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**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS**

HQ AFOSI/XILI
P.O. Box 2218
Waldorf, MD 20604-2218

DEC 17 2010

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for "History, OSI, 19 July 1948 - 30 June 1950 in its entirety." We received your request on 21 September 2010 and AFOSI FOIA tracking #2010-FOIA-00500 was assigned to your request.

We identified the History of the Office of Special Investigation Report as being responsive to your request; however portions of the information requested are exempt from disclosure to you. We have inserted notations on the attached documents to identify the portions deleted and the reasons for doing so. The notations are explained as follows:

a. "b6" indicates the withholding of information contained in personnel, medical, and similar files or information that applies to a particular individual for which we have determined there exists a privacy interest that generally and categorically outweighs any public interest in disclosure that the Freedom of Information Act would authorize. As recognized in federal statute and case law, the type of information that this generally requires to be withheld includes the names of government employees and law enforcement agents; personal data information such as Social Security Numbers, signatures, personal addresses (including email), and telephone numbers; medical and criminal history information; and most identifying information on persons forward deployed, overseas, or assigned to sensitive or routinely deployable units. The authority for this exemption may be found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and in the federal court cases interpreting that statute.

If you interpret this response as an adverse action, you may appeal it to the Secretary of the Air Force and it must be postmarked within 60 days from the date of this letter. Reference AFOSI FOIA #2010-FOIA-00500 and include in the appeal your reasons for reconsideration and attach a copy of this letter. Your letter and envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Address your letter as follows:

Secretary of the Air Force
Thru: HQ AFOSI/XILI
P.O. Box 2218
Waldorf, MD 20604-2218

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Anne C. Costa".

ANNE C. COSTA
Chief, Information Release Branch

Attachment:

Cy of AFOSI History Report 19 July 1946 - 30 Jun 1950, dated 22 November 1950, less redactions.

Classification cancelled and document designated
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY by authority of DIRECTOR
OF SPEC INVE effective on <u>20 Aug 78</u>
(b)(6)
By <u>for (b)(6)</u>

HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, USAF, 19 JULY 1948 -- 30 JUNE 1950

Prepared for the Inspector General, USAF, by Major (b)(6) Plans and
Policy Group, Deputy Inspector General for Security, USAF, 22 November 1950

(Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The material gathered for use in this Historical summary was extracted from the central files and records of the Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF, supplemented by interviews with personnel heading the Division of the Directorate, officers of the 1005th Inspector General Special Investigations Unit, Bolling AFB, and personnel of OSI District Office No. 4.

LECTURES

Address by Brigadier General Joseph F. Carroll at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, 28 April 1948

Address by Brigadier General Joseph F. Carroll at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, 26 September 1949

FILES

Administration and Organization files of the Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF

Records and Files of the Research and Analysis Branch, Plans and Policy Group, Deputy Inspector General for Security USAF. (Formerly Plans and Inspection Group, Office of the Director, Special Investigations)

Records of 1005th Inspector General Special Investigations
Unit Bolling AFB

REPORTS

The following interviews were conducted by Major (b) (6)
Colonel (b) (6) Executive Officer, Directorate
Special Investigations.

Colonel (b) (6) Chief, Plans and Policy Group, The
Deputy Inspector General for Security.

Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) Chief, Management
Division, Directorate Special Investigations.

Mr. (b) (6) Chief, Counter-Intelligence Division.

Mr. (b) (6) Chief, Personnel Investigations Division
Directorate Special Investigations.

Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6) Chief, General Investigations
Division, Directorate Special Investigations.

Mr. (b) (6) Chief, Procurement Investigations
Division, Directorate of Special Investigations.

Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) Commanding Officer,
1005th IG SIU.

Colonel (b)(6) District Commander, District
Office Unit No. 4, Bolling AFB.

HISTORIES

History of 1005th IG SIU from July 1948 to December 1949.

STUDIES

Air University Study of USAF Clearance program dated 12
December 1949.

GLOSSARY

A-2 -- Director of Intelligence USAF
AEC -- Atomic Energy Commission
AFB -- Air Force Base
AMC -- Air Materiel Command
APM -- Air Provost Marshal
CI -- Counter-Intelligence
DCS/O -- Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
DCS/P -- Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DO -- District Office
IG -- Inspector General
OSI -- Office of Special Investigations
SIU -- Special Investigations Unit

FOREWORD

The United States Air Force, split functionally rather than on a geographic basis, found the investigative services on numerous air bases located immediately adjacent ^{to} one to another with no direct interrelation because they were component parts of separate commands. This precluded full utilization at all times of the various personnel engaged in investigative activity. This method of operation also resulted in an increased administrative overhead. In the interest of economy and efficiency, a centralized investigative system has been employed which reduces this overhead, permits flexibility to meet fluid investigative requirements and promotes full utilization of existing manpower.

SECTION I

FOUNDING OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

1. On 19 July 1948 by order of Mr. Stuart W. Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, the Office of the Director of Special Investigations was organized within the structure of The Inspector General as an instrumentality of the Chief of Staff, USAF. This order charged the Office of The Inspector General with the duty of conducting such investigations and inspections as may be required to determine the economy, efficiency, and adequacy of the United States Air Force. This order further directed that the integral components of the Office of The Inspector General consist of the Office of the Air Inspector, the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, and the Office of the Air Provost Marshal. These three (3) components, as designated by the Secretary of the Air Force, were named directorates operating on the staff of the Chief of Staff, USAF, under The Inspector General, USAF. The Office of the Director of Special Investigations was charged with the responsibility for investigating matters involving crime, other violations of public trust and subversive and related activities within the jurisdiction of the Air Force. The Office of Special Investigations under the direction of Brigadier General Joseph F. Carroll was fitted into the Office of The Inspector General, USAF, in view of its close relation to other Inspector General responsibilities.

On 1 August 1948 the OSI as an activity of the Inspector General USAF commenced operation under the provisions of Air Force Letter 20-4, dated 19 July 1948.¹ This directive outlined the mission and functions of the organization and became known as the original charter under which the organization was formed.

2. The investigative responsibilities of the Director of Special Investigations were discharged through a field activity composed of twenty-five (25) district offices strategically located throughout the United States. Each district office was furnished a definite allocation of territory on a geographic basis, and responsibility for operational coverage charged on this basis. Territorial allocations were determined through a careful review and analysis of the most effective means of accomplishing the OSI mission. The geographical chart, Appendix "A," illustrates the territorial jurisdiction of the twenty-five (25) district offices within the United States.

*Printed AFH
20-4 dated
19 July 1948
This is the
original charter
under which the
OSI was formed
to include
the OSI
mission
of 1948.*

1. AFL 20-4 dated 19 July 1948 attached as Appendix "B" to this history.

SECTION II

CONSOLIDATING THE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES

1. The Office of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF, was founded for the purpose of providing a competent, centrally-directed agency to conduct all investigations concerning the integrity or security of the United States Air Force and the conduct or loyalty of its personnel. This organization, through its structure and procedure, combined three (3) previously separate phases of investigative effort: criminal, counter-intelligence, and fraud and other criminal irregularities in procurement matters.

2. Prior to the inception of the Office of Special Investigations, the investigative activities of the Air Force were scattered among several branches of the Air Force. The purpose of the Office of Special Investigations was to consolidate all of these scattered investigative activities into one centrally-directed unit which would function as the only investigative organization within the Air Force. To this end, the Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps, the Air Force Criminal Investigations Division, and other Air Force investigative elements were disbanded and their activities merged within the Office of Special Investigations.

3. Under the leadership and guidance of Brigadier General Carroll, the OSI consolidated the various Air Force investigative elements on a nationwide basis. Three OSI Regional offices located at Langley AFB, Virginia, Kelly AFB, Texas, and San Bernadino, California, were organized for the purpose of assisting the Director OSI in welding the organizational

framework of the OSI into a homogeneous structure. These regional offices headed by OSI Regional Directors were staff components of the regional Inspectors General offices. The principal function of these OSI Regional Directors was to conduct periodic inspections of the District Offices located within their respective regions. OSI Regional boundaries coincided with the Inspector General regional boundaries as designated by The Inspector General, USAF.

4. The Director of the Office of Special Investigations, an officer of an appropriate general grade serving on the Headquarters USAF staff, has been charged with the responsibility of exercising command jurisdiction over the Office of Special Investigations within the continental limits of the United States. This Director has been designated as the final authority within the Office of Special Investigations for the formulation of investigative policy, acting in such capacity for The Inspector General, USAF. He has been authorized to report through the Inspector General, USAF, to the Chief of Staff, USAF or, on matters of special interest, directly to the Secretary of the Air Force.

SECTION III

EXPANSION OF OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF, has been defined as an activity of The Inspector General, USAF, which in turn is an instrumentality of the Chief of Staff, USAF. This directorate has been charged with the operational and administrative control of all Office of Special Investigations activities within the continental limits of the United States. Personnel on duty with the Directorate are assigned to Headquarters USAF with duty at such locations as may be considered necessary.

