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Description of document: Extracts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Foreign Counterintelligence Review, 1976-1979 (see Note below)

Requested date: 11-February-2010

Released date: 29-May-2012

Posted date: 23-July-2012

Source of document: Freedom of Information Act
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS/RL
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20522-8100
Fax: 202-261-8579
[Electronic FOIA Request](#)

Note: Some records are undated

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAY 29 2012

Case No. 201200216

In the course of responding to your FOIA request of February 11, 2010 concerning FBI file HQ-65-74480, the Bureau found nine items which contained Department of State information. On December 19, 2011, we received a request from them asking us to review that material to determine whether or not it could be released to you.

We have reviewed this material, and we are pleased to enclose it.

Please note that the FBI has withheld portions of this material. Their reasons (principally exemptions b1, b6 and b7C) are marked on the pages. We enclose an information sheet describing those exemptions.

If you wish to appeal the FBI's deletions, please write within 60 days to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Avenue, Suite 11050, Washington D.C. 20530-0001 and cite FBI Case No.FBI/PA 1145585-000. The letter and envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal."

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Sheryl L. Walter".

Sheryl L. Walter, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Handwritten initials "for" in blue ink.

Enclosures:

9 document (F1 through F9)

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) military plans, systems, or operations;
 - 1.4(b) foreign government information;
 - 1.4(c) intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology;
 - 1.4(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources;
 - 1.4(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism;
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
 - 1.4(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism;
 - 1.4(h) weapons of mass destruction;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
 - ARMEX Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
 - CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
 - EXPORT Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 241(c)(1)
 - FSA Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
 - INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
 - IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec. 505, 50 USC 1701, note
- (b)(4) trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) personal privacy information
- (b)(7) law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

Section 1

Section 1

Serial 45

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

F1

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FBI

FOREIGN

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 03-15-2011



REVIEW

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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3/6/12

OCTOBER, 1979

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TJD:en

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Classified and Extended by 1756 *cup*
Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)
Date of Review For Declassification (October 1, 1999)

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b1 per FBI

(S)

Within the past year, a number of elements served to undermine relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). From the American perspective, the Soviet introduction of arms and Cuban forces in areas of turbulence in Africa was a matter of serious concern. From the Soviet angle, the American rapprochement with the People's Republic of China was viewed as evidence of an emerging anti-Soviet global strategy. Furthermore, the Soviet decision to try leading dissidents drew worldwide censure, brought the Human Rights issue to a head with the U.S. administration, and spilled over into American-Soviet bilaterals. Despite these difficulties, U.S.-Soviet negotiations over a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) continued apace; and President Jimmy Carter met with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in June to sign a SALT II Treaty. The SALT II Treaty is now being considered by the United States Senate for ratification. The settlement of a SALT II Treaty is a major foreign policy objective of both the Soviet Union and the Carter administration. Ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate is, however, by no means a certainty. (U) "U.S.-Soviet Relations, 5-8/78:"A Periodic Summary," INR Report #1053; "Policy Towards the Soviet Union," Department of State Bulletin, 2/79; "U.S.-Soviet Relations," Department of State Report, 8/78

The less than smooth quality of U.S.-Soviet relations during 1978 served as a fitting backdrop to developments in the field of foreign counterintelligence. On May 20, at Woodbridge, New Jersey, the FBI arrested two Soviet nationals who were serving at the United Nations (UN). The Soviets, named Valdik Enger and Rudolf Chernyayev, were jailed on charges of

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espionage, with bail set at \$2 million each. Shortly thereafter, on June 12, the Soviets publicly revealed their expulsion in July of 1977 of a U.S. Embassy consular official, named Martha Peterson, for an alleged espionage operation. The Soviet newspaper "Izvestia" gave a detailed account of Peterson's movements prior to being apprehended, and implied that the U.S. was responsible for the death of an innocent Soviet victim of the operation. The Soviets also indicated that the publicity was in retaliation for the arrests of the two UN employees. That same day, the Soviets arrested International Harvester representative Francis Jay Crawford in Moscow and imprisoned him on charges of currency law violations. He was released two weeks later, pending trial. On June 26, Enger and Chernyayev were also released; they were placed in the custody of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, to await a September trial. (S)

(U) "U.S.-Soviet Relations, 5-8/78: A Periodic Review," INR Report #1053

The New Jersey arrests, the publicity emanating from the incident, and high bond set for the two Soviets provoked an agitated Soviet response largely because the Soviets erroneously viewed the U.S. action as changing a basic rule of the espionage game, i.e., an informal understanding that each other's spies would be sent home quietly when apprehended. As Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in reaction to the Enger-Chernyayev arrests, "two can play the same game." Despite Soviet laments, the Woodbridge arrests were by no means extraordinary. Since the early 1960s, a number of Soviets have been involved in illegal actions relating to espionage. In 1963, the FBI arrested Igor Ivanov, an Amtorg chauffeur, for conspiracy to commit espionage. He was tried, convicted, and was finally allowed to return to the Soviet Union in 1971, pending resolution of his appeal. In 1970, Aleksandr Tikhomirov was arrested for espionage. He was released on

