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Description of documents:	National Security Agency (NSA) records related to: the charter and meetings of the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), 1940-1980
Requested date:	21-September-2010
Released date:	26-June-2012
Posted date:	13-August-2012
Source of document:	Mandatory Declassification Review Request National Security Agency Declassification Services (DJ5) Suite 6884, Bldg. SAB2 9800 Savage Road Ft. George G. Meade, MD, 20755-6884

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


Request ID: 0000548329

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TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL

Type: OMAL



Submitted: 20120627

TO		FROM (RETURN ADDRESS) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 9800 SAVAGE ROAD FORT MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000 ATTN: HOUPÉ, JOYCE ANNE SUITE: 6884		This transmittal may NOT be downgraded upon removal of the enclosure(s). This transmittal may be declassified upon removal of the enclosure(s).		
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						PACKAGE CT 1 of 1
LN#	UNCLASSIFIED TITLE/DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		QTY	TOT COST	MFG SERIAL#	CLASS. OF ITEM
1	SERIAL: MDR-63028 LETTER DATED 26 JUNE 2012 W/ENCLS.		1	0		UNCLASSIFIED
DESIG	ACCT	TYPE	PAS STATEMENT		APPROVAL	
CPODIR	NO	NA	Not Applicable			
SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (UNCLASSIFIED)						
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: MDR-63028
26 June 2012

This responds to your request of 21 September 2010 to have the following information reviewed for declassification: "Charter and meetings of the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), 1940-1980." The material responsive to this request has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection.

Some portions deleted from the documents were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraph (c), and remains classified TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) (1), (3) and (6) of the Executive Order. Additionally, Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526 allows for the protection afforded to information under other provisions of law. Therefore, the names of NSA/CSS employees and information that would reveal NSA/CSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note).

You may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (DJ5), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall reference the initial partial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Blake C. Barnes", followed by a horizontal line.

Blake C. Barnes
Chief
Declassification Services

Encls:
a/s

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MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE USCSB COMMITTEE ON COMPROMISING
EMANATIONS HELD ON 25 JANUARY 1961

The first meeting of the subject committee was held on 25 January 1961 in the Pentagon. The meeting was concerned primarily with formulating its own procedures and administrative operations. It was agreed that:

1. For the next several months, meetings will probably be scheduled every two weeks.
2. There will be ad hoc working groups established for specific tasks assigned to or developed by the committee.
3. An alternate chairman (CIA) was elected by common consent.
4. The draft of a radiation standard for communications equipment was distributed to the non-military members of the committee for their early consideration. It was noted that the same draft is very near being completely agreed to by NSA and the Military Departments; that when agreed it would be regarded as an interim standard until the full committee ratified it and the USCSB accepted it.
5. The Committee agreed that teletypewriter equipment, as a broad category, would be treated as priority one under committee action. The members were requested to prepare and forward to the Chairman a bibliography of all teletypewriter radiation tests, with the briefest abstract of results, which have been conducted or sponsored by their respective Departments and Agencies. If received in time, these would be compiled, reproduced and distributed at or before the next meeting. The members were requested to begin thinking of relative priorities for the various types of specific teletypewriter equipments.
6. NSA agreed to distribute to the members for their consideration, a currently available draft paper which would serve as the initial effort to establish technical standards of installation of equipment.

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3.5(c) of E.O. 13526



EDWARD B. McGETTRICK
Committee Chairman

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA and CIA on
06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526 MDR63028

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MINUTES OF THE SIXTH MEETING OF THE USCSB COMMITTEE
ON COMPROMISING EMANATIONS HELD ON 26 MAY 1961

1. The 6th meeting of the Special Committee was held at the Naval Security Station, Room 17149 on 26 May 1961. The following persons were present:

NSA

Mr. E. B. McGettrick, Chairman

Mr. W. W. Hamer

Mr. [REDACTED]

P.L. 86-36

Mr. R. G. Klauser

Army

Mr. B. E. Lisonbee, ASA

Mr. R. M. Scott, OCSIGO

Navy

LCDR C. D. Scallorn, NSG

Mr. W. A. Haynes, BUSHIPS

Mr. C. E. Parta, BUSHIPS

Air Force

Capt. H. H. Smith, USAFSS

CIA

[REDACTED]

AEC

Mr. R. G. Cowen

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FBI

Mr. J. L. Perritte

Treasury

LCDR H. J. LeBlanc

2. Minutes of the 5th meeting were reviewed and approved.

3. Report by Chairman of the Sub-committee, [REDACTED]
summarized the meeting of 24 May 1961:

a. Demonstration by Teletype Corp. - The Navy expects to receive, within several weeks, "suppressed" models of the M-28 page printer and typing reperforator. All committee members will be invited to examine the equipment when it is available.

b. Format for "Summary and Evaluation of Radiation Test Report". - Copies of the report format, as revised by the Sub-committee, were reviewed, discussed and approved by the Committee. A copy of the approved format is inclosed.

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION;~~
~~DDI DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY~~

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c. Flexowriter. - A review was made of the accomplishments of the various organizations involved in Flexowriter testing. The Army expects to test, in the near future, an 8-level machine which incorporates certain suppression measures recommended by NSL. The Air Force will also test an 8-level machine which contains radio interference suppression modifications developed by Stromberg-Carlson. The Navy has not yet performed studies of Flexowriter vulnerabilities, but (NRL) facilities are soon to be applied to the possibility of a "quick-fix". If a timely short-range solution is not possible, the Navy expects to survey the commercial sources for some other equipment which would meet their operational requirements with less danger of compromising emanations. The CIA tests of two 5-level machines are essentially complete except for the interpretation of test findings in terms of intercept ranges. In view of mounting pressures for a quick solution to the Flexowriter security problem, the Sub-committee will pool all available information and will prepare a recommendation on the practicability and effectiveness of "quick-fix" modifications. The Sub-committee unanimously urges that the Friden Co. be briefed on the outcome of these deliberations and be prevailed upon to produce corrective measures. (The Committee discussed this point at some length, as summarized in paragraph 4.)

d. Low Level Keyers. - Information on low level keyers was exchanged by Sub-committee members for purposes of review, comment and evaluation. Individual evaluations of available reports will be discussed at the next meeting.

e. The next Sub-committee meeting will be held on 28 June 1961 at NSS from 0900 - 1600. (The Chairman mentioned that a full day will be devoted to the next meeting as one afternoon session each month has not enabled adequate coverage of the heavy Agenda at hand.) The Agenda for the next meeting will cover:

- (1) Low Level Keyers
- (2) Test Schedules
- (3) Flexowriter
- (4) Installation Standards
- (5) Screenrooms
- (6) On-Site Radiation Testing

4. Flexowriter.

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a. [] reported that the CODIB Working Group on Remote Systems Input was briefed in May on the status of Flexowriter tests and on the general outlook for solutions to the security problem. The Working Group has indorsed a report to CODIB on the need for research and development of a new machine as the appropriate long-range solution. The next step in pursuing this course of action will be the assignment of an "action" agency to undertake the necessary R/D effort. The more burning question is

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what to do, as a short-range solution, until a better machine is available. First indications are that the Flexowriter won't adapt to "quick and easy" modifications and that the suppression measures available to date are inadequate. [] re-emphasized the need for another briefing of Friden officials and a concerted effort to obtain satisfactory and timely security modifications. CIA has cancelled an order for additional Flexowriters as a result of the security problem. Such action raises operational hardships and increases the pressure for a short-range modification program.

b. The idea of further discussions with Friden representatives raised the question of whether there may be charges of favoritism or "industrial bias". After considerable discussion, the Committee drew the conclusion that a briefing can and should be presented by select representatives of member organizations sometime in July. The briefing will not be scheduled until the Sub-committee has fully studied all available information in connection with the possibility of a "quick-fix". In order to avoid charges of favoritism, the discussion with Friden would be limited to the problem of equipment on-hand and to its solution by Friden as the developing organization. Care must be exercised to avoid discussion of research and development of future equipments pending the availability of the Radiation Standard to industry at large.

c. [] recapitulated the findings of CIA in their recent Flexowriter tests. Both 5-level machines have proved to be vulnerable but extreme intercept distances have not yet been established. All tests have been conducted in a screenroom and no attempts were made to intercept compromising emanations at great distances. Compromising signals from the machine equipped with radio interference suppression devices are well below the peak noise level from the machine. In general, it is considered that the limit of interceptibility as a practical matter would not extend to many miles as estimated in an earlier NSL report.

d. Mr. McGettrick concluded the discussion by stating that a draft memo to USCSB would be included with the next minutes for review prior to the next meeting. The memo will outline a recommended three-fold approach to the Flexowriter problem, i.e., a policy statement regarding the equipments now in use, a short-range modification program, and a long-range R/D effort.

5. U.S. COMSEC Plan. - The Chairman commented on the division of radiation test and remedial responsibilities outlined in the Plan and then invited comments on the need for up-dating the section on compromising emanations. Several recommendations for minor revisions were discussed but no definite plans were made for the over-all re-writing. At Mr. Scott's suggestion, the Services will be requested at the next meeting to outline their intra-Service division of responsibilities and allocation of resources.

6. On-Site Inspections. - The Chairman reminded the Committee that the Chairman, USCSB, has expressed a special interest in on-site inspections as a deterrent to the exploitation of compromising emanations. He then asked for the committee's views on the inspection capabilities of their respective organizations. The discussion pointed out the fact that no amount of inspection of U.S. facilities is likely to produce conclusive evidence of, or

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to prevent, intercept activities which can be organized from remote foreign facilities. Thus, an estimate of on-site inspection capabilities must be concerned primarily with "susceptibility" tests. NSA and ASA now have a limited capability for performing field tests but virtually all experiments to date have been performed within the U.S. Two teams are now available for "instrument surveys" within the Navy and further plans are being made for a mobile facility as an outgrowth of growing pressures to "prove" that compromising emanations are in fact exploitable under actual field conditions. (Mr. Klaus remarked that a fully equipped van was once available at the Naval Experiment Station, Annapolis.) Two Air Force vans are expected to be operational later this year. The Chairman requested that the Sub-committee undertake further discussion of on-site test capabilities and limitations for the purpose of making an appropriate statement in the next quarterly report to USCSB.

7. Classification of Radiation Information. - A portion of the Combined Policy on this subject was read to the Committee for information. The overall policy, with minor revision is inclosed for review and comment, after which it will be proposed for national use by the Civil as well as the Military Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government.

8. Other Business.

a. The Chairman mentioned the growing plans for use of the IBM-066 Data Transceiver and asked whether there were any projected radiation tests which included the IBM line. The Air Force has programmed IBM-066 tests in conjunction with a study of computers and peripheral equipment. Capt. Smith, AFSS, agreed to influence the scheduling of timely tests when priorities come up for review in June. The Army has tested an earlier equipment, modified by IBM, which proved to be satisfactory at some but not all frequencies. Mr. Lisonbee will provide those test results to the Committee.

b. LCDR Scallorn, NSG commented on the need to consider (1) the heavy investment in current generation equipments and (2) the operational requirements for rapid communications, in the development of anti-radiation doctrine. He emphasized the need to weigh those factors and to adopt a reasonable philosophy based on calculated risks. Mr. Haynes added that the greatest concern in the Navy is the fear that transmitters are being keyed by compromising signals. SSM-33 tests in this connection are still not conclusive but indications are that a code of good installation practices will do much to minimize the hazard. This experience tends to confirm the need for installation standards as well as for on-site tests. Both items are assigned to the Sub-committee for further study.

9. The next Committee meeting will be held at NSS, Room 17149, at 0930 on 30 June 1961.

WILLIAM W. HAMER
Acting Secretary

- Incl: 1. Format for "Summary and Evaluation of Radiation Test Report"
2. Policy on Control of Compromising Emanations from Communications-Electronics Equipment
3. Draft Memo to USCSB

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SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF RADIATION TEST REPORT

I. GENERAL

A. Equipment/Component Tested:

B. Phenomena:

1. Recognized Hazards
2. Areas of Concern

C. Source:

1. Test Facility:
2. Basic Report and Date:
3. Report Availability:

II. TEST DATA (Separate Section for each hazard examined.)

A. Conditions: (Laboratory or field test; tests conducted in a quiet room, screenroom, or in an open area with other equipment operating; ambient noise level of test area; controlled or standard AC power supply.)

B. Procedures and Equipment: (NAG-1A/TSEC procedure or unique techniques applied during test; detection equipment employed; recording equipment used, frequency range of detection equipment.)

C. Results: (Summarize the significant findings of the tests.)

III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: (Correlation of test report data with other reports of radiation tests; possible ramifications of test results on other equipments; validity of techniques used; validity of analytical procedures; recommendations for security restrictions, for remedial countermeasures, and for further testing.)

A. Reference material used in Evaluation:

B. Correlation, etc.:

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INCLOSURE

POLICY ON CONTROL OF COMPROMISING EMANATIONS FROM
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT

1. This Policy defines the criteria for limiting radiation (see paragraph 4 below); provides guidance for determining the security limitations of certain communications, communications security, message preparation, and electronic duplicating equipments; outlines responsibilities with respect to the use of such equipment; and provides classification standards applicable to information relating to radiation.

2. Spurious electrical, magnetic and/or acoustical impulses are radiated when electrical communications, communications security, message preparation and electronic duplicating equipments are placed in operation. Due to their characteristics, many of these equipments emit intelligence bearing signals which may be intercepted at varying distances. These emissions may possibly lead to the recovery of compromising information by unauthorized persons. Studies of communications, communications security, message preparation, and electronic duplicating equipments to determine their radiation characteristics have proven that a serious threat to ~~THE~~ security of ~~military communications~~ ^{CLASSIFIED INFORMATION} exists.

3. In order to reduce the possibility of unauthorized interception and use of classified information, the following policy is established in connection with communications, communications security, message preparation, and electronic duplicating equipments:

- a. No equipment from which compromising emanations are detectable beyond the limits of ~~military~~ physical control and surveillance shall be used for the transmission, reception and/or processing

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of classified information except as specified herein.

- b. An area will be considered secure from surreptitious interception of classified information when the following protective measures are taken as appropriate:

 - (1) Insure that the area surrounding the communications, message preparation or duplicating facility is free from any possibility of unauthorized interception (covert or otherwise) in all directions for at least the distance to which radiations are detectable.
 - (2) Provide specially designed equipment or modifications to meet the needs of installations where the threat of unauthorized interception is exceptionally great.
- c. Pending determination and promulgation to users of the detectable radiation distances for individual equipments in accordance with paragraphs 3e and 4 below, the distance to which radiations are detectable will be assumed to be: for teletypewriter and teletypewriter security equipment, 200 feet; for facsimile and/or electronic duplicating equipments creating an electrical spark which fluctuates with intelligence content, 1200 feet.
- d. A practicable distance from an individual equipment, over which physical control and surveillance can be maintained, is established to be fifty feet. Therefore, this distance should serve as a criterion and equipment should be so treated as not to allow any detectable radiation beyond this distance. Although

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presently available equipment does not necessarily meet this criterion future developments should aim to meet it. Where the threat is such that a 50 foot secure radius is inadequate, special precautions will still have to be taken.

