to be.

Farley: Oh really?

Bernard: I understood that this was mostly, or actually it was exclusively on DEFSMAC days, so that was the only thing I had put any thinking into.

Farley: Just once over lightly and then we'll get into the early part of your career.

Bernard: For this I'll be pretty extemporaneous. Basically when I finished high school I knew that I had wanted to become an engineer. One reason for that was that I was born and raised in Pittsburgh, and if you were born and raised in Pittsburgh, you worked in steel mills. So I knew I didn't want to work in steel mills, having worked there summers. Likewise, I'd worked on my aunt's dairy farm during the summers, and I knew I didn't want to be a farmer. So my dad convinced me that if I became an electrical engineer, that would avert at least those two problems, because that was pretty hard work. I had to get some financial support for college, so I went to the University of Cincinnati, which was a co-op school, and then later on I actually helped start the co-op program at NSA. But I found the co-op program extremely valuable, because it gave you work experience along with your education.

Farley: This is in what year, Mr. Bernard?

Bernard: That would have been from 1948 through '52. Part of college in those days was belonging to the ROTC, because the Korean Conflict was on, and if you weren't in ROTC, you were subject to the draft. But when I got out of the ROTC, I went into the Air Force as a commissioned officer. Went down to (B% Barton) Air Force Base. When they saw I had an engineering degree they said, "Well, you ought to be an Air Force Radar Officer, but our radar officers go to school, so you're going to up to Keesler for Radar Officers School." So even though I had a degree I went there, and since I had both practical experience and formal training, they had a process whereby you could wash through by only taking the test. If you took one test every other day, which was the equivalent of a week's work, you didn't have to go to the classes. So I took a test every other day, and on odd days another friend of mine and I worked on our cars. It was a very enjoyable few months instead of what could have been about a 6-months time. At that time NSA was really just being formed and expanded, and the agency was just getting into the computer business. And they were putting a levy on the military departments for computer engineers. Well, there was no such thing. But somebody got the ..as a matter of fact it was a Colonel Hetherington, who was also an Air Force colonel, who said, "Well, all our systems have digital circuitry, and computers have digital circuitry. We want some really good (B% radar) engineers to come in and become computer technicians, and maintenance people, and designers. So because of my previous experience ..I'd actually graduated at the head of my class at Keesler, and what they had done was they had put a levy on Keesler for the top person out of the next ten courses to be assigned to NSA. So that brought me here to work over at Arlington Hall on some of the early digital computer systems as an Air Force lieutenant. And that was sort of what brought me into the business. You want to sort of continue on in that vein?

Farley: Absolutely, sir. That's fine. That's perfect.

Bernard: Okay.

Farley: With that first assignment at NSA, for instance.

Bernard: That first assignment was actually in the predecessor to what became MPRO. It was either -80 or -81. I always got them mixed up. But it was the cadre of people who were being groomed to actually take over the maintenance of the new computers that were being developed by the R&D organization. And the computer I worked on was called ABNER, which was the equivalent of the Bureau of Standards (B% CAK) (TR Note: pronounced "SEE AK"), except it had some special purpose functions built into it that were to be applied for cryptology. An outgrowth of that was some special purpose digital systems that were built to then perform very specific cryptologic functions. And after several months on ABNER then I actually headed up from the maintenance side a group that was responsible for the maintenance of some early digital computers. That, I think, eventually became MPRO-43 that I was the chief of. Then I got out of the Air Force and actually interviewed for a job here and over at CIA And I was more intrigued with working at CIA, but it took them ..you know, the long clearance process, so I agreed to come back to work at NSA for another 6 months to finish up the project I was responsible for while I was waiting for my CIA clearance. Well, that 6 months turned into about 30 years.

Farley: The CIA never came through?

Bernard: Yes, but by the time they came through, I had been selected to ..I forget which came first. I think I was selected as part of one of the agency's first management intern programs, which was also, I think, one of the most valuable experiences I had, because it gave me the opportunity to work for several weeks in all of the major segments of the agency.

Farley: Was that the CY-100 program?

Bernard: Well, it would have been even long before that. I'm not sure of the name. That would have been about 1954 or '55.

Farley: Okay. CY-100 was about early sixties.

Bernard: Yeah. Also at that time the agency had just started its fellowship program, and I was going to school at George Washington University at nights for my master's degree in Engineering Administration, and I guess it was at the conclusion of this intern program I had applied for a fellowship and was selected then to go to school for one year full time and was able to finish up my master's degree, which I finished up in 1954. When I came back from that, because of some work I had done with the training organization - it was then headed up by Shelby Patterson - I then was selected to help develop the co-op program, because I ..we'd actually talked about it. I remember actually briefing General Canine on the program with great fear and trepidation as a young man who barely even knew what a general was. And Patterson I think took great delight in taking this young person into General Canine's office and briefing him. After we were done, he said, "It's a good idea How much is it going to cost me?"

And we said, "Well, about 75 thousand dollars a year in salaries and administration." And he said, "Hell, I turn that much money back in every year." So that co-op program started at NSA.

Farley: And that was a program where people could go to college for a year and be paid a salary?

Bernard: Well, actually it was sort of the inverse. It's the program where a lot of particularly engineering schools have this cooperative education arrangement where you go to school half and half. And it primarily was being thought of as an opportunity to bring people in, get them some NSA experience, because we could not say anything about the agency. So until you could get somebody here and working, it was very hard to attract college graduates. So this was particularly engineers. So this was mostly the mechanism to try and increase our recruiting ability for engineers.

Farley: Did you have to promise them anything? The perspective, long-term employees that eventually ..and tell them they'd work into something in the R&D, in the engineering elements?

