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*"Rummaging in the government's attic"*

Description of document: Peace Corps Inspector General (OIG) Investigations Closed During CY2025

Requested date: 24-December-2025

Release date: 05-March-2026

Posted date: 16-March-2026

Source of document: FOIA Request  
Peace Corps  
1275 First Street NE  
Washington, DC 20526  
Email: [foia@peacecorps.gov](mailto:foia@peacecorps.gov)  
[Freedom of Information Act \(FOIA\) Submission Portal](#)  
[FOIA.gov](http://FOIA.gov)

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## PEACE CORPS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

March 5, 2026

This letter serves as the final response to your request for information under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received the request on December 24, 2025. In your own words, you have asked for the following:

*1) A copy of the final report, closing memo, or equivalent concluding document for each Inspector General investigation closed during CY2025. 2) A copy of the list of Inspector General investigations closed during CY2025, including relevant data fields such as the subject or topic of the investigation, the case number, closing date, and opening date.*

This request was assigned tracking number 26-FIG-0004. On December 30, 2025 you agreed via email to narrow the scope of the request to the first page of each Peace Corps Office of Inspector General investigation closed in CY 2025.

After conducting a thorough search of OIG's investigative database, the OIG FOIA staff found 30 pages of records responsive to part 1 of your request. A search for Part 2 of your request revealed no responsive records as OIG does not maintain a list of completed investigations in a given year. FOIA staff have applied the following redactions to the documents being released:

- Exemption 6 (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)): allows Federal agencies the discretion to withhold information the disclosure of which would "... constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy".
- Exemption 7 (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)): protects from disclosure "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ...
  - (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or;
  - (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement

### Peace Corps Office of Inspector General



investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. 552(c) This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal sending an email to [FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov](mailto:FOIA@peacecorpsig.gov) or mail at 1275 First Street NE, Washington DC 20526. Your appeal must include the FOIA request number in the body of your message, and a statement explaining the reason for your appeal. Please take the time to clearly mark “FOIA Appeal” on the subject line, along with the assigned FOIA case number. Your appeal must be submitted within 90 days of the date of response to your request.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Respectfully,

*Victoria Molina*

Victoria Molina  
FOIA Officer  
Peace Corps Office of Inspector General  
1275 First St NE  
Washington, DC  
20506

Enclosure: as stated

**Peace Corps Office of Inspector General**

**PEACE CORPS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

(b) (7)(E)

**Theft of Government Property, Violation of Overseas  
Contracting Handbook, and Threatening Behavior**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**March 7, 2025**

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***RESTRICTED USE - PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL - INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
EXTERNAL RELEASE WITHOUT INSPECTOR GENERAL APPROVAL IS NOT AUTHORIZED***

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## SYNOPSIS

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On June 25, 2024, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint, followed by a phone call that same day, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Director of Management and Operations (DMO), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleging the theft of Peace Corps property, specifically 25 solar batteries, 9 solar panels, and 2 laptop computers. The complainant also alleged that a generator that was procured in 2021 had been accepted and paid for by the Contracting Officer (CO), despite not meeting the required specifications in the contract.

Prior to contacting OIG, DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had suspected (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) General Services Manager (GSM), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of committing the thefts. The Department of State Regional Security Office (RSO) assisted OIG with conducting initial interviews with Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During the OIG investigation, GSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was terminated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) security clearance was revoked by RSO, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for a lack of candor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) handling of missing batteries.

The OIG investigation revealed that the post has experienced challenges with inventory management and tracking, and subsequently, OIG was unable to identify and locate the suspected stolen items.

The investigation also obtained evidence that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Deputy Director of Management and Operations (DDMO), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DDMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) failed to comply with the Overseas Contracting Handbook and the contract requirements defined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties as the CO. During the investigation, OIG received testimony that DDMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had previously made possible threats to post staff, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor. Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff reported that on multiple occasions, DDMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made statements that put them in reasonable fear for their safety.

**PEACE CORPS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

(b) (7)(E)

**Allegations of Volunteer Misconduct**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**January 23, 2025**

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## SYNOPSIS

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On August 30, 2024, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint, which alleged that Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] harassed and physically assaulted PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. The complaint also alleged PCV [REDACTED] was in fear [REDACTED] physical safety.

The investigation did not disclose information to corroborate the allegations of harassment or physical assault against PCV [REDACTED]. OIG also obtained testimonial evidence that PCV [REDACTED] may be engaging in questionable, unprofessional behavior [REDACTED]. Prior to the conclusion of the investigation, OIG was informed by [REDACTED] Country Director (CD), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] that PCV [REDACTED] resigned in lieu of Administrative Separation from [REDACTED] due to circumstances unrelated to PC OIG's investigation.

**PEACE CORPS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

(b) (7)(E)

**False Statements/Misrepresentations for Authorization of Per  
Diem for Official Duty Post Staff** (b) (6), (E); (7)(C)

**May 2025**

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## SYNOPSIS

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Between February and August 2024, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of the Peace Corps' operations in [REDACTED]. During the audit, OIG found instances of non-adherence to Federal appropriations law and agency policies when procuring meals, lodging, and entertainment for participants attending training and events within their designated duty station area. Specifically, OIG found copies of the Global Accounts Payable (GAP) Overseas Food/Meal Certification Checklist (herein "GAP Checklist") that were signed illegibly, with the box stating, "I certify that the event was a Staff Retreat and all attendees were outside their official duty station" checked, even though the vast majority of attendees were within the vicinity of their official duty station [REDACTED].