- e. When equipment now in use or under development does not meet the control criterion outlined above, the developing or procuring agency shall inform the user of the minimum safe distance beyond which intelligence bearing energy cannot be detected and indicate precautionary measures that may be required beyond those outlined in this policy.

4. Specifications which will indicate test equipments and testing methods to be used for determination of compliance with the above criteria should be developed by each agency. Until such specifications are available the developing and/or using activity shall use the most sensitive and widest range pick-up devices for detection of emitted energies. Emanations to be considered in this determination shall include but not be limited to the following forms: Electromagnetic field (Electric and magnetic fields in all planes of polarization); induction field; magnetic fields (stray fields from transformers, inductors, etc.); electric voltage field gradient (detection of energy by voltage sensitive pick-up devices); conducted electrical energy (either voltage or current on signal lines, power wiring or electrical conducting structural members (building, machine frames, etc.)); variations of power loading of circuits leading from the equipment; air pressure waves (audible and inaudible); light and heat waves (visible and invisible spectrums.)

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5. When cogent operational requirements dictate the use of equipments under conditions not meeting the policy outlined in paragraph 3 above, exceptions may be granted by authorized representatives as designated by each Department or Agency. Exceptions will be granted only when justified and after consideration of the likely threat of unauthorized interception, of the equipments involved, their radiation characteristics, the extent of control and reconnaissance measures which can be applied, and highest classification of material to be processed.

6. Essential facts of each exception granted under this policy should be furnished, for information purposes, to the Member of the Special Committee on Compromising Emanations.

7. Radiation information will be classified as follows:

a. TOP SECRET

(1) Newly discovered techniques of testing, interception and analysis until specifically downgraded to SECRET.

(2) Information that techniques exist (and any details of them) which may permit recovery of the cryptosystem rather than the plain text of individually intercepted messages, except when this information is specifically downgraded.

b. SECRET

(1) Information concerning compromising radiation characteristics of US approved communications security equipment or installations.

(2) Information concerning compromising radiation characteristics of classified US communications equipments (except as in paragraph d below).

(3) Any information which pertains to the methods or techniques used to intercept, ~~SECRET~~ and/or extract intelligence

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from spurious radiation when such information does not fall within the TOP SECRET category.

(4) Purpose of anti-radiation circuits, devices and/or components incorporated in communications security equipments or installations or parts thereof when such information does not fall within the TOP SECRET category.

(5) Details regarding unremedied weaknesses in existing equipments or installations when such information does not fall within the TOP SECRET category.

c. CONFIDENTIAL

(1) General information concerning compromising radiation characteristics of CONFIDENTIAL or UNCLASSIFIED communications equipment, except as in paragraph d below.

(2) Any statement which implies or provides positive information that radiation other than electro-magnetic fields in space (i.e. conducted or acoustical) is, or may be compromising.

(3) Specifications for new communications security equipment or modification of specifications for existing equipment which have application to the compromising radiation problem, provided specifications are worded, so as not to reveal information in the TOP SECRET or SECRET categories.

d. UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Information concerning radio interference aspects of radiation.

(2) The following statements concerning compromising radiation

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from communications equipment need not be classified:

(a) The statement that communications equipment in general may radiate compromising information.

(b) The statement that communications equipment such as teletypewriter and facsimile sets, etc., do emit compromising radiation.

(c) The statement that radiation from a specified circuit of communications equipments should be no greater thanmicrovolts/meter/KC of bandwidth.

(3) The following types of information concerning radiation from communications equipment need not be classified:

(a) Results of engineering tests on communications equipment showing that.....microvolts/meter/KC of bandwidth can be detected at.....feet by standard engineering interference measuring techniques.

(b) Details of suppression circuits, devices or components, if in themselves unclassified and incorporated in unclassified communications equipment.

8. The classification of equipments incorporating radiation suppression circuits, devices or components.

The classification is governed by the following considerations:

a. In the case of classified communications or COMSEC equipment:

(1) Only suppression circuits, devices, or components that will not up-grade the classification of the basic equipment will be used in equipment intended for general use.

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(2) In special cases where suppression circuits, devices, or components of a classification higher than the basic equipment may have to be incorporated, the equipment will be up-graded accordingly.

b. In the case of unclassified communications or COMSEC equipment:

(1) Only unclassified suppression circuits, devices, or components will be incorporated in equipment intended for general use and which must remain unclassified.

(2) In special cases classified suppression circuits, devices, or components may have to be incorporated. In these cases the equipment will become classified and its usage confined to locations where appropriate security measures can be enforced.

9. This policy guide is for US use only and does not constitute an authority for the release of classified information to other allied nations. (NSA should be consulted concerning compromising emanations information which may be released to other nations.)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: The Flexowriter Security Problem

REFERENCE: COMSEC 11-/17

1. By the reference, the Executive Secretary, USIB, informed the USCSB of the USIB's "sense of urgency for resolution of the Flexowriter security problem". That security problem had to do with the compromising radiation characteristics of the Flexowriter equipment and, hence, was taken under the cognizance of the USCSB Special Committee on Compromising Emanations. The findings of the Special Committee are attached.

Incl: The Flexowriter Problem; Recommendations of the Special Committee

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THE FLEXOWRITER PROBLEM;
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. An office equipment known as the "Flexowriter", manufactured by Commercial Controls Corp, Rochester, N. Y. (a subsidiary of Friden, Inc.), is currently being employed by many Federal agencies and departments in processing classified information. The equipment is understandably quite popular because its use saves much typing and reproduction time. Its main feature is that it produces a punched-paper tape version of whatever copy is typed on it and that this tape can then be used for a variety of purposes, e.g. to reproduce copies which appear as typed originals, to provide input for computers and memory equipments, to be used in conjunction with teletypewriter equipment for the remote transmission of the copy in its original form, etc.

2. As far as is known, the phenomenon of compromising radiation was not considered in designing the Flexowriter models currently available and, with the recent advances in detection/analysis techniques, the equipments have been found to radiate compromising information varying distances. Results of various tests conducted independently by departments and agencies represented on the Special Committee do not provide very precise data on which to establish safe operating perimeters (estimates vary from 150 feet to many miles). It is known that compromising signals emanate from the equipment and that in a proper environment those signals could be recovered. Acting on the conviction that the security problem is of serious concern, the Special Committee recommends the following, three-stage, action:

a. For the immediate, establish a policy which prohibits the use of Flexowriter equipment in overseas locations for the processing of classified information graded higher than CONFIDENTIAL; within the 50 United

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States, information classified up to SECRET may be processed.

b. For the short range program, intensify efforts to provide such suppression modifications as are economically feasible. Upon completion of feasibility studies, approximately 31 July 1961, a briefing will be arranged by the Special Committee for select officials of the Commercial Controls Corp. That firm, as the developing organization, will be prevailed upon to produce timely corrective measures to minimize the security hazard.

c. For the long range solution, establish a research-and-development program for a new equipment which will provide the desired operational characteristics and adequate security against compromising emanations. Upon receipt of a statement of requirements being prepared by the USIB Committee on Documentation, the USCSB Special Committee will determine the most appropriate organization to undertake the necessary R/D effort and will provide security standards for acceptable levels of compromising emanations.

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MINUTES OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE USCSB COMMITTEE
ON COMPROMISING EMANATIONS HELD ON 30 JUNE 1961

1. The 7th meeting of the Special Committee was held at the Naval Security Station, Room 17149 on 30 June 1961. Mr. Fetterolf, CIA, acted as Chairman in the absence of Mr. McGettrick, NSA. The following persons were present:

<u>NSA</u>	Mr. W. W. Hamer
<u>Army</u>	Mr. B. E. Lisonbee, ASA Mr. R. M. Scott, OCSIGO Mr. V. Gale, ASA
<u>Navy</u>	LCDR C. D. Scallorn, NSG Mr. C. E. Parta, BUSHIPS Mr. W. A. Haynes, BUSHIPS
<u>Air Force</u>	Capt. H. H. Smith, USAFSS Maj. G. A. Getman, Jr., J-6, JCS
<u>JCS</u> <u>USMC</u>	Lt. Col. F. Ridenauer, J-6, JCS
<u>CIA</u>	
<u>AEC</u>	Mr. R. G. Cowen
<u>FBI</u>	Mr. R. A. Miller
<u>OSO/OSD</u>	Mr. W. A. Smith Mr. W. Ryan
<u>State Dept.</u>	Mr. J. D. Iams
<u>Treasury</u>	LCDR H. J. LeBlanc

2. Minutes of the 6th meeting were reviewed and approved with the following revisions:

a. Paragraph 3c.---Change second sentence to "The Army expects to have NSL test, in the near future, an 8-level machine which incorporates certain suppression measures recommended by the Air Force and Eastman Kodak Company".

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3.5(c) of E.O. 13526

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b. Paragraph 6.---Delete parenthetical statement.

c. Paragraph 7.---Change "combined" to "CANUKUS".

3. The following persons were introduced to the Special Committee as they had not participated in previous meetings:

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[redacted] CIA
Vernon Gale, ASA
Willis Ryan, OSO

4. Report by Chairman of the Sub-committee.---Mr [redacted] summarized the meeting of 28 June 1961:

a. A demonstration of a modified ASR was arranged and conducted by the Navy. The ASR teletypewriter set includes a keyboard, printer, reperforator and transmitter distributor of the Model 28 line, and was modified by Teletype Corp. at the suggestion and with the encouragement of the Navy. The demonstration was preceded by an historical sketch by Mr. Haynes of the evolution of low level keying as a radiation suppression measure. The modified ASR incorporates two transistorized low level keyers (for TD and KBD), a shunt regulated power supply, and a transistorized selector magnet driver. The two line relays, which are sources of high level radiation in standard equipment, are replaced with suppressed components in the course of modification. NRL will test the modified ASR during July and will prepare an interim report for the next Committee meeting if possible. It appears that the equipment will meet radio interference specifications with little or no additional modification. CIA will also test the ASR, when modification kits or a modified unit becomes available, in view of the more stringent requirements of their Agency for low radiating equipments. Representatives of the Teletype Corp. have estimated that a modification kit for existing equipments would cost approximately \$230 and that the modifications could be built into new equipments for approximately \$150 over the basic cost of a standard ASR. The Navy emphasized that the modified ASR is significant not only as an improvement over conventional teletypewriter equipment but also as a possible solution for the Flexowriter problem. The ASR would perform most of the Flexowriter functions; others could be programmed by Teletype Corp. The cost would probably be less than an adequately suppressed or modified Flexowriter. It is not yet known how the "operational" elements would react to the idea of substituting an ASR for a Flexowriter; the Navy is pursuing this question. It is probable that operational tests as well as radiation tests of the ASR will be necessary as suggested by Capt. Smith, USAFSS. (The ASR modifications will affect space radiation, conduction and power line modulation; they will not affect other possible forms of compromising emanations.)

b. A showing of the film entitled "The Big Ear" was arranged and conducted by representatives of the Navy and General Dynamics Corp. The film was beneficial in understanding the background of the Flexowriter

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modification program undertaken by the Stromberg-Carlson Division of General Dynamics Corp. The Flexowriter is used peripherally with the AN/GRL-1, electronic reconnaissance system, engineered by General Dynamics under Government contract. Substantial effort was spent in reducing RFI (using low level keyers) in the 150 KC - 1000 MC range. Representatives of General Dynamics indicated that:

- (1) they could suppress the Flexowriter to meet interference specification, MIL-I-16910 (SHIPS) with no particular difficulty.
- (2) they would like to study the matter and make a proposal for suppressing Flexowriter, going beyond RFI modifications.
- (3) their research and development might require approximately \$50,000 - \$60,000 and three man years to complete; the work could probably be done in 3 or 4 months.
- (4) modifications would require some retrofitting of Flexowriters in addition to the modifications; they would cost perhaps \$1500 - \$2000 plus installation costs. (All costs and times are rough estimates for discussion purposes only.)

(Further discussion of the Flexowriter was deferred until later in the meeting.)

c. The Sub-committee did not have time to cover other items on their agenda. The agenda for the next meeting, 26 July 1961, 0930 at NSS, will include:

- (1) Low level keyers.
- (2) Flexowriter.
- (3) Test schedules.
- (4) Installation Standards.
- (5) Screenrooms.
- (6) On-site tests.

5. Flexowriter.---

a. Mr [] resumed discussion of the Flexowriter by outlining the Sub-committee's recommended approach to "quick-fix" counter-measures:

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- (1) the use of shielded enclosures in the most sensitive locations, pending the availability of other counter-measures.
- (2) the pursuit of Stromberg-Carlson modifications, or the equivalent.
- (3) seek improved modifications for the interference suppression filter.
- (4) the use of "dummy" relays to protect against power line modulation.
- (5) the use of sound-absorbent materials on machine cover.

b. Mr. [] stated it is the Sub-committee's recommendation that suppression to NAG-1A limits be accepted but that better suppression be obtained if possible. Mr. Haynes emphasized the desirability of investigating other solutions to the Flexowriter problem; namely, the selection and use of some other equipment which would perform the same functions (possibly the modified ASR).

c. Mr. [] reminded the Committee of the intention to brief officials of the Friden Corp. on 13 and 14 July. The purpose of the briefing will be to acquaint Friden with proposed countermeasures, specifications, and test techniques and to determine whether Friden is interested in undertaking the necessary R/D. Mr. Haynes remarked that Stromberg-Carlson has demonstrated some competence in RFI suppression and should therefore be considered along with the others, in the long range planning of Committee. Army, CIA, NSA and possibly the Air Force will be represented at the briefing for Friden.

d. The discussion then turned to the Draft Memo to USCSB. A paragraph-by-paragraph review was begun, but after considerable discussion it was decided to select a "drafting" committee to prepare a revision. Representatives of ASA, CIA and NSA will prepare a statement of Committee "opinion" to which will be attached a draft policy statement for USCSB approval. The paper will, if possible, be prepared and coordinated in draft with the Navy and Air Force before the next Committee meeting. Several suggestions for the policy statement were discussed and will be taken into account by the drafting committee. Notably, CIA, ASA, Navy and State representatives favored a prohibition against the use of unmodified/unsuppressed Flexowriters for all classified information in overseas locations. Capt. Smith, USAFSS, expressed the view that such action would raise undue operational hardships.