2. It was intended that OSI should have certain counter-intelligence functions at the time the organization materialized, ^{1/}however, the counter-intelligence responsibilities of the OSI were not specifically set forth until 4 February 1949 at which time certain counter-intelligence functions, formerly a responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence DCS/O USAF, were formally transferred by memorandum of agreement to the Directorate of Special Investigations.^{2/}

3. On 23 May 1949 instructions were issued to overseas air commands which resulted in the activation of an Office of Special Investigations within each overseas command similar to the OSI in the United States.^{3/} Each overseas OSI organization was placed under an overseas air command inspector general with internal organization and operational control, accomplished at the discretion of the commanding general, each air command concerned.

4. The Directorate of Special Investigations, known as Headquarters Office of Special Investigations, has been charged with the responsibilities for staff support and staff supervision of OSI activities in overseas commands through the Inspector General, USAF. These responsibilities include furnishing trained investigative personnel for replacements, providing technical investigative equipment and other special supplies, justifying budgetary requirements, and accomplishing staff actions as may be required. Direct communication has been authorized between the Directorate of Special Investigations and OSI offices overseas on matters pertaining to the exchange of investigative information.

- 1/ General Order No. 29 Headquarters USAF dated 15 July 1948
- 2/ AFOIF unnumbered letter Headquarters USAF 321.031, dated 4 February 1949 (Restricted)
- 3/ AFOSI unnumbered letter Headquarters USAF, 321.011 dated 23 May 1949 (Restricted)

SECTION IV

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CENTRALIZED

CONTROL WITHIN THE OSI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. To achieve the dual objective of cooperative consolidation and central direction, the OSI structure was organized to provide a headquarters organization known as the Directorate of Special Investigations and twenty-five (25) district offices strategically located to cover the entire area of the United States.

2. As previously stated herein, the Directorate of Special Investigations was organized as a staff agency of The Inspector General USAF with both command and operational functions. This Directorate has consisted of the Office of the Director, an administrative division designated as Management Division, and four operational divisions designated as the Counter-Intelligence Division, Personnel Investigations Division, Procurement Investigations Division and General Investigations Division. Personnel on duty therewith have been assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron USAF.

3. The Office of the Director has been staffed by the Director, the Deputy Director, the Executive Officer, and a Plans and Inspection Group headed by a group chief. The Plans and Inspection Group has been charged with the responsibilities of making technical inspections, special studies, plans and surveys for the Director, initiating general policy matters, and reviewing other specific policies pertaining to the Office of Special Investigations.

4. Each headquarters division, headed by a division chief has been broken down organizationally into branches. These divisions have been charged with the over-all operational responsibilities of monitoring

and controlling the investigative and administrative work performed at the OSI District Office level of operation.

5. On 15 July 1948 General Order No. 29 authorized activation of the 11th Air Force Base Unit at Bolling AFB Washington, D. C. This Base Unit subsequently was re-designated as 1005th Special Investigations Unit, (IG) USAF. This organization, operating under the control and supervision of the Management Division, Directorate of Special Investigations was delegated responsibility of handling all administrative details relating to budgetary matters and supply for the twenty-five (25) district offices within the United States, and the assignments, reassignment, promotion, reduction, and classification of all military and civilian personnel performing duties at these districts.

6. All OSI personnel working at district office level in the United States, including the District Commanders, have been assigned to the 1005th Inspector General Special Investigations Unit. Duty stations of these personnel have been at such locations within the district areas as required to accomplish the OSI mission.

7. The twenty-five (25) district offices of the Office of Special Investigations in the United States commanded by officers designated as District Commanders, were organized as the operational field activities of the OSI. These District Commanders have been authorized direct communication with the Director of the Office of Special Investigations and laterally with each other. They also have been made responsible directly to the Director, OSI, and exercise the disciplinary power of

commanding officers over OSI personnel performing duties within their respective district areas. District Commanders perform local administration for OSI personnel within their districts and control all OSI investigative activity therein. The average district headquarters has been staffed by key personnel who, under the direct control of the District Commander, have supervised the operational activities of investigative personnel within the district and performed such administration for the district as became necessary. These key personnel have been designated as the administrative officer, supervisor of general investigations, and supervisor of personnel (routine loyalty) investigations.

7. Detachments have been placed within each district under the supervision and control of the District Commander and under the command of military personnel designated as Detachment Commanders. These detachments have been located so as to provide OSI service to all Air Force installations as well as OSI representation in the principal cities. District and Detachment Commanders act as the local representatives of the Office of Special Investigations to whom Air Force commanders channel requests for OSI service.

8. District and detachment offices have been authorized to receive their logistic support from the nearest Air Force installation. These OSI offices have been tenant organizations of the installations

furnishing the logistic support. OSI personnel on duty at these installations must comply with the rules and regulations of the local commands.

9. A free and unhampered interchange of information on a national basis has been authorized as required, thereby making the facilities of each district office available to the entire organization. Through OSI Headquarters the twenty-five (25) district offices have been drawn together so that the over-all performance is actually one single operation on behalf of the Air Force as a whole.

1/ APPENDIX "C" -- Charts illustrating the organization and functions of the Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF.

SECTION V

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

OF THE

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

PART I**GENERAL PROCEDURES**

1. The base commander, being responsible for that which occurs on his installation, discharges his responsibilities with the facilities at his disposal. The Office of Special Investigations has operated as a service organization furnishing investigative service to commanders. It has been the facility made available by the Chief of Staff, USAF, through which the commander might handle any matter under his jurisdiction which required investigative attention. In order to effectively perform this investigative service, action copies of all OSI investigative reports have been furnished the base commanders whose installations or personnel were affected. Thus, the commander has received initial reports of investigations, interim reports as to developments where warranted or desired, and final reports of completed investigative actions.

2. The availability of the services of the Office of Special Investigations has not relieved Air Force commanders of their responsibility for making inquiry into all matters which adversely affect the efficiency, morale or welfare of their commands. Inquiries in cases such as intoxications, minor administrative derelictions, and similar matters of personal conduct and misdemeanors have continued to be directed and resolved by commanders under the provisions of pertinent regulations.

3. Where initial inquiry directed by commanders has indicated that extensive or complex investigation is required and/or there is a probability that investigation of the matter is a delegated responsibility of the Office of Special Investigations, commanders

have been responsible for referring the matter without delay to the appropriate representative of the Office of Special Investigations for necessary investigative attention.

4. As previously mentioned, OSI district and detachment offices receive logistic support from the nearest Air Force installations. In addition, the commanders of these installations have been charged with the responsibility of rendering all practicable assistance to representatives of the Office of Special Investigations as required in the performance of their duties.^{1/}

5. All investigative work performed within a particular district office area, has flowed through the district headquarters so that investigations could be conducted in the light of all relevant information gathered from surrounding areas and not in isolated relationship to a given Air Force installation.

6. As indicated, action copies of investigative reports have been submitted to the local commander for such attention as he has deemed appropriate in the proper discharge of his command responsibilities. In addition, copies of investigative reports prepared by the district offices of OSI have been forwarded to OSI Headquarters for review and central filing. All investigations of a substantive nature have been monitored by the appropriate division in OSI Headquarters so that each investigation might be brought to a prompt, logical and effective conclusion. Through

this monitoring process, constructive assistance has been rendered to OSI personnel in the field. This review of investigative reports on the headquarters level has enabled the Director to furnish through The Inspector General to the Chief of Staff and to commanders, information concerning trends and patterns of irregularities and situations actually or potentially adverse to the Air Force.

7. This centralized system of operation has permitted Headquarters OSI to become a central repository for all investigative information in the criminal, procurement and counter-intelligence fields, thus providing the basis for a true coordination of such related activities.

8. In order to carry out this consolidated investigative mission as a centrally directed organization, it has been required that all personnel loyalty background investigations conducted by the twenty-five (25) district offices be processed through other Federal agencies at a national level for name and record checks. The 4th District office located near the seat of government has performed this function for all OSI districts, registering the information derived therefrom with the OSI central files. Through this procedure, a record of all OSI investigations of a non-substantive nature have been also retained in a central file. Each district office has retained copies of all reports concerning investigations conducted within the district area of responsibility. These

district files, permanent in nature, thereby become a central repository of investigative information for the Air Force within local geographical areas. Each district file having been cross-referenced with the central OSI file, actually has become a field extension of the central file and therefore readily available to every other District Office as an informational source.

9. As a protection to the personnel who may become involved in an investigation conducted by OSI, all matters of an investigative nature have been treated as confidential. All reports of investigative findings have been officially classified at least "confidential" with the information contained therein, disclosed only to authorized personnel who require such information in the performance of their official duties.

10. The several major air commands within the United States have bases all over the United States, and it is for this reason that the Air Force has decided to place the Air Force investigative activities under the centralized control of a Director of Special Investigations whose investigators could perform a service for all Air Force activities. Prior to this, much duplication of investigative activity occurred in the Air Force. The value of this centralization has been practically exemplified as follows:

i.e. Within the radius of a few miles in the southern part of Texas, there have been four Air Force installations

operating under three different major Air Force commands. Kelly Air Force Base has operated under the Air Materiel Command, whereas Lackland Air Force Base which is immediately contiguous to Kelly Air Force Base, has been an installation of the Air Training Command. Brooks Air Force Base, which is only a short distance away, has come under the jurisdiction of the Continental Air Command, whereas Randolph Air Force Base, which is also located in the same general vicinity has operated under the Air Training Command. Under the decentralized system of investigation it would have been necessary for all three of these major Air Force Commands to have their own investigative organizations established in this area. Under the centralized system of operation, all Air Force investigative activity in this area has been performed by the OSI, and OSI representatives stationed in the area have been available to all of the Air Force installations involved.