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\$100,000 bond and later allowed to leave the United States. In 1972, Valeriy Markelov was arrested, held on \$100,000 bond, and later allowed to leave the United States. When James David Wood was arrested for espionage in 1973, the FBI detained his Soviet principal, Viktor Chernyshev, although he was soon thereafter allowed to return to the Soviet Union. Most recently, in 1977, Yevgeniy Karpov was named as a co-conspirator in the Ivan Rogalsky espionage case, but he too was allowed to depart the United States. (S)

(U)

"Soviet Responses to U.S. Intelligence Activities," INTD Study, 12/7/78

At any rate, Soviet action did not prevent the trial,

in the

In the meantime,

And

were

waived and they too were allowed to leave their country of detainment and return to the Soviet Union. Thus,

shared the same fate (although, of course, their still stand) as the other Soviets arrested since the early 1960s. But the outcome of the case was different in one sense.

(U)

Despite the arrest and conviction of the two Soviet operatives and the impending SALT ratification debate, during the past year the large complement of United States-based

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
Section 1

Serial 44

F2

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
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b1

During the 1970s, Romania has attempted to forge a foreign policy of national self interest, in some cases pushing to the limits of Soviet forbearance. This policy has included efforts by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to have his country considered a member of the developing nations bloc, rather than as solely a Soviet bloc nation. The implications of Ceausescu's foreign policy are most visibly reflected in U.S.-Romanian relations by the Romanian efforts to foster trade and economic contacts, and to encourage favorable Congressional action for continued MFN status. (U)

INR Report #984



b1

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Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

- 9 -

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(S)

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(U)

WFO SATPIA, 3/79, p.46; 5/79, p.49

(S)

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Section 1

Serial 44 (?)


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F3

FBI FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



SUMMARY

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Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/S

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JULY, 1979

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Date 3-6-12

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Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)
Date of Review For Declassification (August 1, 2009)

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
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
b7C

(S)



In

(DGIB) defected to the West.



(S)

On December 15, 1978, relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) reached a low point when President Carter announced U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the termination of diplomatic relations with the ROC. At the same time, the President stated that the United States would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC, and that within four months the United States would withdraw its remaining military personnel from Taiwan. The President assured that the United States and Taiwan would maintain commercial, cultural, and other

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relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations. In recent years, the ROC has become one of the U.S.'s major trading partners (in 1977, for example, two-way trade totaled \$5.5 billion), and it is hoped that this economic relationship can be carried on. Nevertheless, President Carter's speech of December 15 marked the climax of an American policy--initiated with President Nixon's mission to Beijing in 1972--aimed at gaining a rapprochement with the PRC and which had as its by-product derecognition of the Nationalist Chinese Government of Taiwan. (U)

"U.S. Policy Toward China, 7/15/71-1/15/79," Department of State, Selected Documents, No. 9

b1 per FBI

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Section 1

Serial 41

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REVIEW (U)

MARCH, 1979

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(10)

Classified and Extended by 1929
Reason For Extension FCIM, 11, 1-2.4.2 (1, 2, and 3)
Date of Review For Declassification (March 31, 2009)

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With concurrence of: _____
IPS by _____ obtained _____
Date 3-1-79 not obt. _____

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b1 per FBI

(S)

Among Eastern European communist countries, Poland was the first to attempt a special relationship with the United States. As early as the mid-1950s the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka permitted a U.S. presence in Poland which far exceeded that allowed by any other Warsaw Pact country. The improvement in relations led to the extension of MFN status in 1960. An even more substantial improvement in U.S.-Polish relations followed the assumption of power by Party Secretary Edward Gierek in December, 1970. The United States share of Polish trade has

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remained at a steady 4 percent and by 1980 is expected to increase upwards by 30 percent. In the choice for a new ambassador to the Polish Embassy in Washington, the Poles revealed their desire to foster good relations with the United States; the Poles were careful to select a diplomat, Romuald Spasowski, who strongly favors warm Polish-American relations.