6. COMSEC Plan.---Each Committee member outlined briefly the available radiation test facilities and division of responsibilities in his organization. The discussion should prove helpful in later discussions of the radiation section of the Plan and its up-dating.

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7. The matters of "On-site inspections" and "Policy on Control of Compromising Emanations" were held over for discussion at the next meeting.

8. Other Items.---

a. Mr. Haynes remarked that representatives of Kleinschmidt should be consulted with regard to suppression of their equipment as the Navy had done with Teletype Corp. Representatives of the Signal Corps and ASA agreed to consider what should be done in this regard. (This remark is carried over from the Sub-committee meeting.)

b. Mr. Scott suggested that it would be a considerable advantage to have a sum of money budgeted within DOD for use solely at the direction and/or recommendation of the Special Committee. The consensus of the Committee is that the idea has substantial merit and should be studied further in the light of the Committee charter and the probable reaction of the USCSB.

c. The Committee expressed its appreciation for the contributions Mr. Scott has made to the activities of the group. Mr. Scott is leaving OCSIGO for a position with DCA.

9. The next Committee meeting will be held at NSS, Room 17149, at 0930 on 28 July 1961.

WILLIAM W. HAMER
Acting Secretary

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1 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Tenth Meeting of the USCSB Ad Hoc Committee for Voice Telecommunications

1. The Tenth Meeting of the USCSB Ad Hoc Committee for Voice Telecommunications was held on 20 March 1964 for the purpose of determining whether the Committee should be disestablished because its original purpose of stimulating secure voice planning had been either accomplished or overtaken by events -- depending on your point of view. The RCA World-Wide Voice Plan was in an advanced stage.

2. NSA and Navy came to the meeting in favor of disbanding the Committee. RCA and J-6, after some prodding, voted in favor of dissolution by telephone prior to the meeting. The other members wanted to continue the Committee but in general for reasons which were beyond the scope of the Committee's charter. They ignored the fact that this was an Ad Hoc Committee with a stated limited purpose which had already been in existence for two and one-half years, had held only ten meetings in this time (only one in the prior eight months), and had accomplished very little, if anything. Although the military generally favored continuance, it was the civil agencies who were insistent on continuance. They seemed to feel a lack of belonging, a lack of contact with the COMSEC world. They seemed to feel a need for some kind of forum to air their views and to keep in touch with changes in COMSEC doctrine, engineering, plans etc. which might affect them. It was pointed out that COMSEC and Activities Meetings were available for this type of coordination and information exchange. They felt the level and subject matter of the Activities Meetings as well as the military orientation of both groups to be inadequate for their needs.

3. The NSA member then proposed that the Committee recommend to the Board that a new, permanent CSB Committee be formed to cover the areas mentioned above. All members of the Committee heartily endorsed this proposal and directed the Chairman to prepare suitable paper work to the Board. It must be recognized that behind the civil agency interest in a CSB committee is the thought that such a high level sponsored group would give them some kind of a leverage for "protection" against RGS (DCA) actions not only with respect to COMSEC matters, but in all matters. One representative (CIA) went so far as to state privately that he needed this committee to protect CIA from NSA "dictatorship."

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~~declassification~~

Declassified and approved for release by
NSA and CIA on 06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O.
13526, MDR 63028

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CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1964

4. Mr. Barlow was briefed on the above events. He took the position that we do not need a permanent CSB Committee (Standing Committees are against the stated policy of CSB anyway) and that NSA can handle necessary COMSEC matters under its own authority by organizing a suitable group. The attached "Charter" is proposed for such a group. Proposed membership would be substantially that of the Ad Hoc Voice Committee (list attached). The Chairman would be an S man of suitable stature such as Mr. Cole, SSG. Mr. Cole favors such a group primarily to assist in the requirements area. With the recently announced retirement of CHSC from regular review of R/D requirements, conflict with CHSC should be minimized. In fact, Mr. Erickson may wish to abandon CHSC, once we are established, handling such special technical problems as may be proposed by the CHSC membership in the Engineers Meeting.

5. It is necessary to establish an NSA position on this "Charter" very quickly so that the Committee can consider this proposed alternate to their previous actions and report to the Board by 1 July 1964.

JOHN H. WOODHULL

Chairman

Ad Hoc Committee for
Voice Telecommunications

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given to
Mr Woodhull

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23 November 1964

MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-NINTH MEETING OF THE USCSB
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COMPROMISING EMANATIONS

30 October 1964

1. The meeting was held at the Naval Security Station and the following persons were present:

NSA

D. G. Boak, Acting Chairman
E. B. McGettrick
W. W. Hamer
J. H. Horton

Army

D. B. Glass, ACSI
B. E. Lisonbee, USASA
R. C. Giles, AMC
G. V. Ceres

Navy

C. D. Scallorn, CNO
C. E. Parta, BuShips
J. D. Dwinelle, BuShips

Air Force

D. O. Kerr, AFCC

Treasury

J. G. Wilcox, Jr., USCG
J. G. Williams, USCG

FBI

J. L. Perrette

CIA

State

W. H. Goodman

AEC

R. G. Cowen

DCA

J. M. Perry

OGA

3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.

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~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

Declassified and approved for release by NSACXIA, USAF,
and U.S. ARMY on 06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526.
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2: Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting, 28 August 1964, were approved with the following changes:

a. Change DCAENSP 422-5B to DCAENSP 422-5C in paragraph 2.b(1) of the Minutes and in paragraph 2 of the Inclosure to the Minutes.

b. In paragraph 4.a, delete "will" and insert "is expected to."

3. Sub-committee activity. -

a. Mr. [] submitted a memorandum containing a summary of test information and sub-committee recommendations on the Letteriter (produced by Greene Data Tape Corp.). Discussion of the subject resulted in an agreement that the Letteriter is satisfactory for use under the terms of COMSEC 11-/45, which deal with interim measures to cope with the problem of automatic electric typewriters. A memorandum expressing SCOC acceptance of this equipment will be prepared for USCSB members.

b. Mr. [] also reported that sufficient test information is on hand to accept the General Dynamics QRC-206 modifications for the Flexowriter. The modifications apply to 5, 6, 7 and 8-level, non-programmatic, Flexowriters. Acceptance of the QRC-206 modification will be covered, along with the Letteriter, in the memorandum to the USCSB.

c. Briefings were presented by representatives of HRB Singer and Southwest Research Institute for the purpose of acquainting Government personnel with the TEMPEST test capabilities of the companies. Both firms have the basic technical requirements for work in the TEMPEST field, and SRI in particular is acquiring appreciable experience through a continuing contract with the Air Force.

d. Specification guidelines are being prepared for low level keying in various applications. It is evident at this stage in the activity that there is not yet a common understanding of low level keying objectives in various cryptographic and non-cryptographic situations. As a related matter, the Sub-committee has proposed the development of a new and improved teletypewriter which would meet all requirements of Fed. Std. 222. In this connection, it has been suggested that the Mite input/output typewriter be considered for teletypewriter applications.

4. Mr. Boak explained the difficulty which has been experienced in procuring shielded enclosures to meet the specifications promulgated with COMSEC 11-/48. The main problem is that some manufacturers believe

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that the specifications are biased in favor of a particular type of room. This is true to some extent because only one type of room was known with proven security features when the existing specifications were written. Some criticism of the specifications on this point has been raised through a Congressional office. Such criticism has been somewhat exaggerated but it is agreed that the specifications now need to be re-written so as to stress performance rather than material features of shielded enclosures. Mr. Boak said he would forward a memorandum to the USCSB stating that the specifications associated with COMSEC 11-/48 should not be used in further procurement actions until less prejudicial ones are available. The revised documents are being prepared by NSA and are expected to be available within several weeks. SCOCE concurrence will be obtained as quickly as possible after which the new material will be forwarded to USCSB. (This action was completed on 12 November 1964.)

5. Mr. Boak announced that DOD Directive 5200.19 was signed on 14 October 1964 and promulgated for the purpose of implementing the National Radiation Policy within the Department of Defense. He called attention to the fact that Military Departments and DOD Agencies are required to prepare additional implementing directives within ninety days (i.e., by 15 January 1965). He also noted that a factual report of each exception to the policy must be sent to the Executive Secretary, USCSB for record purposes.

6. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to discussion, editing and approval of a draft status report to USCSB in which the trends of SCOCE activity are discussed. One of the matters covered in the status report is the re-alignment of committee effort along task-force lines. A draft "charter" for achieving this re-orientation was distributed but it was not discussed in detail. Mr. Boak asked SCOCE members to study the paper in depth and to consider membership nominations for various working groups. Assignments and membership for the working groups will be covered in "executive" session at the next meeting.

7. Mr. Boak stated that the Sub-committee should continue to operate under the existing arrangement until details of the new working groups have been worked out. He and Mr. [] cited the existing Sub-committee for a great share of the credit in forming a satisfactory framework for SCOCE activities and in developing the required mutual cooperation among member organizations.

8. The next meeting will be held on 11 December 1964 at the Naval Security Station.

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Army India

Test stand

Reserve or 1) - westness

Assess^{present} equipment value + retrofit

System

Convey, rec

Doc & imp exch

Monitor & Educator of industrially-oriented
+ other govt agencies.

Classification & Doctrine

Standards

Training

System

Environment

Technology

minirev
29 Jan 1981
15 Jan 1981
1 Jan 1981



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USCSB TRANSMITTAL RECEIPT

TO:

Mr Rosenblum
AOR D

H

Date: 28 June 72

Control No. USCSB 602

R1 ~~Red~~

Copy 34 of Comsec 1-1/61 (Classified: Secret)
dtd 27 June 72

Declassified and approved for release by NSA, CIA, OSD,
STATE, USAF, USARMY and Treasury on 06-27-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526.
MDR 630289

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USCSB

UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

34

COMSEC 1-1/61
27 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the USCSB

1. Attached are the minutes of the last meeting of the Board. The Executive Summaries, from the Army and Air Force Members, will be forwarded to the Board later.

2. If no corrections to these minutes are received by 10 July, these minutes will stand approved as written. Additional copies are available, upon request, in the Secretariat's Office.

3. This memorandum may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure.



BAYARD T. KELLER
Executive Secretary

Incl:
a/s

COMSEC 1-1/61

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USCSB
UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

20 June 1972

MINUTES OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING
OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
BOARD

13 June 1972

~~Classified by Chairman, USCSB
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652,
Exemption Category 2. Declassification
Cannot Be Determined.~~

USCSB Meeting, 13 June 1972

ATTENDEES

Department of State

- * William H. Goodman
- George A. Getman, Jr.
- Howard B. Holdway

Department of the Treasury

- * Clyde C. Crosswhite
- Harold R. Patterson
- James V. Nasche, Jr.

Department of Defense

- * Dr. E. Rechtin
- Dr. Howard L. Yudkin
- Capt H. Jefferson Davis, USN

Department of Transportation

- * Frank A. Stanton
- William T. Deeter

U.S. Army

- * B/G Kirby Lamar
- Col Allen J. Mauderly
- Dossie B. Glass

U.S. Navy

- * RADM Chester G. Phillips
- Capt Curtis R. Norton
- Capt Warren M. Cone

U.S. Air Force

- * MajGen Lee M. Paschall
- Col Braxton L. Young
- Daniel W. Sheerin

Central Intelligence Agency

Atomic Energy Commission

- Richard G. Cowen, representing
- *William T. Riley

Federal Bureau of Investigation

- * Donald E. Moore
- William J. McDonnell
- Bruce P. Fisher

National Security Agency

- * VADM Noel Gayler
- Dr. Louis W. Tordella
- Howard C. Barlow
- Dayl D. Croskery
- Howard E. Rosenblum

USCSB

Bayard T. Keller, ExecSec

Secretary P.L. 86-36

AGENDA

FIFTEENTH MEETING OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD

13 June 1972

9:30 a.m.

National Security Agency
Room 9A135

ITEM	SUBMITTED BY	PRESENTED BY	TIME
USCSB consideration of admitting/recognizing organizations as observers (DCA, GSA)	Defense	Defense	10 minutes
USCSB relationship with USIB	Defense	NSA	10 minutes
Implementation of the National Policy on Securing Voice Communications	Defense	Defense Air Force	5 minutes 15 minutes
Threat analysis on unsecured voice communications in the U.S.	AEC	NSA	5 minutes
Briefing on technical relationship between trunk line secure voice (AUTOSEVOCOM), field tactical secure voice, and the TRI-TAC switch	Defense	Defense	15 minutes

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Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the USCSB

The fifteenth meeting of the Board convened at 9:35 a.m. on 13 June 72 at the National Security Agency. After opening remarks by Admiral Gayler, Director, NSA, the Chairman, Dr. Rechtin introduced the first agenda item.

1. USCSB Consideration of Admitting/Recognizing Organizations as Observers (DCA, GSA)

The Chairman referred to the NSC COMSEC Directive which authorized the Board to invite any department or agency to participate in matters of direct interest to such a department or agency. He said he believed that DCA and GSA should be represented at the Board because of their broad telecommunications responsibilities and the strong interaction between communications and communications security. He proposed that they be invited to participate as non-voting observers.

Mr. Crosswhite, Treasury, asked for clarification of observer status. The Chairman replied that an observer would enjoy all privileges of Members except voting. Observers would receive all formal Board correspondence, would be asked to give their views on issues, and would be expected to attend Board meetings and participate in discussions.

The Chairman put the question to the Board and the vote was unanimous to include DCA and GSA as observers.

2. USCSB Relationship with USIB

The second agenda item was the USIB/USCSB relationship in cases involving the release of COMSEC material to foreign governments and requiring an assessment of the intelligence risks involved. The Chairman stated that he saw the question as a matter of precedence as to when the USIB should be involved, and asked Dr. Tordella, NSA, to address the subject.

Dr. Tordella reviewed for the Board four of the factors considered in release cases (intelligence impact, national policy toward recipient, the COMSEC requirement, and good will trade-off). With respect to the intelligence factor, he pointed out that the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent laws give the DCI clearly defined authority and statutory responsibility for protecting intelligence sources, and that if a release directly or remotely impacts on U.S. intelligence the DCI must be consulted. He pointed out that the USIB serves in an

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advisory capacity to the DCI, and that its position is not binding on the DCI. If the DCI accepts the USIB opinion that a proposed release has an acceptable or no intelligence loss, the release is then deliberated by the USCSB in the light of the COMSEC requirement, national policy, and other factors. However, if the DCI decides that there is too great a risk of actual or potential intelligence loss, he may veto the release. In such a case the USCSB may still weigh the other factors involved, and may refer the case to the Special Committee, which can endeavor to dissuade, but cannot overrule, the DCI.