11. More prompt and efficient service has been provided to Air Force Commanders than could be accomplished under a decentralized system. During the first year of operation, the present organization has been demonstrated to be, for the Air Force, more efficient and more effective than its predecessors. The volume part of OSI's investigative activities has been in the personnel background field,

and because of the centralized method of operation it has been possible to effect wide economies of manpower and money which would not have been possible under a decentralized investigative system. The investigation of a background of an individual who was born in Massachusetts, went to school in California, and has resided for the major portion of his adult life in Ohio has been handled in OSI simply and expeditiously because of the absence of the necessity of sending lead requests to other investigative organizations through command channels. OSI field agencies having direct communication with all other OSI activities, have been able, therefore, to shunt command lines which would otherwise have bottle-necked investigative operations.

1/ AFR 124-2 dated 3 August 1950 "Operation of OSI Offices at Air Force Installations." (Re-written from former Air Force Letter 124-2 dated 19 July 1948)

PROCUREMENT INVESTIGATIONS

PART II

1. Centralized direction of the activities of the Office of Special Investigations has been the primary responsibility of the Directorate of Special Investigations, IG, USAF. The diverse fields of investigative effort and the requirements peculiar to the areas in which the OSI mission must be accomplished, have required compartmentalization in the Headquarters, USAF. The fluid nature of investigative activities has required a flexible organizational structure in order to meet the demands as they arise.

2. As previously stated, the organizational framework of the OSI originally consisted of the Directorate of Special Investigations and twenty-five district offices. Of the twenty-five district offices, four (4) were organized as sub-districts under the control and direction of a fifth district office located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio. This sub-district type of organization was applied for the primary purpose of conducting procurement fraud investigations. It was intended that these five districts should conduct all investigations concerning criminal irregularities occurring in connection with the Air Force Procurement Program. The investigative activities of the district at Wright-Patterson AFB, together with the other four (4) procurement sub-districts, were to be monitored by the Procurement Investigations Division in Headquarters OSI.

3. Soon after OSI became operational it was apparent that procurement investigations could be more effectively conducted when administered under standard OSI district procedures of operation.

Therefore, during the month of January, 1949, minor changes were made in the territorial jurisdiction of several district offices, four (4) OSI procurement sub-districts were disbanded, and four (4) standard OSI districts activated in their stead. Even though standard district organizations took the place of the original procurement district type of organization the scope and complexities involved in the procurement fraud investigative activities of these districts, required certain deviations from the standard organizational and operational policies and procedures of the OSI.

4. The procurement field of investigative activity has pertained to allegations of fraud, conspiracy to defraud the Government or other criminal irregularity, in connection with the placement, administration or termination of Air Force contracts. Such investigations have required considerable liaison activity at USAF Headquarters level. It has been necessary to evaluate and analyze allegations, complaints and initial inquiries in the light of all information available. Other Air Force agencies, upon whose activities the information had a bearing, have been consulted to determine if there were any particular questions which they desired to raise concerning the matter. Problems of investigative jurisdiction have been resolved according to applicable directives and agreements. It frequently has occurred that such matters were referred to another investigative agency, however, OSI has retained

full authority to complete all procurement fraud type investigations involving Air Force personnel subject to courts-martial jurisdiction. All procurement investigative reports have been screened as received to determine if there were any indications that Air Force systems, personnel or directives were at fault. Where such indications have been present, OSI investigative effort has been directed toward determining the facts and circumstances involved.

5. It being readily apparent that such operational activity as this could not be effectively conducted at a field level of operation, all OSI investigations of this nature have been authorized, supervised, and controlled by Headquarters OSI through the Procurement Investigations Division. Procurement investigations have been, in most instances, conducted by investigators who were especially qualified for such work. These investigations have been normally assigned to district procurement divisions superimposed upon the organizational structure of several of the OSI district offices. Each district procurement division has been authorized direct communication laterally with all other district procurement divisions and with the Procurement Investigations Division at OSI Headquarters. They have been strategically placed to afford maximum operational coverage within those areas where major Air Force procurement activities were conducted. District Commanders, even though not charged directly with the direction and control of such investigations, have been

responsible that directed investigative assignments were carried out by the district procurement investigations divisions.

6. As stated above, in most instances, special procurement investigators have conducted these investigations. However, district procurement divisions, not being located in each of the twenty-five (25) district offices, have resulted in District Commanders being required in certain instances to handle certain types of procurement investigations with agents who were not necessarily procurement specialists. These investigations normally have involved cases of fraudulent activity arising out of local procurement or purchases such as local contracts for disposal of surplus property, local purchases of gravel, local contracts for maintenance and repair, collusion between bidders in submitting bids on local contracts, and bribery of Air Force personnel to substitute serviceable property in the place of salvage.

7. Regardless of the complaint, allegation or information otherwise received concerning procurement irregularities, whether it has involved large scale or local Air Force procurement, no investigative activity other than preliminary inquiry has been performed until such time as Headquarters OSI was advised and instructions received.

PART III

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS

PART IV

PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS

1. As in the field of personnel background investigations, AFL 20-4 dated 17 July 1948 initially charged the OSI with the function of carrying out the counter-intelligence mission of the Air Force. The transfer of this mission, however, was implemented through the several directives which transferred the responsibility for personnel background investigations to the Air Force and to the Directorate of Special Investigations. This transfer was completed on 4 February 1949 when the counter-intelligence functions of the Directorate of Intelligence DCS/O were transferred to the OSI by a memorandum of agreement through Air Force unnumbered letter AFOIP 321.011. The Director of Special Investigations was subsequently named to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, representing the Air Force in effecting coordination of all domestic espionage, counter espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security.

2. The national aspect of counter-intelligence investigations as distinguished from exclusive localized interest has been especially evident in the fact that individual situations pertaining to treason, sedition, sabotage and subversive activities normally have been part of a pattern having an impact on the country as a whole, effectively combatted only on a nationally integrated basis. In addition to the normal nationwide aspect of counter-intelligence investigations, it has frequently occurred that such investigations receive the joint investigative effort of two or more Federal investigative or law enforcement agencies both military and civilian. This has required that the investigative jurisdiction of these Federal agencies be specified 1/ and adequate liaison systems organized.

PART V

COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE

3. The Office of Special Investigations having been organized on a national basis has been in a position to effectively cope with counter-intelligence investigations requiring national coverage. The principle of centralized direction has afforded OSI the opportunity to set-up a standard liaison system with other Federal investigative agencies at all levels of operation.

4. The counter-intelligence activities of OSI have been conducted under the supervision of the Counter-Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations. This Division was originally designated as the "Security Division," with early emphasis being placed upon security background and security incident investigations. However, as set forth in the preceding "Personnel Investigations" portion of this History, the readily apparent magnitude of the personnel investigations program required a division of counter-intelligence responsibilities to allow more specialized attention to be given to the various facets of the counter-intelligence mission. This requirement for divided CI responsibility was augmented by international developments which were placing more and more emphasis on the collection, analysis and dissemination of counter-intelligence information pertinent to the accomplishment of the Air Force mission. Personnel security investigations were extremely important but represented only a portion of the broad counter-intelligence picture.

5. Counter-intelligence investigations have been conducted under the standard operational procedures of OSI. Significant materials whether gathered as a result of counter-intelligence investigations or from other CI collection procedures, have been submitted to the Counter-Intelligence Division at Headquarters OSI. OSI activities under the Inspectors General in overseas air commands have forwarded pertinent CI material to the Directorate of Special Investigations at Headquarters USAF. Information has been furnished by the other Federal intelligence and investigative agencies. It has been necessary to collate and analyze this information as received to determine which individual pieces of information were significant and to ascertain if trends or patterns were being developed which would have an impact on the Air Force. This has gradually allowed the assembly of current information on a world-wide basis providing a central source from which responsible Air Force authorities might receive current counter-intelligence information

1/ Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

SECTION VI**ADMINISTRATION FOR THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS**

1. The 1005th IG Special Investigations Unit has been the administrative working arm for the Office of Special Investigations within the Zone of Interior. With the exception of the officers on duty in the Directorate of Special Investigations, Headquarters USAF, all Air Force Personnel of OSI within the Zone of Interior have been carried on the rolls of the 1005th IG SIU.

2. The 1005th IG SIU Headquarters, located at Bolling Air Force Base has been organized into six main sections:

ADJUTANT'S SECTION

PERSONNEL SECTION

VOUCHER SECTION

SUPPLY SECTION

BUDGET AND FISCAL SECTION

COST ACCOUNTING SECTION

These six sections have carried out the detailed administrative functions for the OSI under the direction and supervision of the Commanding Officer, and under the monitorship of the Management Division of the Directorate, Special Investigations. Each of these sections have been treated separately herein for the purpose of describing the manner in which the 1005th IG SIU has administered for the OSI.