Bernard: Not really. Most of the college students were pretty much like in the same situation I was, because they were looking for both an opportunity to get experience as well as an opportunity to earn money to work their way through college, and then if they became interested in the work, they stayed. And I think the agency's success ratio has been well above fifty percent of all the co-op students who have worked here. And the same is applied to (1G) summer programs where they've brought people in.

Farley: Even down to the high school level.

Bernard: That's right. So after I finished that, I was then assigned back to MPRO to head up a group of maintenance people on several machines. One of the young engineers who worked with me then was [redacted] who is now moved fairly high up in T. He's chief of [redacted] I also actually worked side-by-side with Tom Cosgrove during those days. He's now, of course, chief of R8. So there were a lot of engineering folks of the era that have, I think, done pretty well within the agency. At about that time I thought I had spent enough of my career in the operations side of computers and wanted to move to the R organization. So sometime in 1956 or a little bit later ..it would have been just after we moved here to FANX, or excuse me, to Fort Meade, I transferred to what was then (B% ANNEC) and worked on the ANNEC staff for some amount of time. Actually it looks like it was about from March of '59 to January of '61. At that time we were just starting as an agency to broaden our relationships with the Service Cryptologic Agencies and military departments in the R&D field. So there was a major effort that had gotten started to try and get a much more unified approach to the development that was needed, not only to computers, but collection equipment. And there was a special project set up on the R staff to try and do that, and I was selected to go up and work as one of three or four people who set up the management mechanisms to do that. During that

time was also the time when ELINT was brought into the agency, and I participated in actually drafting the first ELINT directive. We had been working with what is now C cubed I in the Defense Department Staff, but prior to that the focal point for NSA's relationships came under DDR&E. Prior to that actually a special office under General Urskine in the Pentagon where we cooperated in helping to draft an initial agreement that brought ELINT in. As I'm sure many other people have told you, General Canine did not want ELINT part of the NSA Charter when he was first informed, and he pretty much held that view until it was decided that that was going to be part of SIGINT. The military departments weren't very enthused about that, particularly the Air Force, but that is what happened. So those particular days, as I say, I worked on the R staff primarily for Howard Barlow. He was actually at that time heading up an organization called CIND, which was the combination of all of the SIGINT work in R&D, which was ANNEC, and ANGER, and (B% RAID). So most of my time in R then started to sort of move from the processing side in ANNEC much more towards the collection side. One of the early staff things that I did up there was also NSA got involved in reviewing individual projects with the military departments, and I participated in a review of what was called the "Big Dish" [redacted] It was through NSA's efforts - primarily the technical efforts of Roger Thayer - that concluded that that just wasn't going to be a very effective SIGINT tool. [redacted]

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

There was another large program called "Weapons System Det 117L," which was [redacted] for ELINT that was being developed [redacted] and I were the two primary agency representatives who participated in a lot of studies and interface. That group, particularly the studies that even then were reviewed by Dr. Eugene Fubini, who at that time was part of (B% AIL), pretty much concluded that it was not yet feasible to have that ambitious an [redacted] collection program. At about the same time, [redacted]

OGA

So those were some of the key things that I did on the R staff from roughly 1961 and '62. Along about the end of 1962 the Soviet spacecraft was really becoming readily apparent to the SIGINT community. Starting back in about 1958, as I think you undoubtedly heard from others, the SIGINT - particularly the telemetry - that collection effort started, and one of the key ones was over in Sinop, Turkey. People like Charlie Potts, who was one of the key technical people in that area. I actually visited Sinop as early as 1960 when all of the Army people there were still living in tents. One of the early people there ..many of those early collection systems were actually built by either the Army with contracts

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

sponsored with HRB, or the Army with contracts sponsored by Sylvania out in Mountain View. There was a study performed in that era called the "Triple S Study," which I think is also reasonably well documented. There was a history done on the SPACOL program at that time, and Walt Deeley headed up the study group, and [redacted] was one of the senior engineering people. They then formed the R6 organization to implement that program, and I was selected as one of the several people to be responsible for individual projects within R6. The first project that I was responsible for is what is now known as ..at that time it was [redacted] There were a series of BANKHEAD programs, and [redacted] Sylvania had actually done the technical study that was part of the overall plan that was done. So in looking at the requirements, and looking at the schedule, and looking at the fact [redacted] we awarded a sole-source contract to Sylvania to develop and deploy the system within 2 years. It would be installed in the summer of 1964, and I was program manager for the agency for that system. That was actually the first modern system that was built from scratch against the telemetry problem. Almost all previous systems were either modifications of existing systems that were built for another purpose, or were just a lashing together of equipment. That turned out to be very fortunate for me, a very successful effort, because it really was one of the cornerstones of my career within the agency and was thought to have been done so well that then two additional contracts were awarded on a sole-source basis to Sylvania to develop a system now [redacted] JAEGER, and the system in Alaska - ANDERS. Again, from the SPACOL history, JAEGER, of course, was still in operation. ANDERS was shut down a few years ago. Also, I stayed in R6 for several years beyond that to start to make modifications to the systems and also became involved in our deep space effort, STONEHOUSE. That pretty much covered some of the key things from late '62, when I went into R6, until late 1969, when I then transferred over to a group that Bob Hermann headed up called [redacted] At that time R6 continued to develop and work with SPACOL programs. Bob Hermann had found an assignment in the Pentagon, and when he came back from the Pentagon had set up a systems engineering group in the R organization called ..I think the number then was R8. Bob had the unique ability to recruit almost anyone he really wanted in his organization and to convince both the individuals and management people within the agency that many of his thoughts and plans were good ones. So he was able to assemble a very good cadre of people in R8. I don't remember exactly why, but I decided that that organization, with some expansion and modification, should end up basically as an agency capability. And N was formed, and I think [redacted] was the chief of it, and Bob Hermann headed up [redacted] About that time Bob had some studies that he had thought that I could help him with, so he convinced me that I should leave the SPACOL world temporarily - because I, at various times, have returned to