Dr. Tordella expressed his personal observation that trading modern, high-grade COMSEC equipment and/or techniques for good will is a fruitless exercise. He also emphasized that the release of sophisticated COMSEC doctrine and operating instructions must be controlled as closely as the release of the equipment to which they pertain.

The Chairman commented that under the Nixon doctrine of closer relations with other defense establishments, pressure will increase for release of COMSEC equipment.

Admiral Gayler, NSA, made a plea that requests for release be stated in terms of the problem, not in terms of equipment, and that the experts be given the opportunity to modulate things enough to provide COMSEC, yet still afford protection for the [] effort.

Mr. Goodman, State, asked if it was not a standing procedure for the USCSB to get the views of the USIB before voting on any release. Dr. Tordella responded that it was, and Mr. Goodman stated that it might be well to formalize the procedures by which a request of this sort is processed through the USIB and USCSB. The procedures as summarized by the Chairman, are to be: the department or agency requesting the release is to consult with the Director, NSA, to examine the options available for providing the COMSEC desired; the requesting department or agency will then send the request to the USCSB, which, in turn, will forward it to the USIB for a determination of the intelligence impact; the USCSB Members will be notified of the pending request but will not be asked to act upon it until the DCI has given his position. The Chairman suggested that an SOP be drafted along these lines and forwarded to Members for comment before adoption.

3. Implementation of the National Policy on Securing Voice Communications

The Chairman opened the discussion on this item by noting that we do not have the means - the money - to implement this policy, and that for it to be implemented, a priority structure must be developed. He reiterated that this is a national board and it should set some national priorities. He explained that in his view, there are two dimensions to a priority listing: priorities based on the function of a communications system and priorities based on the threat against the system. The Chairman then opened the subject for discussion.

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Admiral Gayler, NSA, added that there were some factors to be aware of in this approach. First, priorities should not necessarily be based on an assessment of national importance, because such priorities are transitory. Secondly, intelligence vulnerabilities may not be obvious. Vulnerability depends on exploitation of target, the access to it, the way it is used, and the way in which an intelligence agency will look at it. He acknowledged that a priority system should be used for securing radios and systems presently in use, but stressed the need for ensuring that all new systems couple security with communications so tightly that the two are developed as a single integrated package.

Mr. Goodman expressed concern that emphasis on systems security might be at the expense of securing older systems, such as the international telephone system which State for many years must depend upon for its embassy voice communications. He explained that State needs some means of securing communications which are not all controlled by the U.S. Government.

The Chairman remarked that perhaps there should be concurrent actions toward both immediate and long-term solutions, and that new requirements should be added up, slowly building a case for new systems.

At this point, the Chairman called on General Paschall, Air Force, to present an abbreviated briefing of a study the Air Force had made which, among other things, established priorities for securing tactical voice communications. An Executive Summary of the briefing will be forwarded to the Board.

General Paschall concluded his briefing by reminding the Board that the Air Force had requested a waiver of the policy for base non-tactical radio communications used for "housekeeping" functions, with the caveat that there may be some instances in which the threat is such as to warrant not granting a waiver.

The Chairman responded that a waiver should be considered in light of threat information from sources at all levels of classification and compartmentation and since the Board did not have a basis for decision, it was not yet in a position to decide on waivers. He said he was establishing a working group to develop a system by which priorities could be determined for implementing voice security. He requested that the Group consist of representatives from Defense, NSA, the Services, and from any other Member interested in participating.

General Lamar, Army, reported that several years ago the Army had conducted a study, similar to that of the Air Force, which it was now updating. He noted that the Army's field requirements were of a much greater magnitude--230,000 radios in 450 nets, including

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30,000 helmet-sized radios that were not presently encryptable. The latter, he believed, would qualify for a temporary waiver if a short time-frame were imposed on the policy.

The Chairman requested that General Lamar provide copies of the Army study to the Board for information.

Admiral Gayler asked that, in view of the dollar constraints, the Services be asked to reassess the number of radios and nets required, with an eye toward cutting down requirements on a possible trade-off.

The Chairman replied that it would be good for the Board to have an idea of the number of equipments needing security, but that at this point he would prefer not to look at the picture in terms of communications requirements. He added that the data to be provided the Board should reflect COMSEC requirements that cannot be met by existing equipment.

Mr. Crosswhite, Treasury, explained that the priorities of the civil agencies would not necessarily be the same as those stated for the military. Treasury has a need for an inexpensive piece of equipment to provide security for a short time-frame.

Dr. Tordella, NSA, stated that the difference in cost between full and short-term security is hard to detect in quantity production, and that once a short-term type equipment was captured, communications could be read in real time.

Mr. Crosswhite, asked how many hours or days of protection are afforded by the systems advertised on the commercial market, and Mr. Rosenblum, NSA, replied that NSA could develop equipment for \$25

The Chairman recommended, and Admiral Gayler agreed, that Members of the Board consult with NSA on the performance of commercial systems which they may be considering purchasing. He suggested that the FBI, through the LEAA, alert local law enforcement agencies to the fact that commercial systems may not provide the protection they expect.

4. Threat Analysis on Unsecured Voice Communications in the U.S.

Dr. Tordella and Mr. Barlow, NSA, in turn, addressed this subject noting that any black telephone communications carried over microwave are susceptible to monitoring and that there is indisputable evidence of Soviet monitoring activities in the Washington

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and New York areas. They reported that NSA intends to undertake an assessment of the threat to unsecured civil governmental voice systems within the U.S. as soon as it completes a similar analysis under way on world-wide DOD voice radio communications.

Mr. Goodman described the telephone as the Achilles' heel of State's communications both in the United States and particularly overseas. While State has access to AUTOSEVOCOM in the Washington area, it has no protection for international telephone systems. He emphasized that we must find some way, if at all within the state-of-the-art, to secure existing telephone systems rather than wait for new systems to be developed. He said he was making an appeal to rethink our order of priorities and that this particular problem is high on the list.

The Chairman replied that it might prove to be cheaper to install a whole new system than to secure the present system which comprises international telephones of widely varying standards.

General Paschall, Air Force, noting that this might be the last meeting attended by Admiral Gayler, commended him for his excellent leadership in COMSEC and his special attention toward the USCSB. Mr. Goodman, as "dean" of the group, reiterated these remarks and other Members joined him in giving Admiral Gayler a standing ovation.

The meeting recessed at noon for lunch and reconvened at 1:30 p.m.

5. Briefing on Technical Relationship between Trunk Line Secure Voice (AUTOSEVOCOM), Field Tactical Secure Voice, and the TRI-TAC Switch

Dr. Yudkin, Defense, spoke of the Defense Communications System of the future and presented for consideration the concept of a total wideband system. Dr. Rehtin informed Members that they could get further information about the contents of the briefing by calling Dr. Yudkin.

The Chairman adjourned the meeting at 2:15 p.m., with the note that the Board would meet again within the next few months.

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Memorandum

TO : ADC, DADC, Exec S, S1, S2, S3,
S02, S05, S06 IN TURN

DATE: 16 DEC 1970

FROM : Chief, S04

SUBJECT: Minutes of Thirteenth Meeting of the USCSB

1. Attached for your information are the Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the USCSB, dated 23 November 1970.

2. This correspondence may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure and physical removal of the caveat notation.

Arthur T. Keller

BAYARD T. KELLER

Chief

Policy and Planning Staff
Communications Security

Incl:

COMSEC 1-1/53, Subject:
Minutes of the Thirteenth
Meeting of the USCSB, dated
4 Dec 1970

Declassified and approved for release by NSA, CIA, US
ARMY, OSD, USAF, TREASURY, AEC and NAVY on
06-27-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526, MDR 63028

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USCSB
UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

COMSEC 1-1/53
4 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the USCSB

1. The minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the USCSB are inclosed for your review. They have been condensed to a reasonable degree in order to provide a record of the substance of the various discussions. More complete notes are available in the Secretariat for reference purposes. If there are no comments by 22 December 70, these minutes will stand as approved.

2. This correspondence may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure and physical removal of the caveat notation.

Thomas R. Chittenden

THOMAS R. CHITTENDEN
Executive Secretary

Incl:
a/s

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Codeword Material~~

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COMSEC 1-1/53

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2 December 1970

MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

OF THE

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD

23 November 1970
Department of State

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2 December 1970

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Thirteenth Meeting of the United States
Communications Security Board

23 November 1970
Department of State

Members Present:

3.5(c) of E.O. 13526

OGA

Mr. William H. Goodman, State
Mr. Clyde C. Crosswhite, Treasury
Mr. Robert F. Froehlke, Defense (Chairman)
Mr. Frank A. Stanton, Transportation
MajGen John F. Freund, Army
RADM R. E. Cook, Navy
BrigGen Lee M. Paschall, Air Force
Mr. [REDACTED] CIA
Mr. William T. Riley, AEC
ViceAdm Noel Gayler, NSA
Mr. Donald E. Moore, FBI

Staff Present:

State - Mr. George A. Getman
Mr. Howard B. Holdway
Treasury - Mr. Harold R. Patterson
Mr. James V. Nasche
Defense - Mr. Louis A. deRosa
Dr. John P. Gigrich
Cdr Lawrence R. Kilty
Transportation - Mr. William T. Deeter, Jr.
Mr. Stanley E. Holden
Army - Mr. Dossie B. Glass
Navy - Capt C. G. Phillips
Capt J. H. D. Williams
Mr. F. Taylor Grimm
Mr. James E. Weer
Cdr John F. Jennings
Air Force - Col Braxton L. Young
Mr. Daniel W. Sheerin
Maj Jerre B. Richardson
CIA - [REDACTED]
AEC - Mr. Richard G. Cowen

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NSA:- Dr. Louis W. Tordella
Mr. Howard C. Barlow
Mr. Dayl D. Croskery
Mr. Bayard T. Keller
FBI - Mr. Joseph L. Perritte
Mr. Gilbert T. Bergquist

USCSB - Mr. Thomas R. Chittenden
Mrs.

P.L. 86-36

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The Chairman opened the meeting by requesting each Member to introduce himself and to describe briefly his position in his agency. He also introduced Mr. Louis deRosa, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications. The Chairman then observed that probably the Board should meet more frequently and that he was always willing to consider calling a meeting whenever a Member thought it appropriate.

The new Executive Secretary, Mr. Bayard T. Keller, was then introduced by the Chairman with the observation that for reasons of economy and full utilization of time, Mr. Keller would function in a double-hatted capacity, i.e., as Executive Secretary, USCSB, and as an NSA employee. Both the NSA Member and Mr. Keller stated emphatically that when acting as the Executive Secretary he would be working exclusively for the Board and for the Chairman. The Chairman then thanked Mr. Chittenden for his excellent support and wished him well in his new job.

Agenda Item 1, COMSEC Assistance to the Brazilian Navy:

The Navy Member opened the discussion with a brief review (which is attached) of the Navy's position on the proposal to provide KL-7 equipment to Brazilian Navy units. He concluded with the statement that the operational need for secure communications capability with the Brazilian Navy still remains; that the other military services and the JCS have concurred in the requirement, and that in his view the facts of the operational requirement outweigh the intelligence considerations. The NSA Member responded that, although as a Naval officer he understands the need expressed by the Navy, he had voted against the release when it was considered by the USIB because the intelligence risks are certain not conjectural. Dr. Tordella observed that the risk of Brazil seeking crypto equipment from another nation was not great because it would not help the Brazilian Navy to talk with the USN.

He suggested an alternative in which operational codes would be used for these communications in time of peace and an assurance would be given to the Brazilian government that appropriate equipment would be supplied in times of severe tension or hostilities. The Chairman asked if he was proposing a compromise and the NSA Member replied that he was. The possibility of one-time tape systems being used instead of the KL-7 was raised by the State Member. However, the Navy Member said that it would be operationally unsuitable for it would mean re-equipping U.S. ships with

P.L. 86-36
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devices which have severe logistical and intercommunications problems. The fact that 9200 units of the KL-7 have been distributed among eighteen foreign countries, including NATO, South Vietnam, Nationalist China, and South Korea, was raised as an argument that distribution to the Brazilian Navy would not constitute any greater hazard of compromise of equipment. Dr. Tordella stated that compromise of the machine is not an issue because it has been compromised repeatedly. The point is that with the exception of Vietnam and two others, not in South America,

The Chairman then asked the Navy Member for his reaction to the compromise which the NSA Member had proposed. The Navy Member responded that it was not acceptable because it would be impractical to hold off distribution of the equipment until there was a hot war. For one thing, it takes time to develop the capability to use the equipment and for another, the Navy is concerned about the present gradual loss of information about fleet tactics and the details of administrative and logistical arrangements and collaboration with the Brazilians. The Chairman then called for the Members to vote on the proposal to release the modified KL-7 to Brazil. The voting was as follows:

State: No, with comment that this question had been thoroughly coordinated within State and that the political desk, which has the overriding interest, and the Office of Intelligence both were against release.

Treasury: No, with the comment that [] in the area must be protected.

Transportation: Yes, with the comment that the Navy has made a case for the operational requirement.

Army: Yes, with the comment that the Navy has an operational requirement and that practical safeguarding actions can be taken to limit proliferation of the equipment among other South American nations.

Navy: Yes.

Air Force: Yes.

CIA: No.

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EO 3.3b(3)

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without very careful examination. He stated that his own experience as a tactical commander in South Vietnam did not prove that universal secure voice is a necessity, that in his opinion 25% of the links at most should be secured, and that the Combat Development Command was studying this aspect of the problem. One of the reasons that the MALLARD Program will not be developed as originally conceived is because it requires full communications security. The Army Member continued by saying that the price for this is just too high. Trying to secure the systems we now have in the field would require billions of dollars at a time when even a single million dollars has a significant impact on Army intelligence. He estimated that from a tactical standpoint less than 50% of the links would require security.

} The NSA Member responded that he did not intend to suggest that all equipments now in the field should be modified--just new equipments and essential older ones. He stressed that the victim does not always know when he is being compromised and that low level circuits yield a lot of information in the aggregate. He said that Gen Abrahms expressed complete agreement with the principal of complete security and that when asked about the equipment having a plain text capability said to "throw that switch away." On the matter of costs, he said that on a total system basis COMSEC adds about a 10% increment and that this percentage moves up to about 50% for manpack equipment with COMSEC integral in it. He concluded that the cost of adopting a policy such as he suggested would have to be compared against the cost of providing COMSEC separately and that within any given fiscal year the choice might have to be made between more insecurity or less communications capability.

u The Chairman asked Mr. deRosa (Asst to the SecDef for Telecommunications) if he cared to comment.