3. The Adjutant's Section has been organized into four (4) sub-sections known as Statistical Control, Orders' Branch, Mail and Distribution, and Central Files.

a. The Statistical Sub-Section has been charged with the responsibility of keeping a record of all personnel statistical data necessary to the operation of the OSI. The primary source of information has been the Morning Report. Morning Reports have been initially prepared by the various Detachment Commanders and then submitted to the District Headquarters, where they have been consolidated, and, in turn, submitted to the 1005th, Headquarters daily. A consolidated Morning Report for the 1005th IG SIU has then been submitted daily to the Statistical Control Unit of the Air Force. The statistical control unit has provided various other services such as recording current manning table strengths for Districts and Detachments, both authorized and actual. Locator cards on each person assigned to the organization have been kept by this unit. Figures and data developed by the Statistical sub-section have been used by the Management Division OSI Headquarters, to serve as a guide in the placement of personnel.

b. The Order's sub-section has been responsible for the preparation and issuance of all Orders published by Headquarters 1005th. These orders have been issued as required by the Directorate of Special Investigations and as requested from the District Offices. All PCS orders and Leave Orders affecting personnel assigned to the 1005th, have been written by this sub-section. TDY travel orders

for personnel traveling between District Offices have been issued from this sub-section. Orders for travel within District Office areas, have been issued by the respective District Commanders in the form of monthly Blanket Orders. These Blanket Orders have authorized investigative personnel by name, to travel within the District Area concerned, whenever and wherever it is required in the performance of the OSI mission.

c. The Mail and Distribution Sub-Section has been an important factor in the efficient handling of OSI administration because of the fact that nearly all the administrative work has been accomplished by means of correspondence. The high rate of this correspondence has necessitated the assignment of a larger overhead to 1005th Headquarters than is normally found in Units of comparable strengths.

d. The File Section has carried out the filing, indexing, and recording functions for the 1005th, in the same manner as any comparable unit in other organizations.

4. The Personnel Section has been organized into four (4) sub-sections known as the Officer's Section, Payroll Section, Separation and Allotments Section, and the Airmen's Record Section.

a. The Officer's Sub-Section has been responsible for keeping the records for all officers assigned to 1005th, IG SIU with the exception of Pay Records. Officers of the OSI have been paid at

the Air Base to which they have been assigned for permanent duty. This sub-section has been responsible for, the initial processing of Officers' effectiveness reports, the Reclassification of Officers, and the furnishing of officer personnel data to the various agencies of the Air Force as required.

b. The Payroll Section has been responsible for the assembling and processing of all data pertaining to the pay of Airmen assigned to the 1005th IG SIU. As changes occur, Military Pay Change Orders have been prepared and submitted to the Finance Officer, Bolling Air Force Base. The Finance Officer, Bolling AFB has been the office effecting payment of all 1005th IG SIU Airmen throughout the OSI in the Zone of Interior. This pay has been in the form of a check issued to the individual and distributed through the 1005th Headquarters to the District Offices. In view of the peculiar nature of the 1005th IG SIU and the heavy workload facing the Bolling AFB Finance Office, items received after the 15th day of each month, which have affected the pay of the individual, have not been reflected in the payment until the following month.

c. The Separation and Allotment sub-section has been responsible for the assembly of Airmen's personnel records upon notification that such Airmen are being separated from the service. These records have then been forwarded to the appropriate Separation Center for processing. This sub-section has carried out the additional function of preparing and processing the various Airmen allotment forms.

d. The Airman's Record Sub-Section has been responsible for the posting of all changes as reflected on Service Records and Classification Cards.

5. The Voucher Section of the 1005th has been divided into two (2) sub-sections known as the Confidential Voucher Section and The Travel Voucher Section.

a. The Confidential Voucher sub-section, as the name implies, has been responsible for the processing of subvouchers submitted by OSI agents claiming reimbursement from Confidential Funds, ¹/ ascertaining that all expenditures have been supported by appropriate receipts and other documents where applicable. In addition this sub-section has been responsible for keeping appropriate registers and journals, keeping records on initial civilian clothing allowances and other pertinent activities relating to the maintenance and replacement of such clothing.

b. The Travel Voucher sub-section has been responsible for processing and initiating payment on vouchers submitted by all OSI personnel incident to travel performed. The keeping of voucher registers and complete card file records have been important functions of this sub-section because of planning requirements of the budget and fiscal section.

6. The Supply Section has been responsible for the handling of all organizational supply matters for the 1005th IG SIU. This sub-section has also been a central procurement office handling the

1. It was necessary during the first six months of operation to devote considerable attention to the problem of training the investigative personnel to efficiently accomplish the OSI investigative mission. The investigative personnel of the various activities merged into OSI, brought with them certain specialized abilities along the lines of criminal, counter-intelligence and procurement fraud investigative activities. Since it was the desire that each OSI special agent be qualified to handle any type of investigation which OSI might be called upon to perform it was necessary to augment the skill of each special agent with the technique in other fields of investigative endeavor with which he was not previously familiar.

2. It was determined that the moulding of these OSI personnel into a homogeneous unit could best be accomplished through formal training procedures. This training mission has been carried out through the OSI Training School, organized and operated under the direct supervision of Headquarters OSI at Washington, D. C. The principal course of instruction has been the basic training course for investigators, eight weeks in duration, through which it has been intended that all OSI personnel receive standard instruction. This basic course

has been designed to equip all OSI investigative personnel with the necessary training to handle any type of investigation within the jurisdiction of the Office of Special Investigations. In addition, instruction has been provided on such administrative matters as, the filing system of OSI, the preparation of reports, and the administration of district offices. Instruction has been offered by personnel of Headquarters OSI augmented by guest lecturers from such other federal investigative agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Treasury Department, the Customs Service, the Air Provost Marshal, the Judge Advocate General, USAF, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Exercises requiring the application of technical and general investigative techniques and practice pistol marksmanship have been included as an integral part of the basic training program.

3. OSI agents transferring to overseas areas have been afforded special overseas courses of instruction designed to qualify them in the use of special technical electronic and optical equipment, indoctrinating them with the particular requirements of the various overseas theaters to which they may be assigned and preparing them to accomplish their duties overseas in the intelligence field.

4. Advanced training consisting of a one week course has been given in those subjects which have appeared to be giving district offices the most difficulty. In this advanced course of training the latest investigative and scientific techniques have been presented and any other developments in the investigative field have been brought to the attention of the personnel selected to attend the course.

5. Supplementing this course of instruction, field conferences have been convened at periodic intervals for the purpose of discussing investigative problems with which various district offices have been confronted. These conferences have afforded District Commanders an opportunity to bring problems and policies to the attention of their investigative personnel, furnishing explanations and solutions thereof.

6. Even though the courses of instruction given at the OSI Training School have been designed to equip OSI investigators with the knowledge required to effectively conduct OSI investigations, the requirements of this specialized field of operation are of such nature as to make it necessary that potential OSI personnel making application for selection meet certain standards of education or experience. To qualify, an

applicant must have reached his twenty-third birth date, be a citizen of the United States, possess a degree from an accredited college or university, preferably in law or accounting and have two years of qualifying progressive experience in a recognized field of investigation. Qualifying fields of investigation have been: experience in military, federal, state or municipal investigative agencies conducting law enforcement investigations; or experience in bankruptcy and accounting investigations. In exceptional cases, applicants who have completed two years of college may substitute practical experience in the investigative fields mentioned above.

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1. At the beginning of the fiscal year 1949 the Office of Special Investigations being nearly one year old had activated 98 OSI Detachment Offices which were located at each Air Force Installation and in the principal cities of the country under the direct supervision and control of 25 District Commanders. These OSI field activities were operating under the direction of the Directorate of Special Investigations, Headquarters USAF thus accomplishing consolidation and centralized direction according to the instructions which were set forth in Air Force Letter 30-4.

2. Having accomplished the consolidation of the various Air Force investigative activities into a centrally directed investigative organization, the OSI turned its attention to the investigation of nearly 73,000 pending investigations which had accumulated during the first year's operation. The great majority of this case load consisted of routine security background investigations. The rate at which new cases were being received was far exceeding the productive ability of the organization at that time. During the month of July 1949 the OSI opened 8,873 cases and completed 8,052. During this same period, 8,774 corollary investigations were opened and 8,658 closed. This represented a total of 15,447 investigative assignments opened and 11,870 completed during the first month of the fiscal year. This workload was accomplished by 540 investigative personnel actually performing investigative

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duties during the month of July 1949. An average of approximately 21 investigative assignments were completed by each agent during that month.

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1. Major problems anticipated on 1 July 1949 were as follows:

- a. Increase agent productivity to meet the requirements of USAF Security Clearance Program.
- b. Develop streamlined systems of handling investigative operations to more effectively meet the increasing demands.
- c. Determine methods of speeding up the Loyalty Security Service to Air Force Activities without lowering the quality of the investigation or jeopardizing the security of the Air Force.
- d. Adjust the organizational pattern of the OSI field activities to allow a maximum number of available investigative personnel to be utilized fully on investigative assignments without losing adequate supervisory control.
- e. Determine methods of reducing the number of security loyalty investigations without lowering the standards of calculated security risk within the Air Force.
- f. Effect expedient investigation of those types of cases requiring priority treatment without materially slowing down the operations of other Air Force activities requiring security clearances in connection with their operations.
- g. Fully acquaint all Air Force personnel with the importance of security and increase security consciousness within the Air Force as a whole.

h. Furnish adequately trained investigative personnel to perform investigative duties in overseas Air Commands as required.