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

it in many different ways - and went into [redacted] Two of the key studies that we did at that time were a Five-Year SIGINT Development Plan, and there were various annexes to it to cover specific topics. It was becoming apparent, particularly to the scientific people around the agency that a lot of what was then being developed [redacted] from border sites back to a central location. [redacted] of course, is along the West German/East German border with a central point at Augsburg. That is put out for good by the Army. As it turned out, the system itself did not turn out to be bought as off-the-shelf spacecraft receivers. It was put out at a very low price, it was thought of at the time, to the Harris Corporation. It turned out that that low price increased considerably, but that attempted to be an application [redacted] For a while I was the deputy program manager for that program. The Army had the program manager, and I was the deputy. Bill (B% Thayer) then took over that job from me and continued on with some of that effort. We also did the study then of [redacted] and that was one of the first efforts to systematically look at the costs. It turned out that the costs and the band width needed at that time for [redacted] did not look like it was going to be viable. It was called TENNIS. TENNIS then in later years became DRAWSTRING, which, of course, became the MAROON field program. That was pretty much in the '70 and '71 time frame. Then Bob Hermann became convinced and convinced many other people that we ought to take what was then a core of systems engineering people in the N organization and combine it with what was then the old W organization, which was primarily the people who did collection, collection management, and the development of off-the-shelf systems for collection and field processing.

[redacted] You said "W." You meant "K." K preceded W.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Bernard: Yeah. K and N together formed W. Essentially, K became lower W, and N became upper W. I believe that [redacted] were essentially elements of K, largely. There was some intermixing of people and functions. And then a lot of the systems engineering was in what was called "Upper W." In March of '71, I became the chief of [redacted] which then already had all of the [redacted] engineering responsibility, including the SPACOL sites. So that was a cycle back into the SPACOL world at that time. In July of '73 what was then the upper part of W, or the systems engineering, system development part, was combined with the then existing R organization. Bob Hermann ended up being the chief of that, and I then moved into [redacted] which was, again, [redacted] systems area. So it was pretty much just a transfer of responsibilities and

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

a reassignment of title and stayed in the line-of-sight field collection and processing efforts there. I became the chief of [redacted] in 1973 and stayed in that position up through about 1977. Are you looking for sort of highlights in each of the areas as opposed to sticking on to the SPACOL side of things?

Farley: That's right. Yes, until you became Director of DEFSMAC

EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Bernard: Okay. (TR Note: period of silence here.)

Farley: Mr. Bernard is reviewing an organization chart now.

Bernard: That period of time was one of the, I think, better times to be involved in system development within the agency. Generally speaking, the budgets were just starting to loosen up in their usual cycle of either becoming tighter or looser, and there were a larger number of fixed station systems being built and deployed as well as mobile systems. And also then that was the time when we really brought together all of the [redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

The R7 organization and [redacted] then had the responsibility of developing systems for those sites as well. Also during roughly that time period was where they cut back in overseas military personnel. There was very much of a drive to reduce our overseas presence, and the cost of the people and supporting the people overseas, so more money was put into system development where it could be shown that there would be a reduction of support costs. And there was a lot of transfers of existing U.S. sites [redacted] who is I think still up in [redacted] was one of the key people who participated in that. Also during that time frame it was decided that the Asmara base would

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

close, which had a large HF mission but also had the STONEHOUSE facility. And we converted ..the whole base was actually essentially turned over to NSA. We did away with the HF mission, and most of that was sent to be copied at alternate locations. And the only major operating facility there were the STONEHOUSE facility [redacted] OGA [redacted] Lou (B% Rowels) was one of the key people involved in the technical area there as well as Dave who headed up the site - whose last name I'll think of in a little while. But with roughly 20 civilians with contractor support that actually became the primary U.S. deep-space effort. That was very successful up until the point that the military situation in Ethiopia got to the point where we literally had to evacuate the site over a period of a month. Dick Finlay was actually the chairman of that task force, and I was the deputy, since I probably knew more about the site than any other person at NSA, other than the people who were there. So we worked around the clock in NSOC for about 3 weeks getting a lot of the equipment out of there as well as the people. All of that was done safely.

[redacted] Dave Williams.

Bernard: Yes, Dave Williams was the chairman. Because of that at that time we wanted a replacement for that effort, and we then began negotiations with [redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

So primarily to get [redacted] some alternate coverage to STONEHOUSE, we began discussions with them [redacted] was one of the key people there at the time, and Jack Harley headed up the office. [redacted] Mr. Buffham and Mr. Harney thought that it was wise, so we decided that we would go ahead and do that since Buffham was the Deputy Director at that point.

Farley: Let me switch, Mr. Bernard. (TR Note: cassette tape switched here)

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[Tape 1, Side 2]

Farley: All right, sir.

Bernard: So those were some of the key elements that in the long term had effected DEFSMAC from that time frame. And we then did assist [redacted] JAEGER, and to the system in Alaska at Andrews that has been now closed down. I think that over the years it has proven that they can indeed make a contribution [redacted] and particularly since all of the financial aspects of that are borne [redacted] I think that has turned out to be well worth NSA's investment in time and energy. About that time it was then decided to reorganize the agency again. Actually this was an effort that Howard Rosenblum started to pursue. It's my recollection that Bob Hermann had either left or was in the process of leaving, and it was decided that the initial organization and all was not doing things as effectively as it could, so there was a merging ..essentially a reorganization within R. At that time many of the functions for line-of-sight systems that had been split between [redacted] which did the overall program management, and budgeting, and setting requirements, [redacted] which built the systems, and then [redacted] which supported them; was sort of (1G) 90 degrees and sliced a different way, so that for all line-of-sight systems [redacted] then picked up responsibility for program management, overall system architecture, building the systems, and arranging for the field support, which was even then beginning to migrate to what is now the T organization. So during that time I was involved somewhat in the SPACOL side of things, but many of the system acquisitions and improvements at that time were actually starting to be done by the T organization

EO 3.3b(3)
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted] Both R the T were reorganized in '77. T in the spring, and R in the fall.

