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Description of document: US Secret Service (USSS) Mission Assurance Reports on shooting of President Ronald Reagan, attempted assassination of President Gerald Ford, and shooting of George Wallace, 1981

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U.S. Secret Service FOIA Office
245 Murray Lane Building T-5
Washington, D.C. 20223
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

Freedom of Information Act Program
Communications Center
245 Murray Lane, S.W., Building T-5, Mail Stop 8205
Washington, D.C. 20223

Date: September 16, 2025

File Number: 20241486

Dear Requester:

This is the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, originally received by the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) on September 16, 2024, for information pertaining to A copy of each Mission Assurance report at the US Secret Service from the each of the following months:

May 1972 (shooting of George Wallace by Arthur Bremer);

February 1974 (plot to kill Richard Nixon by Samuel Byck);

September 1975 (attempted assassination of President Gerald Ford by Lynette Fromme and Sara Jane Moore);

March 1981 (shooting of President Ronald Reagan by John Hinckley Jr.);and

May 2005 (attempted assassination of President George W. Bush by Vladimir Arutyunian).

After a detailed review of all potentially responsive records, 149 pages were released and 169 pages were withheld in their entirety. After considering the "Foreseeable Harm" standard, outlined in Title 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(8)(A)(i) and Department of Justice guidance, exemptions under FOIA Statute Title 5 U.S.C. § 552, and/or the PA Statute Title 5 U.S.C. § 552a, have been applied where deemed appropriate.

Enclosed are the documents responsive to your request, as well as a document that explains the exemptions in more detail. Withheld information is pursuant to the exemptions marked below.

Section 552 (FOIA)

(b) (1)	(b) (2)	(b) (3)	Statute:		
(b) (4)	(b) (5)	(b) (6)	(b) (7) (A)	(b) (7) (B)	
(b) (7) (C)	(b) (7) (D)	(b) (7) (E)	(b) (7) (F)	(b) (8)	

Please be advised, in the processing of this FOIA request, no fees are being assessed.

If you deem our decision an adverse determination, you may exercise your appeal rights. Should you wish to file an administrative appeal, your appeal should be made in writing and received within ninety (90) days of the date of this letter, by writing to: Freedom of Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U.S. Secret Service, Communications Center, 245 Murray Lane, S.W., Building T-5, Washington, D.C. 20223. If you choose to file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your appeal and reference the case number listed above.

Additionally, you have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) which mediates disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation. Please note that contacting the Secret Service's FOIA Program and/or OGIS **is not** an alternative to filing an administrative appeal and **does not** stop the 90-day appeal clock. You may contact OGIS at: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001. You may also reach OGIS via e-mail at ogis@nara.gov, telephone at 202-741-5770/toll free at (877) 684-6448, or facsimile at (202) 741-5769.

If you need any further assistance, or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please contact our FOIA Public Liaison Kevin Tyrrell, at (202) 220-1819. Alternatively, you may send an email to foia@usss.dhs.gov.

FOIA File No. 20241486 is assigned to your request. Please refer to this file number in all future communication with this office.

Sincerely,



Kevin L. Tyrrell
Freedom of Information Act Officer
Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
FOIA and Privacy Act Exemption List

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: May 4, 1981

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Inspector (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Attempted Assassination of President
Reagan on March 30, 1981

TO: Director

U. S. Secret Service

CO-1-31833

The Office of Inspection, U. S. Secret Service, conducted an internal investigation into the attempted assassination of President Reagan.

The investigation was conducted during the period of March 31, 1981 to May 1, 1981 and the results of that investigation are contained in the attached report.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURES IS DETACHED

Classified by DAD Lawson
Office Office of Inspection
Downgrade to _____ on _____
Decl Review 88/9/1 Decl on _____

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THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN
IN WASHINGTON, D. C.
ON MARCH 30, 1981

Classified by DAD Lawson
Office Office of Inspection
Downgrade to on
Decl Review 88/9/1 Decl on

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This report is of an internal investigation of the United States Secret Service's preparation, deployment and reaction on March 30, 1981.

This investigation did not look into any criminal aspects of the attempted assassination as the U. S. Secret Service is not charged with that legal responsibility.

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I - C H R O N O L O G Y

The movements of President Reagan on March 30, 1981, from the White House to the Washington Hilton Hotel to the George Washington University Hospital.

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CHRONOLOGY - Page 2

Pertinent Attachments:

Attachment No. 1:

(b)(7)(E)

White House to Washington Hilton Hotel.

Attachment No. 2:

Motorcade route, Washington Hilton Hotel to George Washington
University Hospital.

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Chronology - Page 3

- 1:47 PM - President Reagan departed the White House via motorcade. The motorcade departed the White House grounds through the southwest gate onto State Place; made a right turn on 17th Street; continued on 17th Street until 17th Street runs into Connecticut Avenue; continued on Connecticut Avenue to Florida Avenue; right on Florida Avenue to T Street; left on T Street to Washington Hilton Hotel entrance.
- The distance traveled was 1.5 miles.
- 1:51 PM - President Reagan arrived at the VIP entrance, Washington Hilton Hotel, and proceeded to the holding room. President Reagan was greeted at the holding room by (b)(7)(E) of the Building and Construction Trades Union.
- 2:00 PM - President Reagan proceeded to the Main Ballroom where he spoke to approximately 4,000 members of the Building and Construction Trades Union.
- 2:25 PM - President Reagan departed the Ballroom and proceeded to the motorcade via the VIP entrance.
- 2:27 PM - Shots were fired.

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CHRONOLOGY - Page 4

2:27 PM - President Reagan departed the Washington Hilton Hotel via motorcade approximately ten (10) seconds after the first shot was fired. The motorcade departed the Washington Hilton drive and made a right turn onto T Street to Connecticut Avenue; made a left turn onto Connecticut Avenue.

NOTE: As of this time the motorcade was enroute to the White House.

At approximately 2:28 PM Special Agent in Charge Parr, Presidential Protective Division, made the decision that the motorcade would proceed to the George Washington University Hospital. The motorcade continued on Connecticut Avenue until Connecticut Avenue runs into 17th Street; continued on 17th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue; right onto Pennsylvania Avenue, around Washington Circle, to the George Washington University Hospital.

The distance traveled was 2.1 miles.

2:30 PM - President Reagan arrived at the emergency entrance, George Washington University Hospital and proceeded to the emergency room.

3:02 PM - President Reagan was moved to an operating room.

6:45 PM - President Reagan was moved to a recovery room.

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II - ADVANCE PREPARATIONS

The advance preparations by the U. S. Secret Service for President Reagan's visit to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 2

Pertinent Attachments:

Attachment No. 3:

General Survey of the Washington Hilton Hotel

Attachment No. 4:

Preliminary Survey by Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 5:

Preliminary Survey by Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 6:

Counter-sniper Survey by Technician (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 7:

Hospital Protective Survey for George Washington University Hospital

Attachment No. 8:

Technical Security Survey by Security Specialist (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 3

March 25 - Special Agent (b)(6); Presidential Protective Division Operations, contacted Assistant to the Special Agent in (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Presidential Protective Division, concerning the advance assignment for the subject trip. ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) advised SA (b)(6); that Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); Presidential Protective Division, would be the Lead Advance Agent.

ATSAIC (b)(6); advised SA (b)(6); that he (b)(6); would be the Lead Advance for President Reagan's trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Presidential Protective Division Transportation Section, was advised that she would be the Transportation Advance Agent for President Reagan's trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

March 26 - SA (b)(6); obtained the general survey for his reading and familiarization. SA (b)(6); also monitored the preparations being made for an earlier trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

SA (b)(6); was advised that (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) White House Advance Office, would be coordinating the visit and that there would be a general meeting at the Hilton Hotel on March 27, 1981.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 4

March 27 - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) again reviewed the general survey and prepared preliminary diagrams of the site prior to attending the 10:30 AM meeting at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Security Specialist (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Technical Security Division, was advised that he would be the TSD Coordinator for President Reagan's trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981. He was further advised of the 10:30 AM meeting on March 27 and that Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Technical Security Division, would be with him to observe TSD procedures from a training standpoint.

The following individuals attended the March 27, 10:30 AM, briefing at the Washington Hilton Hotel:

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lead White House Advance

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), White House Press Office

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Hilton Hotel Convention Sales Director

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hilton Hotel Security Director

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Host Committee

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) White House Communications Agency

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) U. S. Secret Service Lead Advance

SS (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) U. S. Secret Service TSD Coordinator

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) U. S. Secret Service Technical Security Division

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 5

March 27 - The entire itinerary of President Reagan's visit to (continued)
the Hilton Hotel was discussed. A "walk through" was then conducted and during this walk through, questions were raised, discussed and resolved. One of the questions not resolved was the positioning of the press area within the Ballroom. SA (b)(6); asked to be advised of the final decision.