(U)

WFO SATPIA, 2/21/78, p. 49; INR Report #984, 5/22/78, p. 8

b1 per FBI

(S)

Politically, economically, and militarily, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been dominated by the Soviet Union since the conclusion of World War II, and East Germany's

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relations with the United States have been minimal. Formal relations between the two countries were established only four years ago. Currently, relations between the United States and the GDR are correct but cool. Except for an agreement on fishing, East Germany has yet to conclude even the most elementary cultural, scientific, and economic agreements with the United States. Recently, however, there have been indications that the East Germans desire a more positive interaction with the United States. This shift by the GDR is to a large extent motivated by economic considerations, in particular a necessity to acquire the hard currencies of the West due to an ever-mounting GDR hard currency debt. These hard currencies are mainly obtainable through trade. (C)

INR Report #984, 5/22/78, p. 9

b1 per FBI


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


In recent years, Czechoslovakia, which has attempted to be as responsive as possible to Soviet foreign policy objectives, has taken no initiatives to improve its stagnant relations with the United States. The major obstacles to significant improvement in American-Czechoslovak relations are the long-standing dispute over the resolution of U.S. property claims and the return of Czech gold which was confiscated from the Czechs during World War II. Thus, despite the Czech desire to attain MFN status, it is unlikely that the Czech leadership will take any immediate initiatives toward an improvement in bilateral relations. (C)

WFO SATPIA, 1/18/78, p.20; INR Report #984, 5/21/78, p.9

b1 per FBI

(S)




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b1 per FBI

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During the last two decades Romania has forged a foreign policy of partial alignment whereby it has remained within the Soviet bloc but has often acted independent of it. The United States, along with other countries in Western Europe and elsewhere, was approached by Bucharest in the Romanian search for political and economic support that would counterbalance Soviet influence. Washington has responded positively to the Romanian diplomatic offensive. As a result, American-Romanian trade is now valued at about \$500 million per year, Romania has received MFN status, and a consular convention and major scientific agreements have been concluded. Thus, Romania, with the possible exception of Poland, has the most active and diversified ties with the United States of any Warsaw Pact state. (C)

INR Report #984,
4/22/78, p. 6


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Within the past year, with the granting of MFN status b1 per FBI and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, United States-Hungarian relations reached an unprecedented level of harmony. These two accomplishments are largely the result of a Hungarian effort to improve relations with the United States, and are an expression of Hungary's flexibility in exploiting the possibilities offered by the general thaw in American-Soviet relations during the last several years. Warming relations between the U.S. and Hungary have already led to increased U.S. investments in Hungary (e.g., a Levi Strauss plant recently opened in Hungary), and MFN status is expected to stimulate an increase in American-Hungarian trade. (C)
INR Report #984, 5/22/78, p. 8



(S)

Since 1945, Bulgaria has been the most obsequious ally of the Soviets, and, economically, almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. For the

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Kremlin's benefit, the Bulgarian leadership goes to great lengths to nurture this image of loyalty through the sharpness of its anti-American comment and the defensiveness of its attitude toward Western influence that could undermine internal stability. Consequently, United States-Bulgarian ties have tended to develop at a glacial pace. Recently, however, the Bulgarians have moved to take advantage of the opportunities offered under the East-West detente, particularly with an eye to increased trade and the importation of technology. They have signed several agreements with the United States in cultural and scientific-technical fields, and the Bulgarians have taken steps to achieve MFN status. The new Bulgarian expression of desire for political exchange and economic deals augurs well for a continuing upswing in bilateral relations. (U)

INR Report #984, 5/22/78, p. 10


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
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On December 15, 1978, relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) reached a low point when President Carter announced U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the termination of diplomatic relations with the ROC. At the same time, the President stated that the United States would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC, and that within four months the United States would withdraw its remaining military personnel from Taiwan. The President assured that the United States and Taiwan would maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations. In recent years, the ROC has become one of the U.S.'s major trading partners (in 1977, for example, two-way trade totaled \$5.5 billion), and it is hoped that this economic relationship can be carried on. Nevertheless, President Carter's speech of December 15 marked the climax of an American policy--initiated with President Nixon's mission to Beijing in 1972--aimed at gaining a rapprochement with the PRC and which had as its byproduct derecognition of the Nationalist Chinese Government of Taiwan. (U)
"U.S. Policy Toward China, 7/15/71-1/15/79," Department of State, Selected Documents, No. 9

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


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
b1 per

A marked improvement in American-Yugoslav relations has occurred since the May, 1977, visit to Belgrade of Vice President Walter Mondale. This improvement was capped by the state visit of President Tito to Washington in March of 1978. The Yugoslavs are very optimistic about the prospects for further expansion of overall relations, particularly in the economic/commercial sector, for they perceive that there are no insoluble problems between the United States and Yugoslavia.