Bernard: Yeah, and at almost the same time R ..at least [redacted] and I think almost all of R, moved to FANX. In my judgement that caused, I think, a very serious problem with the way the agency did business. Particularly since I was personally very much involved in, and always liked to be involved in, operations as well as engineering and seeing a product flow. I [redacted] found it exceptionally difficult operating from FANX to properly interface with the budgeting, with the [redacted] organization, which was ..and all of my customers, either in the SPACOL side of things, or in the other areas who were basically here at Fort Meade. So I then started to find it very frustrating. We were also then starting to be a little bit in a budget decline, and it just made it that much harder to be operating from that distance. I was deputy chief of [redacted] from 1977 to 1980. Bill (B% Meyer) was the chief during that time. I think the thing that was done there more than anything else to help the DEFSMAC mission - or at least a couple of things - were there were a lot of improvements being done to the (B% EAS) ship during those days, and we were also participating in the development of the COBRA JUDY. A

lot of that effort was also done within W, and [redacted] was one of the key people who, I think, participated in getting the SIGINT, and particularly the telemetry collection portions of COBRA JUDY, to be a very effective system.

Farley: So during this period, did you ever liaison with the people in DEFSMAC? I mean, was there conversation between your two groups?

Bernard: There were probably not as much as there should have been, primarily because of the physical distance, but we certainly got our requirements from W. I'm pretty much concentrating on the W and telemetry side of things. Some of those situations resulted in that I was also responsible during a lot of the 1970's for the [redacted] and the [redacted], where our primary customer was G and A, who were, of course, also here. But fortunately before we moved to FANX, we had built up very good relations with both A, on the [redacted] and with G on [redacted], and with W on all those SPACOL things. So we had what we thought was as effective as you could have interface, but it did depend a lot on people. Many people, who once they got out to FANX and didn't like to have to come back and forth to Fort Meade once or twice a day for meetings, I think began to grow distant. Particularly from a vantage point of the deputy group chief. I could see that we were losing our touch with the working marriage; that you need interchange between people. In my case I lived in Silver Spring, so it was fairly easy for me to set up meetings either at the beginning of the day, or at the end of the day here at the fort, and cut down on the transit time. But a lot of other people who didn't have that as a help, and certainly the best situation was terrible in those days and probably isn't a whole lot better now, was just too cumbersome to use, at least in the winter time when you have to stand out in the cold and wait. So there was some widening of efforts. During that time Jim (B% Pryde), who ended up as director of DEFSMAC and then Bill (B% Thayer), who is now chief of [redacted] had the responsibility up to W level of trying to make sure that the plans and particularly the budgeting that was being done by W, was properly interfaced with R organizations, and that the R organizations were meeting the requirements as best could be done. Is that sort of enough on (B% DEFSMAC)?

Farley: (1G). We're just about to the point where you came into DEFSMAC.

Bernard: That was easy. Since I was to come back and forth and deal with people, and also liked operations, being chief of DEFSMAC was always one of my career goals. At that time ..can we turn this off a second?

Farley: Sure. (TR Note: recorder shut off briefly here.) All right, sir.

Bernard: During that time, because of my previous, extensive experience in developing SPACOL systems, I was asked to assist the Air Force in developing the COMFY COBAL system that is used as an adjunct to some of the DEFSMAC missions. Because of that assignment, I'd worked actually very closely with Admiral Inman and had often gone to meetings

with him and got to know him on a personal basis. Also at that time, many of the people who I had worked for were in senior positions within the agency as either deputy directors, or at least group chiefs. So when Jim Pryde was selected to go to the Pentagon, there was no question in my mind that I wanted to become director of DEFSMAC. So I actually wrote a memo to Admiral Inman, to Mr Buffham, to Mr. Drake, to, I guess, Jim (B% Baylin), who was chief of R at that time, and outlined my qualifications for the job, which, of course, I thought were unequalled within the agency. To my very pleasant surprise either the people who make those decisions thought they were also good qualifications, or just thought I was being very persistent, but I was selected then to replace Jim. So that was certainly very much to my liking.

Farley: So you actively sought the position of director.

Bernard: Absolutely. And I'm sure, since I sent a memo addressed to about seven or eight people, somewhere in somebody's files there's probably a copy of that, which I'd be interested in rereading myself someday just to see why I thought I was so well qualified.

Farley: Apparently it was very convincing. It got you the job. Okay, you're in-place now. You're the director. DEFSMAC had a reputation of being a pretty smooth functioning organization. Did you agree with that when you walked in, or did you see things that were going on that sort of puzzled you, or caused you concern?