SA (b)(6); and Mr. (b)(6); discussed the arrival and departure area. The VIP entrance was chosen. This entrance provided immediate access to the holding room and direct access to the Ballroom from the holding room. They specifically did not plan for a press area at the arrival and departure point. There was to be a general public area near the VIP entrance which could also be used by the press if they so wished.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) discussed the movements of the press pool and it was decided that Mr. (b)(6); would personally escort the press pool and that SA (b)(6); would provide a Special Agent, U. S. Secret Service, to accompany the press pool.

Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) requested that 15 to (b)(7)(E) meet with President Reagan, prior to his speech, for a photo

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 6

March 27 - opportunity. Mr. (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) stated that this would be
(continued) done in the holding room.

SA (b)(6); requested the names of the (b)(7)(E)
as well as the names of the hotel employees so that
name checks could be run.

SA (b)(6); remained at the hotel after the morning
meeting. He reviewed post assignments and familiarized
himself with the configuration of the Washington Hilton
Hotel.

SA (b)(6); returned to the Presidential Protective Division
Office at which time he made the following notifications
concerning President Reagan's trip to the Washington
Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981:

ASAC (b)(6); Office of Protective Operations, USSS

SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) Washington Field Office, USSS

SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) Intelligence Division, USSS

Lieutenant (b)(6); Uniformed Division, White House, USSS

Lieutenant (b)(6); Uniformed Division, Foreign Missions, USSS

SA (b)(6);, First Lady Detail, USSS

(b)(6); White House Ushers' Office

(b)(6); White House Physician's Office

Captain (b)(6); Washington, D. C. Fire Department

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 7

March 27 - Dispatcher (b)(6); U. S. Park Police
(continued) Sergeant (b)(6); Uniformed Division Counter-Sniper
Unit, USSS
SA (b)(6); Washington Field Office, Intelligence
Squad, USSS

During SA (b)(6); conversation with ASAIC (b)(6);
he (b)(6); requested 23 Special Agents for post assign-
ments.

During SA (b)(6); conversation with Captain (b)(6);
Washington D. C. Fire Department, he (b)(6); requested
inspectors to be at the Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981
and an ambulance to report to him at the Hilton Hotel
at 1:15 PM on March 30, 1981.

SA (b)(6); continued his general preparation and later
that evening he received a telephone call from Mr.
(b)(6); concerning the final press arrangements for the
Hilton Hotel Ballroom. Mr. (b)(6); also advised that
the press pool would not use the VIP entrance but would
be escorted through the Terrace Entrance for both the
arrival and departure.

SS (b)(6); also remained at the hotel after the meeting
and discussed his responsibilities with Mr. (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 8

March 27 - SS (b)(6); then returned to his office and requested,
(continued) through the Technical Security Division Operations
Desk, the following assistance:

(b)(7)(E)

Special Agent (b)(6); Washington Field Office, USSS,
was advised that he was the Washington Field Office
Coordinator for the March 30, 1981, Presidential visit
to the Washington Hilton Hotel. SA (b)(6); was instructed
to contact SA (b)(6); over the weekend of March 28-29, 1981.

On Friday, March 27, 1981, Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Washington Field Office, received his assignment as the
Intelligence representative of the Washington Field Office
for the President's visit to the Hilton Hotel on March 30,
1981.

March 28 - SA (b)(6); prepared the name check list to be provided to
the Intelligence Division.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 9

March 28 - SA (b)(6); proceeded to the Washington Hilton Hotel where (continued) he conducted a complete run through on his own. This included visiting each post and the areas to be visited by President Reagan. He walked through the emergency exit route to the site of the pre-planned emergency motorcade. The emergency stand-by ambulance was to be located in the same area as the emergency motorcade.

SA (b)(6); again looked at the possible arrival and departure areas and again concluded that the VIP entrance was the best from a security standpoint.

SA (b)(6); met with a Hilton Hotel Security representative (Assistant to (b)(6);) and went through the area of the ballroom and the adjoining area. They visited the area under the ballroom stage and the employee entrance.

SA (b)(6); departed the Hilton Hotel and proceeded to the Intelligence Division, USSS, and turned in a name check list.

SA (b)(6); contacted SA (b)(6); Washington Field Office, USSS, and requested the Field Office to provide a route car for the President's trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 10

March 29 - SA (b)(6); contacted SA (b)(6); and obtained the exact times for the subject trip. She then gave this information to SA (b)(6); Washington Field Office, USSS, and requested the route car to be at the White House between 1:00 PM and 1:15 PM on March 30, 1981.

SA (b)(6); began writing the preliminary survey report for the President's visit to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981. He again reviewed his notes and diagrams.

SA (b)(6); contacted SA (b)(6); Washington Field Office, USSS, and obtained the name of SA (b)(6); as the Washington Field Office Coordinator. SA (b)(6); also requested SA (b)(6); to make the notification to the Metropolitan Police Department regarding the subject trip. SA (b)(6); did not notify MPD but MPD became aware of the trip through a telephone call from SA (b)(6); USSS, to Sgt. (b)(6); MPD (SOD), on this same date.

SA (b)(6); prepared his briefing notes for the scheduled 12:00 Noon security briefing on March 30, 1981.

SA (b)(6); placed a telephone call to SA (b)(6); and he (b)(6); advised (b)(6); as to the current situation and requested that (b)(6); meet him at 11:00 AM on March 30, 1981, at the Hilton Hotel. SA (b)(6); official vehicle and SA (b)(6); official station wagon would be used as the emergency motorcade.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 11

March 29 - SA (b)(6); contacted SA (b)(6); and discussed the entrance (continued) and exit to be used for the motorcade at the Hilton Hotel.

SA (b)(6); contacted Sergeant (b)(6); Metropolitan Police Department, Special Operations Division (SOD), and requested intersection control, motorcycle escort, marked lead car, and a marked tail car for the March 30, 1981, visit. Arrangements were made for SA (b)(6); to meet Sgt. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at 9:00 AM on March 30 to run the routes to be used by the motorcade.

SA (b)(6); contacted Sgt. (b)(6);, U. S. Park Police, Special Forces, and requested three (3) motorcycles to assist with escorting the Presidential motorcade on March 30, 1981. These three (3) Park Police motorcycles would work with the three (3) Metropolitan Police motorcycles. SA (b)(6); also requested a portable Park Police radio to be placed in the (b)(7)(E). She further requested a Park Police representative to meet her and Sgt. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at 9:00 AM on March 30, 1981, for the purpose of running routes.

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March 30 - SA (b)(6); was told by Sgt. (b)(6) U. S. Park Police, that he did not have anyone available to run routes at 9:00 AM but that three (3) Park Police motorcycles would be at the southwest gate of the White House at 1:15 PM on March 30, 1981.

SA (b)(6); met Sgt. (b)(6), MPD, at 9:00 AM and they drove the routes to be used by the Presidential motorcade on this same date.

SA (b)(6); contacted the Washington, D. C. Highways and Traffic Department and determined that there was no scheduled construction along the routes to be used.

At approximately 1:00 PM SA (b)(6); coordinated the moving of the Presidential limousine (b)(6); the Secret Service follow-up vehicle (b)(6);, and the spare vehicle (b)(6); from the Secret Service garage to the south grounds of the White House.

SA (b)(6); met with the Metropolitan and Park Police officers assigned to the motorcade and briefed them on their assignments. She placed a Secret Service radio in the marked lead and tail cars. SA (b)(6); also met with the U. S. Secret Service route car personnel and furnished them with the necessary information.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 13

March 30 - SA (b)(6); had prepared a written survey report for (continued) the movement of the motorcade. This survey included the routes to be used and also the emergency route from the Hilton Hotel to the George Washington University Hospital. This survey was distributed to the following:

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) spoke with SA (b)(6); Operations Office, Intelligence Squad of the Washington Field Office. He was advised by SA (b)(6); that there was no intelligence information relative to the planned visit of the President. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reviewed the Washington Field Office Incident Board at that time.

SA (b)(6); was advised by SA (b)(6); Washington Field Office, USSS, that SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was the Intelligence representative for the President's trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel and that there would be

(b)(7)(E)

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 14

March 30 - SA (b)(6); then spoke with SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and gave (continued) him a briefing on the scheduled visit and SA (b)(6); received an up to date intelligence briefing from SA (b)(6);.

On Monday, March 30, Special Agent (b)(6); received his assignment as SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) partner for the intelligence function.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) telephonically contacted Secret Service Intelligence Division regarding the visit. He was advised that no intelligence or demonstration information was known to the Intelligence Division relative to this visit.

SA (b)(6); telephonically contacted the Metropolitan Police Department, Investigative Services Division, regarding the stop. They had no information to pass to the Secret Service regarding possible problems at the Hilton.

SA (b)(6); passed the above to SA (b)(6); directly, and through SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) that there would be only (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) team.

SA (b)(6); requested ASALC (b)(6); Office of Protective Operations, confirm the request for a (b)(7)(E) which (b)(6); did and advised that the team would be Officers (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); of the Uniformed Division, USSS.