6 Mr. deRosa observed that achievement of total security in an on-going program, such as the TRI-TAC switch which must interface with older existing equipment, probably could not be done within the projected time frame without excessive cost. Thus, the initial switch might achieve only partial security. He also said that it would help to relieve the financial hardship if NSA could come up with a device that gave some, but not complete, security, such as PARKHILL.

v Mr. Barlow (AsstDir, NSA, for COMSEC) commented that he believed that there was no option open to maintain a viable military

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AEC: No, with the comment that although recognizing the Navy's need and the wide distribution of the KL-7 among NATO countries, the very strong statements made by NSA are persuasive.

NSA: No.

FBI: Abstain with the comment that because of not being in a position to judge the merits they had abstained in USIB and did not want to be a swing vote here.

Defense: Abstain.

TOTALS: No, 5 votes. Yes, 4 votes. Abstain, 2.

The Chairman stated that the decision was not to release and suggested that the Navy should consider the compromise offered by NSA. The Navy Member said that he would like to have a specific proposal. The NSA Member suggested that they work it out together.

Agenda Item 2, Biennial Reports Analysis:

The NSA Member said that he was convinced that there are general insecurities in both the military and civilian agencies and that, collectively, the electronic security posture of the U.S. has enormous shortcomings. He said he believes that the COMSEC equipment being used is essentially secure but that in voice communications particularly there are major insecurities which the Board should do something about. He then described some nine incidents or situations (mainly military) in which the failure to practice voice security or to use available COMSEC techniques had resulted in significant losses of classified information and unnecessary combat losses. He concluded the presentation with the observation, that insofar as military operations are concerned, that technology now can provide security integral with voice communications security for all military networks at a reasonable cost. He urged the Board to adopt the recommendations in his memorandum of 20 November 70 (Serial: N 1187) which proposed a policy that all new military voice communications systems be developed with integral security and that those now in development be reviewed to determine if they can be secured or, if not that, development should be modified to permit it.

2 The Army Member commented that without being disparaging about NSA's impressive COMINT operations, the money shortage is so severe and the cost of providing secure voice to everyone is so high that the policy proposed by the NSA Member could not be adopted

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force without being completely secure. He pointed out that the [redacted]

2 The Army Member said that in Europe, [redacted]

4 The Chairman brought the discussion to an end by assigning Mr. Keller the task of heading an ad hoc committee consisting of at least one representative of the military services and one of the civilian agencies to analyze the biennial reports and to make recommendations to the Board on these issues. The NSA Member requested that this assignment also include consideration of the problem of regularly changing call signs and frequencies (as outlined in his letter to the Board, Serial: N 1187, dtd 20 Nov 70). Before leaving the subject, the Army Member requested that the other two services give a reaction to the NSA Member's recommendations.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3b(3)

5 The Navy Member said that he agreed with the statement of the threat and that he would support the premise but did not know how to get the money it would require. The Air Force Member said that he would like to have the 10% incremental cost of security proven; also that securing all voice communications was a desirable goal but it would have to be cheap. He also said that the Air Force could not accept the idea of eliminating the clear text option, particularly for airborne communications; for example, many Air Force aircraft must communicate with traffic controllers in many foreign countries. Finally, he said that adoption of the concept would require complete review of the 407L Program which would be very troublesome.

Start here 6 The Chairman asked if any of the civilian agencies had any comments. The Treasury Member said that he could use help in convincing high level officials that the government telephone system is being intercepted on the microwave links. The AEC Member expressed the same problem and cited an NSA study of voice traffic in the Nevada test site which showed considerable loss of classified information. The Chairman summarized by saying that voice security is a major problem and that every effort must be made to solve it including the economic

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aspects. A suggestion that the Ad Hoc Group currently attempting to write national COMSEC objectives should also address themselves to the specific recommendations from NSA and work with the newly designated ad hoc group was objected to by the NSA Member on the grounds that the matter was more urgent. The Chairman sustained him.

Substantive 16r Agenda Item 3, Need for a National Policy on Computer Security:

The AEC Member opened the subject by stating that he sees computer security as a problem which sooner or later will affect practically all agencies, particularly when many computers throughout the government become interconnected with numerous remote interrogation points. The amount of information available in computers, even today, raises the questions of who has access, what are the physical security controls associated with it, and what controls are possible to insure proper interrogation. He stated that everybody proceeds on the basis that the communications should be secured and that the information in the computer should be secured, but that achieving this is exceedingly difficult. He said it is in the general interest of the government to have a national policy, including security standards and criteria, and that this should be done before the problem gets further away from us.

17 The Chairman commented that his Deputy for Security Policy will soon issue a formal statement of security requirements for ADP in the Defense Department and that USIB was also preparing a security policy paper.

18 Mr. deRosa commented that by 1980 most of the military communications will be in data form and that security will be even more important.

19 Dr. Tordella observed that current equipment permits encrypting digital data up to a 20 megabit rate. The Chairman held up a copy of the Defense Science Board's report on computer security (which had been forwarded to each Member) and said that although he had not yet read it he assumed that it would be of help and asked the AEC Member what he thought the next step should be.

The AEC Member replied that, although he is loathe to recommend another committee, he believed that the Board should consider establishing one to look at the problem and to attempt to develop a set of standards that could be applied on a government wide basis. The NSA Member agreed and said that there is a close correlation between the techniques for securing

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computer information and communications circuits. He said he thought this problem should be taken on by the Board rather than attempting to put it somewhere else. The Chairman asked if everyone agreed the Board should have jurisdiction over this. Although there was no direct response, no one disagreed. The Air Force Member commented that at the present time no one, to his knowledge, is dealing with the security aspects of the software operations and that it is this area which is critical.

Dr. Tordella suggested that at its next meeting, the Board listen to a briefing on the extent to which the security problems in the COINS System have been solved.

At this point, the Chairman said that he would like to name an ad hoc group to look into the problem including the question of the jurisdiction of the Board. He asked that Dr. Gigrich of his staff, the Executive Secretary and the Executive Secretary designate meet with him in the coming week to discuss the composition and objectives of an ad hoc group on computer security.

The Chairman then said that he believed that this meeting had been worthwhile and that he thought the Board should meet more frequently than once a year. He stated that meeting for the sake of meeting should be avoided, but he would encourage each Member to get in touch with him if he believes that a problem has arisen which warrants a meeting of the Board. He reiterated that he would call a meeting sometime in February 71 to discuss further the problem of secure voice and to consider the recommendations of the ad hoc groups established today.

The thirteenth meeting of the USCSB adjourned at 1:30 p.m.

Incl:
USN Review

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23 November 70

NAVY REMARKS

Agenda Item 1 - COMSEC Assistance to the Brazilian Navy (S)

A secure, common cryptocapability is

also needed to protect information concerning tactical doctrine during combined USN/BRAZNAV exercises.

OGA

3. Of the means available for meeting the requirement for a secure, common USN/BRAZNAV cryptocapability, only the TSEC/KL-7 will suffice for the following reasons:

- a. Courier - Too slow.
- b. Providing cryptoteams aboard BRAZNAV ships or at shore stations would require additional U.S. naval personnel which the U.S. Navy cannot support. Further, BRAZNAV would undoubtedly not be agreeable to such an arrangement.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO

NSA SER. DCC 27 PCY

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Inclosure

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c. Operations codes do not offer the necessary security, flexibility or speed required.

d. One-time tape systems are not in use afloat in the U.S. Navy; besides there is no reason to assume that the USIB would be agreeable to release of such systems.

e. One-time pad systems are too slow (about 30 words an hour); also, the USIB would undoubtedly oppose release of systems of this type.

f. Delivery of classified messages by visual means or by hi-line at sea is infeasible as units are dispersed 50-100 miles apart.

4. The BRAZNAV now consists of 1 aircraft carrier, 2 submarines, 2 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts, 2 coastal minesweepers, 3 submarine chasers, 3 fleet oilers and 4 transports. In 1967 it embarked on a ten-year building program calling for the additional construction of 4 submarines, 10 destroyer escorts, 26 minesweepers, 25 patrol vessels and 4 auxiliaries. The BRAZNAV has also embarked on a well planned fleet modernization program, including installation of improved SONAR and the ASROC weapons system. Further, it has been modernizing its communications system by converting to RATT both afloat and ashore. BRAZNAV units participating with USN units in exercises have demonstrated a degree of professionalism comparable to that of the U.S. Navy. BRAZNAV communications performance on RATT equipped circuits during exercises has been evaluated as superb.

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5. The USIB objections to release of the TSEC/KL-7 as proposed by NSA are conjectural and are partially offset by the following:
 - a. They do not recognize the bona fide U.S. Navy operational requirement.
 - b. Inquiries from Brazilian authorities for COMSEC assistance for other than Navy communications could be answered by a statement that no additional equipment is available.
 - c. The US-BRAZNAV agreement would specify that no information on that agreement would be releasable to third nations (i.e., other SOAM navies).
 - d. A race to other cryptosystem suppliers by SOAM nations is always a possibility, regardless of whether or not the TSEC/KL-7 is released to the BRAZNAV.
6. The U.S. Navy operational requirement for a secure, common cryptocapability with the BRAZNAV still remains. On the basis of previous USCSB votes, the other military services concur in the requirement. Further, the JCS have also concurred in the Navy operational requirements, and have stated that satisfaction of these operational requirements outweighs the intelligence risks cited by USIB. The JCS have given their support to release of the TSEC/KL-7 to the BRAZNAV to satisfy stated Navy requirement.
7. Therefore, the Navy requests USCSB approval of its request to release the TSEC/KL-7 to the BRAZNAV.

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USCSB

UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

19

COMSEC 1-1/55
4 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: Fourteenth Meeting of the USCSB

REFERENCE: COMSEC 1-1/54, dated 3 February 71

1. Attached as Incl 1 is the memorandum from the Chairman reflecting his decision on the agenda items suggested by the Members for the next meeting. The Chairman has decided the forthcoming meeting should be devoted exclusively to the problem of secure voice communications as proposed by the Director, NSA. Consequently, a briefing on this subject will be presented to the Board by the Director, NSA, on 15 March 71. An agenda will be published shortly. Incl 2 is a summary of the agenda items suggested by the Board Members along with the names of the representatives who will attend the meeting.

2. Attendees must be cleared for access to Top Secret Crypto information and be indoctrinated for Special Intelligence. Verification of this clearance is being obtained for the people listed in Incl 2.

3. Parking arrangements can be made for privately owned vehicles in the underground parking area at the Department of Transportation, but it is requested that Members use staff cars, if possible. All cars (personal and staff) should enter DOT via the E Street ramp where an attendant will provide parking instructions. If you plan to drive, please furnish the Secretariat (by 11 March 71) the tag number and the make of car you will be driving. There are easily accessible elevators, to the conference room, located in the garage area and escorts will be provided if necessary.

4. As mentioned earlier, the meeting will be held at 2:00 p.m. in the Secretary's Conference Room (Room #10212).

Bayard T. Keller

BAYARD T. KELLER
Executive Secretary

2 Incls:

1. Chairman's Memo
2. Summary

COMSEC 1-1/55

Declassified and approved for release
by NSA and CIA on 06-26-2012
pursuant to E.O. 13526, MDR-63028.

1 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: Fourteenth Meeting of the USCSB

REFERENCE: COMSEC 1-1/54, dated 3 February 71


Three agenda items have been proposed for the fourteenth meeting of the USCSB:

1. Follow-on discussion on findings of the Biennial Reports and Computer Security Ad Hoc Committees (CIA)
2. USCSB Membership (proposed addition of General Services Administration and Office of Telecommunications Policy) (Treasury)
3. Secure Voice Communications (NSA)

I am pleased with the progress made by the two Ad Hoc Committees, but do not believe their findings will be prepared in sufficient time prior to 15 March to accomplish the staffing which would be required to permit a substantive discussion by the principal Members.

Knowing the concern we all share over the secure voice problem, I believe it would be most beneficial at this time to have the Director, NSA, bring us up-to-date on this problem, and to devote the forthcoming meeting exclusively to this subject.

At the same time, I suggest that all Members give consideration to the Treasury Member's proposal, but that we postpone discussion to a future meeting. I am, however, inviting both the OTP and GSA to send an observer to our 15 March meeting in view of the pertinence of the NSA presentation.



ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
Chairman

Encl 1

1 March 1971

USCSB VOTE SUMMARY

Subject: Fourteenth Meeting of the USCSB, COMSEC 1-1/54

The following are the suggested agenda items and attendees for the 15 March 71 USCSB meeting:

STATE

Agenda Items: None.

Attendees: Mr. William H. Goodman
Mr. George A. Getman, Jr.
Mr. Howard B. Holdway

TREASURY

Agenda Items: "1. USCSB Membership. Consideration should be given to potential USCSB membership for two agencies which have broad responsibilities in the telecommunications field. These are the General Services Administration (GSA), which maintains the secure communications equipment of fifteen different federal civilian agencies, and the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), which by Executive Order 11556 provides broad telecommunications policy guidance to the President. Preparatory to consideration of these two agencies, it is recommended that the Commissioner of Transportation and Communications, GSA, and the Director, OTP, each be invited to make short presentations on the duties and responsibilities of their respective offices at a USCSB meeting.

"2. Administrative Note. If there is to be an extensive discussion on secure voice problems at the March 15 Board meeting, it would seem advisable to extend an invitation to the GSA for a representative of that office to attend, in view of that office's extensive responsibility toward the secure voice communications requirements of the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government."

Attendees: Mr. Clyde C. Crosswhite
Mr. Harold R. Patterson
Mr. James V. Nasche

DEFENSE

Agenda Items: "No comment, in view of the fact that the Chairman is asking the USCSB Members at this time to recommend agenda items for his consideration."

Inclosure 2

Attendees: Chairman, Robert F. Froehlke
Honorable Louis A. deRosa
Dr. John P. Gigrich
Cdr Lawrence R. Kilty

TRANSPORTATION

Agenda Items: None.

Attendees: Mr. Frank A. Stanton
Mr. William T. Deeter, Jr.
Mr. Stanley E. Holden

NAVY

Agenda Items: None.

Attendees: RADM F. J. Fitzpatrick, or Capt C. G. Phillips
RADM R. E. Cook
Capt C. R. Norton

AIR FORCE


Agenda Items: None.