Bernard: Well, I came to the job with ..as I'm sure everyone comes into the job, with their different background and experience than the previous director's, and with different background experiences with many of the key people here. Well, something that I brought into the job that I don't think had been true of any previous director, was I had actually come from an engineering background. I had actually developed a large number of the field systems which supported DEFSMAC, and I had already built up relationships with many of the foreign governments who are now pretty essential collaborators from DEFSMAC. So when I moved into the job, I did feel that there had not been enough emphasis on summary application of engineering principles, because many of the people had not come up through technical backgrounds, and because of my direct experience in building systems and participating indirectly in operating them, I had some views on things that I thought ought to be emphasized, for right or for wrong. I chose, I hope, to not impose any of those ideas without discussion among the key people who were here at the time. The people who would know about that would be Joe Wortman, who was the initial deputy when I moved in, an Air Force colonel assigned from DIA; Domenick Colella, who had headed up for a long time the intelligence and report production side of things; and Steve Smith, who headed up operations; and [redacted] who headed up the computer support. I spent the first several months trying to learn all the things that I had not been associated with. The thing that I was faced with immediately

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

in walking in the door was that there had been a DEFSMAC modernization plan that had been drafted. It had not yet been put into final form and had not yet been approved. I was clear to me, again with my engineering background, that there were a lot of modernization things that really ought to be done for DEFSMAC. Jim Pryde and others had set into place the mechanism for having a modernization plan, having money budgeted, having the whole system know that we were going to upgrade the center. So I really spent a very large part of the early months in finishing that modernization plan, getting it approved, and getting many of those actions underway. I think, to my recollection, those were the only early changes that I embarked on at that time. I do remember that about that time Steve Smith was selected to move up to W staff under [redacted] Stark), and [redacted] moved up to become chief of Operations and Operations Planning. [redacted] think, definitely is one of the more innovative operations managers that I know of. She has had a lot of overhead experience as well as operations planning experience. She and I very quickly found that we seemed to be pursuing the same paths. So to some degree I let [redacted] take the initiative on a lot of the changes in terms of, particularly in operational procedures, interfacing of the various overhead systems, and getting a lot of the operations set up better. We were also falling behind in our communications, and although it wasn't a direct part of the modernization plan, we had Jimmy Klein doing a lot of work to improve our communications, particularly to a lot of the mobile platforms and a lot of the exercises that would be se: up to go out in the Pacific on [redacted] I think, had had a good handle on a lot of the computer support things that needed to be done. The major emphasis that I started out very early and (B% narrow) was to get that moving along faster. I think I watched over it maybe a little closer than other directors might have, because I was accustomed to developing computer systems and computer systems with real-time software. So that was certainly some of the things that occupied the first several months of being here.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: So you didn't make drastic changes in your operations or administration within the first six or eight months.

Bernard: I think that it all came, again from my perspective, as (1G) gradual. Almost all of them were attempted to document, and particularly major ones, in the modernization plan. One of the things that we found was that getting the operational planners over on this side of the hall, all in the same place, all at the same time, was a big help. It also provided more space for the actual operations floor and the people who were supervising it on around-the-clock basis. Unfortunately there was only a modest expansion in the space for the intelligence analysts and report writers, because at that same time [redacted] and we had to take extra space and put in new equipment, and we wanted to move a lot of the [redacted] down here. Prior to that time there had only been a few here, and they were doing their [redacted] So that was a change that we wanted to

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

make and draw them closer to DEFSMAC, which we did. The other change that we had to allow for and cramped our space even more, was to increase our time-sensitive reporting of [redacted] data from the Soviet program. A lot of that was set up initially and supported by [redacted] We then also started our own program called [redacted] and for the first time there was actually a line item in the budget that was essentially a DEFSMAC line item for system improvements. Up until that time DEFSMAC primarily tasked the [redacted] organization to go and get things done and did not do them themselves. On of the early problems we had which very fortunately I had [redacted] to help me with, was at that time [redacted] was either being formed or reformed, and there was a plan to take all of the applications programmers out of both NSOC and DEFSMAC and put them into [redacted] Jim Devine was heading up NSOC at that time. Both of us didn't think that was a very good idea. He wanted to keep his applications programmers down there, and I wanted to keep the ones here. He was not able to hold the (B% day) and all of his time-sensitive support essentially reverted to T3. With George Cotter's help we were able to preserve the status quo, and so we were able to keep the S-Y organization here. There were at that time, I think, four billets, but [redacted] was supposed to keep four. That seemed to taper off one a year. I would imagine you're down to zero by this time.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted]

Didn't even know they were ever there! That then was apparently the formation of [redacted] which was a time-sensitive ..or at least some change in relationship for NSOC.

Bernard: Yeah. The changes that we did make gradually, in terms of operations, I think were in three or four areas. A lot of them were definitely the more effective integration of the overhead platforms against specific targets. [redacted] was very good at that [redacted] was very good at that. So they spent a lot of their time dealing with both NSOC and [redacted] and the [redacted] and other people to make sure we had good mechanisms in place so that when a specific Soviet activity occurred, [redacted] We also improved significantly, I think, our coordination with NSOC. Prior to that time NSOC and DEFSMAC had operated pretty well apart, with not much more than a phone line between them for coordination. We worked very hard at increasing not only the exchange of message traffic that we would both need to better plan our ideas, but set up some mechanisms on the working floor as well to better improve the coordination of SIGINT, particularly on unusual events that could help DEFSMAC do its mission better.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Did DEFSMAC have a representative in NSOC?

Bernard: (B% Normally) we set up procedures, and the exchange of traffic ..at that time I'm not even sure there was a W Group representative. Initially when NSOC was set up there was a quote, W desk. My recollection is that by that time the W desk had gone away, and we dealt directly with the A

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

analyst down there. I had worked with Jim Devine before when we were both in R. He was in the R4 organization when I was in R7, and because we had a good relationship, it was pretty easy when something seemed logical for us to work closely with them on that it happened pretty quickly.

Farley: Sir, your management techniques. Which type do you prefer and use? I'm thinking about your relationship between yourself, your deputy, this freedom of responsibilities and duty. How did you handle that?