SECTION I

ACTIVITIES DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1950

SECTION IX

**MAJOR PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED
DURING THE
FISCAL YEAR 1950**

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Investigation completed and document assigned	
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OF (UNIT)	20 JUL 73
By (UNIT)	ONE FILE

1. Organization

a. On 21 October 1968 a study was completed concerning the ratio of supervisory personnel assigned to the field activities of the OBI as compared to the number of agents being fully utilized on investigative assignments. As a result of this study 44 investigators formerly used in supervisory capacities were placed on full investigative assignments. At this time standard organizational patterns were set up for the OBI District Offices authorizing a maximum of three investigative supervisors for each District Office including District Commanders.

b. By memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff USAF dated 6 March 1969, The Inspector General, Lieutenant General Robert A. Craig, initiated a reorganization and centralization of The Inspector General inspection activities within the United States. At this time, the Director OBI centralized internal OBI inspection activities and changed the Plans and Inspection Group, Office of the Director OBI with the inspection functions previously performed by the OBI regional offices. These OBI regional offices being a Staff Function of The Inspector General regional offices were disbanded upon implementation of the reorganization.

c. Toward the end of the fiscal year more emphasis was placed on the combat-intelligence phase of OBI activity. The resulting increase in OBI operations along this line of interest.

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gative endeavor, necessitated the authorization of an additional supervisor at District Office levels of operation. On 26 June 1960 the Director OSI, authorized District Commanders to include the position of counter-intelligence supervisor within the organizational framework of their districts where deemed necessary to accomplish the OSI counter-intelligence mission.

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PART II

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING

2. Administration

a. During the fiscal year, administrative officers, clerks and other administrative airmen were furnished on the job training at Headquarters OSI and the 1008th IG SIU administrative organization at Bolling AFB. This training assisted materially in standardizing administrative procedures with the OSI and promoted more efficient handling of administrative matters in the various District Offices.

PART III
INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING

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3. Investigative Training

a. The formal training of investigative personnel was carried out through the OSI Training School located in Temporary Building U, 12th and Constitution Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. This school offered a Basic Investigators Training Course for all OSI agents and an Overseas Indoctrination Course for OSI agents being transferred to overseas Air Commands. During the fiscal year 1950, 476 students were graduated from the Basic Training Course and 113 students attended the Overseas Indoctrination Course. The results of this training program were reflected in increased investigative efficiency and productivity. Many investigative procedures were standardized and the quality of OSI investigations constantly increased. This training program allowed the OSI in the United States to properly meet the investigative personnel requirements of the overseas Air Commands.

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PART IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSI MISSION

4. Implementation of the OSI Mission

a. Due to the importance attached to the Atomic Energy program, priority treatment was given to this category of investigation. By December 1949 all Atomic Energy investigative requests were being afforded National Agency checks on a current basis. This priority system allowed interim clearance consideration to be given personnel in Air Force Atomic Energy work shortly after submission of the investigative requests.

b. At the request of Lieutenant General H. A. Craig, the Inspector General, USAF, a committee of officers at the Air University considered various problems concerning the USAF Personnel Investigations and Clearance Program. This study was completed on 12 December 1949 at which time several recommendations were made for the implementation of the Security Program within the Air Force. These recommendations were studied by Brigadier General Joseph F. Carroll and Brigadier General J. V. Dillon, Air Provost Marshal, the Inspector General, USAF who presented the recommendations complete with their comments to the Inspector General, USAF. A true copy of this memorandum is attached as Appendix "D" to this history. As a result of this study and the decisions derived therefrom the following actions were taken by the Air Force to expedite the USAF Security Clearance Program:

- (1) The Office of Special Investigations in conjunction with the AFM and other AF agencies studied the security clearance program for the purpose of re-writing security directives and making recommendations for a more realistic approach to the problem of security clearances.
- (2) Commands were instructed to screen and review requests for clearance investigations for the purpose of submitting only those which were necessary under the provisions of the security regulations.
- (3) Additional personnel were authorized the OSI.
- (4) Numerous security briefing lectures were given to Air Force activities at all levels of command for the purpose of bringing about a more complete understanding and knowledge of the Air Force Security problem.
- (5) More emphasis was placed upon the recording of granted clearances upon personnel records to avoid duplication of investigations.

c. In April 1950 a study of sexual perversion within the Air Force was completed. As a result of this study numerous

lectures were presented to major air commanders and their staffs for the purpose of acquainting them with the security risks attached to the retention of homosexuals in the Air Force.

SECTION XI

STATUS OF THE OSI AS OF 30 JUNE 1950

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1. As anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year 1950, a major portion of the investigative effort expended by the OSI during the year was devoted to the accomplishment of the investigative mission concerning security of the Air Force and the loyalty of its personnel. During this period the OSI improved its effectiveness in handling this assigned mission and demonstrated an economy of operation through its consolidated method of operation under centralized direction.

2. During the fiscal year of 1950, OSI opened 90,418 cases and 160,291 corollary investigations. During this same period 82,035 cases and 150,415 corollary investigations were completed. These figures show that a total of 250,709 investigative assignments were opened and 232,450 were completed by OSI during that fiscal year. On 30 June 1950, 71,844 cases remained in pending status as the investigative backlog of the OSI. The statistical data furnished herein, includes all cases handled by the OSI the greatest majority of which consist of those investigations in the personnel loyalty security field of investigation.

3. Individual agent productivity continuously increased during the year without detriment to the quality of individual investigations. Even though new investigative requests continued to be received at approximately the same rate at the end of the year as they had at the beginning, during the last half of the

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fiscal year 1950, OSI was able to keep pace with the rate at which new investigative requests were being received. During this period the backlog of pending cases on the record of the organization were reduced to a minor degree. However, no substantial gains against this pending backlog could be made. During the month of June 1950 OSI opened 7,511 cases and completed 8,206. During this same period 22,091 corollary investigations were opened and 13,208 completed. This represented a total of 30,602 investigative assignments opened and 21,414 completed during the last month of the fiscal year. This workload was accomplished by 488 investigative personnel actually performing investigative duties during the month of June 1950. An average of approximately 44 investigative assignments were completed by each agent during that month.

4. Even though additional personnel had been authorized they could not be recruited and trained in sufficient quantity to effect an increase in personnel within the United States during the fiscal year, and meet the requirements of overseas Air Commands for trained investigative personnel.

5. As a result of the studies and projects emanating from the recommendations contained in the Air University study of the USAF Security Clearance program and similar studies by the Departments of Army and Navy, plans for modification of the Department

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of Defense Security Clearance program were being formulated at the end of the fiscal year. It was anticipated that this contemplated modification would result in a substantial reduction of the backlog of pending cases in the early months of the fiscal year 1951.

AIR FORCE REGULATION)
NO. 124-6

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, 14 DECEMBER 1949

DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
Territorial Jurisdiction of OSI District Offices

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
General	2
Limitations	3
Channels of Communication	4
Organization	5

1. Purpose. This Regulation pertains to the location and organizational structure of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) field service districts and detachments within the Continental limits of the United States. It outlines the territorial jurisdiction of each district and the channels of communications to be followed by organizations requesting service.

2. General. In accordance with AFL 20-4, the Director of Special Investigations, Office of The Inspector General, USAF, as an instrumentality of the Chief of Staff, USAF, is to provide a competent, centrally directed special investigations service to all Air Force activities.

3. Limitations. The Office of Special Investigations, Headquarters USAF, exercises operational control over all Air Force investigative activities within the Continental limits of the United States, and renders staff supervision and assistance through The Inspector General, USAF, channels to Air Force investigative activities in oversea theaters.

4. Channels of Communication. Organizations requesting service will be guided by the following instructions:

a. Referral by Commands Inside the United States. Commanding officers will channel all requests to the local Office of Special Investigations whether it be a detachment or district office, except as indicated below:

- (1) If an OSI representative is not located at an Air Force installation or activity, commanding officers will channel requests to the OSI district headquarters responsible for service in the area in which they physically are located. (See attachment.)
- (2) All requests for loyalty investigations will be forwarded to the district office servicing the area, except as outlined below:
 - (a) Request for National Agency Checks involving contractor employees only will be forwarded by the Air Materiel Command and its subordinate installations direct to the 4th OSI District Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.
 - (b) All requests for clearance for access to Restricted Data will be in conformance with the provisions of AFR 205-3.

b. Referral by Commands Outside the United States. Oversea commands initiating cases which require Air Force investigative action in the Zone of Interior will direct all requests for Personnel Security Investigations authorized under the provisions of AFR 205-6 to the 4th OSI District Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C. All other requests will be referred to the Director of Special Investigations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

5. Organization. The administrative and operational structure of the Office of Special Investigations within the Continental limits of the United States consists of the Office of Special Investigations, Washington 25, D. C.; the 1005th IG Special Investigations Unit, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.; and 25 districts, numbered one to 25 inclusive.