Based on the audit findings, OIG initiated an investigation in September 2024, which revealed the following from document reviews and witness interviews:

1. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff violated agency policy by authorizing per diems and lodging for staff who were within their official duty station after falsifying the GAP Checklist for per diem;<sup>2</sup>
2. [REDACTED] staff were unaware of the Federal regulations and agency policies that prohibit per diem and lodging payments to employees who were within their official duty station area; and
3. [REDACTED] DMO and DDMO did not provide training to subordinate staff responsible for payment authorization invoices on relevant Federal regulations and agency policies pertaining to per diem authorization.

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<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>2</sup> The falsification of this official form was presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office and declined for prosecution.

**PEACE CORPS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

(b) (7)(E)

**Allegations of Mismanagement Following a Sexual Assault**



**September 8, 2025**

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## SYNOPSIS

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On September 9, 2024, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who alleged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive adequate support from the Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff following a sexual assault. Specifically, RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received support from the post regarding an unrelated physical assault (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) site, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relocated to the capital city (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently sexually assaulted. Thereafter, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not presented with the available post-assault options by Country Director (CD) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as required by Peace Corps policy. Additionally, RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Safety & Security Manager (SSM) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), treated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) poorly based on the details of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sexual assault.

The OIG investigation disclosed that on March 24, 2024, RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been physically assaulted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Staff from the post took immediate action and relocated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the capital city (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the necessary care and assistance. On March 26, 2024, post staff placed RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a hotel (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). That same night, RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was allegedly sexually assaulted by a man (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met on an online dating app.

RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported the sexual assault to SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on March 27, 2024, specifically stating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) report (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consented to sexual activity on the condition that a condom was used; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offender did not use protection (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested. The Peace Corps Medical Officers (PCMOs) met with RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and determined the encounter was rape. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was taken to the local hospital to undergo a sexual assault forensic exam. In addition, because the offender (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hotel location, post moved RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to a different lodging location. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about options for reporting the incident to law enforcement and, on the same day, elected to convert (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from “restricted” to “standard.”

The investigation revealed that CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered the necessary post-assault options available to RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). When RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first reported the sexual assault, CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood that there was a narrow window of opportunity in which Peace Corps staff could provide the most critical medical, psychological, advocacy, security, and legal assistance. CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a victim/survivor-centered and trauma-informed response and instructed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to employ the same approach and to assist RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in any way possible.

However, OIG obtained substantial evidence that SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made disparaging personal comments to Peace Corps staff throughout the sexual assault response process regarding RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) credibility, character, and motives. Post staff stated that SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) engaged in behavior amounting to victim blaming, and failed to protect RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) privacy, as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talked about the incident, overtly criticized RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in meetings, reportedly claimed RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was lying, and conveyed that RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at fault due (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) promiscuous behavior. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became distrustful and distressed due to interactions (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with SSM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the sexual assault response process.

**PEACE CORPS  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**



**Non-Aggravated Sexual Assault and Sexual  
Harassment**



**March 17, 2025**

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## SYNOPSIS

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On December 04, 2024, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Safety and Security Manager (SSM), [REDACTED] (SSM [REDACTED]) approached the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) law enforcement staff and reported that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Director of Programming and Training (DPT), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had sexually assaulted [REDACTED].

The OIG investigation obtained substantial testimony from the complainant and subject to support the allegations that DPT [REDACTED] committed non-aggravated sexual assault and sexual harassment against SSM [REDACTED]. The investigation also obtained evidence and testimony to demonstrate that DPT [REDACTED] disregarded local laws and customs, specifically (b) (6), (b) (7) Penal Code on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

Pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 2244 - Abusive Sexual Contact, this investigation was presented to the Assistant United States Attorney but was ultimately declined for Federal criminal prosecution in favor of the agency's administrative remedies. On December 05, 2024, Peace Corps placed DPT [REDACTED] on administrative leave, pending the outcome of the investigation. Prior to the completion of the investigation, DPT [REDACTED] resigned [REDACTED] position with Peace Corps on January 20, 2025, with an effective date of February 07, 2025.

OIG learned during the investigation that the Country Director (CD), Peace Corps [REDACTED], had received a report of the incident from the complainant approximately 14 days prior to the complainant contacting OIG. The complainant asked the CD to not report the incident to anyone else. While conducting investigative work at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG provided the CD with additional materials to [REDACTED] further understand [REDACTED] had reporting requirements related to the incident, [REDACTED] acknowledged [REDACTED] not fully aware of at the time. OIG assisted the CD in real-time with reporting the sexual assault to all required points of contact and taking the required steps in accordance with Peace Corps policy. OIG provided the Peace Corps Regional Director with a briefing on the issue and actions taken to correct the reporting of the incident.



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On 24 February 2022, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was informed of possible PROTECT Act violations committed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), prior (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director of Management Operations (DMO), while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Exhibit 01).

Agent Note: Prior to the allegation, DMO [REDACTED] separated from Peace Corps service.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act)
- 18 U.S. Code § 2243 - Sexual abuse of a minor or ward
- 18 U.S. Code § 2423 - Transportation of minors
- 18 U.S. Code § 1591 - Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion
- 18 U.S. Code § 1596 - Additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offenses
- 5 CFR 2635.701 - Misuse of Position (Ethical)
- Peace Corps MS 647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On 02 March 2022, OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Country Director (CD), [REDACTED] (Exhibit 02), who related prior to the incident involving DMO [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (former) Director of Training (DT), [REDACTED] had approached CD [REDACTED] and stated a Volunteer (Not Fully Identified - NFI) addressed a concern the Volunteer had concerning DMO [REDACTED] being seen at a bar/club in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with what the Volunteer categorized as "younger women". CD [REDACTED] stated, after the report, [REDACTED] with DMO [REDACTED] about the matter, wherein DMO [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was out at a bar/club with younger women; however, clarified by stating the referenced "younger women" [REDACTED] two daughters. CD [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] aware DMO [REDACTED] had two daughters who were darker complected, as DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] with darker skin color. CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] thought nothing of the incident, as DMO [REDACTED] being seen with the "younger women" coincided [REDACTED] daughters coming to country to visit DMO [REDACTED]. CD [REDACTED] only recalled one other event that could be derogatory toward DMO [REDACTED], wherein [REDACTED] once caught on an Embassy drive camera operating a government vehicle while either utilizing [REDACTED] phone or without wearing a seatbelt. CD [REDACTED] remembered DMO [REDACTED] was issued a warning for the motor vehicle offense.