Bernard: Well, very shortly after I came Colonel Wortman retired, and [redacted] came into the job. Generally speaking, I matched my management style to the situation and the people. Bob turned out to be just about a good a match that I could have found, I think, for a deputy, because he did not have or was very much concerned about engineering and systems development, so I tended to represent DEFSMAC on all of those things. He initially did not have very much previous experience with the missile and space mission, but he was an extremely quick learner. He spent a lot of time out on the operations floor. He spent a lot of time very quickly learning the business, and he also then took over an awful lot of the briefings. Generally speaking, if it were somebody that the Director had sent down here, and at least in those days both Admiral Inman and General Faurer and their staffs sent, I think, every senior representative that came into the building to DEFSMAC or NSOC. Generally speaking, I handled all the briefings for those if I were here. But all of the other groups, including courses like CY-600 and CY-500, [redacted] would give more often than I would. Also like any two responsible and senior intelligence people and managers, I feel you have to give everyone a little bit of their own territory. So it was just a matter of deciding what his territory was that would make us both comfortable. Even though, and he has today, as [redacted] well knows, our relationships with SAC and SPACECOM are among the most key ones we have with U.S. organizations, [redacted] being an Air Force officer, that seemed to be a good match. So by and large, all of the normal liaison and planning with SAC and NORAD he did, and visited them once every couple of months. I went out to each of them once early in my career here to get a good familiarity with their operations. We were very fortunate during that time frame was that there were no (B% serious) differences of approach between SAC and ourselves, and NORAD and ourselves. [redacted] was the DI at SAC. He kept us busy. He worked his staff very hard and therefore his staff had an unending appetite for details of information, which at times became a little bit of a problem. But generally speaking, we had no serious relationships there. COBRA BALL was in, and I'm sure now [redacted] against missiles in the Kamchatka; and Bob spent a fair amount of his time making sure that was going smoothly, which it usually did. My management style with the other key people was generally a little more easily defined, since they had reasonably proscribed missions and functions that were covered in the DEFSMAC organization manual.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

EO 3.3b(3)
OGA
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: During your tenure, how was the morale of the troops on the floor? Did they have esprit?

Bernard: I think so. One of the key reasons for that was, particularly as viewed from the floor, I fortunately came into the job right at the time expansion, so that first of all you've got more space; first of all you've got some clean space! That was the first time, I think, since the center had been set up there that had been any kind of renovation, and since we were ready to get the intel analysts closer to the floor ..before that time, operations planning had been adjacent to the floor and the intel support people and analysts had been over here. (In) this reorganization we switched. That did not inhibit the relationship between operational planning and the floor, but it improved it between the analysts and the floor. So with the physical changes, those changes and the fact that during that time we had a pretty stable workforce, [redacted] who had headed up operations for a long time, had been assigned to a field site, and we brought in Dave Newsome, who had not had much experience, but I think very quickly moved into the job. I felt that we had a very high esprit de corps on the operations floor. I think the intel analysts have always been a very stable organization, but they were improved because they at least got some improved facilities, walls closer to operations. Their mission was expanding particularly [redacted] effort, and the operational planning people, I think, also felt we were doing a good job. We were getting cooperation from all of the organizations and field sites that we deal with, so I thought it was a good time.

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Good. So, as the months went on, were there apparent deficiencies in manpower, needs for more state-of-the-art equipments? You're an engineer. You'd probably recognize this immediately.

Bernard: There were two serious deficiencies, in my judgement, one of which I corrected and one of which I hope [redacted] has corrected. Well, I should take that back. One of which I tried to correct but wasn't able to, and that was we felt that we needed a shift operation similar to NSOC, which essentially had one shift not on a rotating basis but ongoing daytime duty, or training, or vacations. At that time we had, I guess, what we called a four-shift trick. We had (1G) five shifts. I pushed real hard, up to and including briefing and requesting as strongly as I felt appropriate up to the deputy director level, to approve the extra billets for five shifts. I was almost within grasp of that, and there was some kind of agency reduction of force, or we didn't get some billets we were supposed to get, and that evaporated. The other main thing that I wasn't able to do too much work on was actually to improve the communications floor. We were still using Model 28 teletypes out there for almost all of our circuits, many of them still point-to-point, some of which were that way for security reasons, because of the different sources we dealt with. I never really had the time to truly address the modernization of the communications part of (B% DEFSMAC).

PL 86-36/50
USC 3605

Farley: I think you probably answered this one. Any problems or difficulties that

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defied immediate solution? You mentioned one that you couldn't quite resolve.

Bernard: I'm sure had you asked me that question while I was here or the first year or so afterwards, I could have given you a very long list. The thing that actually worried me then, and I suspect may even be a worry now, is that there is not the ability to bring very many new people into DEFSMAC. As people left, we able to bring people in. We also then made an attempt to get additional DIA billets assigned here, and we almost succeeded in that. I picked [redacted] to work on that. He worked up a plan where even though it sounds modest by numbers, I think we were going to get another five or six DIA slots. We almost had that one in the bag. I truly felt, as I'm sure most of the directors felt, that this is a joint organization: NSA and DIA. I spent a fair amount of time making sure I was personally involved in interfacing with DIA and that we continued to have the good working relationship that we had always enjoyed, including having several meetings with General Williams, who was then Director of DIA. He had approved in principle that he was going to give us some more billets, and I think with the same reduction on that increase that occurred at NSA, occurred at DIA, and we were not able to get that. So our biggest single personnel problem, in my view, was that we had a lot of pretty good people, but we had no mecharism of either a fifth shift, or extra billets of bringing other people in where you didn't have to stick them on the firing line almost from the day they walked in the door.

Farley: Good. Helen, do you ever get into a discussion of the Soviet missile activity during Mr. Bernard's tour, or do you have enough of that?

Tucker: No. You're doing just fine.

[redacted] I'm going to have to step out for a minute, but I would like . (cut off by Farley)

Farley: (3-4G) COMFY (B% COBALT).