*This Regulation supersedes AFL 124-5, 28 January 1949.

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a. Designation of Commanders. Each district is commanded by an officer at the district headquarters designated the District Commander. Within the various districts, detachments exist under the command of a military person designated the Detachment Commander.

b. District Headquarters. The 25 OSI district headquarters and the area jurisdiction of each are as follows:

- (1) District No. 1 - Headquarters at Westover Air Force Base, Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, (mailing address: Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts). Territorial area consisting of the States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and the following counties in Connecticut: Hartford, Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven, New London, Tolland, and Windham.
- (2) District No. 2 - Headquarters at 67 Broad Street, New York, New York. Territorial area consisting of the State of New Jersey, the county of Fairfield in the State of Connecticut and the following counties in New York State: Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan, Ulster, and Westchester.
- (3) District No. 3 - Headquarters at 1612 South Cameron Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Territorial area consisting of the States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
- (4) District No. 4 - Headquarters at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C. Territorial area consisting of the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia and the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, and Prince William in the State of Virginia (including the city of Alexandria, Virginia).
- (5) District No. 5 - Headquarters at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Territorial area consisting of the States of Kentucky and Ohio.
- (6) District No. 6 - Headquarters at Robins Air Force Base, Macon, Georgia (mailing address: Robins Air Force Base, Georgia). Territorial area consisting of the States of South Carolina and Georgia and the following counties in North Carolina: Alleghany, Alexander, Anson, Ashe, Avery, Buncombe, Burke, Cabarrus, Caldwell, Catawba, Cherokee, Clay, Cleveland, Davie, Davidson, Forsyth, Gaston, Graham, Guilford, Haywood, Henderson, Iredell, Jackson, Lincoln, Macon, Madison, McDowell, Mecklenburg, Mitchell, Montgomery, Polk, Randolph, Richmond, Rockingham, Rowan, Rutherford, Scotland, Stanly, Stokes, Surry, Swain, Transylvania, Union, Watauga, Wilkes, Yadkin, and Yancey.
- (7) District No. 7 - Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida (mailing address: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida). Territorial area consists of the State of Florida, with the exception of the following counties: Bay, Calhoun, Escambia, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Walton, and Washington which are assigned to the 8th district.
- (8) District No. 8 - Headquarters at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama (mailing address: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). Territorial area consisting of the States of Alabama and Tennessee and the following counties in Florida: Bay, Calhoun, Escambia, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Walton, and Washington.
- (9) District No. 9 - Headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, Shreveport, Louisiana (mailing address: Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana). Territorial area consisting of the States of Mississippi and Louisiana and the following counties in the State of Arkansas: Lafayette, Little River, and Miller and the following counties in the State of Texas: Bowie, Cass, Harrison, Marion, Rusk, and Panola.
- (10) District No. 10 - Headquarters at Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas (mailing address: Kelly Air Force Base, Texas). Territorial area consisting of the following counties in the State of Texas: Anderson, Angelina, Aransas, Atascosa, Austin, Bandera, Bastrop, Bee, Bell, Bexar, Blanco, Bosque, Brazos, Brazoria, Brewster, Brooks,

Brown, Burleson, Burnet, Caldwell, Calhoun, Cameron, Chambers, Cherokee, Coke, Coleman, Colorado, Comal, Comanche, Concho, Crane, Crockett, Coryell, Culberson, De Witt, Dimmit, Duval, Ector, Edwards, Falls Fayette, Fort Bend, Freestone, Frio, Galveston, Gillespie, Glasscock, Goliad, Gonzales, Grimes, Guadalupe, Hamilton, Harris, Henderson, Hardin, Hays, Hidalgo, Hill, Houston, Irion, Jackson, Jasper, Jeff Davis, Jefferson, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, Karnes, Kendall, Kenedy, Kerr, Kimble, Kinney, Kleberg, Lampasas, LaSalle, Lavaca, Lee, Leon, Liberty, Limestone, Live Oak, Llano, Loving, Madison, Matagorda, Mason, Maverick, McCulloch, McLennan, McMullen, Medina, Menard, Midland, Milam, Mills, Montgomery, Nacogdoches, Navarro, Newton, Nueces, Orange, Reagan, Real, Reeves, Refugio, Robertson, Runnels, Sabine, San Jacinto, San Patricio, San Saba, Schleicher, Shelby, Starr, Sterling, Sutton, Terrell, Tom Green, Travis, Trinity, Tyler, Upton, Uvalde, Val Verde, Victoria, Waller, Walker, Ward, Washington, Webb, Wharton, Willacy, Williamson, Wilson, Zapata, and Zavala. El Paso and Hudspeth counties are assigned to the 17th district.

- (11) District No. 11 - Headquarters at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Territorial area consisting of the States of Oklahoma and Arkansas with the exception of Lafayette, Little River, and Miller counties which are assigned to the 9th district, plus the Texas Panhandle and consisting of the following counties in Texas: Armstrong, Briscoe, Carson, Castro, Childress, Collingsworth, Dallam, Deaf Smith, Donley, Gray, Hall, Hansford, Hartley, Hemphill, Hutchinson, Lipscomb, Moore, Ochiltree, Oldham, Potter, Parmer, Randall, Roberts, Sherman, Swisher, and Wheeler.
- (12) District No. 12 - Headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Belleville, Illinois (mailing address: Scott Air Force Base, Illinois). Territorial area consisting of the State of Illinois with the exception of the following counties: Boone, Cook, DuPage, Iroquois, Kankakee, Lake, McHenry and Will which are assigned to the 24th district; the State of Missouri with the exception of the following counties: Andrew, Atchison, Buchanan, Cass, Clay, Clinton, DeKalb, Holt, Jackson, Johnson, Lafayette, Nodaway, Platte, and Ray which are assigned to the 13th district; and the State of Indiana with the exception of the following counties; Benton, Jasper, Lake, La Porte, Newton, and Porter which are assigned to the 24th district.
- (13) District No. 13 - Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska (mailing address: Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska). Territorial area consisting of the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas and the following counties in Missouri: Andrew, Atchison, Buchanan, Cass, Clay, Clinton, DeKalb, Holt, Jackson, Johnson, Lafayette, Nodaway, Platte, and Ray.
- (14) District No. 14 - Headquarters at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado. Territorial area consisting of the States of Colorado and Wyoming.
- (15) District No. 15 - Headquarters at Great Falls Air Force Base, Great Falls, Montana. Territorial area consisting of the State of Montana.
- (16) District No. 16 - Headquarters at Hill Air Force Base, Ogden, Utah (mailing address: Hill Air Force Base, Hill Field, Utah). Territorial area consisting of the State of Utah and the following counties in Idaho: Ada, Adams, Bannock, Bear Lake, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Booneville, Butte, Camas, Canyon, Caribou, Cassia, Clark, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, Gooding, Jefferson, Jerome, Lemhi, Lincoln, Madison, Minidoka, Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, Power, Teton, Twin Falls, Valley, and Washington.
- (17) District No. 17 - Headquarters at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico (mailing address: Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico). Territorial area consisting of the States of Arizona, and New Mexico and the following counties in Texas: El Paso and Hudspeth.
- (18) District No. 18 - Headquarters at 822d USAF Specialized Depot, P. O. Box 310, Maywood, California. Territorial area consisting of the following counties in southern California: Imperial, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, San Diego, San Luis Obispo, and Ventura and the county of Clark in southern Nevada.