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 15

March 30 - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) contacted Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and briefed him (continued) on the scheduled trip.

SA (b)(6); PPD Operations, provided the names of special agents for (b)(7)(E). SA (b)(6); incorporated the assigned agents with the (b)(7)(E).

SA (b)(6); arrived at the Hilton Hotel and conducted a personal walk through, checking all post locations.

SA (b)(6); briefed ATSAIC (b)(6); on shift responsibilities for the visit to the Hilton Hotel.

SA (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) met at the Hilton Hotel and conducted a complete walk through of all areas to be visited. All post assignments were discussed.

SS (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Technical Security Division, arrived at the Washington Hilton Hotel and met with the

(b)(7)(E)

SA (b)(6); with SA (b)(6); and SS (b)(6); then conducted the security briefing for the President's visit to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981. Present for the briefing were the following:

(b)(7)(E)

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 16

March 30 -
(continued)

(b)(7)(E)

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) went through the itinerary and explained the radio frequencies to be used. He advised that (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) and gave each agent his/her post assignment.

SA (b)(6); advised that the event in the Ballroom was open to all Union members attending the Building and Construction Trades Convention and that each person would be wearing a name plate issued by the Host Committee.

SA's (b)(6); and (b)(6); attended the briefing at the Adams Room of the Hilton Hotel. During this overall briefing by SA (b)(6);, PPD, (b)(6); provided an Intelligence briefing for the assembled agents. He advised the agents that no adverse intelligence information was known concerning this visit of the President.

The security room was to be located in Convention Room No. 1.

SA (b)(6); explained the identification to be used for this visit.

The briefing was concluded by 12:20 PM and SA (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); personally posted all the agents. While the

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 17

March 30 - agents were being posted, SS (b)(6); and his personnel
(continued) began the security sweep. The sweep was completed and the agents were posted prior to the doors being opened to the guests at approximately 1:00 PM.

All packages, briefcases and large handbags being brought into the Ballroom by the guests were examined by the EOD teams. This procedure was monitored by the checkpoint agents and the intelligence team.

SA (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); then checked all posts and conducted a complete walk through prior to the arrival of President Reagan.

SA (b)(6); met Sergeant (b)(6); Metropolitan Police Department, and discussed the positioning of his (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at the arrival and departure area.

SA (b)(6); returned to the Ballroom for a final check of security and noticed nothing unusual and then proceeded to the VIP entrance for the arrival of the President.

(b)(7)(E)

Upon the President's arrival, SA (b)(6); posted the agents (b)(7)(E) accompanying the President and readjusted

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS - Page 18

March 30 - the pre-posted agents inside the Ballroom.
(continued)

The advance preparations at the George Washington University Hospital consisted of the "Hospital Protective Survey" which was completed on July 16, 1980. This is a yearly survey done at hospitals which are considered to be potential locations for use of U. S. Secret Service [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) during an emergency situation.

In addition, there is a direct telephone line between the George Washington University Hospital and the "White House Signal Switchboard". The telephone is at the nurses' desk within the emergency room.

The George Washington University Hospital received a telephone call, over the direct line, from Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); White House [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) approximately two (2) minutes prior to the President's arrival, advising that the motorcade was enroute.

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Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in November of 1964 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); was the Protective Intelligence Representative for this visit. He trailed the Presidential party from the Ballroom to the elevator and exited the VIP doors a few seconds ahead of the President.

SA (b)(6); walked directly to the rope line and took a position near the curb to observe the crowd. He heard the shots, turned to his left, and saw the assailant firing with both hands on the gun. He immediately leaped on the assailant, grabbing him by the head and left wrist, while he (assailant) was still clicking the trigger.

A struggle ensued, with others piling on, until (b)(6); with some difficulty, was able to handcuff the assailant. He then, aided by others, protected the assailant and placed him in a police car. SA (b)(6); rode with the assailant to the (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); was the second member of the Protective Intelligence team for this visit. He trailed the Presidential party from the Ballroom to the elevator and exited the VIP doors a few seconds ahead of the President.

SA (b)(6); walked toward the limousine and took a position near the curb where he could see to his right and across T Street. He heard the shots and turned to his left, drawing his weapon. The assailant was still shooting and SA (b)(6); came to point shoulder but could not safely discharge his weapon.

He then rushed to the assailant and grabbed him by the right wrist. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) assisted in subduing and handcuffing the assailant while also watching for a second attack. He assisted in protecting the assailant and placing him in a police car. He also accompanied the assailant to the Central Cell Block.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in July of 1975 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); [REDACTED] was a member of the Counter-sniper Response Team. He had taken a position, near the tail of the limousine and about five feet in front of the follow-up car, to help keep this area clear.

When he heard the shots, he turned to his left and saw only a hand holding a gun. He moved toward the assailant, but he had been subdued by the time he reached him. He next helped clear the immediate area and went to the aid of SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in May of 1965 and is currently assigned to the Forgery Division.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was a member of the Counter-sniper Response Team. He had taken a position on the roadway in front of the Terrace doors and was observing the rear of the crowd at the rope line and an intelligence subject.

When he heard the shots, he rushed through the crowd to the area of the struggle. Seeing he could not help, he immediately began to clear the area of news media and general public.

Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in February of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Uniformed Division.

Officer (b)(6); was a member of the Counter-sniper Team.

He and Officer (b)(6); were posted on the southwest corner of the southern-most wing of the hotel, above the VIP entrance. When he heard the shots, he grabbed his (b)(7)(E) chambered a round, and assumed a prone position facing Connecticut Avenue. He then came to a kneeling position and continued to scan the surrounding area until ordered to return to the briefing room.

Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in April of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Uniformed Division.

Officer (b)(6); was the team leader of the Counter-sniper Team. He and Officer (b)(6); were posted on the southwest corner of the southern-most wing of the hotel, above the VIP entrance. When he heard the shots, he grabbed his JAR (rifle), chambered a round, and ran to the edge of the roof and looked down.

Officer (b)(6); saw three men down and the cars leaving.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) began to scan the surrounding buildings until ordered to return to the briefing room.

Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in November of 1972 and is currently assigned to the Uniformed Division.

Officer (b)(6); had positioned himself above the VIP entrance on the wall. He heard the shots and immediately ran to the VIP entrance.

When he made the turn at the top of the taxi ramp, he noticed the limousine approaching Connecticut Avenue on T Street.

He made a transmission on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to the effect "All agents be advised (b)(7)(E). Using the Uniformed Division radio frequency, he requested ambulances to be sent to the scene.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Counterfeit Division.

SA (b)(6); was posted on the sidewalk, just to the west of the VIP doors. He was watching the crowd across T Street and the area to the President's rear when he heard the shots. He looked toward the President and saw him being placed in the limousine. He then drew his weapon and ran to the right rear door of the limousine and worked it out onto T Street.

Seeing the President had been secured inside and that the assailant was being subdued, SA (b)(6); proceeded to the (b)(7)(E) and assumed the No. 2 position as he was aware that members of the shift were injured or otherwise involved. He continued to assist the working shift at the hospital until relieved at approximately 10:00 PM.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); was posted inside the ballroom by the kitchen doors. She first realized something was wrong when she heard what she thought was (b)(7)(E) over (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency. She discussed this with SA (b)(6); and they went to the security room to inquire and to assist. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) helped with the radios and phones, and at SA (b)(6); direction, obtained necessary information from the agents at the crime scene and in the briefing room.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in May of 1974 and is currently assigned to the Liaison Division.

SA (b)(6); was posted inside the ballroom by the kitchen doors. He heard what he thought was (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) over (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency, but it did not immediately alert him that something was wrong. Shortly thereafter, an assistant manager of the hotel told him that shots had been fired.

SA (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) immediately went to the security room to assist SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who they knew was alone. SA (b)(6); was sent to the crime scene, which was already secured, and aided in locating witnesses and assuring the proper authorities were in touch.

Special Agent [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in October of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Special Investigations and Security Division.

SA [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] was posted near the projection booth of the International Ballroom as a roving post.

After the President left the International Ballroom, he heard a transmission on [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] frequency, [(b)(7)(E)]. Shortly after this, an employee of the hotel told him that shots had been fired at the President.

He proceeded to the departure site through the Terrace doors. Upon arrival at the departure site he noticed that the limousine and [(b)(7)(E)] were gone. A scuffle was ongoing with the suspect and he noticed several people on the ground.

He immediately began crowd control duties inasmuch as the assailant was under control and the wounded were being helped.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in March of 1972 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); was assigned to the west ballroom kitchen/Terrace entrance inside the Hilton Hotel. He remained on post when the President left the ballroom. He thought he heard a transmission relative to the President's departure. He walked to the Terrace entrance and heard people saying that shots had been fired. When he exited the Terrace doors, the [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

He noticed agents and police officers attempting to control the crowd. He immediately assisted in this function.

He located a Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) a witness, and remained with him. Detective [REDACTED] (b)(6); MPD 3rd District, and he transported [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to the 3rd District for interview.