[redacted] Yes, the fact that the coordination for the COMFY (B% COBALT) center moved in sort of next door to us.

Farley: Sir, before we get into the details on Soviet missile activity, could you give us a brief rundown on [redacted]

Bernard: Okay, [redacted] was just a gem of an idea when I first came here, at least as I recall it. The Soviet [redacted] was just getting to the point where it became possible to actually collect enough information and to do enough real-time processing on it that we saw an opportunity to not only have DEFSMAC involved in sort of the scientific aspects of what was happening in the foreign missile and space effort, but actually involved in much more current operational support as a result of the information that was uniquely available to the center. I don't actually remember the way in which it all came about, but we did develop some initial, real-time support efforts through [redacted] We also then started planning [redacted] and that was at the point that we actually got [redacted] approved as a specific line

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

item in the budget.

Farley: Excuse me, let me switch. (TR Note: remainder of segment blank. New segment begins here) This is tape number 2 with the interview with Mr. Bernard.

Bernard: I think I mentioned before we felt that we definitely had the capability here in the center to do that type of computer development. We had in that time frame off-loaded enough of the programs that had been done on the (B% BOOKER) system that we were able to disestablish it, and that picked up probably a couple a hundred extra feet of space that we had not previously had available. Since we were not able to get additional computer software people assigned to the center, it was decided that we needed to go out for contractual support for the effort. So we actually worked up a plan of what we needed. We did an informal survey of the companies that appeared to be qualified to staff and have the technical ability to perform that kind of a program, and with DEFSMAC's recommendation, although the paperwork has to, of course, be done as an NSA contract, the contract was awarded to Computer Sciences Corporation to provide the software support that was needed. Just as that contract was starting to get underway was when I left the center, so I'm not really familiar with the mechanisms that were used to get that contract moving and to establish the interfaces. We did feel at that time that it was not the kind of a job where we could define the system and let it out as a contract for systems development. We felt that because of the classification of the data, and because of the close working relationships within the center, that we wanted to essentially have a contractor computer programmers work with the center, and that was the approach we took.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Good. Do you need more on that, Helen?

Tucker: I don't know whether [redacted] wanted more detail information on that or not.

Bernard: Well, we can certainly ask him after he comes back and add to it if we need to.

Farley: Would you give us a few comments on the ACC?

Bernard: Well, the ACC came into being just at about the same time I became director of DEFSMAC. Because of my previous work with the COMFY COBALT program and the ACC, I'd actually been participant in planning for the ACC. After I became director of DEFSMAC, the systems actually started to be deployed, and the ACC itself was set up here in the center. That, of course, like even today created a space problem. DEFSMAC is by and large an adjunct and a part of what is considered a [redacted] space within the building, so our biggest single hurdle was actually finding the physical space that was going to be needed for the center. [redacted] ortunately found some processing equipment within the NTPC that they could relocate to another area. That gave us the space requirements. Initially it was no

more than a year after we put in the first portion of the ACC that we then needed an expansion to a larger area. Again, fortunately, some additional space was freed up within [redacted] and that was expanded to its present size. The Air Force people who operated and manned it have always been selected on the basis of being extremely well qualified, and many of them have had previous SPACOL experience; if not, on the COBRA JUDY, or some of the other platforms that are manned by the Air Force with the COMFY COBALT field systems. So I think they were always able to staff it with a very good group of people, and I feel we had very effective working relationships, both personally and on an interface basis, with them in terms of the exchange of information.

Farley: Good; Sir, let's talk about some of the Soviet missile events during your tenure. By the early eighties, were the people in DEFSMAC routinely able to predict and follow the launching of Soviet missiles and space vehicles? The batting average is what I'm talking about.

Bernard: At the time I came in, I think we had a very ..they had already been established [redacted] As you well know from previous history discussions [redacted] So people had already honed that process down to a pretty good science. The biggest problem with it was a lot of the science was in the minds of the senior watch officers. And we had not been able to have a system that helped out in terms of a lot of automation, or a lot of things that could be just immediately brought to their attention and correlated. So an awful lot of our success depended on how good or how bad the watch officers were. I was very fortunate to have very good watch officers and, generally speaking, a very stable set of watch officers. The thing that we did do during that time was continue to improve that process. We got additional message traffic here that we found could be helpful from NSOC We did start to refine some of the processes and get them more orderly so that the less senior people could do as well as the senior people. And then with, I think [redacted] getting a lot of the credit, we did several new things with the [redacted] programs to better and more quickly get information to us. We made sure that we were getting information from COBRA BALL and COBRA JUDY. We got the information from [redacted] and we took several initiatives with foreign countries to improve our support to them in terms of telling them what we were looking for, and how to look for it, so that we were able to get better information. [redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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PL 86-36/50
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

which in the early days were impacting in the water areas around Australia. Those were all improvements to help us do our collection job better. In general, I think, our ability to predict



Farley: Okay, good. Sir, do you recall any unusual space activity such as a restocking of the space module - the laboratory - or rotation of personnel that took place during your tenure?

Bernard: Well, there was a very significant growth to the Soviet manned space program during those three years, and it was because of that growth that

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

If I could digress just one moment on

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

that, one of the most significant things, I think, we did during that time frame was, without equivocation, convince the people who were running the U.S. space shuttle program to secure their communications to the space shuttle. They had been proceeding in a very conservative and orderly fashion. General Abramson, who headed up the program at that time, came out here for a tour one day, because he knew General Faurer, and he came through DEFSMAC. We, of course, briefed him on the Soviet space program. From that time on, we had a frequent and reoccurring exchange of information with he and his staff, and he very quickly accelerated the program to secure the [redacted] he introduced some operational security in the U.S. space program that is existent and available now even today. For a while he asked that we have DEFSMAC representatives at all of the major launches and at the center as observers, and then after the event we have a feedback session with his staff people on what could have been done, or what might have been done better just from an operational security standpoint.