Attendees: MajGen Gordon T. Gould
BrigGen Lee M. Paschall
Col B. L. Young
Mr. Daniel W. Sheerin

CIA

Agenda Items: "It is felt that the reports and follow-on discussion of the findings of the two sub committees, one on the Biennial Reports; the other on USCSB's role in Computer Security, will be a sufficient agenda."

Attendees:



OGA

3.5(c) of E.O. 13526

AEC

Agenda Items: "I believe the secure voice and computer security items will consume the allotted time."

Attendees: Mr. William T. Riley
Mr. Richard G. Cowen

NSA

Agenda Items: (Director, NSA, letter to the Chairman, USCSB) "You well know my deep concern over the lack of secure voice communications and our responsibility to provide the leadership in finding a solution to this situation. I see the voice problem as a test of the ability of the national COMSEC policy structure to respond to a critical national requirement. The Board cannot afford, at this time, to give this matter less than its urgent and undivided attention."

"I propose therefore that the forthcoming meeting of the USCSB be devoted exclusively to a deeper investigation into the problem. I am prepared to present to the Board Members briefings on the threat we are facing in this area, the solutions we have in sight, and the estimated cost of these solutions. This presentation, together with demonstrations of the equipment described, will provide a background for Board action on the recommendations I submitted on this subject on 20 November 1970. Secure voice is by consensus the most challenging and consequential problem for national security at this time."

Attendees: VADM Noel Gayler, Director
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Deputy Director
Mr. H. C. Barlow, Assistant Director, NSA, for Communications
Security
Mr. D. D. Croskery, Chief, Policy Division

FBI

Agenda Items: "No suggestions."

Attendees: Mr. Donald E. Moore
Mr. Joseph L. Perritte
Mr. William J. McDonnell

ARMY

Agenda Items: None.

Attendees: BrigGen David E. Ott
Dossie B. Glass

USCSB
UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

COMSEC 1-1/57
7 April 1971

19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the USCSB

1. Inclosed are the minutes of the last meeting of the USCSB. Any corrections to the minutes should be sent to the ExecSec by 22 April 1971; after that date if no corrections have been received, the minutes will stand approved as written.

2. This memorandum may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure.

Bayard T. Keller

BAYARD T. KELLER
Executive Secretary

Incl:
a/s

Declassified and approved for release by NSA, FBI, US ARMY, USAF, USD, CIA, TREASURY, OSD, DISA, AND GSA on 06-27-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526, MDR-63028

COMSEC 1-1/57

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USCSB
UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

6 April 1971

MINUTES OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING
OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD

~~Group 1
Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification~~

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6 April 1971

Fourteenth Meeting of the United States
Communications Security Board

15 March 71
Department of Transportation

Members Present:

Mr. William H. Goodman, State
Mr. Clyde C. Crosswhite, Treasury
Mr. Robert F. Froehlke, Defense (Chairman)
Mr. Frank A. Stanton, Transportation
Brig Gen David E. Ott, Army
RADM Ralph E. Cook, Navy
Maj Gen Gordon T. Gould, Jr., Air Force
Mr. [] CIA
Mr. William T. Riley, AEC
VADM Noel Gayler, NSA
Mr. Donald E. Moore, FBI

OGA

3.5(c) of E.O. 13526

Staff Present:

Mr. George A. Getman, Jr., State
Mr. Howard B. Holdway, State
Mr. Harold R. Patterson, Treasury
Mr. James V. Nasche, Treasury
Dr. John P. Gigrich, Defense
Cdr Lawrence R. Kilty, Defense
Mr. William T. Deeter, Jr., Transportation
Mr. Stanley E. Holden, Transportation
Mr. Dossie B. Glass, Army
Capt Curtis R. Norton, Navy
Capt Chester G. Phillips, Navy
Mr. Daniel W. Sheerin, Air Force
Col Braxton L. Young, Air Force
Maj Jerre B. Richardson, Air Force
Mr. [] CIA
Mr. Richard G. Cowen, AEC
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, NSA
Mr. Howard C. Barlow, NSA
Mr. Dayl D. Croskery, NSA
Mr. Bruce P. Fisher, FBI
Mr. William J. McDonnell, FBI
Mr. Bayard T. Keller, USCSB
Mrs. [] USCSB

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Observers:

Mr. Louis A. deRosa, Defense
Maj Gen Anthony T. Shtogren, JCS
Mr. Elmer D. Jones, GSA
Mr. David B. Hall, OTP

Briefing Team:

Mr. Howard E. Rosenblum, NSA
Mr. [REDACTED], NSA

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The Chairman opened the meeting by welcoming and introducing the observers to the meeting: Mr. Louis deRosa, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications; Maj Gen Anthony Shtogren of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Elmer Jones, Deputy Commissioner of Transportation and Communications, GSA; and Mr. David Hall, Office of Telecommunications Policy. He then turned the meeting over to Admiral Gayler.

Adm Gayler introduced the NSA presentation with a commentary on the factors contributing to the poor posture of U.S. communications security. He identified the major problem as the securing of military voice traffic and said it was because of the seriousness of this problem that he had requested the Chairman to devote this meeting to the subject of secure voice communications. He reiterated the policy proposals he had submitted to the Board at its last meeting, and noted that work is rapidly progressing in the area of changing call signs and frequencies. He said that even though he did not want to minimize the important problem of call sign and frequency changes, this briefing today would deal only with the problem of secure voice communications. He further stated that JCS had been briefed on secure voice and had accepted the need for a policy stating that all military voice communications should be secured.

Adm Gayler then introduced Mr. [] who spoke of the threats to U.S. COMSEC. Mr. Rosenblum followed with a briefing on the technological advances in the area of voice communications which included explanations of the three basic techniques available for encryption of voice transmissions. Mr. Barlow then discussed the COMSEC equipment, both available now and under development, which NSA sees as the solution to the secure voice problem. These included:

Tactical Communications:

1. SAVILLE for VHF/UHF radio (manpack and airborne models)
2. USC-20 or PARKHILL for HF radio
3. TRI-TAC for multichannel microwave

Fixed-Plant Communications:

1. TDM and crypto-digital for multichannel microwave
2. BELLFIELD/CARLOS for Phase II of AUTOSEVOCOM

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Mr. Barlow included in his discussion the estimated costs associated with each of these secure systems, based on information available to date.

Mr. Rosenblum continued the presentation with a detailed description of the concept embodied in BELFIELD/CARLOS, demonstrations of PARK-HILL and VINSON equipments, and an explanation of the remote keying process. He concluded by describing the MOS (Metal Oxide Silicon) chip, which is the technological breakthrough permitting the micro-miniaturization of the new COMSEC equipment which was described.

During the presentations, Members were encouraged to ask questions. Mr. Goodman asked whether there was any prospect of improving our capability for securing voice conversations which might deal with high-level policy considerations. Mr. Barlow replied that CARLOS would seem to fill this need since it is reasonably priced, of high quality, and does not require dedicated circuits. Mr. Goodman commented that the answer to State's need must be related to international communications systems that now exist. Messrs. Goodman, deRosa, and General Ott raised questions on the technical aspects of the operations of BELFIELD/CARLOS.

In conclusion, Adm Gayler handed each Member a proposed secure voice policy (attached as an inclosure) and asked Members if they had any further questions.

The Chairman asked Adm Gayler to confirm his understanding that there is no question about our ability to secure voice from the technical standpoint, rather the problem involves budgetary considerations. Adm Gayler replied that essentially this was correct; he pointed out, though, that as with CARLOS, there still remains much to be done in the testing and demonstration phases, and that design decisions still must be made. He believes the technology is substantially available to solve this problem and any new system required can be secured at an acceptable cost. The major cost problem, he said, is how to handle older systems in the inventory. He suggested that users may have to accept fewer communications systems in order to get totally secured systems.

Dr. Tordella added that had the Chairman's question been asked a year and a half ago, NSA would have had to give an equivocal answer; but that recent advances in integrated circuitry and MOS technology, coupled with hard, inventive work have given us the technical capability to secure voice communications.

Adm Gayler returned to the policy he was proposing and again pointed out that the JCS have already accepted his recommendation that all military voice radio systems need to be secured. He suggested that civil government

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voice systems, such as those of State and Treasury, which carry traffic of significant intelligence value also should be secured. He added that the judgment of whether or not the traffic is of intelligence value must be determined by the agency concerned, but that help would be offered by NSA in providing any pertinent advice.

Mr. Goodman asked whether Adm Gayler's definition of "policy" carried the connotation of "mandatory" or of "objective". Adm Gayler answered that a "mandatory" approach without qualification was impractical, but, on the other hand, he believed the Board would fall short of what it should do as a national board if it approached this merely as an "objective." He would, therefore, prefer the wording he had submitted. He explained that he had proposed this be adopted as policy within the Department of Defense, and that there would be programs developed within the Services to implement this policy. He suggested that each government department and agency would have to use its own judgment as to how to set priorities and implement this policy.

Gen Gould stated that the word "all" in paragraph 2.a. of the proposed policy is a problem in his Service. He explained that some nets did not have to be secured by virtue of the very nature of the information that they carried, such as non-tactical; base support nets (fire crash, hospital, etc.). Adm Gayler replied that even hospital nets could provide intelligence information on such subjects as casualties, effectiveness, and order of battle.

The Chairman suggested that Members look over Adm Gayler's policy proposal and provide the Executive Secretary with any comments on its wording. After Adm Gayler has considered any comments submitted, the Executive Secretary would send the proposed policy to the Board for a vote.

The Chairman adjourned the meeting at 4:00 p.m.

Incl:

NSA Ltr, dtd 15 Mar 71

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

15 March 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, U. S. COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: National Secure Voice Policy (U)

1. At the Thirteenth Meeting of the USCSB, I urged the Board to adopt the recommendations on secure voice contained in my memorandum of 20 November 1970. Since then, we have gained support for these concepts within the Department of Defense. We have further made arrangements with the JCS and the Services to test a system for changing call signs and frequencies on a regular basis. Establishment of a national policy in this area will reinforce the progress we have already made and establish the authority for applying the system on a wide-spread basis.

2. Against the background we have presented today, I urge your support for adopting the following national policy on secure voice:

- a. All military voice radio systems be secured.
- b. Civil governmental voice systems, which carry traffic of significant intelligence value, be secured.

Noel Gayler

NOEL GAYLER
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Director

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~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Unofficial Minutes of 16th Meeting of the USCSB,
28 November 1972 (U)

Dr. Rechlin opened the 16th Meeting of the USCSB by introducing the two new Members (Mr. Groughan, AEC and Lt Gen Phillips, NSA) and the two new observers (Lt Gen Gould, DCA and Dr. Muntner, GSA). He reiterated that the Board had agreed that Observers would participate in all actions of the Board except voting, and that they would receive all Board correspondence. He informed the Board that he had received an inquiry from the Office of Telecommunications Policy regarding its being represented at the Board, and said that he had replied to OTP that granting Membership would require a change in the NSC COMSEC Directive, and that it would be difficult for him to grant observer status. He said he had offered to keep OTP informed of pertinent developments within the Board. He commented that the OTP request may come up again, but that it seemed to be settled for the time being.

Dr. Rechlin then briefed the Board on the developments in national security that impact on the policies and philosophies of the Board regarding the release of COMSEC material to foreign governments. The first factor is the effective solution of the key generator problem, whereby security can be built at a modest cost. The second is the availability of secure devices on the foreign market. He commented that the abuse of COMSEC devices (such as not changing key properly) by some countries negates the security that the device offers. Third is the Nixon doctrine, the administration's move toward burden sharing with our allies, and the resultant need for greater interoperability in communications. NICS and the TRI-TAC switch are examples of our efforts to ensure interoperability. Finally, as Russia becomes more aggressive and moves into the international arena, it has an effect on our U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy, which depends on many intelligence inputs (e.g. the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility). If these

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FBI, DCA, DISA on 06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526 MDR63028

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sources of intelligence are not secured, we disclose our intelligence collection sources and techniques. These same leaks can occur in the unsecured communications of the other navies with whom our Navy works. Dr. Rehtin explained that these factors pose a number of problems:

a. Should we release crypto-equipment to foreign governments? The USIB determines whether or not such a release may [redacted] However, the benefit to penalty ratio is changing; the benefits are going up and the penalties are going down with regard to the situation fifteen years ago.

b. Should we talk to our allies about electronic key distribution systems?

c. There is the "dark maroon" (neither red nor black) nature of the TRI-TAC switch.

d. The denial of releasing U.S. COMSEC is much less a factor today, with the wide availability of COMSEC from other sources.

e. The secure voice deficiency is leading the compromise of U.S. intelligence.

Therefore, what we need to do is to review our release policy, keeping in mind:

a. What kind of changes are appropriate; Dr. Rehtin said that the basic policy looks very good to him, and that he does not believe it has to be changed very much.

b. What kind of rules we need to permit the Navy to exercise with the Allies in a secure mode.

c. Release of key distribution techniques to the communications community at a security level releasable to NATO.

d. Release of TRI-TAC (TENLEY) at least to a limited number of allies.

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He concluded by saying that there are now enough changes in world conditions to consider these questions which we would not have considered fifteen years ago. A page-by-page review of COMSEC 2-/54 ensued, with the following comments being made:

a. Page 1, no change.

b. Page 2, Paragraph 2.c. Dr. Rechtin said he thought the phrase "no significant effect" contained very strong words, and suggested "no unacceptable" effect. Gen Phillips commented that the intent of the phrase was that there be a careful review and judgement in each release case, and that he was not sure that a new word would affect that judgement. However, he agreed that "unacceptable" better defined the determinations that were made, and supported the change of "unacceptable" for "significant." Mr. Crosswhite asked who has the ultimate authority. Dr. Rechtin asked how we would get the policy changes approved -- by the NSC, Special Committee, USIB? Mr. Barlow stated that since this was a policy of the USCSB, no outside approving authority was required. Mr. Scott concurred in the proposed change. Gen Edge (Air Force) asked to whom the effect would be unacceptable. Dr. Rechtin replied that our procedures state that it is the USIB that determines the unacceptability, and, if we wish, we could include this phrase in the policy. Gen Gould expressed concern at this statement and asked how one could obtain the benefit-to-penalty ratio, of which Dr. Rechtin spoke earlier, if the determination is made by the penalty people. He said he did not believe that the benefits were understood by USIB. Dr. Rechtin responded that we agreed in the procedures that we go to the USIB, but that the USIB does not address the benefit/penalty ratio. If a release is unacceptable to the USIB, it doesn't matter what the benefits are. The USCSB must accept this preemption. The USIB may express concern over the release, but not find it "unacceptable." Gen Phillips added that if the USIB were to find a release unacceptable, the matter could still be referred to the Special Committee, which acts as an appellate body. The Board agreed to substitute the word "unacceptable" for "significant."