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Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in January of 1972 and is currently assigned to the Liaison Division.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was posted in the audio control room of the International Ballroom. After the President departed the Ballroom, he heard a transmission on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency "All posts on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E).

He immediately left the area of the audio control room and ran through the lobby and out the Terrace doors to the departure area.

The limousine and (b)(7)(E) were no longer on the scene when he first exited the Terrace doors. He noticed the struggle with the suspect to his right.

He immediately began crowd control procedures.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1967 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

He was (b)(7)(E) inside the Hilton Hotel near the center aisle of the writing press area. After the President left the International Ballroom, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) remained on post.

He heard two transmissions on (b)(6); frequency, (b)(7)(E).

He left the ballroom and went up the stairs at the VIP exit. When he arrived on the scene, the limousine and the (b)(7)(E) were gone. The assailant was no longer on the scene. Crowd control was being implemented by police officers and Secret Service agents. He was instructed to return to the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room at that time.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in November of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Office of Protective Operations.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was assigned as the security room agent at the Hilton Hotel.

He heard on one of the frequencies the term (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) noted the time of that transmission as 2:27 PM according to his wrist watch.

He decided to stay off the air unless necessary. He heard

SA (b)(6); on (b)(6); frequency requesting ambulances.

(b)(6); instructed (b)(6); to switch to (b)(6); frequency.

When he switched, ambulances were on the way.

He monitored traffic on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency indicating that the President was enroute to the hospital. He picked up the phone and was dialing the hospital when he heard the (b)(7)(E) tell the limousine that the hospital had been notified.

He then called Deputy Assistant Director Bechtle to advise him of the facts as known to that point.

Special (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in February of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was (b)(7)(E) at the East Entrance Hall of Presidents near the holding room. After the President departed his area, he remained at his post.

He heard a transmission on (b)(6); frequency saying (b)(7)(C). He decided something was wrong and ran up the stairs near the holding room to the VIP exit.

When he exited this door, he noticed wounded on the ground and a group of law enforcement personnel in control of a suspect.

He attempted to assist the officers trying to evacuate the suspect. He opened the front and rear right doors of an MPD cruiser to facilitate this evacuation. He entered the rear of the cruiser and attempted to open the left rear door. This was not possible and the suspect was taken to another cruiser and departed the area.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) then assisted other Secret Service agents and Metropolitan Police Officers in crowd control.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in July of 1969 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); was assigned the post at the holding room.

After the President left his area and proceeded to the limousine, he remained in the vicinity of his post.

He heard a transmission on (b)(6); frequency which he interpreted as (b)(7)(E). For a short period of time he remained at his post. He decided to investigate. He ran up the stairs leading to the VIP exit.

When he arrived at that location, the limousine and (b)(7)(E) were not there. He immediately determined that the assailant was under control and the wounded were receiving attention. Therefore, he assisted other Secret Service and Metropolitan Police personnel in the clearing of the crime scene and assisting in the arrival of the ambulances.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in December of 1974 and is currently assigned to the Presidential Protective Division.

On March 30, 1981, SA (b)(6); was assigned to the 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Shift and specifically assigned to remain in W-16 (Presidential Protective Division Office) during President Reagan's movement to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

At approximately 2:27 PM SA (b)(6); heard a transmission from ATSAIC (b)(6); saying that shots had been fired and that they were coming to the White House.

SA (b)(6); instructed the Uniformed Division control center to open all gates to the White House area.

SA (b)(6); then heard a transmission saying that the President was "okay".

A short time later he heard a transmission saying that the motorcade was going to George Washington University Hospital.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) immediately placed a telephone call, through the White House Signal Board, to the hospital and told a female that "The President is enroute to the emergency room". The female asked if the President had been shot and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Continued)

replied that he did not know but that there may be three other individuals who had been wounded.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) placed a telephone call to ASAC (b)(6);, Washington Field Office, and advised him of the situation and requested agents be sent to the George Washington University Hospital.

SA (b)(6); was then dispatched to the hospital and arrived there between 2:45 PM and 3:00 PM. He began to secure the hallway between the emergency room and operating room.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) further assisted at the hospital until being relieved by the 4:00 PM to 12:00 Midnight Shift.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in July of 1968 and is currently assigned to the Technical Security Division.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was at the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981, in a Technical Security capacity.

He was walking up the stairs when he heard a commotion outside. He ran up the stairs and out the door. He saw the limousine pulling away, three men down, and a crowd struggling with a man. He went to Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) but didn't see anything he could do to help. He then went to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who was bleeding badly, when he saw a gun on the pavement. He realized this had to be the weapon used by the assailant. He picked it up with his handcuffs and kept it in his possession.

He telephoned AD-Investigations' Office and talked with ASAIC

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) He was advised to insure that the proper chain of custody was maintained when he turned the weapon over to the FBI. He noted the make, model and serial number of the weapon. He scratched his initials on the hammer of the weapon and placed it in a plastic bag provided by MPD. He surrendered the weapon to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Mireles of the FBI. He then helped the FBI re-enact the crime scene and provided them with a statement before returning to his office.

Special Agent [REDACTED]

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in November of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA [REDACTED] reported to the [REDACTED] of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. His post was to be with the emergency motorcade and ambulance. He picked up a set of car keys from SA [REDACTED] and a set from SA [REDACTED]. He also stopped at the security room to pick up a [REDACTED] for the ambulance. He advised that he was on post at 12:30 PM in the emergency limousine.

When the ambulance arrived, he placed the [REDACTED] in the ambulance with it set on [REDACTED] frequency. He had the ambulance park in the designated area (near the emergency motorcade) and returned to the emergency limousine. He had his [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] frequency and with the car radio, he monitored [REDACTED] frequency.

At 2:20 PM he heard SA [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] frequency say "He's coming to Halfback". He then heard four or five shots. He could not see the shooting site but heard on [REDACTED] frequency [REDACTED] - [REDACTED]. He saw the limousine turn the corner and disappear. Everything was quiet for what seemed like a long time when he saw SA [REDACTED] shouting, waving and talking

Special Agent [REDACTED] (Continued)

into his radio. He could see [REDACTED] saying "Send an ambulance".

He directed the ambulance to go around to the departure site and then ran down the ramp to the departure site. He stated he saw what he thought was two (2) SA's and one police officer on the ground.

He began assisting in crowd control and called on [REDACTED] frequency for a second ambulance. The ambulance arrived shortly.

He continued helping with crowd control and helped load [REDACTED] [REDACTED] into an ambulance.

He returned to the emergency [REDACTED] until he was directed on [REDACTED] frequency to return to the [REDACTED]. He went to the [REDACTED] gave a statement to the FBI and then returned to the Washington Field Office.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in April of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was in the Washington Field Office when the assassination attempt was made. He and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were dispatched by ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

When they arrived, everyone, including the injured, were gone. He contacted the FBI and MPD on the scene. All agreed that the FBI had primary jurisdiction and that the U. S. Secret Service and Metropolitan Police Department would assist. He froze all SA's on the scene until the FBI could talk with them. He instructed SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to hold onto Hinckley's weapon until the FBI needed it.

The Metropolitan Police Department, FBI and Secret Service were setting up a (b)(7)(E) at the hotel where leads could be investigated immediately. MPD started searching the area for a vehicle and the FBI had approximately (b)(7)(E) working. He assisted in re-enacting the crime scene. He also was passing all information he received to the Washington Field Office and Intelligence Division and passing all information from the Washington Field Office and Intelligence Division to the FBI and MPD.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in February of 1971 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the (b)(7)(E) of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing, he was (b)(7)(E) - West Press entrance doors in the ballroom - by SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

After the President left, he maintained his post until SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) came in and said there had been an attempted assassination. He then went to the departure site and assisted with crowd control at the crime scene. When he arrived, the limousine, (b)(7)(E) the assailant and all wounded were already gone. He then heard on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to report to the (b)(7)(E) which he did. He remained there for about 45 minutes and then returned to the Washington Field Office as instructed.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in April of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the Washington Hilton Hotel at 12:00 Noon on March 30 for a briefing. After the briefing, he was posted by SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). His post was inside the ballroom, stage right. When the shift arrived, he was relieved and moved over to a set of doors [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) away from the podium.

He maintained his post after the President left and finally heard on his radio, [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency, [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) then a short time later "get an ambulance up". He maintained his post until he was instructed on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to report to the briefing room. He was in the briefing room about 30 minutes and then told to return to the Washington Field Office for assignment.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing he was posted at the west dais entrance inside the ballroom where he remained on post until the President left.

After departure, he waited for quite some time, then heard on [REDACTED] (b)(6); frequency, [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E). Then he heard on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency something about an ambulance. He remained on post until he was instructed on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to report to the briefing room [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room). He waited there for about 45 minutes and then was instructed to return to the Washington Field Office for assignment.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1975 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. SA (b)(6); then posted SA (b)(6); at the right side of the podium inside the ballroom.