Date:  
10/03/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] / [REDACTED]

AIGI Init. [REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On April 25, 2024, Returned Peace Corps Volunteer (RPCV) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted the Peace Corps (PC) office of Inspector General (OIG), and advised that while serving as a PCV in [REDACTED], a cobra spit venom in [REDACTED] eyes. [REDACTED] that due to delayed responses from the Peace Corps Medical Officers (PCMOs) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) irreversible damage. RPCV [REDACTED] filed a complaint with the PC Quality Improvement unit, which, according to RPCV [REDACTED], found issues with [REDACTED] care. RPCV [REDACTED] was medically evacuated due to the eye injury. [REDACTED] subsequently administratively separated by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (CD) [REDACTED] based on complaints from the PCMOs. RPCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged to OIG that [REDACTED] separation was in retaliation for reporting the mismanagement [REDACTED] care.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

MS 262 - Peace Corps Medical Services Program

MS 271 Section 6.0 – Retaliation Prohibited

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

OIG determined to investigate this matter in two parts: a) Review the medical care received by RPCV [REDACTED] and b) Review RPCV [REDACTED] separation from Peace Corps.

### Review of Medical Care Received by RPCV [REDACTED]

#### Quality Nurse Review

On May 6, 2024, OIG received the Quality Nurse Review (QNR) from Chief of Quality Improvement (CQI) [REDACTED], Office of Health Services (OHS), concerning the treatment of cobra venom in the eye of RPCV [REDACTED] (EXHIBIT 1). The report disclosed that PCV [REDACTED] received the following treatment, in relevant part:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date: 18DEC2024	Agent Name/ Signature/s: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	nit. [REDACTED]
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# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On May 14 2024, Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received Hotline complaint (Exhibit 1) alleging [REDACTED], Country Director (CD), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), authorized a non-government minor to conduct a two-week "job shadowing" at local [REDACTED] facilities. The minor is a family member of a Host Country National (HCN) staff member. Complainant further alleges there is a known friendship between U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and HCN staff at post that go beyond a work relationship, in particular with the CD and the Information Technology Specialist, who allegedly conducted personal favors to USDHs during work hours.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- MS 644 Fraternalization
- MS 647 Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On May 17, 2024, OIG began to interview staff members within [REDACTED], pursuant to allegations of mismanagement, security violations and fraternization at [REDACTED]. OIG interviewed a total of eight staff members regarding the allegations.

OIG interview of CD [REDACTED] authorized a non-government minor to conduct a two-week "job shadowing" at local [REDACTED] facilities.

OIG verified Program Manager [REDACTED], Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) teenage [REDACTED] at Post for a two-week internship. The teenager shadowed [REDACTED] and was escorted at all times and interfaced with staff at the training building as well as during a celebratory staff lunch at the main building with all of the staff. During the internship, the teenager helped to hand out papers to Volunteers. OIG interview of CD [REDACTED] confirmed [REDACTED] approved this internship. OIG found no evidence to suggest the teenager accessed any electronic devices, laptops or Peace Corps equipment while at Post.

OIG identified two separate and specific rumors of possible inappropriate relationships between USDH and HCN staff: first between CD [REDACTED] and Executive Assistant (EA) [REDACTED]; and second between Director of Programming and Training (DPT) [REDACTED] and Program Manager for Youth and Families Development (PM) [REDACTED]. However, none of the rumors could be verified, as none of the staff could provide testimony of any observed or apparent fraternization that may have occurred.

Date:  
12/18/2024

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED]

AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On August 26, 2024, Country Director (CD) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] contacted the PC Office of Inspector General (OIG) and advised that an anonymous source who was concerned about retaliation, reported that PC Volunteer (PCV) [REDACTED] sexually assaulted a female host country national (HCN) Counterpart during a Peace Corps training at a hotel near (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], on or about May/June 2024 (EXHIBIT 1). CD [REDACTED] advised that the Counterpart was alone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] when PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] entered the room [REDACTED] had been drinking and kissed [REDACTED]. CD [REDACTED] also advised that PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] is on a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for alcohol use following a police incident in January 2024. Subsequently, PCV [REDACTED] agreed [REDACTED] would not drink alcohol for the duration of [REDACTED] service. Because there was insufficient evidence to serve as the basis for administrative action, either for a) the sexual assault or b) the alcohol use, CD [REDACTED] requested OIG that conduct an investigation.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

### 4.19 Prevention and Elimination of Harassment, including Sexual Harassment

V/Ts may not engage in harassment, including sexual harassment, against... community members, or other persons they encounter during Peace Corps service... For the purposes of this Section, "harassment" is defined as... unwelcome touching or contact that would not be covered by IPS 1-12 Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct;

### 4.7 Use of Alcohol 4.7.1

Peace Corps recognizes that excessive use of alcohol, including binge drinking, may compromise a V/T's health, safety, and security, lead to behavior which is a discredit to the Peace Corps or the individual V/T, or affect the V/T's performance in an assignment. Examples of such behavior include... verbal or physical aggressiveness while under the influence of alcohol. Such inappropriate or unsafe behavior... may be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including administrative separation.