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c. Paragraph 3. Dr. Rechtin questioned the use of the term "detrimental," and asked how one judged this effect. He added that it may be more important to outfit NATO or the Republic of South Vietnam with war equipment than to equip ourselves, and that a trade-off might be required. There may be a detrimental effect, which could be in the national interest. There was agreement that the term was ambiguous as written. Mr. Barlow explained that this factor has never been a consideration in any past releases, and that in practice, it has never posed a production problem. Our cryptographic support of keying material to Vietnam caused only a 10% increase in production, with about a 100K increase in the budget. It was agreed that the intent of the sentence was that there should be no deleterious effect upon the ability to fulfill U.S. COMSEC requirements. Dr. Rechtin suggested that since it had not been a significant factor in the past, it be deleted and the sentence end with the word "intended." The Board agreed.

d. Paragraph 4. Mr. Crosswhite questioned with whom the agreements were entered into. Col Mauderly suggested we delete the modifier "communications and policy." Mr. Getman noted that the same idea was covered in paragraph 2.b. Dr. Rechtin answered Mr. Crosswhite by citing NATO as an organization with whom we would be making communications agreements, and asked Gen Gould, as the Defense communications negotiator, for his views. Gen Gould discoursed on the parallelism of DCS and NATO communications in Europe and the need for cryptographic components to be compatible to permit interoperability. Mr. Barlow added that compatibility is required in both communications and in COMSEC, and that communications planning is a key factor for COMSEC. Dr. Rechtin suggested that the phrase "will be consistent with" might be more suitable than "be dependent upon," and the Board agreed. Gen Edge and Mr. Crosswhite suggested that paragraphs 3 and 4 were really conditions of the release and should be subparagraphs under paragraph 2. Dr. Rechtin observed that making these conditions of the release would complicate the matter. He noted that these were conditions placed on carrying out a release, and not on

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the initial determination of a release. He suggested an introductory statement for paragraph 3 to the affect that "if the conditions of paragraph 2 are met, the following is guidance pertaining to the release." Paragraphs 3 through 6 would then become incorporated into this new paragraph containing post-release guidance. Dr. Rechtin suggested "In the execution of authorized releases,..." and asked NSA to redraft the paper and send it around for approval.

Gen Gould returned to paragraph 2 a., and asked whether all releases were in some way detrimental because of joint use of key, or loss of key. Mr. Barlow explained that this used to be a concern, but that now security is provided by the keying material, not by the equipment, and that we issue distinct keying material to foreign users. Dr. Rechtin suggested we might add "in balance" to take care of this concern, but Gen Phillips stated that he thought it best to leave the wording as it was. The Board concurred.

a. Paragraph 5. Gen Edge suggested adding the term "or international organization" after "foreign government." The Board concurred.

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NSA to write a statement after this sentence describing our COMSEC relationship with New Zealand, and then asked State to review this relationship to see if the former decision of the Board is still consistent with our national policy with respect to New Zealand. Gen Gould described New Zealand's full participation in the CCEB.

c. Annex. Gen Edge noted that the title was not consistent with the title of the basic policy document, and suggested that it be reworded "Procedures for Handling Requests for the Release of COMSEC Material to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." Dr. Rechtin agreed that the procedures described governed the handling of the request for release rather than the mechanics of the release itself. Navy suggested further correlation with the policy title by rewording it "Procedures for Handling Requests for Disclosure or Release of COMSEC Information or Material to..." Gen Gould referred to the Board's COMSEC glossary and pointed out that the use of both "information" and "material" was redundant, since the definition of "information" embodied "material." Dr. Rechtin instructed NSA to edit the document throughout to make it consistent with Glossary terminology (i.e. use "information" throughout).

d. Annex, page 2. [] pointed out the need to substitute "unacceptable" for "significant" in paragraph 1.b. (2) ("Should the DCI decide, however, that the release will have an significant unacceptable...") Dr. Rechtin recommended that a statement be added that the Director, NSA will also advise the requesting department or agency of alternate possibilities available to the original requestor and the possible consequences thereof. For example, NSA might recommend that the country use [] or conversely, that if the country were to use [] it would not be in the interest of the U.S. Dr. Rechtin recommended also that when a department or agency submits its request to the USCSB it should contain NSA's technical comments. The Boards should hear what NSA has to say. He suggested adding "The requesting department or agency should

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then submit its request, with such technical comments as are appropriate, to the Executive Secretary, USCSB." Gen Phillips noted that the requesting department or agency might change its original request in light of NSA's comments. Dr. Rehtin agreed, and added that there was no need for a department or agency to drag out all the alternatives listed which were not feasible. He said the NSA COMSEC input is necessary so that NSA's position on alternatives is known from the outset. It may change its position on the [] side, when these factors are discussed, but at this point [] is not being addressed. Gen Phillips remarked that NSA might not want to lay out all the alternatives to an agency which did not have the need-to-know, and Dr. Rehtin said that in such a case supplementary information could be given the Board. Dr. Rehtin said that if the NSA response were "no," the Board should not see the request, and that NSA's comments should be of a technical nature, and not a "judgemental value." After receiving NSA's comments, an agency may want to disagree with NSA's recommendations and submit its request to the USCSB. This concluded discussion of the release policy.

Dr. Rehtin proceeded into a discussion of the National Communications System. He described it as a loose confederation of independent baronies, with a charter to work on making things better. In 1956 the White House established a policy that there should be a single unified federal telecommunications system, but this was not found to be practical. Dr. Rehtin, as Executive Agent of the NCS, and Gen Gould, its Manager, get together to discuss various telecommunications matters. The level of authority they were given is minimal, and they try not to step on toes. He explained that the NCS established a secure voice study group, and Dr. Rehtin became concerned that this group would get into the security aspect of secure voice, rather than the telecommunications aspects. He decided that the best solution was to have the NCS group concerned with digital, rather than secure voice, and described the former as how to process digital signals and how to communicate digital signals. He said the NCS role is to solve these problems as communicators.

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The fact that some of the digital traffic may be secure voice is only a matter of information to the NCS, and should not be a factor which would involve the NCS in aspects of securing digital voice. Accordingly, he asked that the group rename itself as the Digital Voice Study Group, which would permit it to do the things NCS ought to be worrying about. He passed out the Terms of Reference of the Digital Group, and asked that Members address any comments to Dr. Rechlin. In a final statement, he said that he had wiped "security" out of the Terms of Reference and replaced it with the word "digital."

Dr. Rechlin turned to Secure Communications with NATO and said it was a subject of multi-departmental interest. He said the most important factor is that four to five years ago NATO decided to build its communications a different way. It wanted a NATO Integrated Communications System, to be operated by a management authority (which has become NICSMA). He explained that NICSMA has been given about 65 million IAUs (equivalent to \$200 million) which it will commit over the next two -three years. Beginning in '75 it will probably get another \$200 million, and possibly another \$200 million in 1980, averaging about \$40 million a year for the next decade. This budget includes NATO SATCOM III, for which SAMSO is the technical agent. The U.S. launches the satellites. The bidders are all U.S., but there is some sharing of production with other NATO countries. NATO SATCOM III is paid for out of infrastructure funds. The budget also includes TARES (switching gears?) comparable to AUTOVON/AUTODIN.

The Department of Defense, as well as State, OTP, and ISA realized that if NATO is building communications systems (both ground and satellite) of this sophistication and expense (with the U.S. contributing some 25% of funds), and if the U.S. has a parallel Defense system in Europe (with assets of some \$100 million), we could run into a problem with Congress over U.S. funding of two parallel systems. SATCOM III will parallel the Defense Satellite system. It behooves all of us to consider

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communications in a common context. We have established a Defense Communications Agency Field Office in Brussels to ensure that DCS and NICS are designed for interoperability. It is possible that in 10-15 years there will be only one net in Europe instead of three parallel systems (NATO, U.S., national). The U.S. could lease NATO circuits for U.S. communications. There is an unanswered question of what to do with the U.S. assets. Dr. Rehtin suggested that the logical consequence of the NICSMA doctrine could be analogous to the Vietnamization program, i.e. turn the system over to our allies to run. This is the kind of thing to do if we are forced to reduce military support functions overseas. In thinking of the possibility of a single net in the future, we might as well design our communications so that such options are available to us. This presents real problems of interoperability and compatibility, and COMSEC is right at the center of the problem.

channels. By a government's taking no direct preventive measures, mobs could disrupt our communications, or they could be monitored. How do we solve this problem? There are two technical developments available now that were not available five years ago: (1) end-to-end security, whereby only the originator and recipient can hear clear voice. We do not have this now. Most of our encryption is link-to-link, but the technology is nearby. For end-to-end encryption we need a key distribution system. If we are to use a NATO net, we must tell NATO about key distribution. Also, politicians, as well as the military, will be using NICS. Granting access to the politicians added 10% to the capacity of the system, but brought in a 20-50% increase in funds. Political conversations must have end-to-end encryption. End-to-end security is essential if we are to operate in a multi-polar world. Communicators will have to be in the middle and informed. (2) availability of communications satellites, whereby we can

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leapfrog over any recalcitrant communications in the group. We cannot use satellites all the time because the traffic load is too great; your needs are greater than what you can afford. However, satellites are a valuable option. Good COMSEC and good communications satellites are important in a world where we need secure voice.

Consequently, there are special problems with NATO which will show up in special requests. Dr. Rechtin stated that he had discussed, with Gen Gould, the possibility of getting NSA and COMSEC involved in the DCA Field Office in Brussels. The COMSEC people have kept their U.K. counterparts informed of COMSEC developments in the [redacted]

[redacted] will be consistent. But we must work with other countries which might be involved in using our switch. We announced at the NJCEC our decision to go from a 19.2 to 16 kilobit rate. The 16k rate is good for tactical communications, and is compatible with PTT so that widespread service is available in a hurry. In three - four years we may be able to talk with as many as 90 cities with no problems in adding security.

Dr. Rechtin said that [redacted] which will be used as the first step in NICS secure voice communications, costs about \$35,000 for half duplex. It isn't clear that [redacted] is the proper way to start out on secure voice. It doesn't appear to be the right step that will lead on to others. But we can't convince NATO countries of this if we don't talk to them about what's down the road. The proliferation of NATO liaison groups, in which the U.S. is represented, poses another problem. All U.S. reps need policy guidance in communications and COMSEC. ANCA, ACSA, ALLA, ACTA, are only a few of the many groups in which the U.S. is represented and upon which COMSEC policies impact.

Our only alternative to not getting involved in NATO is to limit our thinking to COMSEC for U.S. use only. However, this doesn't build a NATO system, nor permit command and control interoperability for U.S. elements in Europe, nor permit us to

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get consistent policy guidance to our NATO reps. NATO is getting to be a serious problem, and the Board is going to start to get requests from NATO. We therefore need to be astute and act in accord with our release policy. The release policy is thus a very important ingredient in our move toward NATO.

Dr. Rehtin spoke on the National COMSEC Objective which the Ad Hoc Committee had submitted to him for approval. He gave the Board his remarks, informed them of some changes he had made, and asked them to respond to the proposed Objective in normal USCSB fashion. He said that he had difficulty with the original objective that the committee had sent to him. First, he disagreed with the committee that the objective was not obtainable. Secondly, he took exception with the committee's recommendation that COMSEC should be extended to cover the rights of individual citizens. Dr. Rehtin said that the Defense General Counsel advised him that addressing the subject of privileged information and rights of the individual citizen would be a legal morass. He agreed that the objective should cover all correspondence already in federal government channels but not correspondence coming into the government. The objective now states under SCOPE: "This Objective is applicable to all federal telecommunications, defined as those telecommunications which are of an official character dealing with the affairs of the United States Government." This wording excludes propriety information unless it becomes of an official character dealing with an affair of the U.S. Government. Dr. Rehtin said he raised this point so the Board Members would understand the changes Dr. Rehtin had made to the report of the working group. Dr. Rehtin added that the Objective is a reasonably attainable objective and it does not get into the rights of the individual citizen. He asked that Members comment through normal Board channels.

Dr. Rehtin next notified the Board that he has been informed that the present Executive Secretary, Mr. Keller, has been designated for an overseas assignment and that a replacement will be provided by NSA. He said that he had found the

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arrangement whereby NSA provides the Executive Secretary to be a satisfactory one for getting work done and for the security arrangements. He added that there had been some comment as to whether the Secretary finds himself in an internal conflict of interest by being a member of NSA, and asked Gen Phillips to comment. Gen Phillips replied that he had given careful consideration to the question Dr. Rechten brought up, that he had discussed the matter with his Deputy, his Assistant Director for COMSEC, Mr. Barlow and with Mr. Keller, and they all agreed that the Executive Secretary's position does not require full time attention. It is important for the Executive Secretary to have a detailed knowledge of the COMSEC field, and to have good access to the COMSEC community. This is facilitated by having a member of the NSA staff serve doubly as the Executive Secretary. Gen Phillips added that he had not seen any signs of conflict of position, and that an experienced, competent individual has the necessary judgement to avoid any conflict and to deal with the Board in a straightforward manner without being prejudiced by NSA interests. Rather than jeopardizing one's career, serving as Executive Secretary enhances one's career in NSA. Mr. Keller explained his view that when he is engaged in Board business, he works for Dr. Rechten, not NSA. He added that he does not view this assignment as anything but a positive factor in his career. He stated his aim of trying to serve all members impartially. The Navy and CIA stated their appreciation for the way the Executive Secretary handled matters with them. Mr. Crosswhite stated that he always had two concerns about the present arrangement: that the eleven agencies of the Board should get equal consideration, and that the Board not be responsible for jeopardizing the career of an individual who was trying to serve the Board well. He was satisfied that by bringing the matter up all Members recognized these factors, and noted that it did seem to be a good arrangement. Dr. Rechten concluded by saying that all Members were now aware of a potential problem, and that he would appreciate knowing if any Member saw any indication of difficulty.

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[] informed the Board of the pending retirement of Mr. Goodman (State), and suggested that the Board pass on its thanks to Mr. Goodman for his long service on the Board and his active participation in its affairs.

ROBERT K. PRICE

OGA

E.O. 3.3(b)(1)

CHIEF OF POLICE COORDINATION

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TO: DIR
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DIR HAS SEEN

12 Nov 73

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For your information.