Farley: Excellent. Sir, was there ever any indication that the Soviets were meddling in our space program, jamming communications, or sending deceptive communications? The story is still making the rounds whether that ever happened or not.

Bernard: [redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)
OGA
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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Farley: Okay. That's good. Fine. Sir, again during your tenure, did the Soviet

missile and space program prcgress to such a degree that a successful launch was the rule rather than an exception?

Bernard: Yes.

Farley: Pretty technically competent now?

Bernard:



Farley:

Bernard:

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EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Good. [redacted] we've covered [redacted] and ACC. Do you have any other questions of Mr. Bernard?

Bernard: [redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)
PL 86-36/50
USC 3605

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Farley: Sir, we're getting to the end. Do you have any reflections, fond memories of your tour as director of DEFSMAC? Anything that you'd like to put on tape to sort of wrap it up?

Bernard: Well, I think I've touched on most of the highlights. I mentioned how interested I was in becoming the director of DEFSMAC. I never regretted that for a moment. I consider it to be one of the most interesting 3-year tours I had, if not the most interesting. And I will never forgive Mr. Richard Finlay, who decided that he would like to have me come down and head up his staff, and Mr. Roy Crippen, who thought he would like to become director of DEFSMAC when he returned. [redacted] The two of them did

EO 3.3b(3)
OGA
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

me in. So I would have been delighted to stay here for another 3 years, or even more from the time I was here. And certainly I had the advantage of operating in a reasonably good budget climate and a time at which our relationships with DIA, and with all of our collection and collaborating centers, and governments was working very smoothly.

Farley: Fine. Helen, do you have any questions at all? Helen, I'll bet you have a couple. None?

Tucker: Huh ah. You've had no problem at all with DIA contacts? In other words, going directly to the top, or having to go through an intermediate when you wanted something done?

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Bernard: No. [redacted] is, I think most of the colonels that have been assigned from DIA are usually very senior and very astute colonels, and he was able to ... very much about our assistance, seemed to get many things done down there that even I was surprised by, by just the good relations, and the fact that it was well-known that General Williams fully supported DEFSMAC. Part of the modernization when we complete the modernization of the center, which upgraded the watch area and changed the people around that we had mentioned. We had a ceremony where General Williams, and General Faurer, and several other senior people from NSA and DIA came out for a ribbon cutting. Both of the directors at that point made very generous statements about how the fact that they liked the way DEFSMAC was working as an interagency organization. Many people do not understand why it has worked so smoothly, because there are many things that could create problems. Just that fact that it is physically located in NSA, to get DIA as a part of the organization. So we decided we had very good relationships, and I'm sure those have continued.

Farley: That's certainly a tribute to the people.

Bernard: No question.

Farley: [redacted] shall we wrap her up? Mr. Bernard, thank you very much for your time.

Tucker: Could I ask one question? [redacted] was there any particular questions [redacted] that you wanted to ask? We just did very general.

[redacted] No. No, I didn't have anything specific, but I just wanted to get something down since it pretty much started during that period.

Tucker: With Mr. Bernard.

Bernard: (XG) comment about organizational relationships. Our relationship with the [redacted] organization was also at a, I think, had a very solid foundation and was a very smooth one. [redacted] and I had worked together as early as 1960 when we were both in ANNEC. [redacted] and I had worked together when we were both assigned to the [redacted] and [redacted] organization. [redacted] also had a lot of experience in working with W, and I felt that it is absolutely essential that DEFSMAC and the [redacted]

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

organization, that provides most of its support, have a good relationship. That contributed significantly to our success during those years as well.

Farley: Good. Anything else in your notes there?

Bernard: Well, just perhaps a little bit of elaboration to [redacted] That certainly went a long way to making sure that [redacted] continued on as a priority item within the budget at that time.

EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)
OGA
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Farley: Anything else that comes to mind?

Bernard: No, the only thing we might have done better work on that we didn't is any relationship between imagery and SIGINT [redacted] We had exceptionally good relationships with the imagery community, and [redacted]

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Farley: That's a point we haven't covered very well, Helen. NPIC and all the other troops.

Bernard: At one time there was basically [redacted] so to speak, who was assigned to [redacted] and who worked in DEFSMAC. It was then decided that person should actually be assigned to [redacted] and to bring out, and the person was transferred to [redacted] Fortunately, the person, whose name will come back to me in a minute.

[redacted] Female?

Bernard: Male.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted] Paul Childress?

Bernard: Paul. Paul Childress had a long enough association with DEFSMAC and knew the problem well enough that he actually at times worked many extra hours on his own time coming in here in evenings and nights and [redacted] if he is still here, I'm sure you

at least have that good solid connection, but, as I say, I feel we could have probably done more in that area, and just did not have the resources to devote to it.

Farley: Is that it?

Bernard: That's it.

Farley: Again, as I started to say, thank you much for your time. Do appreciate it. Thanks for coming out.

Bernard: It's certainly been a pleasure for me to hopefully contribute something to history, and also I can be available almost at any time to come back and cover other topics that you want.

Farley: Good. It's been most enlightening, and I think very helpful for Helen.

Tucker: Thank you very much, Mr. Bernard.

Bernard: Thank you.

Farley: Sir, what classification shall we put on these two cassettes?

Bernard: I don't think I said anything that would exceed ~~Top Secret SI/TK~~ [redacted] I didn't hear anything beyond that.

Farley: Good.

Bernard: I think the reference to [redacted] is not in itself compartmented.

Farley: So let's make it ~~Top Secret Codeword SI/TK~~. Thanks again, sir.

Bernard: Thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW OH-1988-13-BERNARD]

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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