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

### Interview of Counterpart Lusia Omungo

On September 3, 2023, OIG interviewed Counterpart (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] concerning [REDACTED] reported sexual assault by PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (EXHIBIT 2). Counterpart Omungo stated that following a

Date:  
19SEP2024

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

AIGI Init.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

Post: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On 23 September 2024, OIG was notified by Country Director (CD) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Peace Corps (PC), [REDACTED], of an allegation that Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [REDACTED], had engaged in sexual relations with a seventeen-year-old (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] during his Pre-Service Training (PST).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code Chapter 110 - Sexual Exploitation and other Abuse of Children (PROTECT ACT 2003)
- IPS 1-12 (Dated 03 July 2019) - Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On 25 September 2024, OIG interviewed CD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [REDACTED], who stated that during an Administrative Separation action with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] commented [REDACTED] was aware that PCV [REDACTED] had engaged in sexual relations with a 17-year-old [REDACTED].

CD [REDACTED] clarified that the only overlap between PCV [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] took place from September 9, 2024 to September 13, 2024 for the mid-service training (MST) in [REDACTED]. PCV [REDACTED] was assigned to the town (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] from March 2, 2023 until [REDACTED] departure from the country on September 26, 2024 while PCV [REDACTED] was assigned to the town of [REDACTED] since September 2, 2023 and the journey between the two locations takes approximately five to six hours. CD [REDACTED] was unaware of any derogatory information pertaining to PCV [REDACTED] apart from an unauthorized absence from [REDACTED] site on June 4, 2024. (Exhibit 1).

Agent Note: [REDACTED] was administratively separated for numerous violations of Peace Corps Cameroon's Transportation policy; specifically for spending nights in restricted areas without permission and being out of [REDACTED] site without prior authorization.

On 02 October 2024, OIG interviewed former PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] who stated that PCV [REDACTED] was only familiar with PCV (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] and did not know [REDACTED] last name. PCV [REDACTED] became aware of the allegation in approximately July or August 2024. [REDACTED] never personally witnessed PCV [REDACTED] engaging in sexual relations with minors (Exhibit 2).

Date:  
16 December 2024

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] / [REDACTED]

AIGI Initials:  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On January 16, 2025, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint that [REDACTED], Returned Peace Corps Volunteer (RPCV), [REDACTED], sent inappropriate and offensive emails to [REDACTED] former PC Country Director (CD), [REDACTED]. RPCV [REDACTED] email communications threatened self-harm and contained derogatory insults towards CD [REDACTED].

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code § 2261A Stalking
- Colorado Revised Statutes Title 18. Criminal Code § 18-9-111 Harassment

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

The OIG reviewed emails sent from RPCV [REDACTED] to CD [REDACTED] that indicated self-harm and derogatory insults towards CD [REDACTED].

The OIG located RPCV [REDACTED].

The OIG interviewed RPCV [REDACTED] and provided [REDACTED] a cease and desist/warning letter (Exhibit-1) regarding communication with CD [REDACTED].

## FINDINGS

RPCV [REDACTED] admitted to sending the emails to CD [REDACTED]. RPCV [REDACTED] was provided a cease and desist/warning letter and acknowledged [REDACTED] face potential criminal charges [REDACTED] continued to communicate with CD [REDACTED].

No further investigative activity is anticipated or expected.

## EXHIBIT LIST

1. Cease and desist/warning letter to RPCV [REDACTED].

Date:  
03/07/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED]

AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On November 4, 2024, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), General Services Manager (GSM), [REDACTED], was receiving bids from shell companies and had a personal relationship with a contractor who performed work at post.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 15 U.S. Code § 1 - Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
- MS 647 Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

The OIG reviewed bid submissions and contracts for projects at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). OIG determined that some bids under consideration by Post came from companies that were not registered as businesses in [REDACTED], and some awards did not go to the lowest bidder.

Foreign Service National Investigators (FSNIs) from the U.S. Embassy in [REDACTED], interviewed the contractors in question to determine their relationship to GSM [REDACTED]. Some contractors were unresponsive.

The Regional Security Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Diplomatic Security Overseas Criminal Investigator interviewed GSM [REDACTED] who disclosed [REDACTED] hired a contractor to do work on [REDACTED] home and who also worked on Peace Corps contracts.

During a follow-up interview of GSM [REDACTED] gave conflicting information on how [REDACTED] another contractor who was awarded a Peace Corps contract. GSM [REDACTED] also deleted [REDACTED] WhatsApp messaging application from [REDACTED] prior to the second interview (Exhibit-1).

## FINDINGS

The investigation disclosed unethical procurement practices and failed to conduct adequate independent government due diligence in finding qualified businesses to award Peace Corps contracts. GSM [REDACTED] conflicting statements (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) efforts to identify and select the contractors resulted in the RSO [REDACTED] to revoke [REDACTED] security certification, which

Date:  
06/24/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init.

[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: (b) (6) (b) (7)(C)

## ALLEGATION

On March 17, 2025, Associate General Counsel (AGC) [REDACTED], Office of General Counsel (OGC), Peace Corps, provided information to the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding a possible conflicting dual employment by a Peace Corps employee.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

18 USC 1001 – False Statements

5 CFR § 3801.106 – Outside employment

MS 630 – Direct Hire Hours of Duty

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

AGC [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] unconfirmed suspicions that Peace Corps Medical Officer (PCMO) [REDACTED], Director, Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office of Health Services (OHS), Peace Corps, may be working at [REDACTED] private practice during [REDACTED] scheduled working hours with Peace Corps (EXHIBIT 1).