He heard on (b)(6); frequency (b)(7)(E). He remained on post until he heard on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency that he was to report to the (b)(6); Room. He stayed in the (b)(7)(E) for approximately one hour and then was told to return to the Washington Field Office for assignment.

He returned to the Washington Field Office and was sent to George Washington University Hospital where he was assigned to the main switchboard to handle incoming calls that were of an interest to this Service.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in June of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, he reported to the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing he was posted by SA (b)(6); . His post was the east door of the Hall of Presidents, inside the ballroom and he was on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency.

After the President left the ballroom, he remained on post for quite some time until he heard on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency (b)(7)(E), get another ambulance up here". He stayed on post until he was instructed on (b)(6); frequency to report to the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) He was in the (b)(7)(E) about 30 minutes and then was instructed to return to the Washington Field Office for assignment.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in September of 1970 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, he reported to the [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing he was posted by SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). His post was stage right until the shift arrived and then he moved to the left hand side of the stage.

After the President left the room, he remained on post until he heard on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency "There's been an [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E). He remained on post until he was instructed on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to report to the briefing room [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E). He was in the briefing room about 45 minutes when he was told to return to the Washington Field Office for assignment.

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in March of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing, he was posted by SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in the room directly underneath the ballroom stage.

He remained on post until he heard [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency and also a call for an extra ambulance. He proceeded to the departure site. When he arrived, the limousine and follow-up were gone as were all the wounded. He then was told to report to the [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) on [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency which he did. He was then instructed to return to the Washington Field Office which he did. He was on stand-by at the Washington Field Office until 10:00 PM.

Special Agent [REDACTED]

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in August of 1970 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, SA [REDACTED] reported to the [REDACTED] of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing, he was posted by SA [REDACTED] at the main checkpoint going into the ballroom with SA [REDACTED] (Washington Field Office).

After the President departed, SA [REDACTED] went into the security room and heard on the radio, [REDACTED] frequency, about the attack. He immediately went to the departure area. The limousine and follow-up were gone as was the assailant. Three men were on the ground and he went to assist Officer [REDACTED] but there was help already there. He then assisted in placing SA [REDACTED] on the stretcher and into the ambulance. The ambulance was having a hard time because of traffic and he assisted with traffic control and then crowd control at the crime scene until notified to report to the [REDACTED] Room for instructions. He was told to return to the Washington Field Office which he did where he was interviewed by the FBI. He remained in the Washington Field Office until 12:00 Midnight.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in March of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, he and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were posted on the main checkpoint going into the ballroom.

After the President left the hotel, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) went outside and saw three men on the ground. The limousine and follow-up were gone. He assisted in taking Hinckley to a police car. He then assisted in putting (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) into ambulances and rode in the ambulance with (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to George Washington University Hospital.

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in March of 1962 and is currently assigned to the Liaison Division.

On March 30, 1981, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) reported to the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. After the briefing, he was (b)(7)(E) leading into the ballroom.

He waited until after the President had left the area and then switched his radio over to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) frequency to hear the departure. He heard "shots fired, some injuries, (b)(7)(E) okay, enroute (b)(7)(E) .

He then went to the departure site advising SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) of what he had heard. When he arrived at the departure site, the limousine, (b)(7)(E) Hinckley, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were gone and they were loading (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) into an ambulance. He assisted with crowd control until directed to return to the (b)(7)(E) for instructions. He returned to his office as instructed about 5:15 PM.

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ATTACHMENTS - Page 2

Attachment No. 1:

Motorcade route, White House to Washington Hilton Hotel

Attachment No. 2:

Motorcade route, Washington Hilton Hotel to George Washington
University Hospital

Attachment No. 3:

General Survey of the Washington Hilton Hotel

Attachment No. 4:

Preliminary Survey by Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 5:

Preliminary Survey by Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 6:

Counter-Sniper Survey by Technician (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 7:

Hospital Protective Survey for the George Washington
University Hospital

Attachment No. 8:

Technical Security Survey by Security Specialist (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attachment No. 9:

Chart of motorcade alignment - White House to Washington
Hilton Hotel

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ATTACHMENTS - Page 3

Attachment No. 10:

Chart of Presidential limousine and U. S. Secret Service

(b)(7)(E)

positioned for departure from the

Washington Hilton Hotel

Attachment No. 11:

A - Chart of security personnel for Hilton Departure

B - Chart of staff personnel for Hilton Departure

Attachment No. 12:

(b)(7)(E)

- Connecticut Avenue and

Florida Avenue to 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue

Attachment No. 13:

(b)(7)(E)

- 17th Street and Pennsylvania

Avenue to George Washington University Hospital

Attachment No. 14:

Photograph of John W. Hinckley in the general public area
prior to President Reagan's arrival at the Washington
Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981

Attachment No. 15:

Series of twelve (12) photographs taken by the White House
photographer

Attachment No. 16:

Series of five (5) photographs taken by a private civilian

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ATTACHMENTS - Page 4

Attachment No. 17:

Two (2) photographs of John W. Hinckley at the time
of his arrest on March 30, 1981

Attachment No. 18:

Photograph of the (b)(7)(E) used in the
attempted assassination

Attachment No. 19:

Photograph of the Presidential Limousine, (b)(7)(E)
showing bullet hits to right rear window and right
rear fender

Attachment No. 20:

Photograph of bullet hit to right rear window of (b)(7)(E)

Attachment No. 21:

Photograph of bullet hit to right rear fender of (b)(7)(E)

Attachment No. 22:

Three (3) photographs, taken subsequent to March 30, 1981,
showing the position of the Presidential Limousine and
U. S. Secret Service follow-up for the arrival of President
Reagan to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTACHMENTS - Page 5

Attachment No. 23:

Five (5) photographs, taken subsequent to March 30, 1981, showing the position of the Presidential Limousine and U. S. Secret Service follow-up for the departure of President Reagan from the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981

Attachment No. 24:

Photograph of the Washington Hilton Hotel "VIP" entrance

Attachment No. 25:

Photograph of Washington Hilton Hotel, T Street and Connecticut Avenue, taken from across Connecticut Avenue

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<div data-bbox="506 617 699 856" data-label="Image"> </div>	<div data-bbox="626 501 743 585" data-label="Image"> </div> <div data-bbox="751 501 1029 588" data-label="Text"> <p>THE WASHINGTON HILTON</p> </div> <div data-bbox="751 585 1052 609" data-label="Text"> <p>1912 CONNECTICUT AVE., N. W.</p> </div>
	NAME _____
	DEPT. _____
	SIG. _____
AUTH. BY _____	

Front

HEIGHT _____	WEIGHT _____
EYES _____	HAIR _____
SOCIAL SECURITY No. _____	
DATE OF BIRTH _____	

Back

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL ~ Page 55

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in May of 1972 and is currently assigned to the Presidential Protective Division.

On March 30, 1981 SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was assigned as the driver for the U. S. Secret Service (b)(7)(E)

He heard SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) say that the President was coming out of the hotel. At this time (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was concentrating on the people in front of the (b)(7)(E) and he began moving the follow-up slowly closer to the limousine.

He heard shots, saw people scatter and he waited until ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) got into the follow-up.

As soon as the people were clear of the (b)(7)(E) he departed and he remembers seeing the spare vehicle behind the limousine. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) advises he was moving on T Street prior to the limousine reaching Connecticut Avenue. He states he did not "gun the (b)(7)(E) when the limousine left because of the people in front of the (b)(7)(E)

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) advised he passed the spare car and moved in behind the limousine within a block or so after turning onto Connecticut Avenue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 56

SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) (continued)

As soon as the motorcade reached George Washington Hospital and upon orders from ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), he radioed (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and requested that additional SA's be sent to the hospital.

After arrival at George Washington Hospital he helped position the limousine and (b)(7)(E) and remained with them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 57

Special Agent [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in May of 1972 and is currently assigned to the Presidential Protective Division.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); was the limousine driver for the visit on March 30, 1981. After arriving at the Hilton Hotel, he positioned the limousine [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) for the departure. SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) monitored a radio transmission advising the President would be leaving the hotel momentarily. SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) opened the right rear door of the limousine at which time SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned on the red flashing lights located in the grill. He looked over his shoulder and observed the President approaching the vehicle. He then turned around and looked straight ahead. At this point he heard gunshots. SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned and saw SAIC Parr pushing the President into the limousine. He heard the door slam and after a few seconds, he accelerated the car at the same time SAIC Parr was telling him to depart the area.

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned right onto T Street and had to maneuver to avoid a police car. The limousine turned left on Connecticut Avenue. SAIC Parr was talking to the President to determine if he was injured. SAIC Parr gave a radio transmission that the President was not injured and they were returning to the White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 58

SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) (continued)

Shortly thereafter, the President had difficulty breathing and SAIC Parr decided to take the President to George Washington Hospital. During this time, SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) recalled seeing an MPD lead car in front of him as well as motor-cycles. They had passed the limousine somewhere along the route; however, he did not recall when they did. He also observed the follow-up car behind the limousine.

SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) took the radio from SAIC Parr somewhere in the vicinity of 17th Street and K Street intersection and informed SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) they wanted to go to the emergency room of George Washington Hospital. SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) thought SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) was in the MPD lead car but saw that she was in the spare car when it passed the limousine shortly after the transmission.

The MPD lead car and (b)(7)(E) continued straight on 17th Street while the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) and the remaining cars turned right on Pennsylvania Avenue. The route car assisted with intersection control from this point to George Washington Hospital. The limousine pulled into the emergency entrance at the hospital and SA (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) remained with the car.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 59

Protective Support Technician [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in July of 1976 and is currently assigned to the Presidential Protective Division.

PST [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was the driver of the [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) for the visit on March 30, 1981. Dr. Ruge was a passenger in the car.

Upon arriving at the Hilton Hotel, PST [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) parked the spare limousine on T Street.

PST Weakley monitored a radio transmission advising the President would be departing shortly. He turned to the right and saw Dr. Ruge coming out of the VIP entrance. PST [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned to the front preparing for the departure. He then heard gunshots and looked out the rear window but only saw movement of people. SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) opened the left rear door, got in the car, and said "Let's go".

About the same time the limousine was passing the [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) on the left and Dr. Ruge was getting in the spare car from the right rear door. PST [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) accelerated the car, following the limousine because the [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) was not immediately behind the limousine. By the time the limousine turned left on Connecticut Avenue from T Street, the spare limousine was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 60

PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (continued)

immediately behind the limousine. PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not know the location of the MPD lead car at this time.

In the vicinity of the R Street and Connecticut Avenue intersection, PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) moved to the right allowing the follow-up car to get directly behind the limousine.

A radio transmission was received advising the President was not injured and he was returning to the White House. Around 17th Street and K Street or possibly L Street intersection, there was a radio transmission from the limousine saying they were going to George Washington Hospital. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) told PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to pass the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) and the limousine so as to act as the lead car to the hospital because she felt the MPD lead car probably did not hear the transmission regarding the change to the hospital.

After passing the two cars and getting in front of the limousine, PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned right on Pennsylvania Avenue. The MPD lead car continued straight on 17th Street. The route car assisted in traffic control to the hospital from 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. Upon arriving at the hospital, the spare car parked on the street and did not enter the emergency entrance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 61

Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in August of 1965 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was in the Washington Field Office when the assassination attempt was made. He and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) were dispatched by ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

When they arrived, the scene was controled and the injured had been removed. They were aware that the FBI had primary jurisdiction and that the Secret Service and the Metropolitan Police Department were to assist them.

SA's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) made contact with the FBI and the Metropolitan Police. They also talked with SA's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and determined that the Secret Service Agents were being held at the scene for interviews and that SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was in possession of the assailant's weapon.

SA's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) then separated and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) went with the FBI to assist in the interviews of the civilian witnesses.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 62

Protective Support Technician (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Entered on duty with the U. S. Secret Service in October of 1970 and is currently assigned to the Washington Field Office.

On March 30, 1981, PST (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was assigned as the driver for the Secret Service route car. SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was also in the route car.

While the President was inside the Hilton Hotel, he parked the route car on T Street just above the VIP entrance. As soon as he heard that the President was coming out of the hotel, he departed the area and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue.

When the route car reached the intersection of Florida Avenue, he heard a radio transmission that shots had been fired. A few seconds later he saw the motorcade when it turned onto Connecticut Avenue. He remembers hearing a radio transmission to the effect that they were going to the White House. Approximately one minute later he heard a radio transmission that they were going to George Washington Hospital.

The route car turned right onto Pennsylvania Avenue at 17th Street and attempted to establish intersection control for the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACTION OF USSS PERSONNEL - Page 63

PST (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) (continued)

(b)(7)(E) to George Washington Hospital since the MPD lead car and motorcycle had gone straight ahead on 17th Street when they reached Pennsylvania Avenue. Upon reaching Washington Circle, the route car went around the Circle to the George Washington Hospital emergency entrance and stopped just beyond the entrance.

PST (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) stayed with the vehicle until 4:30 PM and after that he reported to the Washington Field Office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

C/S

Admin. Capt.

D/C Admin.

Chief D.D.

DAD D.D.

TELETYPE-FMB #

DATE

(b)(7)(E)

1. Protectee: Potus 1345
2. Date and Time of Detail: 3-30-80 Location: WASH HILL
3. Date and Time Notified of Detail: 3-30-81 0840 Received By: Doc
4. Authorization: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) AD-PO: _____
5. Agent in Charge of Detail: _____ Telephone: _____
6. Advance Agent: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Telephone: _____
7. Site Agent: _____ Telephone: _____
8. Date Assigned: _____ Assigned By: _____
9. C/S Team (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
10. Protectee's Itinerary: 1200 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
11. Protectee's Transportation: PLANE - HELICOPTER - VEHICLE
12. On _____ the Advance Team will depart _____ Airport at _____ AM, PM. Via _____ Airlines.
13. Location of C/S Team while on Assignment: HOTEL; _____
Address: _____ Telephone: _____
14. C/S Personnel will depart _____ Airport at _____ AM, PM.
Arriving _____ Airport at _____ AM, PM. Via _____ Airlines
15. Reporting Time to 1310 L Street _____
16. C/S Team(s) will return to W.D.C. departing _____ SITES; _____
_____ Airport at _____ AM, PM via _____
Arriving _____ Airport at _____ AM, PM.
- SOD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) 6 1400 3/27/81

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)






(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(7)(E)














(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)




(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)





(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)







(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

John R. Simpson
Assistant Director

Special Agent

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Work. Field Office, USSS

Special Agent

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Forgery Division, USSS

Special Agent

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Work. Field Office, FBI

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SA

1174

1175 ~~at~~ rented

by T. Moore

(DC Builders
Trade)

F. Wood

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

May

5-27-81

Call down

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SA

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

FBI

SA

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

USSS

looked into it.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

has notes.

memorandum

630.0

DATE: April 1, 1981

 REPLY TO
ATTN OF: SS (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - Technical Security Division

 SUBJECT: TSD Support for Presidential Visit at the Washington
Hilton on March 30, 1981, and Accounts as Relating
To The Incident.

TO: Acting SAIC - Technical Security Division

Support was provided as stated in my Technical Survey Report
Summary dated April 1, 1981:

Team members present and their locations at the time of the
incident are as follows: SS (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lt. Early (EOD), SFC
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (EOD), and (b)(7)(E) (EOD), were in the (b)(6); Briefing
Room. We had completed a walk-through of the President's path
from the stage to the sidewalk exit point and were standing by
for response. (b)(7)(E) (b)(6); (EOD) was at the press checkpoint in
the International Ballroom. Officer (b)(6); USSS/UD K-9, had
stated earlier he would be standing by at his cruiser and would
respond from there when called. Officers (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E)
MPD/K-9, were released at 1 p.m., after completing the ballroom
search.

Upon hearing what later was verified as shots, we did not react.
Seconds later we heard the radio transmission (b)(7)(E) on (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E) Interpreting as EOD on (b)(7)(E) we proceeded
immediately to the Lobby and on outside. I saw a scuffle along
the wall on my right. I directed my (b)(7)(E) men back inside. Realiz-
ing (b)(7)(E) was actually (b)(7)(E), I pulled back and left the Lobby.
During the surge of the crowd, I was separated from my men. I
returned to the ballroom to locate (b)(7)(E) (b)(6); I was unable to
locate him.

I proceeded to the Director of Security's Office. Our equipment
and coats were there and I presumed the men would be returning
there. Captain (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Hotel Security, had a note from the
hotel switchboard. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) the Operator, had received a call
from Room 1175 at 2:25 p.m.. The caller (male voice) stated "The
President needs an ambulance." Captain (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) also added
Sgt. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) from the MPD (b)(7)(E) wanted a response. I
intended to pass it on to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) WFO Site ID Agent.



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-75)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

The Hilton Security Room had announced a meeting for all (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E) in the (b)(7)(B) Enroute there, I located my (b)(7)(E) and released them after determining they had not seen anything during the incident.

I arrived at the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and waited with the (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E) After several minutes and agent entered and asked for any witnesses. The USSS/CS Team stated they did not have a vantage point and they were told they could leave. I explained my message. He did not want to take it because he in turn "would have to explain it to someone else." I waited an additional 10-15 minutes.

The telephone lines at the hotel were tied up and I wanted to contact TSD operations. I waited a few more minutes and decided to return to the (b)(7)(E) and pass my information to TSD operations.

When returning to TSD, I tried to contact operations several times on the radio with no success. I did call operations immediately upon my return and was cut short due to heavy traffic in operations.

I remained in the section until my shift ended at 4:30 p.m., monitoring TV accounts. My associates were relating how the outside telephone lines were tied up. I decided to call back from my residence.