(U)

INR Report #984, 5/22/78; pp. 10-11

(S)



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Section 1

Serial 40

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SUMMARY (U)

JANUARY, 1979

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TJD:en
(7)

MAIL ROOM ☐

Classified and Extended by 1929

Reason For Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (1,2, and 3)
Date of Review For Declassification (January 1, 2009)

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources
And Methods Involved

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ENCLOSURE

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
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INR Report #984, 5/22/78; pp. 10-11



b1 per FBI

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
Section 1

Serial 32

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F6

(C)



(S)


IN AUGUST, 1976, SOVFRACHT, a shipbroker for bulk carriers, especially American grain bound for the Soviet Union, acquired new office space at 277 Park Avenue, (near 48th Street), New York, New York. (C)

b1 per FB

(U)

(NY SPIA 9/27/76, page 14)

(S)



(C)

THE SOVIETS HAVE also sought United States Department of State (USDS) approval to establish a new company, in New York, to handle sales and servicing of Soviet tractors exported to the United States. This company may also seek offices in Milwaukee and New Orleans. (C)

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

(NY SPIA 3/14/77, page 19)

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
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THE USDS, WHICH had protested the Soviet Union's attempts to acquire two separate properties in New York, one a large suburban estate, without prior USDS approval, has refused permission for such acquisition. (C)

(NY SPIA 3/14/77, page 21)

IN APRIL, 1977, USDS advised that the Soviets had rented office space at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, for the Export and Information Department of Amtorg without prior USDS approval. Accordingly, the Soviets were ordered to vacate this space by May 31, 1977. (C)

(NY SPIA 5/13/77, page 17)



(S)

b1

(U) THE ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL Office in Chicago, Illinois, occupied its new office space, Room 911, 100 West Monroe Street, Chicago, on June 1, 1976. (C)

(CG SATPIA 7/23/76, page 7)

Section 3

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Serial 64

(S)

~~SECRET~~ - ORCON/NOFORN

F7

Counterintelligence Actions

b1 per FBI

During the past year a significant number of counterintelligence actions were initiated against XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX some of which involved the expulsion of IOs. They are as follows:

Soviet Intelligence Services

In April, 1983, three Soviet officials were declared PNG by the USDS after being implicated in various espionage activities. First, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Barmyantsev, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Soviet Army and a GRU officer, was expelled after the FBI apprehended him as he removed eight rolls of undeveloped film from a plastic bag at the base of a tree in rural Maryland. The film contained photographs of classified documents. At the time of the incident, Barmyantsev was the highest-ranking Soviet military attache in Washington. (U)

Second, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Mikheyev was forced to leave the United States when the FBI discovered he had attempted to obtain classified information from a congressional aide. Mikheyev, ostensibly attached to the United States and Canada Institute in Moscow, was on a three-month tour at the Permanent Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN). Mikheyev is a suspected KGB officer. (U)

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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
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p. 239-240

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Finally, Oleg Vadimovich Konstantinov was intercepted by the FBI in Manhasset, New York, when he met with a United States citizen from whom he was trying to get highly classified information concerning weapons technology and the aerospace industry in the United States. Konstantinov, a known KGB officer, was assigned to the SMUN at the time of his expulsion. (U)



b1 per FBI

(S)

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F8

exceeds that given to recruited Soviet agents in recent espionage cases (e.g. [REDACTED])

b1 per FBI
b6
b7C

(S)

(S)

per FBI
Central/Direct

In handling [REDACTED] the Soviets were extremely amateurish and ineffective, and this enabled the FBI to blunt an operation that could have been very productive for the SIS. In this sense, the case is very similar to another recent case in which a valuable source of information was compromised due largely to a lack of security employed by the Soviets. (Detailed studies of both the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] cases will appear in the next issue of the "Review.") (S)

b6 per FBI
b7C

(U)

In one further operation, a known IO, Yuriy Marakovskiy, was declared persona non grata (PNG) by the United States Department of State (USDS), following an

Department of State, A/GISAPS/SRP

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
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incident in which the Soviet was confronted by the FBI, while engaging in a clandestine meeting. At the same time, the USDS protested such Soviet espionage activities and demanded that they be halted immediately. (C)

(S)



b1 per FBI

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F9

(S)

b1 per FBI

A case which helped to illuminate Soviet priorities in the area of strategic intelligence was a recent FBI double agent operation. Over the period of several months, the double agent received detailed tasking from first, and, secondly,

(S)

Department of State, A/GIS/PS/SRP

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Due in part to the sensitivity of the targeted material, the double agent operation was terminated shortly after the Soviets tasked the agent to acquire the classified data. The U.S. Department of State filed a strong protest with Soviet authorities regarding the activities of Kuzarvin and Kuzin. Kuzarvin thereupon permanently departed the United States; at the time of the USDS protest, Kuzin was in the Soviet Union on home leave, and the Soviet request for his visa to return to the United States was withdrawn. (S)

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