AGC [REDACTED] is the Associate General Counsel assigned to the PC/Office of Health Services. In that capacity, [REDACTED] in on regular Teams meetings with OHS employees, including Director [REDACTED]. Director [REDACTED] has been working at OMS for approximately 1 - 2 years. [REDACTED] that many clinicians in OMS have outside practices. In this case, [REDACTED] suspicions were raised because Director [REDACTED] appeared to be participating in agency Teams calls from an office setting. [REDACTED] the background is clearly neither [REDACTED] nor a standard Teams background. The location has fluorescent lighting, a drop ceiling, and white walls. [REDACTED] has seen the background location for about the last year, but has only recently started paying attention to it. AGC [REDACTED] also noted that Director [REDACTED] has not agreed to take OMS duty calls in rotation with other doctors, or to hold the duty phone. AGC [REDACTED] said there are other doctors in OMS who say it is very atypical for a PCMO not to agree to do so.

AGC [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] is also the Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO). In that capacity, [REDACTED] access to Confidential Financial Disclosure (CFD) filings. [REDACTED]

Date:  
31OCT2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

AIGI Init. [REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On November 22, 2025, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Associate Director (AD) for Global Health and HIV (OGHH), Peace Corps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), may be committing Time and Attendance fraud. AD [REDACTED] subordinates are reportedly unable to contact [REDACTED] rarely appears online. No other substantive information was provided in the complaint.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or Entries Generally
- 5 CFR § 2635.705(a) - Use of official time
- Peace Corps MS-647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

From December 4, 2024, to January 10, 2025, OIG reviewed AD [REDACTED] electronic Official Personnel File, network log-ins, records of government email activity, and building access records.

(b) (7)(E)

Director [REDACTED] network log in records showed regular times and hours for accessing the Peace Corps network (Exhibit-1). A review of director [REDACTED] email logs over a thirty-day period show 357 emails were sent from [REDACTED] PC email (Exhibit-2). Director [REDACTED] also regularly entered and exited PC headquarters according building access records (Exhibit-3).

## FINDINGS

No information was found that indicated AD [REDACTED] may be committing T&A fraud. Regular network, facility access, and email activity indicated routine and regular attendance.

No further investigative activity is anticipated or expected.

## EXHIBIT LIST

1. PC Network Access Records
2. PC Email Activity Records
3. PC Headquarters Building Access Records

Date:

01/21/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)

AIGI Init.

[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On July 31, 2025, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint (Exhibit 1) alleging that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Training Assistant (TA), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), sexually assaulted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Executive Assistant (EA), on/about July 16, 2025, during an overnight stay at a local lodging facility used for Pre-Service Training (PST).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- Peace Corps Manual Section (MS) 645 – Anti-Harassment Program
- MS 646 – Staff Alcohol Use
- MS 647 – Staff Responsibilities and Conduct
- 5 CFR 2635 – U.S. Federal Government Standards of Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

Between August 12 and August 14, 2025, OIG conducted interviews with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff members:

### 1. EA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 2)

EA [REDACTED] reported that TA [REDACTED] pressured [REDACTED] via WhatsApp messages and phone calls to stay overnight at the hotel used by [REDACTED] for Post staff members to facilitate PST, claiming [REDACTED] had obtained approval from the Country Director. Upon arrival [REDACTED] TA [REDACTED] insisted there were no other rooms, and that EA [REDACTED] would have to be sharing a room with TA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] objections, TA [REDACTED] convinced [REDACTED] to share the room with [REDACTED]. That night, after drinking alcohol in the room, TA [REDACTED] entered [REDACTED] bed, placed [REDACTED] arm and leg over [REDACTED], and kissed [REDACTED] on the face and cheek. EA [REDACTED] resisted, said “No” multiple times, and reminded [REDACTED] wife and children. TA [REDACTED] eventually moved to the other bed. EA [REDACTED] was left in shock and unable to sleep the entire night because [REDACTED] afraid of TA [REDACTED].

### 2. Host Family and Logistics Coordinator (HFLC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 3)

HFLC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that [REDACTED] TA [REDACTED] had been drinking together earlier that evening, and that TA [REDACTED] later admitted to kissing EA [REDACTED] and placing [REDACTED] arm and leg over [REDACTED]. HFLC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated [REDACTED] betrayed by TA [REDACTED] and was unaware of the full extent of the incident until EA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disclosed it.

### 3. Training Coordinator (TC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 4)

TC [REDACTED] recalled that HFLC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed that TA [REDACTED] had recently been suspended because

Date: 10/15/2025

Agent Name/ Signature: [REDACTED]

AIGI Init. [REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

Post: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On 10 February 2025, OIG was notified of an allegation that [REDACTED], Peace Corps Trainee (PCT), [REDACTED], may have possessed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) on one [REDACTED] personal electronic devices (PEDs) during [REDACTED] Pre-Service Training (PST). The allegation regarding the CSAM came from [REDACTED] after PCT [REDACTED] returned home to [REDACTED] after voluntary early termination (ET).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code Chapter 110 - Sexual Exploitation and other Abuse of Children (PROTECT ACT 2003)

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On 18 February 2025, OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who stated that on February 2, 2025, PCT [REDACTED] went on a date with a local [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] (No Further Information, NFI). According to [REDACTED], on February 3, 2025, PCT [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] email was “hacked” and completely “shut down” by Google because the account was sending “malware” and “misinformation” (NFI). Langan did not see that notification from Google, nor did [REDACTED] observe CSAM on any of PCT [REDACTED] PEDs.

On February 4, 2025, PCT [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] would be returning home from [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] own volition and subsequently arrived at [REDACTED] residence on February 6, 2025. [REDACTED] added that PCT [REDACTED] host family in [REDACTED] was very sad to see [REDACTED] leave.

On February 7, 2025, PCT [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] was caught with CSAM. PCT [REDACTED] did not say who caught [REDACTED] nor did [REDACTED] ask [REDACTED] who or how [REDACTED] caught with CSAM. [REDACTED] directed PCT [REDACTED] to leave [REDACTED] home due to the presence of minor children and then filed a report with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). On February 9, 2025, an officer from the [REDACTED] responding to the IC3 complaint, arrived at [REDACTED] residence. [REDACTED] provided the responding officer with five laptops (including the one used by PCT [REDACTED]) for forensic review. (Exhibit 1).