Upon arriving at my residence at 5:30 p.m., I called SS (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in TSD operations. I explained the message briefly and asked if there was an official case agent announced by Headquarters. He advised trying the Washington Field Office. I called the field office immediately and the receptionist referred me to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). I passed the message to him at that time.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Security Specialist

Reviewed:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Acting SAIC



INQUIRY FOR LOST PROPERTY

No. 295 Date 1/17/5

M 295 1175

Address (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"THE PRESIDENT NEEDS MALE VOICE"

Telephone # 597

Inquires for MFD C.A. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Description wants response (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Claims to have been left

On By

Signed ASST. MANAGER OR PERSON IN CHARGE OF L. & F.

INVESTIGATION OF INQUIRY Date

Res (b)(6); (b)(7)(D)

CAP (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Rec (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ED

Signed

INSPECTRESS OR HOUSEKEEPER

2:30 PM

1.

(b)(7)(E)

2. Internal Only

A

(b)(7)(E)

3. To many questions for report
A. Nashville
B. Devastator

4. I have briefing book

5. Recommendations (verbal)

6. Bad guy on awards

memorandum

DATE: April 16, 1981

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

Inspector (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

U. S. Secret Service

610.0

SUBJECT: Hospital Records Relative to Movements and
Treatment of President Reagan, Jim Brady
and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
TO: FILE

The following information was provided by GW Hospital Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) on April 15, 1981. It reflects information gleaned from normal hospital records. Due to concerns with the "Privacy Act", Mr. (b)(6) chose not to provide the raw records to the Secret Service.

March 30, 1981

Times Relating to President Reagan:

- 1432 - Hospital emergency room received word that the President was enroute there.
- 1436 - The President arrived, was "registered" at the emergency room
- 1502 - Moved to the operating room "on the table"
- 1840 - Anesthesia ended
- 1845 - Arrived post anesthesia recovery room (PARR)
- 2400 - Remained in the PARR

Times Relating to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) :

- 1440 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) arrived at the emergency room
- 1527 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) departed the emergency room
- 1530 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) arrived at the operating room
- 2025 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was moved to the post anesthesia recovery room
- 2220 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was moved to the intensive care unit

Times Relating to Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1445 - Arrived at the emergency room - "vital signs taken"

1515 - Moved to the operating room "on the table"

1647 - Moved to the post anesthesia recovery room

1800 - Moved to the intensive care unit

The President was moved from the (b)(7)(E) to the intensive care unit at 6:15 AM on 3-31-81. He was subsequently moved to a suite of rooms on the 3rd floor south at 9:50 PM on 3-31-81. He remained there until his discharge on 4-11-81 at 10:40 AM.

Jim Brady remained at the intensive care unit until 4-4-81 at which time he was moved to a 3rd floor room.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was moved from the ICU to 6 South Nursing Unit at 12:30 PM on 4-1-81. On 4-7-81 at 10:00 AM he was discharged from the hospital.

According to the Hospital Administrator's office a Ms. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (nurse or clerk) was the individual receiving the hospital's first notification that the President's motorcade was enroute to the hospital (Telephone No. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)).

A second notification advising that three gunshot victims were enroute (one of which was a Secret Service Agent) was received by Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (GWU clerk).

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Assistant Hospital Administrator) is preparing diagrams of the emergency room, operating room and recovery room areas at GW for this Service (Telephone No. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)).

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

SG:sjl

TESTS OF VEHICLE PLACEMENT - Office of Inspection - 4-12-81

ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) states that since the Inauguration of President Reagan, the standard car package for the President has been (b)(7)(E) and parade follow-up (b)(7)(E) for all in town movements and when possible, for out of town movements. ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) advises that (b)(7)(E) is the most secure vehicle we have for the President. Deviations from this occur with off the record movements.

Arrival - Pulling Straight In

Pulling the vehicle straight up on the up ramp at the VIP entrance on arrival is not contrary to the best security as this puts the President in close proximity to the entrance. After exiting the vehicle if an attack were to take place, he would be covered and evacuated into the secure hotel rather than reverse direction and return to the car. If an attack occurred prior to or while exiting the vehicle, the vehicle could proceed forward or jump the low curb to the left. In summary, this position would give ample coverage and evacuation measures.

Up Ramp

The vehicle can negotiate this ramp; however, it is very narrow and presents only one direction. If the ramp were blocked from the top, one could not back down with the Presidential (b)(7)(E) behind it. One must then negotiate the main hotel entrance at the top of the ramp which is extremely busy with taxi cabs, private vehicles, etc. One must then close off seven (7) lanes of traffic at the intersection of Columbia Road and Connecticut Avenue. The length and narrowness of this ramp present an excellent opportunity for the assassin.

With the vehicle backed into the ramp with the left hand door immediately adjacent to the VIP entrance, options for departure are extremely limited. The vehicle can only exit down T Street away from Connecticut. The door would open toward the normal public area. Parked in this position, the vehicle cannot come out and make a right turn on T Street to proceed to Connecticut Avenue with cars parked on the far side of T Street. This was tested on the morning of April 12, 1981 with (b)(7)(E)

Angled In as on 3-30-81

This is the most desirable position as it permits emergency egress either way on T Street. The vehicle still acts as a barrier and is in close proximity to the VIP entrance.

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL REPORT

TO:	OFFICE:	DATE OF ACTIVITY:
SAC Jerry S. Parr	SSD	1/24/71
FROM (SHIFT, DETAIL, OR SECTION)	WEATHER:	DAY OF WEEK:
12am-6am Shift	Clear/Cool	Monday
	LOCATION:	
	Washington, D.C.	

SPECIAL AGENTS	REGULAR HOURS	EXTRA HOURS	REMARKS
----------------	---------------	-------------	---------

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (PRINT OR TYPE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (SIGNATURE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ACTIVITY OF SECTION

DATE OF ACTIVITY

2/30/21

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL REPORT

OFFICE: DD	DATE OF ACTIVITY: 3-30-71
WEATHER: Cloudy/Mild	DAY OF WEEK: Monday
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.	

TO:
SATS Jerry S. Parr

FROM (SHIFT, DETAIL, OR SECTION)

First Lady Detail

SPECIAL AGENTS

REGULAR HOURS

EXTRA HOURS

REMARKS

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (PRINT OR TYPE)

SA

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (SIGNATURE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

SSF 1875 (04-77)

JP

3

ACTIVITY OF SECTION

DATE OF ACTIVITY

3-10-61

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

When the 4pm - 12am shift discontinued the First Lady was in residence on the second floor of the White House.

Reference is made to the 8am - 4pm P.M. Shift Report regarding the attempted assassination of the President.

**PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL REPORT**

TO:	OFFICE:	DATE OF ACTIVITY:
SAIC Jerry S. Parr	FPD	March 30, 1981
FROM (SHIFT, DETAIL, OR SECTION)	WEATHER:	DAY OF WEEK:
Transportation Section	Cloudy/Rain	Monday
	LOCATION:	
	Washington, D. C.	

SPECIAL AGENTS	REGULAR HOURS	EXTRA HOURS	REMARKS
----------------	---------------	-------------	---------

W. Slade

R. Teter

T. Williams

S. Collins

K. Davis

R. Dry

W. Erickson

D. Fabel

M. Gordon

C. Hass

G. Kierstead

D. Newsom

R. Raisler

D. Unrue

S. Rutledge

W. Ingram

G. Snow

R. Weakley

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (PRINT OR TYPE)

Ricky W. Dry

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

ACTIVITY OF SECTION

DATE OF ACTIVITY

March 30, 1981

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL REPORT

SAIC Jerry S. Parr
FROM (SHIFT, DETAIL, OR SECTION)
APM-12M Shift

OFFICE: PPD	DATE OF ACTIVITY: March 30, 1961
WEATHER: Mild/ Rain	DAY OF WEEK: Monday
LOCATION: George Washington Hospital	

SPECIAL AGENTS	REGULAR HOURS	EXTRA HOURS	REMARKS
----------------	---------------	-------------	---------

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (PRINT OR TYPE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ACTIVITY OF SECTION

DATE OF ACTIVITY

March 30, 1981

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

**PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL REPORT**

OFFICE: PPD	DATE OF ACTIVITY: March 30, 1981
WEATHER: Cloudy, rain	DAY OF WEEK: Monday
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.	

SAIC Jerry S. Parr
FROM (SHIFT, DETAIL, OR SECTION)

8am - Arm Shift

SPECIAL AGENTS

REGULAR HOURS

EXTRA HOURS

REMARKS

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (PRINT OR TYPE)

ATSAIC

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

PREPARED BY (SIGNATURE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

SA

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SSF 1875 (04-77)

ACTIVITY OF SECTION

DATE OF ACTIVITY

March 30, 1961

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

cont'd

Activity of Section Continued

March 30, 1961

Agents, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) remained at the scene to maintain custody of suspect, John W. Hinckley Jr.. Suspect, John W. Hinckley Jr. was transported to Metropolitan Police Department C Cell Block, 300 N. Indiana, Washington, D.C. for interrogation.