- (19) District No. 19 - Headquarters at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base, Fairfield, California. Territorial area consisting of the following counties in central and northern California: Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Inyo, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Benito, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo, and Yuba and the State of Nevada, with the exception of Clark County which is assigned to the 18th district.
- (20) District No. 20 - Headquarters at McChord Air Force Base, Tacoma, Washington (mailing address: McChord Air Force Base, Washington). Territorial area consisting of the States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho with the exception of the following counties in Idaho: Ada, Adams, Bannock, Bear Lake, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Bonneville, Butte, Camas, Canyon, Caribou, Cassia, Clark, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, Gooding, Jefferson, Jerome, Lemhi, Lincoln, Madison, Minidoka, Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, Power, Teton, Twin Falls, Valley, and Washington.
- (21) District No. 21 - Headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia (mailing address: Langley Air Force Base, Virginia). Territorial area consisting of the State of Virginia, less the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, and Prince William which are assigned to the 4th district, and the following counties in North Carolina: Alamance, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Brunswick, Camden, Carteret, Caswell, Chatham, Chowan, Columbus, Craven, Cumberland, Currituck, Dare, Duplin, Durham, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gates, Granville, Greene, Halifax, Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Hyde, Johnson, Jones, Lee, Lenoir, Martin, Moore, Nash, New Hanover, Northhampton, Onslow, Orange, Pamlico, Pasquotank, Pender, Perquimans, Person, Pitt, Robeson, Sampson, Tyrrell, Vance, Wake, Warren, Washington, Wayne, and Wilson.
- (22) District No. 22 - Headquarters at Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, New York. Territorial area consisting of the State of New York, with the exception of the following counties: Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan, Ulster, and Westchester which are assigned to the 2d district.
- (23) District No. 23 - Headquarters at Carswell Air Force Base, Ft. Worth, Texas. Territorial area consisting of the following counties in central Texas: Andrews, Archer, Bailey, Baylor, Borden, Callahan, Camp, Clay, Cochran, Collin, Cooke, Cottle, Crosby, Dallas, Dawson, Delta, Denton, Dickens, Eastland, Ellis, Erath, Fannin, Fisher, Floyd, Foard, Franklin, Gaines, Garza, Grayson, Gregg, Hale, Hardeman, Haskell, Hockley, Hood, Hopkins, Howard, Hunt, Jack, Johnson, Jones, Kaufman, Kent, King, Knox, Lamar, Lamb, Lubbock, Lynn, Martin, Mitchell, Montague, Morris, Motley, Nolan, Parker, Palo Pinto, Rains, Red River, Rockwall, Scurry, Shackelford, Smith, Somervell, Stephens, Stonewall, Tarrant, Taylor, Terry, Throckmorton, Titus, Upshur, Van Zandt, Wichita, Wilbarger, Wise, Wood, Yoakum, and Young.
- (24) District No. 24 - Headquarters at 209 W. Jackson Blvd., Room 416, Chicago, Illinois. Territorial area consisting of the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and the following counties in the State of Michigan: Alger, Baraga, Chippewa, Delta, Dickinson, Gogebic, Houghton, Iron, Keweenaw, Luce, Mackinac, Marquette, Menominee, Ontonagon, and Schoolcraft; the following counties in the State of Illinois: Boone, Cook, Du Page, Iroquois, Kankakee, Lake, McHenry, and Will and the following counties in the State of Indiana: Benton, Jasper, Lake, LaPorte, Newton, and Porter.
- (25) District No. 25 - Headquarters at West Warren and Lonyo Avenues, Dearborn 32, Michigan (mailing address: Box 326, Roosevelt Park Annex, Detroit 32, Michigan). Territorial area consisting of the State of Michigan, with the exception of the following counties: Alger, Baraga, Chippewa, Delta, Dickinson, Gogebic, Houghton, Iron,

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28

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS


DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Formulates plans, policies, standards and procedures governing investigative activities of the United States Air Force including the Reserve Force.

Organizes, directs, and supervises all investigative matters involving crimes, other violations of public trust, and subversive and related activities within the jurisdiction of the Air Force.

Exercises direct operational and administrative control over all investigative personnel within the limits of interior and normal staff technical responsibility relative to related activities in overseas areas.

Reports to the Secretary of the Air Force on matters of special interest to the Secretary when so directed.



Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Approved: _____

By: _____

On: _____


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1 June 1950

281

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
MANAGEMENT DIVISION



Classified by 1005TH IG SIU on 11/1/50

1005TH IG SIU

20 Aug 70

54

66

1 June 1950

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282

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS
DIVISION

Reviews reports of investigations and refers complaints and allegations of irregularities and deficiencies to appropriate agency for removal action or to appropriate field office for investigation.

Supervises investigation of criminal offenses (with the exception of fraud and conspiracy matters) and investigations of a general nature.

Responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on criminal matters as directed by investigative action with the Air Force.

Establishes requirements for the conduct of criminal investigations.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH

Receives complaints and allegations and forwards them to field offices for appropriate investigation. Reviews investigations of criminal offenses, recommending action to interested command.

Directs and coordinates investigations of important criminal offenses.

SPECIAL INQUIRY BRANCH

Conducts special investigations and reviews investigations of cases pertaining to administrative matters when so required by responsible authority.

Case name as filed in record

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Case No. 25 Aug 74
(b)(6)


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1 June 1950

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2B3

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION



1 June 1950

(b)(6)

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284

**THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
PROCUREMENT INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

**PROCUREMENT INVESTIGATIONS
DIVISION**

Receives, evaluates, and processes allegations or reports of fraud against the Government, conspiracy to defraud, or alleged irregularities requiring investigative attention in connection with placement, administration, and termination of Air Force contracts as well as the accountability for and disposition of Air Force property connected therewith.

Authorizes and supervises investigations of such irregularities.

Reviews reports of procurement investigations and refers them with recommendations to appropriate agencies for action.

Maintains liaison with and refers appropriate cases to the Department of Justice for consideration.

Maintains close liaison with DCA/M on all matters of irregularity in procurement.

Observes patterns and trends of irregularities and misadministration in contract matters and recommends appropriate preventive and corrective measures.

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Classification of this document is **SECRET**

DATE OF REVIEW **20 Aug 70**

BY **(b)(6)**

FOR **(b)(6)**

1 June 1950

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2B5

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS
DIVISION

Personnel for the investigation and execution of the effective personnel investigation program for the IAP.

Provides the Director with pertinent information concerning files and personnel of all personnel background investigations within the IAP.

SPECIAL ACTIONS BRANCH

Reviews all investigations pertaining to loyalty of personnel where a question of policy or planning is involved.

Formulates plans, policies, and procedures for coordination of all phases of the Personnel Investigation Program.

Initiates, supervises and reviews all investigations pertaining to the loyalty of civilian and military personnel assigned to the Directorate.

OPERATIONS BRANCH

Initiates, controls, reviews and supervises all investigative reports submitted in connection with personnel investigations concerning the Personnel.

Supervises background investigation on foreign military and civilian personnel of the IAP connected with the IAP. Supervises background investigations of newly integrated regular AF officers.

1 June 1950

(b)(6)

AIR FORCE LETTER
NO. 30-4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, 19 JULY 1948

ORGANIZATION

Office of The Inspector General, USAF

(Effective until 19 January 1950 unless shown otherwise or superseded.)

Purpose	Paragraph
General	1
The Office of The Inspector General, USAF	2
Inspectors General of Echelons of Command Below Headquarters USAF	3
The Director of Special Investigations, USAF	4
Interim Period	5

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Letter is to announce:

- a. The establishment of the Office of The Inspector General, USAF, and to outline the composition, organization, and functions thereof.
- b. The general outline of the reorganization and reallocation of the inspecting, investigating, and policing functions and responsibilities within the Air Force.

2. General:

- a. Commanders will take action as appropriate to effect the administrative changes required to initiate this plan.
- b. Further details necessary to effect complete implementation of this plan are being currently developed.

3. The Office of The Inspector General, USAF:

a. **Mission.** The Office of The Inspector General, USAF, is an instrumentality of the Chief of Staff, USAF, charged with the duty of assisting him with special regard to determining the combat readiness and logistic effectiveness of the Air Force and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof, investigating matters involving crime, other violations of public trust, and subversive and related activities within the jurisdiction of the Air Force, and insuring the maintenance of discipline and security.

b. **Composition.** The Office of The Inspector General, USAF, will be composed of:

- (1) An officer of appropriate general officer grade, designated The Inspector General, USAF, by and reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and such additional personnel as may from time to time be authorized.
- (2) The Office of the Air Inspector, USAF.
- (3) The Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF.
- (4) The Office of the Air Provost Marshal, USAF.

*This Letter supersedes AFL 30-4, 9 April 1948.

9-325, AF

4. Inspector General of Beliefs of Command Below Headquarters USAF

a. Authorization. The commanding general or commanding officer of each echelon of command down to and including the wing base and comparable organization is authorized one inspector general appointed by the commander thereof.

b. Mission. The mission of inspectors general is to assist their commanders by keeping them informed as to the state of their commands in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security.

c. Functions:

- (1) In the accomplishment of their mission inspectors general are specifically charged with discharging the activities of:
 - (a) Air inspectors who are responsible for inspecting both and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.
 - (b) Provost marshals who are responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.
- (2) The investigative functions formerly performed by air inspectors and those criminal investigative functions formerly performed under supervision of provost marshals will be transferred to the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF.

5. The Director of Special Investigations, USAF

a. Organization:

- (1) The Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, is established as an agency of the Office of The Inspector General, USAF.
- (2) Personnel on duty with the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, will be assigned to Headquarters USAF with duty station at such locations as considered necessary.
- (3) Personnel adjustments incident to the transfer of functions outlined in paragraph 4c(2) will be announced in appropriate directives issued by Headquarters USAF.

b. Functions and Responsibilities:

- (1) In general the functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, as an activity of The Inspector General, USAF, is to provide a competent, centrally directed special investigations service to all Air Force activities. It will render full assistance to all commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities by:
 - (a) Making available trained specialists to perform all types of investigations as required by responsible commands and/or Headquarters USAF.
 - (b) Keeping the commanders apprised of investigative activity on a current basis by the submission of interim or progress reports.
 - (c) Forwarding to the interested commanders completed investigative reports for appropriate action.

(d) Furnishing commanders with information concerning trends and patterns of irregularities and offenses as disclosed by a centralized operation.

(2) Specific functions and responsibilities are:

(a) The conduct of special investigations of all major offenses occurring within or affecting the Air Force, including:

1. Fraud and/or conspiracy, particularly in connection with procurement or disposition of property or activities related or incident thereto.
2. Major crimes of arms, black market operations, bribery, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, insanity, perjury, robbery, smuggling, and similar offenses.
3. Other major violations of the Articles of War, Federal Statute, and/or other pertinent directives.