On 19 February 2025, OIG interviewed [REDACTED], Country Director (CD), [REDACTED], who stated that PCT [REDACTED] was only in country for a few weeks but seemed passionate about the PC mission and did not observe any “red flags”. CD [REDACTED] was surprised to hear about PCT [REDACTED] decision to depart [REDACTED] so soon but during [REDACTED] meeting with [REDACTED], PCT [REDACTED] explained [REDACTED] mother was suffering from a mental health illness (NFI). CD [REDACTED] was unaware of any other issues surrounding PCT [REDACTED] departure [REDACTED] left [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] own volition. (Exhibit 2).



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: (b) (5), (b) (7)(C)

## ALLEGATION

On April 17, 2025, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a hotline submission from an anonymous complainant that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Acting Director (AD), Office of Overseas Programming and Training Support (OPATS), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was hired into a position that violated [REDACTED] Not-To-Exceed (NTE) date (EXHIBIT 1).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

MS 601 Section 2.4 – Time Limits

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On April 17, 2025, OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Chief Compliance and Risk Officer (CCRO), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (EXHIBIT 2). CCRO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (Acting) Chief of Staff (COS), [REDACTED], had been working for approximately 2 years to fulfill recommendations provided by OIG in 2012 (EXHIBIT 3) regarding certain staffing positions under the authority of Sam Farr and Nick Castle Peace Corps Reform Act of 2018 (identified as 22 U.S.C. 2506(a)(8), the “Farr/Castle Act”), specifically to identify positions for exemption from the Peace Corps Five-Year “In/Out” Rule.

According to CCRO [REDACTED], Peace Corps determined that 30% of agency positions would be identified as Exempt. CCRO [REDACTED] explained several agency [REDACTED] officials, including [REDACTED], Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO); Lauren Stephens, (former) COS; [REDACTED] (CFO); and the Office of General Counsel were included in the decisions to identify and establish positions as Exempt. Among them, it was determined the Senior Advisor position (51PN036), within OPATS would be Exempt in approximately October of 2024.

On April 24, 2025, OIG reviewed a Decision Memorandum, dated November 20, 2024, which identified the OPATS Senior Advisor as the most senior position under the Director of OPATS (EXHIBIT 4). CCRO [REDACTED] said that Carol Spahn, (former) Director, Peace Corps, exercised [REDACTED] authority to exempt position 51PN036 from the Five-Year Rule outlined in Section 7 of the Peace Corps Act of 1961, as amended.

On April 30, 2025, CHCO [REDACTED] advised OIG in an email that AD [REDACTED] encumbers the position in question, which remains Exempt under the Farr/Castle Act. This position was Exempted on December 3, 2024. AD [REDACTED] was detailed to the position by Allison Greene, OPATS Director and Acting Chief Executive Officer (CEO), [REDACTED].

Date:  
27 May 2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(D)

AI GI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

## ALLEGATION

On March 27, 2025, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint that [REDACTED] had made disparaging comments towards women, veterans, and was grossly mismanaging [REDACTED] position.

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 5 USC § 2302(b) - Prohibited Personnel Practices
- Peace Corps MS 401- Domestic Physical Security
- Peace Corps MS-647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

The OIG conducted interviews of Office of Safety and Security (OSS) personnel. The OIG also reviewed Peace Corps policies and the contract for Peace Corps [REDACTED] s.

## FINDINGS

No definitive information was discovered regarding disparaging comments about women and veterans made by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was disclosed during the investigation. OSS repeatedly requested additional staffing for [REDACTED] (Exhibit-1), but additional staff were not placed in [REDACTED] until June 2025 after agency personnel were reassigned to different offices. A review of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contract (Exhibit-2) did not disclose any mismanagement or performance issues by the contractor.

No further investigative activity is anticipated or expected.

## EXHIBIT LIST

[REDACTED]

Date:  
09/09/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

[REDACTED] / [REDACTED]

AIGI Init.

[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On June 4 2025, Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint alleging that [REDACTED], Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV), [REDACTED], had abruptly terminated [REDACTED] Peace Corps service amid [REDACTED] potential sexual involvement in a relationship with a 17-year-old [REDACTED].

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- MS 204 Volunteer Conduct - 4.17.3 Sexual Activities with Children
- MS 647 Staff Responsibilities and Conduct
- MS 648 Child Protection Act

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On June 11, 2025, OIG interviewed PCV [REDACTED] (b) (5), (b) (7)(C) a member of the Volunteer Service Improvement Committee (VSIC), which is a group of PCV leaders who facilitate communication between Peace Corps Staff and Volunteers to ensure issues are discussed or addressed in a timely manner. PCV [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] had reported through the VSIC that PCV [REDACTED] was reportedly involved in a relationship with HCN [REDACTED], [REDACTED] near PCV [REDACTED] local community.

On June 11, 2025, OIG interviewed PCV [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who explained that PCV [REDACTED] claimed [REDACTED] in a relationship with Host Country National (HCN) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). However, PCV [REDACTED] denied ever having sex with [REDACTED] and did not know [REDACTED] age.

On June 11, 2025, OIG interviewed PCV [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who explained [REDACTED] was in the same cohort as PCV [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), while PCV [REDACTED] was in a neighboring village in [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), teaching at [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV [REDACTED] said that “from the beginning, [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was known to party really hard; rumors would have [REDACTED] drinking heavily.” [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a time when PCV [REDACTED] passed out drunk in a trench on the side of the road in front of a police station, and was later found by another PCV.