Agents, [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) then proceeded to George Washington University Hospital to assist in security of the hospital.

memorandum

116-200.0

DATE: April 17, 1981
TO: DSAIC DeProspero - PPD

SUBJECT: SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

TO: Inspector [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SA [REDACTED] (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) first assignment with the Secret Service was with the Washington Field Office, EOD 12/8/74. He remained there until 10/21/79, when he was reassigned to the Presidential Protective Division. He has had five (5) protective advances since that time.

[REDACTED]
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Special Agent in Charge

tsb



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

memorandum

DATE: April 17, 1981

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

Inspector

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

U. S. Secret Service

SUBJECT:

Purchase of
by John W. Hinckley

(b)(7)(E)

510.3

X. Ammunition File

TO: FILE

On April 10, 1981 I was requested by Director Knight to ascertain when the U. S. Secret Service first became aware that John W. Hinckley had purchased .22 caliber devastator ammunition.

On April 10, 1981 I placed a telephone call to RA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Resident Agency, and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) supplied me with the following information.

On March 30, 1981 at approximately 6:30 PM (5:30 PM Lubbock time) SA (b)(6); U. S. Secret Service, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI, and SA (b)(6); ATF, were at a gun shop in Lubbock, Texas and all three learned that Hinckley had purchased the subject ammunition. At this time SA (b)(6); knew that the President was out of surgery.

SA (b)(6); and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) continued their investigation in the field while SA (b)(6); returned to the office at approximately 6:50 PM (5:50 PM Lubbock time), where he informed RA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and RA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI, of Hinckley's purchase.

On March 30, 1981 at approximately 7:00 PM (6:00 PM Lubbock time), RA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) placed a telephone call to the Intelligence Division and told ID of the subject purchase.

On March 30, 1981, at approximately 7:15 PM, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ID, informed SA (b)(6); Liaison Division, and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) immediately passed the information to the FBI at the Command Center.

On March 30, 1981 at approximately 7:00 PM the Intelligence Division received a telephone call from SA (b)(6); Liaison Division, who advised that he had received the Devastator purchase information from ATF, Washington, D. C.

Besides notifying ID, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) notified the Liaison Division and SA (b)(6); Northcut (PPD) at (b)(7)(E) and requested Northcut to pass the information to PPD at the hospital. See attached O/M by SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) dated 4-6-81, under file CO-2-84,101.

On March 30, 1981 SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) called SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (PPD) at the George Washington Hospital and advised him of the Devastator ammunition purchase.

SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated to Inspector (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) that he (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) did not pass on this information as the President was now out of surgery.

On March 30, 1981 at approximately 8:00 PM SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) received another call from ATF asking him not to pass the Devastator ammunition information to anyone as they were making follow-up inquiries.

At this time it is my understanding that surgery had been completed on President Reagan, Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) prior to the Secret Service learning of the subject purchase.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

Attachment:

O/M by SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Liaison Div.,
dated 4-6-81 under file CO-2-84,101

TJB:sjl

EVIDENCE TIMETABLE

At approximately 3:40 PM, the following individuals assembled outside the operating room and became the inventory team. The team received, inventoried and secured all evidence: Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Officer (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lt. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), MPDC, Mobile Crime Lab, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Federal Bureau of Investigation), SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Federal Bureau of Investigation), SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (USSS)

3:30 PM - USSS recovers Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) personal effects from operation room

3:30 PM - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turns over weapon to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

3:40 PM - President's suitcoat and handkerchief and National Security card (See attached memo)

Personal effects of SA (b)(6); recovered from operation room

Personal effects of Mr. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) turned over to evidence team

3:59 PM - Bullet from SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) through SS to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

4:59 PM - Dr. Korbine turns over first bullet from Mr. Brady to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS, to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

5:14 PM - Dr. Korbine turns over second bullet fragment to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) who gives it to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

5:18 PM - Subject departs Central Cell Block in custody of FBI (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

5:40 PM - Dr. Aaron turns over bullet recovered from President to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS - to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS - to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS

5:44 PM - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS, turns over above to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

5:45 PM - Dr. Korbine turns over third bullet fragment from Mr. Brady to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI

6:40 PM - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) shirt recovered by medical personnel to

Evidence Timetable - Page 2

to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SS, to SA (b)(6) SS to SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI
6:50 PM - SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI, takes final custody of personal effects
of all wounded.

memorandum

April 15, 1981

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

ATSAIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - WFO

File: J-CO-2-84,101

SUBJECT: Attempted Assassination/George Washington
University Hospital Security

TO: Acting SAIC Powis - WFO

On March 30, 1981, at approximately 2:45 pm, SA's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Brancaccio, Blossman and the undersigned were instructed by ASATC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Washington Field Office, to immediately proceed to George Washington University Hospital. Upon our arrival in the hospital emergency room, we immediately assisted PPD Shift personnel in securing the emergency room and with the assistance of hospital personnel, we cleared the area of all nonessential persons. In conjunction with PPD Shift Agents and hospital personnel we reinforced our main access checkpoint at the emergency room, ensuring essential medical personnel with immediate access to the area. I assumed the role of the Washington Field Office Coordinator and assigned SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as the hospital Advance Agent. In conjunction with PPD Shift Leaders Finch and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SA's (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and I instituted additional security procedures. See Memorandum Report of SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for details.

While in the emergency room, I established liaison with MPD Homicide Detective (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) concerning the acquisition of evidence. The accountability and control of the evidence was monitored by SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) WFO. The evidence was marked for identification and turned over to the FBI.

While in the emergency room, I instructed SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to make an attempt to determine the type of gun used in the attempted assassination. Subsequently, SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) determined that a .22 caliber revolver and (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) slugs were used in the attempt. I passed this information to the doctors prior to the President's removal from the emergency room.

Additional site and post assignments were made upon the arrival of agents who were directed to report for assignments by ASATC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as well as other agents who responded to the hospital upon hearing of the incident.

It is pointed out that radio traffic was minimized because of probable monitoring by non-security persons. We attempted to pass essential messages by telephone when possible.

The interview of PPD Shift personnel who were present during the attempted assassination was coordinated between AD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ASATC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Shift Leader (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPD Detective (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) FBI Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and I. The interviews were authorized by Director Knight. Arrangements were made for the interviews to take place at the Secret Service Washington Field Office upon their relief.

April 15, 1981

Page 2

At approximately 8:30 pm, a police security meeting was held at the hospital. (See Attachment #1) This meeting was held for the purpose of discussing areas of responsibility and evaluating current security procedures at the hospital.

At approximately 10:00 pm, another police meeting, attended by the same personnel, was held at the hospital. During the course of this meeting we identified areas of responsibility and determined the specific manpower needed to secure the hospital complex for the remainder of the President's hospitalization.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ATSAIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

- I CHRONOLOGY
- II ADVANCE PREPARATIONS
- III DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY PERSONNEL
- IV REACTION OF U. S. SECRET SERVICE PERSONNEL
- V CONCLUSIONS
- VI ATTACHMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVIEW OF ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA,
ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PRIVATE~~

Director

September 30, 1975

Inspectors

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

and

610.1

xCO-2-70,800

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Office of Inspection

Review of Procedures Utilized by United States Secret Service Personnel Relating to the Attempted Assassination of President Gerald R. Ford, on September 5, 1975, in Sacramento, California

On September 11, 1975, the Director requested the Offices of Inspection and Training to conduct a review of Secret Service policies and procedures as they relate to the attempted assassination of President Gerald R. Ford, on September 5, 1975, in Sacramento, California. In this regard, the reporting Inspectors and ASATC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Special Agent (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), Office of Training, were assigned this responsibility.

This report gives a chronological listing of the advance security arrangements, security in effect at the Sacramento Capitol on September 5, 1975, assassination attempt by Lynette A. Fromme, reaction by security personnel, follow-up investigation conducted by this Service and other law enforcement agencies, and conclusions based on this review.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Inspector

Inspector

APPROVED:

Myron I. Weinstein
Myron I. Weinstein
Assistant Director

Attachment

CC: AD - PF ✓
CC: AD - PI
CC: ATD - Training
CC: Inspection
CC: Records Branch

(TOP SECRET - SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL) CLASSIFIED BY *Myron I. Weinstein*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 1981.

~~PRIVATE~~

~~PRIVATE~~

C O N T E N T S

- I. CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF EVENTS.
- II. LIST OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ADVANCE SACRAMENTO VISIT.
- III. DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE TIME OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.
- IV. REACTION OF USSR SECURITY PERSONNEL DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION.
- V. CONCLUSIONS.
- VI. ATTACHMENTS.

~~PRIVATE~~

REVIEW OF ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
ON
GOVERNOR GEORGE C. WALLACE
LAUREL, MARYLAND
MAY 15, 1972**



VOLUME 1

**UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
JAMES J. ROWLEY, DIRECTOR**

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