(b) To perform the following duties within the Air Force:

1. Detect espionage and sabotage.
2. Detect treason, sedition, subversion, disloyalty, and disaffection.
3. Conduct investigations of violations of AR 380-3.
4. Conduct personnel background investigations within the jurisdiction of the Air Force.
5. Summarize and analyze information as required on the status and extent of disaffection, subversion, espionage, sabotage, and details thereof within the scope of Air Force responsibility for dissemination to Headquarters USAF, Air Force commands, and appropriate agencies.

(c) All other investigative functions except those specifically delegated to other Air Force activity or directed by commanders in compliance with procedures prescribed by law or regulations.

(d) To assist Air Force commanders in preventing major crimes by conducting surveys of conditions favorable to crimes and by making suggestions for improvement thereof.

(e) To perform such other duties as may be directed.

(3) The above described functions include:

- (a) That portion of investigations as outlined in (2) above, formerly conducted by air inspectors.
- (b) Those criminal investigative functions formerly performed under supervision of provost marshals.
- (c) Those investigations formerly performed by the USAF Courier-Intelligence Corps.

c. Responsibility of Commanders

- (1) The availability of the services of the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, will not relieve commanders of their responsibility for making inquiry into all matters which adversely affect the efficiency, morale, or welfare of their commands. Inquiries in cases, such as intoxication, petty larceny,

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physical altercations, and similar matters of personal conduct and misbehavior will be directed and resolved by commanders under the provisions of pertinent regulations.

- (2) Where initial inquiry directed by commanders indicates that extensive or complex investigation is required and/or there is probability that the matter is within the purview of b above, commanders are responsible for referring the matter with all available facts to the appropriate representative of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, for necessary investigative attention and report to the interested commander.

a. Interim Period. It is evident that to effect the new concept of the organizational structure of the inspecting, policing, and investigating functions involves many administrative details attendant to selection, training, and placing personnel as well as establishing operating procedures.

a. Air Inspection. The Air Inspection System will be operated in accordance with provisions of AFI 123-1.

b. Provost Marshals. Pending revision of current directives, responsibilities of provost marshals will include those formerly charged to them, except as modified by paragraph 8(c), with provost marshals under direction of the Inspector General of their respective headquarters.

c. Director of Special Investigations. Pending the establishing and manning of the district offices of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, it will be necessary to call upon the commanders to perform investigative functions within their capabilities as directed or required.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

OFFICIAL:

(b)(6)

Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A (minus reference)

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AIR FORCE LETTER
NO 20-4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, 12 JULY 1948

ORGANIZATION

Office of The Inspector General, USAF

(Effective until 15 January 1950 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.)

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
General	2
The Office of The Inspector General, USAF	3
Inspectors General of Echelons of Command Below Headquarters USAF	4
The Director of Special Investigations, USAF	5
Interim Period	6

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Letter is to announce:

- a. The establishment of the Office of The Inspector General, USAF, and to outline the composition, organization, and functions thereof.
- b. The general outline of the reorganization and reallocation of the inspecting, investigating, and policing functions and responsibilities within the Air Force.

2. General:

- a. Commanders will take action as appropriate to effect the administrative changes required to initiate this plan.
- b. Further details necessary to effect complete implementation of this plan are being currently developed.

3. The Office of The Inspector General, USAF:

a. **Mission.** The Office of The Inspector General, USAF, is an instrumentality of the Chief of Staff, USAF, charged with the duty of assisting him with special regard to determining the combat readiness and logistic effectiveness of the Air Force and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof; investigating matters involving crime, other violations of public trust, and subversive and related activities within the jurisdiction of the Air Force; and insuring the maintenance of discipline and security.

b. **Composition.** The Office of The Inspector General, USAF, will be composed of:

- (1) An officer of appropriate general officer grade, designated The Inspector General, USAF, by and reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and such additional personnel as may from time to time be authorized.
- (2) The Office of the Air Inspector, USAF.
- (3) The Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF.
- (4) The Office of the Air Provost Marshal, USAF.

*This Letter supersedes AFL 20-4, 9 April 1948.

9-325, AF

APPENDIX B

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4. Inspectors General of Echelons of Command Below Headquarters USAF

a. Authorization. The commanding general or commanding officer of each echelon of command down to and including the wing base and comparable organization is authorized one inspector general appointed by the commander thereof.

b. Mission. The mission of inspectors general is to assist their commanders by keeping them informed as to the state of their commands in respect to the efficient and economical performance of the mission thereof and to insure the maintenance of discipline and security.

c. Functions:

- (1) In the accomplishment of their mission inspectors general are specifically charged with directing the activities of:
 - (a) Air inspectors who are responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon all matters affecting the tactical, technical, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the command and the efficiency, economy, and adequacy thereof.
 - (b) Provost marshals who are responsible for supervision and inspection of all matters pertaining to the maintenance of military discipline and enforcement of security within the command.
- (2) The investigative functions formerly performed by air inspectors and those criminal investigative functions formerly performed under supervision of provost marshals will be transferred to the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF.

5. The Director of Special Investigations, USAF

a. Organization:

- (1) The Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, is established as an agency of the Office of The Inspector General, USAF.
- (2) Personnel on duty with the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, will be assigned to Headquarters USAF with duty station at such locations as considered necessary.
- (3) Personnel assignments incident to the transfer of functions outlined in paragraph 4c(2) will be announced in appropriate directives issued by Headquarters USAF.

b. Functions and Responsibilities:

- (1) In general the functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, as an activity of The Inspector General, USAF, is to provide a competent, centrally directed special investigations service to all Air Force activities. It will render full assistance to all commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities by:
 - (a) Making available trained specialists to perform all types of investigations as required by responsible commands and/or Headquarters USAF.
 - (b) Keeping the commanders apprised of investigative activity on a current basis by the submission of interim or progress reports.
 - (c) Forwarding to the interested commanders completed investigative reports for appropriate action.

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- (d) Furnishing commanders with information concerning trends and patterns of irregularities and offenses as disclosed by a centralized operation.
- (2) Specific functions and responsibilities are:
 - (a) The conduct of special investigations of all major offenses occurring within or affecting the Air Force, including:
 - 1. Fraud and/or conspiracy, particularly in connection with procurement or disposition of property or activities related or incident thereto.
 - 2. Major crimes of arms, black market operations, bribery, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, larceny, perjury, robbery, smuggling, and similar offenses.
 - 3. Other major violations of the Articles of War, Federal Statute, and/or other pertinent directives.
 - (b) To perform the following duties within the Air Force:
 - 1. Detect espionage and sabotage.
 - 2. Detect treason, sedition, subversion, disloyalty, and disaffection.
 - 3. Conduct investigations of violations of AF 150-3.
 - 4. Conduct personnel background investigations within the jurisdiction of the Air Force.
 - 5. Summarize and analyze information as required on the status and extent of disaffection, subversion, espionage, sabotage, and details thereof within the areas of Air Force responsibility for dissemination to Headquarters USAF, Air Force commands, and appropriate agencies.
 - (c) All other investigative functions except those specifically delegated to other Air Force activity or directed by commanders in compliance with procedures prescribed by law or regulations.
 - (d) To assist Air Force commanders in preventing major crimes by conducting surveys of conditions favorable to crimes and by making suggestions for improvement thereof.
 - (e) To perform such other duties as may be directed.

(3) The above described functions include:

- (a) That portion of investigations as outlined in (2) above, formerly conducted by air inspections.
- (b) Those criminal investigative functions formerly performed under supervision of provost marshals.
- (c) Those investigations formerly performed by the USAF Counter-Intelligence Corps.

c. Responsibility of Commanders

- (1) The availability of the services of the Office of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, will not relieve commanders of their responsibility for making inquiry into all matters which adversely affect the efficiency, morale, or welfare of their commands. Inquiries in cases, such as intoxication, petty larceny,

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physical altercations, and similar matters of personal conduct and misdemeanors will be directed and resolved by commanders under the provisions of pertinent regulations.

- (2) Where initial inquiry directed by commanders indicates that extensive or complex investigation is required and/or there is probability that the matter is within the purview of b above, commanders are responsible for referring the matter with all available facts to the appropriate representative of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, for necessary investigative attention and report to the interested commander.

g. Interim Period. It is evident that to effect the new concept of the organizational structure of the inspecting, policing, and investigating functions involves many administrative details incident to selection, training, and placing personnel as well as establishing operating procedures.

a. Air Inspection. The Air Inspection System will be operated in accordance with provisions of AFR 123-1.

b. Provost Marshals. Pending revision of current directives, responsibilities of provost marshals will include those formerly charged to them, except as modified by paragraph 4a, with provost marshals under direction of the Inspector General of their respective headquarters.

c. Director of Special Investigations. Pending the establishing and manning of the district offices of the Director of Special Investigations, USAF, it will be necessary to call upon the commanders to perform investigative functions within their capabilities as directed or required.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

ROYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

OFFICIAL:

(b)(6)

Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A (plus overseas)