PCV [REDACTED] recalled that in February 2025, there was a festival in the region that several PCVs attended, including PCV [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who took a video of PCV [REDACTED] dancing with a young girl. This girl was later identified as HCN [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PCV [REDACTED] related that a teacher from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school named [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came up to [REDACTED] and said “your friend [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is hanging out with [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a lot and [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put a selfie of them [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WhatsApp status.”

Date:  
14 October 2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Initials:  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED] POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On June 30, 2025, Peace Corps Medical Officer (PCMO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Director of Epidemiology and Medical Officer, Office of Health Services (OHS), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], advised the PC Office of Inspector General (OIG) that OHS had concerns about the authenticity of a medication. PCMO [REDACTED] advised that a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) in [REDACTED] that PC purchased from a pharmacy in [REDACTED]. Because the PCV did not improve, OHS requested OIG assistance to check if the [REDACTED] was counterfeit. PCMO [REDACTED] advised that the PCV's condition improved after [REDACTED].

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

18 U.S. Code § 2320 - Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

OIG requested that OHS provide the suspect medication to OIG for testing. On July 15, 2025, OIG received two boxes of purported [REDACTED] from OHS. The items were placed into evidence under Evidence Tag numbers [REDACTED]. Images of the boxes and their contents are appended to this report. (EXHIBIT 1)

On July 15, 2025, OIG sent the suspect medications to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Forensic Chemistry Center (NFCC), [REDACTED] (EXHIBIT 2)

On September 9, 2025, Supervisory Chemist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), NFCC, [REDACTED] advised that initial results indicated the presence of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. (EXHIBIT 3). OIG advised OHS of the initial results.

On November 13, 2025, OIG received the final results of analysis from NFCC (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (EXHIBIT 4) OIG advised OHS of the final results.

## FINDINGS

OHS reported concerns to OIG about the authenticity of Coartem that PC had purchased from a pharmacy [REDACTED]. FDA NFCC analysis of the suspect medication disclosed that [REDACTED]. No further investigative activity is proposed or expected.

Date:  
17DEC2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init.

[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On July 20, 2025, the Peace Corps Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a notification from (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C) Country Director (CD) [REDACTED] forwarded a notification alleging that Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] had physically assaulted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] Host Country National (HCN). After the initial report, CD [REDACTED] said PCV [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED] had restrained, choked, and injured HCN [REDACTED] in self-defense when [REDACTED] attacking [REDACTED] (Exhibit 1). The event allegedly took place at an AirBnB.

[INV Note: An AirBnB is generally not considered to be within the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States (SMTJ).]

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

MS 204 Volunteer Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

### Notice of Administrative Hold

On July 21, 2025, CD [REDACTED] related that PCV [REDACTED] would be placed on Administrative Hold pending while the matter was reviewed. [REDACTED] be returning to his Home of Record in the United States. CD [REDACTED] provided OIG with PCV's return itinerary.

### Review of Police Records

OIG reviewed a photograph of a police blotter (Exhibit 2) which indicated that HCN [REDACTED] had gone to the police station on July 21, 2025, and reported [REDACTED] was assaulted by PCV [REDACTED] and had gone to the hospital.

### Review of Treatment Notes

On July 22, 2025, CD [REDACTED] sent OIG the clinical notes of an examination of HCN [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] medical facility. The notes indicated soft tissue injuries and tenderness (Exhibit 3).

### Interview of PCV [REDACTED]

On July 23, 2025, OIG interviewed PCV [REDACTED] (Exhibit 4) [REDACTED] transited through [REDACTED] during [REDACTED] return to home of record pursuant to [REDACTED] placement on [REDACTED]

Date:  
08 August 2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]

[ AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

Post: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On 22 July 2025, OIG was notified by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Country Director (CD) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], an allegation that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) [REDACTED], had a sexual encounter with a seventeen-year-old host country national (HCN) and in a separate incident drove another HCN's vehicle while possibly intoxicated (No Further Information, NFI).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code Chapter 110 - Sexual Exploitation and other Abuse of Children (PROTECT ACT 2003)
- IPS 1-12 (Dated 03 July 2019) - Volunteer/Trainee Sexual Misconduct
- Peace Corps Manual Section (MS) 450 – Volunteer and Trainee Transportation

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On 24 July 2025, OIG interviewed CD [REDACTED], who relayed that the source of the information from [REDACTED] complaint was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], PCV [REDACTED]. CD [REDACTED] stated that PCV [REDACTED] believed PCV [REDACTED] was "bad influence" on other PCVs. CD [REDACTED] noted that PCV [REDACTED] was recently elected as a representative to the Service Improvement Committee [REDACTED] opined that both PCV [REDACTED] and PCV [REDACTED] viewed themselves as leaders within the PCV community in [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 1).

On 25 July 2025, OIG interviewed PCV [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] had been acquainted with PCV [REDACTED] in a social and professional capacity since late November/early December 2023. PCV [REDACTED] related an incident that occurred at PCV [REDACTED] second PC site in November 2024 [REDACTED] had to drive [REDACTED] school principal's vehicle back to their village because the principal was too intoxicated (they went to pick up a printer and, on the way, back stopped for a drink). PCV [REDACTED] was unaware if PCV [REDACTED] consumed alcoholic beverages with the principal. (Exhibit 2).

In November or December 2024, PCV [REDACTED] recounted to PCV [REDACTED] about paying an HCN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] in October or November 2024 for a sexual encounter (PCV [REDACTED] did not mention anything about the prostitute's age or being a minor).