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D. D. CROSKERY

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OSD and NGA on 06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O.
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13 NOV RECD

USCSB
UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

20
COMSEC 3-/78
6 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

SUBJECT: M/R on the Meeting of the USCSB Economic Sub-Committee

REFERENCE: COMSEC 1-1/67, dtd 10 Oct 73, Minutes of the 11 Sept 73
USCSB Meeting

Inclosed for your information is a memorandum for the record
concerning the 17 Oct 73 meeting of the USCSB Economic Sub-Committee
which was formed to consider the economic aspects of the release to
NATO of secure tactical communications equipment.

Robert E. Sears
ROBERT E. SEARS
Executive Secretary

Incl:
a/s

COMSEC 3-/78
(Cross Ref in COMSEC 1-1/ File)

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5 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Release to NATO of Secure Tactical Equipment

REFERENCE: COMSEC 1-1/67, dtd 10 Oct 73, Agenda Item #1 of the
Minutes of the 11 Sept 73 USCSB Meeting

1. The USCSB economic sub-committee formed by State and Treasury* with Department of Commerce participation met on 17 October 73 to hear a presentation by representatives of the U.S. Tactical Communications Organization (TRI-TAC) and NSA. This presentation was an outgrowth of USCSB consideration of the release to NATO of the TRI-TAC communications switch system and its associated COMSEC equipments, known collectively as TENLEY. During USCSB consideration of the release action, the Treasury Member had sought assurances that the release would not be to the economic disadvantage of the U.S. Following the presentation, the Treasury Member expressed his satisfaction that the approach to the release was at this stage of negotiation acceptable to him and that the program of presentations to NATO bodies should proceed.
2. The Department of State Member advised the economic sub-committee that he believed that further consideration within State Department should be the responsibility of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs. This was agreed to by Mr. John Dobrin who was present and represented that Office. Mr. Dobrin suggested that the U.S. Ambassador to NATO should receive the briefing. This suggestion was discussed further on 18 October 73 in State/EUR/RPM with Mr. Eric Rehfeld who believed it more appropriate to continue, at this time, with the technical presentations as planned.
3. The Department of Commerce representative took note of the presentation but had no specific comments or recommendations.
4. Further meetings of the economic sub-committee are not now anticipated. The sub-committee will be kept advised of subsequent actions on this matter.

Robert E. Sears
ROBERT E. SEARS
Executive Secretary

*In accordance with

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COMSEC 1-1/67, Agenda Item #1

End

17 Oct 73 Meeting Attendees:

State:

Mr. Willis E. Naehner
Mr. John Dobrin
Mr. Robert A. Mosher
Mr. Seymour Goodman
Mr. Robert Mc Conahy

Treasury:

Mr. Clyde C. Crosswhite
Mr. Robert C. Fauver

Department of Commerce:

CDR Robert D. Frey

NSA:

Mr. Robert E. Sears
Mr. James W. Abney, Jr.

DOD, TRI-TAC:

John L. Faherty, Jr.

(FORMER)

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USCSB

UNITED STATES
COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY BOARD

COMSEC 1-1/80
11 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
BOARD (FORMER)

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting of the
USCSB (Former)

1. Attached are the minutes of the last meeting of the Board.
2. If no corrections or changes to these minutes are received by 29 September 1978, they will stand as written.
3. Also enclosed is a copy of the photograph taken at the meeting for your retention.
4. This memorandum may be declassified upon removal of the enclosures.

Robert E. Sears
ROBERT E. SEARS
Executive Secretary

Enclosures
a/s

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA, CIA, DIA,
NAVY, and DSA on 06-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526.
MDR 63028.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 SEPTEMBER 1978

MINUTES OF THE 21ST MEETING OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD (FORMER)

3 AUGUST 1978

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ATTENDEES

TWENTY-FIRST UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD (FORMER)
MEETING

3 August 1978, 2:00 p.m.

Department of Transportation
400 7th Street, S.W.
Room 7334

STATE

Mr. Stuart Branch
Mr. Donald Lacman
Mr. Kenneth Kidwell

TREASURY

Mr. Harold R. Patterson
Mr. Gary E. Johnson

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mr. Kier Boyd
Mr. Alvin C. Frank

TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Frank A. Stanton
Mr. Otis V. Bobo
Mr. William T. Deeter, Jr.

COMMERCE

Mr. Paul Bortz
Mr. Donald Jansky

ENERGY

Mr. John W. Polk
Mr. John Stush

ARMY

BG Thomas Healy
Colonel Kelly Porter

NAVY

RADM George March
Commander John Leonard
Mr. Jerry Moore
Commander W. P. Moran

AIR FORCE

Mr. Daniel Sheerin

DEFENSE (ASD C3I)

Dr. Gerald Dinneen (Chairman)
Commander Eddie Benford


DUSD (Policy)

Dr. Kostas Liopiros

JCS

RADM Milton Schultz (USN)
LTC Frank Torres (USA)

CIA



OGA

3.5(c) of E.O. 13526

GSA

Mr. Warren Burton
Mr. Robert Wilks

DIA

Colonel James Schultz (USA)

NSA

Mr. Robert Drake
Mr. Howard Rosenblum

DCA/NCS

MG James Rockwell (USA)
Colonel Preston Hix (USA) (NCS)
Mr. Robert Edberg (DCA)

ATTENDEES (cont'd)

EXEC. SEC, SSTP

Colonel Wayne Kay (USAF)

SECRETARIAT

Mr. Robert Sears

Mrs.

P.L. 86-36

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MINUTES OF THE 21st USCSB (FORMER) MEETING, 3 AUGUST 1978

The USCSB (Former) met on 3 August 1978 to consider a new national COMSEC directive and to note actions taken since 16 November 1977 (date of publication of US/NSCP 24).

1. The draft presented to the Board members was produced from comments received from members and others on a proposal circulated by the Chairman (COMSEC 5-/26, dated 5 May 1978); and as discussed at a meeting of senior staff representatives on 26 July 1978. Various recommendations made at the table were incorporated, and unresolved issues were to be addressed outside the meeting. These issues were:

a. A decision concerning the authority of the proposed National Communications Security Committee to "establish" as opposed to "recommend" broad objectives and policies; in either option, subject to the approval of the Executive Agent for COMSEC after coordination with the Chairman, SSTP. The Chairman was to undertake resolution of this subject with the Executive Agent and the Chairman, SSTP.

b. NSA and CIA to discuss changes in the text concerning NSA functions in relation to the identification of the threat to US communications to remove the possibility of conflict with the finished intelligence role of CIA.

c. NSA and Navy to resolve an issue in the use of the terms "cryptographic" and "COMSEC".

d. NSA and CIA, ⁸agreed on more precise wording concerning the exemptions granted by NSCID #5.

e. An editorial point concerning the proper manner in which reference to E.O. 12036 is entered in text.

2. The Board was asked to note actions taken during the pro tem functioning of the Board following the publication of PD/NSC 24. The list of these actions is attached, and were noted without comment.

3. The Chairman, on behalf of the Board, thanked Mr. Frank Stanton, DOT, for the courtesy and excellence of the Department in hosting the meeting.

Enclosure:

a/s

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ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FORMER USCSB SINCE 16 NOV 77

Amendment to USCSB 12-13, National Policy on Authorizing U.S. Contractors Access to Classified Federal Telecommunications for Communications Security Material

1. By COMSEC 13-/326, dated 16 November 1977, Members were asked to consider two changes to USCSB 12-13. These changes were agreed upon by the Ad Hoc Committee to Review USCSB 12-13.
2. COMSEC 13-/330, dated 5 May 1978, advises the Members that the Board concurred in the amendments to USCSB 12-13, and that as a part of the over-all review of USCSB Policy issuances conducted in connection with the changes taking place in the national COMSEC structure, USCSB 12-13 will be revised.

Requests for Exception to USCSB 12-13

1. By COMSEC 13-327, dated 16 November 1977, Members were advised that the USCSB had concurred in the USAF and CIA requests for exception to Paragraph 7.b., USCSB 12-13. The Treasury and FBI Members abstained.
2. By COMSEC 13-/329, dated 14 April 1978, the Board was requested to vote on a Navy request for exception to Paragraph 7.a., USCSB 12-13.
3. By COMSEC 13-/332, dated 22 May 1978, Members were advised that the USCSB concurred in Navy's request for exception to Paragraph 7.a., USCSB 12-13.

Annual Report on Contractor Access to COMSEC Material

By COMSEC 13-/328, dated 16 November 1977, USCSB Members received for information the NSA annual report on contractor access to COMSEC material during the period 1 January 1976 to 30 June 1977.

Enclosure

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Equipments to Japan

1. USCSB-03-78, DTG 241756Z Mar 78, advises the Members of a CINCPACFLT request to install one KY-38 secure voice equipment and one KW-7 secure teletypewriter equipment aboard the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ship Haron during a Combined Exercise for the period 10 through 21 April 1978. It also advises the Members that unless advised to the contrary, a message would be sent to JCS advising them that the USCSB interposes no objection.
2. USCSB-05-78, DTG 031924Z Apr 78, advises JCS that the request to install one KY-38 secure voice equipment and one KW-7 secure teletypewriter equipment aboard the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ship Haron during a Combined Exercise (ASWEX J2-78) was approved by the Board.
3. By COMSEC 2-6/27, dated 22 May 1978, the Members were advised of an NSA request to release, on loan, COMSEC equipment to Japan and that the request was forwarded to the DCI for comments.
4. *COMSEC 2-6/28, dated 27 June 1978, forwards DCI's comments on the release, on loan, of COMSEC equipments to Japan and asks the Members to vote.

Equipments to Royal Thai Government (RTG)

1. By COMSEC 2-18/13, dated 24 April 1978, the Members were advised of a request from NSA to release, on loan, SW-15 equipments to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and also advised that the request was sent to the DCI for comments.
2. COMSEC 2-18/14, dated 9 June 1978, forwards DCI's response to the request to release, on loan, SW-15 crypto-equipment to the Royal Thai Government and each Member was requested to vote.
3. COMSEC 2-18/15, dated 27 July 1978, advised the Members that the Board had concurred in the request to release, on loan, SW-15 crypto-equipment to the Royal Thai Government.

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Equipments to the Republic of Korea

1. By COMSEC 2-15/30, dated 7 December 1977, Members received NSA's comments on the reportability of the release, on loan, of additional TSEC/SW-15 equipments to the Republic of Korea (ROK) , under the Case Act.
2. By COMSEC 2-15/31, dated 7 December 1977, Members were advised that all USCSB Members had concurred, with the exception of State, Treasury and CIA who abstained, in the CINCPAC request to install one KY-38 secure voice equipment on board a Republic of Korea (ROK) ship during a combined USN/ROKN Antisubmarine Warfare Exercise (ASWEX K1-78) which was held during the period 5 through 8 December 1977.
3. By USCSB-01-78, DTG 220216Z Feb 78, Members were advised of a CINCPACFLT request to install one KY-38 secure voice equipment aboard a Republic of Korea Navy ship during a U.S./ROK Exercise to be held during the period 4 through 18 March 1978. On the basis that Board Members had previously concurred in similar requests, and unless advised to the contrary, Members were advised that a message would be sent to JCS advising them that the Board interposes no objection to the CINCPACFLT request.
4. USCSB-02-78, DTG 281800Z Feb 78, advises JCS that the CINCPACFLT request for installation of one KY-38 secure voice equipment aboard a ROK ship during the U.S./ROK Team Spirit Exercise was approved.
5. USCSB-06-78, DTG 132137Z Apr 78, advises the Members of CINCPAC's request to install two KY-38 secure voice equipments aboard a Republic of Korea Navy ship during a U.S./ROKN Combined Exercise (ASWEX K3-78) for the period 3 through 9 May 1978 and were asked to convey any objection to the proposal.
6. USCSB-07-78, DTG 241635Z Apr 78, advises JCS that the CINCPAC request for installation of two KY-38 equipments aboard a ROK ship during ASWEX K3-8 was approved by the Board.

P.L. 86-36
EO 3.3b(3)
EO 3.3b(6)

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Release of COMSEC Equipments to NATO, Airborne Early Warning

1. COMSEC 3-/102, dated 25 May 1978, advised the Members that the Director, NSA's comments on the release of COMSEC equipment to NATO, Airborne Early Warning were that the PARKHILL equipments represent the most feasible interim solution for satisfying AWACS HF secure voice requirements and recommended that the equipments be approved for release to NATO. Members were requested to vote.
2. By COMSEC 3-/107, dated 27 June 1978, Members were advised that the Board had concurred in the request to release COMSEC equipments to NATO in support of Airborne Early Warning Program.

Release, On Loan, of KEESEE COMSEC Module to NATO

1. COMSEC 3-/101, dated 27 March 1978, advises Members of a request from NSA to release, on loan, KEESEE COMSEC Module to NATO. It also advises the Members that the request was sent to the DCI for comments.
2. COMSEC 3-/103, dated 30 May 1978, forwarded DCI's comments on the release, on loan, of KEESEE COMSEC Module to NATO and requested Members to vote on this subject.
3. COMSEC 3-/105, dated 24 July 1978, advised the Board Members that the Board concurred in the release of KEESEE COMSEC Module to NATO. FBI abstained.

Release of TSEC/KW-46 TO NATO

1. COMSEC 3-/100, dated 27 March 1978, advises Members of an NSA request to release TSEC/KW-46 to NATO. It also advises the Members that the request was sent to DCI for comments.
2. COMSEC 3-/104, dated 30 May 1978, forwards DCI's response on the release of TSEC/KW-46 to NATO and requested the Members to vote.
3. COMSEC 3-/106, dated 24 July 1978, advised the Members that the Board concurred in the request to release TSEC/KW-46 to NATO. FBI abstained.

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Revision of USCSB 16-5, USCSB Directive on the Special Committee on
Compromising Emanations

COMSEC 11-104, dated 23 June 1978, advises the Members that by a majority vote, the Board has concurred in the revision of the USCSB 16-5.

Revised Policy on Applications of the Data Encryption Standard (DES)

COMSEC 1-24, dated 14 July 1978, circulated NSA letter, Subj: Revised Policy on Applications of the Data Encryption Standard (DES), dated 7 July 1978.

Release of U.S. COMSEC Equipment for Certain Exercise Purposes

1. COMSEC 2-/69, dated 14 April 1978, forwards Members a message from JCS asking them to consider the JCS request for use of COMSEC equipment, on loan, in U.S. Custody, along with the other previous requests.

2.** COMSEC 2-/70, dated 26 May 1978, forwards a draft message for JCS to the Members for their consideration. The message concerning use of U.S. COMSEC equipment for exercise purposes with Japanese and Korean Military was informally agreed at a USCSB meeting on 2 May 1978. Members were asked to vote.

* Awaiting votes from some Members.

** Resolution of nonconcur is being sought.

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