PCV [REDACTED] also told PCV [REDACTED] about meeting another HCN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On August 21, 2025, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Director of Management and Operations (DMO), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that [REDACTED], Travel Specialist (TS), [REDACTED], might have arranged personal travel through a PC-contracted travel company and used [REDACTED] government-issued travel card at a nightclub (Exhibit-1).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- Peace Corps MS-647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct
- Peace Corps MS-731 - Peace Corps Purchase Card Program

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

According to the complaint, TS [REDACTED] had not been soliciting travel quotes from multiple vendors, but instead relied on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the preferred travel and tours vendor for [REDACTED]. In June 2024, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began seeking reconciliation for travel services previously procured by [REDACTED]. TS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had assured DMO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that payments were pending or already paid. However in July, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent an urgent request to make payment for numerous invoices, purportedly being withheld by TS [REDACTED], even though [REDACTED] records indicated payments for requested services had been paid.

OIG reviewed invoices sent by [REDACTED] and compared them to staff records and travel authorizations (Exhibit-2). The review disclosed numerous invoices that were unaccounted for in [REDACTED] records, overpayment made by [REDACTED], and balances shown as due by [REDACTED]. Numerous invoices had no associated official [REDACTED] travel authorization.

OIG reviewed TS [REDACTED] purchase card transactions and conducted interviews. TS [REDACTED] admitted during an interview [REDACTED] had arranged travel for family and friends through a PC contracted travel agency which were then subsequently billed to [REDACTED] (Exhibit-3).

OIG interviewed TS [REDACTED] (Exhibit-4), who admitted during the interview to using [REDACTED] government issued purchase card at a nightclub.

## FINDINGS

TS [REDACTED] admitted to OIG [REDACTED] misused [REDACTED] resources TS [REDACTED] security certification was revoked after [REDACTED] interview (Exhibit-5). TS [REDACTED] failed to appear at [REDACTED] disciplinary hearing and [REDACTED] contract was subsequently terminated (Exhibit-6).

Date:  
11/24/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: [REDACTED]

## ALLEGATION

On 31 August 2025, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous complaint through the OIG Hotline. According to the complaint, [REDACTED], Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV), [REDACTED], was sharing tips on how to cultivate marijuana online and discussing [REDACTED] distribution of marijuana to minor children (Exhibit 01).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code § 7 – Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States
- 21 U.S. Code § 859 – Distribution of controlled substance to persons under 18 years of age.
- Peace Corps MS 647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

According to the complainant, PCV [REDACTED] was associated with username [REDACTED] on a social media platform known as Discord. However, OIG did not find any such account name on Discord. On 24 September 2025, OIG found that PCV [REDACTED] maintained an email address vaguely similar to the username in question, but determined [REDACTED] was not an active or inactive username on Discord. OIG disclosed the allegation to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) [REDACTED]

On 25 September 2025, pursuant to PC Manual Section 204, OIG disclosed the allegation to [REDACTED] Country Director (CD), [REDACTED], to coordinate next steps. CD [REDACTED] agreed to conduct an unannounced home inspection of PCV [REDACTED] residence.

On 07 October 2025, CD [REDACTED] completed the unannounced home inspection and notified OIG that the residence of PCV [REDACTED] was “remarkably squared away”, and there were no signs of any illicit drug activity, growing/cultivation activities and no found contraband. Additionally, CD [REDACTED] questioned PCV [REDACTED] about the allegation, wherein PCV [REDACTED] denied [REDACTED] was involved in any illicit drugs and never used Discord under the username [REDACTED]. CD [REDACTED] suggested to OIG [REDACTED] PCV [REDACTED] was being truthful, [REDACTED].

On 16 October 2025, DEA informed OIG that they were not investigating the allegations further.

Date:  
11/14/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] / [REDACTED]

AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]



# SUMMARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT



Case Number: [REDACTED]

POST: (b) (6) (b) (7)(C)

## ALLEGATION

On 16 October 2025, the Peace Corps (PC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was informed of possible illegal sexual contact with a local minor allegedly committed by [REDACTED], Peace Corps Trainee (PCT), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exhibit 01).

## APPLICABLE LAW, REGULATION OR POLICY

- 18 U.S. Code § 2251 - Sexual exploitation of children
- Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act)
- Peace Corps MS 647 - Staff Responsibilities and Conduct

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

On 16 October 2025, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Intermittent Expert (IE), [REDACTED] reported to OIG that numerous PCTs had reported misconduct by PCT [REDACTED], including sexually inappropriate remarks, sexually inappropriate behavior, offensive language, inappropriate touching of host country (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and conduct unbecoming of a PCT. IE [REDACTED] added that based on the circumstances described by the PCTs, there may also be sexual abuse of a minor by PCT [REDACTED] against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). IE [REDACTED] referred to possible social media communications referenced in a consolidated statement from the reporting PCTs (Exhibit 02).

On 16 October 2025, OIG conducted open source research on possible identities for PCT [REDACTED], and obtained confirmation of the social media username (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). OIG submitted a preservation request to Meta and Instagram for the account username (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), case number [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 03)

On 16 October 2025, OIG obtained clarifying information from IE [REDACTED], who related [REDACTED], PCT, [REDACTED], had reported [REDACTED] that PCT [REDACTED] acted inappropriately throughout their entire PCT cohort training time. PCT [REDACTED] said PCT [REDACTED] was continuously showing up [REDACTED] unannounced, inviting [REDACTED] over even when instructed not to do so. Additionally, PCT [REDACTED] claimed PCT [REDACTED] had acted inappropriately with two (b) (6) [REDACTED]. As reported by PCT [REDACTED], PCT [REDACTED] again showed up unannounced to PCT [REDACTED] host family house. PCT [REDACTED] was packing in [REDACTED] bedroom with two young host family [REDACTED], who were sitting on PCT [REDACTED] bed. PCT [REDACTED] made it known that PCT [REDACTED] should not

Date:  
11/05/2025

Agent Name/ Signature/s:  
[REDACTED] / [REDACTED]

AIGI Init.  
[REDACTED]